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Vote Buying, Government Accountability, and Political Corruption: The Case of The Philippines
Vote Buying, Government Accountability, and Political Corruption: The Case of The Philippines
ABSTRACT : Vote buying and political corruption have been permanent features of the Philippine political
landscape. Despite laws that prohibit and punish vote-buying and corruption, these phenomena continue to exist
in the Philippines. The implementation of the anti-corrupt practices act in the Philippines is only one of the
mechanisms of the government to fight corruption. The study will examine how vote-buying and accountability
affect corruption in the Philippines. It will primarily give emphasis on corruption as the effect of vote-buying
and accountability using the data provided by the “Varieties of democracy” (V.Dem). The study used Multiple
Regression Analysis to model the causal relationship between the explanatory variables; government
accountability and vote-buying; and the response variable; political corruption. The results found are striking;
there is no correlation between accountability and corruption. In the case of vote-buying and corruption, the
study revealed that there is a statistically significant negative linear association between the two
KEYWORDS: accountability, corruption, government, political landscape, vote-buying
I. INTRODUCTION
Vote-buying is a well-known global phenomenon around the world. This phenomenon form part of the
Philippines’ political landscape since colonial times. ( Schaffer 2005)
Section 261(a)(1) of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a person is guilty of vote-buying if “he
gives, offers or promises anything of value to any person, entity or community in order to induce the public to
vote for or against a candidate”. (Election Code). This provision of the code expressly prohibits vote-buying in
the Philippines, but despite the law, vote-buying still persists in the country. This practice is like a cancer cell
that keeps on growing, it was strengthened because of the automation of elections where cheating becomes
difficult.
Vote buying becomes institutionalized in the Philippine political landscape. Elite politicians use their
influence, money, and government resources to entice voters to vote for them. In return, the beneficiary
reciprocates by offering his support and personal services to the benefactor. A study revealed that vote-buying
and clientelism may induce corruption because the winning candidate who spent more money to buy votes will
likely to recover his expenditures during his tenure. ( Kramon 2013)
According to Julio Teehankee, “institutional and procedural defects prevent the electoral politics of the
Philippines from becoming meaningful to effective and efficient governance. He also argued that while the
nation’s elections are rather open, the issue of the lack of real and political alternatives still exists.”( Teehankee
p.187)
Also, corruption is a widespread global phenomenon despite mechanisms to make politicians
accountable to the people, corruption is still rampant. Political accountability includes an exchange of
responsibilities between the rulers and the ruled. In other words, accountability is a mutual relationship between
the officials and the citizens. Moreover, Schmitter notes that removal from office of key officials like the
president or prime minister and loss of vote confidence are some positive indicators of political accountability.
(Schmitter 2007)
Political leaders may be investigated and be held responsible for their actions. Accountability is very
important for good governance. Political leaders are expected to fulfill their promise to the electorates after they
are elected because they owe their position to the electorate. Adsera( 2003) adds that citizens can play an
important role in making their rulers accountable through elections. The fear of losing in the next election can
compel the leaders to answer to the voter’s interest. ( Adsera par.4).
To better illustrate this relationship, a visual representation of this framework is presented below.
ACCOUNTABILITY -
POLITICAL
VOTE BUYING + CORRUPTION
This figure reflects that the incidence of vote-buying has a positive relationship with political corruption
whereas government accountability is negatively related to political corruption.
Vote Buying
Mean -0.900294118
Standard Error 0.198834162
Median -1.215
Mode -0.54
Standard Deviation 1.159392436
Sample Variance 1.34419082
Kurtosis 0.432404834
Skewness 0.848945311
Range 4.61
Minimum -2.71
Maximum 1.9
Sum -30.61
Count 34
Table 1. B
Descriptive Statistics of Election Vote Buying in the Philippines from 1907-to 2010
Table 1. B reflects the central tendency as well as the measures of the range of variability of the raw
data values of election vote-buying in the Philippines from 1907-to 2010. Based on the said table, the average
score of vote-buying incidence is -0.900294118 which seems to imply that there is a negative 0.9 index of vote-
buying in the country.
However, the standard deviation of the data values is 1.159392436 which signifies a minimal
dispersion of the raw values of vote-buying during the said period of time.
Table 2. B
Descriptive Statistics of Government Accountability in the Philippines during 1907-2013
Accountability
Mean 0.529705882
Standard Error 0.067801594
Median 0.535
Mode 0.06
Standard Deviation 0.395347835
Sample Variance 0.156299911
Kurtosis -1.596524207
Skewness 0.083050769
Range 1.12
Minimum 0.01
Maximum 1.13
Sum 18.01
Count 34
Table 2. B reflects the central tendency as well as the measures of the range of variability of the raw
data values of election vote-buying in the Philippines from 1907-to 2013.
Based on the results reflected in the table, the average score of government accountability is
0.529705882 which means that there is a 0.53 index of government accountability in the country.
However, the standard deviation of the data values is 0.395347835 which signifies a minimal
dispersion of the raw values of vote-buying during the said period.
Table 3. A
Correlation Result of the Relationship between Political Corruption and Vote Buying
Association R-value P-value
Vote Buying and Political
Corruption -0.61637 0.001652373
Based on Table 3. there is a negative moderate linear association between vote-buying and political
corruption (-0.61637). This linear association is perceived to be statistically significant (p-value=0.001652373 <
0.05) hence an increase in vote-buying incidence in the Philippines can be accompanied by a decrease in
political corruption. This is contradictory to the key argument of Kliitgard’s corruption equation. This can be
explained by the vote-buying case in the Philippines. In Orbeta (2018) he reported that although vote-buying is
rampant in the Philippines, it is usually practiced at the local levels, and despite the laws that prohibit illegal
practices during the election, no candidate received punishment or penalty for violating the anti-vote buying
law, additionally, few incidents of vote-buying were also reported to the Commission on Election, thus the data
on vote-buying is low. (Orbeta, 2018)
Table 3. B
Regression Analysis Result of the Relationship between Political Corruption and Vote Buying
Relationship Coefficient P-Value Standard Error
Vote Buying and Political -0.051729014
Corruption 0.00009 0.011520578
Table 3. b depicts the regression analysis results of the relationship between political
corruption and vote-buying. It is shown that the causal relationship between political corruption and
vote-buying is statistically significant (p-value = 0.00009 < 0.05). Moreover, this implies that an
increase of one percent in vote-buying incidence in the Philippines causes a decline of -0.051729014
percent in political corruption. This is opposite to the key argument of Kliitgard’s corruption equation
which argues that these two are positively related. A possible explanation is an r-value which is only
(0.40) which means that only 40% of the data was explained by the model. The remaining 60% is
generally attributed to unaccounted factors.
This section presents the correlation results and multiple linear regression analysis results between
political corruption and government accountability in the Philippines covering the period 1907-to 2013.
Table 4. A
Correlation Result of the Relationship between Political Corruption and Government Accountability
Table 4.A. illustrates that government accountability is negatively (little to very weak) correlated [r=-
0.13417] with political corruption in the Philippines capturing the period provided in this study.
This is in support of Kliitgard’s Corruption model arguing that there is a negative association between
corruption and accountability. However, this perceived linear association is not statistically significant hence it
can be argued that this correlation can either be by chance or the data used may not be sufficient to prove the
statistically significant linear association of the said two variables.
Table 4. B shows the regression analysis result of political corruption and government accountability.
It can be derived from the result that the relationship between the said variables is not statistically significant
despite that there is an association that is captured in the previous table [however not statistically significant].
This outcome does not align with Kliitgard’s corruption model which claims that accountability is
negatively related to corruption. However, this can be explained by the following reasons; (a) the data values
that were utilized in this study may not be sufficient to support the theory; (b) the conceptualization of the
variables used to test the said corruption model is not similar to what this study has undertaken. While the
theory is generally acceptable, In the Philippine setting, one or more independent variables need to be identified
to better understand the corruption index.
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