Race Textbook

丁A1NYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA
A C RIT IC AL APP RO AC H SECOND EDITION
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A CRITICAL APPROACH
SECOND EDITION
TANYA MARIA GOLASH 嗣 BOZA

University of California, Merced
NEW YORK OXFORD

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Golash-Boza, Tanya Maria, author.
Title: Race & racisms : a critical approach / Tanya Maria Golash-Boza,
University of California, Merced.
Other titles: Race and racisms
Description: Second Edition. I New York : Oxford University Press, [2017] I
Revised edition of the author's Race & racisms, [2015] I Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 20170317161ISBN 9780190663780 (pbk.: alk. paper) I ISBN
9780190663797 (eISBN)
Subjects: LCSH: United States- Race relations. I Racism- United States. I
Equality- United States. I United States- Emigration and immigration. I
Race. I Racism.
Classification: LCC El84.Al G565 2017 I DDC 305.800973- dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017031716
987654321
Printed by LSC Communications, United States of America
「ie onrenrs
List of Excerpts xvii

About the Author xix
Preface xx
...
Talking About Race Outside the Classroom XXVI II
PART I RACIAL IDE。LOGIES
1 The Origin of the Idea of Race 3

• 2 Race, Immigration，。 nd Citizenship from the 1840s
to the 1920s 35
• 3 Racial Ideologies from the 1920s to the Present 63
4 Sociological Theories of Race and Racism 95
• 5 Racism in the Media: The Spread of Ideology 127
• 6 Colorism and Skin-Color Stratification 157
• 7 White Privilege and the Changing U.S. Racial Hierarchy 185 ·
PART II p。LICY AND INSTITUTI。NS
• 8 Educational Inequality 217

• 9 Income and Labor Market Inequality 247
10 Inequality in Housing and Wealth 281
• 11 Racism and the Criminal Justice System 309
• 12 Health Inequality, Environmental Racism，。 nd Environmental
Justice 343
• 13 Racism, Nativism, and Immigration Policy 373
PART Ill c。NTESTING AND C。MPARING RACIAL INJUSTICES

• 14 Racia I Justice in the United States Today 413
• 15 Thinking Globally: Race and Racisms in France, South Africa
and Brazil 441
Glossary 475
References 483
Credits 508
Index 513
List of Excerpts xvii
Abou •• he Autho「 xix
p「eface xx
Talking About Race Outside the Classroom xxviii
PART I RACIAL IDE 。 i。 GIES
The Origin of the Idea 。f Race 3

Defining Race and Ethnicity 6
Race: The Evolution of an Ideology 7
Historical Precedents to the Idea of Race 8
Slavery Before the Idea of Race 9
European Encounters with Indigenous Peoples of the
Americas 10
Slavery and Colonization 11
“~ ~－e~ni~七 T~eaJ.用~nt 。f ln司 i~~no~~ P~~P.I~~
v。ices T 1主
research focus Slave Flights and Runaway Communities in Colo 门 ial
Angola 14
Exploitation in the Thirteen English c。lonies 15
The Legal Codification of Racial Differences 19
voices From Bull听h!P... Da_r.~ 22
Slavery versus the Ideal of Freedom in the United States 23
。 GLOBAL VIEW: The Idea of Race in Latin American Nation-Making 24
The Indian Removal Act: The c。ntinuation of Manifest
Destiny 25
The Rise of Science and the Question of Human Difference 27
European Taxonomies 27
Scientific Racism in the Nineteenth Century 28
Conclusion and Discussion 31
Check Your Understanding 31
Talking about Race 33
vi CONTENTS
Race, lmmigrati。n, and Citizenship fr1。m the 1840s

to the 1920s 35
The Continuation of Scientific Racism 38
Measuring Brain Size 38
Intelligence Testing 38
Eugenics 40
v。ices Carrie Buck 41
…….........................
Exclusionary lmmigrati。n and Citizenship Policies 42

The Chinese Exclusion Act 43
research focus Chinese E×clusion a门d Gatekeeping Ideology 44
The Johnson-Reed Act (Immigration Act of 1924) 45
Birthright Citizenship and Naturalization for Whites
Only 46
Defining Whiteness in Court 47
Takao Ozawa 以 United States (1922) 48
United States 以 Bhagat Singh Thind (1923) 49
How the Irish, Italians，。nd Jews Became White 49
The Irish 51
The Italians 51
The Jews 53
Structural Violence against Native Americans and African
Americans 54
Native Americans: Appropriating Lands, Assimilating
Tribes 54
African Americans and the Struggle for Rights 55
Talking about Race 6 7
Racial Ide。l。gies fr。m the 1920s f。 the Present 63

Ideological Consistency and Change 66
v。ices Trayvon Martin 67
·.......................................
Overt Racism in the Mid-Twentieth Century 70

Segregation 70
Mass Deportation of Mexicans and Mexican
Americans 70
Internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans 72
CONTENTS VII
v。ices Fred T~Y.?saburo Korematsu 74

Tuskegee .Syphilis Experiment 75
The Civil Rights Movement and the Commitment to Change 76
Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott 77
Sit-Ins 78
Freedom Rides 78
Old Versus New Racism: The Evolution of an Ideology 80
Biological Racism 81
Cultural Racism 82
Color-Blind Universalism 83
。 GLOBAL VIEW Cultural Racism in Peru 84
Color-Blind Racism 85
Four Types of Color-Blind Racism 85
Rhetorical Strategies of Color-Blind Racism 86
The New Politics of Race 86
s。ci。｜。gical The。ries 。f Race and Racism 95

Individual Racism and Institutional Racism 98
Individual Racism 98
voices 0icroa.~.~~essions 101
Institutional Racism 102
。GLOBAL VIEW Microaggressions in Peru 103
Systemic Racism and Structural Racism 105
Systemic Racism 105
Structu 「al Racism 106
research focus Systemic Racism and Hur「icane Katrina 107
Racial Formation 109

Critique 1: Not Holding Whites Accountable for Racial Inequality 111
Critique 2: Not Going Far Enough to Expose the Depths
of Racism 112
Critique 3: Overlooking Parallels Between Jim Crow Racism and
Racism Today 113
research focus E×amining Legitimized Racism against Indigenous
Peoples 114
viii CONTENTS
White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism 116

research focus Applying Settle 「 Colonialism Theory 118
lslamophobia and Anti-Arab Racism 119

lntersectional 丁heories of Race and Racism 120
Racism in the Media: The Spread of Ide。l。gy 127

Portrayals and Representations in Entertainment 129
Portraya Is of Blacks 130
voices 问~Y.. ~lac止－is扣 Is th~ ~“o听 '!!_~ 问e~d R!fJ_ht 问 o听. 13~
Portrayals of Latino;/~s 136
Portrayals of Arabs and Arab Americans 138
voices Why We Hacked Homeland 739
………………………………………………………….
Portrayals of Asians and Asian Americans 140
Portrayals of Native Americans 142
。 GLOBAL VIEW Racial Stereotypes in Peruvian Television 143
New Media Representations 144
Video Games 144
Social Media 144
research focus Kimberl 台 C「enshaw on Black Women's Lives
Matte「 145
Media Images and Racial Inequality 148

Raced, Classed, and Gendered Media Images 150
c。l。rism and Skin-C。｜。r Stratificati。n 157

The History of Colorism 160
research focus Latino lmmigra 时S and the U.S. Racial Order 161
The Origins of Colorism in the Americas 161
The Origins of Colorism in Asia and Africa 164
The Global Color Hierarchy 165
Asia and Asian Americans 166
CONTENTS IX
v。ices: The Fair-Skin Ba忖le 167

··...............................................
Latin America and Latinos/as 168

Africa and the African Diaspora 170
research focus Skin Tone a门d School Suspension 173
v。ices Colorism and Creole Identity 175

Skin Color, Gender，。nd Beauty 176
v。ices After ＃问otfairandlo~el_Y.: Chan_
~! n.~.Tho口.~~t Patterns Instead of Skintone 180
PART II p。 LICY AND INSTITUTI 。 NS
White Privilege and the Changing U.S. Racial

Hierarchy 185
White Privilege 188
research focus White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible
Knapsack 190
Whiteness, Class, Gender, and Sexuality 192

voices ExP.!ainin.~..问hit~ ~ri~ile.~~ to a 巳rok~ Y.Y.hite Person 193
Whiteness and Racial Categories in Twenty-First-Century
America 196
Latinos/as and the Multiracial Hierarchy 197
Arab Americans, North Africans, Middle Easterners, and Their
Place in the U.S. Racial Hierarchy 199
voices Arab American-AKA Y.Y.hite Y.Y.ithout the Privil~~ e 201 -
Muitiracial Identification and the U.S. Raciai

Hierarchy 202
Will the United States Continue to Be a White-Majority
Society♀ 204
Changes in Racial and Ethnic Classifications 207

。 GLOBAL VIEW Social, Cultural, and Intergenerational Whitening in Latin
America 209
Revisiting the Definitions of Race and Ethnicity 211
x CONTENTS
Educati。nal Inequality 217

The History of Educational Inequality 220
Indian Schools 221
Segregation and Landmark Court Cases 223
The Persistence of Racial Segregation in the Educational
System 225
Affirmative Action in Higher Education 226
Educational Inequality Today 228
research focus Native American/Alaska Na •ive College
Student Retention 231
The Achievement Gap: Sociological Explanations for Persistent

Inequality 232
。 GLOBAL VIEW Affirmative Action in Brazil 233
Parental Socioeconomic Status 233
Cultural Explanations:”'Acting White” and Other Theories 235
Tracking 236
Social and Cultural Capital and Schooling 237
v。ices Moesha 240
……··....................
Hidden Curricula and the School-to-Prison Pipeline 241

research focus The Asian Ame 「ican Achievement Parado× 242

Inc。me and Lab。r Market Inequality 247

Income Inequality by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 250
Dimensions of Racial Disparities in the Labor Market 254
Disparities among Women 254
Disparities among Asian Americans 256
Underemployment, Unemployment, and Joblessness 258
v。ices J。「~~9. ？.：？.。
s。ciological Explanations for Income and Labor Market
Inequality 262
Individual-Level Explanations 263
v。ices Latina Professionals as Racialized Tokens: Lisa ’s Story 264
....................................................................................................................
CONTENTS XI
Structural Explanations 266

research focus Discrimination i 门 G Low Wage
“ Labo 「 Market 267
Affirmative Action in Employment 271

Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment 273
。 GLOBAL VIEW Racial Discrimination in Australia 275
Inequality in H。using and Wealth 281

Land Ownership after Slavery 285
Residential Segregation 286
The Creation of Residential Segregation 286
Discriminatory and Predatory Lending Practices 289
research focus The Role of Real Es•ate in Creating Seg 「ega ↑ed
Cities 290
Neighborhood Segregation Today 292
v。ices Sab「！Y.~ lhs9.n 问ill!ams o口问 e！~.“』or~o。9. St~「~o~Y.P.!n~. 2 ?.~.
Wealth Inequalities 297
research focus The Colo 「 of Wealth in the Natio门’s Capital 299
Inequality in Homeownership and Home Values 301
Wealth Inequality Beyond Homeownership 301
Explaining the Wealth Gap in the Twenty-First Century 302
Racism and the Criminal Justice System 309

Mass Incarceration in the United States 312
The Rise of Mass Incarceration 313
Mass Incarceration in a Global Context 314
。GLOBAL VIEW Prisons in Germany and the Netherlands 316
Race and Mass Incarceration 316
.
voices Ea .「I Y.Y~~hi 口~－t。口 ~1 !.
The Inefficacy of Mass Incarceration 319
xii CONTENTS
Mass Incarceration and the War on Drugs 320

Race, Class, Gender，。nd Mass lncarcerati。n 322
Institutional Racism in the Criminal Justice System 323
Racial Pr。filing 323
v。ices S。口司.Y..Bl。”司 ~主δ
Sentencing Disparities 327
The Ultimate Sentence: Racial Disparities in the Death
Penalty 328
voices 专雪.Y..~9.~！~ .....~？.雪
The Economics of Mass Incarceration 329
Private Pris。ns 332
The Pris。n-lndustrial c。mplex 333
Beyond Incarceration: Collateral Consequences 335
The Impact of Mass Incarceration on Families and
Children 335
The Lifelong Stigma of a Fel。ny：”The New Jim Crow” 337
research focus Can Felons Get Jobs♀ 337

Check y。ur Understanding 339
Health Inequalities, Environmental Racism, and

Environmental Justice 343
The History of Health Disparities in the United States 345

Involuntary Experimentati。n 。n African Americans 346
Explaining Health Disparities by Race and Ethnicity
丁oday 348
s。ci。ec。n。mic Status and Health Disparities by Race/
Ethnicity 350
Segregation and Health 351
research focus 忖eal↑h and Social Inequity in Alameda Cou门↑y,
California 353
The Effects 。f Individual Racism 。n Health 354
Life-C。urse Perspectives 356
Culture αnd Health 357
CONTENTS XIII
。 GLOBAL VIEW Health and Structural Violence in

Guatemala 358
Genetics, Race，。nd Hea Ith 359
Environmental Racism 361
v。ices The Holt Familr._of Dickson!. Tennessee 363
voices The Flint Water Crisis 367
··...................................................

Racism, Nativism，。nd lmmigrati。n p。licy 373

v。ices Robert Bautista-Denied Due Process 376
………………·.................................................................
The Racialized History of U.S. Immigration Policy 378

Race and the Making of U.S. Immigration Policies: 1790 to
1924 379
( GLOBAL VIEW Whitening and Immigration Policy in
Brazil 381
Nativism Between 1924 and 1964: Mass Deportation
of Mexicans and the McCarran Internal
Security Act 382
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and the Changing
Face of Immigration 384
Latin American and Caribbean Immigration 390
Illegal Immigration and Policy Response 394
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)
and Nativism 394
Proposition 187 and the Lead-Up to IIRIRA 396
The 1996 Laws and the Deter廿ion and Deportation of Black
。nd Latino Immigrants 398
voices Hecto~! . a Guatemalan Dee.ortee 400
Immigration Policy and Nativism in the Twenty-First
Century 404
v。ices The Zarour Family 407
………………·............................

Talking about Race 47 7
xiv CONTENTS
PART Ill c。 NTESTING AND C。MPARING RACIAL INJUSTICES

Racial Justice in the United States today 413
Perspectives on Racial Justice 415
Rec。gniti。n, Resp。nsibility, Rec。nstruction，。nd Reparati。ns 416
Civil Rights 419
Human Rights 421
Struggles for Racial Justice 424
Racial Justice and the F。reclosure Crisis 425
v。ices F~~－“t!n.~ － ~~！αin~t F。r。~I。s~re:: A 民aci9.I ]ustice S~?.':Y.. 4?6
DREAMers and the Fight for Justice 428
Racial Justice and Empathy 430
v。ices Three Leadership Less。ns from Opal T。meti 431
................................................................................................
Moving Beyond Race 434

lntersecti。nal Analyses: Race, Class, Gender 434
Racism and Capitalism 435
Check y。υr Understanding 438
Talking ab。υt Race 439
Thinking GI。bally 441

How Do Other Countries Differ from the United States in Racial
Dynamics♀ 443
Race and Racism in France 446
French c。1。nies in Africa 446
The French Antilles 448
African lmmigrati。n to France 448
Discriminati。n and Racialαnd Ethnic Inequality in Frαnce
丁。day 449
v。ices Justice f。r The。 451
.........................................
Race and Racism in South Africa 454

c。｜。nialism in S。uth Africa: The British and the Dutch 454
The Apartheid Era (1948-1994) 454
CONTENTS xv
四抽回 S。υth African c。loυred Identity 4~?

The Persistence 。f Inequality in the Post-Apartheid Ero 459
research focus The Politics of White hυth Identity in
s。υth Af1icc 460
Race an d Racism in B『azil 462

p。『fυguese c。l。nizoti。n and the Slave Trade in Brazil 462
Whitening Through lmmigrati。n and lnterma『riage 462
The Racial Dem。cracy Myth in Brazil and Affirmative Action 464
咽i四s Brazil ’s c。1。r Bind 46凸
Racial Categ。ries in Brazil T，。day 468
research focus Radiccl ldeo'ogy and Black-W nile Interracial Marriages in
Ri。 de Janeir，。 469

Talking αbout Race 473
GI。目arγ475
References 483
C redits 508
Index 513
is• 0 × cer s
CHAPTER 1
A People云 His切ry ofthe United St，αtes: 1492-Present, Howard Zinn, p. 4
CHAPTER 2
How the Irish Beeαme White, Noel Ignatiev, p. 36
CHAPTER 3
The Persistence ofthe Color Line: Rαcial Politics αnd the Obαmα
Presidency, Randall Kennedy, p. 64
CHAPTER 4
Muslim Girl: A Coming ojAge, Amani Al-Khatahtbeh, p. 96
CHAPTER 5
We Gon' Be Alright: Notes on Rαce αnd Resegreg1αtion, Jeff Chang, p. 128
CHAPTER 6
Bone Black: Memories ofGirlhood, bell hooks, p. 158
CHAPTER 7
How Did 而u Get to Be Mexican? A White/Brown Ma价 Search for
Identity, Kevin Johnson, p. 186
CHAPTER 8
Sαuαgelnequαlities: Children in Americα云 Schools, Jonathan Kozol, p. 218
CHAPTER 9
Divided: The Perils ofOur Growing Inequαli切， David Cay Johnston, p. 248
CHAPTER 10
The Color ofU切lth: The Story Behind the U.S. RαcialU切lthDivide,
Meizhu Lui, Barbara Robles, Betsy Leondar-Wright, Rose Brewer, and
Rebecca Adamson, p. 282
CHAPTER 11
The New Jim Crow: Mαsslncαrcer，αtion 仇 the Age ofColorblindness,
Michelle Alexander, p. 310
XVII
...
XVIII LIST OF EXCERPTS
CHAPTER 12
Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, a：乱d Big Business Re-Create Race
in the Twenty-First Century, Dorothy Roberts, p. 344
CHAPTER 13
“ Til
Law Do Us Part: Immigration Policy and Mixed-Status Family
Separation,” Ruth Gomberg-Mufi.oz, p. 374
CHAPTER 14
Facebook post, Michelle Alexander, p. 414
CHAPTER 15
Coal to Cream: A Black Man's Jour’n ey Beyond Color to anA.ffirmation of
Rαce, Eugene Robinson, p. 442
OU e u or
Tanya Maria Golash-Boza holds a B.A. in Philosophy from the University

of Maryland, a Certificate of Anthropology from L'Ecole d ’'.Anthropologie in
Paris, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University ofN orth Carolina at Chapel
Hill. She is a Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Merced. In
addition to this textbook, she is the a
Proαss Denied (2012), Immigration Nation (201功y and Yo Soy Negro: Blackness
inP
published dozens of articles in peer-reviewed journals on deportations, race
and racism, and U.S. Latinas/os and Latin America, in addition to essays and
chapters in edited volumes and online venues such as Al Jazeera, The Nation,
Salon, and The Chronicle ofHigher Education.
Tanya's innovative scholarship was awarded the 2010 Distinguished Early
Career Award from the Racial and Ethnic Minorities Studies Section of the
American Sociological Association. In 2013, she was awarded the UC Merced
Academic Senate Award for Distinguished Scholarly Public Service. In 2016,
her book Deported was awarded the Distinguished Contribution to Research
Book Award from the Latina/o Studies Section of the American Sociological
Association. She is also the creator of the blog Get a Life, Ph.D., which focuses
on academic success and well-being and has millions of pageviews. She is
the 2017-2018 Chair of the University Committee on Affirmative Action,
Diversity, and Equity Committee for the University of California Senate and
served on the Executive Council of the American Sociological Association
from 2014 to 2017.
Tanya has been teaching undergraduate and graduate courses on race
and ethnicity since 2003. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of
California, she was an Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas. She
lives in 岛1erced, California, with her husband and three school-age children.
She has lived in Latin America, Europe, and the Caribbean and speaks fluent
English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French.
XIX
rerace
’Thissecond edition of Race and Racisms engages students in significant ques-

tions related to racial dynamics in the United States and around the world. In
accessible, straightforward language, the text discusses and critically analyzes
cu仗ing-edge scholarship in the field.
FEATURES
Race and Racisms includes several unique features designed to aid both teach-
ing and learning. Each of the following features appears throughout the book:
voices boxes highlight individual stories related to race and racism,

bringing personal experiences to life.
research focus boxes describe recent scholarship in the field, show-
ing students that this is an active and vibrant area of interest for
researchers.
。GLOBAL VIEW boxes introduce race刊lated phenomena as they are
experienced in other parts of the world, to he导 students look beyond race
and racism in the United States.
• As You Read questions point students to the key ideas in each chapter.
• Chapter-opening excerpts provide relevant readings as an entry point
into the material.
• Marginal Glossary definitions reinforce key concepts.
• [NEW] Check Your Understanding chapter summaries are now struc-
tured around the As You Read questions, incorporating both Review
and Critical Thinking questions.
• [NEW] At a Glance infographics show striki鸣 statistics in a vis叫ly
powerful wa予
• [NEW] Talking about Race guidelines in the front matter and at the
end of each chapter suggest ways to approach discussions about race and
racism.
xx
PREFACE XXI
NEW IN THIS EDITI 。 N
咀1e goal for the second edition of Race and Racisms was not merely to keep up
with our changing world but to invite students to consider their own role in it.
Each chapter has been carefully updated to reflect current issues and events
as well as the latest data and research. Beyond these updates, new stories and
examples throughout engage readers in thinking about how racism could be
addressed or alleviated. Highlights of this edition include:
• Expanded coverage of Arab and Middle Eastern Americans, in addition
to new topics such as Islamophobia.
• The chapter on theory is now introduced earlier in the text (Chapter 4) to
provide a framework for material that follows.
• New Voices or Research Focus sidebars in every chapter.
• New features: At a Glance infographics, Check Your Understanding
summaries, and Talking about Race guidelines and prompts.
Following this preface, we include an overview for the new Talking about
Race feature. We hope this overview, Talking About Race Outside the
Classroom, will serve as a practical guide on how to have thoughtful, informed,
rational discussions about race and racism. ’These are sensitive and emotional
topics that many people have difficulty approaching. 咀1is overview encour-
ages students to engage in constructive conversations about race and provides
tips for countering racist ideology. At the end of each chapter, a brief Talking
about Race section provides some more specific suggestions for approaching
these conversations.
NEW MATERIAL BY CHAPTER

1 The Origin of the Idea of Race
• New Research Focus box: Slave Flights and Runaway Communities
in Colonial Angola (p. 1份
• New infographic on servitude, slavery, and genocide in the
Americas (p. 17)
2 Race, Immigration, and Citizenship from the 1840s to the 1920s

• New Research Focus box: Chinese Exclusion and Gatekeeping
Ideology (p. 44)
xxii PREFACE
3 Racial Ideologies from the 1920s to the Present

• New discussion of Black Lives Matter and high-profile killings by
police (p. 69)
• Newdiscu创onof 肌ein 肌ent politics (p. 86)
4 Sociological Theories of Racism

• New opening excerpt 仕om Muslim Girl: A Coming ofAge by Amani
Al-Khatahtbeh (p. 96)
• New Research Focus box: Examining Legitimized Racism against
Indigenous Peoples (p. 114)
• New discussion: Islamophobia and Anti-Arab Racism (p. 119)
5 Racism in the Media: The Spread of Ideology

• New opening excerpt from 讥Te Gon' Be Al1恕＇ht: Notes on Race and
Resegregation by Jeff Chang (p. 128)
• New Voices boxes on Black-ish (p. 135) and Homeland (p. 139)
• New infographic on the underrepresentation of people of color
in the media (p. 131)
• New Research Focus box: Black Wome的 Lives Matter (p. 145)
6 Colorism and Skin-Color Stratification

• New Voices box: After #NotFairandLovely: Changing Thought Patterns
Instead of Skintone (p. 180)
• New Research Focus box: Skin Tone and School Suspension (p. 173)
7 White Privilege and the Changing U.S. Racial Hierarchy

• New opening excerpt from How Did You Get to Be Mexican? by Kevin
] ohnson (p. 186)
• Newdiscu创on of the Brock Turner case (p. 190)
• New Voices boxes: Explaining White Privilege to a Broke White
Person (p. 193) and Arab American一AKA White Withou he
Privilege (p. 201)
• Expanded discussion: Arab Americans, North Africans, Middle
Eastern
...
PREFACE XXIII
8 Educational Inequality
• Newinfog即hie on educational disparities and life-course effects (p. 229)
New Research Focus box: The Asian American Achievement Paradox
(p. 242)
9 Income and Labor Market Inequality

• New opening excerpt from Divided: The Perils of Our Growing Inequali抄
by David Cay] ohnston (p. 248)
• New Voices box: Latina Professionals as Racialized Tokens: Lisa’s
Story (p. 264)
• Newinfog即hic on income and labor market inequality (p. 253)
10 Inequality in Housing and Wealth

• New Voices box: Neighborhood Stereotyping (p. 293)
• Newinfographic on wealth disparities by race/ethnicity (p. 298)
11 Racism and the CriminalJustice System

• New Voices boxes :“Earl Washington”(p. 317) and Sandy Bland (p. 326)
• New infographic on criminal justice disparities by race/ethnicity (p. 318)
12 Health Inequalities, Environmental Racism, and EnvironmentalJustice

• New infographic on health disparities and inequalities by race/
ethnicity (p. 349)
• New Voices box:’The Flint Water Crisis (p. 367)
13 Racism, Nativism, and Immigration Policy

• New opening excerpt from “ Til Law Do Us Part: Immigration Policy and
Mixed-Status Family Separation by Ruth Gomberg皿Mu虱oz (p. 374)
• Updated and expanded discussion: Immigration Policy and Nativism in
the Twenty-First Cent旧y (p. 404)
• New Voices box on a Syrian refugee family living in the United
States (p. 407)
14 RacialJustice in the United States Today

• New Voices box: Three Leadership Lessons from Opal Tometi (p. 431)
xxiv PREFACE
15 ’Thinking Globally: Race and Racisms in France, South Africa,

and Brazil
• New Voices boxes o叼olice brutality in France (p. 451), South African
coloureds (p. 457), and the skin-color hierarchy in Brazil (p. 466)
。 RGANIZATI 。 N
Race and Racisms is divided into three sections, each using an intersectional
framework and global considerations to guide our understanding of racial
dynamics in the United States:
• Pa刑， Racial Id叫ogies, draws from history, anthropology, and sociol-

ogy to explain how racial ideologies were created and how they have
evolved over time. This section provides a provocative historical and the-
oretical analysis that is rarely encountered in sociology texts, considering
the effects of colonialism, scientific racism, nativism, and inequality.二 In
addition, it invites in-depth discussion by examining prevailing racial
attitudes in the context of recent U.S. history, the media, colorism, and
white privilege.
• Pa付 II, P1。licy and lnstituti。ns, focuses on racial inequality, educational
and labor market inequality, housing and wealth, the criminal justice
system, health and the environment, and immigration policy. 咀1is sec-
tion highlights the empirical evidence for racial inequalit予
• Pa付 Ill, C。ntesting and c。mparing Racial lniustices, considers racial
justice, human rights, and racial dynamics around the world, helping us
to look forward by looking outward.
ANCILLARIES
Oxford University Press is proud to offer a complete supplements package to
accompany Race and Racisms: A Critical Approach.
The Ancillary Resource Center (ARC) at www.oup” arc.com is a co盯e
nient, instructor-focused single destination for resources to accompany this
book. Accessed online through individual user accounts, the ARC provides
instructors with up-to-date ancillaries while guaranteeing the security of
grade-significant resources. In addition, it allows OUP to keep instructors
informed when new content becomes available.
PREFACE xxv
卫1e ARC for Race and Racisms: A Critical Approach contains a variety of
materials to aid in teaching:
• PowerPoint lecture slides to aid in the presentation of course material
• Additional recommended readings that delve deeply into the topics
discussed in each chapter
• A computerized test bank with multiple-choice, true/false,
short-answer, and essay questions
c。 MPANI 。 N WEBSITE
Race and Racisms: A Critical Approach is also accompanied by an extensive com-
panion website {www.oup.com/us/golash国boza}, which includes materials
tohe恪 st叫e附 with every aspect of the course. For each cl呻te叼ou will find:
• Learning Objectives that identify the concepts that students should

understand a丘er reading each chapter
• A brief summary of the broad themes of each chapter, to help students
organize their thinking and reading
• Web-based activities that challenge students to apply their knowledge
to a variety of Internet resources
• Additional links to websites providing supplemental information on the
topics and ideas covered in the chapter
• Multiple-choice selιquizzes to help students review the material and
assess their own comprehension
• Filmographies to illustrate and reinforce material covered in the book
• Glossary flashcards to assist students in studying and review
• A YouTube channel collecting films and videos related to key topics
ACKN 。WLEDGMENTS
When I travel around the country to give talks at universities, I am always

pleased and humbled when instructors tell me they use this book in their class
and when students tell me how much they enjoy reading it. The positive feedback
I received from the first edition was a major motivation to revise this book. I have
a忧empted to respond to the many helpful critiques and comments I received to
make this book an even better tool for teaching about race and racism.
xxvi PREFACE
My interest in race and racism derives in part from my experiences growing

up as a white child in a primarily black neighbo血ood. I am grateful to my par-
e附 for deciding to raise our wh让efami与 on the east 创e of Rock Creek Park in
Washington, D.C., and for staying in that neighb。由ood to this day. Had my par-
ents made different life choice价 is like忖也is book would never have been wri忧en.
Writing this textbook has been much less painful than it otherwise would
have been due to the extraordinary efforts of the editorial team at Oxford
University Press, especially Executive Editor Sherith Pankratz, Development
Editor Lauren Mine, Senior Development Editor Lisa Sussman, and Associ-
ate Editor Meredith Keffer. My deepest gratitude to this amazing and efficient
team. I would also like to acknowledge the design and production team at
Oxford University Press, including Managing Editor Lisa Grzan, Team Leader
刀1eresa Stockton, Senior Production Editor William Murray, and Art Director
Michele Laseau. My thanks as well to Sarah Calabi for her photo research and
to Patti Isaacs for creating the new infographics.
I did not write this book alone. In fact, many of these chapters were writ-
ten in the company of fabulous colleagues in coffee shops and cabins across
the United States. I'd like to extend a special thanks to my writing partners:
Zulema Valdez, Ayu Saraswati, Christina Lux, Dalia Magana, Whitney Pirtle,
Amani Nuru-Jeter, Jemima Pierre, Winddance Twine, and Vilna Treitler.
’Thanks also to Maria Duenas for her research assistance. A very special thanks
to the wonderful scholars who allowed us to use their wr让ings in new Voices
sections throughout this book, including the Arabian Street Artists, Gina
Crosley-Corcoran, Glenda Flores, Namira Islam, Daren W.Jackson, Stephanie
Nolen, Whitney Pirtle, Ali Saad, Opal Tometi, and Sabriya Ihsan Williams.
MANUSCRIPT REVIEWERS
I would like to extend special thanks to the many reviewers commissioned by
OUP who have taken the time to offer thoughtful comments over the develop-
ment of this edition:
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PREFACE XXVII
Shingueru Tsuha Jennifer Lynn Padilla

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UTSI e e ass room
This book is designed primarily for classroom use. I hope teachers and stu-
dents find the analyses, narratives, and data it conveys helpful in generating
productive class engagements on racial justice, racial equity, and race relations.
Learning, however, is a lifelong experience. And, as many of my students point
out, few people you encounter in your daily life will be privy to all the knowl-
edge and insight conveyed in this book. So, how do you-the reader-carry
this knowledge from the classroom to your living room, to the coffee shop, to
the dining room table, to the bar, or to your workplace? How do you talk about
race outside the classroom?
Each chapter of this book concludes with a “ Talking about Race'' section
that provides some suggestions on how to have conversations about the spe-
cific topics in that chapter. Here, I'd like to more generally address the issue of
discussing race.
Conversations about race can be either premeditated or surprise. Premed-
itated conversations can be easier because you can decide ahead of time how
and why you would like to broach a topic with a friend, family member, or
coworker. Surprise conversations are a bit harder to deal with because you have
to respond on the spot-and many times emotions can make it more difficult
to have level-headed responses. Let’s consider each of these two conversation
types in turn, as they are quite different and require different tools.
Let’s say an organization you are involved in has a policy that disadvantages
people of color. You decide you would like to initiate a conversation with the
leaders so that they will reconsider the policy. Here are some tips for having a
productive conversation with your colleagues, drawn from a briefby the Annie
E. Casey Foundation on “ How to Talk about Race飞
- Emphasize shared values. Begin the conversation by focusing on what

you all may agree on.
- Provide more than a critique. Offer a manageable solution that can be
implemented.
...
XX.VIII
TALKING ABOUT RACE OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM XXIX
- Use narratives more than numbers. Provide concrete examples of

how people are affected by the current policy and how a change could
benefit them.
- Emphasize shared goals. Present the change you are proposing as an
opportunity for the organization to move forward.
It is great when you have an opportunity to prepare for a discussion about race.
Often, however, we encounter racial microaggression乌 macroaggressions, overt
acts ofracism, or other forms ofbigotry and have to respond on the spot. Ofcourse,
you can choose not to respond, but even silence is a response in and of itself.
How do you respond if you experience a microaggression? What if you are
sitting with friends and someone makes a racial or racist joke? What if you wit-
ness someone mistreating a person because of race? Having a strategy ready
ahead of time can make it easier to respond in the moment. Here are some
options:
回 Respond with silence. If you are with someone who tells a racist joke,
you can be silent. By not laughing, you are sending a message that this
joke is not appropriate.
- Leave the room. If you are with a group of people, and the conversation
takes a turn toward complaining about a particular ethnic group, you
can exit the room or grab your keys and leave the event. That sends a
signal that their conversation is not appropriate.
- Question the statement. If you are with a group of people, and one of
them says that all black people are great dancers, you can ask them why
they think that. You can push them and ask if they think it is genetic or
cultural. You can keep asking them questions to help them see that their
statement is problematic.
- Ask the person making a racist statement if they would make the
statement in different company二 For example, if someone makes a joke
about Jewish people, ask them if they would feel comfortable making
the joke in front ofJewish people. ’That may help them and others in the
room see that the statement is problematic.
Hearing a bigoted joke or statement-directed at you or others-can stop you

in your tracks. How you respond is a personal decision, one based on your per-
sonality as well as your relationships with others. It is important to know that you
have options-ranging from silence to leaving to responding direct协 Thinking
through these options ahead of time will make you better prepared to respond.
Empl‘’yment 。fNegroes in Agriculture. Earle Wilton Richardso n. 1934. Oil o n canvas，令8 x 32 in. (Smitli,onian A merican Art
M刷出鹏， Wa,hi 吨阳霄， DC/A rt Rcar,ur阻，目γ：
..
Chapter 。utline
Defining Race and Ethnicity 6

Race: The Evolution of an Ideology 7
Historical Precedents to the Idea
of Race 8
Slavery Before the Idea of Race 9
European Encounters with Indigenous
Peoples of the Americas l O
Slavery and Colonization 11
v。ices The Spanish Treatment
of Indigenous Peoples 12
research focus Slave Flights and
Runaway Communities in Colonial
Angola 14
Exploitation in the Thirteen English
Colonies 15
The Legal Codification of Racial
Differences 19
voices From Bullwhip Days 22
Slavery versus the Ideal of Freedom
in the United States 23
GI。bal View The Idea of Race in
Latin American Nation-Making 24
The Indian Removal Act: The
As y。u Read Continuation of Manifest
Destiny 25
1.1 What are race and ethnicity？矶That is racism?
The Rise of Science and the Question
1.2 How old is racism? How is race distinct from previous ways of Human Difference 27
of thinking about human difference? European Ta×·onomies 27
1.3 How did the writers of the U.S. Constitution think of slavery? Scientific Racism in the Nineteenth
Century 28
1.4 How did the Indian Removal Act affect Native Americans?
1.S What role did science play in the propagation of racism?
Check You 「 Unde「S↑anding 31
4 CHAPTER I Th e Origin of the Idea 。i Race
.“·...‘’
••Tl•11 H 111"'1U ‘…
<.......-‘…
…．．山··、．．．．．四..
In th巳 160郎， Native Americans, E uropean colonists, and enslaved
HOWARD ZIN 汗
电w A 唱e Africans found themselves together in t he N ew World . \\7hy d id the
PEOPLE ’ S Eu ropeans believe t hey needed slaves? And \Vhat was the mot ivation
HISTORY for exploiting Africans in p art icular? In this excerpt 台。mAPeople如
OF T HI:
UNITED H istory efthe United States, I·Ioward Zin n provides son1e insight.
STATE S
T…… ded I油。r, to grow c。rn 川bsiste
tobacco for exp。rt. 刀1eyhadjust 矗gured 。ut h。wt。 gr。wt·。bacc。， and
in 1617 they sent 。ff the first carg。 t。 England. Finding that, like all
pleasurable drugs ta皿
intedwithm。ral disapproval, it br。ugh high price, the
planter鸟 despite their high religi。us talk, were n。t g。ing to 臼k questions ab。ut
somethings。 profitable.
τheyc。uldn't f，。rce Indians t。 work for them, as Columbus had d。ne. They were
。utnumb町ed, and while, with superior firearms, they c。uld massacre lndians,
they w。uld face massacre in return. They could not 臼pture them and keep them
enslaved; the Indians were t。ugh, res。urceful, defiant, and at home in thew。。ds,
as the transplanted Englishmen were not.
White servants had not yet been brought over in sufficient quantity. Besides,
they did not c。me out of slavery，四d did not have t。 d。 m。re than contract their
lab。r for a few years to get their passage and a start in the New飞q。rid. As for the free
white settlers, many of them were skilled cra丘smen，。r even men 。fleisure back in
England,wh。were so little inclined t。w。rk the land thatJ。hnSm抽 [leader of the
Vi啦1ia Colony], in those earlyyears, had t。 declare a kind of martial law，吨anize
themintow。rk gangs, and force them int·。 the fields for survival.
τhere may have been a kind of frustrated rage at their own ineptitude, at the
Indian superiority at taking care 。fthemselves, that made the Virginians especially
ready to bee。me the m臼ters 。f slaves. Edmund Morgan imagines their m。。d ashe
,..,rites in his b。。kAmerican Slavery, American Freedom:
Jj'y＝四ere a colonist, you k:new that y=r technolo1,"J} 削川叩erior to

thelndi，αTM’. You kn仰 thaty<YU 甜ere civilized, and they were s，αvag咽．．．
Buty<YUrsuperi旷 technology had proved in.i耳t阳。7.t to 田trαct anything.
The ！：阻t印刷， keep仇,g to themsel即s, laughed at y<YUr i-uperi.or me伪odsand
lived｝子。响 the land 1TWre αbundantly and 四ithl，础 ω旷 than '!}<YU did ...
And 四hen your own pe，φle st，αrted deserting tη ord旷 to live 钮，也h them,
也相ω 阳 much ... So you lcilled the Indians, tortured them, burned their
villag，时， burned their cornfields. It pro四d yoi矿，iuperiority，仇明te oj'

CHAPTER 1 The O ri g in of the Idea of Race 5
your failures. And you g1αve similar treatment to αny ofyour own people
who succumbed to their Sαuαge wαys of life. But you still did not grow
much corn ...
Black slaves were the answer. And it was natural to consider imported blacks
as slaves, even if the institution of slavery would not be regularized and legalized
for several decades. Because, by 1619, a million blacks had already been brought
from Africa to South America and the Caribbean, to the Portuguese and Spanish
colonies, to work as slaves. Fi丘y years before Columbus, the Portuguese took ten
African blacks to Lisbon-this was the start of a regular trade in slaves. African
blacks had been stamped as slave labor for a hundred years. So it would have
been strange if those twenty blacks, forcibly transported to Jamestown, and sold
as objects to settlers anxious for a steadfast source of labor, were considered as
anything but slaves.
’Their helplessness made enslavement easier. 咀1e Indians were on their own land.
’The whites were in their own European culture. ’The blacks had been torn from
their land and culture, forced into a situation where the heritage oflanguage, dress,
custom, family relations, was bit by bit obliterated except for the remnants that
blacks could hold on to by sheer, extraordinary pressure.
Souγce: Zinn 2010, 25-26.
In the colonial Americas, no one would have

described the population using the terms Native
American, white, or black. Instead, people identi-
fied themselves by groups such as Shawnee, Irish,
and Ashanti. How, then, did our current racial
categories come to be? What distinguishes the
idea of race from previous ways of thinking about
human difference? These are the questions we
will consider in this chapter.
In the contemporary United States, one of
the first things we notice about someone we
meet is race. When we aren’ t sure of someone’s
A When people in the United States are unsure of
race, we may get inquisitive or begin to feel
someone's race, many feel compelled to ask:“What are
uncomfortable (Dalmage 2000). It is as i毛 before you?”
interacting, we have to know if the other person
6 CHAPTER 1 The O 「 ig i n of the Idea of Race
is white, black, Asian, Native American, or something else. ’The perceived

race of the other person affects how we treat one another and what we expect
the other person to say and do.
It may be hard to imagine a time when the idea of race did not exist, when we
did not categorize ourselves and others this way.二 But this time was not so long
ago: although humans have long used various factors to classi命 one another,
the idea of race as a classificatory system is a modern invention. Ancient Greeks
and Romans, for example, did not think that the world ’s population could be
divided into 肌es (Eze 1997). Thei
social construction An idea different from ours. Race is a modern social construction, meaning that the
or way of viewing people idea of race is not based on biological differences among people, even though
based not on biological race has become important in determining how we interact. It is a particular
differences but on social way of viewing human difference that is a product of colonial encounters.
perceptions.
race A social construction DEFINING RACE AND ETHNICITY

to describe a group of
’The word race refers to a group of people who share physical and cultural traits
people who share physical
as well as a common ancestry.二’The idea of race implies that the people of the
and cultural traits as well
world can be divided into biologically discrete and exclusive groups based
as a common ancestr予
on physical and cultural traits. This idea is further linked to notions of white
or European superiority that became concretized during the colonization of
racism (1) The belief that
the Americas. Racism refers to both (1) the belief that 肌es are populations
races are populations
whose physical differences are linked to significant cultural and social differ-
whose physical differences
ences within a hierarchy, and (2) the p肌tice of subordinating races believed
are linked to significant
to be inferior.
cultural and social
’The idea of race is slightly different from the concept of ethnicity.二 Races are
differences within a
categories ofpeople based on a hierarchical worldview that associates ancestry,
hierarchy二（2) The practice
descent, and appearance with cultural and moral attributes. Ethnicities, on
of subordinating races
the other hand, are group identities based on notions of similar and shared
believed to be inferior.
his to叨 culture, and kinship (Cornell and Ha巾nann 1998). Ethnicity also has
a distinct historical tr斗 ectory from race. People selιidentify as belonging to
ethnicity Group identity
an ethnic group on the basis of a perceived shared history and a concomitant
based on notions of
set of cultural attributes. In contrast to ethnicity, race is often an externally
similar and shared
imposed categor予 In the United States, people are placed into races based
history, culture, and
on socially constructed, ascribed characteristics o丘en related to physical
kinship.
appearance, such as skin color or hair texture, regardless of selιidentification.
Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997, 469) argues that “ ethnicity has a
primarily sociocultural foundation, and ethnic groups have exhibited tremen-
dous malleability in terms of who belongs; racial asc句tions (initially) are
Race: The Evolution of an Ideo logy 7
imposed externally to justify the collective exploitation of a people and are

maintained to preserve status differences.”
It’s important to emphasize that race is a social construction, an idea we
endow with meaning through daily interactions. It has no biological basis. 卫1i s
might seem an odd statement, as the physical differences between a Ken阳1, a
Swede, and a Han Chinese, for example, are obvious. However, these physical
differences do not necessarily mean that the world can be divided into discrete
racial groups. If you were to walk from Kenya to Sweden to China, you would
note incremental gradations in physical differences between people across
space, and it would be difficult to decide where to draw the line between Africa
and Europe and between Europe and Asia. There may be genetic differences
between Kenyans and Swedes, but the genetic variations within the Kenyan
population are actually greater than those between Swedes and Kenyans
(Smedley 2007). Although 肌e is a social, as opposed to a biological, con-
struction, it has a wide range of consequences in our society, especially when
used as a sorting and stratifying mechanism.
Race is also a historical construction, meaning that the idea of race was historical construction
formed in particular times and places. Of particular note in its development An idea or view that was
are the eras of colonialism-the practice of acquiring political control over formed in particular
another countr如 occupying it with se时ers, and exploiting it economically- times and places.
and slavery in the Americas. ’The idea of race involves classifying humans into
distinct groups with particular cultural and moral traits. ’Through this classi- colonialism The practice
fication, Europeans and their descendants have used the idea of race to justify of acquiring political
exploitation, slavery, colonialism, and genocide, the mass killing of a group of control over another
people, especially those of a particular ethnic or racial group. country, occupying it with
settlers, and exploiting it
economically.
RACE ： τHEEV。 LUTI 。 N 。 F AN IDE 。 L。GY
genocide The mass
An ideology is a set of principles and ideas that benefits the dominant group.
killing of a group of
’The racial ideologies that operate today reflect our times and are rooted in
people, especially those
the history of the Americas. 古1e way we understand the idea of race today
of a particular ethnic or
is distinct from previous ways of thinking about human difference. Before
racial group.
the conquest of the Americas, there was no worldview that separated all of
humanity into distinct races (Montagu 1997；也巾no 2000; Smedley 2007).
ideology A set of
Understanding what race means today requires delving into the historical
principles and ideas that
process through which the idea of race was created. Once we understand that
benefits the dominant
thinking ofpeople as belonging to specific racial categories is not “ natural ” but
group.
constructed, we can begin to think about why and how these categories were
created. As we will see, European thinkers created racial categories to justify
mass genocide and widespread exploitation. ’This brutal history in turn raises
the question of why we continue to use these categories.
Historical Precedents to the Idea of Race

Until the sixteenth century, Northern Europeans had limited knowledge of
the world beyond their immediate communities. Southern Europeans, in
contrast, had much more contact with other peoples. Alexander the Great
traveled to India in the fourth century B.c., the Greeks established trade routes
with Ethiopia in the third century B.c., and Islamic peoples conquered Spain
in the eighth century A.D. Yet this contact did not lead to a racial worldview.
Ancient peoples did not divide the world into distinct races based on physical
and cultural traits. Instead, Greeks had great respect for the achievements of
Ethiopians (Snowden 1970), and Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived in rea-
sonable harmo町 in Spain for hundreds of years (Smedley2007).
Although the idea of race did not develop until later, these early interactions
between Europeans and other groups did provide important precedents for
current ways of conceptualizing human difference. ’The Spanish Inquisition
is one example. When the Catholic Church began to consolidate its power in
Spain under the reign of monarchs Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of
Castile (14万－1504),Jews were expelled from Spain, and converted Jews were
subject to scrutiny.二 In 1480, Ferdinand and Isabella established a tribunal
called the Spanish Inquisition, which was intended to ensure the ortho-
doxy of people who had converted from Judaism and Islam to Catholicism.
’The monarchs issued royal decrees in 1492 and 1501 that ordered Jews and
Muslims to convert or leave the country.二 During the Inquisition, ] ews and
Muslims were obliged to convert, but conversion did not ensure their safety, as
converts continued to be subject to scrutiny and suspicion. Moreover, people
believed to be the descendants of Jews and Muslims also faced persecution.
Discrimination against Jews and Muslims was more religious in nature than
racial, yet the ideas regarding purity of blood that emerged set the stage for
ideas of racial difference that were to become part of the European under-
standing of human differences （也均ano 2000; Smedley 2007).
Another crucial precedent to the idea of race is the English view of the Irish
and later of Native Americans. England and Ireland were involved in centu-
ries of conflict before the English first settled in North America, and English
soldiers o丘en portrayed the Irish as savage, sexually immoral, and resistant to
civilizing forces. Many English colonists had been deployed to Ireland before
settling in the New World. The ideas the English developed about the Irish may
thus have played a role in settlers' perception of Native Americans as savage
虫ace: The Ev。f u Ii。n of on Ide。logy 9
(Allen 1994; Smedlcy2007). This perception was a p阳cu且rs。rt。 thera

thats。me humans were less 且t for civilizati。n than 。thers.
Slavery Before the Idea of Race

Slavery was n。t new 。r pa此icular t。 the Americas: the practice of enslaving
people has existed since antiquity. In African, European, and Middle Eastern
societies, conquered pc。，pies 。丘en became slaves in the a丘ermath of war.
As agricultural societies gre问 so did the demand for lab。r, leading peoples
such as the Greeks and Ph。enicians to raid other societies for slaves. Slavery
existed not only across societies but also within societies: people lacking the
support of a family often had no place 。ther than as slaves, and some people
became enslaved as a means 。f paying off a debt 。r as punishment fi。r a crime.
Slavery of this form almost always inv，。lvcd p町s。ns of the same ethnic group
as their mastc臼．
τhe prevalence of slavery in ancient societies does n。t in1ply that racism
existed then as well. Although s。me ancient writings refer to skin c。lor, these
references are rarely derogatory and by no means represent the general ide-
ology 。f any ancient society. On the contrary, Greeks and R。mans held the
Egyptians as well as the Ethi。pians in high esteem and admired their culture
and way of life. These ancient peoples devcl。ped no known stere。types 。f
blacks as primitives 。r lacking in culture (Snowden 1983). Marr吨es between
Egyptians and black Africans were c。mmon
place in ancient times, and Muslim conquer。rs
regarded anyone they succeeded in converting as
brethren (Franklin 1974).
τhe status 。f slaves varied across societies. In
some instances, slaves were ad。pted as kin a丘er
serving for a certain number of year勾皿。ther
cases, slaves were permi吐ed t。 marry and 。Wll
prope民y (Smedley 200巧 Morgan 1975). Many
slaves w·ere granted rights not found in the system
ofslavery in theNewWorld. These rights included
acce臼 t。 education, the p。tential t。。btain free-
d。m f。r themselves and their children, the right
to marry, and the right t。。wn propert予 Until
the eighteenth century, no s。ciety categorically
denied the humanity of slaves. It was not seen as
necessary t。 rationalize slavery by denying that A Although slavery w描 common in Ancient Gr刷刷， the
slaves were fully human. Alth。ugh slaves were at idea of race did not yet exist.
10 CHAPTER 1 The O 「 igin of the Idea of Race
times treated brutally, tl

slavery was never attributed to 肌ial inferiority (Smedley 2007).
European Encounters with Indigenous

Peoples of the Americas
Before the arrival of European colonizers, the Americas were home to over
100 million indigenous people. As a result ofwarfare, slavery, and disease, about
95 percent of this population was decimated during the first two centuries of
colonization (Stannard 1993; At a Glance I.I). The excerpted accounts in the
Voices sidebar on p. 12 provide a small window into the depths of this massacre.
When Christopher Columbus encountered the native peoples of the
Caribbean islands in 1492, he found them to be peaceable and generous.
Despite the Spaniards' initial admiration for the indigenous people, the rela-
tions between the two groups soon deteriorated, as it became clear that the
Spaniards' primary motive was to extract gold from the Americas. Intent upon
taking as much gold as possible, the Spaniards used their weaponry to over-
power and enslave the people indigenous to the Americas to compel them to
,
“’
,
』
,
‘’
. 唱，，，．
> When Christopher

Columbus encountered
the native peoples of the
Caribbean, he found
them to be peaceable and
generous.
虫ace: The Ev。f u Ii。n of on Ide。logy 11
find gold and silver for the Spaniards to take back t。 Spain (Tod。rov 1984).
咀1e abuse the Caribbean peoples suffered at the hands 。f the Spaniards was
devastating : the Arawaks 。fSant。 Doming。， for example, were reduced from
over 3 million pe。，pie in 1496 t。 a mere 125 in 1570 (Jones 2003).
Rep。此s of the Spaniards' e双reme cruelty t。W盯d the indigenous pe。，pie 。f
the Americas made their way back t。 Spain and eventually became a subject 。f
c。ntrove臼y.Fi丘yyears a丘er Columbus’s arrival in the Caribbean islands, the
enslavement of indigen。us pe。pie was outlawed. The Spaniards c。ntinued t。
extract labor from indigenous people, h。wever, by relying 。n 。ther systems of
forced labor (Wade 1997).
One of the m。st remarkable aspects of t he conquest 。f t he Americas is that
many of the civilizations in the Americas were far m。re advanced than those
from which the Europeans hailed. Eur。pe in the sixteenth century was quite a
ghastly place, with 丘equent famines and epidemic outbreaks of the plague and
smallpox. Large cities w田e pestilent and dirty, with unsightly open sewers.
Crinle was rampant. Half of all children died before they turned ten. Thus,
we can imagine the surprise and awe that the magnificent city of Tenochtitlan
engendered in the Spaniards wh。 arrived there. Tenochtitlan, an Aztec city in
central Mexico, had about 350,000 inhabitants-many times the popul低ion
of London 。r Seville at the time. When the Spanish 四plorer and colonizer
HernandoC。rtes (1485-1547) sawthisc均 he declared it to be them。st beau-
tiful city on earth. His compani。n and chronicler Bernal Diaz (1492-1585)
agreed, calling it a "wonderful thing to behold." Unlike European cities of the
time, Tenochtitlan boasted clean streets, amazing floating gardens, a huge
aqueduct system, and a market m。re extensive than any the Europeans had
ever seen (Stannard 1993).
Despite their admiration, the Spaniards did not preserve this city.τhe
arrival of the Spaniards led to the destructi。a 。f not only this amazing city,
but also many t。wns and cities across the Americas. The p。pulati。n of cen-
tral Mexico was decimated in less than a centur再也dining from 25 million
in 1519 to barely 1.3 milli。n in 1595.τhis pa吐ern continued through。utthe
Americas, so that nearly 95 percent of the native p。pulations w町e destroyed
in less than 200years (Stannard 1993).
Slavery and c。1。nization

Africans were present in the c。nquest 。f the Americas from the beginning,
b。th as slaves and as sailors and explorers. Spain and p。rtugal were slavehold-
ingsocieties long before Columbus set sail in search 。fthelndics.Many, but not
all，。f the slaves in Spain in the E丘eenth centuryw·ere A仕icans. Some African
12 CHAPTER 1 The O 「 i g in of the Idea of Race
The Spanish Treatment

of Indigenous Peoples
………………………………....................................................... ............ . ............ . ... .
The following excerpts are from a 1519 report by the Dominican order about the
Spanish treatment of indigenous peoples in the Carib Islands.
Some Christians encounter an Indian woman, who was carrying in her arms
a child at suck; and since the dog they had with them was hungry, they tore
. the child from the mother's arms and flung it still living to the dog, who
proceeded to devour 让 before the mother's eyes.
When there were among the prisoners some women who had recently given
bi此h, if the new-born babes happened to cry, they seized them by the legs
and hurled them against the rocks, or flung them into the jungle so that they
would be certain to die there.
Each of them [the foremen] had made it a practice to sleep with the Indian
women who were in his workforce, if they pleased him, whether they were
married women or maidens. While the foreman remained ... with the
Indian woman, he sent the husband to dig gold out of the mines; and in
the evening, when the wretch returned, not only was he beaten or whipped
because he had not brought enough gold, but further, most often, he was
bound hand and foot and flung under the bed like a dog, before the foreman
lay down, directly over him, with his wife.
Source: Todorov 1984, 139.

