Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2021-11-17 CATF Report Electrolysis Final
2021-11-17 CATF Report Electrolysis Final
03 | 2020
Policy Brief
Opportunities and challenges
when importing green hydrogen
and synthesis products
Authors
Martin Wietschel, Anke Bekk, Barbara Breitschopf, Inga Boie, Jakob Edler,
Wolfgang Eichhammer, Marian Klobasa, Frank Marscheider-Weidemann, Patrick Plötz,
Frank Sensfuß, Daniel Thorpe, Rainer Walz
Green hydrogen and its synthesis products are regarded as important elements of the energy and climate transition
in both Germany’s and the European hydrogen strategy. Importing these products is considered an important strat-
egy component. Alongside many aspects that can be classified as relatively certain according to the current state of
knowledge, there are still a number of open questions that are addressed in this policy brief and that lead to the
following conclusions:
01 04
Climate neutrality Import potentials
Green hydrogen and synthesis products are required in In techno-economic terms, importing green hydrogen and
the future for greenhouse gas neutrality, especially in synthesis products from regions with the right climatic and
certain industrial sectors such as basic chemicals, iron geographic conditions has already been analyzed compre-
and steel and refineries, as well as international air and hensively and is considered feasible. However, it should be
sea transport. However, the demand for other applica- noted that constructing the corresponding production and
tions is still the subject of controversial discussions. transport capacities will take time and capital.
More info on page 13 More info on page 15
02 05
Market Import risk
The import market will probably be between 100 billion and The import risk is reduced if partnerships and long-term
700 billion euros per year in the long term based on current relationships can be built with democratic, politically and
knowledge. This range is determined by the application economically stable countries producing the hydrogen.
areas, into which hydrogen and its derived energy sources More info on page 16
can penetrate. This will give rise to new import dependencies
and risks.
More info on page 14
06
03 Import price
2 | 3
Summary
07 09
Sustainability Incentive systems
Constructing renewable power generation capacities, the So far, the incentive systems to create attractive market
electrolyzers to produce hydrogen and the synthesis plants conditions for hydrogen production and transportation are
requires resources like land, water, energy and CO2 and is as- missing for the exporting countries. These include instruments
sociated with corresponding negative environmental effects. promoting investment and measures to create secure hydro-
In addition, electricity production in potential producing gen demand (e.g. quotas) and instruments to compensate the
countries is often still based on fossil sources. It is there- higher costs (e.g. feed-in tariffs or contracts for difference).
fore important to develop and apply sustainability criteria, More info on page 20
where possible at international level. It is also important to
ensure that these countries can achieve their own energy
and climate policy goals. Embedding the hydrogen strategy
in the national energy strategy and close coordination with
industrial policy instruments in the producing countries are
10
essential to avoid conflicts of national goals and resources. Governance
More info on page 18
The environmental impacts of a hydrogen economy – linked
to the low efficiencies from production to use – imply it
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
11 13
International cooperation Technology sovereignty
It is possible to meet the complex, societal challenges in the So far, there are no comprehensive assessments of the tech-
potential producing countries of the Global South, including nology sovereignty for hydrogen technologies. Initial indica-
the impacts of climate change, by properly integrating the tions suggest that, from a German and European viewpoint,
import strategy into international cooperation. This requires the reliability of the countries exporting green hydrogen is
purposefully building trust to counteract local concerns about more likely to pose a risk to technology sovereignty than
continuing to be left behind internationally in the long term access to existing technologies. However, in order to arrive
in the field of technology and scientific knowledge in spite of at reliable statements, updated analyses are needed that also
local production and export. differentiate technologies to a greater degree. At the same
More info on page 23 time, it becomes clear that the prospect of importing green
hydrogen also requires extending technology sovereignty
to include the perspective of developing countries. This
4 | 5
Contents
Introduction 9
Theses 13
01 Climate neutrality 13
02 Market 14
03 Potentials for renewables 14
04 Import potentials 15
05 Import risk 16
06 Import price 17
07 Sustainability 18
08 Investors 20
09 Incentive systems 21
10 Governance 22
11 International cooperation 23
12 Local competencies 24
13 Technology sovereignty 25
6 | 7
Introduction
Setting the political goal of climate neutrality by 2050 in Germany and the EU calls for turning away from fossil
fuels completely by 2050. As the path of greenhouse gas reduction from today until 2050 is also relevant for the
effects on climate change, this means significantly reducing all greenhouse gas emissions early on.
On the one hand, energy efficiency measures must save fossil ly expensive. [1] shows there are sufficient potentials for a hy-
fuels and, on the other hand, renewable energies must large- drogen economy in Germany as well as in Europe at costs of
ly replace them. Since the potential of sustainable biomass is up to 100 Euro / MWh electricity, and these are sufficient to
limited and in competition with food crops, primarily renew- meet demand, especially when combined with strong energy
able electricity and energy carriers based on this are consid- efficiency measures. This results in higher costs for transform-
ered suitable substitutes. As far as technically feasible and ing the energy system, which must be weighed against issues
economical, renewable electricity is used directly, for exam- of supply security. Therefore, importing sustainably produced
ple, in electric vehicles, heat pumps, and heating networks, energy sources such as green hydrogen and its synthesis
or to generate process heat in industry. However, there are a products is currently being discussed. The idea is that regions
number of applications such as aviation or shipping as well as with advantageous conditions for renewable energy (e.g.
the basic chemical industry or refineries, where this does not high solar irradiation or favorable wind conditions) could
seem possible at present for process engineering reasons or produce sustainable energy sources cost-effectively. These
because of the energy densities required. This is where green so-called green synthetic fuels based on renewable electric-
hydrogen or green synthesis products made from it, such ity could then be exported to Germany or other countries.
as methanol or methane, come into play. This is why green Figure 1 shows the individual conversion steps needed from
hydrogen is considered an additional important component source to application.
of the energy transition, and why German and European cli-
mate policy are increasingly focusing on it. In principle, fossil The topic of imports is also clearly anchored in the political
fuels combined with carbon capture, use or storage (CCUS) agenda. The European Commission’s hydrogen strategy
can continue to be used even in a case of climate neutrality. (see [2]) addresses the issue of importing green hydrogen.
This is the subject of intensive discussions about “blue” hy- One of the goals is cooperation in the field of clean hydrogen
drogen, i.e. hydrogen produced using natural gas combined with the EU’s neighboring countries and regions to contrib-
with carbon capture storage (CCS). In general, however, CCS ute to their transition to clean energy and promote sustain-
faces serious acceptance issues in Europe. Furthermore, up- able growth and development. Germany’s current National
stream GHG will continue to be emitted from producing and Hydrogen Strategy (see [3]) also assumes that the anticipated
transporting the natural gas. relevant amounts of green hydrogen will not be able to be
produced in Germany alone. From this perspective, Germany
Most scenarios agree that there is not enough renewable will remain a major importer of energy in the future as well,
power available in Germany to produce sufficient hydrogen with all the consequences this entails. An important element
exclusively in Germany or the EU to meet German demand in of the National Hydrogen Strategy is therefore to prepare the
the long term, and that the hydrogen would be comparative- import of hydrogen.
8 | 9
Introduction
Meeting the demand for green hydrogen and synthesis prod- So far, an integrative view has not been taken of the global
ucts from countries with favorable climatic and geographic demand for hydrogen and its long-term development in the
conditions is mainly addressed from a techno-economic context of climate neutrality, or of the economic require-
perspective in completed and ongoing analyses. The inter- ments. As a result, there is a lack of understanding about the
ests and concerns of the exporting countries are dealt with extent to which potentials must be exploited in the future
only as a marginal issue (see [5], [6], [7], [4]). This is a deficit. and what price level can be expected for green hydrogen.
Germany’s National Hydrogen Strategy, the EU’s Hydrogen This is all essential information for developing an import
Strategy, the international agreements on climate protection strategy.
and the sustainable development goals (SDG) all require a
much broader analysis and evaluation. Various studies in this Against this background, this policy brief aims to identify
context (see e.g. [8]) as well as Germany’s National Hydrogen and discuss the aspects of importing hydrogen in the future
Strategy point to the need to develop and apply an interna- that go beyond techno-economic issues. In this way, it aims
tional sustainability standard for hydrogen production. to contribute to outlining the entire path to importing green
hydrogen for the energy transition in Germany. The topics of
The needs of the partner countries must be considered to a climate neutrality, technical and economic potentials, sustain-
greater extent in future strategies. These needs include meet- ability, but also capital availability, governance and local im-
ing their own energy demand in a sustainable way, achieving pacts are dealt with separately in the following chapters. The
their own climate goals using the economic development state of knowledge and the challenges still to be faced are
opportunities presented by a hydrogen economy, and com- identified and recommendations made for future research.
plying with specific sustainability criteria for the hydrogen
economy in the partner countries. In addition, the countries’
capacities to construct such capital- and technology-intensive
plants must be analyzed (e.g. governance structures, access
to capital, geopolitical stability). There is also a lack of knowl-
edge about the opportunities that could result for these
countries (e.g. effects on local value creation, capacity-
building possibilities), and analyses of acceptance and stake-
holders are missing.
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
Electricity generation
Conversion
H2 Air separation
Synthesis
Methanization
Methanol synthesis & upgrading Haber-Bosch
CO2 Fischer / Tropsch & upgrading N2
etc.
etc.
Fischer-Tropsch fuels
(diesel, gasoline, kerosene, wax)
Applications
Figure 1: Selected conversion paths to produce green hydrogen and synthesis products based on renewable
electricity (as an extension of [4])
10 | 11
Theses
01
Climate neutrality requires the projects as well as initial implementation projects on a large
12 | 13
Theses
02
There could be a big market for green annually (cf. [9]). For European companies, [11] expects a
hydrogen and synthesis products turnover of up to 65 billion euros in Europe and an addi-
tional 65 billion euros or so on global hydrogen and fuel cell
As already shown, with ambitious climate goals like green- markets.
house gas neutrality, green hydrogen and its synthesis prod-
ucts have an important role to play, especially in transport Depending on the study and scenario, the demand for syn-
and industry. Various studies have dealt with the global thetic fuels in Germany in 2050 is expected to be between
potential of hydrogen and synthesis products. [9] estimates 530 TWh and 910 TWh in ambitious climate protection
the worldwide Power-to-X (PtX) market potentials in a range scenarios (see [12], [13], [14]). In comparison: In 2018, the
from 320 to 726 TWh by 2030, and 972 to 6,180 TWh by total electricity demand in Germany amounted to 560 TWh
2050 (cf. also [10]). This corresponds to a market volume of (see [66]), and the total final energy consumption was 2,500
45 to 102 billion euros annually in 2030, and 107 to 680 bil- TWh (see [67]). This illustrates what efforts will be required in
lion euros annually in 2050. In comparison: the oil markets this field in the future.
in today’s prices amount to approximately 2,000 billion euros
03
Expansion potentials for renewables on economic viability and acceptance. This implies that the
in Germany are limiting domestic domestic potential of renewable energy is probably not suffi-
cient to meet the total demand for power including hydrogen
hydrogen production potentials production. However, in scenarios that strongly emphasize
Decarbonizing the energy system will ultimately take place direct power applications, it also means that not insignificant
to a large extent by generating power based on renewable amounts of the electricity required can be covered by domes-
energies, which substitute fossil energy sources. This power tic potentials (see [1]). According to our own calculations, the
can be used in the energy system either directly or indirect- capacity expansion potential for renewable power generation
ly via hydrogen or synthetic hydrocarbons produced from in neighboring European countries is much higher at more
it. The proportions of these energy sources vary widely in than 15,000 TWh (see [1]). However, very high exploitation of
different scenarios. Hydrogen and derived synthetic fuels are this potential is expected to be accompanied by higher costs
characterized by high flexibility of use, but also by higher and dwindling acceptance among the population. A possible
power demand due to the efficiency of the process chain. alternative, therefore, is to produce hydrogen in those regions
The resulting electricity demand in scenarios with a strong of the world, which, due to their geographical and climatic
use of hydrogen and hydrogen-based synthetic hydrocarbons conditions, have a naturally high supply of (low-cost) renew-
reaches values of just under 3,000 TWh in studies (see [16]). able energy sources and less intensively used land areas. Solar
This requires substantial expansion of renewable electricity technologies in Germany, for instance, always compete with
generation in Germany, which reached 243 TWh in 2019 other land uses. In the uninhabited areas of North Africa,
(see [17]). The potential in Germany to expand renewable there is often no competition for use, and the potential yield
electricity generation is seen as between 700 and 1,100 of PV is sometimes twice as high.
TWh according to Fraunhofer ISI’s internal calculations based
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
Despite all the uncertainty concerning future developments, egy and the European hydrogen strategy. However, too little
it seems likely that significant amounts of hydrogen will be is known about acceptance and the conditions needed for
produced outside Germany and even outside Europe because imports to actually take place to the extent considered neces-
of lower costs abroad and limited public acceptance at home. sary. The following chapters address the individual problems
This is also emphasized in Germany’s national hydrogen strat- and open research questions.
04
Importing green hydrogen and need for water in the producing countries, which presents
synthesis products is technically and a challenge in some regions and may require working with
seawater desalination plants. Manufacturing the synthesis
economically attractive products also requires CO2. The CO2 can come from bio-
Several studies have looked at the production costs of genic or stationary sources, e.g. from fossil power plants or
imported synthetic fuels based on renewable electricity gen- industry. As these are not always available, technologies are
eration (see [4], [18], [4], [19], [20], [21]). Electricity prices, currently being developed that can capture CO2 directly from
efficiency, investments in the electrolyzers and their full-load the air. However, this is energy-intensive, requires lots of land
hours have the biggest influence on production costs. The and causes additional costs.
electricity costs of renewable installations in countries with
favorable climatic conditions, such as North Africa, are much Economic assessment shows that hydrogen and its synthesis
lower than in Germany—with electricity production costs products based on renewable electricity are currently still two
from PV and wind installations of less than 3 € ct / kWh. They to three times more expensive than hydrogen based on fossil
are therefore more than 50 percent lower than the costs energy carriers (see [7]). This means cost reduction poten-
at German locations. They also have a higher number of tials must be exploited and financial incentives should be set
full-load hours with more than 4,000 hours per year. The pro- for the market introduction and market ramp-up phases.
duction costs of hydrogen and synthesis products in countries As things stand at present, the costs of synthetic fuels are
with favorable climatic conditions are therefore significantly significantly higher than the costs of today’s fossil fuels, even
lower than production in Germany. Furthermore, the costs if imported from particularly attractive regions. In addition,
for transporting the synthetic fuels from these countries are from a national economy viewpoint, it should be considered
comparatively low in relation to the production costs. From that Germany would relinquish the opportunity for additional
the supply cost perspective, therefore, it makes sense to domestic value creation by importing hydrogen, and would
import synthetic fuels to Germany. continue to be heavily dependent on energy imports. This
latter point is the subject of the next chapter.
Technical obstacles do not prevent this, or only occur in
specific cases. They still exist, for example, when transport- Finally, it should be mentioned that constructing the relevant
ing cryogenic hydrogen, i.e. liquid hydrogen at −253 °C, for production plants and transport infrastructures would take
which suitable ships still have to be developed and brought several years, and that significant import volumes are only
to series production, or for transporting synthetic methane, expected from 2030 onwards.
for which retrofitted natural gas pipelines can be used. An-
other technical requirement that currently exists concerns the
14 | 15
Theses
05
Strategies must be developed for the As discussed in detail above, in various climate protection
new import dependencies of a hydro scenarios, green hydrogen and synthesis products substitute
fossil-based energy carriers in all sectors by 2050, but with
gen economy different functions and to varying degrees. For the German
If it is assumed that relevant amounts of green hydrogen power grid, for example, hydrogen offers a new flexibility
will be imported in the future, it must be asked what this option and contributes to system stability, while in industry
implies for Germany’s supply security. At present, Germany green hydrogen will become increasingly important for ma-
is heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, mainly from terial use (see [29] and Chapter 01). In the transport sector,
non-European countries. In 2019, 60 percent of Germany’s depending on the underlying scenario, hydrogen-based fuels
primary energy consumption was covered by oil and gas (see will cover up to about 50 percent of the energy demand in
[22]). Germany gets its natural gas mainly from Russia, the 2050 (see [13]). These could significantly reduce the current
Netherlands and Norway (see [23]). Oil is primarily obtained import ratio in the transport sector of almost 100 percent. As
from Russia, Norway, Great Britain, Libya and other countries it is not yet clear which countries will deliver hydrogen-based
(see [24]). Hard coal is also largely imported from countries energy carriers to Germany in the future, it is not possible
like Australia. In some cases, the production of some supplier to estimate the risks associated with transport and transit,
countries (Netherlands, UK) will decrease strongly over the political stability and the diversity of the supplying countries.
next 10 to 20 years. Nevertheless, there are already various possibilities for Ger-
many and the EU to build a solid basis for a reliable energy
The transformation of the energy system is not only aimed supply. On the one hand, integrating and networking the en-
at a sustainable, competitive and efficient energy supply, but ergy markets in the EU can cushion regional bottlenecks and
also at an affordable and secure one (see [25]). When consid- instabilities. On the other hand, long-term and cooperative
ering energy supply security, therefore, the EU Energy Union relationships that can contribute to supply security can be
does not restrict itself to import dependency, but includes forged with selected countries by considering socio-economic
system stability, critical infrastructures and cybersecurity as and sustainable criteria when selecting potential producing
well. For instance, in the course of expanding renewable en- countries, and by strengthening international cooperation
ergies, the effect of volatile renewable energies on the stabili- (see Chapter 11). One of the political tasks ahead is to fur-
ty of the grid is analyzed (see [26], [27]). Nevertheless, import ther develop these approaches and a new sustainable policy
dependency plays a major role in the discussion about supply for cooperation with future producing countries.
security. Assessing import risks is based on various factors
(see [28], [23]) such as import share, stability of the exporting
country, substitutability of the exporting country, number of
(potential) exporting countries, transportation risks (transit
route, infrastructures), substitutability of the imported energy
carrier, and diversification of the supply sources.
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
06
It is still open how global supply and and infrastructures like power lines and gas pipelines. The
demand and an international hydro second step is to integrate the economic, social, energy and
development policy goals and restrictions into the analysis.
gen price will develop in future These include securing the energy supply in the country
As discussed in Chapter 04, a number of studies compare the exporting the hydrogen and meeting the energy and climate
economic attractiveness of importing hydrogen to producing policy goals there. Additional aspects should also be includ-
green hydrogen and synthesis products domestically. How ed such as industrial structures, know-how of developing
ever, these only analyze individual countries such as Australia, production capacities, capital available for investments in
Morocco, Argentina or regions (like North Africa) (see [18], plants, training structures and capacities, and environmental
[30], [7], [31]). The potential imports are then analyzed for aspects. The interests of local actors as well as global actors
selected countries like Germany or regions like the EU. What and stakeholders also influence potential production. All of
is missing so far is a global overview of the potential supply these aspects ultimately determine the potential for export-
and the potential demand and the extent to which these ing green hydrogen and synthesis products. Many of these
match. For a comprehensive analysis, potential producing aspects also apply to the potential importing country. Energy
countries worldwide would have to be identified and ana- and climate policy goals, sustainability requirements, actors
lyzed. The first step is to consider natural potentials, such and stakeholder interests etc. drive the demand for imports.
as the availability of resources (wind, solar radiation, water), The most important aspects are discussed in more depth in
as well as technical feasibility and costs for plant facilities Chapters 05 to 13.
H2 costs
N1 A1
H2 marginal costs
(GK)
N0
[€/t] A0
Restrictions
GK1
GK0
Drivers
Figure 2: Methodology to determine hydrogen supply and demand and possible pricing derived from marginal
costs (Index 0 without drivers and obstacles, Index 1 including these)
16 | 17
Theses
A comparison purely in terms of quantities helps to gain an Chapter 08 examines the connection between market at-
idea of whether supply and demand can be matched. How- tractiveness, risks and costs of capital in more detail. Figure 2
ever, this is followed by another question that is difficult to illustrates the connections. There will be restrictions that limit
answer. How will the prices for green hydrogen and synthesis the supply of green hydrogen, and drivers that increase the
products develop in future? The economic analyses conduct- overall global demand for it. Today’s mainly production cost-
ed so far are almost without exception based on the costs based analyses entail the risk of significantly underestimating
for production and transportation. However, it is not possible the actual market price and deriving incorrect policy recom-
to derive market prices directly from these. Market prices mendations as a result. This is why analyses of production
are based on marginal costs plus surcharges for taxes, profit, costs are needed for a realistic future perspective in order to
risk premiums, sales, warranty, R&D expenditure etc. or even add the derivation of potential market prices, comparable to
scarcity prices (see crude oil) or prices based on other energy today’s trade with energy carriers and raw materials.
sources (such as natural gas).
07
Sustainability criteria must be devel One of the policy measures in Germany’s National Hydrogen
oped and complied with in the poten Strategy makes the following reference to pilot projects in
partner countries:
tial producing countries
As can be read in the German government’s National Hydro- “[...] attention will be paid to ensuring that importing green
gen Strategy (see [3]), from the perspective of the German hydrogen or energy sources based on it to Germany takes
government, only hydrogen produced using renewable place on top of domestic energy production in the respec-
energies is sustainable in the long term—so-called “green” tive partner countries and does not impede the supply of
hydrogen. It is therefore the German government’s goal to renewable energy, which is inadequate in many cases, in the
use green hydrogen, to support its rapid market ramp-up developing countries. Also, the sustainable supply of water in
and to establish the corresponding value chains. It is also arid regions of these countries must not be impaired by the
being discussed whether CO2-neutral hydrogen should be production of hydrogen. The aim is to achieve sustainable
used, at least in a transitional period, for reasons of eco- production along the entire supply chain.“
nomic efficiency (e.g. “blue” (see [68]) or “turquoise” (see
[69]) hydrogen). This can be used transitionally in Germany Producing hydrogen requires large amounts of electricity,
due to the country’s integration into European energy supply and therefore also large areas of land to generate renew-
infrastructure. able power. In the “Greenhouse gas neutrality” path of its
roadmap published in 2019, the German Chemical Industry
Globally, there are very different definitions of “green hydro- Association (VCI) assumes that 628 TWh electricity will be
gen”, including some that allow the use of nuclear energy required annually until 2030 for the chemical industry alone
as CO2-free (see [32]). Other definitions, such as the Green (see [34]). The world’s largest PV plant at present, the Bhadla
Hydrogen Standard of the TÜV SÜD, are based on limits for (see [70]), has had a capacity of 2.2 gigawatt since Decem-
the reduction of CO2 emissions (see [33]). ber 2019. This plant covers an area of 45 square kilometers.
Assuming a daily production of 5.5 kWh per square kilome-
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
ter, about seven of these plants with an area of more than In the future, it will therefore be important to provide proof
300 square kilometers would be needed just for the German of origin for the electricity needed for electrolysis, but also
chemical industry. Depending on spacing regulations, the for the water required and, if necessary, for the carbon
area required for wind turbines would be even larger. In ad- sources. From the viewpoint of the acceptance of importing
dition, land is needed for the electrolyzer facilities, transport green hydrogen into Germany, sustainability issues along the
infrastructure, and other things. If green synthesis products entire value chain are of great importance to avoid the mis-
are also produced from hydrogen on-site, areas with favor- takes that were made with biofuels, for example. More than
able climatic conditions for renewables often lack stationary a decade ago, the discussion about the sustainability of bio-
point sources or biomass sources able to meet the necessary fuels (palm oil) from Malaysia or Brazil and indirect changes
carbon demand. CO2 would then have to be captured directly in land use halted the spread of a global biofuel economy. In
from the air, which also entails a significant demand for land terms of an extended sustainability discussion, it is important
and energy due to low plant efficiency. These dimensions to consider the social consequences in the producing coun-
show that constructing additional renewable energy capac- tries, see also the section on the possible positive aspects due
ities here can only be done together with expanding the to the creation of local value added.
power supply for the local population.
Consequently, it should be an important political priority in
In many of the potential hydrogen producing countries, such the next few years to develop a sustainability standard that
as those from the MENA region or Australia, for example, is as international as possible, and this should be integrated
power generation is often still based on fossil energy sources. into global climate negotiations. Germany and the EU could
Developing renewable power generation to export green take a lead role here. Strong state institutions in the future
hydrogen must not result in the perpetuation of fossil sources producing countries are an important factor for improving
or countries not being able to meet their own energy and environmental and social standards, and this aspect should
climate policy goals. be part of developing a strategy. A comprehensive sustain-
ability standard must have positive effects on at least six
Many of the possible hydrogen producing countries already of the global sustainability goals, specifically: SDG 6 (clean
have large installed hydropower capacities (e.g. Egypt, Tur- water), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), SDG 8 (decent
key). The sustainability of large hydropower plants is con- work and economic growth), SDG 9 (industry, innovation
troversial, and water consumption is another problem. The and infrastructure), SDG 12 (responsible consumption and
electrolyzers used to produce hydrogen require water that production) and SDG 13 (climate action).
may be in short supply depending on local conditions and
where distribution issues may arise, for example, to supply
the local population with drinking water or to produce food.
Seawater desalination plants are often used to obtain water.
In addition to their high energy consumption and CO2 emis-
sions, these plants also produce large amounts of residues,
above all large quantities of brine with highly concentrated
salts, biocides, anti-scaling agents, anti-foaming agents and
metals (see [35]).
18 | 19
Theses
08
An economically attractive market effects among investors play a role (see [39]). Effective policy
must be created for investors measures to promote the expansion of renewable energies
have also made a significant contribution to reducing the
The production as well as the energetic and material utiliza- investment risk (see [40], [41]). From a global perspective,
tion of hydrogen require extensive investments in facilities to private investors such as households, companies, and project
supply electricity and water, in conversion plants, and in ap- developers now contribute about two thirds of renewable
plication technologies. Mobilizing large amounts of capital is energy financing, and private financial intermediaries and
necessary for this. For private investors, the expected return development banks about one third, while the importance
on investment is decisive, while for external lenders (financial of institutional investors is still low at five percent (low
intermediaries), minimizing the default risk plays a major role expected returns due to risk aversion). Development banks
(see [36]). A high risk drives up financing costs (see [37]), are attributed an important role as enablers during the early
which in turn are reflected in the specific production costs phase of expansion (see [41]), as they reduce the extent of
(see Chapter 06 on the challenge of pricing green hydro- potential credit defaults through grants and low-interest
gen). Furthermore, there is limited venture capital available. loans, and thus increase the attractiveness for other inves-
The goal is therefore to shape market conditions so they are tors (leverage effect).
attractive to a large number of investors and to have enough
low-cost capital available. It was decisive for the expansion of renewable energies and
thus also for investments and financing that various bundles
Looking at the risks, certain analogies can be drawn to the of policy instruments created secure demand (guaranteed
expansion of renewable energies, but differences are also purchase of electricity), which influenced the risks involved
expected. There are differences, for example, resulting from and thus the financing costs (see [42]). If policy measures
country risks that are partially reflected in the capital costs such as premiums, quotas or certificates in the countries
of external investors via counterparty contracts. With regard importing hydrogen generated a similarly reliable demand as
to the production of hydrogen, for example, part of this will has partly been accomplished in the expansion of renew-
take place in countries with high risks. The financing costs able energies (shifting demand to the right in Figure 2), this
in developing countries are sometimes twice as high as in would reduce the market risk and make the market more
industrial nations; this discrepancy is especially evident in attractive to investors. If, in addition, corresponding guar-
projects with high initial investments (derisking renewable antees from the importing countries reduced the existing
energy investment, see [38]). Analogies can be drawn with country or counterparty risk in the exporting countries, and
regard to the long-term development of the market and if development banks served the capital market as enablers,
the investors. Over time, the financing costs for renewable investment risks could be reduced and the supply of hydro-
energies have fallen significantly (compare [71], [72]). The gen increased (shifting supply to the right in Figure 2), so
main reasons for this are declining risks at country level and that the market as a whole could grow significantly.
developments on the capital market, especially in the euro-
zone. In addition, declining technology risks and learning
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
09
Incentive systems for hydrogen • Contract for differences: In addition to the producers
production are largely missing and of hydrogen, incentives are also needed for potential
consumers in order to create a (global) hydrogen market.
must be introduced “Contracts for differences” are being discussed as an in-
Under the current framework conditions, producing hydro- centive here. They aim to compensate the cost differences
gen abroad and the associated hydrogen imports are not to consumers between existing production processes and
competitive (see Chapter 04). In addition, the lack of sales processes modified to use hydrogen, if CO2 pricing is not
markets and unclear legal boundary conditions, for example sufficient for this.
with regard to certification as green hydrogen, are hindering
competitiveness. This is why different incentive systems are • Quotas: Quotas are an instrument to increase the use of
being discussed to make the production of hydrogen abroad hydrogen in the transport sector and partly in the heating
and its import attractive. sector. Quotas are fulfilled by the suppliers of fuels. They
are suitable in areas not subject to international competi-
• Investment support: Germany’s National Hydrogen Strate- tion. The costs of meeting the quota are passed on in the
gy plans the construction of hydrogen production facilities form of higher fuel costs. Due to the flexibility in meeting
in Germany with a capacity of 5 gigawatt by 2030, and quotas, there is much higher uncertainty for hydrogen
an additional 5 gigawatt by 2035 (see [3]). At European producers than with “Contracts for differences” regarding
level, the EU’s Hydrogen Strategy aims at an electrolysis the development of market demand.
capacity of more than 40 gigawatt by 2030, which is to be
supported within so-called IPCEI projects (see [2]). • Proof of origin for green hydrogen: When importing green
hydrogen, quality and origin are of major importance to
• Regulatory framework conditions in the producing coun- ensure that the use of hydrogen contributes to sustain-
try: The regulatory framework in the producing country ability (see the discussion in Chapter 07 on sustainability).
has to be designed so that it does not impede the produc- In countries of hydrogen origin, certification can create
tion of green hydrogen. This concerns, for example, extra an incentive to trigger additional investment in renewable
charges for power through state-induced price compo- energies due to hydrogen exports. Care must be taken
nents, but also regulations on plant operation. to ensure that this does not take place at the expense of
the local energy supply, or that it creates incentives for
• CO2 pricing: Designing CO2 pricing to reflect costs more additional fossil energy generation.
accurately and expanding emissions trading or CO2 pricing
to other sectors and countries creates incentives for elec- The lack of economic viability for producing and using
tricity from renewable energies and therefore for green hydrogen as a decarbonization option means that additional
hydrogen (or acts as a cost burden on fossil competitors). incentives are needed, and the current framework conditions
must be adapted. This is also very important for the discus-
• Feed-in tariffs: At EU level, feed-in tariffs are seen as a sion in Chapter 08 about incentives for investors. This should
major support instrument for hydrogen production. In this consider their integration into existing instruments, especially
way, producers of green hydrogen can become competi- the EU emissions trading scheme, in order to guarantee
tive with existing producers of gray hydrogen at an early efficient and effective climate protection. Further research is
stage. It is unclear to what extent producers in countries required concerning the coordination of appropriate instru-
outside the EU can or should also be paid feed-in tariffs ments in order to make a contribution to climate protection
for green hydrogen exported to the EU. and to incentivize the most suitable options.
20 | 21
Theses
10
The hydrogen economy must be in • The second stage in the hierarchical principle is priority
tegrated into the overarching gover for renewable energies in the continued expansion of the
electricity sector (or if substituting fossil power capacities
nance structures for transforming the is necessary). Fossil fuels should be phased out as quickly
energy system as possible to make room for clean power generation. This
second stage is especially relevant for potential hydrogen
As discussed in Chapter 07, generating electricity to produce producing countries that have not yet decarbonized their
hydrogen in Europe and in developing countries is linked with own power sector.
environmental impacts that are enhanced by the low efficien-
cies in the entire chain from producing to using the hydrogen • The third stage of the hierarchical principle gives priority
and synthetic energy sources. Although these impacts are not to alternatives based on renewable energy sources that
easy to quantify and internalize in renewable power gener- provide similar services but with less environmental im-
ation, they provide arguments for a hierarchy principle that pact. These include the direct use of electricity in particular
minimizes the necessary RE capacities—even if costs continue and sustainable biomass / biofuels / biogas, taking into ac-
to fall. This implies that the development of the hydrogen count their limited availability in the countries consuming
economy must be integrated into the general governance and producing hydrogen.
structures for transforming the energy system via a hierarchi-
cal principle. This hierarchical principle should—analogous to • Applications where none of the above three apply must
the energy efficiency first principle—minimize the cost of hy- use hydrogen and synthesis products. As mentioned in
drogen production, even if the costs for renewables, electrol- Chapter 02, this still opens up a global market of 100 to
ysis and the production of synthetic energy sources continue 700 billion euros worldwide for the hydrogen economy.
to fall. This principle applies to the entire system of supplying
and consuming energy, i.e. it covers both producing and con- This four-stage principle, which can be regarded as an exten-
suming countries, and comprises the following four stages: sion to the “energy efficiency first” principle, must be imple-
mented in the governance structures for transforming the
• The “energy efficiency first” principle recently introduced energy system for both the countries consuming hydrogen
into European policy must be a strong guiding principle and for those producing it. This is an important prerequisite
when expanding energy supply and therefore the RE for their sustainable development.
capacities in a country. This refers to both PtX import
and export regions. This also applies to the direct use of
renewable energies to decarbonize the power sector and
the demand sectors as well as to RE capacities used to
produce the hydrogen itself.
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
11
Integration into international coop courses of being kept at the periphery of technological and
The desired security of supply (see Chapter 05) is therefore Local actors who are able to build trust in implementing the
rooted in a large area of conflicting interests. However, necessary technological and socio-economic infrastructures
based on carefully planned international cooperation, (see Chapter 12) should be identified using situation and
Germany can work towards translating its own dependen- stakeholder analyses. It is essential to integrate local carriers
cy (imports of hydrogen, see Chapter 05) into the neces- of knowledge about historical-geographic, climatological,
sary bilateral and multilateral reliability and infrastructural economic, sociocultural and technological aspects if part-
resilience (production and maintenance). Germany has ner countries are to be reciprocally involved when working
helped to formulate the task of international cooperation towards the SDGs. This is also necessary to prevent expensive
on climate protection and for global energy supply within bottlenecks through trustworthy capacity building (see Chap-
international agreements (see discussion in Chapter 07). ter 12), and to increase the economic attractiveness of the
The relevant Paris Agreement of 2015 explicitly mentions market to investors (see Chapters 06 and 08). Local research
support for developing countries via technology transfer institutions can play a role here as intermediaries between
and joint technology development: society and politics. Local universities possess relevant knowl-
edge, for instance, but its transfer is sometimes pushed into
“Taking full account of the specific needs and special situa- the background due to a lack of infrastructures and corre-
tions of the least developed countries with regard to funding sponding day-to-day efforts in capacity building (see [62]).
and transfer of technology […]“ (see [51]). Supporting local research on energy issues not only builds
trust, but also can properly integrate the H2 infrastructure
Building on the discussion of local value creation (see Chap- into a regional, social, and economic context (see Chapters
ter 12), Germany has the opportunity to create structural and 07, 10 and 12).
“systemic” trust (see [52]) in partner countries for hydrogen
exports. With regard to the characteristic features of trust, At the same time, strategy development should consider
such as interaction and reciprocity (ibid.), the aim should be already ongoing international activities in the context of
to counteract the local feeling that can be derived from dis- energy partnerships and multilateral cooperation, such as
22 | 23
Theses
“International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the partnerships can integrate stakeholders that have not yet
Economy (IPHE)”. Complex political, economic and cultural been identified, as these can have both a supportive and
contexts should also be taken into account. Morocco, for a hindering effect (see [63]). In addition to bilateral and
example, acts as an “African”, “Maghrebi”, “Arabian” and multilateral dialogs between Morocco and other states (for
international player. With regard to the energy transition, it example PAREMA), these also include the African Union (AU,
is important to consider conflicting goals and unnecessary see [64]), UNECA and the League of Arab States (LAS with
redundancies at an early stage. The systemic consideration reference to IRENA & RCREEE) (among others, see 3.4. in
of NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and transnational [65]).
12
Local economic competencies are re Assuming an ambitious scenario for a European hydrogen
quired for successful implementation industry, a recent study by E4tech (see [43]) estimates that
developing a hydrogen and fuel cell economy in Europe
A global hydrogen economy, which is developed by the users could have potential economic effects of up to 3.5 billion
and producers of hydrogen and synthetic energy sources euros and create 38,500 direct jobs and more than 70,000
or chemicals working together, requires the development indirect ones (i.e. full-time equivalents) by 2030. By 2050,
of new and the enhancement of existing local economic the hydrogen economy could reach a volume ranging from
competencies. This is the only way to ensure that a globally 100 billion euros worldwide, which is equivalent to today’s
networked green hydrogen economy not only contributes steel market, up to almost 700 billion euros, about one third
to the global energy transition, but also to sustainable and of today’s oil market. The size of the market depends on
innovative economic development in the producing countries where alternatives are available in the form of direct electrici-
as well. This is a major driver for establishing new energy ty use, such as freight transport (see [9]).
technologies, especially in emerging economies and devel-
oping countries, as creating jobs and expanding local value Organizing the global value chains for hydrogen is still in its
creation potentials in sustainable sectors are key elements of infancy, with only a few active players so far. Against this
national development strategies. background, there is significant potential for local value
creation in possible producing countries worldwide. Current-
In the context of developing an internationally networked ly, numerous emerging economies and developing countries
hydrogen economy, local value creation may concern the are not only working on strategies to use different hydrogen
direct production of hydrogen and the associated supply application technologies in the transport sector or industry,
of materials and services. However, it may also involve the for example, but are also actively assessing the possibilities
upstream and downstream components of value chains, such for local value creation due to establishing a local hydrogen
as expanding and developing supplier industries and locally economy (see [44], [45]).
required transport or storage infrastructure. In addition, it
can encompass components for energy generation (i.e. re- The following local competencies are especially relevant for
newable energy technologies) and any downstream chemical realizing an international trading system in the context of a
synthesis and transformation processes, and application hydrogen economy, and must be taken into account when
technologies. developing a strategy:
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
• Existing local industrial value chains support the emer- ucts, local research networks must be competitive and,
gence of hydrogen value chains. where necessary, further developed through international
research cooperation and energy partnerships in order to
• The producing countries must have already implemented keep up with global competition.
successful policies to develop renewable energies, with
the goal of developing a local economic base here too, • The development and implementation of global quality
parallel to a green hydrogen economy. Not all the technol- and safety standards for the production of green hydrogen
ogies needed to produce hydrogen have to be manufac- represent a key element that calls for intensive interna-
tured in the producing countries, but it is in their interests tional cooperation.
to keep as much of the value chain as possible up to the
final product in their countries. • Embedding the hydrogen strategy in the national energy
strategy and close coordination with industrial policy in-
• Since investments in research are needed to reduce the struments in the producing countries are essential to avoid
costs of hydrogen and increase the longevity of the prod- conflicts of goals and resources (compare Chapter 07).
13
Technology sovereignty must be that are essential for economic competitiveness, meeting key
critically analyzed and ensured for societal needs such as energy supply and sovereign tasks.
Chapters 02 and 03 clearly show that hydrogen technologies
countries importing and exporting meet these criteria. It is therefore foreseeable that hydrogen
hydrogen strategies will be increasingly assessed from the viewpoint of
technology sovereignty (TS) in the future.
Calls for technology sovereignty in Europe were becoming
louder even before the current Corona crisis. Growing geo- The factors needed to produce technology sovereignty are
political uncertainties and the threat of global trade conflicts distinguished in [73] between a state’s already existing own
are questioning the optimism of recent decades concerning competencies and resources or the possibility to develop
the interdependence of our economies. This is triggering a these itself if needed, and access to resources, competen-
discussion about how independent a state or a federation of cies and upstream services of third parties. Constraints on
states must and can be with regard to critical technologies. A technology sovereignty are to be feared if there is no security
definition of technology sovereignty and ways to determine of supply from third parties for critical resources or compe-
the criticality of technologies have recently been presented tencies that a state or a federation of states cannot provide
by Fraunhofer ISI (see [73]). Technology sovereignty refers to or develop itself.
the ability of a state or a federation of states to provide the
technologies it deems critical for its welfare, competitiveness In the discussion up to now, technology sovereignty has
and ability to act, and to be able to develop these or source mainly been addressed from the viewpoint of important
them from other economic areas without one-sided structur- industrial nations and regions. From a German and European
al dependency. Technology sovereignty should be addressed perspective, therefore, the first question is how to assess the
in particular for those technologies and their value chains availability of the technologies needed to establish a hydro-
24 | 25
Theses
gen economy. There are additional questions here about been no differentiated analysis of the trade relations in these
importing green hydrogen. The second question concerns technologies, which is also important for this question.
the reliability of imports from the exporting countries, which
was already raised in Chapter 05. From the perspective of the With regard to the second question concerning reliability, a
compatibility of a hydrogen strategy with the development number of dimensions must be considered when assessing
prospects of the countries producing green hydrogen, the the reliability of countries from which green hydrogen is to
third question concerns how these countries assess the tech- be imported to Germany or the EU (see Chapter 05). In ad-
nology sovereignty of a corresponding hydrogen strategy for dition, [73] refers to the importance of countries complying
themselves, and what consequences result from this. with the WTO regime and of general country indicators such
as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (com-
So far, there are no comprehensive assessments of the tech- pare [75]). The index based on these indicators is also used by
nology sovereignty of hydrogen technologies. [73] refers to the EU to assess critical raw materials. For example, Germany
patent analyses as a starting point to assess the availability has an index value of 1.46 for the indicators analyzed in
of technology expertise. Initial information can be obtained 2019, and is therefore slightly better than Japan (1.32) and
from previous patent analyses, in which hydrogen produc- the US (1.13). This index can also be used as a first indication
tion, storage and distribution technologies formed a subset of the reliability of the potential countries exporting green
of the green technologies examined (see [76] and [82]. hydrogen. If applied, e.g. to the countries being discussed as
For the mid-2010s, these data indicate a visible position of the starting points for a hydrogen strategy in Africa, signifi-
Germany (a good 10 percent share of global patents) and for cantly lower index values result for the nine countries consid-
the EU as a whole (roughly 40 percent patent share). Other ered, which range between −0.89 and 0.16 (see [75]).
important players were primarily Japan and the US, while
China as a whole took a less prominent position and even With regard to the third question outlined above, from the
showed negative patent specialization in this field. It remains viewpoint of many countries exporting green hydrogen, both
to be seen what picture will result once these data have been the available technology knowledge and the manufacturers
updated. Looking at, e.g. the members of the Hydrogen of the technology are located abroad. The distribution of
Council, suggests that German and European companies play patents across different countries, mainly the EU, Japan and
a prominent role here as well (see [74]). From a German and the US, does indicate a certain heterogeneity in the origin of
European point of view, therefore, the starting situation is the knowledge. On the other hand, it should be noted that
likely to be quite favorable with regard to the domestic avail- restrictions in technology availability may also result from the
ability of hydrogen technologies. However, a more reliable link with financing. This could occur especially if financing
statement would require updated analyses that also differen- countries link their financial commitments to expectations
tiate technologies to a greater extent. about the choice of country of the technology provider.
In-depth empirical studies are needed here, as is further
To assess technology sovereignty with regard to hydrogen development of the concept of technology sovereignty in its
technologies that are not available domestically, the choice application to developing countries.
of different countries, but also their reliability are import-
ant for the risk of dependency. Indications of a concentra- Overall, the comments make it clear that, from a German
tion in patent applications for technologies for producing, and European viewpoint, a risk to technology sovereignty is
storing and transporting hydrogen can be derived from more likely to occur with regard to the reliability of the coun-
the above-mentioned data for Japan and the US as the tries exporting green hydrogen than with regard to access to
two countries, in which the most knowledge is likely to be existing technologies. In order to arrive at reliable statements,
available, in addition to the EU. However, so far, there has however, updated analyses are required that differentiate
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
technologies to a greater extent. At the same time, it is clear the development of future-oriented competencies, it would
that the prospect of importing green hydrogen also requires therefore be important to explicitly consider the extent to
extending technology sovereignty to include the perspective which these knowledge and production interconnections
of developing countries. That these countries are expected between consuming and producing countries also have stabi-
to be dependent on foreign technologies and financing lizing effects on governance in the producing countries.
underlines the urgency of the issue addressed in Chapters
10 and 12 of linking an import strategy for green hydrogen Finally, the analysis of technology sovereignty in the context
with a strategy of technological and economic cooperation of importing green hydrogen also requires adapting the anal-
with the developing countries producing green hydrogen. ysis concept itself. Especially with regard to the mentioned
Successfully improving the social and political stability of link to the financing of development strategies, it becomes
potential supplier countries would not only be key with clear that foreign policy aspects play a role here as well. In
regard to international sustainability goals, but would also the future, one challenge to the technology sovereignty of
increase the technology sovereignty of a hydrogen strategy Germany and Europe when importing green hydrogen could
from Germany’s point of view. However, it falls short to indi- also result from the activities of players like China, for exam-
cate that investments in constructing hydrogen production ple, if these were to influence the technology sovereignty of
capacity and the relevant exports to the EU would automat- green hydrogen producers in Africa not only by technology
ically strengthen a positive development outcome in the provisions, but also by integration strategies such as the
corresponding export countries. The resource curse, which Belt&Road initiative. Similar to the discussion about the criti-
describes the problematic relationship between a wealth of cality of raw materials (see [82]), it can therefore be expected
resources and positive economic development (see [79], [80], that technology and market-related dimensions will increas-
[78]),) is now also being discussed in the context of renew- ingly merge with development and foreign policy dimensions
able energies (compare [81]). When discussing increased in the future determination of technology sovereignty when
international R&D cooperation with producing countries and importing green hydrogen.
26 | 27
Literature and notes
[1] Sensfuß et al. (2019): Summary report energy systems: supply [9] Eichhammer, W.; Oberle, S.; Händel, M.; Gnann, T.;
perspective. Project report European Union’s Horizon 2020 re- Wietschel, M.; Lux, B. (2019): Etude sur les Opportunites
search and innovation programme under grant agreement no. et Priorites du „Power-to-X“ au Maroc. Studie gefördert von
691843. Available online: https://www.set-nav.eu/sites/default/ Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. Durchgeführt
files/common_files/deliverables/WP7/D7.8_SET-Nav_Summa- vom Fraunhofer ISI im Rahmen der Deutsch-Marokkanischen
ryReport_WP7_final.pdf, last checked on 12.11.2020. Energiepartnerschaft (https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/57157.
html). Available online: https://www.energypartnership.ma/
[2] European Commission (2020): A hydrogen strategy for a
fileadmin/user_upload/morocco/PtX_Morocco_Presentation-
climate-neutral Europe, Communication from the Commission
FraunhoferISI_Rabat_11Feb2019_Francais.pdf, last checked on
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Econo-
12.11.2020.
mic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
Brussels: European Commission. [10] Viebahn, P.; Zelt, O.; Fischedick, M.; Wietschel, M.;
Hirzel, S. ;Horst, J. (2018): Technologien für die Energie
[3] Bundesregierung (2020): Die Nationale Wasserstoffstrategie.
wende – Technologiebericht – Band 2. Studie im Auftrag des
Berlin: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi)
BMWI. Wuppertal Institut, Fraunhofer ISI, IZES. Wuppertal-
(Hrsg.). Available online: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/
Institut: Wuppertal.
Publikationen/Energie/die-nationale-wasserstoffstrategie.pdf?
blob=publicationFile&v=16, last checked on 12.11.2020. [11] Roland Berger (2020): Potenziale der Wasserstoff- und
Brennstoffzellen- Industrie in Baden-Württemberg. Studie im
[4] Deutsch, M.; Maier, U.; Perner, J.; Unteutsch, M.; Löven-
Auftrag des Ministeriums für Umwelt, Klima und Energie
ich, A. (2018): Die zukünftigen Kosten strombasierter synthe-
wirtschaft des Landes Baden-Württemberg. Roland Berger:
tischer Brennstoffe. Berlin, Köln: Agora Energiewende/Frontier
München.
Economics.
[12] NOW (2018): Studie IndWEDe. Industrialisierung der
[5] Lux, B.; Pfluger, B. (2020): A supply curve of electricity-based
Wasserelektrolyse in Deutschland: Chancen und Heraus-
hydrogen in a decarbonized European energy system in
forderungen für nachhaltigen Wasserstoff für Verkehr, Strom
2050. Available online: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apener-
und Wärme. Hg. v. Nationale Organisation Wasserstoff- und
gy.2020.115011, last checked on 12.11.2020.
Brennstoffzel- lentechnologie – NOW GmbH für das Bundes
[6] Hydrogen Council – Studies: https://hydrogencouncil.com/ ministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur: Berlin.
en/category/studies/
[13] BDI (2018): Klimapfade für Deutschland. Studie im Auftrag
[7] IEA (2019): The future of hydrogen – seizing today’s opportu- des BDI, durchgeführt von BCG und Prognos. Berlin: BCG.
nities. Report prepared by the IEA for the G20, Japan, Seizing
[14] Dena (2018): dena-Leitstudie – Integrierte Energiewende.
today’s opportunities. Available online: https://www. iea.org/
Deutsche Energie-Agentur: Berlin.
reports/the-future-of-hydrogen, last checked on 12.11.2020.
[15] Ausfelder, F.; Dura, H.E. (Hrsg.) (2018): Optionen für ein
[8] Hobohm, J.; auf der Maur, A.; Dambeck, H.; Kemmler,
nachhaltiges Energiesystem mit Power-to-X-Technologien.
A.; Koziel S.; Krei-Delmeyer, S. et al. (2018): Status und
Herausforderungen – Potenziale – Methoden – Auswirkungen.
Perspektiven flüssiger Energieträger in der Energiewende. End-
1. Roadmap des Kopernikus-Projektes „Power-to-X“: Flexible
bericht. Eine Studie der Prognos AG, des Fraunhofer-Instituts
Nutzung erneuerbarer Ressourcen (P2X). Frankfurt a.M.:
UMSICHT und des Deutschen Biomasseforschungszentrums
DECHEMA Gesellschaft für Chemische Technik und Biotech-
DBFZ. Berlin: Prognos. Available online: https://www. prognos.
nologie e.V.
com/uploads/tx_atwpubdb/2020_Bericht_Fluessige_Energie
traeger_RZ01.pdf, last checked on 12.11.2020. [16] UBA (2014): Treibhausgasneutrales Deutschland im Jahr 2050.
Climate Change 07/2014. Dessau-Roßlau: Umweltbundesamt.
28 | 29
Available online: https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/ sites/ bericht-versorgungssicherheit-2017.pdf? blob=publication-
default/files/medien/378/publikationen/07_2014_climate_ File&v=20, last checked on 12.11.2020.
change_dt.pdf, last checked on 12.11.2020.
[24] Statista (2020): Deutsche Rohölimporte nach ausgewählten
[17] UBA (2020a): Bilanz 2019: Erstmals mehr Strom aus erneuer- Exportländern. Available online: https://de.statista.com/
baren Energien als aus Kohle. Pressemitteilung. Dessau-Roßlau: statistik/daten/studie/2473/umfrage/rohoelimport-hauptliefer-
Umweltbundesamt. Available online: https://www.umwelt- anten-von-deutschland/ (Account Fraunhofer ISI), last checked
bundesamt.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/bilanz-2019-er- on 12.11.2020.
stmals-mehr-strom-aus-erneuerbaren, last checked on
[25] COM/2015/080 final: Communication from the Commission
12.11.2020.
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
[18] Pfennig, M.; Gerhardt, N.; Pape, C.; Böttger, D. (2017): nomic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions
Mittel- und langfristige Potenziale von PtL- und H2-Importen and the European Investment Bank. A framework strategy for
aus internationalen Vorzugsregionen. Teilbericht im Rahmen a resilient energy union with a forward-looking climate change
des Projektes: Klimawirksamkeit Elektromobilität – Entwick- policy.
lungsoptionen des Straßenverkehrs unter Berücksichtigung der
[26] Breitschopf, B.; Bäumann A. (2018): Do variable renew-
Rückkopplung des Energieversorgungssystems in Hinblick auf
able energies endanger the power system? An approach to
mittel- und langfristige Klimaziele. Teilbericht. Kassel:
measure flexibility. Conference paper of the 15th International
Fraunhofer-Institut für Windenergie und Energiesystemtechnik
conference on the European Energy Market, Lodz, June 2018.
IWES.
Available online: https://www.researchgate.net/deref/http-
[19] Kramer, U.; Ortloff, F.; Stollenwerk,S.; Thee, R. (2018): Prozent3AProzent2FProzent2Fdx.doi.orgProzent2F10.1109
Defossilisierung des Transportsektors – Optionen und Voraus- Prozent2FEEM.2018.8469983, last checked on 12.11.2020.
setzungen in Deutschland. Studie der Forschungsvereinigung
[27] 19th EuObserv’ER Report 2019, The State of Renewable
Verbrennungskraftmaschinen (FVV) e.V. Frankfurt a.M.
Energies in Europe (2019): https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/en/
[20] Timmerberg, S.; Kaltschmitt, M. (2019): Hydrogen from re- competence-center/energiepolitik-energiemaerkte/projekte/
newables: Supply from North Africa to Central Europe as blend eu-res-monitoring.html#3
in existing pipelines – Potentials and costs. In Applied Energy
[28] Breitschopf B.; Schlotz, A. (2014): Wirkung erneuerbarer
237 (2019) 798–809.
Energien auf die Versorgungssicherheit. Untersuchung im
[21] Prognos (2020): Kosten und Transformationspfade für strom- Rahmen des Projekts ImpRES (Impacts of Renewable Energy
basierte Energieträger. Available online: https:// www.bmwi.de/ Sources. Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer ISI (Hrsg.). Available online:
Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Studien/transformationspfade-fuer- www.impres-projekt.de/impres-wAssets/docs/ImpRES_Ener-
strombasierte-energietraeger.pdf? blob=publicationFile, last giesicherheit_Uebersicht-und-Vorgehensweise_v18.pdf, last
checked on 11.10.2020. checked on 12.11.2020.
[22] UBA (2020b): Primäerenergieverbrauch. Dessau-Roßlau: [29] Hebling, C. et al. (2019): Eine Wasserstoff-Roadmap für
Umweltbundesamt. Available online: https://www.umwelt- Deutschland. Karlsruhe und Freiburg: Fraunhofer ISI und Fraun-
bundesamt.de/daten/energie/primaerenergieverbrauch#de hofer ISE. Available online: https://www.ise. fraunhofer.de/
finition-und-einflussfaktoren, last checked on 21.11.2020. content/dam/ise/de/documents/publications/ studies/2019-10_
Fraunhofer_Wasserstoff-Roadmap_fuer_Deutschland.pdf, last
[23] BMWi (2019): Versorgungssicherheit bei Erdgas. Monitor-
checked on 12.11.2020.
ing-Bericht nach §51 EnWG. Berlin: Bundesministerium für
Wirtschaft und Energie (BMWi). Available online: https://www. [30] Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH (Hrsg.) (2020): H2 Atlas
bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Energie/monitoring- Africa – Atlas of green hydrogen generation potentials in
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
Africa. Jülich: Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH. Available to support policymakers in selecting public instruments to pro-
online: https://www.sasscal.org/atlas-of-green-hydrogen-gen- mote renewable energy investment in developing countries.
eration-potentials-in-africa/, last checked on 12.11.2020. New York, US: UNDP. Available online: https:// www.undp.
org/content/dam/undp/library/EnvironmentProzent20and-
[31] World Energy Council (2018): International Aspects of a
Prozent20Energy/ClimateProzent20Strategies/Derisking
power-to-X Roadmap. Study conducted by Frontier Econom-
Prozent20RenewableProzent20EnergyProzent20Investment-
ics, on behalf of the World Energy Council (Weltenergierat –
Prozent20-Prozent20FullProzent20ReportProzent20(MayProz-
Deutschland). World Energy Council.
ent202013)Prozent20ENGLISHProzent20(1).pdf, last checked
[32] Abad, A.V.; Dodds, P.E. (2020): Green hydrogen characteri- on 12.11.2020.
sation initiatives: Definitions, standards, guarantees of origin,
[39] Egli, F.; Steffen, B.; Schmidt, T.S. (2018): A dynamic analysis
and challenges. Energy Policy 138.
of financing conditions for renewable energy technologies.
[33] TÜV SÜD (2020): Standard CMS 70. Erzeugung von Grünem Nat Energy 77, 525. Available online: https://www.nature.com/
Wasserstoff (GreenHydrogen). Version 01/2020. München: articles/s41560-018-0277-y.pdf, last checked on 12.11.2020.
TÜV SÜD. Available online: https://docplayer. org/73293340-
[40] Egli, F. (2020): Renewable energy investment risk: An investi-
Tuev-sued-standard-cms-70-erzeugung-von-gruenem-
gation of changes over time and the underlying drivers. Energy
wasserstoff-greenhydrogen-kurz-erzeugung-gh.html#down-
Policy 140, 111428. Available online: https://doi.org/10.1016/
load_tab_content, last checked on 12.11.2020.
j.enpol.2020.111428, last checked on 12.11.2020.
[34] DECHEMA; FutureCamp (2019): Roadmap Chemie 2050 –
[41] IRENA; CPI (2018): Global landscape of renewable energy
Auf dem Weg zu einer treibhausgasneutralen chemischen
finance. Available online: https://www.irena.org/-/media/ Files/
Industrie in Deutschland. Studie für den VCI. München: Future-
IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Jan/IRENA_Global_lands-
Camp Climate GmbH. Available online: https://www.vci.de/
cape_RE_finance_2018.pdf, last checked on 12.11.2020.
vci/downloads-vci/publikation/2019-10-09-studie-roadmap-
chemie-2050-treibhausgasneutralitaet.pdf, last checked on [42] Polzin, F.; Migendt, M.; Täube, F.A.; von Flotow, P. (2015):
12.11.2020. Public policy influence on renewable energy investments – a
panel data study across OECD countries. Energy Policy 80,
[35] Latemann, S. (2011): Meerwasserentsalzung. Warnsignal
98–111. Available online: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.
Klima: Genug Wasser für alle? p. 452–458, 3.Auflage. Hrsg.
2015.01.026, last checked on 12.11.2020.
Lozán, J. L. H., Graßl, P. Hupfer, L. Karbe & C.-D. Schönwiese.
[43] E4tech (2019): Value added of the hydrogen and fuel cell
[36] Gerhard, M.; Rüschen, T.; Sandhövel, A. (Eds.) (2015): Fi-
sector in Europe – supporting European growth and compet-
nanzierung Erneuerbarer Energien. 2nd edition, Frankfurt a.M.:
itiveness – study on value chain and manufacturing compet-
Frankfurt-School-Verlag.
itiveness analysis for hydrogen and fuel cells technologies.
[37] Agora Energiewende (Hrsg.) (2018): A clean-energy Study by E4tech on behalf of the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint
transition in Southeast Europe. Challenges, options and policy Undertaking (FCH). Available online: https://www.fch.europa.
priorities. Impulse 11.2018. Berlin: Agora Energiewende. Avail- eu/page/FCH-value-chain, last checked on 12.11.2020.
able online: https://static.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin2/
[44] ESMAP (2020): Green Hydrogen in Developing Countries.
Projekte/2018/Energiewendedialog_Suedosteuropa/Agora-
Washington, DC: World Bank. Available online: http://docu-
Energiewende_Impulse_SEE_energy_transition_priorities.pdf,
ments1.worldbank.org/curated/en/953571597951239276/pdf/
last checked on 12.11.2020.
Green-Hydrogen-in-Developing-Countries.pdf, last checked on
[38] Waissbein, O.; Glemarec, Y.; Bayraktar, H.; Schmidt, T.S.) 12.11.2020.
(2013): Derisking renewable energy investment. A framework
30 | 31
[45] AHP (2020): African Hydrogen Partnership. Available online: [57] Dibua, J.I. (2006): Modernization and the crisis of develop-
https://www.afr-h2-p.com/, last checked on 12.11.2020 ment in Africa: the Nigerian experience. Hampshire: Ashgate.
[46] Sayne, A. (2011): Special report: climate change adaptation [58] Mavhunga, C.C. (2017): Introduction: What do science,
and conflict in Nigeria. Washington: United States Institute of technology, and innovation mean from Africa? In: What do
Peace. science, technology, and innovation mean from Africa?
pp. 1–28. Cambridge, MA, London: MIT Press. Available
[47] Sathaye, J.; Meyers, S. (1987): Transport and home energy
online: https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.
use in cities of the developing countries: a review. The Energy
12657/31335/631166.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, last
Journal 8: 85–102.
checked on 12.11.2020.
[48] Barros, C.P.; Ibiowie, A.; Managi, S. (2014): Nigeria’s power
[59] Gewald, J.-B.; Leliveld, A.; Pesa, I. (eds.) (2012): Transform-
sector: analysis of productivity. Economic Analysis and Policy
ing innovations in Africa: explorative studies on appropriation
(44): 65–73.
in African societies. Leiden, Boston: Brill.
[49] Fawole, A.W. (2018): The illusion of the post-colonial state:
[60] Altenburg, T. (2009): Building inclusive innovation systems in
Governance and security challenges in Africa. Lanham, Boul-
developing countries: challenges for IS research. In: Lundvall,
der, New York, London: Lexington Books.
B.-Å.; Joseph, K.J.; Chaminade, C.; Vang, J. (eds.): Handbook
[50] Pieterse, J.N. (2001): Development theory: deconstructions / of Innovation Systems and Developing Countries. Chapter 2.
reconstructions. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage. Cheltenham / UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
[51] United Nations (2015): Paris Agreement. Edited by United [61] Lundvall, B.-Å.; Vang, J.; Joseph, K.J., Chaminade, C.
Nations, Paris. Available online: https://unfccc.int/process- (2009): Innovation system research and developing coun-
and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement, last tries. In: Handbook of Innovation Systems and Developing
checked on 12.11.2020. Countries: Building Domestic Capabilities in a Global Setting.
pp. 1-30. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
[52] Schweer, M.K.W. (2003): Vertrauen als Organisationsprinzip:
Vertrauensförderung im Spannungsfeld personalen und [62] Thorpe, D. (2019): Unbundling “indigenous space capability”:
systemischen Vertrauens. Erwägen Wissen Ethik EWE 14 (2): actors, policy positions and agency in geospatial information
323–32. science in Southwest Nigeria. (Dissertation, Science, Technolo-
gy and Innovation Studies). University of Edinburgh.
[53] Ya’u, Y.Z. (2004): The new imperialism & Africa in the global
electronic village. Review of African Political Economy 31 [63] Savage, G.T.; Nix, T.W.; Whitehead, C.J.; Blair, J.D. (1991):
(99):11–29. Available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/03056 Strategies for assessing and managing organizational stake-
24042000258397, last checked on 12.11.2020. holders. Academy of Management Perspectives 5 (2): 61–75.
[54] Hwang, K. (2008): International collaboration in multilayered [64] AFREC (2019): Designing the African energy transition – an
center-periphery in the globalization of science and technolo- approach for social and economic transformation in a climate
gy. Science, Technology & Human Values 33 (1): 101–133. compatible manner. African Energy Commission (AFREC).
Algiers: AFREC.
[55] Bassey, N. (2013): To cook a continent: destructive extraction
and climate crisis in Africa. Ibadan: Kraft Books Limited. [65] UNECA (2013): Regional cooperation policy for the devel-
opment of renewable energy in North Africa Framework
[56] Schmitt, T.M. 2018: (Why) did Desertec fail? An interim anal-
document. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) – Office for
ysis of a large-scale renewable energy infrastructure project
North Africa UNECA. Available online: https://www.unecaorg/
from a social studies of technology perspective. Local Environ-
sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/regional_cooperation_policy_
ment 23 (7): 747–76.
www.isi.fraunhofer.de
for_the_development_of_renewable_energy_in_ north_africa. [75] Weltbank 2020: Worldwide Governance Indicators. Avail-
pdf, last checked on 12.11.2020. able online: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/, last
checked on 15.11.2020.
[66] bdew (2019): Zahl der Woche/Gesamtstromverbrauch.
Available online: https://www.bdew.de/presse/presseinforma- [76] Gehrke, B.; Schasse, U.; Ostertag, K.; Marscheider-
tionen/zahl-der-woche-gesamtstromverbrauch-deutschland/, Weidemann, F. (2015): Innovationsmotor Umweltschutz.
last checked on 13.11.2020. Forschung und Patente in Deutschland und im internationalen
Vergleich. Reihe Umwelt, Innovation, Beschäftigung 05/2015,
[67] UBA (2020): Energieverbrauch nach Energieträgern und
Berlin: BMU/UBA.
Sektoren. Available online: https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/
daten/energie/energieverbrauch-nach-energietraegern- [77] Walz, R.; Pfaff, M.; Marscheider-Weidemann, F.; Glöser-
sektoren, last checked on 13.11.2020. Chahoud, S. (2017): Innovations for reaching the green sus-
tainable development goals – Where will they come from? In-
[68] So-called “blue hydrogen” is produced carbon-neutrally, as
ternational Economics and Economic Policy 14 (3), p. 684–695.
the CO2 emitted during production is captured and stored
using CCS. [78] Boschini A, Petersson J, Roine J (2013): The resource curse
and its potential reversal. World Development 43: 19–41.
[69] “Turquoise hydrogen” is produced using methane pyrolysis;
this produces solid carbon in addition to hydrogen. [79] Mehlum H, Moene K, Torvik R (2006): Institutions and the
resource curse. The Economic Journal 116: 1–20.
[70] Mercom India (2020): With 2,245 MW of commissioned
solar projects, world’s largest solar park is now at Bhadla. [80] Ploeg F van der (2011): Natural resources: curse or blessing?
Available online: https://mercomindia.com/world-largest-solar- Journal of Economic Literature 49: 366–420.
park-bhadla/, last checked on 13.11.2020.
[81] Mansson, A. (2015): A resource curse for renewables? Con-
[71] DiaCore: Policy dialogue on the assessment and convergence flict and cooperation in the renewable energy sector. Energy
of RES policy in EU Member States. Available online: Research & Social Science 10: 1–9.
http://www.diacore.eu/, last checked on 13.11.2020.
[82] Walz, R., Bodenheimer, M., Gandenberger, C. (2016):
[72] AURES II: Auctions for Renewable Energy Support II. Available Kritikalität und Positionalität. Was ist kritisch für wen – und
online: http://aures2project.eu/deliverables/, last checked on weshalb? In: Exner, A.; Held, M.; Kümmerer, K. (Hrsg.):
13.11.2020. Kritische Rohstoffe in der Großen Transformation, Heidelberg:
Springer, p. 19–38.
[73] Edler, J.; Blind, K.; Frietsch, R.; Kimpeler, S.; Kroll, H.;
Lerch, C.; Reiss, T.; Roth, F.; Schubert, T.; Schuler, J.;
Walz, R. (2020): Technologiesouveränität – Von der Forderung
zum Konzept. Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer ISI.
32 | 33
Imprint
Contact
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems
and Innovation Research ISI
Breslauer Str. 48
76139 Karlsruhe
Germany
Authors
Martin Wietschel
Anke Bekk
Barbara Breitschopf
Inga Boie
Jakob Edler
Wolfgang Eichhammer
Marian Klobasa
Frank Marscheider-Weidemann
Patrick Plötz
Frank Sensfuß
Daniel Thorpe
Rainer Walz
Translation
Gillian Bowman-Köhler
Graphic design
Sabine Wurst
www.isi.fraunhofer.de