THE UNITED STATES, 

plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE, defendants-appellants.

FACTS: It appears from the record that on the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was presented in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging the defendants with a violation of the Usury
Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint they were each arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not
guilty. The cause was finally brought on for trial on the 1st day of September, 1921. At the close of
the trial, and after a consideration of the evidence adduced, the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, judge,
found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of
them to pay a fine of P120 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to
this court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants violated Act No. 2655

RULING: The defendants did not commit a crime under Usury Law. The law is well established
that when a contract contains an obligation to pay interest, the interest thereby becomes part of
the principal and is included within the promise to pay. The obligation to pay interest on money
due under a contract is a part of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution
of a contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract
without violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing
the obligation of contract." The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to
perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That
law must govern and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it,
whether it affect its validity, its construction or discharge. Any law which enlarges, abridges or in
any manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself. It is an
elementary rule of contracts that the laws in force at the time it was made must govern its
interpretation and application.
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this
jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the present
case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal
act, and to make said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto
operation. The Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done before
its adoption a crime. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is curative
in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is
favorable to the defendant.
ALEJANDRO JAVIER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.

FACTS: Alejandro Javier (petitioner-appellant) was a sales agent of German and Co., Ltd. He
was tasked to prepare purchase orders of the merchandise sold by him, subject to the approval
of the manager, and collection of the sale was entrusted to him. Sometime later, the company
management discovered that there was a big outstanding and uncollected account and that
some of the persons whose names appeared in the invoice did not live in the address specified,
or if they were, the pretended ignorance of any sales made to them. The manager of the
company compiled a list of all the sales made by petitioner-appellant, gave them to Atty. Pedro
France and later showed it to Javier. Upon request of Atty. Franco, Javier indicated the
customers who were fictitious and those who were not. In a written confession, Javier admitted
that he misappropriated P12,052.57, by means of fictitious orders. Petitioner-appellant was
given a chance to pay the company a sum of P50.00 monthly. However, he only made 4
complete payments there being a balance of P11,990.57. Javier was sentenced to
indeterminate term of one year, eight months, and twenty days to five years, five months and 11
days of prision correctional and to indemnify the offended party.
ISSUE: Whether the case falls under the second paragraph of Article 315 because the amount
does not exceed P12,000.00
RULING: It is also vehemently contended that since the appellant was able to make partial
payments of P11,990.57 should serve as the basis of determining the penalty to be suffered by
the appellant. Thus, it is argued, because the amount embezzled by appellant does not exceed
the amount of P12,000, his case falls under the second paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code and he should, therefore be sentence only to a minimum of one year, eight months
and twenty-one days and a maximum of two years, eleven months and ten days. We find to
merit in this contention. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that payment made
subsequently to commission of the crime of estafa does not alter the nature of the crime
committed nor does it relieve the defendant from the penalty prescribed by law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARDINO GAFFUD,

[G.R. NO. 168050, September 19, 2008]

FACTS: Gaffud Jr., along with two John Does, was charged with the crime of Double Murder
for killing Manuel and Analyn Salvador (father and daughter). Orly Salvador (nephew) was on
his way to Manuel’s house when he heard two gunshots. Afterwards, he saw his uncle’s house
burning. Due to the glow of the fire, he saw three people within the vicinity of the burning house
and they were hurriedly leaving the place towards Cagayan River. One of the three was holding
a flashlight and was then identified to be Gaffud, Jr. Orly, and Brgy. Cpt. Ballang found the
charred remains of Manuel and Analyn inside the house. Dominga, Manuel’s common law wife,
had filed an earlier complaint in the barangay against Gaffud, Jr. for slaughtering her pig. She
also stated that she went to Gaffud’s house regarding Manuel’s share in the construction of the
barangay hall. Prior to the incident, it was stated that Brgy. Cpt. Ballang saw Gaffud, Jr. a few
meters away from the house of Manuel. When asked, Gaffud, Jr. said that he was looking for
his boat even though Brgy. Cpt. Ballang knew he did not own a boat.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gaffud, Jr is liable for the complex crime of double murder or for two separate
counts of murder.

RULING: Art. 48 of the RPC states:

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.

There are two kinds of complex crime (1) compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, and (2) complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other.

The single act of Gaffud, Jr. burning the house of Manuel with the main objective of killing him
and his daughter, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double murder.

The CA has correctly imposed the penalty of death for the complex crime of double murder
instead of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for two counts of murder. However, due to RA
9346 (Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines), the penalty is reduced to
reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

Notes: (1) The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the RPC follows the Pro Reo principle.
It is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed.
The rationale is that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates a
lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG

[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]

FACTS: De Guzman was charged with estafa thru falsification of public document on March 29,
1974. As the attorney-in-fact of Mariano Carrera (complainant), in 1964, De Guzman forged his
signature on the special power of attorney (SPA) to use it to mortgage Carrera’s parel of land
and obtain a loan from the mortgage bank. Both documents (Power of Atty. and mortgage
contract) were later registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. The mortgage
foreclosed, the land was bought by someone else, and Carrera only knew about it when an
action for ejectment was filed against him by the new owner in 1972. The trial court dismissed
the case against De Guzman on the grounds that the said crime, which was punishable by
prision correcional, already prescribed, pursuant to Art. 90 of the RPC. The SC affirmed the
challenged decision of the trial court, ruling that the crime prescribed upon the public registry of
the power of attorney which is considered a notice to the whole world.
ISSUE: Whether or not the com charge of estafa through falsification of a public document has
sufficient basis to exist in law
Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already
extinguished by prescription. 
RULING: YES. On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The
falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already
been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the
public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.
YES. a) The start of the prescriptive period was when the falsified SPA was registed in
the Registry of Deeds on Feb. 13, 1964. In a crime of falsification of public document, the
prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds. Citing People v.
Reyes, the Court said that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The
record is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein. Also, in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the
discovery," it was held that the discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time
the document was registered in the Register of Deeds and that this rule applies in criminal and
civil cases.

SANTIAGO PAERA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181626               May 30, 2011

FACTS: As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera
(petitioner) allocated his constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by
limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the
neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong
(Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioner’s scheme,
Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio
of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecio’s access.
The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply
interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To
stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a
wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by
the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged
towards Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing
along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank.
Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner
shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I don’t spare anyone, even if you are
a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house
of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As
petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his
bolo towards him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will
crack open your skull!").

According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily
inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but
to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.

Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner was the
defense’s lone witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

RULING: To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the
case to the concept of "continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. To fix the
penalty for his supposed single continued crime, petitioner invokes the rule for complex crime
under Article 48 of the RPC imposing the penalty for the most serious crime, applied in its
maximum period.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a
crime." This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the
person threatened."

There is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but
only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime.
The act of taking the roosters [and heads of cattle] in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there
are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.

VIRGINIA M. GUADINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164891               June 6, 2011

FACTS: