1. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G.

Kho
3:27 AM

Facts: Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar. He was found guilty of
gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody. She was fined
P10k. Since his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Supreme Court ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer
and as an officer of the court. In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely
remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in
the court’s safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit. 

Issue: 
Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

Held: 

Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating,
cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the
mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission is a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 

Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes 

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 

As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and
maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. 
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. By
definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although it is broad enough to include it. Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer
is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits
lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. 

Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to
account. Atty. Kho is ordered to pay FINE of P5,000.00. (Re: Financial Audit Of Atty. Raquel G. Kho, A.M.
No. P-06-2177, April 19, 2007)

3 . Elesterio, Dessa Marie V. 16101108 Subject: Legal Profession Professor: Judge Francisco A.
Seville Jr. A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

Facts: In 1970, Arciga was a medical technology student and Maniwang was a law student. The two
acquainted and had a sexual relationship. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. In 1975, Maniwang passed the
bar exams. After which, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga then found out that Maniwang
married another woman. She confronted the wife and this irked Maniwang to inflict physical injuries
upon Arciga. Arciga filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many
times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently Arciga had an
illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

Issue: W/N Maniwang should be disbarred and be held liable for gross immoral conduct.

Arguments of the Parties: Arciga, complainant said that Maniwang reassured he many times that he
would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. She reported that Maniwang inflicted physical
injuries upon herr and secured medical treatment in a hospital Maniwang, respondent contended that the
cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his
disbarment. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry
Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because
apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born. \

Decision of the Court: The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of
Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry
Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. But the Supreme Court did say that
it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral
conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing
as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as
“that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”. The complaint for disbarment against
the respondent is hereby dismissed. Relevance to the subject (Legal Profession) The case of Arciga vs
Maniwang is important in determining whether the act that the lawyer has done was immoral or grounds
of disbarment. It is very crucial for a lawyer especially in his profession to maintain his/ her etiquette in
order to become an example to the other citizens of the Philippines. A litigator must be the first one that
the people must look up to. Legal profession does not only apply to the duties of a lawyer to the bar and
to his clients but also to the people surrounding him.

4 . ROYONG VS. OBLENA

AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera

FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench,
with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no
rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another
complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the
same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to
practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent
as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation
of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and
its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for
disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case,
as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the
bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to
have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment
that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

5 . EMERENCIANA V. REYES v. FELIPE C. WONG, Adm. Case No. 547, 1975-01-29

Facts:
Felipe
C. Wong, duly admitted in 1962 to the Bar, is sought to be disbarred for grave immorality by
Emerenciana V. Reyes... respondent... completely... denied... the... charge
On January 21, 1963, petitioner filed her reply to the answer of respondent, attaching thereto xerox
copies of two letters written by respondent to her dated October 20, 1960 and December 14, 1960...
for comparison with the penmanship of the respondent in his... answer sheets to the Bar questions in
1961 to disprove respondent's claim that he never wrote letters to petitioner.
After the submission of petitioner's evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated July 31,
1963, contending that in the light of the ruling of this Court in Soberano vs. Villanueva... the
evidence presented by the petitioner does not... make out a case against him
Respondent likewise filed... a motion for the cancellation of all scheduled hearings of the case until
after the Court has resolved the said motion to dismiss
Petitioner in turn filed an opposition dated August 17, 1963 to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Soberano ruling does not apply to her situation, because, unlike the complainant in said case,
petitioner never doubted her marriage with respondent; and that respondent in... fact wrote her
numerous letters and sent her telegrams, all addressing her either as "E.R. Wong" or "Emerenciana R.
Wong"
On June 9, 1972, then Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin, now CFI Judge, issued an order
resetting the case for hearing
The June 20, 1972 hearing was however postponed, and it was only on September 6, 1972 that the
hearing of the... case was continued but was again reset to October 18, 1972, upon motion of
respondent so as to give him time to file a motion with this Court in connection with his 1963 motion
to dismiss
On September 13, 1972, respondent thus filed with this Court a motion reiterating his still unresolved
1963 motion to dismiss the case, adding that the Solicitor General had already reset the case for
hearing; that subsequent to the filing of the present administrative... case, petitioner herein filed with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action against herein respondent
For Recognition of Natural Children and
Support; and that in the compromise agreement dated October 28, 1966 submitted in said case,
respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the two daughters of petitioner and that he agreed to
support these children, while petitioner in turn agreed to withdraw this... administrative case against
respondent, which compromise agreement was approved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court on November 14, 1966... petitioner filed another pleading reiterating her opposition
Before the Solicitor General could resolve the motion to dismiss, petitioner Emerenciana V. Reyes
filed on November 21, 1972 an affidavit of desistance, requesting permission to withdraw the
administrative complaint against respondent.
stated that it would be for the good of her children that the administrative case against respondent be
dismissed and terminated... the Solicitor General did not act upon petitioner's motion to withdraw;
but instead proceeded to take up respondent's motion to dismiss.
Petitioner is a holder of the degree of Bachelor of Laws, graduating from the MLQ University in
1960... in 1958 petitioner and respondent were classmates at the same university... respondent began
courting... petitioner and finally won her love... sometime in the first week of February, 1960,
petitioner was requested to fill up and sign an application for marriage license... later on, upon the
request of respondent, petitioner... also filled up and signed a marriage contract... thereafter,
petitioner was shown by respondent the marriage contract, dated February 15, 1960, now allegedly
signed by witnesses and the Honorable Arsenio Dizon as the... solemnizing minister... believing that
petitioner was married to respondent, she went with him in hotels and had carnal knowledge with
him
Issues:
whether in the light of the evidence presented by petitioner, there is a prima facie case against
respondent to warrant... requiring respondent to present his evidence.
Ruling:
sustain the said recommendation of the Solicitor General, on the force of the Soberano ruling and on
the fact that the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to disclose a case against respondent
warranting disciplinary action.
Quite clearly, petitioner's evidence discloses that petitioner voluntarily yielded to the carnal desire of
respondent, with whom thereafter she freely lived as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage an illegitimate cohabitation that stemmed from love and mutual... desire.
And in the compromise agreement embodied in the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court in C.C. No. E-00454, respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the two natural
children, Sheila Reyes Wong and Florinda (Thelma) Reyes Wong, and agreed... to support them
It was indeed a relationship that was devoid of deceit on the part of the respondent and a happy one
until his sudden turnabout and marriage to another woman that compelled him to... abandon
petitioner and their children.
petitioner was aware all the time of the nature of her relationship with respondent, foreclosing all
doubts that the petitioner knowingly and freely lived with respondent without the benefit of marriage
Furthermore, complainant was then in the fourth year in the School of Law, MLQ University.
Complainant could not have been so naive as to be easily deceived to believe that she was legally
married to respondent, knowing fully well that no marriage ceremony was performed publicly, in the
presence of witnesses and solemnizing minister, before whom the parties to the... marriage are to
declare that they take each other as husband and wife
Petitioner should have realized that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court would not have
consented to taking part in the execution of a simulated or... fictitious marriage contract.  This
circumstance alone should have put her on her guard and should have provoked her into further
inquiry before submitting herself to the sexual passions of respondent, if she valued her honor and
virtue as she now pretends.
Undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack of a valid marriage. 
But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must be "grossly
immoral" "it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal... act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree."
And the same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is free from
doubt as to compel the... exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power
The evidence... adduced by petitioner lacks the quantity and quality required by the foregoing
criteria.
disbarment proceeding against respondent Felipe C. Wong is hereby dismissed.

6. Advincula vs. Macabata A.C No. 7204

March 7, 2007
FACTS:

Petitioner Advincula, a client of the respondent lawyer Atty. Macabata filed a

disbarment case against the latter  on the grounds of gross immorality. The
petitioner alleged that the respondent took advantage of his position as a
lawyer by  kissing  her and lure her to agree to have sexual relations with
him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.

HELD:

No. The Court perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere
gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and
customary. The act of kissing by the respondent towards the complainant,
even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly
immoral.

Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment

or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral
character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of
such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to
continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as
well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating
or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense
should also be considered.

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED and hereby reprimanded.

7. . JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG

A. C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998

TOPIC:
 Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found
guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
 
FACTS:
Mrs. Julieta Narag, spouse of Atty. Dominador Narag, filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against her husband alleging that the latter courted one of
his students named Gina Espita and they then maintained an illicit relationship known
in various circles in the community.
 
Her husband abandoned his family to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous
circumstances. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation. Later on, the
complainant sought for the dismissal of the administrative complaint and retracted all
her previous allegations. 
 
The case took an unexpected turn when, the Court received another letter from the
complainant, with her seven children as co-signatories, again appealing for the
disbarment of her husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case
against him because of his husband’s continuous threats against her.
 
The investigating officer submitted his report, recommending the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. However, the IBP imposed the
penalty of disbarment.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred from practice of law.
 
HELD:
The Court found that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the
penalty of disbarment.
 
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found
guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
 
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order
to live with Gina Espita. On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the
complainant was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived
with another woman. Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters
that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his
love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own.
 
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, "a lawyer may be
disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."

8 . IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA v. ARMANDO

PUNO, Adm. No. 389, 1967-02-28
Facts:
Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the
Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct.
on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were
engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their
way the respondent told the... complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric
Theater;... that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the res-
taurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they
go to one... of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married;' that with
reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of
marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered...
and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno'... respondent shoved complainant inside the
room;... as soon as they were inside... someone locked the door from outside and respondent
proceeded to the bed and... undressed himself... complainant begged respondent not to molest her but
respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing
the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better...
give up.
two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when
they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together... on June 1, 1958, respondent
repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until
they were married... complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of mar-
riage but respondent refused to comply... respondent... answered the complaint on June 9, 1962,
again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of
marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual... intercourse with her.
He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts
until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel.  He left for Zamboanga
City in July, 1958, to practice law.
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
Issues:
disbarment of the respondent... allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member the Bar
Ruling:
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character
If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law,
it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.
Respondent denied that he took... complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse
with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date.
it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension
is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts... to suspend or disbar a lawyer.
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and... dishonesty
in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act
and has thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession.  Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned... profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality.
Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the
Roll of Attorneys.

RATIO:
[T]he respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned
profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As
stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
… The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.
[A] “grossly immoral conduct” is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court).

9 . 100 Phil. 610

BENGZON, J.:
In October  1954 Josefina  Mortel  filed  in the  Manila court  of  first instance a 
complaint against Anacleto F. Aspiras  and  Cesar Aspiras  (Civil Case No. 24414) 
alleging substantially:

That posing as a bachelor Anacleto  courted her in 1952 in Romblon province, and 
persuaded her to come to  Manila for their  wedding; that for  such purpose she
arrived in the city, and  stayed in the house of her sister  in  Pasay, where
Anacleto,  repeating his  assurances  of  marriage lived with her as her husband;
that subsequently, heeding plaintiff's insistence on the wedding, Anacleto
accompanied her to the  City Hall  to obtain  a marriage license; that there he 
introduced his son  Cesar  to her  as  a nephew, and  then left them both in  the
building, after  saying that Cesar already knew  what to do; that  with the help of
Atty. Moises Espino  both  obtained  a marriage license; that several days later
plaintiff was made to marry Cesar Aspiras in the presence of Anacleto, who led her
to  believe she was really marrying  him thru Cesar  Aspiras as a proxy; that after
such marriage ceremony she continued to live with Anacleto  as his wife never
with  Cesar,  with whom she never had amorous relations; and that she had a baby
born January 24, 1954 of defendant Anacleto Aspiras, who turned out to be 
married to another woman. She asked  for annulment  of  her marriage to Cesar
Aspiras, and  for judgment  requiring defendants to  pay her, jointly and severally,
a  monthly allowance of P150.00 and damages  in  the total  sum of P72,580.00.

On  November 9,  1954 defendants filed a motion to dismiss on  two  grounds:  no 
cause  of action, and  prior judgment in Civil Case No.  19115 of the same court.

On February 11, 1955, the court issued an order saying,

"Upon motion  of the defendants this case is dismissed it being a repetition of Civil
Case No. 19115 (Josefina Mortel vs Anacleto Aspiras and  Cesar Aspiras) which
was dismissed upon separate motions of the parties in the order of this Court of
April 11, 1953."
The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied in  a court
resolution explaining that this case "is a reiteration substantially of  the  old case
No. 19115" *  * * which  was  "dismissed  upon  separate  motions of both parties"
and such "dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits  in accordance with
the provisions of Sec- 4, Rule 30 of the Rules  of Court".

Consequently the plaintiff appealed to this  Court  alleging error in the application
of Rule 30 section 4, inasmuch as the matter  was  governed by sec. 1 of same Rule
30.

Civil Case No. 19115 was admittedly filed March 1953. The allegations of  the
complaint  therein were practically the same  as those  in the present litigation;
before  filing of the answer, plaintiff Josefina Mortel submitted on April 9,  1953 a
motion to dismiss her complaint "stating that .she was in fact and  in truth married
to  the  defendant Cesar Aspiras  and  that Anactieto F. Aspiras  participated in  the
solemnization of the  marriage as father of Cesar Aspiras, and that she filed her 
said complaint at the height of anger and thus the contents thereof did not represent
her true sentiments"  (29 Record on Appeal).  It is also admitted that on April  1,
1953 the defendants  in said Civil Case No.  19115 presented a motion to dismiss,
asserting the  plaintiff had no cause of action because she  "was a school  teacher,
knew that she contracted marriage with Cesar Aspiras and there was no
misrepresentation or fraud perpetrated against her."   (15, 29 Recdrd on Appeal.)

There is no question that on April 11, 1953 the court issued, in  said civil case, an
order  stating, "upon separate motions of both parties the complaint is hereby
dismissed".

For  the sake of clearness  the rules  cited by both sides are  quoted:

"SECTION  1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. An action may be dismissed by the

plaintiff without  order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service of the answer. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that  * * *.

