Rule 

38
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS
(Sections 1 to 7)
 
Grounds and nature
 
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (2a)

Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a judgment or final order is
rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and
in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course. (1a)

* The phrase “any court” refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
          
Purcon vs. MRM Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 182718, 26 September 2008.

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by respondent MRM Philippines, Inc as a seaman on

January 28, 2002. On June 2002, petitioner felt an excruciating pain in his left
testicle. After being examined, he was diagnosed with hernia. Subsequently,
petitioner was repatriated due to his ailment. Upon his return to the Philippines,
petitioner was again examined by the company physician and the latter declared
that he was fit to resume work. When petitioner reported to MRM Philippines,
Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that there was no
vacancy for him. Petitioner a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of
medical expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with
prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
before the Labor Arbiter. However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
for utter lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor
arbiter. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule65 of the
Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals(CA). However, the CA
dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Subsequently, the CA resolution became final
and executory. Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the resolutions of the
CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari. In Our Resolution dated July 16,
 2007, We denied the petition. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief
from judgment.

Issue:

Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from the resolution denying his petition for
review?

Held:

We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an

available remedy in the Supreme Court. First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states
that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from
judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court. A petition for
relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule56 cases originally
cognizable by this Court. Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it
refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. Third, the
procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions
of the Rules of Court. Neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules
of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA. There is no provision
in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this
Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule
45which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before
said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule
47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a
petition for relief under Rule 38mentioned.If a petition for relief from judgment
is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this
remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are
beyond the concerns of this Court.
 
Grounds
 
(1) When judgment or final order is entered or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against
petitioner through FAME
(2) When petitioner has been prevented from taking an appeal by FAME

*   Requires final judgment or loss of appeal

* Only available against a final and executory judgment
 Valencia v. CA
G.R. No. 119118, 19 February 2001.

Facts:

Rufino Valencia entered into a lease agreement with the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Malolos (RCBM) involving a fishpond. The people of Barrio Sta. Cruz,
Paombong filed a complaint against RCBM for declaration of nullity of the title of
the fishpond alleging ownership of the fishpond and that RCBM was a mere
trustee. They prayed for the issuance of an injunction to prevent RCBM from
leasing the fishpond or in case it had already been leased, from implementing the
lease.

The RTC rendered judgment upholding the validity of RCBMs title and
its lease contract with petitioner. However, he dismissed petitioners
counterclaim for lack of evidence.

Upon belatedly learning of said judgment, petitioner moved for execution

pending appeal, contending that since the trial court found him entitled to
possession of the fishpond, it is unfair to deprive him thereof. Meanwhile, he
filed a petition for relief from the portion of the judgment dismissing his
counterclaim, where he alleged that his failure to move for reconsideration of or
appeal from said judgment was due to a mistaken belief of his former counsel
that he was no longer interested to pursue the counterclaim.

The RTC deferred action on the petition for relief.  The trial court also
said that a grant of the petition for relief during the pendency of the appeal
would pre-empt the appellate court’s ruling in case private respondents would
appeal. The court added that they were entitled to have their appeal given due
course, otherwise, the grant of the petition might bring incalculable harm to
them.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
mandamus contending that it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to
defer action on his petition for relief. 

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari and mandamus concludin that there was nothing capricious or
whimsical in the trial court’s decision to defer action on the petition for relief on
the ground that it would pre-empt the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Lastly,
since the petition for relief remained to be resolved by the trial court, the Court of
 Appeals did not deem it appropriate to pass upon the issue of whether the
dismissal of petitioners counterclaim was a violation of his right to due process.

Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:

WON the trial court should have allowed the petition for relief.

Held:

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to compel

the trial court to act on the petition for relief. According to him, the trial courts
duty under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, except sections 4 & 6 thereof, is
ministerial such that upon finding the petition sufficient in form and substance,
the judge must order the other party to answer, conduct a hearing and decide
whether to grant or deny the petition. The judge was therefore remiss in his duty
when he deferred action on the petition, since his only role was either to dismiss
or grant it, according to petitioner.

Private respondents argue that the trial court was correct in deferring
action on the petition for relief, in the interest of justice and equity. To grant the
petition pending private respondents appeal, they aver, would pre-empt the
Court of Appeals. This, they say, is not abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

We find no merit in petitioners argument. A petition for relief under Rule

38 is only available against a final and executory judgment. In this case, the trial
courts judgment subject of the petition for relief has not yet attained finality
because of the timely appeal by private respondents.  Therefore, petitioner cannot
require the judge to follow the procedure laid down in Rule 38.  The judge did
not err nor abuse his discretion when he deferred action on the petition.

Fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence

         
Gomez v Montalban
G.R. No. 174414, 14 March 2008

Facts:

Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of

P40,000 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month.
Montalban failed to comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in
the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still
failed to file an Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
Montalban to pay Gomez.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging

that there was no proper service of summons since there was no personal service.
She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive
summons and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence (FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but
counsel for respondent failed to appear before the court hence the dismissal of
the Petition.

Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the

Petition stating that counsel’s failure to appeal was unintentional to which the
RTC granted. To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

Issue:

WON the granting of Petition for Relief from Judgment by the RTC is
proper.

Held:

NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A Petition for Relief under
Rule 38 is only available against a final and executory judgment and the grounds
include fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a
motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he
was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from
filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.

Discussion on Grounds:

"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case.
The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was
never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed
in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. This does not
exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from
interposing an appeal.
 "Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind
which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to
the court,or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the
controversy. This is not present in the case at hand as respondent was not
prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her
case.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and

prudence could not have guarded against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the
"negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it
is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule
and allow a party to disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of
replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative
sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's
ruling.

In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature of a Petition for Relief from
Judgment:

“A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only
in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party
has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or
appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal,
he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who
seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was
due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right
to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.”

In the case, Montalban contended that judgment was entered against her
through mistake or fraud because she was not duly served summons. However,
under the discussion of the following grounds, the SC sees no merit in her
petition. Petition for Relief from Judgment is set aside.

 Time for filing (Sec. 3)

     
Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either
of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (3)
(1) Within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be
set aside; AND
(2) Not more than 6 months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
was taken

The two periods for the filing of a petition for relief are not extendible and never interrupted.
Both periods must be complied with. [Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Ariaga]

Reckoning points:
(1) The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order,
judgment or proceeding. Not from the date he actually read the same [Perez v. Araneta]
(2) 6-months period is computed from the date of entry of the order or judgment

* Strictly followed
       

Victory Liner, Inc. v. Michael Malinias

G.R. No. 151170, 29 May 2007.
Facts:
A vehicular collision occurred between a bus owned by petitioner Victory
Liner, Inc. and an Isuzu Truck used by respondent Michael Malinias. Nobody
died, but both vehicles were damaged from the accident. A complaint for sum of
money and damages was instituted by respondent against petitioner and the bus
driver.
In the course of trial, respondent finished presenting his evidence and
rested his case. In the meantime, counsel for petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, but the same was denied by the MTC as the motion did not
bear any signature of conformity from the petitioner. When the case was called
for the reception of petitioner’s evidence, no appearance was made for the bus
company. Respondent thus immediately moved that petitioner be declared to
have waived its right to adduce evidence in its favor and that the case be deemed
submitted for judgment. The MTC found merit in respondent’s contention, and
ordered the case be deemed submitted for decision.
Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with a defective Notice of Hearing. Accordingly, the MTC declared that its
earlier judgment had become final and executory. In the same order and upon
the same predicates, the MTC also granted the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution filed by respondent.
Petitioner responded to the foregoing developments by filing a Notice of
Appeal which was however denied, the MR being defective and not having
tolled the reglementary period for appeal.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the MTC which was
denied by the MTC on the ground that it had been filed out of time. The MTC
explained that the petition for relief from judgment must have been filed either
within sixty (60) days from the date petitioner’s new counsel learned of the
judgment, or sixty (60) days after learning that the Motion for Reconsideration
had been denied for having been filed out of time. Neither circumstance was met
by petitioner. Subsequently, the MTC likewise denied a Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Second, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. The petition
for certiorari was dismissed by the RTC agreeing with the MTC that the Petition
for Relief from Judgment had been belatedly filed. Petitioner filed an MR, which
was again denied. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for
Certiorari to Annul Judgment" under the aegis of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Interestingly, based on the first paragraph and the express relief
prayed for in this petition, the "judgment" sought to be annulled was not the final
and executory judgment of the MTC, but rather, the two orders of the RTC which
successively dismissed the special civil action for certiorari, and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of respondent. However, in explaining
the "nature of the petition," petitioner claimed that it was seeking to annul the
judgment and orders of both the RTC and the MTC, although the issues
identified in the petition pertain only to "serious errors" and "grave abuse of
discretion" on the part of the RTC. There is a general allegation that the acts of
the RTC in granting the motion for execution even before petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was acted upon constituted an extrinsic fraud, but no particular
arguments were offered to explain why that was so.
The Court of Appeals further held that it was clear that the ground of
extrinsic fraud raised by petitioner had already been availed of in its earlier
petition for relief from judgment before the MTC. Such circumstance
contradicted Section 2 of Rule 47, which provides that "extrinsic fraud shall not
be a valid ground (for annulment of judgment) if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief."
Issue:
What should have been the remedy pursued by petitioner?
Held:
A proper remedy for the petitioner is found under Rule 38 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs petitions for relief from judgment.
Indeed, Section 2, Rule 38 finds specific application in this case, as it provides
that "[w]hen a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a
party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been
prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition [for relief from denial of
appeal] in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due
course." Such petition should be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment or final order, and not more than six (6) months after such
 judgment or final order was entered. The facts of this case indicate that petitioner
could have timely resorted to this remedy.
Notably, it was only after the Notice of Appeal was denied that the
petitioner had pursued the two remedies it could have undertaken from the
MTC Order declaring its motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper.
First, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the MTC. The
problem with this remedy was the utter belatedness in the resort thereto. Section
3 of Rule 38 requires that said petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered.
Neither benchmark was met by the petitioner, since the petition was filed only
on 25 October 1999, or some sixteen (16) months after the rendition of the
judgment sought to be set aside, and around fourteen (14) months after such
judgment was declared final and executory. Petitioner had opportunely learned
of both the rendition of the judgment and the Order refusing to give cognizance
to the motion for reconsideration. Had it simply consulted the rulebook, it
should have realized that a petition for relief from judgment was a remedy
available to it, and certainly one more appropriate than the Notice of Appeal it
ultimately resorted to.

Contents
       
Affidavit of merit (Sec. 3)
      
FORM AND CONTENTS OF THE PETITION
(1) The petition for relief must be verified
(2) The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit showing the FAME relied upon; and
(3) The affidavit of merit accompanying the petition must also show the facts constituting
the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense as the case may be

 The absence of an affidavit of merits is a fatal defect and warrant denial of the petition
[Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick].
 However, it is not a fatal defect so long as the facts required to be set out also appear in
the verified petition [Fabar Inc. v. Rodelas].

When Affidavit of Merit is not necessary:

(1) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the defendant;
(2) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(3) When judgment was taken by default;
(4) When judgment was entered by mistake or was obtained by fraud; or
(5) Other similar cases.