............ . ............ . .................................. . ............ . . . .......... . ......................... . ........
residents of Spain and Portugal-enslaved as well as free-accompanied

Spaniards on their initial conquest voyages to the New World. Juan Garrido
(ca. 1480-ca. 1547), for example, was born in Africa and later traveled to
Portugal and then to Spain, where he joined an expedition to Santo Domingo.
Juan Garrido also participated in the conquest of Puerto Rica, Cuba, and then
Mexico.Juan Garcia (ca. 1495-date of death unknown), in contrast, was born
in Spain as a free mulatto and traveled to Peru as a colonist (Restall 2000).
τhe Spanish colonists-often called conquistadores-endeavored to subdue
native populations and to convert them into Catholics and subjects of the
Spanish Crown. Their main goal, however, was to extract as much wealth as
possible from the Americas. This extraction of wealth required labor, and the
Spanish colonists enslaved the native populations to this end. The harsh con-
ditions of this enslavement led to massive declines in the native populations,
Race : The Evolu • io n of a n Ideology 13
and in 1550, the Spanish Crown outlawed the practice, although it continued
to allow other forms of forced labor. The ban on enslavement of indigenous
people did not end the need for labor, and the Spaniards turned to Africa in
their search for workers. As they realized that agricultural exploitation, partic-
ularly the harvesting of sugarcane, could bring enormous wealth, they began
to bringA仕ican slaves in very large numbers to their colonies in the Americas
(Franklin 1974; Morgan 1975; Smedley2007） .τhe Spaniards and Portuguese
had long been trading with Africans and thus could imagine the possibili-
ties for slave trading with Africa. Notably, the Spaniards were well aware of
the technological advances developed in Africa and did not seek Africans as
slaves because they thought they were inferior. To the contrary, the Spaniards
believed enslaved Africans would be a valuable asset. Consequent！拓 tens
V Between 10 and
of millions of Africans were brought over between the early 1600s and the 30 million Africans were
ninetee brought to the Americas
on slave ships. Nearly a
quarter died while at sea.
F号， 5
”吗？『....，.…『『崎…·
D
’
.
，。
6
。「 c 虫。 G
。
。
I ’'ig.·f
_,
Pr，＇.＇，、．．·，令
1.4 CHAPTER 1 The O 「 ig i n of the Idea of Race
Whereas the Spaniards had had centuries of contact with Africans, the
English who settled in North America had had no such contact until the arrival
of twenty Africans in Jamestown in 1619. Slaves did not become an essential
part of the workforce in North America until much later.
τhe form of slavery that eventually emerged in the North American colonies
was unique in several ways. First, slaves had no human or legal rights. They were
seen only as property, not as people who could marry or own property them-
selves. Second, slavery was permanent and the slave status was inherited. ’Third,
slaves were forbidden to learn to read or write, thereby ensuring their inferior
social status. Finally, slavery in North America was unique insofar as nearly all
Africans and their descendants were enslaved, and only this group could be
enslaved. This unique system of human exploitation laid the groundwork for a
new idea of human difference (Smedley 2007). Before delving further into this
poin飞 let’stake a closer look at the English settlements in North America.
γesea~γc
Slave Flights and Runaway Communities

in Colonial Angola
Slavery was common in Africa well before the transatlantic slave trade. And for
as long as slavery existed, so did slave rebellions and runaway slave communities.
Brazilian historian Roquinaldo Ferreira has studied these forms of resistance in
colonial Angola, a country in southwestern Africa, focusing on the seventeenth
to nineteenth centuries.
Ferreira argues that slave flight and the formation of runaway slave commu-
nities were frequent in Angola, which the Portuguese colonized in 1575. His
work shows that these factors disrupted internal trade networks and impeded
Portuguese plans to develop a plantation system there. Slaves played an import-
ant role in Angola's economy during this period, working in both urban and farm
se忧ings. ’Their resistance posed major problems for the Portuguese colonists.
Local resistance to slavery also posed a threat to the transatlantic slave trade.
Angolan slaves feared being sent on ships to Brazil and would do whatever they
could to avoid that fate, including running away二 Angolan slaveowners were thus
reluctant to sell into the transatlantic slave trade, fearing that the sale of one slave
would cause others to flee.
Some runaway slaves were taken in by African rulers. For example, in 1805
a ruler named Caculo Cacahenda hired a runaway who was a scribe literate in
Portuguese. ’The scribe helped his new employer correspond diplomatically and
commercially with the Portuguese in Luanda, Angola’s capital.
Runaway slaves sometimes joined together in communities called quilombos
in Portuguese, some of which became large and powerful. One was led by a
former slave named Calumba, who commanded widespread respect from African
rulers. In a Portuguese military campaign against Calumba, sixty-four individ-
uals were captured, which gives us an idea of how large his quilombo may have
been. ’There were at least five quilombos in Angola in the 1820s, and the popula-
tion of these communities may have been in the thousands.
’Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Portuguese colonial
government consistently tried to break these quilombos. 咀1ey were unsuccessful,
and in the late nineteenth centu叨 the Luanda administration signed a treaty that
allowed the quilombos' existence and promised to cease attacks on them.
For Discussion
I. What are some differences between the Angolan slave trade and the transatlantic
slave trade?
2. Why do you think the Portuguese tried to break the quilombos?
Source: Ferreira 2014.
Exploitation in the Thirteen English Colonies

In the late fifteenth century, Europeans began to explore parts ofN orthAmerica
where indigenous peoples had lived for thousands of years. 咀1e English,
learning of the great wealth the Spanish had accrued in the New World, were
anxious to fill their coffers with riches as well. England first sent colonists to
Roanoke Island in the late sixteenth century, but that a忧empt at settlement
failed. ’The first permanent English settlement was at Jamestown in 1607. Much
as Columbus had recounted in 1492, these English settlers reported that the
local Native Americans were kind and generous and helped them to survive the
unfamiliar conditions. Amicable trade relations did not last long, however, as it
became clear that the Englishmen’s intentions were not benign: they planned to
take over indigenous land and resources (Morgan 1975; Zinn 2010).
Takeover of Indigenous Lands

European colonists engaged in constant warfare with Native Americans, oftetl
burn
justified their takeover of indigenous lands in religious terms. ’They interpreted
their successes as God's will. For example,John Winthrop (1588-1649), a leader
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the mid-seventeenth century, wrote that
the death of so many Native Americans as a result of smallpox showed that “ the
Lord hathe cleared our title to what we possess'' (quoted in Wood 1991, 96).
It is important to note that when the English colonists interacted with Native
Americans, they did not see them as belonging to a separate race; this idea did
not yet e刻st. Instead, the English saw themselves as superior in religious and
moral terms. ’These religious justifications, however, laid the groundwork for
racial distinctions tl以 emerged later (Jordan 1968; Smedley 2007).
币1e first fi丘y years of the new settlement in Virginia were full of hardship.
Disease, starvation, and war caused extreme与 high death rates among both
Native Americans and English colonists. There were severe food shortage叼a吻
because the first se忧lersdidnot 抖ant enough corn. Morgan (1975) points out tl以
most of the settlers in Virginia were not farmers but nobles or gentry who thought
food cultivation was beneath them. Although the settlers were too proud to grow
corn to eat, they were willing to take up the enterprise of growing tobacco to sell
and expected to make their riches in this manner. As there was no shortage ofland
in this vast count叨 the only commodity lacking was labor power (Zinn 2010).
咀1e English colonists were notoriously successful at decimating the Native
American population, yet less so in their a忧empts to use Native Americans
for labor. When the English realized they would not become rich instanta-
neously through gold or silver mining, as it appeared the Spaniards had done,
they turned to agricultural production to seek wealth. For this, they needed
labor-lots of it. The English were able to enslave Native Americans they cap-
tured in warfare, but most indigenous slaves either died or ran away, leaving
the English in need of more labor in order to accumulate wealth (Zinn 2010).
Indentured Servi缸，de
’The lack of success at enslaving Native Americans led the colonists to turn
to Britain, where they recruited poor men, women, and children from the
streets of cities such as Liverpool and Bristol. Englishmen also rounded up
Irish and Scottish peasants who had been conquered in warfare, banished, or
released from prison. Indentured servants from Europe who were willing t 0
work for four to seven years to pay off their passage and debt soon became the
primary source oflabor for th olonies (At a Glance 1.1). The harsh treatment
AT A GLANCE 1.1 Servitude, Slavery, and Genocide in the Americas
Slaves and Servants in Populati。n: Chesapeake Col。nies

The enslaved population increased as the indentured servant population declined.
100
90
Free
COZ旦2BOBFoom
80
70
60
50
40
Servants
30
且gcogω
20
10
。
矿矿矿矿心子。矿矿~萨心θ ＂＇0.,,(:) "'0:)（：） ♂ ，~<o(:) ,~ro(:) ,~~(:) "'<:o(:)
Data from Tom/ins 2001
The American Slave Trade
Between 1450 and 1900, 12,817,000 Africans were brought to the New World as slaves.
1450-1500
1501-1600
Each figure
1601-1700 •tttttt1 represents
250,000 persons
1701-1800 •tttttt忡忡，；，忡忡忡””啊’
1801-1900 堕tttttt宁市TT啦？”’
。 2 3 4 5 6 7 Data from Lovejoy 2012
Number of persons, in millions
Genocide 。f lndigen。us People

Between 1492 and 1600, as many as 138 million indigenous people were killed-90 to 95°/o of the pre-1492 population.
5-10°/o 一「
Indigenous population
killed
Remaining indigenous
population
90-95°/o
Data from Stannard 1993;

Taylor 2002
18 CHAPTER 1 The O 「 igin of the Idea of Ra ce
of European indentured servants needed no justification, as servitude was a

way of life in Britain at that time (Smedley 2007; Zinn 2010 ).
τhroughout the seventeenth century, indentured servants endured harsh
conditions as laborers in the colonies. Hopeful laborers continued to come
to the Americas, despite the difficult circumstances, because there were pos-
sibilities for social and economic advancement in North America that did
not exist in England. The flow of English laborers began to decline, however,
with the restoration of the monarchy in England in 1660, as King Charles II
implemented policies that discou鸣ed emigration (Smedley2007).
Jhe Enslavement of Africans

In addition to bringing English laborers, colonists brought Africans to the
colonies as slaves (At a Glance I .I). Most African slaves brought to North
America were from West Africa and were Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, or Mada.
In I6I9, English colonists brought the first group of Africans to the North
American colonies. ’These twenty Africans occupied nearly the same social
status as European indentured servants and were soon joined by African slaves
brought over by Dutch and Spanish slave ships. All of these early Africans
were granted rights that were later denied to all blacks in Virginia. ’There is no
evidence that African slaves during the period before I660 were subjected to
more severe disciplinary measures than European servants. Some slaves were
allowed to earn money of their own and to buy their freedom with it. 咀1ere are
several cases recorded in which masters set up conditions in their wills whereby
Negro slaves would become free or could purchase their freedom a丘er themas-
ter's death. ’The terms of these wills imply that the freed slaves would become
鸣ular members of the community (Mo耶n I975; Smedley2007; Zinn2010).
The enslavement of Africans turned out to be particularly profitable in part
because Africans brought with them agricultural and craft experience. In
addition, unlike people indigenous to the Americas, Africans had immunities
白1e American Slave Trade

1492 I 1619 I 1660 I 1676 I 1863 I 1865
。
Christopher First African First slave codes Bacon's Rebellion Abraham Slavery is
Columbus lands slaves arrive in enacted Lincoln issues abolished in the
in the Caribbean Jamestown the Emancipation United States
Proclamation
to Old World diseases and thus could live longer in slavery. The initial justifi-
cations for bringing Africans to the colonies were not racial in nature. At the
time, slavery was an accepted social system. To the extent that a justification
was offered, it was that Africans were heathens and their enslavement would
ensure their salvation (Smedley 2007). Over time, racial justifications for the
enslavement ofAfricans emerged.
The Legal Codification of Racial Differences

Slave codes of the 1660s spelled out the legal differences between African slaves slave codes Laws enacted
and European indentured servants. In 1667, Virginia issued a decree that slaves in the 1660s that clearly
who had converted to Christianity could continue to be enslaved because of spelled out the differences
their so-called heathen ancestry二 Whereas earlier justifications for slavery were between African slaves
primarily religious, the idea that ancestry could be used to determine social and European indentured
status set the stage for the development of the idea of race. In the late seven- servants.
teenth century, Virginia and Maryland each passed a series oflaws that solidified
the status of blacks. The strongest indicator of the solidification of the status of
Africans was the prohibition of manumission: masters were not allowed to free
their slaves, ther由y establishing a permanent slave class. Other laws established
lifelong servitude, forbade interracial marriage, and limited the rights of blacks
to own property and bear arms. These laws specific to blacks both reflected the
social order and solidified the status quo. For most of the seventeenth century,
European indentured servants and African slaves had shared a similar social
status. ’The slave codes gradually changed this social classification.
Laws against lnterma时。ge

’The shared social position of African and European servants and slaves in the
early years of the colonies meant that these groups intermarried and frater-
nized. The fact that Africans and Europeans had amicable relations can be seen
in the laws passed that forbade these relationships. In 1661, Virginia passed
a law that imposed harsh conditions on English servants who ran away with
African slaves. In 1691, Virginia passed another law that prohibited free whites
from intermarrying with blacks and Native Americans. Had these groups been
naturally disinclined to intermarry or to fraternize, these laws would not have
been necessary二 As the 1661 law shows, plantation owners were concerned that
European indentured servants and African slaves would see that they shared a
common interest in fighting for more rights and better conditions. As historian
Howard Zinn puts i飞“only one fear was greater than the fear ofblack rebellion
in the new American colonies. That was the fear that discontented whites
would join black slaves to overthrow the existing order” ο010, 37).
20 CHAPTER 1 The Origin of the Idea of Race
When Africans and Europeans first found themselves together in the

Americas, sexual relations and even marriage between these two groups were
not uncommon. African men and women married European men and women
(Smedley 2007). Various laws were passed, however, both to prevent and to
control these relationships. 咀1e aforementioned 1662 law made it clear that
when African women had children, the child ’s status as slave or free would be in
accordance with the condition of the mother. ’The law also indicated that when
Christians-here meaning Europeans-had sexual relations with Africans,
they would pay double the normal fine for adultery.τhe European men who
wrote these laws perceived 让 to be important to prevent sexual relations
between Europeans and Africans and to ensure that the children of enslaved
African women would also be slaves. 卫1is law
effectively prevented the formation of families by
enslaved African women and European men.
Baei。n’s Rebellion
Bacon’s Rebellion, which occurred in September
1676, provides one example ofwhat could happen
when blacks and whites joined forces to fight for
their interests. 刀1e rebellion itself was not partic-
ularly successful, but the coalition that emerged
between poor whites and African slaves and
freedmen became a cause for concern among the
elite planter class, who depended on these groups
for cheap labor. In Bacon’s Rebellion, white
indentured servants joined forces with enslaved
Africans and freedmen to protest their condi-
tions. 咀1is massive rebellion, in which protes-
tors demanding an end to their servitude burned
Jamestown to the ground, was a clear threat to the
status quo. One of the last groups to surrender was
a mixed group of eighty black and twenty white
servants. ’This multiracial coalition indicates that
blacks and whites were willing to join forces to
fight for their common interests as laborers. A丘er
Bacon’s Rebellion, an official report arguing for
the continued presence of British soldiers in Vir-
A In Bacon's Rebellion, white indentured servants joined ginia stated:“Virginia is at present poor and more
forces with enslaved Africans to protest their conditions. populous than ever. 咀1ere is great apprehension
of a rising among the servants, owing to their great necessities and want of
clothes; they may plunder the storehouses and sh胁”（Zinn 2010, 37).
Howard Zinn and other historians argue that Bacon’s Rebellion stirred up
fear in the hearts of the elite planter class and that this fear led these elites
to pass laws that worked to divide blacks and whites. For example, in the
aftermath of the rebellion, the Virginia Assembly gave amnesty to the white
servants who had rebelled but not to the blacks. By extending this and other
privileges to whites that were denied to blacks, the elites succeeded in prevent-
ing future class-based alliances between blacks and whites that would threaten
the social order.
”而9a/th Imbalance and 伪e Tenuous Social Order

Wealth in colonial North America was concentrated in the hands of very few
people. In 1700, there were about 250,000 colonists, most ofwhom lived in hor-
rendous conditions. In Virginia, there were only about a丘y wealthy families,
who depended on the labor of the other 40,000 poor colonists. 卫1is imbalance
of wealth made for a tenuous social order (Zinn 2010). It soon became clear to
the rich elite and the governing body that they could not continue to disregard
the interests of the majority of the population. In 1705, a law was passed requir-
ing masters to provide white servants whose indenture time was completed
with ten bushels of corn, thirty shillings, a gu凡 andfi丘y acres of land (Morgan
1975, 344). This tactic of giving servants a piece of the American Dream was
intended to avoid rebellion by convincing poor whites that the rich landowners
were not extortionists or enemies, but protectors of their common interests. To
reinforce this impression, it was further mandated that servants had the right
to possess property but that slaves did not (Morgan 19巧 333）.’The Virginia
Assembly in 1705 also prohibited any Negro, mulatto, or Indian from raising
his hand in opposition to any Christian, which meant any white man (Jordan
1968). By denying black slaves privileges extended to white servants, the 且m
step was taken in creating a division between blacks and whites (Zinn 2010).
In New York in 1708, a group of slaves was accused of murdering a farmer
and his family.二 Shortly a丘erward, a law was enacted preventing the conspir-
acy of slaves. ’This meant, in effect, that slaves could not gather in private to
talk about anything. In 1712, a slave rebellion involving about fifty slaves le丘
nine whites dead and six others wounded. Immediately therea丘er, New York ’s
repressive laws were reinforced. For example, arson committed by a slave wa s
made into a cr
One purpose of the slave codes was the prevention and deterrence of slave
rebellions, which were becoming more and more of a real danger with the
increasing number of slaves, especially in the southern colonies, where slaves

o丘en outnumbered whites. In 1730, in Virginia, the governor ordered that all
whites should bring their guns with them to church on Sunday so that they
would be prepared for a slave uprising in the event that slaves took advantage
of tl附 absence to conspire (Jordan 1968).’Ihe idea of a slave rebellion was
even more distasteful to whites because of the widespread idea that any slave
insurrection would have as its ultimate goal not only the emancipation of
slaves but also the dominance ofblacks over whites (Jordan 1968).
s。lidilying the Idea of Race

Ev创ually, the entire slave class was composed of black Africans, and, as a
result of manumission restrictions, most blacks were enslaved. 刀1e creation of
From Bui/whip Days

.............................................................................................. ...........................
My mother's mistress had three boys-one twenty-one, one nineteen,

and one seventeen. One day, Old Mistress had gone away to spend the
day. Mother always worked in the house; she didn’t work on the farm, in
Missouri. While she was alone, the boys came in and threw her down on the
floor and tied her down so she couldn’t struggle, and one after the other used
. her as long as they wanted, for the whole afternoon. Mother was sick when
her mistress came home. When Old Mistress wanted to know what was the
matter with her, she told her what the boys had done. She whipped them,
and that’s the way I came to be here.
-Mαry Peters describing the brutαl circumstances ofher own conception
I saw slaves sold. I can see that old block now. My cousin Eliza was a pretty
girl, really good-looking. Her master was her father.... The day they sold her
will always be remembered. They stripped her to be bid off and looked at..
The man that bought Eliza was from New York. The Negroes had made
up 'nuf money to buy her off theyself, but the white folks wouldn’tlet that
happen. There was a man bidding for her that was a Swedeland. He allus bid
for the good-looking cullud gals and bought ’em for his own use. He ask the
man from New York “What you gonna do with ’er when you git 'er?” The man
from New York said,“None of your damn business, but you ain’t got money
’n11fto buy ’er.'’
-Former slave DαnielDowdy
Source: Mellon 2002, 297; 287.

..................... . .............. . ..................... . .............. . .................................... . ...... . ...
S l ave 「y Versus • he Ideal of F 「eedom in the United States 23
this sort of color line, alongside the introduction of the concept of hereditary
slavery, was an important step toward solidifying the idea of race. Notably,
it was not until the eighteenth century that negative beliefs about Africans
became widespread among the English settlers. Even then, there is ample evi “
dence that blacks and whites continued to fraternize. In 1743, a grand jury
in Charleston, South Carolina, denounced “’The Too Common Practice of
Criminal Conversation with Negro and other Slave Wenches in this Province''
(Zinn 2010 ).
The stories of Mary Peters and Daniel Dowdy (Voices: From Bullwhip
Days) elucidate the cruelty and dehumanization that were part and parcel
of colonialism and enslavement in the Americas. ’These two phenomena-
colonialism and slavery-have left a strong mark on the way people in the
United States view the world. Our contemporary racial worldview is a relic of
the systems of human classification that were first used in the context of the
colonization of Native American territories and the enslavement of Africans
in the Americas. Although such brutal practices are no longer morally or
legally permissible, the ideas of racial difference that emerged from those
practices persist.
SLAVERY VERSUS THE IDEAL 。 F FREED。M

IN THE UNITED STATES
’The Declaration of Independence famously begins by stating that all men are
created equal. ’The question was, then, why were some enslaved? Although the
concept of liberty was at the core of the American Revolution, nearly half of
the fifty-five men who made up the 1787 Constitutional Convention owned
slaves, and most of the rest profited from slavery through their business prac-
tices.Aprominent member, George Washington (1732-1799), was one of the
richest men in the colonies and the owner of many slaves. These men struggled
with the contradictions inherent in advocating for freedom in a slaveholding
society, yet they were unwilling to outlaw slavery (Feagin 2001).
τhe writers of the founding documents of the United States were not will-
ing to end slavery in part because most of them profited directly or indirectly
from it. The wealth generated by slave labor in the United States had made the
American Revolution possible: a signi且cant amount of the funds that financed
the Amer
contradiction between the ideals of freedom and the prevalence of slavery led
to justifications of slavery in terms of blacks’ alleged racial inferiority二 Writings
by people such as Thomas Jefferson validated the belief that people of African
24 CHAPTER I T如e Origin of the Idec of Race
descent were less than hun1an. In 1787, Th。mas Jeffers。n w rote in Notes 。”
的喀inia：“Blacks, whether originally a distinct race or made distinct by time
and circumstance, are inferior t。 whites in the endowment both ofb。dyand
mind” (Jefferson (1787] 2004, 98 -99).
Slavery was an immensely profitable enterprise f。r a small number of slave-
h。lders. In 1860, the twelve wealthiest count ies in the United States c。uld all
be found in the Deep s。uth. The pr。且ts were n。t evenly divided, however:
about 7 percent 。cs。utherners owned t hree-quarters of the 4 million slaves in
the South. 刀1is concentration 。f wealth meant that slaveowners constituted a
powerful planter class that went to great lengths t。 protect its property, which
included humans: slaveowners saw enslaved Africans and African Americans
as an investment they did not want t。 lose. Additionally, many whites who
did not own slaves pro且ted indirectly from the slave system. In t he s。uthern
The Idea of Rαce in Latin American

Nation-Making
Conlradictions sυrraund呐。 v
1acial ide。｜。。ies
v
a re Lalin Americans c。unlered Eur，。p曲。的1e'lecruals’
nal υnique ta the Uniled Stales. Dυring the 时ne impre础。n of I协m with doims th。I rocial mixlure （厅时
teenth cenluiv. Latin American c。υntries s，。υchi their
，卜
’ 》
lizoie）、叫υId lead lop阳gress. L alin Amer阳内 inlellec·
independence from c。l。阳。l rule. As in 1he United luals 。rgυed lhol racial mixlure 咱s not only beneficial
Stoles, such oails for political freedom seemed at bυ1 。Isa 1he ho!lmark of Lalin Amerioan nolions.
。dds with lhese nalio时’ l。n9 hislories 。l slovery According to lhis log比， the mixture of Iberians !those
and servitude. of Sponish 。r Porlugυese descent) wilh olher 阳西s
Fi。而 1870 to 1940, Lalin American counlries was w仇。i made c。unlries such os Mexico Cυba,
we陪 en909ed in nalion making. Thal 筒， Latin Ameri 。nd Brazil greol nalions. Although Lalin Amerioans
con intell制υ。l 。nd pa!ilical elites allempted l。 build de咱l。ped their own brar、d oi raciol id四logy, lhey
nati。阳！ υnily for !heir fledgling nalions !Knighl 防守0). did not 陪ject lhe belief 1ha1 whiter暗自 was Sυper阳
In this process, they ende。v。red lo pro咱 thol their lnslead, they e净。nded the ide。。f w'nileness lo
counlries w自e m。den、 noli。nswilh 。 υniqυe idenlity ind，战阳cia11y and cultural怜 mixed peo饨的。rder
They hod lo c。时end, howev凹， wilh European schol lo ace。而m。dole lheir 。wn1e。Iiii出 Faced wilh differ·
ors who viewed lhem 出阳ciaily degener，。te ISie归。 enl rocial dem。graphics, Lalin American intel!ecluals
199 1) M。rry European scholars looked down 。a de叫。ped rcciol and 阳1酬。l d阴阳rs部队。I suited
Lalin Americo, which lhey per，四ived cs hoving h阶 lheir oounlries. A c。nsideroli町、。l Lalin American
le咱Is ol racial mix阳陪。nd a 1elati咱ly sm。II number ra白。I ideal。gies and d肘。urses r由四川hat ideas of
o! whites. while supenorily come in many forms.
The Ind ian Removal Ac •: The Continuation of Manifes • Des • iny 25
United States, slavery was part of the economic and social fabric of society.
咀1ere were fewer slaves in the northern states, but many Northerners had
strong economic ties to slavery insofar as they consumed and manufactured
products made on slave plantations. ’These strong economic interests in slavery
meant that the practice was not ended in the United States until the victory of
the North in the Civil War (Wilson 1996; Feagin 2001).
On January 1, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) issued the
Emancipation Proclamation, which freed the slaves held in the rebel states of
the Confederacy二 His willingness to issue this proclamation was not hindered
by his belief that blacks were inferior to whites. Five years earlier, in 1858,
Lincoln had declared:“I am not nor ever have been in favor of the social and
political equality of the white and black races: that I am not nor ever have been
in favor of making voters of the free negroes, or jurors, or qualifying them to
hold office or having them to marry with white people .... I as much as any
other man am in favor of the superior position being assigned to the white
man”(quoted in Feagin 2001, 83-84).
In 1865, the United States finally abolished slavery二 Slavery was one of the
main reasons for the long and bloody Civil War that had pitted the North
against the South. From the perspective of plantation owners in the South,
slavery was a profitable institution that ensured the proper place of blacks in
society. From the perspective of capitalists in the North, slavery gave southern
capitalists an unfair competitive advantage (Feagin 2001).’The end of slavery
marked the end of an era of extreme exploitation. ’The racist ideologies that had
Indian Removal Act of
justified the enslavement of Africans and the massacre and removal of Native
1830 Act that enabled
Americans, however, would endure.
the administration of
U.S. President Andrew
Jackson to use military
THE INDIAN REM。VAL ACT: THE C。 NTINUATI 。N
power to displace at
。F MANIFEST DESTINY
least 70,000 Native
’The Indian Removal Act of 1830 enabled the administration of President Americans, killing tens of
Andrew Jackson to use military power to displace at least 70,000 Native thousands in the process.
Americans, killing tens of thousands in the process. Indian removal is often
associated with the Cherokee of Georgia, but there were actually many more Trails of Tears The forced
“ Trails of Tears,” including the forced displacement of the Apalachicola of displacement of the
Florida, the Peoria of Illinois, the Shawnee of Ohio, and a host of other tribes Cherokee of Georgia, the
(Littlefield and Parins 2011).’These removals violated treaties the United Apalachicola of Florida,
States had made with Native Americans, even though the Indian Removal the Peoria of Illinois, the
Act contained a clause guaranteeing that “ nothing in this act contained shall Shawnee of Ohio, and a
be construed as authorizing or directing the violation of any existing treaty host of other tribes.
26 CHAPTER 1 Th e O rig in of the Idea of Race
> Under President

Jackson's administration,
tens of thousands of
Native Americans died
as a result of forced
displacements known as
the Trails of Tears.
between the United States and any of the Indian tribes" (quoted in Cave
2003, 1335). These forced displacements, which continued until 185现 when
the Seminoles were removed from Florida, wreaked havoc on indigenous
communities (Littlefield and Parins 2011).
During these treacherous journeys, tens of thousands of Native Americans
died from disease, cold, starvation, and exhaustion. Approximately 17,000
Cherokee were forcibly removed, and nearly half of those who embarked on
the Trail of Tears died in the process. Large numbers of indigenous people
died in other removals: about 6,000 of the 40,000 Choctaw did not survive the
journe如 and only about half of the Creek and the Seminole peoples survived
their removals (Churchill 2002).
咀1e justifications for Indian removal were distinct from those used for
slaver}
Americans, in contrast, were construed as hindering white expansion, and thtl s
the racial ideologies surrounding Native Americans tended to explain and pre-
dict their gradual extinction. Notably, this extinction was imagined as occur-
ring through both assimilation (marriage to whites) and natural selection
The Rise of Science and the Question of Human Diffe 「ence 27
(death from disease). Whereas colonists’ ideas about Africans 阳ved to justi行
their hyperexploitation of slaves, whites' ideas about Native Americans aimed
to justify the assimilation and gradual extinction of these groups, enabling
whites to appropriate Indian lands (Berger 2009).
THE RISE 。 F
SCIENCE AND THE QUESTI 。 N
。F HUMAN DIFFERENCE
In the seventeenth century, people in the Americas developed and acted on folk
ideas about differences among Africans, Europeans, and Native Americans
that were based on daily interactions and the prevailing social order. ’The slow
emergence of the idea of racial difference can be seen in the laws passed and
the decisions made by religious leaders. However, the rise of science in the
eighteenth century would fundamentally alter this conversation. ’The question
of human difference began to move from the realms of religion and folk ideas
to that of science.
Eur。pean TaX!。no mies

Before the rise of science, Westerners understood the world primarily in bibli-
cal terms. Theology provided explanations for nearly everything. ’Thus, when
Europeans encountered the Americas, they a忧empted to place these peoples
into their understanding of the history of the world, as described in their scrip-
tures. 咀1is led to debates over which of the three sons ofNoah was the ancestor
of the Native Americans and even over whether Native Americans were fully
human. 卫1e strong belief in the biblical scriptures carried over into scientific
thought, which became the central arena for shaping understandings of race
(Smedley 2007).
One of the key features of the rise of science was the emergence of taxon-
omy. Scholars endeavored to classify all flora and fauna known to them. Soon,
scientists began to a忧empt to classify human beings into types. One of the
first efforts to develop a classificatory system for humans appeared in a French
journal in 1684. ’The author, Fran<;ois Bernier (1625-1688), divided humans
into four groups: Europeans, Far Easterners, Negroes, and Lapps (people from
Lapland in no此hern Scandanavia). His system used physical traits such as skin
color and hair texture, which would later become prominent determinants of
racial status, to categorize different groups. Other scholars worked on devel-
oping classificatory schemes, but it was not until 1735 that we begin to see the
development of a comprehensive system of classification that resembles the
modern concept of race (Eze 1997).
28 CHAPTER 1 The O 「 ig i n o f the Idea of Race
In 1735, the Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778) proposed that

all human beings could be divided into four groups. 币1ese four groups are
consistent with the modern idea of race in two ways: all of them are still used
today, and Linnaeus connected physical traits such as skin color with cultural
and moral traits such as “ indolence.” Linnaeus described these four groups,
which correspond to four of the continents, in Systemae N aturae in 1735:
Americanus: reddish, choleric, ... obstinate, merry, free; ... regulated by

customs.
Asiaticus: sallow, melancholy, ... black hair, dark eyes, ... haughty, ... ruled
by opinions.
Aj争icanus: black, phlegmatic, relaxed; women without shame, ... cra丘%
indolent, negligent; governed by caprice.
Europαenus: white, sanguine, muscular; inventive; governed by laws.
Other European men elaborated on this schema. For example, Johann

Blurr
icatory system that divided humans into five varieties that also were associated
with geographical origins: Caucasian，岛1ongolian, Ethiopian, American, and
Malay. Both Blumenbach and Linnaeus endowed Europeans-their own
group-with the most admirable qualities. It bears repeating that the idea of
race is an idea that was initiated by European men and that, not surprisingly,
consistently has been used to explain and justify European superiorit予 The
Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), for example, asserted in 1748
that whites were the only “ species” to have created civilized nations and to have
developed arts and sciences. European explanations ofwhite racial superiority
espoused by Blumenbach, Linnaeus, and Hume soon reached the Americas,
where they were used to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans and
the continued takeover of indigenous lands (Eze 1997).
Scientific Racism in the Nineteenth Century

’The nineteenth century was an age of emancipation from slavery and libera-
tion from colonial powers. It also saw the rise of industrial capitalism and the
scientific racism emergence of scientific racism-the use of science or pseudoscience to justify
The use of science or or reproduce racial inequality. For intellectuals in the Americas and Europe,
pseudoscience to justi命 scientific racism was central to most human and social inquiries. Eighteenth-
or reproduce racial century scientists had developed elaborate systems of human classification. In
inequality. the nineteenth century, scientists built on these classification systems by devel-
oping anthropometrics-tools designed to measure the qualities ofhumans.
The Rise of Science e nd the Qυeslion of Hυmon Difference 29
With the publication bct,,.een 1853 and 1855 of c。mte ..... __‘….,.
Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau's f。旧 v。lumes entitled Essays on
,...”“.
the Inequali纱 of 伪e Human Races, it is safe to say that by the
mid-nineteenth century, the idea 。f race was fully in place.
G。bineau (1816-1882) di功ded humanity int。 three races-
white, yell。问 and black- and argued that racial differences
allow us t。 explain fundamental differences among pe。pie.
G。binea1矿s thinking was in line with that 。£Herbert Spencer
(1820-1903), who contended that the superiority of the ......
, __ -
European ra臼 explained its d。minant position. He p。inted
价·“国，.
to the natural inferiority of Native Americans as an expla-
nation for their decimati。n. Spencer's ideas of the “ survival
。f the fi忧es俨 would hold great s,,.ay for many years to c。me.
B。th Spencer and G。bineau used ideas and rudimentary evi-

dence fr。m travel accounts t。 make their claims. Other scien- －』
tists, however, were devel。ping anthropometric techniques

价· ·‘……·....•
that enabled them to measure differences between people
(Gould 1996). ·..”.,.
Samuel Ge。rgeM。rton (1799-1851)1 a scientist and physi-
cian ,,.ho worked in Philadelphia, amassed an impre臼ive col-
lection 。fhuman skulls. He began his collection in the 1820s,
and by the t ime of his death in 1851 he had over 1,000 skulls.
…….”··
Morton used t hese skulls to test his hyp。thesis that brain size
c。uld be used to rank the various human races. In his initial
efforts to measure brain size, Mort。n 量lled the cranial cavity A A racist illustration from Josiah Clark Nott
削d George Robert Gliddon's Ind馆刷刷础
with mustard seed. Later, when he realized that mustard seed
Ra剧 ofthe Earti, (1857), showing per凶iv创
did n。t provide c。nsistent measurements, he switched tο lead distinctions be怕也en the white man, the
shots with a one-eighth-inch diameter that produced less v盯i black man，缸，d the chimpanzee.
able results. Using both mustard seeds and lead shots, Mort。n's
measurements c。nsistently showed that Europeans had larger
brains than Africans or American Indians. In 1977, cvoluti。nary biologist and
scientific hist。rian StephenJayG。uld reanalyzed M。rton's raw data and found
several examples of unconsci。us bias in his work (G。uld 1996).
Mort。n found that American Indians had the smallest skull sizes. Gould
explains that Morton arrived at this conclusi。n because he had included
155 skulls of Peruvian Incas, wh。 had an average brain size of seventy-five
cubic inches, yet he only included three skulls of lroqu。is people, wh。 had,
on average, a much larger skull size. In contrast, in the Caucasian group,
Morton eliminated the Hindus, wh。 had the smallest skulls, from his sample.
30 CHAPTER 1 The O rig in of the Idea of Race
Had Morton ensured equal representation from each of the American Indian
and Caucasian groups, he would have found no significant differences in
skull size.
Stephen Gould explains that skull size is related to body size, and yet he
contends that Morton never took body size into account when he measured
skulls. As women tend to be smaller than men, women o丘en have smaller
skulls. When Morton compared the brain sizes of Africans and Europeans,
his African sample was entirely female and his E吨lish 阳nple entirely male.
Of course, he found that Europeans had larger brains. What is remarkable
about Morton’s research is not just that it is full of unconscious bias, but also
that his biases are consistently in favor of his expectations. Morton set out
to prove, through science, that Europeans were superior. All of his miscal-
culations turned out in favor of his hypothesis. In this sense, Morton was
similar to nearly all of his contemporaries: European and American male
scientists of the nineteenth century developed a plethora of methods to mea-
sure human abilities and consistently found that white men were superior to
all other groups.
Paul Broca (1824-1880), a French ar灿ropologist, built on the work of
Samuel Morton to develop more elaborate techniques to measure humans.
Broca believed strongly that there was a direct correlation between brain
size and intelligence, and he spent much of his career measuring the brains
of dead people. Broca eventually ran into trouble with his arguments when he
discovered, by measuring the brains of eminent scholars who had passed on,
that many people considered to be highly intelligent turned out to have small
brains. Broca, however, accounted for those anomalies by asserting that they
died very old or that their brains had not been properly preserved. When a
study of criminal brains revealed that criminals had abnormally large brains,
Bro ca argued that their sudden death by execution meant that their brains did
not atrophy, as did those of people who died of natural causes. Broca eventu-
ally went on to measure other characteristics of brains and bodies; however,
his scientific measurements always showed what he set out to prove: that
Europeans were superior to other groups (Gould 1996).
Ideas of European racial superiority emerged during a time when colonists
were advocating radical ideas of freedom for themselves. Justifications for
Indian removal o丘en were couched in terms of perceived lack of civilization:
Native Americans would not make as good use of the land as whites would and
thus did not deserve to live on the land. The supposed natural inferiority of
Africans began to be used as a justification for slavery. In the late eighteenth
centu叨 Americans such as Thom叫efferson (1743-1826) grappled with a
Check Your Unders • anding 31
fundamental contradiction: they were advocating for liberty, justice, and the
rights of men at the same time that they depended on African slavery二
c。 NCLUSI 。 N AND DISCUSSI 。 N
咀1e brutal, troubled history of the idea of race clearly demonstrates the power
of ideologies about human difference. 币1e idea that the world ’s population can
be divided into discrete racial groups is a product of a specific series of events:
colonialism, slavery, and the rise of science. Because Europeans wished to
take land from indigenous peoples in the Americas and to extract labor from
Africans, they developed ideologies of inferiority as justification.
Alongside this large-scale the丘 of land and exploitation of labor, science
began to emerge as a field of study concerned largely with the classification of
all objects and species into specific groups. Scientists rushed to develop taxon-
omies of flora and fauna, including classifications of humans. Europeans who
proposed these classifications put their own group at the top of the hierarchy二
This subjective (and overt) bias of Europeans continued with the develop-
ment of anthropometric and other measurement techniques in the nineteenth
century. European scientists measured human skulls, brains, and many other
parts of the human body and arrived at the same conclusion: Europeans were
superior. This recounting of history offers a revealing look at not only the past
but also the present. We cannot simply look at the past and point fingers at
those “ racists” of yesteryear. Instead, we should also be compelled to explore
the assumptions and ideologies that govern our behavior today二
Key Terms
social construction 6 historical construction 7 slave codes 19
race 6 colonialism 7 Indian Removal Act of 1830 25
racism 6 genocide 7 Trails of Tears 25
ethnicity 6 ideology 7 scientific racism 28
I.I What are race and ethnicity? What is racism? (pp. 6-7)
• Race refers to a group of people who share physical and cultural traits as well as a
common ancestry.二 It is a social construction and has no biological basis.
• E仇nici纱 refers to a group identity based on notions of similar and shared history,
culture, and kinship.
• Racism refers to the belief that some races are superior to others, as well as the
practice of subordinating races believed to be inferior.
Review Critical Thinking

> Why do sociologists argue that race is a social 沙 Why is it important to understand that the idea
and historical construction? of race is a modern invention?
I.2 How old is racism? How is race distinct from previous ways of thinking about
human difference? (pp. 7-23)
• There are historical precedents to the idea of race, including the Spanish Inquisi-
tion and the subjugation of the Irish by the English.
• Slavery existed long before the invention of the idea of race.
• When the Spanish colonists arrived in the Americas, they displayed extreme
cruelty to the native people of the Americas.
• African slaves were brought to the Americas to meet labor needs.
• The idea of race emerged to justify slavery and colonization.

汾 When was the idea of race invented? > Can you imagine a world in which racial classifi-
cations had no importance? Why or why not?
I. 3 How did the writers of the U.S. Constitution think of slavery? (pp. 23-25)
• Although the Declaration of Independence states that “ all men are created equal,”
nearly half of the authors were slave owners.
• Slavery was not abolished in the United States until 1865.

>> Why were slavery and freedom in tension > What are today’s prevailing racial ideologies in
during the writing of the Declaration of the United States?
Independence? > In what ways do those ideologies work to justify
the current racial hierarchy?
1.4 How did the Indian Removal Act affect Native Americans? (pp. 25-27)
咀1e Indian Removal Act of 1830 resulted in the death of tens of thousands of
Native Americans due to forced dis抖a cements.

扮 How were the justifications for Indian Removal > How and why do racial ideologies related to
distinct from those used for slavery? Native Americans and African Americans
differ?
1.5 What role did science play in the propagation of racism? (pp. 27-31)
• From simple classification schemes to more complex endeavors, bias has affected
scientific a忧empts to explain differences among racial groups.

扮 How did the unconscious bias of nineteenth- > What biases toward race might be present in
century scientists influence their measurements today's sciences and social sciences?
of various racial groups?
Tα：［king α~bout Race

Imagine someone said to you that African Americans are naturally
gi丘ed at basketball. How could you respond in a constructive way to
such a statement? The first step is to ask for further explanation. Listen
to any evidence provided to support the claim. You should be able to
draw from the knowledge you gained in this chapter to respond to the
contention that there are natural or genetic differences between racial
groups. Use your sociological imagination to encourage your conver-
sational partner to think of explanations other than genetics for racial
differences in basketball skills.
, 、飞
、、
， ’少 .
. ..
·、
, ’‘
γ• I 、
4
America 1985. Diana Ong. (Diαnα Ong/SuperStock)

Chapter 。utline
/
. The Continuation of Scientific
Racism 38
Measuring Brain Size 38
/ Intelligence Testing 38
Eugenics 40
Voices Carrie Buck 41
Exclusionary Immigration and
Citizenship Policies 42
·.· . The Chinese E× clusion Act 43

E巳S巳arch focu sChinese Exclusion
and Gatekeeping Ideology 44
The Johnson-Reed Act (Immigration
Act of 1924) 45
rom the s •o the Birthright Citizenship and
Naturalization for Whites Only 46
5 I Defining Whiteness in Court 47
Takao Ozawa v. United States
(1922) 48
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind
(1923) 49
How the Irish, Italians，。 nd Jews
Became White 49
As y。u Reαd
The Irish 51
2 .1 How did scientific racism evolve over the twentieth The Italians 51
cent11ry? TheJews 53
2.2 How did scientific racism influence immigration and Structural Violence against
citizenship policies? Native Americans and African
Americans 54
2.3 How did legal decisions shape racial categories?
Native Americans: Appropriating
2.4 Where did European immigrants fit into the racial Lands, Assimilating Tribes 54
hierarchy in the United States? African Americans and the Struggle
2.5 What forms of structural violence did Native Americans for Rights 55
and A企ican Americans confront in the late nineteenth and Conclusion and Discussion 57
early twentieth centuries? Check You 「 Understanding 58
Ta lking about Race 61
36 CHAPTER 2 Race, lmm i g 「a ti on, and Ci • izensh ip
飞iVhen the Irish left Ireland for the United States in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, they did not think of themselves as
whites, or even as Europeans. In the new country, however, they
encountered a divide between whites and blacks, and they found it
was best to be on the white side of that divide. In this excerpt from
How the Irish Beeαme White, historian Noel Ignatiev reflects on
their experience.
'h e Irish who emigrated to America in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries were fleeing caste oppression and a system oflandlordism
that made the material conditions of the Irish peasant comparable to
those of an American slave. ’They came to a society in which color was import-
ant in determining social position. It was not a pa忧ern they were familiar with
and they bore no responsibility for it; nevertheless, they adapted to it in short
order.
When they first began arriving here in large numbers they were, in the
words ofMr. Dooley [a fictional Irish immigrant bartender created by journal-
ist Finley Peter Dunne], given a shovel and told to start digging up the place as
if they owned it. On the rail beds and canals they labored for low wages under
dangerous conditions; in the South they were occasionally employed where
it did not make sense to risk the life of a slave. As they came to the cities, they
were crowded into districts that became centers of crime, vice, and disease.
币1ere they commonly found themselves thrown together with free Negroes.
Irish-and Afro-Americans fought each other and the police, socialized and occa-
sionally intermarried, and developed a common culture of the low协’They also
both suffered the scorn of those better situated. Along with Jim Crow and Jim
Dandy, the drunken, belligerent, and foolish Pat and Bridget were stock char-
acters on the early stage. In antebellum America, it was speculated that if racial
amalgamation was ever to take place it would begin between those two groups.
As we know, things turned out otherwise. ’The outcome was not the inev-
itable consequence of blind historic forces, still less of biology, but the result
of choices made, by the Irish and others, from among available alternatives.
To enter the white race was a strategy to secure an advantage in a competitive
society.
What did it mean to the Irish to become white in America? It did not mean
that they all became rich, or even 、iddle-class”（however that is defined); to
CHAPTER 2 Race, Immig ration, and Ci • izenship 37
this day there are plenty of poor Irish. Nor did it mean that they all became
the social equals of the Saltonstalls and van Rensselaers; even the marriage
of Grace Kelly to the Prince of Monaco and the election of John F. Kennedy
as President did not eliminate all barriers to Irish entry into certain exclusive
circles. To Irish laborers, to become white meant at first that they could sell
themselves piecemeal instead of being sold for life, and later that they could
compete for jobs in all spheres instead of being confined to certain work; to
Irish entrepreneurs, it meant that they could function outside of a segregated
market. To both of these groups it meant that they were citizens of a demo-
cratic republic, with the right to elect and be elected, to be tried by a jury of
their peers, to live wherever they could afford, and to spend, without racially
imposed restrictions, whatever money they managed to acquire. In becoming
white the Irish ceased to be Green.
Souκe: Ignatiev 1995, 2-3.
τhe idea of race has evolved over time and continues to shape our thinking. It
exists because we use and propagate this idea. As discussed in Chapter One,
and as we will explore further, race is a historical, social, cultural, and legal
construction.τhrough this exploration, we will begin to see how the racial
categories we use today are also contested and in flux.
For race to have meaning, we must constantly give it meaning. Whiteness,
together with its associated privileges, is a contested concept; its boundary
expands and contracts depending on circumstances. Without the boundary,
however, whiteness would be meaningless and would not carry the many
social benefits and privileges that it does.
币1e 1840s through the 1920s is a critical period for analyzing the contested
boundary of whiteness. During this time, the United States received millions
of immigrants from Europe, Asia, and Mexico. How did these newcomers fit
into the racial hierarchy of the United States? And how did the racial policies
of this era affect Native Americans and African Americans ？ τhis chapter con-
siders the following:
1. How scientific, popula乌 and legal conceptions of race both worked together
and collided at various moments during this period; and
2. How the idea of race continued to develop in the context of European and
Asian immigration, the annexation of Mexican territories, the appropriation
of Native American lands, and the abolition of slavery in the United States.
38 CHAPTER 2 Race, Imm igrat ion, and Citizenship
THE C。 NTINUATI 。 N 。 F SCIENTIFIC RACISM

Today, most scientists reject the idea that the world can be divided into
racial groups with measurable moral and intellectual differences. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, most scientists and the vast
majority of whites concurred that races existed biologically and that whites
were the superior racial group. Popular and legal debates over who was and was
not white o丘en relied on the purported scientific findings of the time. We will
begin our discussion by examining the applications of scientific racism in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Measuring Brain Size

When nineteenth-century scientists compared the skulls of blacks to those of
whites, they set out to use science to prove what they thought they already
knew: that the white race was superior to all others. Nineteenth-century
craniometry-the measurement of cranial capacity-provided the first
opportunity for scientists to bring massive amounts of data to bear on their
ideas of human hierarchy. As discussed in the previous chapter, these data on
brain size supposedly provided “ scientific” proof of white superiority. Eventu-
ally, however, craniometry lost its appeal, and scientists looked for new ways to
measure human difference and prove European supremacy二咀1ese new meth-
ods revolved around measuring intelligence directly (Gould 1996).
Intelligence Testing
intelligence testing In the United States, intelligence testing-the attempt to quantify intellec-
The attempt to quanti命 tual ability using scientific measures-became popular in the early twentieth
intellectual ability using century. Such tests were used in a忧empts to demonstrate the alleged superior-
scientific measures. ity of not only Europeans as a whole but also particular groups of Europeans.
When the United States began to receive large numbers of immigrants from
southern and eastern Europe, American scientists used intelligence testing to
draw di挝inctions among them (Gould 1996; Brodkin 1998).
Intelligence tests were not originally designed to find out which races were
the most intellectually fit. Instead, the goal was to identify children who
needed extra help in school. Alfred Binet (1857-1911), director of the psychol-
ogy laboratory at the Sorbonne in Paris, dedicated much of his scholarly career
to developing ways to measure children’s intellectual ability. It was only when
Binet’s test was taken to the United States that it began to be used to determine
which groups were innately superior or inferior.
One of the first psychologists to use Binet ’s test was H. H. Goddard
(1866-1957), who adapted it for use in the Vineland Training School for
丁he Cont in uat ion of Scie nt if ic Racism 39
Feeble-Minded Boys and Girls. Goddard 且rmly

believed that feeble-mindedness was inherited,
attributing intelligence to a single gene. To pro-
vide evidence for his beliefs, Goddard took
Binet’s test to Ellis Island, where he administered
the exam to arriving immigrants who spoke little
English. Many received a low score, but instead
of questioning the conditions under which he
performed the exam, Goddard concluded that
immigrants were of low intelligence. He further
argued that, given these results, immigration
had to be curtailed. Later in his caree鸟 Goddard
conceded that perhaps what he defined as feeble-
mindedness could be cured through education
(Gould 1996).
τhe next prominent psychologist to use intel-
ligence testing was Lewis Terman (1877-1956),
a professor of psychology at Stanford University.
Terman modified the Binet test, endeavoring
to standardize it such that the average person
would score 100. 咀1is number should sound
familiar, as it is still used today as the mean for
IQ-the intelligence quotient-in what ’s known A Immigrants arriving at Ellis Island were subjected to
as the Stanford-Binet test. Terman’s colleague not only invasive medical inspections but also intelligence
testing.
R. M. Yerkes (1876-1956) carried on Terman’s
work and developed the Army Mental Tests, which aimed to measure innate
intelligence. Yerkes succeeded in convincing the U.S. Army to allow him to
administer the tests to all of its recruits.τhis massive sample of over a million
respondents gave significant quantitative weight to the emerging field of intel-
ligence testing (Gould 1996).
Stephen Gould, whose work we discussed in Chapter One, argues that the
primary error in intelligence testing is that of reification-making intelli-
gence into a scientific concept by measuring it. Some people know more facts
and trivia, are more quick-witted, can calculate sums in their heads faster, and
are more eloquent in speech and writing than others. But as Gould contends,
intelligence tests are flawed because they can not truly measure this wide
range of abilities. Moreover, instead of promoting the idea that each of these
skills can be learned and nurtured, intelligence testing implies that they are
innate ( Gould 1996).
40 CHAPTER 2 Race, Immigration, and Ci • izenship
Eugenics
Faulty thinking about intelligence developed into ugly manifestations. In
the United States, about 60,000 people who were deemed less intelligent
were forcibly sterilized in the early twentieth century (Jacobson 1998). The
eugenics 刀1e practice of eugenics movement, which had its heyday from about 1900 to 1930, aimed
controlled breeding to to improve the population through controlled breeding. Eugenicists believed
increase the occurrence of that not only intelligence but also alcoholism, laziness, crime, poverty, and
desirable characteristics other moral and cultural traits could be inherited. Based on this notion, they
in a population. advocated sterilizing the biologically unfit as a way of creating a superior breed
of people. During this period, many Americans believed the country's popu-
lation was in decline because of immigration and the high fertility of poor
people (Lindsay 1998).
One of the main proponents of eugenics was Madison Grant (1865-1937), a
lawyer, historian, and physical anthropologist. In much of his work, including
the 1916 book The Passing of 仇e Great Race, Grant put forward the idea that
Europe could be divided into three races:“Nordics,"“'.Alpines,” and “ Medi-
terraneans.” He forcefully argued that Nordics were the most fit of the three
and that measures should be taken to ensure their racial purity and survival.
His ideas made it into the mainstream both through his book and through his
position as chairman of the U.S. Committee on Selective Immigration. In that
capacity, he advocated for a reduction in the numbers of Alpines and Medi-
terraneans admitted into the United States. The views of Madison Grant and
other eugenicists played an important role in the development of immigration
policy in the 1920s, placing limits on the immigration of “ undesirable” groups
(Jacobson 1998).
Madison Grant’s ideas that Nordics were the “ master race'' and that it was
incumbent upon the state to ban interracial marriages and sterilize inferior
races found a large audience in Germany二 Adolf Hitler referred to Grant’s book
The Passing ofthe Great Race as his “ bible," and the German translation became
wide与 read in the 1930s (Spiro 2008). Hitler put Grant’s ideas into practice
when he passed the Eugenic Sterilization Law in 1933, which led to the steril-
ization of 225,000 people in Germany in just three years. Similar to steriliza-
tion laws in the United States, this law was intended to improve the population.
The Nazis then took these ideas several steps further, first to euthanasia and
then to the gas chambers (Smedley 2007).
Nazi extremism caused white Americans as well as many Europeans to
question the implications of white supremacist thinking. ’The experience
of World War II led, in 1948, to the signing of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which asserts that all humans possess inherent dignity and
丁 he Continuation of Sc ientific Racism 41
Carrie Buck
……· ·... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . ... . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . ..
Carrie Buck (1906-1983) was separated from her mother, Emma, as a young child
and was placed in a foster home, where she worked as a domestic servant for most
of her childhood. When Carrie was a teenager, her foster parents’ nephew raped her.
As a result of the rape, Carrie became pregnant. After she gave birth at age seven-
teen to a girl, Vivian, her foster parents placed Carrie in the Virginia State Colony .
for Epileptics and Feebleminded, most likely in an attempt to avoid public shaming
of their family. Carrie Buck's mother had previously been placed in this same facil-
ity on the grounds of her alleged feeble-mindedness and promiscuity. The colony
ordered Carrie sterilized, and although the sterilization was challenged in court in
1925, the ruling was upheld. At the age of twenty-one in 1927, Carrie was sterilized
under the authority of the
Racial Integrity Act of
1924, part of the state of
Virginia’s eugenics pro-
gram. Chief Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes declared
that “ three generations
(
of imbeciles are enough,” ,
referring to the alleged /(

feeble-mindedness of
工＇／
,
Carrie, her mother, and her
six-month-old daughter.
一
Following her sterilization,
Carrie Buck was released Carrie and Emma Buck. Carrie was sterilized under
Virginia's et1genics p1·ogram.
into the community as a
domestic servant.
...... . .......... .. ..... . ....... .. ..... . .. . . . .......... . ...... . ..... . ............... . ..... . ................. . . . .. . . . .
equality. 咀1is declaration in turn influenced the beginnings of the civil rights
movement in the United States.
Yet ideas of innate inferiority and superiority have not disappeared. In 1994,
psychologist Richard Herrnstein and political scientist Charles Murray pub-
lished a book titled 刀ie Bell Curve, which perpetuated the theory that intel-
ligence is hereditary. Despite virulent criticism from academics, the book
received a great deal of publicity. Ten years later, in 2004, Frank Miele, senior
editor of Skeptic, and Vincent Sarich, professor emeritus of anthropology at
42 CHAPTER 2 Race, Immigration, and Citizenship
Berkeley, argued in their book Race: The Reality ofHuman Differences that races
are a biological reality. In addition, they contended that there are real, mea-
surable intellectual differences between racial groups. Esteemed race schol-
ars such as Jonathan Marks have repeatedly pointed out the absurdity of such
findings, arguing that Sarich and Miele ’s book is “ scientifically idiosyncratic
and politically reactionary”(Marks 2004, 43).
In 2009, a Harvard PhD candidate named Jason Richwine defended a dis-
sertation in which he argued that Latino immigrants have a substantially lower
IQ than the white native-born population of the United States. He further
argued that, because of the supposed hereditary nature of IQ, Latino immi-
gration should be limited. According to the leading scholarship on race, how-
eve鸟 there is no genetic basis for racial differences (Roberts 20l2j Smedley
2007). Latinos are people with roots in Latin America who live in the United
States and whose ancestry could include people from any continent. It is thus
illogical to argue that they share a genetic ancestry.
pseudoscience Beliefs or Sociologists identify such arguments as examples of pseudoscience-
practices appearing to be beliefs or practices appearing to be scientific but not based on the scientific
scientific but not based on method. Similar to nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century eugenicists, the
the scientific method. authors of the works mentioned earlier mistakenly find that their own group-
those of European descent一is intellectually superior to others. While schol-
ars have identified these works as pseudoscientific, attention from popular
media outlets can perpetuate the myths and falsehoods they contain.
EXCLUSI 。 NARY IMMIGRATI 。 N

AND CITIZENSHIP P。 LICIES
Intense debates on immigration and citizenship in the late-nineteenth and

early-twentieth centuries drew on the discourses of scientific racism. From
its inception, immigration policy in the United States has been racially
Race-Related U.S. Im1nigration Laws and Supreme Court Rulings, 1790-1924
。
1790 I 1857 I 1s66 I 1868 I 1882 I 1887
Naturalization D1·ed Scott v. Civil Rights Act Fourteenth Chinese Exclu- Dawes Act forces
law grants citi- Sαndford rules extends birth- Amendment sion Act prohibits I Native Americans
zenship to wl1ites that free blacks right citizenship constitutionalizes Chinese laborers to give up com-
born in the a1·e not U.S. to blacks the Civil Rights from entering the munal owne1·ship
United States I citizens I Act of 1866 United States of land
E ×cl usi o n a 「 y lmm igra • io n and Ci tizenship Po li cies 43
motivated.τhe first major piece of immigration legislation, the 1882 Chinese

Exclusion Act, set the course for biased immigration policy in the twentieth
century (Lee 2002).
The Chinese Exclusion Act

The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) was overtly racist in that it targeted one Chinese Exclusion Act
specific group on the basis of race and class: Chinese laborers. It was renewed (1882) Legislation that
in 1892, made permanent in 1902, and not repealed until 1943. The act spe- denied Chinese laborers
cifically prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the United States while entry to the United
allowing Chinese merchants and teachers to enter. According to the 1890 States.
census, there were 102,620 Chinese men and 3,868 Chinese women present
in the country, mostly in California. At the time, most Chinese immigrants
were laborers; they were integral to the completion of the Central Pacific Rail-
road. By 1882, the federal government had succumbed to pressure from white
laborers to exclude Chinese immigrants, and Congress issued this first racially
exclusive immigration law.
Subsequently, the Immigration Act of 1917 expanded the Chinese Exclu- Immigration Act of 1917’
sion Act to deny entry to anyone coming from the “'Asiatic Barred Zone," Legislation expanding the
which included India, Burma, the Malay States, Arabia, and A也hanistan 1882 Chinese Exclusion
(Calavita 2000; Lee 2002). Between 1917 and 1952, the United States placed Act and denying entry
strict immigration limits on people from Asia while welcoming those from to the United States for
preferred European countries.τhe intent behind these laws was to improve anyone coming from the
the racial composition of the United States. “'Asiatic Ba1·red Zone ,”
The Chinese Exclusion Act compelled the federal government to put into place which included India,
the bureaucratic machinery needed to patrol the borders ofthe country. As the act B11rma, the Malay States,
excluded specific groups ofpeople from entering the United States, it required that Arabia, and Afghanistan.
the government establish immigration controls and checks. ’The act required the
creation of an immigration inspection force, one that eventually would evolve into
the Border Patrol. It further required the creation of certificates ofresidence-the
1898 I 1917 1922 1923 1924

Supreme Court Immigration Takαo Oz，αmα v. United States ℃． Johnson-Reed
grants citizen- Act creates the United St，α tes rules Bhag1αt Singh Thiγid Act establishes
ship to Asians “'.Asiatic Barred that whiteness is rules that whiteness national-origin
bo1·n in the Zone" defined by Cauca- is not defined by quotas
United States sian ancestry Caucasian ancestry
44 CHAPTER 2 Ra ce, Immigra tion, a nd Ci • izenshi p
γesea~γc
Chinese Exclusion and Gatekeeping Ideology

Historian Erika Lee 。002) argues that the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act helped
shape the racialized nature of subsequent U.S. immigration policies. ’Iheactmade
the United States what she calls a “gatekeeping” nation一 one that first racialized
Chinese immigrants and then others as a permanently alien and inferior class
that should be excluded. Specifically, she contends that
Chinese exclusion it仰oduced a ''gatekeψing'' ideology, politics, la叫 and culture

that tranφrmed the ways in which Americans viewed and thought about race,
immigration, and the United States' identi纱 as a nation ofimmigration. It legal-
ized and reinforced the need to restrict, exclude, and deport 、ndesirable'' and
excludable imm您rants. (Lee 2002, 3η
Subsequent to the passage of Chinese exclusion, nativists-people who

presume the superiority of native-born citizens-directed their ire at other
groups, often using the same narratives and discourses used to exclude the
Chinese. These nativists were successful in lob hying for more exclusion laws,
including the Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924, which drastically restricted
immigration from southern and eastern Europe. 咀1is ideology continues into
the present day, as current immigration laws prioritize certain immigrants
over others.
Once the United States passed selective immigration policies, it became nec-
essary to build a state apparatus and bureaucracy to enforce these laws. ’The 1892
Geary Act and the 1893 McCreary Amendment required Chinese laborers to reg-
ister with the federal government and obtain certificates of residence. By 1928, all
immigrants were required to secure “ immigrant identification cards,” precursors
to today's “ green cards.”
Based on her analysis of the Chinese Exclusion Act and related legislation, Lee
contends that gatekeeping ideology “ was instrumental in the formation of the
nation itself and in articulating a definition of American national identity and
belonging，，。002, 41).’The legislation thus transformed the United States from
a nation of immigrants to one that guarded its gates against foreigners it deemed
undesirable.
Exclusiona 「y lmmig 「ation and Ci • izenship Policies 45
For Discussion
1. What is the relationship between anti-Chinese sentiment and nativism toward
other immigrant groups?
2. What does Lee mean by"gatekeeping”?
Source: Lee 2002.
J。hns。n-Reed Act
precursors to today’s 飞reen cards"-for Chine优 individuals who were permitted {lmmigrati。n Act of
to remain in the United States. It was not until 1928 that other immigrants had to 1924) Legislation that
carry proof oflegal presence. In 1940, these cards were replaced by “ alien registra- madepasspo时s and
tio川ards," which continue to be used today (Lee 2002). visas a requirement
for entry to the United
The j。hns。n-Reed Act (lmmigrati。n Act 。f 1924) States and established
’The next major piece of immigration legislation, the Johnson-Reed Act (or national-origin quotas for
Immigration Act of 1924), was also overtly racist in that it was European immigrants.
designed to increase the Nordic population in the United States
and halt the growth of other groups.τhe act made passports and
visas a requirement for entry to the United States and established
national-origin quotas for European immigrants.τhese quotas
dictated the number of immigrants who could enter the United
States in any given year. Calculated on the basis of the U.S. pop-
ulation's composition in 1890, the quotas were applicable only
to the European population. Specifically, the law stipulated
that the quotas not take into account the following four groups:
(1) immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, (2) aliens ineligi-
ble for citizenship (i.e., Asians), (3) the descendants of slaves, and
(4) Native Americans. By basing national-o句in quotas exclusively
on the European population at the time, the law made it clear that
Africans, Asians, and Native Americans were not considered to be
part of the nation (Ngai 2004). It is also remarkable to look back T 盹 ~EAT ActTATO'fl
on this legislation from today’s perspective: no restrictions were

placed on Mexican immigration.
A ’The cover of an 1878 fictional story
咀1e Johnson-Reed Act ignored the presence of Asians and
about the supposed economic and
Africans in the United States and set a quota of one hundred immi- moral threats posed by large-scale
grants per year for immigrants from China, Japan, India, Ethiopia, Chinese immigration.
46 CHAPTER 2 Race, Immigra tion , and Ci • izensh ip
Liberia, and South Africa. 古1ese restrictionist policies remained in place until
after World War II. In 1943, Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act,
and in 1946, it extended the 咆ht of citizenship to other Asians (Reimers
1981; Ngai 2004).’The quotas were revised in the Immig时ion and National-
ity Act of 1952 and then completely revamped in 1965.
Intelligence test proponents and eugenicists influenced the debates sur-
rounding the Johnson-Reed Act. ’The most radical eugenicists advocated
sterilization of people deemed to be inferior. Eugenicists were invited to
testify before Congress during these debates, and in their testimonies they
made it clear that they believed that Northern Europeans were superior to
people from southern and eastern Europe. Harry H. Laughlin, director of
the Eugenics Institute, for example, pointed to the Army Mental Tests car-
ried out by Robert Yerkes as evidence of the inferiority of Poles, Italians,
Russians, and blacks.
Members of Congress took the ideas of eugenicists into account when they
voted to restrict the immigration of people they deemed undesirable immi-
Naturalization Law of grants and to promote the immigration of those whom they expected might
1790 The first piece improve the American stock. ’The quotas that took effect in 1929 reflect
of U.S. legislation on these preferences: Great Britain and Northern Ireland were granted a quota of
citizenship, stating that 65,271 immigrants; Italy, 5,802; Yugoslavia, 845; and most African and Asian
only “ free white persons” countries, 100 (Ngai 2004). Immig时ion restrictions reflected a clear racial
who had lived in the bias in determining who could enter the country二 Citizenship restrictions,
United States for at least which we consider next, demonstrated racial biases regarding who could
two years were eligible. become a full member of society二
birthright citizenship Also Birthright Citizenship and Naturalization for Whites 。nly
known as jus soli, the One of the first laws passed in the newly formed United States was the
concept that citizenship Naturalization Law of 1790, which granted citizenship to whites born in
is determined by where the United States and limited naturalization to immigrants who were “ free
one is born, not by white persons.” Whereas birthright citizenship refers to gaining citizenship
the nationality, race, in the country of one's birth, naturalization describes the process whereby
or citizenship of one’s people become citizens of a country where they were not born.
parents. Since the inception of the United States, birthr
as jus soli) has prevailed as the law of the land, albeit with racial restrictions.
naturalization The process Birthright citizenship conveys the idea that citizenship is determined by
whereby people become where one is born, not by the nationalit只 race, or citizenship of one's par-
citizens of a country ents. This concept was part of English common law, on which much of U.S.
where they were not born. law is based. ’The 1790 law was explicitly restricted to whites: it was not until
Defining Whi • eness in Cou 『 t .47
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that native-born blacks were granted citizenship.
In 1868, this act was incorporated into the Constitution in the form of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which reads:“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereo£ are citizens of the United
States, and of the state wherein they reside.”
咀1e Fourteenth Amendment granted birthright citizenship to most blacks
and whites born in the United States-but only to blacks and whites. Native
Americans were not officially granted birthright citizenship until 1924. And it
was not until the Nationality Act of 1940 that birthright citizenship became a
reality for all people born in the United States (Haney-Lopez 2006).
It was not until 1952 that immigrants of races other than black or white
could become U.S. citizens. Throughout the twentieth century, immigrants
from China, Japan, Syria, and India applied for citizenship via naturalization
and were denied on the basis that they were not white (Haney-Lopez 2006).
DEFINING WHITENESS IN C。 URT
Between 1878 and 1952, U.S. courts considered fi丘y-one cases in which a non-
citizen contested his denial of citizenship on the basis of his race. In all but
one case, the noncitizen claimed that he was in fact white and therefore should
be granted c让izenship. 古1ese pet让ioners were Native American, Chinese,
Hawaiian, Burmese, Japanese, Indian, Syrian, Armenian, Filipino, Korean,
Arabian, Mexican, and mixed race.τhe courts were not consistent in their
determinations: one court declared Syrians to be not white, whereas an appeal
court ruled that they were. Most of the claims to whiteness were denied, with
the exception of those made by Mexicans (1897),Armenians (1909 and 1925),
and Syrians (1910 and 1915) (Haney-Lopez 2006).
It was not predetermined which groups would be granted whiteness in the
United States. Instead, court decisions played a role in assigning a racial cat-
egoηr to each national-origin group in the United States. 咀1e assignment of
whiteness to Armenians and Italians and nonwhiteness to Japanese, for exam-
ple, would have enduring effects on their social location in the United States.
Pronouncing the Armenians as white
allowed them a prosperous and privileged position in American society. 刀iis

prosperity then con.firmed the common knowledge of their Whiteness, which
in turn served to just份 the judicial tγeatment of Armenians as White per-
sons. The oppos让e occurred with the Japanese. Again, their pos让ion in the
U.S. racial schema was initially户r from certain: some had been naturalized
as ''white persons,'' but others had been excluded 卢om citizenship. Partly
under court authority, howeve9 the non-Whiteness of Japanese immigrants
emerged as common knowledge.
(Ha叫’Lopez 2006, 93)
Prominent court cases denied Japanese and Asian Indians citizenship and,
in many cases, stripped them of their land.Japanese and Indian groups would
have to wait several decades before being granted all the rights associated with
citizensh与（Ngai 2004).
Legal scholar Ian Haney-Lopez (2006) argues that social ideas about
whiteness influenced both scientific endeavors and legal decisions. In cases
of granting or denying citizenship based on race, judges cited both scien-
tific studies and what they called “ common knowledge'' in their decisions.
Haney-Lopez contends that in determining whiteness, judges’ decisions
reflected their own unconscious bias and effort to maintain the privileges
associated with being white. ’The fact that whiteness could be contested in
court shows that it is not a fixed category; it exists only by virtue of defining
some people as nonwhite.
Two of the prerequisite cases that reached the Supreme Court were Takao
Ozawa v. United States and United States v. Bhagat Singh 刀zind. τhese two cases
stand in stark opposition to each other and make it clear that in a court of law,
whiteness is what the judges say it is; that is, whiteness is a legal construct. In
Ozawa, the court determined that despite Japanese-born Takao Ozawa's white
skin, he was not white because he was not Caucasian. In Thind, argued just
months later, the Court determined that even though Asian Indians such as
Bhagat Singh 哑1ind were Caucasian, they were not white.
Tako。。7awa v. United States (1922)

