SLPOA V City of ST Louis - Petition

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST.
LOUIS
STATE OF MISSOURI
ST. LOUIS POLICE OFFICERS’ )

ASSOCIATION, )
)
ETHICAL SOCIETY OF POLICE, INC )
)
and )
)
ST. LOUIS POLICE LEADERSHIP )
ORGANIZATION )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. )
)
THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, ) Cause#
)
TISHAURA JONES, in her Official ) Division #
capacity as Mayor of the City of )
St. Louis, )
)
DANIEL ISOM, in his Official capacity )
as Director of Public Safety, )
)
THE CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT BOARD )
OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, )
)
MATTEW BRUMMUND, in his Official )
Capacity as Commissioner of the Civilian )
Oversight Board, )
)
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION )
OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, )
)
BETTYE BATTLE -TURNER, in her )
Official capacity as Commissioner of the )
Civil Service Commission of the City of )
St. Louis, )
)
DEAN KPERE-DAIBO, in his Official )
capacity as Commissioner of the )
Civil Service Commission of the City of )
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St. Louis, and )
)
STEVE BARNEY, in his Official capacity )
as Commissioner of the Civil Service )
Commission of the City of St. Louis, )
)
Defendants. )
VERIFIED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
COME NOW Plaintiffs, St. Louis Police Officers’ Association (hereinafter “SLPOA”),
Ethical Society of Police (hereinafter “ESOP”), and St. Louis Police Leadership Organization
(hereinafter “SLPLO”) (jointly referred to hereafter as “Plaintiffs”), by and through counsel,
pursuant to §527.010 and §536.050 RSMo., and for its Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Injunctive Relief, states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 2022, City of St. Louis Ordinance ____________ (hereinafter “COB
Ordinance”) was signed into law. A genuine and authentic copy of the COB Ordinance is
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The COB Ordinance gives broad, sweeping powers to the Civilian
Oversight Board (hereinafter “COB”) over internal investigations of complaints against St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department (hereinafter “SLMPD”) officers as well as final authority over
discipline resulting therefrom. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against The City
of St. Louis’ enforcement of the COB Ordinance contending it violates numerous Missouri
statutes, specifically §590.653, §590.502, and §84.344.
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. SLPOA is a labor organization and is incorporated as a Missouri non-profit
corporation. SLPOA maintains its office in St. Louis, Missouri.

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2. SLPOA, by and through its representatives and legal counsel, represents SLMPD
police officers in disciplinary proceedings and therefore has standing to bring this action on its
own behalf.
3. ESOP is a Missouri nonprofit corporation. ESOP maintains its office in St. Louis,
Missouri.
4. ESOP, by and through its representatives and legal counsel, represents the interests
of minority officers and civilian employees of the SLMPD, in disciplinary proceedings and
therefore has standing to bring this action on its own behalf.
5. SLPLO is a Missouri nonprofit corporation. SLPLO maintains its office in St.
Louis, Missouri.
6. SLPLO, by and through its representatives and legal counsel, represents the
interests of supervisors and commanders of the SLMPD, in disciplinary proceedings and
therefore has standing to bring this action on its own behalf.
7. Plaintiffs also have associational standing to bring these claims on behalf of their
members to enforce their interests and rights in that their members have standing to sue in their
own right, the interests they seek to protect are germane to their purposes, and neither the claims
asserted nor relief requested requires the participation of individual members.
8. The City of St. Louis (hereinafter “The City”) is a charter city established by and
organized pursuant to the Missouri Constitution. Mo. Const. Art. VI. §§19, 31-33. The City
operates under the Charter of the City of St. Louis, adopted June 30, 1914, as amended
(hereinafter the “Charter”). The City is responsible for and operates the SLMPD and the COB.
9. Tishaura Jones is the Mayor of The City of St. Louis.
10. The COB is a division of the City of St. Louis.