When motion for reconsideration considered as petition for relief

Action of court before answer
Power to deny (Sec. 4)
Section 4. Order to file an answer. — If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to
justify relief, the court in which it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the adverse parties
to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof. The order shall be
served in such manner as the court may direct, together with copies of the petition and the
accompanying affidavits. (4a)
        
Preliminary injunction pending proceedings (Sec. 5)
       
Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings. — The court in which the petition is
filed may grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the preservation of the
rights of the parties, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in favor of the adverse party,
conditioned that if the petition is dismissed or the petitioner fails on the trial of the case
upon its merits, he will pay the adverse party all damages and costs that may be awarded to
him by reason of the issuance of such injunction or the other proceedings following the
petition, but such injunction shall not operate to discharge or extinguish any lien which the
adverse party may have acquired upon, the property, of the petitioner . (5a)

Order to file answer (Sec. 4)

Procedure
       
Availability of preliminary injunction (Sec. 5)
       
Proceedings after answer is filed (Sec. 6)

Section 6. Proceedings after answer is filed. — After the filing of the answer or the
expiration of the period therefor, the court shall hear the petition and if after such hearing, it
finds that the allegations thereof are not true, the petition shall be dismissed; but if it finds
said allegations to be true, it shall set aside the judgment or final order or other proceeding
complained of upon such terms as may be just. Thereafter the case shall stand as if such
judgment, final order or other proceeding had never been rendered, issued or taken. The
court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for a new trial
or reconsideration had been granted by it. (6a)

Where denial of appeal is set aside (Sec. 7)

Section 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside. — Where the denial of an
appeal is set aside, the lower court shall be required to give due course to the appeal and to
elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely and proper appeal had been made. (7a)
Action of court after giving due course
       
Grant of petition for relief (Sec. 7)

Denial of petition for relief (Rule 41, Sec. 1 (b))

Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

… … …

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;
… … …

* Appeal from an order denying a petition for relief is no longer available under the present
rules. The remedy against a denial of a petition for relief is certiorari under Rule 65, when
proper.

Remedies after petition for relief expires

      
Reopening not allowed

Alvendia v. IAC
G.R. No. L-72138, 22 January 1990

Facts:

A simple collection suit was filed by Bonifacio Bonamy against the

spouses Alvendia. Thereafter, both parties submitted to the trial court a
"Compromise Agreement." Subsequently, Bonamy moved for execution of
judgment. The court ordered the issuance of the writ prayed for. The Alvendias
did not move for reconsideration nor did they elevate the matter to the higher
courts. Bonamy sought the issuance of an alias writ of execution, the first writ
having been returned unsatisfied. Pursuant to the alias writ , the provincial
sheriff levied on the Alvendias "leasehold rights" over a fishpond. Thereafter, a
certificate of sale over said leasehold right was executed by the Sheriff in favor of
Bonamy. More than a year later, the spouses moved for the quashal and
annulment of the writ of execution, levy and sale.
 A final deed of sale was executed and registered with the Register of
Deeds. In an order, the trial court denied the spouses' motion to quash and
ordered instead the issuance of a writ of possession in Bonamy's favor. The
possession of the fishpond was delivered to Bonamy.

In a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary

injunction and temporary restraining order filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the spouses Alvendias sought the annulment of the writ of execution, the
levy made upon the leasehold rights and the writ of possession.

The IAC dismissed the aforesaid petition. The Alvendias filed an urgent
motion for reconsideration. Pending action thereon, the spouses manifested to
the court, thru motion, their willingness to immediately pay to Bonamy the
remaining balance of the judgment sought to be enforced. The IAC issued two
resolutions, denominated as Resolutions I and II.
Resolution I denied the Alvendias' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Resolution II granted their motion to satisfy the judgment sought to be enforced
in cash thereby directing the parties to submit to the court an agreement duly
signed by both parties regarding full satisfaction of the judgment but only after
the total amount involved in said judgment had been tendered and delivered to
Bonamy. The Alvendias then tendered payment to Bonamy in the form of a
cashier's check. Bonamy refused said tender of payment, and instead moved for
a reconsideration of Resolution II.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the

annulment of respondent court's Resolution I and II alleging that respondent
court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Alvendias' motion that
they be allowed to pay the judgment debt in cash. Petitioner claims that the
assailed resolutions are in effect an annulment of the assailed Orders and Writs
of the Bulacan Regional Trial Court, the Certificate of Sale and the Final Deed of
Sale of the Leasehold Rights over the Foreshore Lands;

Issue:

WON the writs and orders may be annulled or at least reopened.

Held:

No. The writs and orders of the lower court sought to be annulled or at
least reopened are already final and executory and in fact already executed. The
judgment which was executed was a compromise judgment, duly approved by
the court and therefore, final and immediately executory. Bonamy was clearly
entitled to execution since the Alvendias failed to pay on time the judgment.
 It is axiomatic that there is no justification in law and in fact for the
reopening of a case which has long become final and which has in fact been
executed.  Time and again this Court has said that the doctrine of finality of
judgments is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of courts must become
final at some definite date fixed by law. 

The Alvendias cannot invoke equity as a ground for reopening the case
and making the payment of the judgment in cash possible. The records show that
they had all the opportunity to make such payments on four occasions but failed.
The Alvendias failed to pay on time the judgment of which the execution sale
was a necessary consequence. They also failed to redeem the property within the
required period despite the fact that the Final Deed of Sale was issued long past
the aforesaid period; undeniably showing a lack of intention or capability to pay
the same.

Rule 47
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
(Sections 1 to 10)

I. When remedy available

 An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
 Annulment of judgment is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner, and is based
on only two grounds, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. (Alaban v.
Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA 697)

a. Where applicable
 Annulment of judgment does not apply to judgments rendered by quasi-
judicial bodies. It does not also apply to decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases whose decisions or orders may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. (Macalalag v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 147995, 5 March 2004)

      
II. Grounds (Sec. 2)
 1. Extrinsic fraud or collateral fraud
 is trickery practiced by the prevailing party upon the unsuccessful party,
which prevents the latter from fully proving his case. It affects not the
judgment itself but the manner in which said judgment is obtained. (People
v. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, 26 June 2007)
 must emanate from an act of the adverse party, and the fraud must be of
such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The
fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own
counsel. (Pinausukan Seafood House, Roxas Boulevard, Inc. v. Far East Bank &
Trust Company, G.R. No. 159926, 20 January 2014)
 must be sought within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, which
fact should be alleged and proven; the particular acts and omissions
constituting extrinsic fraud must be clearly established. (People v. Bitanga,
supra)

2. Lack of jurisdiction
 petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but
an absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction as a
ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of
discretion. (Antonino v. The Register of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663,
20 June 2012)

Cosmic Lumber Co v. CA
G.R. No. 114311, 29 November 1996
Facts:
Cosmic Corporation, through its General Manager, executed a Special Power of
Attorney appointing Paz G. Villamil-Estrada (“Estrada”) as attorney-in-fact to initiate,
institute and file any court action for the ejectment of third persons and/or squatters of
the entire lot 9127 and 443 for the said squatters to remove their houses and vacate the
premises in order that the corporation may take material possession of the entire lot,
one of which is respondent Isidro Perez (“Perez”). Estrada, by virtue of her power of
attorney, instituted an action for the ejectment of private respondent Isidro Perez and
recover the possession of a portion of lot 443 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Estrada entered into a Compromise Agreement with Perez. Although the

agreement was approved by the trial court and the decision became final and executory,
it was not executed within the 5 year period from date of its finality allegedly due to the
failure of Cosmic Lumber to produce the owner’s duplicate copy of title needed to
segregate from lot 443 the portion sold by the attorney-in-fact, Paz Estrada to Perez
under the compromise agreement. Respondent filed a complaint to revive the
judgment. Petitioner sought the annulment of the decision of the trial court based on the
compromise agreement, alleging that it had no knowledge of the compromise
agreement.

Issue:
Whether the annulment of the decision of the trial court must be sustained.

Held:

Yes. Nowhere in the authorization was Estrada granted expressly or impliedly

any power to sell the subject property nor a portion thereof. Neither can a conferment of
the power to sell be validly inferred from the specific authority to enter into a compromise
agreement because of the explicit limitation fixed by the grantor that the compromise
entered into shall only be so far as it shall protect the rights and interest of the corporation in
the aforementioned lots.
It is therefore clear that by selling to respondent Perez a portion of petitioners land
through a compromise agreement, Villamil-Estrada acted without or in obvious
authority. The sale ipso jure is consequently void. So is the compromise agreement. This
being the case, the judgment based thereon is necessarily void. Antipodal to the opinion
expressed by respondent court in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, the
nullity of the settlement between Villamil-Estrada and Perez impaired the jurisdiction
of the trial court to render its decision based on the compromise agreement. 

Under authority of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, a party may now petition the
Court of Appeals to annul and set aside judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) shall exercise x x x x (2) Exclusive
original jurisdiction over action for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial
Courts x x x x However, certain requisites must first be established before a final and
executory judgment can be the subject of an action for annulment. It must either be void
for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or it has been obtained by
fraud.

Conformably with law and the above-cited authorities, the petition to annul the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. D-7750 before the Court of Appeals was
proper. Emanating as it did from a void compromise agreement, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to render a judgment based thereon.
 It would also appear, and quite contrary to the finding of the appellate court, that
the highly reprehensible conduct of attorney-in-fact Villamil-Estrada in Civil Case No.
7750 constituted an extrinsic or collateral fraud by reason of which the judgment
rendered thereon should have been struck down.

For sure, the Court of Appeals restricted the concept of fraudulent acts within too
narrow limits. Fraud may assume different shapes and be committed in as many
different ways and here lies the danger of attempting to define fraud. For man in his
ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary.

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where
it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining
to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a
fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud
is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away
from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar
cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.

III. Where petition filed (Secs. 1, 10)   

Judgments, Final Orders of Resolutions Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions

of RTC of MTC
Filed with the Court of Appeals Filed with the RTC
Basis: It has exclusive original Basis: RTC as a court of general
jurisdiction over said action under jurisdiction under Sec. 19 (6) of B.P.
Sec. 9 (2) of B.P. 129 129

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court
of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
 petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner. (n

Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts.

— An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall
be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be
treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall
be applicable thereto.

IV. Annulment of MTC judgment should be filed with RTC

Victory Liner v. Malinias

G.R. No. 151170, 29 May 2007

Facts:
On 17 July 2001 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari to
Annul Judgment" under the aegis of Rule 47. In explaining the "nature of the petition,"
petitioner claimed that it was seeking to annul the judgment and orders of both the RTC
and the MTC, although the issues identified in the petition pertain only to "serious
errors" and "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the RTC. There is a general
allegation that the acts of the RTC in granting the motion for execution even before
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was acted upon constituted an extrinsic
fraud, but no particular arguments were offered to explain why that was so. The CA
dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was the proper venue for the petition.

Held:
Section 2 of Rule 47 does disqualify extrinsic fraud as a valid ground "if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief," and such provision would have found incontestable relevance had the clear
object of the petition for annulment been the MTC judgment. But petitioner’s action for
annulment of judgment did not provide clarity in that regard, and in fact does devote
considerable effort in imputing errors on the part of the RTC with the objective of
annulling, in particular, the RTC decision. If that were so, reliance on Section 2 of Rule
47 would have been misplaced, since the judgment subject of the petition for relief was
different from the decision subject of the action for annulment of judgment. Still, given
the confused nature of the petition for annulment of judgment, blame could hardly be
attributed to the RTC.

All told, even if we were to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the petition on the perceived defect in the verification and certification requirements,
the appellate court would have been left with an action stigmatized by error upon error
interminably. Most frustratingly, for every procedural misstep committed by petitioner,
there existed a corresponding viable alternative which would have necessitated a ruling
on the merits, and which petitioner could have chosen with ease. Instead of filing a
Notice of Appeal, it could have instead filed a special civil action for certiorari or a
petition for relief from judgment. Instead of filing the no longer timely petition for relief
from judgment, it could have instead by then filed a petition for annulment of
judgment. When it did file a petition for annulment with the Court of Appeals, it could
have instead filed a more feasible petition for annulment with the RTC.

V. Period for filing (Sec. 3)

       
Extrinsic Fraud Lack of Jurisdiction
Period for filing Four (4) years from Before it is barred by
discovery laches or estoppel.

