FM 3-99

Airborne and Air

Assault Operations

MARCH 2015
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 *FM 3-99

Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-99 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 6 March 2015

Airborne and Air Assault Operations

Contents
Page
PREFACE .............................................................................................................. ix
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... x
Chapter 1 OVERVIEW .........................................................................................................1-1
Section I – Forcible Entry Operations ..............................................................1-1
Joint Principles for Forcible Entry Operations......................................................1-2
Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations ........................................1-4
Joint Command and Control ................................................................................1-6
Joint Operation Planning .................................................................................. 1-13
Joint Entry Force............................................................................................... 1-16
Section II – Vertical Envelopment ................................................................. 1-18
Tactical Applications ......................................................................................... 1-18
Command Responsibility.................................................................................. 1-21
Space Operation............................................................................................... 1-25

PART ONE AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Chapter 2 ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT ..............................................................2-1
Section I – Airborne Assault Force ..................................................................2-1
Organization of Forces ........................................................................................2-1
Echelon Employment...........................................................................................2-2
Section II – Airborne Assault Force Considerations ......................................2-4
Assault Force Formation......................................................................................2-4
Joint and Army Control Teams ............................................................................2-4
Section III – Capabilities, Limitations, Vulnerabilities ....................................2-5
Capabilities ..........................................................................................................2-5
Limitations............................................................................................................2-5
Vulnerabilities.......................................................................................................2-6
Section IV – Airborne Command and Control Platforms ...............................2-6
Airborne Warning And Control System................................................................2-6
Joint Surveilance Target Attack Radar System ...................................................2-7
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 90-26, dated 18 December 1990 and ATTP 3-18.12, dated 1 March 2011.

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Contents

Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post .................................... 2-7

Chapter 3 AIRBORNE ASSAULT PLANNING ................................................................... 3-1
Section I – Roles and Responsibilities............................................................ 3-1
Higher Headquarters........................................................................................... 3-1
Airborne Assault Force........................................................................................ 3-2
Supporting Aviation ............................................................................................. 3-2
Section II – Reverse Planning Sequence ........................................................ 3-2
Ground Tactical Plan........................................................................................... 3-3
Landing Plan ....................................................................................................... 3-3
Air Movement Plan .............................................................................................. 3-3
Marshalling Plan.................................................................................................. 3-4
Section III – Planning Considerations ............................................................. 3-4
Planning Methodology......................................................................................... 3-4
Predeployment Planning and Preparation .......................................................... 3-6
X-hour/N-hour Sequences for Deployment ......................................................... 3-6
Optimize Available Planning Time ...................................................................... 3-6
Control Measures................................................................................................ 3-9
Determine Go/No-Go Criteria ........................................................................... 3-10
Airfield Opening................................................................................................. 3-10
Section IV – Shaping Operations ................................................................... 3-11
Create Conditions ............................................................................................. 3-11
Preserve Conditions .......................................................................................... 3-12
Chapter 4 GROUND TACTICAL PLAN............................................................................... 4-1
Section I – Elements ......................................................................................... 4-1
Task Organization ............................................................................................... 4-1
Mission Statement............................................................................................... 4-1
Commander’s Intent............................................................................................ 4-2
Concept of Operations ........................................................................................ 4-2
Tasks to Subordinates ........................................................................................ 4-2
Section II – Plan Development ......................................................................... 4-3
Mission Variables of METT-TC ........................................................................... 4-3
Assault Objective and Airhead Line .................................................................... 4-5
Section III – Air-ground Operations ............................................................... 4-12
Fundamental Considerations ............................................................................ 4-12
Close Combat Attack......................................................................................... 4-12
Close Air Support .............................................................................................. 4-14
Unmanned Aircraft System ............................................................................... 4-15
Section IV – Execution .................................................................................... 4-16
Conduct of the Airborne Assault ....................................................................... 4-16
Development of the Airhead.............................................................................. 4-17
Buildup of Combat Power ................................................................................. 4-17
Section V – Follow-on Operations ................................................................. 4-18
Section VI – Supporting Operations .............................................................. 4-18
Remote Marshalling .......................................................................................... 4-19
Intermediate Staging Base................................................................................ 4-20

ii FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Contents

Chapter 5 LANDING PLAN ................................................................................................. 5-1

Section I – Delivery Considerations ................................................................ 5-1
Organization ........................................................................................................ 5-1
Requirements...................................................................................................... 5-1
Priorities .............................................................................................................. 5-2
Section II – Delivery Elements ......................................................................... 5-2
Sequence of Delivery .......................................................................................... 5-2
Method of Delivery .............................................................................................. 5-3
Place of Delivery ................................................................................................. 5-5
Time of Delivery .................................................................................................. 5-9
Section III – Preparation and Supporting Fires .............................................. 5-9
Fire Support Planning ....................................................................................... 5-10
Fire Support Considerations ............................................................................. 5-11
Air Operations ................................................................................................... 5-14
Section IV – Assembly and Reorganization.................................................. 5-17
Assembly........................................................................................................... 5-17
Reorganization .................................................................................................. 5-25
Chapter 6 AIR MOVEMENT PLAN ..................................................................................... 6-1
Section I – Joint Planning................................................................................. 6-1
Section II – Elements of the Air Movement Plan ............................................ 6-1
Air Movement Table ............................................................................................ 6-1
Types of Movement............................................................................................. 6-2
Aircraft Requirements ......................................................................................... 6-2
Section III – Load Planning Considerations ................................................... 6-3
Tactical Integrity .................................................................................................. 6-3
Cross Loading ..................................................................................................... 6-3
Self-Sufficiency ................................................................................................... 6-4
Section IV – Loading and Delivery of Forces ................................................. 6-5
Load Planning Sequence .................................................................................... 6-5
Load Planning of Vehicles................................................................................... 6-5
Air Movement Planning Worksheet ..................................................................... 6-5
Unit Aircraft Utilization Form................................................................................ 6-6
Section V – Aircraft Load and Air Movement Table ....................................... 6-6
Section VI – Manifests and Air-Loading Planning System ............................ 6-9
Manifests............................................................................................................. 6-9
Integrated Computerized Deployment System ................................................... 6-9
Chapter 7 MARSHALLING PLAN ....................................................................................... 7-1
Section I – Preparation ..................................................................................... 7-1
Section II – Movement ...................................................................................... 7-2
Section III – Protection...................................................................................... 7-2
Passive Defense Measures ................................................................................ 7-2
Dispersal ............................................................................................................. 7-3
Section IV – Departure Airfield-Marshalling Area ............................................ 7-3
Selecting Departure Airfields............................................................................... 7-3
Selecting and Operating Marshalling Areas........................................................ 7-4

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Facility Requirements.......................................................................................... 7-4

Marshalled Unit and Support Organization Activities .......................................... 7-7
Section V – Outload .......................................................................................... 7-9
Outload Planning Considerations........................................................................ 7-9
Outload Control ................................................................................................. 7-10

PART TWO AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

Chapter 8 ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT ............................................................. 8-1
Section I – Air Assault and Air Movements .................................................... 8-1
Section II – Air Assault Task Force ................................................................. 8-1
Organizing Forces ............................................................................................... 8-2
Brigade Combat Teams ...................................................................................... 8-2
Combat Aviation Brigades................................................................................... 8-2
Section III – Task Force Considerations ......................................................... 8-4
Section IV – Capabilities, Limitations, Vulnerabilities ................................... 8-5
Capabilities.......................................................................................................... 8-5
Limitations ........................................................................................................... 8-5
Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................... 8-6
Section V – Airspace Control ........................................................................... 8-6
Concurrent Employment ..................................................................................... 8-6
Airspace Coordinating Measures ........................................................................ 8-7
Airspace Development ........................................................................................ 8-8
Section VI – Air Assault Task Force Mission Command ............................. 8-10
Mission Orders .................................................................................................. 8-10
Command Posts................................................................................................ 8-12
Personnel and Key Elements within the Task Force ........................................ 8-13
Mission Command System................................................................................ 8-15
Chapter 9 AIR ASSAULT PLANNING ................................................................................ 9-1
Section I – Roles and Responsibilities............................................................ 9-1
Higher Headquarters........................................................................................... 9-1
Brigade Combat Team ........................................................................................ 9-1
Supporting Aviation Units .................................................................................... 9-1
Section II – Reverse Planning Sequence ........................................................ 9-1
Section III – Planning Methodology................................................................. 9-2
Deliberate Planning ............................................................................................. 9-3
Time-Constrained Planning ................................................................................ 9-4
Rapid Decisionmaking and Synchronization Process......................................... 9-5
Allowable Cargo Load Planning Considerations................................................. 9-6
Section IV – Planning Process ......................................................................... 9-6
Warning Order..................................................................................................... 9-6
Initial Planning Conference ................................................................................. 9-7
Air Mission Coordination Meeting ....................................................................... 9-7
Air Mission Brief .................................................................................................. 9-8
Air Mission Brief Documents ............................................................................... 9-8
Air Assault Task Force Rehearsal....................................................................... 9-9
Aircrew Brief ........................................................................................................ 9-9

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Aviation Task Force Rehearsal ........................................................................... 9-9

Condition Checks ................................................................................................ 9-9
Abort Criteria ..................................................................................................... 9-10
Section V – Control Measures........................................................................ 9-11
Force-Oriented Control Measures..................................................................... 9-11
Boundaries ........................................................................................................ 9-12
Fire Support Coordination Measures ................................................................ 9-12
Airspace Coordinating Measures ...................................................................... 9-12
Section VI – Shaping Operations ................................................................... 9-13
Section VII – Medical and Casualty Evacuation ........................................... 9-14
Medical Evacuation Planning............................................................................ 9-14
Casualty Backhaul ............................................................................................ 9-15
Medical Evacuation Landing Zone.................................................................... 9-15
Chapter 10 GROUND TACTICAL PLAN............................................................................. 10-1
Section I – Elements ....................................................................................... 10-1
Task Organization ............................................................................................. 10-1
Mission Statement............................................................................................. 10-1
Commander’s Intent.......................................................................................... 10-1
Concept of Operations ...................................................................................... 10-2
Tasks to Subordinate Units ............................................................................... 10-4
Section II – Plan Development ....................................................................... 10-4
Mission Analysis................................................................................................ 10-4
Assault Objective and Landing Zone Development .......................................... 10-8
Section III – Air-ground Operations ............................................................... 10-8
Effective Integration........................................................................................... 10-8
Close Combat Attacks....................................................................................... 10-9
Close Air Support ............................................................................................ 10-11
Unmanned Aircraft Systems ........................................................................... 10-11
Section IV – Execution .................................................................................. 10-12
Conduct of the Air Assault............................................................................... 10-12
Buildup of Combat Power ............................................................................... 10-12
Chapter 11 LANDING PLAN ............................................................................................... 11-1
Section I – Landing Zone Selection ............................................................... 11-1
Criteria for Selecting Landing Zones................................................................. 11-1
Location of Landing Zones................................................................................ 11-2
Number of Landing Zones................................................................................. 11-2
Section II – Landing Zone Updates................................................................ 11-3
Landing Zone Condition .................................................................................... 11-3
Fixed-wing Support ........................................................................................... 11-3
Unmanned Aircraft System Support.................................................................. 11-3
Section III – Hot Landing Zone Considerations............................................ 11-3
Scenarios .......................................................................................................... 11-3
Reaction to Enemy Contact Away From the Objective ..................................... 11-4
Reaction to Enemy Contact on the Objective ................................................... 11-4
Section IV – Preparation and Supporting Fires ............................................ 11-4

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Section V – Landing Site Operations ............................................................ 11-5

Landing Zone and Obstacle Markings .............................................................. 11-5
Exiting the Aircraft ............................................................................................. 11-6
Exiting the Landing Zone ................................................................................ 11-11
Chapter 12 AIR MOVEMENT PLAN ................................................................................... 12-1
Section I – Development Considerations ...................................................... 12-1
Air Routes.......................................................................................................... 12-1
En Route Formations ........................................................................................ 12-3
Terrain Flight Modes ......................................................................................... 12-5
Fires .................................................................................................................. 12-6
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses ................................................................ 12-6
Air Assault Security ........................................................................................... 12-8
Mission Command ............................................................................................ 12-8
Section II – Air Movement Table .................................................................... 12-9
Air Movement Table Development.................................................................... 12-9
Air Movement Table Criteria ............................................................................. 12-9
Chapter 13 LOADING AND STAGING ............................................................................... 13-1
Section I – Loading Plan ................................................................................. 13-1
Pickup Zone Selection ...................................................................................... 13-1
Pickup Zone Organization and Control ............................................................. 13-2
Coordination With Supporting Aviation Unit...................................................... 13-3
Preparation of Air Loading Tables .................................................................... 13-3
Disposition of Loads on Pickup Zone................................................................ 13-4
Lifts, Serials, and Chalks................................................................................... 13-5
Bump Plan......................................................................................................... 13-6
Section II – Staging Plan................................................................................. 13-7
Preparation for Loading..................................................................................... 13-7
Movement to Pickup Zone ................................................................................ 13-7
Chalk Check-In and Inspection ......................................................................... 13-7
Load Staging ..................................................................................................... 13-8
Sling Load Operations....................................................................................... 13-8
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................ Glossary-1

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... References-1

INDEX ........................................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures
Figure 1-1. Joint phasing model..............................................................................................1-5
Figure 3-1. MDMP and airborne assault planning process.....................................................3-5
Figure 4-1. Assault objectives ................................................................................................ 4-6
Figure 4-2. Airhead line .......................................................................................................... 4-7
Figure 4-3. Boundaries ......................................................................................................... 4-10

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Contents

Figure 4-4. Base options ....................................................................................................... 4-19

Figure 5-1. Offset and parallel drop zones .............................................................................. 5-7
Figure 5-2. Parallel on-line drop zones ................................................................................... 5-8
Figure 5-3. Assembly control posts for ABN IBCT forces landing on one drop zone ............ 5-18
Figure 5-4. Movement of personnel to company assembly area .......................................... 5-19
Figure 5-5. Line-of-flight/clock system .................................................................................. 5-20
Figure 5-6. Stiner aid............................................................................................................. 5-21
Figure 6-1. Cross-loaded aircraft ............................................................................................ 6-7
Figure 7-1. Airborne task force marshalling area .................................................................... 7-5
Figure 7-2. Heavy-drop loading area control center................................................................ 7-6
Figure 7-3. Heavy-drop rigging site......................................................................................... 7-7
Figure 7-4. Concept of outload control.................................................................................. 7-11
Figure 8-1. Grid line method ................................................................................................... 8-9
Figure 8-2. Attack by fire method .......................................................................................... 8-10
Figure 8-3. Example of air assault leadership positioning..................................................... 8-12
Figure 9-1. Air assault planning stages................................................................................... 9-2
Figure 9-2. MDMP and air assault planning process .............................................................. 9-4
Figure 9-3. Time-constrained air assault planning .................................................................. 9-5
Figure 10-1. Organizational framework ................................................................................. 10-3
Figure 10-2. Weather data. ................................................................................................... 10-7
Figure 11-1. One-side off-load (UH-60) ................................................................................ 11-7
Figure 11-2a. One-side off-load (squads in same chalk) trail landing formation ................... 11-8
Figure 11-2b. One-side off-load (squads in same chalk) staggered trail right landing
formation .................................................................................................................11-8
Figure 11-3. Two-side off-load (UH-60) ................................................................................ 11-9
Figure 11-4. Two-side off-load (squads in same chalk) diamond landing formation ........... 11-10
Figure 11-5. Two-side off-load (chalks cross-loaded) heavy right landing formation .......... 11-10
Figure 11-6. Rear ramp off-load and landing zone exit (CH-47) ......................................... 11-11
Figure 11-7. One-side landing zone rush (squads in same chalk) trail landing
formation .............................................................................................................. 11-12
Figure 11-8. Two-side landing zone rush (chalks cross loaded) trail landing formation ...... 11-13
Figure 11-9. Two-side landing zone rush (squads in same chalk) trail landing
formation .............................................................................................................. 11-14
Figure 12-1. Air route overlay................................................................................................ 12-3
Figure 12-2. Standard flight and landing formations ............................................................. 12-5
Figure 13-1. Example pickup zone diagram.......................................................................... 13-4
Figure 13-2. Lifts, serials, and chalks.................................................................................... 13-6

Tables
Table 1-1. Command responsibility of airborne operations................................................... 1-22
Table 1-2. Command responsibility of air assault operations................................................ 1-24

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Contents

Table 7-1. Parachute issue .....................................................................................................7-2

Table 8-1. Heavy Combat Aviation Brigade organization .......................................................8-3
Table 8-2. Medium Combat Aviation Brigade organization.....................................................8-4
Table 8-3. Standard air assault radio networks and monitoring requirements..................... 8-18
Table 9-1. Example of an air mission coordination meeting agenda ......................................9-8
Table 12-1. Example air movement table .......................................................................... 12-10
Table 13-1. Example air loading table.................................................................................. 13-3
Table 13-2. Aircraft bump information .................................................................................. 13-6

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 Preface
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations, establishes doctrine to govern the
activities and performance of Army forces in forcible entry (specifically airborne and air assault operations) and
provides the doctrinal basis for vertical envelopment and follow-on operations. This publication provides
leaders with descriptive guidance on how Army forces conduct vertical envelopment within the simultaneous
combination of offense, defense, and stability. These doctrinal principles are intended to be used as a guide and
are not to be considered prescriptive.

FM 3-99 encompasses tactics for Army airborne and air assault operations and describes how commanders plan,
prepare, and conduct airborne and air assault operations by means of joint combined arms operations. This
publication supersedes FM 90-26, Airborne Operations and Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-18.12,
Air Assault Operations.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in this publication, readers must first understand the principles of war,
the nature of unified land operations, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described
in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, and Army Doctrine Reference Publication
(ADRP) 3-0. The reader must understand the fundamentals of the operations process found in ADP and ADRP
5-0 associated with the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks contained in FM 3-90-1 and reconnaissance,
security, and tactical enabling tasks contained in FM 3-90-2. In addition the reader must also fully understand
the principles of mission command as described in ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 and command and staff
organization and operations found in FM 6-0.

The principal audience for FM 3-99 is the commanders, staff, officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
of the brigade, battalions, and companies within the brigade combat team. The audience also includes the
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command institutions and components, and the United States Army
Special Operations Command. It serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing doctrine, materiel
and force structure, institutional and unit training, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for airborne or air
assault operations.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (Refer to FM 27-10.)

FM 3-99 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and text. Terms for which FM 3-99 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk(*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 3-99 is the proponent publication are boldfaced
in the text and the term is italicized. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the
number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United
States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for FM 3-99 is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The preparing
agency is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE). Send comments and
recommendations by— mail or e-mail—using or following the format of DA Form 2028, (Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). Point of contact information is as follows:

E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: COM 706-545-7114 or DSN 835-7114
Mail: Commanding General, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Doctrine
and Collective Training Division, ATTN: ATZK-TDD, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are implied.

0DUFK FM 3-99 L[
7KLVSDJHLQWHQWLRQDOO\OHIWEODQN
 Introduction
Assured access is the desired conditions that the United States seeks to maintain in
potential areas of strategic importance throughout the world. Assured access is the
result of a combination of geopolitical factors that affect the United States’ ability to
exert influence and project power in a variety of political, economic, humanitarian,
and military situations. While assured access includes the freedom of movement
through the global commons of international airspace and oceanic sea lanes,
operational access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with
sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.

Operational access is the joint force contribution to assured access, the unhindered
national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace
and cyberspace. Operational access challenges can be categorized in a number of
ways. They can be classified in terms of geographical, military, or diplomatic access
issues. They can be described in terms of anti-access challenges, capabilities
designed to prevent entry into an operational area, or area-denial capabilities
designed to limit freedom of action within the operational area.

Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to projecting military force into an
operational area and sustaining it in the face of armed opposition by defeating enemy
anti-access and area denial capabilities. Projecting and sustaining forces require the
capability to secure multiple entry points into an operational area. As a major
application of forcible entry, the joint force uses vertical envelopment (airborne and
air assault operations), giving leaders flexibility and depth to set conditions for
decisive action. Vertical envelopment capitalizes on mobility to surprise the enemy,
seize a lodgment, and gain the initiative.

The joint force establishes several precepts for gaining operational access. Foremost
among them is “Conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the
broader mission, while also designing subsequent operations to lessen access
challenges.” Consistent with this precept, entry operations into enemy territory are a
means to military or political objectives, rather than an end in themselves. Entry
operations are planned within the larger context of the campaign’s overarching
purpose. Without considering the impacts of entry operations on the larger objectives
of a military campaign it is possible that entry may be gained through means that
decrease the likelihood of achieving political and military objectives.

Operations during the last 25 years make clear that future entry of forces onto hostile
or uncertain territory will be necessary for a number of purposes, one of which is the
establishment of a lodgment. Joint doctrine defines forcible entry as the “seizing and
holding of a lodgment in the face of armed opposition,” and a lodgment as “a
designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized
and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides
maneuver space for subsequent operations.” Each service and functional component
has an important role in how joint forcible entry operations overcome opposed access.

This manual provides doctrinal guidance for forcible entry operations at the
operational and tactical levels. It describes relationships within the operational joint

0DUFK FM 3-99 [
 Introduction

task force; vertical envelopment, organizational roles, functions, capabilities, and

limitations; and responsibilities for the brigade combat team and its subordinate units
within the assault force during airborne and air assault operations. A summary of key
constructs to FM 3-99 follows:
x Operational access—forcible entry and vertical envelopment—within the operational
environment.
x Task force organization, mission, capabilities, and limitations as well as the duties and
responsibilities for the conduct of airborne and air assault operations.
x Task force command and staff operations; cross-functional staff organizations (cells, working
groups, and centers) to assist in coordination.
x Meetings, working groups, and boards to integrate the staff, enhance planning, and
decisionmaking within the task force.
x Airborne and air assault task force unique capabilities and planning considerations in transitioning
to other tactical operations.

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 Chapter 1

Overview
Adaptive adversaries and enemies will contest United States joint forces across all
domains— air, sea, land, space and cyberspace. Enemies are likely to employ anti-
access strategies to prevent friendly force ability to project and sustain combat power
into a region, and area denial strategies to constrain our nation’s freedom of action
within the region. Assured access— the unhindered national use of the global
commons and selected sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace, is
achieved by projecting all the elements of national power. Often the United States
requires operational access— the ability to project military force into an operational
area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Operational access
is the desired condition that the United States seeks to maintain in areas of strategic
importance, to achieve assured access. Army forces, as part of joint forces project
forces into an operational area and conduct operations to defeat enemy anti-access
and area denial capabilities and establish security conditions and control of territory
to pressure freedom of movement and action for follow-on operations or deny that
area’s use to the enemy. Forcible entry operations are complex and always involve
taking prudent risk to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. Equally
critical is the transition between phases of the operation. This chapter discusses
forcible entry operations and in particular the application of vertical envelopment as a
tactical maneuver conducted by airborne or air assault forces to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative.

SECTION I – FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

1-1. United States forces gain access to sovereign spaces through invitation (humanitarian relief),
negotiations (basing rights), coercion (peacemaking operations under United Nation charter) or through
force. The joint force’s ability to project power and influence is challenged by proliferated anti-access
weapons with increasing range, diversity, density and sophistication in the hands of both state and nonstate
actors who are devising innovative approaches to contest joint forces in all domains. This evolving threat
necessitates the development of comprehensive joint force solutions for gaining and maintaining
operational access. (Refer to JP 3-18 for more information.)
1-2. The composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that make up an operational
environment affects the employment of capabilities and impacts the decisions of commanders. The
operational environment of the access force includes all enemy, adversarial, friendly, and neutral systems
across the range of military operations; it includes an understanding of the physical environment, the state
of governance, technology, local resources, and the culture of the local population. (Refer to JP 2-01.3 for
more information.)
1-3. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition (JP
3-18). A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized
and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for
subsequent operations (JP 3-18). A forcible entry operation is conducted to gain entry into the territory of
an enemy by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or
conduct a singular operation. The operations must be designed to provide maneuver space for subsequent
operations. This section addresses the principles and operational application of joint forcible entry

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 1-1

Chapter 1

operations. It discusses joint command and control, planning process and considerations, and the entry
force.

JOINT PRINCIPLES FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

1-4. Fundamental principles are essential to plan, prepare, execute, and access joint forcible entry
operations. Joint principles for forcible entry operations are:

ACHIEVE SURPRISE
1-5. Commanders and planners strive to achieve surprise regarding exact objectives, times, methods, and
forces employed in forcible entry operations. Surprise depends upon comprehensive information-related
capabilities [operations security (OPSEC) and military deception] followed by disciplined execution by the
joint force. (Refer to JP 3-13.3 and JP 3-13.4 for more information.) Surprise is not a necessary condition
for operational success (particularly when the force has overwhelming superiority), but it can reduce
operational risk significantly.

CONTROL OF THE AIR

1-6. Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air
superiority and protection in the operational area to protect the force during periods of critical vulnerability
and to preserve lines of communications. At a minimum, the joint force must neutralize the enemy’s
offensive air and missile capability and air defenses to achieve local air superiority and protection over the
planned lodgment. The joint force controls the air through integrated and synchronized air and missile
defense operations. Air interdiction of enemy forces throughout the operational area enhances the
simultaneity and depth of the forcible entry operation.

CONTROL OF SPACE
1-7. Space superiority allows the joint force commander access to communications, weather, navigation,
timing, remote sensing, and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
Clearly defined command relationships are crucial for ensuring timely and effective execution of space
operations and provide depth, persistence, and reach capabilities for commanders at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels.

ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

1-8. Electromagnetic spectrum management is the planning, coordinating, and managing use of the
electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures (JP 6-01). It
includes the interrelated functions of frequency management, host-nation coordination, and joint spectrum
interference resolution that together enable the planning, management, and execution of operations within
the electromagnetic operational environment during all phases of military operations. The electromagnetic
operational environment is the background electromagnetic environment and the friendly, neutral, and
adversarial electromagnetic order of battle within the electromagnetic area of influence associated with a
given operational area (JP 6-01). (Refer to JP 6-01 for more information.)

OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

1-9. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do
the same (JP 3-13). It enables the primary mission objective and information-related activities within
information operations. Information operations is the integrated employment, during military operations, of
information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13).
(Refer to JP 3-13 for more information.)
1-10. Information in an operational environment is an important contributor to operational access as it
enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power,

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ultimately creating opportunities to achieve decisive results. Operations in the information environment—
the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on
information (JP 3-13) requires—
z Complementary tasks of information operations that inform and influence a global audience and
affect morale within the operational environment.
z Cyber electromagnetic activities (See FM 3-38.) to ensure information availability, protection,
and delivery, as well as a means to deny, degrade, or disrupt the enemy’s use of its command
and control systems and other cyber capabilities.
z Knowledge management capabilities to allow the commanders to make informed; timely
decisions despite the uncertainty of operations.
z Information management to help commanders make and disseminate effective decisions faster
than the enemy can.
z Information systems to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations.

SEA CONTROL
1-11. Local maritime superiority is required to project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry
operation and to protect sea lines of communications (SLOCs). Protection of SLOCs ensures the
availability of logistic support required to sustain operations and support the transition to continuing
operations by follow-on forces.

ISOLATE THE LODGMENT

1-12. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized
and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for
subsequent operations. The joint force attacks or neutralizes enemy capabilities with the potential to affect
the establishment of the lodgment. These capabilities include—
z Enemy ground, sea, and air forces that can be committed to react to joint force assaults.
z Indirect fire systems and theater missile systems that can range the lodgment.
z Related enemy sensors, command and control systems, and digital networks.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN ACCESS

1-13. Gaining and maintaining access is a critical precondition for successful forcible entry and follow-on
operations. In any given operational area, numerous and diverse limitations to access present themselves.
Access may be restricted due to diplomatic, economic, military, or cultural factors. Ports, airfields, and
infrastructures may be physically limited. Additional access precondition considerations include—
z Leveraging established basing, access, and security cooperation agreements as well as the
regional and national expertise and partner capabilities developed through precrisis engagement
activities at the national and regional levels.
z Appropriate shaping operations or activities focused on identifying and neutralizing an
adversary’s anti-access capabilities balanced against the need for surprise.
z Operational access to expand the degree to which the full range of joint capabilities within the
joint operations area is utilized.

NEUTRALIZE ENEMY FORCES WITHIN THE LODGMENT

1-14. The joint force must neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment to facilitate the establishment of
airheads (Refer to chapter 3 of this publication for more information.) and beachheads (Refer to JP 3-02 for
more information.) within the operational area and to provide for the immediate protection of the force.
Planning considerations should include—
z Identification of enemy infrastructure, which may be of value for future use by friendly forces.
z Limiting physical damage to lessen the time needed to rebuild.

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Chapter 1

EXPAND THE LODGMENT

1-15. The joint force quickly builds combat power in order to enhance security and the ability to respond to
enemy counter attacks, enable continuous landing of troops and materiel, and facilitate transition to
subsequent operations. Analyze requirements to expand with regards to maximum on ground capabilities,
throughput, and infrastructure.

MANAGE THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

1-16. Managing the impact of environmental factors refers to overcoming the effect of land and sea
obstacles; anticipating, preventing, detecting, and mitigating threat use of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), and weapons of mass destruction; and, determining the impact of
climate, weather, and other naturally occurring hazards. (Refer to JP 3-11, JP 3-40, and JP 3-59 for more
information.)

INTEGRATE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

1-17. Reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations are critical to information
collection based on the commander’s critical information requirement. Information operations, civil-
military operations, and special operations (to include special reconnaissance missions) are keys to setting
conditions, and integrated into the operation at every stage from initial planning to transition. Logistic
services comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable the joint force to rapidly provide
sustainment of entry forces in order to achieve the envisioned end state of the joint force commander (JFC).

OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY

OPERATIONS
1-18. The Army combines campaign qualities and expeditionary capabilities to contribute decisive,
sustained land power to unified actions. Campaign quality extends expeditionary capability well beyond
deploying combined arms forces that are effective upon arrival. It is an ability to conduct sustained
operations for as long as necessary, adapting to unpredictable and often profound changes in an operational
environment (OE) as the campaign unfolds. Expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy
combined arms forces worldwide into operational environments (OEs) and conduct operations upon arrival.
Future conflicts, involving forcible entry operations, place a premium on promptly deploying land power
and constantly adapting to each campaign’s unique circumstances as they occur and change.

CAMPAIGN QUALITY
1-19. The joint force commander (JFC) conducts campaigns to translate operational-level actions into
strategic results and exploits the advantage of interdependent service capabilities. Through operational art
and the principles of joint operations, the JFC determines the most effective and efficient methods for
applying decisive operations in various locations across multiple echelons.

EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY
1-20. Expeditionary operations require the ability to deploy quickly with little notice, shape conditions in
the operational area, operate immediately on arrival exploiting success and consolidating tactical and
operational gains. Expeditionary capabilities of an entry force are more than physical attributes; they begin
with a mindset that permeates the force. The Army provides entry forces to the joint force commander that
are organized and equipped to rapidly deploy as well as conduct sustained operations.

PHASING AND TRANSITIONS

1-21. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 3-
0). Phasing is critical to arranging complex operations. It describes how the commander envisions the
overall operation unfolding in time. Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or
mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end

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 Overview

of a phase. Descriptions of efforts during each phase should emphasize effort, concentrate combat power in
time and space at a decisive point, and accomplish its objectives deliberately and logically.
1-22. Phasing is critical to arranging all tasks of an operation that cannot be conducted simultaneously.
Commanders, with the assistance of the staff, visualize the mission, decide which tactics to use, and
balance the tasks of unified land operations while preparing their intent and concept of operations
(CONOPS). They determine which tasks the force can accomplish simultaneously, if phasing is required,
what additional resources are necessary, and how to transition from one task to another. At the operational
level, this requires looking beyond the current operation and prioritizing forces for the next phase or sequel.
1-23. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution
of a branch or sequel. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution to maintain
the momentum and tempo of operations. The force is vulnerable during transitions, and commanders
establish clear conditions for their execution. Transition occurs for several reasons. It may occur from an
operation dominated by combined arms maneuver to one dominated by wide area security. An unexpected
change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases,
the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task
organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions;
however, transition planning also must account for changes in mission. Commanders continuously assess
the situation and task-organize and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. They strive to achieve changes
in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.
1-24. The JFC’s vision of how a campaign or operation should unfold and anticipated enemy action drives
decisions regarding phasing. Generally, joint operations and campaigns involve six phases (shape, deter,
seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority) as illustrated in figure 1-1. Phasing assists in
framing commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and
activities into phases, the joint force commander can better integrate and synchronize subordinate
operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase represents a natural subdivision of the campaign or
operation. Within the context of the phases established by a JFC, subordinate JFCs and component
commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. A creditable threat of forcible entry
operations can be an effective deterrence and may be applicable in both Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase I
(Deter).

Figure 1-1. Joint phasing model

1-25. A forcible entry operation normally is conducted during Phase II (Seize the Initiative) or Phase III
(Dominate) of a joint operation. A forcible entry operation may be the JFC’s opening move to seize the
initiative. For example, a JFC might direct friendly forces to conduct a vertical envelopment (airborne or
air assault operation) to seize and hold a lodgment to ensure the continuous landing of troops and materiel
and provide the maneuver space to conduct follow-on operations. The establishment of the lodgment,
followed by the arrival and preparation of follow-on forces, usually marks the end of the forcible entry sub-
phase of the operation and a transition to further offensive operations to seize the initiative or dominate.

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Chapter 1

1-26. Forcible entry operations during the dominate phase of a campaign may be used for the following
purposes:
z A sudden attack in force to achieve decisive results (a coup de main).
z Conducting operational movement and maneuver to attain positional advantage.
z A military deception.

1-27. The defeat of enemy forces usually marks the end of the dominate phase of the operation and a
transition to area security and further operations to stabilize and enable civil authority. The mere existence
of a forcible entry capability may be used by the JFC as a military deception operation, as a show of force
or to force enemy movement even without mounting a forcible entry operation.

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-28. Joint and partner interoperability (to include communications, planning and operations processes,
staff functionality, language skills, and cultural knowledge) is critical to achieve unity of effort. Joint
command and control information systems must enable interoperability and help synthesize information
into knowledge while operating in austere environments, on the move, and across wide areas.
1-29. Joint command and control capabilities must maintain communications when networks are
compromised or degraded due to friendly or enemy actions as well as materiel breakdown, natural
atmospheric effects, or geospatial interference. The following paragraphs provide guidance on the
employment options, organization of the operational area, command relationships, and command and
control functions that support the conduct of forcible entry operations.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT
1-30. The combination of forcible entry capabilities employed depends on the mission. Unity of command
is vital when multiple forcible entry capabilities are used or combined. Forcible entry operations are
complex and must be kept simple in concept and well understood by all elements of the joint force and
supporting commands.
1-31. If the JFC decides to use a combination of forcible entry capabilities, he must decide whether to
conduct the forcible entries as concurrent or integrated operations. The distinction between concurrent and
integrated operations has implications for organizing forces, establishing command relationships, and
applying force to accomplish the mission. He must consider the unique aspects of the specific operation and
should organize the force, establish command relationships, and apply force in a manner that fits the
current situation.
1-32. Concurrent operations occur when a combination of amphibious, airborne, or air assault forcible
entry operations are conducted simultaneously but as distinct operations with separate operational areas and
objectives. Integrated forcible entry operations result when amphibious, airborne, or air assault forcible
entries are conducted simultaneously within the same operational area and with mutually supporting
objectives. Integrated forcible entry operations feature the complementary employment of forces and seek
to maximize the capabilities of the respective forces available to the commander.
1-33. Dispersed joint forces use strategic and operational maneuver via air and sea to deploy or employ
from the global system of main operating bases, forward operating sites, cooperative security locations, and
amphibious and other sea-based platforms to project military force into an operational area with sufficient
freedom of action to accomplish the mission. The complementary capability to employ from the air, with
airborne and air assault forces, and the sea, with amphibious and air assault forces, complicates the
adversary’s defense. By requiring the adversary to defend a vast area against our mobility and deep power
projection, joint forces can render some of his force irrelevant while exploiting the seams created in his
defensive disposition.
1-34. Advanced force operations include strike operations, clandestine insertion of special operations
forces and organic or supporting reconnaissance and/or surveillance teams, deception, counter-mine or
counter-obstacle operations, and information operations. These activities combine with efforts to gain
localized air and maritime superiority in the approaches to and entry areas. Joint strike operations along
with theater air and missile defense, computer network operations, and electronic attack help provide

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 Overview

protection and select areas of domain advantage allowing for the conduct of entry operations. (Refer to JP
3-05 and ADRP 3-05 for more information.)
1-35. To counter the enemy’s defensive capabilities, joint forces attack from multiple directions and
dimensions and disperse or concentrate forces depending on the intelligence preparation of the operational
environment. (See JP 2-01.3.) Ideally, they avoid enemy defenses and seize undefended entry points
through vertical envelopment, attacking the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the
force. In hostile environments, assault forces conduct simultaneous force projection and sustainment to
multiple unexpected or austere locations along a coastline and unexpected or austere landing zones ashore.
1-36. Operational maneuver requires the near-simultaneous movement and support of multiple tactical
formations by ground, air, and sea from separate staging areas to locations in depth from which their
military capabilities can be focused against critical enemy forces and facilities. High operational tempo and
continuous pressure disrupts the enemy’s ability to regroup, reconstitute capabilities, or reconfigure forces
to support new plans. The primary means of maintaining continuous pressure is the rapid cycling of joint
functions, related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct
joint operations.
1-37. An intermediate staging base is a tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment
and/or extraction into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). Intermediate staging bases (ISBs) are a
critical capability that enables shorter range recycling of intra-theater lift capabilities, reorganization and
reconfiguration of capabilities to meet evolving tactical demands and recalibration of battle and logistical
rhythms. Obtaining ISBs remains a critical part of baseline condition setting for joint force employment
worldwide in access operations. Absent ISBs, the joint force’s ability to maintain continuous pressure in the
face of area denial capabilities is reduced significantly.
1-38. Joint commanders can employ forces in ISBs as a deterrent or as part of a forcible entry or other
combat operation to defeat enemy forces. Besides conducting forcible entry to secure a lodgment as a
prelude to a larger campaign, they may conduct limited attacks to seize key terrain upon which the enemy
has emplaced air and missile defenses and anti-satellite missiles to ensure freedom of action in other
domains.
1-39. Entry operations may rely on joint assets in an ISB for command and control, fires, protection,
intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and sustainment. Under austere conditions or when overcoming
anti-access capabilities joint ISBs help reduce the requirement for large ground-based sustainment stocks
and extended ground lines of communication, which could be vulnerable to enemy attack and which
require additional forces to secure.
1-40. Forcible entry may include an airfield opening to support air operations following the initial entry.
An airfield is an area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings, installations, and
equipment), landing, takeoff of aircraft. (JP 3-17). As airfields are identified for use and the missions and
aircraft for which the airfield will be opened are determined; operators and planners generate options for
one of three operational environments: permissive, uncertain, and hostile. Once employment forces are
assigned by the joint task force, more detailed planning is conducted in coordination with the entry force
and United States Air Force (USAF) first-responder airfield opening units.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONAL AREA

1-41. Gaining operational area access. Joint forces seek to achieve periods of advantage in every domain to
counter enemy anti-access capabilities and gain access to an operational area. They attack enemy anti-
access capabilities and gain access to an operational area by conducting cross-domain operations in an
effort to maximize the advantages and negate the disadvantages encountered in a single domain. Gaining
total domain dominance is rarely obtainable, access forces fight for domain superiority—
z To gain an advantage in time and place that need not be permanent or widespread.
z At critical times and places within the operational area to achieve, the degree of freedom of
action required to accomplish objectives.
1-42. Maintaining operational area access. The Army’s role in the joint fight for maintaining operational
area access is the integration of ground maneuver into a joint effort; conducting entry operations; and

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Chapter 1

employing and sustaining forces while fighting to maintain freedom of action. The primary means of
maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy is the continuous and rapid cycling of capabilities under
operational-level direction throughout the duration of operations.
1-43. Operational area. Operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for
geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited
to, area of operations, amphibious objective area, joint operations area, and joint special operations area
(JSOA). The JFC may designate operational areas on a temporary basis to facilitate the coordination,
integration, and deconfliction between joint force components and supporting commands. Operational areas
have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains and are
defined by geographical boundaries.
1-44. Area of operations. Defined areas of operations for land and maritime forces typically do not
encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for the land and maritime
component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders
with areas of operations may designate subordinate area of operations within which their subordinate forces
operate. For example, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) may assign subordinate
commanders separate areas of operations within an assigned airborne or air assault area of operations.
These subordinate commanders employ the full range of joint and service doctrinal control measures and
graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, safeguard friendly forces and civilians, and
promote unity of effort.
1-45. Amphibious objective area. An amphibious objective area is an area of land, sea, and airspace,
assigned by a joint force commander to commander, amphibious task force (CATF) to conduct amphibious
operations. The amphibious objective area should be specified in the initiating directive. This area must be
of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient
area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. This three-dimensional area often is limited in
height (for example, up to 25,000 feet). Amphibious objective area air control procedures are identical to a
high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) and CATF is the regional (or sector) air defense commander
(RADC or SADC).The amphibious objective area extends below the water surface, and can have a depth
limitation. (Refer to JP 3-02 for more information.)
1-46. Joint special operations area (JSOA). A joint special operations area is an area of land, sea, and
airspace, assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special
operations activities. The JFC may establish a JSOA when geographic boundaries between special
operations forces and conventional forces are the most suitable control measures. Establishment of a JSOA
for special operations forces to conduct operations provides a control measure and assists in the prevention
of fratricide. The commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF) may request the
establishment of a JSOA. When a JSOA is designated, the CDRJSOTF is the supported commander within
the designated JSOA. The CDRJSOTF may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a
subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces
mission, operational environment, and politico-military considerations all influence the number,
composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to
accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad
range of unconventional warfare operations. (Refer to JP 3-05 for more information.)
1-47. Airspace control area. An airspace control area is that airspace laterally defined by the boundaries
that delineate the operational area. This airspace may include subareas. This airspace may entail an
operational area and is a means of planning and dividing responsibility. While an operational area is in
existence, airspace control within the operational area is delegated according to JFC guidance, the airspace
control plan, and airspace control order. (Refer to JP 3-52 for more information.)
1-48. Control and coordination measures. Control and coordination of forcible entry operations pose a
difficult challenge to all elements of the joint force. In addressing this challenge, the JFCs and appropriate
commanders may employ various control and coordination measures that facilitate the execution of
operations and, at the same time, protect the force to the greatest possible degree. These measures include,
but are not limited to, boundaries that circumscribe operational areas; control measures to facilitate joint
force maneuver; fire support coordination measures (FSCMs); and airspace coordinating measures. (Refer
to JP 3-52 for more information.)

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 Overview

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

1-49. The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination between
subordinate commanders to ensure unity of command. He may organize the forcible entry force as a
subordinate joint task force or the forcible entry force may be organized from a component. An initiating
directive provides guidance on command relationships and other pertinent instructions for the duration of
the forcible entry operation. Joint force commander subordinate command relationships may include:

Functional Component Commanders

1-50. Designating joint force functional component commanders, allows resolution of joint issues at the
functional component level and enhances component interaction at that level. Delegating control of the
forcible entry operation to a functional component commander permits the JFC to focus on other
responsibilities in the operational areas. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the forcible entry operation may be
conducted by a functional component commander. (Refer to JP 3-30, JP 3-32, and JP 3-02 for more
information.) Responsibilities when organized under functional lines include the following:
z Joint force land component commander (JFLCC). Plans, coordinates, and employs designated
forces or capabilities for joint land operations in support of the joint force commander’s
CONOPS. Normally commands forcible entry operations that involve airborne or air assaults
that originate from land bases, and typically designates subordinate airborne and air assault task
force commanders.
„ Airborne task force commander (ABNTFC). Serves as the airborne assault force
commander’s (ABNAFC) higher echelon commander. The ABNTFC may be the joint force
commander or ground commander, depending upon experience and the scope of the
operation. Responsible for the planning, coordination, and employment of designated
airborne forcible entry forces or capabilities in the support of the joint force commander’s
CONOPS. The ABNTFC has overall responsibility to synchronize and integrate the actions
of assigned, attached, and supporting air capabilities or forces in time, space, and purpose.
The command relationships established between the joint force commander, ABNAFC,
commander, airlift force; joint force air component commander (JFACC), and other
designated commanders of the forcible entry force are key to mission success.
„ Air assault task force commander (AATFC). Serves as the overall commander of the air
assault task force (AATF) using fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft deploying from land-based
facilities and ships. Responsible for the planning, coordination, and employment of
designated air assault forcible entry forces or capabilities in the support of the joint force
commander’s CONOPS. The AATFC ensures continuity of command throughout the
operation by forming and employing the AATF, which is a temporary group of integrated
forces tailored to a specific mission under the command of a single headquarters.
z Joint force air component commander (JFACC). Synchronizes and integrates the actions of
assigned, attached, and supporting air capabilities or forces in time, space, and purpose in
support of the joint force commander’s CONOPS. The JFACC coordinates with the supported
functional component commander or joint task force commander to establish airspace control
and air defense plans in support of a forcible entry operation.
z Joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). Plans, coordinates, and employs
designated forces or capabilities for joint maritime operations in support of the joint force
commander’s CONOPS.
„ Commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and commander, landing force (CLF)
amphibious assault forcible entry operations include air and land assaults that originate
from the sea. The amphibious force is organized to best accomplish the mission based
on the CONOPS.
„ Establishing command relationship between the CATF, CLF, and other designated
commanders of the amphibious force is an important decision. An establishing directive is
essential to ensure unity of effort within the amphibious force. Normally, a support
relationship is established between the CATF and CLF by the JFC or establishing authority.

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Chapter 1

Special Operations Forces Command

1-51. When directed, Commander, United States (U.S.) Special Operations Command provides continental
U.S.-based special operations forces to a JFC. The JFC normally exercises combatant command (command
authority) of assigned and operational control of attached special operations forces through a commander,
theater special operations command (TSOC), or a subunified commander. When a JFC establishes and
employs multiple task forces concurrently, the TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple joint
special operations task forces (JSOTFs) to manage special operations forces assets and accommodate joint
task force/task force special operations requirements. Accordingly, the joint task force commander, as the
common superior, establishes support or tactical control command relationships between the JSOTF
commanders and joint task force/tasks force commanders. The special operations forces liaison to the JFC
helps coordinate the operations of the supported or supporting special operations force and advises the joint
force commander of special operations forces capabilities and limitations. (Refer to FM 6-05 for more
information.)

Multinational Partners
1-52. Entry forces participating in a multinational operation always have at least two distinct chains of
command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. Although nations often
participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces.
1-53. Forcible entry operations with multinational partners are planned and conducted much the same as a
U.S. joint force operation. Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation
may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal. Forcible entry objectives must be understood by all
national forces. (Refer to FM 3-16 for more information.)

AIRSPACE CONTROL
1-54. The JFC normally designates a JFACC as the commander for joint air operations. In addition, to a
JFACC, the JFC may designate an area air defense commander (AADC) and an airspace control authority
or he may designate the JFACC as the AADC and airspace control authority. If a separate airspace control
authority or AADC is designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort.

Airspace Control Authority

1-55. The airspace control authority plans, coordinates, and develops airspace control procedures and
operates the airspace control system. He monitors, assesses, and controls operational area airspace and
directs changes according to the joint force commander’s intent. The airspace control authority normally
controls the airspace through the theater air control system (TACS) and the Army air-ground system
(AAGS) in forcible entries. Situations may limit establishment of ground systems and require airborne or
sea-based systems to conduct airspace control. Commanders and staffs should closely monitor and plan the
employment of critical communication systems within TACS/AAGS. (Refer to JP 3-52 for more
information.)

Army Air-Ground System

1-56. Army components of the AAGS consist of airspace elements, fire support cells, air and missile
defense sections, and coordination and liaison elements embedded in Army command posts. Collectively
they coordinate and integrate airspace use —joint, coalition, nonmilitary and Army manned and unmanned
aircraft systems, directed energy, munitions— for the echelons they are assigned. These participants consist
of airspace elements, fire support cells, air defense airspace management/brigade aviation elements
(ADAM/BAEs), an Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC), battlefield coordination
detachments (BCDs), ground and reconnaissance liaison detachments, and air defense artillery fire control
officers (ADAFCOs). Some participants of the theater air-ground system (TAGS) —such as the air
mobility liaison officer, the tactical air control party, and the air support operations center— remain under
operational control of different Services but provide direct support during the conduct of operations. (Refer
to FM 3-52 for more information.)

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 Overview

Airspace Elements by Echelon and Role

1-57. Airspace elements are organic to brigade combat teams BCTs and higher. Corps and division
airspace elements are the same and both contain an airspace element in their main and tactical command
posts. The BCTs contain a version of an airspace element referred to as an ADAM/BAE. The ADAM/BAE
integrates brigade airspace, including air and missile defense (AMD) and aviation functions. Each of these
elements coordinates with higher, subordinate, and adjacent elements to maximize the effectiveness of
airspace control.
1-58. The ADAM/BAE manages the airspace control working group to facilitate and synchronize
contributions from all the elements that perform the airspace collective tasks. The airspace control working
group typically consists of an air liaison officer and representatives from the airspace element, aviation
element, AMD element, fire support cell, tactical air control party, and unmanned aircraft systems element.

Airspace Coordination and Liaison Element

1-59. The JFACC establishes one or more joint air component coordination elements (JACCEs). JACCEs
colocate with the joint force commanders headquarters and other component commanders’ headquarters.
When established, these elements act as the JFACC’s primary representatives to the respective
commanders and facilitate interaction among the respective staffs. The JACCE facilitates integration by
exchanging current intelligence, operational data, and support requirements. It also aids integration by
coordinating JFACC requirements for airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), FSCMs, close air support,
air mobility, and space requirements.
1-60. The battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), the Army liaison to the JFACC, is located in the
joint air operations center (JAOC). The BCD facilitates the synchronization of air and Army ground
operations within the area of responsibility. BCD personnel work with their counterparts in the JAOC to
facilitate planning, coordination, and execution of air-ground operations. The BCD expedites the exchange
of information through face-to-face coordination and digital interfaces with JAOC elements and with—
Army ground liaison officers at USAF operations centers, the Army theater main command post, the corps
main command post (or if necessary the tactical command posts), and with subordinate unit command
posts, if appropriate. At the corps or division main command post, the BCD exchanges information with the
integrating and functional cells within the headquarters. (Refer to FM 3-52 for more information.)
1-61. The BCD also supervises the Army’s reconnaissance liaison detachments and ground liaison
detachments that provide coordination among Army forces and USAF reconnaissance, fighter, and airlift
wings. The Army assigns ground liaison detachments to each USAF air wing operations center supporting
ground operations. The Army ground liaison detachments provide Army expertise, interpreting and briefing
pilots on the ground commander’s concept of operations, tactics, equipment, and the ground situation. They
also provide guidance on target designation, help identify friendly troops, and participate in the debriefing
of pilots on their return from missions. These detachments are also the principal points of contact between
the USAF contingency response groups and Army airfield control groups for controlling Army theater
airlift movements. (Refer to JP 3-17 for more information on air mobility operations.)

Airspace Control Coordination During Airborne and Air Assault Force Operations
1-62. Missions such as airborne, air assault and other incursions into enemy territory require specific
airspace control coordination. When supporting a forcible entry operation, the air component commander
for the operation or JFACC (if designated) may use airborne command and control assets to enhance
coordination and control of joint air operations and airspace management. Additional considerations
include the following:
z Force employment and system interoperability normally determines the systems available to the
airspace control authority in designating airspace control system to control joint air operations.
z Distances involved and the duration require establishing special air traffic control facilities or
special tactics teams to extend detailed control into the objective area.
z Air traffic volume demands careful coordination to limit potential conflict and to enable the
success of mission-essential operations within the airhead.

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Chapter 1

z Establishment of a high-density air control zone around a drop zone or landing zone (includes
sufficient terrain and airspace) to permit safe and efficient air traffic control.
z A high-density air control zone can be nominated by the ground force commander and should
include, at a minimum, the airspace bounded by the airhead line. (Refer to chapter 4 and chapter
10 of this publication for more information.)
z Within the high-density air control zone, all aircraft flights should be coordinated with the drop
zone, landing zone, and the agency responsible for controlling the joint airspace.
z Air mission commander coordinates with the assault force commander to select the time on
target and the direction of approach into and through the airhead.
z Environmental effects on airspace control coordination may dictate force employment
techniques and aircraft selection for specific mission profiles.

AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER

1-63. The JFC designates an area air defense commander (AADC) with the authority to plan, coordinate,
and integrate overall joint force defensive counterair operations. The AADC normally is the component
commander with the preponderance of air and missile defense assets and the capability to plan, coordinate,
and execute integrated air and missile defense operations. Additionally, the AADC is granted the required
command authority to deconflict and control engagements and to exercise real-time battle management.
1-64. As approved by the joint force commander, the AADC may designate the commander, Army air and
missile defense command (AAMDC) as a deputy AADC for air and missile defense [DAADC (AMD)] in
support of the AADC for defense counterair operations. The AAMDC is responsible for balancing the
Army counterair assets/capabilities between the Army/JFLCC maneuver units and theater-level
requirements. The AAMDC ensures that Army theater air and missile defense operations are internally
coordinated and properly integrated with the joint force and multinational forces.
1-65. The Army provides mission command, sensors, and weapon systems for the counterair operational
area, but does not provide the capability for regional or sector air defense commands within the land
component area of operations. Regional or sector air defense commands normally are provided by
command and control elements [control and reporting center (AADC), tactical air operations center United
States Marine Corps (USMC), or Aegis United States Navy (USN)] of the other components.
1-66. The operational area, to include ingress and egress routes, must be fully protected by an integrated air
defense system consisting of air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space assets. The joint force is
particularly vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles during the early stages of
a forcible entry. Accordingly, the primary objectives for air defense operations are to assist in gaining air
superiority.
1-67. The AADC integrates all available surface-to-air assets into the overall air defense plan and complies
with procedures and weapons control measures established by the joint force commander or JFACC. The
AADC exercises the degree of control of all systems through established guidelines; weapons control status
and joint force commander-approved procedural controls.
1-68. During air movement to the operational area, the AADC controls air defense operations from an
airborne platform (for example, Airborne Warning and Control System). In practice, extended distances
from staging bases to designated areas of operation may require the AADC to delegate control
responsibilities to an air control element on board the airborne platform. Initial air defense assets may be
limited to fighter aircraft only. Control of these aircraft is exercised through established procedural
controls.
1-69. Forces initially entering the area of operation are accompanied by organic short-range air defense
systems that must be integrated into the air defense architecture. Planned procedural control measures and
guidelines may be established by the AADC to expedite integration of assets. With force buildup and the
introduction of follow-on forces into the lodgment area, more robust high- to medium-altitude air defense
systems normally become available. These systems must establish communications with the AADC’s
command and control agency and be incorporated into the established air defense system.

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 Overview

COMMUNICATIONS
1-70. Communications systems supporting forcible entry operations must be interoperable, agile, trusted,
and shared. The complexity and tempo of assault force operations requires the technical capability to
support an increased level of lateral coordination and integration between assault, special operations forces,
and multinational forces in the operating area. Assault forces rely upon en route collaborative planning,
rehearsal, execution and assessment tools and beyond-line-of-sight, over-the-horizon, on-the-move
communications.
1-71. Typical forcible entry operations communications employ single and multichannel tactical satellites
(TACSATs); commercial satellite communications (SATCOM); and single-channel ultrahigh frequency
(UHF), very high frequency (VHF), and high frequency (HF) radios. When operating in degraded
environments, assault forces must be prepared to operate using only line-of-sight or intermittent
communications.

Communications System Planning

1-72. Communications system planning must be an integral part of joint force planning. Once specific
command and control organization for the forcible entry operation is established, communications system
planning begins and information exchange requirements are established.
1-73. The communication directorate of a joint staff (J-6) is responsible for planning and establishing the
communications system and the communications estimate of supportability. The J-6 must be able to
integrate communication across the joint force among elements conducting assault force operations, initial
assault elements forward planning at an ISB, and the main assault force preparing for operations from home
station.
1-74. Communications system planning is conducted in close coordination with the operations directorate
of a joint staff (J-3) and intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) to identify specialized equipment and
dissemination requirements for some types of information. (Refer to JP 6-0 and FM 6-02 for more
information.)

Communications Support During Airborne and Air Assault Force Operations

1-75. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of
forcible entry forces and the senior headquarters. Significant considerations include the use of intermediate
staging bases and airborne command and control platforms, to include en route mission planning and
intelligence sharing, which can add to the complexity of managing the communications architecture.
1-76. Because communications systems must be built up at the objective area, some aspects of
communications support are unique in forcible entry operations. Assault force support considerations
include the following:
z Long-range radio communications through retransmission and relay sites with U.S.-based forces
or intermediate staging bases to facilitate control of personnel, supplies, and equipment.
z Interoperability with the overall joint force communications architecture—communications
redundancy for assault force and subordinate commanders.
z Initial deployment communications capability largely based on UHF SATCOM, becomes more
robust as signal units and equipment enter the operational area.
z Command relationships, networks, frequency management, codes, navigational aids, and other
communication issues must be resolved before the assault phase begins.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

1-77. Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated
operation: the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of
joint forces. It integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired
military end state; the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.
Joint operation planning connects the strategic end state to campaign design and ultimately to tactical
missions. The following paragraphs discuss the joint operation planning process and intelligence

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Chapter 1

preparation of the operational environment, and planning considerations in support of forcible entry
operations.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

1-78. In conducting joint operation planning, commanders and staffs apply operational art to operational
design using the joint operation planning process (JOPP). This includes forcible entry operation
requirements. The JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process comprised of a set of logical steps to
analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative course of actions; select the best course of
action; and produce a plan or order. The process provides a methodical approach to planning at an
organizational level before and during the joint operation. It focuses on the interaction between an
organization’s commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and
supporting commanders and their staffs.
1-79. Through the application of operational art and operational design and by using JOPP, the JFC and
staff combine art and science (control) to develop products that describe how (ways) the joint force will
employ its capabilities (means) to achieve the military end state (ends). Operational art is the application of
creative imagination by commanders and staffs— supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience.
Operational design is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders
and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct
viable approaches to operations and campaigns. Operational design results in the commander’s operational
approach, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state. JOPP is
an orderly, analytical process through which the JFC and staff translate the broad operational approach into
detailed plans and orders. (Refer to JP 5-0 for more information.)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-80. The J-2 has the primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, and conducting the overall
joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) analysis and production effort at the
joint force level. The JIPOE supports decisionmaking and planning by identifying, analyzing, and
estimating the enemy’s centers of gravity, critical factors, capabilities, limitations, requirements,
vulnerabilities, intentions, and courses of action that are most likely to be encountered by the joint force.
1-81. Joint task force joint intelligence support element or joint task force joint intelligence operations
center (JIOC) is the intelligence organization at the joint task force level that is responsible for complete
air, space, ground, and maritime threat characteristics analysis for the joint operation. It identifies adversary
centers of gravity; analyzes command, control, and communications systems, targeting support; collection
management; and maintenance of a 24-hour watch in a full JIPOE effort.
1-82. The joint intelligence support element or JIOC continuously develops, updates, and tailors JIPOE
products while proactively seeking out and exploiting all possible assistance from interagency and
multinational intelligence sources. It directs the effort, integrating analyses with all products produced by
subordinate commands and other organizations and ensures the JIPOE process encompasses a systematic
analysis of all relevant aspects of the operational environment with tailored products continuously
developed and updated to support the planning process. (Refer to JP 2-0 and JP 2-01.3 for more
information.)

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

1-83. Forcible entry, which may include airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations, or a combination
of all three can create multiple dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond.
These operations are complex and high risk and should remain as simple as possible in concept.
1-84. Forcible entry operations require extensive intelligence, detailed coordination, innovation, and
flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all
participants. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and
employment.

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 Overview

1-85. Entry forces require seamless intelligence and operations integration from the small unit up through
national-level decision makers, enabling leaders at all levels to access relevant information at the proper
time and place. The JIOC ensures the intelligence staffs of subordinate component commands have
appropriate reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence products prepared for each domain in which
entry forces operate.
1-86. As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately
against the enemy’s center of gravity using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities.
Attacks may be decisive or may begin offensive operations throughout the enemy’s depth that can create
dilemmas causing paralysis and destroying cohesion.
1-87. When airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations are combined, unity of command is vital.
Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared to
fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence capabilities to move
with forward elements. The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to follow-on
operations, and should plan accordingly.
1-88. Force entry actions occur in both singular and multiple operations. These actions include establishing
forward presence, preparing the operational area, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining access,
receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and conducting
decisive operations. Additional activities to consider include—
z Information operations. The full impact of information operation on friendly, neutral, and hostile
forces should be considered with the key goal of information operations achieving and
maintaining information superiority for the U.S. and its allies; and exploiting enemy information
vulnerabilities. Information operations are the integrated employment, during military
operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries
while protecting the entry force. (Refer to JP 3-13.)
z Operations security and military deception. Use to confuse the enemy and ease access. Actions,
themes, and messages portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if military deception is
to be believable. Operations security helps foster a credible military deception. (Refer to
JP 3-13.3 and JP 3-13.4.)
z Special operations forces. May precede forcible entry forces to include the following:
„ Identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the lodgment.
„ Conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or seaports.
„ Provide or assist in employing fire support.
„ Conduct other operations: seizure airfields, reconnaissance of landing zones or amphibious
landing sites.
„ Conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well beyond the lodgment to identify,
interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry force (See JP 3-05).
1-89. Entry forces must collect, process, and disseminate relevant information in near real time to support
fire and movement, and maintain the ability to deliver and control joint fires throughout the assault. Given
the distances from which entry forces are deployed and employed, ground forces require access to and
direction of joint fires during the assault, stabilization of the lodgment, and introduction of follow-on
forces.
1-90. Targeting intelligence supports forcible entry operations in verifying existing information and
making recommendations on targeting and collateral damage estimate with respect to intelligence
preparation of the operational environment, service capabilities, and rules of engagement. Targeting
intelligence analysis encompasses many processes, all linked and logically guided by the joint targeting
cycle, that continuously seek to analyze, identify, develop, validate, assess, and prioritize targets for
engagement in order to achieve the commander’s objectives and end state. (Refer to JP 3-60 and ATP 3-
60.1 for more information.)
1-91. The threat a tactical mission may pose to the civilian populace requires balanced lethal and nonlethal
actions during forcible entry operations. Overcautious prevention activities or procedures limit the freedom

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Chapter 1

of action just as unrestrained action can result in provocation tactics by adversaries. (Refer to ATP 3-09.32
for more information.)
1-92. Obtaining accurate combat identification provides the ability to differentiate among friendly, enemy,
neutral and unknown personnel and objects. Combat identification is the process of attaining an accurate
characterization of detected objects in the operational environment to support an engagement decision (JP
3-09).
1-93. To achieve surprise or strike a decisive blow, entry forces focus on identifying and defeating enemy
area denial capabilities (mine development, emplacement and control network). Commanders must weigh
the benefit of massed fires versus the requirement for precision in an area denial environment.
1-94. Contingency response groups planners are integrated into the planning process as early as possible.
Contingency response groups provide the USAF first-responder airfield opening unit capability to the JFC
regardless of service or mission of the field being opened. Each contingency response group can be scaled
to meet specific tasking requirements to support air operations at specific points up to large-scale airfields.
(Refer to FM 3-17.2 for more information.)
1-95. Sustainment requirements can be formidable, but must not become such an overriding concern that
the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. Commanders and staffs must carefully balance the
introduction of sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to
establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment as well as forces required to transition to follow-on
operations.

JOINT ENTRY FORCE

1-96. Forcible entry is executed as either a major operation or a part of a larger campaign to seize and hold
a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition for the continuous landing of forces. Joint entry forces
can strike directly at the enemy and can open new avenues for other military operations. The entry force
employs distributed, yet coherent, forcible entry operations to attack the objective area or areas. The net
result is a coordinated attack that overwhelms the adversary before the adversary has time to react. A well-
positioned and networked force enables the defeat of adversary reaction and facilitates follow-on
operations, if required.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

1-97. Joint entry forces must operate a fully integrated and collaborative intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance enterprise that provides timely intelligence and counterintelligence to meet entry force
requirements. This enterprise must be sustainable and remain responsive and adaptive, and capable of
addressing new challenges and opportunities as they emerge. (Refer to JP 2-01 for more information.)
1-98. Entry forces have to fight for and collect information in close contact with the enemy and civilian
populations through continuous physical reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, security operations, and
intelligence operations: to develop the contextual understanding to counter enemy anti-access capabilities
and gain access to an operational area; counter area denial strategies to ensure freedom of action; and adapt
continuously to changing situations. (Refer to FM 3-55 and ATP 2-01 for more information.)
1-99. Human interaction on the ground must complement other intelligence to create contextual
understanding of events on the ground. This aids in the ability to locate, target, and suppress or neutralize
hostile anti-access and area denial capabilities in complex terrain with lethal or nonlethal effects while
limiting collateral damage. (Refer to FM 2-22.3 for more information.)
1-100. Long-range surveillance and special operations forces support entry forces by conducting shaping
operations in support of forcible entry operations, to include reconnaissance and surveillance and raids.
Advanced force operations include strike operations, clandestine insertion of special operations forces and
organic reconnaissance teams, deception, counter mine or counter obstacle operations, and information
operations. (Refer to FM 3-55.93 and ATTP 3-18.04 for more information.)

1-16 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Overview

INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION

1-101. The complex nature and operational tempo of forcible entry operations requires entry forces to
support an increased level of lateral coordination and integration throughout the application of unified
action within an operational area. The entry forces’ role in the operation for access is the integration of
ground and littoral maneuver into the joint effort; conducting entry operations; and employing and
sustaining forces while fighting to maintain access throughout the duration of operations.
1-102. Integrating and synchronizing near simultaneous execution of a broad range of operations is
essential to presenting the enemy with the greatest range of challenges against which to react. Designing,
planning, and executing these operations require a philosophy that embraces decentralization of resources
and authority for portions of the force yet more centralized planning and execution for missions where
resources are scarce, or strategic sensitivities demand greater control. However, entry forces must be
prepared to operate with decentralized decisionmaking, as adversaries may attempt to isolate units by
attacking communications capabilities.

REHEARSALS
1-103. Forcible entry is a deliberate operation in that the situation allows for the development and
coordination of a specified task organization and a detailed plan, to include multiple branches and sequels.
The process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution
reduces and mitigates operational frictions inherent to entry operations.
1-104. Rehearsing key entry force actions and sustainment activities allows participants to become
familiar with the operation and the visualization of the plan. This process assists in orienting joint and
multinational forces to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals provide a forum
for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but they must exercise caution in adjusting the plan. Changes
must be coordinated throughout the chain of command to prevent errors in integration and synchronization.
1-105. While the joint entry force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, commanders should
identify essential elements for rehearsal. Operation plan rehearsal benefits include:
z Common understanding.
z Unity of effort.
z Articulate supporting intents.
z Subordinate and supporting commanders questions.
z Branches or sequels.
z Integration and synchronization.

OPERATIONAL PHASING
1-106. As stated earlier in this chapter, forcible entry operations are conducted during the “Seize the
Initiative” or “Dominate” phase of a joint operation. Within the context of these phases established by a
higher-level JFC, the joint entry force commander may establish additional phases that fit the forcible entry
CONOPS. Planning for each phase must include branch and sequel planning. Transitions between these
phases are designed to be distinct shifts emphasized by the joint entry force, often accompanied by changes
in command or support relationships. Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed in the
following five phases.

Phase I –– Preparation and Deployment

1-107. Forcible entry operations are conducted by organizations whose force structures permit rapid
deployment into the objective area. Joint entry forces may deploy directly to the operational area or to
staging areas to prepare for subsequent operations. Key activities include:
z Planning. All phases, includes Department of Defense agencies and interagency participants.
z Movement. Planning from both strategic and operational perspectives.
z Intelligence. Focused on answering the commander’s critical information requirement.
z Reconnaissance and surveillance. Insertion into operational area.

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Chapter 1

z Transition to assault. Sets conditions required for successful assault.

Phase II –– Assault
1-108. Assault phase, in airborne and air assault operations, a phase beginning with delivery by air of the
assault echelon— the element of a force that is scheduled for initial assault on the objective area, and
extending through attack of assault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead or lodgment area. Key
activities include:
z Initial assault designed to surprise and overwhelm the enemy with decisive force and to protect
assault force.
z Overcoming natural and man-made obstacles intended to restrict or halt movement that allows
the enemy to mass its forces and repel the assault.
z Main assault entry by parachute assault and air assault, landed forces must have immediately
available joint fire support.
z Transition to stabilizing the lodgment, introduction of follow-on forces to assist in securing and
preparing or repairing the lodgment to allow the landing of air assets, and continue to follow-on
operations without an operational pause.

Phase III – Stabilization of the Lodgment

1-109. Stabilization of the lodgment involves securing the lodgment to protect the force and ensure the
continuous landing of personnel and materiel.
z Organizing the lodgment to support the increasing flow of forces and logistic resource
requirements.
z Expanding the lodgment as required, support the joint force in preparing for and executing
follow-on operations.
z Transition to introducing follow-on forces intended to conduct follow-on operations, in extreme
circumstances, follow-on forces may be required to assist assault forces in the seizure of initial
objectives, or may be used to help secure and defend the lodgment.

Phase IV – Introduction of Follow-On Forces

1-110. The introduction of follow-on forces is required when subsequent operations are planned for
conduct in or from the lodgment. It provides the joint force commander with increased flexibility to
conduct operations as required.

Phase V – Termination or Transition

1-111. Forcible entry operation to subsequent operations or termination must be an integral part of the
planning phase of the joint deployment process. Completed in one of two ways: attainment of the campaign
objectives (termination), or completion of the operational objectives when a lodgment is established for
follow-on combat operations (transition). (Refer to JP 3-18 for more information.)

SECTION II – VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT

1-112. Operational experience has demonstrated that the rapid projection of combat power is the key to
successful ground and littoral maneuver. Experience and analysis have shown that the most effective
method of doing so is through a combination of vertical and surface means. These complementary means
provide flexibility in negating threats unique to operational access. This section addresses vertical
maneuver within forcible entry operations, the airborne or air assault force, and command responsibilities.

TACTICAL APPLICATIONS
1-113. Forcible entry, composed of an entry force, together with other forces that are trained, organized,
and equipped for entry operations, project power. Forcible entry can be executed through vertical
envelopment, directly against the enemy in a sudden attack in force to achieve decisive results or to

1-18 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Overview

establish a lodgment to allow for the introduction of follow-on forces. Besides serving as a forcible entry
assault force, such forces can conduct follow-on operations from the lodgment. The following paragraphs
discuss the application of vertical envelopment as conducted by airborne or air assault forces to achieve
operational objectives.

TACTICAL MANEUVER
1-114. Vertical envelopment is a tactical maneuver in which troops that are air-dropped, air-landed, or
inserted via air assault, attack the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the force (JP
3-18). Commanders conduct vertical envelopment to occupy advantageous ground to shape the operational
area and accelerate the momentum of the engagement. An enemy may or may not be in a position to
oppose the maneuver. While the commander should attempt to achieve an unopposed landing when
conducting vertical envelopment, the assault force must prepare for the presence of opposition.
1-115. Vertical envelopment, airborne and air assault operations, allows a tactical commander to do the
following:
z Threaten enemy echelon support areas, causing the enemy to divert combat elements to protect
vital bases or installations and hold key terrain.
z Overcome distances quickly, overfly barriers, and bypass enemy defenses.
z Extend the area over which the commander can exert influence.
z Disperse reserve forces widely for survivability reasons while maintaining their capability for
effective and rapid response.
z Exploit combat power by increasing tactical mobility.

COMMON FACTORS
1-116. Planning results in establishing positions that support completing the assigned mission. Factors
that are common to vertical envelopments include reverse planning process, condition setting, and the
impact of meteorological conditions (weather and light data).
Reverse Planning Process
1-117. Airborne and air assault commanders begin planning operations with a visualization of the ground
tactical plan and work through a reverse-planning sequence. Planning factors common to airborne and air
assault operations are as follows:
z Ground tactical plan. A ground tactical plan is the basis for planning throughout the planning
process. It is the first plan completed and it addresses the destruction of enemy forces that pose
an immediate threat to the lodgment area. However, each plan affects the others, and changes in
one plan can require adjustments in the others.

Note. For example, the amount of lift available determines the feasibility of the ground tactical
plan. If there are not enough lift systems to put all the required forces in place at the required
time, the commander adjusts the ground tactical plan as well as the other plans. Therefore,
vertical envelopment planning requires the unit staff obtain vital planning data, such as the
availability of lift systems and the technical and tactical capabilities of those systems, as early as
possible.

z Landing plan.
z Movement plan.
z Loading and staging plans. (Air assault.)
z Marshalling plan. (Airborne.)
z Additional planning factors include—
„ In analyzing the plan the commander and staff consider lodgment terrain and infrastructure,
with a emphasis on the ability to support follow-on operations and forces.
„ Intelligence regarding the enemy and terrain characteristics of the objective area is vital to
this planning process. (Refer to ADRP 2-0 and FM 2-0 for more information.)

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 1-19

Chapter 1

„ Positive target identification vetted to ensure correct identification. (Refer to ATP 3-09.32
for more information.)
„ Continuous coordination between the parallel echelons of the assault force and the
supporting forces; from the beginning of an operation until its completion or abandonment.
„ Maximized use of combined arms capabilities to ensure the assault force has sufficient
power to accomplish its mission and defend itself.
„ Short planning times often require staffs to modify contingency plans and SOPs to meet the
exact situation while still ensuring adequate coordination.
1-118. The commander determines if adjustments to any of these plans entail acceptable risk. If the risk is
unacceptable, the CONOPS changes.
Condition Setting
1-119. Condition setting is an iterative process where the commander’s situational understanding
determines what part of the situation must change to ensure the success of the vertical envelopment.
Warfighting capabilities or functions continually assess until the commander is satisfied with the result or
operational necessity forces him to either cancel or conduct the vertical envelopment. Conditions common
to airborne and air assault operations are as follows:
z Posture the air assault or parachute force for success with the degree of acceptable risk.
z Suppression of enemy air defense, plan preparation and deception fires.
z Cross-service and echelon-staff, cell, and board synchronization and integration.
z Exchange liaisons.
z Reconnaissance and surveillance detect systems that unacceptably endanger the operational
success.
z Service and joint fires-detected targets.

Meteorological Conditions (weather and light data)

1-120. Meteorological conditions influence the conduct of operations. Conditions common to airborne
and air assault operations are as follows:
z Impacts vertical envelopment to a greater extent than other operations.
z Long-range forecasts affect planning for force build up and sustainment by aerial delivery.
z Current and future forecasted impact on tactical operations and aircraft performance.
z Current weather information at departure sites and pickup zones, along approach routes, and in
the objective area.
z Marginal weather conditions may enhance the element of surprise, but they increase the risk
of accidents.
z Deteriorating weather condition: postponement of planned operation or reduced tempo of an
ongoing operation when risk becomes unacceptable.
z Weather condition affects on joint fires and medical evacuation or withdrawal of forces.
z Conditions that include wind shears, crosswinds, and the ambient temperatures throughout the
course of the operation.
z High temperature and altitude degrade aircraft lift performance— a combination of these factors
results in trade-offs in the operating parameters. (For example, a commander may insert
dismounted reconnaissance teams on mountainsides in the cool of the morning, but be unable to
execute the same mission in the noonday heat.)
AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE
1-121. Airborne forces may be used as the assault force or used in combination with other capabilities for
a forcible entry; or they may conduct follow-on operations from a lodgment. As an assault force, airborne
forces may air land or parachute into the objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure
designated objectives. Airborne forces may be employed from a lodgment in additional joint combat
operations appropriate to their training and equipment. Airborne forces offer the JFC an immediate forcible
entry option since they can be launched directly from the continental United States and/or forward

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 Overview

deployed location without the delays associated with acquiring intermediate staging bases or repositioning
of sea-based forces. (Refer to this publication, Part I, Airborne Operations, for more information.)
AIR ASSAULT FORCE
1-122. An air assault force is a force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units organized,
equipped, and trained for air assault operations (JP 3-18). Air assault forces can deploy from land-based
facilities and ships. Fires from aircraft (manned and unmanned) or ships (surface and subsurface) take on
added importance to compensate for the lack of artillery. An air assault force may require the establishment
of an intermediate staging base. These forces can rapidly project combat power throughout the depth of an
operational area. (Refer to Part II, Air Assault Operations, of this publication for more information.)

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
1-123. Entry forces conduct airborne and air assault operations with a preference for decentralized
decisionmaking. The ability to integrate and synchronize near simultaneous execution of a broad range of
operations is essential to presenting the enemy with the greatest range of challenges against which to react.
Designing, planning and executing these operations requires a philosophy that embraces decentralization of
resources and authority for portions of the force yet more centralized planning and execution for missions
where resources are scarce or strategic sensitivities demand greater control.
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
1-124. The airborne assault of a forcible entry operation is delivered by strategic airlift from the
continental United States or by strategic or tactical airlift from an intermediate staging base. An airborne
assault over intercontinental distance, places additional requirements on joint command and control.
Effective employment of an airborne assault force (ABNAF) requires an organizational structure with an
Army intermediate higher headquarters nested within the joint task force. This intermediate headquarters,
tailored to accompany the assault force to the objective area facilitates the assault force in the execution of
its ground tactical plan by controlling enabling functions and units. (See table 1-1, page 1-23.)

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Chapter 1

Table 1-1. Command responsibility of airborne operations

AIRBORNE TF AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE
JTF
CDR/HQ CDR/HQ
CDR / HQ
(Division) (IBCT)
Operational planning. Operational/tactical planning. Ground tactical planning.
JIPTL development. Joint fires integration. Joint fires execution.
Joint ISR integration. LRS/SOF integration. Update IPB.
Joint operational access. Receipt of assault fires
Forcible entry condition C2/mission command pre-assault handover.
setting. fires. En route mission planning and
rehearsal.
APOE SA and integration en route Rig/outload paratroopers and
mission command, airspace control equipment.
Operational level aerial relay using joint Conduct airborne assault.
command and control communications between Seize assault objective.
through JOC, CAOC. JTF/APOE and IBCT/APOD
Establish APOD C2/mission
command network.
APOE/APOD C2/mission Secure APOD.
command. Repair/maintain APOD.
Airflow management. RSOI. Expand lodgment.
Generation of combat power
Follow-on forces.
LEGEND
APOD – aerial port of debarkation IPB– intelligence preparation of the battlefield
APOE – aerial port of embarkation ISR – intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
APOE SA – aerial port of embarkation staging area JIPTL – joint integrated priority target list
CAOC – combat air operations center JOC – joint operations center
C2 – command and control JTF – joint task force
LRS – long-range surveillance
CDR – commander
RSOI – reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
HQ – headquarters
SOF – special operations forces
IBCT – Infantry brigade combat team

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

1-125. The airborne assault force commander (ABNAFC) is responsible for seizing the airhead. He
accompanies the initial assault and focuses on the planning and execution of the ground tactical plan.
Although the size and composition of the assault force varies according to the mission, the ABNAF is
typically an Airborne (ABN) Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT).
1-126. The airborne task force commander (ABNTFC) is a higher echelon commander. He may be the
joint force commander or ground commander, depending upon experience and the scope of the operation.
As the assault requires an ABN IBCT, for example, the BCT commander leads the assault force and the
parent Army headquarters (normally a division but could be a corps headquarters) provides the ABNTFC.
This ensures that the commander fighting the ground tactical plan can give his full attention to the fight in
the airhead without having to manage en route follow-on forces and support. An assault command post of
the ABNTFC accompanies the initial ABNAF in order to provide a command element in the airhead to
facilitate these functions and to act as an interface with the airborne command post.
1-127. The ABNTFC organizes the parachute assault force, strategic airlift force, supporting fires force,
and follow-on airland forces in such a way as to best accomplish the mission. The ABNTFC’s
responsibilities end upon achievement of a secure airhead line (Refer to chapter 4 of this publication for

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 Overview

more information.) and the establishment of either a JFLCC or designated ground commander command
post in the airhead.
1-128. En route mission planning and rehearsal systems allow the airborne force to maintain situational
awareness and to receive and disseminate updated intelligence while en route from load time until arrival
over the airhead.
z Ground commanders in airlift aircraft may communicate with the chain of command over the
Army secure en route communications package. Normally, the airlift mission commander and
the airborne force commander are in the same aircraft. The senior ground commander can advise
embarked ground commanders of changes in the ground tactical situation or to the air movement
plan.
z Airborne operations require the use of redundant airborne and ground command posts.
Normally, a joint force airborne command post operates from a joint airborne communications
center and command post, while a command post from the airborne force operates from a fixed-
wing platform with required communications installed.
z TACSAT downlink and other en route communications systems can be used to communicate
with USAF special tactics teams, air mobility liaison officers, contingency response elements,
and contingency response teams in objective areas.
z The use of special navigational aids and homing devices to direct aircraft to specified areas (for
example, a designated drop zone) may be needed. Specialized airborne or air assault force
personnel (for example, special tactics teams or long-range surveillance units) are equipped with
navigational aids, global positioning systems, and homing devices. These teams are employed
early to guide the airborne units, and provide reconnaissance, surveillance, visual flight rules
service, and limited instrument flight rules air traffic control service. Other joint force assets
such as special operations forces are capable of performing some of these functions.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY OF AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

1-129. Air assault operations embody the combined arms concept through coordination and planning
between the air and ground commanders. Infantry and air units are fully integrated with other members of
the combined arms team to form a powerful and flexible joint task force. An air assault operation
dramatically extends the commander’s ability to influence operations within the area of operations and to
execute operations in locations beyond the capability of more conventional forces. Effective employment
of an air assault force requires an organizational structure with intermediate higher headquarters nested
within the joint task force. (See table 1-2, page 1-25.)

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 Chapter 1

Table 1-2. Command responsibility of air assault operations

JTF CDR / AIR ASSAULT TF AIR MISSION GROUND TACTICAL
HQ CDR / HQ CDR / HQ CDR / HQ
(Div/BCT/BN) (BDE/BN/CO) (BCT/BN/CO)
Operational Operational/tactical Air movement and Ground tactical,
Planning planning. planning. landing planning. loading, and staging
planning
Air space
management
PZ/LZ selection and Air movement of Conduct air assault.
Operational C2 PZ control. personnel and Seize assault OBJs.
Execution through JOC, JFE condition equipment. Secure LZ.
CAOC. monitoring. OPCON of all Expand lodgment.
Aerial relay using aviation elements.
joint comms between
JTF/PZ and BCT/LZ.
PZ and follow-on
forces control. Mission command Mission command of
Mission Airflow from PZ to LZ all elements cleared
Command management. Go/No Go criteria (AATFC colocated from LZ.
assessment and with AMC).
decisions.
Joint fires
planning/integration.
Joint Integrated
Pre-assault fires/Joint En route fires. Clear and direct all
Prioritized Target
Fires SEAD/SEAD. Facilitation from fires inside the airhead
List (JIPTL)
Clear and direct all PZ to LZ. line.
development.
fires outside the
airhead line.
Personnel recovery
Approve, disapprove,
operations
Decision or modify all
Authority
authority (above
components of the
immediate unit
assault plan.
level).
Legend:
get list
AMB - air mission brief
AMC - air mission commander
AATFC – air assault task force commander
BCT – brigade combat team
CAOC – combat air operations center
C2 – command and control
CDR – commander fenses
HQ – headquarters
JFE – joint fires element

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

1-130. The AATF is a combined arms force under the command of a single headquarters consisting of
Infantry, assault and attack reconnaissance helicopters, fire support, electronic warfare, and sustainment
assets. The commander ordering the air assault designates the AATF commander. The AATF commander’s
headquarters coordinates airspace with other airspace users, to include artillery, air defense, unmanned

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 Overview

aircraft, close air support, and other aviation units. It coordinates the AATF’s plans for maneuver and
sustainment with those of higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
1-131. Normally, a BCT commander serves as the AATF commander for a ground maneuver battalion-
size air assault and a ground maneuver battalion commander serves as the AATF commander for a
company-size air assault. The air mission commander and the ground maneuver unit commander are
subordinate to the AATF commander.
1-132. The air mission commander is the aviation unit commander or his designated representative. The
air mission commander receives and executes the guidance and directives from the AATFC, and controls
all aviation elements. The air mission commander ensures continuity of command for all supporting
aviation units and employs attack helicopters and artillery along the air route, fighting the battle from the
pickup zone to the landing zone, while keeping the AATFC informed. The air mission commander has
operational control of assault helicopters providing lift to the ground maneuver force and the aviation unit
providing assault helicopters is either in direct support of the ground combat unit or under the operational
control of the AATF. The support relationship may end at a predetermined point during the operation, on
order of the higher commander, or the AATF commander may determine with the air mission commander’s
input when the operational control relationship begins and ends.
1-133. The commander directing the air assault normally does not attach aviation airlift or escort units to
the AATF, because it is unlikely that a ground unit can control the aviation unit and supply the aviation-
specific munitions and large amounts of fuel required by aviation units. Direct support and the operational
control command relationships do not place logistics responsibility for the supporting unit on the supported
unit. The operational control command relationship allows the AATF commander to reorganize the
aviation airlift and escorting units when necessary as dictated by the situation. The direct support
relationship allows the overall commander to shift the support of these aviation units to other units in
response to unexpected developments. Consequently, direct support or operational control is usually the
desired relationship between air and ground units in air assault operations.
1-134. The commander ordering the air assault considers the availability and allocation of assault and
attack aviation assets when determining the AATF’s task organization. He ensures that the ground
maneuver force contains sufficient combat power to seize its initial objectives and defend its landing zones.
The ground maneuver force requires a mission specific balance of mobility, combat power, and
sustainment capabilities. The available rotary-wing aircraft must be able to insert the required combat
power into the objective area as quickly as possible to provide surprise and shock effect, consistent with
aircraft and pickup zone and landing zone capabilities.
1-135. Air assault operations require the use of redundant airborne and ground command posts. Normally,
a joint force airborne command post operates from a joint airborne communications center and command
post, while a command post from the air assault force operates from fixed-wing or rotary-wing platform
with required communications installed or a specially configured mission command rotary-wing aircraft.

SPACE OPERATION
1-136. Airborne and air assault forces rely on space-based capabilities and systems for precision,
navigation and timing, communication, terrestrial and space weather, and intelligence collection platforms
to be successful during forcible entry operations. (Refer to JP 3-14 and FM 3-14 for more information.)
These systems are critical enablers to plan, communicate, navigate and maneuver, maintain situational
awareness, engage the enemy, provide missile warning, and protect and sustain the entry force.
1-137. Space specialists supporting tactical planning by providing expertise and advice regarding
available space capabilities and limitations enable space operations. Planning and coordination of space
support with national, service, joint, and theater resources takes place with Army space professionals who
are attached at the corps and division levels to provide expertise and advice to the commander on space
related issues that may impact operations.
1-138. Space support capabilities include receiving accurate status of positioning, navigation, and timing
for planning operations, providing capabilities and limitations of space-based intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, weather, and communication systems, as well as providing assistance and notification of
deliberate enemy interference activities such as attempts to jam or spoof friendly communications.

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Chapter 1

1-139. Space-based systems enable airborne and air assault forces and subsequent follow-on forces byʊ
z Providing rapid communications that enable a commander to gain and maintain the initiative by
developing the situation faster than the enemy can react.
z Maintaining a shared common operational picture.
z Retaining the ability to recognize and protect own and friendly forces, as well as synchronize
force actions with adjacent and supporting units.
z Providing communication links between forces and commanders within theater and worldwide.
z Monitoring terrestrial areas of interest through information collection assets to help reveal the
enemy’s location and disposition, and attempting to identify the enemy’s intent.
z Providing global positioning system status and accuracy of positioning, navigation, and timing
for planning and conducting mission operations such as support for targeting.
z Providing update of solar environment and the impact to both terrestrial and space-based
segments of friendly communication systems.
z Providing meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental information which is
processed and analyzed to produce timely and accurate weather effects on operations.

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 PART I

Airborne Operations

Chapter 2
Organization and Employment
An airborne operation involves the air movement into an objective area of combat
forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic
mission (JP 3-18). The means employed may be any combination of airborne units,
air transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and
the overall situation. This chapter focuses on the role, organization, and capabilities
of the airborne assault force (ABNAF) as well as the duties and responsibilities of
personnel within or task-organized to an airborne (ABN) Infantry brigade combat
team (IBCT) for airborne operations.

SECTION I – AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE

2-1. An airborne assault is the use of airborne forces to parachute into an objective area to attack and
eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives (JP 3-18). An ABNAF comprises an ABN
IBCT with capabilities organized, trained, and equipped to gain entry into an operational area to enable the
conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular mission.
2-2. The ABNAF seizes an airhead to destroy or capture enemy forces; repel enemy assaults by fire, close
combat, or counterattack; for follow-on forces; or for any combination. It can deploy rapidly and be
sustained by an austere support structure; and can conduct operations against conventional and
unconventional enemy forces in all types of terrain and climate conditions. This section addresses how an
ABNAF is organized to include distinct levels of echelon employment and application to conduct an
airborne assault

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
2-3. Once the commander determines the principal features of the ground assault plan (scheme of
maneuver and fire support), he task-organizes subordinate units to execute assigned missions and
determines boundaries. To ensure unity of effort or to increase readiness for combat, part or all of the
subordinate units of a command can be formed into one or more temporary tactical groupings (teams or
task forces), each under a designated commander. No standard organization can be prescribed in advance to
meet all conditions. Infantry units usually form the tactical nucleus of the team; Infantry unit commanders
lead the teams. These teams are tailored for the initial assault by the attachment of supporting units. These
supporting units join the Infantry units as soon as possible in the marshalling area to plan and prepare for
the initial assault. Dependent on the ground tactical plan, certain supporting units may be detached once
centralized control is gained. Other units such as higher echelon command posts can be attached for the
movement only.

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Chapter 2

INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

2-4. As the assault requires an ABN IBCT, the BCT commander leads the assault force and the parent
Army headquarters (normally a division but could be a corps headquarters) provides the ABNTFC. This
ensures that the commander fighting the ground tactical plan can give his full attention to the fight in the
airhead and not be consumed with managing en route follow-on forces and support. Although the size and
composition of the ABNAF varies according to the mission, the ABNAF is typically an ABN IBCT that is
scalable and tailored with additional capabilities and forces as determined by the ABNTFC.

INFANTRY BATTALION
2-5. For control, the airborne Infantry battalion usually is reinforced for the airborne assault and is
organized into a task force. This is especially true if battalions land in widely separated drop zones or
landing zones. A battalion task force usually comprises an airborne Infantry battalion with reinforcements
based on the IBCT commander’s estimate for the airborne assault. Follow-on echelon— those additional
forces moved into the objective area after the assault echelon. Follow-on echelon reinforcements may
include more Infantry, Armored, Stryker, cavalry, antitank, engineer, dedicated artillery, and other units or
detachments needed to expand the lodgment. As in the IBCT, attachments to the task force for the airborne
assault are made early in the planning phase. They can be withdrawn as soon as the ground situation
stabilizes.

INFANTRY RIFLE UNITS

2-6. Airborne Infantry rifle companies and platoons can be reinforced for the airborne assault according
to the usual considerations governing a ground attack. Attachments are made before the move to, or on
arrival in, the marshalling base.

CAVALRY SQUADRON
2-7. The cavalry squadron of the airborne IBCT, assigned to perform reconnaissance and security
missions within the assault phase, usually is reinforced for the airborne assault into a task force. After the
ABNAF makes the initial assault landing into the objective area and consolidates the initial airhead, the
commander organizes the airhead line, confirms reconnaissance and security plans, and task-organizes the
cavalry squadron for operations in the security area.

ECHELON EMPLOYMENT
2-8. After the task organization of units or Soldiers for the airborne assault or landing is announced, units
organize into assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. The airborne IBCT as the ABNAF, employs organic
forces and other attached units assigned for the mission over three echelons: the assault echelon, the follow-
on echelon, and the rear echelon. Elements of the higher headquarters ABNAF are employed throughout
the three echelons as directed by the ABNAFC.

ASSAULT ECHELON
2-9. The assault echelon (airborne assault) referred to as the Alpha Echelon, is the initial entry force. It is
part of the ABNAF that conducts the parachute assault on an unsecured drop zone to seize the lodgment or
initial assault objectives. The airborne assault echelon is composed of those forces required to conduct the
parachute assault to seize assault objectives and establish the initial airhead, and if appropriate, prepare an
airfield to receive follow-on echelons. This echelon is deployed with sufficient supplies to sustain
operations for 72 hours. It includes the assault command post of the ABNTF headquarters providing joint
interoperability.

FOLLOW-ON ECHELON
2-10. The follow-on echelon comprises two elements. Referred to as the Bravo Echelon and the Charlie
Echelon, these elements are the airland portion of the ABNAF.

2 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Organization and Employment

z The Bravo Echelon is the reinforcing forces in the airhead. When needed, the Bravo
Echelon enters the objective area as soon as practical by air or surface movement, or a
combination of the two. It is manned and equipped for combat power augmentation and
lodgment expansion. It includes additional vehicles and equipment from the ABNAF, plus more
forces to include supporting personnel. The existence of one of the following conditions requires
an ABNAF to have a follow-on echelon:
„ Shortage of aircraft.
„ Aircraft that cannot land heavy items of equipment.
„ Any enemy situation, terrain, or weather that makes it impossible to land certain Soldiers or
equipment in the assault echelon.
z The Charlie Echelon includes the remainder of the ABNAF and the airborne task force
(ABNTF) required for operations after the establishment of the airhead and securing or
expanding the lodgment. The Charlie Echelon gives the ABNAF the capability to conduct
sustained combat operations within the limitations of the IBCT and provides additional combat
power and equipment for the ABNTF. Depending on the mission and subsequent operations, the
Charlie Echelon may be either a reinforcing force or the first elements of what will become the
follow-on force.

Note. Airborne Infantry units can be committed to an airborne assault with the full complement
of the follow-on echelon as part of the assaulting force; however, if leaving a follow-on echelon
that must be brought forward by means other than air, it is often desirable or necessary to leave
certain personnel and equipment behind.

REAR ECHELON
2-11. The rear echelon is the echelon containing those elements of the force that are not required in
the objective area. The rear echelon is normally small for a brigade or battalion and includes personnel left
at its rear base to perform administrative and service support functions. A higher headquarters usually
controls the rear echelon for all units. The rear echelon can remain at the remote marshalling base when the
unit is to be relieved at an early date; or it can rejoin the unit when the IBCT remains committed to
sustained combat for a prolonged or indefinite period. In addition, if the airborne force continues in the
ground combat role after linkup, the rear echelon may be brought forward.

DESIGNATION OF RESERVE
2-12. The employment of the reserve element follows the normal employment of a reserve unit in a
ground operation. The location occupied by the echelon reserve depends on the most likely mission for the
reserve on commitment. With the reserve element at the departure airfield, the reserve commander must
continue planning for possible future commitment of his forces as far as maps, photos, and information of
the situation permit.

The Battalion as the Reserve

2-13. The reserve can be held in the departure area ready to be committed by air when and where the
situation dictates. This usually happens in large-scale airborne operations when suitable airfields in the
airhead are not available. However, it may cause delays in commitment—
z If signal communications fail.
z If the air movement is long.
z If flying weather is unfavorable.
z If time is added for coordination of air cover.

Brigade and Battalion Reserves

2-14. These reserves may be used to enter the airhead as part of the assault echelon. They provide depth to
the airhead by blocking penetrations, reinforcing committed units, and counterattacking. They consist of

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 2-3

Chapter 2

not more than a company at BCT level or a platoon at battalion level. However, their small size is dictated
by tactical considerations and assigned missions. Commanders should organize, task, and position the
reserve, ensuring that—
z The size of the reserve is compatible with likely missions.
z The reserve comes from the unit with the fewest priority tasks.
z The reserve is not assigned assault objectives or an area of the airhead to defend.
z The reserve is positioned in an area that allows for quick employment.
z The reserve is mobile. (This can be achieved using organic vehicles (such as, weapons company,
forward support company, or if augmented with Armored or Stryker forces.)
z The reserve is located in an assembly area, both initial and subsequent assembly areas, or a battle
position, so that it does not interfere with units assigned assault objectives.
z The reserve is near lines of communication in a covered and concealed location to provide ease
of movement, to reinforce, or to block.
z The reserve is located within the area of one unit, if possible.
z The reserve’s location allows for dispersion of the force.

SECTION II – AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

2-15. The ABNAF can be part of a larger unit, or it can be comprised solely of the initial assault force,
preparing the way for deployment of a follow-on force. This section discusses assault force considerations
for formation and support.

ASSAULT FORCE FORMATION

2-16. The ABNAF is formed early in the planning stage by a directing or establishing headquarters that
allocates units and defines authority and responsibility by designating command and support relationships.
Predesignated and well-understood command and support relationships includeʊ
z A task organization that provides a mission-specific balance of maneuver, combat power, and
endurance to seize and protect the airhead or lodgment.
z Unit tactical integrity that is maintained when developing load plans and cross loading key
leadership, crew-served weapons and equipment followed by all other personnel to ensure unit
integrity upon insertion into the drop zone and assemble.
z A sustainment capability to support a rapid tempo until follow-on or linkup forces arrive, or until
the mission is completed.

JOINT AND ARMY CONTROL TEAMS

2-17. Terminal guidance aids and control measures are used on the ground in the objective area to assist
and guide incoming airlift aircraft to the designated drop zones or landing zones. Combat control teams
comprised of USAF personnel are organized, trained, and equipped to provide aircraft terminal guidance.
Army teams from the long-range surveillance company (LRSC), a divisional or corps asset, are organized,
trained, and equipped to deploy into the objective area and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks
before the deployment of the airborne force.

COMBAT CONTROL TEAM

2-18. The combat control team is a small task-organized team of USAF parachute and combat diver
qualified personnel. The combat control team’s mission is to establish assault zones (drop zones and
landing zones) in austere and non-permissive environments. The mission includes initially placing en route
and terminal navigational aids; controlling air traffic; providing communications; and removing obstacles
and unexploded ordnance with demolitions. Combat control teams provide command and control,
reconnaissance and surveillance, and limited weather observations. (Refer to JP 3-17 for more
information.)

2-4 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Organization and Employment

LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE COMPANY

2-19. The long-range surveillance company (LRSC) is a corps level asset for the purpose of long-range
surveillance. The LRSC comprises a headquarters section, a communications platoon, a transportation
section, a maintenance section, and three long-range surveillance platoons with three teams each for a total
of 9 teams. The LRSC is modular in that it has the command, control, and communications capability to
support multiple operations simultaneously. (Refer to FM 3-55.93 for more information.)

SECTION III – CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, VULNERABILITIES

2-20. Airborne forces deploy strategically, operationally, or tactically on short notice anywhere in the
world. They can be employed as a deterrent or as a combat force. The strategic mobility of airborne forces
permits rapid employment to meet contingence across the range of military operations; and provides a
means by which a commander can decisively influence operations. This section discusses the capabilities,
limitations and vulnerabilities unique to an ABNAF.

CAPABILITIES
2-21. Since airborne forces are able to respond on short notice, airborne operations provide distinct
advantages such as—
z Ability to bypass all land or sea obstacles.
z Surprise.
z Ability to mass rapidly on critical targets.

2-22. Airborne forces can extend the area of operation, move, and rapidly concentrate combat power like
no other available forces. Specifically, airborne forces can—
z Attack enemy positions from any direction.
z Conduct attacks and raids beyond the area of operation.
z Conduct limited exploitation and pursuit operations.
z Overfly and bypass enemy positions, barriers, and obstacles and strike objectives in otherwise
inaccessible areas.
z Provide responsive reserves, allowing commanders to commit a larger portion of their forces to
action.
z React rapidly to tactical opportunities, necessities, and threats in unassigned areas.
z Rapidly place forces at tactically decisive points in the area of operation.
z Conduct fast-paced operations over extended distances.
z Conduct and support deception with false insertions.
z Rapidly reinforce committed units.
z Rapidly secure and defend key terrain (such as crossing sites, road junctions, and bridges) or key
objectives.
z Rapidly repair or construct infrastructure to receive follow-on forces.
z Delay a much larger force without becoming decisively engaged.

2-23. Airborne forces, when augmented with appropriate support or augmentation, can conduct sustained
combat operations against the enemy.

LIMITATIONS
2-24. The commander and planners must recognize the limitations of airborne forces and plan accordingly.
They must consider the following:
z An airborne force depends on USAF aircraft for long-range movement, fire support, and
sustainment. The availability and type of aircraft dictates the scope and duration of airborne
operations.
z After the initial airdrop, the sustained combat power of airborne forces depends on resupply by
air. Any interruption in the flow of resupply aircraft can cause a potential weakening of the

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 2-5

Chapter 2

airborne force. Enemy air defense fires against resupply aircraft and long-range artillery and
mortar fires on the drop zone can hamper the delivery, collection, or distribution of critical
supplies.
z Once on the ground, the airborne force has limited tactical mobility. That mobility depends on
the number and type of vehicles and helicopters that can be brought into the objective area with
the follow-on force.
z The airborne force has limited field artillery and air defense artillery support until additional
assets can be introduced into the objective area. Additional target acquisition assets are needed
to provide accurate and timely targeting information.
z Evacuation of casualties from the airhead is difficult. Until evacuation means are available, the
BCT must be prepared to provide medical care through the attachment of its organic medical
company or the attachment of echelon above BCT medical elements.

VULNERABILITIES
2-25. Airborne forces are vulnerable to enemy attack while en route to the drop zone. Although the USAF
can conduct limited airdrops without air superiority, large operations require neutralization or suppression
of enemy air defenses (SEAD). This may require SEAD, radar jamming, and fighter aircraft besides
transport and close air support sorties. Initial airborne assault elements are light and are separated from
weapon systems, equipment, and materiel that provide protection and survivability. An ABNAF is
particularly vulnerable to enemy—
z Attack by aircraft and air defense weapon systems during the movement and airborne assault
phases.
z Attack by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons because of limited chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear protection and decontamination capability.
z Attack by ground, air, or artillery during the assault and landing phases.
z Air strikes if air superiority is not gained before the airborne assault.
z Electronic attack, to include jamming of communications and navigation systems, and disrupting
aircraft survivability equipment.
z Small-arms fire that presents a large threat to the aircraft during the air movement, airborne
assault and landing phases.

SECTION IV – AIRBORNE COMMAND AND CONTROL PLATFORMS

2-26. Airborne operations require extensive coordination between the USAF, Army, and often, other
services. During forcible entry, airborne command and control platforms may be employed separately or in
combination to augment or even replace the ground-based elements when response time is critical. This
section discusses the airborne elements of the tactical air control system, consisting of the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and
the Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post (JACC/CP) or "Jackpot" package, designed to
fit aboard a C-130 aircraft.

AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM

2-27. The AWACS, designated by the USAF as the E-3 radar, is a modified Boeing 707 that houses a radar
subsystem and vast communications equipment. It is under operational control of the tactical airlift control
center (TACC). The AWACS radar system can compensate for the major limitations of ground-based radar
systems such as their inability to detect low-flying aircraft due to line-of-sight restrictions. Other limitations
of ground-based radar systems include their susceptibility to electronic countermeasures and their
vulnerability to attack.
2-28. The AWACS can communicate with a wide range of systems. It has extensive high frequency (HF),
very high frequency (VHF), and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radios used to communicate with ground
controllers, airborne forces, and ground forces. The E-3‘s radar flexibility allows it to support tactical
missions, defensive missions, or both at the same time. The aircraft is used for weapons control or as a

2-6 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Organization and Employment

surveillance platform. In an air defense role, the E-3 radar provides weapons control and surveillance
capabilities. It provides control for weapons and air defense regions during stages of increased alerts.

JOINT SURVEILANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

2-29. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is an airborne command and
control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform. Its primary mission is to provide theater
ground and air commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting that
contributes to the delay, disruption and destruction of enemy forces. When available, JSTARS aircraft may
be employed as a viable airborne assault force command platform in support of forcible entry operations.
2-30. The E-8C is a modified Boeing 707-300 series commercial airframe extensively remanufactured and
modified with the radar, communications, operations and control subsystems required to perform its
operational mission. The most prominent external feature is the 27-feet (8 meters) long, canoe-shaped
dome under the forward fuselage that houses the 24-feet (7.3 meters) long, side-looking phased array
antenna. This aircraft is capable of in-flight refueling, allowing flexibility for extend operations in support
of forcible entry operations.
2-31. The radar and computer subsystems on the E-8C can gather and display detailed information on
ground forces. The information is relayed in near-real time to ground command, control, communications,
computers and intelligence systems. The antenna can be tilted to either side of the aircraft where it can
develop a 120-degree field of view covering nearly 19,305 square miles (50,000 square kilometers) and is
capable of detecting targets at more than 250 kilometers (more than 820,000 feet). The radar has some
limited capability to detect helicopters, rotating antennas and low, slow-moving fixed wing aircraft.

JOINT AIRBORNE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER/COMMAND POST

2-32. The Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post (JACC/CP), or "Jackpot" package is
designed to fit aboard a military C-130 aircraft and has military and civilian band radios and Internet
access. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) is the contingency support unit for the package
consisting of U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel providing operator support to assist
G-6 in managing the variety of communications equipment to include: SECRET Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) services through an international maritime satellite antenna; as well as, a full array of
FM and TACSAT networks. The JACC/CP can be deployed within 24 hours from the time the JCS issues
deployment approval messages. With most C-130 aircraft not being capable of in-flight refueling, time
available over an objective may be limited, possibly requiring basing from a forward area or an
intermediate staging base. (Refer to JP 6-0 for more information.)
2-33. The JACC/CP has four major components: operations center (12 SIPRNET laptop workstations),
communications control, generator, and an air conditioner/accessory trailer. The jackpot package provides
one high frequency, single sideband (HF/SSB) voice or teletype communication channel over its 1-kilowatt
transceivers or high frequency, double independent sideband with a total of four independent 3 kilohertz (3
SPKHZ) voice or teletype channels over its 10-kilowatt system. The 10-kilowatt system is limited to
ground operations only. The JACC/CP contains three radios, an AN/ARC-73 (VHF/AM), AN/ARC-54
(VHF/FM) and AN/ ARC-51BX (VHF/AM), for ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications.
2-34. The voice radio system may be connected to a 10-line, 20-line, or 30-line, four-wire/two-wire
telephone switchboard. The switchboard can connect any telephone subscriber to another telephone or a
JACC/CP. The complete JACC/CP can be transported in a winch equipped C-130 or larger aircraft. A wide
lowboy trailer must be used to transport the vans any distance or over other than paved or gravel roads.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 2-7

7KLVSDJHLQWHQWLRQDOO\OHIWEODQN
 Chapter 3
Airborne Assault Planning
Airborne assaults may be conducted as a rapid crisis response against less capable
enemies, where the conditions needed for the entry are quickly set with limited
shaping operations or where forward deployed and rapid response elements must
conduct the airborne assault mainly with their organic capabilities and minimal
reinforcement. They may be larger-scale entry operations where there is significant
shaping required to set the conditions for the airborne assault. Commanders begin
planning for an airborne assault with a visualization of the ground tactical plan and
work backwards through the landing plan, the air movement plan, and the
marshalling plan. Planning is conducted in this order regardless of the type and
duration of the mission or the size of the force. This chapter addresses roles and
responsibilities, planning sequence and considerations, and shaping operations for an
airborne assault.

SECTION I – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3-1. Airborne assault planning is as detailed as time permits and should include completion of written
orders and plans. Within time constraints, the ABNAFC carefully evaluates capabilities and limitations of
the total force and develops a plan that communicates a common vision and synchronizes the action of
forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The planning should be
highly structured involving the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others to develop a fully
synchronized plan or order. Planning time should abide by the one-third/two-thirds rule to ensure
subordinates have enough time to plan and rehearse.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
3-2. The joint task force commander directs the composition of the ABNTF headquarters and the
ABNAF. This headquarters allocates units, defines authority, and assigns responsibility by designating
command and support relationships. The staff of this headquarters is responsible to develop the task
organization of the ABNAF and conducting the necessary steps of the military decisionmaking process
(MDMP). A division-level commander or his equivalent is the approving authority for the formation of an
ABNAF. (Refer to FM 3-94 for more information.)

PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES
3-3. The joint task force commander initiates airborne operations with a planning directive to
participating units. The directive assimilates through normal command channels at the corps and division
levels; pertinent information then is passed to BCTs. The directive must—
z Specify missions.
z Outline the command structure.
z Identify participating ground and air forces.
z List forces in support.
z Provide a schedule of events.
z State conditions under which the operation begins, is delayed, is altered, or is terminated.
z Establish supported and supporting relationships.

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Chapter 3

KEY PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES

3-4. The ABNTFC establishes mission command by ensuring that his concept is understood and by
defining the responsibilities of key personnel for—
z Accomplishing the ground mission.
z Task-organizing and aircraft assignment.
z Sustaining.

3-5. The commander, airlift force for defining responsibilities of key personnel for—
z Aircraft allocation to support the ground tactical plan.
z Assault force insertion.
z Resupply and evacuation.

3-6. The ABNTFC and commander, airlift for defining joint responsibility of key personnel for—
z Establishing control parties at departure location.
z Loading (Soldiers and equipment).
z Rehearsing.
z Rehearsing communication coordination and standardization.
z Selecting drop zones and landing zones.
z Establishing control parties at drop zones and landing zones.
z Uploading aircraft.
z Planning aerial resupply and evacuation.
z Departing airfield security.
z Working or planning air movement tables.
z Coordinating movements (Soldiers and aircraft).

AIRBORNE ASSAULT FORCE

3-7. The ABN IBCT is the core of the ABNAF and the ABN IBCT commander is normally the ABNAFC
for a battalion or larger airborne assault. The primary role of the ABNAFC and his staff is to develop the
ground tactical plan by providing his staff and all supporting unit commanders and staffs with key tasks,
intent and guidance concerning the weight of the attack, reconnaissance coverage and the level of
acceptable risk.

SUPPORTING AVIATION
3-8. Strategic location of the airhead or lodgment may limit what aviation support can be provided for
reconnaissance and attack of the airhead or lodgment before the airborne assault. Once the joint force
commander relinquishes control of the operation to the ABNAFC, both fixed- and rotary-wing supporting
aviation units are under the operational control of the ABNAFC. Not all fixed-wing aviation falls under the
ABNAFC, only that which is in direct support of the ground tactical plan.
3-9. Once the airhead or lodgment is established, and dependent on the ground tactical plan, an aviation
task force may be created to support an ABNAF especially if the ground tactical plan necessitates support
for follow-on operations. However, the combat aviation brigade commander typically anticipates the needs
of the ABNAFC and provides the necessary aviation units to support the mission of the ABNAF. As the
supporting unit, the combat aviation brigade commander directs aviation units within his command or
requests augmentation from his higher headquarters to meet the needs of the ABNAFC.

SECTION II – REVERSE PLANNING SEQUENCE

3-10. The ABNTFC and his staff develop, in this order, the ground tactical plan, the landing plan, the air
movement plan, and the marshalling plan. The ABNAF staff and all supporting units coordinate, develop,
and refine concurrently to make best use of available time and resources. They develop first the ground
tactical plan, which serves as the basis to develop the other plans. Each plan may potentially affect the
others. Changes in an aspect of one plan may require adjustments in the other plans. The ABNAFC must

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 Airborne Assault Planning

determine if such adjustments entail acceptable risk. If the risk is unacceptable, the concept of operations
(CONOPS) must change.

GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

3-11. The ground tactical plan is the basis for the development of all other plans. The ABNAFC and his
staff give special consideration to the assembly and organization of the assault forces and to the
decentralized nature of initial operations in the objective area. The subordinate commander requires the
ground tactical plan of his higher headquarters before he can begin planning. He needs to know the type,
location, and size of objectives and the enemy situation at each one; the mission and intent of higher
headquarters two levels up; and his task and purpose. The ground tactical plan is generated down the chain
of command as a mutual effort. (Refer to chapter 4 of this publication for more information.) The ground
tactical plan includesʊ
z Assault objectives and airhead line.
z Reconnaissance and security forces to include observation posts.
z Boundaries.
z Task organization.
z Designation of reserve.
z Supply (accompanying, follow-up, routine).
z Fire support plan.
z Tactical cross load (for air land or parachute).

LANDING PLAN
3-12. The landing plan is the ABNAFC’s plan that links the air movement plan to the ground tactical plan.
It is published at brigade level and below. Before the ABNAFC can prepare an overall landing plan, he
must know where the subordinate commander wants to place his assault force. The landing plan is
generated up the chain of command as a mutual effort. (Refer to Chapter 5 of this publication for more
information.) The landing plan includesʊ
z Drop zone, landing zone, locations and descriptions.
z Sequence of delivery.
z Method of delivery.
z Place of delivery.
z Time of delivery.
z Cross-loading plan.
z Assembly plan.
z Landing plan worksheet.

AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

3-13. The air movement plan provides the information required to move the airborne force from the
departure airfields to the objective area. This plan is the third step in the reverse planning process and
covers the period from when units load to when they exit the aircraft. The airborne commander designates
the subordinate unit’s sequence of airflow and allocates aircraft. This allows the subordinate commanders
to conduct air movement planning. The air movement plan is generated up the chain of command as a
mutual effort. (Refer to chapter 6 of this publication for more information.) The air movement plan
includesʊ
z Departure airfields.
z Aircraft by serial.
z Parking diagram.
z Aircraft mission (air movement tables and flight routes).
z Unit providing the aircraft.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 3-3

Chapter 3

MARSHALLING PLAN
3-14. This plan is developed last in the reverse planning sequence and is based on the requirements of the
other plans. It provides the needed information for units of the assault force to prepare for combat, to move
to departure airfields, and to load aircraft. The marshalling plan provides detailed instructions for facilities
and services needed during marshalling. It is generated down the chain of command. (Refer to chapter 7 of
this publication for more information.) The marshalling plan includesʊ
z Movement to the marshalling area.
z Passive defensive measures.
z Dispersal measures.
z Departure airfields.
z Marshalling operations.
z Confirmation brief schedule.
z Preparation for combat (backbrief, inspection, supervision, rehearsal, and rest).
z Communications.

SECTION III – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-15. Whether done deliberately or rapidly, all planning requires skillful use of available time to optimize
planning and preparation throughout the unit. Taking more time to plan often results in greater
synchronization; however, any delay in execution risks yielding the initiative with more time to prepare and
act to the enemy. When allocating planning time ensure subordinates have enough time to plan and prepare
their own actions before execution.

PLANNING METHODOLOGY
3-16. Planning for airborne operations mirrors the MDMP. (See figure 3-1.) It incorporates parallel and
collaborative planning actions necessary to provide the additional time and detailed planning required for
successful execution of an airborne assault mission.

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 Airborne Assault Planning

Figure 3-1. MDMP and airborne assault planning process

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 3-5

Chapter 3

PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION

3-17. Units must plan for and prepare internal deployment standard operating procedures (SOPs) and
continually update and rehearse them. These SOPs should include actions that are common to all
deployments, to include airland, parachute assault planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. They
may include:
z Conduct rapid, short notice deployment.
z Emergency deployment readiness exercise (commonly known as EDRE).
z Prepare personnel for overseas deployment. (Refer to FM 3-35 for more information.)
z Update and review all vehicle load plans.
z Validate and update movement plans with next higher headquarters.
z Update access and recall rosters.
z Review family readiness group rosters and rear detachment responsibilities.
z Ensure special team personnel are identified and trained (movement, chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear, outload, ammunition handling).

X-HOUR/N-HOUR SEQUENCES FOR DEPLOYMENT

3-18. The X-hour/N-hour sequences for deployment are developed and followed to ensure all reports,
actions, and outload processes are accomplished at the proper time during marshalling. They aid in
developing air and deployment schedules and are flexible to allow for modifications based on the mission
and the unit commander’s concept of the operation.
3-19. X-hour is the unspecified time that commences unit notification for planning and deployment
preparation in support of potential contingency operations that do not involve rapid, short notice
deployment. X-hour sequence is an extended sequence of events initiated by X-hour that allow a unit
to focus on planning for a potential contingency operation, to include preparation for deployment.
3-20. N-hour is the time a unit is notified to assemble its personnel and begin the deployment
sequence. The N-hour sequence starts the reverse planning necessary after notification to have the
first assault aircraft en route to the objective area for commencement of the parachute assault in
accordance with the order for execution.
3-21. In anticipation of an order for execution; the ABNAF staff and its key leaders begin preparing or
updating an operations plan. The length of X-hour planning varies based on the contingency planning or
crisis action planning situation and the specific operations plan. It normally ceases with either the
designation of N-hour, or if political or military events warrant, no further action. Deployment planning
sequences fall into one of three scenarios:
z Unconstrained X-hour sequence. Used primarily for deliberate planning or crisis-action planning
that is not under a time constraint.
z Constrained X-hour sequence. Used for crisis action planning.
z N-hour sequence. May be proceeded by an X-hour sequence.

OPTIMIZE AVAILABLE PLANNING TIME

3-22. Effective execution requires issuing timely plans and orders to subordinates. Timely plans are those
issued soon enough to allow subordinates time to plan, issue their orders, and prepare for operations. In
time-constrained environments, products contain just enough information for the commander to make a
reasoned decision and subordinates to assess the situation quickly and plan, prepare, and execute the
necessary actions. Regardless of whether time for planning is constrained or not, to optimize available time
and ensure the best possible synchronization, commanders encourage collaborative and parallel planning
between their headquarters and higher and lower headquarters.

COLLABORATIVE AND PARALLEL PLANNING

3-23. Both collaborative and parallel planning help optimize available planning time. Collaborative
planning is several echelons developing plans and orders together. Commanders, subordinate commanders,

3-6 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Airborne Assault Planning

and staffs share their understanding of the situation, and participate in course of action development and
decisionmaking for development of the higher headquarters plan or order.
3-24. Parallel planning is two or more echelons planning for the same operation through the sequential
sharing of information from the higher headquarters before the higher headquarters publishes its operations
plan or operation order (OPORD). It requires significant interaction between echelons. During parallel
planning, subordinate units do not wait for their higher headquarters to publish an order to begin
developing their own plans and orders.

INFORMATION SHARING
3-25. The higher headquarters continuously shares information concerning future operations with
subordinate units through warning orders (WARNORDs) and other means. Frequent communication
between commanders and staffs and sharing of information (such as intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) products) helps subordinate headquarters plan.
3-26. Generally, the higher the headquarters has more time and staff resources available to plan and
explore options. They are sensitive not to overload subordinates with information and planning
requirements. Higher headquarters provide subordinates with information and involve them in the
development of those plans and concepts that have the highest likelihood of being adopted or fully
developed.
3-27. Commanders provide plans and orders down the chain of command. However, for airborne
operations, higher headquarters often cannot complete their plans until subordinate units have conducted a
backbrief of their plans as a change in one plan impacts other plans.
3-28. Parallel echelons of the airlift and ABNAF units coordinate continuously from the time of the joint
planning conference until the operation is executed or cancelled. They exchange liaison officers to act as
advisors and coordinators immediately upon receipt of orders to participate in an airborne assault. ABNAF
liaison officers must be familiar with all aspects of the airborne assault. They must attend briefings and
conferences, and must be provided with adequate transportation and communications assets. Liaison
officers normally are exchanged between the ABNAF and—
z Army units supporting the operation from outside the objective area.
z Close air support and airlift elements.
z Linkup forces.
z Special operations forces. (Refer to FM 3-05 for more information.)

3-29. The specific duties of liaison officers LQFOXGHʊ

z Represent their unit headquarters at the headquarters to which they are detailed.
z Act as advisors to the headquarters on matters pertaining to their own commands.
z Coordinate matters involving dual responsibility.
z Discuss the time, place, personnel required, and material to be covered at coordination meetings
and when necessary hold coordination briefings, both at the joint and service level.
z Examine parallel orders to ensure complete agreement of plans and arrangements.
z Assess and plan for the availability and procurement of equipment and facilities required from
the higher headquarters.
z Attend all joint conferences, have active knowledge with the agreements reached by the
commanders and with the operations plan.
z Prepare joint reports.
z Obtain copies of the marshalling plan and the parking diagram for their units.
z Know the location and capacity of all installations at the airfields and air landing facilities that
concern their units.
z Review the plans and arrangements for replacement aircraft if last minute failures occur; prepare
to assist the movement of ABNAF from aborting aircraft to reserve aircraft.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 3-7

Chapter 3

z Brief guides, who are furnished by the ABNAF, on airfield traffic measures and locations of
aircraft to be loaded. At dispersed locations, an ABNAF representative is located at the
coordination facility to perform this function and to act as individual liaison.
3-30. Commanders exchange liaison officers on a continuous duty status at echelons higher than ABNAF
level. At BCT and lower echelons, the S-3 liaison officers, the S-3 Air, or unit air movement officer can
perform these duties. For operations of less than ABN IBCT size, commanders exchange liaison officers as
needed.
3-31. When the ABNAF is a follow-on force after a special operations force, it requests a liaison before
arrival in the operational area. During the planning phase, a special operations force liaison officer is
attached to the ABN IBCT along with all communications assets needed for immediate use with special
operations forces assets at joint special operations task force (JSOTF) and at the objective area. The signal
plan must standardize not only frequencies and call signs, but address visual signals, and day and night
operations as well. (Refer to FM 3-05 for more information.)
3-32. Subordinate commanders must conduct confirmation briefs and backbriefs on all aspects of their plan
to the next higher commander. The backbrief differs from the confirmation brief (a briefing subordinates
give their higher commander immediately following receipt of an order) in that subordinate leaders are
given time to complete their plans. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.) This ensures that unit plans are
fully coordinated and in concert with the commander’s intent. Commanders conduct confirmation briefs or
backbriefs on a terrain model, a sand table, or a map. Planning for an airborne assault is a dynamic, fast-
changing process. A change in one plan impacts other plans. Plans remain in draft until every commander
in the chain has conducted a confirmation brief or backbrief. All commanders must inform their
subordinates of changes.
3-33. Rehearsals are essential to the success of an airborne operation. They are conducted at every level,
involve both air, and ground components. They are performed on terrain similar to the objective and under
the same conditions. Rehearsals may be conducted on a sand table, terrain model, mock-up, or map, and if
time permits a full-scale rehearsal. (See FM 6-0.) Rehearsals specific to airborne operations are listed in
order of priority as follows:
z Ground tactical plan.
z Landing plan with emphasis to assemble on the drop zone.
z Air movement plan with emphasis on aircraft loading.

3-34. Leaders of the ABNAF must be able to make decisions to support the ABNTFC’s intent. Plans and
intelligence must be disseminated to the lowest level consistent with security requirements. (Refer to FM 2-
0 for more information.) The staff follows security requirements in disseminating the intelligence required
for subordinate units to develop their plans. Intelligence is provided on a need-to-know basis. As execution
approaches, units are provided with more detailed intelligence. The commitment of an ABNAF is sudden
and complete; there is no time for the commander to orient forces immediately after landing. Plans and
intelligence must be thoroughly briefed before the operation begins.

WARNING ORDERS
3-35. To conduct an airborne assault, planning begins when the designated ABN IBCT receives a
WARNORD from the ABNTF. The WARNORD specifies the ABNAFC and ABNTF task organization
and allows the ABN IBCT staff to start initial planning and request supporting element liaison officers to
report to the ABN IBCT headquarters early in the planning phase.
3-36. Once the ABNAFC receives the WARNORD, the planning process begins. This directive or
WARNORD includesʊ
z Task organization.
z Mission command for the operation.
z Higher commander’s concept of the operation (includes tentative scheme of maneuver/primary
and alternate drop zones and landing zones).
z Missions for subordinate units.
z Time and duration of the operation (includes general timeline).

3-8 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Airborne Assault Planning

z Intelligence and security requirements.

z Allocation and distribution of airlift assets.
z Unit deployment list and sequence.
z Departure airfields, remote marshalling bases, and intermediate staging bases.
z Initial estimate on requirements for airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; close
air support; naval gun fire; and unmanned aircraft system support.
z Signal requirements and instructions.
z Linkup, withdrawal, and follow-on forces concepts.
3-37. Other WARNORDs and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) should follow as the ABNAF staff and
commander work through the reverse planning sequence.

CONTROL MEASURES
3-38. ABNAFCs employ the full range of doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate
responsibilities, deconflict operations, safeguard friendly forces and civilians, and promote unity of effort.
These measures include, but are not limited to boundaries that circumscribe operational area or area of
operation, control measures to facilitate joint task force or ABNTF maneuver, fire support coordination
measures (FSCMs); and airspace coordinating measures (ACMs).

AIRHEAD
3-39. An airhead is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized
and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space
necessary for projected operations (JP 3-18). Due to the nature of the airhead (a perimeter defense) and the
required continuous airflow into the airhead, airspace coordinating measures and FSCMs must be
established throughout the joint operational area, to include the ABNAF area of operation (drop zones,
landing zones, assault objectives, and the airhead line).
3-40. During the initial stages of an airborne assault and before adequate ground communications can be
established, coordination and control of fire support are accomplished from an airborne command and
control platform. On landing, ABNTF and subordinate maneuver units establish contact with the airborne
command and control platform through the tactical air control party (TACP) or fire support officer. Fire
support, such as close air support, beyond that available from organic or direct support assets would be
requested from the airborne platform. Prioritization and coordination of requests are accomplished by the
ground force commander’s representative in the airborne platform. Responsibilities LQFOXGHʊ
z Prevent fratricide of ground personnel.
z Ensure that requests do not interfere with incoming serials, other aircraft, or naval operations.
z Determine means of fire support coordination.
z Determine added safety or control measures required; transmit them to the appropriate ground
elements.
3-41. Terminal guidance aids and control measures are used on the ground in the objective area to assist
and guide incoming airlift aircraft to the designated drop zones and landing zones. Combat control teams
comprised of USAF personnel are organized, trained, and equipped to provide aircraft terminal guidance.
Army teams from the long-range surveillance company, a divisional or corps asset, are organized, trained,
and equipped to deploy into the objective area and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks before the
deployment of the airborne force.
3-42. For airspace coordination, ABNAF staff establishes contact with the appropriate flight, provides
essential information, and then hands the flight off to the appropriate TACP or forward air controller for
mission execution. At that point, the mission is conducted the same way as conventional operations. If
naval gun fire or air support is available, it is essential that a naval gunfire liaison officer be present in the
airborne platform to perform a similar function.
3-43. The area air defense commander (AADC) is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense
effort. All available surface-to-air assets should be incorporated into the overall air defense plan and

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 3-9

Chapter 3

comply with procedures and weapons control measures established by the AADC. The AADC exercises a
degree of control of all systems through established guidelines, determines weapons control status, and
joint force commander-approved procedural controls. (Refer to FM 3-01 and JP 3-01 for more
information.)
3-44. Once adequate airspace ground control capabilities have been established in the airhead, fire support
coordination responsibilities are passed from the airborne platform to the ground to be conducted as in
other operations. (There is no doctrinal time for this transfer.) In some situations, this cannot occur;
however, in most cases once a BCT main or tactical command post is on the ground, the transfer takes
place.

PERMISSIVE AND RESTRICTIVE CONTROL MEASURES

3-45. Fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) both permissive and restrictive, are employed to ensure
the safety of friendly personnel, to synchronize all fire support means, and to permit maximum flexibility
with minimum restrictions on the employment of fire support. A common target and map grid system is
established to permit transmission of target and friendly unit locations. This is critical if standard maps are
not available. Provisions must be made to identify friendly force locations through the employment of
smoke, panels, beacons, or other devices. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.)

DETERMINE GO/NO-GO CRITERIA

3-46. Abort criteria is a predetermined set of circumstances, based on risk assessment, which makes the
success of an operation no longer probable; thus, the operation is terminated. These circumstances can
relate to changes in safety, equipment or troops available, preparation or rehearsal time, weather, enemy,
shaping operations prior to execution of the airborne assault, or a combination of the above. In the
development of a course of action (during the preparation and deployment phase), airborne assault go/no-
go criteria is developed. Criteria considerations include, but are not limited to:
z Minimum force:
„ Number of C130s or C17s.
„ Number lost of critical chalks, Infantry battalion equivalent, BCT assault command post,
indirect fire systems, and mission command vehicle platforms.
„ Heavy-drop critical capability loss
z Intelligence/Pre-assault fires (yes/no):
„ Team recon no-fire areas established.
„ Light airfield repair package (LARP)— airfield damage is repairable with available
equipment.
„ Enemy surface to air assets neutralized; self-propelled anti-aircraft gun on objective
neutralized.
„ Indirect systems on objective destroyed.
„ Engineer forces on objective destroyed, or no larger than .
„ Air forces—air superiority achieved.
z Weather: Winds below 13 knots— Heavy equipment-17 knots—Personnel-13 knots.
z Fire support assets/airspace coordinating measures:
„ Close air support assets are on station with sufficient loiter time until P-hour +_ .
„ Electronic warfare assets on station.
„ Airspace coordinating measures active.
z Mission command sufficient assets until P-hour +_ .

AIRFIELD OPENING
3-47. When developing an operation that may include an airfield opening, entry force tactical planners
must have an understanding of the planning factors to consider for airfield opening in a hostile or
permissive environment. Planners with specific airfield opening expertise to include the designation of a

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 Airborne Assault Planning

senior airfield authority are integrated as early as possible in the planning process. (Refer to FM 3-17.2 for more
information.)

PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

3-48. Planning for airfield opening begins at the strategic level where forces are assigned. Once
employment forces are assigned by the joint task force, more detailed planning is conducted in coordination
with the entry force and USAF contingency response group— first-responder airfield opening units. As
combatant commanders identify airfields for use and direct their staffs to generate the appropriate plans, the
missions and aircraft for which the airfield will be opened are determined and airfield capabilities
are assessed.
3-49. Airfield assessment begins with airfield opening planning, which should begin as soon as the mission
is assigned. Many tools are available to planners to begin the airfield assessment prior to actual arrival at
the field. After arriving at the airfield, the airfield assessment team verifies the information gained during
pre-mission planning with assault forces, collects additional data, and provides a recommendation to the
airfield opening forces.
3-50. An airfield assessment should be accomplished rapidly to verify information and evaluate or obtain
any items that were not pre-assessed. Assessments address areas such as runways, ramps, taxiways, force
protection, communications, facilities, and provide a recommendation to appropriate decision makers on
the suitability of future airfield operations (fixed- or rotary-wing).

OPERATION AND TRANSITION

3-51. Each contingency response group is scalable to meet specific tasking requirements. Primary
capabilities/tasks include: airfield assessment, contingency response element command and control
/port/quick-turn aircraft maintenance, force protection, intelligence, limited airfield security, airfield
management and air traffic control, communications, fuels, medical, financial management, contracting,
and supply.
3-52. When the responsibility for all or a part of an airfield changes from one organization to another, there
is a requirement for a detailed and deliberate transfer. Likely transitions to occur during the life cycle of an
airfield areʊ
z From airfield seizure to airfield opening.
z From airfield opening to follow-on or sustainment.
z From airfield sustainment to closure or turnover to the host nation.

SECTION IV – SHAPING OPERATIONS

3-53. Shaping operations establish conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy,
population, and terrain. Airborne operations may be designed as a sudden attack in force to achieve
decisive results or as a shaping operation to create and preserve conditions for the success of a larger
operation or campaign. When planning indicates the future requirement for an airborne assault, appropriate
shaping operations or activities emphasize identifying and neutralizing an enemy’s anti-access capabilities.

CREATE CONDITIONS
3-54. The ABNAF commander and his staff determine the exact conditions required according to the
mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, and
civil considerations (METT-TC), to include the degree of acceptable risk with regard to each condition.
Setting conditions is not limited to conducting SEAD and preparation fires. It requires the participation of
numerous staffs, units, cells, and boards in different echelons and services.
3-55. Condition setting is an interactive process. The ABNAFC’s situational understanding determines
what part of the situation must change to ensure the success of the airborne assault. The ABNAFC tasks
available reconnaissance forces and surveillance assets to detect the location of those enemy systems that

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Chapter 3

unacceptably endanger the operation’s success. This allows fire support systems to target and deliver
effective fires against those enemy systems.
3-56. The most effective reconnaissance combines ground, aerial, and surveillance systems to provide
constant coverage and multiple assessments of enemy activities throughout the objective area prior to the
airborne assault. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas,
places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 3-0). The
commander uses available reconnaissance forces and surveillance assets, to include available joint systems,
to provide information that increases the accuracy of his situational understanding during planning and
preparation.
3-57. The ABNAFC tasks the other warfighting functions to continue planning and preparing for the
operation while employing service and joint fires to enable conditions. The ABNAFC requests assistance
from higher echelons if there are not sufficient organic assets and information to accomplish the mission.
The ABNAFC then assesses the progress of all the warfighting functions. This process repeats until the
commander is satisfied with the set conditions or operational necessity forces him to either cancel or
conduct the airborne assault.
3-58. Planning considerations should encompass special operations forces. Special operations forces may
be inserted or already be operating in the objective area and become key components of the initial effort to
shape and set conditions. Special operations forces regional expertise and environment preparation
activities support well in advance of airborne assault planning and execution. Special operations forces may
be introduced to the area well in advance of a possible assault to develop or prepare an area for airborne
assault.

PRESERVE CONDITIONS
3-59. As the airborne assault extends in time and geography, extended lines of operations increase the
assault unit’s vulnerability to enemy capabilities designed to interrupt the expansion or reinforcement of the
airhead or lodgment and follow-on operations. As the ABNAF expands its influence within an area of
operation, the ABNAF becomes the primary means of setting conditions for operations that seize the
initiative in other contested domains. The ABNAF leverages its presence to defeat enemy capabilities that
limit freedom of action.
3-60. Continued high operational tempo and pressure preserves condition to hinder the enemy’s ability to
regroup, reconstitute capabilities, or reconfigure forces to support new plans. A primary means of
maintaining continuous pressure is the continuous and rapid cycling of joint enablers and capabilities under
operational level direction.
3-61. To rapidly transition from entry operations to follow-on operations, intermediate staging bases
remain a critical part of baseline condition setting to: enable shorter range recycling of intra-theater lift
capabilities, reorganization and reconfiguration of capabilities to meet evolving assault force demands and
recalibration of battle and logistical rhythms.

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 Chapter 4
Ground Tactical Plan
The ground tactical plan is the base from which commanders develop all other plans.
They must complete the ground tactical plan before finalizing the landing plan, the
air movement plan, and the marshalling plan. It provides the commander’s intent, his
concept of the operation, fire support plan, and task organization of the units making
the initial airborne assault. Ground combat following airborne operations is
conducted along conventional lines but under unusual conditions. Once these
conditions are appreciated, the tactics and methods of ground combat can be applied
after the execution of airborne operations.

SECTION I – ELEMENTS
4-1. The ground tactical plan following an airborne assault contains essentially the same elements as other
offensive operations. The elements, driven by the evaluation of the mission variables of METT-TC, are
prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility to achieve surprise. Elements critical to the ground tactical
plan includeʊ

TASK ORGANIZATION
4-2. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission
(ADRP 5-0). Once ABNAFC determines the principal features of the ground assault plan (scheme of
maneuver and fire support), he task organizes subordinate units to execute assigned missions and
determines boundaries. To ensure unity of effort or to increase readiness for combat, part or all of the
subordinate units of a command can be formed into one or more temporary tactical groupings (teams or
task forces), each under a designated commander. Infantry units usually form the nucleus tactical groupings
of the team; Infantry unit commanders lead the teams. These teams are tailored for the initial airborne
assault by the attachment of required supporting units. They are attached as soon as possible in the
marshalling area. Many of the units detach as soon as centralized control can be regained and the parent
unit headquarters can be established on the ground. After the task organization of Soldiers for the airborne
assault is announced, units organize into assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. (Refer to chapter 2 of this
publication for more information.)
z Assault echelon. The assault echelon is composed of those forces required to seize the assault
objectives and the initial airhead, plus their reserves and supporting Soldiers.
z Follow-on echelon. The airborne force does not need the follow-on echelon in the objective area
during the initial assault, but does need it for subsequent operations. When needed, the follow-on
echelon enters the objective area as soon as practical by air, surface movement, or a combination
of the two.
z Rear echelon. The rear echelon includes the part of an airborne unit that is not considered
essential for initial combat operations. It includes people left at its rear base to perform
administrative and support functions that cannot be done efficiently in the combat area.

MISSION STATEMENT
4-3. The ABNAFC’s mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the ABNAF‘s
essential task (or tasks) and purpose— a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing
so. The mission is analyzed in terms of the commander‘s intent two echelons up, mission statement
(mission essential task and purpose) of the higher headquarters, specified tasks, and implied tasks. The

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Chapter 4

mission of adjacent units must be analyzed to understand how they contribute to the decisive operation
of their higher headquarters.

COMMANDER’S INTENT
4-4. The ABNAF commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation
and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps
subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further
orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). ABNAF planners receive the ABNAF
commander’s intent as soon as possible after the mission is received. Even if the ground tactical plan is not
complete, airborne assault planning often begins after the ABNAFC issues his intent.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
4-5. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate
to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state
(ADRP 5-0). The concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the
commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible
subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another. Commanders and staff use the
operational framework to help conceptualize and describe their concept of operation.
4-6. The operational framework proves the commander with basic conceptual options for visualizing and
describing operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. Commanders are not bound by any specific
framework for conceptually organizing operations, and may use one of three conceptual frameworks listed
below or in combination. These operational frameworks apply equally to both operational and tactical
actions, and are listed as follows:
z The deep-close-security framework to describe the operation in time and space.
z The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework to articulate the operation in terms of purpose.
z The main and supporting efforts framework to designate the shifting prioritization of resources.

4-7. The deep-close-security operational framework has historically been associated with terrain
orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well. Deep operations involve
efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. Close operations
are operations that are within a subordinate commander’s area of operations. Security operations involve
efforts to provide an early and accurate warning of enemy operations and to provide time and maneuver
space within which to react to the enemy.
4-8. The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation. The
decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission (ADRP 3-0). It determines the
outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. A shaping operation is an operation that establishes
conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain (ADRP 3-
0). A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping
operation by generating and maintaining combat power (ADRP 3-0).
4-9. The main and supporting efforts operational framework—simpler than other organizing
frameworks—focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, leaders can use the main
and supporting efforts with either the deep-close-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining
framework. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most
critical to overall mission success (ADRP 3-0). It usually is weighted with the preponderance of combat
power. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the
main effort (ADRP 3-0). (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)

TASKS TO SUBORDINATES
4-10. Tasks to subordinate units direct individual units to perform specific tasks. They are a clearly defined
and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations and contribute to accomplishing the
ABNAF mission or other requirements. The assignment of a task includes not only the task (what), but also

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the unit (who), place (where), time (when), and purpose (why). The purpose of each task should nest with
completing another task, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state condition to the airborne assault.
Example of activities includeʊ

z Movement and maneuver. Maneuver units conduct an airborne assault and attack to destroy
enemy forces on objectives. Units such as scouts, cavalry, long-range surveillance and special
operations forces conduct reconnaissance and surveillance near the objective area, facilitate joint
fires and close combat attack against identified enemy forces in the objective area, and conduct
limited offensive tasks to interdict enemy forces.
z Intelligence. Ensures the information collection effort focuses on drop zones and landing zones
and the objective area to identify enemy forces for targeting by fires and aviation assets to set
conditions for airborne assault execution.
z Fires. While cannon artillery is part of the ABNAF, the primary support is close air support,
naval gun fire and organic mortars initially on conduct of the airborne assault. Upon airland or
follow-on force arrival, the field artillery battalion provides fire support on identified enemy
positions on or near drop zones and landing zones to neutralize enemy forces and help set
conditions for follow-on operations.
z Sustainment. Once the lodgment or airhead is secure for air-land or follow-on forces to arrive,
forward logistics element from the brigade support battalion can begin casualty evacuation,
resupply, equipment recovery, and refueling of vehicle and aviation assets in support of the
ground tactical plan.
z Mission command. The ABNAFC may deploy in an airspace control aircraft to provide mission
command oversight of the mission.

SECTION II – PLAN DEVELOPMENT

4-11. The ABNAFC begins to visualize the application of his ground tactical plan to his area of operation
by defining the tactical problem and then begins a process of determining feasible solutions with his
planning staff. The ground tactical plan incorporates considerations for those actions to be taken in the
objective area, for example, during the assault and subsequent operations phases. This is the first plan to be
finalized. It must be keyed on the accomplishment of the commander’s concept of the operation.
4-12. The ground tactical plan is developed as other tactical plans using the procedure as delineated in FM
3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team. However, the initial goal of airborne operations is the establishment of an
airhead and its subsequent defense. Essential elements of the ground tactical plan are developed in the
following sequence:
z Assault objectives and airhead line (selected concurrently).
z Airhead and security area boundaries (developed sequentially).
z Assault force and security force task organization (developed sequentially).

MISSION VARIABLES OF METT-TC

4-13. When the ABNAF is alerted for deployment and assigned a mission, its assigned higher headquarters
provides an analysis of the operational environment. That analysis includes the following operational
variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time.
The mission variables of METT-TC are used to filter the broader scope of operational variables into
variables that directly affect a specific mission. The ABNAFC uses mission variables to gather relevant
information for his mission analysis. This analysis enables him to combine operational variables and
tactical-level information with knowledge about local conditions relevant to the mission. The following
paragraphs address the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)

MISSION
4-14. The mission of an airborne Infantry battalion or BCT is to close with the enemy by means of fire and
movement to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. These

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Chapter 4

missions usually require the seizure and defense of objectives and surrounding terrain. Airborne assault
forces rely strongly on the element of surprise.

ENEMY
4-15. Commanders analyze all available information to determine the enemy’s situation. The following
factors are considered:
z Enemy morale, leadership, and probable intentions.
z Enemy capabilities.
z Enemy tactics.
z Probable enemy reactions to an airborne assault.
„ The enemy that can react the fastest poses the immediate threat.
„ The enemy that can cause the most damage or prevent the airborne force from
accomplishing its mission poses the most significant threat.
z Enemy reserves and paramilitary organizations (gendarmeries, police, border guards, and
militia) and their ability to mobilize and react.
z Enemy capability to conduct guerrilla, partisan, or sabotage activities and the enemy’s
relationship to the local population.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

4-16. The staff must consider these components; observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key
terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC) and then act on the following factors:
z The availability of drop zones and landing zones. Division or corps staff provides a landing area
study to subordinate elements before the preparation of the airborne assault and follow-on
landing plan. However, the availability and selection of drop zones should not influence the
selection of assault objectives, the airhead line, or unit boundaries.
z Obstacles within the airhead line and out to the maximum effective range of direct- and indirect-
fire weapons, with emphasis on those that can be prepared or reinforced with minimal engineer
effort.
z Enemy avenues of approach, since the enemy tries to reach and destroy the airborne force before
it can assemble and reorganize. This consideration weighs heavily in determining the location of
assault objectives.
z Key terrain that can determine how the airborne force can best defend the area in-depth.
z Friendly and enemy observation and fields of fire (particularly for indirect fires and anti-armor
weapons).
z Cover and concealment for movement and consolidation.
z The staff must consider the effects of climate and weather onʊ
„ Flight formations.
„ Trafficability.
„ Visibility.
„ Close air support.
„ Logistics.
„ Personnel and equipment.
„ Manned and unmanned aerial platforms.

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE

4-17. Commanders consider all forces available to accomplish the mission. These include all assigned,
attached, and supporting forces.
z U.S. ground forces. Commanders evaluate the plans, missions, capabilities, and limitations of
U.S. ground forces. They consider whether artillery can support the airborne forces and whether
the forces perform a linkup or passage of lines.

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z United States Air Force (USAF). Close air support often can compensate for the lack of armor
and heavy artillery. The airborne commander must consider the Air Force’s ability to support the
force and must bring knowledgeable airlift and tactical air planners together early.
z United States Navy (USN). The airborne commander examines the availability and feasibility of
naval gun fire support and naval or U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) air support. Early arrangements
for liaison and coordination must be made to support the operation.

TIME AVAILABLE
4-18. Time is critical in all operations. There are several time considerations that are unique to an airborne
operation. Significant time may be required to mass the lift force. The time between the initial assault and
the deployment of the follow-on echelon must be considered. The amount of time before linkup or
withdrawal drives sustainment planning.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
4-19. Understanding the operational environment requires understanding the civil aspects of the joint
operational area. Social and economic variables often receive close analysis as part of civil considerations
at brigade and higher levels. Depending on mission, the ABNTFC considers national and regional
characteristics such as—
z Religion and customs.
z Politics and tribal affiliations.
z Support or lack of it for central and local governments or occupying powers.
z Loyalty to political or military leaders.
z Available labor.
z Support or lack of it for U.S. forces.

4-20. Civil considerations is the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of
the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military
operations (ADRP 5-0). The ability to analyze civil considerations to determine their impact on operations
at brigade and below enhances several aspects of the airborne operation to include insertion into the
objective area, seizure of assault objectives and establishment of the airhead, and follow-on operations.
Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory DLG$6&23(ʊareas, structures,
capabilities, organizations, people, and events. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)

ASSAULT OBJECTIVE AND AIRHEAD LINE

4-21. Based on his analysis of METT-TC, the commander selects specific assault objectives. (See
figure 4-1, page 4-6.) Although the airhead line is developed and the assault objectives determined
concurrently, the assault objectives dictate the size and shape of the airhead.

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Chapter 4

Figure 4-1. Assault objectives

4-22. This selection does not necessarily include those objectives that the force must seize to secure the
airhead line. An appropriate assault objective is one, which the force must control early in the assault to
accomplish the mission, or it must control to enhance the security of the airborne unit during the
establishment of the airhead.
4-23. Objectives should allow for the accomplishment of mission-essential tasks while meeting the
commander’s intent. They can include key terrain within the airhead or terrain required for linkup. For
example, the commander has directed the airborne force to secure a bridge for later use by linkup forces.
The force must secure this bridge before the enemy can destroy or damage it; therefore, the commander
designates the bridge as an assault objective.
4-24. The airborne unit is vulnerable from the time of the airborne assault until follow-on forces can be
delivered to the airhead. A mobile enemy unit attacking the airhead during these early moments can
completely disrupt the operation. Therefore, the commander selects assault objectives terrain that
dominates places where high-speed enemy avenues of approach enter the airhead.
4-25. Enemy positions that both threaten the mission and are located within the airhead can be selected as
assault objectives. However, commanders would not classify mobile forces as assault objectives.
4-26. Assault objectives must be seized immediately to establish the airhead and to provide security for
follow-on forces coming into the airhead.
4-27. Other considerations influence the development and final selection of assault objectives.
Subordinate commanders decide the size, type, or disposition of the force to gain/maintain control.
z Division selects brigade assault objectives.
z Brigade selects battalion assault objectives.
z Battalion selects company assault objectives.
„ Senior commanders choose as few assault objectives as possible since subordinate
commanders must select additional objectives to establish a cohesive defense of their
assigned areas of the airhead.
„ Assault objectives are ranked in order. A unit SOP may predesignate a numbering system
for subordinate objectives. For example, all first brigade objectives begin with a “Q,” or for
OPSEC purposes, they may be randomly numbered or lettered. Priorities are chosen based
on the most likely threat or on the needs of the friendly force.

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„ Assault objectives are secured before the defense is setup in the airhead line. The airhead is
then cleared of organized enemy resistance and forces are positioned to secure the airhead
line.
4-28. When commanders select assault objectives, they should consider the extent of the airhead. The
airhead includes the entire area under control of the airborne force. It acts as a base for further operations
and as a respite that allows the airborne force to build combat power. Once the force secures the airhead,
they must clear enemy forces within it; then, they must defend it.
4-29. The airhead line is a line denoting the limits of the objective area for an airborne assault (JP 3-18). It
delineates the specific area to be seized and designates the airhead. Several principle factors determine the
location, extent, and form of the airhead or airhead line, they are as follows:
z The actual trace of the airhead line reflects the control of key or critical terrain essential to the
mission. (See figure 4-2.)

Figure 4-2. Airhead line

z The airhead line anchors on obstacles, and the airhead itself takes advantage of natural and man-
made obstacles.
z The airhead contains enough drop zones and landing zones to ensure interior rather than exterior
lines of communication and to permit mass rather than piecemeal assault.
z The airhead must allow enough space for dispersion to reduce vulnerability to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear weapons.
z The airhead must be large enough to provide for defense in depth, yet small enough for the unit
to defend. Although this is largely METT-TC dependent, a battalion can defend an airhead three
to five kilometers in diameter. An IBCT can occupy an airhead five to eight kilometers in
diameter.

SECURITY AND RECONNAISSANCE

4-30. Security in all directions is an overriding consideration early in the airborne operation, since an
airhead or lodgment is essentially a perimeter defense. Another overriding consideration, the airborne unit’s
method of arriving into the objective area requires the conduct of an immediate and thorough
reconnaissance and the rapid transmission of this information to higher headquarters. Security operations
and reconnaissance missions within the security area enable these efforts.

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Chapter 4

4-31. Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the
protected force (ADRP 3-90). Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or
other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to
secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular
area (JP 2-0).
4-32. After the force makes the initial assault landing and accomplishes its first missions, the commander
organizes the airhead line as the defense perimeter. The terrain and situation dictates how units occupy and
organize the airhead line. Forces assigned reconnaissance and security tasks, usually include reinforcing the
security area. The mission, enemy capabilities, and defensive characteristics of the terrain determine the
degree to which the airhead line is actually occupied and security area forces are organized for the airhead.
Task organization of security and reconnaissance forces is METT-TC-dependent and may include scouts,
Infantry, cavalry, antitank weapons, engineers, Army aviation, electronic warfare, and follow-on Stryker
and Armored forces.

Security Forces
4-33. Security forces land early in the assault echelon. In the early stages of an airborne operation, the
security force acts as a screening force. In later stages (when assault missions have been accomplished,
when the airhead is relatively secure, and when more forces are available), it acts as a guard force. The
security area is established four to six kilometers from the airhead line to afford security to the airborne
force during its landing and reorganization. Security forces come under BCT control except during short
missions such as raids, when they come under battalion or squadron control. The mission of the security
force is to—
z Give the airhead early warning.
z Develop information collection, to include the location, direction, and speed of an enemy attack.
z Deny the enemy observation of and ability to direct indirect fire on the airhead.
z Deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the airhead.
z Delay and disrupt the enemy.

4-34. The need for and positioning of additional security forces is determined by the next subordinate
commander. When possible, mobile forces are selected to facilitate rapid initial movement to positions and
to facilitate withdrawal and adjustment. An aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance effort at lower
echelons augments the security force. The following considerations apply to the selection of positions for
the security force:
z Locate them within radio communications and fire support range. However, this range can be
extended, if necessary, with retransmission stations, split section indirect-fire operations, and
attachment of vehicles, mortars, or other assets to the security force.
z Locate them as roadblocks, obstacles, ambushes, patrols, or sensors (depending on the enemy)
on dominant terrain. This allows long-range observation and fields of fire out to the maximum
range of supporting fires.
z Locate them to observe, control, and dominate enemy high-speed avenues of approach.
z Locate them to deny enemy long-range observation and observed indirect fire into the airhead.
z Locate them far enough out to provide early warning.
z Locate them to provide routes of withdrawal to the airhead. Observation posts generally rely on
their ability to hide as their main protection; they can allow the enemy to pass their position and
not withdraw.

Reconnaissance Forces
4-35. Designated forces under control of the ABNAFC perform reconnaissance missions within the
security area; emphasis is placed on likely enemy avenues of approach. The mission of these forces is to
gain and maintain contact with enemy units reacting to the airborne assault. This force is mobile and not

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 Ground Tactical Plan

used to defend a particular part of the airhead. It may be supported with fire from USAF assets, naval gun
fire, or Army missile systems. The following considerations govern the employment of this force:
z These forces orient on enemy high-speed avenues of approach to develop intelligence to include
the location, direction, and speed of the enemy’s advance.
z Commanders of these forces consider known enemy locations, the number of high-speed
approaches, and communications-relay abilities while orienting on enemy units.
z Usually employed beyond the airhead at a distance based on the tactical situation, commanders
can extend their range if communications permit.
z Aviation assets can extend to 50 kilometers or more, although the commander must consider
loiter time so the forces can provide continuous coverage. (Forward arming and refueling points
[FARPs] can increase this distance.)
z Long-range surveillance teams may perform surveillance of enemy garrisons and major routes
into the airhead.
z Reconnaissance forces must be mobile and task-organized for the mission.

BOUNDARIES
4-36. Commanders visualize the employment of subordinate units to organize them for combat
commensurate with the missions. Commanders use boundaries to assign areas of responsibility to major
subordinate combat elements, which then clear the area of enemy forces. (See figure 4-3, page 4-10.) In
selecting and designating assault boundaries for airborne operations, several points are considered as
follows:
z Each unit should be able to clear its assigned area; therefore, commanders must consider
boundaries concurrently with task organization. To assign boundaries, commanders subdivide
the area into areas with equal tasks (not necessarily into equal areas). This requires a careful
analysis of the enemy, the tasks to be accomplished, and the terrain within the objective area.
z Commanders should avoid splitting (between two units) the responsibility for the defense of an
avenue of approach or key terrain.
z Commanders should ensure there is adequate maneuver space in the area, to include key terrain
features that control it.
z Commanders should avoid designating boundaries in such a way that a major terrain obstacle
divides a unit area; this presents problems for maneuvering forces.
z The boundaries should provide adequate room to permit the commander to maneuver forces on
both sides of their assault objectives.
z Commanders must choose boundaries that are recognizable both on the map and on the ground.
Roads should not be used as a boundary because they represent a high-speed avenue of approach
and need to be covered with a clear understanding of responsibility. Instead, commanders can
use rivers, streams, railroad tracks, the edge of a town, woods, the edge of a swamp, and so on.
z An ABN IBCT area of operation should include at least one drop zone and one landing zone to
allow for follow-on forces to land during the assault. This facilitates resupply and evacuation of
enemy prisoners of war and casualties. Having a drop zone and landing zone allows for ease of
sustainment operations. Regardless of boundaries, units should drop on the drop zone closest to
their assault objective.
z Commanders should establish boundaries that serve during the airborne assault and during later
operations. These should be readily recognizable during limited visibility.
z Commanders should choose boundaries that do not require a unit to defend in more than one
direction at once. They should not expect a unit to secure objectives within the airhead at the
same time they establish its defense.
z Boundaries should extend beyond the trace of the security force as far as needed to coordinate
fires. This allows subordinate units to operate forward of the airhead with minimal coordination.
z Commanders should plan coordinating points at the intersection of the airhead line and security
force ground trace boundaries.

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Figure 4-3. Boundaries

METHOD OF ATTACK
4-37. There are three basic methods of attacking an objective. They are:
z Jumping or landing on top of the objective. This method works best for attacking a small
objective that is specially fortified against ground attack. However, an airborne landing into an
area strongly defended against air attack requires surprise to succeed.
z Jumping or landing near the objective. This method works best for the capture of a lightly
defended objective that must be seized intact such as a bridge. If the enemy has strong defenses
against air attack, only surprise can enable the unit to achieve success with few casualties.
z Jumping or landing at a distance from the objective. This method is the least often used of the
methods available. Airborne forces use this method for large complex objectives that must be
seized by deliberate attack. The drop zone is selected to emphasize security and preservation of
the force. The plan is based on METT-TC considerations and should surprise the enemy.

METHOD OF LANDING
4-38. There are two basic landing methods. They are as follows:
z Multiple drop zones. The use of multiple drop zones creates a number of small airheads in the
objective area. This method supports the principle of mass by placing the maximum number of
paratroopers in the objective area in the minimum amount of time. Additionally, the commander
can capitalize on the principle of surprise because the main effort is not easily determined by the
enemy. This method normally is used by division-size elements and larger.
z Single drop zone. IBCT and smaller-size airborne forces often establish an airhead by
conducting the airborne assault onto a single drop zone. This method allows the assaulting unit
to assemble quickly and mass combat power against the enemy.

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TIME-SPACE FACTORS
4-39. Commanders schedule the delivery sequence and the time between serials to provide the least time
and distance separation between each aircraft and serial. The airborne force assembles maximum combat
power on the drop zone as quickly as possible, using either of the following options:
z Land all elements in the same area. Aircraft approach the drop zone in a deep, narrow formation
and all Soldiers jump into a small area.
z Land all elements at the same time. Aircraft in a wide formation approach various drop zones
situated close to each other and all Soldiers jump at the same time or as near to it as possible.

LANDING PRIORITIES
4-40. Airborne units are cross loaded to land close to their assault objectives and are organized to try to
maintain tactical unity.
z Battalions or battalion task forces land intact on a single drop zone. An IBCT lands in mutually
supporting drop zones. Two or more battalions land successively on the same drop zone or each
can land on a separate drop zone within a general IBCT drop zone area.
z The airborne force sends as many assault unit personnel and equipment as possible into the area
in parachute serials. Commanders must consider the mobility of equipment after the landing. For
example, the carriers or prime movers that are deliverable by parachute, but difficult to move or
carry on the ground; can accompany the weapons in the assault element. Paratroopers
accompany their units’ principal items of equipment.

FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

4-41. The following fire support planning and coordination actions are the responsibility of the
IBCT/battalion/squadron during ground movement:
z Support the scheme of maneuver. The goal is to place the maximum amount of indirect
firepower on the ground as quickly as possible.
z Control indirect-fire systems. Initially, control is decentralized; a forward observer calls for fire
directly to a fire support asset.
z Plan fires to block enemy avenues of approach. (Consider family of scatterable mines
[FASCAM] delivered by air.)
z Plan fires to eliminate enemy resistance (groups and series in the objective area).
z Plan fires to defend key terrain needed to link up with friendly forces.
z Plan fires to support security or reconnaissance forces in the objective area.
z Plan fires on top of, to the flanks, and beyond assault objectives.
z Plan close air support.
z Plan final protective fires.
z Recommend priority of fires.
z Select initial field artillery and mortar positions that can be occupied quickly from drop zones
and landing zones.
z Select subsequent field artillery and mortar positions to provide combat outposts and security
forces.
z Coordinate landing plan. Planning and coordination of fire support during the air movement and
pre-assault fires are the joint task force’s responsibility; he plans SEAD fires along the flight
route and in the objective area. Once on the ground, friendly positions are marked. The assault
force must ensure that pre-assault air strikes are planned against other enemy positions in the
objective area.
z Pre-assault fires are planned as follows:
„ On and around the landing zone or drop zone (alternate and false).
„ On enemy air defense artillery.
„ On enemy command, control, and communication.

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„ On enemy indirect-fire systems.

„ Sequence and location of delivery for field artillery and mortars.

SECTION III – AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS

4-42. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to
friendly forces require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of ground forces.
This section discusses fundamental considerations for effective air-ground operations, close combat attack,
and close air support. It addresses unmanned aircraft system operations to provide surveillance capabilities
and to enhance the ABNAFC’s situational awareness as he plans, coordinates, and executes the airborne
assault.

FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
4-43. To ensure effective air-ground operations, airborne assault commanders and staffs must consider the
integration of air and ground maneuver forces. The following fundamentals provide a framework for
enhancing the effectiveness of both air and ground maneuver:
z Understanding capabilities and limitations of each force.
z Using standard operating procedures.
z Forming habitual relationships.
z Using regular training events.
z Rehearsals.
z Maximizing and concentrating effects of available assets.
z Synchronization.

4-44. Integration involves merging the air and ground fights into one to apply proper aviation capabilities
according to the supported ABNAFC’s intent. Integration ideally begins early in the planning process with
the involvement of the air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE). The
ADAM/BAE advises the ABNAFC on aviation capabilities and the best way to use aviation to support
mission objectives. Ensuring the AVN LNO or BAE passes along the task and purpose for aviation support
and continually provides updates as needed is of equal importance. Simply stated, ensuring the aviation
brigade and subordinate unit staffs fully understand the ABNAF scheme of maneuver and commander’s
intent is critical to successful air-ground operations.

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK

4-45. A close combat attack is a coordinated attack by Army attack reconnaissance aircraft (manned and
unmanned) against enemy forces that are in close proximity to friendly forces. The close combat attack is
not synonymous with close air support flown by joint aircraft. Terminal control from ground units or
controllers is not due to the capabilities of the aircraft and the enhanced situational understanding of the
aircrew (FM 3-04.126). In most instances, the attack aviation already may occupy holding areas, battle or
support by fire positions or are in overwatch of the ground unit as it begins its assault. The ABNAF
employs close combat attack procedures to ensure that these aviation fires destroy the enemy with minimal
risk to friendly forces.
4-46. After executing the airborne assault, employing attack reconnaissance aviation with ground
maneuver forces requires coordinated force-oriented control measures and the close combat attack (CCA)
5-Line attack brief allowing aviation forces to support ground maneuver with direct fires while minimizing
fratricide risks. The aviation liaison officer should identify early in the planning process the minimum
ABNAF graphics required for operations (boundaries, phase lines, attack by fire positions, objectives, and
so on). Brigade aviation elements and liaison officer personnel should ensure that supported units are
familiar with close combat attack request procedures and marking methods

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK REQUEST

4-47. A close combat attack is coordinated and directed by a team, platoon, or company level ground unit
using the standardized Format 22. CCA 5-Line attack brief. (Refer to chapter 10, section III of this

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publication for more information.) The most important factor of successful close combat attack is positive
and direct communication between aviation and ground forces. As stated earlier, close combat attack does
not require a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) unlike close air support missions. However, utilizing a
joint fires observer can minimize the risk of fratricide and expedite the clearance of fires procedures. (Refer
to FM 3-04.126 and ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)
4-48. Any element in contact uses the CCA 5-Line attack brief to initiate the close combat attack. The
CCA 5-Line attack brief allows the ground maneuver forces to communicate and reconfirm to the aircraft
the exact location of friendly and enemy forces. The ground commander owning the terrain clears fires
during the close combat attack by giving aircrews the situational awareness of the location of friendly
elements. The ground commander deconflicts the airspace between indirect fires, close air support, and the
close combat attack aircraft.
4-49. After receiving the request for close combat attack, the aircrew informs the ground unit leader of the
battle position, attack or, support by fire position (or series of positions) the team is occupying, and the
location from which the attack aircraft engages the enemy with direct fire. The size of this position varies
depending on the number of aircraft using the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of
terrain. The position must be close enough to the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover.
Aircraft leaders normally offset the position from the flank of the friendly ground position. This helps to
ensure that rotor wash, ammunition-casing expenditure, and the general signature of the aircraft do not
interfere with operations on the ground. The offset position allows the aircraft to engage the enemy on his
flanks rather than its front. It reduces the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun-target line.

TARGET HANDOVER
4-50. The rapid and accurate marking of a target is essential to a positive target handover. Aircraft
conducting close combat attacks develop an attack plan that is METT-TC dependent and meets the ground
commander’s task and purpose. The aircrew generally has an extremely limited amount of time to acquire
both the friendly and enemy locations. It is essential that the ground unit has the marking ready and turned
on when requested by the aircrew. Attack reconnaissance aircrews use both thermal sight and night vision
goggles (NVGs) to fly with and acquire targets. After initially engaging the target, the aircrew generally
approaches from a different angle for survivability reasons if another attack is required. The observer
makes adjustments using the eight cardinal directions and distance (meters) in relation to the last round’s
impact and the actual target. At the conclusion of the close combat attack, the aircrew provides its best
estimate of battle damage assessment to the unit in contact.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND REATTACK

4-51. After the attack aircraft complete the requested close combat attack mission, the aircrew provides a
battle damage assessment to the ground commander. Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander
determines if another attack is required to achieve his desired end state. The close combat attack operation
can continue until the aircraft have expended all available munitions or fuel. However, if the air mission
commander receives a request for another attack, he must carefully evaluate his ability to extend the
operation. If not able, he calls for relief on station by another attack team if available. It is unlikely that the
original team has enough time to refuel, rearm, and return to station.

CLEARANCE OF FIRES
4-52. During an airborne assault with numerous aircraft in the vicinity of the drop zone, it is critical to
deconflict airspace between aircraft and established indirect fires once air-land or follow-on forces arrive,
to include the following:
z Ensure aircrews have the current and planned indirect fire positions (to include mortars)
supporting the ground tactical plan.
z Plan for informal airspace coordination areas and check firing procedures and communications
to ensure artillery and mortars firing from within the drop zone do not endanger subsequent
serials landing or departing, close combat attack, or close air support.

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z Ensure that at least one aviation team members monitors the fire support network for situational
awareness.
z Advise the aviation element if the location of indirect fire units changes from that planned.
z Ensure all participating units are briefed daily on current airspace control order or air tasking
order changes and updates that may affect air mission planning and execution.
z Ensure all units update firing unit locations, firing point origins, and final protective fire lines as
they change for inclusion in current airspace control order.
4-53. The ABNAFC or ground commander can establish an airspace coordination area. For example, he
can designate that all indirect fires be south of and all aviation stay north of a specified gridline for a
specific period. This is one method for deconflicting airspace while allowing both indirect fires and attack
aviation to attack the same target. The ground commander then can deactivate the informal airspace
coordination area when the situation permits.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

4-54. Close air support is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in
close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces (JP 3-0). Like close combat attack, close air support can be conducted at any
place and time friendly forces are in close proximity to enemy forces based on availability. All leaders in
the ABNAF should understand how to employ close air support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass,
neutralize, or delay enemy forces. (Refer to JP 3-09.3 for more information.)
4-55. Only joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) or forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC[A]s)
personnel have the authorization to perform terminal control of close air support aircraft during operations
(combat and peacetime) within proximity of their supported ground combat units. Nomination of close air
support targets is the responsibility of the commander, air liaison officer, and S-3 at each level. The
ABNAF may receive close air support from USAF, USN, USMC, or multinational units. (Refer to
ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)

CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT

4-56. Before and during an airborne assault, USAF aircraft are available to provide close air support.
Requests for these aircraft are processed through the tactical air control party (TACP) colocated with the
IBCT main command post. The TACP is organized as an air execution cell capable of requesting and
executing Type 2 or 3 terminal attack control of close air support missions. The staffing of the cell depends
on the situation but at a minimum, includes an air liaison officer and a JTAC. (Refer to ATP 3-09.32 for
more information.) To use close air support aircraft, the leader on the ground should be familiar with the
characteristics of the aircraft predominantly used in the close air support role.

BRIEFING FORMAT
4-57. Two types of close air support requests are as follows:
z Preplanned requests that may be filled with either scheduled or on-call air missions. Those close
air support requirements foreseen early enough to be included in the first air tasking order
distribution are submitted as preplanned air support requests for close air support. Only those air
support requests submitted in sufficient time to be included in the joint air tasking cycle planning
phases and supported on the air tasking order are considered preplanned requests.
z Immediate requests that are mostly filled by diverting preplanned missions or with on-call
missions. Immediate requests arise from situations that develop outside the air tasking order
planning cycle.
4-58. The air liaison officer and JTAC personnel in the TACP are the primary means for requesting and
controlling close air support. However, reconnaissance units conducting shaping operations, such as
reconnaissance and surveillance missions that have joint fires observer certified personnel, may observe
and request close air support through the JTAC. (Refer to ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)

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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM

4-59. Before the airborne assault, the ABNTFC may rely on unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations to
provide surveillance capabilities and to enhance the ABNAFC’s situational awareness as he plans,
coordinates, and executes the airborne assault. UAS employment prior to the assault is weighted against the
element of surprise. Once the airborne assault is executed, the commander can employ UAS from his
organic elements or he can request to have direct access to real-time feeds from additional UAS support
from his higher headquarters. UAS employment is particularly effective when employed together with
ground and attack reconnaissance elements as a team during shaping operations in which the commander is
trying to create the conditions for successful airborne assault execution. (Refer to FM 3-04.155 for
more information.)

CAPABILITIES
4-60. UAS bring numerous capabilities to the ABNAF. Employment of these systems before executing the
airborne assault and employment with ground and attack reconnaissance units provides reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities. UAS also can support military deception by flying in an
area to make the enemy think it is a friendly objective. The RQ-7B Shadow can participate in attack
operations by either employing indirect fires and by laser designation of targets for joint aircraft and remote
engagements by armed manned and unmanned aircraft. The MQ-1C Gray Eagle can do the same and may
be armed with Hellfire missiles to engage autonomously or fire its missiles for a remote designator.

Reconnaissance Operations
4-61. When UAS complement the ground reconnaissance units during reconnaissance operations, they
operate forward of the element (METT-TC dependent). They can conduct detailed surveillance of areas that
are particularly dangerous to ground reconnaissance units, such as drop zones, landing zones and objective
areas. They can be employed effectively in support of operations in urban terrain.
4-62. They can support route reconnaissance forward of reconnaissance and security units or be employed
in conjunction with reconnaissance and security units when it is necessary to reconnoiter multiple routes
simultaneously. The reconnaissance unit leader can employ UAS to support an area or zone reconnaissance
mission. Upon contact, UAS provide early warning for the element and then maintain contact until the
element conducts a reconnaissance handover from the UAS to another element.

Security Operations
4-63. In security operations, UAS complement reconnaissance units by assisting in identification of enemy
reconnaissance and main body elements and by providing early warning forward of reconnaissance units.
Besides acquiring enemy forces, UAS can play a critical role in providing security through the depth of the
screen by observing dead space between ground observation posts. They can support reconnaissance units
during area security missions by screening or conducting reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance/Target Handover
4-64. When a UAS makes contact, particularly during reconnaissance operations, the operator hands over
the UAS contact to ground or attack reconnaissance units as quickly as possible. Rapid handover allows the
UAS to avoid enemy air defense weapons and helps maintain the tempo of the operation. During the
handover, the UAS assists in providing direction to the ground or attack reconnaissance unit charged with
establishing contact with or engaging the enemy. It maintains contact with the enemy until the units are in
position and have established sensor or visual contact.
4-65. The first action in the handover process is a report (such as, spot report or situation report) from the
UAS operator to the ground or attack reconnaissance unit. Next, the UAS reconnoiters the area for secure
positions for the unit (such as hide, overwatch, observation posts or battle positions) and likely mounted
and dismounted routes into the area. The ground or attack reconnaissance unit moves to initial hide
positions along the route selected by the leader based on UAS-collected information. The ground or attack
reconnaissance unit then moves to establish sensor or visual contact with the enemy. Once this contact is

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established, the ground or attack reconnaissance unit sends a report to the UAS operator. When the UAS
operator confirms that the ground or attack unit can observe enemy elements and has a clear picture of the
situation, handover is complete. The UAS then can be dedicated to another mission or, in the case of target
handover to attack reconnaissance units, may be used for battle damage assessments and reattack if necessary.

SECTION IV – EXECUTION
4-66. The initial airborne assault emphasizes the coordinated action of small units to seize initial battalion
objectives before the surprise advantage has worn off. As assault objectives are seized, the airborne force
directs its efforts toward consolidating the airhead.

CONDUCT OF THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT

4-67. Tactical surprise and detailed planning should enable units to seize their assault objectives and to
establish the airhead before the enemy has time to react in force. Missions of units change when necessary
by the enemy defense of initial objectives. The enemy can be expected to launch quick uncoordinated
attacks along major avenues of approach using local forces. The degree of coordination and strength of
these attacks increase progressively, therefore, the airborne force must develop correspondingly greater
strength in its defensive positions. Preparing early defense against armored attack is a major consideration.
4-68. Units assigned to perform reconnaissance and security missions should be cross loaded in the load
plan so that during the airborne assault, they are to be some of the first elements on the ground to move and
establish roadblocks, locate enemy forces; disrupt enemy communication facilities; and provide the
commander with early warning, security, and information. Since ground reconnaissance by unit
commanders is seldom possible before the airborne operation, it must begin immediately after units hit the
ground, and assemble. The information flow must be continuous. Information requirements do not vary
from those employed by other ground units. However, the unit’s method of arrival in the area of operations
makes immediate and thorough reconnaissance and transmission of information to higher headquarters
necessary.
4-69. If the initial objectives are heavily defended, the bulk of the force is assigned the task of seizing these
objectives. When initial objectives are lightly defended, the bulk of the force can be employed in clearing
assigned areas and preparing defensive positions in depth. Extensive patrolling is initiated early between
adjacent defensive positions within the airhead line, and between the airhead and the limits of the security
area. Army aircraft are well-suited for support of this patrolling effort. Contact with friendly guerrilla
forces, long-range surveillance teams and special operations forces in the area is established as soon as
possible.
4-70. Brief personnel on unit plans, adjacent and higher units’ plans, and alternate plans. This helps units
or personnel landing in unplanned areas to direct their efforts to accomplishing the mission. Misdelivered
units or personnel establish contact with their respective headquarters as soon as practical.
4-71. Sufficient communication personnel and equipment must be moved into the airhead in advance of the
command post they are to serve to ensure the timely installation of vital communication. (Refer to FM 6-02
for more information.) As soon as communication and the tactical situation permit, commanders regain
centralized mission command. Therefore, immediate establishment of the following is necessary for
effective mission command:
z Command and fire control channels within the airborne forces.
z Communication with supporting air and naval forces.
z Communication with airlift forces concerned with buildup, air supply, and air evacuation.
z Communication with bases in friendly territory.
z Communication between widely separated airborne or ground forces, such as linkup forces, with
a common or coordinated mission.
4-72. The commander influences the action by—
z Shifting or allocating fire support means.
z Moving forces.

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z Modifying missions.
z Changing objectives and boundaries.
z Employing reserves.
z Moving to a place from which he can best exercise personal influence, especially during the
initial assault.
4-73. When initial objectives have been secured, subordinate units seize additional objectives that facilitate
the establishment of a coordinated IBCT defense or the conduct of future operations. Defensive positions
are organized, communications are supplemented, and reserves are reconstituted. These and other measures
are taken to prepare the force to repel enemy counterattacks, to minimize the effects of attack by chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear means, or to resume the offensive.
4-74. Reserves prepare and occupy blocking positions, pending commitment. Typical missions for reserves
committed during the initial assault include taking over the missions of misdelivered units, dealing with
unexpected opposition in seizing assault objectives, and securing the initial airhead.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIRHEAD

4-75. After the airborne forces make the initial assault landings and accomplish the initial ground missions,
commanders must organize the airhead line. Considerations include:
z Size. The airhead line extends far enough beyond the landing area to ensure uninterrupted
landings of personnel, equipment, and supplies. It secures the requisite terrain features and
maneuver space for such future offensive or defensive tasks as called for in the mission.
z Occupation and organization. Units occupy and organize the airhead line to the extent demanded
by the situation. Commanders adjust the disposition of units and installations to fit the terrain
and the situation. Units take reconnaissance and security measures; this usually includes the
reinforcement of the security area. The degree to which the airhead line is actually occupied and
organized for defense is largely determined by the mission, enemy capabilities, and the
defensive characteristics of the terrain.
z Buildup. This proceeds concurrently with seizing and organizing the airhead line and, if
required, repairing or constructing an airfield to receive follow-on airland echelons. As more
combat personnel arrive and commanders organize them by unit, positions are reinforced on and
within the airhead line, reserves are constituted, and preparations are made for such offensive
tasks as the mission requires.

BUILDUP OF COMBAT POWER

4-76. The buildup of combat power is the introduction of the follow-on echelon into the airhead. This
increase of friendly combat power yields a corresponding ability to conduct a defense of the airhead and to
conduct a short-term sustainment of those forces. The intent of the buildup is to provide a secure operating
and logistic base for forces working to move the airhead away from the original point of attack. Usually,
this distance is equal to the enemy’s direct fire capability to harass and destroy incoming aircraft or landing
craft (5 to 10 kilometers).
4-77. Composing the follow-on echelon depends on METT-TC. All though not inclusive, it can consist of
Armored, Stryker, Infantry, field artillery, air defense artillery, and combat engineers as well as other
significant supporting elements (military information support operations, civil affairs, military police, and
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) and sustainment assets.
4-78. The time involved in the defense varies. It depends on the mission assigned, the composition and size
of the force, the enemy reaction, and the type of operation contemplated. A well-prepared defense in short-
duration missions in isolated objective areas may not be required. Security can be accomplished by
completely or almost completely destroying or dispersing the enemy forces in the immediate objective area
during the assault; then, airlifting the striking force before the execution of a coordinated enemy
counterattack.
4-79. Defense of an airhead. The airborne force usually defends an airhead by securing key terrain within
the airhead and dominating likely avenues of approach. Units deny the enemy the areas between the

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occupied positions with a combination of patrols, fires, and natural and man-made obstacles. Units
aggressively reconnoiter between positions within the airhead and forward of the airhead line in the
security. They increase emphasis on reconnaissance forward of the airhead line during limited visibility.
The airhead configuration allows the commander to shift forces, reserves, and supporting fires quickly to
reinforce other areas of the airhead. Regardless of the form of defense chosen, the force prepares positions
in depth within its capabilities.
4-80. Defense during withdrawal. Should withdrawal from the initial positions be required, the final area to
which the airborne force withdraws must contain adequate space for maneuver, for protecting critical
installations, and for planned air landing or air evacuation operations.
4-81. Defense against armor. During the initial phases of an airborne operation, one of the main defenses
against enemy armor is air support. Aircraft attack enemy armor targets as they appear, as far as possible
from the objective area, and continue to attack and observe them as long as they threaten the airborne force.
Strong points defending the airhead use existing obstacles such as ditches, thick foliage, and structures,
plus reinforcing obstacles such as mine fields, tank traps, demolitions, and man-made obstacles. Units
emplace AT weapons in depth along avenues of approach favorable for armor. They cover all dangerous
avenues of approach with planned fires. Javelins, AT-4s and light anti-armor weapons of the rifle
companies, the tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided weapons of the battalion weapons company,
and the antitank weapons of division and corps aviation units give the airborne force a substantial amount
of antitank firepower. Some of the antitank weapons, organic to battalions that are in holding areas not
under armored attack, can be moved to reinforce threatened areas.
4-82. Defense against airborne assault: All personnel must recognize that the enemy can conduct airborne
assault operations and must defend against these attacks. Helicopters afford the enemy one of its best
means of rapidly moving significant operating forces to the airhead area.
4-83. Friendly forces must counterattack an enemy airhead immediately with available forces and fires to
disrupt the enemy’s plan and force build up, and continue until the enemy airborne assault has been
neutralized.
4-84. Defense against guerrilla action and infiltration: The defense must include plans for countering
enemy guerrilla attacks or infiltrated forces attacking the airhead area. The basic defense against these
attacks is an extensive patrol and warning system, an all-round defense, and designated reserve units ready
to move quickly to destroy the enemy force. Units must be especially alert during limited visibility to
prevent the enemy from infiltrating. If the enemy can build up forces in the airhead interior, it can influence
operations. Units must locate and destroy the enemy that has infiltrated the airhead.

SECTION V – FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS

4-85. An airborne assault is as rapid in its execution as it is time-consuming in its preparation.
Commanders must develop contingency plans for possible follow-on operations. These plans should be
modified based on the most current intelligence. Advanced planning can allow more rapid decisionmaking
and timely commitment of forces.
4-86. The employment of ABNAF on the ground is similar to that of other Infantry ground forces. The
entire range of these operations include movement to contact, attack, area defense, or retrograde.
Additional operations may include raids, linkup, relief in place, passage of lines, withdrawal (either
overland or by air), exfiltration, and noncombatant evacuation. (Refer to FM 3-21.20, FM 3-21.10, and FM
3-21.8 for more information.)

SECTION VI – SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

4-87. Airborne forces can deploy from a continental United States base directly to the objective area. A
more common method would be for the airborne unit to first deploy to a remote marshalling base or to an
intermediate staging base (ISB) before establishing a lodgment in the area of operation. In certain
circumstances, the objective can be beyond the range of aircraft operating from a remote marshalling base

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or ISB in friendly territory. Therefore, a forward operating base in hostile territory can be seized to
facilitate or project further operations.

REMOTE MARSHALLING
4-88. The remote marshalling base is a secure base to which the entire airborne force (to include organic
and attached support elements) deploys and continues mission planning. (See figure 4-4.)

Figure 4-4. Base options

z Location. The remote marshalling base is within the geographical area encompassed by the
command authority of the theater or joint task force commander. This ensures that the
sustainment elements providing support to the airborne unit are operating within their normal
area. It prevents or lessens out-of-area support requirements for sustainment elements. The
remote marshalling base should be in an area similar in terrain and climate to the objective area.
Time spent at the remote marshalling base lets the unit begin acclimatization.
z Planning and coordination. The remote marshalling base provides a secure location for the unit
to conduct detailed planning and coordination with the controlling headquarters staff.
z Preparation. In the remote marshalling base, the commander conducts rehearsals, refines and
modifies plans, determines priority intelligence requirements, and coordinates with the proper
intelligence source to receive that information.
z Additions to the unit. In the remote marshalling base, individual specialists who augment the
force are integrated into the unit if they have not already joined. Specially trained supporting
units (such as aviation and communication elements) join the force at the remote marshalling
base.
z Functions of a remote marshalling base. The remote marshalling base must provide—
„ Access to the controlling headquarters staff.
„ Physical security of billeting, planning, maintenance, and communication areas.

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„ Mess, billeting, latrine, and shower facilities for the force and its supporting elements.
„ Access to a C-17 or C-130 capable airfield, possibly with all-weather operations.
„ Access to secure communication and processed intelligence.
„ Access to rehearsal areas where sites can be built and live-fire rehearsals can be conducted.
„ Access to the unit locations of major supporting elements such as naval landing craft or
Army aviation units.
„ An external security force and an active counterintelligence agency.
„ Vehicle transport for personnel lift, equipment transfer, and administrative use.
„ Access to maintenance support facilities.
„ Army Health System support facilities to augment the airborne medical personnel.
„ Covered areas for packing parachutes and rigging airdrop loads.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

4-89. When the assaulting force must move a considerable distance from its sustaining base, the
commander should consider establishing one or more intermediate staging bases. Before establishing an
intermediate staging base, the commander must weigh the benefits of establishing the base against the cost
in terms of combat power or effort diverted from the support mission to secure the intermediate staging
base, and the potential of increased vulnerability to enemy air and missile attack.
4-90. Forward operating bases extend and maintain the operational reach by providing secure locations
from which to conduct and sustain operations. They not only enable extending operations in time and
space; they contribute to the overall endurance of the force. Forward operating bases allow forward
deployed forces to reduce operational risk, maintain momentum, and avoid culmination. Generally, they are
located adjacent to a distribution hub. This facilitates movement into and out of the operational area while
providing a secure location through which to distribute personnel, equipment, and supplies.

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Landing Plan
The landing plan supports the ground tactical plan. It provides a sequence for the
arrival of forces into the area of operation, ensuring that all forces arrive at
designated locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan. The
commander finalizes the landing plan after completing the ground tactical plan. The
landing plan phases forces into the objective area at the correct time and place to
execute the ground tactical plan. Executing the landing plan is vital to the swift
massing of combat power, protecting the force, and subsequent mission accomplishment.

SECTION I – DELIVERY CONSIDERATIONS

5-1. The landing plan is the ABNAFC’s plan that links the air movement plan to the ground tactical plan.
It is published at ABN IBCT level and below. Before the ABNAFC can prepare an overall landing plan, he
must know where his subordinate commanders intend to land their assault forces. The landing plan is
generated up the chain of command as a collaborative effort.

ORGANIZATION
5-2. Airborne forces organize landing plans to maintain tactical integrity. Battalions or battalion task
forces normally land intact on a single drop zone. Two or more battalions land successively on the same
drop zone or each can land on a separate drop zone within a general ABN IBCT area of operation. The
ABN IBCT lands in mutually supporting drop zones.
5-3. The ABNAF sends as many assault force personnel and equipment as possible into the area in
airborne assault serials. The ABNAFC must consider the mobility of equipment after the landing. For
example, the carriers or prime movers that are deliverable by parachute, but difficult to manhandle on the
ground, can accompany the weapons in the assault force. Assault forces accompany their units’ principal
items of equipment.

REQUIREMENTS
5-4. To develop the landing plan, commanders at each level need to know their commander’s priorities,
the airlift plan, the landing area study, the parent and subordinate unit task organization and ground tactical
plans, and subordinate unit landing plans. During the backbrief of the ground tactical plan, the commander
establishes airlift and delivery priorities and airlift plan. He provides as much of this information as
possible to subordinate units at the end of the ground tactical plan backbrief.
5-5. As with the ground tactical plan, each echelon (fire team through brigade) must conduct confirmation
briefs and backbriefs to their landing plans. The landing plan remains tentative until leaders complete
backbriefs and coordinate changes. The leaders take the following actions:
z Landing plan. In the case of the landing plan, backbriefs ensure coordination of who is using
what drop zone, and or landing zone and when, the preferred orientation of drop zones, and who
is landing in which areas and when. The landing plans follow the commander’s priorities, the
airlift plan, and ground tactical plan.
z Assembly plan. One of the most critical parts of the landing plan is the assembly plan. Each
leader must brief his Soldiers, require a backbrief, rebrief his Soldiers, and require another
backbrief. Each Soldier should know exactly what to do, how to do it, and when to do it to
assemble quickly. Assembly plans of one unit do not interfere with the assembly plans of other units.

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z Aircraft requirements. The backbrief of the landing plan identifies aircraft requirements for each
subordinate unit. If there are not enough aircraft available to lift the entire assault force at one
time, commanders must decide the units that should be lifted first, and then allocate aircraft
accordingly. In making this decision, he analyzes the priorities dictated by the mission and the
higher commander.

PRIORITIES
5-6. Commander must set the priorities for each assault objective to determine the delivery sequence for
units that are to secure these objectives. This does not necessarily match the sequence in which the units
secure objectives. The commander must know—
z Priorities for deliveries on each drop zone (personnel drop, container delivery system, and
heavy drops).
z The drop zone sequence.
z Priorities for delivering the remainder of the forces.
z Method of delivery for each unit and its equipment.
z The location of the heavy equipment point of impact, and the personnel point of impact.
z Abort criteria (Go/No-Go) and bump plan.

5-7. Airlift plan. The USAF airlift planners responsible for the airlift plan develops the plan, in
coordination with ABNTF planners, to best support the ground tactical plan. This plan includes aircraft
formations and the sequence of personnel drops, and heavy drops. ABNTF planners choose the sequence
and the time intervals between serials, which are groups of like aircraft (C-130s, C-17s) with the same
delivery method (personnel drops, heavy drops,) going to the same drop zone.
5-8. Landing area study. Division or corps staff, working with U.S. Army topographic engineers and the
USAF, develops the landing area study and provides it to subordinate units. This study enables subordinate
units to select the location, size, and orientation of drop zones to best support their scheme of maneuver.
5-9. Subordinate unit landing plans. Subordinate commanders should develop landing plans to support
their own respective schemes of maneuver. Subordinate units then backbrief their landing plans so that
higher headquarters can finalize their plans. Units must know the initial locations of sustainment assets.
This information should become available as subordinate units backbrief their ground tactical plan.

SECTION II – DELIVERY ELEMENTS

5-10. A designated lodgment area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory, when seized and held, makes
the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for the transition to
follow-on operations. The five elements of the landing plan include: sequence of delivery, method of
delivery, place of delivery, time of delivery, and assembly plan. Assembly and reorganization are discussed
in Section IV of this chapter.

SEQUENCE OF DELIVERY
5-11. The ABNAFC’s priorities within the ground tactical plan determine the sequence of delivery, with
the initial assault designed to surprise and concentrate overwhelming combat power against the enemy and
to protect the assault force. Neither aircraft allocations nor the availability of aircraft should influence
these decisions. He determines final aircraft allocations after the landing plan confirmation brief.
5-12. Advance serials may precede the main airlift column to drop USAF combat control teams and Army
long-range surveillance teams. The combat control team places and operates navigation aids on the drop
zones and landing zones; the long-range surveillance teams provide surveillance on named areas of interest
and reports to the ground force commander. Insertion location of advance serials whether within the
objective area or some distance away from the objective area are always METT-TC dependent, as the
commander strives to achieve surprise regarding exact objectives within the airborne operations.

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METHOD OF DELIVERY
5-13. This part of the landing plan addresses how the force with its needed supplies and equipment arrives
in the objective area. The assault echelon comes in by parachute. The ABNAFC can use a number of other
means to introduce additional personnel, equipment, and supplies into the objective area.

PERSONNEL AIRDROP
5-14. The airborne force delivers assault personnel by parachute drop. This method allows quick, nearly
simultaneous delivery of the force. Planners choose terrain with minimal obstacles that allows the assault
force to land on or close to objectives. In some cases and with special equipment, it can deliver personnel
into rough terrain. Special teams can use high-altitude high-opening (HAHO) or high-altitude low-opening
(HALO) parachute techniques. These methods allow for early delivery without compromising the
objective’s location.

EQUIPMENT/SUPPLY AIRDROP
5-15. Airborne forces can airdrop supplies and equipment directly to ground forces behind enemy lines or
in other unreachable areas. However, there are advantages and disadvantages.
z Advantages are as follows:
„ Prerigging and storing emergency items for contingencies considerably reduces shipping
and handling time and increases responsiveness.
„ Since the delivery aircraft does not land, there is no need for forward airfields, landing
zones or material handling equipment for offloading.
„ This reduces flight time and exposure to hostile fire and increases aircraft survivability and
availability.
„ Ground forces can disperse more since they are not tied to an airfield or strip.
z Disadvantages are as follows:
„ Airdrops require specially trained rigger personnel and appropriate aircraft.
„ Bad weather or high winds can delay the airdrop or scatter the dropped cargo.
„ Ground fire threatens vulnerable aircraft making their final approach, especially if
mountains or high hills canalize the aircraft.
„ Since the aircraft do not land, no opportunity for ground refueling exists. Planned aerial
refueling can extend aircraft range and should be considered on long flight legs to increase
objective area loiter time and mission flexibility.
„ Bulky airdrop rigs for equipment prevent the aircraft from carrying as much cargo as when
configured for airland.
„ The possibility of loss or damage to equipment during the airdrop always exists.
„ Ground forces must secure the drop zone to prevent items from falling into enemy hands.
„ Recovery of airdropped equipment is slow and manpower intensive.

Types of Delivery
5-16. All means of delivery are exploited to maximize combat power in the lodgment. Free drop, high-
velocity airdrop, low-velocity airdrop, and joint precision airdrop, are different types of airdrop delivery.

Free Drop
5-17. Less than 600 feet above ground level (AGL), free drop requires no parachute or retarding device.
The airdrop crew can use energy-dissipating materiel around the load to lessen the shock when it hits the
ground at a rate of 130 to 150 feet a second. Fortification or barrier material, clothing in bales, and other
such items can be free dropped.

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High-Velocity Airdrop
5-18. Parachutes, which have enough drag to hold the load upright during the descent at 70 to 90 feet a
second, stabilize loads for high-velocity airdrops. Army parachute riggers place airdrop cargo on energy-
dissipating material and rig it in an airdrop container. This method works well for subsistence, packaged
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products, ammunition, and other such items. The ground commander
may use the standard high-velocity delivery system, which is the container delivery system, to deliver
accompanying and follow-on supplies; they can be delivered within an area 400 by 100 meters. A container
delivery system is the most favored means of resupply; it is the most accurate of all airdrop methods. Each
pallet holds up to 2200 pounds. A C-130J holds up to 16 of these containers, and a C-17 holds up to 40 of
these containers. Planners should calculate the computed air release point (CARP) near assembly areas or
resupply points. The air liaison officer or Army drop zone support team controls receipt of container
delivery systems.
Low-Velocity Airdrop
5-19. 700 ft AGL to 1300 ft AGL. Low-velocity airdrop requires cargo parachutes. Crews rig items on an
airdrop platform or in an airdrop container. They put energy-dissipating material beneath the load to lessen
the shock when it hits the ground. Cargo parachutes attached to the load reduce the rate of descent to no
more than 28 feet a second. Fragile materiel, vehicles, and artillery can be low-velocity airdropped.
z Heavy drop. Airborne forces use this method most often to deliver vehicles, bulk cargo, and
equipment. Airdrop aircraft deliver heavy-drop equipment just ahead of the main body or, if
following personnel drops, at least 30 minutes after the last paratrooper exits. For night drops,
the heavy-drop precedes personnel drops.
z Door bundles. Requires the use of either the A7A cargo sling or the A21 cargo bag. With these,
aircraft personnel can drop unit loads of up to 500 pounds just before the first Soldier’s exit.
Airdrop standard operating procedures dictate the number and type of door bundles that specific
aircraft can drop.

Joint Precision Airdrop

5-20. The Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS) is a high altitude-capable guided precision airdrop
system that provides increased control release from the aircraft, and reduces on-ground load dispersion with
GPS-supported accuracy. Two current increments of JPADS support precision delivery of cargo pallets up
to 2200 pounds and up to 10,000 pounds.

Airland
5-21. Airborne forces can accomplish certain phases of airborne operations, or even the entire operation,
by using airland to deliver personnel and equipment to the objective area. The advantages and
disadvantages are as follows:
z Advantages. In some cases, air landing rather than air-dropping personnel and equipment may be
advantageous because air landing—
„ Provides the most economical means of airlift.
„ Delivers Army aviation elements, engineering equipment, artillery pieces, and other
mission-essential items in one operation.
„ Provides a readily available means of casualty evacuation.
„ Allows forces to more easily maintain tactical integrity and to deploy rapidly after landing.
„ Allows the use of forces with little special training and equipment.
„ Does not require extensive preparation and rigging of equipment.
„ Offers a relatively reliable means of personnel and equipment delivery regardless of
weather.
„ Precludes equipment damage and personnel injuries forces may experience in parachute
operations.
z Disadvantages. In other cases, air landing is not advantageous because it—
„ Cannot be used for forced entry.

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„ Requires moderately level, unobstructed landing zones with adequate soil trafficability.
„ Requires more time for delivery of a given size force than airdrop, especially for small,
restricted landing zones.
„ Generally requires improvement or new construction of airland facilities, which adds to the
engineer workload.
„ Requires some form of airlift control element support at offloading airfields. Mission
intervals depend on airlift control element size, offloaded equipment availability, and
airfield support capability.

Airland Organization for Movement

5-22. The tactical integrity of participating forces is a major consideration in an airland operation. Small
forces that are expected to engage in combat on landing, airland organizationally intact with weapons,
ammunition, and personnel in the same aircraft. Airland planning stresses placing forces as close as
possible to objectives, consistent with the availability of landing zones and the operational capability of the
aircraft employed. Because of aircraft vulnerability on the ground, forces unload as quickly as possible.
5-23. The airborne commander determines the composition of each aircraft load and the sequence of
delivery. The mission, the tactical situation, and the assault force’s task organization influence this
decision.
5-24. Forces should use facilities, such as roads and open areas, to reduce the time and effort required for
new construction. They should consider layouts that facilitate future expansion and provide maximum
deployment and flexibility. As the size and efficiency of an air facility improve, its value to the enemy as a
target increases. To reduce this vulnerability, the facilities should be dispersed and simple.

PLACE OF DELIVERY
5-25. Selecting drop zones and landing zones is a joint responsibility. The airlift commander is responsible
for the precise delivery of personnel and cargo to the drop zone or landing zone and selecting approaches to
the drop zone. Both joint and component commanders must base their decisions on knowledge of their
respective problems and on the needs of the overall operation. The nature and location of landing areas are
important considerations when preparing the scheme of maneuver. The general area in which they are to be
established is governed by the mission. At higher echelons, commanders can assign landing areas in broad
general terms. In subordinate units, leaders must describe their locations more specifically. Drop zones are
selected after a detailed analysis. If the enemy situation permits, the commander should choose a drop zone
directly on top of assault objectives. Commanders should consider the following factors when making their
selections:
z Ease of identification. The drop zone should be easy to spot from the air. Airlift pilots and
navigators prefer to rely on visual recognition of terrain features to deliver personnel and
equipment in an accurate manner.
z Straight-line approach. To ensure an accurate airdrop, the aircraft makes a straight-line approach
to each drop zone for at least 10 miles, or about four minutes at drop airspeed, before the start of
the drop.
z Out of range. The commander should choose a drop zone that allows the forces to avoid enemy
air defenses and strong ground defenses and puts them outside the range of enemy suppressive
fires. To get to the drop zone, aircraft should not have to fly over or near enemy antiaircraft
installations, which can detect aircraft at drop altitudes. They should fly over hostile territory or
positions for the least possible time.
5-26. Suitable weather and terrain. The commander must consider the weather and terrain due to
conditions that may affect the usability of a drop zone.
z Weather. Commanders should consider seasonal weather conditions when selecting drop zones.
Adverse weather effects can be devastating. Ground fog, mist, haze, smoke, and low-hanging
cloud conditions can interfere with the aircrew’s observation of drop zone visual signals and
markings. However, they do offer excellent cover for blind or area drop zones. Excessive winds
hamper operations.

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z Terrain. Flat or rolling terrain is desirable; it should be relatively free, but not necessarily clear,
of obstacles. Obstacles on a drop zone do not prevent paratroopers from landing but increase
jump casualties. Sites in mountainous or hilly country with large valleys or level plateaus can be
used for security reasons. Small valleys or pockets completely surrounded by hills are difficult to
locate and should be used only in rare cases. Commanders must avoid man-made obstacles more
than 150 feet (46 meters) above the level of the drop zone within a radius of three nautical miles.
High ground or hills need not be considered a hazard unless the hills pose an escape problem
that is beyond the aircraft’s capability. High ground or hills more than 1000 feet (305 meters)
above the surface of the site should not be closer than three nautical miles to the drop zone for
night operations. The perimeter of the drop zone should have one or more open approach areas
free of obstacles that would prevent the aircrew’s sighting of the drop zone markings.
„ Cover and concealment. Cover and concealment near the drop zones or landing zones are a
distinct advantage when the airborne forces assemble and when airland forces land.
„ Road network. Having a drop zone near a good road network expedites moving personnel,
supplies, and equipment from that zone. If the landing area contains terrain that is to be
developed into an air landing facility, a road network is of particular value not only for
moving items from the facility but also for evacuating personnel and equipment as well.
However, a road network offers the enemy a high-speed avenue of approach and must be
defended.
„ Key terrain. The drop zone site selected should aid in the success of the mission by taking
advantage of dominating terrain, covered routes of approach to the objective, and terrain
favorable for defense against armored attack.
5-27. Minimum construction for drop zones or landing zones. Because of limited engineer support in the
airborne force, selected landing zones should have a minimum requirement for construction and
maintenance. Unless more engineer support is requested and received, construction and maintenance
restraints can limit the number of areas that can be used or developed.
5-28. Mutual support. Commanders should select mutually supporting drop zones or landing zones that
provide initial positions favorable to the attack.
5-29. Configuration. The division or brigade commander gives guidance on drop size in operations plans
or operations orders. Then each unit commander determines the exact shape, size, and capacity required.
z Shape. The most desirable shapes for drop zones are rectangles or circles; these permit a wider
choice of aircraft approach directions. However, they require precise navigation and timing to
avoid collisions or drop interference.
z Size. The drop zone should be large enough to accommodate the airborne force employed; one
drop zone that allows the aircraft to drop its entire load in one pass is desirable. Repeated passes
are dangerous because the initial pass can alert enemy antiaircraft and other emplacements,
waiting for subsequent drops.
„ There are certain situations, however, when multiple passes are used. This occurs mainly
when there is no significant air defense threat and orbits are made over areas where enemy
antiaircraft systems are not positioned. This applies especially to the seizure of islands
where small drop zones are the rule. If there are enough aircraft available to deliver the
force with fewer personnel on each aircraft, there is no real problem. However, if there are
only enough aircraft to deliver the assault echelon in one lift with each aircraft carrying the
maximum number of personnel, then the aircraft has to make multiple passes over the
drop zone.
„ A large drop zone can permit several points of impact to be designated and used. It is
desirable to saturate the objective area in the shortest possible time but there is a reasonable
limit to the amount of personnel and heavy equipment drop that can be stacked on a single
drop zone. Therefore, it can be desirable to use multiple points of impact on a single drop
zone provided the drop zone is large enough to permit this.
z Capacity. The drop zone capacity is based on the expected number of forces to be dropped and
their dispersion pattern.

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5-30. Orientation. Thoughtful orientation allows the quickest possible delivery of the airborne force into
the objective area.
z Ideal drop zones offset and parallel each serial. (See figure 5-1.) This allows aircraft to share a
flight route until they approach the objective area; then they can split at an initial point or release
point for simultaneous delivery on several drop zones.
z Another method is parallel on-line. (See figure 5-2, page 5-8.) This employs making two drops
on two drop zones in line , which eliminates a change of flight direction between the two drops.
The drop zones must be far enough apart to permit the navigators to compute the location of the
second release point.
z Paratroopers are more likely to overshoot the drop zone than to undershoot it. The primary
objective for selecting the trailing edge drop zone for the primary assault is for personnel in the
front of the aircraft to exit last.
z If a fighter aircraft escort or rendezvous is required for the drop, they must remain advised of the
drop pattern, the direction of all turns to be flown around the drop zone, and the areas to look for
possible enemy activity. Drop zones that require intersecting air traffic patterns should be
avoided, whenever possible. They delay simultaneous delivery of the force because of the safety
requirements to stagger delivery times and clear the air by at least a 5- or 10-minute formation
separation time. They require that joint suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is
accomplished for multiple routes instead of one. This may result in piecemeal delivery and an
unnecessarily complicated plan, violating the principles of mass and simplicity.

Figure 5-1. Offset and parallel drop zones

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Chapter 5

Figure 5-2. Parallel on-line drop zones

5-31. Alternate drop zones or landing zones. Commanders must select alternate drop zones or landing
zones to compensate for changes that may occur.
5-32. Number of drop zones or landing zones. The number of drop zones to be used by the assault
parachute echelon of an ABN IBCT depends on the number, size, and relative position of suitable sites; the
ABN IBCT plan of maneuver; and the expected enemy situation. The maneuver battalions of an ABN
IBCT can land successively on the same drop zone, on separate battalion drop zones, or on adjacent areas
within a single large ABN IBCT drop zone. Advantages and disadvantages of each drop zone is address
below:
z Single BCT drop zone. The use of a single ABN IBCT drop zone on which battalions land
successively has the following advantages:
„ It permits greater flexibility in the plan of maneuver and the plan of supporting fires.
„ It facilitates coordinating and controlling assault battalions.
„ It applies the principle of mass.
„ It makes logistical support easier.
„ It decreases the area of vulnerability.
z The use of a single drop zone has the following disadvantages:
„ It slows the buildup of combat power.
„ It causes later airlift sorties to be vulnerable to enemy air because of the loss of surprise.
„ It allows the enemy to emphasize his efforts.
z Separate battalion drop zones. The use of separate battalion drop zones has the following
advantages:
„ It increases readiness for action by deploying the ABN IBCT as it lands.
„ It reduces confusion on the drop zones during the landing and reorganizing.
„ It tends to deceive the enemy as to the intention and strength of the landing force.
„ It makes capture of the ABN IBCT objective easier when there is strong opposition on one
drop zone.
„ It increases the freedom of maneuver of the assault battalions.
z The use of separate battalion drop zones has the following disadvantages:
„ It makes mission command more difficult.

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„ It reduces flexibility because forces are dispersed.

z Adjacent drop areas. Landing battalions on adjacent areas within a single large ABN IBCT drop
zone has, although to a lesser degree, the same advantages and disadvantages of dropping on
separate drop zones.

TIME OF DELIVERY
5-33. No set rule can be prescribed for the timing of an airborne operation. It varies with each situation;
however, the airborne force tries to conduct airborne assaults during limited visibility to protect the force
and to surprise the enemy. The commander sets the specific time of delivery. However, for the landing
plan, times are stated in terms of P-hour. P-hour is the specific hour on D-day at which a parachute assault
commences with the exit of the first Soldier from an aircraft over a designated drop zone. P-hour may or
may not coincide with H-hour (FM 6-0). The following considerations affect the timing of the operation.

SUPPORT OF THE DECISIVE OPERATION

5-34. The airborne assault can be a shaping operation. If so, the time of commitment of the airborne forces
in relation to the decisive operation is directed by orders from higher headquarters. It is determined in
advance according to the mission, the situation, and the terrain. For example, the airborne force can be
committed in advance of the decisive operation to give the airborne assault an increased element of
surprise. It can be committed during the decisive operation to neutralize specific areas or to block the
movement of enemy reserves. It can be committed after the decisive operation to assist a breakthrough or to
block an enemy withdrawal.

VISIBILITY
5-35. The decision as to whether the airborne force is committed by night or day depends on the estimated
degree of air superiority, the need for security from enemy ground observation, the relative advantage to be
gained by surprise, and the experience of both airlift and airborne personnel.
5-36. As an advantage, night airborne operations greatly increase the chance of surprise and survivability,
and reduce the chance of attack by enemy aircraft during the air movement. They reduce vulnerability to
antiaircraft fire, conceal preparations for takeoff from the enemy, and reduce the effectiveness of the
defender’s fires. Daylight operations provide better visibility from the air and ground, more accurate
delivery, quicker assembly, and more effective friendly fires than night operations.
5-37. As a disadvantage, night airborne operations in zero visibility require well-trained Soldiers and
aircrews to locate the drop zone and assemble rapidly. They provide more air and land navigation problems
and offer slower rates of assembly than day operations. Night operations reduce the effectiveness of close
air support. Day operations increase vulnerability to enemy air defense, ground fires, and air attack, and
they result in loss of surprise.
INTERVALS
5-38. The time interval between delivery of the assault echelon (P-hour) and the follow-on echelon
depends on the availability of aircraft, the capacity of departure airfields, the number of aircraft sorties that
can be flown on the initial airborne assault, the availability of drop zones or landing zones within the
objective area, and the enemy situation. For example; if there are unlimited aircraft, ample departure
airfields, numerous drop zones or landing zones within the objective area, and little or no enemy air
defense, the commander could deliver the follow-on echelon immediately after the assault echelon. Thus,
the time interval could be so brief that it would be hard to determine which was the last aircraft of the
assault echelon and which was the first aircraft of the follow-on echelon. Regardless of the timing selected,
avoid setting a pattern.

SECTION III – PREPARATION AND SUPPORTING FIRES

5-39. An ABNAF’s organic fire support is typically limited to its mortars when initially conducting the
airborne assault phase of an entry operation. The ABNAFC must plan for the use of fire support external to

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the ABNAF until organic field artillery assets are delivered by heavy-drop or with the airland phase of the
operation. Once paratroopers de-rig and prepare their gun systems from the heavy-drop or airland and place
into action those systems, the ABNAFC then can use their supporting fires. As part of the landing plan and
following the ground tactical plan, the ABNAFC and staff must plan and integrate a fire support plan as
part of the operation.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

5-40. Fire support planning for an airborne operation is initiated on receipt of the mission. Concurrent with
the development of the concept of the operation, the commander plans for fire support so that it is provided
throughout the operation.

PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND EXECUTION

5-41. Fire support teams, elements, and cells advise the commander on fire support capabilities and joint
fire support command and control, effective use of fires assets, and assist in the planning, coordination, and
execution of fires. Fire support planning, coordination, and execution for airborne operations are more
complex than ground operations not involving vertical envelopment due to the following factors.
5-42. The assault elements of the airborne force are quickly placed in direct contact with the enemy deep in
hostile territory. Initial operations are decentralized and communications can be limited or nonexistent.
During the initial airborne assault and periodically thereafter, airspace over the drop zone contains a high
density of airdrop aircraft, which complicates fire support aspects of airspace management.
5-43. Airborne force vulnerability increases during the time between landing and assembly or seizure of
assault objectives. This time varies based on force size and the mission variables of METT-TC. During this
vulnerable period, reliable communications are essential to coordinating and executing fire support
missions.
5-44. Calls for fire are sent under conditions where forces are in critical need of fire support. Units lack
firm knowledge of the situation, especially locating friendly and enemy forces. Calls for fire can come
when reliable ground communications have not been firmly established.
5-45. Initially, artillery support in the airhead is limited. This situation occurs at the same time as the
arrival of the assault echelon or the operation’s opening phase. Consequently, the bulk of fire support must
come from joint fire support assets and organic mortars. Fire support can be provided by the long-range
artillery of advancing friendly forces (if in range), Army long-range rocket or missile fire, and joint
interdiction.

INITIAL AVAILABLE FIRE SUPPORT

5-46. Joint fire support, organic mortars, and limited Army aviation and field artillery are usually the only
fire support available to the airborne force until the lodgment is established. Examples of initial available
fire support missions include:
z Column cover for the assault and follow-up echelons and resupply sorties.
z Suppression of enemy air defenses along the corridor selected for penetration and near the
objective.
z Counterair operations to gain and maintain air superiority along the corridor and in the objective area.
z Pre-assault fires of the airhead and other critical targets and deception.
z Field artillery may conduct counterair missions by striking enemy aircraft bases, helicopter
forward aiming and refuel points, missile storage, and launch sites.
z Air interdiction of the objective area to include armed reconnaissance missions targeted against
enemy forces that react to the airborne assault.
z Air defense of marshalling areas, resupply airfields, and the airhead.
z Close air support.

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FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS

5-47. Fire support assets can perform a variety of missions in support of the airborne assault. The
following are examples of standard missions arranged by type of asset.

Joint Air Support

5-48. Joint air support, preplanned and immediate, provides air interdiction and close air support to an
airborne operation. Types of support include:
z Air interdiction pre-assault fires within the objective area and other critical targets.
z Suppression of enemy air defenses.
z Electronic warfare.
z Close air support to the airborne assault force.

Naval Gun Fire

5-49. Naval gun fire, when available and in range, is a reliable, accurate, high-volume source of fire
support. Naval gun fire provides the following types of support:
z Pre-assault fires of the objective area and other critical targets.
z Suppression of enemy air defenses.
z Direct support and general support of forces in contact.
z Interdiction (land and sea).

Field Artillery
5-50. Artillery of linkup forces within range can provide the following support:
z Interdiction fires.
z Suppression of enemy air defense fires.
z Counterfire.
z Fires to maneuver units.

Army Aviation
5-51. Army aviation can conduct close combat attack when the intermediate staging base or forward
staging base is within range or when a secure airfield permits airland and buildup of Army aviation that is
transported in USAF airlift aircraft. They can support—
z Interdiction of enemy reaction forces, especially mechanized forces with accurate, long-range
antitank fires.
z Seizure of assault objectives with rocket fire and gunfire.
z Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks within and beyond the security area.

FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

5-52. Fire support planning relies on careful, thorough planning based on fire support principles designed
to support maneuver. Fire support considerations include the following.

UNITY OF CONTROL AND CONTINUOUS LIAISON

5-53. Unity of control may be met through the establishment of joint headquarters (such as a joint task
force) to include a joint operations center or other higher headquarters, which is responsible for
coordinating fire support to the maneuver commander. Liaison, especially between Army and USAF units,
is necessary at all echelons down to battalion/squadron level. It must be supported with adequate
communications to facilitate command and to control lateral dissemination of information and
coordination. Joint agreements, memorandums of understanding, standard operating procedures, and signal
operating instructions all facilitate this effort. Example, each assault battalion and ABN IBCT must have
attached tactical air control party (TACP) and naval gun fire line of sight, if naval gun fire is available.

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CENTRALIZED COORDINATION
5-54. Due to the nature of the airhead and the required continuous airflow into the airhead, fire support
assets must be closely controlled to prevent fratricide and waste of assets. During the initial stages of an
airborne operation and before adequate ground communications can be established, coordination and
control of fire support are accomplished from an airborne platform.
5-55. On landing, each battalion/squadron or BCT or regimental headquarters establishes contact with the
airborne platform or joint airborne communications center/command post (JACC/CP) through the TACP.
Fire support, such as close air support, beyond that available from organic or direct support assets would be
requested from the airborne platform. Prioritizing and coordinating requests are accomplished by the
ground force commander’s representative in the airborne platform. His responsibilities include the following:
z Prevent fratricide of ground personnel.
z Ensure that requests do not interfere with incoming serials, other aircraft, or naval operations.
z Determine the fire support means to be employed in coordination with appropriate commander’s
staff members.
z Determine, while coordinating with the command staff, added safety or control measures
required then transmit them to the appropriate ground elements.
5-56. For air missions, the commander’s staff establishes contact with the appropriate flight, provides
essential information, and then hands the flight off to the appropriate TACP or forward air controller for
mission execution. At that point, the mission is conducted the same way as conventional operations. If
naval gun fire or air support is available, it is essential that a naval gunfire liaison officer be present in the
airborne platform to perform a similar function.
5-57. Once adequate facilities have been established in the airhead, fire support coordination
responsibilities are passed from the airborne platform to the ground commander and his staff. (There is no
doctrinal time for this transfer.) In some situations (for example, raids), this cannot occur; however, once an
ABN IBCT main or tactical command post is on the ground transfer takes place in most cases.
COORDINATION MEASURES
5-58. The ABNAFC, assigned an area of operation within the airhead, employs fire support coordination
measures (FSCMs) to facilitate rapid target engagement while simultaneously providing safeguards for
friendly forces. Boundaries are the basic FSCM. The fire support coordinator recommends additional
FSCMs to the commander based on the commander’s guidance, location of friendly forces, scheme of
maneuver, and anticipated enemy actions. FSCMs are either permissive or restrictive.
5-59. The primary purpose of permissive measures is to facilitate the attack of targets. Once they are
established, further coordination is not required to engage targets affected by the measures. Permissive
FSCMs include a coordinated fire line (CFL), a fire support coordination line (FSCL), and a free -fire
area (FFA).
5-60. The primary purpose of restrictive measures is to provide safeguards for friendly forces. A restrictive
FSCM prevents fires into or beyond the control measure without detailed coordination. Restrictive FSCM
include an airspace coordination area, a no-fire area (NFA), a restrictive fire area (RFA), and a restrictive
fire line (RFL). Establishing a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific coordination
before the engagement of those targets affected by the measure. (Refer to FM 3-90-1 for a detailed
discussion of FSCMs.)
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN
5-61. Fire support during movement to the objective area is the responsibility of the airlift commander and
staff. However, the airborne force commander must be closely involved because of the possibility of
downed aircraft or a mission being diverted. Planning considerations includeʊ
z Ensure fire support personnel and equipment is included on load plans and manifests.
z Plan targets on enemy.

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ARTILLERY AND MORTAR EMPLOYMENT

5-62. The initial phase of the airborne operation is decentralized and flexible until the assault objectives are
secured and the airhead is established. During parachute assaults, the organic field artillery battalion of the
ABN IBCT provides field artillery support within the context of assigned tactical missions. Airborne
artillery adheres to tactics and methods applicable to other artillery units. Mortars provide rapid fire support
at the company and battalion level. If the battalion commander chooses to employ his mortars as a split
section, he also must plan how the mortar fire direction center will control fires.

NAVAL GUNFIRE
5-63. When operating on islands or near a coastline, naval gun fire support may be available to the airborne
force. Naval guns can provide high-volume, accurate fires employing a variety of ammunition.

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

5-64. The air-naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) provides ship-to-shore communications and
long-range, fire control teams to adjust fire. In the absence of ANGLICO fire control teams, the fire support
team can call for and adjust fires through the ANGLICO team.

ANGLICO Organization
5-65. Deployed ANGLICO forces comprise a command element, operational element (air/naval gun fire
teams), and support element. Forces are as follows:
z The company is organized into groupings. The headquarters or support section and divisional
air/naval gun fire section give command, control, administration, training, and logistics support
for the company. They provide fire support planning and liaison personnel to the airborne force.
Three ABN IBCT air/naval gun fire platoons provide liaison and control for air and naval gun
fire to the assault companies, battalion, and the ABN IBCT.
z Each ABN IBCT platoon divides into an ABN IBCT team and two supporting arms liaison
teams, which support two forward battalions. Each supporting arms liaison team has two
firepower control teams, which support the forward companies of the battalions.
z The ANGLICO assists the staff in matters concerning air and naval gun fire. It coordinates
requests for air and naval gun fire support from the battalions and squadron of the ABN IBCT
and represents the airborne mission control platform, if required.
z The liaison officer and firepower control teams operate in the ground spot network. They
communicate with the ship by HF radio to request and adjust naval gun fire. The firepower
control team communicates with the liaison officer, using VHF radios. The liaison officer can
communicate with aircraft using UHF radios.

Tactical Missions
5-66. Naval gunfire ships are assigned one of two tactical missions—direct support or general support.
Missions are as follows:
z Direct support. A ship in direct support of a specific unit delivers both planned and on-call fires.
(On-call fires are to the ship what targets of opportunity are to artillery units.) A fire control
party with the supported unit conducts and adjusts on-call fires; they can be adjusted by an naval
gun fire air spotter.
z General support. General support missions are assigned to ships supporting units of ABN IBCT
size or larger. The fires of the general support ship are adjusted by an aerial observer or the
liaison officer assign the fires of the ship to a battalion supporting arms liaison team for fire
missions. Completing the mission, the ship reverts to direct support.

Coordination and Control Measures

5-67. Coordination and control measures that apply to naval gun fire are the same as for field artillery
except for adding the terms fire support area and fire support station. They are as follows:

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z Fire support area. The fire support area is a sea area within which a ship can position or cruise
while firing in support. It is labeled with the letters “FSA” followed by a Roman numeral–for
example, FSA VII.
z Fire support station. The fire support station is a specified position at sea from which a ship must
fire; it is restrictive positioning guidance. It is labeled with the letters “FSS” and followed by a
Roman numeralʊfor example, FSS VII.

AIR OPERATIONS
5-68. Air operations normally are conducted using centralized control and decentralized execution and are
integral to an airborne operation. They are performed concurrently and are mutually supporting and are
planned with ample communications for liaison and control. The following paragraphs discuss counterair
operations, close air support, air interdiction, airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, airlift
missions, specialized tasks, and air operations planning in support of airborne operations.

COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS
5-69. The ultimate objective of counterair operations is to gain and maintain theater air supremacy. This
has two purposes. It prevents enemy forces from effectively interfering with friendly areas and activities,
and it precludes prohibitive interference with offensive air operations in the enemy area. This is
accomplished by destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s air offensive and defensive systems. (Refer to
JP 3-01 for more information.)

Offensive Counterair Operations

5-70. Offensive counterair operations are conducted to seek out and neutralize or destroy enemy air forces
at a chosen time and place. They are essential to gain air supremacy and to provide a favorable situation for
other missions. Typical targets includeʊ
z Enemy aircraft.
z Airfields.
z Tactical missile complexes.
z Command and control facilities.
z Petroleum, oil and lubricants and munitions storage facilities.
z Aircraft support equipment and their control systems.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

5-71. Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is conducted to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily
degrade enemy air defense systems in a specific area by physical attack, electronic warfare, or both.
Airborne electronic warfare assets (See ATP 3-36.) often are used in conjunction with other air operations
or mission and are especially important to SEAD operations throughout the airborne operation. (Refer
to ATP 3-01.4 for more information.)

Defensive Counterair Operations

5-72. Defensive counterair operations contribute to local air control by countering enemy offensive
actions. By countering enemy offensive actions, theater forces can effectively use an in-place and
operational radar warning and control system, consisting of both ground and airborne elements. They
integrate and control the employment of fighters and air defense artillery.
5-73. Counterair tasks that are employed as a part of offensive and defensive counterair operations include
air-to-surface attacks, fighter sweeps, and the protection warfighting function (escort). Field artillery may
conduct counterair missions by striking enemy aircraft bases, helicopter forward arming and refuel points,
and missile storage and launch sites.

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CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

5-74. The objectives of close air support are to support surface operations by attacking hostile targets close
to friendly surface forces. Each air mission requires detailed integration with those forces. (Refer to JP 3-09.3 for
more information.)

AIR INTERDICTION
5-75. The objectives of air interdiction are to delay, disrupt, divert, or destroy an enemy’s military potential
before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly ground forces. These combat operations are
performed far enough away from friendly surface forces so that detailed integration of specific actions with
the maneuver of friendly forces is not possible or required. (Refer to JP 3-03 for more information.)

AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

5-76. Airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions are directed toward satisfying the
requirements of joint force and component commanders engaged in surface and air operations within the
joint operational area. The JFC’s J-2 and J-3 jointly develop an overall collection strategy and posture for
the execution of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. These airborne missions
provide timely information, either visually observed or sensor recorded, from which intelligence is derived
for all forces. Surveillance operations continuously collect information; reconnaissance operations are
directed toward localized or specific targets. (Refer to JP 3-30 for more information.)

AIRLIFT MISSIONS
5-77. The basic mission of airlift is passenger and cargo movement. This includes combat employment and
sustainment, combat airlift missions that rapidly move forces, equipment and supplies from one area to
another in response to changing conditions. Within airborne operations, combat employment missions
allow a commander to insert surface forces directly and quickly into a objective area or airhead and to
sustain combat operations through air landing of follow-on forces and sustainment operations. (Refer to JP
3-17 for more information.)

SPECIALIZED TASKS
5-78. Specialized tasks are those operation conducted in direct or indirect support of primary air and
ground missions. These activities include, but are not limited to electronic combat, combat search and
rescue, and air refueling operations.

AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING

5-79. Planning for air operations begins with understanding the JFC’s and ABNTFC’s mission and intent,
and occurs in a collaborative manner with other components to integrate operations across the joint force.
The joint air operations plan is the JFC’s plan to integrate and coordinate joint air operations and
encompasses air capabilities and forces supported by, and in support of, the airborne operation and other
joint force components in the objective area.

Command and Control of Joint Air Operations

5-80. With the beginning of air operations in the objective area, provision must be made for command and
control air operations with the supported ground effort. A joint operations center, where the supporting air
component and the airborne force is represented, performs the planning, integration, direction, and
supervision of the air effort according to the needs of the airborne force. Command and control
considerations for air operations during airborne operations include:
z Preparation. If an airborne operation includes tactical air elements, the joint force commander
directs part or all of the preliminary air efforts while other preparations for the operation are
completed. Air support before and during the mounting of an airborne operation is a USAF
responsibility . When the airborne force does not include tactical air elements. Therefore,

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requests from the joint airborne force commander involving both reconnaissance and fire
missions are processed through normal joint operations center channels.
z Assault. Requirements during the assault phase are the same for all airborne operations. During
the dropping or air landing and assembly of assault elements, aircraft that are on air alert status
over drop zones or landing zones defend against hostile surface or aerial reaction to the assault.
z Consolidation and exploitation. Air control network facilities in excess of tactical air control
parties and airborne platforms are meager until the air landing of more supplies and
reinforcements during this phase. In an operation, that does not involve an immediate linkup
after seizure of objectives; the air landing of reinforcing or supporting elements provides for the
rapid expansion and improvement of tactical air control networks to meet the needs of
anticipated emergencies.
„ Aircraft providing support subsequent to the assault phase are based within the objective
area, outside the objective area, or both. In view of the logistics demands of aircraft, air
support is based within the objective area only when it cannot be effectively provided from
outside. Limitations in the effective radius of aircraft are the determining factors. An
airstrip or sufficiently adaptable terrain is one of these factors in selecting an objective area.
„ A single commander in the objective area has command over both ground and air elements.
However, an officer charged with broader responsibilities whose headquarters is outside the
objective area can retain such command.

Integration to Support Ground Operations

5-81. Adequate air support of an airborne operation requires some integration of airborne forces and air
activity in support of ground operations.
z The air operations plan is based on the overall USAF mission and the amount of available
strategic, tactical, and airlift effort. The effect of forecasted weather en route and in the proposed
area of operation must be considered.
z Offensive and defensive air operations must be continuously planned in support of an objective
area. Immediate air support must be continuously available (on air alert) in spite of an apparent
absence of targets.

Air Traffic Control

5-82. Air traffic control in the airhead is initially an USAF combat control team responsibility. Augmented
combat control teams can be replaced by Army air traffic control units at a later time. Air traffic services
provided to airborne forces come from contingency corps assets. Liaison, beacon, and tower teams are the
most frequently employed elements. Actions are as follows:
z During alert, marshalling, and deployment, a liaison team is sent to the headquarters that is
planning the operation; it serves as a part of the section and provides advice on airspace
management, especially in the airhead. The main concern in planning is the handoff between
combat control teams and air traffic control parties. Combat control teams control the airhead
with the advice and assistance from air traffic control personnel until follow-on air traffic control
elements arrive.
z Beacon and tower teams deploy with the aviation or ABNAF main command post attached to
the S-3 section. These teams provide initial air traffic control in the airhead. The beacon team
provides terminal guidance for Army aircraft from their intermediate staging base into the
airfield. The tower team augments the combat control team party. The amount of control given
up by combat control teams to air traffic control teams depends on the size of the airflow.
z Operational control of air traffic control assets usually passes to the senior aviation unit
commander once he is established in the airhead. Forward arming and refueling point and
aviation assembly area operations include air traffic control elements and services, as specified
by the senior aviation unit commander.

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SECTION IV – ASSEMBLY AND REORGANIZATION

5-83. The success or failure of the mission can depend on how fast the airborne force can regain its tactical
integrity. The first goal of an airborne assault must be to deliver and assemble all available combat power
as rapidly as possible. The more rapidly assault force personnel assemble and reorganize as squads,
platoons, and companies, the sooner they can derig equipment and conduct the operations plan as a
cohesive force. How efficiently and rapidly this happens is a direct result of detailed planning, cross
loading on assault aircraft, and assembly and reorganization on the drop zone.

ASSEMBLY
5-84. Because the assembly is a key to success, it must be as deliberate and simple as possible. Assembly
is more than accounting for personnel; the commander must ensure the force has regained its tactical
integrity, and is organized and prepared to fight as a combined arms team. The slower the force assembles,
the more it risks failure. An airborne force’s assembly plan consists mainly of the following tasks:
z Establish and secure assemble areas and/or assault positions.
z Place all organic and attached weapon systems into action as quickly as possible.
z Reestablish mission command (such as radio networks or reporting to higher headquarters).
z Assemble the force and account for casualties and stragglers.

CROSS LOADING FOR RAPID ASSEMBLY

5-85. Cross loading of key personnel and equipment is an important factor in rapid assembly. Careful
attention is given to cross loading and includes the following actions:
z Personnel. Separate key personnel in case an aircraft aborts or fails to reach the drop zone. This
prevents the loss of more than one key officer or noncommissioned officer of a unit.
z Heavy equipment drop loads. Always plan for the possibility that one or more heavy equipment
drop aircraft aborts before it gets to the drop zone or the equipment streams in and becomes
unserviceable.
z Individual equipment and weapons. Planners should separate radios, mortars, antitank weapons,
ammunition bundles, and other critical equipment or supplies as much as possible. No like items
of combat-essential equipment from the same unit should be on the same aircraft if possible.
z Paratroopers jumping additional equipment containers or weapons systems such as antitank
weapons should be jumped at any position in the stick to support cross loading and assembly
plans. The commander must make a risk assessment when locating paratroopers in the stick
carrying this equipment.
z Risks to both the paratrooper and mission accomplishment are present. If the paratrooper falls
inside the aircraft, the remainder of the personnel may not be able to exit on that pass. In
addition, this equipment increases the risks of the paratrooper being towed outside the aircraft.
ASSEMBLY METHODS
5-86. Based on the mission variables of METT-TC, the ground force commander may elect to use one of
the following methods:
z Assembly on the assault objective. This method may be used when speed is essential, the
objective is lightly defended, or the enemy can be suppressed.
z Assembly on the drop zone. This method may be used when: the drop zone does not use follow-
on forces, speed is not essential, and dismounted avenues of approach from the drop zone to the
objective are available.
z Assembly adjacent to the drop zone. This method may be employed when the drop zone is to be
used by follow-on forces or if the drop zone is compromised during the airborne assault.
ASSEMBLY AIDS
5-87. To speed up assembly after landing, airborne forces use assembly aids to orient themselves on the
ground and to locate their unit’s assembly area. Assembly aids help identify personnel, equipment, and

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points or areas on the ground. Units can use visual, audible, electronic, natural, or individual aids; for
reliability and ease of recognition, units combine these. Operators of assembly aids land as close as
possible to their assembly area so they can mark the area. An USAF combat control team or LRSC team
may place assembly aids if the situation permits. Partisans, special operations forces personnel, or high-
performance aircraft can deliver assembly aids. Whenever possible, regardless of the method chosen to
emplace the aids, commanders should provide backup personnel, backup aids, and backup delivery means.
Control Posts
5-88. An assembly control post is established by a small party equipped with assembly aids, which moves
after landing to a predesignated location to help assemble assault forces. (See figures 5-3 and 5-4.) Each
drop zone or landing zone has a control post in or near the unit assembly area to coordinate and regulate
assembly. No standard organization exists for control posts; their composition varies with the size of the
parent unit, the number and type of assembly aids, the terrain, and the assigned mission.

Figure 5-3. Assembly control posts for ABN IBCT forces landing on one drop zone

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Figure 5-4. Movement of personnel to company assembly area

Line-of-Flight or Clock System
5-89. The line of flight parallels the parachute-landing pattern. This helps each paratrooper establish his
own landing position relative to those of the other members of their planeload. Leaders use the clock
system to brief personnel, calling the direction of flight 12 o’clock. (See figure 5-5, page 5-21.) After
landing, personnel assemble to the right of the drop zone at 3 o’clock or to the left of the drop zone at 9
o’clock.

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Figure 5-5. Line-of-flight/clock system

Natural Assembly Aids
5-90. These aids include landmarks or easily recognizable terrain features that forces can use as assembly
aids or that personnel can orient their movement on. These features include hills; stream junctions; clumps
of woods; or man-made objects like radio towers, bridges, buildings, crossroads, or railroads. Units cannot
rely on natural features as the primary assembly aid. The assembly plan must be usable regardless of the
drop zone. Executing contingency plans en route may require assembly on an alternate drop zone; an
emergency exit from the aircraft can place paratroopers on an unfamiliar drop zone.
Assembly Equipment
5-91. Airborne forces carry visual, audible, or electronic aids to help them assemble. Planners assign
different colors, sounds, and coded signals to each unit. The unit standard operating procedures
standardizes assembly aids. However, units can adapt assembly aids to fit specific situations or
environments. Terrain restrictions and battlefield noise do not restrict the use of the best assembly aids,
which are simple to use. Units usually use visual assembly aids. Assembly equipment may include:
z Visual aids. Visual aids include visible light sources (such as beacons, flashlights, strobe lights,
or signal mirrors; panels; flags), balloons; infrared lights (such as metascopes, flashlights with
filters, infrared weapons sights, or starlight scopes); pyrotechnics; and chemical lights. These
aids are simple to use and afford positive identification of assembly areas. However, the enemy
can see them as well as friendly personnel can. The Stiner aid has a cloth panel with a colored
letter; that is, HHC=White “H.” They are the same color for night use. (See figure 5-6.) It has
pockets for chemical lights; the letter and pockets are on both sides. It is mounted on a sectional
aluminum pole that fits into a weapons case.

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Figure 5-6. Stiner aid

z Audible aids. Audible aids especially help small units assemble at night. They include tin
crickets, sirens, cowbells, air horns, triangles, dinner bells, ratchets, drums, gongs, whistles,
bugles, and voice signals. They are used to identify individuals or assembly areas. Strong winds,
gunfire, aircraft sounds, an elevation high above sea level, and other factors can limit their
effectiveness. The normal sounds of the battlefield easily mask or confuse the sounds of audible
assembly aids.
z Electronic aids. Units can use organic radios to direct small units to assembly areas, using
landmarks as references. They can use radio homing devices. A homing device is a lightweight
attachment to a standard field radio; it is an excellent aid for day or night assembly. With it, a
radiotelephone operator (RATELO) can pick up a coded signal beam from a transmitter at the
assembly area. By following the beam, the RATELO homes in on the transmitter and leads the
unit to the assembly area. Signal crews can make equipment homing assembly aids from a
standard portable field radio or transmitter. The unit attaches the radio to the equipment and
turns it to a designated frequency. They encase it in shock-absorbing material just before its
extraction from the aircraft. This method is especially useful for assembling crews on heavy
equipment drop loads.
z Field-expedient aids. The unit uses numerous field-expedient assembly aids; only the Soldiers’
imaginations limit the choices. For example, they can burn gasoline-soaked sand in cans or other
containers; fashion a light gun or a one-direction light source by placing a flashlight in the
receiver of a grenade launcher or other tube system; or lift a deployed main or reserve parachute
so other unit members can see it.
Identification Markings
5-92. Identification markings aid positive, rapid identification of personnel and equipment that speed up a
unit’s assembly. The airborne force standardizes personnel and equipment markings for all subordinate
units. Specifics on markings are as follows:
z Personnel markings. Soldiers use individual assembly aids to help recognize individuals and
assemble units. Individual aids include colored armbands or helmet bands, distinctive patches or
designs on uniforms, or helmet bands of luminous tape. Sortie commanders and key leaders,
jumpmasters, safeties, other jumpmaster personnel, medics, and bump personnel use distinctive
markings. Larger force standard operating procedures prescribe unit designations to prevent
duplication and to allow unit-wide understanding.
z Equipment markings. Aerial equipment containers are identified by simple, distinctive markings.
Distinctive unit markings are prescribed by larger force (ABN IBCT or division) standard
operating procedures to prevent duplication and to assist in recognition by other units. Unit
codes are placed on the bottom and all sides of each container; they should be visible for at least
50 meters. Various color parachute canopies, container colors, luminous tape and paints, smoke
grenades, homing devices and lights can be used with the containers to facilitate identification
on the ground and in the air. Lights and homing devices attached to equipment can be activated

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 5-21

Chapter 5

manually aboard the aircraft just before extraction, either by improvised timer, or on the ground
by the first individual to reach the equipment.
z Assault aircraft markings. A simple code symbol (using various designs, colors, and
combinations of letters and numbers) can be painted on both sides of the fuselage of assault
force aircraft to identify the contents. This symbol is large enough to be seen, and it indicates not
only the type of equipment contained in the aircraft but the unit to which the equipment belongs.

FORCE ASSEMBLY
5-93. Commanders base the assembly of the airborne force on a simple, flexible plan that adapts to any
likely situation. Assault forces assemble speedily, silently, and without confusion.
Drop Zone Assembly
5-94. When moving to an assembly area first as opposed to an assault objective, to speed assembly on the
drop zone, forces should—
z Establish an assembly control point. Location of this point is dependent upon unit scheme of
maneuver. A designated assembly control point officer in charge or non-commissioned officer in
charge accounts for all paratroopers as they report to the control point. He then confirms azimuth
and distance to the assembly area, or if the situation changes gives a new azimuth and distance to
an alternate assembly area.
z Establish the assembly area. Locate the force assembly area in a covered and concealed position
off the drop zone. The first group to arrive in the unit assembly area should first establish local
security, and then establish the predetermined assembly aid as soon as possible to assist in
directing the rest of the unit to the assembly area.
z Depart the assembly area. Move out rapidly on assigned mission once enough combat power is
established. Leave a small element in the assembly area to assemble and account for personnel
that have not arrived for later linkup.
Troop Briefings
5-95. Assault force personnel must understand individual actions during assembly. Personnel briefings
include the following information:
z Brief assault force personnel and rebrief them on the assembly plan for their unit and on those of
other units scheduled to share the same drop zone.
z Use visual aids such as maps, aerial photos, terrain models, and sand tables.
z Warn personnel to resist guiding on what appears to be a prominent terrain feature on a map.
Once they are on the ground, the terrain feature probably cannot be seen. This is especially true
if personnel land on the wrong drop zone or on the wrong part of a drop zone.
z Use the clock directional system. Instruct personnel to orient themselves and the general location
of the assembly area by the direction of flight.

Note. Regardless of the actual azimuth, the direction of flight is always 12 o’clock.

FACTORS AFFECTING ASSEMBLY

5-96. When preparing the assembly plan consider dispersion (such as the speed, altitude, and flight
formation of airlift aircraft and their effect (along with wind) of personnel and equipment in landing. The
resultant landing pattern significantly affects assembly, as does the drop zone length and width, the training
level of the airborne forces and pilots, the enemy situation, and cross loading.
Dispersion
5-97. The extent of dispersion is the result of the airlift formation; type, speed, and altitude of the aircraft;
number of serials; sequence of delivery weather conditions; and aircrew proficiency. Dispersion covers the
following:

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 Landing Plan

z The speed at which airplanes carrying paratroopers cross the drop zone affects the length of the
landing pattern. The greater the speed, the greater the distance that is covered between the exit of
each paratrooper, thus increasing the length of the landing pattern. Planes cross the drop zone as
slowly as is safely possible, and paratroopers exit rapidly to reduce dispersion.
z As paratroopers descend, they drift with the prevailing wind, but usually not at a uniform rate for
each paratrooper. They can pass through strata of varying wind direction and velocity that causes
some dispersion within the force. Due to the wind and higher altitude, there is a great possibility
of dispersion. Therefore, the aircraft cross the drop zone at minimum altitudes that are consistent
with the safety of aircraft and paratroopers.
z In parachute landings, the width of the landing pattern of paratroopers and equipment is the
approximate width of the aircraft formation at the time of the drop. Therefore, keep the
formation tight as possible to keep paratrooper and equipment together. If possible, place a
company or battalion in the flight formation so that all planeloads of the force land in a small
pattern as close as practicable to the assembly area.
Drop Zone Visibility
5-98. Darkness, fog, haze, rain, brush, trees, and terrain affect drop zone visibility on the ground, and
hence impact on assembly. Darkness complicates assembly— poor visibility and difficulty in identifying or
recognizing assembly areas, control posts, personnel, and equipment. Although it provide concealment,
darkness contributes to confusion, to stragglers, and to the loss of equipment. An assembly during darkness
takes longer and requires more elaborate assembly aids and larger control posts than a daylight assembly.

State of Proficiency
5-99. One of the most important factors that affect rapid assembly is proficiency. Assault forces must
conduct parachute assaults and assemble as they would in combat. For specific missions, previous training
is built on and tailored through detailed briefings to include maps, photos, and terrain models. When
possible, rehearsals using assembly methods planned for the assault are used. Thorough orientation,
rigorous training, aggressive leadership, and individual initiative have the single greatest impact on an
airborne assault and assembly.

Enemy
5-100. Enemy action can have both a direct and indirect effect on assembly. Enemy action indirectly
affects en route airlift capability to deliver the force to the correct drop zone. It directly affects friendly
assembly once on the ground. Enemy opposition during or immediately after landing is a critical
consideration affecting assembly due to the unusual vulnerability of the airborne force between landing and
the completion of assembly or seizure of assault objectives. While the commander should attempt to
achieve an unopposed landing, every possible provision is made to deal with enemy resistance. This
requires accurate intelligence, responsive fires, and effective OPSEC and military deception. When
assembly is on the assault objective, individuals linkup as they move using appropriate movement
techniques in accordance with the operation plan.

MULTIPLE POINTS OF IMPACT

5-101. A slightly more complicated but more efficient method to facilitate rapid assembly of paratroopers,
container delivery systems, and heavy equipment drop loads is the use of multiple points of impact. The
theory and methods of cross loading apply as much to this method of delivery as to any other. When the
USAF drops paratroopers along a single track (line of flight) down the center of the drop zone they use just
one personnel and one heavy equipment drop impact point. When conducting multiple points of impact,
USAF aircraft fly multiple tracks across the drop zone and use multiple impact points on the drop zone. By
efficient cross loading, selecting assembly areas, and carefully selecting personnel and equipment points of
impact, personnel, units, and equipment can be delivered closer to assembly areas than the single-track, one
personnel and one heavy equipment drop point of impact method. (Refer to FM 3-21.38 for more
information.)

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 5-23

Chapter 5

KEYS TO RAPID ASSEMBLY

5-102. Rapid assembly results from well thought out and rehearsed cross loading to include heavy
equipment drop loads, and a thorough, but simple plan that applies for all drop zones. Take the following
actions:
z Use the clock system (not magnetic azimuth system nor north, south, east, west) for direction or
route to the assembly area.
z Use assembly areas that are easy to find without complicated assembly aids, even if dropped on
the wrong part of the drop zone or on an unplanned drop zone.
z Be prepared with both day and night assembly aids, especially for drops scheduled at dawn
or dusk.
z Locate assembly areas as close as possible to where personnel land.
z To permit rapid assembly, never locate assembly areas at either end of the drop zone.
(Paratroopers should not have to walk from one end to the other.)
z Use personnel, unit, and equipment markings to speed assembly.
z Brief to all units what marking the same serial will use.
z Use sand tables extensively to brief on and rehearse assembly procedures as often as possible.

ASSEMBLY AREA ACTIVITIES

5-103. Not only do forces assemble as quickly as they can, but they get out of the assembly area as
quickly as possible. They remain in the assembly area only long enough to establish mission command,
task organize for further operations, and to determine the status of assembly. They modify plans as needed
to meet changes in the situation and issue orders as appropriate.
5-104. Subordinate units determine minimum forces necessary to depart assembly areas early in the
planning process. As the unit assembles on the drop zone, it immediately moves to its assault objectives
once minimum force is established.

Departure From the Assembly Area

5-105. Battalion assault forces proceed on their assigned mission when assembly is complete or on order
of the ABN IBCT commander. Reorganization of an assault force is complete when all subordinate units
are assembled and command and fire control communications channels are established. As a result of
inaccurate landings, enemy action, or assembly delays, assault forces may have to attack before assembly is
complete. The ABN IBCT commander or acting commander makes this decision. In the absence of other
orders, the battalion commander decides when enough of his battalion assault force has assembled to
accomplish the mission. The time or conditions for assault forces to move out on their assigned missions
are ordinarily established in the operation plan by higher headquarters.

Reports
5-106. Because of the dispersion of personnel and equipment in landing, the possibility of inaccurate
landings, and the potential loss of aircraft during the air movement, commanders at all levels must learn the
status of personnel and equipment in their units as soon as possible after landing. They need this
information to determine combat power before executing the ground tactical plan. Reporting actions may
include:
z All forces report their personnel and equipment status to the next higher unit at predetermined
times or intervals until reorganization is complete. These status reports indicate the location of
the unit; the number of personnel assembled and the number of known casualties; the number
and type of crew-served weapons, vehicles, radios, and other recovered key equipment; and
information available on missing personnel and equipment. Forces make abbreviated status
reports from the drop zone as soon as they establish radio communications in accordance with
standard operating procedures.

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 Landing Plan

z As personnel arrive in assembly areas, units make status reports by squad, platoon, and
company. As commanders establish command posts in the assembly areas, they receive status
reports from within the battalion by radio, messenger, or direct contact between commanders.

Security
5-107. Assault forces of the airborne operation are responsible for their own security once on the ground
as they are vulnerable to enemy attack from all directions during assembly. For this reason, and because of
the size of drop zones or landing zones, protection requirements are great in comparison with the size of the
airborne force. Assault force actions may include:
z In small-unit drops, jumpmasters or chalk leaders may provide local security as their plane loads
assemble and recover equipment dropped in aerial delivery containers.
z Leaders of air-landed personnel provide local security while the equipment is off loaded.
z Personnel linkup as the move to assembly areas using movement techniques as the situation
dictates for security as well as speed and control.

REORGANIZATION
5-108. Reorganization includes all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat
effectiveness or return it to a specified level of combat capability (FM 3-90-1). Reorganization is addressed
in the landing plan and starts during assembly in assembly areas. If the enemy situation permits, assault
forces may assemble on assault objectives after landing. Planning considerations for reorganization includeʊ
z Designation and location of unit assembly areas and/or assault objectives.
z Use of assembly control posts and assembly aids.
z Establishment of command and fires communications networks.
z Reporting requirements.
z Limited visibility.
z Security operations.
z Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks.
z Coordination and final preparations before the seizure of assault objectives.
z Minimum force requirements to conduct mission.
z Time or conditions for assault forces to move out on missions.
z Designated personnel remain on the drop zone or landing zone to:
„ Assemble and provide security for stragglers.
„ Care for casualties.
„ Complete the recovery of accompanying or delayed equipment and supplies.
„ Establish straggler control and later linkup with the main force.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 5-25

7KLVSDJHLQWHQWLRQDOO\OHIWEODQN
 Chapter 6
Air Movement Plan
After development, backbriefs, and approval of the landing plan, planners begin to
finalize the air movement plan. This plan is the third step in planning an airborne
operation and supports both the landing plan and the ground tactical plan. It provides
the required information to move the airborne force from the departure airfield to the
objective area. The plan includes the period from when forces load until they exit the
aircraft. The air movement plan is a tab to the airborne operations appendix within
Annex C, Operations.

SECTION I – JOINT PLANNING

6-1. Airborne assaults are inherently joint operations with specific service component responsibilities.
Delivery by USAF airlift will be from either the continental United States, an intermediate staging base, or
a theater airbase. Although the commander, airlift force is solely responsible for executing the air
movement phase (See JP 3-17.), the ABNTFC normally exercises responsibility for the airlift plan, to
include priority of airdrop and airland sorties, the preparatory fires plan, and the ground tactical plan in the
airhead.
6-2. The ABNAF contributes its landing plan and the procedures for controlling and positioning
personnel at the departure airfield. The airlift force controls takeoff times and, based on the ABNAF’s
landing plan, coordinates air operations and timing between different departure airfields, to ensure the
proper arrival sequence at the drop zone, and/or landing zone (See JP 3-30.). The airlift force designates
rendezvous points and develops the flight route diagrams. The ABNTF operation plan and ABNAF ground
tactical plan determine flight routes and orientation of drop zones and landing zones.

SECTION II – ELEMENTS OF THE AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

6-3. The movement plan includes the period from when forces load until they exit the aircraft. Elements
of the air movement plan includeʊ
z Air movement table.
z Types of movement.
z Aircraft requirements.

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE

6-4. The air movement table forms the principal part of the air movement plan with the following
information:
z Departure airfield for each serial.
z Number of aircraft for each serial.
z Chalk numbers for each aircraft, each serial, and each departure airfield; aircraft tail numbers
correspond to aircraft chalk numbers.
z Unit identity of the airlift element.
z Name/rank of each USAF serial commander.
z Number and type aircraft.
z Employment method for each aircraft.
z Army force identity.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 6-1

Chapter 6

z Name and rank of each Army commander.

z Load times.
z Station times.
z Takeoff times.
z Designated primary and alternate drop zones for each serial.
z P-hour for the lead aircraft of each serial. (Given in real time.)
z Remarks such as special instructions, key equipment, and location of key members of the chain
of command.
6-5. Besides the air movement tables, the air movement plan contains the following informationʊ
z Flight route diagram.
z Serial formation.
z Air traffic control.
z Concentration for movement.
z Allowable cabin/cargo loads.
z Airfield/forward logistic site aircraft maneuver on ground space.
z Aircraft parking diagram.
z Army personnel and equipment rigging areas at the departure airfield.
z Army control procedures during preparation for loading.
z Emergency procedures to include survival, evasion, resistance and escape and search and rescue
planning.
z Weather considerations.
z Joint suppression of enemy air defenses, counterair, and air interdiction considerations.

TYPES OF MOVEMENT
6-6. The type of movement administrative or tactical must be considered when determining how to load
the aircraft. Airborne forces can conduct an administrative movement to an intermediate staging base or
remote marshalling base, and then transload into assault aircraft by using tactical loading. They are as
follows:
z Administrative movements are non-tactical. Personnel and equipment are arranged to expedite
their movement and to conserve time and energy. Economical use is made of aircraft cabin
space, and planners make maximum use of the allowable cabin load (ACL).
z Tactical movements are when personnel and equipment are organized, loaded, and transported to
accomplish the ground tactical plan. The proper use of aircraft ACL is important, but it does not
override the commander’s sequence of employment.

AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS
6-7. When the airborne force deploys, planning guidance from higher headquarters indicates the type of
aircraft available for the movement. Based on this information, the unit commander determines and
requests the number of lifts by the type of aircraft required to complete the move. The air movement
planner must ensure that each aircraft is used to its maximum capability. This is based on the information
developed on unit requirements, ACLs, and available passenger seats. The methods of determining aircraft
requirements are the weight method and the type-load method. They are as follows:
z Weight method. This method is based on the assumption that total weight, not volume, is the
determining factor. Since aircraft sometimes run out of space before exceeding the ACL, this
method is no longer widely used. It has been replaced by the type-load method. The long
distances involved in reaching an objective area, the necessity of the aircraft to circle for
extended periods before landing, and the large amounts of fuel needed to sustain the aircraft can
result in the aircraft having to reduce its ACL. As a rule, the longer the deployment, the lower
the ACL.

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 Air Movement Plan

z Type-load method. In a force air movement, a number of the aircraft loads contain the same
items of equipment and numbers of personnel. Identical type loads simplify the planning process
and make the tasks of manifesting and rehearsing much easier. Used for calculating individual
aircraft lift requirements, the type-load method is the most common and widely accepted method
of unit air movement planning. It requires consideration of load configuration and condition on
arrival at a desired destination, rapid off-loading, aircraft limitations, security requirements en
route, and the anticipated operational requirements. Use the more detailed type-load method in
planning force movements.

SECTION III – LOAD PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-8. When preparing the air movement plan, the S-3 Air considers tactical integrity, cross loading, self-
sufficiency of each load, and chance of executing the air land option. The S-3 air keeps units intact as much
as possible. For airborne operations, this can mean placing forces larger than squads on separate aircraft so
they exit their respective aircraft over the same portion of the drop zone. This facilitates rapid assembly by
placing units close to their assembly areas on landing.

TACTICAL INTEGRITY
6-9. Maintaining tactical integrity includes the following guidance:
z The S-3 Air must understand and develop the tactical cross load based on the ground
tactical plan.
z Key leader or staff groups are cross loaded and positioned within the assault echelon to best control
ground maneuver and provide redundancy of mission command for the airborne operation.
z Fire support teams and their radiotelephone operators should be on the same aircraft with the
commander they support; they should jump to land next to him.
z Platoon leaders (and platoon sergeants on different aircraft) should have their forward observers,
radiotelephone operators, at least one machine gun crew, and one Javelin gunner on the same aircraft.
z Each aircraft has at least one unit non-commissioned officer or commissioned officer for each
unit with personnel on board. Each aircraft has Army leadership present.
z To ensure tactical integrity, distribute the company commander, unit first sergeant, and
executive officer in different aircrafts.

CROSS LOADING
6-10. Cross loading distributes leaders, key weapons, and key equipment between the aircraft of the
formation to avoid total loss of mission command or force effectiveness if an aircraft is lost. Give careful
attention to cross loading during rapid assembly.
6-11. Separate key personnel in case an aircraft aborts or fails to reach the drop zone. This prevents the loss
of more than one key officer or NCO of a unit. Properly planned cross loading accomplishes the following:
z Personnel from the same unit land together in the same part of the drop zone for faster assembly.
z Equipment or vehicle operators and weapon system crews land in the same part of the drop zone
as their heavy-drop equipment so they can get to it, derig it, and put it into operation quickly.
z If one or more aircraft abort either on the ground or en route to the drop zone, some key leaders
and equipment still are delivered.
6-12. When planning airborne force cross loading, remember—the fewer key people on the same aircraft,
the better. If possible, separate the following personnel:
z The ABN IBCT commander from his executive officer and battalion commanders.
z The battalion commander and his company commanders.
z The brigade executive officer, and the brigade S-3.
z The battalion executive officer, and S-3 from the same battalion.
z The primary ABN IBCT and battalion staff officers and their assistants.
z The company commander, executive officer, and first sergeant from the same company.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 6-3

Chapter 6

z The platoon leader and platoon sergeant from the same platoon.
6-13. Always plan for the possibility that one or more heavy equipment drop aircraft aborts before it gets
to the drop zone or the equipment streams in and becomes unserviceable. Take the following actions:
z Cross load heavy-drop equipment to have the least possible impact on the mission if it does not
arrive in the drop zone. Separate critical loads so if an aircraft aborts or fails to reach the drop
zone, no single unit loses more than one key officer or non-commissioned officer or a significant
proportion of the same type of combat-essential equipment.
z Coordinate closely with the Air Force so heavy-drop equipment loads are loaded in the reverse
order they should land.
z Do not include the same type of critical equipment from the same unit, or like equipment from
different units in the same aircraft loads. This applies whether it is to be airdropped or air-
landed.
z Cross load heavy-drop equipment in one of the following ways:
„ Select heavy equipment points of impact to support the ground tactical plan. Place loads so
they land close to the location where they are used.
„ Cross load the parachutists to first support the ground tactical plan; then coordinate their
landings with those of the heavy-drop platforms.
„ Coordinate the selected heavy equipment point of impact for each load with the Air Force
mission commander, when using multiple heavy equipment points of impact.
„ Do not load two or more like platforms from the same unit on the same aircraft because the
aircraft are moving too fast to drop more than one platform in the same area.
z Separate radios, mortars, antitank weapons, ammunition bundles, and other critical equipment or
supplies as much as possible. No like items of combat-essential equipment from the same unit
should be on the same aircraft. Apply the following:
„ A weapons system should be loaded on the same aircraft as its crew.

Note. Only one crew-served weapons squad/team should be on each aircraft.

„ A RATELO should jump the same aircraft as the leader he supports, either just before or
after him. Another good method is for the leader to jump the radio himself. In this way, he
still can set up immediate communications even if he and his RATELO separate on the
drop zone.
„ The container, weapon, and individual equipment can and should be jumped at any position
in the stick to support cross loading and assembly plans. The commander makes a risk
assessment when locating paratroopers in the stick carrying this equipment. Risks to both
the paratrooper and mission accomplishment are present. If the parachutist falls inside the
aircraft, the remainder of the personnel may not be able to exit on that pass. This equipment
increases the risks of the paratrooper being towed outside the aircraft.
„ Individual crew-served weapons (such as machine guns, mortars, antitank weapons) and
other critical equipment or supplies should be distributed on all aircraft.
„ Communications equipment, ammunition, and other supply bundles must be cross loaded.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY
6-14. Each aircraft load should be self-sufficient so its personnel can operate effectively by themselves if
other aircraft misses the drop zone, makes an emergency landing somewhere else, or aborts the mission.
Take the following action:
z A single (complete) weapons system should have the complete crew for that system on the same
aircraft along with enough ammunition to place the weapon into operation.
z For airland or heavy equipment drop operations, trailers and weapons are manifested with their
prime movers.
z Squads should stay together on the same aircraft; fire teams are never split.

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 Air Movement Plan

z Squads and fire teams should jump both aircraft doors to reduce the amount of separation on the
drop zone.

SECTION IV – LOADING AND DELIVERY OF FORCES

6-15. The air movement plan contains the information required to ensure the efficient loading and delivery
of forces to the objective area in the proper sequence, time, and place to support the ground tactical plan.
The following paragraphs will discuss load planning sequencing, vehicle load planning, air movement
planning worksheet, and aircraft utilization.

LOAD PLANNING SEQUENCE

6-16. Planners can best accomplish the movement of forces by air for an airborne assault by developing
plans in an orderly sequence, such as—
z Preparing vehicle load cards.
z Preparing air movement planning worksheets for each unit (company through battalion).
z Preparing basic planning guides (company and battalion) and forwarding them to higher
headquarters (battalion and ABN IBCT).
z Establishing priorities for entry into the objective area by echelonʊassault, follow-on, and rear.
Units establish priorities within each echelon to phase personnel and equipment into subsequent
echelons if aircraft are not available.
z Preparing a force aircraft utilization plan to determine aircraft requirements and type loads.
z Preparing air-loading tables to facilitate rapid deployment.
z Complete and print draft load plans through the Integrated Computerized Deployment System
(ICODES) to help identify issues prior to completing actual load plans.
6-17. Units receive their missions and review previous plans. Units—
z Amend the plans based on the task organization dictated by the ground tactical plan.
z Allocate available aircraft. If aircraft are not available, they phase low-priority items to the
follow-on or rear echelon.
z Prepare air-loading tables and manifests.
z Prepare the air movement table.
z Prepare a DD Form 1387-2 (Special Handling Data/Certification) for hazardous materials.

LOAD PLANNING OF VEHICLES

6-18. Base vehicle load plans on standard operating procedures and mission tailoring. Then, update them
according to aircraft availability and type.
z Heavy-drop vehicles are first loaded with as much unit equipment as they can hold. The
vehicle’s load capacity should not be exceeded, and all cargo must be secured in the vehicle’s
cargo compartment.
z Vehicles are measured and weighed after they have been loaded. Some items, especially
ammunition, cannot be rigged on the vehicle, but can be carried as ballast on the platform.
z Vehicle load cards are made for each vehicle to be loaded aboard an aircraft. Each sketch
includes such information as load data for the vehicle; length and width of the vehicle when the
vehicle carries cargo; the names and locations of the cargo in the vehicle.

AIR MOVEMENT PLANNING WORKSHEET

6-19. The air movement planning worksheet is a consolidated list of a unit’s equipment and personnel. It is
not a formal DA form; it is an example of a locally made form. If necessary, use grid-type paper in lieu of a
printed form. The worksheet lists all the dimensions and cargo loads of vehicles. It must include all on-
hand equipment and personnel, and the full amount authorized by the unit table of equipment. Short items
still are included as equipment, and personnel shortages can be filled if alerted for deployment. This

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 6-5

Chapter 6

prevents the need for constant revision of the worksheet. Basic loads of ammunition carried with the unit,
which must be palletized or placed in door bundles, should be included.
6-20. The basic planning guide form is a report prepared by ground forces to determine the aircraft
required for an airborne operation. The S-3 Air for the battalion collects the basic planning guide forms
from the subordinate companies and consolidates them at battalion level. He submits them to U.S. Army
riggers, airlift control element (ALCE), and the departure airfield control group (DACG), depending on the
type of movement required.

UNIT AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION FORM

6-21. The unit aircraft utilization plan identifies equipment by aircraft load; this simplifies planning of
identical types of loads. The goal is to support the ground tactical plan while maximizing efficient use of
USAF assets. The first step is to weigh personnel and equipment by echelon. Then, add up the aircraft loads
to determine how many aircraft are needed. If too few aircraft are available to meet the planned
echelonment, this becomes readily apparent. At this point, priorities are applied and equipment and
personnel are phased back to fit airlift constraints.

SECTION V – AIRCRAFT LOAD AND AIR MOVEMENT TABLE

6-22. The development of aircraft loads is accomplished through reverse planning. The planner must have
a mosaic or facsimile when developing the heavy equipment point of impact, personnel point of impact,
and personnel manifests. Aircraft loads must support the assembly and ground tactical plans through
effective cross loading. This includes—
z Preparing the load. Using the mosaic, facsimile, or sketch, preparers mark the desired single or
multiple heavy equipment points of impact for all equipment, and the personnel point of impact.
Line off the sketch in 70-meter (75-yard) increments from the personnel point of impact. This
represents the normal one-second parachutist interval. Make the set lines perpendicular to the
line of flight so that the name of the parachutist associated with a particular piece of equipment
can be marked on the sketch.
z Planning purposes. Heavy-drop equipment lands 400 yards apart on C-130 and C-17. The name
of the parachutist who must obtain his equipment is entered on the line nearest the equipment.
Personnel not associated with a particular piece of equipment can be marked on the lines closest
to their assembly area. Take the personnel manifest directly off the drop zone schematic, the
result is a manifest order that facilitates quick assembly.
z Allocating seats. Once the commander has developed the cross-load plan, he notifies involved
units how many and which seats they have on each aircraft. Platoons can be manifested in
multiple aircraft to facilitate cross loading, but personnel are placed in stick order on each
aircraft to exit and land in the same general area on the drop zone.
z Making internal adjustments. Each company commander in turn cross loads his part of the split
platoon within his part of the stick to best support the assembly plan and ground tactical plan.
(See figure 6-1.)
z Preparing the manifest. Manifesting is accomplished in the reverse order of exit. (Refer to
paragraph 6-26 of this publication for more information.)

6-6 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Air Movement Plan

Figure 6-1. Cross-loaded aircraft

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 6-7

Chapter 6

6-23. The air movement table assigns units to serials within the air columns. Locating units in successive
serials is according to priorities established for landing. Units maintain tactical integrity of Army and airlift
units as far as practicable. All elements in a given serial land on the same drop zone or landing zone in the
objective area; however, certain aircraft in a serial can continue on to drop reconnaissance and security
forces in their planned areas of employment.
6-24. The ground forces commander in coordination with the USAF commander prepares the air
movement table form. This form, used in the air movement plan to the airborne operations, allocates
aircraft to the ground forces to be lifted. It designates the number and type of aircraft in each serial and
specifies the departure area and the time of loading and takeoff. Exact format for the air movement table
depends on the needs of the commander, which are specified by unit standard operating procedures. There
is no specific format, but the air movement table should provide the following information:
z Heading. When the air movement table is published as a part of the order, the following
elements are included:
„ Classification.
„ Appendix, annex and operations order number.
„ Headquarters.
„ Place of issue.
„ Date and time.
„ Map reference.
z Serial number. Serial numbers are arranged consecutively in the order of flight. Consider the
following factors in the assignment of units to serials:
„ Mission of the airborne force.
„ Size of the drop zone or landing zone.
„ Distribution (cross loading) of personnel, weapons, and equipment.
z Chalk number. The chalk number specifies the position of aircraft being loaded in each serial.
Loads are numbered sequentially according to serial numbering, such as Serial 1 contains Chalks
1 through 12; Serial 2 contains Chalks 13 through 24.
z USAF units. This section includes USAF information that is important to the ground force
commander.
„ Airlift unit. This is the designation of the airlift unit that is transporting or furnishing the
aircraft for each serial.
„ Serial commander. This is the senior USAF officer in the serial.
„ Number and type of aircraft. The exact number and type of aircraft that actually fly in the
serial are shown in this column.
z U.S. Army forces. This section includes information directly related to the ground forces.
„ Aircraft required. The number of airplanes required to transport the force.
„ Employment. Type of movement (such as parachute, heavy equipment, container delivery
system, or air-landed).
„ Unit loaded. The airborne force being loaded.
„ Serial commander. The senior airborne officer in the serial.
„ Departure airfield. Name or code name of the departure airfield.
„ Load time. The time established by the airlift and ground force commander to begin
loading. Parachutists can require 30 to 45 minutes to load, depending on the aircraft and
any accompanying equipment (door bundles, and parachutes for in-flight rigging). Heavy-
drop and container delivery system loads should take about two hours for loading.
„ Station time. The time the passengers, equipment, and crew are loaded and ready for
takeoff.
„ Takeoff. The time the aircraft is scheduled to depart from the airfield.
„ Aircraft formations. The type formation the aircraft will fly.
„ Objective. The name or designation of the drop zone, landing zone, or airfield.

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„ Time over target. Time over target is the time of arrival at the objective area.
„ Direction of flight over the objective area.
z Other items. Other items that can be included in the air movement table (at the commander’s
discretion) are as follows:
„ Number of personnel by serial/chalk.
„ Initial and final manifest call times.
„ Prejump training times.
„ Type parachute.
„ Weather decision.
„ Weather delay.
„ Time for movement to the departure airfield.
„ USAF station time.
„ Remarks.

SECTION VI – MANIFESTS AND AIR-LOADING PLANNING SYSTEM

6-25. To help maintain order and sequence of delivery of personnel and equipment to the drop zone the
ABNAFC and planning staff use a process of prioritization and accounting for the ABNAF personnel and
equipment. Manifests and computerized systems stream line this process.

MANIFESTS
6-26. The flight manifest DD Form 2131 (Passenger Manifest) is an exact record of personnel by name,
rank, Department of Defense (DOD) identification number, and duty position in each aircraft. It is a brief
description of the equipment, with the station number, as loaded in the aircraft. Load computations for
personnel and equipment are listed. Make a separate form for each aircraft.
6-27. Copies are made for the arrival and departure airfield control group, departure airfield control officer,
pilot, and ALCE. The jumpmaster or senior Army representative on the aircraft retains a copy. The senior
ground forces member or primary jumpmaster in each aircraft finalizes the form. The USAF authorizes it,
and the ground force representative signs it after verifying the personnel on the manifest.

INTEGRATED COMPUTERIZED DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

6-28. The Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES) is a computer-based automated system
designed to simplify the outload plans for combat forces.
6-29. Files data base. By computerizing the necessary loading characteristics, weight restrictions, and
equipment configurations required to outload the airborne force, this system automatically tells the
commander the load configurations and number of aircraft required to move a specific force. The files data
base includes the following:
z USAF aircraft characteristics. This file includes all data that affect the placement of equipment
on a particular aircraft; it contains data on the C-130, C-17, and C5A/B aircraft, which
appropriate personnel update as changes occur.
z Items and uniform. This file contains size data on all the equipment in the unit that requires floor
space. Commanders use the data for airland or airdrop. The file contains information about the
aircraft center of balance, the psi of the tires, whether the item requires shoring or not, and
whether the item can be turned or not. The unique feature of this file is that it considers
inseparable items of equipment together (for example, a jeep and trailer or a high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicle and 105-millimeter howitzer). This permits the program to load an
item of equipment with its prime mover.
z Force package and options. This file contains 12 force packages and about 1000 modular force
package options.
6-30. Commander input. The automated air load planning system allows commanders to input force
packages, options, items, prime movers and the towed pieces of equipment, and multiples of each. Once a

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force package or option is entered into the program, the force package or option can be changed for the
specific run of the program to meet mission requirements.

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Marshalling Plan
After the air movement plan is developed, backbriefed, refined, and approved, the
next plan to be finalized is the marshalling plan. The previous three plans— ground
tactical, landing, and air movement— are used to determine the number of personnel
and vehicles to be stationed at or moved through each airfield. The marshalling plan
provides the necessary information and procedures by which units of the airborne
force complete final preparations for combat, move to departure airfields, and loads
the aircraft. It provides detailed instructions for facilities and services needed during
marshalling. This chapter assists airborne assault force (ABNAF), commanders and
staffs in planning for marshalling and sustainment.

SECTION I – PREPARATION
7-1. Marshalling is the process by which units participating in an amphibious or airborne operation group
together or assemble when feasible or move to temporary camps in the vicinity of embarkation points,
complete preparations for combat, or prepare for loading (JP 3-17). The marshalling plan appears as a tab
to the airborne operations appendix Annex C, Operations. S-4s (in coordination with S-3s), are the
principals to the commanders for marshalling. Marshalling begins when elements of the force are literally
sealed in marshalling areas and it terminates at loading. The marshalling plan is designed to facilitate a
quick, orderly launching of an airborne assault under maximum security conditions in the minimum
possible time.
7-2. Units complete the following preparations before marshalling as a minimum:
z N-hour sequence. As soon as a force is notified of an airborne operation, it begins the reverse
planning necessary to have the first assault aircraft en route to the objective area at the
predetermined time. The N-hour sequence contains preparation activities, along with planning
actions that must take place within a flexible schedule, ensuring that the force is prepared and
correctly equipped to conduct combat operations on arrival.
z Rehearsals. Rehearsals are conducted at every echelon of command. They identify potential
weaknesses in execution and enhance understanding and synchronization. Full-scale rehearsals
are the goal, but time constraints may limit them.
z Static load training (SLT). Requires coordination with USAF loadmasters. Scripted event that
trains joint force for daytime and limited visibility aircraft egress and personnel and equipment
on/off-load procedures.
z Sustained airborne training (SAT). Conducted no more than 24 hours prior to execution of the
airborne assault. Paratroopers receive SAT from the jumpmaster and safety from the door from
which they will exit. SAT normally is conducted during SLT. (See TC 3-21.220.)
z Assembly, inspection, and maintenance. As soon as feasible, units assemble the equipment and
supplies that are to accompany them to the objective area. Hold inspections to determine the
status of equipment. Perform maintenance and prepare parachutes, aerial delivery containers,
and heavy equipment drop loads. Commanders and leaders brief personnel, and rations and
ammunition are issued. Personnel eat as time permits.
z Storage of nonessential items. Individual clothing and equipment, and unit equipment not
needed in the objective area are packed in suitable containers and stored with the rear
echelon or rear detachment.

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Note. At a minimum, marshalling activities include briefing personnel, inspecting,

preparing airdrop containers, issuing rations and ammunition, and resting.

SECTION II – MOVEMENT
7-3. A marshalling area is a location in the vicinity of a reception terminal or pre-positioned equipment
storage site where arriving unit personnel, equipment, materiel, and accompanying supplies are
reassembled, returned to the control of the unit commander, and prepared for onward movement. (Refer to
JP 3-35 for more information.) Unit marshalling areas should be located near departure airfields to limit
movement, higher headquarters can either control the movement to the marshalling area completely, or it
can get a copy of the march table and use it to control the traffic out of the assembly area, along the route of
march, and into the marshalling area. Advance parties assign personnel to areas.
7-4. The S-4 of the unit to be marshaled notifies higher headquarters on the number of organic vehicles
that the unit can give to move its personnel and equipment to the marshalling areas. This information and
the personnel list furnished by the S-3 must be available early enough during planning to procure other
transportation required for the movement.
7-5. When marshalling areas are on airfields, they are placed temporarily at the disposal of the airborne
force’s higher headquarters. The air base commander’s permission is obtained by the tactical units that
must conduct activities outside of the camp area.
7-6. Parachute issue and rigging may be conducted on the ramp, alongside the aircraft, or in-flight.
Advantages and disadvantages are listed below in table 7-1.
Table 7-1. Parachute issue
Issue/Rig Advantages Disadvantages
RAMP x Reduces the parachute supply problem. x Parachutists may require transportation
x Efficient use of personnel. to the aircraft.
x Supply accountability. x Parachutists are rigged for a greater
period.
PLANE x Parachutists are not required to walk while x Parachutes must be transported to the
SIDE rigged. aircraft.
x Decentralized execution reduces rigging x Rigging process may impede other
time. activities.
IN-FLIGHT x Prevents fatigue during long flights. x Reduces the number of parachutists that
x Provides more time for rehearsals and an aircraft can carry.
inspections. x Requires loading of parachutes on the
aircraft.

SECTION III – PROTECTION

7-7. Protection tasks and systems preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat
power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel and physical assets of
the U.S., host-nation, and multinational military and civilian partners.
7-8. The marshalling area should be surrounded by security fencing or, at least, triple-strand concertina. It
should have a posted security area outside the perimeter that is at least 50 meters wide and cleared of brush
and trees. If available, use lights to illuminate the security area. Gates to the camp should be two lanes wide
to accommodate heavy traffic.

PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES

7-9. Uncommitted airborne forces pose a strategic or operational threat to the enemy. Avoid concentrating
forces during marshalling to keep impending operations secret and to deny lucrative targets to the enemy.
Dispersal methods include the following:

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z Move. Units move rapidly under cover of darkness to dispersed marshalling areas near air
facilities.
z Control. Commanders control movement to loading sites so most personnel arrive after the
equipment and supplies are loaded on the aircraft.
z Prepare. Commanders prepare for loading before arrival at the loading site.
z Avoid. Commanders avoid assembling more than 50 percent of an ABN IBCT at a single point.

DISPERSAL
7-10. The degree of dispersal is based on an intimate knowledge of the operation’s problems and what is
best for the overall operation. Regardless of the dispersed loading method, the airlift commander ensures
that aircraft arrive over the objective area in the order required by the air movement plan. Depending on the
situation, one of the following methods is used:
z Movement to departure air facilities. Move airborne forces and equipment to departure air
facilities where airlift aircraft may be dispersed.
z Movement to intermediate staging base. Before the mission, airlift aircraft fly to an intermediate
staging base to pick up airborne forces and equipment. Airlift airborne forces and equipment to
dispersed departure airfields; the mission originates from these facilities.
z Combining methods. Airlift aircraft fly to intermediate staging bases for the equipment before
the mission. The equipment is airlifted to the dispersed departure airfields and the mission
originates from these facilities, or airlift aircraft stop en route at intermediate staging bases to
pick up personnel. Crews load aircraft quickly, so the fewest possible aircraft are at the
intermediate staging base at one time.

SECTION IV – DEPARTURE AIRFIELD-MARSHALLING AREA

7-11. Base the departure airfield selection on the proposed air movement and the capability of airfields to
handle the traffic. Designate loading sites near departure airfields after selecting departure airfields.

SELECTING DEPARTURE AIRFIELDS

7-12. For a specific situation or operation, one or a combination of the following factors can determine the
selection:
z Mission.
z Airfields (number required, location, and type).
z Runway length and weight-bearing capacity.
z Communications facilities.
z Navigational aids and airfield lighting.
z Locating participating units and marshalling areas.
z Radius of action required.
z Vulnerability to enemy action to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.
z Other air support available or required.
z Logistical support available, required, or both.
z Facilities for reception of personnel and cargo.
z Facilities for loading and unloading of personnel and cargo.
z Facilities for dispatch of personnel and cargo.
z Facilities to support rigging and storage of heavy-drop platforms.

Note. While dispersion is necessary to avoid vulnerability to enemy action, excessive dispersion
increases control problems and can diminish the effectiveness of other supporting ground and air
operations.

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Chapter 7

SELECTING AND OPERATING MARSHALLING AREAS

7-13. The marshalling area is a sealed area with facilities for the final preparation of paratroopers for
combat. Commanders select marshalling areas based on the air movement plan and other considerations.
Another way to avoid concentration of personnel is to time-phase the movement of personnel from their
home bases through the marshalling area to the departure airfield, minimizing the buildup of forces. After
choosing the marshalling areas and departure airfields, choose loading sites near the airfields.
7-14. The following factors are considered when selecting marshalling areas:
z Distance to airfield(s).
z Time available.
z Current facilities.
z Availability of personnel and materials for construction.
z Availability or access of maneuver and training areas.
z Communications requirements.
z Briefing facilities.
z Locating participating units.
z Security or vulnerability to enemy action.
z Logistical support available or required.

7-15. In the marshalling plan, the S-4 (in coordination with the S-3), assigns units to marshalling areas near
the departure airfields the units will use. Make every effort to locate the areas as close as possible to
departure airfields to reduce movement time between them and to reduce requirement for vehicles.
7-16. The ABNAF’s higher commander is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the
marshalling areas. He includes the following:
z Provide operating detachments and necessary equipment for each area. These detachments give
signal communications, transportation, medical, and postal services. They operate mess facilities
and utilities.
z Marshal personnel from the units or from follow-on units of the ABNAF can assist in operating
the marshalling areas if it does not interfere with their preparations for the airborne operation.
Do not use equipment from these units because it must be packed and loaded for movement to
the objective area.
z Maintain smalls stocks of supplies and equipment of all services at each marshalling area to fill
last-minute shortages of the units being marshaled. Furnish services maintenance support as
required.

Note. The number of personnel required to support operation and maintenance of marshalling areas varies.
Based on experience, about 10 percent of the number of personnel being marshaled is required for
supporting services.

FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
7-17. Commanders can use this information as a guide to selecting and modifying facilities for ABN IBCT
use. Figure 7-1 shows a typical marshalling area layout for an ABN IBCT-size unit that needs about 100 acres.

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 Marshalling Plan

Figure 7-1. Airborne task force marshalling area

7-18. Task force facility. The ABN IBCT or battalion (task-organized for the mission), and the marshalling
area control group occupy an ABNTF facility. If no facilities exist, support elements must construct the facilities.
7-19. Facility specifications. The ABNTF facility should be near a departure airfield and large enough to
support the ABN IBCT or battalion (as specified), its attachments, supporting personnel, and the
marshalling area control group that supports the marshalling requirements of the ABN IBCT. Each facility
has a site for rigging the heavy-drop and palleted equipment for air delivery (airdrop and airland).
7-20. Facility security. The facility should be surrounded by security fencing or, at least, triple-strand
concertina. It should have a posted security area outside the perimeter that is at least 50 meters wide and
cleared of brush and trees. If available, use lights to illuminate the security area. Gates should be well
lighted into the facility and have two lanes to accommodate heavy traffic.
7-21. Quarters, unit headquarters, dining areas, supply rooms, and latrines should be constructed and
allocated to maintain unit integrity.

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z Bivouac site. If billets are not available, a bivouac site can be prepared with tents laid out in
company streets.
z Dining facilities. Determining facility size requirement to adequately feed force.
z Latrine areas. There should be enough latrines to serve at least four percent of the male Soldiers
and six percent of the expected female Soldiers. Build latrines at least 100 yards downwind from
food service facilities to prevent food and water contamination. They need to be 30 yards from
the end of the unit area, but within a reasonable distance for easy access.
z Shower facilities. Enough shower facilities should be provided to support the size force in the
marshalling area.
7-22. The airborne force requires facilities for rigging heavy equipment drops and container delivery
system platform loads. Although equipment can be rigged outdoors, it should be rigged in a large building,
such as a hangar, where it is protected from weather. The following facilities are needed to outload:
z Loading area control center. The loading area control center (LACC) is provided for preparing
vehicles for heavy-drop, or airland. It should have a 10-foot by 20-foot area for each vehicle and
a 20-foot-wide area between rows for maintenance. A large area must be provided on either side
of the LACC for maneuverability within the LACC for maintenance or other vehicles. (See
figure 7-2.)

Figure 7-2. Heavy-drop loading area control center

z Rigging sites. The rigging site accommodates the rigging and outloading of about 50 platforms
in a 24-hour period, depending on the availability of trained personnel, equipment, and supplies.
The rigging site uses an assembly line rigging method. Riggers can operate as many lanes as
required with augmentation and as available space allows. (See figure 7-3.)

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 Marshalling Plan

Figure 7-3. Heavy-drop rigging site

MARSHALLED UNIT AND SUPPORT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

7-23. Marshalling is comprised of four activities: assemble personnel and cargo; conduct unit inspection,
load equipment, and prepare; sequence loads; and establish support organization at the port of debarkation.
Marshalled unit and support organization activities although not inclusive are addressed in the following paragraphs.
MARSHALLED UNIT
7-24. Prior to marshalling, if possible the marshalled unit advises the marshalling area control group,
through a liaison officer or by personal contact, of the requirements for the deploying unit at the
marshalling area. The marshalling area control group is the provisional unit, made up of nonorganic and

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Chapter 7

certain organic units not participating in the airborne assault, organized to support the deploying unit.
During marshalling coordinating staffs of the marshalled unit perform specific duties as follows:
z The S-1 provides human resources support including requisitions replacements, requests
recreational facilities, legal services, and coordinates medical support.
z The S-2 is responsible for intelligence readiness to include support to security programs,
counterintelligence, and deception measures to ensure secrecy.
z The S-3 submits personnel rosters, and outlines training, briefing, movement, and rehearsal
requirements and tracks and submits required operational reports.
z The S-4 continues to refine the deploying unit’s requirements for supply, maintenance,
transportation, and storage facilities.
z The S-6 determines communications systems requirements, establishes network and
electromagnetic spectrum operations, network defense, and information protection.
z The S-9 integrates civil affairs operations, gaining efficiencies presenting coordinated and
deconflicted activities during marshalling.
z The staff makes requirements known as far as possible in advance of the marshalling period to
enable support personnel to procure the facilities and install them where necessary.
7-25. Marshalled unit, in accordance with an unit standard operating procedure may establish a departure
airfield control officer, (commonly referred to as the DACO), who will act as the ABN IBCT commander’s
principal representative for all activities conducted at the departure airfield. He may act as a liaison officer
between the marshaled unit and the marshalling area control group or departure airfield control group,
discussed later in this section. The departure airfield control officer also may control a departure airfield
control team designated to perform duties as prescribed in an airborne standard operating procedures
document. (Refer to unit standard operating procedures document for specific instructions.)
SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS
7-26. When the ABN IBCT deploys and the marshalling areas close, the division support command acts as
the provisional logistical unit at the home station. The theater commander responsible for the area of
operation provides the provisional logistical support unit for the intermediate staging base. If a support unit
cannot preposition at the intermediate staging base, a support unit from the home station command is
included in the advance party. Marshalling control agencies assist the airborne and airlift force in executing
the operation.
7-27. Marshalling area control group. To enable most of the airborne force to concentrate on preparing for
planned operations, support agencies are designated by division headquarters to provide most of the
administrative and logistical support. As stated earlier these nonorganic units and certain organic units not
participating in the airborne assault organized into a provisional unit known as the marshalling area control
group. The marshalling area control group, commander is the principal logistical operator for the deploying
force; he executes the logistical plan. This control group provides services until the assault force departs
and the marshalling area is closed. Typical assistance provided by this unit includesʊ
z Transportation.
z Movement control.
z All classes of supply.
z Communications.
z Facility construction, operation, and maintenance.
z Maintenance.
z Rigging.
z Recreation and other morale services.
z Local security personnel, when required.
z Army health system support.

7-28. Airlift control element (ALCE). The ALCE coordinates and maintains operational control of all
airlift aircraft while they are on the ground at the designated airfield. This includes aircraft and load-
movement control and reporting, communications, loading and off-loading teams, aeromedical activities,

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 Marshalling Plan

and coordination with interested agencies, The ALCE’s support function includes activities that relate to
the airfield. Typical tasks for this USAF unit include—
z On both planned and rapid notice, support and control exercises and contingency operations, as
defined in air mobility, and deployment and redeployment operations manuals and mission
directives.
z Conduct around-the-clock operations to provide supervisory control and to ensure effective use
of the airlift force on assigned missions.
z Direct, execute, and coordinate mission directives, plans, and orders assigned.
z Distribute completed loading manifests as required.
z Give copies of the aircraft-parking plan to support units.
z Coordinate loading of aircraft.
z Coordinate disposition of Army equipment and personnel remaining behind or returning because
of aborted sorties.
z Ensure that appropriate and adequate briefings for Army and USAF personnel are conducted.
z Coordinate flight clearances.
z Coordinate configuration of aircraft.
z Schedule and coordinate proper air force coverage of assault landing zones, and drop zones.
z Schedule and publish air movement tables for supported units.
z Provide or arrange weather support for the mission.

7-29. Departure airfield control group (DACG). The DACG ensures that Army units and their supplies and
equipment are moved from the marshalling area and loaded according to the air movement plan. Timing is
critical at this point in the operation. Maintain strict control of both air and ground traffic on and across
active runways.
7-30. Arrival airfield control group (AACG). Organizing the AACG is similar to the DACG. When
personnel, supplies, and equipment are arriving on aircraft and need to be moved to marshalling facilities or
holding areas, the AACG is responsible for offloading them. Like the DACG, the AACG works closely
with the ALCE unit at the arrival airfield.

SECTION V – OUTLOAD
7-31. Complex outload operations are more difficult because they usually are conducted at night under
blackout conditions. Since most or all airborne units’ vehicles are rigged for air delivery, airborne forces
must rely on the supporting unit for transportation during outload. These requirements are closely related to
and dictated by the loading plans developed for the operation.

OUTLOAD PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7-32. Loading preparations are included in the marshalling plan. Loading plans outline the moving
personnel and equipment and heavy-drop loads from the alert holding area to planeside. They outline the
use of available materials-handling equipment. The loading plans are coordinated closely with the
supporting airlift force.
7-33. A loading plan is formulated at joint conferences. It contains information about the number of
personnel and the amount of equipment to be airlifted, ACLs, and the general sequence of movement.
7-34. Strict adherence to the loading timetable is mandatory. The loading of equipment and supplies must
be completed in time to permit post-loading inspection, joint pre-takeoff briefing, and personnel loading by
the designated station time.
7-35. The general delineations of loading responsibilities in connection with the airborne operation are as
follows:
z Airlift commander responsibilities include—
„ Develops plans for specific loads and the sequence of movement in conjunction with the
unit being moved.

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Chapter 7

„ Establishes and disseminates manifesting all cargo and personnel.

„ Provides instructions for loading, instructions for documenting and unloading aircraft and
for cargo tie-down.
„ Parks aircraft according to the parking plan.
„ Provides loading ramps, floor conveyors, tie-downs, load spreaders, and other auxiliary
equipment such as operation ejection equipment.
„ Prepares aircraft for ejecting cargo and for the safe exit of paratroopers from aircraft in
flight. Cargo to be ejected in flight is tied down by USAF personnel.
„ Ensures that a USAF representative is present to provide technical assistance and to
supervise the loading unit during the loading operations of each aircraft.
„ Verifies documentation of personnel and equipment.
„ Furnishes and operates materials-handling equipment required in aircraft loading and
unloading if the U.S. Army unit needs it.
z Airborne commander responsibilities include—
„ Establishes the priority and sequence for movement of airborne personnel, equipment, and
supplies.
„ Prepares cargo for airdrop, airland, or extraction according to applicable safety instructions.
„ Marks each item of equipment to show its weight and cubage and, when appropriate, to
show the center of gravity. Ensures hazardous cargo is properly annotated on DD Form
1387-2.
„ Documents and manifests all loads of U.S. Army personnel.
„ Directs and monitors both movement of ground traffic to airfield or loading area, and
accepts delivery at the destination.
„ Delivers properly rigged supplies and equipment to the aircraft according to the loading
plan.
„ Loads, ties down, and unloads accompanying supplies and equipment into and from the
aircraft with technical assistance from a USAF representative. Cargo to be ejected in flight
is tied down and ejected by USAF personnel. (Exception is made in the case of containers
of supplies and equipment that are pushed from the jump exits by paratroopers immediately
before their exit from the aircraft.)
„ Ensures that U.S. Army personnel are seated aboard aircraft, are properly equipped, and
have their safety belts fastened by station time.
„ Briefs and supervises U.S. Army vehicle operators to ensure that the operators thoroughly
comprehend airfield vehicular traffic control measures and pertinent safety precautions
before they operate vehicles around aircraft.
„ Provides vehicles and loading personnel to outload U.S. Army personnel and cargo from
aborting aircraft and reload them on spare aircraft if time permits.

OUTLOAD CONTROL
7-36. A control system at arrival airfields is essential to prevent congestion and to facilitate orderly
movement of cargo and personnel. Outload control includes parking, traffic control, loading, bump plan,
and unloading.
PARKING
7-37. The main parking consideration is loading access. Dispersal must provide the most security possible
with the least possible vulnerability and, at the same time, allow maneuvering room for loading the equipment.
CONTROLLING TRAFFIC
7-38. A traffic control system is essential to avoid congestion at loading and unloading sites. In outloading,
force control is accomplished by using a call-forward system in which loads are brought into the loading
area as required. The following control system outline applies to air landing facilities as well as airfields.
(See figure 7-4.) The system provides a separate loading facility for personnel, heavy-drop loads, and aerial

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 Marshalling Plan

supply. The separation is essential to control loading and decrease the time required to load. The airfield
control system is set up with the minimum required personnel and communications equipment, and with
regard to the size of the forces being moved.

Figure 7-4. Concept of outload control

LOADING
7-39. The actual outload is complex and requires close supervision to ensure all equipment and personnel
are loaded on the correct aircraft as quickly and efficiently as possible.
z Initially, personnel and equipment are dispersed in marshalling areas distant from the loading
airfields, but in close communication with control groups at the airfields.
z When called, the unit or equipment is moved by planeload to the call-forward area. The fewest
possible planeloads are maintained on hand in the call-forward area to ensure uninterrupted
loading. Use guides and military police as required.
z As aircraft arrive in the loading area, planeloads are called forward; unit members load and tie
equipment down with the technical assistance of USAF personnel.
z Control personnel maintain a log listing the departure of each aircraft. It contains the following
information:
„ Aircraft tail number.
„ Summary of load or unit load number. (Correlate manifests with this entry.)
„ Time aircraft was available for loading.
„ Station time.
„ Takeoff time.

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„ Remarks.
BUMP PLAN
7-40. A bump plan is used to ensure that critical personnel and equipment are delivered to the airhead in
the assault in the event of last-minute aircraft maintenance problems or the planned number of aircraft is
not available. When designing the plan, consider communications requirements, the time required/available
to execute the bump plan, and ensure secure en route communications package and tactical satellite
(TACSAT) supports the physical location of key personnel (i.e. commander on right door, TACSAT on
right door). A simple plan always works better under time constraints.
7-41. The bump plan must be coordinated through the ground liaison officer. State bump plan by priority
and sequence, the time required to execute the plan, and number of personnel to be bumped. Units must
keep in mind, the bump plan should account for the location of key personnel and communications
requirements (TACSAT hatch mounts for example).
7-42. The outload brief is coordinated and facilitated by the G-3 of the higher headquarters. This is a
working briefing and is the final coordination opportunity for all involved in the airborne operation. The
outload coordination brief sheet is filled out during the outload brief. Special attention should be given to
chalk number and formation, key personnel, key heavy drop, hot loads, air land loads, bump plan, number
of personnel and time line.
7-43. All paratroopers will be marked in accordance with unit marking standard operating procedures.
These markings must be strictly adhered to for both day and night jumps so that jumpmasters and key
leaders can recognize the tactical cross load within a chalk, implement timely bump plans, or reorganize
jumpers at the last minute to adhere to a cross load, and assemble quickly. At a minimum a bump plan
should include:
z Identification and location of key personnel and communications and mission essential
equipment (in accordance with the mission).
z Prioritization and sequence.
z Actions to be taken to bump non-essential personnel.
z Time required and available to execute the bump plan.
z Location of key personnel down through task force level.

UNLOADING
7-44. At arrival airfields, the control system is the reverse of that used at departure airfields. On arrival,
crews unload aircraft and move the loads to dispersed holding areas where arriving elements build up to
convenient size for further movements. Crews keep load categories separated to facilitate control and movement.

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 PART II

Air Assault Operations

Chapter 8
Organization and Employment
An air assault operation is an operation in which assault forces, using the mobility of
rotary-wing assets and the total integration of available firepower, maneuver under
the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage enemy forces or to
seize and hold key terrain (JP 3-18). An air assault is a vertical envelopment
conducted to gain a positional advantage, envelop or turn enemy forces that may or
may not be in a position to oppose the operation. Ideally, the commander seeks to
surprise the enemy and achieve an unopposed landing when conducting a vertical
envelopment. However, the assault force must prepare for the presence of opposition.
At the tactical level, vertical envelopments emphasize seizing terrain, destroying
specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes.

SECTION I – AIR ASSAULT AND AIR MOVEMENTS

8-1. Air assaults are not merely movements of Soldiers, weapons, and equipment by Army aviation units
and should not be considered as such. An air assault is not synonymous with an air movement. They are
separate and distinct missions.
8-2. An air assault is the movement of friendly assault forces by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and
destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain (JP 3-18). It is a precisely planned and vigorously
executed combat operation. An air assault allows friendly forces to strike over extended distances and
terrain barriers to attack the enemy when and where it is most vulnerable. Commanders and leaders must
develop an insight into the principles governing their organization and employment to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by an air assault.
8-3. Air movement is air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment including airdrops and air
landings (JP 3-17). Army air movements are operations involving the use of utility and cargo rotary-wing
aircraft and operational support fixed-wing assets for other than air assaults. Air movements are conducted
to move Soldiers and equipment; emplace systems; and transport ammunition, fuel, and other high-value
supplies. The same general considerations that apply to air assaults apply to air movements. (Refer to
FM 3-04.113 for more information.)

SECTION II – AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE

8-4. Air assaults are accomplished by forming and employing an air assault task force (AATF). The
AATF is a temporary group of integrated forces tailored to a specific mission under the command of a
single headquarters. It may include some or all elements of the BCT. The ground or air maneuver
commander, designated as the AATFC, commands the AATF.

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ORGANIZING FORCES
8-5. The division is the lowest echelon capable of resourcing an air assault, a combat battalion or task
force is the lowest echelon with a staff to properly plan an air assault, and the company is the lowest
echelon with a headquarters to execute an air assault. Once the commander determines the principal
components of the ground tactical plan and the maneuver and fire support schemes, the AATF organizes to
execute its assigned mission. (Refer to FM 3-94 for more information.)
8-6. BCTs, combat battalions or task forces, and aviation elements from a combat aviation brigade are
ideally suited to form powerful and flexible AATFs that can project combat power throughout an area of
operation with little regard for terrain barriers. The unique versatility and strength of an AATF is achieved
by combining the speed, agility, and firepower of rotary-wing aircraft with those of the maneuver forces in
the BCTs.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

8-7. All BCTs, whether Infantry, Stryker, or Armored have the capability to plan, prepare, and execute air
assault operations when the situation dictates. BCTs have maneuver, field artillery, reconnaissance and
surveillance, sustainment, military intelligence, signal, and engineer capabilities that allow for the effective
execution of air assault operations.
8-8. Although Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) and Armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) may
not conduct air assaults as frequently as IBCTs, such operations conducted on a limited scale may be the
decisive maneuver in an SBCT or ABCT operation. For this reason, all BCTs should be proficient in
conducting air assaults. Examples of air assault operations conducted by SBCTs and ABCTs include
seizing and retaining river-crossing sites, deliberate breach sites, and key terrain. Understanding the
detailed planning and preparation that goes into an air assault enables the SBCT or ABCT to—
z Exploit the mobility and speed of task-organized or supporting helicopters to secure a key
objective in the offense.
z Reinforce a threatened unit in the defense.
z Place combat power at a decisive point in an area of operation.

8-9. Due to the abundance and unrestricted use of all forms of improvised explosive devices and the
threat of ground attack, it is common for aviation, engineer, and field artillery units to conduct air assault
operations alongside or air movement operations separate from their Infantry counterparts. Ground tactical
movement subjects the entire organization to the threat of improvised explosive devices or ground attack as
soon as the vehicles leave their assembly areas or base.

COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADES

8-10. Most of the Army’s aviation combat power resides in combat aviation brigades, which can be task-
organized based on the mission. (See table 8-1, page 8-3, and table 8-2, page 8-4.) These combat aviation
brigades include various types of organizations with manned and unmanned systems and specialize in
providing combat capabilities to multiple BCTs.
8-11. In a BCT-sized air assault, the combat aviation brigade typically task-organizes based on the mission
variables of METT-TC to form an aviation task force. Additional aviation companies, platoons, or sections
may be task-organized to include attack reconnaissance (manned and unmanned), mission command,
communications relay, air medical evacuation, and air traffic services. In BCT-sized air assaults,
reinforcement with additional aviation is a common way to mass combat power and accelerate force
buildup. Other combined arms forces, to include Infantry, field artillery, or engineer, and sustainment units,
may be part of the combat aviation brigade task organization for specific missions.
8-12. The aviation task force employs a mix of attack reconnaissance aircraft to support an air assault, Teams of
mixed attack and reconnaissance aircraft, commonly referred to as attack weapons teams and scout weapons
teams, are organized and employed based on METT-TC. An attack weapons team is composed of two AH-64
attack helicopters. A scout weapons team is composed of two OH-58D scout helicopters. Planning
considerations for the two airframes include:

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 Organization and Employment

z The AH-64 offers longer range, increased station time, and a larger weapons load, but has a
larger signature.
z The OH-58D has a shorter range, decreased station time, and a lighter weapons load, but has a
smaller signature.
z Both airframes have a mix of sighting systems and optics capable of employment in various
environmental and weather conditions.
z Forward arming and refueling point assets are postured and configured based on airframe type.
Table 8-1. Heavy Combat Aviation Brigade organization

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Chapter 8

Table 8-2. Medium Combat Aviation Brigade organization

SECTION III – TASK FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

8-13. When forming an AATF, consider the following factors:
z Early formation of the AATF. This force is formed early in the planning stage by a headquarters
that can allocate dedicated aviation resources. The directing or establishing headquarters
allocates units and defines authority and responsibility by designating command and support
relationships. Predesignated and well-understood command and support relationships ensure the
AATF fights as a cohesive, coordinated, combined arms team.
z Availability of aviation assets. The warning order (WARNORD) may include task-organizing
the AATF, which must provide a mission-specific balance of mobility and combat power. The
AATF normally is organized with sufficient combat power to seize initial objectives and protect
landing zones. The required combat power should be delivered to the objective area consistent
with aircraft and pickup zone capacities to take advantage of surprise and shock effect.
z Maintaining unit tactical integrity. When planning loads, squads normally are loaded intact on
the same helicopter, with platoons located in the same serial, to ensure unit integrity upon
landing. To perform its mission, an AATF must arrive intact at the landing zone. The force must
be tailored to provide en route security and protection from the pickup zone, throughout the
entire air route, and at the landing zone.
z Sufficient sustainment capability. The AATF is organized with a sustainment capability to
support a rapid tempo until follow-on or linkup forces arrive, or until the mission is completed.
Units that support the air assault operation normally are placed in direct support to the AATF to
ensure close coordination and continuous, dedicated support throughout an operation. Normally,

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an AATF exists only until completing a specified mission. After that, aviation and other
elements return to the control of their parent units.

SECTION IV – CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS, VULNERABILITIES

8-14. Gaining the initiative and setting the conditions requires commanders to know the capabilities,
limitations and vulnerabilities of their force. The flexibility of conducting air assault operations allows a
commander to control the tempo and exploit the initiative. A properly planned and executed air assault
operation generates combat power.
8-15. An air assault force is a force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units organized,
equipped, and trained for air assault operations (JP 3-18). Air assault forces are most effective in situations
where the threat of speed from mobility provides surprise and affords seizure of key terrain. Air assault
forces are best suited for missions that require—
z Massing or shifting combat power quickly.
z Surprise.
z Flexibility, mobility, and speed.
z Gaining and maintaining the initiative.

8-16. Considerations for conducting air assault operations are as follows:

z Best conducted at night or during weather conditions that allow aircraft operation but obscure
enemy observation to facilitate deception and surprise.
z Close air support planning must provide suppression of threats en route to and the vicinity of the
vertical envelopment point.
z As early as possible, ground and air reconnaissance should be conducted at landing zones.

CAPABILITIES
8-17. An AATF can extend the battlefield, move, and rapidly concentrate combat power like no other
available forces. AATF capabilities are as follows:
z Attack enemy positions from any direction.
z Conduct attacks and raids within the operational area.
z Conduct exploitation and pursuit operations.
z Overfly and bypass enemy positions, barriers, and obstacles and strike objectives in otherwise
inaccessible areas.
z Provide responsive reserves, allowing commanders to commit a larger portion of his force to
action.
z React rapidly to tactical opportunities, necessities, and threats in unassigned areas.
z Rapidly place forces at tactically decisive points in the area of operation.
z Conduct fast-paced operations over extended distances.
z Conduct and support deception with false insertions.
z Rapidly reinforce committed units.
z Rapidly secure and defend key terrain (such as crossing sites, road junctions, and bridges) or key
objectives.
z Delay a much larger force without becoming decisively engaged.

LIMITATIONS
8-18. An AATF relies on helicopter support throughout an air assault operation. As such, it may be limited byʊ
z Adverse weather; extreme heat and cold; and other environmental conditions (such as blowing
snow and sand) that limit flight operations, helicopter lifting capability, or altitude and elevation
restrictions that affect operational capabilities.
z Reliance on air lines of communication.
z Threat aircraft, air defense, and electronic warfare action.

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z Reduced ground mobility once inserted (particularly SBCT and ABCT forces).
z Availability of suitable landing zones and pickup zones due to mountainous, urban, jungle, or
other complex terrain.
z Availability of air routes (for example, air routes near international borders).
z Availability of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection and decontamination capability.
z Battlefield obscuration that limits helicopter flight.
z High fuel and ammunition consumption rates.
z Availability of organic fires, sustainment assets, and protection.

VULNERABILITIES
8-19. An AATF uses helicopters to move to and close with the enemy. Initial assault elements should be
light and mobile. They often are separated from weapon systems, equipment, and materiel that provide
protection and survivability on the battlefield. An AATF is particularly vulnerable toʊ
z Enemy attack by aircraft and air defense weapon systems during the movement phase.
z Enemy attack by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons because of limited
protection and decontamination capability.
z Enemy attack by ground, air, or artillery during the loading and landing phases.
z Enemy air strikes due to limited availability of air defense weapon systems.
z Enemy electronic attack to include jamming of communications and navigation systems, and
disrupting aircraft survivability equipment.
z Enemy small-arms fire that presents a large threat to helicopters during the air movement and
landing phases.

SECTION V – AIRSPACE CONTROL

8-20. Airspace control requires both a control authority and a control system. Airspace control is a process
used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with
minimum restraint upon airspace users. Planning must include coordinating, integrating, and regulating
airspace to increase operational effectiveness. Proper planning causes effective airspace control and reduces
the risk of fratricide, enhances air defense, and permits flexibility.

CONCURRENT EMPLOYMENT
8-21. Airspace control is applying airspace control to coordinate airspace users for concurrent employment
in assigned missions. Effective airspace control enables all warfighting functions to work efficiently while
synchronizing air operations to support the commander’s intent. Successful airspace control is dependent
on the ability to perform the functions of identification, coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace
users.
8-22. Properly managed airspace increases combat effectiveness. Ensuring the safe, efficient and flexible
use of airspace, minimizes restraint placed on airspace users. It includes coordinating, integrating, and
regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness. Effective airspace control reduces the risk of
fratricide, enhances air defense, and permits flexibility.
8-23. Airspace control does not denote ownership of a block of airspace or command over activities within
that airspace. Rather, it refers to users of the airspace. All air missions are subject to the airspace control
order published by the airspace control authority, which provides direction to deconflict, coordinate, and
integrate the use of airspace within the operational area.
8-24. Joint forces use airspace to conduct air operations, deliver fires, employ air defense measures, and
conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. At times, these missions may be time
sensitive and avoid the ability to conduct detailed coordination with the land force. It is imperative that land
forces provide their higher headquarters with all airspace coordinating measures to provide visibility to
other joint users and prevent fratricide.

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 Organization and Employment

8-25. Methods of airspace control are as follows:

z Positive control relies on positive identification, tracking, and directing aircraft within the
airspace control area. It uses electronic means such as radar; sensors; identification, friend or foe
systems; selective identification feature capabilities; digital data links; and other elements of the
intelligence system and mission command network structures.
z Procedural control relies on combining mutually agreed and promulgated orders and procedures.
These may include comprehensive air defense identification procedures and rules of
engagement, aircraft identification maneuvers, fire support coordination measures, and airspace
coordinating measures. Service, joint, and multinational capabilities and requirements determine
which method, or which elements of each method, that airspace control plans and systems use.
Procedural control is a common method used by all airspace users (to include indirect fire units)
to deconflict airspace. In Army rotary-wing operations, such as air assaults, procedural control is
used more often than positive control.

AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES

8-26. Airspace coordinating measures are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to
accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (Refer to FM 3-52 for
more information.)
8-27. Common airspace coordinating measures used during an air assault are as follows:
z Coordinating altitudes use altitude to separate users and as the transition between different
airspace coordinating entities. The airspace coordinating entities should be included in the air
control plan and promulgated in the airspace control order. Army echelons incorporate airspace
control planning guidance and integrate the airspace control order, area air defense plan, special
instructions, and air tasking order via operation orders (OPORDs). All airspace users should
coordinate with the appropriate airspace coordinating entities when transitioning through or
firing through the coordinating altitude.
z Restricted operations areas are airspaces of defined dimensions created in response to specific
operational situations or requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users
is restricted. They are known as restricted operations zones. The AATF may use a restricted
operations area or restricted operations zone to deconflict an area where prior coordination
enhances aviation safety.
z Using standard Army aircraft flight routes that are routes established below the coordinating
altitude to facilitate the movement of Army aviation assets. They normally are located in the
corps through BCT support areas and do not require approval of the airspace control authority.
They normally are listed on the current airspace control order. Direction of travel can be dictated
as one- or two-way traffic.
z Using air corridors that are restricted air routes of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and
established for preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces. They are used
to route aviation combat elements between such areas as forward arming and refueling points,
holding areas, and battle positions. Altitudes of an air corridor do not exceed the established
coordinating altitude.
z Using axis of advance that is a general route of advance, assigned for the purposes of control,
which extends toward the enemy. The axis of advance symbol graphically portrays a
commander’s intention, such as avoiding built-up areas or known enemy air defense sites. When
used for attack aviation operations, it provides the general direction of movement and may be
subdivided into routes.
z Using air control points which are points easily identifiable on the terrain or an electronic
navigational aid used to provide necessary control during air movement. Designate air control
points at each point where the air route or air corridor makes a definite change in any direction
and at any other point deemed necessary for timing or control of the operation.
z Using communication checkpoints which are points along the air route where serial commanders
report to the air mission commander. Radio transmissions should be used only when necessary.
If a report is required, consider using codes to ensure a short transmission.

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AIRSPACE DEVELOPMENT
8-28. When developing a course of action, the ground maneuver unit should plan an air axis of advance.
This provides the general concept to the aviation planners who further refine it into routes with enough
guidance to determine the direction from which the commander wants to approach. Do not submit the
developed axis of advance to the higher headquarters airspace control element.

AIR ROUTE PLANNING

8-29. Upon receipt of the course of action, the aviation liaison officer plans the air routes within the air
axis of advance. The aviation unit normally plans multiple routes within the axis of advance since the threat
air defense disposition may not be clear. The air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element
(ADAM/BAE) should assist in route planning, but the supporting aviation unit is responsible for
completing the routes and submitting them to the higher headquarters airspace control element for inclusion
on the airspace control order.

RESTRICTED OPERATIONS ZONE PLANNING

8-30. Any unit with organic unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is responsible for planning their own
restricted operations zones for unmanned aircraft launch and recovery. All elements operating UAS in a
BCT submit their request through the ADAM/BAE for deconfliction before submitting it to the higher
headquarters airspace control element.
8-31. UAS launch and recovery restricted operations zones typically should be three kilometers in radius or
surface to coordinating altitude, but may be tailored to meet operational requirements. Due to their size,
unmanned aircraft launch and recovery restricted operations zones should not be planned near indirect fire
units, supporting aviation unit assembly areas, or forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) if possible.
8-32. The supporting combat aviation brigade submits restricted operations zone locations for mission
command and air medical evacuation aircraft to the higher headquarters airspace control element. Mission
command and air medical evacuation aircraft restricted operation zones should be at least three by three
kilometers in size. The combat aviation brigade plans both a primary and alternate restricted operations
zones for each aircraft. This enables control of the operation as it moves forward and provides a restricted
operations zone, if needed, for the higher headquarters mobile command group. Fire support units can
utilize restricted operations zones to assist in deconflicting airspace between firing locations and target
locations.
8-33. Special consideration should be given to planned employment of an organic UAS near a landing
zone. If required due to the tactical mission, small-UAS should be clearly separated by a defined terrain
feature from the landing zone area, and the approach and exit routes of aircraft.

METHODS TO DECONFLICT ON THE OBJECTIVE AREA

8-34. Three possible methods to deconflict airspace between attack reconnaissance aircraft and assault
aircraft on the objective are described in the following paragraphs. They include: grid line or terrain feature
separation, attack by fire positioning, and call clear methods.

Grid Line or Terrain Feature Separation

8-35. This is the most restrictive but easiest method to execute. It may not allow the attack reconnaissance
units to engage targets in the close combat attack role during the air assault, but this technique is
appropriate when time is limited for rehearsals, or when prior planning is extremely limited or not possible.
With this method, the attack reconnaissance units clear the airspace for inbound assault units by moving to
a designated grid line or terrain feature on either side of the objective. This movement and the subsequent
maneuver of the attack reconnaissance units in and around the objective area are executed according to the
instructions in the order. (See figure 8-1.)

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 Organization and Employment

Figure 8-1. Grid line method

Attack by Fire Positioning

8-36. Attack by fire positioning is a method of deconfliction, as it allows attack reconnaissance aircraft the
flexibility to engage targets during the air assault in support of the ground commander. The attack
reconnaissance units occupy known attack by fire positions according to the published OPORD. This
method restricts the attack reconnaissance units to the general vicinity of the attack by fire positions but not
to a specific grid. (See figure 8-2, page 8-10.)
8-37. The attack by fire positioning method requires the attack reconnaissance units to ensure they stay
clear of the landing zone and do not cross the centerline of the direction of flight. Using this method
requires the attack reconnaissance aircraft to have increased situational awareness. This method is best used
when all elements have adequate time to rehearse.

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Chapter 8

Figure 8-2. Attack by fire method

Call Clear
8-38. The call clear method is used in contingency circumstances when assault or other aircraft (such as air
medical evacuation or mission command aircraft) are inbound to the objective area. It is initiated with an
inbound call of the assault or other aircraft to the landing zone and a response from the attack
reconnaissance air mission commander indicating that all elements of the landing zone and the flight path
to it from the release point are clear. Avoid using this method during the main air assault itself due to
congestion on the air battle network.

SECTION VI – AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE MISSION COMMAND

8-39. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders
to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command— as a warfighting function— assist the
AATFC in balancing the art of command with the science of control, while emphasizing the human aspects
of mission command. Mission command systems within AATF includes the arrangement of personnel,
networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable the
AATFC to conduct air assault operations.

MISSION ORDERS
8-40. The AATFC, supported by his staff, conducts air assault operations through centralized planning and
decentralized execution based on mission orders. The commander during the development of mission
orders applies the foundation of mission command together with the mission command warfighting
function, guided by the following principles:
z Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
z Create shared understanding.
z Provide a clear commander’s intent.
z Exercise disciplined initiative.
z Use mission orders.
z Accept prudent risk.

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 Organization and Employment

8-41. The AATFC’s intent, formalized in the order and understood at the execution level, provides the
AATF with the concept of operations (CONOPS), allowing the task force to act promptly as the situation
requires. The commander focuses his order on the purpose of tasks and the air assault operation as a whole
rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Orders and plans are as brief and simple as
possible. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)
8-42. As the commander develops his CONOPS he considers the complexity of the operation, the mission
variables of METT-TC, and the experience level of his subordinate commanders and staffs to determine the
detail of command. In most situations, air assaults are centrally planned and well-rehearsed before
execution. This ensures that each subordinate leader knows the commander’s intent and is able to execute
his mission with minimal direction.
8-43. Contingencies or alternative courses of actions should be factored into the plan to allow for
continuation of the mission in a dynamic environment. Tasks must be planned to occur based on time or the
execution of a previous task (or tasks) so that actions occur at the specified time or in the specified
sequence. Use manned or UASs for communications relay to help mitigate potentially degraded or lost
communications. Commanders must plan contingencies for degraded or intermittent communications.
Refer to FM 6-02 for more information.)
8-44. Another factor for the AATFC to consider when determining mission command responsibility is the
location of the key AATF leadership. Key leaders should be positioned into discrete elements and dispersed
throughout the lifts with provisions to ensure continuity of command. (Figure 8-3 on page 8-12 shows an
example for positioning key leaders during an air assault.)
8-45. While air assault planning is centralized, air assault execution is aggressive and decentralized.
Subordinate commanders should be given as much freedom of action as possible (consistent with risk, the
situation, and mission accomplishment) to empower leaders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

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Chapter 8

Figure 8-3. Example of air assault leadership positioning

COMMAND POSTS
8-46. The AATFC executes mission command through the establishment of two primary command posts—
main command post and tactical command post. If the AATFC is the BCT commander, he has the option to
form a command group consisting of select staff members who accompany him and help exercise mission
command away from a command post. The following paragraphs addresses how the AATFC organizes the
AATF command posts for the conduct of an air assault.
MAIN COMMAND POST
8-47. The main command post provides control of operations when the tactical command post is not
deployed. When the tactical command post is deployed, the main command postʊ
z Provides planning for future operations.
z Maintains current enemy and friendly situations.
z Gathers information and disseminates intelligence.
z Keeps higher and adjacent organizations informed of the friendly situation and submits recurring
reports.
z Acts as liaison to higher and adjacent organizations.
z Coordinates for and advises the commander on the use of enablers for future operations.
z Assists the tactical command post with executing operations as needed.
z Develops and disseminates orders as necessary.

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 Organization and Employment

TACTICAL COMMAND POST

8-48. The AATFC employs the tactical command post as an extension of the main command post to help
control execution of the air assault for a limited period. The AATF tactical command post may be
employed into the objective area soon after the initial echelon if the enemy situation permits. The tactical
command post assists the commander in controlling current operations by taking the following actions:
z Maintaining the common operational picture and assisting in developing situational
understanding.
z Developing combat intelligence of immediate interest to the commander.
z Maneuvering forces.
z Controlling and coordinating fires.
z Coordinating with adjacent units and forward air defense elements.
z Serving as the main command post if the main command post is destroyed or unable to function.

8-49. The tactical command post comprises the AATFC, representatives from the S-2 and S-3 sections, fire
support officer, brigade aviation officer, and air liaison officer or whomever the commander designates.
The tactical command post deploys in a mission command aircraft in which the air mission commander
will be located. This aircraft contains a mission command package, which allows the commander to
observe and direct the air assault from a forward position if he chooses. The AATFC may elect to deploy a
tactical command post with the maneuver force. This command post is led by the AATF S-3 and comprises
a mission-tailored portion of the AATF headquarters.

COMMAND GROUPS
8-50. Command group is the commander and selected staff members who assist the commander in
controlling operations away from a command post (FM 6-0). The BCT headquarters can form two
command groups, which are organized based on the mission. Both are equipped to operate separately from
the tactical command post or main command post. Command groups give the commander and the
executive officer (if required) the mobility and protection to move throughout the area of operation and to
observe and direct BCT operations from forward positions.
8-51. Both command groups require a dedicated security element, additional considerations are required if
ground movement is planned. The command group led by the BCT commander comprises whomever he
designates. This can include the command sergeant major and representatives from the S-2, S-3, and fires
sections. The commander positions his command group near the most critical event, usually with or near
the decisive operation.
8-52. A second command group led by the brigade executive officer, if used, may include representation
from the operations staff section, intelligence staff section, and fire support element. The executive officer
usually positions his command group with a shaping operation or at a location designated by the BCT
commander. The executive officer must be able to communicate with the BCT commander, battalion and
squadron commanders, and command posts.

PERSONNEL AND KEY ELEMENTS WITHIN THE TASK FORCE

8-53. Emphasizing the human aspects of mission command are the personnel and key elements within the
AATF who operate command posts and assist the AATFC by exercising control of the air assault from the
initial planning stages through execution. This section describes the duties and responsibilities of personnel
and key elements within an air assault operations..

AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE COMMANDER

8-54. The AATFC is the overall commander of the AATF. He ensures continuity of command throughout
the operation. He must position himself where he can best see the battlefield and control the operation. In
situations that allow, he is airborne in a mission command aircraft during the air movement stage. At other
times, he may fight the battle from a tactical command post.

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GROUND TACTICAL COMMANDER

8-55. The ground commander is the commander of the largest ground maneuver force inserted during an
air assault. He is usually one of the AATFC’s subordinate maneuver commanders (such as a battalion or
company commander). He flies on one of the first serials into the objective area, maintaining
communication with the AATFC during the flight.

AIR MISSION COMMANDER

8-56. The air mission commander is the aviation unit commander or his designated representative. He
receives and executes the AATFC guidance and directives, and controls all aviation elements. The air
mission commander ensures continuity of command for all supporting aviation units and employs attack
reconnaissance helicopters and artillery along the air route, fighting the battle from pickup zone to landing
zone while keeping the AATFC informed.
AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE S-3
8-57. The AATF S-3 assists the AATFC with mission command. He normally leads the AATF tactical
command post when the AATFC is airborne in a mission command aircraft.

BRIGADE AVIATION OFFICER

8-58. The brigade aviation officer advises the AATFC on all matters relating to Army aviation and, along
with the AATF S-3 Air, jointly develops the detailed plans necessary to support the air assault operation.
During the execution phase, he should be available to assist the AATFC or S-3 Air in coordinating the
employment of aviation units.
AIR DEFENSE AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT/BRIGADE AVIATION ELEMENT
8-59. The air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE), led by the brigade
aviation officer, is a functional element residing in the BCT’s main command post. This functional element
continually plans for airspace use, executes near real-time control during execution, and monitors
operations of airspace users. This situational understanding is critical to ensure that the BCT can react to
any situation requiring immediate use of airspace, such as immediate fires, close air support, unplanned
UAS launches, or a diversion of aviation assets.
8-60. The ADAM/BAE coordinates directly with the aviation brigade or the supporting aviation task force
for detailed mission planning. The ADAM/BAE element is equipped with the Tactical Airspace Integration
System (TAIS), which provides a digitized, integrated, and automated system to provide airspace control
and air traffic services. Shared functions between the ADAM and BAE include analysis of airspace use to
determine and resolve conflicts; maintaining, requesting, and dissemination of joint airspace coordinating
measures; and development and coordination of the airspace control appendix.
Air Defense Airspace Management
8-61. The ADAM plans and synchronizes air and missile defense operations with the ground commander’s
scheme of maneuver. The ADAM produces the integrated air picture, plans low-level sensor employment,
and develops and maintains the air defense artillery overlay to include unit locations; weapons control
status and weapon system coverage.
Brigade Aviation Element
8-62. The BAE advises the AATF on all tactical matters relating to Army aviation. The element provides
subject matter expertise on enemy threat weapons and tactics, techniques, and procedures; aircraft
survivability equipment; and mission planning and must be capable of 24-hour operations. The BAE:
z Plans and synchronizes aviation with the BCT commander’s concept of operation.
z Advises and plans the use of unmanned aircraft systems, reconnaissance, attack, assault, air
movement, sustainment, and medical evacuation.
z Standardizes BCT unmanned aircraft system employment.

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FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

8-63. The AATF fire support officer plans, coordinates, and synchronizes fire support for all phases of the
air assault. He deploys with the AATFC in a mission command helicopter to ensure the fire support plan is
executed as planned.

AVIATION LIAISON OFFICER

8-64. Although the ADAM/BAE conducts many of the functions traditionally performed by liaison
officers, the aviation liaison officer from the supporting aviation brigade remains a critical part of the air
assault planning process. The aviation liaison officer can be the supporting aviation unit S-3, the aviation
mission survivability officer, or another aviation subject matter expert designated by the supporting
aviation unit commander.
8-65. While the members of the ADAM/BAE work directly for the BCT commander as permanent staff
members, aviation liaison officers represent the supporting aviation task force at a designated maneuver
headquarters only for a specific operation. If colocated with the ADAM/BAE, the liaison officer team
normally reports to the brigade aviation officer as a functioning addition to the ADAM/BAE staff section.
Often, the aviation liaison officer coordinates with the ADAM/BAE and then proceeds to a supported
ground maneuver battalion.

AIR LIAISON OFFICER

8-66. The air liaison officer (ALO) is an USAF officer who leads the tactical air control party (TACP)
colocated at the BCT headquarters and advises the BCT commander and staff on air operations. The ALO
leverages the expertise of the BCT TACP with links to the higher headquarters TACP to plan, coordinate,
synchronize, and execute air support operations. He maintains situational awareness of the total air support
and air support effects picture. Additional responsibilities of the air liaison officer includeʊ
z Monitoring the execution of the air tasking order.
z Advising the commander and staff about the employment of air assets.
z Receiving, coordinating, planning, prioritizing, and synchronizing immediate close air support
requests.
z Providing USAF input to analyses and plans.

PICKUP ZONE CONTROL OFFICER

8-67. A pickup zone control officer (PZCO) is designated for each pickup zone in an air assault. The
PZCO organizes, controls, and coordinates operations in the pickup zone. Depending on the unit that is
conducting the air assault, the PZCO may be a BCT, battalion, or company executive officer; BCT or
battalion S-3 Air; or sometimes a company first sergeant. The PZCO operates on the combat aviation
network and is prepared to assist in executing changes as needed.

MISSION COMMAND SYSTEM

8-68. The mission command system enables mission command. As with any operation the BCT uses
networks and information systems, such as Brigade Combat Team Network and/or LandWarNet, to share
the common operational picture with subordinates to guide the exercise of initiative. The common
operational picture conveys the BCT commander’s perspective and facilitates subordinates’ situational
understanding. This section identifies core Army battle command systems and discusses mission command
systems that enable centralized planning and decentralized execution specifically to air assault operations.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS
8-69. An information system consists of equipment that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate
information. This includes computers— hardware and software— and communications, as well as policies
and procedures for their use (ADP 6-0). The Army Battle Command System gives the BCT advantages in
collecting technical information, and distributing information and intelligence rapidly. The battle command

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system comprises core battlefield automated systems plus common services and network management.
Each system provides access and the passing of information from a horizontally integrated BCT mission
command network. The following are the core systems:
z Tactical Battle Command. The Tactical Battle Command System comprises the functions
previously performed by the Maneuver Control System and the Command Post of the Future.
z Global Command and Control System-Army.
z Distributed Common Ground System-Army.
z Battle Command Sustainment and Support System.
z Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System.
z Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.
z Force XXI Battle Command-Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracker.
z Tactical Airspace Integration System.
z Digital Topographic Support System.
z Integrated System Control.

INTEGRATED SYSTEM CONTROL

8-70. The BCT and battalion S-6 signal officers and S-6 sections are the air assault staff proponents
responsible for planning and coordinating communications support for each phase of the air assault
operation. They use integrated system control to provide communications system network management,
control, planning, and support to the AATF. Also known as, the tactical internet management system,
integrated system control provides network initialization, local area network management services, and an
automated system to support the combat network radio-based wide area network. Features of integrated
system control include mission plan management, network planning and engineering, frequency spectrum
management, tactical packet network management, and wide area network management.
8-71. As the AATF executes the mission and distances become extended, communications for mission
command become less sophisticated. The AATF must make extensive use of airborne or unattended very
high frequency (VHF) retransmission, high frequency (HF) capabilities, and ultrahigh frequency (UHF)
tactical satellite (TACSAT). Subordinate elements in the AATF may range beyond multichannel
capabilities and radio transmissions, and transmissions may be unintelligible due to enemy electronic
countermeasures. As a result, subordinate commanders of the AATF may have to make decisions without
being in contact with the AATFC.

RADIO NETWORK
8-72. The AATF uses combat network radios primarily for voice mission command transmission and
secondarily for data transmission where other data capabilities do not exist. Combat network radios are
designed primarily around the single-channel ground and airborne radio system, the single-channel
TACSAT, and the HF radio. (Refer to FM 6-02.53 for more information.)
8-73. AATF S-6 planners organize frequency-monitoring requirements into a communications card or
matrix and distribute to key leaders, command posts, and other key personnel. Using a dynamic mix of air-
to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-ground radio networks provides the necessary responsiveness and
flexibility for air assault mission command. Table 8-3 on page 8-18 depicts the radio networks commonly
employed during air assaults and recommended monitoring requirements for each. Apply the following:
z Air assault task force command network is a VHF command network dedicated to ground-to-
ground coordination during operations. It normally is secure and used by the AATFC to
communicate with his subordinate commanders. Given the VHF communication range
limitations in restrictive terrain, consider alternate means of communications such as UHF
TACSAT or HF when planning an air assault.
z Combat aviation network (CAN) is a VHF network dedicated to air-to-ground coordination
during operations. All aviation elements and the remainder of the AATF elements monitor this
network before and during air movements. The two combat air networks typically employed
during an air assault are as follows:

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 Organization and Employment

„ CAN 1. CAN 1 provides common communications between the air assault task force
commander, air mission commander, ground commander, and the pickup zone control
officer.
„ CAN 2. CAN 2 is usually reserved as an anti-jamming network. The pickup zone control
officer can use this network to provide terminal guidance to individual flight leads when
required.
z Air battle network is typically a UHF command network dedicated to air-to-air communications
between the air mission commander and all aviation element leaders. All aviation elements
monitor this network and receive instructions from the air mission commander or the air assault
task force commander when he is airborne. This network is operated on the lift unit’s UHF
command frequency if a dedicated airborne is not specified in the OPORD or air mission brief.
z Fire support network is a VHF network operated by the air assault task force fire support
coordinator. All aviation element s must have access to this network to facilitate calls for fire
during movements, insertions, and extractions. An artillery quick-fire network is used when a
supporting battery or battalion is dedicated to an air assault. Plan alternate means of
communication, such as TACSAT, multi-use internet relay chat, and blue force tracker or Force
XXI Battle Command-Brigade and Below (FBCB2), in case of VHF communication failure.
z Operations and intelligence network is a secure VHF network controlled by the S-2 section at
the main command post. All routine tactical reports and other intelligence reports are sent on this
network, freeing the air assault task force commander network for command and combat critical
traffic. The main command posts for all elements of the air assault task force and supporting
aviation units monitor the operations and intelligence network.
z Aviation internal network is typically a VHF network operated by each aviation element leader
for internal use. Using VHF radios provides each element leader with a dedicated frequency with
which to direct and control individual aircraft, teams, or platoons and to communicate with air
traffic control authorities.
z Pickup zone control network is a VHF network established by the pickup zone control officer for
communications between ground forces at the pickup zone. The pickup zone control officer may
request to use the communication platform from a mission command UH-60 if it is available.
The pickup zone control officer uses this network to control the flow of vehicles in and around
the pickup zone. He communicates with the pickup zone control party on this network. This
ensures that chalks are lined up correctly, external loads (sling loads) are ready, the bump plan is
activated if necessary, and extraneous vehicles and personnel are kept clear of pickup zone
operations. All lifted units should enter the pickup zone control network 30 minutes before their
pickup zone time. Specific chalks may be required to monitor the network if the aircraft
formation in the pickup zone requires them.

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Table 8-3. Standard air assault radio networks and monitoring requirements

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 Chapter 9
Air Assault Planning
Planning for air assault operations mirrors the military decisionmaking process
(MDMP). It incorporates parallel and collaborative planning actions necessary to
provide the additional time and detailed planning required for successful execution of
the air assault mission. Standardizing operations between units conducting the air
assault significantly enhances the ability of the unit to accomplish the mission.

SECTION I – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

9-1. Air assault planning is as detailed as time permits and should include completion of written orders
and plans. Within time constraints, the air assault task force commander (AATFC) carefully evaluates
capabilities and limitations of the total force and develops a plan that ensures a high probability of success.
The planning time should abide by the one-third/two-thirds rule to ensure subordinates have enough time to
plan and rehearse.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
9-2. The headquarters above the element forming the air assault task force (AATF) directs the formation
of the AATF. This headquarters allocates units, defines authority, and assigns responsibility by designating
command and support relationships. The staff of this headquarters is responsible for developing the task
organization of the AATF and conducting the necessary steps of the MDMP. A division-level commander
or his equivalent is the approving authority for the formation of an AATF larger than a company.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

9-3. The brigade combat team (BCT) is the core of the air assault and the BCT commander is normally
the AATFC for a battalion air assault. The AATFC for a company air assault is normally the battalion
commander of the company conducting the assault. The primary role of the AATFC and his staff is to
develop the ground tactical plan by providing his staff and the supporting aviation unit staff with key tasks,
intent and aviation staff guidance concerning the weight of the attack reconnaissance coverage and the level
of acceptable risk for the supporting aviation units.

SUPPORTING AVIATION UNITS

9-4. Normally, supporting aviation units are operational control to the AATFC. Occasionally, an aviation
task force may be created to support an AATF. However, the combat aviation brigade commander typically
anticipates the needs of the AATFC and provides the necessary aviation units to support the mission of the
AATF. As the supporting unit, the combat aviation brigade commander directs aviation units within his
command or requests augmentation from his higher headquarters to meet the needs of the AATFC.

SECTION II – REVERSE PLANNING SEQUENCE

9-5. Air assault planning is based on careful analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC and detailed
reverse planning. Five basic plans comprise the reverse planning sequence. (See figure 9-1, page 9-2.) They
areʊ
z Ground tactical plan.
z Landing plan.
z Air movement plan.
z Loading plan.

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Chapter 9

z Staging plan.
9-6. These plans are not developed independently. The AATF staff and supporting aviation unit
coordinate, develop, and refine concurrently to make best use of available time and resources. They
develop the ground tactical plan first, which serves as the basis to develop the other plans. Each plan may
potentially affect the others. Changes in an aspect of one plan may require adjustments in the other plans.
The AATFC must determine if such adjustments entail acceptable risk. If the risk is unacceptable, the
concept of operations (CONOPS) must change.

Figure 9-1. Air assault planning stages

SECTION III – PLANNING METHODOLOGY

9-7. The AATF staff conducts continuous coordination under the guidance of the AATF executive officer
and S-3 during course of action development. Concurrent planning includes identifying air assault hazards
and developing controls to mitigate risk.
9-8. The air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE) and the supporting
aviation liaison officer from the combat aviation brigade serve as the link between the combat aviation
brigade staff and the AATF staff and are critical to the air assault planning process during mission analysis
and course of action development. The ADAM/BAE and the aviation liaison officer serve as the subject
matter experts on aviation operations to the AATF and supported unit staffs during this process. This
enables the AATFC and ground commander to concentrate on refining the ground tactical plan and follow-
on missions. The ADAM/BAE must anticipate requirements of the supported units and disseminate these
requirements as soon as possible to the aviation liaison officer.
9-9. The AATF, supported unit staff, and supporting aviation unit staff should receive and share the
following:

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 Air Assault Planning

z Landing zone confirmations by imagery, aircraft videos, landing zone sketches, reconnaissance
products, patrols, and higher headquarters intelligence.
z Composition of assault, follow-on, and area of operation echelons by unit.
z Nomenclature of every vehicle and sling load to be flown and maximum expected weight and air
item availability for heavy and light loads.
z Confirmed troop counts by serial for assault and follow-on echelons.
9-10. The collaboration between the AATF, supported unit staff, and supporting aviation unit staff results
in the Air Assault Appendix to Annex C (Operations), of the OPORD and may includeʊ
z Tentative lift and serial composition (draft air movement table).
z List of suitable pickup zones and landing zones.
z Tentative air routes.
z Landing zone imagery (if available).
z Any deviations from standard planning factors.
z An execution checklist.

DELIBERATE PLANNING
9-11. Air assaults are deliberately planned due to the complex nature and requirement to provide the
commander detailed intelligence concerning the enemy situation. The air assault planning process mirrors
the steps in the MDMP and incorporates parallel actions necessary to provide the additional time and
detailed planning required for successful mission execution. (Figure 9-2 on page 9-4 provides a comparison
of the MDMP and the air assault planning process when maximum time is available for planning.)

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Chapter 9

Figure 9-2. MDMP and air assault planning process

TIME-CONSTRAINED PLANNING
9-12. Due to the dynamic nature of operations, units often are required to execute air assaults within short
time constraints, sometimes a few hours from the time of receiving the OPORD. Based on the time
available, the AATF executive officer adjusts the timeline as required. It is critical for the executive officer
to consider the ability of the supporting aviation unit to accomplish its tasks with its crew endurance
program. (See figure 9-3, page 9-5.)

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 Air Assault Planning

Figure 9-3. Time-constrained air assault planning

9-13. Successful execution of an air assault in a time-constrained environment requires parallel and
collaborative planning by all units and staffs that are part of or supporting the AATF. Parallel planning
begins as soon as the mission is received, with the supporting combat aviation brigade providing liaison
officers or conducting coordination through the ADAM/BAE to the AATF if they are not colocated with
unit. Through continual coordination with the supporting combat aviation brigade, the ADAM/BAE
advises the AATF S-3 on limitations of aircraft or crew availability affecting course of action development.
9-14. Once the AATFC has provided a directed course of action or approved a course of action, the brigade
aviation officer immediately begins the air mission coordination meeting (AMCM). To save time by
reducing the number of meetings, specific portions of the air mission brief are included in the AATF
OPORD brief in lieu of doing a separate air mission brief. With the exception of the combined OPORD and
air mission brief, mission coordination and planning may be completed by phone, e-mail, video
teleconferencing, or other mission command systems. Backbriefs, aircrew briefs, and rehearsals still are
conducted as described earlier. The specific portions of the air mission brief included in the OPORD
brief areʊ
z Staging plan.
z Air movement plan.
z Landing plan.
z Attack reconnaissance coverage.
z Landing zone condition criteria.
z Weather decision.
z Risk assessment.

RAPID DECISIONMAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS

9-15. Typically, the AATFC executes air assaults in response to time-sensitive intelligence or rapidly
changing battlefield conditions. If time is extremely limited, the AATFC may choose to rely on his
intuition and direct the staff to use the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process (RDSP). While
the MDMP seeks the optimal solution, the RDSP seeks a timely and effective solution within the
commander’s intent, mission, CONOPS, and level of risk. Using the RDSP lets the staffs avoid the time-
consuming requirements of developing and comparing multiple courses of action. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for
more information.)

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Chapter 9

9-16. Due to a shortage of time, the primary method of coordination for the AMCM and the air mission
brief may be via video teleconference or conference call. However, a face-to-face meeting addressing the
contents of the air mission brief should be conducted before mission execution. This meeting may be
conducted on the pickup zone with aircraft shutdown. At a minimum, the flight lead, air mission
commander, chalk leaders, S-2, and the ground commander should be present. Rehearsals conducted in this
situation should be combined AATF and aviation unit events.

ALLOWABLE CARGO LOAD PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

9-17. To load an effective AATF aboard helicopters, commanders and staffs must know the exact
composition of the AATF, the essential characteristics of the types of helicopters to be used for the
operation, and the methods of computing aircraft requirements.
9-18. Maximum allowable cargo load (ACL) is affected by altitude and temperature and differs widely
according to topography and climatic conditions common to specific zones or areas of military operations.
ACLs vary based on the location of, approaches to, and exits from landing zones; pilot proficiency;
aviation unit standard operating procedures; type of engine in the aircraft; and age of both aircraft and
aircraft engine. Therefore, two identical aircraft, of the same model and type, may not be able to pick up
and carry identical loads.

SECTION IV – PLANNING PROCESS

9-19. Throughout the operations process, the AATFCs and staffs synchronize the warfighting functions to
accomplish missions. Commanders and staffs use several integrating processes and continuing activities to
do this. Synchronization is the arrangement of action in time, space, and purpose, integration is combining
actions into a unified whole. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more information.)
9-20. The integrating processes combines the efforts of the AATFC and staff to synchronize specific
functions throughout the operations process. The integrating process includesʊ
z Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)
z Targeting. (Refer to FM 3-60 for more information.)
z Risk management. (Refer to ATP 5-19 for more information.)

9-21. The AATFC and staff ensure several continuing activities are continuously planned and coordinated.
The following continuing activities require particular concern of the commander and staff throughout the
operations process:
z Information collection. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)
z Security operations. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)
z Protection. (Refer to ADRP 3-37 for more information.)
z Liaison and coordination. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)
z Terrain management. (Refer to ADRP 3-90 for more information.)
z Airspace control. (Refer to FM 3-52 for more information.)

9-22. MDMP integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other military
and civilian partners when developing an air assault OPORD. The AATF staff fosters a shared
understanding of the situation as it develops a synchronized plan or order to accomplish a mission.

WARNING ORDER
9-23. Air assault planning begins when the designated AATF receives a warning order (WARNORD) from
higher headquarters for the upcoming air assault mission. The WARNORD specifies the AATFC and task
organization. This allows the aviation commander to dispatch a liaison officer to the AATF headquarters
early in the planning phase. Other WARNORDs and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) should follow as
the AATF staff and commander work through the reverse planning sequence.
9-24. The following information is sent out with the WARNORD to provide units in the AATF the
information needed for planning:
z Ground commander’s scheme of maneuver.

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 Air Assault Planning

z Estimate of the size of the force to be air assaulted.

z Likely pickup zones and landing zones.
z Air assault task force commander’s intent on the number of lifts and general timeline.
z Initial estimate on requirements for attack reconnaissance aircraft.

INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE

9-25. The initial planning conference is the first meeting between the AATF staff and supporting aviation
unit. The air mission commander, liaison officer, assault helicopter battalion S-2 and S-3, flight leads, and
select aviation brigade staff personnel should represent the aviation unit. This initial meeting allows the
supporting aviation unit planners to address impacts that environmental factors (climate and weather,
terrain, and altitude) may have on the performance capabilities of the aircraft and subsequent mission
accomplishment with the AATF planners, as early as possible in the planning process. The initial planning
conference is conducted at the AATF headquarters.
9-26. The AATF staff should have hastily war-gamed the concept for the ground tactical plan before the
initial planning conference in order for planners to discuss and determine landing zones, routes, and pickup
zones. If more planning time exists, units may conduct a subsequent AMCM (similar to the initial planning
conference), but this occurs after the ground tactical plan and other mission details are finalized.
9-27. Following the initial planning conference, the ground and aviation staffs should understand the
distance and general time involved for each lift. The staffs should know which forces are planned to be in
the first lift and in each serial of the first lift, and which first-lift serials are going to which landing zones
and by what route. Subsequent lifts and follow-on echelon lifts, while discussed at the initial planning
conference, can be planned in detail at a later AMCM if time permits.

AIR MISSION COORDINATION MEETING

9-28. The air mission coordination meeting (AMCM) is a meeting between the AATF and supporting
aviation units. An S-3 meeting follows the development of the ground tactical plan. The AMCM is run by
the brigade aviation element and chaired by the AATF S-3. The AMCM is scheduled to allow sufficient
time for maneuver units to decide on a specific course of action based on the WARNORD and the standard
planning factors.
9-29. The AATFC should approve the maneuver course of action before the AMCM. At the AMCM, unit
S-3s brief the concept of their ground tactical plans. S-3s show the composition of combat power, by
echelon, required at each landing zone. It is imperative that the subordinate unit S-3s attend this meeting
with an 80 to 90 percent solution on their requirements.
9-30. The meeting is not complete until the assault helicopter liaison officers know which loads go to
which landing zone and in what sequence. Attack reconnaissance liaison officers must know the air routes
to be used, and all must understand the landing zones and agree on a tentative air movement table with the
start and end times of the first and last serial on the landing zone. The brigade aviation element is the
central figure in coordinating this information.
9-31. The AATF S-3, executive officer, or commander must approve changes after the AMCM. It is
critical that the supported unit and the air assault planners come to the AMCM with the information needed
for an effective meeting. (See table 9-1, page 9-8.) The end result of the AMCM is a finalized air
movement plan, landing plan, air routes, pickup zones, and landing zones.

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Chapter 9

Table 9-1. Example of an air mission coordination meeting agenda

AIR MISSION BRIEF

9-32. Air mission brief refers to the written product and the briefing itself. The air mission brief is a
coordinated staff effort during which the AATFC approves the air assault plan. The air mission brief is in
addition to the AATF OPORD and is published in the air assault appendix to the operations annex. (Refer
to FM 6-0 for more information.)
9-33. The air mission brief highlights air assault requirements to the AATF, aviation, and ground units. It
should not be a working meeting. It is a backbrief to the AATFC and important to the key subordinate
aviation and ground unit leaders who execute the mission. The combat aviation brigade or supporting
aviation unit staff plays a vital role in the air mission brief process.
9-34. The air mission brief should stress assault and attack concepts, sequence of events, and the reasoning
for the mission’s sequence. The slightest change in serial separation, landing zones, or other elements of the
mission can significantly affect the rest of the plan. The AATFC must approve changes to the air assault
mission after the air mission brief. It is difficult to resynchronize the different warfighting functions in the
short time that remains between the air mission brief and mission execution.

AIR MISSION BRIEF DOCUMENTS

9-35. Documents required to conduct a thorough air mission brief includeʊ
z Air movement table. The air movement table regulates the sequence of flight operations from
pickup zone to landing zone. (Refer to chapter 12 of this publication for more information.)
z Communications card. The communications card includes a summary of all call signs and
networks.
z Pickup zone diagrams. The pickup zone diagram graphically depicts the pickup zone. Units
should prepare a separate diagram for each light and heavy pickup zone.

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 Air Assault Planning

z Landing zone diagrams. Graphically depicts the landing zone and should be prepare for each
light and heavy landing zone.
z Operations sketch. Sketch provided by each battalion S-3 describing the ground maneuver plan
and given to the aviation S-3 at the BCT rehearsal. Each pilot carries an operations kneeboard
sketch to provide situational awareness and to counter the potential for fratricide during close
combat operations. These sketches are included as enclosures to the air mission brief. Additional
documents that enhance the operations sketch include the grid reference graphic and a concept of
fires.
z Route cards. Depict ingress and egress routes on the air assault.
z Execution checklist. The air assault execution checklist permits brief, informative radio
transmissions on crowded radio networks. Execution checklists will use brevity codes to
represent critical points in the scheme of maneuver. Ensure brevity codes are aligned with multi-
service brevity codes. (Refer to ATP 1-02.1 for more information.)

AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE REHEARSAL

9-36. The AATF combined arms rehearsal is culminating the formal air assault planning process. It is a
rehearsal of the entire air assault mission, beginning with condition setting and ending with the
commander’s expressed end state.
9-37. The rehearsal includes the aviation flight lead, S-3, the AATF staff, and other key leaders. The
emphasis is on synchronizing all units supporting and executing the air assault. Included in the rehearsal is
a discussion and demonstration of likely ground and air contingencies, such as downed aircraft, alternate
route or landing zone activation, delays in the pickup zone, alternate suppression of enemy air defenses
(SEAD) plan, and others suited to a particular mission.
9-38. It is critical that air assault security forces from attack reconnaissance aviation units are represented
at the rehearsal to confirm air route deconfliction, fire control measures, and locations of expected attack by
fire or battle positions. Additionally, the AATF S-3 or their designated representatives attend the rehearsal
to brief the ground tactical and fire support plans.

AIRCREW BRIEF
9-39. In the aircrew brief, aviation unit and serial commanders brief all flight crews executing the air
assault mission. The aircrew brief covers all essential flight crew actions and aviation planning necessary to
accomplish a successful mission. Flight crews must fully understand the mission to execute the air assault
successfully.
9-40. The aircrew brief is conducted at the aviation battalion level, with the aircrews from each unit in
attendance. The aircrew brief can be conducted at the aviation company level (with assistance from the
aviation brigade staff) when conditions do not allow the brief to be conducted at the battalion level.

AVIATION TASK FORCE REHEARSAL

9-41. The aviation task force combined arms rehearsal is similar to the AATF rehearsal. However, its
emphasis is the aviation scheme of maneuver and the contingencies associated with the movement of
aircraft and how they apply to the mission. The purpose of the aviation task force rehearsal is to validate
synchronization.
9-42. At a minimum, the rehearsal includes the pilot in command of each aircraft, the air mission
commander of each serial, the aviation task force S-3, and the aviation task force commander. Additional
requirements are set by the air mission commander. Topics discussed should include, but are not limited to,
route deconfliction, bump plan execution, execution matrix, downed aircraft recovery procedures,
personnel recovery, actions on contact, and pickup zone and landing zone procedures.

CONDITION CHECKS
9-43. Condition checks are coordination meetings conducted by the AATF staff to update the AATFC on
the status of how well shaping operations create the conditions to execute the air assault. These conditions

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are monitored constantly to ensure they exist for air assault execution. It is important to consider the
latency of the information when presenting it to the commander for a decision.
9-44. The initial air assault condition check usually is conducted in the AATF or ground tactical force main
command post. All air assault staff principals are represented. BCT and higher headquarter liaison officers
attend each other’s condition checks in person when possible and by video-teleconference or conference
call when necessary. The final condition check is conducted near the AATF’s pickup zone control
command post. It includes a review of the latest friendly, terrain and weather, and enemy situations.
9-45. An air assault condition check considers critical factors to evaluate and recommend the execution of
an air assault. For example, air assaults planned for dawn and dusk periods are extremely dependant on
weather and visibility. Air assaults planned for these periods increase the risks to air assets. The S-2
evaluates the weather and visibility conditions and provides recommendations to the AATFC based on his
assessment.

ABORT CRITERIA
9-46. Abort criteria is a predetermined set of circumstances, based on risk assessment, which makes the
success of the operation no longer probable; thus the operation is terminated. These circumstances can
relate to changes in safety, equipment or troops available, preparation or rehearsal time, weather, enemy,
losses during execution, or a combination of the above. The methodology used in executing an air assault
involves setting the conditions, providing suppressive fires immediately before and on landing, and
continuously monitoring abort criteria from beginning to end.

CONSIDERATIONS
9-47. Abort criteria are important considerations when a change of one or more conditions in the objective
area or landing zone seriously threatens mission success. As such, they are the friendly force information
requirement relating to ongoing air assault operations and requiring command consideration regarding
mission continuation. It is important that the air mission brief clearly defines abort criteria and that the
AATFC monitors them throughout the operation.

DECISION PROCESS
9-48. If an abort criterion is met, a decision sequence is used before aborting the mission—
z Delay. If time is available, delay a mission in order to correct a circumstance that may abort a
mission.
z Divert. If time is not available or a delay does not correct an abort criterion, the task force may
execute a divert contingency away from its primary air assault mission.
z Abort. If an abort criterion exists and a delay or diversion to the mission does not correct it, the
mission can be aborted by the AATFC. Apply the following:
„ A lift is aborted when it reaches an abort criterion. The mission itself is not aborted.
„ A mission is aborted when an abort criterion exists for the entire mission and the AATFC
decides to abort.
9-49. Given the continued advantage of using the primary landing zone over the alternate, delay while en
route or at the pickup zone is preferable to diverting. The AATFC must evaluate the risk of such a delay in
light of time, fuel, enemy, and other mission variables.
9-50. Planners establish proposed abort criteria to assist commanders in deciding when success of the
operation is no longer probable. The AATFC retains authority for abort decisions. The six factors that
determine abort criteria for air assault missions are as follows:
z Weather. Adverse weather conditions make flying unsafe and degrade the effectiveness of the
helicopter’s organic weapon systems. The support combat aviation brigade sets theater-specific
minimum weather conditions and establishes the appropriate approval authorities for risk
management.
z Available aircraft. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation depends on the rapid
massing of combat power at the critical place and time by helicopters. The supporting aviation

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task force manages combat power to support the AATF and keeps the staff informed of any
limitations.
z Time. Refers to three distinct subjects: light and darkness, planning time, and fighter
management.
„ Light and darkness. U.S. armed forces gain a significant advantage over most military
forces in the world by operating at night. Night operations may increase aviation
survivability, but may increase accidental risk in periods of low illumination. The aviation
task force standard operating procedure specifies illumination thresholds related to mission
approval.
„ Planning time. In general, less planning time equates to increased risk. Time-sensitive
operations should be preplanned to the greatest extent possible and should rely on
established standard operating procedures.
„ Fighter management. Aircrew fighter management may impact the air assault timeline if
the mission is delayed or extended. The aviation task force standard operating procedure
specifies approval level for mission extension.
z Mission essential combat power. Air assault mission planners use mission variables to determine
the minimum combat power (to include Infantry, field artillery, and aviation) needed to ensure
mission success. Use abort criteria to ensure friendly forces have the required combat ratio for
the operation.
z Mission criticality. The success of units and future operations may depend on the success of the
air assault mission. Therefore, some air assault operations may proceed despite the presence of
circumstances that normally would abort the mission.
z Enemy. Certain types of enemy activity, especially along air routes or near landing zones or
objectives, may abort an air assault mission. Abort criteria usually is stated in terms of the size
or type of an enemy unit, the type of enemy equipment (especially air defense), and the
proximity of the enemy to present or future friendly locations.

SECTION V – CONTROL MEASURES

9-51. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADRP 6-0). Conduct of
air assault operations is inherently complex and requires unity of command. Complexity of the operation
necessitates keeping the operation as simple as possible with control measures.

FORCE-ORIENTED CONTROL MEASURES

9-52. Coordinated force-oriented control measures are crucial and allow for maneuvering ground and air
elements to operate with confidence. Control measures are preplanned steps that establish boundaries of an
area of operation.
9-53. Commanders use boundaries to assign units tactical responsibility of a designated geographical area.
They use control measures to govern airspace control and clearance on the ground of a diversity of fire
support ranging from artillery and naval gun fire (to close combat attacks and close air support.
Commanders try to use easily identifiable terrain as a reference aid to enhance fire support coordination
measures (FSCMs) and easily recognizable terrain features on the ground to expedite maneuver.
9-54. An important point on maneuver control graphics; is that staffs must be knowledgeable regarding the
different maneuver control measures and their impact on clearance of fires. For instance, boundaries are
both restrictive and permissive, while corridors, routes, and direction of attack are restrictive.
9-55. Since boundaries serve as both permissive and restrictive measures, the decision not to employ them
has profound effects upon timely clearance of fires at the lowest possible level. This is important,
especially if maneuver units are not given areas of operations meaning that no boundaries are established.
9-56. The higher echelon may coordinate all clearance of fires short of the coordinated fire line, a time-
intensive process. It allows the unit to maneuver successfully and to engage targets in a swift and efficient
manner. It requires coordination and clearance only within that organization.

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BOUNDARIES
9-57. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and
deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 3-0). (Refer to JP 3-09,
FM 3-09, and FM 3-90-1 for more information.) Boundaries affect fire support in two ways. They areʊ
z Restrictive. Boundaries are restrictive in that normally units do not fire across boundaries unless
the fires are coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are allowed by a permissive fire
support coordination measure, such as a coordinated fire line. These restrictions apply to
conventional and special munitions and their effects. When fires such as obscuration and
illumination affect an adjacent unit, coordination with that unit normally is required. A
commander may employ direct fires without clearance at specific point targets that are clearly
and positively identified as enemy. Targets and their triggers should be kept within the same
unit’s boundary without overriding other tactical or doctrinal considerations.
z Permissive. Boundaries are permissive in that a maneuver commander, unless otherwise
restricted, enjoys complete freedom of fire and maneuver within his own boundaries. Thus, units
may execute joint fires without close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise
restricted.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES

9-58. A fire support coordination measure (FSCM) is a measure employed by commanders to facilitate the
rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-0). The
following restrictive and permissive FSCMs— are used frequently in airborne or air assault tasks. See JP 3-
09, FM 3-09, and FM 3-90-1 for a discussion of FSCMs.
z Restrictive Fire Support Coordination Measures. Restrictive measures impose requirements for
specific coordination before engagement of targets. Restrictive FSCMs are those that provide
safeguards for friendly forces and noncombatants, facilities, or terrain. Restrictive FSCMs
include the no-fire area, restrictive fire area, restrictive fire line, fire support area, fire support
station, and the zone of fire.
z Permissive Fire Support Coordination Measures. Permissive FSCMs facilitate the attack of
targets by reducing or eliminating the coordination necessary for the clearance of fires.
Permissive FSCMs include the coordinated fire line, fire support coordination line, free fire area,
and the kill box.

AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES

9-59. Airspace coordinating measures (ACM) are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of
airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-52). Two
ACMs–the airspace coordination area and the restricted operations area– are frequently used in airborne or
air assault tasks. Refer to JP 3-52, FM 3-52, FM 3-90-1 for a discussion of ACMs.
z An airspace coordination area is a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area,
established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe
from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be formal or informal
(JP 3-09.3). The airspace coordination area is the primary ACM which reflects the coordination
of airspace for use by air support and indirect fires. (Refer to JP 3-09.3 for more information.)
z A restricted operations area (ROA) is airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the
airspace control authority, in response to specific operational situations/requirements within
which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted (JP 3-52). An ROA is used to
separate and identify areas, examples include but are not limited to artillery, naval surface fire
support, unmanned aircraft system operating areas, areas of combat search and rescue, special
operations forces operating areas, and areas which the area air defense commander has declared
weapons free. Air defense missions generally have priority over ROAs. (Refer to JP 3-52 for
more information.)

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SECTION VI – SHAPING OPERATIONS

9-60. A shaping operation is an operation at an echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the
success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations establish conditions for the decisive operation
through effects on the enemy, population, and terrain.
9-61. The AATFC determines the exact conditions that must be created and preserved according to the
mission variables of METT-TC and the level of risk associated with each air assault. When determining
these conditions, the AAFTC considers the following factors:
z Shaping operations are not limited to conducting ground and air reconnaissance, suppression of
enemy air defenses, and preparation fires. They may require additional augmentation from
higher headquarters, the supporting aviation unit, and the supported unit staffs to succeed.
z Assessing the effects of lethal fires by conducting battle damage assessment of enemy forces and
capabilities is not easy. Enemies often remove wounded or dead personnel and equipment to
make friendly battle damage assessment more difficult and less accurate.
z In weighing the validity of battle damage assessment projections, it is important to balance
confirmed intelligence against friendly combat power applied. More combat power may be
useful against uncertain battle damage assessment.
z The threat, the ability to assess the impact of shaping operations, and the air assault execution
time may determine the duration of shaping operations. Allocate as much time as possible.
9-62. Conducting shaping operations to create and preserve the proper conditions for air assault execution
is an iterative process. Based on his situational understanding, the AATFC decides what part of the
situation must change to ensure success of the air assault. The commander directs available reconnaissance
forces and surveillance assets to detect the location of enemy systems that unacceptably endanger the air
assault’s success. This allows lethal and nonlethal systems, such as artillery, jammers, attack
reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), to target and deliver the desired fires
and/or effects against enemy systems before launch.
9-63. The AATF staffs continue to plan and prepare for the air assault. The AATFC considers employing
service and joint fires to help set the conditions. The commander requests assistance from higher
headquarters if sufficient organic assets and information are not available to accomplish the mission. The
commander then assesses the progress of the shaping operations. This process repeats until the commander
is satisfied with the result or operational necessity forces him to either abort or conduct the air assault.
9-64. When available Army teams from the long-range surveillance company (LRSC), a divisional or
corps asset, are organized, trained, and equipped to deploy into the objective area and conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance tasks before the deployment of the air assault force. Special operations
forces may be inserted or already be operating in the objective area and become key components of the
initial effort to shape and set conditions. Special operations (to include special reconnaissance missions) are
keys to setting conditions, and integrated into the operation at every stage from initial planning to
transition. (See FM 3-05.) Refer to chapter 1 of the publication for additional information.
9-65. The AATFC employs his reconnaissance and surveillance forces (to include cavalry, scouts,
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear platoon, and UAS to conduct reconnaissance and
surveillance of proposed landing zones and the objective area to identify and target enemy forces near the
landing zones and objectives. The field artillery battalion is positioned to provide fires throughout all
phases of the operation. Shaping operations should deny the enemy’s ability to conduct reconnaissance,
defeat his strike operations, and neutralize his ability to communicate and command. The supporting
aviation unit is prepared to conduct reconnaissance in coordination with reconnaissance forces or provide
lethal fires to neutralize or destroy enemy forces in the objective area once they have been identified.
9-66. The commander considers employing other capabilities that may not be in his task force, such as
close air support and electronic warfare assets. The purpose of these operations is to set and preserve the
conditions on the landing zone and objective area that allow the maneuver forces to launch the air assault
and execute a successful attack to destroy the enemy on the objective.

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9-67. Successful execution of an air assault may be decisive to accomplishing the mission, but it is not
necessarily the decisive operation. Air assaults often are conducted as shaping operations to establish the
conditions for the decisive operation through the effects rendered on the enemy and terrain. An example of
this is a company conducting an air assault to seize a bridge and secure a crossing site in support of a
combined arms battalion-level attack that requires the bridge as a crossing site.
9-68. Similarly, the AATF sets the conditions for a successful air assault by conducting shaping operations
of its own. The AATFC may employ ground and air reconnaissance units, attack aviation units, UAS, close
air support, and artillery fires to conduct shaping operations to mitigate the level of risk for executing the
air assault.

SECTION VII – MEDICAL AND CASUALTY EVACUATION

9-69. Medical evacuation refers to both air and ground casualty evacuation. Air medical evacuation
employs air assets from the air ambulance companies assigned to the combat aviation brigade and air
medical evacuation general support aviation battalions to evacuate casualties. Dedicated air medical
evacuation aircraft include specifically trained medical personnel to provide en route care. The nine-line
medical evacuation request is the standard method to request medical evacuation.
9-70. Casualty evacuation refers to the use of nonmedical vehicles or aircraft to evacuate casualties. Use
casualty evacuation only when the number of casualties exceeds the medical evacuation assets or when the
urgency of evacuation exceeds the risk of waiting for medical evacuation assets to arrive. Typically, air
assaults plan for both air and ground evacuations. (Refer to FM 3-04.113 and ATP 4-02.2 for more
information.)

MEDICAL EVACUATION PLANNING

9-71. The combat aviation brigade allocates medical evacuation assets to the supported AATF for the
duration of the air assault. However, the size and distance of the planned air assault dictates the duration of
medical evacuation support to the AATFC. As a rule, the supporting commander should provide medical
evacuation assets to the supported commander until ground lines of communications are established.
9-72. Typically, the evacuation platoon leader from the brigade support medical company and the air
ambulance platoon leader from the air ambulance company conduct the medical evacuation planning for
the air assault. They do so in coordination with the AATF S-1, AATF S-4, BAE, AATF S-3, supported unit
S-3, BCT surgeon section, and BCT support medical company commander. The air ambulance platoon
leader should brief the medical evacuation plan at the AMCM, AMB, and health service support rehearsal.
When planning for medical evacuation during an air assault they should—
z Integrate ground evacuation measures into the overall medical evacuation plan.
z Plan medical evacuation routes to Level II or III health care facilities. Ensure all aircrews
participating in the air assault know these routes.
z Plan for medical personnel to fly on casualty evacuation aircraft if time and situation permit.
z Ensure medical evacuation crews are available for air assault orders, rehearsals, and
preparations.
z Brief casualty collection point locations and markings during the air assault rehearsal.
z Plan to maintain a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) after the air assault is completed
so that medical evacuation aircraft have a staging place for follow-on ground tactical operations.
9-73. Medical evacuation aircraft are limited assets and should be scheduled and used accordingly. The
AATF’s casualty estimate provides planning guidance for the number of medical evacuation aircraft
needed to support the air assault. To maximize the amount of mission hours they can support the mission,
personnel should stage medical evacuation aircraft to support an air assault at the latest possible time.
Medical evacuation aircraft should support short distance air assaults from the pickup zone (PZ) or brigade
support area. Aircraft may stage at a FARP or use a restricted operations zone to expedite pick up of
casualties in long distance air assaults.

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9-74. Medical and casualty evacuation aircraft normally are under operational control to the AATF during
air assault operations. The air mission commander (AMC) controls the medical evacuation flights to
facilitate quick deconfliction of airspace. The AMC clears all medical and casualty evacuation aircraft
movements, to include launch and landings. The AATFC may retain launch authority, but the AMC is
responsible for medical evacuation.
9-75. Typically, requests for medical or casualty evacuation is over the combat aviation network for the
duration of the air assault operation until an evacuation network, if necessary, is established. This ensures
good coordination for deconfliction of fires and airspace. When planning medical evacuation operations—
z Send medical evacuation aircraft into secure landing zones (LZs) if possible.
z Integrate attack reconnaissance aviation units to provide escort and LZ overwatch as required.
z Ensure terminal guidance into the LZ.
z Ensure redundant means of communication with the supporting medical evacuation assets
throughout the air assault.
z Designate a medical evacuation officer in charge, typically a medical officer from the
brigade support medical company, to ride on mission command aircraft to receive and
prioritize evacuation mission requests and forward this information to the AMC for launch.

CASUALTY BACKHAUL
9-76. The AATF staff and aviation unit staff plan the combined use of aerial and ground medical and
casualty evacuation assets during air assault planning. While assaulting aircraft may backhaul wounded
from the LZ, the time required to load and unload casualties could desynchronize the air movement table.
9-77. Casualty evacuation during an air assault may cause delays in air assault missions unless spare
aircraft are committed to replace aircraft designated to backhaul casualties. Designating separate casualty
evacuation aircraft may prevent delays of follow-on lifts. Procedures for casualty backhaul during an air
assault are as follows:
z Medical evacuation request goes to mission command aircraft. The medical officer onboard
relays the request to the AMC. If the request is approved, the AMC directs the next serial’s last
two aircraft (dependent on METT-TC) to move to the LZ casualty collection point to pick up
casualties after dropping off personnel.
z All backhauled casualties are taken back to the PZ casualty collection point.
z Backhaul aircraft with casualties notify PZ control they are inbound with casualties.
z Last serial of the final lift makes the final pick up of casualties before the conclusion of the air
assault, if necessary.

MEDICAL EVACUATION LANDING ZONE

9-78. During air assault planning, the AATF staff and AMC plan the combined use of air medical
evacuation and aerial casualty evacuation landing zones. The AATF plans a means of marking the casualty
collection point for air medical or assault aircrew identification. Preferred LZ signaling methods include
smoke or panel markers (VS-17 panel marker) during the day and strobe or chemical lights (not blue or
green which are not visible under night vision goggles) at night. If air assault crews evacuate casualties,
they must know where to take them and how to rejoin remaining lift aircraft for subsequent lifts. Using a
backhaul LZ within the normal assault PZ, FARP, or both can minimize disruption of the loading plan
while helping maintain serial integrity.
9-79. A dedicated medical evacuation LZ may be used for both air medical and aerial casualty evacuation.
Medical evacuation LZ selection and procedures include—
9-80. A dedicated medical evacuation LZ may be used for both air medical and aerial casualty evacuation.
Medical evacuation LZ selection and procedures include—
z Select LZs that are level and clear of debris within a 50-meter radius.
z Keep all other light sources away from the LZ unless instructed otherwise by aircrew.
z Once medical evacuation aircraft are inbound, make an estimated time-of-arrival call.

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z Ensure personnel communicating with the aircraft at the pickup site have visual on the LZ to
confirm the signal or to assist the crew as required.
z Once medical evacuation aircraft has landed, if manned with medical personnel to provide en route
care, keep personnel away from the aircraft while the medical personnel come to the patient.
z The unit should provide personnel to assist in loading the patient on the aircraft, and if present,
under direction of medical personnel.

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 Chapter 10
Ground Tactical Plan
The ground tactical plan is the foundation of a successful air assault on which all
other air assault planning stages are based. It is the decisive operation for the air
assault task force (AATF) because it accomplishes the mission assigned by the higher
headquarters. It specifies actions in the objective area that lead to accomplishment of
the mission and subsequent operations.

SECTION I – ELEMENTS
10-1. The ground tactical plan may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander’s
evaluation of the mission variables of METT-TC. The ground tactical plan for an air assault contains
essentially the same elements as other terrain or enemy-oriented offensive operation. However, the
elements of the ground tactical plan are prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility to achieve surprise.
The following elements are critical to the planning process.

TASK ORGANIZATION
10-2. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission
(ADRP 5-0). When determining the task force organization, air assault planners emphasize the following:
z Maximizing combat power in the assault to heighten the surprise and shock effect, which is
especially important if the air assault task force plans to land on or near the objective. Assaulting
forces organize on or near the objective are prepared to rapidly eliminate enemy forces,
immediately seize objectives, and rapidly consolidate for subsequent operations.
z Ensuring the task force inserts enough force to accomplish initial objectives quickly. To prevent
being defeated by repositioning mobile enemy forces, air assault task forces must be massed in
the landing zone to build up a significant early combat power capability. If adequate combat
power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, the air assault force lands away from
the objective to build up combat power and then assaults like other combat unit.
z Ensuring the air assault task force commander properly allocates his logistics assets to sustain
the task force until follow-on forces arrive.

MISSION STATEMENT
10-3. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore. Commanders analyze a mission in terms of the commander‘s intent two echelons up,
along with specified and implied tasks. They consider the mission of adjacent units to understand how they
contribute to the decisive operation of their higher headquarters. This analysis produces the unit‘s mission
statement.
10-4. A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization‘s essential task
(or tasks) and purpose— a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The
mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. It
is important to remember that an air assault is a type of operation and not a tactical mission task.

COMMANDER’S INTENT
10-5. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the
desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate
and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even

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Chapter 10

when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). It is critical that the AATF planners receive the
commander’s intent as soon as possible after the mission is received. Even if the ground tactical plan is not
complete, air assault planning often begins after the AATFC issues his intent.
10-6. During planning, the initial commander's intent drives course of action development. In execution,
the commander’s intent guides disciplined initiative as subordinates make decisions when facing
unforeseen opportunities or countering threats.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
10-7. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate
to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state
(ADRP 5-0). The concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the
commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible
subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another. Commanders and staff use the
operational framework to help conceptualize and describe their concept of operation.
10-8. The operational framework proves the commander with basic conceptual options for visualizing and
describing operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. Commanders are not bound by any specific
framework for conceptually organizing operations; and use one of three conceptual frameworks listed
below or in combination. These operational frameworks apply equally to both operational and tactical
actions.
z The deep-close-security framework to describe the operation in time and space.
z The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework to articulate the operation in terms of purpose.
z The main and supporting efforts framework to designate the shifting prioritization of resources.

10-9. The deep-close-security operational framework has historically been associated with terrain
orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well. Deep operations involve
efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. Close operations
are operations that are within a subordinate commander’s area of operations. Security operations involve
efforts to provide an early and accurate warning of enemy operations and to provide time and maneuver
space within which to react to the enemy.
10-10. The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation. The
decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission (ADRP 3-0). It determines the
outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. A shaping operation is an operation that establishes
conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain
(ADRP 3-0). A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or
shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power (ADRP 3-0).
10-11. The main and supporting efforts operational framework—simpler than other organizing
frameworks—focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, leaders can use the main
and supporting efforts with either the deep-close-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining
framework. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most
critical to overall mission success. It usually is weighted with the preponderance of combat power
(ADRP 3-0). A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success
of the main effort (ADRP 3-0). (Refer to ADRP 3-0 for more information.)
DECISIVE-SHAPING-SUSTAINING FRAMEWORK EXAMPLE
10-12. Commanders identify the decisive operation and unit(s) responsible for conducting the decisive
operation. This allows them to articulate their shaping operations and the principal task of the units
assigned each shaping operation. Commanders complete their CONOPS with sustaining actions essential to
the success of decisive and shaping operations.
Decisive Operations
10-13. In figure 10-1, the AATF has been directed by its higher headquarters to conduct an air assault to
destroy enemy forces on Objective Horse. The AATFC determines that his decisive operation is the attack

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 Ground Tactical Plan

to destroy enemy forces on Objective Horse. He further decides that the decisive point of this operation is
the successful air assault of his forces into the objective area to destroy the enemy.
Shaping Operations
10-14. In figure 10-1, the AATFC employs his reconnaissance force (to include scouts, CBRN platoon,
and UAS) to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of proposed landing zones and the objective area to
identify and target enemy forces near the landing zones and objective vicinities. The field artillery battalion
is positioned to provide fires throughout all phases of the operation. It is prepared to deny the enemy’s
ability to conduct reconnaissance, defeat his strike operations, and neutralize his ability to communicate
and command. The supporting aviation unit is prepared to conduct reconnaissance in coordination with the
reconnaissance force or provide fires to neutralize or destroy enemy forces in the objective area once they
have been identified. The commander considers employing other enablers that may not be in his task force,
such as close air support and electronic warfare assets. The purpose of these operations is to set and
preserve the conditions on the landing zone and objective area that allow the maneuver forces to launch the
air assault and execute a successful attack to destroy the enemy on the objective.

Figure 10-1. Organizational framework

Sustaining Operations
10-15. The AATFC considers how he refuels the supporting aviation unit, resupplies, and provides
responsive medical and casualty evacuation to his task force. He determines that this operation may require
bringing a forward logistics element from the brigade support battalion and some of its crucial elements
forward to conduct casualty evacuation, resupply, and equipment recovery. He positions a forward surgical
team or treatment team with a maneuver force to treat casualties before evacuation to a medical treatment
facility.

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Chapter 10

TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS

10-16. The BCT commander through his staff assigns tasks to subordinate units. The assignment of a task
includes not only the task (what), but also the unit (who), place (where), time (when), and purpose (why). A
task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are
specific activities that contribute to accomplishing missions or other requirements and direct friendly
action. The purpose of each task should nest with completing another task, achieving an objective, or
attaining an end state condition.
10-17. Examples of decisive, shaping, and sustaining activities are as follows:
z Mission command. The AATFC deploys in a mission command aircraft to allow the commander
to observe and direct the air assault from a forward position.
z Movement and maneuver. Maneuver force conducts an air assault and attack to destroy enemy
forces on objectives. Aviation units conduct air insertion of reconnaissance force near the
objective area and provide interdiction and close combat attack against identified enemy forces
in the objective area.
z Intelligence. Ensures the information collection effort focuses on landing zones and the objective
area to identify enemy forces for targeting by fires and aviation assets to set conditions for air
assault execution.
z Fires. The field artillery battalion provides fires on identified enemy positions on or near landing
zones and the objective to neutralize enemy forces and help set conditions for air assault
execution.
z Protection. Suppression of enemy air defenses— plan, synchronize, and execute route lethal
suppressive fires and nonlethal suppressive effects on known or suspected enemy air defense
positions that are unavoidable.
z Sustainment. The brigade support battalion establishes a forward medical treatment point
colocated with the maneuver force. Aviation forward arming and refueling points may colocate
with brigade support battalion assets for security and to facilitate the refuel of aircraft.

SECTION II – PLAN DEVELOPMENT

10-18. The AATFC begins to visualize the application of his ground tactical plan to the battlefield by
defining the tactical problem and then begins a process of determining feasible solutions with his planning
staff using mission analysis. The results of mission analysis (to include intelligence preparation of the
battlefield and running estimates) inform the commander as he develops his operational approach that, in
turn, facilitates course of action development during the MDMP. (Refer to ADRP 5-0 for more
information.)

MISSION ANALYSIS
10-19. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, the commander supported by his staff, filters relevant
information categorized by operational variables into the categories of the mission variables used during
mission analysis. The commander uses mission variables to refine his understanding of the situation and to
gather relevant information used for mission analysis. Incorporating the analysis of the operational
variables with METT-TC ensures the commander considers the best available relevant information about
conditions that pertain to the mission. The mission variables of METT-TC consist of mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, and civil considerations.

MISSION
10-20. The analysis of the mission is conducted early-on during mission analysis. The mission involves
the critical tasks that must be performed. The tasks are either specified tasks stated by the order or implied
tasks that the commander must deduce. Mission analysis determines not only what must be accomplished,
the intent of the commander ordering the mission (the why of the operation), and the limitations (when,
where, how) placed by the higher headquarters, but is the basis for deciding on task organization. Once the

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mission is analyzed and deductions are made, all other factors are considered in terms of their impact on the
mission. It is therefore imperative that the mission be understood.
ENEMY
10-21. Examining enemy factors should be as detailed as possible depending on the time available.
General factors to consider areʊ
z Identification. Size and type of unit (regular or irregular force, or some combination of the two).
z Location. Current and future movement.
z Disposition. Organization or formation.
z Strength. Compared to friendly forces.
z Morale. Esprit, experience, state of training, regular or reserve.
z Capabilities. Electronic warfare, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, air defense,
airborne, air movement, attack helicopters, mobility (in comparison to the air assault force).
z Composition. Armored, Infantry, artillery, and sustainment.
z Probable courses of action. Likely mission or objective, probability of achieving it.
z Most dangerous course of action as it applies to the AATF mission and its potential impact on
the ground tactical plan.
10-22. When planning an air assault operation, the following factors about the enemy must be considered:
z Air defense weapons and capability.
z Mobility; particularly his ability to react to an air assault insertion.
z Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability; particularly his ability to influence
potential flight routes and landing zones.
z Capability to interdict or interrupt air assault operations with his helicopters or fixed-wing
aircraft.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
10-23. In air assault operations, terrain and weather must be analyzed in terms of their effect on the air
assault force. This includes the air assault force’s pick up, air movement, insertion, and movement to the
final objective, and in terms of the overall influence on aviation operations.
Terrain
10-24. Terrain preparation starts with the situational understanding of terrain through proper terrain
analysis. Terrain analysis described in terms of the military aspects of terrain includes observation and
fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC).
Observation and Fields of Fire
10-25. Observation is the condition of weather and terrain that permits a force to see friendly, enemy, and
neutral personnel, systems, and key aspects of the environment. An assault force’s field of fire is directly
related to its ability to observe. Considerations related to both enemy and friendly forces and, for air assault
operations, includeʊ
z Enemy visual observation or electronic surveillance of pickup zones, flight routes, and
landing zones.
z Enhanced friendly observation provided by scout weapons teams and aerial field artillery
observation helicopters.
z Ease of navigation along flight routes particularly for night or adverse weather operations.

Avenues of Approach
10-26. Air and ground avenues of approach are considered in both offensive and defensive operations
from friendly and enemy viewpoints. A good avenue of approach for air assault forces offersʊ
z A reasonable degree of mobility and few natural obstacles to the aircraft.
z Little or no canalization.
z Terrain masking that decreases effectiveness of enemy air defense weapons.

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Chapter 10

z Cover.
z Concealment.
z Good lines of communication and logistics.
z Ease of linkup with other forces when appropriate.
Key Terrain
10-27. Key terrain is mission-dependent; however, in air assault operations key terrain is not limited to
that which influences the ground tactical plan. It must be analyzed in terms of the following actions:
z Pickup zones or landing zones.
z Flight routes.
z Attack weapons team and scout weapons team battle positions.
z Occupation by enemy air defense artillery assets.
z Potential forward arming and resupply points.
z Ground attack positions.

Obstacles
10-28. Obstacles are any natural or man-made obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or
block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and
equipment on the opposing force (JP 3-15). While most obstacles can be bypassed by air assault forces,
obstacles that affect the ground tactical plan must be considered.
Cover and Concealment
10-29. Cover is protection from the effects of fires (ADRP 1-02). Concealment is the protection from
observation or surveillance (ADRP 1-02). Cover and concealment considerations which affect the ground
tactical plan includeʊ
z Terrain masking for nap-of-the-earth flight routes and insertions.
z Cover for attack weapons team and scout weapons team positions.
z Landing zones that offer Infantry cover and concealment following insertion.

Weather
10-30. Weather and visibility information is analyzed for trends. (See figure 10-2.) If the operation begins
in marginal weather, the commander must consider the possibility that it deteriorates below acceptable
limits during the operation. This may result in interrupting helicopter support and requiring changes in
planned operations. Considerations includeʊ
z Fog, low clouds, heavy rain, and other factors that limit visibility for aviators.
z Illumination and moon angle during aviation operations with night vision goggles.
z Ice and sleet, and freezing rain that degrades aerodynamic efficiency, and impact the ground
tactical plan.
z High temperatures or density altitudes that degrade aircraft engine performance and lift
capability.
z Darkness, normally an advantage to well-trained aviators and Soldiers.
z High winds (large-gust spreads).
z Weather conditions that create hazards on pickup zones and landing zones, such as blowing dust,
sand, or snow.

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FORMAT MAXIMUM WINDS

Weather forecasts are received in the following Observation helicopter (OH): 30 knots.
format: Utility helicopter (UH):40 knots.
Ceiling. Cargo helicopter (CH):60 knots.
Visibility.
*Note. Gusting winds, in excess of 15 knots
Weather (for example, clear, fog, rain, snow).
over the lull wind, may avoid UH usage.
Additional information as requested by the S-2
intelligence staff officer. Significant weather patterns (which limit
operations) are moderate turbulance and
CONSIDERATIONS icing.
Extremes Limiting Tactical Air
Allowable Weather Limits
Ceiling:1,000 feet.*
(Applicable to combat operations and tactical training
at a military airfield). Visibility: 2 miles.*
Visibility:1/2 mile. *Note. Operational design of a A-10, close air
Ceilings: Clear of clouds. support aircraft. Other type aircraft
require better weather conditions.

Figure 10-2. Weather data.

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
10-31. Troops and support available include the number, type, capabilities, and condition of assault and
support troops and support aviation available to conduct the air assault operation. Critical considerations to
the air assault operation include:
z The AATF should have enough combat power to seize initial objectives and protect the landing
zones until follow-on echelons arrive in the objective area.
z Assault (lift) helicopter capability is the single most important variable in determining how
much combat power can be introduced into the objective area.
10-32. Aircrew endurance must be considered. The aviation task force standard operating procedures
(SOP) outlines aircrew duty day and flying hour limits. If those limits are exceeded during a single period,
then degraded aircrew performance or limited aircrew availability can be expected on the following days.

TIME AVAILABLE
10-33. The commander assesses the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks and
operations. This includes the time required for pick up, air movement, insertion, movement to the final
objective, and delivery of follow-on forces in relationship to the enemy and conditions. Critical
considerations to the air assault operation include:
z Air assault planning must be centralized and precise, and takes more time than that for other
operations. Time must be made available for air-ground operations preparation, planning,
and rehearsals.
z Allot additional planning time for night operations and those involving multiple pickup zones or
multiple landing zones.
z The AATFC must allow adequate time to ensure that all subordinates units, particularly aviation
aircrews, are thoroughly briefed. Viable SOPs and previous training significantly reduce
briefing time.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
10-34. The ability to analyze civil considerations to determine their impact on operations enhances several
aspects of the air assault operation to include air movement, insertion into the objective area, movement to
the final objective, and follow-on operations. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.) Civil
considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid $6&23(ʊ

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z Areas.
z Structures.
z Capabilities.
z Organizations.
z People.
z Events.

ASSAULT OBJECTIVE AND LANDING ZONE DEVELOPMENT

10-35. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation contains essentially the same elements as other
attacks but differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility to achieve surprise. Assault
echelons are placed on or near the objective and organized to be capable of immediate seizure of objectives
and rapid consolidation for subsequent operations. If adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly
into the objective area, then the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat
power. The air assault force then assaults like other Infantry units and the effectiveness of the air assault
operation is diminished. (Refer to FM 3-21.20, FM 3-21.10, and FM 3-21.8 for more information.)
10-36. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander’s
evaluation of METT-TC to include, in particular, the availability of landing zones in the area. The
plan includesʊ
z Missions of all task force elements and methods for employment.
z Areas of operations with graphic control measures.
z Task organization to include command relationships.
z Location and size of reserves.
z Fire support to include graphic control measures.
z Sustainment.

SECTION III – AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS

10-37. Employing aviation forces with ground maneuver forces requires detailed integration and
coordinated force- oriented control measures to support ground maneuver while minimizing fratricide risks.
This section discusses the integration of air and ground maneuver, close combat attack, close air support,
and unmanned aircraft system employment during air-ground operations. (Refer to FM 3-04.111 for
more information.)

EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION
10-38. Integrating effective air and ground maneuver forces begins at the AATF and continues down to
the lowest unit level. In an air assault, the AATF plans and coordinates with the supporting combat aviation
brigade through their aviation liaison officer and the ADAM/BAE to support the ground tactical plan.
Integration should start at the home station with implementation of effective SOPs, habitual relationships,
and training if possible.
10-39. Integration involves merging the air and ground fights into one to apply proper aviation
capabilities according to the supported AATFC’s intent. Integration ideally begins early in the planning
process with the involvement of the ADAM/BAE. The ADAM/BAE advises the AATFC on aviation
capabilities and the best way to use aviation to support mission objectives. Ensuring the aviation liaison
officer or brigade aviation element passes along the task and purpose for aviation support and continually
provides updates as needed is of equal importance. Simply stated, ensuring the aviation brigade and
subordinate unit staffs fully understand the AATF scheme of maneuver and commander’s intent is critical to
successful air-ground operations.
10-40. Employing attack reconnaissance aviation with ground maneuver forces requires coordinated
force-oriented control measures and the CCA 5-Line attack brief allowing aviation forces to support ground
maneuver with direct fires while minimizing fratricide risks. Aviation liaison officers should identify early
in the planning process the minimum AATF graphics required for operations such as boundaries, phase

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lines, attack by fire positions, and objectives. Brigade aviation element and liaison officer personnel should
ensure that supported units are familiar with close combat attack request procedures and marking methods.

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACKS

10-41. A close combat attack is a coordinated attack by Army attack reconnaissance aviation aircraft
(manned and unmanned) against targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces. In most instances, the
attack aviation may already occupy holding areas, battle or support by fire positions or are in overwatch of
the ground maneuver force as it begins its assault. The AATF employs close combat attack procedures to
ensure that these aviation fires destroy the enemy with minimal risk to friendly forces.
10-42. Close combat attack is not synonymous with close air support flown by joint aircraft. Due to
capabilities of the aircraft and the enhanced situational awareness of the Army aircrews, terminal attack
control from ground units or controllers is not required. The most important factor of successful close
combat attacks is positive and direct communication between aviation and ground elements. Aviators and
ground elements need to understand the following to employ a successful close combat attack. (Refer to
FM 3-04.126 for more information.)
CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK REQUEST
10-43. When providing support to ground maneuver elements, Army aviation will operate on that
echelon's command network unless directed otherwise. The CCA 5-Line attack brief (Format 22) is the
standard brief for Army rotary wing and organic-armed UASs. The format is similar to the 5-Line RW
CAS attack brief, but will be prefaced with “Fire mission” vice a type of control. At check-in, Army attack
and scout weapons teams will brief the Format 23. CCA Check-in, Aircraft Transmits to Ground Unit.
(Refer to ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)
10-44. Any element in contact uses the CCA 5-Line attack brief to initiate the close combat attack. The
CCA 5-Line attack brief allows the ground maneuver forces to communicate and reconfirm to the aircraft
the exact location of friendly and enemy forces. The procedure remains the same regardless of the type of
unit in contact or the responding aviation element. The ground commander owning the terrain clears fires
during the close combat attack by giving aircrews the situational awareness of the location of friendly
elements. The ground commander deconflicts the airspace between indirect fires, close air support, UAS
and the close combat attack aircraft.
10-45. Transmission of the brief constitutes clearance to fire except in a danger close situation. For danger
close fire, the ground commander on the scene accepts responsibility for increased risk. Danger close must
be declared in the Line 5 when applicable by stating “Cleared Danger Close” and passing the initials of the
ground commander on scene.
10-46. After receiving the request for close combat attack, the aircrew informs the ground maneuver force
leader of the battle position, attack- or support by fire position (or series of positions) the team is
occupying, and the location from which the attack aircraft engages the enemy with direct fire. The size of
this position varies depending on the number of aircraft using the position, the size of the engagement area,
and the type of terrain.
10-47. The position must be close enough to the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handover.
Aircraft leaders normally offset the position from the flank of the friendly ground position. This helps to
ensure that rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the general signature of the aircraft do not
interfere with operations on the ground. The offset position allows the aircraft to engage the enemy on its
flanks rather than its front. It reduces the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun-target line. (Refer to
ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)
GROUND MANEUVER FORCE AND TARGET MARKING
10-48. Marking methods for identifying targets and friendly positions vary from one ground maneuver
force to another. The close combat attack request should include a detailed description of all friendly
locations and target locations in relation to friendly positions. It should include the target description and
how it is marked.

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10-49. For mutual protection and clarity on the appropriate target, the ground maneuver force does not
mark the target until requested by the aviation element. This in no way restricts the ground maneuver force
from returning fire from the enemy. However, the ground maneuver force should consider that the aircrews
may not be able to distinguish the correct target from other fires if they mark the target with fire. Ground
maneuver forces should have multiple means of marking their positions. If the target is marked by fire, the
aviation element requests the ground maneuver force to stop marking. The aviation element calls when
clear of the area and reports estimated battle damage assessment.
10-50. The close combat attack cannot be conducted without positive identification of friendly and enemy
forces by both the ground and aviation commander before attack aviation aircraft opens fire. The aviation
element tailors its attack angles and weapon selections based upon the target and friendly unit proximity to
the target.

TARGET HANDOVER
10-51. The rapid and accurate marking of a target is essential to a positive target handover. Aircraft
conducting close combat attacks normally rely on a high rate of speed and low altitude for survivability in
the target area. As such, the aircrew generally has an extremely limited amount of time to acquire both the
friendly and enemy marks. It is essential that the ground maneuver force has the marking ready and turned
on when requested by the aircrew.
10-52. Attack reconnaissance aircrews use both thermal sights and NVGs to fly with and acquire targets.
After initially engaging the target, the aircrew generally approaches from a different angle for survivability
reasons if another attack is required. The observer makes adjustments using the eight cardinal directions
and distance (meters) in relation to the last round’s impact and the actual target. At the conclusion of the
close combat attack, the aircrew provides its best estimate of battle damage assessment to the unit in
contact.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND REATTACK

10-53. After the attack aircraft complete the requested close combat attack mission, the aircrew provides a
battle damage assessment to the ground commander. Based on his intent, the ground maneuver commander
determines if another attack is required to achieve his desired end state. The close combat attack operation
can continue until the aircraft have expended all available munitions or fuel. However, if the air mission
commander receives a request for another attack, he must carefully evaluate his ability to extend the
operation. If not able, he calls for relief on station by another attack team if available. It is unlikely that the
original team has enough time to refuel, rearm, and return to station.

CLEARANCE OF FIRES
10-54. During an air assault with numerous aircraft in the vicinity of the landing zone, it is critical that
procedures are in place to deconflict airspace between aircraft and indirect fires, considerations includeʊ
z Ensure aircrews have the current and planned indirect fire positions (to include mortars)
supporting the air assault before the mission.
z Plan for informal airspace coordination areas and check firing procedures and communications
to ensure artillery and mortars firing from within the landing zone do not endanger subsequent
serials landing or departing, close combat attack, or close air support.
z Ensure at least one of the aviation team members monitors the fire support net for
situational awareness.
z Advise the aviation element if the location of indirect fire units changes from that planned.
z Ensure all participating units are briefed daily on current airspace control order or air tasking
order changes and updates that may affect air mission planning and execution.
z Ensure all units update firing unit locations, firing point origins, and final protective fire lines as
they change for inclusion in current airspace control order.
10-55. The AATFC or ground commander can establish an informal airspace coordination area. For
example, he can designate that all indirect fires be south of and all aviation stay north of a specified gridline

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for a specific period. This is one method for deconflicting airspace while allowing both indirect fires and
attack aviation to attack the same target. The ground commander then can cancel the informal airspace
coordination area when the situation permits. (Refer to FM 3-52 for more information.)

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

10-56. Close air support is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in
close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces. Like close combat attack, close air support can be conducted at any place and
time friendly forces are in close proximity to enemy forces based on availability. All leaders in the AATF
should understand how to employ close air support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or
delay enemy forces. Nomination of close air support targets is the responsibility of the commander, air
liaison officer, and S-3 at each level. The AATF may receive close air support from USAF, USN, USMC,
or multinational force. (Refer to JP 3-09.3 for more information.)

CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT

10-57. In some cases, USAF aircraft are available to provide close air support. Requests for these aircraft
are processed through the TACP colocated with the BCT main command post. The TACP is organized as
an air execution cell capable of requesting and executing Type 2 or 3 terminal attack control of close air
support missions. The manning of the cell depends on the situation but, at a minimum, includes an air
liaison officer and a JTAC. To make a recommendation to the commander regarding the use of close air
support aircraft, the leader on the ground should be familiar with the characteristics of the aircraft
predominantly used in the close air support role. (Refer to ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)

BRIEFING FORMAT
10-58. Two types of close air support requests are listed as follows:
z Preplanned requests that may be filled with either scheduled or on-call air missions. Those close
air support requirements foreseen early enough to be included in the first air tasking order
distribution are submitted as preplanned air support requests for close air support. Only those air
support requests submitted in sufficient time to be included in the joint air tasking cycle planning
phases and supported on the air tasking order are considered preplanned requests.
z Immediate requests that mostly are filled by diverting preplanned missions or with on-call
missions. Immediate requests arise from situations that develop outside the air tasking order
planning cycle.
10-59. The air liaison officer and JTAC personnel in the TACP are the primary means for requesting and
controlling close air support. However, forces may have joint fires observer certified personnel who can
request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2
and 3 close air support terminal attack controls, and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations.
(Refer to ATP 3-09.32 for more information.)

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

10-60. Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations provide surveillance capabilities to enhance the
AATFC’s situational awareness as he plans, coordinates, and executes the air assault. The commander can
employ UAS from his organic elements or he can request to have direct access to real-time feeds from
additional UAS support from his higher headquarters. They are particularly effective when employed
together with ground and attack reconnaissance elements as a team during shaping operations in which the
commander is trying to create the conditions for successful air assault execution. (Refer to chapter 4 of this
publication for UAS discussion.)

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SECTION IV – EXECUTION
10-61. An AATF is normally a highly tailored force specifically designed to hit hard and fast and is
employed in situations that provide the task force a calculated advantage due to surprise, terrain, threat, or
mobility. The following employment considerations govern the execution of the air assault operations.

CONDUCT OF THE AIR ASSAULT

10-62. The AATF normally should be assigned only missions that take advantage of its superior mobility
and should not be employed in roles requiring deliberate operations over an extended period. The basic
principles that apply to the conduct of air assault operations includeʊ
z Air assault forces always fight as a combined arms team.
z Availability of critical aviation assets is a major factor in an operation.
z Air assault planning must be centralized and precise; execution must be aggressive and decentralized.
z Air assault operations may be conducted at night or during adverse weather, but require more
planning and preparation time in those cases.
z Assault force tactical integrity must be maintained throughout an air assault. Squads are loaded
intact on the same helicopter, with platoons located in the same serial ensures fighting unit
integrity upon landing.
z Fires must provide for suppressive fires along flight routes and near landing zones. Priority for
fires must be to the suppression of enemy air defenses.
z Infantry operations are not fundamentally changed by integrating aviation units with Infantry;
tempo and distance are changed dramatically.
z An air assault operation may be the decisive operation; examples include river crossings, seizure
of key terrain, raids, and security area actions.
z An AATF is employed most effectively in environments where limited lines of communication
are available to the enemy, where he lacks air superiority and effective air defense systems.

BUILDUP OF COMBAT POWER

10-63. The availability of aviation assets is normally the major factor in determining AATF task
organization. The AATF must provide a mission-specific balance of mobility and combat power to include
sustainment of combat power. Considerations for rapid massing and shifting of combat power during the
conduct of an air assault includeʊ
z Delivery to the objective area as soon as possible, consistent with aircraft and pickup zone
capacities, to provide surprise and shock effect.
z Arrival intact at the landing zone with assault force tailored to provide en route security and
protection from the pickup zone, throughout the entire flight route, and at the landing zone.
z Nonstandard command relationship, attached for movement, used extensively during air assault
operations. Elements, to include field artillery, air defense artillery, intelligence, and engineer
may be attached to maneuver elements for movement only, to facilitate mission command,
maneuver, and security.
z Task-organized with sufficient combat power to seize initial objectives and protect landing
zones, and with sufficient sustainment for rapid tempo until follow-on or linkup forces arrive, or
until the mission is completed.

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 Chapter 11
Landing Plan
The landing plan supports the ground tactical plan. It provides a sequence for arrival
of units into the area of operation, ensuring that all assigned units arrive at designated
locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan. General
considerations to develop the landing plan follow.

SECTION I – LANDING ZONE SELECTION

11-1. Landing zones usually are selected by the AATFC or his S-3 based on technical advice from the air
mission commander or the aviation liaison officer. The section addresses keys considerations for landing
zone selection.

CRITERIA FOR SELECTING LANDING ZONES

11-2. Air assault landing zone selection is based on user requirements; type of environment; availability;
adequacy; security of landing zones on or near the objective area, or away from the objective area; threats
to the objective area; and aircraft/aircrew capability. Criteria for selecting landing zones includeʊ
z Location. In general, two options are viable when selecting landing zones—land on the objective
or land away from the objective. The selection of either option is METT-TC dependent.
z Capacity. Size determines how much combat power can be inserted at one time and the need for
additional landing zones or time separation between serials.
z Types of loads. External loads generally require larger landing zones than landing zones for
personnel alone.
z Elevation. The altitude of potential landing zones may not be supportable due to operating
restrictions of certain aircraft.
z Alternates. An alternate landing zone should be planned for each primary landing zone to ensure
flexibility to support the mission.
z Enemy composition, disposition, and capabilities. Landing zone considerations include enemy
force concentrations, weapons systems, and their capability to react to an air assault task force
landing nearby.
z Cover and concealment. Select landing zones to deny enemy observation and acquisition of
friendly ground and air elements while they are en route to, from, or in the landing zone.
z Obstacles. If possible, the air assault task force should land on the enemy side of obstacles when
attacking to negate their effectiveness. The air assault task force should consider using obstacles
to protect landing zones from the enemy at other times.
z Landing point. Landing zones should be generally free of obstacles. The landing point or
touchdown point must be free of obstacles (any object or hole greater than 18 inches high or
deep). (Refer to FM 3-21.38 for more information.)
z Identification from the air. If possible, landing zones should be easily identifiable from the air or
marked by friendly reconnaissance forces that have reconnoitered the landing zone.
z Approach and departure routes. If possible, approach and departure air routes should avoid
continued exposure of aircraft to enemy fire.
z Weather. Reduced visibility or strong winds may cause aircraft to avoid or limit the use of
primary or alternate landing zones.

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LOCATION OF LANDING ZONES

11-3. The AATF plans to land on or near the objective when the assault force is able maximize combat
power in the landing zone to rapidly eliminate enemy forces, immediately seize objectives, and rapidly
consolidate for subsequent operations. Considerations for landing on or near the objective include—
z Air assault task force is assigned a terrain-oriented mission.
z Commander has accurate up-to-date intelligence on the enemy.
z Commander has accurate intelligence on terrain (especially landing zones), weather is favorable,
and suitable landing zones are available on or near the objective.
z Shaping operations have set conditions for air assault execution.
z Time in which to accomplish the overall mission is limited.
z Civilian population is known to be supportive of U.S. presence in the area of operation.

11-4. When adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, the air assault
force lands away from the objective to build up combat power and then assaults to seize objectives.
Considerations for landing away from the objective include—
z Air assault task force is assigned an enemy-oriented mission.
z Commander has incomplete or unknown intelligence on the enemy.
z Commander has incomplete information on terrain (especially landing zones), weather is not
favorable, or no suitable landing zones are available near the objective.
z Shaping operations have not set conditions for air assault execution or conditions cannot be
verified.
z Time is available upon landing in the landing zone to develop the situation.
z Civilian population is unknown or hostile to U.S. presence in the area of operation.

NUMBER OF LANDING ZONES

11-5. The AATFC decides whether to use a single landing zone or multiple landing zones. A large number
of landing zones for an air assault increases the tactical risk and complexity of the operation as well as the
difficulty of setting conditions at each landing zone before landing. The AATFC should plan for one
primary landing zone and one alternate landing zone according to the maneuver force regardless of
proximity to the objective. He should plan for more than one primary and one alternate landing zone
according to maneuver force only after careful analysis of the mission variables to determine if sufficient
forces are available to conduct shaping operations at each landing zone.
11-6. Using a single landing zone—
z Requires less planning and rehearsal time.
z Allows concentration of combat power in one location.
z Facilitates control of the operation.
z Concentrates supporting fires in and around the landing zone.
z Requires fewer attack helicopters for security.
z Provides better security for subsequent lifts.
z Reduces the number of air routes in the objective area, making it more difficult for the enemy to
detect the air assault operation.
z Centralizes required resupply operations.

11-7. Using multiple landing zones—

z Avoids grouping units in one location, which creates a lucrative target for enemy mortars,
artillery, and close air support.
z Allows rapid dispersal of ground elements to accomplish tasks in separate areas.
z Reduces the enemy’s ability to detect and react to the initial lift.
z Forces the enemy to fight in more than one direction.
z Reduces the possibility of troop congestion in one landing zone.

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z Eliminates aircraft congestion on one landing zone.

z Makes it difficult for the enemy to determine the size of the air assault force and the exact
location of supporting weapons.

SECTION II – LANDING ZONE UPDATES

11-8. Just before the start of the air movement and just before the lift aircraft reach the release point, the
attack reconnaissance aircraft or unmanned aircraft system (UAS) provide a landing zone update to the
AATF, informing the AATFC ground commander, and air mission commander of the status of enemy
activity on the landing zone. The requirement for a landing zone update is METT-TC dependent and based
on the need to preserve surprise on the objective. The manner in which the landing zone update is
conducted should not divulge the exact location of the landing zone.

LANDING ZONE CONDITION

11-9. The landing zone is considered cold if no enemy activity is observed. If the landing zone is cold, the
air assault is executed as planned. The landing zone is considered hot if enemy activity is occurring on or
near the landing zone. If the landing zone is hot, the attack reconnaissance aircraft provide a situation report
consisting of enemy activity, their actions toward the enemy and a recommendation for using the alternate
landing zone. Based on the recommendation of the attack reconnaissance aviation element, the AATFC
decides whether to use an alternate landing zone. As part of the mission analysis and rehearsal process,
aircrews rehearse and execute the air movement using an alternate landing zone.

FIXED-WING SUPPORT
11-10. When available, fixed-wing aircraft can be used to provide a landing zone update or to eliminate
enemy activity. As long as lift aircraft or attack reconnaissance aircraft possess the proper communication
capabilities, fixed-wing aircraft can relay the update directly to the AATFC. If these capabilities are not
present, fixed-wing aircraft may relay the update to a command post that then relays the update to the
AATFC. The plan must account for time needed to relay the update to all parties.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SUPPORT

11-11. UAS can be employed to monitor and relay the updated status of the landing zone and surrounding
area during the air movement phase. This early information gives the AATFC more time to adjust plans if
required. UAS that fly at higher altitudes may observe with negligible risk of revealing landing zone or
objective locations.

SECTION III – HOT LANDING ZONE CONSIDERATIONS

11-12. Sometimes the presence of enemy activity is unknown or unclear until the first aircraft lands in the
landing zone. A unit should develop and rehearse its plan for reacting to enemy contact in that situation.

SCENARIOS
11-13. The enemy may employ one or a combination of the following actions to oppose
landing operations:
z Conduct a near ambush.
z Conduct a far ambush.
z Deliver indirect fires by mortars, artillery, or rockets directed by an observer that can see the
landing zone.
z Emplace obstacles, such as antipersonnel mines, booby traps, or other barriers.

11-14. The AATFC considers five options in response to a hot landing zone. They areʊ
z Fight through the contact.

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Chapter 11

z Divert to the alternate landing zone.

z Abort remaining serials.
z Slow airspeeds to delay serials.
z Racetrack serials.
11-15. Racetracking is considered a high-risk option. All serials orbit at their current position. Once the
enemy has been neutralized or destroyed on the landing zone, the air assault resumes in the order outlined
in the air movement table. The air mission commander determines whether enough fuel, spacing, and time
is available between serials to conduct this option and advises the AATFC accordingly.
11-16. The AATFC makes the final decision on all options involving a hot landing zone, and the air
mission commander and ground commander execute. Whether landing away from or on the objective, it is
important that primary and alternate landing zones are mutually supporting to allow the AATFC to shift the
main effort if needed.

REACTION TO ENEMY CONTACT AWAY FROM THE OBJECTIVE

11-17. When landing away from the objective, ground maneuver forces can more readily divert to an
alternate landing zone. In doing so, the main effort of the decisive operation may be shifted to the force
landing at the alternate landing zone, and the force at the hot landing zone may be extracted or continue to
fight through the enemy contact. If the alternate landing zone is hot as well, the AATFC should choose
which force to designate as the main effort to accomplish the mission.
11-18. A force that encounters a near ambush, unless extremely successful in counteracting that ambush,
is usually extracted, reorganized, and reinserted into an alternate landing zone to continue the mission. A
force that encounters a far ambush, hostile indirect fires, or obstacles usually continues its mission.

REACTION TO ENEMY CONTACT ON THE OBJECTIVE

11-19. When landing on the objective, units react to contact and fight through. Because the landing zone
is on the objective, fighting for control of the hot landing zone is critical to mission accomplishment and
continuing the assault is the priority. The unit on the hot landing zone may be directed to fix the enemy,
while the main effort is shifted to the unit that lands at an alternate landing zone and fights through to the
objective.
11-20. If the alternate landing zone is hot as well, the AATFC should choose which unit to designate as
the main effort to accomplish the mission. Given the overall mission, breaking contact or extraction is not
likely for units caught on a hot landing zone. In cases other than a near ambush, units fight through enemy
contact and continue the mission without diverting serials to an alternate landing zone.

SECTION IV – PREPARATION AND SUPPORTING FIRES

11-21. Preparation fires are planned for each landing zone so they can be executed if needed. However, it
is desirable to make the initial assault without preparation fires to achieve tactical surprise. Planned fires for
air assault operations should be intense and short but with a high volume of fire to maximize the surprise
and shock effect.
11-22. Ground forces land ready to fight, with the integrated support of close air support, close combat
attack, and indirect fires. Supporting fires, direct or indirect, are directed and cleared on the landing zone by
the ground commander.
11-23. Factors to consider when developing fire support plans are listed as follows:
z Deception. False preparations can be fired into areas other than the objective or landing zone
area to deceive enemy forces if rules of engagement allows. For example, some rules of
engagement might prevent any unobserved fires.
z Duration of preparation fires. A preparation of long duration may reduce the possibility of
surprise. The preparation fires should begin as the first aircraft of the first lift crosses the release
point and end just before the first aircraft lands.

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z Availability of fire support assets. The ground commander coordinates with the artillery unit to
arrange the preparation of units that can fire. In some cases, where an air assault is executed
across extended distances, preparation fires by close air support or attack helicopters may be the
only viable alternative.
z Objective area fires. A known or suspected enemy force in the landing area, regardless of size,
warrants preparation fires.
z Effects of ordnance on the landing zone. Some ordnances used in preparation fires (such as
artillery, bombs, or infrared illumination) may be undesirable since they can cause craters,
downed trees, fires, and landing zone obscuration.
z Scheduling fires. Fires are scheduled to be lifted or shifted to coincide with the arrival times of
aircraft formations.
z Collateral damage. The unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that
would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is
lawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the
attack. (Refer to JP 3-60 for more information.)
z Positive control measures. Control measures must be established for lifting or shifting fires.
z Additional considerations include:
„ The ground commander clears all ground, air, and indirect fires inside the airhead line.
„ Door gunners in assault aircraft fire only at the base of the tree line to avoid fratricide of
overwatching gunships.
„ As long as the air assault continues, attack aviation works for the AATFC. Attack
reconnaissance aviation is placed in direct support of the ground commander for air assault
security and close combat attack within the objective area. The ground commander passes
control of attack aviation aircraft to subordinate commanders for close combat attack. Once
the threat is eliminated, attack aircraft are passed back to the ground commander‘s control.
Only a ground commander can clear Apache or Kiowa fires into the tree line assaulted by
friendly forces. (Refer to chapter 6 of this publication for more information.)
„ Indirect fires on the tree line being assaulted by friendly forces are always treated as danger
close. (In other words, in a right door exit, a fire mission into the right tree line would be
danger close.)
„ Know the locations of all friendly forces in the area, to include reconnaissance and long-
range surveillance units, pathfinders, and special operations forces.

SECTION V – LANDING SITE OPERATIONS

11-24. Aircraft formations on the landing zone should facilitate a rapid exit from the aircraft, an orderly
departure off the landing zone, and an organized deployment for the assault. The number and type of
aircraft and the configuration and size of the landing zone may dictate the formation. (See chapter 12 for a
discussion of standard flight and landing formations.) If contact is expected in the landing zone, elements
must land ready to fight and maneuver in all directions.

LANDING ZONE AND OBSTACLE MARKINGS

11-25. For daylight operations, pathfinders use panels or some other minimal identification means to
mark landing zones. Smoke might also be used to identify a landing zone and assist the pilot in determining
wind conditions. However, smoke is also easily identified by the enemy. For daylight operations, mark the
number one landing point using a single VS-17 panel, with the international orange side visible. Other
touchdown points might be marked, as coordinated. Mark obstacles using the cerise colored side of the
panel. For night operations, use chem-lights, lanterns, field expedients, or other methods to show the
direction of landing and to mark individual landing points. For day and night air assault operations, mark
all obstacles. (Refer to FM 3-21.38 for more information on daylight landing formations.)
11-26. At night, pathfinders can use lights of different colors (except red, which marks obstacles) to
designate different helicopter sites or to separate flights within a larger formation. A lighted "T" or inverted

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"Y" indicates both the landing point for the lead helicopter of each flight and the direction of approach.
Other lights mark touchdown points for the other helicopters in the flight. Each helicopter should land with
its right landing gear or its right skid 5 meters left of the lights. Large cargo helicopters (CH-47) land 10
meters to the left of the lights. (Refer to FM 3-21.38 for more information on night landing formations.)
11-27. For security, pathfinders and the ground unit turn off, cover, or turn all lights upside down until the
last practical moment before a helicopter arrives. Then they orient the lights in the direction from which the
lead helicopter is approaching, and a signalman directs its landing.

Note: Because the marking lights could be too bright for the aircrew member's night vision
goggles, crew members might have to look under the goggles to distinguish the colors. Also,
aircrew members wear night vision goggles with filtered lenses. These filters do not allow the
aircrews to see blue or green chem-lights. Colors such as yellow, orange, red, and infrared can
be seen by pilots wearing ANVIS.

11-28. During daylight landing operations, pathfinders use red-colored panels or other red, easily-
identifiable means to mark any hard-to-detect, impossible-to-remove obstacles such as wires, holes,
stumps, and rocks. During nighttime, pathfinders use red lights to mark any obstacles within the landing
site that they cannot reduce or remove.
11-29. In most combat situations, the need for security keeps pathfinders from using red lights to mark
treetops on the departure end of a landing zone. However, in training or in a rear area landing site, they do
use red lights. If they cannot mark obstacles or hazards, they must fully advise aviators of existing
conditions by ground to air radio. In any case, the pathfinder landing site leader makes sure that pathfinders
mark the most dangerous obstacles first and, if possible, that they remove them.
11-30. Pathfinders have a limited capability to secure a landing site. If they precede the initial assault
elements into a landing site, Soldiers from the supported ground unit can go with them for security. If
required to do so by the supported unit, pathfinders can mark initial assembly points for soldiers,
equipment, and supplies. They should choose locations that help ensure the quick, efficient assembly and
clearing of the helicopter landing site. If the unit uses assembly areas, the ground unit commander selects
their locations. If needed, supported ground unit Soldiers go with the pathfinders to reconnoiter and mark
the unit assembly areas, set up assembly aids, act as guides, and help with landing and unloading
operations. Having this help ensures that the pathfinders can rapidly clear soldiers, supplies, and equipment
from the landing points.
11-31. A landing zone formation may not have standardized distances between aircraft due to the size or
terrain on the landing zone. The goal in landing aircraft successfully is to select a safe landing area as close
to cover and concealment as possible to reduce Soldier exposure. If possible, the aircraft formation on the
pickup zone is the same as the landing zone. This provides Soldiers and leaders a preview of the landing
zone landing formation and gives them an idea of their location upon landing in relation to other elements.
11-32. The lead elements lifted into the landing zone are responsible for clearing the landing zone to
support follow-on lifts. This can be accomplished using a number of methods, which are entirely METT-
TC dependent. The most common method for clearing the landing zone is to assign assault objectives,
which requires subordinate units to move through an assigned area to clear enemy forces before reaching
their final objective.

EXITING THE AIRCRAFT

11-33. The two methods for exiting a UH-60 aircraft are the one-side off-load and the two-side off-load.
Soldiers exiting a CH-47 do so from the rear ramp. In each method, Soldiers must be careful to avoid the
main and tail rotors of the aircraft they are exiting and the rotors of other aircraft in their serial. The
separation between serials and the number of serials that can fit into the landing zone at one time are
critical planning considerations when determining the aircraft exiting method.
11-34. As part of an air assault, the mission may require the application of the fast-rope insertion and
extraction system (FRIES) for small units to infiltrate or insert into a confined area where a helicopter is
unable to land as an alternative method for exiting an aircraft. FRIES is the fastest method of deploying

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 Landing Plan

Soldiers from a rotary-wing aircraft that are unable to land. FRIES is not approved for Army-wide use and
is restricted to special operations forces and long-range surveillance units. (Refer to FM 3-05.210 for more
information.)

ONE-SIDE OFF-LOAD
11-35. In this method, Soldiers exit from either the right or left side of the aircraft. (See figure 11-1.)
Soldiers exiting the aircraft should step outward and take up a prone position, forming 180-degree security
on that side of the aircraft yet remaining under the main rotor system and outside the landing gear of the
aircraft. Soldiers should remain in the prone position until the aircraft lifts off before departing the landing
zone. The chalk leader directs his chalk to move to the nearest covered and concealed position according to
the landing plan or SOPs.
11-36. A unit plans to execute a one-side off-load on the side away from known or potential enemy
positions but may be forced to exit the aircraft on the opposite side due to the enemy or other METT-TC
considerations once the aircraft has landed.

Figure 11-1. One-side off-load (UH-60)

Advantages
11-37. The one-side off-load simplifies mission command and the establishment of zones of responsibility
on the landing zone. It allows the door gunners on the opposite side of the aircraft to engage enemy
positions during off-loading. (See figure 11-2a, page 11-8.) This allows the door gunners of follow-on
serials to engage enemy on the far side of the landing zone. Figure 11-2b on page 11-8 allows for
immediate establishment of 360-degree security upon landing.

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Chapter 11

Figure 11-2a. One-side off-load (squads in same chalk) trail landing formation

Figure 11-2b. One-side off-load (squads in same chalk) staggered trail right landing formation

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 Landing Plan

Disadvantages
11-38. The one-side off-load is the slowest of the off-loading methods. The Soldiers and aircraft are
exposed for a longer amount of time while exiting the aircraft, making them vulnerable to direct and
indirect fire.

TWO-SIDE OFF-LOAD
11-39. In this method, Soldiers exit from both sides of the aircraft. (See figure 11-3.) Soldiers exiting the
aircraft should step outward and take up a prone position, forming 180-degree security on that side of the
aircraft yet remaining under the main rotor system and outside the landing gear of the aircraft. Soldiers
should remain in the prone position until the aircraft lifts off before departing the landing zone. The squad
leader directs his squad to move directly to the nearest covered and concealed position according to the
landing plan or SOPs.

Figure 11-3. Two-side off-load (UH-60)

11-40. Cross-load options allow for pure unit integrity of chalks (See figure 11-4, page 11-10.) or mixed
loads to support moving to opposite sides of a large pickup zone. (See figure 11-5, page 11-10.) Cross-load
planning considerations support the mission command initially required on the landing zone and follow-on
lifts into the landing zone.

Advantages
11-41. The two-side off-load is the quickest method for exiting the aircraft. It simplifies control and the
establishment of zones of responsibility on the landing zone.

Disadvantages
11-42. The two-side off-load has the slowest movement time off the landing zone of all off-loading
methods, which exposes Soldiers longer to enemy direct and indirect fire. This method masks both door
gunner fires while Soldiers exit the aircraft, which increases vulnerability to enemy direct fire.

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Chapter 11

Figure 11-4. Two-side off-load (squads in same chalk) diamond landing formation

Figure 11-5. Two-side off-load (chalks cross-loaded) heavy right landing formation

REAR RAMP OFF-LOAD

11-43. In this method, Soldiers exit from the rear ramp of a CH-47 or other rear exiting aircraft. Soldiers
move out from the aircraft and drop to a prone fighting position, establishing 360-degree security until the

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 Landing Plan

aircraft lifts to depart the landing zone. (See figure 11-6.) Once the aircraft departs the landing zone, the
unit may execute a one- or two-side landing zone rush according to the landing plan or SOPs.

Figure 11-6. Rear ramp off-load and landing zone exit (CH-47)

EXITING THE LANDING ZONE

ONE-SIDE LANDING ZONE RUSH
11-44. Upon exiting the aircraft and dropping to the prone position, Soldiers recover from the prone
position and move immediately with their squad to a covered and concealed position (such as a tree line) in
wedge or other formation determined by their squad leader. Squads assemble at designated rally points and
then move to assault objectives on the landing zone or to objectives off the landing zone. This is the
preferred method to use when touchdown points are near covered and concealed positions. The unit may
plan a one-side landing zone rush away from a potential enemy position, allowing the door gunner closest
to the enemy position to continue firing while Soldiers exit the other side of the aircraft. (See figure 11-7,
page 11-12.)

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Chapter 11

Figure 11-7. One-side landing zone rush (squads in same chalk) trail landing formation

Advantages
11-45. A one-side landing zone rush—
z Moves the unit off the danger area quickly.
z Facilitates control.
z Maintains momentum and is less vulnerable to indirect fires.
z Simplifies establishing zones of responsibility on the landing zone.
z Minimizes aircraft cross-loading plans.
z Allows door gunner of off-loading and follow-on serials to engage enemy on the far side of the
landing zone.
z Clears the landing zone quickly for follow-on lifts.

Disadvantages
11-46. The unit executing a one-side landing zone rush is vulnerable to direct fire weapons while moving
off the landing zone.

TWO-SIDE LANDING ZONE RUSH

11-47. Aircraft loading options to consider when using a two-side landing zone rush are:
z Split the squad across two chalks, with each fire team exiting the same door. (See figure 11-8.)
z Keep each chalk as a pure squad, with even-numbered chalks exiting the right door and odd-
numbered chalks exiting the left door or vice versa. (See figure 11-9, page 11-13.)
11-48. Upon exiting the aircraft and dropping to the prone position, Soldiers recover from the prone
position and move immediately with their squad to a covered and concealed position in wedge or other
formation designated by their squad leader. Squads assemble at designated rally points and then move to

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 Landing Plan

assault objectives on the landing zone or to objectives off the landing zone. The aircraft landing formation
can help facilitate the unit in rapidly clearing Soldiers off the landing zone.

Advantages
11-49. A two-side landing zone rush—
z Moves the unit off the danger area fastest.
z Facilitates clearing and securing of the landing zone.
z Facilitates fire control measures on the landing zone.
z Maintains momentum and is less vulnerable to indirect fires.
z Establishes zones of responsibility on the landing zone.
z Clears the landing zone quickly for follow-on lifts.

Disadvantages
11-50. A two-side landing zone rush is more difficult to plan and control due to its complex aircraft cross-
loading plan. It masks fires of both door gunners while departing the landing zone, which increases
vulnerability to direct fire while moving off the landing zone.

Figure 11-8. Two-side landing zone rush (chalks cross loaded) trail landing formation

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Chapter 11

Figure 11-9. Two-side landing zone rush (squads in same chalk) trail landing formation

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 Chapter 12
Air Movement Plan
The air movement plan is largely based on the ground tactical plan and landing plan.
It begins when the assault or lift helicopters cross the start point and ends when they
cross the release point. The air movement plan specifies the schedule and provides
instructions for air movement of Soldiers, equipment, and supplies from the pickup
zone to the landing zone. The air movement plan considers the impact of airspace
restrictions. It provides coordinating instructions regarding air routes, aircraft speeds,
altitudes, formations, and the planned use of attack reconnaissance helicopters.

SECTION I – DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

12-1. The air movement plan is developed by the air assault task force (AATF) and supporting aviation
unit staffs in coordination with technical assistance and recommendations from the brigade aviation
element, air mission commander, and the aviation liaison officer. The aviation unit conducts all air mission
planning using the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS). This allows the aviation unit to plan
digitally, allowing rapid distribution of digital products between units within the AATF. However, the air
assault task force commander (AATFC) approves the final plan. The result of air movement planning is the
completion of the air movement table, which specifies the AATF movement from the pickup zone to the
landing zone.
12-2. Important considerations when developing the air movement plan areʊ
z Air routes.
z En route formations.
z Terrain flight modes.
z Fires.
z Suppression of enemy air defense.
z Air assault security.
z Mission command.

AIR ROUTES
12-3. Components of an air route areʊ
z Start point.
z Release point.
z Air control points.
z Flight path between the start point and release point.

START POINT AND RELEASE POINT

12-4. The air route starts at the start point and ends at the release point. The location of start points and
release points are usually three to five kilometers from the pickup zones and landing zones respectively to
allow adequate flying time for execution of the flight’s en route procedures. The distance from the pickup
zone to the start point allows the aircraft to achieve the desired airspeed, altitude, and formation after
liftoff. The distance from the release point to the landing zone allows the flight leader to reconfigure the
formation and execute a tactical formation landing. The designated locations of the start points and release
points should—

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Chapter 12

z Profit from favorable weather conditions.

z Avoid obstacles and known enemy positions.
z Facilitate takeoff and landing into the wind by the best air route.
AIR CONTROL POINTS
12-5. Air control points designate each point where the air route changes direction. They include readily
identifiable topographic features or points marked by electronic navigational aids. A route may have as
many air control points as needed to control the air movement. The start points and release points are air
control points.
12-6. Once identified, air routes are designated for use by each unit. When large groups of aircraft are
employed, dispersion is achieved by using multiple routes. However, with large serials, it is often necessary
to use fewer routes or even a single route to concentrate available supporting fires. The number of alternate
and return routes may be limited.
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING ROUTES
12-7. Regardless of direction or location, certain criteria apply. All characteristics are seldom present in
any one situation, but all should be considered. Give careful consideration to the terrain and enemy forces.
Air routes should assist in navigation (day or night) and avoid turns in excess of 60 degrees to facilitate
control of the aircraft formation when formation flying is required or if sling loads are involved.
12-8. Factors to consider when selecting routes as follows:
z Interference with ground action. Overflying ground elements may interfere with their supporting
fire. Clear air routes of the gun-target line when possible. Avoid over-flight of built-up areas.
z Support of landing plan. To reduce vulnerability of the air assault force, air routes facilitate rapid
approach, landing, and departure from selected landing zones.
z Enemy ground and air capabilities. Air routes maximize use of terrain, cover, and concealment
to minimize exposure to enemy observation, target acquisition, and direct fire.
z Available fire support. Air routes allow fire support from all available resources. Avoid masking
friendly fires, particularly supporting fires.
z Available air cover. Air routes are selected to provide air cover for friendly forces en route.
z Weather conditions. Prevailing weather during the air assault operation significantly affects the
selection of air routes.
z Terrain. Air routes use terrain to maximize the advantage of and reduce vulnerability of the
aircraft formations, providing cover by placing terrain mass and vegetation between the enemy
and the aircraft.
z Distance from pickup zone to landing zone. Air routes should be as short as is tactically feasible
according to mission variables to reduce flying time.
12-9. Maps or overlays containing air route information are prepared at aviation unit headquarters and
disseminated to subordinate and support units. Air routes and corridors are designated by a letter, number,
or word. (See figure 12-1, page 12-3.)

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 Air Movement Plan

Figure 12-1. Air route overlay

EN ROUTE FORMATIONS
12-10. Many factors dictate the flight’s formation, such as terrain, enemy situation, visibility, weather,
altitude, speed, type of aircraft mix, and the degree of control required. The air mission commander or
flight leader selects the en route formation and landing formation based on the mission analysis of the
ground tactical plan. Ideally, all aircrafts land at the same time in a planned flight formation as specified by
the air movement table. The landing site commander includes this information in his landing instructions to
the flight leader and the pathfinder establishing the landing zone. (Refer to FM 3-04.113 for more
information.)
12-11. The flight leader and pathfinder must understand the en route and landing formation and the
ground tactical plan to best support the ground unit and facilitate the air assault operation. The flight leader
should try to match the landing formation to the flight formation. Pilots should have to modify their
formations no more than necessary to accommodate the restrictions of a landing site, but it might be
necessary to land in a restrictive area. Touchdown points are established by the pathfinder in the same order

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as indicated in the formation. The following standard flight and landing formations (See figure 12-2, page
12-5.) are used when conducting air assault operations:

z Heavy left or right formation. Requires a relatively long, wide landing area; presents difficulty in
pre-positioning loads; restricts suppressive fire by inboard gunners; provides firepower to front
and flank.
z Diamond formation. Allows rapid deployment for all-round security; requires relatively small
landing area; presents some difficulty in pre-positioning loads; restricts suppressive fire of
inboard gunners.
z Vee formation. Requires a relatively small landing area; allows rapid deployment of forces to the
front; restricts suppressive fire of inboard gunners; presents some difficulty in prepositioning
loads.
z Echelon left or right formation. Requires a relatively long, wide landing area; presents some
difficulty in prepositioning loads; allows rapid deployment of forces to the flank; allows
unrestricted suppressive fire by gunners.
z Trail formation. Requires a relatively small landing area; allows rapid deployment of forces to
the flank; simplifies pre-positioning loads; allows unrestricted suppressive fire by gunners.
z Staggered trail left or right formation. Requires a relatively long, wide landing area; simplifies
pre-positioning loads; allows rapid deployment for all-round security; gunners' suppressive fire
restricted somewhat.

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Figure 12-2. Standard flight and landing formations

12-12. The pathfinder chooses landing sites that have firm surfaces; are free of dust, sand, and debris that
might create problems when disturbed by rotor wash; and are cleared of obstacles. The landing site is laid
out in a location where helicopters will not fly directly over aircraft on the ground. The layout of the site
also depends on the landing space available, the number and type of obstacles, unit standard operating
procedures, and prearranged flight formations. En route formation impacts how the formation lands,
impacting loading and off-loading of aircraft. (Refer to FM 3-21.38 for more information.)

TERRAIN FLIGHT MODES

12-13. A specific en route flight altitude is not designated and is usually below the coordinating altitude.
Factors affecting flight altitude include enemy, terrain, navigation, weather, flight distance, need for
surprise, and pilot fatigue. Pilots may use one or some combination of the three terrain flight modes as
dictated by the mission variables.

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z Nap-of-the-earth flight is conducted at varying airspeeds as close to the earth’s surface as

vegetation and obstacles permit. A weaving flight path remains oriented along the general axis
of movement and takes advantage of terrain masking. This is a general flight mode and may
likely be in close proximity to the enemy.
z Contour flight is conducted at low altitudes, conforming to the earth’s contours. Relatively
constant airspeeds and varying altitudes as dictated by terrain and obstacles characterize it.
z Low-level flight is conducted at constant altitudes and airspeed dictated by threat avoidance. Its
intent is to facilitate speed and ease of movement while minimizing detection. This mode of
flight is used when there is a low threat level. Fires along the air route are planned to suppress
known or suspected enemy positions. These fires should be intense and of short duration. Utilize
multiple target engagement methods as needed. On-call fires are planned along the air route to
ensure rapid target engagement if necessary.

FIRES
12-14. Fire plans cover the pickup zones, air routes, and landing zones. Fire support plans include
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) systems and obscuration to protect formations from enemy
detection. This requires aggressive fire planning and direct coordination with field artillery and mortar fire
direction centers and other fire support elements.
12-15. All available fire support is used to suppress or destroy enemy weapons, to include close air
support, artillery, and attack reconnaissance helicopters. Support may comprise concealment or other
countermeasures for suppressing or confusing enemy air defense systems. During night operations, the use
of illumination fire requires detailed planning. Illumination can interfere with NVGs causing unsafe conditions.

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

12-16. In executing air movement, the air mission commander integrates air routes based on pickup zone
and landing zone locations, avoiding known or suspected enemy air defense positions. The AATF is
responsible for planning, synchronizing, and executing lethal suppressive fires and nonlethal suppressive
effects on known or suspected enemy air defense positions that are unavoidable. Lethal and nonlethal assets
available to conduct SEAD missions includeʊ
z Mortars and artillery (cannon, rocket and missile).
z Fixed-wing assets, to include unmanned aircraft systems.
z Naval gunfire.
z Attack reconnaissance helicopters.
z Radar suppression and jamming (lethal and nonlethal).
z Communications suppression and jamming (lethal and nonlethal).

JOINT SEAD
12-17. The term Joint SEAD encompasses all SEAD activities provided by components of a joint force in
support of one another. When operating as a component of a joint force, different assets and unique
planning requirements may exist. (Refer to JP 3-01 for more information.) Joint SEAD includes all SEAD
categories and additional classifications to includeʊ
z Operational area system suppression comprises operations within an operational area against
specific enemy air defense systems to degrade or destroy their effectiveness. It targets high
payoff air defense systems whose degradation most affects the enemy’s total system.
z Opportune suppression is a continuous operation involving immediate attack of air defense
targets of opportunity. It is normally unplanned suppression, includes aircrew self-defense, and
attacks against targets of opportunity.
z Localized suppression can occur throughout the area of responsibility or joint operations area
and can be conducted by all components. However, it is limited in time and to geographical
areas associated with specific ground targets.
z Corridor suppression is planned joint SEAD focused on creating an air defense artillery
suppressed corridor to maneuver aircraft. Missions that normally require this suppression are air

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missions supporting tactical airlift or combat operations, search and rescue operations, and
operations in support of special operations forces.

SEAD PLANNING
12-18. The ground maneuver, aviation units, AATF operations officers, AATF intelligence officers (Refer
to FM 2-0 for more information.), and electronic warfare officer (See ATP 3-36.) participate in SEAD
planning. SEAD planning is conducted as part of the military decisionmaking process and targeting
process. Consider the following critical factors in mission analysis:
z Ingress and egress air routes and locations of air control points.
z En route airspeed.
z Time, distance, and heading information for primary and alternate air routes.
z Expected start point crossing time on ingress and egress.
z Enemy air defense artillery locations within the area of operation.
z Locations, frequencies, and call signs of friendly artillery.
z Available assets to deliver SEAD fires.

12-19. When determining enemy air defense capabilities, mission planners—

z Plot the location of all known enemy air defense artillery systems on a map.
z Draw a circle (threat ring) around each air defense artillery system with a radius equal to the
maximum engagement range. Depending on the threat system and its means of target acquisition
(optical, infrared, and radar) and fire control, the size of the threat ring may change during hours
of limited visibility. Terrain that blocks electronic or visual lines of sight may reduce the radius
of a threat ring.
z Use AMPS, Falcon View, or other automated systems to reduce workload and ensure accuracy.
z Plot the primary and alternate air routes and all landing zones on the map. Air routes and landing
zones should avoid threat rings whenever possible.
12-20. Plan SEAD fires to engage the two types of targets, planned targets and targets of opportunity
described below.

Planned Targets
12-21. A planned target is a target that is known to exist in the operational environment, upon which
actions are planned using deliberate targeting, creating effects which support the commander’s objectives
(JP 3-60). The two types of planned targets are—
z Scheduled targets that are prosecuted at a specified time.
z On-call targets that have planned actions and are triggered when detected or located.

12-22. One example of a scheduled target is a deception SEAD mission. Deception SEAD may be fired
into an area to deceive the enemy or cause him to reposition his air defense weapons away from where
actual operations take place. Another example is an electronic attack of enemy air defense radars and
command and control information systems when enemy ADA assets are in civilian populated areas.
12-23. Provisions should also exist for immediate on-call fires in the SEAD plan. Establish a quick-fire
network for this purpose providing a direct link between an observer and weapon system (normally field
artillery). Order observers based on their priority of fire. Conduct a fire support rehearsal with the
supporting unit. Brief and rehearse with all participants during the combined arms rehearsal.

Targets of Opportunity
12-24. SEAD is conducted against ADA targets of opportunity and should reflect priorities established on
the high-payoff target list and attack guidance matrix. Delivery systems and quick-fire networks are critical
to engaging targets of opportunity.

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SEAD EMPLOYMENT
12-25. SEAD fires should be planned against an enemy ADA system that threatens the air assault force. A
period of focused immediate SEAD is planned at each landing zone before the arrival of the AATF. If
possible, plan deception SEAD to mitigate further tactical risk.
12-26. Scheduled SEAD missions are planned against threat systems along the ingress and egress route of
flight. The start time for each SEAD mission may be calculated if the assault aircraft’s en route airspeed
and SP time on the air route are known. These calculations may be made manually or with AMPS or
similar planning systems.
12-27. Factors that determine the duration of each SEAD mission include aircraft speed and the range of
each enemy ADA system (size of the threat ring). This information may be used with planning software to
determine how long to suppress each ADA system along the air route. Calculations may be made manually
or estimated. A good planning estimate is that the air assault travels three kilometers in one minute.
12-28. Position units to support as much of the area of operation as possible. To ensure synchronization,
organize all planned fires into an SEAD schedule or add them to the execution matrix. Assess the
effectiveness of the SEAD plan during war-gaming.

AIR ASSAULT SECURITY

12-29. Air assault security is conducted throughout the air movement phase. Air assault security is not
necessarily just an escort mission. The air assault security process can be conducted sequentially,
simultaneously, or over a period of 24 to 72 hours before the start of the air assault mission. This process is
determined early in the mission analysis phase and is a direct result of the AATFC’s initial guidance and
key tasks.
12-30. UAS should observe the air routes and landing zones beginning well before launch to provide early
warning to the AATFC. Just before the launch of the air movement phase, attack reconnaissance units fly
along the route to conduct an air assault security mission. This mission is much like a movement to contact.
Usually, one to two attack reconnaissance companies conduct the mission just before the assault aircraft
launch for the air movement. This allows the attack reconnaissance units opportunity to conduct a relief on
station with elements that may already be on station providing reconnaissance.
12-31. The air assault security force generally makes the final landing zone update call, as the assault
forces are en route to the landing zone. Before assault forces land on the landing zone, air assault security
forces may be directed to shift to a landing zone overwatch mission, ensuring they do not conflict with the
air routes entering or exiting the landing zone. As the assault forces land on the landing zone, air assault
security forces may be directed to move forward to the next phase line to conduct a screening mission or to
occupy a battle position.
12-32. Attack reconnaissance units maintain the flexibility to execute on-call close combat attacks as
needed. Air assault security forces must maintain communications with the fires elements for immediate
suppression missions as needed.

MISSION COMMAND
12-33. In executing the air movement, the air mission commander takes operational control of all Army
aviation forces. The air mission commander controls all—
z Timing for deconfliction.
z En route fires.
z Initiation and shifting of landing zone preparation fires.

12-34. Once the air assault force has cleared the landing zone and moved to its rally point, the tactical
commander on the ground assumes mission command of the element and continues his assigned mission.
Mission command should allow continued execution despite loss of radio communications. If the air
mission commander and lift flight leaders have air movement tables or the execution checklist in their
possession, they can continue the mission without radio communications.

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SECTION II – AIR MOVEMENT TABLE

12-35. The AATF staff and aviation unit staff develop the air movement table. (See table 12-1, page
12-10.) This table serves as the primary air movement document for the air assault operation.

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE DEVELOPMENT

12-36. The AATF S-3 Air and aviation liaison officer begin work on this document right after the initial
planning conference. This gives them an idea early in the planning process of challenges involved in
moving units to the landing zone. The table ensures that all personnel, equipment, and supplies are
accounted for in the movement and that each aircraft is fully loaded, correctly positioned in the flight, and
directed to the right landing zone. The air movement table—
z Contains aircraft allocations.
z Designates number and type of aircraft in each serial.
z Specifies departure point; route to and from loading area; and loading, liftoff, and landing times.
z Includes the refuel schedule for all lifts if required.

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE CRITERIA

12-37. The air movement table regulates the sequence of flight operations from pickup zone to landing
zone using the following line information:
z Line number. Quick reference with brevity codes numbered sequentially.
z Aviation unit. Aviation unit conducting the air movement. Depicted as unit designation over call
sign to save space.
z Lifted unit. Unit being lifted or air assaulted. If more than one unit is in the load, use unit with
most assets in the load. Depicted as unit’s designation over call sign to save space.
z Lift. Serials that make one complete turn out to and back from the area of operation. Numbered
sequentially.
z Serial. A tactical grouping of two or more aircraft under the control of a serial commander
(aviator) and separated from other tactical groupings within the lift by time or space. The
capacity of the smallest landing zone determines the number of aircraft in each serial.
z Chalk. Each aircraft equals one load. Number UH-60 and CH-47 chalks separately.
z Pickup zone. Name of the pickup zone where chalks pick up the loads.
z Pickup zone arrival and load time. Time the troops get on the aircraft or when the aircraft starts
to hookup the load.
z Takeoff time. Time the aircraft lifts off the pickup zone.
z Start point time. Time the aircraft hit the start point (brigade aviation element-determined point
usually three to five kilometers from the pickup zone).
z Release point time. Time the aircraft hit the release point (brigade aviation element-determined
point usually three to five kilometers from the landing zone).
z Landing zone. Landing zone name and location determined by the lifted unit’s ground tactical plan.
z Landing zone time. Time the serial lands in the landing zone.
z Landing zone degree. Compass heading at which the serial is landing, should be converted to
and shown in magnetic heading for the aircraft.
z Landing zone formation. Landing formation, normally the trail formation.
z Routes. Primary ingress and egress routes for the mission.
z Load. Personnel and sling load configuration. Refer to the tadpole diagram to save space on
this page.
z Remarks. Additional remarks (such as scheduled delays, refuel, or other uncommon serial
characteristics).

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Table 12-1. Example air movement table

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 Chapter 13
Loading and Staging
The activities that take place in or near the pickup zone are referred to as pickup zone
operations. These activities include both the loading and staging plan. Like the
previous steps in the air assault planning process, these plans support and are based
on the steps before them. Pickup zone operations are a collaborative effort between
the supported unit (maneuver forces that compose the assault force) and the
supporting aviation unit. The assault force is organized on the pickup zone. Every
serial and lift is a self-contained element that must understand what it does upon
landing at either the primary or the alternate landing zone and later in executing the
ground tactical plan. Planning for insertion and extraction follows the same process
and requires the same forethought and attention to detail. Insertion and extraction
plans are developed during the air assault planning process and coordinated with all
supporting units at the initial planning conference or air mission coordination
meeting (AMCM). Both insertion and extraction loading and staging plans should be
rehearsed at the air assault task force (AATF), aviation, and assault force rehearsals.

SECTION I – LOADING PLAN

13-1. The loading plan ensures that Soldiers, equipment, and supplies are loaded on the correct aircraft and
moved from the pickup zone to the landing zone in the priority order designated by the air assault task force
commander (AATFC). The air movement table is the planning document that details how to execute this.
At the company level and below, leaders use an air-loading table to document how the loading plan is
executed. The basic information found in the air-loading table is found in the air movement table.
Considerations to develop a loading plan are described below.

PICKUP ZONE SELECTION

13-2. Operations requiring the pick up or extraction of personnel may require special considerations
dependent on the mission and or element requiring support. When the pickup zone or mission prevents a
helicopter from landing, the mission may require the use of the special patrol infiltration and exfiltration
system (SPIES). (Refer to FM 3-05.210 for more information.)

IDENTIFYING PICKUP ZONES

13-3. Identifying pickup zones is the first step in developing a loading plan. The goal of pickup zone
identification is to locate suitable areas to accommodate the lift aircraft. Identify primary and alternate
pickup zones at the same time.

PICKUP ZONE OPERATION

13-4. Establishing and running a pickup zone to standard is the first step in executing a successful air
assault. The number of pickup zones selected depends on the number and type of aircraft and loads
required to complete the mission. The mission may require the designation of both a light pickup zone
(UH-60) and a heavy pickup zone (CH-47). Based on his unit’s level of training, the air mission
commander may adjust the specifications for identifying and selecting pickup zones (such as degree of
slope, wind speeds, and distance between aircraft).

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SELECTION CRITERIA
13-5. Once available pickup zones are identified, the AATFC and his S-3 select and assign pickup zones
for each unit to use. Pickup zone selection criteria include:
z Number. Multiple pickup zones avoid concentrating forces in one area.
z Size. If possible, each pickup zone should accommodate all supporting aircraft at once.
z Proximity to Soldiers. When possible, the selected pickup zones should not require extensive
ground movement to the pickup zone by troops.
z Accessibility. Each pickup zone should be accessible to vehicles to move support assets and
assault forces.
z Vulnerability to attack. Selected pickup zones should be masked by terrain from enemy
observation.
z Conditions. Surface conditions of the area (for example, excessive slope; blowing dust, sand, or
snow; and man-made obstacles) create potential hazards to pickup zone operations.

Note. Using pickup zones located in secure forward operating base and outposts precludes much
of the effort required to identify and select suitable pickup zones.

PICKUP ZONE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

13-6. Once the AATFC selects the pickup zones, he designates a pickup zone control officer (PZCO) to
organize, control, and coordinate pickup zone operations. The designated PZCO is selected based on
experience and the size of unit that is conducting the air assault. For example, at BCT level, the BCT
executive officer is usually the PZCO. At the battalion level, the battalion executive officer or S-3 Air are
usually the PZCO. At company level, the company executive officer is usually the PZCO.
13-7. Once designated, the PZCO is responsible for the overall success of all pickup zone activities, to
include the following:
z Forming a control party to establish control over the pickup zone by clearing the pickup zone
and establishing pickup zone security. The pickup zone control party comprises pickup zone
control teams and support personnel from subordinate units, typically to include a PZCO, a
pickup zone noncommissioned officer in charge (PZNCOIC), and—
„ Chalk guides guide the aircraft loads (Soldiers, vehicles, and equipment) from the chalk
check-in point to their respective staging areas on the pickup zone once they have been
inspected and approved for loading by the pickup zone control party.
„ Ground crew teams provide visual guidance to the aircraft pilots and hook up the vehicles
and equipment that are externally loaded (sling loaded) by the aircraft. UH-60 ground crew
teams typically consist of one hook-up person, one static probe person, and a signal person.
CH-47 hook-up teams typically consist of one hook-up person and one static probe person
according to sling hook-up point.
„ Crisis action teams are experienced officers or non-commissioned officers who are experts
with rigging all types of loads and hook-up procedures for all aircraft.
„ Security teams provide local security for all pickup zone operations. These teams may
include air defense teams if they are available.
„ Air traffic control teams (if available) use radio or directional light signals to provide flight
information, expedite traffic, and prevent collisions. Pathfinder teams are capable of serving
as air traffic control teams if required.
„ Pathfinder teams (if available) provide air traffic advisories and navigational aid for fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft. They perform limited physical improvement and chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear monitoring and surveying within pickup zones, if
required. Pathfinder availability, the tactical plan, the complexity of the operation, the
terrain, and the air assault proficiency of the supported ground force may dictate
pathfinder support.

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 Loading and Staging

z Establishing communications on two primary radio frequencies— one to control movement and
loading of units and the other on combat aviation net. Alternate frequencies are provided as
needed.
z Planning and initiating fire support near pickup zones in coordination with the AATF to provide
all-round protection (from available support) without endangering arrival and departure of
Soldiers or aircraft.
z Planning and initiating security to protect the main body as it assembles, moves to the pickup
zone, and is lifted out. Other forces should provide security elements if the pickup zone is within
a friendly area. Security comes from AATF resources if a unit is to be extracted from the
objective area.
z Marking the pickup zone as specified in unit standard operating procedure regardless of the type
of markers, pickup zone marking requirements depend on the type and number of aircraft and
are based on the minimum acceptable distance between aircraft. At a minimum, mark the pickup
zone to indicate where each aircraft, by type, is to land.
z Clearing the pickup zone of obstacles.
z Executing the bump plan.

COORDINATION WITH SUPPORTING AVIATION UNIT

13-8. Loading plans are carefully coordinated with the brigade aviation officer and aviation liaison. Copies
of the air movement tables and air loading tables should be distributed to the aviation liaison officer,
AATFC air mission commander, and PZCO.
13-9. The supporting helicopter unit must ensure that aviation expertise is present on the pickup zone. The
brigade aviation officer or aviation liaison officer (or another designated representative) should locate with
the PZCO during the pickup zone selection, setup, and execution phase. The aviation representatives
provide guidance on the pickup zone setup, considering aircraft factors. For example, the pickup zone
landing direction may change if the wind changes significantly. Additionally, the aviation representatives
can offer advice on surface conditions and their effects on helicopter operations.

PREPARATION OF AIR LOADING TABLES

13-10. The air-loading table assigns personnel and major items of equipment or supplies to a specific
aircraft (chalk) at the company and below level. The air-loading table is an accountability tool, a loading
manifest, for each aircraft. (See table 13-1)
Table 13-1. Example air loading table

13-11. When time is limited, the table can be written on a sheet of paper. It should contain a list, prepared
by the aircraft chalk leader, of Soldiers (by name) and equipment to be loaded on each chalk. This ensures
that information on personnel and equipment onboard is available if an aircraft is lost. The chalk leader

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Chapter 13

gives a copy of the air-loading table to the pickup zone control party upon arriving at the pickup zone for
check-in.
13-12. During preparation of the loading tables, leaders at all levels maintain the—
z Tactical integrity of units. Load a complete tactical unit, such as a fire team or squad, on the
same aircraft or a platoon in the same serial to ensure integrity as a fighting unit upon landing.
z Tactical cross loading. Plan loads so that key personnel and critical equipment (for example,
crew-served weapons) are not loaded on the same aircraft. Thus, if an aircraft is lost to an abort
or enemy action, the mission is not seriously hampered.
z Self-sufficiency of loads. Ensure that each unit load has everything required (weapons, crew, and
ammunition) to be operational upon reaching its destination. Ensure the following:
„ The prime mover accompanies every towed item.
„ Crews are loaded with their vehicle or weapon systems.
13-13. Leaders must determine whether internal or external (sling) loading is the best delivery method for
equipment and supplies. Helicopters loaded internally can fly faster and are more maneuverable.
Helicopters loaded externally fly slower at higher altitudes and are less maneuverable but can be loaded
and unloaded more rapidly than internally loaded helicopters. The method used depends largely on
availability of sling loading and rigging equipment.

DISPOSITION OF LOADS ON PICKUP ZONE

13-14. Position personnel and equipment on the pickup according to the pickup zone diagram. (See figure
13-1.) Flight crews must understand the loading plan and should be prepared to accept Soldiers and
equipment immediately on landing. Pickup zone diagrams depicting the location of chalks and sling loads
in the pickup zone assist flight crews in loading troops and equipment quickly once the aircraft arrive in the
pickup zone. Flight crews should be provided a pickup zone diagram.

Figure 13-1. Example pickup zone diagram

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 Loading and Staging

LIFTS, SERIALS, AND CHALKS

13-15. The loading plan and pickup zone selection should aim to maintain ground unit integrity. Just as a
squad should not be divided between chalks, a platoon should remain in one serial and a company should
not be divided into different lifts or pickup zones. To maximize operational control, aviation assets are
designated into lifts, serials, and chalks. (See figure 13-2, page 13-6.)

LIFTS
13-16. A lift is complete each time all aircraft assigned to the mission pick up Soldiers or equipment and
set them down on the landing zone. The next lift is complete, when all lift aircraft place their next chalk on
the landing zone and so on with all subsequent lifts.

SERIALS
13-17. A serial is a tactical grouping of two or more aircraft under the control of a serial commander
(aviator) and separated from other tactical groupings within the lift by time or space. The use of serials may
be necessary to maintain effective control of aviation assets. For example, due to METT-TC considerations,
it may be difficult to control 16 aircraft as a single serial. However, a lift of 16 aircraft with four serials of
four aircraft each can be more easily controlled.
13-18. Multiple serials may be necessary when the capacity of available pickup zones or landing zones is
limited. If available pickup zones or landing zones can accommodate only four aircraft in a lift of 16
aircraft, it is best to organize into four serials of four aircraft each.
13-19. Multiple serials are employed to take advantage of available air routes. If several acceptable air
routes are available, the AATFC may choose to employ serials to avoid concentrating his force along one
air route. If the commander wants all his forces to land simultaneously in a single landing zone, he does so
by having the serials converge at a common release point before landing. With a lift of 16 aircraft and four
available air routes, the ABNAFC can use four serials of four aircraft each, with each serial using a
different air route. Each time there is a new lift, a new serial begins. For example, within lift 1, there are
serials 1 through 4. For each lift thereafter, serials start again with one.

CHALKS
13-20. A chalk comprises personnel and equipment designated to be moved by a specific aircraft. When
planning the air movement, each aircraft within the lift is termed a chalk. For example, within a lift of 10,
there are aircraft chalks 1 through 10. For each lift thereafter, there are chalks 1 through 10. Each aircraft is
accounted for within each lift.
13-21. Chalks must be designated within serials just as they are within lifts. Counting within the serials is
continuous up to the total number of aircraft in the lift. For example, in a lift of 16 aircraft in lift 1, serial 1,
there are chalks 1 through 4. In lift 1, serial 2, there are chalks 5 through 8. In lift 1, serial 3, there are
chalks 9 through 12. Finally, in lift 1, serial 4, there are chalks 13 through 16.

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Chapter 13

Figure 13-2. Lifts, serials, and chalks

BUMP PLAN
13-22. The bump plan ensures that the most essential personnel and equipment arrive on time at the
objective area. It specifies personnel and equipment that may be bumped from an aircraft or serial, and
delivered later. Each aircraft load and serial has a bump plan sequence designated on its air movement
table. (See table 13-2.)
Table 13-2. Aircraft bump information

13-23. If all personnel within the chalk cannot be lifted, individuals must know who is to offload and in
what sequence. This ensures that key personnel are not bumped arbitrarily. This ensures that key aircraft
chalks are not left in the pickup zone. When an aircraft within a serial or flight cannot lift off and key
personnel are onboard, they offload and board another aircraft that has priority.
13-24. Bumped personnel report to a pickup zone bump area specified by company or larger units. At this
location, they are accounted for, regrouped, and rescheduled by the PZCO for later delivery to appropriate
landing zones. Sometimes, spare aircraft are held in reserve for bumped chalks in the event a primary

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 Loading and Staging

mission aircraft is unable to fly due to maintenance or other reasons. These spare aircraft remain staged on
the pickup zone for occasions such as these or to fly other high priority serials.

SECTION II – STAGING PLAN

13-25. The staging plan organizes the movement of Soldiers and loads into position for the forthcoming
air assault. It establishes the pickup zone and specifies the manner in which the supported unit organizes to
execute the loading plan. The staging plan prescribes the arrival of ground forces at the pickup zone in the
proper order for movement. It prescribes what actions the ground force must complete to prepare to load
the aircraft. All vehicles and equipment to be lifted should be properly configured, inspected, and ready to
load before the aircraft arrive at the pickup zone. Typically, ground forces arrive at the pickup zone and
posture in proper chalk order before their aircraft arrive. Considerations to develop a staging plan are
addressed in this section.

PREPARATION FOR LOADING

13-26. Preparations for loading are conducted in a unit assembly area or other secure location that is near
the pickup zone. Before reporting to the pickup zone, units complete all preparations to successfully load
the aircraft, to includeʊ
z Completing the air-loading table or manifest. The chalk leaders verify the air-loading table to
ensure it is properly completed, making changes to the manifest before arriving to the pickup zone.
z Preparing and inspecting all equipment for loading. The chalk leaders prerig all equipment to be
sling loaded and ensure vehicles have the proper equipment to rig and fly. The chalk leaders
inspect their loads and complete all necessary inspection records, to include DA Form 7382,
Sling Load Inspection Record, according to TM 4-48.09.
z Conducting rehearsals for loading and off-loading the aircraft.

MOVEMENT TO PICKUP ZONE

13-27. Once units have completed preparations for loading, they begin movement to the pickup zone
according to the air movement table so that the Soldiers to load arrive shortly prior to the helicopter to be
loaded. This prevents congestion, preserves security, and reduces vulnerability to enemy actions on the
pickup zone. To coordinate the movement of units to the pickup zone, the PZCO—
z Determines movement time of ground forces to the pickup zone.
z Specifies arrival time(s).
z Ensures that movement of units remains on schedule.

CHALK CHECK-IN AND INSPECTION

13-28. Upon arriving to the pickup zone area, the unit first checks in with the pickup zone control party at
chalk check-in. The PZCO should plan adequate time for check-in based on mission variables. As a rule,
the greater the number of serials in a lift, the longer it takes check-in and inspection for loading. Serials
with large numbers of vehicles and equipment to be sling loaded require more time to check in.

CHALK CHECK-IN
13-29. As the unit arrives at the check-in point, loads are identified by lift-serial-chalk. Chalk leaders are
briefed, and their air loading tables or manifests are inspected. The chalk leader provides one copy of the
manifest to the pickup zone control party.

LOAD WEIGH-IN
13-30. The loads then are weighed with all personnel and equipment to ensure they meet the ACLs as
briefed in the air mission brief. Overweight loads are sent to a designated frustrated cargo area to download
equipment before being reweighed.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 13-7

Chapter 13

LOAD INSPECTION
13-31. All items to be loaded are inspected according to TM 4-48.09. For emergency purposes only, the
pickup zone control party may maintain a parts box for on-the-spot corrections. Units are responsible for
the serviceability and corrective maintenance of their own equipment.
13-32. Loads with deficiencies are sent to a designated frustrated cargo area. Loads must remain in the
frustrated area until deficiencies are corrected and the loads are inspected again. No load is allowed to leave
the frustrated area without permission from the PZCO.

LOAD STAGING
13-33. Once a serial is complete, a chalk guide from the pickup zone control leads it into position on the
pickup zone. Loads are staged in reverse chalk order by serial according to the pickup zone diagram.
13-34. Once the chalk is staged and in pickup zone posture, the chalk leader should brief his chalk on—
z Seating arrangement.
z Loading procedures.
z Use of safety belts.
z In-flight procedures.
z Off-loading procedures.

SLING LOAD OPERATIONS

13-35. The three phases of a sling load operation are—
z Preparation and rigging. Loads are prepared and rigged according to TM 4-48.09 or unit
standard operating procedures.
z Inspection. A Pathfinder School graduate, Sling Load Inspector Certification Course graduate, or
an Air Assault School graduate in the rank of specialist and above is qualified to inspect and
certify each load. The individual who rigged the load cannot inspect the same load. The contents
of the load are recorded on a DA Form 7382.
z Sling load operation. Trained ground crews hook up loads.

SLING LOAD UNITS

13-36. The three different elements involved in a sling load operation are the supported unit, the aviation
unit, and the receiving unit. In an air assault, the supported unit and the receiving unit are the same. The
responsibilities of each element are as described below.
z Support unit is responsible for—
„ Selecting, preparing, and controlling the pickup zone.
„ Requisitioning all the equipment needed for sling load operations.
„ Inspecting and maintaining all sling load equipment.
„ Providing trained ground crews for rigging and inspecting, filing inspection forms,
controlling aircraft, aircraft guides, hooking up loads, and clearing the aircraft for departure.
„ Providing load dispositions and instructions to the aviation unit for the sling load
equipment.
„ Verifying the load weight (to include rigging equipment).
z Aviation unit is responsible for—
„ Establishing coordination with the supported unit.
„ Advising the supported unit on load limitations.
„ Advising the supported units on the suitability of selected landing zones and pickup zones.
„ Providing assistance in the recovery and return of sling load equipment.
„ Establishing safety procedures and understanding of duties and responsibility between the
flight crew and ground crew.
z Receiving unit is responsible for—

13-8 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Loading and Staging

„ Selecting, preparing, and controlling the landing zone.

„ Providing trained ground crews to guide the aircraft and derig the loads.
„ Coordinating for the control and return of the sling load equipment.
„ Inspecting the rigging of back loads (sling load equipment returning to pickup zone).

SLING LOAD TEAMS

13-37. Three personnel are used for the ground crew in external load operations on the pickup zone or
landing zone. They are—
z Signal person.
z Static probe person.
z Hook-up person.

13-38. The static probe person carries an electricity probe an insulated contact rod joined by a length of
metallic tape or electrical wire to a ground rod. All ground crew personnel wear the following
protective equipment:
z Advanced combat helmet.
z Goggles.
z Earplugs.
z Gloves.
z Sleeves rolled down and buttoned.
z Identification card and tags.

HOOK-UP SITE
13-39. The aircraft approaches the hook-up site, and the signal person guides it into position over the
load. The static probe person drives the ground rod into the ground and discharges the static electricity
from the aircraft by holding the contact rod, which is connected to the ground rod, to the cargo hook of the
aircraft. The hook-up person then attaches the apex fitting to the aircraft cargo hook.

Note. When using a cargo hook pendant the use of a static discharge wand is not required.

RELEASE SITE
13-40. The aircraft approaches the release site, and the signal person guides it into position. The hook-up
release team stands by but is not actively employed unless the slings cannot be released from the aircraft.
The ground crew at the landing zone comprises one signal person and two release personnel.

GROUND CREW EMERGENCY

13-41. In an emergency, the ground crew moves to a predesignated rendezvous point identified during
prior coordination with the aviation unit. Thorough preparation and rehearsal enable ground crews to react
to changes to the plan and unexpected events.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 13-9

7KLVSDJHLQWHQWLRQDOO\OHIWEODQN
 Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint
definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-99 is the proponent
are marked with an asterisk (*).The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses
after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym Definition

A
AACG arrival airfield control group
AADC area air defense commander
AAGS Army air-ground system
AAMDC Army air missile defense command
AATF air assault task force
AATFC air assault task force commander
ABCT Armored brigade combat team
ABN airborne
ABNAFC airborne assault force commander
ABNAF airborne assault force
ABN IBCT airborne Infantry brigade combat team
ABNTF airborne task force
ABNTFC airborne task force commander
ACL allowable cargo load
A/DACG arrival/departure airfield control group
ADAM air defense airspace management
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AGL above ground level
ALCC airlift control center
ALCE airlift control element
AMCM air mission coordination meeting
AMD air missile defense
AMPS Aviation Mission Planning System
ANGLICO Air-naval gunfire liaison company
APOD aerial port of debarkation
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 Glossary-1

Glossary

Acronym Definition

B
BAE brigade aviation element
BAO brigade aviation officer
BCT brigade combat team
BN battalion

C
CAN combat aviation network
CAOC combat air operations center
CARP computed air release point
CATF commander, amphibious task force
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operation task force
CH cargo helicopter
CLF commander, landing force
CONOPS concept of operations

D
DACG departure airfield control group
DACO departure airfield control officer
DA Department of the Army
DD Department of Defense form
DZ drop zone

E
EDRE emergency deployment readiness exercise
EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System

F
FAC (A) forward air controller (airborne)
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FASCAM field artillery scatterable mines
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command-Brigade and Below
FM field manual
FRAGORD fragmentary order
FSCM fire support coordination measures
FSC forward support company
FRIES Fast-Insertion/Extraction System

Glossary-2 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Glossary

Acronym Definition
G
GMRS Ground Marked Relief System

H
HAHO high-altitude high-opening parachute
HALO high-altitude low-opening parachute
HEPI heavy equipment point of impact
HF high frequency
HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

I
IBCT Infantry brigade combat team
ICODES Integrated Computerized Deployment System
ISB intermediate staging base

J
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
JACC/CP joint airborne communication center/command post
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JIOC joint intelligence operations center
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
JOPP joint operation planning process
JP joint publication
JPADS Joint Precision Airdrop System
JSOA joint special operations area
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTAC joint terminal attack controller

L
LACC loading area control center
LZ landing zone
LRSC long-range surveillance company

M
MDMP military decisionmaking process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 Glossary-3

Glossary

Acronym Definition
support available-time available, and civil
considerations
MILDEC military deception
MMEE minimum mission essential equipment

N
NCO noncommissioned officer
NVG night vision goggles

O
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach,
key terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security

P
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PZ pickup zone
PZCO pickup zone control officer
PZNCOIC pickup zone noncommissioned officer-in-charge

R
RADC regional air defense commander
RATELO radiotelephone operator
RDSP rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, integration

S
S-1 personnel staff officer
S-2 intelligence staff officer
S-3 operations staff officer
S-4 logistics staff officer
S-6 signal staff officer
S-9 civil affairs operations staff officer
SATCOM satellite communication
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SDAC sector air defense commander
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SLOC sea lines of communication
SOP standard operating procedure

Glossary-4 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Glossary

Acronym Definition
SPIES Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction System

T
TACP tactical air control party
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAIS Tactical Airspace Integration System
TM technical manual

U
UH utility helicopter
UHF ultra-high frequency
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
U.S. United States

V
VHF very high frequency

W
WARNORD warning order

SECTION II – TERMS

air assault
The movement of friendly assault forces by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or
to seize and hold key terrain. (JP 3-18)
air assault force
A force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units organized, equipped, and trained for
air assault operations. (JP 3-18)
air assault operation
An operation in which assault forces, using the mobility of rotary-wing assets and the total integration
of available firepower, maneuver under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage
enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (JP 3-18)
air movement
Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment including airdrops and air landings. (JP 3-17)
airborne assault
The use of airborne forces to parachute into an objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance
and secure designated objectives. (JP 3-18)
airborne operation
An operation involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic
support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic mission. (JP 3-18)

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 Glossary-5

Glossary

airfield
An area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings, installations, and equipment),
landing, takeoff of aircraft. (JP 3-17)
airhead
A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, ensures
the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for
projected operations. (JP 3-18)
airhead line
A line denoting the limits of the objective area for an airborne assault. (JP 3-18)
airspace coordinating measures
Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-52)
airspace coordination area
A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the appropriate ground
commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace
coordination area may be formal or informal. (JP 3-09.3)
*assault echelon
(Army) The element of a force that is secheduled for initial assault on the objective area.
boundary
A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of
operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 3-0)
civil considerations
The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders,
populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations.
(ADRP 5-0)
close air support
Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to
friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of
those forces. (JP 3-0)
close combat attack
A coordinated attack by Army attack reconnaissance aircraft (manned and unmanned) against enemy
forces that are in close proximity to friendly forces. The close combat attack is not synonymous with
close air support flown by joint aircraft. Terminal control from ground units or controllers is not due to
the capabilities of the aircraft and the enhanced situational understanding of the aircrew. (FM 3-
04.126)
combat identification
The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment
to support an engagement decision. (JP 3-09)
command group
The commander and selected staff members who assist the commander in controlling operations away
from a command post. (FM 6-0)
commander’s intent
A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that
supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting
commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the
operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)
concept of operations

Glossary-6 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Glossary

A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission
and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. (ADRP 5-0)
concealment
The protection from observation or surveillance. (ADRP 1-02)
control measure
A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (ADRP 6-0)
cover
Protection from the effects of fires. (ADRP 1-02)
D-day
The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. (JP 3-02)
decisive operation
The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. (ADRP 3-0)
electromagnetic operational environment
The background electromagnetic environment and the friendly, neutral, and adversarial
electromagnetic order of battle within the electromagnetic area of influence associated with a given
operational area. (JP 6-01)
electromagnetic spectrum management
The planning, coordinating, and managing use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational,
engineering, and administrative procedures. (JP 6-01)
fire support coordination measure
A measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously
provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-0)
*follow-on echelon
(Army) Those additional forces moved into the objective area after the assault echelon.
forcible entry
The seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. (JP 3-18)
H-hour
The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. (JP 3-02)
information environment
The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on
information. (JP 3-13)
information operations
The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert
with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries
and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)
information superiority
The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.
(JP 3-13)
information system
Equipment that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers—
hardware and software—and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. (ADP 6-
0)
intermediate staging base
A tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment and/or extraction into and out of
an operational area. (JP 3-35)

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 Glossary-7

Glossary

lodgment
A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes
the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent
operations. (JP 3-18)
main effort
A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission
success. (ADRP 3-0)
marshalling
The process by which units participating in an amphibious or airborne operation group together or
assemble when feasible or move to temporary camps in the vicinity of embarkation points, complete
preparations for combat, or prepare for loading. (JP 3-17)
mission command
The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined
initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of
unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)
*N-hour
The time a unit is notified to assemble its personnel and begin the deployment sequence.
*N-hour sequence
Starts the reverse planning necessary after notification to have the first assault aircraft en route to the
objective area for commencement of the parachute assault according to the order for execution.
obstacles
Any natural or man-made obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the
movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on
the opposing force. (JP 3-15)
P-hour
The specific hour on D-day at which a parachute assault commences with the exit of the first Soldier
from an aircraft over a designated drop zone. P-hour may or may not coincide with H-hour. (FM 6-0)
phase
A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. (ADRP 3-0)
planned target
A target that is known to exist in the operational environment, upon which actions are planned using
deliberate targeting, creating effects which support the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-60)
*rear echelon
The echelon containing those elements of the force that are not required in the objective area.
reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about
the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 2-0)
reorganization
All measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specified
level of combat capability. (FM 3-90-1)
restricted operations area
Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control authority, in response to specific
operational situations/requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is
restricted. (JP 3-52)

Glossary-8 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 Glossary

security operations
Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy
operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to
the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force.
(ADRP 3-90)
shaping operation
An operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other
actors, and the terrain. (ADRP 3-0)
supporting effort
A designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. (ADRP 3-0)
surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by
visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)
sustaining opeation
An operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and
maintaining combat power. (ADRP 3-0)
task organization
A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (ADRP 5-0)
vertical envelopment
A tactical maneuver in which troops that are air-dropped, air-landed, or inserted via air assault, attack
the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the force. (JP 3-18)
*X-hour
The unspecified time that commences unit notification for planning and deployment preparation in
support of potential contingency operations that do not involve rapid, short notice deployment.
*X-hour sequence
An extended sequence of events initiated by X-hour that allow a unit to focus on planning for a
potential contingency operation, to include preparation for deployment.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 Glossary-9

7KLVSDJHLQWHQWLRQDOO\OHIWEODQN
 References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online:
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.>
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 5 January 2012.
JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 23 March 2012.
JP 3-02. Amphibious Operations. 18 July 2014.
JP 3-03. Joint Interdiction. 14 October 2011.
JP 3-05. Special Operations. 16 July 2014.
JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 12 December 2014.
JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support. 25 November 2014.
JP 3-11. Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments. 4 October
2013.
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 4 January 2012.
JP 3-13.4. Military Deception. 26 January 2012.
JP 3-14. Space Operations. 29 May 2013.
JP 3-15. Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 17 June 2011.
JP 3-17. Air Mobility Operations. 30 September 2013.
JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-30. Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. 10 February 2014.
JP 3-32. Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. 07 August 2013.
JP 3-35. Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 31 January 2013.
JP 3-40. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 31 October 2014.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014.
JP 3-59. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. 7 December 2012.
JP 3-60. Joint Targeting. 31 January 2013.
JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011.
JP 6-0. Joint Communications System. 10 June 2010.
JP 6-01. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations. 20 March 2012.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most army doctrinal publications are available online:
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/Active_FM.html.
ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 References-1

References

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012

ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ATP 1-02.1. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Multi-Service Brevity Codes. 23
October 2014.
ATP 2-01. Plan Requirements and Assess Collection. 19 August 2014.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.
ATP 3-01.4. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air
Defense (J-SEAD). 19 July 2013.
ATP 3-09.32. JFIRE Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower. 30 November 2012.
ATP 3-36. Electronic Warfare Techniques. 16 December 2014.
ATP 3-60.1. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting. 7 May 2012.
ATTP 3-18.04. Special Forces Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 5
January 2011.
ATP 4-02.2. Medical Evacuation. 12 August 2014.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.
FM 2-0. Intelligence Operations. 15 April 2014.
FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006.
FM 3-01. United States Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 15 April 2014.
FM 3-04.111. Aviation Brigades. 7 December 2007.
FM 3-04.113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 7 December 2007.
FM 3-04.126. Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Operations. 16 February 2007.
FM 3-04.155. Army Unmanned Aircraft System. 29 July 2009.
FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 9 January 2014.
FM 3-05.210. Special Forces Air Operations. 27 February 2009.
FM 3-09.Field Artillery Operations and Fire Support. 4 April 2014.
FM 3-14. Army Space Operations. 19 August 2014.
FM 3-16. The Army in Multinational Operations. 8 April 2014.
FM 3-17.2. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Airfield Opening. 15 May 2007.
FM 3-21.8. The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 28 March 2007.
FM 3-21.10. The Infantry Rifle Company. 27 July 2006.
FM 3-21.20. The Infantry Battalion. 13 December 2006.
FM 3-21.38. Pathfinder Operations. 25 April 2006.
FM 3-35. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 21 April 2010.
FM 3-38. Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. 12 February 2014.
FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 8 February 2013.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.
FM 3-55.93. Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations. 23 June 2009.

References-2 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

 References

FM 3-60. The Targeting Process. 26 November 2010.

FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-90.6. Brigade Combat Team. 14 September 2010.
FM 3-94. Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations. 21 April 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 6-02. Signal Support to Operations. 22 January 2014.
FM 6-02.53. Tactical Radio Operations. 5 August 2009.
FM 6-05. CF-SOF Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and
Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence.
13 March 2014.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
TC 3-21.220. Static Line Parachuting Techniques and Training. 28 April 2014.
TM 4-48.09. Multiservice Helicopter Sling Load Basic Operations and Equipment. 23 July 2012.

WEBSITES
Army Knowledge Online, https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html.
Army Publishing Directorate, http://www.apd.army.mil/.
Central Army Registry (CAR) on the Army Training Network (ATN), https://atiam.train.army.mil. CAC or
AKO login required.

PRESCRIBED FORMS
There are no prescribed forms for this publication.

REFERENCED FORMS
Forms are available on the APD Web site (www.apd.army.mil)
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 7382. Sling Load Inspection Record.
DD Form 1387-2. Special Handling Data/Certification
DD Form 2131. Passenger Manifest.

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 References-3

7KLVSDJHLQWHQWLRQDOO\OHIWEODQN
 Index

AACG, 7-9 airborne assault force, 1-9, 5-21, 5-23, 5-24, 5-25, 5-26,
1-22, 2-1, 2-2, 2-7, 7-1 6-1, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-8,
AADC, 1-11, 1-12, 1-13, 3-10 6-9
AATF, 1-10, 1-26, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4, airborne assault force
commander, 1-23 drop zones, 2-2, 2-4, 3-2, 3-9,
8-5, 8-6, 8-7, 8-11, 8-13, 4-3, 4-4, 4-7, 4-11, 4-12,
8-14, 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 9-1, airborne task force 4-16, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7,
9-2, 9-3, 9-4, 9-5, 9-6, 9-7, commander, 1-9, 1-23 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, 5-16, 5-25,
9-8, 9-9, 9-10, 9-11, 9-13, Airborne Warning and Control 6-1, 6-2, 7-9
9-14, 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-5, System, 1-13, 2-6
10-7, 10-8, 10-9, 10-11, elements of air movement plan,
10-12, 11-3, 12-1, 12-4, airspace coordinating 6-1
12-5, 12-6, 12-7, 13-1, 13-3 measures, 1-9, 1-12, 3-9, fire support, 3-3, 3-9, 3-10,
3-11, 8-7, 8-14, 9-12
AATFC, 1-10, 1-26, 8-1, 8-11, 5-11, 5-12, 5-13, 5-14, 6-3,
8-12, 8-13, 8-14, 8-15, 8-16, ALCE, 6-6, 6-9, 7-9 8-8, 8-17, 10-8, 12-4
8-17, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-5, 9-6, ALO, 8-15 Fire support, 5-10
9-7, 9-8, 9-10, 9-11, 9-13, AMCM, 9-5, 9-6, 9-7, 13-1 fire support coordination
9-14, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, 10-7, assembly aids, 5-18, 5-19, measures, 1-9, 3-10, 8-7,
10-8, 10-12, 11-1, 11-2, 9-11
5-21, 5-22, 5-24, 5-25, 5-26
11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 12-1, 12-6,
13-1, 13-2, 13-3 aviation liaison officer, 4-13, FSCMs, 1-9, 3-9, 3-10, 9-12
air assault task force 8-8, 8-15, 9-2, 10-8, 11-1, fire support coordination
12-1, 12-7, 13-3 measures, 3-9
commander, 1-25, 9-8,
9-10, 10-4, 10-8, 10-11, AWACS, 1-13, 2-6, 2-7 high-density air control zone,
11-2, 11-3, 13-2, 13-6 1-12
casualty backhaul, 9-15
ABNAF, 1-22, 1-23, 2-1, 2-2, intelligence preparation of the
casualty evacuation, 9-14
2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2, battlefield, 1-15, 1-16, 3-7
3-3, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, CATF
intermediate staging base,
3-12, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-13, commander, amphibious
5-12
4-15, 4-16, 4-20, 5-1, 5-10, task force, 1-10
IPB, 1-15, 3-7
6-1, 6-9, 7-1, 7-4 CCA 5-Line attack brief, 4-13,
4-14, 10-9 ISB, 1-14, 4-20
ABNAFC, 1-9, 1-23, 2-2, 3-1,
intermediate staging base,
3-2, 3-3, 3-8, 3-12, 4-1, 4-2, commander of the air assault
1-7, 2-7, 4-20, 4-22, 5-17,
4-3, 4-8, 4-13, 4-15, 4-16, task force, 1-10
6-2, 7-3, 7-8
5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-10, 6-9, 13-6 commander, amphibious task
JACC/CP, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 5-12
ABNTFC, 1-9, 1-23, 1-24, 2-2, force, 1-8
3-2, 3-3, 3-8, 4-16 JACCEs, 1-11
commander, joint special
ACLs, 6-2, 7-9, 9-6, 13-8 operations task force, 1-8 JFACC, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12,
1-13
ACMs, 1-12, 3-9, 9-12 concept of operations, 1-5,
1-12, 3-3, 8-11, 9-2 JFC
ADAM/BAE, 1-11, 4-13, 8-8,
joint force commander, 1-4,
8-14, 8-15, 9-2, 9-5, 10-8 CONOPS
1-5
aerial casualty evacuation, concept of operations, 1-5,
1-9, 1-10, 1-18, 1-21, 3-3, JFLCC, 1-9
9-16 joint force land commander,
8-11, 9-2, 9-5, 10-2
Air assault task force 1-8, 1-13
commander, 1-10 counterair, 1-2, 1-12, 1-13,
5-11, 5-14, 5-15, 6-2 JFMCC, 1-10
air defense airspace JIOC, 1-15
management/brigade Counterair, 5-11
aviation element, 4-13, 8-14, DACG, 6-6, 6-9, 7-9 joint air component
9-2 coordination elements, 1-11
DACO, 7-8
air liaison officer, 1-11, 4-15, Joint Airborne Communications
drop zone, 1-12, 1-24, 2-2, 2-4,
4-16, 5-4, 8-13, 8-15, 10-11 Center/Command Post, 2-6,
2-6, 3-8, 4-9, 4-11, 4-12,
2-7
air mission coordination 4-13, 4-15, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4,
meeting, 9-5, 9-7, 9-8, 13-1 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, joint force commander, 1-2,
5-11, 5-17, 5-18, 5-19, 5-20, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10,

6 March 2015 FM 3-99 Index-1

Index

1-11, 1-13, 1-19, 1-23, 3-2, landing zone, 1-12, 1-26, 3-3, remote marshalling base, 2-3,
3-10, 5-16 4-9, 4-13, 5-1, 5-5, 5-19, 4-20, 4-21, 6-2
joint force land component 5-26, 6-1, 6-8, 6-9, 8-4, 8-8, sea lines of communications,
commander, 1-8 8-9, 8-10, 8-14, 9-3, 9-7, 9-8, 1-3
9-9, 9-10, 9-14, 10-1, 10-3,
Joint force maritime component SEAD, 1-25, 2-6, 3-12, 4-12,
10-10, 10-11, 10-13, 11-1,
commander, 1-10 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 5-15, 9-9, 12-4, 12-5, 12-6
joint operation planning 11-7, 11-8, 11-10, 11-11, special patrol infiltration and
process, 1-14 11-12, 11-13, 12-1, 12-2, exfiltration system, 13-1
Joint Precision Airdrop System, 12-4, 12-6, 12-7, 12-8, 13-1, suppression of enemy air
5-4 13-5, 13-6, 13-9, 13-10 defenses, 2-6, 6-2, 9-13,
joint special operations task marshalling area, 2-1, 3-4, 4-1, 10-12, 12-4
force, 3-8 7-2, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, TACC, 2-7
Joint Surveillance Target 7-9 TACP, 3-9, 3-10, 4-15, 4-16,
Attack Radar System, 2-6, marshalling plan, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 5-12, 5-13, 8-15, 10-11
2-7 3-7, 4-1, 7-1, 7-4, 7-9 TACSAT, 1-24, 2-7, 7-12, 8-16,
joint task force joint intelligence MDMP, 3-1, 3-4, 3-5, 9-1, 9-3, 8-17
operations center, 1-15 9-4, 9-5, 9-6, 12-5 tactical air control party, 1-11,
joint terminal attack controllers, medical evacuation, 9-14 3-9, 4-15, 5-12
4-15 landing zone, 9-16 tactical airlift control center, 2-7
JOPP, 1-14 planning, 9-14
Tactical Airspace Integration
JPADS, 5-4 N-hour, 3-6, 7-1
System, 8-14
JSOA operational environment, 1-1, TAIS, 8-14
1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-7, 1-9, 1-14,
joint special operations the fast-rope insertion and
area, 1-8 1-15, 1-16, 8-2
extraction system, 11-6
PZCO, 8-15, 13-2, 13-3, 13-7,
JSOTF, 1-10, 3-8 UAS, 4-16, 4-17, 8-8, 8-14,
13-8
JSTARS, 2-6, 2-7 9-13, 9-14, 10-3, 10-9,
PZNCOIC, 13-2 10-12, 11-3, 12-6
JTACs, 4-15
RDSP, 9-5 X-hour, 3-6
LACC, 7-6
regional (or sector) air defense
commander, 1-8

Index-2 FM 3-99 6 March 2015

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0DUFK

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
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