GR Nos.

L-6687 and L-6688 July 29, 1954

The complaint in the first cause is as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1952, in Mountain Province, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then a passenger of Philippine Air Line plane PI-C-38 enroute from Laoag to
Aparri , and while said plane was flying over Mountain Province, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and
armed with .45 and .38 caliber pistols, with treachery and known premeditation shot Eduardo Diago, the purser of the aforesaid
plane, thus inflicting gunshot wound on his (Eduardo Diago) body and as a result thereof said Eduardo Diago died instantly.

Contrary to law.

Baguio City, March 9, 1953 (p. 1, rec., Criminal Case No. 419).

The complaint in the second case is as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1952, in Mountain Province, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then a passenger of Philippine Air Line Plane PI-C-38 enroute from Laoag to Aparri
while the said plane was flying over Mountain Province, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without
authority of law, compel Pedro Perlas, pilot of the aforesaid plane, against the latter's will and consent, to change the route of the
plane and take him (Accused) to Amoy, and when Pedro Perlas failed to comply immediately with said order, said accused who
was then armed with .45 and .38 caliber pistols, with treachery and known premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, shot said Pedro Perlas,thus inflicting gunshot wounds on the different parts of his (Pedro Perlas) body and as a
result thereof said Pedro Perlas died instantly.

All contrary to law.

Baguio City, March 9, 1953 (p 1, rec., Criminal Case No. 420.).

Informed the accused of the two complaints with the assistance of his lawyers, he pleaded guilty. The Court sentenced him in the
first case to twelve (12) years in prison greater than a minimum of twenty (20) years of temporary imprisonment as a maximum,
with compensation to the heirs of Eduardo Diago in the amount of P6,000 and costs. In the second cause, the Court sentenced
him to life imprisonment , with compensation to the heirs of Pedro Perlas in the sum of P6,000 and costs. The motions for
reconsideration filed in these cases, alleging that the lower court erred in not imposing life imprisonment in the first case and
death in the second, have been denied by the lower court, which is why the provincial prosecutor filed an appeal. .

The Attorney General maintains in his argument that the lower court made an error, in the first case, by not declaring the
aggravating circumstance of premeditation compensated with the extenuating circumstance of spontaneous declaration of guilt
and by not imposing the sentence of life imprisonment on the accused and, in the second cause, by not declaring that the accused
committed the complex crime of serious coercion with murder and by not imposing the death penalty.

The containment of the Public Prosecutor's Office in the first case is well founded. As the aggravating circumstance of
premeditation is compensated with the extenuating circumstance of a declaration of guilt, the defendant must be imposed the
penalty provided by article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in its medium degree, that is, life imprisonment .

Regarding the second case, the defendant forced the pilot Pedro Perlas to direct the airplane from Laoag to Amoy instead of
taking it to Aparri and, for not complying with such illegal requirement, the defendant fired several revolver shots at him. The
crime committed — contends the Attorney General — is the complex crime of serious coercion with murder, and the death
penalty. This claim is baseless.

Said article provides that "In the event that a single act constitutes two or more crimes or when one of them is a necessary means
to commit the other, the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime will be imposed, applying it to its maximum degree."

The defendant forced the aviator Pedro. Pearls to change the direction of the plane, and as he did not comply with his order, he
killed him; the defendant executed two different acts, and not just one; therefore, these two successive acts cannot constitute the
complex crime of coercion with murder. If the aviator had followed the defendant's order, the defendant would not have needed
to kill him; the pilot was put in the stark alternative of complying with the order, or die. Elaviador did not want to be disloyal to
his obligation, and he was killed.

The defendant could have deprived Pedro Perlas of his life without having to force him to change the direction of the airplane;
coercion was not necessary to commit the murder. Neither was murder indispensable to commit coercion, quite the contrary; For
having murdered the pilot, the defendant did not get his wish to reach Amoy: he committed two acts that constitute the crimes of
criminal coercion and murder.