 Laches
 A party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction for
the first on time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything doen
in the case, with the active participation of said party invoking the plea.
(Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, 15 April 1968)

Marcelino v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 94422, 26 June 1992

Facts:
Petitioners are the registered owners of the land in Tarlac but even before WWII
respondents have been and still are in possession of these lands and the titles.
Petitioners demanded the restitution to them of the physical possession and titles of the
property but was refused by the respondents. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of
laches. CA upheld the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether petitioners are guilty of laches.

Held:
Yes. Laches in a general sense, means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it.

In the case at bar, the petitioners admitted in their complaint, that the private
respondents had been occupying the parcels of land in question even before World War
II, and that they (private respondents) have in their possession the titles thereof. For
almost 50 years, or until June 20, 1988 no action had been taken by the petitioners, or
their predecessors-in-interest, to recover possession of the land and the titles thereof.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the petitioner's long inaction in asserting their right to
the contested lots bars them from recovering the same. The law serves those who are
vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.

Although the parcels of land in question are registered under the Torrens
System, it is nevertheless settled in this jurisdiction that the ownership of registered
land may be lost through laches. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based
on grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement
of stale claims. Unlike the statute of limitations, laches is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a stale right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.

The individual elements of laches were sufficiently and thoroughly discussed by

the appellate court in its decision. We find no need to make any further disquisition on
the matter.

VI. Parties and contents  (Sec. 4)

The action for annulment of judgment shall be commenced by filing:

1. Verified petition alleging therein:
a. With particularity the facts and the law relied upon; and
 b. Petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense.
2. Filed in seven (7) legible copies together with sufficient copies
corresponding to the number of respondents.
3. Certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be
attached to the original copy of the petition.
4. Affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or
defense; and
5. Certificate of non-forum shopping.

 May be filed by a non-party to the judgment

 The petitioner need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled. What is essential is that the petitioner is one who can prove
his allegation that the judgment was obtained and that he was affected
thereby. (Alaban v, Court of Appeals, supra)

 Available even if judgment has been executed (Sec. 9)

 The judgment of annulment may include the award of damages,
attorney's fees and other relief.
 If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already
been executed the court may issue such orders of restitution or other
relief as justice and equity may warrant under the circumstances. (n)

Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80892, 29 September 1989

Facts:
Da Sila, mortgagor and petitioner, mortgagee, executed a Real Estate Mortgage
over a land in Cubao as security for a 1 million promissory note. Upon default,
petitioner filed for foreclosure with the RTC. Parties entered into a Compromise
Agreement that the land will be transferred to petitioners. The title was then transferred
in the name of the petitioner. Araneta filed with the RD a notice of lis pendens in
connection with the ejectment case filed by petitioner against Araneta but was later on
withdrawn by the petitioner. Araneta filed a notice of adverse claim in connection with
the case filed by da Silva against Araneta. Both lis pendens and adverse claim were
annotated on the title. Petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of
possession against Araneta and for the cancellation of the 2 annotations. Pending said
case, heirs of Araneta filed in the CA a petition to annul the judgment in the foreclosure
case. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case before the CA on the ground that the
decision in the foreclosure proceeding had already been executed and that the heirs
were not a party to the proceedings before the lower court.

Issue:
Whether the petition for annulment of judgment is proper.

Held:

There can be no question as to the right of any persons adversely affected by a

judgment to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a
nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the very matter of obtaining
the judgment when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the
issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person need not be a party to the
judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation
that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.

In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the
foreclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the judgment
rendered therein. However, their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged
fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas and the Council as
would adversely affect them. This allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of
evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of the civil case.

Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of annulment of judgment applies
only to final and executory judgment and not to that which had already been fully
executed or implemented. The Council’s contention is devoid of merit. In Garchitorena v.
Sotelo, the Court affirmed the trial court’s annulment of the judgment on foreclosure
notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the house and lot subject of the mortgage
had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the
property at public auction to a person who bought the same and finally to another
individual in whose name the Torrens certificate of title stood by the time the case
reached this Tribunal. (An action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if
the judgment sought to be annulled had been fully executed and implemented.)

VII. Action by the court.

Two Stages:
  Should the court find no substantial merit in the petition, the same may be
dismissed outright with specific reasons for such dismissal.
 Should prima facie merit be found in the petition, the same shall be given
due course and summons shall be served on the respondent. (Sec. 5, Rule 47)

VIII. Procedure.
 The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should trial be
necessary, the reception of the evidence may be referred to a member of the
court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 6, Rule 47)

IX. Effect of judgment. (Sec. 7)

Extrinsic Fraud Lack of Jurisdiction

Effect of judgment Court may on motion, Set aside the questioned
order the trial court to judgment and render the
try the case as if a timely same null and void,
motion for new trial had without prejudice to the
been granted. original action being re-
filed in the proper court.

X. Suspension of prescriptive period.

 The prescriptive period for the refiling of the aforesaid original action shall
be deemed suspended from the filing of such original action until the
finality of the judgment of annulment. However, the prescriptive period
shall not be suspended where the extrinsic-fraud is attributable to the
plaintiff in the original action. (Sec. 8)
 Rule 65
CERTIORARI

Constitutional provisions on judicial power

Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2, Constitution

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Petition for certiorari, in general (Sec. 1)

Rule 65, Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. 

Distinction between without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and grave of abuse

of discretion

a. Without jurisdiction – the court has no jurisdiction from the beginning; there is
an absolute want of jurisdiction.
b. In excess of jurisdiction – if the court has acted beyond the limits of its authority.
c. Grave abuse of discretion – too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or an act in
contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility; does not encompass
 an error of law nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the
contending parties’ respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.

Remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction

Jamer v. NLRC
G.R. No. 112630
5 September 1997

Facts:

Petitioners worked as store cashiers at respondents’ Isetann Department Store.

Their work as store cashiers is to accumulate, at the end of daily operations, the cash
sales receipts of the selling floor cash register clerks. Thereafter, petitioners will
reconcile the cash sales with the tally sheets to determine shortages and deposit the
same with the bank depositor of Isetann.

Petitioners discovered a shortage of P15,353.78. It was complainant Corazon

Jamer who first discovered the shortage. She informed her co-store cashier,
complainant Cristina Amortizado, about the shortage. Amortizado also reconciled and
re-counted the sale and she also confirmed that there was a discrepancy or a shortage
of P15,353.78. They did not immediately report the shortage to management hoping to
find the cause of the shortage but to no avail. Hence, they had no other alternative but
to report the same to the management.

Respondents placed both petitioners under preventive suspension for the alleged

shortages. Thereafter, respondents conducted an administrative investigation. Finding
the explanation of the complainants to be unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed the
complainants on the alleged ground of dishonesty. Aggrieved, complainant instituted
an action for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of herein petitioners, finding that
petitioners had been illegally dismissed. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the latter rendered
the challenged decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for illegal
dismissal. Hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that petitioners
were validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Held:

At the outset, the Court notes petitioners inexcusable failure to move for the
reconsideration of respondent NLRCs decision. Thus, the present petition suffers from a
procedural defect that warrants its outright dismissal. While in some exceptional cases
we allowed the immediate recourse to this Court, we find nothing herein that could
warrant an exceptional treatment to this petition. Moreover, The unquestioned rule in
this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of
respondent. In the case at bench, the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Rule 65,
Section 1, is a motion for reconsideration of the challenged decision and the resolution
thereof.

Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of

discretion when it reversed the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter.

In asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioners advert to alleged
variances in the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the respondent NLRC. This is
inept and erroneous. Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of
jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari.  Secondly,
a careful reading of the records of this case would readily show that if there is any error
by public respondent in its analysis of the facts and its evaluation of the evidence, it is
not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse
of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just
because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither
does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor
Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The
NLRC's decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect
from the Court.

The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The rationale for this rule is simple.
When a court exercises its jurisdiction an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of
justice would not countenance such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the
original special civil action of certiorari.
 On the merits, there is substantial evidence exists to warrant the finding that
petitioners were validly dismissed for just cause and after observance of due process.
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the public respondent that the herein
petitioners were guilty of acts of dishonesty by incurring several occurrences of
shortages in the amounts of P15,353.78, P1,000.00, P450.00 andP70.00 which they failed
to turnover and account for/and in behalf of respondent Isetann. The failure of
petitioners to report the aforequoted shortages and overages to management as soon as
they arose resulted in the breach of the fiduciary trust reposed in them by respondent
company, thereby causing the latter to lose confidence in them. This warrants their
dismissal.

The NLRC, therefore, did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that
petitioners were legally dismissed from employment. The failure of petitioners to report
to management the aforementioned irregularities constitute fraud or willful breach of
the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative one of
the just causes in terminating employment as provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282
of the Labor Code, as amended.

Distinction between error of jurisdiction and error of judgment

a. When court without jurisdiction and it rendered decision, committed error
of jurisdiction - decision null and void even if correct, and remedy is
certiorari.
b. When court with jurisdiction and rendered decision, but decision not
correct, committed error of judgment – decision valid even if wrong, and
remedy is appeal

Questions of fact cannot be raised

Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City

G.R. No. 79119
22 November 1990

Facts:
Petitioner Victorino Day is the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Zamboanga City. Respondent Go Chu is the owner of a building constructed on said
lot. Petitioner asked respondent to peacefully vacate and remove the latter’s building
on the former’s lot. Due to private respondent’s refusal to vacate the premises, on April
17, 1982, petitioner instituted a formal complaint against respondent with the Office of
the Barangay Chairman. As no amicable settlement could be reached, the Barangay
Chairman issued a certification that conciliation of the dispute at the barangay level had
failed.

On January 15, 1985, petitioner again made another demand on respondent to

remove the building. Because of respondent’s adamant and continued refusal to vacate
the disputed lot, petitioner filed with the MTC on March 25, 1985 an action for unlawful
detainer with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory. Petitioner did not use
the former Barangay Certification in commencing the said suit against respondent. The
MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, ordering defendant to vacate the
premises and remove the portion of his building over petitioner’s property. The MTC
considered the April 1982 certification to file action as sufficient compliance with the
provision of P.D. No. 1508 requiring prior conciliation proceedings.

Respondent filed an original action for certiorari with the RTC. The RTC granted
the petition for certiorari, setting aside the decision of the MTC. Hence the present
petition for review assailing the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not procedural questions or questions of facts or substance may be

entertained in a petition for certiorari.

Held:

No. The RTC has no jurisdiction in a certiorari case to entertain procedural

questions or questions of facts or substance already passed upon by the lower court.
The barangay certificate of 1982 was admitted and found to be sufficient by the MTC
after considering the circumstances surrounding its issuance. This is a procedural
question or a question of fact which cannot be raised or corrected in a certiorari case, but
should be assigned as error and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the
decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. Admissibility of evidence
is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court (the MTC in this
case). Such being the case, no potent reason existed to justify respondent RTC’s
substitution of the lower court’s judgment with its own judgment. "Questions of fact
cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari. Only established or admitted facts
can be considered." (Rubio v. Reyes, Et Al., L-24581, May 27, 1968)
 It is therefore clear that respondent court erred in reversing the lower court’s
findings regarding the sufficiency of the Barangay Certificate of 1982. It was an error for
the respondent court to rule upon a question of fact or procedural question already
decided by the lower court.

Furthermore, only errors of jurisdiction are correctible by certiorari. Clearly, the

only grounds which may serve as the basis for the respondent court to raise the writ of
certiorari are lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by the lower court or that
the said lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in its appreciation of the
barangay certification as constituting sufficient compliance with P.D. No. 1508. In the
ejectment suit filed by petitioner against respondent, the lower court undoubtedly
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the respondent.
Thus, it cannot be said that the lower court had no jurisdiction to render the decision set
aside by respondent court. Assuming that the lower court committed a mistake on the
merits of the case, it was in the exercise of such jurisdiction. The error, if at all, is at most
one of judgment and not of jurisdiction, which cannot be the object of a petition for
certiorari. The proper remedy in such case was appeal. Errors in the application of the
law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it has acquired
jurisdiction over a case, are correctible only by appeal.

