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Amicus Brief by The Committee For Justice Filed in Andy Warhol Foundation v. Lynn Goldsmith, Et Al.
Amicus Brief by The Committee For Justice Filed in Andy Warhol Foundation v. Lynn Goldsmith, Et Al.
21-869
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
__________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . 1
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. The fair use doctrine must be interpreted in a
manner that upholds the Copyright Clause’s
textual empowering of Congress to protect
the fundamental civil right to the fruit of one’s
labor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. The Copyright Clause codifies the founding-
era understanding of copyright law . . . . . . . . 3
B. The fair use doctrine has always been
interpreted to uphold the fundamental civil
right to the fruits of one’s labors. . . . . . . . . . 10
II. Holding Warhol’s work at issue here to be
“transformative” would expand the fair use
doctrine beyond anything previously known and
effectively negate copyright’s ability to protect
the fundamental civil right to the fruits of one’s
labors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bohn v. Bogue,
(1846) 10 Jurist 420 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17
Daly v. Palmer,
6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) . . . . . . . . . . 13
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5
Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4, 6, 9
Emerson v. Davies,
8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1865) . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Falk v. Donaldson,
57 F. 32 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Lawrence v. Dana,
15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) . . . . . . . . 13, 18
Lewis v. Fullarton,
(1839) 48 Eng. Rep. 1080 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11, 17
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
iii
Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U.S. 275 (1897). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Roworth v. Wilkes,
(1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Sweet v. Benning,
(1855) 139 Eng. Rep. 838 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. 591 (1834). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 8, 9
Wiren v. Shubert Theatre Corp.,
5 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d
70 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1934) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
OTHER AUTHORITIES
William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of
England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law
(6th ed. 1848) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government
(New Edition 1821) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7
Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, The
Constitutional Foundations of Intellectual
Property (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
iv
1
In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.3, all parties
consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party has
authored this brief in whole or in part. No person aside from
amicus curiae has made a monetary contribution to fund this
brief’s preparation or submission.
2
ARGUMENT
I. The fair use doctrine must be interpreted in a
manner that upholds the Copyright Clause’s
textual empowering of Congress to protect the
fundamental civil right to the fruit of one’s
labor.
A. The Copyright Clause codifies the
founding-era understanding of copyright
law.
In arguing for an expansion of the fair use doctrine
that would encompass as “transformative” any work its
author subjectively believes to convey a meaning
different from that of the original work, the Warhol
Foundation fundamentally misconstrues the Copyright
Clause as being a utilitarian, pragmatic instrument
that does nothing other than advance the arts and
sciences. On the contrary, the Clause’s text as
understood at the time of the Constitution’s enactment
empowers Congress to protect an individual’s
fundamental civil right to the fruits of his or her labor.
See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 658 (1834) (“That
every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour
must be admitted[.]”). Certainly, protecting such a
fundamental civil right can serve the purpose of
furthering the arts and sciences, but this Court has
warned against interpreting the Clause’s purpose in a
manner that would minimize or eliminate the
fundamental right it empowers Congress to protect. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
Consequently, this Court should reject any
interpretation of the Clause that would undermine its
4
2
Even following the Constitution’s enactment, American jurists
continued to cite recent developments in English law in support of
their conclusions on the fair use doctrine. E.g., Folsom, 9 F. Cas.
at 345, 348 (Story, J.). Accordingly, English cases following the
Constitution’s enactment still amount to persuasive authority on
the fair use doctrine.
12