Takao Ozawa was born in Japan in 1875. At the age of nineteen, he moved to
California and studied at the University of California at Berkeley. He met and
married another Japanese national living in the United States, and they had
children together. In 1914, when he was thirty-nine years old, Ozawa applied
for citizenship in Hawaii, where he was living at the time. ’The U.S. district
A Takao Ozawa. In Takαo
a忧orney of Hawaii denied his application for citizenship, stating that because
Oz，αωα v. United States
。922), the Court ruled he was not white, he was ineligible for naturalization. Ozawa appealed this
that whiteness is defined by decision, and a丘er many years, his case made it all the way to the Supreme
Caucasian ancestry二 Court. One of Ozawa’s major arguments was that his skin color was as light
How the Irish, llol旧ns, and Jews Become While 49
as that of many whites. Of cou白马 this was also true f。r n1any people legally
defined as black. The Supreme Court denied his petiti。n 。n the basis that he
was n。t white, even though his skin c。1。r was lighter than that of some people
considered t。 be white. The ruling classified him as not white 。n the grounds
that"white” meant “Caucasian，” and ethnol。gists had determined that he was
not Caucasian (Haney-L。pez 2006).
United S细tes v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923)

Just three m。nths a丘er the Ozawa decision, the Supreme Court reviewed
the petition of Bhagat Singh Thind, who arrived in the United States at the
age of tw·cnty-one in 1913. In 1920, Thind applied f。r naturalizati。n on the A Bhagat Singh 1nind,
basis that, as a high-caste Hindu, he was in fact Caucasian and therefore denied citizenship because
white. The district court granted his petition f。r naturalization. Howeve鸟 he was not considered
whi扭 despite his Caucasian
the federal g。vernment appealed that decisi。同 and Thind ’s case also went
to the Supreme Court. Thind ’s case was heard less than tw·o months a丘er the ancestry.
Ozawa decision，。nJan阳y 11, 1923.τhe Supreme Court did not dispute
τhind’s argument that, as an Asian Indian, he was “ Caucasian,” per the latest
scientific evidence. τhe c。urtwrote，“It may be true that t he blond Scandi-
navian and the brown Hindu have a c。mm。n ancestor in the dim reaches of
antiquity, but the average 1nan knows perfectly well that there are unmistak-
able and prof.。und differences between them today" (quoted in Haney-L。pez
2006, 63). To foll。w up on this idea, t he Court ’s final ruling stated, "What we
a。wh。Id is that the words 'free white pers。d are words 。fc。mm。n speech,
to be interpreted in accordance of the c。mmonman,s严1onyn1。us with the
word 'Caucasian，。nly as that word is popularly understood”（qu。ted in
Haney-Lop臼 2006, 6份．
τhe relationship between c。mmon knowledge and law is circular. When
judges decided wh。 w·as legally white, they were subject t。 the unc。nscious
biases inherent in w·hat is c。nsidered c。mmon knowledge. At the same time,
their decisi。ns reinforced common beliefs ab。utwh。 W剖 white and who was
a。t. Similar processes occurred with identificati。n of the Irish, Italians, and
Jews, people wh。 today are nearly unive目ally accepted as white.
”。W THE IRISH, ITALIANS, AND JEWS

BECAME WHITE
As we saw in t he chapter-opening passage, the millions of Irish wh。 came t。

the United States in the mid-nineteenth century did not think of themselves
50 CHAPTER 2 Race, Immigrat ion, and Ci • izenship
10,000,000
9,000,000
8,000,000
7,000,000
6,000,000
5,000,000
4,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000
FIGURE 2-1. 1,000,000
Immigration to the United
。
States, 1820-1940
Source: Office of Immigration
Statistics, Department of
Homeland Security.
as “ white” when they lived in Ireland. In a context in which everyone is Irish,

whiteness has little meaning. However, both the government's decision to
permit the Irish to come to the United States in large numbers and their even-
tual incorporation into the United States were closely related to their per “
ceived whiteness. How did this perception of the Irish as white come about?
The process through which Irish and other Europeans acquired the status of
unequivocal whiteness was not as straightforward as one might think.
Relatively few immigrants arrived in the United States between 1790 and
the 1830s. By the 1840s, however, hundreds of thousands of immigrants began
to arrive, primarily from Ireland and Germany (Figure 2-1). Between 1846
and 1855, over 3 million immigrants came to the United States, including
1,288,307 from Ireland and 975,311 from Germany, most of whom were flee-
ing deprivation in their home countries. Irish immigration to the United States
reached a high point in 1851, at 221,253 for the year. The highest number of
German immigrants in one year was recorded in 1882, when 250,630 Germans
arrived in the United States. Once German and Irish immigration began to
taper off, Italians and Russians (mostly Jews) began to immigrate in large
numbers. Italian immigration peaked in 1907, with 258,731 immigrants, and
Russian immigration peaked in the same yea乌 with 258,943 immigrants arriv-
ing in the United States.
As each of these groups integrated into the United States, they experi-
enced both assimilation, through which Irish, Italians, and Germans became
Americans, and racialization, through which Celts, Hebrews, and Mediterraneans
How the Irish, I•alians, and Jews Became White 51
became white (Jacobson 1998). Assimilation is a process whereby immi- 。ssimilation A process
grants lose their ethnic distinctiveness and become part of the mainstream- whereby immigrants
for example, when an Italian American becomes simply an American. lose their ethnic
Racialization is a process whereby people come to be recognized as part of distinctiveness and
a racial gro叩y such as when a Mediterranean becomes white (as defined by become part of the
him- or herself and others). mainstream.
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Ireland has a long history of oppression of Irish Catholics by English Protes-
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tants. In the eighteenth century, Ireland was governed by the Penal Codes, g
ρL
which denied many rights and privileges to Catholics, including the rights
to vote, to attend university, and to own horses worth more than five pounds.
Catholics in Ireland were known as Celts or Gaels, and most lived in pov-
erty. Neither Catholics nor Protestants felt united as members of a white race.
It was not until Catholics and Protestants immigrated to the United States
and saw that whiteness was associated with free wage labor and blackness
with slavery that whiteness assumed any real meaning for them. They further
learned that blackness was devalued and that whites were entitled to privi-
leges denied to blacks, similar to the privileges denied to Catholics in Ireland
(Ignatiev 1995).
When the Irish arrived in the United States, they found a situation in which
blacks occupied the lowest rungs of the paid labor force. 币1e Irish joined black
Americans in these occupations-as coal heavers, cooks, stewards, mill-
workers, servants, and waiters-and began to form unions to fight for better
wages and working conditions. Because of the prevailing racial hierarchy
in the United States, these unions were able to exclude black workers from
membership. As such, between 1830 and 1870, the Irish slowly replaced black
Americans as workers in these industries. Black workers soon found them-
selves confined to the occupations of ragpickers, shoe-shiners, chimney
sweeps, and itinerant laborers. Over the course of a few decades, Irish immi-
grants were able to capitalize on their newly found whiteness and control
several niches as longshoremen, waiters, millworkers, and factory employees.
Insofar as the Irish were able to secure their position in the United States by
excluding blacks, many scholars argue that the Irish became white through
this process (Ignatiev 1995).
The Italians
As the Irish were establishing their whiteness in relation to blacks in the United
States, Italians were just beginning to arrive. Similar to the Irish, the Italians
52 CHAPTER 2 Race, lmmig 「ati on , and Ci • izenship
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had no reason to think of themselves as "white" prior to their arrival in the

United States. Upon migrating to the United States, Italians o丘en faced dis-
crimination because ofboth their Catholicism and stereotypes related to their
alleged criminality, and they were even lynched on occasion in the U.S. South.
One notable case occurred in 1891 in New Orleans, when eleven Italians
were accused of murder and conspiracy following the death of Police Chief
David Hennessy. Although acquitted in a jury trial amidst accusations ofbrib-
ery and corruption, they continued to be held in the jailhouse. A mob of angry
townspeople, infuriated by the acqui忧al and charges of corruption, descended
on the jailhouse and lynched the Italian prisoners. In the a丘ermath of the raid,
a local judge, R. H. Marr, pointed out that the commun让y’s rage was in part
because the victim was a non-Italian:“Until the killing of Hennessy,'’ said
Marr:,“these people had so far as the public knew, confined their operation to
their own race”(quoted in Jacobson 1998, 58). Such references to an Italian
"race” were common during this time.
Italians who arrived in the United States in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries were legally white. At the same time, Italians were o丘en
juxtaposed to “'.Anglo-Saxons" or to members of the “ Nordic" race. Matthew
Jacobson argues that during this period, one could be both “ white and racially
distinct from other whites" (1998，的．’This is the same co毗adiction we saw
How the Irish, Italians, and Jews Became White 53
when examining the Irish. These immigrants were legally entitled to white-
ness but were not able to attain all the privileges associated with being white.
It was only a丘er the passage of legislation that cut off most immigration from
eastern and southern Europe that Italians came to be seen as only culturally,
not racially, different from other whites. We see a similar pattern with Jews-
mostly those of eastern European descent-who gradually gained acceptance
as members of the “ white race."
The Jews
In the early twentieth century,] ewish immigrants from Germany and eastern
Europe were concentrated in New York City, where many worked in the gar-
ment industry. They encountered numerous forms of anti-Semitism, a term anti-Semitism
that refers to discrimination, hostility, or prejudice against]ews. Just as trade Discrimination, hostility,
unions organized by the Irish excluded blacks from wage labor in many large or prejudice against Jews.
cities, the acceptance of anti-Semitism enabled cra丘 unions to exclude ] ews
from better-paying occupations. As a result, even Jews who were skilled hat-
makers, watchmakers, and tailors had no choice but to work as unskilled labor-
ers. Not only were] ews relegated to these low-paying jobs, they o丘en had no
choice but to live in cramped housing in slum areas known as ghe忧os. Further,
elite universities routinely barred them from admission. 咀1is labor, housing,
and educational discrimination has led some scholars to contend that ] ews
were not viewed as white in this period (Brodkin 1998).
τhe lynching of Leo Frank, a] ewish man, is one case supporting this argu-
ment. In April 1913, Mary Phagan, a fourteen-year-old white girl, was found
dead in the basement of the pencil factory that Frank owned. After a long trial,
Frank was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death, but owing to the
nature of the evidence, the governor commuted his sentence to life in prison.
In response, a white mob rampaged the prison and dragged Frank to the out-
skirts of Atlanta, where they lynched him for the alleged murder and rape of
Phagan. Remarkably, Frank’s conviction rested largely on the testimony ofJim
Conley, a black janitor at the factory.τhe fact that Frank was hanged from a
tree in a way similar to how African Americans were lynched caused many
to ask whether]ews were white. 币1e lynching, combined with the fact that a
black man’s testimony formed the basis of the case, indicated that Frank did
not benefit from the privileges associated with whiteness in the early twentieth
century (Jacobson 1998).
In the a丘ermath ofWorld War II, as Americans reckoned with the horrors of
Nazism and subsequently repudiated the eugenics movement, anti-Semitism
lost much of its hold. Whereas Jewish people who grew up in the 1920s and
54 CHAPTER 2 Race, lmmig 「ati on , and Ci • izenship
structural vi。lence 1930s faced virulent anti-Semitism, it had diminished by the 1950s. Accord-
Institutional harm or ingl如 whiteness expanded to include Jewish people (Brodkin 1998).
disadvantage inflicted
on individuals or social
STRUCTURAL VI 。 LENCE AGAINST NATIVE
groups.
AMERICANS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS
As we have seen, immigrants to the United States contended with race-
related discrimination and hardship in the mid-nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. Native-born populations did as
well. Native Americans confronted seizures of
their lands and forced assimilation, while African
Americans faced lynchings and consistent denial
of their rights as citizens and as human beings.
We can describe these experiences as forms of
structural violence in that government policies
and practices inflicted specific institutional harm
on Native Americans and African Americans.
Native Americαns: Appr。priating Lands,

Assimilαting Tribes
As discussed in the previous chapter, Indian
removal policies beginning in the 1830s dis-
placed Native Americans from their lands. Whites
attempted to justify this displacement by arguing
that Native Americans had not made appropriate
use of the territory (Berger 2009). These policies
excluded Native Americans from white society
and forced them to relocate to undesirable areas.
On the heels of Indian removal, the 1851 Indian
Appropriations Act created reservations for
Native Americans and provided funds for reloca-
tion to these communal lands.
During what is known as the Allotment and
Assimilation Period from the 1870s to the
ran，.哥儿'Tll、“ TII民 tll:'1'1'1.EM』
1920s, the oppression of Native Americans inten-
sifi.ed, and tw，。”thirds of Native American lands
A The appropriation of Native American lands was were lost. 卫1e 1871 Indian Appropriations
enacted through violence. This image depicts settlers Act declared that the U.S. government would no
murdering the Yuki people in California in 1861. longer sign treaties with Native American tribes.
Structural Violence Agains • Native Ame 「 i ca ns a nd Afr ica n America ns 55
咀1is act made it easier for the U.S. government to appropriate native lands. 1851 Indian Appropriations
The 1887 Dawes Act then forced Native Americans to give up their commu- Act Legislation that
nal lands and to claim individual ownership of plots. Native Americans were created reservations for
allotted a specific amount of land per family, and any remaining land was sold Native Americans.
to white settlers. These allotment policies continued until the 1934 Indian
Allotment and Assimilation
Reorganization Act, which finally ended them and facilitated tribal selι
Period The oppression of
government to a certain degree.
Native Americans from
While the Dawes Act forced native people to give up their lands, a federal
the 1870s to the 1920s,
program obliged many Native American childred to attend strict boarding
when two-thirds of Native
schools (Noel 2002). These schools required students to renounce their lan-
American lands we1~e
guages and heritage. In the words of Captain Richard Pratt, founder of the
lost and fede1·al boarding
Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania, the mission of these schools was to
schools fo1·ced students to
'' [kJill the Indian in him and save the man”(quoted in Berger 200到 629). As
assimilate.
Bethany Berger (2009) argues, the forced assimilation of Native Americans
enabled whites to further their encroachment on Native American lands. 1871 Indian Appropriations
Act Legislation that
African Americansαnd the Struggle for Rights declared the U.S.
Native-born blacks, exploited for their labor power by wealthy whites, also government would no
str吨gled to gain and retain fundamental 鸣hts. In the Dred Seo 们. Sandfor
longer sign treaties with
decision of 1857, the Supreme Court ruled that free blacks were not citizens of Native American tribes.
the United States. Even a丘er slavery ended in 1865 and blacks were granted
the right to vote in 1868, they still faced tremendous barriers to full citizenship Dawes Act (1887)
(Franklin and Moss 2000). Legislation that forced
In 1865, 4 million Africans and their descendants were freed a丘er centuries Native Americans to give
of enslavement.τhe end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery marked up their communal lands
the beginning of the Reconstruction era (1865-1877), during which the and claim individual
fragmented country attempted to reunite a丘er a devastating war. 咀1e status ownership of their lands.
of freed slaves in the United States was a matter of controversy during this
time. Many southern states were reluctant to grant former slaves citizenship Indian Reorganization Act
rights and did not do so until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in (1934) Legislation that
1868, which effectively overturned the Dred Scott decision. Newly vested with ended allotment policies
citizenship and the right to vote, many black men were elected to public office for Native American land.
in southern states. 咀1e first South Carolina legislature a丘er the Civil War
comprised eighty-seven blacks and forty whites. Blacks also were elected at Reconstruction The period
the national level: between 1869 and 1901, there were two black senators and from 1865 to 1877 in the
twenty blacks in the House of Representatives. Yet the newly secured rights of United States, when the
blacks would be strongly challenged (Franklin and Moss 2000). country attempted to
Many whites were unhappy with the rise of blacks to positions of power. In reunite after the Civil
the a丘ermath of the Civil War, whites began to organize in their own interest War.
56 CHAPTER 2 Race, Imm igrat ion, and Citizenship
and established a variety of secret orders, including the well-known Ku I(lux

I(lan and the Knights of the 斗\Thite Camellia. Klan members as well as members
of other secret orders used intimidation, murder, arson, and bribery to deprive
blacks of political equality. Blacks were instructed not to vote and were threat-
ened with beatings and murder if they did so. Whites located polling places far
from black communities and blocked roads to keep blacks from voting.
τhe determination of whites to maintain political power in the South came
to a head in the 1890s, when nearly all southern states passed suffrage amend-
ments that effectively disenfranchised blacks. In Mississippi, for example,
legislators wrote a suffrage amendment that imposed a poll tax, excluded
people who had been convicted of certain crimes, and required literacy tests.
These measures prevented most blacks in the state from voting. Other states
followed suit, enacting grandfather clauses, poll taxes, and literacy require-
ments that led to the disenfranchisement of most southern blacks (Franklin
and Moss 2000).
Although lynchings occurred across the country and victims included
Jews, Italians, Mexicans, and Native Americans, most victims were Afri-
can Americans in the South. Between 1884 and 1900, there were more than
2,500 lynchings. Another 1,000 people were lynched in the first fi丘een years
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Conclus ion and Discussion 57
of the twentieth century. In addition to lynch- .

, ” …丁习二 . ~ ／「
,
ing, blacks in both the South and the North 、 ·· 、
faced intimidation and violence at the hands of

. 、．
.
whites. In the first few decades of the twentieth 电
century, race riots exploded in cities across the

country, and blacks bore the brunt of the vio-
lence (Pfeifer 2006).
One of many examples of race riots occurred
in Springfield, Ohio, in 1904. A mob raided a jail 、
where a black man was being held on charges

that he had killed a white police o侃cer. ’Ihemob ,.t~
tore the man from his cell, shot him, and hanged
him from a telegraph pole. Members of the mob
then took their wrath to the black section of
town, where they beat many blacks and burned
eight buildings to the ground. Similar riots hap-
pened in East Saint Louis, Illinois, and in other
cities, when white workers protested the influx A Lynching scene in Texas, 1905: A black man, accused of
having attacked a white woman, is hanged immediately.
of black workers from the South (Franklin and
Moss 2000).
In addition to outright violence by hate groups and lynch mobs, blacks also
faced state-imposed legal seg吨ation (separation of racial groups) and politi-
cal disenfranchisement. These measures were known collectively as Jim Crow
laws, a set oflaws in place between 1876 and 1965 that mandated segregation
in all public facilities (as we will discuss in Chapter Three). These laws ranged
from the segregation of public schools and transportation to the establish-
ment of separate restaurants, drinking fountains, and regiments in the U.S.
military.二’The legal segregation of public schools continued until the Supreme
Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional in the 1954 Brown
认 Board ofEducation decision. ’The remainingJim Crow laws were overturned
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965-one
hundred years a丘er the abolition of slavery.二
Since the creation of the United States, whiteness has carried with it undeni-
able privileges. For Syrians, Mexicans, Armenians, Irish,] ews, and Italians, the
importance ofbeing considered white has been a reflection of this privilege. As
we will discuss in Chapter Seven, Peggy Mcintosh describes white privilege as

“ an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each
day, but about which I was 'meant’ to remain oblivious. White privilege is like
an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, code-
books, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks”（198究 10).
Nonwhiteness, in contrast, carries burdens. Because of this disparity, fifty
people contested their racial status in the courts between 1878 and 1952
(Haney-Lopez 2006) in a personal and collective mission to attain full citi-
zenship. 咀1e Japanese community paid close attention to the Ozawa case in
the hope that Japanese people in the United States would be classified as white
and thus be able to attain citizenship. ’The Indian community watched the
Th ind case just as closely. In a very different way, Irish, Italians, Jews, and other
new immigrants discovered the advantages associated with whiteness in the
United States. At the same time, Native Americans and African Americans
faced hardships associated with the idea of race.
As the histories recounted in this chapter demonstrate, those who have had
the power to define whiteness have benefited from its privileges. Whiteness is
valuable only as long as some people are not labeled as white, and it is meaning-
ful only if we endow it with meaning.
Key Terms
intelligence testing 38 birthright citizenship 46 1871 Indian Appropriations Act 55
eugenics 40 naturalization 46 Allotment and Assimilation
pseudoscience 42 assimilation 51 Period 55
Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) 43 racialization 51 Dawes Act (1887) 55
Immigration Act of 1917 43 anti-Semitism 53 Indian Reorganization Act
(1934) 55
Johnson-Reed Act (1924) 45 structural violence 54
Reconstruction era 55
Naturalization Law of 1790 46 1851 Indian Appropriations Act 55
2.1 How did scientific racism evolve over the twentieth century? (pp. 38-42)
• In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scientists continued their
quest to demonstrate the supposed superiority of the white race. To do so, they
used craniometry and intelligence testing, and many promoted eugenics.

汾 What is the origin of intelligence testing? > What is an example of contesting the boundary
> What were some of the consequences of the of whiteness?
eugenics movement? > Why does Stephen Gould argue that the
primary error in intelligence testing is
reification (making somethi
concrete or real)?
2.2 How were U.S. immigration and citizenship policies racially exclusionary?
(pp. 42-47)
• Scientific racism influenced U.S. immigration and citizenship policies in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
．币1e first major piece of immigration legislation in the United States was the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred Chinese immigrants from entering
the United States.
．币1e 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, based on eugenicist ideas, was designed to increase
the number ofN ordic immigrants to the United States by se忧ing country-specific
quotas.
• In 1868, African Americans gained citizenship rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
• Native Americans did not gain U.S. citizenship rights until 1924.

沙 What was the significance of the Chinese > How were eugenecists able to influence
Exclusion Act? immigration quota laws in the early twentieth
> What changes did the Johnson-Reed Act make century?
to immigration policy? > How were nonwhites excluded from
> How did the Fourteenth Amendment change citizenship?
who was eligible for citizenship?
60 CHAPTER 2 Race, Imm igration, and Citizenship
2.3 How did legal decisions shape racial categories? (pp. 47-49)
• In several prominent court cases, plaintiffs argued for their inclusion in the
category of whiteness.
• In the contradictory Supreme Court decisions of Th ind and Ozawa, judges drew
from their own biases when deciding who was legally white.
Review Criticαl Thinking

> How has whiteness been legally constructed ? > What is the significance of the claim that
> Why does the author argue that there is a con- “whiteness is what the court s句TS it is勺
tradiction between the Singh and Thind cases?
2.4 Where did European immigrants fit into the racial hierarchy in the United
States? (pp. 49-54)
• When European immigrants arrived in the United States, they learned to think of
themselves as white.
• The Irish replaced black workers in several industries and then worked to exclude
blacks from wage labor.
• Italians faced discrimination as Southern Europeans, yet benefited from their
legal status as whites.
• Jewish immigrants were relegated to low-paying jobs and crowded housing yet
enjoyed the benefits of citizenship, which were denied to many non-whites.

> Historically speaking, what are some of the > What can we learn about whiteness by
privileges associated with whiteness? comparing the treatment of Asian Americans

> What is the difference between racialization to that of European Americans in the early
and assimilation? twentieth century?
> What does it mean to say that the Irish, Italians,
and Jews became white?

》飞!\Thy would Syrian, Jewish, Italian, and Irish
immigrants want to be classified as white?
> How have the privileges associated with
whiteness changed over time?
2.5 What forms of racial and structural violence did Native Americans and
African Americans confront in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries? (pp. 54-57)
• Native Americans lost two-thirds of their lands as a consequence of allotment
acts.
• White hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan emerged in opposition to the
perceived rise in power ofblack voters and politicians.

汾 What are some differences between the forms > How were Indian boarding schools a form of
of violence that Native Americans and African structural violence?
Americans faced during the early twentieth > Why do you think lynchings were common
century? during this period?
Talking α：bout Rαce

Europeans who came to the United States before 1924 arrived during
a time when there were few to no restrictions on immigration. Those
Europeans subsequently had many options for legalization that are no
longer available to today’s immigrants. You may be able to use these
facts in conversations about contemporary immigration. Many descen-
dants of Europeans believe that their ancestors came to the United
States the so-called right way and that immigrants who come today are
not law-abiding. Using the knowledge you have gained in this chapter,
seek out productive conversations about both historical and contempo-
rary illegal immigration.
Blind. Dane Chanase. Oil on canvas, 111 × 86.5 cm. (Private Collection/Photo © Christie 注 Imαges/Bridgemαn Imαges)
.
Chapter 。utline
. Ideological Consistency and

Change 66
voices Trayvon Martin 67
Overt Racism in the Mid-Twentieth
Century 70
rom the s •o Segregation 70

Mass Deportation of Mexicans and
Me× ican Americans 70
•ne rese n• Internment ofJapanese and
Japanese Americans 72
v。iicesFred Toyosaburo
Korematsu 74
The Tuskegee Syphilis
E× periment 75
The Civil Rights Movement and the
Commitment to Change 76
Rosa Parks and the Montgomery
Bus Boycott 77
Sit-Ins 78
Freedom Rides 78
As y。u Read Old Versus New Racism: The
Evolution of an Ideology 80
3.1 How do racial ideologies both persist and change? Biological Racism 81
3.2 In what ways was 1920 to 1965 an era of overt racism? Cultural Racism 82
3.3 What role did the civil rights movement play in promoting Color-Blind Universalism 83
change? Global View Cultural Racism
3.4 What are some of the forms that racism takes today? in Peru 84
3.5 What is color-blind racism, and how does 让 perpetuate Color-Blind Racism 85
inequality? Four Types of Color-Blind Racism 85
3.6 What did the elections of Presidents Obama and Trump Rhetorical Strategies of Color-Blind
Racism 86
reveal about racial ideologies in the United States?
The New Politics of Race 86
Check You 「 U nde 「standing 90
64 CHAPTER 3 Racial Ideolog ies
In 1955, African American Rosa Parks was

arrested after refusing to sit in the back of a
bus in the section designated for blacks. Since
the mid-twentieth century, the racial terrain
has clearly changed in the United States.
Nevertheless, as Randall Kennedy, author of
The Persistence ofthe Color Line, describes, race
continues to be of great import in our society.
here was a time-now it seems long ago-when it appeared, momen-

tarily, that America had taken a giant stride toward redemption. A丘er
all, the electorate selected Barack Hussein Obama, a black man, to
be president of the United States. 币1e hope, pride, relief, and astonishment
generated by this unprecedented event provoked all sorts of optimistic dec-
larations. People who had, in emotional selιdefense, habitually eschewed
patriotism, now waved American flags enthusiastically二 People who had
doubted that Americans would ever be able to overcome racial alienation
now believed that they could. Expressions of exhilaration produced sounds
and scenes reminiscent of reactions to such landmark events as the Emanci-
pation Proclamation; Joe Louis's victory over Max Schmeling; the “ I Have
a Dream'' speech of Martin Luther King, Jr.; and the landing on the moon.
Parties erupted featuring such anthems as “'.A.in’ t NO Stoppin’ Us Now,"“A
Change Is Gonna Come,” and “ We ’re a Winner." Strangers danced and cried
with one another. People named newborns a丘er the president-elect. On the
day a丘er the election, one of my students at Harvard Law School tearfully
declared that in light of Obama's election she was reconsidering her career
plans. His example, she said, made her want to be a better person. A few days
later, I received a letter from an inmate of a maximum-security prison in
Indiana that said the same thing.
On Election Night one heard repeatedly echoes of Maya Angelou's state-
ment “ I never thought I'd see a black president in the White House in my
lifetime.” Oprah Winfrey exclaimed that Election Night was “ the most elec-
trifying'' moment she had ever experienced. People commonly remarked that
they felt as if they were dreaming. ’The day after the election, on a Listserv orga-
nized by racial-minority law professors, a distinguished black jurist remarked,
CHAPTER 3 Racial Ideo logies 65
“ When I woke up this morning. I said to my husband, 'I had the weirdest dream
last night. I dreamed that a black man named Barack Hussein Obama became
president of the United States. Is that weird or what ?’”
...
Electing a black American as president is treated as remarkable. It is-but
only against the backdrop of a longstanding betrayal of democratic principles.
When Shirley Chisholm ran for president in 1968, she declined to portray her
pioneering candidacy as a reason for celebration. 飞代Thy should it be such a big
deal, she asked, for a black woman to run for the presidency? Forty years later,
the low expectations to which Chisholm objected were poignantly revealed
at the moment of Obama's victory二 When people exclaimed that they never
thought that they would live to see the day a black man [wasJ elected pre剑dent,
they were expressing how little they expected of their fellow Americans. 咀1ey
were saying that they didn’t antic毕ate that within their lifetimes the (white)
American electorate would be willing under any circumstances to entrust to
a black, any black, the highest office in the land. For many, the joyful tears on
November S, 2008, reflected surprise that a sufficient number of whites would
be willing to vote for an African American to enable him to become president.
咀1at surprise was founded upon a realistic appreciation of the extent to which
the race line in America has cruelly thwarted talents and aspirations. The tears
of election night were a reflection of that somber reality.
Sourα： l(ennedy 2011, 3-5.
币1e election of Barack Obama to the presidency did not signal the end of
racism. It did, however, indicate a change in racial ideologies in the United
States. Racial ideologies change over time because the needs and interests of
the elite change. As Karl Marx wrote in Uε German Ideolog如“τhe ideas of
the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas." American racial ideolo-
gies have evolved such that it ’s possible to have a black president, even while
incarceration rates are disproportionately high for black men, and even while
life expectancy for African Americans continues to be shorter than for whites.
In this chapter, we consider how racial ideologies have evolved, as well as how
they continue to reproduce and justify persistent racial disparities.
66 CHAPTER 3 Racial Ideologies
hegemony When an IDE 。 L。 GICAL C。 NSISTENCY AND CHANGE

idea or view of the world
The work of Pat削a Hill Collins (200份 is useful for understanding ideologi-
becomes accepted by most
cal shifts. As she explains :“When ideologies that defend racism become taken-
people as common sense.
for-granted and appear to be natural and inevitable, they become hegemonic.
prejudice The belief that Few question them and the social hierarchies they defend ”(96). When Collins
people belong to distinct explains that racial ideologies are hegemonic, she means that they become so
racial groups with innate widely accepted that they become common sense.
hierarchical differences Racism encompasses both racial prejudice-the belief that people belong
that can be measured and to distinct races with innate hierarchical differences that can be measured and
judged. judged-and racial discrimination-the practice of treating people differ-
discrimination The ently on the basis of their race. An ideology is more than an individual preju-
practice of treating people dice: it is a set of principles and ideas that embodies the interests of a societal
differently on the basis of group. A racial ideology, then, is a set of principles and ideas that (1) divides
their race. people into different racial groups and (2) serves the interests of one group.
Ideologies are usually created by the dominant group and reflect the interests
racial ideology A set
of that group.
of principles and ideas
Racial ideologies in the United States were established during the colonial
that (1) divides people
era. They have since evolved over time from primarily a folk concept in the
into different racial eighteenth century to a pseudoscientific concept in the nineteenth century,
grot1ps and (2) serves the a scientific association in the twentieth century, and cultural explanations
interests of one gro11p. following the horrors of 飞Norld 认Tar II. Today, many scholars of race describe
color-blind racism A racial the most pervasive racial ideology as color-blind racism, in which race is not
ideology that explains explicitly acknowledged, but individual prejudices, acts of racial discrimina-
contemporary racial tion, and 归uctures of inequality work to benefit whites (Bonilla-Silva 2013).
inequality as the outcome Color-blind racism can be applied to almost any arena of society, from mass
of nonracial dynamics. incarceration to the educational gap between blacks and whites, and is used to
explain racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics.
stereotype Widely
τhe case of Trayvon Martin (discussed in the Voices feature on page 67)
held but fixed and
raises several questions about racial ideology today. Was George Zimmerman’s
oversimplified image or
perception of Trayvon Martin shaped by the fact that Trayvon was a black
idea of types of people or
boy wearing a hoodie? As we will discuss in Chapter Five, the media feed us
things.
a constant stream of images that shape our beliefs.τhe media also perpetuate
stereotypes, widely held but fixed and oversimplified images or ideas of types
of people or things. One very common racial stereotype is that black men who
wear hoodies and baggy jeans are dangerous. Defenders of Trayvon Martin
and his family argued that Zimmerman is racist, and Zimmerman was quick
to defend himself by saying that he is not. However, George Zimmerman does
not have to identify as a racist to be influenced by racial ideologies. That is how
ideology works: it is so pervasive that we do not realize its influence on us.
Ideological Consis • ency and Change 67
Trayvon Martin
......................... . ...... . .................................... . ...... . ..................................... . ..
On the evening of
February 26, 2012,
seventeen-year-old
Trayvon Martin was
walking down the street .
in Sanford, Florida,
carrying an iced tea
and a bag of Skittles
he had just bought at
a convenience store.
George Zimme·γman ended TIγ叨叨轧 Martin's life, yet was He and his father were
acquitted ofmurder.
visiting his father's
fiancee, who lived in a gated community. Self-appointed neighborhood watchman
George Zimmerman, who was twenty-eight years old, saw Trayvon and called the
police to report what he perceived to be Trayvon's suspicious behavior: walking
slowly in the rain, wearing a hoodie. The police told Zimmerman not to pursue
Trayvon and that they would send a patrol car. Shortly afterward, however, a fight
broke out between Zimmerman and Martin. It is unclear who started the fight, but
a few moments later, Trayvon Martin lay dead on the sidewalk. When the police
arrived, they took the body but did not take Zimmerman into custody. Zimmerman
claimed self-defense and was not arrested.
Meanwhile, Trayvon's parents became worried when he did not return from
the store, and they began to look for their son. They did not learn until two days
later that Trayvon had been killed and that his killer had walked free. Trayvon's
parents used social media to draw attention to their plight. Two weeks after
Trayvon's death, they created a Change.org petition that eventually garnered over
2 million signatures. People around the country mobilized in response to what
many viewed as a racially motivated crime, one downplayed by a racist police
department that did not arrest George Zimmerman because he was a white man
who had killed a black boy. Six weeks after the murder, Zimmerman was charged
with second-degree murder. He was placed in custody but released days later on a
$150,000 bail.
On July 13, 2013, a jury acquitted George Zimmerman of both second-degree
murder and manslaughter.
Source: Associated Press 2012.
............................................ . ........................................................................
68 CHAPTER 3 Racial Id eo log ies
In today’s society, no one wants to be labeled a racist. ’This is the paradox

of color-blind racism: how do we have racism without racists? In this case, an
African American friend of Zimmerman's appeared on television and stated:
“ I'm a black male, and all that I know is that George has never given me any
reason whatsoever to believe he has anything against people of color." Other
media reports pointed to the fact that Zimmerman has an Afro-Peruvian
grandmother to buttress the claim tl刚 Zimmern
2012).’The claim that one can’t be racist because one has black friends is
common in a color-blind society (Bonilla-Silva 2010). However, the claim that
one can’t be racist because one has black family members is more typical of
Latin America (Golash-Boza 2010). This instance is one in which we may be
witnessing a Latin Americanization of racial ideologies in the United States-
an issue discussed further in Chapter Seven.
Finally, Trayvon Martin's killing reveals another aspect of our changing
racial ideologies: George Zimmerman has a white father, a Peruvian mother,
and an Afro-Peruvian grandmother. ’This set of facts raises two questions:
Is Zimmerman white? And does his racial identity have anything to do with
whether and how he carried out racial与 motivated actions? These qu创ions
and the complexities surrounding the case underscore the importance of racial
ideologies as societal factors that continue to be in flux.
One indication of change is that Trayvon's killing was handled very diι
ferently than it would have been before the civil rights movement. A story
from 1955 provides a point of comparison. In 1955, Emmett Till, an African
American boy from Chicago, was visiting his relatives in Mississippi when he
was tortured and brutally murdered by two white men. His murderers-Roy
Bryant and J. W. Milam-were acquitted, although they publicly admitted
to the murder after the acquittal. In 1955, Bryant and 岛1ilam were protected
by an outwardly racist justice system that refused to punish whites for killing
blacks. In 2013, Zimmerman was acquitted even though he was responsible for
Trayvon Martin’s death. Zimmerman relied on color-blind self二defense laws,
whereas Bryant and Milam relied on deep-seated racism that made it difficult
for white jurors to convict a fellow white man for the killing of a black man.
Social media enabled Trayvon’s parents to spread the news quickly about
his murder. Since then, several police killings have sparked widespread out-
rage, and again social media played a major role in spreading the news. On
July 14, 2014, New York Police Department officer Daniel Pantaleo put forty-
three-year-old Eric Garner in a chokehold and strangled him to death. A video
of Garner's death circulated widely on social media, where Garner is heard
saying,“I can’t breathe.” Despite widespread outrage, the grand jury did not
indict Pantaleo. ’Three weeks later, John Crawford was shot dead in a Walmart
Ideo log ica l Consis•ency and Change 69
by a police officer in Beavercreek, Ohio.Just four days later, on August 9, 2014,

teenager Michael Brown was killed by officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson,
Missouri. ’The killing of Michael Brown led to nationwide protests that lasted
nea句 a year (Taylor 2016). These killings and others led to the creation of the
Black Lives Matter hashtag and movement, which are part of a broad cam- Black Lives Matter
paign against racial violence. A hashtag and movement
It is remarkable that some of the largest marches against racism and police aimed at ending antiblack
brutality occurred while the United States had a black president and a black racism and violence in all
a忧orney general. The persistence of racist ideas and practices both during and 武s permutations.
following the Obama era provides insight into the deep-seated nature of racial
ideologies in the United States.
To be sure, much has changed since the civil rights movement, yet some
things are remarkably similar. Racial fears and racial i时ustice are still at play,
‘』 ‘
A A series of police killings led to the creation of the Black Lives Matter hashtag and movement, which are part of a
broad campaign against racial violence.
70 CHAPTER 3 Rac ial Ideologies
though they have evolved. Later in the chapter, we will continue to consider
what has changed in the United States since the 1960s. But first, we will look at
some of the most egregious instances of overt racism in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury: segregation, the mass deportation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans,
segregation A policy of
the internment of people of Japanese descent, and the Tuskegee syphilis
racial separation ensuring
experiment.
that whites have access
to the best opportunities
and facilities. 。VERT RACISM IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
Jim Crow laws A set of 币1e end of slavery did not end the oppression of people of color in the United
laws in place between States. Instead, a丘er the brief but promising period of Reconstruction, the
1876 and 1965 that country witnessed the rise of discriminatory laws and the continuation of
mandated racial overt racial discrimination.
segregation.
Segregation
Plessy v. Ferguson 1896 Between 1896 and 1954, it was legal to deny African Americans, Mexican Amer-
U.S. Supreme Court icans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans access to public schools and
case ruling that other facilities designated for whites. Such segregation laws ensured that whites
state laws requiring had access to the best opportunities, education, housing, and even seats on the
racial segregation in bus.τhe majority of states enacted some variant of these laws一o丘en referred
public facilities we1·e to as Jim Crow-prohibiting nonwhites from marrying whites, living in white
constitutional, as long as neighborhoods, riding in the same streetcars, attending the same events, and
they were “ separate but enrolling in the same schools. Jim Crow laws existed because the Supreme Court
equal.” had ruled in 1896 in the case of Plessy 队 Ferguson that state laws requiring racial
segregation in public facilities were
constitutional, as long as they were
“ separate but equal.，， τhe Plessy deci-
．、飞 sion had meant that states were free
. to pass and enforce laws segregating
schools, public transit, and any other
public place.
Mass Deportαtion of Mexico ns

and Mexican Americans
In the early twentieth century, seg-
LONESTAR RESTAURANT ASSN .
regation was in place to keep whites
Dallas, Texas
and nonwhites in separate social
A The majority of states enacted some va1·iant of segregation laws, legally spaces. During this same time,
denying non-whites access to facilities designated for whites only. legislators developed immigration
Over • Racism in the Mid-Twentie • h Century 71
policies aimed at engineering the racial makeup of the United States. In

California, although the growing agricultural sector depended on labor from
China, ] apan, and the Philippines, white nativists fought to pass legislation
that would prevent Asians from migrating to the United States. ’The Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882, followed by implementation of the Asiatic Barred Zone
in 1917, ended legal Asian labor migration to the United States. ’This law in
turn created labor shortages just as agribusiness was expanding. Accordingly,
agribusiness owners turned to Mexico to recruit laborers to come pick crops
in the United States (Hernandez 2010). By 1930, there were about 1.5 million
Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States (Balderrama and
Rod句uez 2006).
During the Great Depres剑on (1929-1940), unemployment rates in the
United States soared and poverty became widespread. In this time of fear and
need, many Americans pointed their fingers at Mexicans and blamed them for
the crisis. Anti-Mexican sentiment made it easy for many Americans to see the
mass deportation of Mexicans as a viable measure to ease economic pressures.
Balderrama and Rodriguez 。006) estimate that the vast majority of people
of Mexican origin living in the United States at the time were deported in
the 1930s：“ ma町 as a million Mexicans and their children (who were often
U.S. citizens) were repatriated to Mexico during this decade.
Many of these deportations were conducted through raids on Mexican
communities across the United States. Immigration agents went from door to
door demanding verification oflegal residence and arresting anyone who could
not provide it. Agents even conducted raids in public places. In one instance
in 1931, federal agents descended on La Placita, a public park in Los Angeles
popular among Mexicans. Approximately 400 Mexicans were enjoying the
afternoon in the park when the agents arrived, closed off the entrances, and
ordered everyone present to line up and produce documentation oflegal entry
and residency. ’Those who could not produce documentation were detained
for further questioning, and many were deported. ’These raids spread fear
throughout the Mexican community and set the tone of tension for decades to
come (Balderrama and Rod咆uez 2006).
In 2003, the California Senate Select Committee on Citizen Participation
held hearings on the repatriation of Mexicans, and the California legislature
passed a bill authorizing the creation of a commission to explore and docu-
ment the repatriation. The bill, however, never became law because of a veto by
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (Johnson 2005). Notably, although there
were undocumented Europeans throughout the United States during the
Depression, this mass deportation campaign focused exclusively on Mexicans.
During the 2016 presidential campaign, much of candidate Donald Trump ’s

platform centered on immigration-with promises t。“build a wall'' and
“ deport them all.” τhese slogans and threats of mass deportation are based
on the same set of racial ideologies that led to Chinese exclusion and the mass
deportation of 岛1exicans.
Internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans

In the early twentieth century, Japanese immigrants began to arrive in
California and Hawaii to work in the agriculture sector.τhe Japanese o丘en
were skilled agricultural workers, and most had a primary school education.
Many began as farmhands and hoped to ascend the agricultural ladder, first
as sharecroppers, then as tenant farmers, and finally as landowners. How-
eve乌 as increasing numbers of Japanese immigrants became landowners
and entered into direct competition with their former white employers in
California, white Californians began to protest and insist on the passage of
laws, such as the Alien Land Laws of 1917, which prevented people ineligi-
ble for citizenship (such as tl时apane叫 from owning land.τhe children of
Japanese immigrants, however, who were born in the United States were eli-
gible to own land, as they were citizens of the country by birth. As increas-
ing numbers of second-generation Japanese immigrants came of age, white
Californians searched for other measures to cut out the competition and pre-
vent the Japanese from owning land (Aoki 1998).
币1e beginning of World War II and the emergence ofJapan as an enemy of
the state provided just this opportunity. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese
Selected Critical Moments in the Evol11tion of Racial Ideologies

1896 1917 1946 1954 1955 1955 1960
Plessyv. Asiatic Barred Mendezv. Bγow饥℃． Murder of Rosa Parks Greensboro
Feγguso乱 Zone Westm仇steγ Board of Emmett Till refuses to give I sit-in
Education up her bt1s seat
Alien Land I oj'TopekαF Boyntonv.
Laws I11 JGαnsαs Vi·γgi：悦α
1896-1954 I Jim Crow laws

< 1929-1940 I preat Depressio
< 1930-1935 I M和s depor·tation of Mexicans
<l阳－1946 I Internment 中fJ叩aneseAm士~ns
1932-1972 I Tuskegee syphilis expe1·iment

Ove 「↑ Racism in the M id -Twent ie• h C e nt u 「y 73
navy attacked Pearl Harbor. Two months later, on February 19, 1942, Pres-
ident Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which ordered that people of
Japanese descent be detained and sent to internment camps.Japanese families,
many ofwhom had lived in the United States for decades, were ordered to pack
< During World War II,

Japanese families, such as
the Mochida family二 were
ordered to evacuate and
were placed in internment
camps.
1961 1964 I 1965 11968 I 1973 I 2003 I 2013 I 2015

First Free- Civil Rights Voting Civil Rights NAACP California George Emergence
domRide Act of Rights Act Actofl968 files a Senate Zimmerman of Black
1964 bans restores outlaws class-action Select acquitted I Lives Matter
.
discrimi- voting housing dis- lawsuit over Committee after fatal 1n response
nation 1n rights to all cr1m1nat1on the Tuskegee on Citizen shooting to fatal
empl句rment citizens syphilis Participa- ofTrayvon shooting
.
and public Publication experiment tion holds Martin ofTrayvon
acco口1日10-
of the hearings Martin,
dations Moynihan on Mexican Eric Garner,
. .
Report repatr1at1on Michael
Brown, and
-
『 I others
74 CHAPTER 3 Rac ia l Ideolog ies
their things and evacuate their homes within forty-eight hours. Many families
sold all their belongings and even their homes for a fraction of their value, as it
was not clear when or if they would be able to return.
During World War II, the United States government imprisoned over
120,000 men, women, and children ofJapanese descent-nearly everyone of
Japanese origin living on the U.S. mainland. Over 60 percent of the people
sent to internment camps were U.S. citizens, and they were kept in the camps
for an average of two to three years (Nagata 1991; Ng 2002). The justification
for the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans was that the nation
was at war with Japan. 咀1e United States was also at war with Germany and
Italy, however, and very few Germans and Italians were detained; and they
certainly were not rounded up and put into camps.
Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu

· ..... .. ..... .. ..... . . . ..... .. ..... . . . ..... .. ..... .. ..... ... ..... .. ..... ... ..... . ...... .. .... .. ....... .. .... .. ...... .. ...
Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu was born in Oakland,

California, in 1919, to Japanese immigrant parents
who ran a flower nursery. In May 1942, when Fred
was twenty-three, his parents were sent to an intern-
ment camp. Fred, a U.S. citizen by birth, resisted.
. He changed his name to Clyde Sarah and had minor

plastic surgery performed on his eyes so that he would
look less Japanese. However, he was arrested just two
weeks after his parents were placed in internment.
Fred was charged with violating military orders and
was convicted in September 1942. He was given five FredToyosαburo
years of probation and taken first to a temporary Koremαtsu.

camp in San Bruno, California, and then to a perma圄
nent incarceration camp in Topaz, Utah, where he and his family remained interned
for the duration of World War II. Upon his arrest, Korematsu filed a case that led
the U.S. Supreme Court to examine the internment order's legality, which it upheld
in a 1944 decision. Korematsu continued to speak out against the injustice, and in
1980, President Jimmy Carter appointed a special commission to investigate and
ultimately reopen the case. As a result, Korematsu's conviction was overturned in
1983; however, the 1944 Supreme Court ruling still stands.
Sources: Ng 2002 and http://korematsuinstitute.org/institute/aboutfred/.
· ..... ....... ........ . …… … … …..... ....... ........ ..…… … … … ………… ·...... .. . ...... ...... ...…… · ...
Ove1I Racism in the Mid-Twentieth Century 75
The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment

τhe prevailing racial id四logics of the period that produced the internment
of the Japanese and the mass dep。rtation of Mexicans also p町mi忧ed the
severe mistreatment ofAfrican Americans. One ex缸nple is the Tuskegee syph-
ilis experiment. In 1932, the Public Health Service (PHS) and the Tuskegee
Institute in Alabama recruited nearly 400 p。or black men f。r a study of the
long也rm effects of syph山s. τhey determined that the men had syphilis but did
not give them this diagn。sis, instead telling them they would be treated for “ bad
bl。。d,"an。nspccific, nonmedical term used to describe several illnesses. Unable
t。 afford health care, these men agreed to parti口pate in the study in exchange for
free medical exams, free meals, and burial insurance （民凹erby2009).
Rationalizing that the study participants would n。tn。rmally have access t。
health care, given their pove此y, the PHS doct。rs did not a忧empt t。位eat the
men for syphilis. Instead, they used the study t。 determine from observation
while they were alive and 丘。maut。psics once they were dead what untreated
syphilis would d。 to the b。dy (Reverby 2009). When the study began, there
was no proven treatment f。r syphilis.τhePHS d。ct。rs led the men to believe
they were being treated for their illness by giving them aspirin and aromatic
c。lored elixirs that had no medical purp。se. In 1947, it became widely kn。wn
in the medical community that penic过lin would cure syphilis. Yet, because
< During the Tuskegee

syphi!L~ experiment, black
men 轨，<ere diagnosed with
syphilis, yet were never
treated for it or told they
had it.
76 CHAPTER 3 Racia l Ideo log ies
the Tuskegee scientists were interested in seeing how the disease spread and
killed, they did not make penicillin available to the study participants.
τhe study encompassed a total of 624 participants and lasted four decades.
It finally came to an end in 1972, when Peter Buxtun, an employee of the PHS,
leaked the story to the media and sparked a national controversy.二 By that time,
dozens of the men had died, and many of their wives and children had become
infected with syphilis. ’The National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP) filed a class-action lawsuit in 1973. This resulted in a
$9 million settlement, which was divided among the study’s participants, in
addition to the promise of the provision of free health care and treatment to
the men who were still living, as well as their family members who had been
infected. ’The governmen飞 however, did not apologize formally for the unethi-
cal study until 1997 (Reverby 2009).
THE CIVIL RIGHTS M。VEMENT AND THE

c。MMITMENT T。 CHANGE
civil rights movement
A series of mass protests Segregation, the mass deportation of Mexicans, the internment of the
between about 1950 and Japanese, and the Tuskegee study occurred primarily because of the prevail-
1980 aiming to achieve ing racial ideologies at the time. We can imagine that mass detention of Italian
racial equality in law and Americans would have caused much more controversy in the 1940s than the
practice. detention of Japanese Americans did and that an experiment similar to the
Tuskegee syphilis experiment would have ended much sooner had the partic-
Mendez v. Westminster
ipants been white. Today, most Americans are appalled to learn of these dark
A 1947 California federal
moments in the country’s history. This reaction is indicative of a change in atti-
circuit court case ruling
tudes about race over the past century-a change we can trace, in large part, to
that segregating Mexican
the civil rights movement.
American children was
τhe civil rights movement sought to endJim Crow by first achieving legal
unconstitutional.
equality and subsequently implementing laws that were already on the books.
Brown 识 Board of One of the first victories of the movement was the 1947 case of Mendez v.
Education of Topeka, ”也stminste的 in which the federal circuit court in California ruled that seg-
Kansas 1954 U.S. regating children of Mexican descent was unconstitutional. ’The Mendez case
Supreme Court ruling was a critical forerunner to the landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision in the
that separate educational case of Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka, Kansas. With this decision,
facilities were inherently which overturned the ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court deter-
unequal and in violation mined that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal.
of the Fourteenth Despite these rulings, it would take more than a court decision for non-
Amendment of the U.S. whites, particularly African Americans, to gain equal access to education
Constitution. and other state institutions. African Americans, Asian Americans, Chicanos,
The Civil Rights Movement 。nd the Commilmenl to Cha nge 77
Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans 。rganized a series of mass protests

between 1950 and 1980 that would become part of the civil rights m。vement.
Notable legal victories of the civil rights movement include the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which banned discrimination in employment practices and public
accommodations; the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which rest。red voting rights
to all citizens; and the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which 。utlawed h。using dis-
crimination.τhese legal vict。ries came ab。ut in large part as a result of wide-
spread civil disobedience carried 。ut by African Americans and their allies in
the 1950s and 1960s.
R。sa Parks and the M。ntg。mery Bus s。ye。It

In the 1950s, African Americans in the Jim Crow South were forced to sit at
the back of the bus; the front rows were reserved for whites. Even when the
back of the bus was full, blacks were not permi吐ed t。 sit in any empty seats
in the fr。nt rows. If the white secti。n of the bus was full, howeveιwhites
< Rosa Parks on a

Montgomery bus the day
a仇er thesegr嗨atio自由对峙
were repealed, with a wlute
reporter behind her.
could demand that blacks give up their seats. Bus drivers and white passengers
enforced these rules. On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks was seated in the black
section of the bus when the bus driver ordered her to move so that a white pas-
senger could have a seat. She refused, and the bus driver called the police. Rosa
Parks was arrested for her violation of the city code, which indicated that bus
drivers could tell passengers where to sit. The arrest of the forty-two-year-old
Parks sparked a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, that lasted over a year.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., became the spokesperson of the boycott, which
crippled the bus transit company’s finances and eventually led to the repeal of
laws permi忧ing segregation on public transit.
Sit-Ins
On Monday, February 1, 1960, four black college students bought a few items
at the F. W. Woolworth store in Greensboro, North Carolina, and then sat
down at the lunch counte乌 which was reserved for whites. They asked to be
served but were refused. They remained there for almost an hour, until the
store closed. The following morning, they returned to the store, this time
with a group of thirty African American students, and occupied the lunch
counter for about two hours. On Wednesday, they occupied nearly all of the
lunch counter’s sixty-six seats.τheir actions caught the attention of the press,
and soon hundreds of white protestors and black supporters had rallied out-
side the store. By the end of the week, the Woolworth manager had decided to
close the store.τhe Greensboro sit-in led to similar acts of civil disobedience
across the country, primarily by black youth, and eventually led to the cre-
ation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Together
with the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the SNCC was central to the
civil rights movement (Carson 1981). Both organizations participated in
the Freedom Rides, which we discuss next.
Freedom Rides
In 1960, the Supreme Court ruled in Boynton v. Virginia that segregation in
Freedom Riders Civil interstate bus and rail stations was unconstitutional. Local authorities in the
rights activists who South, however, were unwilling to enforce integrationist laws.
rode buses in 1961 to In the summer of 1961, the Freedom Riders set out to test the Supreme
test the U.S. Supreme Court ’s ruling. Six white and seven black volunteers from CORE and SNCC
Court’s ruling that boarded a public bus in Washington, D.C., headed south.τhese Freedom
segregation in interstate Riders traveled peacefully through Virginia and North Carolina. But when
bus and rail stations was they reached the Rock Hill bus terminal in South Carolina, a group of
unconstitutional. white protestors attacked two of the black Riders, who were waiting in the
The Civil Rights Movemen • and the Commitment to Change 79
white section of the bus terminal. No one was seriously injured, and a丘er the
police arrived, the Riders were able to continue their journe予咀1ey did not
see serious violence until they arrived in Anniston, Alabama, where a mob
attacked one of the buses, smashing its windows and slashing its tires. 卫1e
bus was able to escape, but the mob followed the bus, and, six miles later, the
mob threw a firebomb into the bus. The Riders on this bus regrouped and
continued on to Birmingham, Alabama, where another mob of whites was
waiting. The mob severely beat many of the passengers when they disem-
barked. 卫1e police were late in arriving, and many of the passengers suffered
serious i闪uries.
A丘er the Birmingham attacks, the Riders were unable to find a bus driver
willing to take them on to Montgomery二’This first Freedom Ride ended earl如
but it did succeed in calling attention to ongoing segregation and brutality in
the South. It also helped solidi马r the civil rights movement and gain traction
< Elizabeth Eckford

on her first day at Little
Rock Central High
School on September 舍，
1957, surrounded by
whites yelling insults at
both her and the U.S.
marshals ensuring the
implementation of laws
permitting 1ntegrat1on.
80 CHAPTER 3 Rac ial Ideologi es
for future Freedom Rides. And, on September 22, 1961, the Justice Depart-
ment issued a ruling that prohibited separate facilities for whites and blacks in
train and bus terminals (Carson 1981).
Prior to these judicial decisions and legal changes, it was permissible in the
United States to deny the vote to nonwhites and to force nonwhites to attend
separate and inferior schools. In addition, the victories of the civil rights move-
ment were won despite massive and violent white resistance. This was evident
in the mob attacks on the Freedom Riders, but it happened at every turn. One
of the most shocking instances occurred when African American children
attempted to attend schools they were legally eligible to attend, and white resi-
dents responded with brutal attacks on them.
In the twenty-first century, we can no longer imagine whites openly protesting
and hurling insults at an African American girl for attending an all-white school.
On the other hand, schoolchildren shouted “ build a wall'' at Mexican American
students in the a丘ermath ofthe election ofDonald Trump as U.S. pre剑dent (Sims
2016). Whites no longer kill or harass blacks with exemption from punishment,
although police officers are rarely punished for killing black men (Williams 2016).
What has changed? And-just as important-what has not?
。 LO VERSUS NEW RACISM: THE EV。 LUTI 。 N