Neither can it be said that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion
or exceeded its jurisdiction when it appreciated the barangay certification as sufficient
compliance with P.D. 1508. In the petition for certiorari filed by respondent before the
respondent court, he did not allege that the lower court’s decision was outside or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or was issued in grave abuse of discretion. Respondent merely
alleged that the lower court "erroneously" appreciated facts and evidence, issued
interlocutory orders, and appreciated the issues. He also challenged the soundness of
the decision. These do not constitute excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Neither questions of fact nor of law entertained

Romy’s Freight Service v. Castro

G.R. No. 141637
8 June 2006

Facts:
In 1975, respondent Castro was hired by respondent as a mechanic, and later as
supervisor. In 1994, he suffered a stroke and had to take a leave of absence from work.
While on leave, petitioner sent him several demand letters urging him to work. Later
he was asked to show cause why he should not be disciplined for prolonged absence.
Cruz also filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against him. Because of these,
Castro was constrained to file a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner on the
ground that Cruzs acts constituted constructive dismissal. Respondent Veloria was
hired in 1977 as a carpenter, and later as a senior mechanic. Sometime in 1995, he
figured in an accident. He was forced to absent himself from work to undergo
recuperation. During his absence, he received several letters from Cruz. One letter
required him to explain the loss of several tools, another ordered him to pay his loan
and still another required him to explain his absences. He was later charged for
qualified theft of the missing tools. Because of petitioner’s acts against
him, Veloria joined Castro in filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal against
petitioner.

The labor arbiter ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal. Upon
appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiter’s ruling. Finding respondents
guilty of abandonment of work, the NLRC dismissed their complaint for illegal
dismissal. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the labor
arbiter. Hence the present petition for certiorari, faulting the CA for reversing the
decision of the NLRC.

Issue:

Whether or not the issues of illegal dismissal, abandonment and entitlement to

backwages and benefits are proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.

Held:

No. The issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether respondents were illegally

dismissed (as the CA and the labor arbiter ruled) or abandoned their work (as the
NLRC held) and whether they were entitled to backwages, unpaid benefits, separation
pay and attorneys fees, are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. They involve
an inquiry into factual matters.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are
entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. The phrase grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in law, denoting
abuse of discretion too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty,
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and personal hostility. It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a
mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties respective evidence or the
evaluation of their relative weight.
 
The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and
analyze, assess and weigh them all over again to ascertain if the trial court or quasi-
judicial agency and the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this
or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is
the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public
respondents evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon.
Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions the affirmation
by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private respondents were
illegally dismissed, entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid benefits,
separation pay and attorney’s fees.

Only issue involved is jurisdiction, either want of or excess thereof

Gerardo vs. De la Pena

G.R. No. 61527
26 December 1990

Facts:

Angel Gerardo owned three parcels of lots. Filomina, Berta, and Santiago were
his children. Filomina and Berta were both survived by their respective children, herein
respondents. Santiago was also survived by his children, herein petitioners.

Before the cadastral hearing involving the subject parcels of lots could
commence, Angel Gerardo died. Subsequently, Santiago filed the corresponding
answers for the three lots in question. It was alleged in said answers that he (Santiago)
was the heir of Angel Gerardo and that said three lots were being claimed by him as his
inheritance from his late father, Angel Gerardo. Consequently, after hearing, the lots
were registered in Santiago’s name.
 About sixteen (16) years later, or on April 28, 1960, respondents instituted an
action for ownership, partition and accounting against the petitioners. The case, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 3191-11, prayed for the cancellation of title in the name
of Santiago. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, declaring all the
petitioners and respondents as legal heirs of Angel Gerardo and co-owners of the
subject lots. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed
the same. Thus, the judgment became final and executory on October 11, 1965.

Several years later, or on March 18, 1982, petitioners filed a complaint for
reconveyance of properties, annulment of judgment and damages in the lower court
against respondents. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. According to the lower court, all the elements or res judicata are present: (1)
the judgment in Civil Case No. 3191-II became final on October 11, 1965; (2) the court in
taking cognizance of the case had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the judgment was rendered on the merits of the case; and (4) in both cases, the same
parties and properties and the same causes of action are involved.

Hence, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of a petition
for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court possesses no authority to rule upon non-jurisdictional

issues in a certiorari proceeding. The only question involved in Certiorari is jurisdiction;
either want of or in excess thereof. In the case at bar, respondent Judge correctly
dismissed the complaint in based on res judicata considering the prior judgment in
Civil Case No. 3191-11. There is no question that petitioners have no right at all to
claim exclusive ownership of the properties in question. Ownership thereof having
been settled in favor of both herein petitioners and private respondents as co-owners of
the subject properties in Civil Case No. 3191-11 which constitutes res judicata to Civil
Case No. 7590.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Respondent judge
who dismisses a complaint on the ground of res judicata does not commit grave abuse
of discretion.

Distinction between certiorari under Rule 45 as a mode of appeal and certiorari

under Rule 65 as a special civil action

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA

G.R. No. 132703
23 June 2000

Facts:

The instant case originated from the sale by Banco Filipino to Tala Realty of four
(4) lots in Iloilo City, covered and described in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and
62274, for two million one hundred ten thousand pesos (P2,110,000.00). Tala Realty then
leased them back to Banco Filipino for a monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos
(P21,000.00) /for a period of twenty (20) years and renewable for another twenty (20)
years. The lease contracts of the other branch sites sold to Tala Realty have substantially
similar terms and conditions, except for the amount of the rent.

Banco Filipino alleges that a trust was created by virtue of the above transactions.
Tala Realty was allegedly established to serve as a corporate medium to warehouse the
legal title of the said properties for the beneficial interest of Banco Filipino and to
purchase properties to be held in trust for the latter.

However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty demanded payment of

increased rentals, deposits and goodwill from Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment
in case of failure to comply thereto. On April 20, 1994, some stockholders of Banco
Filipino filed a derivative suit against Tala Realty before the SEC for the reconveyance
of the properties sold by the former to the latter. However, on March 6, 1995, the SEC
dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Due to Banco Filipinos failure to comply with Tala Realtys terms, the latter
carried out its threat by filing numerous ejectment suits against Banco Filipino. This
prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995, an action for recovery of real
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground of breach
of trust. Incidentally, during the period from August to September 1995, Banco Filipino
also filed sixteen (16) other complaints for recovery of real properties which it had
previously sold to Tala Realty.

These complaints, including the one filed in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 28, were uniformly worded in their material allegations.

As regards Banco Filipinos complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Tala Realty filed on October 9, 1995 a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1)
forum-shopping; (2) litis pendentia; (3) pari delicto; (4) failure to implead indispensable
parties; and (5) failure to state a cause of action. On the same date, private repondents
Pilar D. Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim and Rubencito del Mundo filed a
separate motion to dismiss in the same case on the following grounds: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; and (3) failure to state a cause of
action. Likewise, on November 10, 1995, private respondent Nancy L. Ty filed a
separate motion to dismiss, alleging the same grounds as those invoked by private
respondents Ongking, et. al.

These motions to dismiss alleged, among others, that aside from the said suit
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 28, other suits involving certain
Quezon City, Lucena City, Malolos and Manila branches of Banco Filipino are also
pending in other Regional Trial Courts.

Banco Filipino filed separate oppositions, dated October 14, 1995, October 31,
1995 and November 21, 1995 respectively, to the motions to dismiss. After a protracted
exchange of pleadings, the trial court dismissed the complaint on April 22, 1996.

On June 27, 1996, the trial court denied Banco Filipinos motion for
reconsideration. Banco Filipino received a copy of said order of denial on July 5, 1996
but instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. Banco Filipino alleged in its petition that the trial
courts decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion because it did not comply
with the constitutional mandate on the form of decisions.

However, the Court of Appeals dismissed Banco Filipinos petition on the

ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioners recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court is patently malapropos." It reiterated the rule that a special civil action for
certiorari may be resorted to only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Banco Filipinos failure to appeal by writ
of error within the reglementary period and its belated recourse to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt
by Banco Filipino to resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal. Furthermore,
the Court of Appeals debunked Banco Filipinos theory that the assailed order of the
RTC did not comply with the substantive requirements of the Constitution, and was
thus, rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

On December 28, 1996, Banco Filipino received a copy of the Court of Appeals
decision dismissing its petition thereby prompting the latter to file a motion for
reconsideration on January 10, 1997. The Court of Appeals denied the said motion for
reconsideration on December 19, 1997 in a resolution, a copy of which was received by
Banco Filipino on January 7, 1998. Banco Filipino then filed with this Court its subject
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on March 9, 1998.

Held:

Without need of delving into the merits of the case, this Court hereby dismisses
the instant petition. For in filing a special civil action for certiorari instead of an
ordinary appeal before this Court, Banco Filipino violated basic tenets of remedial law
that merited the dismissal of its petition.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

We have said time and again that for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie
by reason of grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion, must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.

The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the
decision of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for
certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.
 The antithetic character of the remedies of appeal and certiorari has been
generally observed by this Court save only in those rare instances where appeal is
satisfactorily shown to be an inadequate remedy. In the case at bar, Banco Filipino has
failed to show any valid reason why the issues raised in its petition for certiorari could
not have been raised on appeal. To justify its resort to a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, it erroneously claims that an appeal is not a speedy and adequate
remedy because further delay in the disposition of this case would effectively deprive
Banco Filipino of the full use and enjoyment of its properties. However, the further
delay that would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is one
purely of Banco Filipinos own doing. We cannot countenance an intentional departure
from established rules of procedure simply to accommodate a case that has long been
pending in the courts of law because of the partys own fault or negligence.

Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal.
Banco Filipinos recourse to a special civil action for certiorari was borne not out of the
conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the resolution of its petition before
the Court of Appeals but simply because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this
Court. This observation is shared by the Court of Appeals, which was quick to point out
that when Banco Filipino filed its petition for certiorari assailing the RTC order, the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review before the Court of Appeals had
already lapsed.

It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed
under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed
well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without
offering any reason therefor.

No appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy

General rule, if appeal available, no certiorari

Fajardo vs. Bautista

G.R. Nos. 102193-97
10 May 1994

Facts:

Private respondents Isabelo Jareño and Purita Jareño (hereinafter JAREÑOS) are
the owners and developers of a subdivision known as the Calamba Central Compound.
On various dates, they as SELLERS, and the petitioners as BUYERS signed separate
contracts, each designated as a CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the
considerations therein stated, they bound themselves to sell to the petitioners the lots
subject thereof, and after the latter shall have paid the purchase price and interest, to
execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding deeds of transfer of title, free from
any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided for in the Contract to Sell.

On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty and Development

Corporation (hereinafter FERNANDO) as SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo as
BUYER signed on 22 February 1985 a CONTRACT TO SELL under which for the
considerations therein stated, FERNANDO agreed to sell to Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block
No. 3, also located at the Calamba Central Compound Subdivision, and upon full
payment of the agreed price and interest thereon, to execute a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Fajardo.

It appears, however, that on 18 October 1986, the JAREÑOS sold the aforesaid
lots subject of the different contracts to sell to private respondent Ruben Habacon
(hereinafter HABACON) under separate documents denominated as "Kasulatan ng
Bilihan." On 18 February 1991, HABACON caused the cancellation of the certificates of
title covering the said lots and the issuance of new ones in his name.

When the petitioners learned of these, they filed on 21 June 1991 separate
complaints with the court a quo for annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and
of the new certificates of title issued to him, for reinstatement of the certificates of title
cancelled by those issued to HABACON, and for accounting and damages. The
complaints were docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 1683-91-C, 11 1684-91-C, 12 1685-91-C, 13
1686-91-C, 14 and 1688-91-C, 15 and were assigned to Branch 37 of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba.

