CASE OF TAGIYEVA v. AZERBAIJAN
CASE OF TAGIYEVA v. AZERBAIJAN
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 July 2022
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
TAGIYEVA v. AZERBAIJAN JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. The application concerns the death of the applicant’s husband,
Mr Rafig Tagiyev, following his stabbing by an unknown perpetrator.
Relying on Articles 2, 10 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained
that the State had failed to protect her husband’s right to life, that the criminal
investigation into his murder had not been effective, and that he had been
targeted on account of his publications.
THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Baku. The applicant was
represented by Mr R. Hajili, a lawyer based in France, and by
Ms R. Remezaite, Mr P. Leach, Ms J. Gavron, Ms J. Evans and Ms K. Levine,
lawyers based in the United Kingdom.
3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov.
4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.
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I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
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THE LAW
52. The applicant complained that the State had failed to protect the right
to life of her husband and that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct
an effective investigation into his murder. Article 2 of the Convention
provides in so far as relevant:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his
life ...”
A. Admissibility
B. Merits
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not receive any threat in relation to the publication of the article entitled “Iran
and the inevitability of globalisation” and he did not mention or discuss with
the applicant any danger or threat to his life caused by that publication (see
paragraphs 19 and 27 above). The victim’s son and brothers also made similar
statements to the investigating authorities (see paragraph 27 above).
62. The Court further observes that there is no material in the case file
indicating that at the relevant time the law-enforcement authorities had been
aware of any danger to the life of the applicant’s husband or had held any
information which might give rise to such a possibility (compare Dink
v. Turkey, nos. 2668/07 and 4 others, §§ 66-70, 14 September 2010, and
Huseynova, cited above, § 101).
63. As regards the applicant’s reference to the religious fatwa and protests
by various religious groups and figures (see paragraph 56 above), the Court
does not exclude that in some circumstances a fatwa issued by a religious
figure, holding a considerable religious and political influence on a
community, may trigger the State’s duty to act by taking preventive
operational measures. However, the Court is not convinced that in the
particular circumstances of the present case the authorities knew or ought to
have known at the relevant time, namely in the days preceding 19 November
2011, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of the applicant’s
husband from the criminal acts of a third party solely on the basis of
information that in November 2006 a religious fatwa about the applicant’s
husband was issued in Iran and various religious groups and figures protested
against the publication of the article “Europe and us”.
64. The Court deems it necessary to reiterate that bearing in mind the
difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human
conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities
and resources, the scope of the positive obligation under Article 2 of the
Convention must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Not every claimed
risk to life, therefore, can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement
to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising (see,
among many other authorities, Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703/97,
§ 68, ECHR 2002-VIII; Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC],
no. 78103/14, § 111, 31 January 2019; and Kurt, cited above, § 158).
65. In that connection, the Court refers to its above findings that the
applicant’s husband had never applied to the domestic authorities or informed
them of any danger or threat to his life before his stabbing (see paragraph 61
above). The Court also does not lose sight of the fact that the applicant’s
husband had not received any verbal threat or had not been subjected to any
kind of intimidation, let alone physical violence, in connection with his
publications following his release from prison in December 2007. The Court
furthermore cannot overlook the statements of the applicant’s husband before
his death in which he did not refer to the above-mentioned religious fatwa or
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protests, but to his recent article about Iran published in November 2011,
while indicating that he had not received any threat following its publication
(see paragraphs 17-19 above).
66. For those reasons, the Court considers that it has no basis on which to
conclude that the domestic authorities knew or ought to have known at the
relevant time, namely in the days preceding 19 November 2011, of the
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of the applicant’s husband.
Therefore, the Court does not need to assess whether the domestic authorities
had taken measures which could reasonably have been expected of them.
67. Accordingly, there has been no violation of the substantive limb of
Article 2 of the Convention.
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of result, but of means (see Tahsin Acar v. Turkey [GC], no. 26307/95, § 223,
ECHR 2004-III; Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 47708/08, § 186, ECHR
2014; and Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç, cited above, § 173). In the present
case, the Court observes that a number of relevant and timely investigative
actions were carried out (see paragraphs 16-27 above) and it appears from the
case file that the investigating authorities explored various possible motives
behind the killing of the applicant’s husband, including the possibility that it
could have been linked to his publications (see paragraphs 25, 36 and 42
above) (contrast Huseynova, cited above, § 115, and Mazepa and Others
v. Russia, no. 15086/07, §§ 77-78, 17 July 2018). In these circumstances, the
Court perceives no such shortcomings as might call into question the overall
adequacy of the investigation conducted by the domestic authorities.
