Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 168757 January 19, 2011 RENATO REAL, Petitioner, SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. And/ or KIICHI ABE, Respondents
G.R. No. 168757 January 19, 2011 RENATO REAL, Petitioner, SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. And/ or KIICHI ABE, Respondents
RENATO REAL, Petitioner,
vs.
SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. and/ or KIICHI ABE, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The perennial question of whether a complaint for illegal dismissal is intra-corporate and thus
beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter is the core issue up for consideration in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated June 28, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86017 which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed before it.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Renato Real was the Manager of respondent corporation Sangu Philippines, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower for general services, like janitors,
janitresses and other maintenance personnel, to various clients. In 2001, petitioner, together with 29
others who were either janitors, janitresses, leadmen and maintenance men, all employed by
respondent corporation, filed their respective Complaints2 for illegal dismissal against the latter and
respondent Kiichi Abe, the corporation’s Vice-President and General Manager. These complaints
were later on consolidated.
With regard to petitioner, he was removed from his position as Manager through Board Resolution
2001-033 adopted by respondent corporation’s Board of Directors. Petitioner complained that he was
neither notified of the Board Meeting during which said board resolution was passed nor formally
charged with any infraction. He just received from respondents a letter4 dated March 26, 2001 stating
that he has been terminated from service effective March 25, 2001 for the following reasons: (1)
continuous absences at his post at Ogino Philippines Inc. for several months which was detrimental
to the corporation’s operation; (2) loss of trust and confidence; and, (3) to cut down operational
expenses to reduce further losses being experienced by respondent corporation.
Respondents, on the other hand, refuted petitioner’s claim of illegal dismissal by alleging that after
petitioner was appointed Manager, he committed gross acts of misconduct detrimental to the
company since 2000. According to them, petitioner would almost always absent himself from work
without informing the corporation of his whereabouts and that he would come to the office only to
collect his salaries. As he was almost always absent, petitioner neglected to supervise the
employees resulting in complaints from various clients about employees’ performance. In one
instance, petitioner together with a few others, while apparently drunk, went to the premises of one
of respondents’ clients, Epson Precision (Phils.) Inc., and engaged in a heated argument with the
employees therein. Because of this, respondent Abe allegedly received a complaint from Epson’s
Personnel Manager concerning petitioner’s conduct. Respondents likewise averred that petitioner
established a company engaged in the same business as respondent corporation’s and even
submitted proposals for janitorial services to two of the latter’s clients. Because of all these, the
Board of Directors of respondent corporation met on March 24, 2001 and adopted Board Resolution
No. 2001-03 removing petitioner as Manager. Petitioner was thereafter informed of his removal
through a letter dated March 26, 2001 which he, however, refused to receive.
Further, in what respondents believed to be an act of retaliation, petitioner allegedly encouraged the
employees who had been placed in the manpower pool to file a complaint for illegal dismissal
against respondents. Worse, he later incited those assigned in Epson Precision (Phils.) Inc., Ogino
Philippines Corporation, Hitachi Cable Philippines Inc. and Philippine TRC Inc. to stage a strike on
April 10 to 16, 2001. Not satisfied, petitioner together with other employees also barricaded the
premises of respondent corporation. Such acts respondents posited constitute just cause for
petitioner’s dismissal and that same was validly effected.
Rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
The Labor Arbiter in a Decision5 dated June 5, 2003 declared petitioner and his co-complainants as
having been illegally dismissed and ordered respondents to reinstate complainants to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay their full backwages from the
time of their dismissal until actually reinstated and furthermore, to pay them attorney’s fees. The
Labor Arbiter found no convincing proof of the causes for which petitioner was terminated and noted
that there was complete absence of due process in the manner of his termination.
Respondents thus appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and raised therein
as one of the issues the lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over petitioner’s complaint.
Respondents claimed that petitioner is both a stockholder and a corporate officer of respondent
corporation, hence, his action against respondents is an intra-corporate controversy over which the
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction.
The NLRC found such contention of respondents to be meritorious. Aside from petitioner’s own
admission in the pleadings that he is a stockholder and at the same time occupying a managerial
position, the NLRC also gave weight to the corporation’s General Information Sheet6 (GIS) dated
October 27, 1999 listing petitioner as one of its stockholders, consequently his termination had to be
effected through a board resolution. These, the NLRC opined, clearly established petitioner’s status
as a stockholder and as a corporate officer and hence, his action against respondent corporation is
an intra-corporate controversy over which the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction. As to the other
complainants, the NLRC ruled that there was no dismissal. The NLRC however, modified the
appealed decision of the Labor Arbiter in a Decision7 dated February 13, 2004, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all foregoing premises considered, the appealed Decision dated June 5, 2003 is
hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint of Renato
Real for lack of jurisdiction. As to the rest of the complainants, they are hereby ordered to
immediately report back to work but without the payment of backwages.
All other claims against respondents including attorney’s fees are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Still joined by his co-complainants, petitioner brought the case to the CA by way of petition
for certiorari.
Before the CA, petitioner imputed upon the NLRC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in declaring him a corporate officer and in holding that his action against
respondents is an intra-corporate controversy and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
While admitting that he is indeed a stockholder of respondent corporation, petitioner nevertheless
disputed the declaration of the NLRC that he is a corporate officer thereof. He posited that his being
a stockholder and his being a managerial employee do not ipso facto confer upon him the status of a
corporate officer. To support this contention, petitioner called the CA’s attention to the same GIS
relied upon by the NLRC when it declared him to be a corporate officer. He pointed out that although
said information sheet clearly indicates that he is a stockholder of respondent corporation, he is not
an officer thereof as shown by the entry "N/A" or "not applicable" opposite his name in the officer
column. Said column requires that the particular position be indicated if the person is an officer and if
not, the entry "N/A". Petitioner further argued that the fact that his dismissal was effected through a
board resolution does not likewise mean that he is a corporate officer. Otherwise, all that an
employer has to do in order to avoid compliance with the requisites of a valid dismissal under the
Labor Code is to dismiss a managerial employee through a board resolution. Moreover, he insisted
that his action for illegal dismissal is not an intra-corporate controversy as same stemmed from
employee-employer relationship which is well within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. This can be
deduced and is bolstered by the last paragraph of the termination letter sent to him by respondents
stating that he is entitled to benefits under the Labor Code, to wit:
In this connection (his dismissal) you are entitled to separation pay and other benefits provided
for under the Labor Code of the Philippines.8 (Emphasis supplied)
In contrast, respondents stood firm that the action against them is an intra-corporate controversy. It
cited Tabang v. National Labor Relations Commission 9 wherein this Court declared that "an intra-
corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation;" that "[t]here
is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever;" and that it is "broad and covers all
kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations." In view of this ruling and since
petitioner is undisputedly a stockholder of the corporation, respondents contended that the action
instituted by petitioner against them is an intra-corporate controversy cognizable only by the
appropriate regional trial court. Hence, the NLRC correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.
In the assailed Decision10 dated June 28, 2005, the CA sided with respondents and affirmed the
NLRC’s finding that aside from being a stockholder of respondent corporation, petitioner is also a
corporate officer thereof and consequently, his complaint is an intra-corporate controversy over
which the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction. Said court opined that if it was true that petitioner is a
mere employee, the respondent corporation would not have called a board meeting to pass a
resolution for petitioner’s dismissal considering that it was very tedious for the Board of Directors to
convene and to adopt a resolution every time they decide to dismiss their managerial employees. To
support its finding, the CA likewise cited Tabang. As to petitioner’s co-complainants, the CA likewise
affirmed the NLRC’S finding that they were never dismissed from the service. The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed decision and
resolution of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No.
036128-03 NLRC SRAB-IV-05-6618-01-B/05-6619-02-B/05-6620-02-B/10-6637-01-B/10-6833-01-B,
STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
Now alone but still undeterred, petitioner elevated the case to us through this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
Petitioner likewise contends that his complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents is not an
intra-corporate controversy. He avers that for an action or suit between a stockholder and a
corporation to be considered an intra-corporate controversy, same must arise from intra-corporate
relations, i.e., an action involving the status of a stockholder as such. He believes that his action
against the respondents does not arise from intra-corporate relations but rather from employer-
employee relations. This, according to him, was even impliedly recognized by respondents as shown
by the earlier quoted portion of the termination letter they sent to him.
For their part, respondents posit that what petitioner is essentially assailing before this Court is the
finding of the NLRC and the CA that he is a corporate officer of respondent corporation. To the
respondents, the question of whether petitioner is a corporate officer is a question of fact which, as
held in a long line of jurisprudence, cannot be the subject of review under this Petition for Review
on Certiorari. At any rate, respondents insist that petitioner who is undisputedly a stockholder of
respondent corporation is likewise a corporate officer and that his action against them is an intra-
corporate dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals. To support this, they cited several
jurisprudence such as Pearson & George (S.E. Asia), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,11 Philippine School of Business Administration v. Leano, 12 Fortune Cement Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission13 and again, Tabang v. National Labor Relations
Commission.14
Moreover, in an attempt to demolish petitioner’s claim that the present controversy concerns
employer-employee relations, respondents enumerated the following facts and circumstances: (1)
Petitioner was an incorporator, stockholder and manager of respondent company; (2) As an
incorporator, he was one of only seven incorporators of respondent corporation and one of only four
Filipino members of the Board of Directors; (3) As stockholder, he has One Thousand (1,000) of the
Ten Thousand Eight Hundred (10,800) common shares held by Filipino stockholders, with a par-
value of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00); (4) His appointment as manager was by
virtue of Section 1, Article IV of respondent corporation’s By-Laws; (5) As manager, he had direct
management and authority over all of respondent corporation’s skilled employees; (6) Petitioner has
shown himself to be an incompetent manager, unable to properly supervise the employees and even
causing friction with the corporation’s clients by engaging in unruly behavior while in client’s
premises; (7) As if his incompetence was not enough, in a blatant and palpable act of disloyalty, he
established another company engaged in the same line of business as respondent corporation; (8)
Because of these acts of incompetence and disloyalty, respondent corporation through a Resolution
adopted by its Board of Directors was finally constrained to remove petitioner as Manager and
declare his office vacant; (9) After his removal, petitioner urged the employees under him to stage an
unlawful strike by leading them to believe that they have been illegally dismissed from
employment.15 Apparently, respondents intended to show from this enumeration that petitioner’s
removal pertains to his relationship with respondent corporation, that is, his utter failure to advance
its interest and the prejudice caused by his acts of disloyalty. For this reason, respondents see the
action against them not as a case between an employer and an employee as what petitioner alleges,
but one by an officer and at same time a major stockholder seeking to be reinstated to his former
office against the corporation that declared his position vacant.
Finally, respondents state that the fact that petitioner is being given benefits under the Labor Code
as stated in his termination letter does not mean that they are recognizing the employer-employee
relations between them. They explain that the benefits provided under the Labor Code were merely
made by respondent corporation as the basis in determining petitioner’s compensation package and
that same are merely part of the perquisites of petitioner’s office as a director and manager. It does
not and it cannot change the intra-corporate nature of the controversy. Hence, respondents pray that
this petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
Issues
From the foregoing and as earlier mentioned, the core issue to be resolved in this case is whether
petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal constitutes an intra-corporate controversy and thus,
beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Our Ruling
Respondents strongly rely on this Court’s pronouncement in the 1997 case of Tabang v. National
Labor Relations Commission, to wit:
[A]n intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the corporation.
There is no distinction, qualification nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and
covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations.16
In view of this, respondents contend that even if petitioner challenges his being a corporate officer,
the present case still constitutes an intra-corporate controversy as petitioner is undisputedly a
stockholder and a director of respondent corporation.