"He who breaks into someone else's dwelling, causing the door to give way by force of blows and closing it, and, once there, kills
the woman who resides there, and with whom he had previously had illicit relations," does not commit the complex crime of
home invasion with homicide. The sentence corresponding to each of the crimes must be imposed on the accused. (Sentence of
January 24, 1881.)(2 Viada, 5th ed., 613.)

"Two subjects show up at night in the dwelling of a third party; they knock on the door, and when the owner asks them what they
want, they answer that they want to enjoy her and her daughter; not having been opened, they enter by force, mistreat and beat
the inhabitants , causing them serious and minor injuries, taking with them when they left, some effects valued at less than 10
pesetas: "The defendants did not commit the crimes of breaking and entering with violence and intimidation, serious injuries,
minor injuries and theft. Article 88 must be applied and not article 90, which deals with the complex crime. (Sentence of
February 10, 1885.) (2 Viada, 5th ed.; 614-615.) Therefore, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the accused .

Can the public prosecutor appeal? Article 2 of Rule 118 reads as follows:

Who can appeal — The People of the Philippines, however, may not appeal when the defendant is exposed to double jeopardy .
In all other cases, either party may appeal from a final judgment or an order issued after the judgment that affects the essential
rights of the appellant.

This article is a reproduction of articles 43 and 44 of General Order No. 58 as amended by article 4 of Law No. 2886. General
Order No. 58 is of American origin and, therefore, Anglo precedents -Americans must be taken into account.

In a long list of decisions after Kepner v . United States was decided on appeal, 195 US, 100; 11 JUR. Fil., 689, the doctrine has
been invariably established by this Court that the prosecution cannot appeal against a sentence in which the accused is acquitted,
for the reason that for the second time he is put in danger of being punished by the same crime. "American common law also
prohibited a second trial for the same crime whether or not the accused had suffered any punishment, or been acquitted or
convicted in a previous case."

In United States v . Sanges, cited in Kepner's, it was said: "From the time of Lord Hale to the date of the Chadwick case just
cited, the textbooks, with rare exceptions, either assume or affirm that the defendant, (or his representative), is the only one who
can obtain a new trial to appeal in cassation in a criminal case, and a judgment in his favor is final and conclusive (See 2 Hawk.,
c. 47, § 12; c. 50, sections 10 et seq.; Bac. Ab. Trial, L. 9; Error, B; 1 Chit, Crim. Law, 657, 747; Stark, Crim. PI. (Second
Edition), 357 , 367, 371, Archb. Crim. Pl.,.

(Twelfth English Edition and Sixth American Edition) 177, 199.)"

"... `There has been no case of appeal against a judgment in favor of the accused, after he has been acquitted.' (Arcbold Cr. PI &
PR., Pomery's Ed., 199).

"No error, however, flagrant, committed by the court against the state, can be reserved by it for decision by the supreme court
when the defendant has once been placed in jeopardy and discharged, even though the discharge was the result of the error
committed State vs. Rook, 49 LRA 186, 61, Kan. 382, 59 Pac. 653. (1 LRA 242.)

This Court has never resolved an issue similar to the present case in which the defendant was sentenced for a lesser sentence than
that established by law and the public prosecutor, on appeal, requests that, in accordance with the Revised Penal Code, the
sentence be imposed on the charged a higher sentence. If the prosecutor — like the defendant — can appeal to correct an error in
the law, then it will be mandatory to impose the sentence of life imprisonment on the defendant . After having been and —
mistakenly-convicted by the court of less than 12 years in prison more than 20 years of temporary imprisonment, is not putting
the defendant again in danger of being sentenced to a greater penalty for the same crime? If the defendant were the appellant, he
would not have the right to complain if a higher sentence was imposed, in the present case the one who appeals is the
prosecution, and said appeal puts the accused in danger of receiving another higher sentence. We believe that in the present case
the accused is placed in double jeopardy , that is, in danger of receiving a sentence of life imprisonment after having already been
sentenced by the lower court to a lesser sentence. Due to this danger, the public prosecutor cannot appeal, in accordance with
article 2 of Rule 118 and following the constitutional guarantee that "a person will not be put in danger of being punished twice
for the same infraction" onjeopardy .

The appeal is dismissed.