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11. Matthew Brummund is the Commissioner of the COB.
12. The Civil Service Commission of the City of St. Louis is a duly constituted
administrative body created pursuant to the Charter of the City of St. Louis.
13. Bettye Battle-Turner is the Chairman of the Commission, Dean Kpere-Daibo is
the Vice-Chairman of the Commission, and Steve Barney is a member of the Commission.
14. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this civil action under §527.010 and
§536.050 RSMo, which authorize this Court to grant declaratory judgments.
15. Pursuant to §508.050 RSMo, this Court is the proper venue for this action in that
the dispute arises out of the legality of provisions of the COB Ordinance.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF LAW
16. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending the
final disposition of the merits of an action. State ex rel. Myers Mem. Airport Comm. v. City of
Carthage, 951 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997). An injunction should issue when
necessary to protect against a substantial interference with a right. RFS, Inc. v. Cohen, 772
S.W.2d 713, 718.
17. In determining Plaintiffs’ right to a preliminary injunction, the court should
weigh “the movant’s probability of success on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant absent the injunction, the balance between this harm and the injury that the injunction’s
issuance would inflict on other interested parties, and the public interest. State ex rel. Director of
Revenue v. Gabbert, 952 S.W. 2d 838, 839 (Mo. banc 1996).
18. Irreparable harm is established if monetary remedies cannot provide adequate
compensation for improper conduct. Glenn v. City of Grant City, 69 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2002. An injunction to prohibit violation of a statute requires only a showing that the
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parties were “adversely affected” instead of showing irreparable harm. Mertzlufft v. Bunker Res.
Recycling & Reclamation, Inc., 760 S.W.2d 592, 597 (Mo. App. S.D. 1988).
The balance of the harm weighs heavily in favor of Plaintiffs.
COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
19. On November 6, 2012, §84.344 RSMo (commonly known as the “Enabling
Statute”) became effective enabling The City to take control of the SLMPD from the State of
Missouri.
20. On September 1, 2013, control of the SLMPD officially transferred to The City.
21. On June 5, 2015, The City, pursuant to §590.653 RSMo, which empowers cities
to create civilian review boards, enacted Ordinance 69984 establishing the Civilian Oversight
Board. This Ordinance allowed the COB to review specific investigations of complaints against
members of the SLMPD, including allegations of excessive use of force, abusive of authority,
sexual harassment and assault, discourtesy, racial profiling, or use of offensive language
including, but not limited to, slurs relating race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity, immigrant status, and disability. This language mirrored the types of allegations
§590.653 allows city civilian review boards to review and make disciplinary recommendations
on.
22. Ordinance 69984 did not grant subpoena power to the COB, nor did it vest final
authority over discipline in it.
23. On or about July 15, 2022, the City of St. Louis Board of Aldermen (hereinafter
the “BOA”) passed Board Bill 47.
24. On or about August 3, 2022, Board Bill 47 was signed by Mayor Jones.
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25. Pursuant to Charter Art. IV. §19, the Ordinance shall take effect thirty days after
its approval by the Mayor, on or about September 2, 2022.
26. The new COB Ordinance repeals and replaces Ordinance 69984, and among other
things, grants the COB subpoena power, complete control over investigations into any and all
complaints against SLMPD officers, and final authority over discipline.
27. As Plaintiffs demonstrate herein, their members will be irreparably harmed and
adversely affected if the injunctive relief requested herein is not granted and monetary remedies
cannot provide adequate compensation for these harms.
28. Neither the The City nor the public will be harmed by a preliminary injunction.
This action raises purely legal issues that can be resolved expeditiously.
29. §12 of the COB Ordinance provides for a transition period of twelve months for
the COB to be fully operational. Granting a preliminary injunction will merely preserve the
status quo pending the final disposition of the merits. A final disposition should be entered prior
to the expiration of the twelve-month transition period.
30. Not only will The City and public not be harmed by a preliminary injunction, but
The City and public interest will be best served by ensuring that the COB operates in a lawful,
fair and equitable manner.
31. Violating Missouri state law does not promote the goals of fairness, equity and
transparency that the ordinance purportedly seeks, and could result in less cooperation from
police officers who lack faith and trust in the COB Ordinance and process.
COUNT I
THE COB ORDINANCE EXCEEDS THE CHARTER AUTHORITY
UNDER MO. CONST. ART. VI, §19(a)
32. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained
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in paragraphs 1 through 31, as if fully set forth herein.
33. Mo. Const. Art. VI, §19(a) applies to and limits the powers of The City. Section
19(a) provides that:
Any city which adopts or has adopted a charter for its own government, shall have all
powers which the general assembly of the state of Missouri has authority to confer upon
any city, provide such powers are consistent with the constitution of this state and are not
limited or denied either by the charter so adopted or by statute. Such city shall, in
addition to its home rule powers, have all powers conferred by law.
Mo. Const. Art. VI, §19(a)
34. Pursuant to Mo. Const. Art. VI, §19(a), a charter city’s ordinances must be
“consistent with the constitution and not limited or denied by statutes.” City of Springfield v.
Goff, 918 S.W. 2d 786, 789 (Mo. Banc 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
35. A charter city is not required to exercise delegated powers in “precisely the same
manner as prescribed by the general law of the state”, but local legislation cannot create an
inconsistent or irreconcilable conflict with state law. Cooperative Home Care, Inc.. v. City of St.
Louis, citation (Mo. 2017) (quoting Missouri Banker’s Association, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 448
S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo. banc 2014)). If this Court finds such a conflict exists, state statutes
preempt the local ordinances. Id.
36. The authority of the municipality is not without meaningful limits: notably,
municipal legislation may not “invade the province of general legislation involving the public
policy of the state as a whole”. Missouri Bankers Association Inc. v. St. Louis County, 448 S.W.
3d 267, 271 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Flower Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Louis County,
528 S.W. 2d 749, 754 (Mo. Banc 1975)); Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. v. Mayor’s Commission
on Human Rights, 791 S.W. 2d 386 (Mo. banc 1990). “The Constitution and general laws of the
state shall continue in force with the municipalities which have framed their own charters, and
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that the power of the municipality to legislate shall be confined to municipal affairs.” Kansas
City v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 87 S.W. 2d 185, 200 (Mo. banc 1935).
37. The scope of this issue extends beyond purely local considerations, to state and
federal concerns. Crime is not restricted to local jurisdictional boundary lines. The stability of a
police agency in one jurisdiction can have a dramatic impact on the crime rates and stability of
public safety in neighboring jurisdictions and in the state as a whole. For instance, high crime
rates in the City of St. Louis will impact the crime rates of neighboring jurisdictions.
Additionally, high crime rates in the City of St. Louis will impact the economies and tax
revenues of neighboring jurisdictions as well as the State as a whole.
38. Law enforcement agencies have a direct impact on crime. Consequently, the
stability and health of a law enforcement agency and the professionals the agency employs have
a direct impact on crime. Where an agency struggles to recruit and retain quality police officers,
the crime rates are negatively impacted in that jurisdiction and in the surrounding jurisdictions as
well.
39. An unlawful civilian review board in one jurisdiction whose provisions violate the
due process rights of the police officers who are critical to public safety directly impacts the
public safety and revenues of the entire state. Therefore, the COB Ordinance and the negative
impact it will have on public safety is not purely a local concern such that the City is authorized
to legislate the same outside the scope of the authority granted by state law, specifically Mo.
Const. Art. VI, §19(a) and §590.653 RSMo.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
A. Enter a preliminary injunction enjoining The City from enforcing the COB
Ordinance. Specifically: 1) enjoining the COB, its investigators, employees, agents and servants
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from compelling SLMPD officers to interview or give statements to COB investigators; 2)
enjoining the Civil Service Commission from promulgating any rules delegating the authority to
discipline from the SLMPD to the COB; 3) enjoining the COB Commissioner from making any
disciplinary decisions in connection with internal investigations of complaints lodged against
SLMPD officers; 4) enjoining the COB commissioner from issuing subpoenas in connection
with internal investigations of complaints lodged against SLMPD officers; and 5) enjoining the
COB from disseminating information obtained from confidential closed records until such time
as the court rules on Plaintiffs’ Petition for Permanent Injunctive Relief;
B. That the Court set this matter for hearing and require the City of St. Louis to
show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted, restraining and enjoining it in
the matters set forth in paragraph A above;
C. Issue a declaratory judgment holding that the COB Ordinance violates state law
and is invalid;
D. Make the preliminary injunction permanent;
E. Award Plaintiffs’ costs and fees incurred herein as required by §536.050.3 and as
authorized by §527.100; and
F. Grant such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II
THE COB ORDINANCE CONFLICTS WITH
MO. REV. STAT. §§71.010 AND 590.653
41. §71.010 RSMo. provides that any municipality “having authority to pass
ordinances regulating subjects, matters and things upon which there is general law of the
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state…shall confine and restrict its jurisdiction and the passage of its ordinances to and in
conformity with the state law upon the same subject”.
42. §590.653 RSMo. provides each city, county, and city not within a county the
authority to establish a civilian review board and sets out the specific powers and duties afforded
to them. The City recognized the authority granted by §590.653 in the body of the COB
Ordinance.
43. §590.653.1 authorizes civilian review boards to “investigate allegations of
misconduct by local law enforcement officers towards members of the public.”
44. §590.653.2 provides that the board shall have the power to receive, investigate,
make findings and recommend disciplinary action upon complaints by members of the public
against members of the police department that allege misconduct involving excessive use of
force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or use of offensive language, including, but not limited to,
slurs relating to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, immigrant
status, and disability. The findings and recommendations shall be submitted to the chief law
enforcement officer and no finding or recommendation shall be based solely upon an unsworn
complaint or statement. (Emphasis added).
45. The COB Ordinance conflicts with §590.653 in the following respects:
a. §1 and §3(C) require COB investigators to investigate all complaints.
Complaints are defined as “a request, written, online or oral, by any person to review
and investigate allegations of a Police Incident, Police Professional Misconduct, a
Detention Incident or Corrections Professional Misconduct, as defined herein.” §3(C)
provides that investigators shall be “broadly authorized to independently investigate,
conduct and oversee investigatory matters defined as Professional Standards