On 9 August 1991, HABACON filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the

ground that the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) have no legal capacity to sue because they
were not parties to the "BILIHAN."

In its Order of 4 September 1991, 20 the trial court dismissed the aforesaid civil
cases for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, but the trial
court denied this in its Order of 20 September 1991. 22 It ruled that while HABACON
may not be the developer, the JAREÑOS are, and by selling the same lots to HABACON
after they were previously sold to different parties, the JAREÑOS may have committed
an "unsound business practice." Moreover, it ruled that Section 19(2) of B.P. Blg. 129,
being a general law, should yield to P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344, which
is a special law.

On 24 December 1991, the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari to annul the 4 September 1991 and 20 September 1991 Orders of the trial court
on the ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing their complaints and that they have no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioners maintain that the
trial court has jurisdiction over their complaints.

In the Resolution of 18 November 1991, 23 we required the respondents to

comment on the petition. Private respondent HABACON filed his comment and
opposition on 27 August 1992 24 while public respondent Cesar S. Reyes filed his
comment on 24 August 1993. 25 Both respondents rely on our pronouncement in Solid
Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal and echo the ruling of the trial court in the questioned orders.
The copy of the resolution sent to the JAREÑOS was returned unserved and in the
Resolution of 21 July 1993, we considered it as served on them. As required, the
petitioners filed a reply to the comment. On 8 November 1993, we resolved to give due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their memoranda, which the
petitioners complied with on 29 December 1993 and the private respondents, on 28
March 1994.

Held:
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper
when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the
appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party
from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and
ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy
of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error in the
choice of remedies.

The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the trial court's order
dismissing their complaints on 4 October 1991. The instant petition was filed on 24
October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the order. The petitioners
have not even attempted to explain why they were unable to appeal from the
challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil action then was resorted to
as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the exceptions
to the rigid rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to exist in this petition, or
even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be dismissed.

Exceptions

(1) May be availed of even when appeal is available or period to appeal

has expired

Lansang v. CA
G.R. No. 76028
6 April 1990

Facts:

Private respondent Salangsang filed a complaint for damages arising from a

vehicular accident against Spouses Lansang (the “petitioners”) before the RTC of South
Cotabato. During trial, Salangsang was able to present his evidence. Thereafter, the
court issued an order resetting the hearing. On the date of hearing, neither petitioners
nor their counsel appeared. As such, on the same day, the Court submitted the case for
resolution. Subsequently, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Salangsang. From said
judgment, petitioners filed a “motion for reconsideration and/or to set aside order or
decision and to allow them to present their evidence.” Petitioners’ motion was,
however, denied.

Thereafter, petitioners filed their notice of appeal with the RTC. The RTC
approved the appeal and ordered the records of the case to be forwarded with the
appellate court. Later on, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, wherein they alleged
that “they already perfected their appeal and that they are not abandoning it, but the
same is not an adequate, speedy and plain remedy due to the P250.00 daily penalty in
the RTC’s award.” Subsequently, the appellate court dismissed petitioners’ Petition for
Certiorari.

According to the CA, petitioners, by filing a petition for certiorari, in effect

abandoned their appeal and that the perfected appeal is inconsistent with the remedy of
certiorari. Furthermore, the CA held that petitioners cannot be permitted to first resort
to appeal and then shift the remedy to certiorari.

Issue:

Is a perfected appeal inconsistent with the remedy of certiorari?

Held:

No. The purpose of an appeal is to bring up for review a final judgment or order
of the lower court. The remedy of certiorari is to correct certain acts of any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions performed without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A certiorari proceeding
may be instituted during the pendency of a case or even after judgment.

If after judgment, the petition for certiorari is availed of when appeal is plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, then the petition must fail as certiorari may not be
resorted to as a substitute for appeal much less for a lost one. In such a case, the right to
appeal is abandoned. However, after a judgment had been rendered and an appeal
therefrom had been perfected, a petition for certiorari relating to certain incidents
therein may prosper where the appeal does not appear to be plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Hence, appeal and certiorari are not remedies that exclude each
other.

Indeed, there are instances when this Court relaxed the application of Rule 65 on
certiorari and allowed the writ to issue even while appeal was available in the interest
of justice, or due to the dictates of public welfare and for the advancement of public
policy.

In this case, after judgment was rendered, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which is in effect a motion for the trial. The failure of counsel and
petitioners to appear on November 8, 1985 in order to present its evidence was duly
explained and which may be considered excusable. The courts are called upon to be
liberal in the assessment of the non-appearance of counsel or the party if only to
promote the greater interest of justice.

While it appears that the vehicle of petitioners hit the car of private respondent
while parked it is contended by petitioners that it was parked in a prohibited zone.
Assuming the petitioners to be at fault, they contend the additional damage of P250.00
per day is unconscionable in addition to the actual damage to the car of P19,500.00 and
P10,000.00 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. They estimate the damage awarded
can run up to the amount of P600,000.00.

These circumstances justify the grant to petitioners of another day in court. It is a

pity that this case has been pending in court for so long. But this is what happens when
an overly strict and narrow interpretation of the rules is undertaken. The liberal
application of the rules must always be in the mind of the courts.

(2) When appeal not adequate, or equally beneficial, speedy or adequate

Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.

G.R. No. L-25771
29 March 1982

Facts:

Urbano and Bonifacio Jaca (the “petitioners”) filed a complaint for Accounting,
Return of Price Differentials and Damages against Davao Lumber (the “respondent”).
The trial court, in resolving the case, rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
Thereafter, petitioners filed an appeal. Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion for
execution pending appeal, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting respondent’s motion,
but the same was denied. As such, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, contending
that the Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order granting execution pending appeal, and denying their motion for
reconsideration. In its answer to petitioners’ petition for certiorari, respondent contends
that petitioners, having availed of the remedy of appeal are barred from filing a petition
for certiorari.

Issue:

Are petitioners barred from filing a petition for certiorari since they already
availed of the remedy of appeal?

Held:

No. Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special
civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when “there is no appeal, nor plain
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law,” the rule is not without exception.
The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to
prevent a party from making used of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the
appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the
inadequacy—not the mere absence—of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of
certiorari.

In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is inadequate. It will not immediately relieve
petitioners from the injurious effect of the order granting execution. The slow and
inexpensive remedy of appeal will not prevent respondent judge from executing his
decision requiring petitioners to pay the huge amount of P867,887.52. Moreover, to
dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner has already availed of the remedy of
appeal will only aggravate the patent injustice already inflicted on petitioners.

Motion for reconsideration required; exceptions

Settled is the rule the rule that, except in some recognized situations, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for
certiorari to allow the court an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. The filing of a
motion for reconsideration before a resort to certiorari is intended to afford the public
respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way
of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.

Some of the recognized exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari will lie
even without first availing of a motion for reconsideration include:

a. The order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no

jurisdiction;
b. The questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
c. There is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or of the
petitioner;
d. The subject matter of the action is perishable;
e. Under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
f. Petitioner was deprived of due process and there is an extreme
urgency for relief;
g. In a criminal case, relief from order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
h. The proceedings were done ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object;
 i. Where the issue raised is one purely of law; or
j. Where public interest is involved.

Tan v. CA & DPG Development

G.R. No. 108634
17 July 1997

Facts:

Tan was the lessee of a piece of property in Sampaloc, Manila when DPG
Development (the “respondent”) acquired ownership over said property from one
Manuel Gonzales. Subsequently, respondent filed an ejectment suit for non-payment of
rentals against Vermont Packaging, which was managed by Tan.

During the pendency of the ejectment suit, Tan filed a complaint for the
cancellation/annulment of title. For respondent’s failure to file an answer, Tan moved
that respondent be declared in default. Tan’s said motion was granted and thereafter,
the trial court rendered judgment in Tan’s favor. From the trial court’s judgment,
respondents filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted by the CA.

Issue:

Did the CA err in not dismissing respondent’s petition for certiorari considering
that no motion for reconsideration was filed before said petition was resorted to?

Held:

No. The special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to
correct its errors. However, this rule admits of certain recognized exceptions such as (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from
an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial Court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved. It is exceptive circumstance (b) that justified DPGs non-filing
of a motion for reconsideration, inasmuch as DPGs petition for certiorari before the CA
involved a similar issue or question passed upon by the trial court in its November 23,
1990 Order, i.e., the propriety of the motion for new trial filed by DPGs new counsel
(Atty. Formoso).

It must also be stressed that what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is

the danger of failure of justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies. Thus, even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, a writ of
certiorari has been allowed when the orders of the lower court were issued either in
excess of or without jurisdiction. Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal
would be slow, inadequate and insufficient and that to strictly observe the general rule
would result in a miscarriage of justice. This is especially true when the petition, such as
DPGs certiorari petition before the CA, appears to be meritorious and the trial judge
indeed seems to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

Period for filing (Sec. 4)

Rule 65, Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998; A.M.
No. 00-2-03-SC).
 DEPOSITIONS

I. RULE 23 - Depositions Pending Action

Deposition – definition and purpose.

People vs. Webb

G.R. No. 132577, 17 August 1999
312 SCRA 573 (1999)

Facts:

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb (“Webb”) is one of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide. During the course of the proceedings in the trial
court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take Testimony By Oral
Deposition1 praying that Webb be allowed to take the testimonies of five (5) citizens and
residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in
Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be. Webb alleged that the taking of the
oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly
"material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime charged is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that:
1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-
accused, has no application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional
examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 19,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional
examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction.

In an Order dated 11 June 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent
on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. Webb’s Motion for Reoncisderation having been
denied, he elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari.

The Court of Appeals granted Webb’s Petition for Certiorari, and set aside and
annulled the trial court’s Order dated 11 June 1997. Thus, the People challenged the
Court of Appeals’ Decision before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the trial court’s Order dated 11
June 1997, denying Webb’s motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United
States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court.

Held:

No. As defined, a deposition is —

The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories,
not in open court, but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by court,
or under a general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce to writing and duly
authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a
criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or
her attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or of a witness for the other party.

The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is conducted
under oath outside of the court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices. A transcript
— word for word account — is made of the deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken
in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions
or interrogatories . . . and the purposes of taking depositions are to: (a) give greater
assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing
perjury; (b) provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent
claims and defenses; (c) make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way,
facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; (d) educate the
parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby
encouraging settlements; (e) expedite litigation; (f) safeguard against surprise; (g)
prevent delay; (h) Simplify and narrow the issues; and (i) expedite and facilitate both
preparation and trial. 

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its nature as
a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In fact, rules on
criminal practice — particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main
defense in the criminal proceedings against him in the court below — states that when a
person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must move for the taking of the
deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of
the foreign witnesses is "to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may
be, the admissibility of Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long
been rendered moot and academic by the admission of the aforementioned
documentary exhibits by the trial court in its order dated 10 July 1998.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the factual circumstances of this case only serves
to underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the
five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in
denying respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its
judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the
introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence
already on record. 

Depositions pending action, when may be taken.

1. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer
has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories.

2. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as

provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these
Rules.

3. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court
on such terms as the court prescribes.

Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. vs. Reyes

225 SCRA 622 (1993)

Facts:
The American President Lines, Ltd. (“APL”) sued Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. to
recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent
(25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

In one of the hearings for the presentation of its witnesses, APL filed a motion
praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei,
Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued
addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines
in Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the
Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China
policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied
by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary —
and it therefore prayed — "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to
Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc.,
Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and
take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons

The motion was opposed by Dasmariñas. It contended that (a) the motion was
"fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person within
its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses
"can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and (c) the Rules of Court "expressly
require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by
deposition."

The trial court granted APL’s Motion. Motion for Reconsideration having been
denied, Dasmarinas instituted a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, which likewise denied said petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in granting APL’s motion to
take testimonies of the Taiwanese witnesses.

Held:

No. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to
compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are
relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of
discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party;
production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of
persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only
known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the
latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the
parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have
knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from
inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and
completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of
informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to
be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The
deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or
hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court provides:

Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses

presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or
hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be
opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is
offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony
is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded
during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination
must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing.

However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to
the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules
of Court.

The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead,

out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with
another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be,
in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition
"shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of
Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice
before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as
may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).

Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a
secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1
Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the
Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by
the court in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in
writing to every other party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if
the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular
class or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the
process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice
(id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or
impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that
the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers
or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a
showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).

Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines

has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as
may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.

A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or

other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act
by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing
Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined
as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another,
requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause
pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court
to whom such letters are addressed" (Feria, J., op. cit., citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary,
p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a commission is addressed to
"officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters rogatory are
addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in
this connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for
and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is apparent from
Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which
requires the inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______ day of ______, 19__,
to take the testimony of (here name the witness or witnesses) in (here name the
foreign country in which the testimony is to be taken), before _________________
(name of officer), was returned unexecuted by __________________ on the ground
that ____________, all of which more fully appears from the certificate of said
__________ to said commission and made a part hereof by attaching it hereto (or
state other facts to show commission is inadequate or cannot be executed)
(emphasis supplied).
 In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . .
Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . . ."
It appears that said Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now
Department) of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of
Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public and other
public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of
Consular Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of the
petition for review on certiorari) — a prima facie showing not rebutted by petitioner.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 90478. 21 November 1991.
204 SCRA 212 (1991)

Facts:

Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago —

together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr.,
Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case
No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan.

Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories
under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under
Rule 25."  Basically, they sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners
of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who
approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago as defendants in the . . case?"  The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated
February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent,
"queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is
improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise."

Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, the Sandiganbayan denied the

motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding
them to be without legal and factual basis. It opined, among others, that service of
interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court is premature absent
any special or extraordinary circumstances, which would justify the same.

On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents.

By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and
inspection of documents (production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989),
respectively. PCGG’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, it filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly admitted the Amended Interrogatories and
granted the motion for production and inspection of documents.

Held:

Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided
in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties,  and production and inspection of
documents and things. Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers
(and not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright
ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a
strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them — which is a
great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism,
coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions
convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up
adjudication. Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.

The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts.

This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and
relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties,
and second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application
of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively,
definitely and finally.

It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction
is occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for
obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to
that extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the
obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is attained; that is
to say, that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the
facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a relevant to the action, or
surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial. 

Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor, this Court described the nature and
object of litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests
are to be conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:

A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply

schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather a contest in whicheach contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be
done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.
There should be no vested right in technicalities. . . .

The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the
court the facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and
relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another
party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and
evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.

Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by
the pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate
facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of
a party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading
"shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate factson which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case
may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts."

Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are

alleged too generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare
for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the
court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to
making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its office to
supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details
are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is
adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
 The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the
parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties —
before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them
individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that
civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal
possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The
experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under
proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not
only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but
also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility
of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ." 

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy

the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-
giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the
pleadings.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device,
along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues
between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.
The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized
privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials
and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. 

To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or

interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify
orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be
ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The
objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the
relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle
is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions)  which generally allows the
examination of a deponent —
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending
action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
 What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which
may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at
which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . . 

In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-

discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral
examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties
under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of
without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court
explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery
after an answer to the complaint has been served.  It is only when an answer has not yet
been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property
subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of
discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the
disputed facts are not clear. 

On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a)

production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b)
physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon
due application and a showing of due cause.

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled

and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make
discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering
judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the
party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow
the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out
pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. 
 Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be
undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the)
Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is
being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the
person subject to the inquiry.  And . . . further limitations come into existence when the
inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of
privilege." 

In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the

matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made
in good faith and within the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism,
in relation of course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case
will now be resolved.

The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with

Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.

It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private respondents "Motion

for Leave to File Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 — that it was correct for them
to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an
answer had been served. In such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained
over any defendant or over property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1
of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with
interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court."  But there was no need for
the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to
Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 19) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's
complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.

The petitioner's first contention — that the interrogatories in question are

defective because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are
propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same
matters . . (private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . .
for Bill of Particulars" — are untenable and quickly disposed of.

The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule

25 which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as
"a public or private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be
"answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely
no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories
served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without
naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and
may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the
interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf."

Scope of examination.

 Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by section 16 or 18 of this Rule,

the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense
of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.

Use of depositions.

 At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part
or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used
against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or
who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions;
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation,
partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party
for any purpose if the court finds:
(1) the witness is dead;
(2) the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers
from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it
appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition;
(3) the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity,
or imprisonment;
(4) the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance
of the witness by subpoena;
(5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to
make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
 importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to
allow the deposition to be used.
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party
may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced,
and any party may introduce any other parts.

Effect of substitution of parties.

1. Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions previously taken.

2. When an action has been dismissed and another action involving the same subject
is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or
successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former
action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor.

Objections to admissibility.
Subject to the provisions of section 29 of this Rule, objection may be made at the trial or
hearing, to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which
would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and
testifying.

Effect of taking depositions.

A party shall not be deemed to make a person his own witness for any purpose by
taking his deposition.

Effect of using depositions.

The introduction in evidence of the deposition or any part thereof for any purpose other
than that of contradicting or impeaching the deponent makes the deponent the witness
of the party introducing the deposition, but this shall not apply to the use by an adverse
party of a deposition as described in paragraph (b) of section 4 of this Rule.

Rebutting deposition.

At the trial or hearing any party may rebut any relevant evidence contained in a
deposition whether introduced by him or by any other party.
Persons before whom depositions may be taken within the Philippines.

Within the Philippines depositions may be taken before any judge, notary public, or the
person referred to in section 14 hereof.

Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries.

In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken:

(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory; or
(c) the person referred to in section 14 hereof.

Commission or letters rogatory.

(a) A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or

convenient, on application and notice, and on such terms, and with such direction
as are just and appropriate.

(b) Officers may be designated in notices or commissions either by name or

descriptive title and letters rogatory may be addressed to the appropriate judicial
authority in the foreign country.

Disqualification by interest.

No deposition shall be taken before a person who is:

(a) a relative within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or employee or
counsel of any of the parties;
(b) a relative within the same degree, or employee of such counsel;
(c) financially interested in the action.

Stipulations regarding taking of depositions.

If the parties so stipulate in writing, depositions may be taken before any person
authorized to administer oaths, at any time or place, in accordance with these Rules and
when so taken may be used like other depositions.
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place.

(a) A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall
give reasonable notice in writing, to every other party to the action.

(b) The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name
and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not
known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or
group to which he belongs.

(c) On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause
shown enlarge or shorten the time.

Orders for the protection of parties and deponents.

(a) After notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and for good cause
shown, the court in which the action is pending may make an order that:

1. the deposition shall not be taken;

2. it may be taken only at some designated place other than that stated in the
notice;
3. it may be taken only on written interrogatories;
4. certain matters shall not be inquired into;
5. the scope of the examination shall be held with no one present except the
parties to the action and their officers or counsel;
6. after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court;
7. secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed;
8. the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court;
9. the court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party
or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.

Record of examination, oath; objections.

(a) The officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on
oath and shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his
presence, record the testimony of the witness.

(b) The testimony shall be taken stenographically unless the parties agree otherwise.
(c) All objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of the
officer taking the deposition, or to the manner of talking it, or to the evidence
presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other objection to the
proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition.
(d) Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In lieu of
participating in the oral examination, parties served with notice of taking a
deposition may transmit written interrogatories to the officers, who shall
propound them to the witness and record the answers verbatim.

Motion to terminate or limit examination.

(a) At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion or petition of any party
or of the deponent, and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted
in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the deponent or party, the court in which the action is pending or the Regional
Trial Court of the place where the deposition is being taken may order the officer
conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may
limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition, as provided in section
16 of this Rule.

(b) If the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only
upon the order of the court in which the action is pending.

(c) Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall
be suspended for the time necessary to make a notice for an order.

(d) In granting or refusing such order, the court may impose upon either party or
upon the witness the requirement to pay such costs or expenses as the court may
deem reasonable.

Submission to witness; changes; signing.
(a) When the testimony is fully transcribed, the deposition shall be submitted to the
witness for examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination
and reading are waived by the witness and by the parties.

(b) Any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be
entered upon the deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by
the witness for making them.
(c) The deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by
stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to
sign.

(d) If the deposition is not signed by the witness, the officer shall sign it and state on
the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the
fact of the refusal to sign together with the reason be given therefor, if any, and the
deposition may then be used as fully as though signed, unless on a motion to
suppress under section 29 (f) of this Rule, the court holds that the reasons given for
the refusal to sign require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.

Certification, and filing by officer.

(a) The officer shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn to by
him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness.

(b) He shall then securely seal the deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of
the action and marked "Deposition of (here insert the name of witness)" and shall
promptly file it with the court in which the action is pending or send it by
registered mail to the clerk thereof for filing.

Notice of filing.

The officer taking the deposition shall give prompt notice of its filing to all the parties.

Furnishing copies.

Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall furnish a copy of the
deposition to any party or to the deponent.

Failure to attend of party giving notice.

If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to attend and proceed
therewith and another attends in person or by counsel pursuant to the notice, the court
may order the party giving the notice to pay such other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred by him and his counsel in so attending, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
Failure of party giving notice to serve subpoena.

If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition of a witness fails to serve a
subpoena upon him and the witness because of such failure does not attend, and if
another party attends in person or by counsel because he expects the deposition of that
witness to be taken, the court may order the party giving the notice to pay to such other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by him and his counsel in so
attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.

Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories.

(a) A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories
shall serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name and
address of the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and
address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken.

(b) Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories
upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

(c) Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a
party who has served cross-interrogatories.

(d) Within three (3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may
serve recross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

Officers to take responses and prepare record.

A copy of the notice and copies of all interrogatories served shall be delivered by the
party taking the deposition to the officer designated in the notice, who shall proceed
promptly, in the manner provided by sections 17, 19 and 20 of this Rule, to take the
testimony of the witness in response to the interrogatories and to prepare, certify, and
file or mail the deposition, attaching thereto the copy of the notice and the
interrogatories received by him.

Notice of filing and furnishing copies.

When a deposition upon interrogatories is filed, the officer taking it shall promptly give
notice thereof to all the parties, and may furnish copies to them or to the deponent upon
payment of reasonable charges therefor.
Order for the protection of parties and deponents.

After the service of the interrogatories and prior to the taking of the testimony of the
deponent, the court in which the action is pending, on motion promptly made by a
party or a deponent, and for good cause shown, may make any order specified in
sections 15, 16 and 18 of this Rule which is appropriate and just or an order that the
deposition shall not be taken before the officer designated in the notice or that it shall
not be taken except upon oral examination.

Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions.

(a) As to notice. — All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a deposition are
waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice.

(b) As to disqualification of officer. — Objection to taking a deposition because of

disqualification of the officer before whom it is to be taken is waived unless made
before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the disqualification
becomes known or could be discovered with reasonable diligence.

(c) As to competency or relevancy of evidence. — Objections to the competency of witness or

the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to
make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground, of the
objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.

(d) As to oral examination and other particulars. — Errors and irregularities occurring at
the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition in the form of the questions
or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of the parties and errors of any
kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly prosecuted, are waived
unless reasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition.

