Facts:: 1.re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho
Facts:: 1.re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho
Kho
3:27 AM
Facts: Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar. He was found guilty of
gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody. She was fined
P10k. Since his malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Supreme Court ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer
and as an officer of the court. In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely
remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in
the court’s safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
Held:
Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating,
cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the
mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission is a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and
maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. By
definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although it is broad enough to include it. Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer
is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits
lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to
account. Atty. Kho is ordered to pay FINE of P5,000.00. (Re: Financial Audit Of Atty. Raquel G. Kho, A.M.
No. P-06-2177, April 19, 2007)
3 . Elesterio, Dessa Marie V. 16101108 Subject: Legal Profession Professor: Judge Francisco A.
Seville Jr. A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
Facts: In 1970, Arciga was a medical technology student and Maniwang was a law student. The two
acquainted and had a sexual relationship. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. In 1975, Maniwang passed the
bar exams. After which, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga then found out that Maniwang
married another woman. She confronted the wife and this irked Maniwang to inflict physical injuries
upon Arciga. Arciga filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga many
times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently Arciga had an
illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.
Issue: W/N Maniwang should be disbarred and be held liable for gross immoral conduct.
Arguments of the Parties: Arciga, complainant said that Maniwang reassured he many times that he
would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. She reported that Maniwang inflicted physical
injuries upon herr and secured medical treatment in a hospital Maniwang, respondent contended that the
cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his
disbarment. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry
Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because
apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born. \
Decision of the Court: The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of
Mortel vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry
Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. But the Supreme Court did say that
it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral
conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing
as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as
“that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”. The complaint for disbarment against
the respondent is hereby dismissed. Relevance to the subject (Legal Profession) The case of Arciga vs
Maniwang is important in determining whether the act that the lawyer has done was immoral or grounds
of disbarment. It is very crucial for a lawyer especially in his profession to maintain his/ her etiquette in
order to become an example to the other citizens of the Philippines. A litigator must be the first one that
the people must look up to. Legal profession does not only apply to the duties of a lawyer to the bar and
to his clients but also to the people surrounding him.
FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench,
with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no
rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another
complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the
same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to
practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent
as lawyer and judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation
of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and
its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for
disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case,
as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the
bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to
have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment
that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
HELD:
No. The Court perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere
gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and
customary. The act of kissing by the respondent towards the complainant,
even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly
immoral.
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED and hereby reprimanded.
RATIO:
[T]he respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned
profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As
stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
… The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.
[A] “grossly immoral conduct” is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court).
BENGZON, J.:
In October 1954 Josefina Mortel filed in the Manila court of first instance a
complaint against Anacleto F. Aspiras and Cesar Aspiras (Civil Case No. 24414)
alleging substantially:
That posing as a bachelor Anacleto courted her in 1952 in Romblon province, and
persuaded her to come to Manila for their wedding; that for such purpose she
arrived in the city, and stayed in the house of her sister in Pasay, where
Anacleto, repeating his assurances of marriage lived with her as her husband;
that subsequently, heeding plaintiff's insistence on the wedding, Anacleto
accompanied her to the City Hall to obtain a marriage license; that there he
introduced his son Cesar to her as a nephew, and then left them both in the
building, after saying that Cesar already knew what to do; that with the help of
Atty. Moises Espino both obtained a marriage license; that several days later
plaintiff was made to marry Cesar Aspiras in the presence of Anacleto, who led her
to believe she was really marrying him thru Cesar Aspiras as a proxy; that after
such marriage ceremony she continued to live with Anacleto as his wife never
with Cesar, with whom she never had amorous relations; and that she had a baby
born January 24, 1954 of defendant Anacleto Aspiras, who turned out to be
married to another woman. She asked for annulment of her marriage to Cesar
Aspiras, and for judgment requiring defendants to pay her, jointly and severally,
a monthly allowance of P150.00 and damages in the total sum of P72,580.00.
On November 9, 1954 defendants filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: no
cause of action, and prior judgment in Civil Case No. 19115 of the same court.