。F AN IDE 。 t。GY
Many scholars make a distinction between old racism-which permitted the
internment of the Japanese and the enslavement of Africans, for example-
and a new but related ideology that perpetuates racism without such practices.
new racism An ideology in In new racism, it is no longer acceptable to make overtly racist statements
which it is not acceptable or to have overtly racist laws (P. H. Collins 2004; Bonilla-Silva 2013; Logan
to make overtly racist 2011; Harvey Wingfield and Feagin 2010). Racism did not disappear with the
statements and laws, yet dismantling of slavery and Jim Crow laws, nor did the civil rights era mark the
racial inequality persists. end of racism. Race scholars generally agree that the post-1965 era is distinct.
Theorists Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994) explain that whereas the
government could once be overtly violent toward nonwhites，飞n the post-civil
rights era, the racial state cannot merely dominate; it must seek hegemony''
(147) (emphasis in original). By this Omi and 飞N"inant mean that policymakers
must seek to make the current racial order seem natural and normal, as it is no
longer viable to have laws and practices that are explicitly racist.
Racial inequality persists today both because of our history-colonialism,
slavery, and Jim Crow-and because of ongoing practices of discrimination
and exclusion.τhe new racism is an outgrowth of past racial inequality; mass
。Id Vers us New Rac i sm ：丁 he Evo lut ion of an Ideology 81
media and popular beliefs “ help manufacture the consent that makes the new
racism appear to be natu叫 norrr叫y and inevitable”( P.H. Collins 2004, 34).
Racial inequality in the United States has become naturalized. We have come
to think of it as normal that African American men are overrepresented among
prisoners and that white men are overrepresented among the elite, even
though we would never accept laws that overtly discriminated against African
Americans.
In the United States, most people do not consider themselves to be racist,
and we have laws in place that prevent overt acts of discrimination. Despite
this massive change in attitudes and laws over the past century, racial inequal-
ity persists. African Americans have, on average, a mere 10 percent of the
wealth that whites have (Oliver and Shapiro 2006). African American men
are seven times mo时ikely than white men to go to prison (Feagin 2001). On
almost any measure, blacks and Latinos are doing worse socially and econom-
ically than whites in the United States (Logan 2011). How do we explain the
persistence of racial inequality despite the social stigma associated with being
a racist? One way is by looking at how different forms of racism operate. 咀1is
allows us to see how some forms of racism are more acceptable than others,
even though all racial ideologies serve the same purpose: to explain, justify,
and normalize racial inequality and i叫ustice.
Another reason to examine racial ideologies closely is that despite trends
that demonstrate widespread racial inequality, a few prominent exceptions
make it seem as if racism is a problem of the past. Most notably, the United
States had an African American president, has a Latina and an African Ameri-
can serving on the Supreme Court, and has a woman of African American and
Indian descent serving as U.S. senator of California. How do we explain these
developments? Clearly, we need new ways to think and talk about race and
racism. In this section, we will discuss different forms of racism and consider
the extent to which these racial ideologies persist.
Biological Racism
Biological racism is the idea that whites are genetically superior to nonwhites. biological racism The idea
币1is idea has its origins in the scientific racism of the nineteenth century, which tl1at whites are genetically
set out to prove whites' superior innate intelligence. In the 1920s, the American superior to nonwhites.
lawyer Madison Grant argued that Nordics were the “ master race ” and that the
United States should pass laws banning interracial marriages and ensuring the
sterilization of inferior races. In the twenty岳 rst century, it would be difficult to
find people who openly advocate for the sterilization of blacks because of their
biological inferiority.Nevertheless, these ideas have not completely disappeared.
As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the most prominent examples of bio-

logical racism in recent decades is a 1994 book called The Bell Curve. In this
book, Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray argue that intelligence is quan-
tifiable. For Herrnstein and Murray, as for a century of intelligence testers
before them, the fact that blacks scored lower on intelligence tests than whites
provided support for the idea that blacks are innately inferior to whites. More
recently, Frank Miele and Vincent Sarich argued in their 2004 book Race: The
Reali纱 of Human Differences that races are a biological reality and that there
are measurable intellectual differences among racial groups. ’The publication
of The Bell Curve, Race: The Reali纱 of Human Differences, and other books and
articles in this vein provide evidence of the persistence of the belief that whites
are genetically or biologically superior to non-whites. However, most academ-
ics reject these views, and few Americans openly express such opinions in
public spaces today二 Biological racism still exists, but it is waning and is subject
to virulent criticism whenever expressed.
Cultural Racism
cultural racism A way of Cultural racism is a way of thinking that attributes disadvantaged racial
thinking that attributes groups’ lack of prosperity to their behavior and culture rather than to struc-
disadvantaged racial tural factors. Unlike biological racism, which claims that some races are inferior
groups’ lack of prosperity because of lower intelligence, cultural racism is the standpoint that a particular
to their behavior and culture-African American or Latino culture，岛rexam抖e-inhibits success.
culture rather than to 币1e 1965 publication of a report by the American politician Daniel Patrick
structural factors. Moynihan (1927-2003) planted the seeds for ma町 of the ideas inherent in
cultural racism. ’The document, which has come to be known as the Moynihan
Rep or飞 acknowledged the pervasiveness of poverty in the black community
and yet pointed to the breakdown of the black family as one of the principal
causes of this poverty二 Moynihan argued that the history of slavery and racism
had had detrimental consequences for the black family. He made the gendered
argument that the central problem of black America was that there were too
many single black mothers who were incapable of raising children on their
own. His proposed solution to black poverty was restoration of black men
to their rightful place as breadwinners and heads of families. For Moynihan,
the solution to black poverty was t。“缸” black families. 币1is stance-which
ignores structural factors such as discriminatory employment policies and
practices-is typical of cultural racism. Essentially, the cultural racism argu-
ment points to the behavioral patterns and culture ofAfrican Americans as the
primary cause of their poverty二 Cultural racism persists today二 For example,
pundits often blame blacks' educational failures on dysfunctional families or
。Id Vers us New Rac i sm ：丁 he Evo lut ion of an Ideology 83
parenting styles rather than on failing schools and

pervasive poverty.
Cultural racism also takes another form: teach-
ers perceive children who invoke African American
language and style as less intelligent than those who
conform to dominant culture. Ann Arnett Ferguson
(200 I) found in her research in an elementary school
that black students were more likely to get into trou-
ble at school because of the way teachers and school
administrators responded to their body language,
oral expressiveness, manners, and styles. She found
that children who conformed to white, middle-class A American politician Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued
cultural norms were less likely to get into trouble in a 1965 repo1·t that the b1·eakdown of the black family
and more likely to do well in school, and that the was a principal cat1se of poverty in the black community二
use of African American forms of expressiveness in This cultt1rally racist stance ignores structt1ral factors
such as discriminatory employment policies and practices.
school was grounds for punishment. Ferguson also
argues that when children are white or behave in a white middle-class way, they
are perceived to be selιdisciplined and good, while children who 飞ehave black''
are perceived as troublemakers. Ferguson’s findings point to the persistence of
cultural racism: whereas white, middle-class children are rewarded for behaving
in school as they and their parents do at home, working-class and poor black
children are punished for speaking and acting as their parents do.
Cultural racism also affects other racialized groups in the United States.
Latinas are o丘en portrayed as “ pregnant breeders'' who plan to have “ anchor
babies'' in the United States (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1995). Asians feel the
brunt of the “ model minority” stereotype-the myth that Asians are smarte乌
harder-working, and more successful than other minorities. And Native
Americans are perceived alternatively as “ savages'' or “ wise men.”咀1e racialized
sterotypes of Native Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos and Latinas are
discussed further in Chapter Four.
Color-Blind Universalism
Dr. Martin Luther I{ing’s dream of a day when his children “ would be judged not
by the color of their skin but by the content of their character'' calls for a world
in which skin color is no longer the basis for discriminatory treatment. Many
liberals argue that color-blind universalism, or color-blind liberalism-the color-blind universalism
idea that we should ignore skin color-provides the best framework for shaping The idea that we should
a world without racial discrimination. People who promote color-blind univer- ignore skin color.
salism recognize that racial inequality is a problem in the United States but
contend that the best way to remedy racial inequality is through universalist
programs that help everyone, regardless of race.
David Cochran (1999, 17) argues that “ color-blind liberalism begins with
the claim that the color of an individual ’s skin is a morally arbitrary fact that
should make no difference in the way he or she is treated.”’This thinking seems
to be in line with King’s dream. 币1e problem is that we live in a society in which
skin color is important. Ignoring skin color won’ t make inequalities based
on skin color disappear. Ironically, to achieve King、 dream of a color-blind
world, we can’t just pretend that skin color is not important. Skin color and cul-
tural groups based on skin color are real and important factors in U.S. society,
and they can’t simply be wished away二
Over the course of the twentieth century, we have seen racial ideologies
evolve from biological racism to cultural racism to color-blind universalism.
Biological racist views attribute racial inequality to inherent differences among
races. Cultural racist views blame racial inequality on cultural differences. In
contrast, color-blind universalism is not a racist ideology in and of itself, but
Cultural Racism in Peru

Cultu 「al racism is no• unique to the United Sta•es. I 门 Many Pe 「uvians also associated blacks with
Peru, people freely exp「ess negative stereotypes with C「iminality. Fernanda, a wo 「ki 门g-class woman in her
「egard to blacks and indig 门eous peoples. When I mid-forties,• old me: "People of color he「e in Peru can
interviewed people in Lima, Pe 「u, in 2007 ma 门y of be cha 「acterized as deli 「1quen怡， as gang mem be「s,
them spoke of blacks and indigenous peoples as because, generally, it is a ma 「ginalized 「ace.... The
havi 「19 "un bajo nivel cultural" （、 low cul↑U 「al level"). majo 「i↑y of people of color here are ... bad people;
For e×ample, Jorge, a forty-yea 卜。 Id Pe 「uvian dentis•, • hey live in poo「门eighbo 「hoods and G 「e criminals as
said that if he were to b「ing a black woman home, well ；而ey G「e in jail."
his neighbors would say, "How is it possible that he Through a va 「iety of widely accepted s↑e「eo
is with a black woma 门， because being black means types, the presumed cultu 「al and intellec•ual inferiori•y
that you G 「e of a lowe 「 cul↑U 「al level，。 I owe 「 profes- of black and indige 门ous peoples i门 Pe「U is used •o
sio 门。I level a lowe「 S↑atus ." justify thei 「 low position in the social hierarchy. Since
When I asked Jos台 Manuel, a P「ofessional in cultu 「al 「acism is very much ingrained in Peruvian
his mid-thi 「↑ies, how he would feel if his daughter society, e×P「essions of cul•ural racism are often 「1ot
decided •o marry an indigenous man, he 「es ponded perceived •o be racism at all, bu• simply to be factual
that the indige门ous pe 「so门 would be unlikely to be S•atements. Thus Peru has its ow门 brand of cul• ural
civilized. Many middle-class Peruvians were U 门com racism.

fo「↑able with the idea of intermarriage and expressed Source: Go/ash-Boza 20 l0.
• heir discomfort th 「ough cultural 「acism.
Color-BI in d Rae ism 85
it allows racial inequality to persist. We will explore this point further in the
next section.
c 。 L。 R-BLIND RACISM
Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva has built on these ideas of cultural racism
and color-blind universalism to offer a framework for understanding how wide-
spread racial inequality persists, even though no one wants to be called a racist.
In his work, Bonilla-Silva (2013) presents the notion of color-blind racism, a
racial ideology that explains contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of
nonracial dynamics, such as market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena,
or cultural differences. 咀1is racial ideology ignores or marginalizes people of
color's distinctive needs, experiences, and identities. Bonilla-Silva (2013) argues 。bstract liberalism The
that although race is a social construction, the idea of race is real in a social sense first of Bonilla-Silva's
and has produced a racial structure that systematically privileges whites. “frames”。f color-blind
racism. It involves using
Four Types of Color-Blind Racism liberal ideas such as
How is it possible to have widespread racial inequality when most whites claim equality of opportunity
there is no racism and that they are not racist? Bonilla-Silva offers an explana- or freedom of choice to
tion in his book Racism Without Racists. His research team interviewed whites explai11 or justi命 1·acial
and asked them questions about their views on race in the United States. He inequality.
found that whites use four types, or “ frames," of color-blind racism to justify
naturalization The second
and reproduce racial inequality.
“frame”。f color-blind
Bonilla-Silva calls the first frame abstract liberalism. 卫1is frame involves
racism, which permits
using liberal ideas such as equality of opportunity or freedom of choice to
people to explain racial
explain or justify racial inequality. For example, when presented with the fact
phenomena as if they
that African Americans still live in underserved, poorer neighborhoods, a
were natural.
person using this frame would explain this inequality by saying it is a choice.
As the argument goes, nothing prevents people living in poorer neighbor- cultural racism
hoods from leaving, so their situation is not because of racism but because of (Bonilla-Silva) The third
individual choices. 咀1is response, however, ignores the structural factors that of Bonilla-Silva's “ frames ”
both created segregation and perpetuate it. 。f color-blind racism,
The second frame is naturalization. This frame permits people to explain relying on culturally
racial phenomena as if they were natural.τhe explanation for segregation based explanations such
would be that people like to be around others who are like them. Again, the as the idea that blacks live
thinking is that segregation is not because of structural factors, but because it ’s in poor neighborhoods
normal or natural. because they don’t work
τhe third frame is cultural racism. 咀1is frame relies on culturally based hard enough to get out of
explanations, such as the idea that blacks live in poor neighborhoods because the ghetto.
they don’t work hard enough to get out of the ghe忱。. A person can use cultural
racism by saying something along the lines of, ''Blacks like Barack Obama who
work hard get ahead, yet most blacks can’ t get out of the ghe忧o because they
are too lazy to find work.” Statements like these ignore the fact that high unem-
ployment rates among black men in urban areas are due to a host of structural
factors that make it extraordinarily difficult for them to obtain employment, as
discussed in Chapter Nine.
minimization of racism η1e The fourth and final frame is minimization of racism. 咀1is frame sug-
fourth “ frame” of color- gests that discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting life chances for
blind racism, suggesting people of color. When confronted with facts indicating that racism is a real
that discrimination is no problem in society, those who use this frame would respond with comments
longer a central factor such as “ racism rarely happens” or “ most employers are not racist."
affecting life chances for
people of color. Rhetorical Strategies of Color-Blind Racism
In addition to the frames mentioned in the last section, Bonilla-Silva found
rhetorical strategy Way that whites used specific rhetorical strategies, or ways of expressing racist
of expressing racist ideas ideas without being labeled as racists. Bonilla-Silva argues that because post-
without being labeled as civil rights racial norms do not permit the open expression of racial views,
racist. whites have developed concealed ways of voicing them.
As Bonilla-Silva found, one common rhetorical strategy is to preface dis-
criminatory claims with “ I am not a racist, but....” Alternatively, whites would
sa如“Some of my best friends are black, but....” For example, when asked if
they would mind if their daughter married a black man, a white person would
respond,“I am not a racist, but I don’ t think interracial marriages work.” Or
they might use another rhetorical strategy called pr叫 ection, according to
which they would respond :“I don’t mind if my daughter marries a black man,
but you have to think about the children.”’These rhetorical strategies allow
whites to indirectly express discriminatory or prejudiced ideas.
In his research, Bonilla-Silva found that people use color-blind racial ideol-
ogy in everyday speech patterns to justify racial inequality. ’而is ideology influ-
ences rhetorical strategies, stories, and customary behaviors that allow whites
to explain why racial inequality is not due to racism. In addition to justifying
racial inequality, color-blind racism reproduces racial inequality by permitting
people to engage in discriminatory actions without being labeled as racists.
THE NEW P。 LITICS 。 F RACE

As we have seen throughout this chapter, racial ideologies constantly change
and adapt but do not disappear. Over the course of the twentieth century, they
evolved from biological racism to cultural racism to color-blind universalism
The New Poli • ics of Race 87
and color-blind racism. In each instance, these ideologies worked to justify and
explain racial inequality. 卫1e malleability of racial ideologies permits them to
evolve as society does.
Barack Obama became the first black president of the United States a丘er
winning the 2008 election. In 2016, Donald Trump was elected to the
presidency on a platform that galvanized white supremacists-the number
of hate crimes in 2016 hit an all-time high (Center for the Study of Hate and
Extremism, 2017). Let ’s take a closer look at these two historic elections to
evaluate what has changed and what has not.
What did Obama's election reveal about racial ideologies? It did not signal
the end of racism in the United States, despite what some commentators
claimed. Did it mean that white Americans were able to see past race, or did
Americans embrace his blackness?
Sociologist Enid Logan (2011) contends that Obama won the 2008 elec-
tion because he was able to shape an image of blackness that was palatable to
a broad cross section of Americans. 咀1is strategy required Obama to distance
himself from African American leaders such as ] esse ] ackson, Al Sharpton,
and Jeremiah White (Logan 2011; Nopper 2011). Obama's ability to claim this
particular form ofblackness was crucial to his success. As a presidential candi-
date, Obama had to walk a fine line-one where he neither rejected blackness,
thus alienating African Americans, nor claimed blackness too blatantly, thus
alienating white voters. Sociologists Adia Harvey Wingfield and Joe Feagin
< Inat1guration Day,

2017. Whereas Obama
sought racial conciliation,
Trump campaigned using
messages that were at
times overtly racist.
88 CHAPTER 3 Rac ial Ideolo gi es
(2010) argue that Obama’s marriage to African American Michelle Obama

was critical for his acceptance among African Americans: it permitted him to
claim blackness through his marriage while he simultaneously emphasized his
biracial status.
Racial politics undoubtedly played a significant role in Obama's election to
the presidency. But the election of a black president should not be taken as
an example of how America had moved beyond race. Instead, it showed the
continuing importance and evolution of racial ideologies. Obama was able
to become president not because we were living in a postracial society, but
because he distanced himself just enough from his blackness.
One way Obama leveraged race was by using color-blind universalism to
move his agenda forward. For example, Obama did not favor programs directed
at alleviating black male inner-city unemployment, even though black unem-
ployment rates have consistently been double that of whites (Taylor 2016).
Instead, he advocated for job recovery programs that would help all Ameri-
cans. Table 3-1 uses the example of black unemployment rates to show how
racial ideologies affect our approaches to social problems. Obama rejected bio-
logical and cultural racism, while embracing color-blind universalism.
Whereas Obama sought racial conciliation, Donald Trump campaigned,
using messages that were at times overtly racist, on a promise t。“make
America great again.” Trump appealed primarily to blue-collar whites frus-
trated with the lack of economic progress in the United States, as well as to
others frustrated with the state of politics in the country. Supporters of the
TAB 山 1
Racial Ideology Argument Solution
Biological racism African American men are genetically inferior Do nothing. Let natural selection prevail.
to whites and thus have trouble getting and
keeping jobs.
Cultural racism African American men are unemployed because Teach African American men appropriate
they are unable to present themselves appro- demeanors.
priately to employers.
Color-blind The disparity exists, but the solution is to Implement universal solutions that do not target
universalism improve the overall economy, not to focus on one racial group.
African Americans specifically.
Conc lusion and Discussion 89
alt-right-a far right-wing white supremacist movement-found Trump ’s

messaging particularly appealing. Trump redirected white Americans' fears of
economic insecurity to fears of terrorism and immigrants. He also used thinly
veiled racial rhetoric, although he has denied he is racist and has said that he
has a “ great relationship with the blacks”(0 ’ Connor and Marans 2016).
We can use Table 3-1 to consider how Trump ’s ideology differs from
Obama's. One of the most egregious types of racism is biological racism-
the idea that whites are genetically superior to nonwhites. Donald Trump is
reported to have said that “ laziness is a trait in blacks. It really is, I believe that.
It ’s not anything they can control'' ( O'Donnell and Rutherford 2016). The
idea that black people are innately lazier than other races is a clear example of
biological racism.
Another, more common form of racism is cultural racism, which involves
the belief that a particular racial or ethnic culture can inhibit or promote suc-
cess. Trump has also made statements in line with this thinking. He stereo-
typed Jewish people as good negotiators ( 0 ’ Connor and Marans 2016). He
referred to Mexican immigrants generally as rapists and other criminals (Ye
He Lee 2015）.τhe ideas that Jewish people are characteristically good at busi-
ness and that Mexicans are criminally inclined because of their culture are
clear examples of cultural racism.
Trump has also demonstrated subtler applications of this ideology. In an
interview regarding the Trump University fraud lawsuits, he stated that the
U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel had a conflict of interest because he wa s
of
that would limit immigration, but the idea that a Latino judge is necessarily
pro-immigration is an example of cultural racism. Based on the judge’s ethnic
background, Trump presumed to know his political beliefs.
From Presidents Clinton to Bush to Obama to Trump, racial inequality has
persisted. The specificities have fluctuated, but the overall picture has changed
relatively little. Racial inequality is deeply embedded in the fabric of our nation
and, by extension, in its politics.
Reading the stories of Japanese internees and of violence against African

Americans in the Jim Crow South, we cannot deny that we have come a long
way. However, today there are more African American men in prison or jail or
on probation or parole than were enslaved in 1850 (Alexander 2010). In this
light, the trajectory toward racial justice does not seem so straightforward.
90 CHAPTER 3 Rac ial Ideologi es
Signs that say “ No Dogs, Negroes, or Mexicans'' are no longer displayed

prominently in storefronts, nor are there designations for
“飞气Thites Only'' at water fountains. Instead, we usually see more subtle indica-
tions of continued racism through statements such as “ I'm not a racist, but ....”
And we see the open denigration of other groups. For example, during the
U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump stated: ＇飞,Vhen Mexico sends its
people, they’re not sending their best.... They're sending people that have
lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us.τhey're bring-
ing drugs.τhey're bringing crime. They're rapists.”(Moreno 2015). He风
Trump qualifies his statement by saying that some Mexican immigrants are
“ good people,” but the message is clear: he believes that many of them are not.
τhe discourses have changed, as have the outcomes. In our society, calling
someone a racist is a serious insult. However, a racial ideology that upholds the
superiority of whites and ensures that whites have access to the best resources
persists. 卫1is is the paradox of racism in the post-civil rights era.
Key Terms
hegemony 66 Jim Crow laws 70 biological racism 81
prejudice 66 Plessy v. Feγgusoη70 cultural racism 82
discrimination 66 civil rights movement 76 color-blind universalism 83
racial ideology 66 Mendez v. Westminster 76 abstract liberalism 85
color-blind racism 66 Brown v. Board of Education of naturalization 85
stereotype 66 Topeka, I(ansas 76 cultu叫 racism (Bonilla-Silva) 85
Black Lives Matter 69 Freedom Riders 78 minimization of racism 86
segregation 70 new racism 80 rhetorical strategy 86
3.1 How do racial ideologies both persist and change? (pp. 66-70)
• Racial ideologies in the United States have since evolved over time, from primar-
ily a folk concept in the eighteenth century to a pseudoscientific concept in the
nineteenth century to color-blind ideology today二

> What is the difference between prejudice and > How have racial ideologies become hegemonic,
discrimination? and what does that mean?

> What are racial ideologies, and how have they > Why do racial ideologies shi丘 over time?
changed over time in the United States?

> How is the killing of Trayvon Martin connected
to that of Emmett Till?
3.2 In what ways was 1920 to 1965 an era of overt racism? (pp. 70-76)
• The early to mid-twentieth century in the United States was the se忧ingfor
many cases of egregious racism, including segregation, the mass deportation of
Mexicans and Mexican Americans, the internment ofJapanese Americans during
World War II, and the Tuskegee syphilis experiment.

》认That were the Jim Crow laws? > What are contemporary parallels to the
> What was the motivation for the mass deporta- Tuskegee syphilis experiment, the mass
tion of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the deportation of Mexicans in the 1930s, and the
mid-twentieth century? internment ofJapanese Americans? What has
> Why were Japanese Americans interned during changed, and what has not?
斗\lorld 飞叮ar II? > It is difficult to imagine that the United States
> What was the Tuskegee syphilis experiment? would reenact the mass internment ofJapanese
and Japanese Americans. However, in the a丘er
math of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, U.S. government 。而cials interrogated
thousands of people from the Middle East.
Do you think there are parallels between the
internment ofJapanese during World War II
and the interrogation of 岛iiddle Easterners
a丘er September 11? Do you think racial ideol-
ogies were at play in either instance? Why or
why not?
3.3 What role did the civil rights movement play in promoting change?
(pp. 76-80)
• During much of the 1950s and 1960s, African Americans and others in the
United States rallied together to demand civil rights. Landmark events include
the Montgomery bus boycott, sit-ins, and the Freedom Rides.
92 CHAPTER 3 Rac ial Ideolog ies

> How were the Jim Crow laws dismantled? > Which strategies of the civil rights movement
》飞,Vho was Rosa Parks? were most successful? Why?

》飞句Tho were the Freedom Riders?
3.4 What are some of the forms that racism takes today? (pp. 80-85)
• Since the era of the civil rights movement, racism has continued to plague
our society. It has changed over time, however, so that today we more o丘en
see examples of cultural racism than biological racism.
• Color-blind universalism has become pervasive, allowing racial inequality to
persist.

> What are some ways that racial ideologies have > Provide an example from an encounter or
evolved since the 1960s? conversation you have had with someone that is
> What is the difference between old and new indicative of biological racism, cultural racism,
racism? or color-blind universalism.
> What is the difference between biological and
cultural racism?
> What is color-blind universalism?
3.5 What is color-blind racism, and how does it perpetuate inequality?

(pp. 85-86)
• Color-blind racism involves four types, or “ frames ,” according to sociologist
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and
minimization of racism.
． τhis racial ideology ignores or marginalizes the distinctive needs, experiences,
and identities of people of color.

> What is an example of each frame of color-blind > Explain in concrete terms how whites use a
racism? frame, in Bonilla-Silva’s terms, to justify and

reproduce racial inequality. Use a specific
example from the readings, your personal expe-
riences, or your service learning experiences to
demonstrate the frame.
3.6 What did the elections of Presidents Obama and Trump reveal about racial
ideologies in the United States? (pp. 86-89)
• The election of Barack Obama to the presidency changed racial dynamics in the
United States, yet racism still persists.
• The election of Donald Trump galvanized white supremacists.
Review Critical Thinking and Discussion

> How did Obama's blackness play a role in his > How have racial dynamics changed in the
political career? United States between the Obama and Trump

> Who found Trump ’s message compelling? presidencies?
Tα：［king about Race

Have you ever heard someone say “ racism is a thing of the past ”? If that
statement were to come up in conversation, what have you learned from
this chapter that might help you counter the idea that racial inequality
or racial discrimination has gone away? In what ways is the current era
unique? What are some parallels between today and one hundred years
ago, and how far have we come as a country?
吨 J
／回电、 ,/
I
’ y
..,
a』
~
、
，岳
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Mr. Prejudice. Horace Pippin. 1943. Oil on canvas, 18-1/8 × 14-1/8 in. (The Philadelphiα Museum ofArt/Art
Resou：γce,NY〕
. .
Chapter 。utline
. Individual Racism and Institutional

Racism 98
Individual Racism 98
voices Mic「oaggressions l Ol
Institutional Racism l 02
GI。ba lView Mic 「oaggressio 门S
in Peru l 03
Systemic Racism and Structural
Racism 105
. Systemic Racism l 05
Structural Racism l 06
research focus Sys•emic Racism
and H u 「ricane Katri no l 07
Critique l: Not Holding Whites
Accountable for Racial
Inequality 111
Critique 2: Not Going Far Enoug七
to Expose the Depths of
Racism 112
Critique 3: Overlooking Parallels
As y。u Reαd Between Jim Crow Racism
and Racism Today 113
4.1 How is individual racis1n li11ked to institutional inequality?
research focus E×amini 「， g
4.2 What are the key similarities and differences between Legitimized Racism agains•
systemic racism and structural racism? ｜门digenous Peoples 11 4
4.3 What is racial formation, and how does this concept inform White Supremacy and Settler
Colonialism 116
our understanding of racial inequality?
4.4 What does the perspective of indigenous studies reveal about research focus Applying Se忖le「
Colonialism Theory 118
racism in the United States today?
lslamophobia and Anti-Arab
4.5 How is Islamophobia related to racism? Racism 119
4.6 In what ways do race, class, and gender oppression work lntersectional Theories of Race
together? and Racism 120
Check You 「 Unde「standing 122

96 CHAPTER 4 Soc io log i cal Theo 「i es of Race and Rac ism
Amani Al-Khatahtbeh is a Muslim woman who grew up in New

Jersey. She was eleven years old in September 2001 when terrorists
attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. That was the
same year Amani heard her first racial slur. Another student said
AMANI AL·KHATAHγ8ε” to her:“Your people throw rocks at tanks.” Amani learned at a
MUSLIM GIRiL
A CO:M IN F AGE young age that she would be judged not only on her own merits,
but on those of her 平eople.” The September 2001 attacks (known
as 9/11) would have lasting implications for Amani, her family, and
her community, as she explains in the following excerpt. Amani
also describes how she feels about the election of Donald Trump
to the presidency, in light of his calls to ban Muslims from the
United States.
’m not really sure I understood what was going on when 9/11 happened, but
I was old enough to feel the world shi丘 on its axis that day and change everything
forever. I remember it so vividly because it was confusing and chaotic, and the
first time since my grandfather from Jordan passed away that I was enveloped by
sadness all around me, yet this time it applied to everyone. ’That day has become
crystallized in my memory not just for how harrowingly scary it was-how we
didn’t know what would come after that-but also because I deeply believe that
my generation of millennial Muslims has, whether we like it or not, come to be
defined by it.
We have become commodified in every demeaning way: Our bodies have
become political targets in the service of returning America to the imaginary
greatness it once e叫 oyed, which I can only assume was during the days of outright
racial comfort and superiority of white people; at the same time, our bodies have
been reprinted, sold, contorted to fit the only cool narrative society can accept, sold
to us Muslim women in a way that makes us eagerly jump to celebrate the shatter-
ing of another glass ceiling.
...
Abed Ayoub, legal director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Com-
mittee, issued a statement in the winter of 2015, almost immediately after Donald
Trump’s call for a ban on Muslim immigration, stating that levels oflslamophobia at
that time were the worst they had witnessed since immediately after 9/11. My heart
hurt. I could not imagine a generation oflittle girls living through a Trump era-the
CHAPTER 4 Socio log ica l Th eo ries of Race and Racism 97
terrifying possibility of a Trump generation-and enduring the same unsettlement

that my friends and I did growing up, not just from navigating their own identities,
but their surroundings as well. Enough is enough. ’The cycle needs to stop. In this
case, it’s less of a cycle and more of an uphill battle in which we toil. We’re climbing
toward the light with exceptional weight on our backs, digging our heels into the
dirt of the past to gain our way to the top, only to slip-no, be completely knocked
down-by an uncontrollable, newly emerging force that causes us to tumble all the
way back to where we started, much to the jeers and cheers and additional trips of
the bystanders around us. Everyone can see it happen, and complacency is a killer.
Souγce: Al-Khatahtbeh 2016, 3-4.
Above, Amani Al-Khatahtbeh describes the significance for her community of

both 9/11 and the Trump presidency.二 Muslim Americans became hypervisible
after 9/11, as anti-Muslim sentiment grew (Salaita 2006).’The discrimination
that Muslim Americans face is just one manifestation of deeply embedded
racism in our society.二
Racial discrimination is pervasive in the contemporary United States. We
see it in the criminal justice system, where blacks and Latinos are several
times more likely to go to prison than whites (Gottschalk 2015). We can find
racial inequality in employment as well: audit studies have shown that blacks
are less likely than whites to be interviewed and, once interviewed, to get a
job. Once blacks have jobs, they are less likely to be promoted. Black busi-
ness owners have more trouble obtaining contracts. In education, the picture
is equally bleak. Many schools in the United States are racially segregated,
and the quality of education is lower at primarily black and Latino schools.
Within schools, white students are given preferential treatment. When white
parents visit schools, they receive more attention from staff members, and
teachers are more likely to recommend white students for gi丘ed programs
(Nicholso卧Crotty et al. 2016). Sociologists and other researchers have
carried out study upon study demonstrating that inequality and discrimi-
nation exist. Yet how do we explain it？咀1is is where sociological theories sociological theories of
of racism come into play. Sociologists use evidence from their studies to racism Sociological
develop explanations for how racial inequality is created and reproduced. explanations for how
’These explanations are known as theories. racial inequality is
Sociological theories in the field of racial and ethnic relations look both created and reproduced.
at how racism works (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2013; Feagin 2001) and at how
98 CHAPTER 4 Sociological Theo 「 i es of Race and Rac ism
people are racialized (Omi and Winant 1994; Cornell and Hartmann 2007).
In this chapter, we will look at several sociological theories of race and racism
to help us understand how people are categorized into racial groups and the
consequences of those categorizations. Before we begin an examination of
these theories, what do you think? How would you explain the fact that black
men are seven times more likely to go to prison than white men? Do you think
blacks commit more crimes? Do you think police officers spend more time
policing black communities? Do you think police officers are biased toward
African Americans? All of these hypotheses can be tested through scientific
studies. Togethe乌 these hypotheses about how racism works lead to theories
of racism that help us understand how our society operates.
INDIVIDUAL RACISM AND INSTITUTI 。 NAL RACISM

Racism includes both discrimination and prejudice. As we discussed in
Chapter ’Three, racial discrimination involves practices or actions that repro-
duce racial inequality, and racial prejudice refers to racially biased beliefs. For
exam抖e, an employer can thi
whites 一this belief constitutes racial prejudice. When that employer decides
to hire a white person instead of an equally qualified black person, that decision
may be considered racial discrimination. Both prejudice and discrimination
are widespread in U.S. society.二
Many Americans, even those who do not believe they are racially preju-
diced, have implicit biases that operate at the level of the subconscious. It is
hard to avoid these biases because of the barrage of racialized messages we
receive in the media and through our personal networks. Racial prejudice
and implicit biases inevitably lead to racial discrimination. (Curious about
your own implicit bias? Take the Implicit Association Test at https://implicit.
harvard.edu/implicit/.)
Individual Racism
Discrimination can occur at the individual level when one person discrimi-
nates against another. Audit studies have consistently shown that blacks are
less likely to be interviewed for jobs than whites and that blacks and Latinos
face housing discrimination on a regular basis (Feagin 2001; Pager, Western,
individual racism When and Bonikowski 2009). Racially disc白ninatory actions by individuals such as
one person discriminates not calling back an interviewee for a job because ofhis race or telling a person
against another on the on the phone that the apartment is taken because he or she has a Spanish
basis of race or ethnicity. accent or lives on a reservation constitute individual racism. Individual acts
Individual Racism and Ins • itut io na I Ra c is m 99
of racial discrimination and bigotry are commonplace in our society and help
to reproduce racial inequalities.
How widespread is individual racism? Researchers have consistently
found that racial discrimination is pervasive. One study of Department of
Defense employees revealed that nearly half of the black employees had
heard racist jokes in the previous year (Feagin 2001). Another survey con-
ducted by Feagin and McKinney (2003) revealed that 80 percent of black
respondents had encountered racial hostility in public places. One African
American secretary detailed the consequences of constant discrimination
as follows :“I had to see several doctors because of the discrimination, and
I went through a lot of stress. And, then, my blood pressure ... went on the
rise '’(82). This woman, like many other African Americans interviewed in
this study, displayed high levels of stress as a result of her mistreatment in
the workplace and consequently developed health issues. In another study,
Dwanna Robertson (2015) found that Native Americans constantly face
the consequences of negative stereotypes about them. One of her partici-
pants told her,“I hear things like: 'Show me an Indian, I'll show you a drunk
Indian.' 'Indians a时azy”’（130).
It is remarkable that individual racism is widespread in a society that usu-
ally condemns overt acts of racism. If a television announcer were to make
a racially charged or overtly racist statement such as ''African Americans are
inherently more violent than whites,” we can be sure that the following day,
critics would forcefully condemn the racist statement. If racial discrimination
is frowned upon, how can it be so widespread?
One way that individual racism persists, even in a society that decries racism,
is through racial microaggressions-daily, commonplace insults and racial racial microaggression
slights that cumulatively affect the psychological well-being of people of Daily, commonplace
color. The consequences of these microaggressions can be severe, and stud- insults and racial slights
ies of African Americans, Latinos, and Asians have uncovered the continued that cumulatively affect
prevalence of microaggressions. One study of African Americans on college the psychological
campuses, for example, found that white students and professors consistently well-being of people
doubted the academic potential of African Americans. One black student was of color.
presumed to have cheated after ge扰ingan “A” on a difficult math quiz. Another
black student found that people assumed his scholarship was for sports, when,
in fact, it was for his academic achievements. ’These students reported that
the cumulative effect of these slights was to make them tired, discouraged,
and frustrated-especially since they had expected more from their profes-
sors and peers (Solorzano, Ceja, and Yasso 2000). These microagressions can
have severe consequences: a recent study among African American college
100 CHAPTER 4 Sociological Theories of Race and Racism
students found that certain types of racial microaggressions were associated

with elevated levels of suicide ideation (Hollingsworth et al. 2016).
African Americans are not the only group to experience microaggressions.
In a study of Asian Americans' experiences of discrimination, Derald Wing
Sue and his colleagues found that Asian Americans experienced a wide variety
of microaggressions, ranging from the assumption of foreignness to exoticiza-
tion of Asian women to invisibility.二 For example, Asian Americans reported
that white Americans consistently asked them questions such as “ Where are
you from ?” or made comments such as “ You speak good English,” when the
only indication that they might not be from the United States was their Asian
appearance. Other Asian Americans pointed out that people presumed they
were good at math and that men presumed Asian women would be submis-
sive lovers. Asian Americans also reported that people presumed that they
didn’t face discrimination. The Asian Americans in this study recounted that
the constant barrage of microaggressions angered them but that they also felt
disempowered to respond, as any single event could seem inconsequential
by itself (Sue, Bucceri, Lin, Nadal, and Torino 2007). These experiences are
commonplace: a recent study of 152 Asian Americans found that 78 percent of
them experienced microagre臼ions during a two-week period (Ong, Burrow,
Fuller-Rowell,Ja, and Sue 2013).
Kevin Nadal and his colleagues conducted a study of multiracial people’s
experiences of microaggressions and found them to be pervasive (Nadal et al.
2011). These studies of both Asian Americans and multiracial individuals
reveal that well-intentioned whites o丘en deliver microaggressions because of
their insensitivity toward and ignorance about nonwhites. 咀1is can be seen, for
example, when a white person speaks Japanese to a Chinese American or tells
a biracial woman with a black mother and a white father that being half-white
makes it easier to get along with her. In the first instance, the white person
may be trying to show a cultural interest in Asian people, although her act
simultaneously tries to erase the differences between Japanese and Chinese
people and reasserts the presumed foreignness of Asian Americans. In the
second instance, this assertion reinforces white supremacy by implying that
the biracial woman is better than other blacks because she has a white parent.
Microaggressions and other forms of individual racism continue to pose a
problem on college campuses. Studies have consistently found that individ-
叫 acts of bigotry are commonplace (Harper and Hurtado 2007). In a recent
study (Harper et al. 2011), higher education researchers ir阳viewed 他y-two
African American male resident assistants (RAs) on five college campuses
and found that many of the participants reported that supervisors and fellow
Ind ivid ual Racism a nd Ins • itut iona l Racism 101
Microa~~ressions
Individuals who hαvehαd the following
experiences αnd consider them to be Tαcial
d
microα：ggressions posted these reports on the website u -
microaggressions.com. How do youfeel αsyou mαd
these reports? What would yousαy if you overheαrd .
such comments? Whαtwouldyousαy ifsomeone
directed one ofthese comments αtyou?
Often when I l1ave dinner at people’s houses, they
ask me if I would prefer chopsticks, regardless of the
meal! The presumption thαtAsian
I am a registered nurse and always get told that Americαηs use chopsticks
I speak English so well. I was born in Australia and αt every meal is bαsedon
I am of Filipino background. I don’t think about my αn idea ofinherent cultural

dffferences. 防 don’·t see
appearance until a patient or their family member
these sαme presumptions
points it out, and they are quite amazed/baffled that
αpplied to third-generαtion
someone who appears Asian “ speaks so well'' and ItalianAmericαns or Irish
could be considered a “ real Australian.” Am衍’icαns.
I always get asked to be an interpreter for patients

who are not native English speakers, specifically for those of Asian background.
Because I am of Asian background as well, there is this assumption that I speak
every language in Asia or that there is only one language/country in Asia.
Unbelievable.
“ Sorry, that must be my black coming out." [Said byJ my biracial friend (African
American and Mexican). Whenever she does or says something negative she blames it
on the “ Black” side of her. Makes me feel angry, belittled, resentful.
I express that my brother attends a private university. Immediately a girl in the car
responds in a very sure voice “ Oh, he plays football ?” This is the second time this has
happened. As if a young black male can only attend a prestigious private college on a
football scholarship.
“ You’re really unintimidating for a black guy二” Said by white male. I am a freshman
in college. Made 1ne feel as though I sl1ould be intimidating because I ’m black.
Ohmygawd. You’re totally not what people think of when they think of Muslim
wo1nen. You’re so cool.
Wow. Don’t get the Muslim mad, guys. We don’t want a blown-up school
tomorrow.
(co ’n tinued)
102 CHAPTER 4 Soc iolog ica l Theor ies of Race a nd Racism
Continued Substitute teacher: Quiet down! You’re acting like a bunch of wild
ωωυ－
Indians!
Oh, but you’re Latin, so you must love the heat! While discussing the
summer weather. I ’m from Bogota-the average temperature is 60°F. I feel
like nobody in the States bothers to understand that Latinos are not just one
O＞
monolithic entity.
Source: The Microaggressions Project.

·.. ...··... .··.... . ...…...……··... ...……·....... ……· ·.... ..….. ..··.... ...……·.... ....……..
students consistently doubted their competence and stereotyped them as

potential thugs or gangsters. 卫1e frequency of individual acts of racism on
college campuses has led a number of scholars to argue that many primarily
white campuses have hostile climates that are not conducive to learning for
nonwl巾 students (Harper and Hurtado 2007).’These issues came to a head
at the University of Missouri amid a series of overtly racist incidents begin-
ning in 2014. In April that yea乌 freshman Bradley Becker inscribed a swas-
tika and the word "heil~’ on a dormitory wall. In Septembe马 a group of young
people near campus yelled the N-word at the student body president. When
the administration did not respond to these incidents in a meaningful way,
black students and allies organized and demanded the president's resignation.
As student protests mounted, racist incidents continued, including another
swastika drawing. Finally, following the football team’s threatened boycott,
Preside町fimWolfere句ned in November 2015 (Izadi 2015).
lnstituti。nal Racism
In the late 1960s and 1970s, sociological thinking on racism moved away
from a focus solely on prejudice and individual acts of racism toward an
institutional approach. Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) introduced tl削dea
instituti。nalracism of institutional racism-the policies, laws, and institutions that reproduce
Policies, laws, and racial inequalities- in their book Black Powe1：布ey explained that the high
institutions that rates of black infant mortality in Birmingham, Alabama, and the prevalence
reproduce racial of black families in slums are best understood through an analysis of institu-
inequalities. tional racism.
In an essay published in 1979, Carol Camp Yeakey posited that research
on institutional racism in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s repre-
sented a marked departure from previous research, which had not focused
on “ the attributes of the majority group and the institutional mechanisms by
which majority and minority relations are created, sustained, and changed"
Ind iv i d ual Racism a nd Ins • it u ti on a I Racism 103
Microaggressions in Peru
Monica Car 「i l lo Zegarra is G 门 Afro-Pe 「uvi an artis•, • 6:10 p .m.: 八八onica is walking down the st「eet,
scho l α 「f a 门d activis• She finished university in Pe 「u and a ta ×i drive 「 begins to follow her. He ope门S
and then wen • on to O × ford to comple•e a deg 「ee the doo 「 and says，” Neg 「a: ge• in ." When she
「esponds defensively, he says: "You should be
i门 human rights. In Peru, she fou 门ded an organiza-
happy I am looking at a woman like you ."
tion ca lled LUNDU, wh ich organ izes and empowers
Afro-Peruvian youth. ｜门 her essay, Monica continues to describe the
Monica describes what happened to her on microαgg 「ess ions she consistently e×per ie 门ces. Men
one no• untypica l evening in Lima, Peru. On New and women, girls and boys, sho 叶飞egra ”。↑ her
Yea 「’s Eve 2006 she left her home in a middle-class whe门 she leaves the house. Men presume she is
门eighborhood in Lima to go shopping and had the se× ua lly ava il αb l e a 门d offer unsolici•ed invi↑atio门S for
fo llowi 门gi 门↑erac↑ions: se× ual intimacy. 0 门 one occasion, within jus• th irty
minu•es, Monica counts e leven people who verba lly
• 5 p .m.: A man wa lking down the s↑「ee↑ holding
his f iveγea 「＇－Old SO门’s hand points at Monica and assaul• her as she wa lks down the s•reet. Monica
says, "Monster, monster. Do you see the mons↑e币” e× p lains tha↑ 「acia l aggressions are commonplace in
The boy laughs a 门d 「esponds, "Daddy, she is Peru because Peruvians feel as if •hey ca 门 hurl insults
burned ." at Af「o-Peruvians with impunity. As o 门 artist and activ-
• 6:05 p.m .: Monica wa ll。↑oward an ou•door ist, she struggles with the bes• ways to co 门fron↑ ↑his
marke• where women o「e se l li 门g ea 「rings. The rea li•y and ↑0 「nain↑ain a sense of humani•y in the
women begin to laugh. One of •hem says:”There face of co 门sta 门↑ de h umanization .
goes you 「 sis↑er." The othe 「 responds: "A 「e you
C「azy; she ’s your sis•er." And they a ll laugh. Source: Carrillo Zegarra 20 l 0.
叶
FVK
，
--
W
A
Monica Carrillo gathering signatures in the 2012 campaign “ Sign up

against racism" in Peru.
(Yeakey 1979, 200). Yeakey then argued that racism ope以es on

both a covert and an overt level and takes two related forms :“’The
first is on an individual level. ’The second is on an institutional level
where racism as a normative, societal ideology operates within
and among the organizations, institutions, and processes of the
larger society二 And the overt acts of individual racism and the more
covert acts of institutional racism have a mutually reinforcing
effect”。00).
Understanding the framework of institutional racism is essential
for understanding racism in the United States, as racism amounts
to more than individual acts of discrimination. An individual police
o侃cer may have prejudicial beliefs that blacks are more likely to
be violent than whites. Based on this prejudice, the officer may be
more likely to racially discriminate against blacks and more likely to
use more physical force against blacks than whites. What do we call
it, though, when this kind of discrimination happens repeatedly? An
analysis of the 1,217 U.S. police shootings between 2010 and 2012
A Protestors calling for the end of found that young black males are 21 times more likely to be killed
police brutality march through by police than a以heir white cou1出rparts (Gabrielson, Grochowski
New York in 2015. Young black men
Jones, and Sagara 2014). How do we explain this statistic?
are 21 times more likely than young
In overwhelmingly black neighborhoods in Washington, D.C.,
white men to be killed by police.
and Chicago, nearly three-quarters of black men have been incar-
cerated. In some states, black men go to jail on drug charges at fi丘y times the
rate of white men. In seven states, blacks constitute over 80 percent of drug
offenders sent to prison (Alexander 2010). These extraordinary disparities
cannot be explained by individual acts of discrimination alone.
Instead, it makes sense to argue that racial discrimination has become insti-
tutionalized in the criminal justice system. 卫1is is because racial discrimina-
tion happens at every level of this system. ’The laws are written in ways that
discriminate against blacks-the disparities in sentences for possession of
crack and possession of cocaine are one example (Alexander 2010). Police
officers are consistently more likely to pull over and arrest black men than
they are white men. Blacks are more likely to get harsher sentences or even the
death penalty (Gottschalk 2015). When we look at the system as a whole and
see that the criminal justice apparatus more harshly affects blacks than whites,
and when we can see that racial discrimination is consistent and systematic,
we can say that the criminal justice system is a prime example of institutional
racism. Institutional racism also exists in other institutions, including the
educational system, housing, and the labor market.
Systemic Racism and St 「 υct u ra I Racism 105
SYSTEMIC RACISM AND STRUCTURAL RACISM

Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton (1967) developed the idea of
institutional racism in the 1970s. Since that time, many thinkers have enhanced
their conceptual models and developed more complex and integrative ways
of thinking about institutional racism. In 1969, Samuel Robert Friedman
(196究 20) defined structural racism as a ''pa忧ern of action in which one or
more of the institutions of society has the power to throw on more burdens
and give less benefits to the members of one race than another on an on-going
basis.” In 1979, Carol Camp Yeakey wrote about “ the interrelated and cumu-
lative nature of systemic or institutional discrimination and racism,” the way
racism works in ''social systems”。03), and explained:
The resource allocation of ci抄 schoolsj residential segregation and housing

qualityj the location, structure, and placement oftransport systemsj hiring and
promotion practice习 academic underachievement of racial and ethnic minority
youthj availabili今y of decent health carej behavior of policemen and judgesj
a legal order that incarcerates more minorities than majoritiesj stereo飞ypical
images prevalent in the media and school curriculaj price gouging in ghetto
s切化与 morbidity, mortali凯 and longevi抄 ratesj lack of political clout and
φctive legislative representation-these and a myriad ofotherforms ofsocial,
political, and economic discrimination concurrently interlock to determine the
statu马 1叫fare, and income of the racial and ethnic minorities of coloκ
Unfortunately, nearly forty years later, we can make the same assessment with
regard to institutional racism. Fortunately, scholars of race and racism con-
tinue to refine these theories and approaches. In this section, we explore some
of these current approaches.
Systemic Racism
Sociologist Joe Feagin defines systemic racism as 飞 diverse assortment of systemic racism As defined
racist practices; the u时ustly gained economic and political power of whites, by Joe Feagin (2001),
the continuing resource inequalities; and the white-racist ideologies, attitudes, a diverse assortment
and institutions created to preserve white advantage and power”。001, 16). He of racist practices,
explains that systemic racism encompasses daily microaggressions, deep-seated encompassing daily
inequalities, and anti-black ideologies. Taken togethe乌 systemic racism includes: m1croaggressions,
deep-seated inequalities,
• Patterns of u时ust impoverishment of nonwhites and antiblack ideologies.
• Vested group interests of whites to maintain racism
• Omnipresent and routinized discrimination against nonwhites

.’ The rationalization of racial oppression
• An imbalance of power whereby whites are able to reproduce inequality
through control of major political and economic resources
Systemic racism theory gives primacy to history and to anti-blackness:

Feagin explains that systemic racism exists because of the history of the
United States as a slaveholding nation. Racial oppression was foundational to
and is deeply ingrained in our nation's history. The legal system of the United
States-based on the Constitution and Supreme Court cases-is rife with
exam抖es of entrenched racism. Systemic racism in history and the present day
has created a “ white racial frame'' that shapes individuals and institutions in
the United States. Feagin emphasizes that racism and racial inequality were
created by whites and continue to be perpetuated by white individuals and
white-owned institutionsο001).
The u时ust enrichment of whites through slavery and privileged access to
resources since the beginning of the United States is at the core of an under-
standing of systemic racism. 咀1is unjust enrichment has led to unjust impov-
erishment of African Americans. Past and continuing discrimination has
created a situation in which African Americans have been denied resources
manywhites have come to take for granted, including good jobs, great schools,
and nice neighborhoods (Feagin 2001; Feagin and McKinney 200孙’The
pervasiveness of everyday acts of discrimination, combined with a legacy of
unequal distribution of resources throughout every aspect of U.S. society, con-
stitutes systemic racism.
Structural Racism
structural racism Proponents of the idea of structural racism take a slightly different approach
Interinstitutional in their analysis of racial inequality. As we have seen, institutional racism
interactions across time focuses on practices within institutions, and systemic racism focuses on accu-
and space that reproduce mulated acts of racism across history and throughout one's lifetime. Structural
racial inequality. racism differs by pointing to interinstitutional interactions across time and
space. For example, racial inequality in housing leads to racial inequality in
schooling, which in turns leads to racial inequality in the labor market. Across
generations, this chain of events becomes a cycle because parents who are less
well positioned in the labor market cannot afford housing in the better neigh-
borhoods, which means that their children will be less likely to attend better
schools. A structural understanding of racism underscores the “ structural rela-
tionships that produce racialized outcomes”(powell2008, 798). This emphasis
Systemic Racism and St 「 υctural Racism 107
γeseαγc 。cus
Systemic Racism and Hurricane Katrina

咀1e images broadcast on national television
in the a丘ermath ofHurricane Katrina made
it clear that those hardest hit were African
Americans. Images of poo乌 dark-skinned
African Americans wading through flood-
waters made their way into living rooms
across the United States.
Sociologists Kristen Lavelle and ] oe
Feagin (2006) have responded to the ques-
tions many people asked a丘er seeing these
images: Why were poor blacks the pri-
mary victims of Hurricane Katrina? Was People ωαde throughfloodwαters on their wαy to the
it because they were black or because they Superdome 仇 NewOrleαns, Louisiαnα， look仇gfor
were poor? Lavelle and Feagin argue we shelter 饥 the aftermath of HurricαneKatrinα in 2005.
must look at race and class simultaneously,

as they are inextricable. In New Orleans, and across the United States, race and
class are intertwined because of a long history of institutionalized racism.
咀1ere are large numbers of African Americans in southern Louisiana because
of the history of slavery in the United States-New Orleans was the principal
slave market in the United States in the 1700s and 1800s. By 1840, there were
over 23,000 slaves in New Orleans and about 20,000 free blacks. Although
slavery ended in 1865, inequality persisted through “ separate but equal'' statutes.
For nearly one hundred years, blacks in New Orleans were prevented by law
from living in white neighborhoods and attending white schools. When schools
were officially desegregated, most white families moved out of integrated school
districts or sent their children to private schools. Black families were left with
underfunded schools, diminished job opportunities, and limited choices for
housing.
By the time Hurricane Katrina hit in the summer of 2005, two-thirds of the
residents of New Orleans were black, and one-quarter of the city's residents
lived below the official poverty line. Forty percent of the black residents of the
city earned less than the salary required to meet the poverty line, giving New
(co’nti：乱.ued)
108 CHAPTER 4 Sociologica l T h eo 「 ies of Race and Racism
Orleans the highest rate of black poverty in the country. When the hurricane hit,
60 percent of poor blacks lacked access to a ca鸟 making it di面cult for them to
follow evacuation orders. Only 17 percent of poor whites in the city did not have
access to a car.
Lavelle and Feagin argue that “ this u叫ust impoverishment takes place within
a continuing framework of well-institutionalized racism'' (13). They contend
that we can best understand why the primary victims of Hurricane Katrina were
black and poor when we consider the long history of institutionalized racism in
the United States.
For Discussion
1. Is systemic racism a useful framework for understanding Hurricane Katrina?
Why or why not?
2. Why do Lavelle and Feagin argue that race and class are inextricable?
3. Why do you think segregation persisted a丘er laws that enforced segregation
were overturned?
4. What evidence do Lavelle and Feagin provide for contemporary and historical
systemic racism in New Orleans?
Sou reε： Lavelle and Feagin 2 006 .
on the relationships among structures of institutional inequality provides new

insights into how racial inequality is reproduced across generations.
racialized social systems Eduardo Bonilla-Silva proposes the concept of racialized social systems.
Societies in which By this term, he means “ societies in which economic, political, social, and
economic, political, social, ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial
and ideological benefits categories”(1997, 469). Bonilla-Silva places particular emphasis on racial
are partially structured hierarchies and points to how these hierarchies influence all social relations.
by the placement of actors Societies that have racialized social systems differentially allocate “ economic,
in racial categories. political, social, and even psychological rewards to groups along racial lines''
(442). Bonilla-Silva's framework reflects a structural racism pe叩ective
because he focuses on structures of inequality, hierarchies, and social relations
and practices that reproduce and justify racial disparities.
Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro (2006) offer a keen analysis of the role of
structural racism in reproducing wealth inequalities. They explain that wealth
inequality “ has been structured over many generations through the same
Ra cia I Formation 109
systemic barriers that have hampered blacks through-

Whites $141,900
out their history in American society: slavery, Jim Crow,
so-called de jure discrimination, and institutionalized
Hispanics $13,700
racism'' (12-13). Oliver and Shapiro (2006) point to three
instances of structural inequalities that work together:
Blacks $11,000
(1) blacks' transition from slavery to freedom without a
material ba风（2) the suburbanization of whites and the
FIGURE 4-1.
ghettoization of blacks, and (3) contemporary institutional Median net worth of white, Hispanic, and black
racism in the lending and real estate markets. These three households, 2014
inequalities work together to create a situation in which source: Pew Research ζenter (2014).
the median net worth of one white household is 10 times
that of a Hispanic or Latino household and 13 times that of a black household
(I{ochhar and Fry2014) (Figure 4-1).
Oliver and Shapiro (2006) explain how laws and policies, even those that
do not mention race, can still work to enhance racial inequality. Our tax pol-
icies provide one example. In the United States, capital gains are taxed at a
lower rate than income, and tax deductions are offered for home mortgages.
These policies are ostensibly designed to help the middle class and encourage
economic growth. However, they provide many more advantages to whites
than to blacks because blacks rarely have capital gains income, are less likely
to own a home, and, when they do own a home, have houses that are worth
less than wl巾s’ houses (Shapiro 2004） .τhese state policies work to widen the
wealth gap between blacks and whites by providing advantages to those who
are already wealthier and who are more likely to be white.
RACIAL F。 RMATI 。 N
As discussed in Chapter One, racial categories were created during the time
of slavery, genocide, and colonialism. Nevertheless, we still use categories
such as White, Black, Asian, Native American, and, more recently, Latino/ a
and Arab to make meaning of our social world. In Latin America, mestizo racial formation As
(white/ Indian) and mulato (white/ black) as well as other racialized categories defined by Michael
continue to shape social life. One key aspect of racial categories is that they Omi and Howard
are flexible and can accommodate distinct social realities.τhe emergence of 飞机nant (1994),“the
“'.Arab ” and “Latin。” as racialized categorizes in the United States is an exam- sociohistorical process by
ple of how racial ideologies can evolve and change the racial structure itself. which racial categories
Whereas analyses of structural and systemic racism focus on racism itself, are created, inhabited,
Michael Omi and Howard 飞tVinant consider racial meanings (1994). They transformed, and
introduce the concept of racial formation to help us understand how racial destroyed .”
110 CHAPTER 4 Socio log ica I T h eo 「 ies of Race and Racism
dynamics work in the United States. Omi and Winant define racial formation
as “ the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited,
transformed, and destroyed,” and as a “ process or historically situated project''
(56). They argue that the state (i.e., national government) is the primary site
where race is constructed and contested. According to this theory, the state can
reproduce or alleviate racial inequality through its institutions and policies.
Omi and Winant explore “ how concepts of race are created and changed'' and
argue that “ concepts of race structure both state and civil society”。ii).
WhenOmiand 认Tin ant ’s book was first published in 1986, it was a welcome
change from earlier works that studied race as some variation of ethnicity,
class, or nation. Instead, Omi and 飞rVinant presented race as a topic worthy of
study in itself. 咀1eir groundbreaking work has greatly enhanced our under-
standing of how race works in the United States.
Omi and Winant (1994) draw from the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci
to argue that racial dynamics in the United States have changed from dom-
ination to hegemony. Domination refers to direct rule by coercion, whereas
hegemony involves rule by both coercion and consent. For example, Omi and
飞机nant contend that the United States prior to the civil rights era could be
characterized as a racial dictatorship in which racial inequality was enforced
through domination. During slavery and the Jim Crow era, white domination
was legal, state-enforced, and difficult to contest openly. In the current era of
racial hegemony, racial stratification and white dominance are achieved more
subtly through coercion and consent. Omi and Winant argue that the United
States is undergoing a slow, gradual, and contentious transition from a racial
dictatorship to a racial democracy.
咀1e concept of racial formation blends an understanding of social structures
with an understanding of cultural representations. Omi and Winant use the
racial project As de岳ned concept of a racial project, which they define as being “ simultaneously an
by Michael Omi and interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort
Howard Winant (1994), to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines'' (1994,
a way of giving meaning 56). Racial projects give meaning to racial categories through both cultural
to 1·acial catego1·ies representations and social structures. For example, Doris Marie Provine and
through cultural Roxanne Lynn Doty (2011) argue that the criminalization of immigrants
representations and social through intensified immigration policy enforcement is a racial project. In this
structures. example, the state targets immigrants and draws attention to their vulnerable
status.τhe increased law enforcement and resulting media attention reinforce
the marginalization of immigrants as a racialized group.
For Omi and 飞rVinant, a racial project is defined as racist if it 冗reates or
reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race''
(1994, 71).’They are careful to distinguish between 肌e and racism and to

point out that not all racial projects are racist. Projects are racist only when
they reproduce structures of domination and hegemony二 For example, one
could argue that the criminalization of Latino immigrants is a racist project
because it reinforces the marginalized status of this racialized group. Omi and
认Tinant argue that every state institution is a racial institution. ’They don’ t go
so far as to say that every state institution is racist. 币1is is because they believe
the state can also use racial schemas to promote racial equality二
Omi and Winant have received a substantial amount of scholarly atten-
tion, mostly positive, for the concept of racial formation. However, they have
also received critiques, primarily for not pu忧ing racism at the center of their
analyses (Wellman 1993; Bonilla-Silva 1997; Feagin and Elias 2013). David
Wellman (1993, 10) contends that the racial formation perspective does not
analyze the advantages whites receive from racial projects, thereby ignoring
the question of who benefits from systems of racial domination. Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva (1997) posits that this pe吨ective relies too much on ideological/
cultural processes and does not pay enough attention to the ways that racial-
ization is embedded in society. Feagin and Elias (2013) offer
Omi and Winant’s work, contending that the scholars:
1. offer abstractions that are less useful than direct critiques holding whites
accountable for racial inequality;
2. do not go far enough to expose the depths of racism in the United States; and
3. overlook many of the parallels between Jim Crow racism and present-day
racism.
Critique 1: Not Holding Whites Accountable for

Rαcial Inequality
In their first critique, Feagin and Elias (2012) argue that Omi and Winant
do not provide “ a significant and explicit discussion of whites' central and
powe巾1 role in shaping the racial hierarchy”(10). Instead of delineating who
upholds the racial hierarchy,“terminology such as 'the state' obscures activi-
ties of the mostly white (male) deci剑on-makers who control the US political
economy”(10). Feagin and Elias critique Omi and Winant for pointing to the
“ new racial state'' instead of the “ new white political power elite-controlled
governrr
identifying the actors who reproduce racial inequality, Omi and Winant’s
analysis is less useful than other approaches to dismantling racism. Whereas
Feagin and Elias argue that Omi and Winant should speci马r who the actors
112 CHAPTER 4 Soc io logical Theo 「i es of Race and Rac ism
maintaining racial inequality are and how whites maintain the racial order,
Omi and Winant (1994) maintain that the state should be our primary focus.
’They further assert that they “ have little patience with the argument that
racism is solely a white problem'’(72).
Feagin and Elias (2013) also critique Omi and Winant for not being specific
about how racial hegemony is maintained. However, Omi and Wina时’s work is
primarily theoretical and does not have an empirical focus. One could use the
racial formation perspective to understand better who the actors in 气he new racial
state'' are. For example, we could apply this approach to analyzing why U.S. immi-
gration policies disproportionately affect blacks and Latinos. ’Thus, although Omi
and Winant could have more clearly specified who is creating the current racial
orde马 their framework remains useful and paves the way for future research.
Critique 2: Not Going Far Enough to Expose the Depths

of Racism
Feagin and Elias’s (2013) second critique is that Omi and Winant do not
expose the depths of racism in the United States. 币1is critique is based on how
we understand racism as operating. Feagin and Elias contend that Omi and
Winant do not “ substantially and critically dissect'' the “ structural reality of
US society'
tion perspective, race is primarily a question of individual prejudice, and they
contend that Omi and Winant give primacy to struggles over racial meanings
instead of struggles over power and resources. Feagin and Elias believe the
more important question is: What group has the power to impose meanings?
’They concede that racial meanings are important yet contend that they are
best understood in the context of racial oppression.
An evaluation of this critique requires a close reading of Omi and Winant
(1994). Do these scholars (1) suggest that racism is primarily a question of
individual bigotry, (2) link racism to structural factors, and (3) ignore the
history of white racial domination? Omi and Winant argue that race signifies
“ difference and structure[s] inequality'' and that “ a racialized social structure
shapes racial experience and conditions meaning”(57).’Thus, it seems fair to
say, as Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997) points out, that Omi and Winant pay
less attention to structure than they might, but it is not fair to say that they
completely fail to link racism to structural factors, because they do. Omi and
Winant prefer to focus on the linkages between structural factors and their
cultural manifestations and argue that racial projects do the ideological work
of making these linkages. Racial projects connect the meaning of race to social
structures that redistribute resources unevenly二
Critique 3：。verlooking Parallels Between Jim Crow Racism

and Racism Today
Feagin and Elias's (2013) third critique is that racial “ formation theory
presents a relatively optimistic view of racial progress, especially over the
last half二century”（19) and that “ Omi and Winant o仕en seem to view white
racism today as something tacked onto an otherwise healthy, progressing
US democracy'' (12). Feagin and Elias contend that Omi and Winant pres-
ent too rosy a vision of racial progress in the United States and need to take
a closer look at the lack of gains made by African Americans since the civil
rights movement. Fundamentally, Feagin and Elias are asking if it is true that
the United States is undergoing a transition from a racial dictatorship to a
racial democracy.二
First, we need to go back to Omi and Winant's (1994) work to determine if
this is a fair critique-do they argue that the United States has experienced
significant progress since the Jim Crow era without regard for the persistence
of racial inequalities? Omi and Winant maintain that “ it is obvious that the
attitudes, practices, and institutions of the epochs of slavery, say, or of Jim
Crow, no longer exist today”(71) and that the str吨gles of the 1950s and 1960s
“ dramatically transformed the political and cultural landscape of the U.S ....
[and] achieved limited but very real reforms'' (95). However, they also recog-
nize that much ground has been lost and that racial inequality persists today.二
It would be hard to disagree with their contention that the civil rights move-
ment transformed the meanings of racial identities in the United States; yet it
is also possible that they have overstated the gains made in combating racial
inequality.
To explore this disagreement over the gains in racial equality in the post-
civil rights era, it is useful to consider how Omi and Winant’s depictions stand
up to Michelle Alexander'sο011) contention that mass incarceration is the
“ New Jim Crow.” Alexander argues that our criminal justice system systemat-
ically denies rights and opportunities to African Americans, effectively replac-
ing the openly racist policies of the past. Incarceration has become a common
life event for African Americans, and according to Alexander,
Today it is peγfectly legal to discγiminate against cγiminals in nearly all

the ways that 让 was once legal to discγiminate against Af讥can Americans.
Once you're labeled a felon, the old Joγms of discγimination-employment
discγimination, housing discrimination, denial of the γight to vot马 denial of
educational opportunity, denial offood stamps and other public ben 巳如s, and
e况cl仰oi收om jury seγvice-aγe suddenly legal. (2011, 2)
114 CHAPTER 4 Socio log ica I T h eo 「 ies of Race and Racism
She even goes so far as to contend that “ today a

criminal freed from prison has scarcely more
rights, and arguably less respect, than a freed
slave or a black person living ‘ free’ in 岛1ississippi
at ti
How do Omi and 飞／气Tin ant's ( 1994) claims hold up
in the face of this evidence?
It seems that their main contention一－that
racial identities have been transformed since
slavery and Jim Crow-can be retained, regard-
less of this reality二 However, their contention
Sharecropper, Little Rock, Arkansas, 1935. Michelle that the attitudes, practices, and institutions of
Alexander contends that a criminal freed from prison Jim Crow have been completely dismantled does
today faces a situation similar to that faced by black seem overstated. Rather, it seems, as Alexander
men at the height of Jim C1·ow, such as this sharecropper contends, that these practices have been replaced
photographed here in Little Rock Arkansas in 1935.
with other equally pernicious systems of racial
control.
Joe Feagin’s contributions to our understanding of the historical and
present-day operations of racism in the United States-particularly with
regard to antiblack oppression-have been tremendous. Feagin’s work has
generated thousands of books, articles, book chapters, theses, and disserta-
tions that focus on the operations of racism in the United States. Likewise,
Omiand 认Tinant’s seminal Racial Formations has served as the basis for a sub-
stantial body of scholarly work on racial identities, meanings, and iterations.
γesea，γc
Examining Legitimized Racism against Indigenous Peoples

Sociologist Dwanna Robertson (2015) questions the assumption that overt
racism is no longer socially acceptable in the United States. She argues that this
claim does not hold true for indigenous peoples in particular. Whereas other
groups may face primarily covert or color-blind racism,“Natives still routinely
experience overt racism in the form of racial epithets like 'redskin,' 'injun,’ and
‘squaw' and hor山ly distorted depictions of Natives as mascots”(113).
Because of the widespread nature of racist discourse and practices toward

indigenous people, Robertson contends that racism against Native Americans
has been “ legitimized”(11 S). By this term, she means that racist image乌 mascots,
and stereotypes are so pervasive that they have become acceptable.
Many race scholars contend that overt bigotry is relatively rare and has been
replaced with more polite forms of racism. Yet Robertson argues that this is not
the case for Native Americans. On television, Native Americans see a football
team called the Redskins. On Halloween, they see gross caricatures of their
culture. In schoolyards, they overhear children “ playing Indian." On Columbus
Day, they witness a celebration of their genocide. Every day, Native Americans
hear negative racial stereotypes, such as that they are drunks or savages.
Robertson interviewed forty-five Native Americans, many of whom told her
about their experiences of overt racism. Will, a Chickasaw man, explained that
many people have negative views of Native Americans:“We are considered
drunks. Lazy, dirty drunks. ’They look at the reservations, and they see all the
old cars just broke down and the shanty shacks, and a lot of people feel that the
Indians get money all the time, and that’s why they live in poverty, because they
take their money and drink all the time”(131).
Tom, a Penobscot man, shared similar experiences. He said:“I hear things like:
'Show me an Indian, I'll show you a drunk Indian.’'Indians are lazy.二’ We won't get
jobs because we get everything for free. 咀1ey think we all get casino money and
government entitlements .... But I still have to work, and I can’t even drink a beer
without people throwing stereotypes around'' (130).
Native women experience racial discrimination particular to their gender
and sexuality. Maggie, a Maliseet woman, described the trauma she experienced:
“'.As I got into puberty, white boys seemed to have some kind of idea that I was
'wild’ and would be more willing to have sex with them .... Boys would grab me
and say stuff and call me 'Pocahontas.’’They didn’ t treat other [white] girls on
their street that way”(132).
Eva, another Native woman in Robertson's study, recalled being mistreated
as a child as well. She explained:“I remember being pushed in the pool before,
called squaw or dirty squaw. But I also remember [hanging outJwith a close friend
of mine and her friend once, and because I was darker skinned I was accused of
being dirty.二 Because when you’re darker, obviously on your elbows and your
knees you have darker skin and she’s like, 'Why are you so dirty? Why don’ t you
clean yourself?”’(135)
(co’nti：乱.ued)
116 CHAPTER 4 Soc io logical Theo 「 i es of Race and Rac ism
Robertson's research makes it clear that Native Americans experience overt

racism in many forms. She argues that this racism has been normalized and
institutionally legitimized, rendering it invisible both in public and in scholarly
discourse.
For Discussion
1. What is legitimized racism? Can the concept be applied to groups other than
Native Americans? Why or why not?
2. Compare and contrast the concept of legitimized racism to another form of
racism discussed in this chapter.
Source: Robertson 2015.
WHITE SUPREMACY AND SETTLER C。 t。 NIALISM
What if we consider present-day racism in the United States from the

perspective of indigenous studies? From this perspective, we are forced to con-
tend with questions related to the meaning of white control of lands that once
belonged to Native Americans. What would the end of racism look like for
indigenous peoples? We can imagine that Native Americans have an entirely
different set of claims than do African Americans.
Andrea Smith (2012) argues that there a以hree pillars of white supremacy:
(1) antiblack 肌ism, (2) genocide, and (3) orientalism (Table 4-1). Antiblack
racism defines people as property, thereby justifying slavery and current forms
of exploitation, and is rooted in a logic of capitalism-that is, designed to
extract profit. Genocide is rooted in colonialism.τhis is the idea that native
people are disappearing and must disappear, and that therefore non-native
people have a right to everything that once belonged to native people. Orien-
talism is rooted in the idea that certain nations or peoples pose a permanent
threat to Western civilization and is thereby used to justify war.
Although the United States is no longer engaged in the mass murder and
expulsion of Native Americans, many indigenous scholars contend that
the logics of genocide and settler colonialism endure (Smith 2012). Native
Americans continue to have a unique legal position in the United States: they
are citizens both of the United States and of the tribes to which they belong.
Wh i•e Supremacy and Settle r Co lon ia lism 117
Antiblack Racism Genocide Oriental ism
Justifies Capitalism, slavery Colonialism War
Position People can be property Native people are disappear- Certain nations or peoples
ing and must disappear pose a permanent threat
to Western civilization
Source: Based on Smith 2012.
Scholars such as Andrea Smith ο012) contend that capitalist ideas of prop-
erty ownership and white supremacist ideas of indigenous inferiority work
together to justify the expropriation (seizure) of indigenous lands. From this
perspective, simply returning lands to Native Americans would not solve the
problem of indigenous expropriation. 咀1e more fundamental problem is the
nation-state itself and the idea that people can control territory and keep other
human beings out of it.
Once we recognize that the United States is a nation rooted in white
supremacy, it becomes clear that the state will never grant native peoples
selιdetermination. For some indigenous scholars, this recognition means that
the struggle against racism requires a challenge to the very existence of the
United States as a legitimate state (A. Smith 2012).
< Students graduating

from Haskell Indian
Nations University, in
Lawrence, Kansas.
118 CHAPTER 4 Soc iolog ica l Theories of Race a nd Racism
Joe Feagin (2001), in his systemic racism framework, contends tl时 antiblack
oppression is at the center of U.S. society, even though the United States was
formed through genocide. Andrea Smith (2012) contests this framework,
arguing that the United States exists precisely because of the disappearance
of indigenous people and that this genocide continues today. One's framework
for understanding the experience of native peoples is critical because it shapes
how we view racial progress or regression. Smith points to the example of high
rates of intermarriage between Native Americans and whites. Is this progress?
Or is it a continuation of a pa忧ern of genocide?
Using these perspectives, we can see how frameworks shape research
questions and answers. From the perspective of settler colonialism, one
might argue that the United States is an illegitimate state founded on geno-
cide and must be dismantled. From a systemic racism perspective, one can
argue that the United States is founded on a history of racism and that the
Constitution must be rewritten. From a racial formation perspective, the
United States is headed in the right direction and through more struggles
for justice and civil rights will complete the transition from racial dictator-
ship to racial democracy.
γeseαγch TOCUS
Applying Settler Colonialism Theory
In Canada, nearly half of the children in foster care are aboriginal, even though
only 7 percent of all Canadian children are abo鸣inal (Government of Canada,
2017). Social work and sociology scholars Gordon Pon, Kevin Gosine, and Doret
Phill协（2011) argue that an anticolonial and cr让ical race 丘amework can help us
understand this striking overrepresentation.
Pon and colleagues (2011) contend that “ the contemporary racial dispropor-
tionality in child welfare is inseparable from the historical exigencies of race,
class, and gender divisions”。87). Canada is a settler state, meaning that people
came there from Europe and took over lands inhabited by aboriginal peoples.
An understanding of this difficult history is critical to comprehending contem-
porary racial disparities in Canada. Blankets contaminated with smallpox were
Isla mophobia and Anti-A 「ab Racism 119
used in genocidal attacks against aboriginals. In addition, aboriginal children

were forced to attend Indian residential schools, where as many as SO percent
died. Pon, Gosine, and Phillips make the case that the foster care system is effec-
tively an extension of the residential school system. 卫1ey pos让 that "the child
welfare system naturalized the removal of Aboriginal children by constructing
Aboriginal women 挝、ad mothers’”。92).
Pon and his colleagues also point to another parallel between the residential
schools of the past and the foster care system of today: the teachers in the resi-
dential schools were white women, as are most social workers in Canada today.
Drawing 丘om national narratives of civilization and progress, these white women
promote the idea that they are saving aboriginal children from their mothers. Pon
and colleagues argue that understanding the overrepresentation of aboriginal
children in foster care requires acknowledging the ways that whiteness has been
conceptualized-particularly the notion of the white savior, embodied in the
white female social worker.
For Discussion
I. 币1ink of three different explanations for the overrepresentation of aboriginal
children in the foster care system. Identify which sociological framework your
explanations are based on.
2. Why do you think Pon and colleagues find 让 important that most social
workers are white women? Do you think that is relevant?
3. What parallels can you find between this description of the Canadian foster
care system and the foster care system in the United States?
4. Why do you think the authors take an anticolonial perspective?
Source: Pon, Gosine, and Phillips 2011.
ISLAM。 PH 。 BIA AND ANTI-ARAB RACISM

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Islam is a religion. Does it make sense, then, to define Islamophobia-

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ination are not identical. Nevertheless，让 is clear that the United States is a
Christian-centric society and that people who are not Christians face various
120 CHAPTER 4 Soc iolog ica l Theories of Race and Racism
forms of marginalization. To what extent should we think of these forms of

exclusion as racism?
Ramon Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants (2006) state that Islamophobia began
as religious discrimination and has evolved into racial/ethnic discrimination.
They point out that, at the same time that Spaniards set out to colonize the
Americas, they expelled Jews and Arabs from the Spanish peninsula. During
this time, religious beliefs were the primary motivation for the marginaliza-
tion of Jews and Arabs. Grosfoguel and Mielants argue that in more recent
times, however, Islamophobia and anti-Arab sentiment have primarily taken
the form of cultural racism-a concept discussed in more detail in Chapter
咀1ree. 币1ey explain that the tropes used to describe Muslims and Arabs such
as “ uncivilized," "barbarian,"“savage,”“primitive,”“underdeveloped,"“author-
itarian，飞nd 气errorist”“） are markers of cultural racism.
For Gr。由guel and Mielants (2006), lslamophobia is a form of racism.
Steven Salaita (2006) argues, however, that it is important to draw a dis-
tinction between lslamophobia and anti-Arab racism. Despite the American
conflation of Arabs and Muslims, only one岳丘h of the world ’s total Muslim
population is A灿y and not all Arabs are Mu 叫 slim (Gro白gu 叫 el and Mielan
2006). Salaita (2006) maintains that anti-Arab racism goes beyond dislike
or distaste for Islam: it is used to justify U.S. military interventions in the
Middle East.
INTERSECTI 。 NALTHE 。 RIES 。 F RACE AND RACISM

In what ways do race, class, and gender oppression work together? Some race
scholars argue that we need to develop a concrete understanding of how
race and racism work before we can understand other forms of oppression.
Feminist scholars, however, o丘en contend that we must look at race and gender
intersecti。nαlity A oppression simultaneously-a concept known as intersectionality.
simultaneous look Kimberle Crenshaw (1991) uses this co肌ept in her work, making her point
at various forms of with the example of a group of black and Latina women in a battered women’s
OPDATA QUQU 0 n
·唱且
ρIV
shelter. Taken togethe马 the factors of race, class, and gender elucidate how
these women ended up in the shelter. 刀1e women faced abuse in part because
ofgender oppression, but their economically vulnerable situation and race also
help us understand their situation. If they had the economic resources, they
likely would have gone elsewhere-not to a shelter. If they were white, they
wouldn’t face racial discrimination in employment, meaning that they may
have had more resources. If they were men, their chances of being battered
Conc lusion and Discussion 121
would be much lower. Any proposed method of helping these women must
pay a忧ention to their gender, class-based, and racial oppression. A narrow lens
that focuses on just race, gende乌 or class would miss crucial aspects of these
women’s situations.
Similarly, Priya Kandaswamy (2012) contends that an intersectional per-
spective helps us better understand welfare policies. She ar事ies that race
scholars, Marxists, and feminists o丘en look past one another. In contrast, she
adopts an intersectional perspective to shed light on the 1996 welfare reforms.
Interconnected ideas of gende马 sexuality, race, and class influence public opin-
ions about who deserves state assistance and who does not.τhe 1996 welfare
reforms, which dramatically reduced public aid, did not mention race specifi-
cally二 In contrast, the writers of the legislation had no qualms about promoting
heteronormative ideas (the assumption that heterosexuality is or should be the
norm): the first line of the 1996 law is :“Marriage is the foundation of a success-
ful society.＂ τhe 1996 law explicitly embraced marriage, was based on a public
discussion of family values and personal responsibility, and was designed to
reform the “ welfare queen," a stereotypical figure who is o丘en imagined as a
black woman.
Kandaswamy (2012) explains howtl川dea that race is historically produced
and constantly changing can complicate our understanding of intersectional-
让如 as it forces us to look at how race and gender “ are constituted in and through
each other" (26). Race is a socially constructed idea that has developed i盯on
junction with ideas about gende乌 class, and sexuality二 In this examination of
welfare policy, Kandaswamy explains concretely how the adoption of an inter-
sectional perspective can enhance a racial formation perspective.
’Theories of systemic, structural, and institutional racism provide us with diι

ferent frameworks to understand the deep-seated nature of racial inequality
in the United States. These ana忖ses place the emphasis on racism and are
exemplified by Feagin and Elias (2012), who aψie that only thro吨hanunder
standing of racial oppression can we grasp the true nature of racial meanings.
In contrast, racial formation theory focuses on how race is constructed, and
让 uses these analyses to understand racism (Omi and Winant 199份. Who
is right?
τhere is no right answer to this question. Instead, it depends on the kind
of question you are asking. An understanding of why African Americans
122 CHAPTER 4 Sociological Theories of Race and Racism
and Latinos are faring worse economically than whites in the a丘ermath
of the Great Recession would likely benefit from an analysis based on
systemic or structural racism (Kochhar, Fr如 and Taylor 2011). A consid-
eration of why Indonesian women use whitening creams and yet insist they
have no desire to be Caucasian might get a more nuanced treatment when
approached from a racial formations pe呻ective (Saraswati 2010). These
two studies are both grounded in the field of racial and ethnic studies, but
they have different research questions and goals and thus draw from differ-
ent frameworks.
古1e frameworks set forth by indigenous and feminist scholars can also be
more or less useful, depending on the kinds of questions you decide to ask.
A consideration of Mayan migration to Houston would likely benefit from
Andrea Smith ’s (2012) ind地enous-se忧ler framework, and an analysis of vio-
lence among youth gangs in Oakland, California, would likely be enriched
by an intersectional perspective that focuses on race, class, gende乌 and
sexuality. No theory can be expected to shed light on every aspect of our soci-
ety.二 Moreover, sociologists and other thinkers continue to develop ways for
us to understand inequality二 Readers of these texts can decide for themselves
which frameworks are most useful for understanding the questions that are
important to them. What about you? What frameworks do you find most com-
pelling, and why?
Key Terms
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4.1 How is individual racism linked to institutional inequality? (pp. 98-104)

• Prejudice, discrimination, and institutional racism are interconnected and thus
should not be studied in isolation.
Check Your Unde 『5↑anding 123

汾 How do prejudice and discrimination differ, and > How does individual racism persist?
what is the larger context in which they occur? > How does institutional racism persist?
协 How widespread is individual racism?

扮 What are some examples of racial
micro aggressions?
4.2 What are the key similarities and differences between systemic racism and
structural racism? (pp. 105-109)
• Systemic racism and structural racism are two theoretical frameworks that aim
to explain how racism is deeply rooted in societ予 While systemic racism focuses
on accumulated acts of racism across history and throughout one’s lifetime, struc-
tural racism points to interinstitutional interactions across time
and space.
Review Critic。I Thinking

沙 How do systemic racism and structural racism > How might the differences between systemic
reproduce and justify racial disparities? and structural racism shape a research agenda?
>> How does structural racism explain wealth
inequalities?
4.3 辆That is racial formation, and how does this concept inform our understanding
of racial inequality? (pp. 109-114)
Racial formation is one of the most influential theories of race and racism in the
United States. It focuses on racial meanings-how racial categories are "created,
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed," as Omi and Winant (1994) describe. 刀山
theory has received a significant amount of scholarly attention, mostly positive,
but it has also been critiqued for not pu忧ing racism at the center of analysis.

>> What is an example of a racial project? > What do Omi and Winant mean when they say
the United States is transitioning from a racial

dictatorship to a racial democracy?
124 CHAPTER 4 Soc iolog ica l Theories of Race and Racism
4.4 矶That does the perspective of indigenous studies reveal about racism in the
United States today? (pp. 116-118)
• Another way to consider how racism works is to examine it from the perspective
of indigenous studies. ’This leads us to consider settler colonialism theory, which
offers a broad critique of racism and cap让alism.

’> What are the three pillars of white supremacy? >> Are members of some racial groups more likely
扮 Why is it important to understand genocide in to experience specific kinds of racism (e.g.,
relation to contemporaηr race relations? legitimized racism, cultural racism, structural
racism)? Why or why not? Discuss at least two
distinct racial groups and at least two forms of
racism to make your case.
4.5 How is Islamophobia related to racism? (pp. 119-120)

• Although lslamophobia refers to the systematic marginalization of Muslims-a
religious group-some scholars argue that it is a form of racism.

汾 On what basis do scholars argue that >> Can you make a case that Islamophobia is
lslamophobia is a form of racism? a form of racism, drawing from one of
the theories of racism outlined in
this chapter?
4.6 In what ways do race, class, and gender oppression work together?
(pp. 120-121)
• Ideas of race, gende马 class, and sexuality all shape how racism works, and inter-
sectional scholars take these factors seriously as they build their frameworks.

” What is an example of a scenario that intersec- > Most of the scholars cited in the section on
tional theory helps us understand? intersectionality are women of color. Why do
you think these scholars have been at the head
of these debates and discussions?
沙哑1ink of an issue related to racial inequality,
and use one of the frameworks discussed in this
chapter to explain it. Justify your selection of
this framework over others.
Talking α：bout Race

Structural ideas of racism help us understand how racial inequality can
be reproduced even in the absence of overt与 racist acts. What racial
disparities in your community could be explained by a structural
theory? How can you use what you have learned in this chapter to
explain such disparities? Some examples might include a lack of green
spaces in nonwhite neighborhoods, a preponderance of minorities in
lower-quality schools, or a concentration of nonwhites in poorer areas
of the city.
:
.
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---
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.
.
Mural from the Wide Open Walls art village project, Kubuneh, near Brikama, The Gambia. (Plinthpics/Alαmy Stock Photo)
. .
Chapter 。utline
. Portrayals and Representations

in Entertainment 129
Portrayals of Blacks 130
voices Why Black-ish Is the Show
We Need Right Now 135
e rea 。 8010 Portrayals of Latinos/as 136

Portrayals of Arabs and Arab
Americans 138
voices Why We Hacked
Homeland 139
Portrayals of Asians and Asian
Americans 140
Portrayals of Native Americans 142
GI。bal View Racial Stereotypes
in Peruvia 门 Televisio 门 143
Video Games 144
Social Media 144
research focus Kimberl台 Crenshaw
on Black Women’s Lives Mat•er 145
Media Images and Racial
Inequality 148
Raced, Classed，。 nd Gendered
Media Images 150
As y。u Re。d Conclusion and Discussion 153
5.1 How are racial stereotypes propagated in popular culture? Check You「 Understanding 154
5.2 How have new media changed the way stereotypes are spread
and countered?
5.3 How do media images serve to justi命 racial inequality?
5.4 How are media representations raced, classed, and gendered?
128 CHAPTER 5 Racism in • he Med i a
···”
WE ’··· Comedian Chris Rock has described Hollywood as a “ white
GO N ’ industry'' (The HolZ岁wood Reporter 2014). And as Jeff Chang

explains in this excerpt from 冈1e Gon' Be Alright: Notes on Rαce
BE
αnd Resegreg1”αtion, Hollywood storylines often come from a
ALRIGHT
NOTES ON RACE white perspective. Representations have changed with the release
AND RESEGREGATION
of hits such as Black-ish and Fresh Off the Boat, as he notes, yet
JEFF CHANG
people of color are broadly underrepresented as writers, directors,
and producers.
n the first year of Obama's presidenc只 ABC's Modern Family recon-

structed the suburban sitcom by augmenting the stock white nuclear
fami与 with an extended clan tl以 featured a gay couple with an adopted
Asian American child, and a patriarch with a gorgeous young Latina wife and child.
In Hollywood elevator-pitch terms, it was Married with Children meets I Love Lucy
and The Birdcage. But its surprise success made it possible for TV execs to gingerly
step back toward shows with leads of color. For twenty years, Asians had not had a
lead on television, but in 2016 Fresh Off the Boat, Quantico, and Dr. Ken were among
ABC's top shows. ABC was also home to Black-ish and Shonda Rhimes’s Scandal and
How to Get Away with Murder. On Fox, Empire continued to crush the ratings. 刀1ey
were the big stories in a company town that loves to celebrate its successes.
So maybe it seems a bit rude, a bit vibe-killing to note that, despite all of this,
Hollywood remains overwhelmingly white. But it does. In February 2016, when
Channing Dungey, an African American woman, was named president of ABC
Entertainment, she became the first person of color to head a major network. In
2014, less than 6 percent of executive producers and 14 percent of writers were
of color. ’These numbers had barely changed in a decade. Hollywood may indeed
be run by the most liberal whites in the country-some of them have written and
acted and produced with the deepest of empathy. But they can never be a substi-
tute for people who can tell their own stories best. ’That was the lesson of Black-ish,
Fresh Off the Boat, and Empire’s breakthroughs, a lesson that needed to be relearned
every twenty years or so. Millions wanted to see shows written, directed, and acted
by people of color telling stories about themselves. Duh.
And yet the odds of a person of color breaking into the upper echelon of the cul-
ture, where the stories and songs and visions that we tell ourselves about ourselves-
with all their values, meanings, and instructions for living-are gathered, made, and
produced, and then marketed, sold, and pushed back to us, remain long indeed.
Souγce: Chang 2016.
Por ↑「ayals and Rep 「esen ↑ ations in En • ertainmen • 129
If you were to watch the films of the early twentieth century, you would find
that people of color are portrayed almost exclusively in stereotypical roles:
Native Americans are represented as silent Indian chiefs, Arabs play the roles
of desert sheikhs, Latinas appear as sexual objects, and African Americans
play roles of maids and buffoons. Fast-forward to the twenty-first century, and
we find more nuanced depictions. Nevertheless, there are still traces of these
historical stereotypes in film, television, and even new media.
Moreover, these stereotypes are not harmless: they have real and enduring
consequences. Representations of blacks and Latinos as poor and lawbreak-
ing, for example, reinforce popular notions about black and Latino cultural
deficiencies. 亚1e pervasiveness of these images leads many Americans to
falsely believe that higher incarceration rates among blacks and Latinos are
due to higher criminality (Feagin 2001; P. H. Collins 2004). This stance
ignores evidence to the contrary, as well as the racially discriminatory nature
of the criminal justice system. However, it makes sense to people who con-
stantly see images of blacks and Latinos shooting and robbing on television.
Just as past stereotypes about black laziness served to justify slavery, current
representations of blacks as criminals work to justify the high rates of incarcer-
ation of African Americans. Representations of people of color on television
are modern versions of the stereotypical images created to justify slavery, seg-
regation, genocide, colonialism, and exclusion.
In this chapter, we will focus on racial ideologies propagated in the media.
How do these ideologies play a role in normalizing and justi马ring racial
inequality? Why do racial segregation and inequality remain prevalent despite
laws against racial discrimination? An understanding of how the media repro-
duce racial stereotypes will h句 us answer these questions. More pointedly,
this examination will show how media portrayals may partly explain why so
li忧le is being done about racial disparities in a nation that purportedly values
equality and democracy.
p。 RTRAYALS AND REPRESENTATI 。 NS

IN ENTERTAINMENT
In 2015, people in the United States watched, on average, 2.8 hours of tele-
vision a day, making television viewing the most common leisure activity in
the country (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). Given that Americans spend
so much time in front of screens, it is no wonder television shows and films
have a great influence on how we see the world. ’Think, for example, of two
popular shows: Girls and Sex and the Ci飞y, both of which took place in the
extraordinarily diverse New York City二 According to the 2010 U.S. census,
130 CHAPTER 5 Racism in the Med ia
over one-third of the population of New York City is foreign-born, and the
city's population is less than half white. In these two shows, however, all of the
main characters were white, and the tremendous racial and ethnic diversity of
their city was largely unnoticeable, even when the characters were in public. By
presenting primarily white people in primarily white spaces, representations
in shows such as these naturalize racial segregation. It thus seems perfectly
natural to many white Americans that they themselves would live in primarily
white neighborhoods and send their children to primarily white schools, even
when they too live in multiracial urban areas (Orfield 2009). Racial segrega-
tion thus becomes com抖ete与 normal and desirable.
Because film and television shape how we see the world, it is important
to consider how various groups are represented (At a Glance 5.1). Media
scholars Stacy Smith, Marc Choueiti, and Katherine Pieper (2016) issued a
telling report on diversity of representation in American entertainment. ’Their
report is based on movies theatrically released in 2014 and prime-time first-
run scripted series, as well as digital offerings between September 1, 2014, and
August 31, 2015, for a total of 414 stories. ’They found that only 28.3 percent
of all speaking characters were people of color, yet people of color make up
37.9 percent of the U.S. population. As previous studies have found, shows and
movies are mostly black and white, as 71.7 percent of all characters were white,
12.2 percent were black, 5.8 percent were Hispanic/Latino, 5.1 percent were
Asian, and 2.3 percent were Middle Eastern. Over half of all shows and movies
featured no speaking Asian characters, and 22 percent featured no black
speaking characters. There was even more disparity at the level of directors,
with only 13 percent of directors coming from underrepresented racial/ethnic
groups. Notably, only two directors were black women.
Latinos stand out as the most underrepresented group in American enter-
tainment, and all people of color are underrepresented as leading characters and
in executive roles (Smith et al. 2016; Yuen 2016). Nancy Yuen (2016) ex抖a ins
that whites are 62.6 percent of the population, yet make up 74.1 percent of all
speaking roles in films, 80.7 percent of all cable TV leads, 83.3 percent of
all film leads, and 93.5 percent of all broadcast TV leads. Whites also account
for 81 percent of all directors and an astounding 96 percent of all television
network and studio heads.
Portrayals of Blacks
Prior to the civil rights era, portrayals of blacks on television and in popular
culture were uniformly stereotypical. Shows such as Amos 'n' Andy featured
African Americans who appeared almost exclusively as maids, cooks, con
AT A GLANCE 5.1 Underrepresentation 。f People of Color in American Film and Television
Overall U.S. Population Academy Award Winners
Amα
NU·UHwm mhrm
mm
ar npa
aνkr
创
mm
no
-
Asian 5°/o
E -- cecu c/J3
nJ』
0
7 ~8o/o Actors of Color
Black
12°/o
All people of color 37°/o
Hispanic/
White 一：92~2o/o White Actors
Latino
17°/o 63o/o
Data from American Community Survey 2015 1929-2016*

*In 2017, the winners of tw。 of the four acting
Oscars were African American
Data from Yuen 2016; Statuette image 。 A.M.P.A.S. ®
Acting Roles Across all film and TV, whites were overrepresented, while Latinos were specifically underrepresented:
75°/o of all speaking characters were white, 12o/o were black, 6o/o were Hispanic/Latino, and 5o/o were Asian.
Film speaking roles Film leads Cable TV leads Broadcast TV leads
6°/o
74o/o 83o/o 81 o/o 94o/o

n圃］巴
n圃］巴
食食食
Data from Smith et al. 2016; Yuen 2016

Writing and Directing Roles
Film directors Film writers TV directors TV writers
88o/o 81o/o 86o/o

82o/o
Whites People of color Data from Yuen 2016

artists, or deadbeats. These representations served to legitimize

the racial order of overt white dominance. ’The logic of the era was
that African Americans were incapable of selιgovernance and thus
were well served by the racial order of the day. Whites were reas皿
sured that while blacks were often good servants and entertainers,
they were not capable of assuming the responsibilities of full cit-
izenship. ’The NAACP contended that Amos 'n' Andy exclusively
represented blacks as lazy, stupid, loud, thieving, and dishonest
A Prior to the civil rights era, shows and promoted racial prejudice against blacks; it eventually leveled
such as Amos 'n’Andy, which poked
a lawsuit against CBS because of these portrayals. The lawsuit was
fun at African Americans, were
commonplace. successful and resulted in Amos 'n' Andy being taken off the air in
1953 (Gray 1995; Hunt 2005).
In the 1980s, a completely different kind of show became popular. Instead
of presenting blacks as deadbeats or servants, The Cosby Show had a central
cast of successful black characters. It reached the top of television viewers'
rankings and remained there for most of its eight years on prime-time tele-
vi剑on (Hunt 2005). The show, which first aired in 1984, was about a middle-
class African American family made up of Cliff Huxtable, a doctor; his
wife, Clair, a lawyer; and their five children. 币1e family lived in a spacious
brownstone in New York City and was successful economically, socially,
and educationally二’The depictions could not be further from those of Amos
'n' Andy. However, even though The Cosby Show did not reinforce negative
stereotypes ofblacks, it still worked to reproduce what communications schol-
enlightened racism η1e ars SutJhally and Justin Lewis (1992) call enlightened racism: the idea that
idea that the United the United States is a land of opportunity and that African Americans could
States is a land of do better if they only tried harder.
opportunity and that Sut Jhally and Justin Lewis conducted fifty-two focus groups with white
African Americans could and black Americans about The Cosby Show and found that white Americans
do better if they only tried were able to accept the Huxtable family as people like them. ’There was a catch,
harder. however: although white Americans were happy to have the Huxtables in
their living rooms each week, the show did not reduce stereotypes about other
African Americans. Instead, the depiction of successful blacks on television
reinforced “ enlightened racism," as Jhally and Lewis described it. Moreover,
white Americans began to see themselves as less racist because they liked the
Huxtables and other African Americans who behaved similarl予 Whites
attributed any negative feelings they might have had about other African
Americans not to their blackness, but to how they behaved. ’The fact that the
Huxtables never experienced racism further reinforced the idea that racism is
the direct result of how African Americans behave.
Por ↑「aya l s and Rep 「esen ↑ ations in En •erta inmen • 133
In the media today, we see another seemingly positive image ofAfricanAmeri-

cans: the blackathlete.AfricanAmericans dominate U.S. sports, andAmericans
of all hues idolize black athletes. ’The idolization of black athletes might make it
seem as if the media tend to portray these athletes in a positive manner. How-
eve乌 scholars who ana与ze the portrayal of black athletes point out that these
portrayals also reinforce stereotypes and that the media portray black and white
athletes quite differently (King and Springwood 2001). For example, when black
athletes transgress moral or legal boundaries, the media are quick to home in on
the stories-especially those that reinforce stereotypes. One example Charles
Fruehling Springwood and C. Richard King give is of Christian Peter, a white
football player, and Lawrence Phillips, a black football player, both of whom
played at the University of Nebraska. When Peter was accused of assaulting a
white woman, the incident received attention only in Lincoln, Nebraska. When
Phillips, however, was charged with beating his white ex-girlfriend, it received
intense national coverage, including a segment on 60 Minutes. Fruehling and
King also juxtapose athletes Kobe Bryant and Drew Henson. They argue that
when Kobe Bryant, who is black, decided not to attend college full-time, the
media commentary suggested that Bryant needed refinement, training, and dis-
cipline, and that this was a bad decision. In contrast, when Drew Henson, who
is white, made a similar decision, the conversation in the media did not revolve
around his maturity or his possibilities for upward mobility.
Stereotypical representations in sports also extend to women. David
Leonard (2014) explains how port町als ofwhite tennis player Candace Parker
differ from those of black players Venus and Serena Williams. He argues that
Parker is portrayed as representing an ideal femininity, both nurturing and Mammy A stereotypical
sexual. In contrast, the Williams sisters are often portrayed as muscular, image of a black maid.
aggressive, and masculine. Instead of focusing on their talent, media rep-
resentations of both Parker and the Williams sisters often home in on their Sapphire One of the
bodies-and they do so in racialized ways. main characters on the
African American women are portrayed in stereotypical ways in the media television show Amos 'n
more gene叫ly二 A study by Melissa Harris-Pe町（2011) revealed that stereo- Andy; the caricature of ar1
typed caricatures of black women-as Mammies, Sapphires, and Jezebels- ang巧r blac］王 woman.
continue to be prominent. A Mammy is a stereotypical image of a black maid,
encapsulated by the '~unt Jemima” icon and taking its name from “ Mammy” Jezebel A name with
in Gone with the Wind. Sapphire was one of the main characters on Amos 'n biblical origins that
Andy and is a caricature of an angry black woman. Jezebel is a name with has come to signify a
biblical origins that has come to signi马r an oversexed or hypersexual black stereotypically oversexed
woman. Harris- Pe町（2011) found that these three stereotypes about African or hypersexual black
American women have been prominent in political and popular culture since woman.
(a)
(c)
(b)
A (a) Hattie McDaniel as “ Mammy” in Gone with the Wind (1939). (b) The Mammy stereotype is encapsulated in
the “'Aunt Jemima” logo, portrayed here by Anna Robinson in the 1930s. (c) In 1989, Quaker changed the logo to a
less offensive image.
the Civil War and influence how black women perceive themselves and are
perceived by others.
Over the past few years, representations ofAfrican Americans on television
have improved considerably. One exam抖e is Issa Rae's HBO series, I附cure,
which premiered in 2016 and is based on Rae's webseries hit, Awkward Black
Girl. ’The comedy features a variety of protaganists, most of whom are African
American, and Issa Rae stars as a version of herself. The show is set in Los
Angeles, where Issa works at a youth-oriented nonprofit. ’The show revolves
Por ↑「aya l s and Rep 「esen ↑ ations in En • erta inmen • 135
around Issa’s relationships, particularly with her best friend, Molly, a driven
lawyer; and her boyfriend, Lawrence, who is looking for a job. With several
black protaganists, Insecure is able to avoid stereotypical portrayals of black
people. Additionally, the show does not shy away from dealing with racism,
especially in the workplace-showing a reality many African Americans face.
hy Black皿ish Is the Show

e Need Right Now
. ........ ..... ........ ..... ........ ..... .. . ..... . . .... .... . .. ...... ........ .... .......... ... ........ ..... ...... . . .... ... .
Last night, Bl1αck-ish aired

an episode titled “ Hope” that
exemplified why diversity
1s so important 1n enter-
.
tainment. Within its short
30 minutes, a tough and
divisive issue was handled
with intelligence and depths
of which hour-long shows
typically seem incapable of The sitcom Black-ishαddresses serious issues
achieving. I submit that this related to race αnd racism.
was all made possible by a
creator and writers who can speak from personal experience and a cast that can
deliver from the same place.
The episode didn毛 stop with a surface discussion of police brutality. Instead, it
delved deeper and raised discussion around “the talk” with children about brutality
and protests. The genius of the episode, however, was the counterpoints Dre and
Rainbow took. While Rainbow took the more conservative, and hopeful position,
Dre spoke for the black anger that burns deep inside of us that we have been forced to
coexist with. They were personifications of so many things: positivity and despair, old
school and new school, compassion and passion.
This extended into their children, as Junior wanted to join the protests, Zoe was
overcome with the frustration of it all, and the twins were just too young to even
understand what was happening. Still, they were stuck in the middle between the
need forselιpreservation and fighting for the preservation of future generations. This
is one of the most devastating aspects of blackness, often having to choose between
your own health and prosperity and that of your children and those to come.
(co ’n tinued)
136 CHAPTER 5 Ra ci sm in t he Medi a
Continued But even in all of the darkness, there was a tragic, brilliant beauty to it
all. And having this displayed in such a public and truthful manner was
(/) restorative.
It was an unabashed and unbridled acknowledgment of the struggle that
communicated our shared struggle nationwide. This is what good TV looks
. like. This is the power of diversity in entertainment. This is why representa-
tion is important. And I like to believe that, for non-minority viewers, their
perception of the unrest across the nation has been shifted at least a little.
Source: Jackson 2017.

.................. . ............................................. ............ . ..................... . ..........
Portrayals of Latinos/as
Latinos/ as are both underrepresented and misrepresented in American
media (Monk币1rner, Heiserman,Johnson, Cotton, and Jackson 2010; Smith
et al. 2016). In a study of prime-time television during March 2007, Monk-
Turner and colleagues found that overall, Latinos were the group most likely
to bepo巾ayed negatively on television (2010). For example, the 邸earche臼
analyses revealed that none of the Latino characters were depicted as articu-
late, whereas 25 percent of black and 30 percent of white cha肌ters were (see
Figure 5-1). Half of all African American actors were depicted as intelligent,
60°/o
• Black
50°/o • Latino
• White
40°/o
30°/o
20°/o
FIGURE 5-1.
10°/o
Representations of Blacks,
Latinos/as, and Whites on
Television
001o
s。urce: Monk and Turner (2010). Articulate Intelligent Immoral Despicable
Por ↑「ayals and Rep 「esen ↑ ations in En •ertainmen • 137
compared with 43 percent of whites and 2 7 percent of Latinos. Finally, the

researchers found that only 2 percent of white actors were portrayed as
immoral, compared with 18 percent of Latinos, and 3 percent of whites were
portrayed as despicable, compared with 18 percent of Latinos.
In 2013, Latinos were notably absent from significant roles in the American
media. ’There was not a single Latino with a leading role in the top ten movies
and scripted network TV shows. There were no Latinos among the top ten
television show creators, and Latinos constituted just I.I percent of produc-
ers, 2 percent of writers, and 4.I percent of directors. Finally, only one Latina
ranked among the top 53 televi剑on, radio, and studio executives (Negron-
Muntaner 20I4).
Latino men are o丘en stereotyped into specific roles: gangbanger, bandit,
drug trafficker, police officer, janitor, gardene乌 and the Latin lover. Latinas are
most likely to be portrayed as either hot-blooded women anxious for sexual
fulfillment or maids anxious to please (Rod咆uez I997). The long-running
show Desperate Housewives (2004-20I2) played strongly to Latino/a ste-
reotypes. In this show, Gabrielle Solis was an unfaithful wife who could not
keep her hands off of the sixteen-year-old gardener. She constantly used her
sex appeal in a忧empts to manipulate her husband, Carlos, in addition to other
men. Carlos appeared at first to be a loving husband but turned out to be a
c巾1inal and was sent to prison. Debra Merskin (2007) suggests that the show
perpetuated three stereotypes of Latinas in partict山r: (I) the Cantina Girl, a Cantina Girl A stereotype
Latina as an available sexual object; (2) the Suffering Senorita, a Latina who of a Latina as an available
suffers physical harm while protecting her Anglo love interest; and (3) the sexual o均ect.
Vamp, a Latina who uses devious plotting to get her way二
Prime-time American television shows starring Latinos/as are few and far Suffering Se日orita A
between, although this has been changing over the past few years. One of stereotype of a Latina
the first shows to feature Latinos/as in a positive and nuanced light was Ugly who suffers physical harm
Betty, which made its debut in 2006 and ran for four seasons. Based on the while protecting her
Colombian soap opera Yo Soy Betty, La Pea, it was the story of a young Latina Anglo love interest.
from Queens who endeavored to make it in the publishing industry. ’The main
character, Be忧y Suarez, was given considerable depth and was quite likable. Vamp A stereotype of a
Her family, however, fit well into the stereotypes that many Americans have Latina who uses devious
about Latinos/as. Her father was in the United States illegally and had escaped and cunning stratagems
Mexico wanted for murder, her sister was a single mother who dressed provoc- to get what she wants.
atively, and the family lived in Queens in a clearly working-class household.
The main problem with Latino/a representation in entertainment continues
to be underrepresentation. Given such a limited variety of representations, it is
di侃cult to avoid stereotypes.
The show Jane the Virgin, which debuted in

2014, breaks from some of these representational
pa忧erns. It centers on a Latino fami协 made up
of three generations: twenty-three-year-old Jane;
her thirty-nine-year-old mother, Xiomara; and
her grandmother, Alba. Nearly all the main char-
acters in the show are Latino/a. Whereas Xiomara
is cast as a sexy Latina, Alba performs the role of
the sweet abuelita (grandma). Despite these (and
other) tropes, the show is able to dig deeper into
these roles and presents a complex view ofa Latino
family二 In a twist, the primary villains in the show
A J1αnethe Virg仇 features a mostly Latino/a cast and
are not Cuban cartels or the Mexican mafia, but
breaks from stereotypical portrayals.
eastern European mobsters. As of 2017, Jane the
Virgin had been renewed for its fourth season.
Portrayals of Arabs and Arab Americans

Although nearly 3.7 million Americans trace their roots to an Arab coun-
try and nearly 82 percent of Arabs in the United States are citizens (Arab
American Institute 2017), Arabs are overwhelmingly po巾a）叫 on American
television as foreign. Arab women are usually seen veiled or as exotic figures,
and Arab men as terrorists or billionaires. In very recent years, this portrayal has
begun to change, and we now occasionally see Arab Americans on prime-time
televi剑on, O丘en as tl削argets of racial disc由nination. Evelyn Al叫tany (2008)
points out that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
some television shows took up the question ofwhether it was fair to discriminate
against Arab or Muslim Americans in the name of national securit予 Alsultany
contends that this representation leads to the conclusion that Americans have
to choose between protecting the nation and discriminating against Arabs and
Arab Americans (who are, according to the subtext, prone to being dangerous).
Although more nuanced than previous representations ofArab men, this repre-
sentation ultimately reinforces the idea that Arabs are terrorists and thus that it
is legitimate to discriminate against them in the name of national security二
The trope of Muslims as terrorists continues to be prevalent in American
television. In a recent article about the television series Homeland in Salon,
Laila Al-Arian writes :“Homeland leaves little doubt that, regardless of the
other red herring motivations of justice and psychological manipulation, it
is being Muslim that makes someone dangerous.” In addition to portraying
most Arab or Muslim terrorists on the show as terrorists or terror suspects,
Homeland also presents a distorted view of the Middle East. Homeland por-
trays Beirut as a backwards, crumbling city when, in reality, Beirut is a modern,
cosmopolitan city full of cafes, nightclubs, and clothing stores. The portrayal
of the city angered Lebanese officials to the point that they threatened a law-
suit (Al-Arian 2012).
hy We Hacked Homeland
.. .... . . .... . .. .... . . ..... ...... . . ....... .... . .. .......... . . ....... .... .......... . .. ........ .. . .. ........ ..... ........ .. .
In this excerpted blog post, three αrtists-Hebα Am仇， Cαram kα'PP， αndDon kαrl
(a.k.α Stone)-expla仇 why they ''hαeked'' an episode of Homel1αηd bypαinting graffiti
with thei1” own messαge. Their 仇tervention was broαdeαst 仇 Seαson 5, Episode 2.
[HomelαndJ has garnered the reputation of being the most bigoted show on
television for its inaccurate, undifferentiated and highly biased depiction of Arabs, .
Pakistanis, and Af旨hans, as well as its gross misrepresentations of the cities of Beirut,
Islamabad- and the so-called Muslim world in general. [Over several seasons习，
Homeland has maintained the dichotomy of the photogenic, mainly white, mostly
American protector versus the evil and backwards Muslim threat. The Washington
Post reacts to the racist horror of the season 岛ur promotional poster by describing
it as “ white Red Riding Hood lost in a 岛rest of faceless Muslim wolves.” In this
岛rest, Red Riding Hood is permitted to display many shades of grey-bribery, drone
strikes, torture, and covert assassination-to achieve her targets. She points her
weapon of choice at the monochrome bad guys, who do all the things that the good
guys do but with nefarious intent.
It cannot be disputed that the show looks good and is well acted and produced, as
its many awards prove. But you would think that a series dealing so intensively with
contemporary topics including the war on terrorism, ISIS, and ideological clashes
between the US and the Middle East would not, for example, name a key terrorist
character after the former real-life Pakistani ambassador to the United States.
Granted, the show gets high praise from the American audience for its criticism of
American government ethics, but not without dangerously feeding into the racism of
the hysterical moment we find ourselves in today. Joseph Massad, Associate Professor
of Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History at Columbia University, addresses
this deep-[seatedJ racism of American media towards the Middle East:“1/omeland
hardly deviates from this formula [of racist programming习， except to add that Arabs
are so dangerous that even all-American White men can be corrupted by them and
become equally dangerous to America."
At the beginning of June 2015, we received a phone call from a friend who has
been active in the Graffiti and Street art scene in Germany for the past 3 0 years and
(co饥.tinued)
140 CHAPTER 5 Ra ci sm in the Medi a
Continued has researched gra面ti in

the Middle East extensively.
(/) He had been contacted by
‘ ,,
Homeland ’s set production
company who were looking
. for “i\rabian street artists''
to lend gra伍ti authenticity
to a film set of a Syrian
refugee camp on the
Lebanese/Syrian border for
Asked to help αdd αuthenticity to the show their new season. Given the
Homeland， αrtists sprαypainted the g1吨庐ti series' reputation we were
messαge αboveinAr1αbic, which tr1αnsliαtes to not easily convinced, until
Homeland is racist. The messαge αppears 仇 we considered what a
the background ofα scene in Seαson 5. moment of intervention
could relay about our own
and many others' political discontent with the series. It was our
moment to make our point by subverting the message using the
showitsel£
In our initial meeting, we were given a set of images of pro-Assad
gra面ti-apparently natural in a Syrian refugee camp. Our instructions were:
(1) the gra伍ti has to be apolitical, (2) you cannot copy the images because of
copyright infringement, and (3) writing “ Mohamed is the greatest, is okay
of course.” We would arm ourselves with slogans, with proverbs allowing for
critical interpretation, and, if the chance presented itself, blatant criticism
directed at the show. And so, it came to be.
... .... . ... . .. .. .... . ... . .. .. .... . ... . .. .. .... . ..... . . . .... . ... . . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . .... . . .. ......... . . .... .
巾w
y Am
tα
D
H muo Portrayals of Asians and Asian Americans

E mo d A ., an
剖
Darrell Hamamoto (1994) analyzed 即resentations of Asians and Asian

3
QUA
woman as a s1n1ster, Americans on television between 1950 and 1990 and found that Asian men
crafty, and destructive were often represented as foreign, sinister, unidimensional, effeminate char-
seductress. acters. But whereas Asian men are o丘en presented in U.S. media as asexual or
effeminate, Asian women are o丘en portrayed as hypersexual. Asian women
Butterfly A stereotype of are presented primarily in two ways: as the Dragon Lady or as the Butterfly
an Asian woman who is (Rajgopal 2010).’The Dragon Lady is a sinister, era句 and destructive seduc-
a demure, devoted, and tress. The Butterfly is a demure, devoted, submissive wife who is eager to please
submissive wife. whites and men in general.
Por ↑「aya ls and Rep 「esen ↑ ations in En •ertainmen • 141
More recently, some gains have been made in the representation of Asian
women on television. One example is Dr. Christina Yang, a central character
in Grey's Anatomy. Yang is a beautiful and competent doctor. Her character has
substantial depth and defies the “ generic Asian'' stereotype by making it clear
she is both Korean American and from Beverly Hills-not Korea. However,
as R锵opal (2010) points out, Christina Yang’s character does not have the
feminine qualities of white characters in the show, such as Meredith Grey二 She
remains enigmatic and cold, showing hints of the Dragon Lady stereotype as
well as the “ inscrutable Oriental'' stereotype. Another important example is
Fresh Off the Boa走， which premiered in 2015. Notably, it is the first prime-time
American sitcom in two decades to focus on an Asian American family二 Unlike
previous shows featuring Asian Americans, Fresh Off 仇e Boat offers a cast of
characters who are dynamic, stylish, and engaging.
古1e 2016 release of the N etflix original series The Iron Fist led to heated
debates about Asian representations on television. Finn Jones-a white actor
known for his role in Game of Thrones-was cast as the show’s central char-
acte乌 Danny Rand. In the show, which is based on a Marvel comic, Rand is a
wealthy heir who returns to New York City fifteen years a丘er being presumed
dead in a plane crash. Warrior monks had taken him, and he had become their
best martial arts student, vowing to fight a transnational Asian crime orga-
nization upon his return. As is typical of comic book stories, Rand is a white
savior figure. 咀1e critiques of this series focus on casting a white man instead
咽’ 咽’
”‘
法 < Fresh Offthe Boαt

features characters who
are dynamic, stylish, and
engaging. It is the first
prime-time American
sitcom in two decades
,
.. to focus on an Asian
American family.
142 CHAPTER 5 Racism in the Media
of an Asian American as Danny Rand. In 2014, blogger Kevin Chow wrote an

open letter to Marvel asking them to cast an Asian as Danny Rand because
doing so would remove the white savior aspect from the story and replace
cultural appropriation with cultural reconnection. The directors did consider
this possibili勺。 and Lewis Tan-who is bi肌ial (Chinese and white)-was a
top contender for the lead role. Nevertheless, they chose Jones and missed an
oppo阳nity to raise the visibility of Asian American actors (Lee 2017).
Portrayals of Native Americans

In the early years of the United States, when white settlers were endeavoring
to take over Indian lands in the newly formed nation, Native Americans were
most popularly depicted as savages. Over time, the “ captivity narrative''-in
which white women and children were captured by savage natives-became a
staple in American fiction throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twenti-
eth centuries. Alongside this depiction of Native Americans as primitives and
savages, an alternative depiction emerged: that of the Native American wise
man or medicine man. Depictions of Native American men thus tend to fall
into either of the two categories of the savage or the wise man (Bird 1999;
Kopacz and Lawton 20lla; White 2012).
In popular culture in the United States, Native American men are often ste-
reotyped to serve whites. At one end of the spectrum is the eroticized, nearly
naked Native American who gives white women sexual pleasure or who is the
object of white women’s illicit lust. At the other end of the spectrum is the
wise Native American man, who is o丘en a stoic loner and who gives his best
spiritual advice to white heroes. In both cases, sexuality and family life among
Native Americans is largely invisible (Bird 1999).
Representations of Native American women also tend toward a duality: as
either a princess or a lustful savage. Pocahontas is the quintessential represen-
tation of a Native American woman: she is beautiful, erotic, noble, and fully
dedicated to her white lover. At the other extreme is the squaw, who has sex
indiscriminately with both whites and Indians (Kopacz and Lawton 2011功－
Similar to depictions of Native American men, these depictions are from a
white point of view. Native American male and female characters often have
the primary purpose of serving white interests-by providing sexual satisfac-
tion, as well as intimate knowledge of nature and other sacred things, and by
helping convince other Native Americans of the importance of assimilation
(Bird 1999).
In a survey of Native American stereotypes on television, Frederick
White (2012) found that television producers almost exclusively show
Por ↑「aya l s and Rep 「esen ↑ ations in En •erta inmen • 143
Native Americans as shamans, wise men, sidekicks, princesses, and matri-

archs. Today, Native Americans are most commonly represented on televi-
sion in brief appearances on popular sitcoms. In these appearances, Native
Americans are usually presented as the stereotypical wise men who offer
advice tow｝巾 protagonists (Tahmahkera 2008). There areveryfewrepresen-
tations of Native Americans on television as recurring main characters. And
although other groups have seen breakthroughs with the success of Jane the
Virg问 Fresh Off the Boa鸟 and Empire, the same has not been true for Native
Americans, who are notably absent in prime-time television.
Racial Stereotypes in Peruvian Television

un•ii 2015, 。 Pe 「uvian ↑elevision s↑atio 门 featured a The show was finally taken off the ai 「 i 门 20 1 5, not in
popula 「 show o门 P 「ime time called The Humor Spe- response to C「iticism of its racis• imagery but because
cial. "Neg 「O Mama (black Sucker)," a ce 时「·al charac- it had run its course.
↑e「 on the show, was played by a white man-Jorge
Benavides-wearing blackface a 门d a p「OS↑hetic
e 门 larged nose and lips. The cha 「acter was f「om
humble origins, and the show made fu 门 of he 「 lack of
social a 「1d in•ellectual acumen. Each evening, Peruvi-
ans across the coun•ry would sit down and laugh at
Negro Mama. Upon viewing • his po 「↑「ayal, African
Ame 「ican schola 「 He 门「y Louis Ga •es Jr. ，「espo 门ded:
"I can't believe it. That's disgusting .... I have seen
some racis• things on television .... I have never
see门 G nything as racist as Neg 「o Mama."
The Humor Special also featured "La Paisana
Jaci 门↑a" Uacin •G • he Peasant), a 门othe 「 cha 「acter
played by Benavides. La Paisana Jacinta was a
stereotypical 「eprese门↑ation of an Andean woman
who had migra•ed to Lima i门 search of eco 门omic
bet↑e「「nent. The show ridiculed her gullibility and
lack of social skills. Peruvian activis•S such as Mo「1ica
Ca 「illo Zega 「ra, p「esident of the Afro平eruvian orga-
「1ization LUNDU, cri•icized The Humor Special and
demanded it be •aken off the air (La Republica 2010).
Ye• pro pone门↑s of the show insis•ed that i• had pu 「ely Jorge Benavides 侃命agandbγow·吨face, playi：饥g
humoristic i门↑e门↑ G nd should not be 「ead as offensive. “'La Paisana Jacinta ':’ in Pe＇γu's
. “H钮，肌0γ Special. ）”
144 CHAPTER 5 Racism in the Media
NEW MEDIA REPRESENTATI 。 NS
In 2013, the amount of time Americans spent online surpassed television

viewing for the first time-the average adult spent five hours per day online
(eMarketer 201办 By 2016, Americans spent an ave鸣e of 10 hours and
39 minutes each day using smartphones, tablets, television, radio, computers,
or video games (Associated Press 2016). Ma町 of the same stereotypes preva-
lent in television are also apparent in video games and social media.
Video Games
About 91 percent of children between the ages of two and seventeen reg-
ula由 play video games (Reisinger 2011). Instead of being pa创刊 viewers,
video game players are actively engaged and thus potentially more suscep-
tible to stereotypes. Anna Everett and S. Craig Watkinsο008) carried out
a study in which they explored how youths' interactions with video games
affected how they thought about race. ’The researchers argue that the inter-
active nature of the games enhances the potential for the games not only to
perpetuate stereotypes but also to counter them. Additionally, as technology
has improved and permitted video games to be more realistic, game creators
have been able to produce what they perceive to be more real and authentic
places in video games. 币1is increased realism has led, for example, to the
creation of urban spaces that are dominated by African American and Latino
young men.
Studies of video games have revealed consistent stereotyping-Latinos
are overrepresented in sports games, Asians are almost exclusively portrayed
in fighting games, and Arabs are typically portrayed as targets of violence
(Saleem 2008; Bu俘问 Dill, Stermer, Burgess, and Brown 2011). A study of
video games by Melinda Burgess and her colleagues 。011) revealed that black
characters were more likely to be portrayed as thugs, athletes, and gun-toting
figures than white characters. Burgess and colleagues also found that black
women were largely absent from video games.
Socia I Media
While for the most part, only corporations have the means to produce widely
distributed films, television shows, and video games, individuals can produce
and consume social media. In the United States, it is easy to create a Twitter
account or YouTube video. For example, in 2012, one of the students in my
A Student Emma Halling's
monologue “ I Am Not sociology class posted a video on YouTube called “ I Am Not Trayvon Martin,”
Trayvon Martin" went viral which quickly went viral. Her statement is just one example of how social
on YouTube. media allow people with low budgets and few connections to spread a message.
New Media Rep 「esentations 145
Social media have the power to counter stereotypes, not just reinforce them.
But how o丘en does this happen? Are people using social media to counter ste-
reotypes, or are they simply reproducing them?
γeseαγch TOCUS
Kimberle Crenshaw on Black Women ’s Lives Matter
At the 2016 American Sociological Association meeting, Kimberle Crenshaw
spoke on a plenary panel entitled "Protesting Racism." Midway through her pre-
sentation, Crenshaw asked all audience members to stand. She then told the audi-
ence, which included hundreds of sociologists, that she was going to read a list of
names. She instructed the audience to remain standing until they heard a name
they did not recognize. She began to read the list:
Mike Brown
Eric Garner
TamirRice
Freddie Gray
Alton Sterling
Philando Castille
At that point, most people in the room were still standing, as the police killings
of these six unarmed black men had been widely discussed on social media. She
continued:
MyaHall
At this point, the vast majority of the people in the room took a seat. M ya Hall is
a transgender woman who was killed a丘er accidentally driving into the National
Security Agency headquarters in Baltimore in 2015. Crenshaw then read more
names:
Tanisha Anderson
Natasha McKenna
Aura Russer
Jessica Williams
Meagan Hockaday
By this point, nearly everyone in the audience was seated.

