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FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: Fire Protection For Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets: Fire Protection For Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
Table of Contents
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7-79 Gas Turbines and Electric Generators
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Figures
Fig. 2.2.3. Water spray protection for steel columns .................................................................................... 5
Fig. 2.2.4.1. Schematic example of emergency drainage and containment system for unenclosed
combustion turbine installation .................................................................................................. 6
Fig. 2.2.5.3. Cable protection for dc lube oil pump ....................................................................................... 7
Fig. 2.2.5.4.1. Lube oil purifying skid inside containment area ...................................................................... 8
Fig. 2.2.7.1 Guard piping ............................................................................................................................... 9
Fig. 2.4.3.1. Enclosed gas turbine protection system .................................................................................. 14
Fig. 2.4.4. Schematic of fire protection system for unenclosed gas turbine installation .............................. 16
Fig. 2.4.4.2.2(A). Roof level sprinkler option ............................................................................................... 18
Fig. 2.4.4.2.2(B). Local sprinkler option ....................................................................................................... 18
Fig. 2.4.5.2.1. Typical layout of water mist system for local application over oil fire hazards.
[NOTE: Shaded areas are not solid barriers, but areas of operation.] ................................ 20
Fig. 2.5.2.1.1. Typical gaseous fuel system (double block and vent) ......................................................... 22
Fig. 2.5.2.1.2(A). Gaseous fuels (triple block and double vent) .................................................................. 22
Fig. 2.5.2.1.2(B). Gaseous fuels (triple block, double vent, and pressurized pipe section) ....................... 23
Fig. 2.5.2.3.1. Typical liquid fuel system (double block and drain) ............................................................. 24
Fig. 3.1.1. Lube-oil release source: broken supply line .............................................................................. 30
Fig. 3.1.3. Mineral oil spray fire (90 psig [6 barg]) demonstration test performed by FM Global .............. 31
Fig. 3.1.5. Oil-release and fire scenario checklist ....................................................................................... 34
List of Tables
Table 1. Sprinkler Densities for Roof-Level and Local Protection Options ................................................. 18
Table 2. Ceiling Sprinkler Design Criteria for Turbine Buildings with Combustible Roof Construction ....... 21
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet recommends safeguards to protect gas turbine installations against property damage and
loss of production due to fires. For combined cycle power generation installations, use this data sheet for the
gas turbines and Data Sheet 7-101, Fire Protection for Steam Turbines and Electric Generators, for the steam
turbines. For information regarding driven equipment other than electric generators, use this data sheet in
conjunction with other applicable data sheets (e.g., refer to Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors, for information
on compressors). Finally, refer to Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines, for recommendations regarding turbine
monitoring devices, maintenance and testing, and information regarding other equipment hazards.
1.1 Changes
July 2022. Interim revision. The following significant changes were made:
A. Added recommendations for designing water mist systems that have been FM Approved for local
application over oil pool and 2D spray fire areas.
B. Updated cable fire protection to associate fire protection rating to safe shutdown time.
C. Added recommendations for oil conditioning skids.
2.1 Introduction
Severe fires in gas turbine installations can occur as a result of the accidental release and ignition of fuel
or lubrication, control, or seal oil systems. Such fires can cause forced outages and result in extensive damage
to inadequately protected turbine units and building structures. The safeguards recommended in this data
sheet address gas turbine fire hazards using the following basic prevention and mitigation strategies:
A. Fire prevention incorporated into operating procedures and training
B. Location and construction designed to isolate and limit the fire area
C. Fixed automatic protection in all areas where fires could occur
D. An effective emergency shutdown system for the turbine
E. Personnel preparedness for effective response in fire emergencies
The recommendations in this data sheet are based on conservative assumptions regarding the severity of
the initiating events that could result in turbine fires. The isolation and protection criteria for lubrication oil fires
are intended for large releases, as may occur following mechanical breakdown of equipment. Such releases
have occurred in the past and can potentially occur at any given turbine unit despite the best efforts at
prevention. This data sheet also considers other gas turbine hazards, such as high-pressure gas piping and
potential explosions within gas turbine compartments. Loss experience has shown that the mitigation
measures recommended in this data sheet can help prevent the majority of fire and explosion losses, even
in the case of severe initiating events.
Use FM Approved equipment, materials, and services whenever they are applicable. For a list of products
and services that are FM Approved, see the Approval Guide, an online resource of FM Approvals.
2.2.1 General
2.2.1.1 Locate gas turbines in buildings constructed of noncombustible or fire-resistant materials.
2.2.1.2 Where a new turbine unit is located inside or attached to a main building occupied for another purpose,
such as manufacturing, offices or warehousing, provide 2-hour fire-rated cut-offs and direct access to the
turbine from outside the main building.
2.2.1.3 Provide space separation, fire walls, curbing, and/or emergency drainage to prevent a fire in one
unit from exposing adjacent equipment.
2.2.1.4 Install transformers that expose inlet air filters in accordance with Data Sheet 5-4, Transformers.
2.2.1.5 Provide ready access for hose streams to fight inlet air-filter fires.
B. Provide containment and an FM Approved foam-water sprinkler system or compressed air foam (CAF)
system. Design the containment to keep the largest expected oil release plus foam/sprinkler discharge
in the area of origin for 20 minutes. Regardless of the calculated curb height, always provide a minimum
3 in. (7.6 cm) of containment.
2.2.4.2 Design emergency drainage and containment systems in accordance Data Sheet 7-83, Drainage
Systems for Ignitable Liquids.
Roof Ventilation
Floor Slope to Drain
Curb Curb System
Floor Drain
Compressor
Turbine
Crane
Generator Exhaust
Combustor
A A
(Note 1)
Curb
AC Compressor
Combustor
Pump Lube oil
DC reservoir
Curb Pump Curb Generator Turbine Exhaust
Approved
Hydraulic
Fluid
High Voltage
Drain
Switchgear
Switchgear
To Oil-Water Section A-A
Control
Room
Separator Tank
DC Cable in Elevation View
Conduit
Plan View
Note 1: See Section 2.2.5 for preferred location of lube oil reservoir and pumps.
Fig. 2.2.4.1. Schematic example of emergency drainage and containment system for unenclosed combustion turbine
installation
2.2.5.3 Where applicable, make the following provisions for power and control cables for critical functions
such as lubrication of the turbine and power for hydrogen seal-oil pumps:
A. Route the cables to minimize exposure to potential oil fires.
B. Locate control and instrumentation cable for individual units to minimize the chance a fire will result
in an extended outage to multiple units.