"Upon motion of the defendants this case is dismissed it being a repetition of Civil
Case No. 19115 (Josefina Mortel vs Anacleto Aspiras and Cesar Aspiras) which
was dismissed upon separate motions of the parties in the order of this Court of
April 11, 1953."
The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied in a court
resolution explaining that this case "is a reiteration substantially of the old case
No. 19115" * * * which was "dismissed upon separate motions of both parties"
and such "dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits in accordance with
the provisions of Sec- 4, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court".
Consequently the plaintiff appealed to this Court alleging error in the application
of Rule 30 section 4, inasmuch as the matter was governed by sec. 1 of same Rule
30.
Civil Case No. 19115 was admittedly filed March 1953. The allegations of the
complaint therein were practically the same as those in the present litigation;
before filing of the answer, plaintiff Josefina Mortel submitted on April 9, 1953 a
motion to dismiss her complaint "stating that .she was in fact and in truth married
to the defendant Cesar Aspiras and that Anactieto F. Aspiras participated in the
solemnization of the marriage as father of Cesar Aspiras, and that she filed her
said complaint at the height of anger and thus the contents thereof did not represent
her true sentiments" (29 Record on Appeal). It is also admitted that on April 1,
1953 the defendants in said Civil Case No. 19115 presented a motion to dismiss,
asserting the plaintiff had no cause of action because she "was a school teacher,
knew that she contracted marriage with Cesar Aspiras and there was no
misrepresentation or fraud perpetrated against her." (15, 29 Recdrd on Appeal.)
There is no question that on April 11, 1953 the court issued, in said civil case, an
order stating, "upon separate motions of both parties the complaint is hereby
dismissed".
For the sake of clearness the rules cited by both sides are quoted:
"SEC. 4. Effect of dismissal on other grounds. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court, any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, operates an adjudication upon the merits." (Rule 30, Rules of
Court.)
There is another section that may be pertinent:
"SEC, 2. By order of the court. Except as provided in the preceding section, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court
and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. * * * Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be
without prejudice. * * *."
In the light of the above provisions, let us examine what transpired in Civil Case
No. 19115. Before the answer was made, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Withdraw
and/or Dismiss"; and she asked the court "that the complaint * * * be withdrawn
and/or dismissed". At first glance her pleading does not fall exactly within the
letter of the "notice" contemplated by Section 1. In addition it asked for a court
order of dismissal.
But if it does not fall under section 1, it may be considered as a motion which the
court could dispose of under section 2. When acting under such section to court
could consult the wishes of the defendant. The defendant may object; but the
court may order dismissal, and such order is without prejudice. Wherefore if the
defendant agrees, the order is a fortiori also without prejudice. Unless
otherwise expressly stated, of course.
Now then, the defendants' motion to dismiss in April 1953 could in legal
contemplation be deemed a conformity to plaintiff's motion to withdraw.
Therefore, the court's order upon both motions should be without prejudice, under
section 2.
On the other hand, viewing the pleading with liberality[a] and seeing thru the form
to the substance, the plaintiffs "motion to withdraw or dismiss" of April 9
amounted practically to a "notice" of dismissal, before service of the answer,
because it advised the defendants of plaintiff's desire to withdraw. Its caption did
not alter nor disguise its nature as plaintiff's statement of her determination to
drop the matter. It contemplated, it is true, a court order of dismissal; but it was
not thereby taken out of the purview of section 1, since even after a "notice" given
under said section, a court's order of dismissal would not be incongruous.
Defendant's conformity, if openly given, would be surplusage, and would not
modify the ensuing juridical situation.
As we see section 1, when the plaintiff files the notice, the matter is dismissed
without the necessity of a court order; but a court order may subsequently be
entered definitely taking cognizance of the withdrawal and shelving
the ezpediente, without thereby throwing the matter out of the scope of said
section 1 (b).