(co悦.tinued)
’Theseunarmed black women were all killed by police within days or weeks
of the men on the list. Crenshaw pointed out that most people have not heard of
the women’s names because the issue of police brutality has been framed as an
issue pertaining only to black men. Nevertheless, police officers have killed black
women, girls, and femmes, and it is a tremendous oversight to ignore their deaths.
Crenshaw explained:
There were no mass demonstrations over the death of Natasha McKenna, even
though her institutionalized killing at the hands of six officers, who swarmed,
shackled, hooded, and tasered her four times, was filmed and released to the
public, supposedly to affirm the claim that the officers operated in an entirely
pro_户ssional manner. Virtual炒 no one knows the name of Tanisha Anderson,
who was killed by the Cleveland police a little more than a week b吃fore the tragic
death of Tamir Rice. There's been no sustained advocacy for Mya Hall, who in
Baltimore was killed by the NSA just days bφre Freddie Gray.
Even though the movement in response to police killings has mobilized under the
slogan of “ black lives ma忧er," it has not encompassed the experiences of women.
For Discussion
1. Why has the killing of black women received much less attention than that of
black men?
2. Have you noticed any differences in the coverage of police killings of black
men versus women?
Source: Crenshaw 2016.
meme An idea, image, One phenomenon worthy of exploration is the racial meme, an idea, image,
video, or phrase that video, or phrase that spreads in a culture, particularly via social media. Memes
spreads in a culture, can be an effective way to get messages across because they are easy to digest
particularly via social and can be widely shared across a variety of social media platforms, from
media. Twitter to Facebook to Instagram to Snapchat. The meme shown in this sec-
tion plays on stereotpyes and may help people see their own biases.
Social media o丘en afford some degree of anonymity to those who wish to
propagate and validate racial stereotypes. Sociologist Jessie Daniels studies
online hate speech and has found that people in the United States who have cre-
ated websites with overt hate speech often go unpunished. In many cases, these
website creators are protected by free speech laws and can post overtly racist
messages on their own site without facing any legal trouble. Daniels (2008)
also has found “ cloaked ” websites that seek to

deceive Web users by appearing to have a neutral
stance but actually give false information sup-
porting a white supremacist outlook. One exam-
pie of such a website is www.martinlutherking
.org, which at first glance appears to be a tribute
to civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.,
but in fact aims to undermine him and other civil
rights leaders.
Twitter and other social media platforms
can be used to debate racial issues. In 2012,
the much-awaited film 刀ie Hung，εr Games was
released, based on the novel with the same title.
τhe movie was a box-office success and exceeded
expectations. However, some viewers were sur- 四日旧旧， l 斗： I 斗 ~b'Il!]] 山凰山Ifillli]
prised about the race of the characters and made
Ill:: f ft ::~ 31 J~{:;I t0r .II::!
their feelings public. In the book, author Suzanne
Collins describes several of the main characters A Memes st1ch as this make fun of stereotypes.
as having “ dark brown skin." When viewers went
to the premiere and saw that several of the main
characters were African American-Amandla
Stenberg as Rue, Lenny Kravitz as Cinna, and Dayo Okeniyi as 咀1resh-some
were disappointed and made their views known on Twitter:
“why does γue have to be black not gonna liε kinda γuined the movie''
“Joγ the γecoγd1 im st让'l pissed that rue is black''
“γue is too black Joγ what I pictuγεd ''
“call me γacist but when ifound out γue was black her death wasn't as sad''
“why did the produceγ make all the good chaγacteγs black smh [shaking my
head]''
“ewwww γue is black?? I'm not watching''
“awkward moment when Rue is some black girl and not the little blonde inno-
cent giγl you pictuγε＇＇
These tweets make it evident that some viewers would like to keep their
heroes white. These viewers were able to share their ways of thinking via social
media. However, these tweets soon caught the attention of bloggers, who
called them out.
148 CHAPTER 5 Racism in • he Med ia
In contrast, some social media responses and campaigns can lead to positive
changes, as we saw leading up to the 2017 Academy Awards. In 2015, the four
acting categories included only white nominees. Activist April Reign started
the hashtag #OscarsSo认Thite in response, but in 2016, these four categories
were again all white.τhis time, however, the hashtag went viral and caught
the attention of Hollywood. Filmmaker Spike Lee, actress Jada Pinkett, and
others announced they would be boycotting the ceremony. As a result of the
outcry, in June 2016 the Academy extended 683 new membership invitations,
41 percent of which went to people of color. In 2017, the Oscar nominations
and winners reflected much greater diversity- the winners of two of the four
Oscars given to actors were African Americans.τhis represents a remarkable
turn in the history of the Oscars. Additionally, Dev Patel was the first actor of
Indian descent to be nominated in 13 years, and 岛1ahershala Ali was the firs t
Mu
actor of indigenous, Latino/ a, or Asian descent has won an Oscar in the past
16 years (Yuen 2016).
As another positive example of the power of social media, a study by Maria
Kopacz and Bessie Lee Lawton (2011b) found that YouTube videos have the
potential to counteract stereotypes.τhe researchers assessed audience reac-
tions to user-generated videos featuring Native Americans. Although viewers
preferred videos that adhered to stereotypical depictions, they also had a posi-
tive response to videos that countered stereotypes and offered accurate depic-
tions of Native American tribal diversity and activism.τhis study suggests
that social media can work in positive ways to counter stereotypes. Resistance
to and reproduction of racial stereotypes in new media is an emerging area of
sociological inquiry, and future studies will further demonstrate how racial
stereotypes are reproduced and contested in this realm.
MEDIA IMAGES AND RACIAL INEQUALITY

Pop culture representations of people of color have evolved over time, yet
continue to propagate old racial ideologies. 飞气Thile the seventeenth-century
representation of black men as lazy served to justify slavery, the current rep-
resentation of black men as thugs serves to justify the astonishingly high
rates of incarceration of black men today. And while the eighteenth-century
representation of the black woman as sexually depraved served to justify the
common practice of raping black women, the current representation of the
“h。” in 且lms and other media serves to justify cuts in social services to pri-
marily black inner cities by deeming poor black women unworthy of such aid.
Med ia Images and Rac ia l Inequa li ty 149
Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins argues that such justifications rely heavily on
mass media representations ofAfrican Americans. She defines and describes a
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Modern-day representations of African Americans as thugs and whores
are some examples of what Patricia Hill Collins calls controlling images controlling images Raced,
ο004, 165), or 肌ed, classed, and gendered media depictions of what African classed, and gendered
Americans are and are not. ’Throughout U.S. history, blacks have been repre- media depictions of what
sented as grotesque, physically resistant, and hypersexual. These representa- African Americans are
tions create a fascination with blackness, but they also define what whites are and are not.
not. In this way, every representation of nonwhites also defines whiteness. If
blacks are represented as embodying physical strength, then whites can see
themselves as embodying intelligence-brawn versus brain. 币1e same could be
said of stereotypes of other groups: for example, representations of Latinos as
gangbangers and gardeners send the message that whites are not gangbangers
or gardeners. These stereotypical representations not only shape how people in
the United States view one another but also work to justify rampant inequalities.
Representations of Latinos as drug kingpins, gangbangers, and pe忧y crim-
inals serve to justify the disproportionate rates of imprisonment for Latinos.
These sorts of media representations reinforce the idea that Latinos are prone
to criminality. ’The representation of the Latina as possessing uncontrolled
sexuality serves to justify cuts in welfare and restrictions on immigration.
And the representation of Latinas as maids reinforces the idea that Latinas
are destined for low-wage occupations. With the exception of the criminal,
the majority of the representations of Latinos/as portray these individuals as
being in service to whites or to the very system that exploits them. ’The Latin
lover's primary role is to sexually please white women. ’The hot-blooded Latina
fulfills the sexual desires of her lovers and the fantasies of others. ’The maid
and the gardener keep the well-to-do neighborhoods looking nice. And the law
enforcement officials keep the streets safe for everyone.
Portrayals of Arabs and Muslims propagate Islamaphobia, promote Orien皿
talist stereotypes, and work to justify foreign interventions. Hollywood has
played an important role in portraying the Arab world as an exotic place that
requires white Westerners to civilize its people and drag them into the twenty-
first century二 Shoba Sharad Rajgopal argues that representations of Arab
women as veiled, traditional, and oppressed work to reinforce the stereotype
that Western culture is “ dynamic, progressive, and egalitarian,” whereas Arab
cultures are 飞ackward, ba由aric, and patriarchal'' (2010, 145). She further
contends that these stereotypes reinforce the idea that Americans need to go
to Iraq and Afghanistan to rescue women from themselves and, in particular,
from their brutal and oppressive Arab husbands.
Insofar as media depictions shape our perceptions and portray white char-
acters as having more depth and redeeming qualities, they work to justify the
fact that whites tend to do better in American society on nearly any social mea-
sure. In a similar fashion, the depiction of Americans as saviors of the world
helps to shape our perception of the United States as the beacon of democracy,
even as the U.S. military wreaks havoc on Iraq and Afghanistan.
RACED, CLASSED, AND GENDERED MEDIA IMAGES

As we have seen increasing numbers of people of color in popular culture, we
have also become able to find a variety of representations across class lines.
African Americans, for example, are no longer portrayed only as mammies
or con artists. Instead, many are doctors and lawyers. Portrayals of people of
color on television are raced, gendered, and classed-meaning that the rep-
resentations vary by race, class, and gende马 and that they influence how we
think about various racial groups in this country.二 Patricia Hill Collins's (2004)
concept of “ controlling images” argues that the media produces class皿 and
gender-specific depictions ofpeople ofAfrican descent in popular culture. She
further contends that “ mass media has generated class-specific images of Black
women that help justify and shape the new racism of desegregated, color-blind
America." Collins’s analysis of the representations of black men and women
in popular culture is useful, and I describe it in detail later in this chapter. In
addition, Collins's idea of controlling images can be extended to other groups,
including Latinos/as, Native Americans, Asians, and Arabs.
Collins maintains that the vast majority of representations ofblacks on tele-
vision fall into the raced and classed categories presented in Table 5-1.
Collins argues that these images influence how blacks treat each other and
how others treat them. However, this does not mean that these images determine
how blacks are treated. Instead, their pervasive nature means that they affect all
people in our society.二 Faced with these images, we can: (1) internalize them and
accept them as reality, (2) resist them and develop our own ideas about black
masculinity and feminini叨 or (3) ignore them. Any of these reactions requires
some action on our part and will affect how we think of ourselves and others.
Collins primarily restricted her ana与ses to African Americans. The idea of
controlling images can be applied to other groups, however, as it is evident that
Raced, Classed, and Gendered Media Images 151
TABLE 5-1 I
Raced and Classed Categories of Black Representations on Television I
Working Class Middle Class
BITCH: Aggressive, loud, rude, and pushy MODERN MAMMY: Loyal female servant; focuses
on work and subservience to white male boss
BAD BITCH: Materialistic, sexualized;
iconized in hip-hop culture; modern version BLACK LADY: Designed to counter images of black
of the Jezebel women’s promiscuity; focuses on the home
WOMEN BAD BLACK MOTHER: (BBM): Mother who EDUCATED BLACK BITCH: Has money, power,
neglects her children; characterized by bad and job; is beautiful; success depends on her being
values; welfare queen tamed by men
FEMALE ATHLETE: Feminized; focuses on
the family; lesbianism erased
ATHLETE: Physically strong; harsh temper; SIDEKICK: Black buddy in service to whites;
needs to be controlled by coaches origins lie in Uncle Tom; loyal to whites; asexual,
nonviolent, safe, nonthreatening
THUG OR GANGSTA: Inherently physical and,
unlike the athlete, his physicality is neither SISSY: Effeminate and derogated black masculinity;
admired nor easily exploited for white gain gay characteristics, a queen; reinforces
heterosexuality of others
MEN BLACK PIMP: Involved in illegal activity;
hustler; uses women for economic gain;
refuses to work; promiscuous
BLACK RAPIST: Hypersexual, desirous of
white women
Source: Based on P. H . Collins 2004.
stereotypical representations vary by gender. Table 5-2 lists some examples

of prominent gendered stereotypes of Arabs, Native Americans, Latinos/as,
and Asians. As with African Americans, these controlling images account for
the vast majority of representations of these groups. Moreover, each of these
depictions also defines what whites are not. White men are not terrorists or
savages; they are peaceful and civilized. White women are not exotic or hot-
blooded; they are reserved and ethical.
Each of these representations is gendered. Arab women are rarely portrayed
as terrorists, and men are almost always the perpetrators, not the victims, of
gendered violence (Rajgopal 2010). Native American men are usually por-
trayed either as savages (cruel and primitive men who brutalize white people),
as wise elders who use their knowledge to help whites, or as warriors who are
romanticized but know that their tribe will ultimately meet its doom. In con-
trast, Native American women are usually portrayed as either princesses who
叫 E52 I
Men Women
Terrorist Veiled victim
ARABS Immoral billionaire Exotic seductress
Haggler Maiden
Savage Squaw
Sidekick Princess
NATIVE AMERICANS
Wise elder Matriarch
Doomed warrior
Latin lover Hot-blooded Latina
Greaser/bandito Maid
LATINOS/AS Gangbanger Abuela (grandma)
Gardener Mexican spitfire
Buffoon
BD
ta yL
忧
Jum
川UVA
Buddy
a vd
mv
d
唱
Threatening foreigner
ASIANS
Martial artist
Corrupt businessman
Source: Based on Rajgopal (2010); Kopacz and Lawton (20lla, 2011b); Rodriguez (1997).
fall in love with a white hero or as promiscuous squaws (Kopacz and Lawton
2011a). When Latino men on television are not involved in urban violence as
either criminals or police officers, they are most likely to be found in unskilled
labor occupations such as janitor or gardener. 币1is portrayal of Latinos as sub-
servient is complemented by the portrayal of the Latin lover, who, despite his
success in meeting the sexual desires of the Anglo woman, ends up being the
“ Latin loser'' when his lover is in turn conquered by an Anglo man (Rod咆uez
1997). Latinas, in contras飞 tend to bepo巾ayed as hot-blooded women, maids,
or abuelas (grandmothers) who are out of touch with modern life (Berg 1997).
Asian women tend to be portrayed either as Dragon Ladies or as Butterflies,
both of which highlight their sexuality二 In contrast, Asian men are usually
desexualized and emasculated. ’These gendered stereotypes reinforce prevalent
stereotypes about people of color in the United States and also work to define
whites as morally superior.
Within the television industry, debates over the representation of people of

color o仕en revolve around a sort of “ chicken and egg” question: Do the media
create or simply reflect popular stereotypes? For example, would a film that
portrayed black women as demure intellectuals and white women as gang-
bangers be unsuccessful because it would seem unrealistic?
τhe stereotypical portrayals we see in the media today certainly were not
invented by the media. Instead, they are part of our history and were created
decades or even centuries ago. In this chapter, we have seen both how these
stereotypes have evolved and how they continue to be part and parcel of pop-
ular media. We have also seen some of the consequences of these stereotypes:
how they work to reproduce and justify racial inequalities. 币1is raises the ques-
tion of whether the media have a responsibility to try to alter stereotypes.
One recurring complaint about representations of people of color in the
media is that they lack the depth of white characters. One way that this por-
trayal could change would be by including more people of color as writers and
producers of popular media. Shonda Rhimes, the creator of the popular series
Grey's Anatom只 Private Practice, Scandal, and How to Get Away with Murder, is
a prominent African American woman with a significant role in creating tele-
vision shows in the United States. Rhimes's shows have garnered praise both
for including more characters of color and for giving those characters more
depth than we are used to seeing on other shows. ’Thus, with the inclusion of
more people of color in Hollywood as creators of media, we will perhaps see
fewer stereotypes.
However, one of the most prominent African American male showrun-
ners is Tyler Perry, who is widely criticized for his use of stereotypical depic-
tions of black women in his works, including House of Payne, Diary of a Mad
Black Woman, Madea Goes to Jail, and many other television shows, films, and
stage plays. Although Tyler Perry presumably has the ability to portray black
women in a nuanced fashion, he is still beholden to the fact that the primary
motive for the entertainment industry is making a profit. For Perry, it is clear
that making fun of African Americans sells. In 2011, Forbes magazine named
Tyler Perry the highest-paid man in entertainment-with five movies and two
television series, Perry earned $130 million between May 2010 and May 2011
(Pomerantz 2011). Pe町’s body of work shows that simply having black pro-
ducers is not enough if the goal is to reduce stereotypes.
To return to the question of the media’s responsibility for reproducing ste-
reotypes, there are two sides to this issue. On the one hand, you could argue
that the media are responsible to the public, as the public constitutes their c时’
tomer base. On the other hand, you could contend that the media are simply
responding to market forces and giving their customers what they desire.
What do you think?
Key Terms
enlightened racism 132 Cantina Girl 137 Butterfly 140
Mammy 133 Suffering Senorita 137 meme 146
Sapphire 133 Vamp 137 new racism 149
Jezebel 133 Dragon Lady 140 controlling images 149
5.1 How are racial stereotypes propagated in popular culture? (pp. 129-143)
• Common stereotypes of various racial and ethnic groups are perpetuated on
television and in other media.

沙 How have representations ofAfrican Americans > Television shows change constantly.二 Do the
changed since the 1950s? stereotypes mentioned in this chapter apply to
> What are some of the common stereotypes of the shows you currently watch? Why or why
Latinos/as, Asians, and Arab Americans on not? Pick two popular shows on television
television? and assess the extent to which the nonwhite
> What are the historical origins of stereotypical characters fit into stereotypical roles. Are the
portrayals of Native Americans? Latino/a characters portrayed as hypersexual?
Are the Asians and Native Americans stoic?
Describe at least two characters, and then assess
the extent to which those characters fit into the
controlling images for their group.
5.2 How have new media changed the way stereotypes are spread and countered?
(pp. 144-148)
• Old stereotypes prevail even in new media such as video games and social media,
which have an increasingly important influence.

” How do user-generated media affect the spread Do you think social media have the potential to
>
of stereotypes? counter racial stereotypes, or do you think they

are simply providing an arena for the prolifer-
ation of stereotypes? Use at least one example
from social media to make your case.
5.3 How do media images serve to justify racial inequality? (pp. 148-150)
• Media images are not harmless: they justify racial inequalities by shaping
stereotypes about racial and ethnic minorities as well as about whites.

汾 Give an example of a stereotype from the media > To what extent are controlling images
that is used to justify racial inequality.二 prominent in the media today?
5.4 How are media representations raced, classed, and gendered? (pp. 150-152)
• Media images vary not only by racial group but also by race and class.

扮 To what extent are controlling images promi- > Why does Patricia Hill Collins argue that
nent in the media today? media representations are race-, class-, and
> What are the historical origins of the “ video ho” gender-specific?
stereotype?
Tα：lki：η~g α：bout Rαce

咀1e success of television shows and films is o丘en dependent on word
of mouth. If you watch a film or television show that breaks away from
traditional stereotypes, you can talk to your friends and family about it
and encourage them to watch it. When you have that conversation, you
can refer to what you learned in this chapter about stereotypes and the
importance of broad representation. You can also post your thoughts
on social media and play a larger role in promoting media that avoid
negative stereotypes.
Social Colorism. Noe Vice11te. Oil 011 ca11vas, .39.4 × 39.4 i11. (by permission o.fNoe Vicente)
.
Chapter 。utline
. The History of Colorism 160
,..圃 resea1·ch focus Latino lmmig 「ants

and the U.S. Racia l Orde 「 1 61
The Origins of Colorism in the
. . Americas 161
The Origins of Colorism in Asia and
Africa 164
The Global Color Hierarchy 165
Asia and Asian Americans 166
Voices The Fair-Skin Battle 167
Latin America and Latinos/as 168
Africa and the African
Diaspora 170
resea1·ch focus Skin Tone and
School Suspensio 门 173
v。1ices Colorism and Creole

Identity 175
Skin Color, Gender, and Beauty 176
v。ices #NotFairandlovely:
Cha 门g ing Thought Pa↑↑e「ns Ins•ead
of Skin•one 180
As y。u Reαd
6.1 When and how did colorism and skin-color stratification

originate?
6.2 How does colorism differ across societies?
6.3 How does skin color relate to gender and beauty?
158 CHAPTER 6 Co Ior ism a nd Skin-Co Ior Stra tifica tion
Every morning, men and women arot1nd the world wake up and do
something to their hair. Some women spend hours straightening it.
Others simply pass their fingers through or over their cropped locks.
Still others wear dreadlocks or braids. How we view and treat our hair
is a consequence of both societal norms about how hair should look
and tl1e reality of the hair with which we are born. In Bone Black, bell
hooks reflects on rituals surrounding hairstyling in her childhood and
early adult years.
ood hair-that ’s the expression. We all know it, begin to hear it

when we are small children. When we are sitting between the legs of
mothers and sisters getting our hair combed. Good hair is hair that is
not kinky, hair that does not feel like balls of steel wool, hair that does not take
hours to comb, hair that does not need tons of grease to untangle, hair that is
long. Real good hair is straight hair, hair like white folk ’s hair. Yet no one says
so. No one says your hair is so nice, so beautiful because it is like white folk's
hair. We pretend that the standards we measure our beauty by are our own
invention-that it is questions of time and money that lead us to make distinc-
tions between good hair and bad hair. I know from birth that I am lucky, lucky
to have hair at all for I was bald for two years, then lucky finally to have thin,
almost straight hair, hair that does not need to be hot-combed.
飞气Te are six girls who live in a house together. 认Te have different textures of
hair, short, long, thick, thin. We do not appreciate these differences. We do not
celebrate the variety that is ourselves . 飞'Ve do not run our fingers through each
other’s dry hair after it is washed. 认Te sit in the kitchen and wait our turn for the
hot comb, wait to sit in the chair by the stove, smelling grease, feeling the heat
warm our scalp like a sticky hot summer sun.
For each of us ge仕ing our hair pressed is an important ritual. It is not a sign
of our longing to be white. It is not a sign of our quest to be beautiful. We
are girls. It is a sign of our desire to be women. It is a gesture that says we are
approaching womanhood-a rite of passage. Before we reach the appropriate
age we wear braids and plaits that are symbols of our innocence, our youth, our
childhood. ’Then we are comforted by the parting hands that comb and braid,
comforted by the intimacy and bliss. There is a deeper intimacy in the kitchen
on Saturday when hair is pressed, when 亘sh is fried, when sodas are passed
CHAPTER 6 Color ism and Skin -Co l o 「 S↑「G ↑ificat i on 159
around, when soul music dri丘s over the talk . We are women together. 卫1is is
our ritual and our time. It is a time without men. It is a time when we work to
meet each other’s needs, to make each other beautiful in whateverwaywe can.
It is a time of laughter and mellow talk. Sometimes it is an occasion for tears
and sorrow. Mama is angry, sick of it all, pulling the hair too tight, using too
much grease, burning one ear and then the next.
At first I cannot participate in the ritual. I have good hair that does not need
pressing. Without the hot comb I remain a child, one of the uninitiated. I plead, I
抖ead, I beg, I cry for my turn. They tell me once you start you will be so町.You will
wish you had never straightened your hair. 咀1ey do not understand that it is not the
straightening I seek but the chance to belong, to be one in this world ofwomen. It
is finally my turn. I am happy. Happy even though my thin hair straightened looks
like black thread, has no body, stands in the air like ends of barbed wire; happy
even though the sweet smell ofunpressed hair is gone forever. Secretly I had hoped
that the hot comb would transform me, tum the thin good hair into thick nappy
hair, the kind of hair I like and long for, the kind you can do anything with, wear in
all kinds of styles. I am bitterly disappointed in the new look.
Later, a senior in high school, I want to wear a natural, an Afro. I want never
to get my hair pressed again. It is no longer a rite of passage, a chance to be
intimate in the world of women. 卫1e intimacy masks betrayal. Together we
change ourselves. The closeness is an embrace before parting, a gesture of fare-
well to love and one another.
Source: hooks 1996.
What you do or don’t do with your hair each morning is a reflection of soci-
etal norms related to beauty, professional standards, and social worth. If you
completely ignore your hair-never washing, combing, or cu忧ing it-people
likely will stare at you when you leave the house . 咀1e importance of hair, and
the social value we give to certain hairst卢s and not to others, are connected to
ideologies about race, gende巧 class, and sexuality, as well as to colorism-an col。rism The idea tl1at,
ideology related to and yet distinct from racism. Whereas racism relies on the within races, lighter is
belief that some races are better than others, colorism is the idea that, within better.
races, lighter is better. Whereas racism divides people into discrete categories
and judges them on that basis, colorism gives differential value to people in
the same racial group, based on a continuum from light to dark. Colorism pri-
marily refers to skin color, but it also encompasses physical characteristics that
are related to skin color, such as eye color, hair color and texture, and facial
features (Nakano Glenn 2009).
160 CHAPTER 6 Colo 「 i sm and Skin-Color Stra tifica tion
skin-c。｜。r stratification A 咀1eprevalence of colorism has led to skin-color stratification, in which

systen1 in whicl1 resources resources such as income and status are distributed unequally according to
such as income and status skin color. In the United States, lighter-skinned people generally have higher
are distributed 11nequally incomes and education than their darker-skinned counterparts and are more
according to skin color. likely to own homes and marry. Darker-skinned people generally have longer
prison sentences and lower job statuses on average than lighter-skinned
pigmentocracy A society people (Hocl肌hild and Weaver 2007). Verna l{eith and Cedric Herring
in which blacks, Asians, (2001) found that lighter-skinned African Americans have advantages over
and Latinos have different their darker-skinned counterparts in terms of earnings, education, and occu-
social stat11ses according pations. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and David R. Dietrich (2009) contend that
to their skin color. the United States is a pigmentocracy-a society in which blacks, Asians, and
Latinos have different social statuses according to their skin color.
Skin-color stratification is also evident among immigrants to the United
States from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Using data from the 2003 New
ImmigrantS盯vey,Joni Hersch (2008) found that da巾r-skinned immigrants
generally earn less than their lighter-skinned counterparts. This nationally
representative survey included interviews with people who had recently been
granted legal permanent residence in the United States. Each interviewee’s skin
color was rated on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the lightest and 10 the dark-
est. Overall, Hersch found that for immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, light skin color is associated with higher wages across the spectrum.
卫1ere is a pay disparity of 17 percent between the lightest-skinned immigrants
and the darkest-skinned immigrants, even ifwe account for gende鸟 education,
English-language skills, visa type, and occupation. 咀1is pay disparity indicates
that discrimination based on skin color likely does occur in the United States.
THE HIST。 RY 。 F C 。 t。 RISM
When and how did colorism originate, not only in the United States but also
around the world? Some scholars argue that the preference for light skin stems
from the history of slavery and genocide in the Americas. 咀1eir argument is
that the preference for light skin is fundamentally a preference for whiteness
and thus that colorism has the same history as racism (Hunter 2005, 2007).
For these thinkers, colorism is a modern phenomenon. Scholars who focus on
Asia (Rondilla and Spickard 200巧 Saraswati 2010, 2012) attribute the pref-
erence for light skin to earlier ideas that equated leisure with light skin and
work with dark skin. Most scholars of colorism would agree that colorism is
a global phenomenon, with a long history and distinct manifestations around
the world.
The His↑0 『y of Colo 『ism 161
γeseαγch TOCUS
Latino Immigrants and the U.S. Racial Order
Reanne Frank, Ilana Redstone Akresh, and Bo Lu (2010) carried out a study
designed to measure the amount of skin-color discrimination Latino immigrants
face in the labor market in the United States. They drew from a 2003 survey of
about 1,000 Latino immigrants that included a measure of skin color. Frank and
her colleagues used this statistical data to figure out whether skin color affects the
earnings of Latinos in the United States. ’They found that, a丘er accounting for rel-
evant differences between dark- and light-skinned Latinos, darker-skinned Lati-
nos earn, on average, $2,500 less per year than their lighter-skinned counterparts.
’This study used statistical techniques to account for a variety of factors that
could influence income. Instead of simply comparing the incomes of dark- and
light-skinned Latinos, Frank and her colleagues took into account the number of
years the Latino immigrants had been in the United States, their age when they
migrated, their gende乌 their occupational prestige, their region of origin, their
years of education, and other factors associated with earnings. ’They found that,
even accounting for all of these factors, lighter-skinned Latinos earn more than
darker-skinned Latinos.
Frank and her colleagues argue that lighter-skinned Latinos earn more because
they face discrimination in the labor market. They did not speak directly with
employers to find out if they prefer lighter-skinned Latinos but they were able to
infe马 based on the relative earnings of light- and dark-skinned Latinos, that skin-
color discrimination must be a factor in the labor market.
For Discussion
I. Do you think that Frank and her colleagues found evidence of skin-color strat-
ifi.cation, colorism, or both? Explain your answer.
2. Why might some employers demonstrate a preference for lighter吹inned
Latinos over darker-skinned Latinos?
Source: Frank,Akresh, and Lu 2010.
The 。rigins of Colorism in the Americas

Colorism has existed in the United States since the colonial era. ’The Africans
who were brought to the North American colonies as slaves were primarily
dark-skinned. Soon a丘er the arrival of Africans in the Americas, the progeny
162 CHAPTER 6 Colo 「 i sm and Skin-Color Stra tifica tion
mulatt。 Tl1e progeny of of blacks and whites became a new class of mixed-race people, known as
blacks and whites; a class mulattos, who were darker than whites but lighter than blacks. At first, mulat-
of mixed-race people who tos were officially recognized as a distinct category in the United States. In
are darker tl1an whites fact, the U.S. census included a mulatto category from 1850 to 1910. However,
but ligl1ter than blacks. eventually both law and social custom changed, and hypodescent-the idea
that having any amount of black ancestry makes you black一became more
hyp。descent The idea that prevalent.
having any a1not1nt of Each state had the authority to define which people would be classified as
black ancestry 111akes you black. In some states, an individual was legally black if one of his or her grand-
black. parents was black (i.e., ifhe or she was one-quarter black). In other states, an
individual was black if his or her great-grandparents were black. In still other
states, an individual was considered black if he or she was one-thirty-second
black. These laws were eventually abolished in the 1960s (Telles 2009). How-
eve鸟 they have had a lasting impact, in that people
,
with relatively little African ancestry (and thus
very light skin) car
tence of a wide color spectrum in the black com-
munity is one factor that has enabled colorism t 0
flourish.
Skin-color stratification was prevalent during
the era of slavery: lighter-skinned slaves were more
likely to work in the house instead of the fields, to be
taught to read, and to be manumitted (freed） .τhe
manumission of some led to a small class of freed-
men, who tended to be lighter in skin tone than
their enslaved counterparts . τhese lighter-skinned
blacks eventually formed the core of the black elite
in the United States; hence, skin color has been
mapped onto social status in the African American
community for centuries (Hunter 2005).
τhe association of light skin with elite status con-
tinued into the twentieth century.Jewish American
anthropologist Melville Herskovits conducted a
study ofblacks in Harlem in the 1920s and found that
the black elite was disproportionately light-skinned
.
and that black men preferred light-skinned part-
’
· ·| ners. His study revealed that whereas only 9 percent
A In Harlen1 i11 the 1920s, the black elite were of the Harlem black elites were very dark-skinned,
disproport io11ately light-skinned. 28.9 percent of the elites were very light-skinned.
The His↑0 『y of Colo 『ism 163
Herskovits also found that in over half of Harlem couples, wives were lighter
than husbands, revealing that men o丘en preferred lighter-skinned women and
that women were able to marry higher-status darker-skinned men. Within the
black community, lighter skin was valued more highly than dark skin. Addition-
all如 light skin became associated with elite status. ’Thus, the desire to be light
was connected both to the idea that white was better and to the idea that light
skin meant higher class.
Consequently, skin bleaches and hair straighteners were very common in
Harlem in the 1920s. Skin bleaches that promised to provide women with mestiz。 A Latin American
"light skin that men can’t resist" formed a substantial portion of the cosmet- classification of people of
ics products sold in Harlem at the time (Dorman 2011 ).’The practice of skin European and indigenous
bleachi鸣 persists today: Christopher A. D. Charles (2011) found thatpharma- ancestry.
cies and beauty supply stores in Harlem were still selling bleaching products
in 2010. Moreover, the labels on these products
devalued black skin by promising to help custom-
ers with "problems" associated with dark skin.
In Latin America, a skin-color hierarchy has
existed for centuries. During the period that
Latin American countries were Spanish colonies, ,,,_.,;.t 阳』，，胁 j )\·t-,H.4 CJ•• l'.州且”
M,.rl川 -
II c.品阳 c.on 庐俨品也
Iιw,t.,o. 』；，，.；；， t.
the Spaniards developed an elaborate system of jl 国 61 ，也M』’1
castas based on ancestηr that determined one’s

social and legal ranking in society二 By the end of
the colonial period in 1821, over one hundred pos-
sible categories were memorialized in a series of
, 1\'t.ta,o "'" F'w~n,1, I JII刷”” 脚，宫附Z响 I 仙” “ n .i .. dia II .~,r...,,.., 刷 /111lb肌
casta paintings. 刀1e categories included espafioles .Mori,co. I C'阮ino ,
I • ，~，.／，阻.，...，， b。Go
9I i。 l 11 I i2
(Spaniards), indios (indigenous people), mestizos
(persons with one Spanish and one indigenous
parent), castizos (persons with one mestizo parent
and one Spanish parent), and m仇tos (persons
with one Africa叼arent and one Spanish parent).
L obo o,m Chi""
币1e categories went on to divide people into over C. i haro
1:i
one hundred different possible mixtures, each
with its own name. ’These categories were based
on ancestry, not color. Nevertheless, we can say
that, generall如 more Spanish ancestry meant both
lighter skin and more prestige. 咀1ese categories are
•• t'ol阳，i..t ti? 帽、“r6叫他＇ I ·~仇 ""'' N，呻， ./r（.时..,.
4阳，6..,. 钝 w;‘ ...
C'，昭＂＂＂＂＂.
no longer used in Latin America, but the inequal- O ’ T咐，，，，4剧，＇. .『
”··. .X<:., Cc . .
ities that stemmed from them persist (Telles and A Over one hundred social categories can be identified in
Steele 2012). these casta paintings from the Spanish colonies.
164 CHAPTER 6 Colorism a nd Skin-Color S ↑『atif i cati on
Brazil, in contrast to the United States and Spanish America, never had a system
of official classification whereby a person with a certain amount ofAfrican ances-
t巧 would be legally considered black. Instead, in Brazil, usually only a p缸son
who looks black is considered black, whereas a person who looks white is consid-
ered white, regardless of his or her actual ancestry. 卫1e Brazilian census classifies
pard。 A Brazilian people 川hite, pardo (brown
census category meaning gueseJis used in every巾.y language to describe people who are neither black nor
“ brown.” white.τhere is a certain amount of fluidity between these categories, and many
families report blacks, whites, and pardos in their households on the Brazilian
census. Although Brazil has never had laws th挝 mandated racial segreg剧。乌
racial inequality exists, and privilege is mapped along color lines, with lighter-
skinned people generally having more education and income (Telles 2009).’The
presence of skin-color stratification in Brazil today is a relic of colonialism.
The 。rigins of Colorism in Asia and Africa

咀1e preference for light skin in the Americas seems to have its roots in the
period of colonization. In contrast, Asia has a longer history of colorism. As
early as the late ninth century, the ancient Sanskrit text Ram句，ana featured
light skin as ideal. Ayu Saraswati (201份 explains that in both the Indian and
Indonesian versions of this text, beautiful women are described as having
white faces that shine like the full moon. Aryan Indians spread their prefer-
ence for white skin to the rest of South and Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, this
predilection for light skin was reinforced during the Dutch colonial period in
the nineteenth century.二 Colonial authorities granted preferential treatment
to persons of mixed Dutch-Indonesian ancestr予 When the Japanese became
the colonial power in Indonesia in 1942, they also brought their fondness for
lightness with them. And U.S. popular culture has made its mark in Indonesia
through advertising, with blue叮ed blonds staring out of images in this pri-
marily nonwhite countr予 In Indonesia today, dark·也inned people continue to
be seen as unattractive and undesirable. As in other places, this social pa忧ern
has clear gendered dimensions: women feel more pressure than men do to alter
their appearance and lighten their skin (Saraswati 2012).
What about preferences in Africa? Was there preference for light skin in this
region prior to the arrival of Europeans？刀1ere are people of every skin shade
on the African continent, with lighter-skinned people living in the north and
those with darker skin living close to the Equator and in the south. Anthro-
pologist Peter Frost (2006) has reviewed the evidence from several African
tribes and found some evidence that a preference for lighter skin predates colo-
nialism in Africa. In many tribes, women with brown or reddish skin are seen
The Global Co l o 「 Hierarchy 165
as more beautiful than those with very dark skin, and there are indications
that these preferences are deeply rooted in these societies. For example, the
languages of many tribes include value-laden terms that distinguish between
skin color, and early-twentieth-century anthropologists found preferences for
lighter skin even among older Africans who were born before the arrival of
Europeans in their communities (Frost 2006). Whether or not the preference
for light skin predates colonialism is an unresolved question. However, it is
clear that the obsession with light skin increased with colonization and the
presence of large numbers of Europeans in Africa. In South Africa, for exam-
pie, skin lighteners have been available since the 1930s (’Thomas 2009).
咀1e preference for light skin seems nearly universal. Despite varying local
histories, these preferences have converged in the current era as a result of cul-
tural globalization and the spread of transnational corporations that tend to
promote whiter or lighter beauty ideals.
THE GL。 BAL c 。t。 R HIERARCHY

How does colorism differ across societies? Consider a 2016 commercial from
’Thailand for a product called Snowz, skin-whitening pills with the slogan
"white makes you win." In the television advertisement, Cris Horwang-a
35-year-old actress, model, singe马 and dance teacher-explains that the
whiteness she has achieved through beauty products has brought her fame. She
says:“Before I got to this point, the compet让ion was very high. If I stop taking
care of myself, everything I have worked for, the whiteness I have invested
in, may be lost." As she is talking, a younger model comes onto the screen,
A ln ’Thailand, a 2016 commercial for a skin-whitening pill called Snowz

proclaimed，飞Just being white, you will win."
166 CHAPTER 6 Colorism a nd Skin-Color S ↑『atif i cati on
and Cris's skin slowly fades to charcoal-black. She looks at her dark skin with
despondence, and the narrator says, “ Whiteness makes you win." τhe younger
model smiles as the narrator adds that Snowz contains glutathione, derived
gl。bale。｜。r hierarchy A from kiwi seeds which “ helps you not return to black." A丘er the Snowz pills
worldwide system in appear on the screen, Cris turns white again, and smiles return to her face.
which white (or light) skin Skin-whitening products are prevalent not only in Asia but also in Latin
is privileged and people- America, Africa, and the United States. 咀1ey are evidence of a global color
especially women- strive hierarchy, in which wl巾（or light) skin is privileged and people-especially,
to become lighter. but not exclusively, women-strive to become lighter. These dynamics play
out differently in distinct areas of the world.
diaspora A dispersion of In this section, we will examine three areas of the world: Asia, Latin Amer-
people from their original ica, and Africa, as well as the diaspora, or dispersion, of their populations in
homeland. the United States.
Asia and Asian Americans

币1e privileging of light skin in Asia and among Asian Americans has its roots
in ancient Aryan Indian beauty ideals, Japanese and Chinese ideas of white
skin as a sign of leisure, and colonial domination of India and Indonesia by
European powers. Toda·如 women from Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam,
Japan, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India use skin-whitening creams
in an effort to make their skin as light as possible, and they even undergo eyelid
surgery to widen their eyes (Saraswati 2010, 2012). In India, the preference for
light skin is also connected to the caste system. Although it is not the case that
all high-caste members (Brahmins) are light, a pa仕ern can be seen whereby
higher-caste people in India tend to be lighter than those of lower caste. In
addition, the term for caste，阳·na, literally means “colo鸟” and there has been
some historical association ofBrahmins with whiteness and the untouchables
with blackness. In India and across Asia, there are historical and present-day
advantages associated with light skin, especially for women (Parameswaran
and Cardoza 2009).
These preferences for light skin in Asia have carried over to Asian Amer-
icans in the United States. Research by Joanne Rondilla and Paul Spickard
ο007) reveals a fascinating aspect of skin-tone discrimination amo吨 Asian
Americans: the preference for light skin is omnipresent, yet Asian Ameri-
cans do not want to be too white.τhe researchers tell the stories of a Viet-
namese American woman who uses a destructive skin-whitening cream
because she feels excluded by her ethnic group and a Filipina woman who
stays out of the sun to avoid being called “ dark." On the flip side, they also
describe a Chinese woman whose great-grandmother was French who is
The G loba I Color Hi e ra 「chy 167
excluded from social groups because her freckles and reddish h air m ake h er
look t oo white, as well as a woman whose mot her is J apanese and father is
white who struggles to feel accepted in either community. Based on these
interviews and other evidence, Rondilla and Spicka rd argue that light skin
is preferred in Asian American communities, but th at this does not signal a
desire for whiteness.
The Fair嗣Skin Battle

……··.................................................................... ........................................ .
I will admit: I ’ve avoided the sun so I wouldn’t get darker. I ’ve gone swimming
at night instead of during the day to avoid tan lines. It’s completely and utterly
ridiculous. I should enjoy the sun's warm rays and get some exercise! But where
do these thoughts come from? We weren’t born with the innate ability to distin-
guish between skin colors and assign meanings to them. But for some women, .
the fair skin battle draws them into deeper depths than just avoiding sunshine
during the day.
In South Asian tradition, a light-skinned won1an
is supposedly more b eat1tiful tl1an a dark-skinned
历~ ~ I
won1an. This b elief can b e traced back to early .. lJ τ－：； ...
户 i纽哈p
invasions of India by the Turks a nd British. As light-
skinned people inhabited India and wielded their e
authority, natives who sought power a11d b eat1ty
likened fair skin witl1 p ower and status. Some say the
Caste Syst en1 also contributed to these attitudes, witl1
light-skinned higher-cast e m embers dominating the
lower-cast e men1bers with darker skin. Additionally,
history might indicate tl1at lighter-ski11ned people
enjoyed a n1ore fanciful life, while darker-skinned Abo尘。ifFai；γ 巴 Lo℃巳~zy,
people worked in the fields. α skin-light，侃侃igcγeαm
For an even n1ore blatant and modern perpetuatio11 of' fγomNew Dell.坑， India.
this st ereotype, watcl1 any Bollywood movie's actors and
actresses. The m ovies t end to feature ultra-fair-skinned heroes and h eroines, while
villains and village ,ivon1en tend t o be portrayed by darker-complexioned actors.
Can this be a realistic depiction of Sot1tl1 Asian people? Do Sot1th Asian women
str甘e t o appear like tl1e b eautif11l won1en seen in the m ovies? The n1ajority of Soutl1
Asians are not as fair ski1111ed as the movies portray. They range in hues from ivory to
caran1el, from n1ocha to ebony.
(co轧，tinued)
168 CHAPTER 6 Colo 「 ism and Skin-Co lor Stra tification
Continued (As a l1t1morous side note, cl1eck out some of the matrimo11ial ads seeking
ωωυ－
fair maidens.)
Furthermore, the South Asian skin product market is littered with skin
lightening prodt1cts. Everything from our at111t’s Fair and Lovely to our
dermatologist’s hydroquinone is being consumed for the p11rpose of a fair
O＞
complexion. So1ne of these cremes are harmful for the skin, and can lead to
irritation. It’s a1nazing to observe the lengths son1e women vvill go to, some-
tin1es dangerous lengths, just to acl1ieve a sligl1tly lighter shade.
However, Fair and Lovely is now the topic of controversy in South Asia
nowadays, where a movement led by the All India Democratic Women’s
Association 自nally begins to bring some justice to the issue of skin color.
This issue doesn王 j11st concern Sot1th Asians. Af'rican American celebrities
like Beyonce, Ril1anna, and Halle Berry are so beat1tiful and talented i11 their
genres, but in all actuality, they’re considerably fair! In fact, an MSNBC arti-
cle posed the q11estion of whether Vanity Rαir lightened Beyonce's skin for a
cover pl1oto (which they vel1emently denied). A darker-skinned woman like
Fantasia Barrino doesn't get nearly the same spotlight, despite l1er enormous
talent. Son1e African American bloggers speak of' similar sentiment concern-
ing skin color in their communities as well.
It's clear tl1at American Desi girls feel tl1e fair-skin pressure because of'
the media coming at them from both sides of the world. Both Desi ct1lture
and American culture subconsciously allude towards the idea that a lighter
complexion is more beautiful than a darker one. It’s not easy living in a
society ,vhere vanity and visual appearance speak volumes before a wo1nan
even speaks!
The vast diversity in ot1r skin colors is just 011e of the visual aspects of our
heritage. And there's so n1uch wonder woven into our heritage to fret over
skin color! So, feel free to bask in the sun and be proud of your glow!
Source: Mohideen 2009.
Latin America and Latinos/as

In Latin America, people of mixed ancestry have historically been considered
mulattos (when they have African and European ancestry) or mestizos (when
they have European and indigenous ancest呐. M estizo is an o值cial classifica-
tion in Mexico, Peru, and other countries, and pardo (brown) is an o面cial clas-
si且cation in Brazil. Within this system, only people who are very dark-skinned
are considered black, and only those who both are dark-skinned and display
The Globa I Color Hi era 「chy 169
indigenous cultural features are considered indigenous (Golash-Boza 2011a).

咀1us, you could find a family in which one child is considered black, another
mulatto, and still another white. In these families, it is o丘en the case that
the lighter-skinned children are given preferential treatment (Twine 1998;
Hordge-Freeman 2015). Latin Americans 。丘en strategically choose roman-
tic partners who are lighter in skin tone than themselves, with the hope that
their children will be lighter and thus better positioned in society. In Spanish,
this strategy is called mejorando la raza, or improving the race, and is common
across Latin America (Sue 2009).
Latin American countries are marked by a skin-color hierarchy, in which
lighter-skinned people possess a disproportionate share of the resources.
Because of the existence of intermediate categories, we can say that whites
are 。丘en at the top of the hierarchy, mestizos and mulattos in the middle, and
blacks and indigenous people at the bottom (Telles and Steele 2012).
Edward Telles and Liza Steele (2012) conducted a study in which they
compared skin color and educational attainment across Latin America.
They wanted to know whether or not lighter-skinned Latin Americans are
more likely to complete high school and go to college than darker-skinned
Latin Americans. Using a recent and innovative dataset that contained
information about skin color and education for nearly 40,000 people in
twenty-three Latin American countries, they were able to explore the
relationship between skin color and each respondent ’s educational attain-
ment. These data allowed them to ask if lighter-skinned people completed
more years of schooling on average than darker-skinned people. In most
Latin American and Caribbean countries, they found that lighter-skinned
people were more likely to have higher educational attainment than
darker-skinned people. This trend was most prominent in Andean coun-
tries such as Peru and Bolivia, where darker-skinned people receive an aver-
age of eight years of schooling, as compared to the thirteen years received
by lighter-skinned people. In all the countries except four-Panama,
Suriname, Belize, and Guyana-their study revealed that lighter-skinned
people had more years of education than darker-skinned people. Educa-
tional attainment is an important indicator of socioeconomic success.
Thus, this study makes it clear that a pigmentocracy continues to be prev-
alent in Latin America.
The prevalence of skin-color stratification in Latin America raises the ques-
tion ofwhether this stratification is also present among Latin American immi-
grants in the United States. Do lighter-skinned Latinos in the United States
have more education, income, and resources?
170 CHAPTER 6 Colo 「 i sm and Skin-Co lo r Stra tifica tion
Having light skin has real, material rewards for Latinos in the United States
in terms of education and income. Social scientists have conducted a few quan-
titative studies that measured skin color and tested whether light-skinned
people tend to have higher incomes and education. In 1996, Edward Mur-
guia and Edward Telles published a study based on the 1979 National Chi-
cano Study.τhey found that whereas only 7 percent of light-skinned Mexican
Americans had less than five years of schooling, 10.2 percent of them had 且n
ished college. By comparison, about 19 percent of medium- and dark-skinned
Mexican Americans had less than five years of schooling, but only about S per-
cent of them had finished college. Murguia and Telles's analyses also revealed
that skin color still influenced educational outcomes even when parents’ edu-
cation was taken into account. 卫1is means that skin color had an independent
effect on the likelihood that Mexican Americans would attain high levels of
education.
Margaret Hunter (2005), usi吨 data from the 1979 National Chicano Study
as well as the 1980 National Study of Black Americans, also found that skin
color predicted educational outcomes for Mexican American and African
American women. τhose with lighter skin generally had higher educational
levels, even controlling for their own class backgrounds.
You might wonder if things have changed since 1979 and 1980, the years
from which the data used in these studies were drawn. The findings of
more recent studies are, not surprisingly, similar. A study, based in Boston,
found that Latinas with light skin were more likely to be married than
dark-skinned Latinas (Gomez 2008), while more recently, I(arletta White
(2015) found evidence that Latinos and blacks with darker skin are more
likely than their lighter-skinned counterparts to be stopped and arrested
by police officers. In addition, Alexis Rosenblum and colleagues (2015)
found that Latin American immigrants with darker skin tones earn less
than their lighter-skinned counterparts, even when taking into account
other relevant factors such as age, education, and labor market experi-
ence. Using a wide variety of measures, researchers have consistenly found
that Latinos with darker skin tones face more discrimination than their
lighter-skinned counterparts.
Africa and the African Diaspora

Jemima Pierre (2008) describes a scene in downtown Accra, Ghana, where
large billboards that feature a very light-skinned African woman to adver-
tise Gel Eclaircissant-a bleaching treatment-are plastered across the town.
Pierre asks how Ghana,“a proud black postcolonial African nation with an
The G loba I Co lo r Hiera 「chy 171
established history of Pan-Africanism,” can have such blatant antiblack

advertisements. To answer this question, Pierre argues that skin-bleaching
practices are a reflection of the ways that processes of racialization are alive
and well in postcolonial Ghana.τhus, even though Ghana is a proud, black
nation, it is not immune to global white supremacy. It is through global white
supremacy that Ghana and other African nations are connected to the African
diaspora, where a preference for light skin is prevalent. Additionally, many
African countries are marked by a hierarchy in which lighter-skinned, mixed-
race people occupy more positions ofpower and have more economic resources
than darker吹inned people (Lewis, Robkin, Gaska, and Njoki 2011).
Skin bleaching has become common throughout Africa (see Figure 6.1).
Studies have revealed that as many as 25 percent of women in Mali; 30 percent
of women in Tanzania; 52 percent of women in Dakar, Senegal; 66 percent of
people in Brazzaville, Congo; 75 percent of people in Lagos, Nigeria; and 60
percent of women in Zambia use skin-bleaching products (l(panake, Munoz
Sastre, and Mullet 2009; Lewis et al. 2011).
Why? In Tanzania, a team of scholars (Lewis et al. 2011) interviewed
forty-two women to ask them why they used skin-bleaching products, even
though these products are known to cause severe skin damage, skin cance鸟
and brain disease. Tanzanian women gave six primary reasons for why they
bleached their skin: (1) to remove acne, (2) to have so丘 skin, (3) to be more
white, (4) to remove dark patches, (S) to attract men, and (6) to impress peers.
Women gave a variety of reasons for why they used these creams, but the desire
to look better was at the center of all of them. For many, the desire to look
100°/o
90°/o
80°/o
70°/o
60°/o
50°/o
40°/o
30°/o
20°/o FIGURE 6-1.
10°/o Percentage of women in
African countries who use
0°/o
Nigeria Senegal Togo Burkina Cameroon ski11-bleacl1ing products
Faso Source: Davids et al. (2016).
172 CHAPTER 6 Colo 「 i sm and Skin-Co lo r Stra tification
better was connected to looking whiter. One woman said she started bleaching
“ to be beautiful and to look like Arabians or Europeans and attractive to people
especially men" (33). In a similar study in Togo, Lonzozou l(panake, Maria
Teresa Munoz Sastre, and Etienne Mullet (2009) interviewed 300 men and
women who reported using skin-bleaching creams and found that they gave a
variety of reasons for doing so, including wanting to be considered important,
civilized, and attractive, and to have lighter and so丘er skin. τhe prevalence
of skin bleaching in a variety of African countries demonstrates that Africans
continue to privilege light skin.
In a study of skin bleaching in Jamaica, Christopher A. D. Charles (2009)
interviewed thirty-six women and twenty-two men who bleached their skin. He
found that most of them bleached their skin either to remove facial blemishes,
A A billboard advertising to lighten their skin, or to look more beautiful. Although more than 90 percent
a skin lightening prodt1ct of Jamaicans are black, light skin is viewed as socially desirable among both
called “ Kl1ess Petch” in men and women. For this reason, people who bleached their skin o丘en thought
Dakar, Se11egal. that having lighter skin would make them more attractive. In the United States,
skin bleaching was common among A仕ican Americans in Harlem in the 1920s
and 1930s. Since then, we have seen the rise of the “ black is beautiful" move-
ment and an embrace of blackness among African Americans.τhere is some
evidence that these social movements have alleviated colorism among black
Americans. However, colorism has not completely dissipated.
A study by Jeffri Anne Wilder (2010) reveals the extent to which colorism
continues to be embedded in the African American community. Wilder con-
ducted focus groups with fi丘y- eight African American women in which she
probed them about skin-color labels and their meanings. Wilder found that
a wide variety of labels are used to describe light-skinned blacks, quite a few
are used to describe darker-skinned blacks, and just four are used to describe
those of medium skin tone.τhe wide variety of labels used indicates the
importance of skin tone in the African American community. Whereas the
terms used to describe medium skin-brown, milk chocolate, caramel, and
pecan tan-were neutral, those used to describe light and dark skin were not.
Terms for light skin included “ house nigga" and "pre忧y skin," while those for
dark skin included “ jigaboo” and “ tar baby." The association of lightness with
“ pretty skin” indicates that many African Americans view light skin to be more
beautiful than dark skin. At the same time, use of the term “ house nigga" is a
reference to slavery and to the implication that those with light skin may be
less authentically black. Wilder found in her focus groups that many African
Americans view lighter-skinned women as more beautiful, intelligent, and
refined than their darker-skinned counterparts.
The Globa I Color Hi era 「chy 173
γ巳sea＇γch
. TOCUS
Skin Tone and School Suspension
A study by Lance Hannon, Robert DeFina,
and Sarah Bruch (2013) examined whether
children's skin tone affects their likeli-
hood of suspension from school. Previous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
research had found that black children are
The scale ofsk仇，color da1·kness used by the 1·esearch
more likely to be suspended than white teα付i.
children.
Hannon, DeFina, and Bruch considered this effect in terms ofvariation within
the black community, both by skin tone and gender. Suspension is important
not only because it is a punishment inflicted on schoolchildren but also because
suspensions can have long-term, cumulative effects. For example, children who
have been suspended from school are more likely to end up in prison than those
who have never been suspended. In addition, African Americans with darker skin
tone face harsher punishments in the criminal justice system.
Hannon et al.’s study sought to discover whether similar discrimination hap-
pens with school-based discipline. 卫1e study was conducted among two sepa-
rate national samples of African Americans. To measure skin tone, the authors
used a scale designed by Douglas Massey and and Jennifer A. Martin called τhe
National Immigrant Survey Skin Color Scale.
咀1e study found that having a darker skin tone increased the likelihood of
school suspension: each darker gradation resulted in a slightly higher chance of
being suspended. This effect was most pronounced for African American girls.
Overall, 38 percent of the black girls in the study reported that they had been
suspended at least once, compared with 53 percent of the black boys. However,
these results varied further by skin color. Black male students with the lightest
skin had about a 48 percent chance of having been suspended, compared with a
69 percent chance for those with the darkest skin. For girls, the range was from
28 percent (lightest skin) to 58 percent (darkest skin). Thus, whereas for light-
skinned African American girls and boys there is a large difference in the like-
lihood of ever havi吨 been suspended (28 percent for girls versus 48 percent for
boys), the difference is smaller between dark·吹inned African American girls and
boys (58 percent for girls vers1
(co轧.tinued)
174 CHAPTER 6 C o l o 「 i sm an d Skin-Colo r Stra tificat io n
The authors conclude that skin tone affects suspension rates for both black girls
and black boys but that there is more variation in suspension rates for black girls.
咀1ey argue that this finding reveals how various forms of oppression intersect.
咀1e negative consequences of having dark skin are not exactly the same for black
boys and girls. Instead, due to dominant beliefs about femininity and beauty,
darker-skinned black girls face additional layers of discrimination not faced by
lighter-skinned black girls.
For Disc11ssion
1. What are some disadvantages dark-skinned African American girls might
face at school that lighter-skinned African American girls may be less likely to
face?
2 . What do you think of the skin-tone scale? Do you think it captures meaning-
ful variations?
Source: H annon, D eFina, and Bruch 2013 .
咀1ere is
evidence that these preferences for light skin are connected to real,
material rewards for being light. In the United States, historically, lighter-
skinned African Americans have had more resources than darker-skinned
African Americans and have tended to pass those resources down to their
children. Ongoing discrimination exacerbates these inequalities. Colorism is
a prominent aspect of inequality for African Americans in the criminal jus-
tice system: studies have shown that darker-skinned blacks get longer prison
sentences than blacks with lighter skin and that darker-skinned blacks are
more likely to receive the death penalty (Hochschild and Weaver 2007). The
preference for light skin also plays out in hiring decisions: one experimental
study showed that white employers were more like与 to hire a lighter也inned
African American over a darker-skinned African American (Hocl肌hild and
Weaver 2007). Relatedly, Ellis Monk (2014) found that skin tone affects out-
comes related to black Americans’ educational attainment, household income,
occupational status, and even the skin tone and educational attainment of their
spouses. Notably, lighter-skinned black Americans have, on average, one full
year more of education than darker-skinned blackAmericans. In addition, black
Americans with “ very dark skin" have 73 percent higher odds of having a less
prestigious occupation than their lighter-skinned counterparts (Monk 2014).
The G lo bal C ol o 「 Hi e rarchy 175
Colorism and Creole Identity

·.....··...…......……··........…………...…...……··.......…………………·........……·.....··.....
Creole identity is a compli- 圃，，，
＼』
cated thing in Louisiana, says

Kristina Robinson, 29, of New
Orleans.
It's an ethnicity, a cul- ~ . .
tural designation for people
~
descended from colonial set-
tlers in Louisiana, mainly of
French and Latin lineage.
The term Creole was
claimed by the French and
Kristinα Robinson cαlls herselfblack over Creole.
Spanish settlers in colonial
times but it also refeηedto
Africans and people who were a mixture of races. Those mixed-race descendants
became a unique racial group and sometimes even included Native American heritage.
But in popular representation, Robinson says Creole has come to be defined as
skin color.
She doesn't want to deny the rich Creole history but she doesn’t identi句r as such if
it means moving away from her blackness.
Black people think that her embrace of Creole means a rejection of being black.
"I never wanted to distance myself from my black ancestors ,” says the creative
writing graduate student at Dillard University.
“ They are the ones who claim me.”
In her light skin, Robinson understands the insidious ways of colorism, a system
in which light skin is valued more than dark skin.
“ Colorism is a major problem within the Creole community and the black commu-
nity:,” she says. “ It’s under discussed. It's perplexing and vexing how to work out this
idea. I can see how the one drop rule is why we have so much colorism in our society.”
“One drop is a lie,” she says. “ Black plus white doesn’t equal black or 让 doesn’t
equal white. It equals black plus white."
She calls herself black. But other people think she is from India or the Middle
East, especially in her academic work environment, where she does not have black
colleagues.
“ The assumption is I am not black,” she says.
Ultimately, she believes environment plays a big role in identity.
(co吼.tinued)
176 CHAPTER 6 Colo 「 ism and Skin-Color Stratification
Continued Fe,v people, she says, tl1ink that of her sist er. One reason r丑ay be that l1er
ωωυ－
sister l1as more of' a b11tton nose. But a11other reason is that she works in a
field with more black people, whereas Robinson finds l1erself in academic
settings where she is the sole black won1an.
Robinson acknowledges l1er lighter skin gives her privilege in a color-
O＞
conscious society.
“ But in those sitl1ations where you have to identi命 yourself and yo11
choose to identi命 yourself as white-there's a big denial going on there.”
“ I do tl1ink it's tro11blesome when someone who is of mixed race chooses
to deny tl1at part of them that was oppressed,” she says.
Sot1rce: Basu 2009. Courtesy CNN.
..........................................................................................................
SKIN C。 k。 R, GENDER, AND BEAUTY

How does skin color relate to gender and beauty? Colorism is evident in the
U.S. entertainment industry, especially for women of color. Many of the most
prominent Latina stars-Salma Hayek, Jennifer Lopez, and Eva Longoria-
are very light-skinned. 古1e same could be said about newer Latina stars such
as Selena Gomez and Gina Rodriguez. Light-skinned artists of color are more
likely to rise to fame because light skin is associated with beauty both in the
w United States and around the globe. Margaret Hunter (2005) explains that
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m beauty, like colorism, is an ideology that can be used as a tool to maintain

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．，且
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U patriarchy, or male dominance in a society. Beauty divides women through
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competition and diverts their attention to their physical appearance and away
from other oppressive forces in their lives.
In the United States, light skin, lo吨 hair, light eyes, and straight noses are all
associated with beauty-and with whiteness. When a woman is called" fair," this
label refers both to light skin and to physical attractiveness.τhus, African Amer-
ican women with long, straight hair and light skin are o丘en perceived to be more
attractive than their darker-skinned counterparts. Of course, there is individual
preference and variation. Yet studies have consistently shown that dark-skinned
beauty queue A concept women are devalued both by their co-ethnics and by whites (Hunter 2005).
explaining 110,v sexisn1 Hunter (2005, 70-71) introduces the concept of a beauty queue to explain
and racis1n interact to “ how sexism and racism interact to create a queue of women from the light-
create a queue of won1en est to the darkest, where the lightest get the most resources and the darkest
ranging from the lightest get the least. The lightest women get access to more resources because not
to the darkest, i11 ,vhicl1 only are they lighter-skinned and therefore racially privileged, but their light
tl1e lightest get the most skin is interpreted in our culture as more beautiful and therefore they are also
resources. privileged as beautiful women.” For women, beauty is an asset that can lead
Skin Colo 「， Gend 凹， and Beauty 177
to better jobs, better pay, and more status. Because lighter women are seen as skin-color privilege The
more beautiful, they can be considered to have skin-color privilege, even if privilege of being
they belong to a disadvantaged racial group. considered more beautiful
Siobhan Brooks (2010) uses the concept of erotic capital to explain how as a res11lt of having
skin color relates to beauty for women of color. Doing research with strip club lighter skin.
workers, Brooks found that white women o丘en earned more than black and
erotic capital A concept
Latina women, but that light-skinned black and Latina women were able to
linking the att1·activeness
use their erotic capital-their attractiveness and sensuality-to earn more
and sensuality of a
than darker-skinned black women. Whereas lighter-skinned black and Latina
woman to her skin color.
women were seen as exotic, dark-skinned black women were perceived as
hypersexual and thus devalued. Similar to Hunter (2007), Brooks found evi-
dence of a beauty queue, in which white women earned the most, followed by
lighter-skinned blacks and Latinas, and then darker-skinned women. In the
case of strip clubs, being whiter or lighter had material advantages.
Although there are clear advantages to being light-skinned, there is also evi-
dence that women of color do not necessarily want to be white, even if they
prefer lighter skin. Dionne Stephens and Paula Fernandez (2011) interviewed
thirty-four Hispanic women to shed light on their perspective on the relation-
ship between skin color and attractiveness. The researchers found that “ having
'some color' was viewed as an important symbol of [the women’sJ 'authentic’
Hispanic identity'' (85). The women they int町viewed specifically stated that
they did not desire white skin, but that they preferred to be tan and viewed
being tan as being attractive and sexy. Notably, the women also did not want
to be “ black ” or too dark. A Many Latina stars, such
as Selena Gomez, are very
τhis research is also relevant for Asian Americans. Rondilla and Spickard
light skinned-a trait often
(2007) interviewed ninety-nine Asian Americans about their skin-color pref二 associated with beauty
erences. ’They found that respondents widely agreed that lighter skin was better aro11nd tl1e globe.
in that it was associated with beauty, intelligence, and high class. Women and
men recalled being told by their parents not to marry too dark so they could
have light-skinned children. As part of the interview process, the researchers
showed interviewees a picture of three conventionally beautiful Asian Ameri-
can women and asked them to make up a story about each woman. One woman
had light skin, hair, and eyesj another was medium-toned and had black hairj
and the third was dark-skinned. 咀1e stories about the medium-toned women
were the most positive: she was seen as smart, wealthy, and stylish. In con-
trast, the dark-skinned woman was seen as likely an immigrant, poo马 and
hardworking.τhe stories about the lightest woman were not positive either:
interviewees saw her as confused about her identity, lazy, a partygoe乌 and
unhappy. ’These 且ndings reveal that Asian Americans have an abstract desire
178 CHAPTER 6 Colorism a nd Skin-Colo 「 Stratification
for whiteness but do not desire features that make them look too white. In her
later work, Joanne Rondilla (2009) argues that Asian women do not use skin
lighteners in an a忧empt to become white; instead, they use them out of a wish
to become a better version of themselves.
τhis research has parallels with work conducted in other parts of the
world. Aisha l(han (2009) argues that although there is a color hierarchy in
Indo-Trinidadian society, the ultimate desire is to become light, but not white,
as whiteness 吗nifies cultural loss. Lynn Thomas (2009) points out that in
South Africa, women use skin lighteners not to become white, but to attain a
lighter shade ofblack. Christina Sue (2009) contends that people in Veracruz,
Mexico, use mestiz aje as a whitening strategy to become lighter mestizos, not
to become white. Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2009) argues that Filipinas associate
light skin with modernity and social mobility, not necessarily with whiteness.
And Ayu Saraswati (2012) finds that Indonesian women use skin whiteners
to become lighte乌 but not to become Caucasian or to attain the light skin of
Chinese women. Instead, they prefer Indonesian whiteness.
In a study of beauty pageants in Nigeria, Oluwakemi M. Balogun (201 功
examined two beauty pageants: the Queen Nigeria pageant, which focuses
primarily on Nigeria, and the Most Beautiful Girl in Nigeria pageant, which is
geared to a more international audience and is connected to the Miss Universe
and 岛1iss 飞N'orld pageants. Balogun found that beauty pageant directors did not
ignore skin color, nor did they give universal preference to light skin. Instead,
they chose dark-skinned women when their goal was to find an authentic Afri-
can woman to represent their country to the world and lighter-skinned women
when they were searching for a woman with global mass appeal as a beautiful
woman.
Most of these works on skin color focus on women, as colorism is a gen-
dered dynamic. Skin-color valuations more heavily affect women’s lives than
men’s. Jyostna Vaid (2009) highlights the increasing salience of skin color, as
well as the gendered nature of judgments based on skin color, for Indians in
India and the diaspora. 飞！aid found that Indian women are twice as likely as
men to mention skin color in marriage ads, signaling that skin color is more
important in marriage negotiations for women than for men. Evelyn Nakano
Glenn (2009) conceptualizes light skin as a form of symbolic capital and
makes the case that this form of capital is more important for women than
for men. Ayu Saraswati (2012) interviewed forty-six Indonesian women about
their use of skin-whitening creams and found that many of the women had
experienced discrimination and denigration because of their dark skin color.
Many had received comments on their skin color when they were girls and
Skin Co l o 「， Gender，。 nd Bea uty 179
used skin-whitening creams to hide what they viewed to be a deficiency-their

dark skin. Whereas dark skin can be seen as masculine, and thus appropriate,
for men, Saraswati found that women in Indonesia overwhelmingly preferred
light skin. Moreover, women around the world feel more pressure than men to
be beautiful (Hunter 2005).
Nevertheless, men also can experience benefits from being light-skinned and
having European features . Grey's Anatomy star Jesse Williams, for example,
explained :“To some people I might be a celebrity because I ’m physically attrac-
tive. We are programmed to believe that someone is attractive because they told
you that blue eyes are hot. I am not going to participate in that shit," he says.
"I aim to do what I can with what I have. And I have my [looks]-you know,
European beauty standards give me access to things." Williams acknowledges
that his blue eyes and light skin grant him unearned privileges, yet he disparages A G1·ey云Anαtomy
star Jesse 矶Tilliams
the system that gives him these advantages (Kasperkevic 2015).
acknowledges that his bl11e
In India, it continues to be common for people to use advertisements to find eyes a11d light skin gra11t
spouses, and these advertisements make it clear that fair skin makes women him privileges.
more marriageable. Radhika Parameswaran and I(avitha Cardoza (2009)
report that men are much less likely than women to report their own skin
color in these advertisements and that men are much more likely to indicate a
preference for light skin in a partn
written by men that sought a “ fair" bride and even reported one advertisement
by a father who lamented the fact that his daughter、 skin was not fair. These
preferences have generated a market for skin-lightening creams in India. In
2013, fairness products constituted 45 percent of the cosmetics and toiletries
market i川ndia (McDougall 2013). Companies that make these products also
use advertising to reinforce the idea that lighter women are more marriage-
able. One ad for Fair & Lovely Fairness Cold Cream shows a young woman
with a beaming smile . τhe caption reads ： “τhis winter, I discovered the only
cold cream that also made me fairer. (And he discovered me)”(Parameswaran
and Cardoza 2009). A consistent theme in Indian advertisements for whiten
ing creams is that women who wish to be more beautiful can use these creams
to become more fair and thus more desirable, to men.
Transnational corporations have taken advantage of the widespread desire
for fair skin around the world and have used it to generate immense profits.
Through advertising, large transnational corporations have not only rein-
forced the idea that light skin is essential for success, but also have profited
immensely from selling products that promise to save women from the pain
and 叫“tion associated with dark skin. Lynnτhomas (2009) unde臼co臼
the importance of transnational entanglements for the global preference for
180 CHAPTER 6 Colorism and Skin-Colo 「 Stratification
lighter skin, as most companies that sell whitening products are transnational.
In Indonesia, for example, transnational corporations such as Unilever,
L' Oreal, and Shiseido are the main sellers of skin whiteners. And out of all
the products in the cosmetics industry, it is skin-whitening products that are
the most profitable in Indonesia, which is the fourth most populous country in
the world (Saraswati 2012).
After #NotFairandlovely: Changing

Thought Patterns Instead of Skintone
.....................................................................................................................
The MuslimARC-launched hashtag #NotFairandLovely recently trended in London.