(e) As to form of written interrogatories. — Objections to the form of written interrogatories

submitted under sections 25 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless served in writing
upon the party propounding them within the time allowed for serving succeeding cross
or other interrogatories and within three (3) days after service of the last interrogatories
authorized.

(f) As to manner of preparation. — Errors and irregularities in the manner in which the
testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed,
indorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the officer under sections 17, 19,
20 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless a motion to suppress the deposition or some
part thereof is made with reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due
diligence might have been, ascertained.

II. RULE 24 - Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal

Depositions before action; petition.

A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another person
regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any court of the Philippines may file a
verified petition in the court of the place of the residence of any expected adverse party.

Contents of petition.

The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show:
(a) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action in a court of the Philippines
but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought;
(b) the subject matter of the expected action and his interest therein;
(c) the facts which he desires to establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons
for desiring to perpetuate it;
(d) the names or a description of the persons he expects will be adverse parties and
their addresses so far as known; and
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the
testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order
authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons to be examined
named in the petition for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.

Notice and service.

(a) The petitioner shall serve a notice upon each person named in the petition as an
expected adverse party, together with a copy of the petition, stating that the
petitioner will apply to the court, at a time and place named therein, for the order
described in the petition.

(b) At least twenty (20) days before the date of the hearing, the court shall cause notice
thereof to be served on the parties and prospective deponents in the manner
provided for service of summons.
Order and examination.

(a) If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure
or delay of justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons
whose deposition may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the
examination and whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or
written interrogatories.

(b) The depositions may be taken in accordance with Rule 23 before the hearing.

Reference to court.

For the purpose of applying Rule 23 to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each
reference therein to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to
the court in which the petition for such deposition was filed.

Use of deposition.

If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under this Rule, or if, although not so
taken, it would be admissible in evidence, it may be used in any action involving the
same subject matter subsequently brought in accordance with the provisions of sections
4 and 5 of Rule 23.

Depositions pending appeal.

(a) If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a court, including the Court of
Appeals in proper cases, or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has
not expired, the court in which the judgment was rendered may allow the taking
of depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for in the event of further
proceedings in the said court.

(b) In such case the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion
in the said court for leave to take the depositions, upon the same notice and service
thereof as if the action was pending therein.

(c) The motion shall state (a) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined
and the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and (b) the
reason for perpetuating their testimony.
(d) If the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure
or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the deposition to be taken, and
thereupon the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and under
the same conditions as are prescribed in these Rules for depositions taken in
pending actions.

III. RULE 25 – INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

Interrogation to parties; service thereof

A party may serve written interrogatories: 

1. Without leave of court after answer has been served, for the first set of
interrogatories.
2. With leave of court in the following circumstances: (a) before answer has been
served; and (b) for the second set of interrogatories for the same adverse party
(Section 4, Rule 25).

Answer to interrogatories
The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to
by the person making them.
N.B. A judgment by default may be rendered against a party who fails to answer
written interrogatories (Section 3(c), Rule 29).
Objections to interrogatories

Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within 10 days after
service thereof, with notice as in the case of motion. Answers shall be deferred until
objections are resolved, which shall be at the earliest possible time.

Number of interrogatories

No party may, without leave of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be
answered by the same party.

Scope and use of interrogatories

The scope of interrogatories shall be the matters mentioned in Sec. 2, Rule 23. The
answers may be used for the same purpose provided in Sec. 4 of the same Rule.
Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories

Unless a party had been served with written interrogatories, he may not be compelled
by the adverse party (a) to give testimony in open court; or (b) to give a deposition
pending appeal.

The only exception is when the court allows it for good cause shown and to prevent a
failure of justice. 

IV. RULE 26 - ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

Request for admission

When request may be made:

At any time after the issues have been joined (after the responsive pleading has been
served).

What request may include:

1. Admission of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in
and exhibited with the request; and
2. Admission of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the
request.

Implied admission

Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted

unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen
(15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on
motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or setting forth the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters.

Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party
requested within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as
contemplated in his compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are
resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as practicable.
Effect of admission

An admission under this Section is for the purpose of the pending action only and
cannot be used in other proceedings. 

Withdrawal

The party making an admission under this Rule, may be allowed by the court to
withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be just.
 
Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission

The party who fails or refuses to request the admission of facts in question is prevented
from thereafter presenting evidence thereon unless otherwise allowed by the court. 

Case:

Po v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-34341, 22 August 1988

Facts:

The petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the private respondent Jose P.
Mananzan as operator of a banca service for shooting the rapids at Pagsanjan Falls,
arising from an accidental spill into the water, which she and her friend suffered when
the banca in which they were riding capsized during their trip back to town. After
Mananzan had answered the complaint, petitioner served upon him a request for
admission. Mananzan failed to file and serve an answer to the request for admission.
Petitioner thus filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there exists no
genuine or substantial controversy on any issue of fact since Mananzan has deemed
admitted the matters stated in the request for admission for his failure to answer the
same. Respondent Judge Lustre denied the motion for summary judgment, observing
that "the interrogatories ... are nothing but a reiteration of a portion of the plaintiffs
allegations in the complaint, which have already been answered and denied by the
defendant in his answer" hence, they "need not be answered again if asked in the form
of interrogatories." 
Issue:

Whether or not the material facts in a complaint, which were made subject to a
request for admission, are deemed admitted upon failure to answer the request

Held:

No. A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted
by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to
make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request
for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or
documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish
said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy."

V. RULE 27 - PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENT OR THINGS

Motion for production or inspection; order

Requisites of the motion for production or inspection:

1. A motion must be filed by a party showing good cause therefor;
2. The motion must sufficiently describe the document or thing sought to be
produced or inspected;
3. The motion must be given to all the other parties;
4. The document or thing sought to be produced or inspected must constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action;
5. The document or thing sought to be produced or inspected must not be
privileged; and
6. The document or thing sought to be produced or inspected must be in the
possession of the adverse party or, at least under his control.

VI. RULE 28 – PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION

This mode of discovery is available in an action in which the mental or physical

condition of a party is in controversy.

Examples of these actions are:

a. An action for annulment of a contract where the ground relied upon is insanity
or dementia;
 b. A petition for guardianship of a person alleged to be insane; and
c. An action to recover damages for personal injury where the issue is the extent of
the injuries of the plaintiff.

Order for examination

The following are the requisites to obtain an order for examination:

1. A motion must be filed for the physical and mental examination;
2. The motion must show good cause for the examination;
3. The mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy;
4. Notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties; and
5. The motion shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by whom it is made.

Report of findings

1. The person examined shall, upon request, be entitled to a copy of a detailed

written report of the examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions.
2. After such request and delivery, the party causing the examination to be made
shall be entitled upon request to receive from the party examined, a like report of
any examination previously or thereafter made, of the same physical or mental
condition.
3. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion and
notice may make an order requiring delivery.
4. If a physician fails or refuses to make such report, the court may exclude his
testimony if offered at the trial.

Waiver of privilege
Where the party examined requests and obtains a report on the results of the
examination, the consequences are:
1. He has to furnish the other party a copy of the report of any previous or
subsequent examination of the same physical and mental condition; and
2. He waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the
same controversy regarding the testimony of any other person who has so
examined him or may thereafter examine him.

VII. RULE 29 – REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY

If a party refuses to answer any question, the following may be the consequences:
 1. The court, may, upon proper application, compel a refusing deponent to answer
(Sec.1).
a. If granted and refusal to answer is without substantial justification, court
may require the refusing party to pay the proponent the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's
fees.
b. If denied and filed without substantial justification, court may require the
proponent to pay the refusing party the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees.

2. A refusal to answer after being directed by the court to do so may be considered

as contempt of court (Sec. 2)

If a person refuses to be sworn in as a witness, he may be cited in contempt of court.

If a person refuses to answer designated questions or refusal to produce documents
or to submit to physical or mental examination (Sec. 3), the court may make the
following orders:

1. Prohibit the disobedient party to introduce evidence of physical or mental

condition;
2. Refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or defenses;
3. Strike out pleadings or parts thereof;
4. Stay further proceedings;
5. Dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof;
6. Render a judgment by default against disobedient party; and
7. Direct the arrest of any party or agent of a party disobeying any of such orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.

If a person denies the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter of fact in
a request for admission under Rule 26, and the party requesting for admission proves
said document to be genuine or said fact to be true, the court may, upon motion, order
the party requested to admit, to pay the expenses incurred in making such proof unless
the court finds that there were sufficient grounds for the denial.

If a person fails despite due notice to attend a schedule for deposition-taking, or fails to
file his answer to written interrogatories, the court may:
1. Strike out all or any part of any pleading of disobedient party;
2. Dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof;
3. Enter a judgment by default against disobedient party; or
 4. Order payment of reasonable expenses incurred by the other including attorney's
fees.

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC

13 July 2004

GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF

COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-
DISCOVERY MEASURES

The use of pre-trial and the deposition-discovery measures are undeniably important
and vital components of case management in trial courts. To abbreviate court
proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets, and to
further implement the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-
99 dated January 15, 1999 and except as otherwise specifically provided for in other
special rules, the following guidelines are issued for the observance and guidance of
trial judges and clerks of court:

I.          PRE-TRIAL

A. Civil Cases

1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:

1.1 Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder to defendant to observe
restraint in filing a motion to dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof as defenses
in the Answer, in conformity with IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated
March 12, 2002.  A copy of the summons is hereto attached as Annex "A;" and

1.2 The court shall issue an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories to
parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by adverse party under Rule 26 or at
their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules
27 and 28 within five days from the filing of the answer.  A copy of the order shall be
served upon the defendant together with the summons and upon the plaintiff.

Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex
parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion
within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
2.  The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs
containing the following:
a. A statement of their willingness to enter into an amicable settlement indicating the
desired terms thereof or to submit the case to any of the alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
b. A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
c. The issues to be tried or resolved;
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof. (No evidence
shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's
evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked
during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown);
e. A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of
discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and
f. The number and names of the witnesses, the substance of their testimonies, and the
approximate number of hours that will be required by the parties for the presentation of
their respective witnesses.

A copy of the Notice of Pre-trial Conference is hereto attached as Annex "B." The rule on
the contents of the pre-trial brief must strictly be complied with. The parties are bound
by the representations and statements in their respective pre-trial briefs.

3.  At the start of the pre-trial conference, the judge shall immediately refer the parties
and/or their counsel if authorized by their clients to the PMC mediation unit for
purposes of mediation if available.5  If mediation fails, the judge will schedule the
continuance of the pre-trial conference.  Before the continuance, the Judge may refer the
case to the Branch COC for a preliminary conference to assist the parties in reaching a
settlement, to mark the documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and copies
thereof to be attached to the records after comparison and to consider such other
matters as may aid in its prompt disposition.

During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall also ascertain from the parties
the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of the
documents marked as exhibits. The proceedings during .the preliminary conference
shall be recorded in the "Minutes of Preliminary Conference" to be signed by both
parties and/or counsel, the form of which is hereto attached as Annex. "C".

The minutes of preliminary conference and the exhibits shall be attached by the Branch
COC to the case record before the pre-trial.
4. Before the continuation of the pre-trial conference, the judge must study all the
pleadings of the case, and determine the issues thereof and the respective positions of
the parties thereon to enable him to intelligently steer the parties toward a possible
amicable settlement of the case, or, at the very least, to help reduce and limit the issues.
The judge should not allow the termination of pre-trial simply because of the
manifestation of the parties that they cannot settle the case. He should expose the
parties to the advantages of pre-trial. He must also be mindful that there are other
important aspects of the pre-trial that ought to be taken up to expedite the disposition
of the case.