C. Provide separate routing for cables for primary and backup lube-oil pumps (see Figure 2.2.5.3).
D. Provide an FM Approved fire blanket for backup cables (DC) that cannot be routed separately, and
for cables that enter within the same pool or spill-fire area, including cabling within conduit.
1. Provide a blanket that has a fire protection rating equal to or greater than the maximum projected
time for safe shutdown of the system plus 10 minutes.
2. Document the fire rating and methodology in the emergency operating procedure.
3. Ensure the fire blanket includes the flexible conduit used to route the cables from the pump to the
junction box.
4. Provide the fire blanket for 20 ft (6.1 m) beyond the fire area (see Figure 2.2.5.3). Verify the blanket
will not result in cable de-rating.
Unprotected cable
Cable in fire blanket
Alternate Routing
20 ft (6.1 m)
Turbine Pedestal To DC Lube Pump
Oil Piping
Fire Blanket Until In
Separate Fire Area
To AC Lube
Oil Pumps
Switchgear
Room
Curb
2.2.5.4.4 Install FM Approved fire safe, fire-actuated valves for feed and discharge lines to and from the
oil-conditioning skid. Locate these valves within the main lube oil tank containment area.
2.2.5.4.5 Provide flexible hose connectors in piping systems to prevent dangerous stresses due to vibration,
settling, or thermal change. Provide the following material and installation features to ensure adequate hose
strength/ durability and protection against physical damage:
A. Construct flexible hose of high-strength, noncombustible materials that are resistant to decomposition
or melting when exposed to fire, and compatible with the liquid in use.
1. Use all-metal construction consisting of materials such as steel, stainless steel, or an equivalent
material.
2. Reinforced plastic or rubber hose, and a tight metal-braid covering is acceptable when needed to
meet operational requirements. See Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations, for further
information.
3. Do not use soft rubber, plastic, or other unreinforced or unprotected combustible tubing.
B. Protect the hose against mechanical damage.
C. Design hose joints to comply with all rigid pipe joint recommendations (see Data Sheet 7-32, Itnitable
Liquid Operations). Do not use hose clamps.
D. Design hoses and fittings to have a bursting strength greater than the maximum expected working
pressure with a safety factor of at least 4.
2.2.6.3 Where separate fuel pumps are located indoors, provide a 1-hour fire-rated cutoff room with
appropriate emergency drainage and containment (see section 2.2.4) to remove fuel spills to a safe location
outside the building and away from important equipment.
2.2.6.4 Locate storage tanks and vaporizers for liquefied petroleum gas fuel systems in accordance with
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations.
2.2.6.5 Where fuel is heated using an organic heat transfer fluid, locate and arrange the system in accordance
with Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer Fluid Systems.
2.2.6.6 Locate fuel gas compressor stations in open outdoor areas or in detached buildings of damage-limiting
construction in accordance with Data Sheet 1-44, Damage-Limiting Construction, and Data Sheet 7-95,
Compressors. Locate high-pressure gas piping aboveground and arrange it in accordance with American
National Standard B31.1, Power Piping, B31.3, Process Piping Guide, or applicable international standards.
2.2.6.7 Arrange piping systems located in 500-year or less earthquake zones in accordance with Data Sheet
1-2, Earthquakes.
2.2.6.8 Provide emergency fuel shutoff valves where they will be readily accessible in the event of
emergencies.
Bearing Housing
Guard Pipe
To Oil Reservoir
Section A-A
A
Fig. 2.2.7.1 Guard piping
2.2.7.4 Earthquake
2.2.7.4.1 In areas exposed by earthquakes, do not install seismic shutoff switches for lube-oil systems. Refer
to Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake, for further information regarding the omission of seismic
shutoff valves.
2.2.7.4.2 Design oil piping systems to resist damage in the event of an earthquake as follows:
A. Limit gross movement of the equipment to which the piping is connected.
B. Provide flexibility to accommodate relatively small movement at equipment, or larger movement due
to piping deflection.
C. Ensure pipe movement does not result in loss of vertical supports.
2.2.11.1 Locate control and cable spreading rooms in separate areas of noncombustible construction,
detached from turbine enclosures and turbine buildings.
2.2.11.2 When a control room must be sited inside or attached to turbine buildings, design the room as follows:
A. Locate the control room so as to reduce exposure to potential lube-oil, fuel, or grouped cable fires.
B. Isolate the room from the turbine building with 1-hour fire-rated walls, roof, and floor. Provide a 45-minute
fire-rated window assembly, such as wired glass, rolling steel fire-rated shutters, or an automatic water
spray protection system for any windows facing the interior of the turbine building.
C. Provide smoke-tight sealing of windows and an independent air supply capable of pressurizing the
room to maintain habitability during a fire.
D. Seal the walls and ceilings of exposed control rooms inside turbine buildings to prevent ingress of facility
water or other liquids in case of pipe breaks, spills, or water from sprinkler/hose stream discharge.
E. Seal penetrations between the control, cable spreading, and relay rooms with a 1-hour fire-rated, FM
Approved fire-stop system. Conduct recorded inspections to confirm penetrations are properly sealed.
F. Ensure equipment needed to safely shut down the turbine(s) is arranged for remote operation from the
control room.
2.2.11.3 The recommendations in Section 2.2.11.2 provide sufficient segregation and protection of the control
room from a property protection standpoint. However, depending on the location and design of the control
room, a facility may need to consider additional life safety issues, which are outside the scope of this data
sheet. Where the control room is not designed to allow operators to remain and secure the turbines during
a fire, arrange for emergency shutdown of the turbine and lube-oil pumps from a location that will be
accessible.
2.2.11.4 Provide 1-hour fire-rated walls, floors, and ceilings for cable spreading and relay rooms.
2.3 Occupancy
2.3.1 Housekeeping
Maintain high standards of housekeeping in all areas.
2.3.1.1 Conduct periodic recorded housekeeping inspections.
2.3.1.2 Provide a management reporting channel for prompt correction of housekeeping deficiencies.
2.3.1.3 Store flammable gas cylinders in a detached, dedicated area in accordance with DS 7-50,
Compressed Gases in Cylinders.
2.3.1.4 Store drums of lubricating or hydraulic oils outside of the turbine enclosure and turbine building or
in a cutoff room located and constructed in accordance with DS 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable
Containers.
2.3.1.5 Provide FM Approved cabinets for small containers of ignitable liquids.
2.3.5 Earthquake
2.3.5.1 In 500-year or less earthquake zones, anchor electrical cabinets and storage racks in accordance
with Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake.
2.4 Protection
Provide the following fire protection for turbine compartments and turbine buildings where fire could result
in significant property damage or loss of production.
2.4.1.4 Establish and document the frequency at which detectors are to be recalibrated and tested based
on Data Sheet 5-49, Gas and Vapor Detectors and Analysis Systems, facility experience, and the detector
manufacturer’s recommendations.
2.4.1.5 Design and install leak-detection systems so the controls and all components and devices can be
readily inspected, calibrated, and tested according to the manufacturer’s recommended method and the
frequency established per section 2.4.1.4.
Enclosure
Fuel
Exhaust
Compartment
Enclosure
Lube Oil
Gas
Turbine
Compartment
Air
Intake
Load Compartment
Batteries
Unit 2 Unit 1
A A
Control
MCC
Rm
Transformer
(Protect in Accordance
with D.S. 5-4)
MCC Control
Rm * Note: Automatic sprinkler
Cable Spreading protection may be used
Room as a alternative for
(Protect in Accordance the lube oil enclosure
Section A-A with DS 5-32) and fuel enclosure.
D. Where fuel, lubrication, and hydraulic oil tanks, pumps, or other equipment not subject to potential
water damage are located inside a dedicated room or an enclosure, automatic sprinkler protection
designed in accordance with Section 2.4.4 may be provided as an alternative to options A, B, and C above.
Do not provide this option for gas turbine enclosures.
2.4.3.5.1 When a carbon dioxide (CO2) system is provided to protect a turbine compartment, use the following
design criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s instructions,
and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and Data Sheet 4-11, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing
Systems.
B. Provide sufficient agent to achieve an initial CO2 design concentration of at least 34% by volume within
one minute, and maintain a minimum of 30% for the remainder of the concentration hold time determined
in Section 2.4.3.2, in either the largest single hazard zone or group of hazard zones protected by the
system simultaneously.
C. Locate and orient CO2 discharge nozzles to avoid direct impingement by the discharge jet onto the
gas turbine.
2.4.3.5.2 When an inert gas system is provided to protect a turbine compartment, use the following design
criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s instructions,
and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and Data Sheet 4-9, Halocarbon and Inert Gas (Clean
Agent) Fire Extinguishing Systems.
B. Provide sufficient agent to achieve and maintain a concentration in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and Data Sheet 4-9, Halocarbon and Inert Gas (Clean Agent) Fire Extinguishing
Systems, for the concentration hold time determined in Section 2.4.3.2, in the largest single hazard zone
or group of hazard zones protected by the system simultaneously.
C. Locate and orient discharge nozzles to avoid direct impingement by the discharge jet onto the gas
turbine.
2.4.3.5.3 When a water mist or hybrid (water and inert gas) system is provided to protect a turbine
compartment, use the following design criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with its listing in the Approval Guide, the manufacturer’s
recommendations, and Data Sheets 4-0, Special Protection Systems, and Data Sheet 4-2, Water Mist
Systems, as applicable.
B. Ensure all system limitations, such as protected volume size, ventilation rate, and opening size, are
met.
C. Hydraulically design the water mist or hybrid system in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and the system’s listing in the Approval Guide.
D. Design the water mist or hybrid agent supply to provide discharge to the largest single hazard zone
or group of hazard zones protected by the system simultaneously, for the time specified in Section 2.4.3.2.
E. Locate and orient discharge nozzles in accordance with the manufacturer’s instruction.
2.4.3.6 Conduct a full discharge acceptance test, in accordance with the system manufacturer’s test protocol,
to verify the proper operation of the protection system, including all of the following:
A. Activation of the extinguishing system detectors initiates an automatic emergency trip of the turbine
prior to discharge of the agent.
B. Compartment ventilation shutdown and damper closings occur in the proper sequence prior to discharge
of the agent.
C. An alarm is transmitted to a constantly attended location.
D. The settings for time delays and any selector valves are correct.
E. Specified extinguishing concentrations are achieved and maintained for the entire duration of the
concentration hold time.
F. All discharge nozzles flow free and clear, and the discharge from nozzles relative to any obstructions
in the compartment is in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines.
2.4.3.6.1 To accept multiple ″identical″ units on the same site, conduct a full discharge acceptance test on
each unit where fixed protection is needed.
2.4.3.6.2 Do not conduct a “full load” trip test with the turbine at operating temperature.
2.4.3.7 Document the acceptance test procedures and results. Maintain a copy of all documentation on site
and ensure it will be available for future reference.
2.4.3.8 Conduct periodic documented visual inspections to verify compartment tightness and ensure the
proper concentration of the agent can be achieved and maintained according to design.
2.4.3.9 Conduct periodic documented re-validation of installed fire protection systems through full discharge
testing, or simulated discharge plus compartment pressurization testing, at maximum 5-year intervals.
2.4.3.10 Provide a water supply and hose connections for manual firefighting.
Crane
A A
Curb
Curb Curb
Fig. 2.4.4. Schematic of fire protection system for unenclosed gas turbine installation
Protect warehouses, offices, and other occupancies in accordance with the relevant data sheets.
2.4.4.1.8 Where K 25 EC (363 EC) pendent or upright sprinklers are used, install only at the maximum
recommended spacing, as listed in Data Sheet 2-0, Installation Guidelines for Automatic Sprinklers. At this
spacing, treat as a standard response sprinkler.
2.4.4.1.9 Provide FM Approved fire pumps, controllers, and drivers as applicable. Install the equipment in
accordance with the recommendations in Data Sheet 3-7, Fire Protection Pumps. If electric motor-driven
pumps are used, supply power from a source that will not be interrupted in the event of loss of main power
to the facility.
2.4.4.1.10 Arrange fire protection equipment located in areas exposed by earthquakes in accordance with
Data Sheet 2-8, Earthquake Protection for Water-Based Fire Protection Systems.
2.4.4.1.11 Locate automatic deluge and preaction valves and water spray control valves where they can
be manually operated from a safe, easily accessible location during a fire.
2.4.4.1.12 Space detectors for interior deluge systems (either pilot sprinkler, electric, or pneumatic) as follows:
A. Install pilot sprinklers on the same spacing as sprinklers.
B. Install electric or pneumatic devices under smooth ceilings using the spacing requirements listed in
the Approval Guide for the particular model, or as recommended in data sheets that cover the specific
occupancy.
2.4.4.1.13 Space detectors for preaction systems (pilot sprinkler, electric, or pneumatic) as follows:
A. Install electric or pneumatic detectors at a spacing of one-half the listed linear detector spacing, or
the full sprinkler spacing, whichever is greater (e.g., if a detector is FM Approved for 30 ft by 30 ft
[9.1 m by 9.1 m] and allowable sprinkler spacing is 100 ft2 [9 m2], then maximum allowable linear detector
spacing is 15 ft by 15 ft [4.6 m by 4.6 m]). For design purposes, treat preaction systems with this detector
spacing the same as wet systems.
1. If a preaction system has a detector spacing greater than the above spacing, consider it a deluge
system for design purposes. Refer to the Approval Guide for the maximum allowable spacing.
B. Install pilot sprinklers on the same spacing as the sprinklers. For design purposes, treat preaction
sprinkler systems that use pilot sprinklers the same as dry systems, regardless of detector spacing.
2.4.4.1.14 Transmit fire alarm, water flow alarms, and pump supervisory signals to an alarm panel in the
control room.
2.4.4.1.15 Provide portable extinguishing equipment as follows:
A. Standpipes in basement, ground floor, and operating floor areas so all areas can be reached by at
least one hose stream.
B. Wheeled dry-chemical and carbon dioxide extinguishers on the operating floor for small fires at bearings.
Noncombustible roof
Noncombustible roof
2.4.4.2.3 Design roof-level sprinklers for a demand area of 5,000 ft2 (465 m2). Design local sprinklers for a
demand area of 5000 ft2 (465 m2) or the limits of the containment, whichever is less.
2.4.4.2.4 Where foam-water sprinklers or compressed air foam (CAF) are used, use the following design
criteria:
A. Install the system in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations, the FM Approval listing,
and Data Sheet 4-12, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems.
B. Where a foam-water sprinkler system is installed, hydraulically design the system in accordance with
Table 1 of this data sheet or the FM Approval listing density, whichever is larger, over the full demand
area.
C. Where a CAF system is installed, design the system in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations and its listing in the Approval Guide, and design the sprinkler system in accordance
with the recommended sprinkler density in this data sheet.
D. Design the foam concentrate supply and air supply, if applicable, to provide the full sprinkler discharge
(use actual discharge based on water supply) plus any hose streams also arranged to provide foam
discharge for the greater of:
1. 20 minutes.
2. The maximum projected time needed to achieve a safe shutdown of the lube-oil system following
emergency trip of the turbine, plus 10 minutes. Determine maximum safe shutdown time based on the
emergency shutdown procedure (see Section 2.6.2).
E. Include an exterior hose stream allowance of 750 gpm (2,840 L/min).
F. Provide containment as recommended in this data sheet.
2.4.5 Water Mist Systems for Oil Fire Hazards in Unenclosed Areas
2.4.5.1 An FM Approved local application water mist system is acceptable as an alternative to local application
water spray systems or sprinkler systems over specific oil fire hazard areas, including spray fire, pool fire,
and combination spray/pool fire hazards as defined by the oil fire hazard assessment. Local application water
mist systems are not applicable to 3D spill fire hazard scenarios.
2.4.5.2 Install the local-application water mist system in accordance with Data Sheet 4-2, Water Mist Systems,
and the manufacturer’s FM Approved Design, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance (DIOM) manual.
2.4.5.2.1 Arrange the water mist nozzles to surround the expected oil pool fire hazard footprint or spray fire
source in accordance with the manufacturer’s FM Approved layout. Figure 2.4.5.2.1 shows a typical layout.
Fig. 2.4.5.2.1. Typical layout of water mist system for local application over oil fire hazards. [NOTE: Shaded areas are
not solid barriers, but areas of operation.]
2.4.5.3 Use water mist systems FM Approved for the “Combination 2D Ignitable Liquid Pool Fire & Spray Fire
Protection” application type from the Local Application Protection category. It is expected that areas with
potential spray fires will also have pool fire potential. Water mist systems need to be laid out to address both
hazards.
2.4.5.3.1 Surround the oil containment area with water mist nozzles in accordance with the manufacturer’s
FM Approved DIOM manual.
2.4.5.4 It is acceptable to use a water mist system FM Approved for “Spray Fire - Point Protection” where
there is a spray fire hazard as long as the system is supplemented by water mist protection to protect the pool
fire hazard.
2.4.5.4.1 Direct water mist nozzles at the spray fire release point in accordance with the manufacturer’s FM
Approved DIOM manual.
2.4.5.5 It is acceptable to use a water mist system FM Approved for “2D Ignitable Liquids Channel Protection”
for drainage channels provided it covers the entire length of the channel.
2.4.5.5.1 If oil is directed through drainage channels to a secondary containment area, surround the release
and containment areas with water mist nozzles in accordance with the manufacturer’s FM Approved DIOM
manual.
2.4.5.6 Provide drainage and containment in accordance with 2.2.4. Applications in which the oil flow path
is not controlled, such as flow below the level of the oil release point or where there are numerous leak points
(i.e., flanged piping connections spread out in a large volume), are not suitable to being protected by these
systems.
2.4.5.7 Provide a water supply capable of supplying the full design flow of the water mist system for the
duration of the oil release event, but not less than 1 hour.
2.4.5.8 Provide a water supply capable of supplying a 500 gpm (1,900 L/min) hose stream allowance for
the duration of the oil release event but not less than 1 hour. It is acceptable to source the hose stream
allowance from a water supply separate from the water mist system’s.
2.4.5.9 Provide a fire detection system (i.e., heat detector, flame detector, or video detector) arranged to
ensure prompt detection of a fire and installed in accordance with Data Sheet 5-48, Automatic Fire Detection,
and in accordance with the applicable Approval listing.
2.4.5.9.1 For ceiling heights up to 60 ft (18 m), install ordinary temperature spot or linear heat detectors in
accordance with the following:
A. Space heat detectors located below solid barriers or ceilings up to 30 ft (9 m) above the fire hazard
in accordance with the manufacturer’s FM Approved spacing.
B. Space heat detectors located below solid barriers or ceilings between 30 ft (9 m) and 60 ft (18 m) above
the fire hazard at not more than 10 ft x 10 ft spacing (3 m x 3 m).
2.4.5.9.2 For ceiling heights greater than 60 ft (18 m) or where the ceiling is obstructed by piping or equipment,
provide local area heat detection or flame/video detectors in accordance with the following:
A. Provide intermediate heat detector(s) within 10 ft (3 m) above the fire hazard. Place the detectors near
potential leak points. Provide at least two detectors near each potential leak point with a linear horizontal
spacing between detectors of no more than 4 ft (1.2 m).
B. Locate flame or video detectors in positions that provide a clear line of sight to the fire hazard. Ensure
flame or video detectors are FM Approved for use with the fuels expected to be involved in the fire.
Table 2. Ceiling Sprinkler Design Criteria for Turbine Buildings with Combustible Roof Construction
Sprinkler Temperature Density Area of Demand
Type of Sprinkler System Rating gpm/ft2 (mm/min) ft2 (m2)
Wet High 0.2 (8) 5000 (465)
Dry 8000 (740)
Hose stream demand: 750 gpm (2840 L/min). Duration: 60 min (water supply duration may need to be increased
when conditions exist that could delay manual firefighting efforts.)
2.4.8.2 Protect subfloors in accordance with the recommendations in Data Sheet 5-32, Electronic Data
Processing Systems.
Fig. 2.5.2.1.1. Typical gaseous fuel system (double block and vent)
2.5.2.1.2 For a unit to qualify for gas turbine purge credit, provide three fail-closed, automatic shutoff valves
in series in the fuel supply line, with proof of closure (with position indication in the control room). Provide
automatic vent valves between these valves (triple block and double vent). Two acceptable configurations are
shown in Figures 2.5.2.1.2(A) and (B).
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
Vent Vent FT = Flow transmitter
DPT = Differential pressure
transmitter
V4 V5
PT/
DPT FT
PT
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2 V3
Vent
Air or
inert gas
supply
Fig. 2.5.2.1.2(B). Gaseous fuels (triple block, double vent, and pressurized pipe section)
2.5.2.1.3 Use shutoff valves that meet the gas turbine original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM’s)
requirements for closing time and leakage.
2.5.2.1.4 Locate an automatic shutoff valve in a safe location outside the gas turbine enclosure to
automatically isolate the fuel supply in case of a dangerous condition.
V = Valve
PT = Pressure transmitter
Fuel To gas
supply turbine
V1 V2
PT
V3
Drain
Fig. 2.5.2.3.1. Typical liquid fuel system (double block and drain)
2.5.2.3.3 Locate an automatic shutoff valve outside the gas turbine enclosure to automatically isolate the
fuel supply in case of a dangerous condition.
2.5.2.3.4 Install automatic drains (false start drains) in the lower combustor casings and/or exhaust casing
of the gas turbine.
2.5.2.4 Proof-of-Flame
2.5.2.4.1 Provide a flame monitoring system interlocked to close the fuel shutoff valves and trip the gas turbine
in the event of a failure-to-ignite or flameout during operation.
A. A fire that is controlled by fixed fire protection systems and/or the emergency response team (such
as a minor leak or insulation blanket fire). In this case, the unit will be tripped and the fuel will be shut off
upon operation of the fire protection system. However, based on an assessment of the fire event,
shutdown of lubrication-oil systems may not be necessary.
B. A single point release of oil and subsequent fire that is not controlled by either fixed protection or the
emergency response team, resulting in the need to shut down all equipment, including oil systems.
C. Mechanical damage to turbine generator equipment severe enough to stop the rotating element, with
a subsequent fire.
2.6.2.6 With the assistance of the turbine manufacturer or a qualified equipment expert, document the proper
sequencing and critical actions required to be taken by operators following an emergency trip of the turbine.
Ensure onsite personnel having documented authorization to implement the emergency shutdown procedure
are available on all shifts.
A. During the shutdown sequence, verify the first shutoff valve (V1) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria. If
leakage exceeds the OEM’s criteria, do not restart the unit until the valve is replaced or refurbished.
B. During the startup sequence, with airflow passing through the gas turbine, verify that the most
downstream shutoff valve (V2) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria. If leakage exceeds the OEM’s criteria,
abort the start.
2.6.5.3 Following a gas turbine normal shutdown, purge credit is allowed for the subsequent start provided
the gas turbine is fired with gaseous fuel and one of the fuel system configurations described in Section
2.6.5.3.1 or Section 2.6.5.3.2 is incorporated.
2.6.5.3.1 Triple Block and Double Vent Configuration
A. Provide the following for a gaseous fuel-fired unit to qualify for purge credit using a triple block and
double vent configuration (Figure 2.5.2.1.2(A)):
1. During the shutdown sequence, verify the second shutoff valve (V2) meets the OEM’s leakage
criteria.
2. While the unit is shut down, continuously monitor both vent line valves to ensure they are open,
and the three shutoff valves to ensure they are closed. If continuous monitoring is lost or any valve
deviates from its assigned position, purge credit is lost and a subsequent start of the gas turbine requires
a unit purge of the gas turbine and downstream components prior to light-off.
3. Continuously monitor pressures in the spaces between the shutoff valves to prove these spaces
are not pressurized. If continuous monitoring is lost or either pressure indicates leakage, purge credit
is lost and a subsequent start of the gas turbine requires a unit purge prior to light-off.
4. During the startup sequence, with airflow passing through the gas turbine, prove the most
downstream shutoff valve (V3) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria. If leakage exceeds the OEM’s criteria,
abort the start.
B. With this configuration, the maximum gas turbine purge credit period allowed is eight days (192 hours).
If a unit purge is performed during the eight-day period, the purge credit is reinitiated for an eight-day
period. Unit purges can be performed as needed to continue to extend the purge credit period provided
the conditions in Section 2.6.5.3.1(A) are satisfied.
2.6.5.3.2 Triple Block, Double Vent, and Pressurized Pipe Configuration
A. Provide the following for a gaseous fuel-fired unit to qualify for purge credit using a triple block, double
vent, and pressurized pipe configuration (Figure 2.5.2.1.2(B)):
1. During the shutdown sequence, prior to pressurizing the piping between valves V2 and V3, verify
the second shutoff valve (V2) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria.
2. Introduce air or inert gas to create and maintain a pressurized pipe section between the middle and
most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3).
3. Continuously monitor fuel gas shutoff and vent valve positions. If continuous monitoring is lost or
any valve deviates from its assigned position, purge credit is lost and a subsequent start of the gas
turbine requires a unit purge prior to light-off.
4. Continuously monitor pressures in the two double block and vent pipe sections. If the continuous
monitoring is lost, or the pressure downstream of the middle shutoff valve falls to within 3 psi (0.2 bar)
of the pressure upstream of this valve, purge credit is lost and subsequent start of the gas turbine
requires a unit purge.
5. During the startup sequence, with airflow passing through the gas turbine, prove the most
downstream shutoff valve (V3) meets the OEM’s leakage criteria. If leakage exceeds the OEM’s criteria,
abort the start.
B. The purge credit period is maintained as long as the conditions in Part A above, Items 2, 3, and 4,
are met. The purge credit period is not limited to eight days.
C. Ensure fuel cannot enter the air or inert gas supply line at any time.
2.6.5.4 Inspect the fuel system in accordance with the OEM’s recommendations. At a minimum, inspect the
fuel system during scheduled dismantle inspections (refer to Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines, for additional
information). As part of this inspection, test fuel shutoff valves for leak tightness.
2.6.5.5. Test automatic drains in the lower combustor casings and/or exhaust casing of the gas turbine
annually to ensure they operate properly.
2.7 Training
2.8.4.1 Arrange and prepare documented procedures to expedite safe entry and emergency response to
situations such as fires and explosions in turbine areas, including the following:
A. Manual emergency trip of the turbine
B. Notification of facility management and the emergency response team ( include names and up-to-date
contact information)
C. Organizational responsibility for managing emergency response
D. Shutting off pump(s) supplying oil to the control-oil system if mineral oil is used
E. Information on when to shut off AC and DC lube-oil pumps without significant damage to the shaft,
as well as guidelines and timing for shutting off AC and DC lube-oil pumps as a last resort in fire situations
F. A procedure for switching from AC lube-oil pumps to the DC lube-oil pump if this will result in a reduction
in pressure and flow rate from a leak while also supplying an adequate amount of oil to bearings to prevent
damage
G. Emergency procedures for driven generators or compressors
H. A means of venting hydrogen from and purging the generator
I. Steps needed to isolate electrical equipment in the fire area
2.8.4.2 Provide a method of communication (e.g., cellular phones or radios) for control room operators in
the event normal communication methods are interrupted during a fire. Ensure emergency calls will go to the
public fire service nearest the facility.
2.8.4.3 Prepare schematics to guide responders and indicate the location, contents, emergency access route,
and emergency remote controls for shutting down equipment.
2.8.4.4 Train and authorize designated personnel to be liaisons with the public fire service.
2.8.4.5 Provide the local fire service with sufficient knowledge of turbine fire hazards and response procedures
to aid them in conducting firefighting operations. Document this information in the pre-incident plan with the
local fire service.
2.8.4.6 Where applicable, account for earthquake perils in the emergency response plan according to Data
Sheet 10-1, Pre-Incident Planning.
3.1 General
Despite a relatively high flash point, mineral oil used in turbine lubrication and control systems presents a
severe hazard due to the potential for a large quantity of oil to escape and ignite an uncontrolled, high
heat-release fire. A mineral oil release and fire inside a turbine building or compartment can create significant
exposures to critical equipment, production, and the building itself. Fire scenarios can include a spray fire,
a spill fire, a pool fire, or combinations of these events. The most effective means of limiting damage from oil
fires is to quickly shut down the affected oil system. Control-oil systems can usually be shut down quickly,
but lubricating-oil shutdown while the turbine is running will likely cause additional equipment damage. Fire
protection efforts recommended in this data sheet include the following:
A. A comprehensive program to prevent accidental oil releases.
B. An effective emergency shutdown procedure.
C. A combination of active and passive protection features that include construction, curbing, emergency
drainage, automatic fire protection, structural steel protection, spray hoods, barriers, and spray fire shields.
The key goals of any fire protection scheme are to shut down the fuel supply as quickly as possible, control
where the released oil flows, and use automatic sprinkler protection to provide cooling and possible
extinguishment of burning pools of oil. This combination of protection elements is used to limit the extent
of damage. Turbine buildings contain high values per unit of floor area. Loss of generating capability can result
in substantial loss of business income.
E. Maintenance operations
The majority of ignition sources are associated with the turbine, due to the presence of high-speed, rotating
equipment. However, both ignitable liquid and ignition sources are present in other areas as well, including
auxiliary fuel and oil compartments. Additionally, the liquid may be pumped at high pressures and flow rates,
resulting in the potential for the release of an atomized spray (see Section 3.1.3). A spray of finely atomized
droplets may impact the ignition of an ignitable liquid in comparison to a pool or spill. Therefore, while it is
important to consider equipment surface temperatures relative to the auto ignition temperature of an ignitable
liquid, the other ignition sources listed above should not be disregarded.
Where important equipment is exposed by an ignitable liquid such as fuel or lube oil and a potential ignition
source, it is critical to provide fire protection as recommended in this data sheet. Without this protection,
even a small fire could lead to significant equipment damage and business interruption.
Fig. 3.1.3. Mineral oil spray fire (90 psig [6 barg]) demonstration test performed by FM Global
Automatic sprinkler discharge may help limit damage to the building structure and prevent involvement of
other combustibles, but the spray fire will not be extinguished and may open an excessive number of
sprinklers unless the oil discharge is cut off promptly.
By fitting FM Approved spray fire shields over oil piping flanges, the spray fire hazard at the flange can be
reduced to a localized spill and pool fire that can be controlled by local automatic sprinkler protection, curbing,
and emergency drainage for the area of the release. FM Approved spray fire shields are subjected to a
45-minute hydrocarbon fire, during which they have demonstrated the ability to maintain their structural
integrity and limit the release of oil to within a 5 ft (1.5 m) radius from the centerline of the shield.
Some so-called “fire-resistant fluids” will burn very intensely when released and ignited as a spray or aerosol.
FM Approved industrial fluids, which are listed in the Approval Guide, are tested to demonstrate a limited
heat release rate and inability to stabilize a spray flame, and therefore do not in and of themselves require
fire protection measures.
1. Using the compiled information and the prepared schematics, conduct a table-top review of each
oil system, identifying the potential oil-release sources. Mechanical breakdown and on-line maintenance
of oil systems may lead to the release of oil.
2. Consider alternative release points for each mineral oil system.
3. For each release source, obtain the pressure and flow rate and determine the type of fire (e.g., pool
fire, spray fire).
4. Loss experience indicates the size of the release is difficult to predict. Estimate the potential release
size and resulting fire duration based on the reservoir capacity and inherent limits on oil release
(approximately 2⁄3 to 3⁄4 of tank capacity).
5. Determine the likely flow path(s), starting from the source and ending at the drains, a curbed area
within or outside of the turbine compartment, or other low points.
6. Conduct a physical walk-down and revise the release scenario as needed.
7. Document the release scenarios and identify the credible worst cases in terms of size, flow rate,
and flow path taken by the released oil.
8. Estimate the release duration based on the emergency shutdown plan and in the event emergency
shutdown procedures are not followed (due to unforeseen difficulties that may occur in any fire
situation).
C. Determine Oil-Fire Scenarios
1. Assuming ignition will occur, assess the potential fire damage to critical equipment and the building
based on the release mode, duration, quantity, and flow path of the oil. Take into account the mitigating
effects of fixed fire protection systems, drainage, and containment.
2. Conduct a walk-down of the fire area and revise the fire scenario as needed.
3. Document the fire scenarios and identify worst case scenarios (see Figure 3.1.5 for suggested
format).
D. Evaluate Adequacy of Fire Protection, Including Prevention
1. Assess the impact of the fire scenarios in terms of potential property damage and business
interruption for the worst-case scenarios.
2. Determine where it is feasible to prevent or reduce fire damage and downtime through physical
protection, such as drainage, containment, spray fire shields, and fire protection.
3. Determine if improvements are needed in emergency shutdown plans and fire awareness/prevention
training programs. Ensure the emergency response plan incorporates appropriate measures to limit
the size and duration of an oil fire.
E. Implement Action Items
Assign follow-up responsibility for improvements in prevention and mitigation of oil fires.
F. Training and Loss Prevention Programs
1. Use the images, schematics, and findings of the OFHA to train operators and maintenance personnel
in the hazards of oil fires, as well as emergency response procedures.
2. Ensure oil-fire awareness training is conducted on an ongoing basis for all employees and reflects
the hazard as determined by the OFHA.
3. Incorporate findings into operating and maintenance procedures where appropriate to reduce errors
that could result in oil release.
G. Audits and Management of Change
Implement a management of change process for oil systems and safeguards to be certain no changes occur
that could increase the severity or consequence of an oil fire.
Location of Leak
Oil System
Flow Rate
Pressure
Fire Type
(Spray, 3-D, Pool)
Emergency Shutdown
The duration of oil flow in an actual fire is an uncertain parameter that can only be estimated using the
design-basis fire scenarios and the emergency shutdown procedure for the unit. Setting the extinguishing
period equal to the maximum expected duration of oil flow (per the emergency shutdown procedure), plus at
least 10 minutes as a safety factor, will help ensure a sufficient supply of extinguishing agent for the initial
phase of the fire to give manual responders time to apply hose streams to control any subsequent reignition.
If time for cooling metal surfaces below the autoignition temperature of the fluid is not known and not available
from the turbine manufacturer, surface temperatures can be measured by thermocouples and infrared
scanning devices.
4. Monitor the pipe section between the middle and most downstream shutoff valves (V2 and V3) for
a pressure decrease. The allowable pressure decrease should be within the OEM’s acceptance
criteria. Typically, a pressure decrease of more than 10 psi (0.7 bar) in 30 seconds is considered
excessive.
5. Failure of this test indicates that a failure or leak in the most downstream shutoff valve (V3) may
have occurred. Leakage could also have been through vent valve V5.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake
Data Sheet 1-21, Fire Resistance of Building Assemblies
Data Sheet 1-29, Roof Securement and Above Deck Roof Components
Data Sheet 1-44, Damage Limiting Construction
Data Sheet 2-0, Installation Guidelines for Automatic Sprinklers
Data Sheet 2-81 Fire Protection System Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Data Sheet 3-7, Fire Protection Pumps
Data Sheet 4-0, Special Protection Systems
Data Sheet 4-1, Fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection
Data Sheet 4-2, Water Mist Systems
Data Sheet 4-9, Halocarbon and Inert Gas (Clean Agent) Fire Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 4-11, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 4-12, Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems
Data Sheet 5-4, Transformers
Data Sheet 5-23, Design and Protection for Emergency and Standby Power Systems
Data Sheet 5-31, Cables and Bus Bars
Data Sheet 5-32, Data Centers and Related Facilities
Data Sheet 5-40, Fire Alarm Systems
Data Sheet 5-48, Automatic Fire Detection
Data Sheet 5-49, Gas and Vapor Detectors and Analysis Systems
Data Sheet 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable Containers
Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations
Data Sheet 7-50, Compressed Gases in Cylinders
Data Sheet 7-54, Natural Gas and Gas Piping
Data Sheet 7-55, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Stationary Installations
Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging Vessels and Equipment
Data Sheet 7-83, Drainage Systems for Ignitable Liquids
Data Sheet 7-88, Ignitable Liquid Storage Tanks
Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors
Data Sheet 7-98, Hydraulic Fluids
Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer Fluid Systems
Data Sheet 7-101, Fire Protection for Steam Turbines and Electric Generators
Data Sheet 13-17, Gas Turbines
Data Sheet 9-0, Maintenance and Inspection
Data Sheet 9-7, Property Conservation
Data Sheet 10-0, The Human Factor of Property Conservation
Data Sheet 10-1, Pre-incident Planning
Data Sheet 10-3, Hot Work Management
Data Sheet 10-4, Contractor Management
4.2 Other
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Power Piping. ASME B31.1.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Process Piping Guide. ASME B31.3.
Internal Fire or Explosion: A fire occurring inside one of the major components of the turbine usually due
to fuel accumulations. Fuel may accumulate due to fuel leakage past shutoff valves, delay in shutdown
following loss of flame, failure of a casing drain, or an inadequate purge. The fire or explosion occurs within
the turbine, compressor or exhaust system.
Lagging: The term ‘‘lagging’’ refers to a covering or enclosure of some kind designed to shield the hot section
of a gas turbine from external factors, such as other equipment, water discharge, or simply the environment,
and to keep personnel from accidental contact with the hot section while the turbine is operating. Lagging
consists of insulating blankets around the casing. The insulation is usually metal covered.
Proof of Closure Switch: A device that provides feedback that a piece of equipment is in the closed position.
Purge Credit: A condition that is established by maintaining a set of parameters following a gas turbine
normal shutdown that allows the gas turbine to restart without going through a unit purge.
Rundown Time: Following a trip of the turbine, the period during which the unit is coasting down from its
operating speed to a shutdown condition (typically, once the equipment has been placed on turning gear).
Lubrication oil may continue to be supplied to the equipment during this period.
Safe Shutdown: Following the emergency response team’s assessment of the fire event, a decision to initiate
a prompt shutdown of the equipment. Rotating equipment is considered “shut down” when it has reached
a speed where the lubrication oil system can be turned off without damaging the equipment. Typically, this
is achieved once the equipment has been placed on turning gear. Safe shutdown must be accomplished
based on an evaluation of the site specific oil system design, the turbine manufacturer’s emergency
shutdown system, and emergency response procedures.
Skid: A structural steel base on which a gas turbine and/or its auxiliary components are mounted. It may
be enclosed or unenclosed.
Spray Barrier: A metal barrier located between a spray source and critical equipment serving to deflect a
horizontal spray.
Spray Fire Shield: A device placed around the flanges of pressurized piping systems, used to prevent highly
pressurized jets of fluid. The shield is designed to prevent a spray fire from developing by converting a highly
pressured spray into a low pressure, low momentum flow of liquid which can be controlled by a properly
designed sprinkler system.
Spray Fire Source: Any unguarded flange, fitting, or control device that provides containment for pressurized
combustible oil at a high pressure and is connected to a reservoir. Length of the jet flame is determined by
pump capacity and assumed pressure and orifice size for the leak.
Spray Hood: A horizontally mounted barrier located above a spray source serving to deflect a vertical spray.
Total Flooding System: A fire extinguishing system that relies on filling an enclosure with an extinguishing
agent, and maintaining the extinguishing concentration within the enclosure until the fire is extinguished and
conditions will not permit reignition. Inert gas and carbon dioxide extinguishing systems are total flooding
systems.
Unenclosed installation: A gas turbine installation, usually in a large building and possibly part of a multiple
installation, without individual enclosures for any of its auxiliaries or components.
Unit Purge: A flow of air through the gas turbine and its exhaust system at a rate and duration for a sufficient
number of volume changes to occur to remove any flammable vapors and replace them with the air.
Water Mist: A special protection system in which a distribution system is connected to a water supply that
is capable of delivering atomized water spray with droplets that are less than 1,000 microns in size. The
smaller droplets vaporize and extract heat more rapidly from flames, and are able to extinguish spray fires.
A. Added recommendations for designing water mist systems that have been FM Approved for local
application over oil pool and 2D spray fire areas.
B. Updated cable fire protection to associate fire protection rating to safe shutdown time.
C. Added recommendations for oil conditioning skids.
January 2018. Interim revision. Minor editorial changes were made.
January 2018. Minor editorial changes were made.
July 2013. The following major changes have been made.
A. The title of the document has been changed from Fire Protection for Combustion Turbine Installations
to Fire Protection for Gas Turbines and Electric Generators.
B. References to “combustion turbine” have been replaced with “gas turbine” throughout the document.
C. References to “flammable” and “combustible” liquids have been replaced with “ignitable liquids”
throughout the document.
D. The document has been reorganized where necessary to provide a format that is consistent with other
data sheets.
E. Recommendations for structural steel protection, including where protection is necessary, have been
clarified.
F. Recommendations for containment and emergency drainage have been clarified.
G. An option to provide containment of mineral oil without the need for emergency drainage has been
added. This option is contingent on several other factors, such as the design of the containment and
automatic fire protection features.
H. The intent of cable protection guidance has been clarified. The use of FM Approved cable coatings
as a protection method has been removed.
I. Recommendations related to electric generators have been added.
J. The necessary discharge duration for special extinguishing systems has been clarified.
K. Hybrid (water and inert gas) fire extinguishing systems have been added as options for the protection
of gas turbine compartments.
L. Automatic sprinklers and water spray have been removed as options for the protection of gas turbine
compartments.
M. Information on acceptance testing of special extinguishing systems has been added.
N. The fire protection recommendations for unenclosed turbines have been modified.
O. Additional general information on the design of sprinkler systems has been added, including guidance
on spacing and sprinkler system types.
P. Compressed air foam (CAF) systems have been added as an alternative to emergency drainage and
for supplemental protection of the turbine building.
Q. The intent of an Oil Fire Hazards Assessment has been clarified.
R. A discussion of ignition sources and information regarding which compartments need fire protection
has been added to Section 3, Support for Recommendations.
S. Recommendations for gas turbine fuel train arrangements and combustion safeguards have been
added.
T. Recommendations on how to address hydrogen, ignitable liquid, fuel gas, and sprinkler piping systems
in areas exposed to earthquakes have been added.
U. Recommendations for hose streams to be included in the capacity of drains and containment have
been removed.
September 2010. Minor editorial changes were made for this revision.
May 2010. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
January 2008. The following changes have been made:
Design criteria for turbine building sprinkler systems have been revised.
Emergency drainage and containment design criteria have been revised to account for potential fire scenarios
where more than 10 minutes of sprinkler and hose stream discharge is expected.
A recommendation has been added to provide FM Approved flange shields and deflectors to help mitigate
exposures from oil spray fires.
The design extinguishing period for special extinguishing systems protecting turbine compartments has been
revised. Refer to sections 2.4.3.2 and 3.3.2.3.
May 2000. The following changes were made:
1. The recommendation for excess flow valves as an alternate form of protection to fixed fire protection has
been removed. Excess flow valves function if the flow exceeds 110% of the rated flow. There have been
large losses in which oil or fuel leakage from a flange or a fitting has been substantially less than the rated
flow. Excess flow valves may be of benefit in installations such as engine test cells where the frequency
of a catastrophic event is substantially higher than in production machines.
2. A requirement for a full discharge trip test has been included for gaseous agent extinguishing systems.
In addition an inspection program for doors and damper intended to seal openings is recommended. The
causes of previous extinguishing system failures are reported. Also the results of a recent survey of loss
prevention engineers specializing in fire protection for utilities indicate that the reliability of these systems is
substantially improved when full discharge trip tests are conducted.
3. Protection of one set of control and power cable for ac and dc lube oil pumps is recommended.
4. Fixed fire protection system agent supply should be 10 min or the rundown time of the turbine for enclosed
turbines whichever is greater. Local application system agent supply should be 20 min or the rundown time
of the turbine whichever is greater.
5. Automatic sprinkler or water spray protection is recommended as an alternate form of protection providing
the system is arranged to prevent water discharging onto the turbine casing.
6. An annual test frequency is recommended for automatic drains in combustor casings.
7. Descriptions of tests and losses involving automatic sprinkler protection have been revised and examples
of the need to functionally test gaseous agent systems have been added.
The September 1998 revision recommended:
• The use of excess flow check valves in lubrication, hydraulic and liquid-fuel systems.
• Fine-water spray (FWS) extinguishing systems
• The use of less flammable lubricants and hydraulic fluids
• Direct fire protection of the main structural members of turbine halls.