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Inquiries.” “The scope and particulars of the matters out of which such inquiries may
arise shall include but not be limited to the matters stated in the definitions of Police
Incidents, Detention Incidents, Police Professional Misconduct and Detention of
Police Incidents.” This expressly includes any accidental injury during police
custody requiring medical treatment, and any police pursuit resulting in property
damage (which would include the use of a tire deflation device). Basically, there are
no limits on what investigators are required to investigate. This broad, unlimited
scope violates the narrowly defined scope of incidents that can be investigated in
§590.653(2) as set out above.
b. §1 requires COB investigators to respond to the scene of Police Incidents,
defined broadly as misconduct, property damage, critical incidents, domestic
disturbances, injuries in custody, use of force resulting in injury, and vehicle pursuits.
This constitutes a violation of §590.653(1) allowing civilian review boards to receive
and investigate “allegations of misconduct by local law enforcement officers towards
members of the public.” The statute does not contemplate or authorize the type of
first-instance, proactive investigations of police encounters with the public regardless
of whether a complaint has been made alleging misconduct.
c. §3(A) grants the Civilian Oversight Commissioner “the authority to take
disciplinary action against employees of the Police Division”. This power is not
authorized or contemplated by §590.653(2) which specifically only allows civilian
review boards to make recommendations on discipline to the chief law enforcement
official.
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d. §4(A)(4) grants the Civilian Oversight Commissioner original subpoena
power. This power is not contemplated by §590.653 and is outside the scope of the
authority granted therein.
e. §3(c) requires the Civilian Oversight Commission and staff must conduct
“reasonable inquiry” into all Police Incidents, Detention Incidents, Police
Professional Misconduct and Detention of Police Incidents even those that are clearly
frivolous on their face.
f. The COB Ordinance authorizes the hiring of full-time investigators and staff.
§590.653 prohibits members of the civilian review board from receiving
compensation beyond reasonable and necessary expenses.
g. § 7 creates the Public Integrity Unit (hereinafter “PIU”) to replace the Force
Investigations Unit (hereinafter “FIU”), which (among other things) reviews police
officer-involved shootings. The PIU is under the control of the Circuit Attorney.
Currently, the Circuit Attorney’s Office independently reviews police officer-
involved shootings after the FIU. The new PIU creates an untenable conflict of
interest in which police officers are required to provide detailed incident statements to
the City’s prosecutorial arm. Again, §590.653 does not contemplate the creation of
such a unit.
46. Preemption of a local law by a statute may be express or implied. Express
preemption occurs when the General Assembly has explicitly proscribed local regulation in a
specific area. Cooperative Home Care, Inc. citing Stegall v. Peoples Bank of Cuba, 270 S.W.3d
500, 503 (Mo. App. 2008).
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47. Implied preemption can occur in either of two ways – through “conflict”
preemption or through “field” preemption. Id. Conflict preemption occurs when a local
ordinance conflicts with a specific state statute either because it “prohibits what the statute
permits” or because it “permits what the statute prohibits”. Id. citing Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v.
City of Cape Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo. banc 1986). In such cases, the conflict is
resolved by giving effect to the state statute rather than the conflicting local law. Id. citing City
of St. Peters v. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Mo. banc 2015).
48. By contrast, field preemption occurs when the General Assembly has created a
state regulatory scheme that is so comprehensive that it reasonably can be inferred that the
General Assembly intended to occupy the legislative field, leaving no room for local
supplementation. Id. citing Connelly v. Iolab Corp., 927 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Mo. banc 1996).
49. In this case, both conflict preemption and field preemption exist. The COB
Ordinance conflicts with §590.653 as it completely ignores the limitations set out therein. The
legislature expressly restricted a civilian review board’s review and investigation to a specific
category of complaints. Had the legislature’s intention been to allow the review and
investigation of any and all complaints, it would not have identified any specific categories in the
statute. Moreover, granting authority to discipline to the COB is clearly prohibited by the statute
which unambiguously restricts civilian review boards to making recommendations on discipline
to the chief law enforcement officer. Finally, had the legislature intended to give civilian review
boards the power of subpoena, it certainly would have expressly provided the authority in the
statute. The COB Ordinance doesn’t just enhance state law, it renders the statute meaningless.
50. Field preemption applies because §590.653 creates a comprehensive regulatory
scheme setting out specific authority to local civilian review boards. Accordingly, it reasonably
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can be inferred that the General Assembly intended to occupy this particular legislative field,
leaving no room for The City to supplement it.
51. Plaintiffs will be adversely affected and irreparably harmed by the COB
Ordinance. As discussed above, §590.653 only empowers civilian review boards to give
recommendations to police chiefs. Allowing COB investigators to compel police officers to
submit to interviews prior to the Court determining whether the COB Commissioner has legal
authority to discipline, could render immunity rights afforded under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967) meaningless. For Garrity protections to apply, the officer has to be compelled,
under threat of additional discipline, up to and including termination, to answer questions. If the
Court ultimately finds the COB Commissioner, and by extension his/her investigators, did not
have the legal authority to discipline, any and all statements given by officers in the interim
could be used against them in subsequent criminal proceedings. Surrendering the basic
constitutional right to remain silent certainly constitutes irreparable harm as no monetary remedy
could provide adequate compensation.
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and is invalid;
COUNT III
MO. REV. STAT. § 590.502
53. Law enforcement officers are heavily scrutinized, and they face layers of review
and oversight at the local, state and federal levels of government. To help stabilize the law
enforcement profession and to promote public safety, the Missouri Legislature passed the Law
Enforcement Bill of Rights (§590.502) in 2021. It provides, among other things, law
enforcement officers due process rights during investigations of internal complaints.
54. §590.502 defines “Law Enforcement Officers” as any commissioned peace officer
with the power to arrest for a violation of the criminal code, who is employed by any unit of the
state or any county, charter county, city, charter city, municipality, district, college, university, or
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any other political subdivision or is employed by the board of police commissioners as defined in
Chapter 84.” The City of St. Louis is a charter city and therefore the police officers employed by
it are law enforcement officers within the meaning of the statute.
55. The COB Ordinance conflicts with §590.502 in the following respects:
a. §4(A)(2) provides “City employees involved in or witness to police
correctional incidents or misconduct shall provide a statement to civilian oversight
investigators immediately upon request. §590.502(1) provides: “The law enforcement
officer who is the subject of the investigation shall be informed, in writing, of the
existence and nature of the alleged violation and the individuals who will be conducting
the investigation. Notice shall be provided to the officer along with a copy of the
complaint at least twenty-four hours prior to any interrogation or interview of the officer”
Moreover, §590.502(9) provides in part: “Law enforcement officers under investigation
are entitled to an attorney or any duly authorized representative present during any
questioning that the law enforcement officer reasonably believes may result in
disciplinary action……The questioning shall be suspended for a period of up to twenty-
four hours if the officer requests representation. Finally, §590.502(10) provides law
enforcement officers or his/her attorney or representative shall have the opportunity to
review the complaint. Requiring an officer to provide a statement immediately to COB
investigators upon request, without providing twenty-four hour notice, without allowing
twenty-four hours to secure an attorney if requested, and without affording him/her the
opportunity to review the complaint is a clear violation of §590.502(1), (9) and (10).
b. §6(C) prohibits the COB’s office space from being situated in SLMPD
Headquarters. On the other hand, §590.502(4) provides: “Any interviews or questioning