It is worthy to note, however, that before the promulgation of the Tabang case, the Court provided
in Mainland Construction Co., Inc. v. Movilla17 a "better policy" in determining which between the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over termination
disputes,18 or similarly, whether they are intra-corporate or not, viz:
The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the parties involved
are the stockholders and the corporation does not necessarily place the dispute within the ambit of
the jurisdiction of the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court19). The better policy to be followed in
determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider concurrent factors such as the
status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is subject of their
controversy. In the absence of any one of these factors, the SEC will not have jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that every conflict between the corporation and its
stockholders would involve such corporate matters as only SEC (now the Regional Trial Court20) can
resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis ours)
And, while Tabang was promulgated later than Mainland Construction Co., Inc., the "better policy"
enunciated in the latter appears to have developed into a standard approach in classifying what
constitutes an intra-corporate controversy. This is explained lengthily in Reyes v. Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Br. 142,21 to wit:
Intra-Corporate Controversy
A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Court’s approach in classifying what
constitutes an intra-corporate controversy. Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a
dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy was limited to a consideration of the intra-
corporate relationship existing between or among the parties. The types of relationships embraced
under Section 5(b) x x x were as follows:
c) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State as far as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; and
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the
SEC (now the RTC), regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. This came to be known as the
relationship test.
However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., the Court
introduced the nature of the controversy test. We declared in this case that it is not the mere
existence of an intra-corporate relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate controversy; to rely
on the relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for the sole reason that
the dispute involves a corporation, its directors, officers, or stockholders. We saw that there is no
legal sense in disregarding or minimizing the value of the nature of the transactions which gives rise
to the dispute.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be considered
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the controversy itself is intra-corporate. The controversy
must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to
the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the
internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents
are merely incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not
exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists.
The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question
under controversy. This two-tier test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:
‘To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and
decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such
cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties, and (2) the nature of
the question that is the subject of their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations between any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which
they are not stockholders, members or associates, between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns the
individual franchises. The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically
connected with the regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves matters
that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate
controversy.’ [Citations omitted.]
Guided by this recent jurisprudence, we thus find no merit in respondents’ contention that the fact
alone that petitioner is a stockholder and director of respondent corporation automatically classifies
this case as an intra-corporate controversy. To reiterate, not all conflicts between the stockholders
and the corporation are classified as intra-corporate. There are other factors to consider in
determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters as to consider them as intra-corporate
controversies.
What then is the nature of petitioner’s Complaint for Illegal Dismissal? Is it intra-corporate and thus
beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter? We shall answer this question by using the standards
set forth in the Reyes case.
As earlier stated, petitioner’s status as a stockholder and director of respondent corporation is not
disputed. What the parties disagree on is the finding of the NLRC and the CA that petitioner is a
corporate officer. An examination of the complaint for illegal dismissal, however, reveals that the root
of the controversy is petitioner’s dismissal as Manager of respondent corporation, a position which
respondents claim to be a corporate office. Hence, petitioner is involved in this case not in his
capacity as a stockholder or director, but as an alleged corporate officer. In applying the relationship
test, therefore, it is necessary to determine if petitioner is a corporate officer of respondent
corporation so as to establish the intra-corporate relationship between the parties. And albeit
respondents claim that the determination of whether petitioner is a corporate officer is a question of
fact which this Court cannot pass upon in this petition for review on certiorari, we shall nonetheless
proceed to consider the same because such question is not the main issue to be resolved in this
case but is merely collateral to the core issue earlier mentioned.
Petitioner negates his status as a corporate officer by pointing out that although he was removed as
Manager through a board resolution, he was never elected to said position nor was he appointed
thereto by the Board of Directors. While the By-Laws of respondent corporation provides that the
Board may from time to time appoint such officers as it may deem necessary or proper, he avers
that respondents failed to present any board resolution that he was appointed pursuant to said By-
Laws. He instead alleges that he was hired as Manager of respondent corporation solely by
respondent Abe. For these reasons, petitioner claims to be a mere employee of respondent
corporation rather than as a corporate officer.
"‘Corporate officers’ in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are those officers of the
corporation who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.