Being then of the opinion that the proceedings In Civil Case No. 19115 could be
classified either under section 1 or under section 2, we cannot but declare section
4 to be inapplicable. In other words, we hold the dismissal to be without
prejudice. At most, defendants may contend that the order of April 11, 1953 was
also an order sustaining their motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, such
order barring^ subsequent litigation. In fact such was their contention in the court
below, (p. 27 Record on Appeal.) However, we do not believe that the court's
order meant to declare that plaintiff had no cause of action. It did not say, "for the
reasons stated in defendant's motion" the case is dismissed. It merely stated "upon
separate motions of both parties the complaint is dismissed" which ordinarily could
mean "since both parties ask for dismissal, the case is dismissed". In all
probability the court did not stop to consider the merits of the controversy"
Indeed it would be a debatable point whether the court could still properly delve
into the merits of the case after plaintiff had with drawn.[b]
Anyway, even granting that the court's order also held that no cause of action
existed, the situation would be one wherein the order was both provisional and
final in character (if that is legally possible). Then it would not be fair to apply
such finality to plaintiff, since she would thereby be forever barred from
submitting her claim to the courts, although she had reasons to believe the order
was a provisional dismissal. On the other hand, considering the order as
provisional, defendants would not be unduly prejudiced nor definitely harmed,
because they are not deprived of the opportunity to defend themselves.
Defendants should have insisted either that the court make a specific ruling upon
their motion or that the dismissal be expressly made with prejudice.
It may be stated in this connection that we are all the more inclined to permit this
new litigation, because in another expediente we have just decided, (of which we
may take judicial notice) (Adm. Case No. 154, Mortel vs. Aspiras), evidence has
been introduced indicating that the plaintiff's motion for dismissal had been
prepared at the request of defendant Anacleto Aspiras who promised plaintiff full
support, and that there is prima facie merit to her claims for annulment and
damages.
This is verily one instance requiring liberal construction of the Rules for the
purpose of assisting the parties to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their controversies without regard to technical objections that do
not square with the ends of justice.
The appealed order is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
10 . ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR (A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989)
ISSUE:
HELD: NO.
The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar
(Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto.
Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of
law.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct has
been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken advantage of his position in
asking complainant to go with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she
refused.
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned
with disbarment or suspension.
Upon Atty. Edilberto Pizarro’s representations to complainant Wilson Po Cham (Po Cham) that a
certain parcel of land being offered for sale to him was alienable and disposable, Po Cham gave
Atty. Pizarro two checks representing the purchase price of the said property. Po Cham
subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front
portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property
could not be fenced for the reason that it was part of the Bataan National Park. Upon
investigation, Po Cham discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land
susceptible of private ownership.
Po Cham demanded the return of the purchase price but Atty. Pizarro did not heed to the
demand. Po Cham thereafter charged Atty. Pizarro of violation of his oath as a member of the
Bar.
The Supreme Court (SC) referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or decision. The IBP, in its Report and
Recommendation, found Atty. Pizarro to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar. It
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months, subject to the approval of
the members of the Board of Governors. The case was forwarded to the SC for final action.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with
disbarment or suspension.
Atty. Pizarro has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable rights
and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to Po Cham. Atty. Pizarro must
thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing Po Cham to purchase non-existent ―irrevocable rights,
interest and participation‖ over an inalienable property.
The contentious circumstances surrounding the case were demonstrated by an occurrence during the
pendency of this petition that cries out for the resolution of the issue of ownership over the Gilmore
property.
petitioners' claim that the dismissal of the action for reformation of instrument for non-suit had
written finis to the issue of ownership over the Gilmore property is totally unfounded in law.
Petitioners should be reminded that the instant petition... stemmed from an unlawful detainer case,
the issue of which is merely possession of the property in question. The issue of ownership has not
been definitively resolved for the provisional determination of that issue that should have been done
by the MTC at the earliest possible... time, would only be for the purpose of determining who has the
superior right to possess the property.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as alleged by private
respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-handed. On an erroneous assumption that she
had been legally vested with ownership of the property, she took steps prior to the... present
proceedings by illegally taking control and possession of the same property in litigation. Her act of
entering the property in defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals
constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing by either party of an
action regarding the ownership of the property involved. The temporary... restraining order issued on
October 13, 1997 is hereby made permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to turn over
possession of the property to private respondent.