The Judge with all tact, patience, impartiality and with due regard to the rights of the
parties shall endeavor to persuade them to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The
court shall initially ask the parties and their lawyers if an amicable settlement of the
case is possible. If not, the judge may confer with the parties with the opposing counsel
to consider the following:
a. Given the evidence of the plaintiff presented in his pre-trial brief to support his claim,
what manner of compromise is considered acceptable to the defendant at the present
stage?
b. Given the evidence of the defendant described in his pre-trial brief to support his
defense, what manner of compromise is considered acceptable to the plaintiff at the
present stage?

If not successful, the court shall confer with the party and his counsel separately.

If the manner of compromise is not acceptable, the judge shall confer with the parties
without their counsel for the same purpose of settlement.

5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:

a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial proceedings and
confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the
genuineness and due execution of documents;
b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts pending before other courts and
order its consolidation if warranted;
c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the amendments if necessary;

d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the same;

e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties;

f. Scrutinize every single allegation of the complaint, answer and other pleadings and
attachments thereto and the contents of documents and all other evidence identified
and pre-marked during pre-trial in determining further admissions of facts and
documents.  To obtain admissions, the Court shall ask the parties to submit the
depositions taken under Rule 23, the answers to written interrogatories under Rule 25
and the answers to request for admissions by the adverse party under Rule 26. It may
also require the production of documents or things requested by a party under Rule 27
and the results of the physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28;

g. Define and simplify the factual and legal issues arising from the pleadings. 
Uncontroverted issues and frivolous claims or defenses should be eliminated. For each
factual issue, the parties/counsel shall state all the evidence to support their positions
thereon. For each legal issue, parties/counsel shall state the applicable law and
jurisprudence supporting their respective positions thereon. If only legal issues are
presented, the judge shall require the parties to submit their respective memoranda and
the court can proceed to render judgment;

h. Determine the propriety of rendering a summary judgment dismissing the case based
on the disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on the pleadings, evidence
identified and admissions made during pre-trial;

i. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates for continuous trial in accordance with
Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989; adhere to the case flow chart determined by
the court, which shall contain the different stages of the proceedings up to the
promulgation of the decision and use the time frame for each stage in setting the trial
dates. The One-Day Examination of Witness Rule, that is, a witness has to be fully
examined in one (1) day only, shall be strictly adhered to subject to the courts' discretion
during trial on whether or not to extend the direct and/or cross-examination for
justifiable reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to
make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the
opposing party is required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter,
the Judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court. However the
judge has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with
Section 35, Rule 132;

j. Determine the most important witnesses to be heard and limit the number of
witnesses (Most Important Witness Rule). The facts to be proven by each witness and
the approximate number of hours per witness shall be fixed;
k. At his discretion, order the parties to use the affidavits of witnesses as direct
testimonies subject to the right to object to inadmissible portions thereof and to the right
of cross-examination by the other party. The affidavits shall be based on personal
knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. The
affidavits shall be in question and answer form, and shall comply with the rules on
admissibility of evidence;

l. Require the parties and/or counsel to submit to the Branch COC the names, addresses
and contact numbers of the witnesses to be summoned by subpoena;

m. Order the delegation of the reception of evidence to the Branch COC under Rule 30;
and

n.  Refer the case to a trial by commissioner under Rule 32.

During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask questions on issues raised therein
and all questions or comments by counsel or parties must be directed to the judge to
avoid hostilities between the parties.

6. The trial judge shall schedule the pre-trial in the afternoon sessions and set as many
pre-trial conferences as may be necessary.

7. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded. The minutes of each pre-trial
conference shall contain matters taken up therein more particularly admissions of facts
and exhibits and shall be signed by the parties and their counsel.

8. The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial Order within ten (10) days after the
termination of the pre-trial.  Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters
not disposed of and control the course of the action during the trial.  A sample Pre-Trial
Order is hereto attached as Annex "D."

However, the Court may opt to dictate the Pre-Trial Order in open court in the presence
of the parties and their counsel and with the use of a computer, shall have the same
immediately finalized and printed. Once finished, the parties and/or their counsel shall
sign the same to manifest their conformity thereto.

9. The court shall endeavor to make the parties agree to an equitable compromise or
settlement at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment.
B.  Criminal Cases

1. Before arraignment, the Court shall issue an order directing the public prosecutor to
submit the record of the preliminary investigation to the Branch COC for the latter to
attach the same to the record of the criminal case.

Where the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its
records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three days from
the filing of the complaint or information. The accused shall be arraigned within ten
days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial of his case shall be held within ten days
after arraignment unless a shorter period is provided for by law.

2. After the arraignment, the court shall forthwith set the pre-trial conference within
thirty days from the date of arraignment, and issue an order: (a) requiring the private
offended party to appear thereat for purposes of plea-bargaining except for violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and for other matters requiring his
presence; (b) referring the case to the Branch COC, if warranted, for a preliminary
conference to be set at least three days prior to the pre-trial to mark the documents or
exhibits to be presented by the parties and copies thereof to be attached to the records
after comparison and to consider other matters as may aid in its prompt disposition;
and (c) informing the parties that no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and
offered during the trial other than those identified and marked during the pre-trial
except when allowed by the court for good cause shown. A copy of the order is hereto
attached as Annex "E". In mediatable cases, the judge shall refer the parties and their
counsel to the PMC unit for purposes of mediation if available.

3.  During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall assist the parties in
reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case, mark the documents to be presented
as exhibits and copies thereof attached to the records after comparison, ascertain from
the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution
of documents marked as exhibits and consider such other matters as may aid in the
prompt disposition of the case. The proceedings during the preliminary conference
shall be recorded in the Minutes of Preliminary Conference to be signed by both parties
and counsel. (Please see Annex "B")

The Minutes of Preliminary Conference and the exhibits shall be attached by the Branch
COC to the case record before the pre-trial.
4. Before the pre-trial conference the judge must study the allegations of the
information, the statements in the affidavits of witnesses and other documentary
evidence which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation.

5. During the pre-trial, except for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, the trial judge shall consider plea-bargaining arrangements.  Where the
prosecution and the offended party agree to the plea offered by the accused, the court
shall:
a. Issue an order which contains the plea bargaining arrived at;
b. Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case; and
c. Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability or
damages duly established by the evidence.

6.  When plea bargaining fails, the Court shall:

a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial proceedings,
confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the
genuineness and due execution of documents and list object and testimonial evidence;

b.  Scrutinize every allegation of the information and the statements in the affidavits
and other documents which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation
and other documents identified and marked as exhibits in determining farther
admissions of facts, documents and in particular as to the following:
1. the identity of the accused;
2. court's territorial jurisdiction relative to the offense/s charged;
3. qualification of expert witness/es;
4. amount of damages;
5. genuineness and due execution of documents;
6. the cause of death or injury, in proper cases;
7. adoption of any evidence presented during the preliminary investigation;
8. disclosure of defenses of alibi, insanity, self-defense,  exercise of public authority and
justifying or exempting circumstances; and
9. such other matters that would limit the facts in issue.

c. Define factual and legal issues;

d. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates and adhere to the flow chart
determined by the court which shall contain the time frames for the different stages of
the proceeding up to promulgation of decision and use the time frame for each stage in
setting the trial dates;
e. Require the parties to submit to the Branch COC the names, addresses and contact
numbers of witnesses that need to be summoned by subpoena; and

f. Consider modification of order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes
a lawful defense.

7. During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask questions on issues raised
therein and all questions must be directed to him to avoid hostilities between parties.

8. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall
be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused.  The agreements covering the matters referred to in Section 1
of Rule 118 shall be approved by the court.  (Section 2, Rule 118)

9. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared and
the minutes signed by the parties and/or their counsels.

10.  The trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order within ten (10) days after the termination
of the pre-trial setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference, the  facts
stipulated,  the admissions made,  evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be
presented and the schedule of trial.  Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of and control the course the action during the trial.

Case:

Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Ley Construction

G.R. No. 147143, 10 March 2006

Facts:

Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific

performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against petitioner
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation (Hyatt). LCDC filed an amended
complaint impleading Princeton Development Corporation (Princeton) as additional
defendant. Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take the
depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account Officer of Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, Finance Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to
take deposition of Manuel Ley, President of LCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take
the depositions of Manuel and Janet Ley. The RTC ordered the deposition-taking to
proceed. At the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy on September 17, 1996, Hyatt and Yu
prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead,
contending that the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case.  The RTC
agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place
on November 14, 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not deposition as a mode of discovery should be dispensed with, and the
parties to proceed with pre-trial, to expedite the proceedings of a case

Held:
No. A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice
any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make
discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant
and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of
law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been
served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further
that a circumstance for its admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The
rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal
discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation
would be defeated.
 
Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It
approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be
observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of
deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to
issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and
request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of
depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from
the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days
before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the
parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners.
 
Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to the effectivity of said
issuance, however, the depositions sought by LCDC shall be evaluated based on the
jurisprudence and rules then prevailing, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of
Court which provides as follows:
 
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.--- By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the
subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any
party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance
of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule
21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).
 
As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it
made its notice to take depositions after the answers of the defendants have been
served. LCDC having complied with the rules then prevailing, the trial court erred in
canceling the previously scheduled depositions.
 
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is
conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege, such circumstances,
however are absent in the case at bar.
 
The RTC cites the delay in the case as reason for canceling the scheduled
depositions. While speedy disposition of cases is important, such consideration
however should not outweigh a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of cases, for
the ends of justice are reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases but more
importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the merits of the
case. Records also show that the delay of the case is not attributable to the depositions
sought by LCDC but was caused by the many pleadings filed by all the parties
including petitioners herein.
 
The argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary duplicity as the
intended deponents shall also be called as witnesses during trial, is also without merit.
 
The case of Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals which already settled the matter, explained
that:
 
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute good
cause to justify the courts order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness
is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may
be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to
prohibit the taking of his deposition.
 
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely
distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed
upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for
knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may
be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at the
trial; the remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the facts to
the parties before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.
 
x x x [U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double
function of a method of discovery - with use on trial not necessarily contemplated - and
a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and
privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is
subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever
practicable.
 
Petitioner also argues that LCDC has no evidence to support its claims and that it was
only after the filing of its Complaint that it started looking for evidence through the
modes of discovery.
 
On this point, it is well to reiterate the Courts pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan:
 
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be
useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things. Hence, the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing expedition serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at
which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.
 
It also does not escape this Courts attention that the trial court, before
dismissing LCDCs complaint, gave LCDC two options: (a) enter into a pre-trial
conference, advising LCDC that what it would like to obtain at the deposition may be
obtained at the pre-trial conference, thus expediting early termination of the case; and
(b) terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on. The trial court
erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from these options and in dismissing its
complaint upon LCDCs refusal to choose either of the two.
 
The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of Elena Sy, the Finance
Officer of Hyatt and Pacita Tan Go, an Account Officer of RCBC, may not be obtained at
the pre-trial conference, as the said deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference.
 
As also pointed out by the CA:
 
x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat the very
purpose for which it is intended, as a pre-trial device. By then, the issues would have
been confined only on matters defined during pre-trial. The importance of the modes of
discovery cannot be gainsaid in this case in view of the nature of the controversy
involved and the conflicting interest claimed by the parties.
 
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute
between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for
trial.
 
Further, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court explained that:
 
The truth is that evidentiary matters may be inquired into and learned by the parties
before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties - before
the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial - should discover or inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them
individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words,
the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules
of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition- discovery mechanism set
forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been the ample
discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary
ends of modern procedure; it not only eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby
shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards
on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased.
 
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the
conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving,
issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
 
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between
the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The
evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized
privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
 
In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena
and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be
defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced
to prosecute its case in the dark --- the very situation which the rules of discovery seek
to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less a game of blind man’s
bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practicable extent.