The tweets were heart-breaking. Women shared how they were limited from going
outside to play in the sun as children,
their struggles to overcome an inter-
. nalized hatred of a dark skin tone,
and subsequent acts of self二shaming
and devaluation. Some questioned
whether their husband's compli-
ments were genuine and expressed
concern over the future lives of
their children who may inherit their
skin tone. People related stories of
children judged from the day they
are born by the color of their skin:
a light-skinned baby is a joy ... and Namira Islam, executive director ofthe Muslim
a dark-skinned baby?. Anti-Racism Collaborative (MuslimARC),
a咆旧s that b；ν mod饱问 our use oflanguage,
...
’we can ’reshape ou·γ thi＇’n
. king o乱 ski·轧 colo’rα.nd
I ask that we begin un-training
bea~飞'.lty.
ourselves from using the word “ fair”
to mean light. No skin tone should ever be considered unfair, nor should we settle
for a world in which possession of a certain skin tone brings with it an assessment of
strength of character. A “ fair ” world is a just world.
Second, let us remind ourselves and those around us that our words and our
thoughts and our actions matter.
Fo1~ example, if someone lists skin tone as E幻 factor in considering whethe1~ a
person is a good candidate for marriage, ask why the person's skin color is relevant
to the discussion. Listen. Follow up. If you cannot end the conversation with a
verbal request (i.e., to refrain from making comments valuing one skin tone over
Conc lusion a nd Disc uss ion 181
anotl1er or using skin tone to determine tl1e ,vorth of a person in front of

you), do so in your l1eart. Letting people politely know that yo11 dislike
what is being said and thatyou are uncomfortable with itis an important
<
。
starting point.
（
Stop adding value judgments to words in your own vocabular予 Don’t use ......
UOω
“ fair ” to refer to light-skini1ed in your thoughts, your writing, or your speecl1.
Realize that this usage does not reflect an objective truth-this is a constr11c-
tion we maintain. “ Fair” does not have to refer to any one particular skin
tone. The h11man body is a miracle, skin is fascinating, and an individual is
beautiful, period. Staten1ents like “ beautiful for a ...” sho11ld be corrected
when uttered by others and elin1inated from our thinking and speech.
Repeat as necessary.
Lastly, realize that this ei1tire discussion is grounded in the 11se of appear-
ance as a metric of quality. R飞ject the notion that outward beauty dictates
selιworth. Reject the idea that someone's physical beauty is the outward
n1anifestation of their inward val11e. Reject the idea tl1at your face, your
skin, your hair, and your bone construction bear any connectioi1 with your
strength of spirit, depth of heart, or beauty of imagination....
We must retrain our brains to understand tl1atskin tone does not dictate
physical beau町， and that physical beauty does not guarantee happiness. Our
words should reflect tl1ese concepts. Begin within yourself. True l1appiness
comes from valuing the self and valuing others so that we treat ourselves well
in order to better the lives of those aro11nd us.
Source: Islam 2014 .
……··..................................................................................................
As we have seen in this chapter, skin-color valuations have been pervasive

throughout history and around the world. The preference for whiteness or
lightness can be found in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the United States.
There are local variations on these preferences, yet they also have many aspects
in common and are closely related to gender and sexuality. Colorism, it turns
out, is a manifestation of racism that further splits fractured groups into an
internal hierarchy related to color. At the same time, since race is closely tied to
identity, there are costs to being perceived as too light O鸟 especially, too white.
Examining colorism around the world allows us to perceive both commonali-
ties and differences in terms of racial stratification.
182 CHAPTER 6 Colo 「 i sm and Skin-Co lo r Stra tifica tion
咀1is examination also sheds light on the gendered nature of colorism: the
color hierarchy has different meanings for men and women. Although some
men use skin-whitening creams or pills, women are much more likely to use
these products, which can be dangerous and even fatal. Darker-skinned men
may find it more di面cult than lighter-skinned men to find romantic partners,
but this effect is more pronounced among women. And although physical
attractiveness serves as capital for both men and women, patriarchy has cre-
ated a situation in which women must depend more than men on their physical
appearance. To the extent that light skin is viewed as more desirable around
the world, this aspect of the human body more heavily influences women’s
lives than men’s.
Key Terms
colorism 159 mestiz o 163 beauty queue 176
skin-color stratification 160 pardo 164 skin-color privilege 177
pigmentocracy 160 global color hierarchy 166 erotic capital 177
mulatto 162 diaspora 166
hypodescent 162 patriarchy 176
6.1 When and how did colorism and skin-color stratification originate? (pp. 160- 165)
• Colorism has a long history and many distinct manifestations around the world.

> What is the difference between colorism and ” Why might it be important to understand
skin-color stratification? whether colorism predates colonialism?
> How long has colorism been a factor in the
African American community?
> How is skin-color stratification in Brazil related
to colonialism?
> What is the history of colorism in Asia and
Africa?
Check Your Unde 「standing 183
6.2 How does colorism differ across societies? (pp. 165-176)

• Skin-whitening creams, which are evidence of a global color hierarchy, can be
found from the United States to Asia to Latin America to Africa.

> What are some indicators of colorism and skin- > What are some distinctions between a desire to
color stratification in the United States, Asia, be white and a desire to have light skin?
Latin America, and Africa?
6.3 How does skin color relate to gender and beauty? (pp. 176-181)
• Skin-color stratification and colorism are more prominent for women than men,
and this disparity is largely related to beauty norms.

》飞气That is a “ beauty queue”? > In what ways is colorism “ gendered ”?
> How does skin-color privilege vary by racial
group?
Tallcing about Race

How would you respond if a friend or relative implied that you are a
better (or wor叫 perso仙ecause of your skin color or hair texture? You
might first ask for an explanation of what this comment means. Listen to
any justification offered, and then use the knowledge you have gained in
this chapter to respond accordingly. For example, you can tell them that
remarks that devalue dark skin can be harmful, or you can explain the
connections between colorism and racism.
Orgy-Night of the Rich (detail). Diego Rivera . 1926. Mural. (SchallrrCJijk/Art Resource. J..Tγ）
.
Chapter 。utline
.. White Privilege 188
research focus Wh i•e P「ivilege:

u门 packing ↑he Invisible
Knapsack 190
. Whiteness, Class, Gender, and

Sexuality 192
voices Explai 门 ing White P「ivilege to

a B 「oke White Person 193
. Whiteness and Racial Categories in
Twenty平irst-Century America 196
. . Latinos/as and the Multiracial

Hierarchy 197
. Arab Americans North Africans

Middle Easterners and Their
Place in the U.S. Racial
Hierarchy 199
v。icesArab America 门－AKA Whi•e
Withou •• he Privilege 20 l
Multiracial Identification and the
U.S. Racial Hierarchy 202
Will the United States Continue
to Be a Whi恰－Majority
Society♀ 204
Changes in Racial and Ethnic

Classifications 207
As y。u Reαd Global View Social, Cultura l and
｜门↑ergeneratio门。 I Whi↑eni 门g in Latin
7.1 What is white privilege, and how does it work? America 209
7.2 Does white privilege benefit all whites eqt1ally? Revisiting the Definitions of Race and
7.3 Who is white in twenty-first-century America? Ethnicity 211
7.4 How have racial and ethnic classifications changed over time? Conclusion and Discussion 213
Check You 「 Understanding 214
7.5 Are Latinos a racial or an ethnic group?
186 CHAPTER 7 White Privilege and • he Changing U.S. Racial Hierarchy
How Kevin Johnson, born to a Mexican American mother and an Anglo

Did f, r.J
father, reflects on what it means to be a Mexican American with an
You Anglo surname. His reflections point to the salience of racial lines,
Get racial identities, and racial discourses in the United States.
to Be
莎
y mother is Mexican American and my father is Anglo. 卫1ey
met and married young in Los Angeles, where I was born in
1958. 刀1eir story is unremarkable. Intermarriage between
Anglos and Mexican Americans has occurred for centuries in the South-
west. For much of childhood and youth, I paid li忧le attention to my mixed
heritage.
’Though I did not think much about 让 at the time, I have classified
myself as Mexican American since adolescence. My eyes are brown and my
hair dark brown, almost black. I am more comfortable in Mexican American
than in Anglo culture. Over the years, the contrast between my name and self-
identification has o丘en been a source of curiosity to others and of occasional
discomfort to me. ’The burning question always seems to be，“加n I a Latino ?”
’This seemingly simple, straightforward question raises complex issues that go
to the core of race relations in the modern United States. ’This book offers a
glimpse into my life in the borderlands between Anglo and Mexican worlds.
My mother-in-law, Mary Helen Salazar, a Mexican American from Los
Angeles, was visiting our new house in Davis. We were si忧ing in the family
room watching the television news.τhe program cut to a story about racism
in the South. Listening intentl如 Mary Helen observed, "I would never sur-
vive there." I responded without thinking, "’The real division there is between
blacks and whites," to which she quickly replied, "Well, you don’t have a
Spanish surname."
In the spring of 1996, I was si忧ing in a bar off Pacific Coast Highway in
Manhattan Beach, California, a white, upper-middle-class suburb of Los
Angeles. Funeral services formyfather ’s uncle, my great-uncle KennardJohnson
(known as “ Brown-eyes” or "Brownie" to distinguish him from his blue叮ed
twi吗 had just ended. I had time to kill with my father and step-brother while
I waited for my return flight to Sacramento, and we were exchanging memo-
ries of Brown-eyes over a few beers. What a funny guy, I mused. “ Remember
on the way to Yosemite that year when he pulled up his car next to ours and,
for a laugh, pulled out his fake teeth ?” But he sure was a worrier, which was no
CHAPTER 7 W hite P 「i vilege a nd • he C h a 「1 ging U.S. Racial Hiera rchy 187
wonder given a lifetime of economic insecurity二 He always worked hard at the

bakery, where he was employed for as long as I can remember, but money must
have been tight. I wondered what it had been like when he married Rosie and
became one of the first in his family to marry a Mexican American woman.
卫1ey had grown up together in a working-class neighborhood near downtown
Los Angeles where Mexican Americans and Anglos lived side by side, and had
spent fi丘y years there before moving to the desert to retire.
While I sat there thinking about Brown-eyes, a tall fellow sitting on the bar-
stool next to us was rambling on to anyone who would listen about a recent trip
to Texas, interspersing his banter with a series of bad jokes. In retrospect, what
happened next seemed inevitable. I turned in just in time to hear him ask,“How
do you make sure nobody steals the stereo speakers in your car? You put a sign
on them saying ‘no habla espanol. ’”Nobody laughed. I wondered why I had to
listen to this crap. Why couldn't I drink my beer and grieve without dealing with
jokes that cut painfully to the core ofmy identity? Like a boxer in the late rounds
of a fight or a weary runner near the end of a marathon, I was too tired 丘om the
travails of the long day-seeing mourning family, reliving the sad and happy
memories, pondering my own mortality-to lash back at this insensitive Texan
wannabe. “ Please give me another," I asked the barmaid and emptied my glass.
卫1e guy got me thinking. On the flight back to Sacramento, I thought of the
Spanish speakers I knew and found that I could not think of one who might
steal a car stereo. I wondered what it would be like for my identity to be “ trans-
parent," a non-issue in my daily life, the way it is for many Anglos.
卫1ese stories show how a few words may hurt and marginalize. ’They also
demonstrate the limits of assimilation for Latinos, even half-white ones like
myself.
Source: Johnson 1999.
Racial identities are important in the United States because race is personally
and materially important in our lives. In the excerpt above, Kevin Johnson
wonders aloud what it might be like to be unambiguously white and thus to
not have to think about race all the time. Not having to think about race is one
example ofwhite privilege, the other side of racial oppression. Whereas people
of color face disadvantages because of racism, whites experience privilege.
White people in the United States do not all share in this privilege equally-
wealthy whites benefit from whiteness in ways that working-class whites do
188 CHAPTER 7 Wh i• e P「i vi l ege and • he Chang ing U.S. Racia l Hie 「a rchy
not, for example. However, it can be useful to look critically at whiteness in the
same ways that we examine blackness, Asian-ness, indigeneity, or latinidad.
Because whiteness is the unmarked norm in U.S. society, it can be easy to over-
look it and talk about race without talking about what it means to be white. In
this chapter, we will explore whiteness by considering who is white, the priv-
ileges of whiteness, the boundaries of whiteness, and the past and future of
racial categories in the United States.
Although there are undeniable privileges associated with being white, as
we saw in the last chapter, people are attached to their nonwhite identities,
and it is not the case that all nonwhites would like to be white. Why wouldn’ t
(or couldn’t) everyone gain access to white privilege? What does whiteness
signify in the United States today? Who is white and who is not? Where are
the boundaries of whiteness? How and why has the significance of whiteness
changed over time?
WHITE PRIVILEGE
white privilege The What is white privilege, and how does it work? White privilege refers to the
advantages inherent advantages inherent in being categorized as white. ’The concept derives from
in being categorized as earlier work by African Arr
white. who observed that white workers in the United States over time came to see
themselves as white like their bosses, as opposed to developing working-class
wage of whiteness As solidarity with recently freed black slaves. DuBois argued in 1936 that white
defined by W. E. B. workers received a psychological “ wage of whiteness" by aligning with the
DuBois in 1936, dominant group; they were poo马 but at least they were white. Additionally, by
psychological benefits reserving certain segments of the labor market for whites only, white laborers
that white workers were able to reap material rewards from their whiteness. Other scholars, mostly
received by aligning with historians, have built on DuBois’s insights to explain how waves of European
the dominant group, immigrants learned to be wh让e and to reap the privileges of whiteness (Allen
their white bosses, as 1994;Jacobson 1998; Roediger 1999).
opposed to developing As noted in Chapter Two, European immigrants who arrived in the United
working·嗣class solidarity States in the early twentieth century did not think of themselves as white prior
with recently freed black to their arrival. And, in some cases, people in the United States did not see
slaves. them as white. Irish immigrants learned to capitalize on their whiteness by
forming unions and excluding blacks from them. And although Jews faced
discrimination during and after World War II, as whites, they were able to
reap the benefits of the GI bills and Federal Housing Administration and
Department of Veterans Affairs mortgages that were denied to blacks, which
propelled ma町 whites into the middle class (Brodkin 2005). Whereas these
White Privi lege 189
European immigrants had to learn to be white, most whites today never have
to think about whiteness.
In the contemporary United States, whiteness is an unmarked identity.
Whereas blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans are constantly
reminded of their race, whites easily can forget that they too have a race
(Dalton 2005). When we talk about race (or, more recently, diversity), the
focus is usually on nonwhites, as if white were not also a race (Lewis 2004).
When we think of race in the United States, whiteness usually is not the
first thing that comes to mind. ’The reason is that whiteness has become
normalized一“whiteness makes itself invisible precisely by asserting its
normalcy'' (Frankenberg 1997，的．
Privilege is o丘en hard to notice. If you are white, it can be difficult to notice
that you are not being followed around the store; that people are smiling at
you on the street instead of clutching their purses; that no one asks you if you
speak English; that you are not asked for identification when paying with a
credit card. Instead, you are likely to think that these things are normal-that
this is simply how things are. To notice these privileges as a white person, you
likely would have to walk down the street with an African American friend
or accompany a Latino friend to get a driver ’s license. Then, you may notice
a difference in terms of how white people respond to you and your non-white
friend. Few whites notice they are treated better than nonwhites, and most
are unlikely to attribute that better treatment to privilege. Privilege is largely
invisible to those who have it.
White privilege only becomes visible when people point it out. For exam-
ple, in 2015, a white Stanford student by the name of Brock Allen Turner was
found sexually assaulting an unconscious, semi-naked white woman behind a
dumpster. She was taken to the hospital, where a nurse noted that significant
trauma had been inflicted on the victim’s genitalia. When the case went to
trial, the jury found Turner guilty on three felony counts, and the prosecution
argued he should get a six-year sentence. However, Judge Aaron Persky was
hesitant to punish Turner this severely and gave him six months in county jail
instead.τhe judge explained :“A prison sentence would have a severe impac t
onl山 im川-Iuffington Post writer Alanr Va 咯gianos wrote in 臼sponse: ''Turn
lenient punishment is the perfect example of what happens when rape cul-
ture and white privilege collide.” By rape cultur飞 Vagianos is referring to the
normalization of sexual abuse of women in our society. Because of Turner's
whiteness and class privilege, the judge had sympathy for him. Turner was
held in protective custody and ultimately spent only three months behind bars
(Vagianos 2016).
190 CHAPTER 7 White P 「 ivilege and the Changing U.S. Racial Hie 「G 「chy
咀1e
case of Brock Turner, as well as many other
cases of white privilege, makes it clear that white
privilege doesn't simply exist-it is enacted.τhe
judge gave Turner a light sentence because he did
not believe Turner to be a dangerous man. When
shopkeepers are not suspicious of white shoppers,
the white shopper is the beneficiary of the privi-
lege, but only because the shopkeeper has accepted
the racist idea that whites are less likely to shoplift.
White privilege, then, is related to white suprem-
acy: white privilege exists because of past and cur-
rent practices that reproduce racism.
A The case of Brock Turner showed how white privilege is
Why would whites ever be inclined to end white
enacted.
privilege? Moral arguments can be made about the
ethics of accepting unearned benefits, but it is especially hard for anyone to
not be desirous ofpassing down benefits (meritorious or not) to their children.
Everyone wants the best for their children, so there are limits to the utility of
moral arguments.
γfS eαγc
White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack

Peggy Mcintosh (2005) famou句 described white privilege as an 、visible
knapsack.” She explains:“White privilege is like an invisible package of unearned
assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was 'meant' to
remain oblivious”(109). Mcintosh then explains what is included in the contents
of this invisible knapsack. Here are some of the items:
I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not
be followed or harassed.
• When I am told about our national heritage or “ civilization,” I am shown that
people of my color made it what it is.
Whether I use checks, credit cards, or cash, I can count on my skin color not
to work against the appearance of financial reliability.
I can swear, or dress in secondhand clothes, or not answer letters, without
having people attribute these choices to the bad morals, the poverty, or the
illiteracy of my race.
White Privi lege 191
I can do well in a challenging situation

without being called a credit to my race.
I can choose blemish cover or bandages in
“自esh” color and have them more or less
match my skin. (Mcintosh 1989, 10-12) ~二r //}
• Mcintosh explains that these privileges
amount to “ unearned advantages" that are
consistently generated by her skin color.
For Discussion
1. Do all whites experience these forms of
white privilege? Retaile·γs ofte叽 racially profile a＇叽dtγeat
. white c乱stomeγs
2. What other forms of white privilege can bette·γ than ’no’且由’white customers.
you think of?
3. How are other forms of privilege, such as
male privilege or class privilege, related to white privilege?
4. Can non-whites have access to white privilege?
S. Is white privilege a useful concept for thinking about racial inequality in the
United States? Why or why not?
Source: M cintosh 2005.
We can also ask, however, whether racism can be harmful to whites even
though white privilege exists. In Whiteness: The Power of Privilege, the antiracist
activist and writer Tim Wise contends that “ the price we pay to stay one step
ahead of others is enormous'' (2005, 120). The vast majority of wo灿1g people
could earn higher wages and have better benefits ifwhites and nonwhites worked
together to demand them as a common goal. Whites are less likely to go to prison
than blacks or Latinos, yet the enormous amount of resources the United States
invests in the prison-industrial complex are resources that don’t go into better
schools, parks, libraries, and universities. For these reasons，认1. E. B. DuBois and
others have referred to the “ psychological wage of whiteness ”: racism makes all
whites think they are ge忧ing a better deal, but the reality is that racism affects
all of us, albeit in different ways. DuBois argued that the psychological wage
of whiteness drives a wedge between white and black laborers, who otherwise
share an interest in working together to fight for better material conditions.
192 CHAPTER 7 W hi• e Privilege a nd the Changing U.S. Racial Hierarchy
It is important to think about white privilege for several reasons. First of all,
if we want to understand racial oppression, it is crucial to understand how it
looks from the other side. Second, white privilege o丘en remains invisible, and
by bringing it to light we can develop a better understanding of how racism
works in our society.
WHITENESS, CLASS, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY

An important point to keep in mind when thinking about white privilege is
that although it certainly benefits some whites, all whites do not experience
white privilege in the same way二 When an employer gives a white applicant the
benefit of the doubt because he is white, the applicant experiences white priv-
ilege, whether or not he is aware of it. However, a poor lesbian white woman
in rural South Carolina, for example, will experience her whiteness-and her
white privilege-in different ways than a wealthy white heterosexual male
stockbroker in New York. 咀1e white stockbroker will have doors opened to
him that will remain shut to a poor woman of any race.
White privilege can be hard to see. Similarly, class privilege also o丘en
remains invisible. In a study that compared middle-class white students with
poor white students, I{irby Moss found that middle-class white students
“ overwhelmingly perceived class position as nearly nonexistent within White
culture'' (2003, 32). It was very di面c山 for these middle-class whites to see
that they had advantages that working-class and poor whites did not. In con-
trast, the working-class and poor whites criticized the middle-class whites for
being lazy and entitled and for not having to work for anything in life.
咀1e privileges associated with being white were not the same for these two
groups. 卫1e poor whites experienced a contradiction in their identities-
whites were not supposed to be poo马 yet they were. 卫1ese poor whites found it
di面cult to envision taking advantage of their whiteness, as their poverty pre-
sented obstacles to enjoying the privileges of whiteness. Although they were
white, they did not have the 、t of cultural practices”( Frankenberg 1993, 43)
associated with whiteness because of their class background. Moreover, many
of these poor whites lived in poo鸟 primarily nonwhite neighborhoods, where
their whiteness presented obstacles to acceptance in their own neighborhoods.
Past and present-day practices of individual and institutional racism have
created segregated neighborhoods in the United States. 认Thites’ privileged
access to primarily white neighborhoods is part of white privilege. The other
side of this coin is that working-class and poor whites cannot always afford
to live in middle-class white neighborhoods and thus are unable to reap this
particular bene缸 of whiteness. As Kirby Moss (2003) contends, poor whites
Whiteness, Class, Gende 「， and Se × uality 193
sometimes live in primarily nonwhite neighborhoods because that is where

they can afford to live. Living in those neighborhoods, poor whites encounter
many of the same challenges that their nonwhite neighbors encounte鸟 such as
crime, violence, and lack of access to resources.
咀1is is one example that makes it evident that white privilege does not
always work in the same way for working-class and poor whites as it does for
wealthier whites. It is important to note here, however, that most poor whites
live in primarily white neighborhoods, just as most poor blacks live in primar-
ily black neighborhoods (Bischoff and Reardon 2014).
A white man who enters a primarily black neighborhood may be made aware
of his whiteness once he finds himself surrounded by blacks and receiving
stares (or even glares) from residents who want to know why a white person
is in their neighborhood. In the narrow space of a primarily black neighbor-
hood, a white person may not feel she is experiencing white privilege. How-
eve鸟 a middle-class white man o丘en can live his whole life without ever having
to enter a space where his whiteness will present a challenge. He can avoid
primarily black neighborhoods because there is no reason for him to ever
go there. In contrast, a black man may need to go to a white neighborhood
because that is where his job is located, or he even may be desirous of moving
into such a neighborhood because that is where the good schools are. A black
man may encounter problems with law enforcement or neighborhood watch
associations if he walks around a middle-class white neighborhood.
Explaining White Privilege to a Broke

hite Person
………………………………………………………………… .... . .....................................
、
I came from the kind of

poor that people don’t want ·}
to believe still exists in this

country. Have you ever
.
，、
spent a frigid northern- ~ζ·！

Illinois winter without
heat or running water?
I have. At 12 years old
were you making ramen
noodles in a coffee maker
with water you fetched
from a public bathroom? The co’n cept ofinte·γsectionality γecog·η，.izes that people ca＇饥
.
I was. Have you ever lived bep忖vileged in some ways aη~dnot p ’r ivileged 悦。ther、s. (continued)
194 CHAPTER 7 Wh i• e Privilege and the Changing U.S. Racial Hierarchy
Co饥.tinued in a camper year-round and used a random relative's apartment as your

mailing address? We did. Did you attend so many different elementary
(/) schools that you can only remember a quarter of their names? Welcome to
my childhood.
So when a feminist told me I had “ white privilege,” I told her that my
. white skin didn’t do shit to prevent me from experiencing povert予... It is
absolutely a freak anon1aly that I ’m in graduate school, considering that
not one person on either side of my family has a college degree. And it took
me until my 30s to ever believe that someone from my stock could achieve
such a thing. Poverty colors nearly everything about your perspective on
opportunities for advancement in life. Middle-class, educated people assume
that anyone can achieve their goals if they work hard enough. Folks steeped
in poverty rarely see a life past working at the gas station, making the rent
on their trailer, and selιmedicating with cigarettes and prescription drugs
until they die of a heart attack. (I ’ve just described one whole side of my
family and the life I assumed I'd be living before I lucked out of it.汀， maybe
more than most people, can completely understand why broke white folks
get pissed when the word “ privilege” is thrown around. As a child I was con-
stantly discriminated against because of my povert弘 and those wounds still
run very deep.
But luckily my college education introduced me to a more nuanced con-
cept of privilege: the term “ intersectionality.” The concept of intersectionality
recognizes that people can be privileged in some ways and definitely not
privileged in others. There are many different types of privilege, not just
skin-color privilege, that impact the way people can move through the world
or are discriminated against. These are all things you are born into, not
things you earned, that afford you opportunities that others may not have.
For example:
Citizenship: Simply being born in this country affords you certain privi-
leges that non-citizens will never access.
Class: Being born into a financially stable family can help guaran-
tee your health, happiness, safety, education, intelligence, and future
opportunities.
Sexual orientation: If you were born straight, every state in this country
affords you privileges that non-straight folks have to fight the Supreme
Court for.
Sex: If you were born male, you can assume that you can walk through a
parking garage without worrying that you'll be raped and then have to deal
with a defense attorney blaming it on what you were wearing.
Whi teness, Class, Ge n de 「， an d Se × uality 195
Ability: If you were born able-bodied, you probably don’t have to plan
your life around handicap access, braille, or other special needs.
Gender identity: If you were born cisgender (that is, your gender identity
matches the sex you were assigned at birth), you don’t have to worry that
using the restroom or locker room will invoke public outrage.
As you can see, belonging to one or more category of privilege, especially

being a straight, white, middle-class, able-bodied male, can be like winning
a lottery you didn’t even know you were playing. But this is not to imply that
any form of pr如ilege is exactly the same as another, or that people lacking
in one area of privilege understand what it's like to be lacking in other areas.
Race discrimination is not equal to sex discrimination and so forth.
And listen: Recognizing privilege doesn't mean suffering guilt or shame
for your lot in life. Nobody’s saying that straight, white, middle-class,
able-bodied males are all a bunch of assholes who don’t work hard for what
they have. Recognizing privilege simply means being aware that some people
have to work much harder just to experience the things you take for granted
(if they ever can experience them at all).
I know now that Iαmpr如ileged in many ways. I am privileged as a
natural-born white citizen. I am privileged as a cisgender woman. I am
privileged as an able-bodied person. I am privileged that my first language
is also our national language, and that I was born with an intellect and ambi-
tion that pulled me out of the poverty that I was otherwise destined for. I was
privileged to be able to marry my way “ up” by par切ering with a privileged,
middle-class, educated male who fully expected me to earn a college degree.
There are a million ways I experience privilege, and some that I certainly
don’t. But thankfully, intersectionality allows us to examine these varying
dimensions and degrees of discrimination while raising awareness of the
results of multiple systems of oppression at work.
Tell me: Are you a white person who’s felt uncomfortable with the term
“ white privilege”? Does a 1nore nuanced approach help you see you1~ own
privilege more clearly?
Sot1rce: Crosley-Corcoran 2014.
…… … ……………… … …… ·. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..
Just as whiteness is linked to class, it is also defined by gender and sexu-

ality. White womanhood has historically been linked to sexual virtuosity,
and for women, white privilege can hinge on maintaining an appearance of
sexual respectability. Amy Wilkins (2004) uses the case of Puerto Rican
wannabes-white girls and young women who draw on Puerto Rican cultural
196 CHAPTER 7 W hi• e Pr ivilege a nd the C ha nging U.S . Racia l Hierarchy
styles to attract men of color-to explain how race, class, gender, and sexual-
ity are co-constructed. Puerto Rican wannabes manipulate their gender and
sexual identities to cross racial boundaries: by defying conceptions of white
womanhood by dressing provocatively, they can claim to identify with Puerto
Rican-ness. Notably, they reject whiteness through the rejection of main-
stream notions of sexuality.
Catrin Lundstrom (201份 explored whiteness at the other end of the spec-
trum of white womanhood-Swedish whiteness.τhrough interviews with mar-
ried female Swedish immigrants in the United States, Lundstrom found that the
American husbands placed tremendous value on their wives’ Swedish heritage.
These American men viewed Swedish women as representing an ideal form of
whiteness that encompasses white purity, beauty, and sensuality. Lundstrom's
work adds nuance to sociological understandings of whiteness, as it allows us to
see that there are degrees of whiteness in the United States and that these ideas of
whiteness are intertwined with ideas of gender, sexuality, and white womanhood.
WHITENESS AND RACIAL CATEG 。 RIES

IN TWENTY-FIRST嗣 CENTURY AMERICA
飞代Tho is white in twenty-first-century America? As we saw in Chapter Two, the
boundaries of whiteness have been blurry for a long time. 认That about today?
Do controversies still exist about who is white?
One place to which we can look for an understanding of who is white in
America today is the U.S. Census Bureau, the governmental body responsible
for counting people in the United States and enumerating the demographic
aspects of the U.S. population. It is useful to take a close look at the census
categories, as official classifications both reflect and reinforce social categories.
To collect data on racial classification, the Census Bureau must provide defi-
nitions of each racial group. According to the 2010 definition,“white'' refers t。
“ a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle
Ea叽 or North Africa. It includes people who indicate their race(s) as 'white ’
or report entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, Arab, Moroccan, or
Caucasian.＂咀1is definition makes it clear that Middle Easterners are “ white''
in the United States, even if they may not consider themselves to be white. And
what about Latinos? Many have origins in Spain, meaning they would qualify
as “ white ” under this definition, as Spain is in Europe. Notably, this definition
does not say that a person must have origins exclusively in Europe. Census
categories and definitions, however, are not the end of the story; moreove乌
they change over time.
W hite ness a nd Ra ci a l Ca tego 「 ies in Twen t y - Fi 「 st- C e ntu ry A me 「 i ca 197
Racial boundaries are constantly in flux in terms of both their meanings

and their limits. For example, what it means to be an A也hani in the United
States changed in the a丘ermath of September 11 and the U.S. occupation of
Afghanistan. Being Japanese American today means something very distinct
from beingJapanese American during World War II. Some groups have moved
closer to whiteness, whereas others have moved further away. Let ’s consider
how and why racial boundaries have changed and what these changes mean
for the U.S. racial hierarchy. Even though (and perhaps because) whiteness is
an important aspect of many people ’s reality, it is not always clear who is white.
Moreover, the boundaries surrounding whiteness continue to be contested.
Definitions of who is white vary across time and space because “ white ” is a
racialized group, a group that is actively created and reinforced in daily inter- white person of color A
actions and practices (Small 1999). person who appears to be
white and yet identifies
Latin。s／，αs and the Multiracial Hierarcl、y with a nonwhite gro11p.
Are Latinos white? Some scholars argue that Latinos are a “ racialized other''
and thus are all nonwhite (Itzigsohn and Dore Cabral 2001). Others contend racialization The process
that some Latinos are white (Rodriguez 2000). In the 2010 census, 16.3 percent by which a group begins
of respondents reported that they were Hispanic or Latino. Among Hispanics, to be treated as a race.
53 percent identified their race as white; 2.5 percent as black;
1.4 percent as American Indian; 36.7 percent as other; and 6 American 一， Black, 2.5°/o
percent as two or more races (Figure 7-1). Indian, 1.4°/o＿尘」』厂 Two or more
6.0°/o
More than half of Latinos identified their race as white in the
2010 census. What are the implications of this identification?
Can you be a white Latino? Or are all Latinos people of color?
Sociologist Salvador Vidal-Ortiz (2007) explores the idea of
being a white Puerto Rican, or what he refers to as a “ white
person of color ”: a person who appears to be white and yet iden-
tifies with a nonwhite group. 卫1is phrase appears contradictory,
as “ person of color'' seems to be synonymous with “ nonwhite.”
In response, Vidal-Ortiz argues that racialization, the process
by which a group begins to be treated as a race,“unifies Puerto
Ricans’ racial experiences in the U.S., while skin color still oper-
ates as a distinct marker of access and treatment ”(2007, 181).
In short, white Puerto Ricans experience privilege as a result FIGURE 7-1.
Latino Racial Identifications in the U.S. Census
of their white skin, yet are still treated as people of color when
Over half of all Latinos selιidentified as
their Puerto Rican-ness becomes evident through either their
“ white."
Spanish accent, their Spanish surname, or another marker
Source: Humes, Karen, Nicholas A. Jones, and Roberto R.
that identifies them as Puerto Rican, such as their clothing or Ramirez (2010).
198 CHAPTER 7 W hi• e Privilege and the Changing U.S. Racia l Hierarchy
FIGURE 7-2. 0.9 ,, ,,

,, ,,
Probability of External
Classification as White by
0.8 - - - - Light features
,, , -
,, ,,
Dark features ,,
,,
,, ,,
Phenotype and Household 0.7 ,

,, ”’
Income among Latinos/as
-~ 0.6 , ,, -'
五二
,
Source: Vargas (2015). s(/) 0.5 , ,,
i;
而 ,,
, ,
j 0.4
, ,
--Q.) , ,
ε 0.3 ,, ,,
,,
cf -,, ,, //
0.2 .,, ,
0.1
0
。 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Household Income in $1000s
mannerisms. Elizabeth Aranda and Guillermo Rebollo-Gil (2004) found that

white Puerto Ricans experience racism because of cultural markers such as
language and demeanor.
Some Latinos are physically indistinguishable from whites and thus reap
many of the benefits of white-skin privilege. However, not all Latinos who
describe themselves as “ white ” have very light skin. For example, in the 1989
Latino National Political Survey, 32 percent of respondents with “ very dark''
skin identified as white, as did 36 percent of those with dark skin and 54 percent
of those with medium skin. In that survey, light-skinned Latinos were the most
likely to identi马r as white, yet many dark-skinned Latinos also did (Golash-Boza
and Darity 2008). What does it mean to have a dark-skinned Latino identify
herself as white? Does saying you are white make you white?
In a more recent study, Nicholas Vargas (2015) found that although
40 percent of Latinos/ as self-identified as white, only 6 percent reported being
classi且ed as white by others. Moreover, they found that Latinos/ as with light
skin and of higher class status were more likely to be identified by others as
white.Notably, many Latinos who are identified as white by others do not self二
identify as white (Figure 7-2).
Part of the reason for the lack of concurrence between skin color and racial
identification is that many Latinos do not identify with U.S. racial categories
(Rodriguez 2000). In 2010, 18.S million Hispanics marked their race on the
U.S. census as “ other,” whereas only 600,000 non-Hispanics chose this des-
ignation.τhe fact that Hispanics made up 97 percent of those classified as
Whiteness and Racial Catego 「 ies in Twenty-Fi 「 st-Century Ame 「 ica 199
“ some other race ” indicates that Hispanics are the most likely to see them-
selves as outside of the U.S. racial hierarchy-that is, as having a racial iden-
tity that does not fit neatly into the U.S. system of racial classification. And
because of the ways Latinos are racialized in the United States, few Latinos
see themselves as unproblematically white.τheir whiteness is always open to
contestation.
Arαb Americαns, N。rth Africαns, Middle Eαsterners,

αnd Their Plαce in the U.S. Raciαl Hierarchy
North Africans and Middle Easterners were given the official designation
of “ white'' on the U.S. census, in part because these groups lobbied to be
defined as such in the early twentieth century. At the time, whiteness gave
people in the United States access to citizenship rights denied to nonwhites
(Haney-Lopez 2006). Many North Africans, however, do not view them-
selves as white. Mostafa Hefny (pictured at bottom, right) is one example.
Hefny was born in Egypt and came to the United States in 1978. When he
arrived in the United States, he was classified as white because of his origins
in Egypt, which is in North Africa. Hefny, who considers himself a Nubian
and an African, has been trying to get his racial classification changed to
black ever since.τbus far, he has been unsuccessful (J. S. Smith 2012). What
about other North Africans or Middle Easterners? Do they see themselves
as white?
A study of Lebanese immigrants in Michigan found that Lebanese Shi'a
Muslims readily embraced a white identity.τhese Lebanese immigrants
enjoyed the privilege of being white and thus having an unmarked identity
unless they chose to wear a hijab. Sociologists
I{ristine Ajrouch and Abdi I{usow (2007) describe
a Lebanese woman who had cordial relations
with her neighbor until she decided to cover her
head. Once she began to wear a hijab, her neigh-
bors ’ behavior toward her changed. Her display
of religious identity threatened her standing as an
unmarked white person.
In 2003, researchers in Michigan conducted a
survey ofArab Americans in the Detroit area, home
to the largest concentration of Arab Americans
in the United States. In this survey of over 1,000 A According to the definitions used in the 2010 U.S.
Arab Americans, 57 percent identified them- census, both people in these pictures should check “ white.”
selves as Christian and 41 percent identified This categorization will likely change in the 2020 census.
200 CHAPTER 7 W hi• e Privilege a nd the Cha nging U.S . Racia l Hiera 「chy
themselves as Muslim. About three-quarters had finished high school. Most

were Lebanese or Syrian (43 percent) or Iraqi (30 percent). About 70 percent
responded ''yes ” when asked if “'Arab American" described them. As for race,
about two-thirds identified their race as “ white," and another third as “ other”
(Baker et al. 2003). Not surprisingly, Arab Americans who were Christian
were more likely to identify as wl巾（Ajro1
show that most, but not all, Arab Americans identify as white, but that being
white is not always consistent with a Muslim religious identity.
Although the United States is a secular nation, the presumption is that
Christianity is the norm. People with other religious faiths can be subject
to exclusion on this basis. And although not all whites are Christians, there
is an assumption that whiteness is linked to Christianity. When we learn
that someone is not Christian, his or her whiteness can also be put into
question.
For over three decades, Americans of Middle Eastern or North African
descent have lobbied for a census category that reflects them. In 2016, the
Office of Management and Budget (which decides on census classifications)
proposed the addition of such a category for the 2020 census. “ Middle Eastern
and North African'' will include people with origins in Algeria, Bahrain,
Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, or
Yemen, as well as those who identify as Amazigh or Berber, Arab, Assyrian,
Bedouin, Chaldean, Copt, Druze, I{urdish, or Syriac. In the future, other
groups, such as Turks, Sudane风 Somalis, Afghans, Armenians, Azerbaijanis,
Cypriots, Djiboutians, Georgians, Mauritanians, South Sudanese, and
Turkish Cypriots, may be added to the definition. Of course, the addition of
this census category will include a change in the definitions of other racial and
ethnic categories.
A potential downside of this change in the U.S. census is that it could empha-
size the racialization of American Middle Easterners and North Africans. In
particular, the conflation of Middle Easterners with terrorism has led to wide-
spread discrimination. For example, in the a丘ermath of the terrorist attacks
in Paris in 2015, the governors of thirty U.S. states announced their refusal to
accept Syrian refugees (Seipel 2015） .τhis policy is discri
of national origin, which U.S. law prohibits. Although closely related, discrim-
ination on the basis of national origin is distinct from racial discrimination.
However, this discrimination against Syrians, as well as Muslims and Middle
Easterners more general协 may suggest that these groups are being racialized
as not white.
W hite ness and Rac ial Catego 「 ies in Twenty-Fi 「 st-Ce ntu ry Ame 「 ica 201
Arab American-AKA hite ithout the

Privilege
· ·... . .. .. .. . . . .......... . . . ........ . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ..... .. . . . . . . . ...... .. .... .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . ... .... . . . ...... . . . .
OnAugust 12, 2016, th·生.rty-seve叽－year-old Khalid Jabarα was shot and killed o’n his
fro叽.t porch. Sta＇乱.ley
. Verno饥 Majors, a sixty-one-year礼dwhitema：乱 a乱dJabara's
’n ext door ’neighbor.,’was charged ’with ’m urder and hate crimes αs police sa·ν he shot
.
Jabara. As ofthis writi：吨， the trial is still pendi：鸣. Writer MirnaZaher r飞fleets on
what this incident mea＇乱sfor
. Arab America＇乱s.
.
This is not an article I wanted to write. It's not something easy to write. But
something has changed within the past few days. That something has a name, and
it's Khalid Jabara. Khalid, a Lebanese Christian Arab was murdered by his neighbor
after years of racism, and attempted harm. I didn’t write this as a way to vent hatred,
but as a way to express the frustration all American Arabs (Christian, Jew, and
Muslim) know to be true, that legally we may be considered white, but we sure as
hell don’t have any of the privilege. His death hit me hard. This could have been me,
it could have been my sister, or my brother, it could have been so many more people I
care about, and that thought paralyzed n1e.
Growing up as an Arab in a post-9/11 America was not exactly the walk in the
park you would expect it to be. People were racist, more often than not. I remember
the first time someone called me a terrorist, I remember not standing up for the
other Middle Eastern kid in my class because I was afraid they would turn on me
too. I remember watching my mom come home in tears because her manager had
spit on her and told he1~ “ go back to your country." I remember so much, and this .
this makes me understand just how lucky I was to only get insults and hurt feelings.
The racism shown to my family has gotten significantly better as the years progress,
but once Donald Trump based his campaign on racist propaganda and slander, we
once again became the enemy. I grew up being told that it was not okay for me to be
proud of where I come from, that I was to put my race on the census, and legal forms
as white, that I was not an Arab American, but rather a white American. But if I'm
white then tell me this, how many times does a white person get searched at an air-
port, how many times did your father consider changing your last name to its English
translation, how many times have you had to brush off a racist joke that stung like
a bee. My name, my face, my personality, everything about me screams that I am a
fraud living in this white category you placed me in. Not only do Arab Americans get
treated as less than most other racial groups of Americans, but our cultural rights
and identification amongst each other are being taken away too.
(conti：乱.ued)
202 CHAPTER 7 W hi• e Privilege and the Changing U.S. Racia l Hiera 「chy
Co’n tinued Khalid J abrar was just another example of this. He would still be alive
if he were white, oh wait he was, but no one saw him as white. His death
(/) hurts because he looks so much like my family members, his life is so similar
to mine. This makes me understand better, what it is that the Black Lives
Matter Movement is fighting for, the only difference is that when an African
. American dies due to police negligence the media will talk about it for weeks,
by tomorrow the name Khalid Jabara will probably be nowhere to be found
in relation to media stations, because it isn’t just that we Arabs are white
without the privilege, but that our lives simply don’t matter. We don’t matter.
I don’t matter.... Khalid J abara's death may be kicked out of focus in the
following days, but I promise I will never forget. I will never stop fighting
for his life to mean something, because it means something to me. From one
Christian Arab to another, May you find peace brotl1er, and may your family
岳nd the justice you deserve.
Sot1rce: Zaher 2016.

……·.. .. ... . . . .……………………… · ·. . . . . . . .. ..... . . . . . .. . ..... .. . . . . . . .. .... .. . . . . . .. . . ..... ..
Multiracial ldentificati。nαnd the U.S. Rαcial Hierarchy

multiracial A person What about multiracials, people whose parents identify with different racial
whose parents identify groups? Are they white? Or does the one-drop rule persist in our society?
with different 1·acial Three percent of all respondents in the 2010 U.S. census identified with more
groups. than one race. Among these respondents, the largest group- accounting for
20 percent of all multiracials-identified as both white and black. They were
followed closely by those who identified as white and some other race (19%),
white and Asian (18%), and white/American Indian (16%). When we look at
within-group differences, it is remarkable to note that nearly half of all Native
Americans reported more than one race, making this group the most likely to
identify with more than one race.
Since the introduction of the option to choose more than one race on
the U.S. census in 2000, a host of sociological studies have been launched
designed to understand the meanings behind multiracial identifications. Just
looking at the numbers from the most recent U.S. census, it is hard to discern
what they mean. Do people identify with more than one race because they
have one parent who is one race and another who is of a different race? Or is
it because they see themselves as having a multiracial heritage, with ancestry
from more than one group? What factors influence people's decision to iden-
tify with more than one race?
τhe majority of African Americans in the United States have white and/
or Native American ancestry, yet most identify as blacks, not as multiracials.
Although Native Americans are the most likely to identify as multiracials,
many Native Americans with white or black ancestry identify as Native Amer-
icans and not as multiracials. 咀1e reason is that in U.S. society, multiracial
usually refers to a person with two parents of different races. Even then, not
everyone adopts the label.
Today, about 13 percent of marriages in the United States involve persons
of different races. Native Americans, Latinos, and Asians are the most likely
to intermarry, and black and white people are the least like与（Lee and Bean
2004). When these couples have children, some of them may identify as mul-
tiracial, and some may not. Kerry Ann Rockquemore and Patricia Arend
(2002) studied a broad sample of people with one white parent and one black
parent and found that 61 percent identified as biracial, 13 percent as black, and
4 percent as white, with the remainder reporting themselves as having situa-
tional or no racial identities. Rocl叩1emore and Brunsma (2002) argue that
these identities are influenced by physical appearance, socioeconomic status,
and social networks.
Wendy Roth (2005) took a close look at 2000 census data and found quite
a bit of variability in multiracial identifications. Roth looked at a subsample
of children who had one white parent and one nonwhite parent and parsed
out how these parents identified their children. She found that 53 percent of
children who had one black parent and one white parent were identified by
their parents as both black and white on the 2000 census, while 11 percent
were identified as white and 25 percent as black. Remarkably, 25 percent of
children with one white parent and one Asian or Pacific Islander parent were
designated as white, as were 34 percent of children with one white and one
American Indian parent. 咀1ese findings raise further questions about who is
white while also pointing to the fact that it is more di面cult for multiracials
with one black parent to identify as white than for those who have one parent
who is Asian or American Indian.
In a more recent study, Lauren Davenport (2016) analyzed data from sur-
veys conducted with 38,000 incoming college freshmen. She found significant
variation in how children with parents of distinct racial backgrounds iden-
tify racially. In the study, 70.7 percent of those with one black and one white
parent self二identified as multiracial. By contrast, only 36.9 percent of their
counterparts with one Latino and one white parent identified as multiracial.
Among students with one Asian parent and one white parent, 53.5 percent
self-identified as multiracial. (For full data, see Figure 7-3.)
204 CHAPTER 7 Wh ite Priv ilege and the Chang in g U.S. Rac ial H iera 陀的
FIGURE 7-3. 100o/o

Percentage of M11ltiracial
Children Who Identify 90%
as White, Minority, or
80%
Multiracial
Source: Davenport (2016). 70%
60%
50°/o
40°/o
30%
20%
10% 18.4
10.6
0%
Asian-White (n=11,282} Latino-White (n=21 ,134) Black-White (n=5 , 33ο）
I • White ID ’ Minority ID Multriracial ID'
Will the United States Continue to Be a White-Maiority

Society?
In 2016, the Pew Research Center issued a report predicting that by 2055,
whites will no longer be the majority racial group in the United States. 卫1e
report further predicts that by 2065, nonwhites will constitute 54 percent of
the nation’s population, and one in four people in the United States will be
Hispanic or Latino ( Cohn and Caumont 2016).
Social scientists who have considered the future of racial categories do not
agree in their predictions of how the United States will look in the future.
Some scholars think that the category of whiteness will expand to include
some Latinos and Asians; others think that Latinos and Asians will join the
"collective black"; and still others argue that the United States will become a
triracial society, similar to Latin American countries. Let’s take a look at these
possible racial schemas.
The White/Nonwhite Divide

卫1e United States has a long history of denying rights to all those labeled as
nonwhite, and many scholars argue that this tradition will continue, even as
the country’s demography changes. In 1970, Latinos and Asians accounted
for 5 percent and 1 percent of the U.S. population, respectively (Lee 2008).
By 2011, the U.S. census estimated that Asians were nearly 6 percent of the
U.S. population and Latinos nearly 17 percent. White people still made up
63 percent of the population but have slowly been approaching the point of
losing majority status in the country. Despite the shrinking size of the popula-
tion identified as white, some scholars argue that white people will continue to
retain dominance in the United States and that all other groups will be defined
primarily as nonwhite.
Alejandro Po巾s, Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, and William Haller (2005), for
example, have found that immigrants from Latin America and Asia experi-
ence exclusion and disadvantage in the United States that prevents them from
achieving upward mobility. Because of these disadvantages and the fact that
most new immigrants to the United States are physically distinct from white
people, the researchers argue that Asians and Latinos are unlikely to be allowed
entry into the white category, as previous waves of European immigrants were.
For these scholars, the changing demography is not likely to change the basic
structure of the racial hierarchy or the definition of whiteness. Others, how-
eve鸟 think that the category of whiteness will expand.
The Black/Nonblack Divide

George Yancey (2003) predicts that the boundaries of whiteness will expand
to include everyone who is not African American, permitting whites to avoid
becoming a minority. Yancey bases his argument on his findings that African
Americans experience exclusion in ways that Latino and Asian Americans do
not. Drawing from a nationwide telephone survey, Yancey has found that white
people disparage black people more than Latinos and Asians. He also found
that Latinos ’ and Asians' political beliefs are more closely aligned with white
people’s than with black people ’s, signaling their allegiance to white people.
Based on these findings, Yancey concludes that white people will not become
a numerical minority any time soon.
Other scholars (Warren and Twine 1997; Gallagher 2004; Twine and
Gallagher 2008) agree with this prediction. These researchers argue that the
white category has expanded in the United States to include most people not
identified or associated with blackness. Charles Gallagher (2004), for exam-
ple, argues that the United States is experiencing a “ racial redistricting,"
whereby many Asians and Latinos are included in the white category because
of their cultural and physical similarities with whites. These scholars argue
that “ black ” is the most stigmatized category in the United States and that
everyone else is measured in reference to African Americans.
206 CHAPTER 7 Whi te P 「 i v il ege a nd the Chang ing U.S . Rac ial Hi e 「G 「ch y
The Triracial Order: Latin Americanization

honorary white People Many sociologists argue that there will be a Latin Americanization of the U.S.
who are not considered racial hierarchy-that is, that the racial schema will change from a binary to
white but can be treated a tri肌ial order. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2013) contends that although there
as if they were white, such has traditionally been a biracial divide between whites and nonwhites in the
as some light-skinned United States, this racial order is changing. ’The primary engine for this change
Latinos, Asians, and is the recent increase in Latino and Asian immigration-today, Latinos make
multiracials. up more than 15 percent of the U.S. population and Asians about 6 percent.
Another important factor is the rise in intermarriage: about one in twenty
collective black People marriages is now interracial (Lee 2008). Because of these and other changes,
who are black, as well as the racial order in the United States is evolving into a triracial order, with
other groups that receive whites at the top,“honorary whites” in the middle, and the “ collective black''
similar treatment as black at the bottom.
people, such as Hmong Bonilla-Silva posits that the white group will expand to include assimi-
or dark-skinned Puerto lated white Latinos and Native Americans, as well as some multiracials (par-
Ricans. ti cul a向 the children of whites and Asians).’The honorary wl巾 group will
contain light-skinned Latinos, many East and South Asians, Middle East-
erners, and multiracials. ’The collective black group will include Vietnam-
ese and Hmong Americans, dark-skinned Latinos, Native Americans, and
blacks. According to this thesis, the honorary white group will serve as a
buffer between the collective black and the white groups. Thus, as the U.S.
population becomes primarily nonwhite, whites will not have to worry about
losing power and privilege.
To test his thesis, Bonilla-Silva (2013) takes a look at the data to see
(1) if there are socioeconomic and attitudinal distinctions among the
three groups, (2) if whites look more kindly upon members of the honor-
ary white group than the collective black group, and (3) if there is grow-
ing solidarity among members of the collective black group. He finds all
of these claims to be true, with some caveats. For example, the median
income for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in the United States is about half
that of Argentines and Chileans, who tend to be much lighter-skinned.
The median per capita income for Hmong and Cambodian Americans is
about a third that of Chinese, Japanese, and Indian Americans. In terms
of self二identification, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans in the United States
are much more likely to identify as black than are Argentines or Chileans.
Although half of Mexicans identify as white, over three-quarters of
Chileans, Cubans, and Argentines identify as white in national surveys.
The data for intermarriage are also striking: 93 percent of whites and
Changes in Rac ia l and E• hnic Class ifi ca • ions 207
blacks marry within their own racial group, compared to 70 percent of

Asians and Latinos and only 33 percent ofNative Americans. Bonilla-Silva
doa
.
uses this evidence to argue that a triracial system is emerging in the United
States and that this system will work to maintain white dominance and
color-blind racism. ·,, ..,
One criticism of the Latin Americanization thesis is that a two-tier racial

order has never existed in the United States. In colonial times, Edward , '(,
Murguia and Rogelio Saenzο002) argue, there were three groups: English
whites at the top, white indentured servants in the middle, and African
·.
．问
slaves and Native Americans at the bottom. Later, native-born Americans of

.‘
/
British descent came to be at the top, with southern and eastern Europeans
in the middle and Asians, blacks, and Native Americans at the bottom.
There is reason to believe that pa忧erns of racial self二identification vary
across generations. 咀1is means that the children of some census-defined
Hispanics might choose not to identify with the Hispanic label. Persons
of Hispanic descent could potentially opt out of the Latino category and
identify as black or white, while others could disassociate themselves from
the labels of black and white and adopt “ Hispanic” or “ Latino” as their
racial identification. Social scientists need to consider how Latinos racially
selιidentify and what factors affect those choices. How have these classifi-
cations changed historically? How are these changes related to official race
classifications?
CHANGES IN RACIAL AND ETHNIC

CLASSIFICATI 。 NS
How have racial and ethnic classifications changed over time? Every ten
years, a U.S. census is conducted, which includes at least one question about
racial identification. ’These racial and ethnic classifications are constantly
in flux, as Figure 7-4 shows. Almost immediately a丘er the 2010 census was
completed, discussions began within the Office of Management and Budget,
which oversees official racial classifications, about how the “Hispanic/Latin。”
question should be asked on the census. The debate centered on whether the A These three people are
企om the major racial groups
census should include a separate question on Hispanic/Latino ethnicity, or
in Peru: indigenous, black,
if “ Hispanic/Latino” should be considered a race, like white, black, or Asian.
and white. If they were
In the 2010 census, the question “'.Are you Hispanic or Latino ?” was fol- to migrate to the United
lowed by a separate race question, which gave people a丘een options that did States, would all three be
not include “ Hispanic." In 2010, Hispanic/Latino was officially an ethnicity. classified as Latina/o?
208 CHAPTER 7 White P 「 ivilege and the Changing U.S. Racial Hie 「G 「chy
同 1960 onward: People could choose their own race.