73. However, the Court observes that even though the applicant was
granted victim status in the investigation, the investigating authorities
repeatedly denied her access to the case file during the investigation. In that
connection, the Court cannot accept the investigating authorities’ reliance on
the domestic law for justifying that situation and finds it unacceptable that
under the relevant domestic law, the applicant had no access whatsoever to
the relevant case materials during the investigation. The Court observes that
this issue has already been noted in previous cases against Azerbaijan (see
Huseynova, cited above, § 113, and Shuriyya Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan,
no. 69460/12, § 86, 10 September 2020). As a result of this state of domestic
law, when the applicant repeatedly asked to be provided with the relevant
documents concerning the ongoing criminal investigation, her requests were
ignored or dismissed. That situation deprived the applicant of the opportunity
to safeguard her legitimate interests and prevented sufficient scrutiny of the
investigation by the public (see Slimani v. France, no. 57671/00, §§ 44-48,
ECHR 2004-IX; Beker v. Turkey, no. 27866/03, § 49, 24 March 2009; and
Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia, no. 25091/07, § 250, 26 April 2011).
The Court emphasises in this connection the importance of involving the
families of the deceased or their legal representatives in the investigation and
of providing them with information, as well as enabling them to present other
evidence (see Adalı v. Turkey, no. 38187/97, § 232, 31 March 2005).
74. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that the investigation conducted into the death of the applicant’s
husband was ineffective as it lacked an important guarantee, that of the
involvement of the deceased person’s family (see, for example, Fountas
v. Greece, no. 50283/13, § 96, 3 October 2019). There has accordingly been
a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb as regards
the extent of the involvement of the applicant in the investigation.
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75. The applicant complained that there had been a violation of the right
to freedom of expression since her husband had been killed because of his
publications. Article 10 of the Convention provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
76. The Government contested that argument.
77. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined
above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
78. The Court has frequently stressed the fundamental role of freedom of
expression in a democratic society, in particular where, through the press, it
serves to impart information and ideas of general interest which the public is,
moreover, entitled to receive (see, for example, Observer and Guardian v. the
United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 59, Series A no. 216, and Centro
Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 131, ECHR
2012). The Court also reiterates that the key importance of freedom of
expression as one of the preconditions for a functioning democracy is such
that the genuine, effective exercise of this freedom is not dependent merely
on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may call for positive measures of
protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals (see Palomo
Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, § 59, ECHR
2011, with further references). In particular, the positive obligations under
Article 10 of the Convention require States to create, while establishing an
effective system of protection of authors or journalists, a favourable
environment for participation in public debate by all the persons concerned,
enabling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear, even if they
run counter to those defended by the official authorities or by a significant
part of public opinion, or are even irritating or shocking to them (see Dink,
cited above, § 137, and Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, nos. 65286/13
and 57270/14, § 158, 10 January 2019).
79. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes
that the present application should be distinguished from cases in which it
found a violation of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention under their substantive
limb because the State had failed to protect the right to life of a journalist
(compare Dink, cited above, § 137) or a journalist was subjected to the use of
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A. Damage
89. The applicant claimed AZN 7,500 for legal services incurred before
the domestic courts and the Court for her representation by Mr R. Hajili and
Mr E. Sadigov. She submitted a contract entered into with Mr R. Hajili and
Mr E. Sadigov in support of her claim.
90. The applicant also claimed 4,275 pounds sterling (GBP) for legal
services incurred in the proceedings before the Court for her representation
by Ms R. Remezaite and Mr P. Leach; GBP 90 for administrative
disbursements; GBP 237.52 for administrative expenses; GBP 2,409.72 and
EUR 644.95 for translation expenses; and 1,750 United States dollars for the
preparation of an expert report. In support of that claim, she submitted time
sheets from her representatives and invoices for translation expenses.
91. The Government submitted that the amounts claimed by the applicant
were unsubstantiated and excessive. They pointed out that the applicant had
failed to submit any contract concerning her representation by
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2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention under
its substantive limb;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under
its procedural limb as regards the extent of the involvement of the
applicant in the investigation;
5. Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the
complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;
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6. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be
converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a
rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
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