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shall be conducted at a secure location at the agency that is conducting the investigation
or at the place where the officer reports to work, unless the officer consents to another
location.” Consequently, officers cannot be compelled to give statements away from
SLMPD Headquarters or from the place where they report to work.
c. §590.502(3) provides interviews are to be conducted while the officer is
on duty unless reasonable circumstances exist that necessitate questioning the officer
while he or she is off duty. The COB Ordinance does not distinguish between on-duty
and off-duty. It merely allows investigators to compel immediate statements from
officers. Compelling an off-duty officer to submit to an interview, is in most
circumstances, prohibited under state law.
d. §1 (definition of “Complaints”) defines complaints as “a request, written,
online or oral, by any person to review and investigate allegations of a Police Incident,
Police Professional Misconduct, a Detention Incident or Corrections Professional
Misconduct, as defined herein”. §590.502(2) provides in part: “Any person, including
members of the same agency or department as the officer under investigation, filing a
complaint against a law enforcement officer shall have the complaint supported by a
written statement outlining the complaint that includes the personal identifying
information of the person filing the complaint.” The COB Ordinance violates this section
in that it allows for oral complaints and does not require the person filing the complaint to
provide a written statement or their personal identifying information.
56. The due process rights granted in §590.502 are essential to ensure the fair
treatment of police officers in internal investigations, who unlike civilians can be compelled to
submit to interrogation. The COB Ordinance violates and completely ignores and tramples on
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many of the rights enumerated in the statute. Plaintiffs and their members would suffer
irreparable harm and would certainly be adversely affected if they are compelled to give
statements to COB investigators without these basic due process rights. These harms cannot be
adequately compensated by monetary remedies.
and is invalid;