Principles:
A mortgage is a real right... constituted to secure an obligation upon real property or rights therein to
satisfy with the proceeds of the sale thereof such obligation when the same becomes due and has not
been paid or fulfilled.[35] The mortgagor generally retains possession of the... mortgaged
property[36] because by mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but
ownership thereof is not parted with.[37] In case of the debtor's nonpayment of the debt secured by
the mortgage, the only... right of the mortgagee is to foreclose the mortgage and have the
encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagor's default does not
operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is
against public... policy.[38] Even if the property is sold at a foreclosure sale, only upon expiration of
the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, does
ownership of the land sold become consolidated in the... purchaser.[39]
13 . SELWYN F. LAO VS. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL A.C. NO. 5961, July 1, 2003, EN
BANC, (Panganiban, J.)
FACTS: Selwyn Lao lent money to Atty. Medel which he paid using bad checks. Medel
persistently refused to make good on the 4 checks that he issued and kept on delaying its
payment. Needless to say, the intention of this present complaint proves that contrary to Medel’s
written promises, he never made good on his dishonoured checks. Neither has he paid his
indebtedness. In Medel’s Answer, the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because: (a) it does not constitute malpractice only a violation of BP 22; (b)
violation of BP 22 is not one of the grounds for disciplinary action; and (c) it does not constitute
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP recommended suspending respondent from
practice of law for 2 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Robert Medel is liable for gross misconduct for failure to pay debts
and for issuing worthless checks?
HELD: Yes. The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records
that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation
despite sufficient time afforded to him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and
transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to
accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no obligation to
accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with earlier payment plans for the
same debt. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue
as officers of the Court. WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
Plenary Pardon
IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner, a lawyer, was disbarred in 1961 after having been convicted of falsification of public document.
Since 1967, when the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" for
his crime and restored him "to full civil and political rights," petitioner has been seeking readmission to the
practice of law but had been denied. In his present petition, petitioner attached, among others, favorable
indorsements of his plea for reinstatement from the Bar Association of his province, the Mayor of the
municipality where he resides, the Provincial Governor, and the Dean of the College of Law of Siliman
University. Oppositions to his petition were filed, and this Court referred the indorsements and the oppositions
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for comment, and to the Solicitor General for investigation. Both the
Integrated Bar and the Solicitor General favorably found for petitioner. The Solicitor General recommended
the petitioner’s readmission.
The Supreme Court ordered petitioner’s reinstatement in the roll of attorneys stating that his conduct after his
disbarment can stand searching scrutiny, sufficiently proving himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law;
and that 21 years of disbarment was adequate punishment.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT FOR 21 YEARS, ADEQUATE PUNISHMENT. — Petitioner, now 69
years of age, has reached the twilight of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession
for a period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
This is a petition by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the inclusion of his name
in the roll of attorneys.
The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision promulgated on
September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public document, penalized under Article 117 of
the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member of the bar
and in his capacity as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix,
and the court, finding that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality thereof, petitioner
commenced service of the sentence.
Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this Court disbarment
proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961. 1
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon"
and restored him "to full civil and political rights." 2
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of law, the first of which
was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30, 1968. cralawnad
On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was deferred "until after the
integration of the bar has been effected." 3
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others, of the following
documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association signed by 78 members thereof,
indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4; the certificate of the mayor of the municipality of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, where petitioner has been residing, to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral
character, a peace-loving and law-abiding citizen" 5; a certification of Governor William B. Villegas of Negros
Oriental, attesting to the "act that since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has comported himself as
a morally straight and respectable citizen and that he has been active and has cooperated in civic and social
undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead a decent and dignified life" 6; the certification of Dean
Eduardo G. Flores of the College of Law, Siliman University, vouching to petitioner’s "honest, upright and
moral life . . . and because of his conduct he has earned the sympathy of the people of the community and
regained the confidence of the people and of his other associates" 7; the statement of Atty. Alexander G.