"SEC.  4. Effect of dismissal on other  grounds. Unless otherwise ordered by  the
court, any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, operates an adjudication  upon the merits."  (Rule  30, Rules of 
Court.)
There is another section that may  be pertinent:

"SEC,  2. By order of the court. Except as provided in  the preceding section,  an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court 
and  upon such  terms and conditions as the court deems proper.  *  *  *  Unless 
otherwise specified in  the  order, a dismissal under  this paragraph  shall  be
without prejudice.  *  *   *."
In the light of the above provisions, let us examine what transpired in  Civil Case
No. 19115.  Before the  answer was  made, plaintiff filed a "Motion  to Withdraw 
and/or Dismiss";  and she asked the court "that the complaint * *  * be withdrawn
and/or  dismissed".  At first glance her  pleading does not fall exactly within the
letter of the "notice" contemplated by Section 1.  In addition it asked for a court
order of dismissal.

But if it does not fall under section  1, it may be considered as  a motion which the
court could dispose of under section 2.  When acting under such section to court
could consult the wishes  of the defendant.  The defendant may object; but the
court may order dismissal, and such order is without prejudice.  Wherefore if the
defendant agrees, the order is  a fortiori  also without prejudice.   Unless
otherwise  expressly stated,  of  course.

Now then, the defendants' motion to dismiss in April 1953 could in legal
contemplation be deemed  a conformity to plaintiff's motion to withdraw. 
Therefore, the  court's order upon both motions should be without prejudice, under
section 2.

On the other hand, viewing the pleading with liberality[a] and seeing thru the form
to the substance, the plaintiffs "motion  to withdraw or dismiss"  of April 9 
amounted practically to a "notice" of dismissal, before service of the answer,
because it advised the defendants of plaintiff's desire to withdraw.  Its caption did
not alter nor disguise its nature as  plaintiff's statement of her determination to
drop  the matter.  It contemplated,  it is true, a court order of dismissal; but it was 
not thereby  taken  out of the purview of section 1, since even after a "notice" given
under said section, a court's order of dismissal would not be incongruous. 
Defendant's conformity, if openly given, would  be surplusage, and would not
modify the ensuing juridical situation.
As we see section 1, when the plaintiff files the  notice, the matter is dismissed
without the necessity  of a court order; but a court order  may subsequently be
entered definitely taking cognizance of the withdrawal and shelving
the ezpediente,  without thereby throwing  the matter out of the scope of said
section 1 (b).

Being  then of the opinion that the proceedings In  Civil Case No. 19115 could be
classified either under section 1 or under section 2, we cannot but declare  section
4 to be inapplicable.   In other words, we hold the dismissal to be without
prejudice.  At most, defendants may contend that the order of April 11,  1953 was
also an  order sustaining their motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, such
order barring^ subsequent litigation.  In fact such was their contention in the court
below,   (p.  27 Record on Appeal.) However, we do not believe that the court's
order meant to declare that plaintiff had no cause of action.  It did not say, "for the
reasons stated in defendant's motion" the case is dismissed.  It merely stated "upon
separate motions of both parties the complaint is dismissed" which ordinarily could
mean "since both parties ask for dismissal, the case is dismissed".  In all
probability the  court did not stop to consider the merits of the controversy" 
Indeed it would be a debatable point whether the court could still properly delve
into the merits of the case after plaintiff had with drawn.[b]

Anyway, even granting that the court's order also held that no cause of action 
existed, the situation would be one wherein the order was  both provisional and
final in character (if that is legally possible).   Then  it would not  be fair  to apply
such finality  to plaintiff,  since she would thereby be forever barred from
submitting her  claim  to the courts, although she had reasons to believe the  order
was  a provisional dismissal.  On  the  other hand,  considering the order as
provisional, defendants would not  be unduly prejudiced  nor definitely harmed,
because they are not  deprived of the opportunity to  defend themselves.
Defendants should have insisted either that the court make a specific ruling upon
their  motion  or that the dismissal be expressly made with prejudice.

It may be stated in this connection that we are all the more inclined to permit this
new  litigation, because  in another expediente we  have just decided, (of which we
may take judicial notice) (Adm. Case No. 154, Mortel vs. Aspiras), evidence has
been introduced indicating that the plaintiff's motion for dismissal had been
prepared at the request of defendant Anacleto Aspiras who promised plaintiff full
support, and that there is prima facie merit to her claims for annulment and
damages.
This is verily one instance requiring liberal construction of the Rules for the
purpose of  assisting the parties to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their controversies without regard to technical objections that do
not square with the ends of justice.

The  appealed order  is  hereby reversed  and  the case remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.