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COUNT IV
MO. REV. STAT. §§84.344.(8), 590.502(14) and §610.021(3)
58. §84.344.(8) RSMo. provides that “records prepared for disciplinary purposes are
confidential, closed records available solely to the Civil Service Commission and to those who
possess authority to conduct investigations regarding disciplinary matters pursuant to the Civil
Service Commission’s rules and regulations.” §590.502(14) RSMo. makes “all records compiled
as a result of any investigation subject to the provisions of this section shall be held confidential
and shall not be subject to disclosure under Chapter 610, except by lawful subpoena or court
order, by release approved by the officer, or as provided in section 590.070.” §610.021(3)
RSMo. authorizes a public governmental body to close meetings and records to the extent that
they relate to the hiring, firing, disciplining, or promoting of particular employees. Civil Service
Rule XIX makes disciplinary records closed records and allows the records to be provided to the
COB, its members, the Executive Director, and legal counsel. It does not allow production of
these closed records to any other person or entity. When viewed together, there is no question
that records generated in connection with an internal investigation and/or discipline of a police
officer are closed records and cannot be disseminated absent a lawful subpoena or court order.
59. Contrary to the clearly established law, the COB Ordinance requires the illegal
sharing of information from closed personnel records with persons and entities who are not part
of the investigatory or disciplinary process. Examples are as follows:
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a. §5(A) directs the COB to, in consultation with the Circuit Attorney and others,
“adopt or develop a case management system for complaints and matters that are the
subject of investigations, which shall include a system for classifying different types of
complaints, protocols for investigating complaints and incidents, monitoring
investigations, and ensuring the information is timely and appropriately shared between
the Public Integrity Unit and Professional Standards Unit, as well as processes to ensure
compliance with all relevant local, state and federal laws including the protections
accorded under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) and other applicable
Constitutional rights and responsibilities.” This directive requires the COB to consult
with the Circuit Attorneys’ Office in the development of a case management system
which would facilitate the illegal sharing of information from COB investigators to the
Circuit Attorneys’ Public Integrity Unit.
b. §5(E)(1) and (F)(1) of the COB Ordinance requires quarterly and annual
reports be submitted to the Mayor, Board of Aldermen, Chairman of the Public Safety
Committee and must be posted on-line for public viewing. The report must contain a
summary, description and statistical profile, with individually identifiable employee
information omitted or redacted, of all investigations and related activities. Omitting or
redacting individual, identifiable employee information from closed records does not
make them open records. They are still closed records, and the information contained
therein should only be produced if compelled by a lawful subpoena or court order.
c. §7(C)(3) authorizes the Director of Public Safety for the City of St. Louis
to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Circuit Attorney to
develop protocols “governing the documentation of public integrity and professional