There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of the Corporation
Code. These are the president, secretary and the treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to
these three. A corporation may have such other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like,
but not limited to, the vice-president, cashier, auditor or general manager. The number of corporate
officers is thus limited by law and by the corporation’s by-laws."22
Respondents claim that petitioner was appointed Manager by virtue of Section 1, Article IV of
respondent corporation’s By-Laws which provides:
ARTICLE IV
OFFICER
Section 1. Election/Appointment – Immediately after their election, the Board of Directors shall
formally organize by electing the President, Vice-President, the Secretary at said meeting.
The Board, may from time to time, appoint such other officers as it may determine to be
necessary or proper. Any two (2) or more positions may be held concurrently by the same person,
except that no one shall act as President and Treasurer or Secretary at the same time.
x x x x23 (Emphasis ours)
We have however examined the records of this case and we find nothing to prove that petitioner’s
appointment was made pursuant to the above-quoted provision of respondent corporation’s By-
Laws. No copy of board resolution appointing petitioner as Manager or any other document showing
that he was appointed to said position by action of the board was submitted by respondents. What
we found instead were mere allegations of respondents in their various pleadings24 that petitioner
was appointed as Manager of respondent corporation and nothing more. "The Court has stressed
time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is
definitely not evidence."25
It also does not escape our attention that respondents made the following conflicting allegations in
their Memorandum on Appeal26 filed before the NLRC which cast doubt on petitioner’s status as a
corporate officer, to wit:
xxxx
xxxx
While respondents repeatedly claim that petitioner was appointed as Manager pursuant to the
corporation’s By-Laws, the above-quoted inconsistencies in their allegations as to how petitioner
was placed in said position, coupled by the fact that they failed to produce any documentary
evidence to prove that petitioner was appointed thereto by action or with approval of the board, only
leads this Court to believe otherwise. It has been consistently held that "[a]n ‘office’ is created by the
charter of the corporation and the officer is elected (or appointed) by the directors or
stockholders."27 Clearly here, respondents failed to prove that petitioner was appointed by the board
of directors. Thus, we cannot subscribe to their claim that petitioner is a corporate officer. Having
said this, we find that there is no intra-corporate relationship between the parties insofar as
petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal is concerned and that same does not satisfy the
relationship test.
We now go to the nature of controversy test. As earlier stated, respondents terminated the services
of petitioner for the following reasons: (1) his continuous absences at his post at Ogino Philippines,
Inc; (2) respondents’ loss of trust and confidence on petitioner; and, (3) to cut down operational
expenses to reduce further losses being experienced by the corporation. Hence, petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and sought reinstatement, backwages, moral damages and attorney’s
fees. From these, it is not difficult to see that the reasons given by respondents for dismissing
petitioner have something to do with his being a Manager of respondent corporation and nothing
with his being a director or stockholder. For one, petitioner’s continuous absences in his post in
Ogino relates to his performance as Manager. Second, respondents’ loss of trust and confidence in
petitioner stemmed from his alleged acts of establishing a company engaged in the same line of
business as respondent corporation’s and submitting proposals to the latter’s clients while he was
still serving as its Manager. While we note that respondents also claim these acts as constituting
acts of disloyalty of petitioner as director and stockholder, we, however, think that same is a mere
afterthought on their part to make it appear that the present case involves an element of intra-
corporate controversy. This is because before the Labor Arbiter, respondents did not see such acts
to be disloyal acts of a director and stockholder but rather, as constituting willful breach of the trust
reposed upon petitioner as Manager.28 It was only after respondents invoked the Labor Arbiter’s lack
of jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint in the Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal29 filed before
the NLRC that respondents started considering said acts as such. Third, in saying that they were
dismissing petitioner to cut operational expenses, respondents actually want to save on the salaries
and other remunerations being given to petitioner as its Manager. Thus, when petitioner sought for
reinstatement, he wanted to recover his position as Manager, a position which we have, however,
earlier declared to be not a corporate position. He is not trying to recover a seat in the board of
directors or to any appointive or elective corporate position which has been declared vacant by the
board. Certainly, what we have here is a case of termination of employment which is a labor
controversy and not an intra-corporate dispute. In sum, we hold that petitioner’s complaint likewise
does not satisfy the nature of controversy test.