Paras, C.  J., Padilla,  Bautista  Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

10 . ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR (A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2013Labels: Disbarment, Lawyers, Legal Ethics

FACTS:
           
            Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern University in which respondent
Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of Medicine. Complainant was compelled to go to
Manila with respondent for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat of
respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in all her subjects and she
would never become a medical intern. After due investigation, the Solicitor General found the respondent
guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having
gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, a rich
man and is not practicing his profession before the court, he should merely be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

HELD: NO.

            The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar
(Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto.
Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of
law.
           
            Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct has
been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

            In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken advantage of his position in
asking complainant to go with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she
refused.

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.

11 . WILSON PO CHAM v. ATTY. EDILBERTO PIZARRO

A.C. No. 5499, 16 August 2005

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned
with disbarment or suspension.

Upon Atty. Edilberto Pizarro’s representations to complainant Wilson Po Cham (Po Cham) that a
certain parcel of land being offered for sale to him was alienable and disposable, Po Cham gave
Atty. Pizarro two checks representing the purchase price of the said property. Po Cham
subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front
portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property
could not be fenced for the reason that it was part of the Bataan National Park. Upon
investigation, Po Cham discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land
susceptible of private ownership.

Po Cham demanded the return of the purchase price but Atty. Pizarro did not heed to the
demand. Po Cham thereafter charged Atty. Pizarro of violation of his oath as a member of the
Bar.

The Supreme Court (SC) referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or decision. The IBP, in its Report and
Recommendation, found Atty. Pizarro to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar. It
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months, subject to the approval of
the members of the Board of Governors. The case was forwarded to the SC for final action.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Pizarro violated his solemn oath as a lawyer

HELD:

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with
disbarment or suspension.

Atty. Pizarro has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable rights
and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to Po Cham. Atty. Pizarro must
thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing Po Cham to purchase non-existent ―irrevocable rights,
interest and participation‖ over an inalienable property.