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standards inquiries. Such protocols shall be designed to ensure the development of a
complete record, including but not limited to a detailed camera recording of the scene and
incident report. Such protocols shall be designed to enable information sharing to the
fullest possible extent and consistent with the requirements of criminal investigation and
prosecution, including the protections accorded under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967) and other applicable Constitutional rights and responsibilities.” Internal
investigators, whether they be COB investigators or SLMPD Internal Affairs
investigators cannot, absent compulsion by a lawful subpoena or court order, share
information from an internal investigation with criminal investigators.
60. In addition to the cited statutes and Civil Service Rule, Missouri courts recognize
a right of privacy in personnel records that should not be lightly disregarded or dismissed. State
ex rel Delmar Gardens North Operating, LLC v. Gaertner, 239 S.W. 3d 608, 611 (Mo. banc.
2007). The Court in State ex rel St. Louis County v. Block, 622 S.W. 2d 367 (Mo. App. E.D.
1981) stated “there’s a strong need to maintain the confidentiality of the Bureau of the Internal
Affairs’ investigatory files and confidential personnel files. This confidentiality is essential to
protect the integrity of the police department and to maintain an effective disciplinary system.
The files contain hearsay and unverified information, some of that obtained from confidential
sources. Witnesses have been told their interviews are confidential. Systematic disclosure
would inhibit officers and citizens from divulging information in the future.” Id at 370.
61. Disseminating confidential, closed records generated in connection with a
disciplinary investigation to persons who are not authorized by law to be in possession of such
information, and who may or may not be punished for violating the COB’s confidentiality
provisions, would irreparably harm Plaintiffs’ members in the following ways:

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a. Members’ privacy rights in their personnel records, long recognized by
Missouri courts, will be destroyed and/or diminished;
b. Members will experience stress, anxiety and emotional distress under the
threat that their personnel records will be disseminated to the Circuit
Attorneys’ Office, the Mayor, the Board of Aldermen, members of the media
and the public;
c. In the current climate, Members will experience further stress, anxiety and
emotional distress under the threat that they could become the targets of
threats and violence from individuals with anti-police agendas;
d. Members will experience further stress, anxiety and emotional distress under
the threat that the City’s executive and legislative branches will interfere with
the COB’s investigations and disciplinary decisions; and
e. Members will experience further stress, anxiety and emotional distress under
the threat that future promotions and transfers will be affected by political
influence by the City’s executive and legislative branches of government.
These harms cannot be adequately compensated by monetary remedies.

22
and is invalid;
COUNT V
THE COB ORDINANCE IS VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS
63. To be valid, an ordinance must be clear, concise, and certain in its terms and
expressions. Diemer v. Weiss, 122 S.W. 2d 922, 924 (Mo. banc 1938). If the terms and
expressions in the ordinance are so vague that the precise meaning is not ascertainable, the
ordinance is invalid even though the subject matter is otherwise a valid exercise of municipal
power. City of St. Louis v. Bell Place Realty Co., 168 S.W. 721, 723-724 (Mo. 1914). The
necessity for definiteness and certainty of ordinances that forbid or require the doing of certain
23
acts must be so clear and certain that people of ordinary intelligence will not differ as to their
meaning. Olympic Drive In Theatre, Inc. v. City of Pagedale, 441 S.W. 2d 5, 8-9 (Mo. 1969);
Browning Ferris Industries of Kansas City, Inc. v. Dance, 671 S.W. 2d 801, (Mo.App. W.D.
1984). This is especially true when an ordinance is penal in nature. Id. Thus, an ordinance must
be so formed that its terms and expression clearly define that which it intends to require or
prohibit, and that the execution of the ordinance by the persons charged with the duty to enforce
them will not be left to discretionary judgment. Id.
64. To the extent the provisions of the COB Ordinance requiring the establishment of
rules and protocols for investigations and information sharing and access aren’t in conflict with
state law, they are vague, ambiguous and lack certainty. This lack of clear, concise and certain
terms renders the COB Ordinance invalid.
65. Plaintiffs and their members will suffer irreparable harm if The City is allowed to
enforce vague and ambiguous provisions of the COB Ordinance and this harm cannot be
24
and is invalid;
COUNT VI
MO. REV. STAT §84.344(8)
67. §84.344(8) RSMo, the Enabling Statute, provides the Civil Service Commission
has exclusive authority over the disciplinary process and procedures and that it may adopt rules
and regulations appropriate for the unique operation of the police department. As of this filing,
the Civil Service Commission has not promulgated a rule transferring the authority to determine
discipline from the Police Division to the COB.
68. Plaintiffs and their members will suffer irreparable harm if The City is allowed to
enforce the COB Ordinance without the Civil Service Commission’s promulgation of a rule
25
transferring the authority to investigate and discipline its members and this harm cannot be
and is invalid;
26
Respectfully submitted,
MILLIKAN LAW OFFICE, LLC
By: /s/ Brian P. Millikan_______________