With the elements of intra-corporate controversy being absent in this case, we thus hold that
petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents is not intra-corporate. Rather, it is a
termination dispute and, consequently, falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to
Section 21730 of the Labor Code.
We take note of the cases cited by respondents and find them inapplicable to the case at
bar. Fortune Cement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission 31 involves a member of
the board of directors and at the same time a corporate officer who claims he was illegally dismissed
after he was stripped of his corporate position of Executive Vice-President because of loss of trust
and confidence. On the other hand, Philippine School of Business Administration v.
Leano32 and Pearson & George v. National Labor Relations Commission 33 both concern a complaint
for illegal dismissal by corporate officers who were not re-elected to their respective corporate
positions. The Court declared all these cases as involving intra-corporate controversies and thus
affirmed the jurisdiction of the SEC (now the RTC)34 over them precisely because they all relate to
corporate officers and their removal or non-reelection to their respective corporate positions. Said
cases are by no means similar to the present case because as discussed earlier, petitioner here is
not a corporate officer.
With the foregoing, it is clear that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In cases such as this, the Court normally
remands the case to the NLRC and directs it to properly dispose of the case on the merits.
"However, when there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits of petitioner’s case
may be had, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to
prevent further delays in the disposition of the case."35 "It is already an accepted rule of procedure for
us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear
the seeds of litigation. If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can
be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to the
lower court for further proceedings."36 We have gone over the records before us and we are
convinced that we can now altogether resolve the issue of the validity of petitioner’s dismissal and
hence, we shall proceed to do so.
"In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that [the] dismissal of
an employee is for a valid cause."37 Here, as correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, respondents
failed to produce any convincing proof to support the grounds for which they terminated petitioner.
Respondents contend that petitioner has been absent for several months, yet they failed to present
any proof that petitioner was indeed absent for such a long time. Also, the fact that petitioner was
still able to collect his salaries after his alleged absences casts doubts on the truthfulness of such
charge. Respondents likewise allege that petitioner engaged in a heated argument with the
employees of Epson, one of respondents’ clients. But just like in the charge of absenteeism, there is
no showing that an investigation on the matter was done and that disciplinary action was imposed
upon petitioner. At any rate, we have reviewed the records of this case and we agree with the Labor
Arbiter that under the circumstances, said charges are not sufficient bases for petitioner’s
termination. As to the charge of breach of trust allegedly committed by petitioner when he
established a new company engaged in the same line of business as respondent corporation’s and
submitted proposals to two of the latter’s clients while he was still a Manager, we again observe that
these are mere allegations without sufficient proof. To reiterate, allegations must be proven by
sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence.38
Moreover, petitioner’s dismissal was effected without due process of law. "The twin requirements of
lawphi1
notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. The law requires the employer
to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected: (1) a written notice apprising the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2) a subsequent notice informing
the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory and its
absence taints the dismissal with illegality."39 Since in this case, petitioner’s dismissal was effected
through a board resolution and all that petitioner received was a letter informing him of the board’s
decision to terminate him, the abovementioned procedure was clearly not complied with. All told, we
agree with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner has been illegally dismissed. And, as an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the two reliefs of backwages and reinstatement,40 we affirm
the Labor Arbiter’s judgment ordering petitioner’s reinstatement to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and awarding backwages from the time of his dismissal until
actually reinstated. Considering that petitioner has to secure the services of counsel to protect his
interest and necessarily has to incur expenses, we likewise affirm the award of attorney’s fees which
is equivalent to 10% of the total backwages that respondents must pay petitioner in accordance with
this Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed June 28, 2005 Decision of the Court
of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The June 5, 2003 Decision
of the Labor Arbiter with respect to petitioner Renato Real is AFFIRMED and this case is ordered
REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the computation of petitioner’s
backwages and attorney’s fees in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.