12 . FELICIDAD L. ORONCE v. CA, GR No. 125766, 1998-10-19

Facts:
whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may resolve the issue of ownership of the
property involved in an unlawful detainer case
Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the registered owner of a
parcel of land... situated at No. 52 Gilmore Street,... New Manila, Quezon City.
In June 1988, private respondent obtained a four million peso - (P4,000,000.00) loan from the China
Banking Corporation. To guarantee payment of the loan, private respondent mortgaged the Gilmore
property and all its improvements to said bank.
the loan accumulated through the years.
On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B. Gonzales, signed and
executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the Gilmore property and its
improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad L. Oronce.
The deed... provided inter alia that
"x x x the VENDOR (PBGDC) also guarantees the right of the VENDEES (petitioners) to the
possession of the property subject of this contract without the need of judicial action; and possession
of said premises shall be delivered to the VENDEES by the VENDOR at the... expiration of one (1)
year from the date of the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage."
On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private respondent's indebtedness with China
Banking Corporation.
petitioners paid private respondent's indebtedness with the bank. However, private respondent
reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of the premises to petitioners upon... the expiration of
the one-year period
Almost six months later since the execution of the instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners
caused the registration of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register of Deeds.
Simultaneously, they... obtained a new title, TCT No. 67990, consistent with the fact that they are the
new owners of the property.[4]... they paid the real estate taxes on the property... petitioners sent
private respondent a demand letter asking it to vacate the premises. Said letter, just like three other
consecutive notices sent through the Quezon City post office, was unclaimed.
Hence,... petitioners filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for unlawful detainer against private
respondent.
In its answer to the complaint, private respondent raised the issue of ownership over the property. It
impugned petitioners' right to eject, alleging that petitioners had no cause of action against it because
it was merely a mortgagee of the property. It argued that when the... parties executed the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, its real intention was to forge an equitable mortgage and not a
sale.
MTC[7] decided the case in favor of petitioners
Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court... stressed in its appeal that it was
not unlawfully withholding possession of the premises from... petitioners because the latter's basis for
evicting it was the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that did not reflect the true intention
of the parties to enter into an equitable mortgage.
private respondent filed a motion... questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain its appeal. On
the other hand, petitioners filed a motion for the immediate execution of the appealed decision. The
RTC granted the motion... and the corresponding writ of execution was issued
Meanwhile, during the pendency of its appeal, private respondent filed an action for reformation of
instrument with the RTC.
RTC Branch 219 asserted jurisdiction over the appeal.
It ruled that the issue of whether or not an action for reformation of a deed of sale and an unlawful
detainer case can proceed independently of each other has been resolved by this
Court in Judith v. Abragan.
this Court held that the fact that defendants had previously filed a separate action for the reformation
of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court... of
First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to
the plaintiff.
to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of execution... private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners and RTC
RTC Branch 219[10] rendered the decision affirming in toto that of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Stating that in ejectment proceedings, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to physical or
material possession of the premises... involved
On that same date, December 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining RTC Branch 219 from enforcing the writ of execution and the notice to vacate the premises
Around six months later... issued an order declaring private respondent non-suited for failure to
appear at the pre-trial and, therefore, dismissing the action for reformation of instrument
The Clerk of Court accordingly issued the final entry of judgment thereon.
In the meantime,... the Court of Appeals rendered the herein questioned Decision
It set aside the December 13, 1995 decision of RTC Branch 219 and declared as null and void for
want of jurisdiction, the March 24, 1995 decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41. It made permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining petitioners from implementing the decision of RTC Branch 219, the writ of
execution and the notice to vacate.
On whether or not private respondent was in estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of the MTC
since it voluntarily submitted thereto the question of the validity of its title to the property, the Court
of Appeals said
"This is not so.
`The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not, if it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are... not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppe
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
Issues:
whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may resolve the issue of ownership of the
property involved in an unlawful detainer case
Ruling:
inferior courts are now "conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or
ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit."[25] These courts shall resolve the question of
ownership raised as an incident in an... ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for
a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession.
Because metropolitan trial courts are authorized to look into the ownership of the property in
controversy... in ejectment cases, it behooved MTC Branch 41 to examine the bases for petitioners'
claim of ownership that entailed interpretation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that
embodies the agreement of the parties that possession of the Gilmore property and its improvements
shall remain with the vendor that was obliged to transfer possession only after the... expiration of one
year,[28] MTC Branch 41 apparently did not examine the terms of the deed of sale. Instead, it
erroneously held that the issue of whether or not the document was in fact an equitable mortgage
"should not be properly raised in this case."
Had it examined the terms of the deed of sale, which, after all is considered part of the allegations of
the complaint having been annexed thereto, that court would have found that, even on its face, the
document was actually one of equitable mortgage and not of sale. The... inferior court appears to
have forgotten that all documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of
which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint
without need of introducing evidence thereon.[29]
That under the agreement the private respondent as vendor shall remain in possession of the property
for only one year, did not detract from the fact that possession of the property, an indicium of
ownership, was retained by private respondent as the alleged vendor. That period... of time may be
deemed as actually the time allotted to private respondent for fulfilling its part of the agreement by
paying its indebtedness to petitioners. This may be gleaned from paragraph (f) that states that "full
title and possession" of the property "shall vest upon the
VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions herein set forth.
The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not binding as to its nature. The decisive factor
in evaluating such an agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown, not necessarily by the
terminology used in the contract, but by their conduct, words, actions and... deeds prior to, during
and immediately after executing the agreement.[32] Private respondent's possession over the property
was not denied by petitioners as in fact it was the basis for their complaint for unlawful detainer.
Neither does the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in petitioners' favor import conclusive
evidence of ownership or that the agreement between the parties was one of sale.
A closer look into the allegations of the complaint would therefore show that petitioners failed to
make out a case for unlawful detainer. By the allegations in the complaint, private respondent as a
mortgagor had the right to posses the property. A mortgage is a real right... constituted to secure an
obligation upon real property or rights therein to satisfy with the proceeds of the sale thereof such
obligation when the same becomes due and has not been paid or fulfilled.[
In case of the debtor's nonpayment of the debt secured by the mortgage, the only... right of the
mortgagee is to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the
outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagor's default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the
ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is against public... policy.[38] Even if the
property is sold at a foreclosure sale, only upon expiration of the redemption period, without the
judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold become
consolidated in the... purchaser.[39]
MTC Branch 41 should have passed upon the issues raised on the ownership of the Gilmore property
for the purpose of determining who had the right to possess the same.
In fine, had the MTC exercised its bounden duty to study the complaint, it would have dismissed the
same for lack of cause of action upon a provisional ruling on the issue of ownership based on the
allegations and annexes of the complaint.
Had the MTC made a provisional ruling on the issue of ownership, the parties would have availed of
other remedies in law early on to thresh out their conflicting claims.
Private respondent's action for reformation of instrument was in fact a step in the right direction.
However, its failure to pursue that action[41] did not imply that private respondent had no other
remedy under the law as regards the issue of ownership... over the Gilmore property.
Hence, although the Court of Appeals resolved the appeal under the misconception that the action for
reformation of instrument was still viable, it correctly held that the controversy between the parties
was beyond the ordinary issues in an ejectment case. Because of the... opposing claims of the parties
as to the true agreement between them, the issue of ownership was in a sense a prejudicial question
that needed determination before the ejectment case should have been filed.
issue of ownership as PQ