BRIAN P. MILLIKAN, MO BAR #50900
12180 Old Big Bend, Rd
Kirkwood, Missouri 63122
(314) 621-0622
(866) 640-0289 FACSIMILE
[email protected]
ATTORNEYS FOR SLPOA
WORKERS RIGHTS LAW FIRM
By: /s/ Sherrie A. Hall_________________

SHERRIE A. HALL, MO BAR #40949
2258 Grissom Drive
St. Louis, Missouri 63146
Phone: (314) 824-0348
Fax: (314) 828-1029
[email protected]
ATTORNEY FOR ESOP
LAW OFFICES OF RICK BARRY, P.C.
By: /s/ Rick Barry______________

RICK BERRY, MO BAR #58772
1034 S. Brentwood Blvd., Ste 1301
St. Louis, MO 63117
Phone: (314) 918-8900
Fax: (314) 918-8901
[email protected]
ATTORNEY FOR SLPLO
27

SLPOA V City of ST Louis - Petition

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SLPOA V City of ST Louis - Petition

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST.

ST. LOUIS POLICE OFFICERS’ )

VERIFIED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

(hereinafter “SLPLO”) (jointly referred to hereafter as “Plaintiffs”), by and through counsel,

Injunctive Relief, states as follows:

On August 3, 2022, City of St. Louis Ordinance ____________ (hereinafter “COB

statutes, specifically §590.653, §590.502, and §84.344.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. SLPOA is a labor organization and is incorporated as a Missouri non-profit

corporation. SLPOA maintains its office in St. Louis, Missouri.

therefore has standing to bring this action on its own behalf.

5. SLPLO is a Missouri nonprofit corporation. SLPLO maintains its office in St.

interests of supervisors and commanders of the SLMPD, in disciplinary proceedings and

therefore has standing to bring this action on its own behalf.

asserted nor relief requested requires the participation of individual members.

9. Tishaura Jones is the Mayor of The City of St. Louis.

10. The COB is a division of the City of St. Louis.

13. Bettye Battle-Turner is the Chairman of the Commission, Dean Kpere-Daibo is

§536.050 RSMo, which authorize this Court to grant declaratory judgments.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF LAW

S.W.2d 713, 718.

17. In determining Plaintiffs’ right to a preliminary injunction, the court should

Revenue v. Gabbert, 952 S.W. 2d 838, 839 (Mo. banc 1996).

18. Irreparable harm is established if monetary remedies cannot provide adequate

The balance of the harm weighs heavily in favor of Plaintiffs.

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

19. On November 6, 2012, §84.344 RSMo (commonly known as the “Enabling

authority over discipline in it.

the “BOA”) passed Board Bill 47.

its approval by the Mayor, on or about September 2, 2022.

complaints against SLMPD officers, and final authority over discipline.

cannot provide adequate compensation for these harms.

to the expiration of the twelve-month transition period.

fair and equitable manner.

19(a) provides that:

Mo. Const. Art. VI, §19(a)

preempt the local ordinances. Id.

revenues of neighboring jurisdictions as well as the State as a whole.

Const. Art. VI, §19(a) and §590.653 RSMo.

disciplinary decisions in connection with internal investigations of complaints lodged against

as the court rules on Plaintiffs’ Petition for Permanent Injunctive Relief;

the matters set forth in paragraph A above;

D. Make the preliminary injunction permanent;

authorized by §527.100; and

in paragraphs 1 through 39, as if fully set forth herein.

conformity with the state law upon the same subject”.

43. §590.653.1 authorizes civilian review boards to “investigate allegations of

misconduct by local law enforcement officers towards members of the public.”

complaint or statement. (Emphasis added).

a. §1 and §3(C) require COB investigators to investigate all complaints.

and investigate allegations of a Police Incident, Police Professional Misconduct, a

Detention Incident or Corrections Professional Misconduct, as defined herein.” §3(C)

provides that investigators shall be “broadly authorized to independently investigate,

conduct and oversee investigatory matters defined as Professional Standards

Incidents, Detention Incidents, Police Professional Misconduct and Detention of

no limits on what investigators are required to investigate. This broad, unlimited

§590.653(2) as set out above.

b. §1 requires COB investigators to respond to the scene of Police Incidents,

defined broadly as misconduct, property damage, critical incidents, domestic

This constitutes a violation of §590.653(1) allowing civilian review boards to receive

and investigate “allegations of misconduct by local law enforcement officers towards

first-instance, proactive investigations of police encounters with the public regardless