Amor, former president of the Negros Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, certifying "that
Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces . . . is a person of good moral character, whose integrity is beyond question" 8; and
the clearance certificates issued by Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal
Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros Oriental, and City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the effect
that petitioner "is a person of good moral character" and that since his release from the national penitentiary he
"has never been accused or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9
When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then president, Atty. Marcelo D.
Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner s request for reinstatement.
On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original disbarment proceedings, filed an
opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this was followed by a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces,
barangay captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental, addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and referred to this Court, opposing petitioner’s readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-
reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer." cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan, made the following
observations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the following matters have been referred to the
Integrated Bar for comment: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus Paras to respondent’s petition and supplementary petition
for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys; and
(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay Captain of Domolog, Bindoy,
Negros Oriental, addressed to his Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, requesting the Office of the President to
oppose the petition of Quinciano Vailoces for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.
"It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar transmitted to the
Honorable Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above stated petition for reinstatement.
"Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar received
a petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by ‘the people of the Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros
Oriental’ vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5, 1978
the President of the Integrated Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking him to comment on the above mentioned
petitions and telegram. "This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces’ comment dated November 3, 1978,
which is being forwarded herewith to the Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent papers.
"It is believed that Mr. Vailoces’ comment is a satisfactory answer to the adverse allegations and charges
which have been referred to him. The charges of immorality (publicly maintaining a querida) and gambling are
general statements devoid of particular allegations of fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the
Municipal Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental — namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay — who tops the list of persons
who have signed the February 14, 1978 petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces,
appears to be the very same official who on October 25, 1977 issued a Certification to the effect that Mr.
Vailoces ‘is personally known to me as a person of exemplary character, a peace loving and law abiding
citizen’ and that ‘he is cooperative in all our civic and social activities and that he is one of our respectable
citizens in our community.’ That this official should now sign a petition containing statements exactly opposite
in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the least, and it is not altogether difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces’
imputations of politics in the conduct of Mayor Mana-ay.
"As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged absence of remorse on the part of Mr.
Vailoces, and his alleged belligerence and display of open defiance and hostility, etc. are matters so subjective
in character that her general allegations and charges in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is
significant that Mr. Vailoces in his comment states: "If she is indeed that much desperately so in need of cash
assistance, considering really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for her
satisfaction and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her but only with a modest amount because I am
only a small farmer with still three college students to support.’
"Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor Vailoces stating as grounds for denial of Mr.
Quinciano D. Vailoces’ petition for reinstatement the alleged ‘grounds of non-reformation, immoral conduct
and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by soliciting cases,’ there is such a lack of specificity and
particularity in such statement of grounds that one is at a loss as to how a person in the place of Mr. Quinciano
D. Vailoces could properly defend himself against such charges." cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner’s "reinstatement in the rolls
of attorneys."cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras and Nicanor Vailoces
to the Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation; and on August 4, 1982, the latter, after
conducting an investigation, submitted his report, recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in
the roll of attorneys upon taking his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office." chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently proven himself fit to
be readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does
not of itself warrant his reinstatement.
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney
has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the
same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an
original evidence" [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815].
"The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is ‘of good moral character’ in
the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney . . ." [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].
Petitioner’s conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the respect and confidence
of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community. The favorable indorsements of both the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by
the provincial governor of Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral reform
and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight of his
life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has
been exacted.
Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor . . . that if
reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself honestly, uprightly and
worthily." Indeed, there is reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and
maintain steadfast fidelity to the lawyer’s oath.
chanrobles.com : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of attorneys.
PLAGIARISM
In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
[A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]
FACTS:
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya
Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya
et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano
del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books
to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape
as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used
inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works
advocated.
HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to
judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an
indispensable element of plagiarism.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision,
there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the
attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these
foreign works as his own.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313
SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict
rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in
cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background
facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme
Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme
Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to
conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud
or corruption.
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a
highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her
error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her
that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot
be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly
negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long
standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to
assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice
is in control in the writing of the draft.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most legal
references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in
internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that
were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a
smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need.
She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these
to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the
Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape that her
report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the
positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences,
and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded.
Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in their
work.