The contentious circumstances surrounding the case were demonstrated by an occurrence during the
pendency of this petition that cries out for the resolution of the issue of ownership over the Gilmore
property.
petitioners' claim that the dismissal of the action for reformation of instrument for non-suit had
written finis to the issue of ownership over the Gilmore property is totally unfounded in law.
Petitioners should be reminded that the instant petition... stemmed from an unlawful detainer case,
the issue of which is merely possession of the property in question. The issue of ownership has not
been definitively resolved for the provisional determination of that issue that should have been done
by the MTC at the earliest possible... time, would only be for the purpose of determining who has the
superior right to possess the property.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as alleged by private
respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-handed. On an erroneous assumption that she
had been legally vested with ownership of the property, she took steps prior to the... present
proceedings by illegally taking control and possession of the same property in litigation. Her act of
entering the property in defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals
constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing by either party of an
action regarding the ownership of the property involved. The temporary... restraining order issued on
October 13, 1997 is hereby made permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to turn over
possession of the property to private respondent.
Principles:
A mortgage is a real right... constituted to secure an obligation upon real property or rights therein to
satisfy with the proceeds of the sale thereof such obligation when the same becomes due and has not
been paid or fulfilled.[35] The mortgagor generally retains possession of the... mortgaged
property[36] because by mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but
ownership thereof is not parted with.[37] In case of the debtor's nonpayment of the debt secured by
the mortgage, the only... right of the mortgagee is to foreclose the mortgage and have the
encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagor's default does not
operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is
against public... policy.[38] Even if the property is sold at a foreclosure sale, only upon expiration of
the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, does
ownership of the land sold become consolidated in the... purchaser.[39]
13 . SELWYN F. LAO VS. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL A.C. NO. 5961, July 1, 2003, EN
BANC, (Panganiban, J.)

FACTS: Selwyn Lao lent money to Atty. Medel which he paid using bad checks. Medel
persistently refused to make good on the 4 checks that he issued and kept on delaying its
payment. Needless to say, the intention of this present complaint proves that contrary to Medel’s
written promises, he never made good on his dishonoured checks. Neither has he paid his
indebtedness. In Medel’s Answer, the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because: (a) it does not constitute malpractice only a violation of BP 22; (b)
violation of BP 22 is not one of the grounds for disciplinary action; and (c) it does not constitute
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP recommended suspending respondent from
practice of law for 2 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Robert Medel is liable for gross misconduct for failure to pay debts
and for issuing worthless checks?

HELD: Yes. The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records
that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation
despite sufficient time afforded to him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and
transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to
accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no obligation to
accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with earlier payment plans for the
same debt. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue
as officers of the Court. WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

Plenary Pardon
 IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner, a lawyer, was disbarred in 1961 after having been convicted of falsification of public document.
Since 1967, when the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" for
his crime and restored him "to full civil and political rights," petitioner has been seeking readmission to the
practice of law but had been denied. In his present petition, petitioner attached, among others, favorable
indorsements of his plea for reinstatement from the Bar Association of his province, the Mayor of the
municipality where he resides, the Provincial Governor, and the Dean of the College of Law of Siliman
University. Oppositions to his petition were filed, and this Court referred the indorsements and the oppositions
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for comment, and to the Solicitor General for investigation. Both the
Integrated Bar and the Solicitor General favorably found for petitioner. The Solicitor General recommended
the petitioner’s readmission.

The Supreme Court ordered petitioner’s reinstatement in the roll of attorneys stating that his conduct after his
disbarment can stand searching scrutiny, sufficiently proving himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law;
and that 21 years of disbarment was adequate punishment.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; READMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW A PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO

PERSONS OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER WITH SPECIAL QUALIFICATION DULY
ASCERTAINED AND CERTIFIED; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner’s conduct after disbarment can
stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of
the citizens of his community. The favorable indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonial expressed in his behalf by the provincial governor of
Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his active
participation in civic and social undertakings in the community. attest to his moral reform and
rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT FOR 21 YEARS, ADEQUATE PUNISHMENT. — Petitioner, now 69
years of age, has reached the twilight of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession
for a period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.

DECISION

ESCOLIN, J.:

This is a petition by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the inclusion of his name
in the roll of attorneys.

The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision promulgated on
September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public document, penalized under Article 117 of
the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member of the bar
and in his capacity as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix,
and the court, finding that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality thereof, petitioner
commenced service of the sentence.

Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this Court disbarment
proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961. 1

On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon"
and restored him "to full civil and political rights." 2

Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of law, the first of which
was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30, 1968. cralawnad

On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was deferred "until after the
integration of the bar has been effected." 3

On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others, of the following
documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association signed by 78 members thereof,
indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4; the certificate of the mayor of the municipality of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, where petitioner has been residing, to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral
character, a peace-loving and law-abiding citizen" 5; a certification of Governor William B. Villegas of Negros
Oriental, attesting to the "act that since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has comported himself as
a morally straight and respectable citizen and that he has been active and has cooperated in civic and social
undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead a decent and dignified life" 6; the certification of Dean
Eduardo G. Flores of the College of Law, Siliman University, vouching to petitioner’s "honest, upright and
moral life . . . and because of his conduct he has earned the sympathy of the people of the community and
regained the confidence of the people and of his other associates" 7; the statement of Atty. Alexander G.
Amor, former president of the Negros Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, certifying "that
Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces . . . is a person of good moral character, whose integrity is beyond question" 8; and
the clearance certificates issued by Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal
Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros Oriental, and City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the effect
that petitioner "is a person of good moral character" and that since his release from the national penitentiary he
"has never been accused or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9

When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then president, Atty. Marcelo D.
Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner s request for reinstatement.

On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original disbarment proceedings, filed an
opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this was followed by a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces,
barangay captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental, addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and referred to this Court, opposing petitioner’s readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-
reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer." cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan, made the following
observations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the following matters have been referred to the
Integrated Bar for comment: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus Paras to respondent’s petition and supplementary petition
for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys; and

(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay Captain of Domolog, Bindoy,
Negros Oriental, addressed to his Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, requesting the Office of the President to
oppose the petition of Quinciano Vailoces for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.

"It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar transmitted to the
Honorable Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above stated petition for reinstatement.

"Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar received
a petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by ‘the people of the Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros
Oriental’ vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5, 1978
the President of the Integrated Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking him to comment on the above mentioned
petitions and telegram. "This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces’ comment dated November 3, 1978,
which is being forwarded herewith to the Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent papers.

"It is believed that Mr. Vailoces’ comment is a satisfactory answer to the adverse allegations and charges
which have been referred to him. The charges of immorality (publicly maintaining a querida) and gambling are
general statements devoid of particular allegations of fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the
Municipal Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental — namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay — who tops the list of persons
who have signed the February 14, 1978 petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces,
appears to be the very same official who on October 25, 1977 issued a Certification to the effect that Mr.
Vailoces ‘is personally known to me as a person of exemplary character, a peace loving and law abiding
citizen’ and that ‘he is cooperative in all our civic and social activities and that he is one of our respectable
citizens in our community.’ That this official should now sign a petition containing statements exactly opposite
in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the least, and it is not altogether difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces’
imputations of politics in the conduct of Mayor Mana-ay.

"As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged absence of remorse on the part of Mr.
Vailoces, and his alleged belligerence and display of open defiance and hostility, etc. are matters so subjective
in character that her general allegations and charges in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is
significant that Mr. Vailoces in his comment states: "If she is indeed that much desperately so in need of cash
assistance, considering really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for her
satisfaction and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her but only with a modest amount because I am
only a small farmer with still three college students to support.’

"Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor Vailoces stating as grounds for denial of Mr.
Quinciano D. Vailoces’ petition for reinstatement the alleged ‘grounds of non-reformation, immoral conduct
and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by soliciting cases,’ there is such a lack of specificity and
particularity in such statement of grounds that one is at a loss as to how a person in the place of Mr. Quinciano
D. Vailoces could properly defend himself against such charges." cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner’s "reinstatement in the rolls
of attorneys."cralaw virtua1aw library

This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras and Nicanor Vailoces
to the Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation; and on August 4, 1982, the latter, after
conducting an investigation, submitted his report, recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in
the roll of attorneys upon taking his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office."  chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently proven himself fit to
be readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does
not of itself warrant his reinstatement.

"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney
has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the
same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an
original evidence" [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815].

"The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is ‘of good moral character’ in
the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney . . ." [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].

Petitioner’s conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the respect and confidence
of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community. The favorable indorsements of both the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by
the provincial governor of Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral reform
and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight of his
life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has
been exacted.

Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor . . . that if
reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself honestly, uprightly and
worthily." Indeed, there is reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and
maintain steadfast fidelity to the lawyer’s oath.
chanrobles.com : virtual law library

WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of attorneys.

PLAGIARISM

In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
[A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]

FACTS:

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya
Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya
et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano
del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books
to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape
as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used
inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works
advocated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to
judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an
indispensable element of plagiarism.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision,
there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the
attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these
foreign works as his own.

But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.

On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313
SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict
rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in
cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately

According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background
facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme
Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme
Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to
conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.

No Misconduct

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.

No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)

The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a
highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her
error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her
that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot
be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly
negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long
standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to
assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice
is in control in the writing of the draft.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most legal
references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in
internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that
were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a
smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need.

She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these
to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the
Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape that her
report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the
positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences,
and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded.
Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their
work.