同 2000 onward: Americans could be recorded in more than one race category on the census form.
1790 1850 1860 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 2010

WHITE
BLACK
OTHER
AMER.INDIAN/ALASKA
ASIAN
HAWAII/PAC.ISLANDER
HISPANIC
FIGURE 7-4.
How U.S. Census Race
Categories Have Changed However, there are many reasons you might consider Hispanic/Latino to be a
over Time race. In fact, in 2012, the U.S. Census Bureau held a press conference in which
s。urce: Pew Research (2015). it recommended that the question “'.Are you Hispanic/Latino ?” no longer be
asked as a separate question on ethnicity二 Instead, it proposed that Hispanic/
Latino be included as one of the options in the race question. In 2016, Census
Bureau officials presented a proposal that would combine separate questions
on race and Hispanic origin into one. As of this writing, this is the question
that is most like加o be used in the 2020 census.
’The discussions over the 2020 census revolve around important questions
in U.S. society: Is Hispanic a race or an ethnicity? Are Hispanics white,
black, or something else? Many scholars are concerned that if Hispanic
were enumerated as a racial category, we would lose important informa-
tion, namely, data about the different experiences of white, indigenous, and
black Hispanics. People would have the option of choosing multiple races,
meaning black Hispanics could select both black and Hispanic as their racial
categories, but many race scholars are concerned that most Hispanics would
only choose the Hispanic category, and we thus would have less information
about Hispanics.
咀1is controversy over racial categories in the census is part of a long his-
tory of changing racial categories in the United States. ’The only times in U.S.
history that the same racial categories have been used in two consecutive cen-
suses were in 1910 and 1920. Otherwise, the categories have changed each
time there has been a new census. ’This constant flux reflects social construc-
tions of difference rather than real differences between people.
The first census was conducted in 1790. That census did not include
a direct question about race, but it did include an enumeration of free
white men, free white women, other free persons, and slaves. Who was free
and who was enslaved was important at the time, as slaves were counted
as three-fifths of a person for the purpose of determining congressional
representation.
Changes in Racial and Ethnic Classifica • ions 209
In 1890, eight racial groups were listed on the census, half of which were for
people ofAfrican descent-black, mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon. 咀1is was
prior to the officialization of the one-drop rule, according to which persons
with any black ancestry were considered black. 币1e other four races included
on the 1890 census were Japanese, Chinese, Indian, and white-a reflection of
immigration trends at the time.
In 1900, black was the only option for people of African descent. The
category of mulatto was reintroduced in 1910. Then, in 1930, for the first
and only time, Mexican was listed as a race. Previously, Mexicans had
been con州ered white (Lee 1993). In 2000, for the first time, people were
allowed to list more than one race. These changes show that racial catego-
ries are a reflection of the time and not an enumeration of fixed differences
between people. Racial categorizations also reflect the racial ideology of
the time, which, as we have seen, changes according to social and political
circumstances.
’The question of whether Latinos are a racial or an ethnic group is far
from settled. For many scholars, Latinos are a racialized group and should whitening The process
be considered people of color (Alcoff 2000; Itzigsohn and Cabral 2001). by which a person and
According to the 2000 and 2010 censuses, Latinos can be of any race- his or her offspring
including white-as Latino is an ethnicity, not a race. 币1e U.S. Census become whiter as a result
Bureau will most likely change Latino from an ethnic to a racial category in of social status and/or
the 2020 census. 1nterma口1age.
Social, Cultural，。 nd lnteraenerational Whitening

in Latin America -
Scholars of race in Latin America argue that • Thi时， cul↑uralwhitening occurs when a person is
whitening-the process of becoming whi•er born Indian bu↑ accultu 「ates to • he dominant culture
as a result of a change in socia l 剑。tus and/or and becomes whi•e or whiter in some situations.
interma r「iage一↑ones down racial conflict in the ｜门↑ergenerationalwhitening is used i门 co门junction with
陪gion. Whi↑eni 「19 can occur in th 「ee ways: blacks o「 Indians; social whitening is mo陪 commonly
• Fi 时， in↑e「generational whi•ening occurs when a used to discuss people of Africa门 descent; and cultural
black pe「sonαnd a white person have a child， αnd white「1ing is mo陪 commonly used to desc「ibe processes
the child is conside「ed white「↑han the black pa陪时． of incorporation for people of indigenous descent.
• Second, social whitening occυrs when a person is The whiteni 门g process works at the levels of both
born black bu• through G 门 increase in class s•atus practice G「1d ideology: people hope to ” improve
is considered whi•e or white「 i n some situations. the race11 •hrough ma rrying ligh•er-skinned partners,
(continued}
210 CHAPTER 7 White P 「ivilege and the Changing U.S. Racial Hie 「G 「chy
and the governme 门↑s of ma 门y Lati 门 American coun “ social sta 门ding (see van den Berghe 1974; Bour-
↑「ies have promulga •ed a policy of mestizaie (racial 「icaud 1975; de la Cadena 2000). As indige-
and cultu 「al mi× ture) for the purpose of whitening the nousness is concep•ualized in Peru ，。 perso 门 with
门ation (Graham 1990; Skid 「nore 1993). The possibil幡 b 「ow 门 skin and black hai 「 could be labeled as
ity of whi •ening is dependen• on a definition of race white (blanco), Indian (indio），。「 eithe 「 of the two
• ha • is no• based solely on colo 「 O「 descent, but on intermediate labels: cholo o「 mestizo. According •o
othe 「 cha 门geable fac •ors. these studies what determi 门es o 门e’s racial status is
Many scholars con •end that in Latin Ame 「ica, no• skin colo「 but level of education cultural ma 「卡
「ace incorpo 「ates social a 门d cultu 「al characteristics e 「S such as la 门guage and dress, and geog 「aphic
(Rodriguez 2000). Jorge Duany argues tha• in the and class location. In Peru, descendants of indig-
Ca 「ibbea 门，”phenotype a 门d social s↑G↑us 「ather tha 门 e门ous people ca 门 change their 「acial sta •us from
biological desce 门↑ define a person's 「acial identi• y" indio to mestizo by aba 门do 门i 门g indigenous cul↑U 「al
(1998, 150). Nancy Landale a 门d R. S. Oropesa posit forms, obtaining a formal education, and mig 「ating
that in Latin America, "definitions of race are more to the coas •( as this en•ails leaving highland I 门dian
fluid a 门d ambiguous than is • he case in • he U 门i↑ed villages). Highly educated Peruvians are co 门side 「ed
S•ates”( 2002, 233). According ↑o 什1ese scholars, the white and accultu 「G↑ed Indians G 「e conside 「ed
lack of 「igidi↑y in Latin Ame 「ican 「acial classifica • ions mestizos. Subsequent work on indige门ous identi-
allows a perso门 in th is 「egio 门↑o change his or her ties in Pe 「U con •es•s the simplicity of this f「amework,
「acial identity. yet • hese s• udies do no• address the abse门ce of
Scholars of Afro响Latin America have argued tha • Af「ican-desce门ded Peruvia 门S f「om ↑hese discus-
blacks can be whitened through a change in social sions ，门O 「 do they dismiss the idea of cul •ural whi•
status. Winthrop Wright, for e×ample, claims that in e门i 门g for Indians (de la Cadena 2000; Weismantel
Ve门ezuela, "when a black escaped poverty, he o「 2001; Garcfa 2005).
she ceased to be socially black" (1990, 10). Wright Scholars of race in Latin America have found evi-
goes on •o e× plain that "occasio门。 lly, financial a 门d dence of intergenerational whi↑eni 门g in B 「azil and
poli•ical success socially white 门ed black Ve门ezue Colombia. One study found that highly educated
lans. Fo「↑hem and • heir whi •e cou 门↑erpa 巾， clothes, no 门white Brazilia 门S G「e more likely tha 门 thei 「 less
educa↑io 门， language, social positio 门， G 「1d • he accu “ educated cou 门↑erpa 「↑S ↑o label thei「 child 「en white
mu la•ion of wealth combined •o make G门 individual (Schwa 「tzman 2007). Data limitations did not allow
whiter in the social context" (10). Wade argues that Luisa Schwartzman to discern whethe「↑his is because
in Colombia ,• he f「ope "money whitens” does no• class s•atus directly in日 uences racial self-ide 门↑ificatio门
mean that ve 「y dark skinned people G 「e ac•ually clas-
’ 。「 because higher-白class brow 「1 Brazilians are lighte 「
sified as wh i怡， but that "rich black or mulatto people in skin to 门e and thus closer to the boundary between
are treated as if they were whi •e (o 「 nea 「ly white)" white and brown which facilita •es their "bound-
(1993, 339). ary crossing." Research by Pe↑e「 Wade (1993) in
Studies of indigeneity in Latin America contend Colombia a 门d Edward Telles (2004) in Brazil would
that classification with labels such as cholo indio, suppor• this latter claim, as they G 「gue 什1a↑ O nly
0 「 mestizo is not determi 门ed by skin color, but by racially ambiguous people have the option of shifting
cul ↑U 「al factors, including geographical origin and 「·acial categories.
Revisiting • he Definitions of Race and E• hnicity 211
REVISITING THE DEFINITI 。 NS 。 F RACE

AND ETHNICITY
How would one determine whether Latino is a racial or an ethnic category?
One way to look at this question is to use the definitions given in Chapter One
and consider whether being Latino refers more to phenotype, ancestry, and
descent or to place and culture.
Race: Categories of people based on a hierarchical worldview that associates

ancestry, descent, and phenotype with cultural and moral attributes.
Ethnicity: Group identities based on notions of similar and shared history,
culture, and kinship.
It seems that the category of Latino refers quite specifically to shared his-
tory, as it references people with origins in Latin America. One potential
caveat is that many Latinos trace their origins to California or Texas, former
Spanish colonies that have been part of the United States since the mid-
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Latinos can trace their
origins to a place that was once a Spanish colony. ’The issue with this definition
is that places not traditionally considered part of Latin America, such as the
Philippines and Equatorial Guinea, are also former Spanish colonies. Are
Fil毕inos Latinos? Officially, Filipinos are Asians, but Antho町 Ocampo (2014)
found in his interviews with Filipinos that many identified with Latinos because
of their shared history of Spanish colonialism and the Catholic religion.
What about culture? Language is one of the most salient aspects of cultural
identity, and being Latino is associated with speaking Spanish. However,
many people who identi命 as Latino do not speak Spanish.τhese include U.S.-
born Latinos who never learned Spanish, Brazilians who speak Portuguese,
and perhaps even Haitians who speak Creole. We also need to think about how
to classify indigenous migrants from Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and
Ecuador whose first language is Maya, Quechua, or another indigenous lan-
guage. Does the Spanish language unify them?
Ethnicity is principally about culture, and there are a variety of cultural ele-
ments that people in the United States associate with being Latino, such as
salsa dancing, eating tacos, and having a quinceaftera party for fi丘een-year-old
girls. However, there are many Latinos who do not participate in these cul-
tural events. Dominican Americans may be more likely to dance to bachata;
Puerto Ricans eat rice and beans but not tacos; and salsa music is rarely heard
in Brazil. Despite these nuances, it would be fair to say that there are rhetorics
212 CHAPTER 7 Whiie Privilege and 1he Changing U.S. Racial Hierarchy
of culture, language, and place associated with being Latin。．刀、e argument in

favor of considering “Latino渺 an ethnicity or an ethnic group is that the term
invokes an array of cultural practices-it relies on a discourse of culture and
place, even though it is easy to poke holes in this rhetoric.
1叫That about race? How could one make the argument that Latino is a race?
古M category of Latino has not traditi。nally been considere.d a race. Yet, it is
possible that racial categories can emerge. A variety of sociologists argue that
"Latin。” is emerging as a racialized category (Haney-Lopez 2006; Golash-
Boza and Darity2008; Vasquez 2011; Bonilla-Silva 2010). ln order for "Latin。”
to be considered a race, one would have to argue that the label invokes a dis-
course of phenotype and ancestry.
Anthony Ocan阴（2014) in时ter iewed Fi.lipi.nos, many 。f wl、。m told I im
that pe。pie 。ften th。ught they were Lati，、。 because of ti、eir tar、 skin, darl《l、ai马
rociolized a臼imilotian The and Spanish surnames. In terms of descent, there is a presumption that if two
process through wh ich Latinos have a child, that child will be Latino. In the case of Cameron Diaz, for
example, many pe。pie consider her to be Latina because her fath凹’s parents
imnugrants adopt the
are from Cuba. τhe argument that Latino is a racial category rests on the facts
racial identities oflhcir
host count, y. that the term Latino invokes phenotype and ancestry.
币1is phenotypical diversity raises the question of how Lati-
Asian, 1% nos themselves identif予 Although the 2010 U.S. census did not
include Latin。 as a racial category, other surveys do. Golash-
Boza and Darity (2008) examined the factors that influence h。w
Latinos identify raαally on surveys and found that just under half
of the sel“denti自ed Latino responde,us to the 2002 National
Survey of Latinos 呻orted their race as Latino (Figure 7-5).
τhis marked a change from the 1989 Latino Nati。nal Political
Surve如 on which only 18 percent of respondents reported their
race as Latino. Golash-Boza and Darity also found that respon-
dents who had experienced discrimination and those with
darker skin were less likely to 战ntify as wl巾． τhe association
of dark skin and expe.riences of discrimination with a Latino
identity signals that Latino is a racialized category. Based on
these findings, it can be argued that Latinos are experiencing
FIGU RE7·5. raciallzed assimilation, a process of assuming racial identities
Racial ldentl自cation in 2002 National
Sur,·cy of Latinos that make sense in the contemporary United States.
飞，Vhe n given the option to identify Other sociologists have considered why some Latinos
ra‘:, ally a.s 岛Latino; a plura坦ty of Latinos selι，dent均 as black. Research by Ginetta Candelario (2007),
1clentifiecl as such Silvio Torres－$副llant (2000), and Clara Rodriguez (2000)
s。urc缸 Gola曲，Bo曰 and Dadty 120081 reveals that many Dominicans primarily identify as black.
For example, Rodriguez interviewed Jose Ali, a young, dark-skinned Domin-

ican. On the census, he described himself as being of Hispanic ethnicity and
his race as “ other." In the interview, he commented:
''By inheritance I am Hispanic. Howeve9 I identify more with Blacks due to

the fact that to white America, if you are my color you are a nigg1以 I can't
change my colotj and I do not wish to.ρ... When asked, ''Why do you see
yourself as Black?'' his answer was: ''Because, when I was jumped by whites I
was not called a 'spic,' but I was called a 'niggeκ气.. Asked if his identity had
changed over time, Ali said yes, ''I realized that although I feel Hispanic, I
was not seen as Hispanic or Latino, but as Black. Now I agree with whomever
thinks I'm Black . .. no matter who I feel to be, I am categorized as Black."
(Rodr忽uez 2000, 140-141)
Jose Ali, like many Latinos with visible African ancestry, is treated as a black
person in the United States. For this reason, he has internalized a black iden皿
tity and considers himself to be racially black. One could argue that he also
feels ethnically Hispanic, although he is not seen as racially Hispanic. Perhaps
Latino is both a racial and an ethnic category.二
In this chapter, we have seen that it is far from obvious who is white and who
is not. We have also seen that there are benefits related to being classified as
white, yet that these benefits are not spread evenly across the white popula-
tion. White men, middle-class whites, Christian whites, and Anglo whites are
those whose whiteness is much less likely to be put into question and for whom
white privilege is most guaranteed. ’These whites-who fit most closely with
hegemonic definitions of whiteness-are those most prone to seeing them-
selves as “ normal ” or as not having a racial identity.二 As long as we frame race
and racism as problems of people of color, whites can absolve themselves from
talking or thinking about race. 咀1is is where discussions of white privilege can
be useful.
At the same time, we have seen that the definition of who is white has
changed over time and is likely to change in the future. Racial categories are
likely to change in terms of both 。而cial classification and everyday meanings
associated with race. Official racial classifications change when interest groups
push the U.S. government to count them differently or when scholars insist
on classification schemes that more closely reflect our society.二 However, the
214 CHAPTER 7 W hi• e Privilege a nd the Changing U.S. Racia l Hierarchy
processes that produce changes in everyday classifications are much more

complex. How will we know if and when light-skinned Latinos and Asians
achieve honorary whiteness? What does it mean to say that the Hmong of
Southeast Asia are treated as part of the collective black-does that imply that
affirmative action policies should be retooled to reflect our new racial realities?
What other changes would take place if our racial hierarchies were to change
drastically? Perhaps most important, why does the structure of the racial hier-
archy change but not the fact that we have a hierarchy in the first place?
Key Terms
white privilege 188 racialization 197 collective black 206
wage of whiteness 188 multiracial 202 whitening 209
white person of color 197 honorary white 206 racialized assimilation 212
7.1 What is white privilege, and how does it work? (pp. 188-192)
．咀1ere are many unearned benefits associated with being white. 咀1e concept of
white privilege helps us understand this dimension of racial dynamics in the
United States.

》飞,Vho benefits from white privilege, and why? > Make a case for whether white privilege is a
useful concept.
> Does racism harm whites? What are the
advantages and limitations of considering this
question?
7.2 Does white privilege benefit all whites equally? (pp. 192-196)
• Whiteness and white privilege vary by class, gender, and sexuality.

> How is white privilege related to gender and > What are some specific ways that whiteness
sexuality? may not afford men and women the same set of
advantages?
7.3 Who is white in twenty-first-century America? (pp. 196-207)

• Whiteness carries advantages with itJ yet it is not always clear who is white and
who is not.

> Why and how do the meanings and limits of > Why do you think that racial boundaries shi丘
racial boundaries change? overtime?
7.4 How have racial and ethnic classifications changed over time? (pp. 207-210)
• 0 面cial racial categories change each time the census is administered.

> What are some examples of ways that racial > Certain physical traits} such as skin color} nose
categories have shi丘ed over time? shape} and hair type} have been selected as sym-
> What is the difference between social and cul- bols of racial difference. 认That other physical traits
tural whitening? could have been used？飞,Vhy do you think certain
traits have become more important than others?
7.5 Are Latinos a racial or an ethnic group? (pp. 211-213)

• Scholars disagree over whether “Latin。” is a racial or an ethnic category.

> What are two key differences between race > How is the debate over whether Hispanic/
and ethnicity? Latino is a race or an ethnicity a reflection of
current racial ideologies?
Tα：lkiη~g~ about Race

Imagine that while you are in line at the grocery store} you overhear one
customer make a racist remark to another. What should you do? One
strategy is to focus your attention on the person who is being targeted
and to ignore the aggressor. Strike up a pleasant conversation about
anything. For example} you can tell her you really like her shoes or ask
her if she has seen a movie that is out in the cinema. Continue to talk to
the person and create a safe space until the aggressor leaves.
The Family at Work Together (detail from the Ministry of Education frescoes). Diego Rivera. 1923-1928. Fresco. (De Agostini
Picture Library/M. See悦.ulle·γ＇／Bγidgemanlm鸣叫
.
Chapter 。utline
. The History of Educational

Inequality 220
Indian Schools 22 l
Segregation and Landmark Court
Cases 223
The Persistence of Racial
Segregation in the Educational
System 225
Affirmative Action in Higher
Education 227
Educational Inequality Today 228
research focus Native Ar丫1erican I

Alaska Native College Studen•
Re•ention 231
The Achievement Gap: Sociological
Explanations for Persistent
Inequality 232
GI。bαI View Affirmative Action in

B「azil 233
Parental Socioeconomic Status 233
Cultural Explanations: "Acting
White" and Other Theories 235
Tracking 236
As Y。u Reαd Social and Cultural Capital and
Schooling 237
8.1 What are the dimensions of racial inequality in our v。ices Moesha 240
educational system? Hidden Curricula and the
8.2 How important is the historical legacy of unequal educational School-to-Prison Pipeline 24 l
opportunities? resea1·ch focus The Asian Ame 「ican
8.3 How can we explain the continuing gap in the educatio11al Achieveme门↑ Parado× 242
achievements of white, Asian, black, Native American, and Conclusion and Discussion 243
Latino students? Check You 「 Unde 「standing 244
218 CHAPTER 8 Educat iona l Inequa li ty
In Sαuαgelnequαlities, Jonathan Kozol vividly describes the

conditions in a school in the Bronx, New York, where 90 percent
of the children are black or Latino. As you read this description,
think about what the physical conditions of Public School 261 say
about our commitment to public education.
n order to find Public School 261 in District 10, a visitor is told to look
for a mortician’s office. ’The funeral home, which faces Jerome Avenue
SAVAGE
in the North Bronx, is easy to identify by its green awning. ’The school is
INEQUALITIES
’ next door, in a former roller-skating rink. No sign identifies the building
C H ILDRE N I N A M ERIC A S SCHOOLS
as a school. A metal awning frame without an awning supports a flag-

pole, but there is no flag.
I ask the principal where her children go to school. ’They are enrolled in pri-
vate school, she says.
''Lunchtime is a challenge for us," she explains. “ Limited space obliges us to
do it in three shifts, 450 children at a time."
Textbooks are scarce and children have to share their social studies books.
’The principal says there is one full-time pupil counselor and another who is
here two days a week: a ratio of 930 children to one counselor. ’The carpets are
patched and sometimes taped together to conceal an open space. “ I could use
some new rugs," she observes.
To make up for the building’s lack of windows and the crowded feeling that
results, the staff puts plants and fish tanks in the corridors. Some of the plants
are flourishing. Two boys, released from class, are in a corridor beside a tank,
their noses pressed against the glass. A school of pinkish fish inside the tank
are darting back and forth. Farther down the corridor a small Hispanic girl is
watering the plants.
Two first grade classes share a single room without a window, divided only
by a blackboard. Four kindergartens and a sixth grade class of Spanish-speaking
children have been packed into a single room in which, again, there is no
window. A second grade bilingual class of 37 children has its own room but
again there is no window.
By eleven o’clock, the lunchroom is already packed with appetite and life.
The kids line up to get their meals, then eat them in ten minutes. After that,
with no place they can go to play, they sit and wait until it’s time to line up and
go back to class.
CHAPTER 8 Educational Inequality 219
On the second floor I visit four classes taking place within another undi-
vided space. 咀1e room has a low ceiling. File cabinets and movable blackboards
give a small degree of isolation to each class. Again, there are no windows.
τhe library is a tiny, windowless and claustrophobic room. I count approx-
imately 700 books. Seeing no reference books, I ask a teacher if encyclopedias
and other reference books are kept in classrooms.
＇＇、气Te don’ t have encyclopedias in classrooms,” she replies. “τhat is for the
suburbs. ”
The school, I am told, has 26 computers for its 1,300 children.τhere is
one small gym and children get one period, and sometimes two, each week.
Recess, however, is not possible because there is no playground. “ Head Start,"
the principal says,“scarcely exists in District 10. 飞Ve have no space.”
咀1e school, I am told, is 90 percent black and Hispanicj the other 10 percent
are Asian, white or Middle Eastern.
Source: Kozol 20121 103-106.
Education is meant to be the great equalizer. Every child in the United States,
regardless of race, gender, or citizenship status, has the right to attend free
public school up until the twel丘h grade. With these educational opportunities,
any child should be able to be successful. Nevertheless, there are tremendous
gaps in educational achievement in the United States. And these gaps fall along
racial and ethnic lines.
Historically, educational opportunities in this country have not been
equal. Enslaved Africans and their children were forbidden to learn how to
read or write. Chinese immigrants were banned from public schools. African
American, Asian American, and Mexican American children were relegated
to separate and unequal schools. Prior to 1954, U.S. laws prevented many non-
white children from accessing the best educational opportunities.
Today, over six decades later, some things have changed.τhere are no longer
any all-white universities in the United States, and the number of all-white
high schools has decreased.τhe best colleges and universities now seek out
a diverse student body, and many offer scholarships to students who can con-
tribute to campus diversity. Elite private high schools offer similar incentives
to attract students who are neither white nor from privileged backgrounds. Yet
nonwhite children still do not have equal access to the opportunities available
to their white counterparts.
220 CHAPTER 8 Educa • ional Ineq uali ty
In this chapter, we will look at the history and current state of educational
inequality in the United States. We will see how far we have come and how far
we must go to achieve equality in educational opportunities and outcomes for
all children in the United States.
THE HIST。 RY 。 F EDU CATI 。 NAL INEQUALITY

In the United States, the idea of equal opportunity holds great weight, even as
the reality has fallen short of the ideal. Before the Brown v. Board of Education
decision of 1954, children who were not white were systematically prevented
from attending white schools under a doctrine called “ separate but equal."
During slavery, many African Americans were prevented from learning to
read and write, sometimes by law. Free blacks were not permitted to enroll in
the few public schools that existed in southern states. With emancipation came
the freedom to learn and to teach. African Americans across the South started
schools wherever they could-in fields, in one-room schoolhouses, and in peo-
ple's homes. Southern blacks who managed to learn to read and write taught
others in their community. They also recruited Northerners as teachers. By the
end of the nineteenth century, states across the South were able to ensure free
public schooling for all children (Span 2002).
Beginning in the early twentieth century, racial
tensions heightened. African Americans lost the
right to vote in several southern states. In this
context, school segregation was implemented and
enforced in both the North and the South. With
segregation, black children were often left with few
educational resources.τheir communities o丘en
had to make do with one-room schoolhouses pro-
vided by the state, or else they had to pool their
own funds to build better schools. Community-
established schools provided some of the first
educational opportunities to black children in
the South, but they were gravely underresourced
(Span 2002).
Official segregation in public schools persisted
until 1954. Whereas many African American and
Mexican children were obliged to attend segre-
gated schools in their home communities, many
A A teacher reads to his students at a segregated school in Native American children were sent to Indian
Uno, Virginia, in 194亿 boarding schools. 咀1e history of segregated and
The History of Ed ucationa I Ineq ua Iity 221
unequal schools in this country stretches over many decades and continues to
have implications today.
Indian Schools
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. government o值cials
enacted policies to ensure that Native Americans would leave behind their
traditional ways and assimilate into American society. One of the measures
aimed at obliterating native cultures was the creation of Indian schools, as
these institutions were called in the early twentieth century.
咀1e three main types of schools designed for Native Americans were
(1) boarding schools located out浏e ofreservations, (2) boarding schools located
on reservations, and (3) day schools on reservations. In addition, starting in
1819, there were federally subsidized mission schools, which focused on teach-
ing Native American children about Christianity.τhese schools were designed
to assimilate Native Americans into mainstream society (Watras 200份．
卫1e first boarding school was the Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania,
established in 1879.τhe philosophy of the school ’s founder, Richard Henry
Pratt, was that by fostering assimilation, the school could “ kill the Indian and
save the man. ” By 1926, about 70,000 of the 84,000 Native American chil-
dren in the United States were attending a governrr
2004). In 1930, there were 707 Indian schools across the United States, with
52 in Montana alone (Noel 2002).
..
、．『
< Tom Torlino, who was

Navajo, as he entered the
school in 1882 (left), and
. how he appeared three
years later.
222 CHAPTER 8 Ed uca • ional Ineq uali ty
Some Native American children attended boarding schools by choice, o丘en

with the hope that they would be provided for materially and would learn skills
that would help them survive in mainstream society. Many children, however,
were forced or coerced to attend these schools (Noel 2002). Once there, stu-
dents who tried to run away were o丘en harshly punished. At Chemawa School
in Oregon, for example, there were forty-six runaway a忧empts in 1921 and sev-
enty in 1922. At this school, runaways, called deserters, were forced to stand
in the hallway with their arms and legs tied. If they tumbled over because they
fell asleep, the matron would whip them and make them stand again (Marr
n.d.). At Haskell Indian School, there were “ y-three runaways in September
1910, and another thirty-five in October. If runaways were returned to the
school, ti町 would face physical pun
When children arrived at these schools, they were o丘en renamed. A young man
named Raining Bird, for example, was renamed Arthur Raining Bird. If the boys
had long hair, it was cut.Native American children were forbidden from speaking
in their native language and from practicing their own religions. Children who
spoke in their native languages were o丘en physically punished if the teacher over-
heard them. Native languages, dress, and hairstyles were forbidden in order to
inc此ate Native American children in the ways ofwhite Americans (Noel 2002).
τhe children spent half of the day in classes learning English, reading, and
mathematics, and the other half of the day doing industrial, agricultural, or
domestic work, which were framed as “ productive activities.”咀1e girls were
assigned to kitchen duties, sewing, laundry, ironing, and cleaning, while the
boys were required to do farm labor, gardening, grounds keeping, and carpentry
> Students in cadet

uniforms at the Carlisle
Indian School, ca. 1880.
(Noel 2002). In some cases, once Native American girls learned how to keep
hou凯 they were sent to local white homes to work as servants (Trennert 1983).
Native American children who went to boarding schools were o丘en under-
fed at the schools, and many became ill or died. In 1926, a comprehensive
study of Indian schools showed that the boarding schools' budget for feeding
children was only eleven cents a day一 $1.41 a day in today’s currency, and not
nearly enough to provide a reasonable diet. Because of undernourishment,
the children often succumbed to diseases such as tuberculosis (Watras 2004).
Many boarding schools across the United States today have burial grounds for
Native American children who died while at school.
Following the official end of assimilation programs in 1993, these boarding
schools were either reformed or closed.τhe repercussions of these institutions,
however, continue to be felt. Genevieve 飞,Villiams, who was born in 1922, went
to an Indian school as a young girl. She remembers being forced to scrub floors
on her hands and knees and being beaten for speaking in her native language.
She recalls girls being flogged for we忧ing the bed. When she returned home
at age fourteen, she no longer recognized her mother. Having never bonded
with her own mother, Williams found it hard to nurture her own children. Her
husband had been physically abused at school, and this also affected his ability
to raise their children (King 2008). The effects of Indian schools are felt across
generations as the children of Native Americans like Genevieve Williams and
her husband continue to suffer from this intergenerational trauma.
Segregation and Landmark c。urt Cases

Prior to 1885, Chinese American students were not allowed to attend public
schoolsinCalifornia.Betweenl896andl954,itwaslegalforstatestodenyAfrican
Americans, Mexican Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans access
to public schools and other facilities designated for wl巾s (Wollenberg 1974）.τhe
1896 court decision in Plessy v. Fe喀uson (as discussed in Chapter Three) was used
to justify the existence of separate educational facilities for white and nonwhite
students. By 1931, more than three-quarters of the school districts in California
practiced segregation (Wollenberg 1974). At that same time, 90 percent of the
schools in Texas were racially and ethnically seg吨ated (Godfrey2008).
τhe schools established for nonwhites were inferior in many ways to those
that served whites. Schools for Mexican American children were designed
to “Americanize'' them through instruction in cooking, hygiene, English,
and civics. In these segregated schools, children were punished for speaking
Spanish, and girls were taught home economics so that they could work in the
homes of whites (Wollenberg 1974).
In the 1930s and 1940s, Mexican Americans in Texas and California initi-
ated protests against these separate and inferior schools. In Texas, the League
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), founded in 1929, led the pro
tests. 咀1e first case brought by LULAC was Salvatierra v. Del Rio Independent
School District, in 1930.τhe court decided that segregation was permissible,
reasoning that it was not based on race but on language and academic abilities.
Over the next two decades, advocates of educational equality in Texas contin-
ued to be unsuccessful through a series of similar court cases.
One of the first victories of the civil rights movement came in 1947 with the
case ofMendez v. Westminster, when a federal circuit court in California ruled that
the segregation of children ofMexican and Latin American descent was unconsti-
tutional. ’The Mendez case was a critical forerunner to the landmark 1954 Supreme
Court decision in the case of Brown 队 Board of Education, which overturned the
Plessy 认 Ferguson ruling. Mendez began when Gonzalo Mendez, a Mexican Amer-
ican naturalized U.S. citizen, and his Puerto Rican wife, Felicitas, attempted
to enroll their three children in the 17th Street Elementary School in Orange
County, California. Although Gonzalo Mendez had attended the school him-
self as a boy, his children were turned away because the school no longer allowed
Mexican Americans to attend. Following failed a忧empts to win over the school
board, he and 5,000 other people filed suit against several Orange County school
districts in 1945.τheir court case was successful, and the Supreme Court ruled
that segregation based on a Spanish surname was unconstitutional (Ruiz 2001).
For African Americans, the landmark case regarding educational segrega-
tion was Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, which was a compilation of four
separate cases from four different towns. It involved
two rural communities-Clarendon County, South
Carolina, and Prince Edward County, Virginia-
and two urban districts-Topeka, I(ansas, and
飞气Tilmington, Delaware. African Americans in each
of these communities perceived that the education
their children received in segregated schools was
inferior to that given to white children. Indeed,
local governments spent less money on the educa-
tion ofblackchildren. Nationally, prior to 1950, the
average expenditure for black students was less than
two-thirds of that forwl巾 students (Siddle Walker
2000). In 1951, in Clarendon County, for example,
the annual average expenditure was $44.32 per
A Mexican American students reading in a segregated black student, compared with an average of$166.45
classroom, 1942. per white student. Additionally, white children did
The History of Ed ucationa I Ineq ua Iity 225
not have to pay for the

and Byrne 200份. These unequal expenditures meant th拭 African Americans
had access to fewer educational resources (Siddle Walker 2000). Parents in
Clarendon County got together to protest this tremendous inequality, and their
case became one of the four cases heard in Brown v. Board ofEducation.
Despite tremendous obstacles, African Americans in the pre-civil rights
era worked hard to ensure that their children had educational opportunities.
Parents o丘en provided equipment and spaces when they could. Communities
mobilized to ensure educational opportunities. At exemplary high schools
such as Dunbar High School in Washington, D.C., 60 percent of graduates
went on to attend college in the 1950s. At this same high school, several of the
teachers had doctorates from elite institutions (Siddle Walker 2000).
τhe rulings in Mendez v. Westminster and Brown v. Board of Education were
only the beginning of the long process of school desegregation. In Prince
Edward County, Virginia, for example, the Brown decision led to the closing of
all public schools so that white students would not have to integrate. In 1964,
a Supreme Court decision-Grt万n v. Coun 纱 School Board of Prince Edward
Coun纱－forced the county to reopen public schools (Orfield and Lee 2004).
The Persistence of Racial Segregation in the Educational System

Educational institutions are no longer allowed to prevent nonwhite children from
attending.Nevertheless, segregation persists, in part because school districts are
not required to promote integration. In the 1970s, courts o丘en ordered schools
that continued to be racially segregated to bus children in from across town. 卫1is
strategy worked because even though neighborhoods were segregated, busing
meant that schools did not have to be. However using was short-lived (McNeal
2009). In 1991, the Supreme Court decided in Dowell v. Oklahoma Ci抄 that
schools were not obliged to desegregate. 咀1is decision meant that many school
districts abandoned desegregation programs. Once children began to attend
schools in the neighborhoods where they lived (as opposed to being bused to
other neigh rhood轨 schools 即idly became resegregated (see Figure 8-1).
Although 1988 was a high point of desegregation for black students, the Dowell
decision reversed that trend. Since 1991, we have seen increasingly high rates of
segregation, as measured by the percentage of schools that are over 90 percent
nonwhite-nearly one in five by 2013. At the same time, the larger numbers of
nonwhite students overall in the U.S. educational system means that progres-
sively 岳wer schools have less than 10 percent nonwhite students (Orfield, Ee,
Frankenb吗 and Siegel-Hawley 2016） .τhese trends are shown in Figure 8-1.
卫1is high level of racial segregation is o丘en associated with poverty: in 2011,
half of schools that were over 90 percent black and Latino also had poverty
226 CHAPTER 8 Educa • ional Inequality
Segregated
0.06
White/Black divide
0.05 White/Hispanic divide
0.04
0.03
FIGURE 8-1. 0.02

The Return of Segregation
after 1991-2009 Release 0.01
from Court Oversight.
Stanford researchers used a 0.00
"dissimilarity index" to measure
segregation, from O (balanced
integration) to 1 (complete -0.01
segregation).
-15 -10 -5 。 5 10 15
Source: PBS Frontline (2014)/ Integrated
Stanford Center for Education
Policy Analysis (2012). Years since release from c。urt oversight
rates over 90 percent (Orfield and Frankenberg 20l4j Table 8-1). In contrast,
69 percent of schools with less than 10 percent black and Latino students had
poverty rates of less than SO percent. 咀1ere is a direct relationship between the
percentage of black and Latino students in a school and the percentage of poor
students (Orfield and Frankenberg 2014). A recent study of Florida schools
found that more than 80 percent of students in primarily black schools were
impoverished, compared with SO percent of students in integrated schools
and 43 percent of students in primarily white schools. 卫1is study also found
that only 32 percent of fi丘h-graders at the primarily black schools had passed a
basic test, compared with about SS percent of those at the primarily white and
integrated schools. Students at schools that were over 90 percent black fared
the worst on standardized tests (Borman et al. 2004).
Affirmative Action in Higher Education

Racial diversity in schools is a contentious issue at the university level as well.
Title VI of the 1968 Civil Rights Act enabled colleges and universities to take
。ffi rmative action Policies a侃rmative action to enhance racial diversity on campus. Affirmative action
and procedures designed encompasses policies and procedures designed to combat ongoing discrim-
to combat ongoing ination in schools and in the workplace. In higher education, it has meant
discrimination in schools giving preferential treatment to people who are members of historically dis-
and the workplace. advantaged groups. In schools with a伍rmative action programs, admissions
committees can consider the racial diversity of applicants as one factor in their
decision to admit a student to a university二
叫 ESI
% Poor in Percent Black and Latino Students in Schools

Schools 。一 10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-100
。一10 11.4 10.0 3.6 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.9 2.1 2.2
11-20 11.8 16.2 11.3 4.2 2.8 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3
21-30 13.4 14.7 14.4 10.1 5.2 3.7 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.5
31-40 16.1 15.0 15.2 14.8 10.7 7.2 4.8 2.7 2.2 1.8
41-50 16.3 14.3 15.5 16.5 15.1 12.7 8.6 4.9 3.0 2.4
51-60 13.4 12.7 14.9 17.1 16.7 16.9 13.4 8.0 4.6 3.5
61-71 9.0 9.3 12.5 15.7 19.1 17.8 18.5 15.5 9.2 5.4
71-80 4.7 4.7 7.7 11.3 16.0 18.8 20.8 22.0 18.3 10.5
81-90 2.0 1.9 3.4 5.7 8.7 13.2 17.5 23.2 29.3 20.6
91- 100 1.9 1.2 1.5 2.6 3.4 5.6 10.0 17.0 28.0 50.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% U.S. schools 33.2 13.9 9.0 6.9 5.9 4.9 4.4 4.2 5.0 12.7
Source: Adapted from Orfield and Frankenberg (2014).
In 1965, only 2 percent of medical students in the country were African

American. In response to this underrepresentation, the University of California
at Davis Medical School set aside sixteen of its one hundred admission slots
for underrepresented minority students. In 1978, a white applicant named
Allan Bakke was denied admission to the medical school. Bakke believed
that in the absence of these racial quotas, he would have been admitted. He
therefore filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that UC Davis had discriminated
against him based on his race. In the Regen归 of the University of California v.
Bakke (1978) ca问 the Supreme Court rt山d that the preferential racial quotas
did deny equal protection to white students and thus were unconstitutional.
However, the Supreme Court also ruled that race could still be used as one
factor in determining admission. With this ruling, racial quotas were no longer
permissible, but diversity could continue to be used as a factor in determining
admission. 咀1e Bakke decision thus ended the relatively short history of racial
quotas in university admissions, leaving us today with more ambiguous options
for promoting diversity. 咀1e University of California system, for example, can
argue that a student or job candidate would contribute to the diversity of the
campus, but it cannot say that it did or did not offer a position because of racial
or ethnic identity (Yosso, Parker, Solorzano, and Lynn2004).
A丘er the Bakke decision, affirmative action programs continued to come under
attack across the United States. In 1996, California voters passed Proposition
209, which banned the consideration

of race in higher education admis-
sions. Consequently, admission rates
of black, Latino, and Native Amer-
ican students to the University of
California system fell dramatically.
Between 1997 and 1998-the year
the ban took effect-admissions
留F of underrepresented students fell
61 percent at UC Berkeley and 36
percent at UCLA.τhese disparities
斗牛Qjf/J，刷刷何亿 continue today: black, Latino, and
~ Native American students made
4士扫SHε尺VIA广
up 54 percent of all California high
school graduates in 2012 but just
A Demonstrators in suppo1·t of affirmative action in schools gather
outside the U.S. Supre111e Court in 2015. 27 percent of all UC freshmen in that
same year (Murphy2013).
In June 2016, in Fisher v. The Universi纱 of Texas, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the University of Texas has the right to take racial status into consideration in
university admissions. 咀1is factor is one of many considered, including grades, test
scores, extracurricular activities, hardship, and other personal characteristics.τhe
case came to the Supreme Court a丘er applicant Abigail Fisher, who is white, filed
a lawsuit alleging that her denial of admission to the University of Texas was due
to her race. Fisher was not in the top 10 percent ofher high school graduating class,
and she thus was not able to enroll at the University of Texas through the program
that guarantees admission to top students in Texas. Instead, she was competing for
a relatively small pool ofspots for students not in the top 10 perce瓜 University offi-
cials argued that, with an SAT score of 1180 and a 3.59 GPA, Fisher's record simply
did not qualify her for admission. The Supreme Court agreed that Fisher had not
faced discrimination based on her whiteness (Hannah-Jones 2016).
EDUCATI 。 NAL INEQUALITY T。 DAY
At all levels of schooling, educational achievements in the United States vary

by racial or ethnic group, affecting earning potential (At a Glance 8 .1). In 20 IS,
88.4 percent of people in the United States had completed high school. How-
eve乌 only two-thirds of Hispanics had completed high school, as compared
with 93.3 percent of whites (National Center for Education National Center
for Education 2016). In 2015, over half of Asians had a bachelor’s degree or
higher-well above the national average of 32.S percent. In contrast, only
19.8 percent of Native Americans, 15.S percent of Hispanics, and 22.9 percent
Educationa l lnequa li• y Today 229
AT A GLANCE 8.1 Educational Disparities by Race and Life Course Effects
High Sch。ol Nine out of ten Americans had completed high school, yet Latinos lagged behind: Fewer than seven out of
ten had a high school diploma.
College Over half of Asian Americans had a bachelor’s degree in 2015, compared with only 15.5°/o of Latinos.
High School College

cozoEε』0
100
80
60
030
6 」2020且
40 一
。
All persons White Black Hispanic/ Asian and Native More than
age 25 Latino Pacific American two races
or over Islander
Graduate School The percentage of graduate students of color is increasing, in spite of disparities at the high school and
college levels. In 1990, whites made up 86°/o of students in graduate school. By 2013, the percentage of whites had
dropped to 66°/o as the percentages of nonwhites increased across the board.
100
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1990 2000 2013
Median annual earnings for 25- to 34-year-olds, 2014 Unemployment rates 。f 20- t。 24-year-olds, 2014
Total 币’币’忡忡，t'tt
- - - .. MmE..,...
..,...
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·my ..,...
..,,.., .., ..,
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$40,000 $25,000 $30,000 $52,000
Total Less than Completed Attained a Attained a bachelor’s
population high school
completion
high school bachelor’ s
degree
degree or higher ’ tttt
。 5°/o 10°/o 15°/o 20°!o
or higher
All data from NCES 2016
of blacks had a bachelor’s degree. The data are similar if we look at professional
degrees, though as shown in At a Glance 8.1, the percentage of graduate stu-
dents of color is increasing (National Center for Education Statistics 2016).
Although disparities in educational outcomes persist, it is undeniable that
they have lessened over the course of the past hundred years in the United States.
Legal segregation has been banished, Native American children are no longer
forced to attend boarding schools, standard curricula now include multicultural
components, nearly all youth have achieved literacy, and high school graduation
rates for all racial groups are converging. Between 1971 and 1996, the gap in read-
ing test scores between blacks and whites shrank by almost one-half (Kao and
Thompson 2003). There are still some 鸣nificant disparities among 邸ialgrou二ps
but they are not as pronounced as they were at the beginning of the twenty－且rst
ce时ury, when 28 percent of Hispanic/ Latino youth dropped out of high school,
compared with only 12 percent in 2014 (Fry and Taylor 2013; Krogsdad 2016).
In aggregate data, it becomes apparent that Asian students are outperforming
all other students in test scores and high school and college completion rates.
''model minority'' myth τhese achievements have led to a “ model minority” myth, according to which
The stereotype that Asians are widely perceived as the racial minority group that has succeeded in the
Asians are the racial United States. As we saw earlier, Asians have not always been viewed as a model
minority group that has minority. In fact, as already noted, they were prevented from attending public
succeeded in the United schools in California in the late nineteenth century. The current stereotype did
States. not become prevalent until the late twentieth century (Wing 2007). And today,
even though Asians perform better on average than other groups, it is not the
case that every single Asian student is an overachiever. Additionally, when we
break the Asian population down into groups by national origin, we can see a
more complex story (Ngo and Lee 2007). For example, only about 14 percent of
Hmong, Laotian, or Cambodian adults in the United States have college degrees,
compared with about half of all Chinese, Filipino, and Pakistani adults. Indian
adults have the highest rate of college graduation, at 70 percent (Piccorossi 2012).
τhere continue to be disparities in college attendance and completion,
although these disparities have changed over the years. In 2012, Asians were
the most likely racial or ethnic group to attend college, with 84 percent ofAsian
recent high school graduates enrolled in college. Of these students, 79 percent
were enrolled at a four-year college or university, and 91 percent were enrolled
full time (Fry and Taylor 2013). In 2012, 69 percent of Latino high school grad-
uates enrolled in college, compared with 67 percent of white high school grad-
uates, 84 percent of Asians high school graduates, and 63 percent of black high
school graduates. Latinos, however, were less likely to attend a four-year col-
lege than white students. In 2012, 56 percent of Latino college students were
at a four-year college, compared with 72 percent of white students. In addition,
Educationa l lnequa li • y Today 231
Latinos were less likely than whites to attend a selective college, to be enrolled
in college full tin风 and to complete a four识ar degree (Fry and Taylor 2013).
Educational disparities among racial and ethnic groups are evident at each
level of the educational system. In the next section, we will explore these dis-
parities in more detail and look at the various explanations sociologists offer
for them. Before we proceed with sociological explanations, pause to think
about why black, Latino, and Native American students are faring less well
than white and Asian students in the educational system. What have we
learned so far that might inform your explanations?
γesea~γc OCUS
Native American/Alaska Native College Student Reter廿ion
American Indian and Alaska Native students are among the least likely to enroll
in college and to complete college once enrolled. Only about a third of American
Indian and Alaska Native students who enroll in college graduate within six
years, compared with over half of students from the general population. These
facts compelled Raphael Guillory (2009) to design a study to better understand
the obstacles American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) students face in terms
of college enrollment, retention, and completion.
Eαchsumme＇γ
. since 2005,
UCRi~℃eγ·side has hosted
The Gathering ofth巳
T’ribes, an a：叽轧，ualpγog·γam
designed to e’nCOU＇γage
.
Native Ame·γica：叽s to go to
coZZ巳：ge.
(conti，叽飞'1ed)
232 CHAPTER 8 Educa • ional Inequali ty
Guillory examined enrollment and retention rates of AI/ AN students at three

universities: Washington State University, University of Idaho, and Montana
State University. He conducted focus group interviews with thirty AI/ AN
students at these institutions, in addition to interviews with faculty members and
administrators.
咀1e AI/ AN students contended that their primary motivation for staying in
university was their desire to give back to their community and their family.τhey
spoke about the importance of being a role model for their younger family mem-
bers, making their parents and other family members proud, and being able to
give back to their community once they graduated.
τhe students cited social support on campus, including Native American and
multicultural centers, as critical to their persistence. It was important for the stu-
dents to be around other AI/ AN students, particularly for those who came from
reservations and were accustomed to being in primarily AI/ AN communities.
Guillory suggests the following three strategies to help retain AI/ AN students:
1. Maintain connections to family and tribal communities.
2. Address single-parent students and students with family issues.
3. Provide academic assistance through peer mentoring.
For Discussion
1. What can we learn from the history and particularity of the American Indian
experience that might help develop effective strategies to enhance their edu-
cational opportunities?
2. How might these strategies be useful when applied to other groups?
Source: Guillory 200 9.
THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP: S 。 Cl 。 L。 GICAL

EXPLANATI 。 NS F。 R PERSISTENT INEQUALITY
What explains persistent disparities in educational outcomes by race and eth-

nicity? Sociologists describe the disparate educational outcomes of whites,
。chievement gap Asians, blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans as the achievement gap. A
The disparate educational variety of sociological explanations have been offered for this gap, and we will
outcomes of whites, explore a few of these in this section.
Asians, blacks, Latinos, 币1e first observation to make when discussing educational disparities is that
and Native Americans. public education in the United States depends heavily on local property taxes.
Inequalities in housing values translate into inequalities in schools.
The Achievemen • Gap: Socio logical E× p lanations for Persistent Inequality 233
Affirmative Action in Brazil

In B「·azi l ，门early half the population is of African descent, In co门sequence, it has histo「ically been d ifficult for
yet this group is underrepresen•ed in positio 门s of poli•ical nonwhi•e s•udents to gαin adm ission to these schools.
and eco门omic power. I 门 2003, 0 门ly 2 pe陀en↑ of the Brazilian u门ivers ity admission is based primari ly on s•u-
deputies in the 门ationa l congress iden•ified •hemselves den•s' scores on an e× am . However, public secondary
as black. Black Brazilians make up 70 perce门t of the schools ofte门 seldom provide s•udents with adequa•e
poo陪st decile (• enth of the population) in B 「azil and p「eparation to atta in sufficier廿ly high scores on the
only 15 pe陀e门↑ of the richest decile (Htun 2004). And e× am. This disparity in scores be•ween public and pri-
in 2000, o 门ly 2 pe陀en↑ of university graduates we陪 vate school students led to an overrep「esen↑G↑ion of
black (Lloyd 2004). A mo「e recent s•udy shows that, wea Ithy and wh i•e students in Brazilian unive「sities.
despi•e reforms, wh i•e Brazilians conti 门ue to have an ｜门 October 2003, the s•0 •e of Rio de 、J anei 「O
average of two mo「e years of schooling than black announced •ha• 40 percen• of adm ission slots for i•S
Brazilians (Telles, Flores, and Urrea-Gira ldo 2015). state universi •ies would be reserved for black and
The B「azilia 门 cons↑itution has l o门g included p「o brow 门 students . Soon afte 「ward, the sta•e of Minas
visions that preven↑ disc 「imination. However, t「1ese Gerais se• aside 50 percen• of its slots for S•udents
provisions have 门ot been enough •o ove「come racial from public seconda 「y schools (Tel les 2004). In sub-
i门equa l ity. In 「esponse to publ ic pressure, beginn i 门9 seque 门↑ years, o •her public unive「si↑ies added •heir
i门↑he early ↑we 门↑y千i rs• century,• he Brazi l ia 门 gover门－ own versions of affirmative action policies, giving
me 门↑↑urned ↑o affirmative action (H↑U 门 2004). p「eference ↑o stude 门↑s based on characteristics such
Today in Brazi l, federa l law requ i 「es a ll federa l as public high school G忖e门dance; fam ily income; or
universities •o imp l eme 门↑ affi rmative action policies . being black, indigenous, or brown (Telles and Pa i× 00
Fede 「al universities in B 「azil a 「e amo门9 ↑he bes• 2013). In 2012 ，↑he 门－ P「esident Dilma Rousseff signed
ins•i•utions of highe 「 education i 门↑he coun↑「y and are •he "Law of Social Quotas ,” which requ ired al l public
free of charge. Paradoxical ly, the students mos• likely u门 iversities ↑o rese 「ve half of their adm ission spots for
•o gai 门。dmissio 门 ↑o these free publ ic universi• ies o 「e students who had G↑↑e 门ded public high schools . The
•hose who at•end e× pensive, elite seco 门dary schools . in↑e门↑ion of the law was to increase racial diversity by
Wealthy fami l 邸， which are dispropo 「↑ion a •ely using public school a忖end a 门ce as a p「0×y. Rousseff
wh i怡， have historica lly e× pended large amounts of indica•ed that the goal of the law was to increase
money on priva•e second a 「y schools •o ensure •ha• the 门umber of African-descended students in public
• heir child 「en gain admission •o the publ ic u门 ivers i↑i es u门 ivers i↑ies from 8,700 •o 56,000 over the ne×• ten
(Telles a 门d Pai×。0 2013). years (Gl ickhouse 2012).
Parental Socioeconomic Status

In the United States, parental education, income, and wealth are not dis-
tributed evenly. A major factor that can help us understand racial and ethnic
inequality in education is overall socioeconomic inequality. For example, one
study tracked the college completion rates of youth who were sophomores
in high school in 1980. Over half of the youth whose family incomes were in
234 CHAPTER 8 Ed uca • io na l lneq ua li • y
the top 25 percent had earned a college degree by 1992, compared with only
7 percent of those whose family incomes were in the lowest 25 percent.τhe
chances of college completion for the higher-income group were thus seven
times higher than the chances for the lower-income group. Overall, differences
in family income can explain about one-third of the test score gap between
blacks and whites and nearly all of the differences in college completion rates
(Gamoran 2001).
In addition to family income, parental education matters. Children with
parents who have college degrees, for example, are much more likely to attend
college than children whose parents have not completed high school. Parental
education is one factor that explains Asians' relatively high educational attain-
ment. In 1990, 65 percent of immigrants from India had college degrees, as
did 63 percent of immigrants from Taiwan. However, it is important to rec-
ognize the variety in the Asian American experience: less than S percent of
Cambodian and Laotian immigrants had a college degree in 1990 (Kao and
Thompson 2003). The reason for these differences is related to immigration
policy: most Taiwanese and Indian immigrants came on skill-based visas,
which required high levels of education, whereas most Cambodians and Lao-
tians came as refugees.
Children from working-class backgrounds tend to fare less well in school
than children from middle-class or wealthy families. In 2013, these differences
in test scores persisted, both by socioeconomic status and by race/ ethnicity
(IZena et al. 2016; Figures 8-2 and 8-3）.τhe fact that African Americans and
Latinos are, on average, less wealthy than white students helps explain some
of the inequalities in educational
64 outcomes. In one study, sociolo-
60 口 Low- SES household
gists Vincent Roscigno and ] ames
口 Middle-SES household
。』oumo －
50
圃 High-SES household 42
44 Ainsworth-Darnell (1999) found
39
40
33
31
that family socioeconomic status
29
mwuω
30 24 could explain about half of the diι

20 ference between the test scores of
10 black and white children. What
。 explains the other half? Why do
MN
denmg
a2
付。
nnv
ρv4
n川、
First grade Second grade

侣
n .. black and Latino children fare less

Jτ
(Spring 2012) (Spring 2013)

BF
1
Ti 『ne of assessment well in school than white children

FIGURE 8-2.
who have the same family struc-
Average science scale scores of kindergarteners, first graders, and second ture and income levels? Sociologists
graders by family socioeconomic status (SES), 2011一2013 offer a few explanations, which we
Source: Kena et al. (2016). will consider next.
The Ac hi evemen • G ap: Soc io logical E× planat io ns for Pers istent Ineq uality 235
Grade 4
口 1992 _
500
• 2013
。·o－uω 。－
300
• 2015
250 224
206 206 207 208 205 205
197
muω
200
150
丰
。
White Black Hispanic Asian/ American Indian/
Pacific Islander Alaska Native
Race/ethnicity
Grade 8
500
。』OUω 。－
300 274
251 252
250
FIGURE 8-3 .
Average National Assessment
muω
200 of Educational Progress

150 (NAEP) reading scale scores
丰 of fourth- and eighth-grade
。
White Black Hispanic Asian/ American Indian/ students, by race/ethnicity:
Pacific Islander Alaska Native 1992, 2003, 2015
Race/ethnicity Source: Kena et al. (2016).
Cultural Explanations: ''Acting White”。nd 。”、er Theories

Sociologists and other social scientists have long conducted research on the
extent to which culture plays a role in the achievement gap. Culture is a broad
analytic concept and can refer to a wide variety of factors, o丘en revealing dis-
connects among students, parents, and teachers. oppositional
Scholars of education have spent much ink trying to understand why black culture Fordham and
students perform more poorly in school and have lower test scores than white Ogbu's (1986) thesis
students. One explanation that gained currency in the 1980s and 1990s is the tl1at black children
oppositional culture thesis. Anthropologists Signithia Fordham and John receive signals from
Ogbu (1986) are credited with coming up with this thesis, which has two basic both the white and black
components: ( 1) African American children don’t do well in school because communities that lead
they equate school success with “ acting white,” and (2) African American them to reject schooling
children have responded to widespread discrimination by developing an iden- as a route to success.
tity in opposition to dominant white culture, and thus in opposition to school
success. 卫1e basis of this argument is that black children receive signals from 。cting white A term u sed
both the white and black communities that lead them to reject schooling as to refer to nonwhites who
a route to success. Fordham and Ogbu contend that the experiences of black are perceived as behaving
students and their parents with discrimination cause them to distrust white in ways associated with
authority figures and institutions. Additionally, they argue that black students white people.
236 CHAPTER 8 Edu ca • ional Ineq uality
develop anti-achievement attitudes to avoid peer sanctions. They found that

black students equate “ working hard to get good grades in school”(186) with
acting white. Fordham and Ogbu's thesis is based on a studywith only thirty-three
students, and it gained an inordinate amount of media attention.
τhe idea that black students do not do well in school because they have antischool
attitudes was widely accepted and publicized because it resonated with the popular
belief that black people do not value education. However, a series of subsequent
studies have shown that it is simply not true that black students consciously
underachieve or equate academic success with acting white. For example, using
a nationally represe时ative sample of nearly 町000 students, James Ainsworth-
Darnell and Douglas Downey (1998) found that black students had more po副ve
attitudes toward school than white students.τhey also found that black students
reported being more popular when they did better in school, refuting the claim
that black students experience peer pressure to reject school.τhey did not find
support for the claim that black students perceive lower returns from education
than white students; instead, black students were more likely than white students
to agree with the statement that education is important to ge忧ing a job.
In a qualitative study of seventy-two black students from the southeastern part
of the United States, Karolyn Tyson (200功 found that black third-and fourth-
graders were consistently very excited about school and about learning. In her
study, students were proud when they excelled and disappointed when they got
answers wrong or were not allowed to participate in classroom activities. Instead
of experiencing high achievement as a burden, as Fordham and Ogbu (1986) have
argued, Tyson (2002, 1174) found that black youth experienced a 、1rden of low
achievement,” in which they felt emotional distress when they did not do well.
Tracking
Even when schools are supposedly inte-
grated, there is o丘en internal segrega-
tion. In her well-known book titled Why
Are All the Black !(ids Sitting Togetheγ in
the Cafeteria? (2003), Beverly Daniel
Tatum provides many answers to this
question. One response is that schools
are internally segregated, with white stu-
dents being the most likely to be in the
more advanced classes. When children
are in different classes, it is not surpris-
ing that they do not spend time together
A Why are schools often internally segregated? during social hours.
The Ac hi evemen • Gap: Soc iological E× planatio ns for Pers istent Ineq uality 237
From elementary to high school,

students in U.S. schools are placed
in different classes based on ability
groups, or “ tracks. ” Many studies
have found that nonwhite children
are more likely to be placed in
low-ability groups, beginning in ele-
mentary school, whereas white chil-
dren are more likely to be placed in
college-bound tracks in high school.
Kao and Thompson (2003) discuss
data from 1997 which reveals that
nearly half of whites and Asians
were in college preparatory tracks,
compared with about a third of
Latino and Asian students and less A Schools that are predominantly white are 1nore likely to have advanced
than a quarter of Native American placement (AP) classes than primarily black and Latino schools.
students. Another study, based on
1998 data, found that white students were twice as likely to be in advanced
mathematics courses as blacks were.τhis study, however, found that the diι
ferences could be explained by accounting for test scores, grades, prior track
placement, and socioeconomic status (IZelly 2009). A more recent nationally
representative study found that African Americans and Latinos were under-
represented in advanced sophomore math classes in a large number of schools.
Moreover, black and Latino students at those schools had lower average GPAs
and rates of university enrollment (Muller et al. 2010).
In addition to within-school differences, there are also disparities between
schools. Schools that are predominantly white are more likely to have advanced
placement (AP) classes than primarily black and Latino schools. The different
opportunities that black, Latino, and Native American students have to take
advanced classes have important impacts on their overall academic achieve-
ment and college success rates (Kao and Thompson 2003 ).
Social and Cultural Capital and Schooling social capital Relationships

Sociologists of education also o丘en turn to social and cultural capital as expla- and networks that offer
nations for the achievement gap. Social capital refers to relationships and social and other benefits.
networks, whereas cultural capital describes available cultural resources.
Put simply, social capital is who you know, whereas cultural capital is what you cultural capital Cultu1·al
know. Students who know many people who have had educational success- resources that offer social
parents, uncles, aunts, and cousins with college degrees-will have more and other benefits.
238 CHAPTER 8 Educa • ional Ineq uality
information and resources at their disposal than students whose social net-
works primarily include high school dropouts or people with no schooling
at all.τhis social capital will play a role in a student's ability to succeed. In a
similar fashion, students with access to dominant cultural capital-the norms,
values, and cultural knowledge of the school-will have more chances for suc-
cess than students whose families are not part of the dominant culture.
Based on their research with Mexican-origin students in the Bay Area,
sociologists Ricardo Stanton-Salazar and Sanford M. Dornbusch (1995) argue
that to be successful in school, adolescents require supportive ties with insti-
institutional agent A tutional agents. An institutional agent is a person who occupies a position of
person who occupies a power and is able to access or negotiate resources for students.τhese institu-
position of power and is tional agents can be family or community members as well as school person-
able to access or negotiate nel. An institutional agent can be a high school counselor who helps a student
resources for others. obtain financial aid, an alumnus of a local college who serves as a mentor to
a student and helps him or her fill out college applications, or a high school
teacher who writes a college recommendation for a student. These institu-
tional agents constitute a form of social capital that permits students to reach
their educational goals. Working-class youth have less of this necessary form
of social capital, which makes reaching their educational goals more difficult.
Most schools in the United States make some effort to recognize the multi-
cultural nature of the nation. Nevertheless, people whose culture and experi-
ences are part of the dominant culture are in charge of most schools. Children
whose families are part of the dominant culture thus have an inherent advan-
tage, as they do not have to learn the codes and norms of the dominant culture
to be successful in school. Moreover, the school does not devalue their experi-
ences and culture.
卫1e concept of cultural capital draws from the work of French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu (1984), who argued that the dominant group in a society
makes its preferences, tastes, and norms appear to be superior to those of the
nondominant group. He describes the power of the dominant group to do this
symbolic violence As as symbolic violence, as the dominant group creates a context in which the
described by Pierre norms, values, and tastes of other groups are labeled as inferior. An example of
Bourdieu (1984), the this symbolic violence in the United States is the idea that the standard form
power of a socially of English spoken by middle-class white Americans is an indication of intelli-
dominant group to make gence and eloquence, whereas the forms of English that working-class African
its preferences, tastes, Americans speak to one another is an indication of ignorance. The dominant
and norms appear to be group-middle-class whites-sets the standards.
superior to those of the What all this means for education is that children who grow up in homes
nondominant group. where Standard English is spoken can speak this language in school and
The Achievement Gap: Sociological Explanations for Persisten• Inequality 239
receive praise for their intelligence and eloquence. Meanwhile, children raised
in homes where other forms of English or other languages are spoken must
learn new languages and accents in school, and their teachers may tell them
not to speak the way their parents do at home. 古1e act of telling children that
the way their parents speak is inferior and unacceptable in a school environ-
ment can amount to symbolic violence.
Scholars such as Michele Lamont and Annette Lareau (1988, 16份 define
cultural cap让al as "widely shared, legitimate culture made up of h地h-status
cultural 鸣nals (attitudes, preferences, behaviors, and goods) used in direct or
indirect social and cultural exclusion." Other scholars, however, contend that all
people have cultural capital, not solely those who belong to the dominant group.
Sociologist Prudence Carter (2003) explains that nondominant cultural capital
refers to those cultural resources and tastes that people who do not belong to the
dominant group use to gain authenticity as a member oftheir group. For example,
African American youth may use nondominant cultural 叩tal 叫 askn州吨e
of the latest underground hip-hop music to s地ni马r their cultural authenticity.
In this way, nondominant cultural capital also has an instrumental use-even
though that use may not benefit the youth very much in terms of dominant society.
In a 2003 study, Prudence Carter interviewedAfricanAmerican youth in New
York, who explained to her that they used different ways of talking at home and
at school because they knew that speaking Standard English would be valued
in a school se忧ing. Carter’s interviewees pointed to dress, musical, and speech
st泸es as the most salient cultural indicators of what it means to be authentically
black. Carter, however, found there was a certain amount of tension involved
in these students' navigation of their home and school identities. Students told
her they could easily navigate the different cultural markers and language of the
two environments. However, in some cases, the youth"sensed that their cultural
presentations of selves negatively influenced teachers’ evaluations”(150). Black
youth who wish to maintain cultural authenticity have to work hard to maintain
an appropriate balance. However, middle-class white youth whose families and
communities value dominant cultural capital do not have to worry about this
balancing act. As Carter explains, the black youth she worked with
perceived that teachers evaluated them as dφcient based on the teachers'

and the schools' standards of cultural decorum. They understood that most
Whites with whom they came into contact used Standard English primarily,
the language that facilitates success in U.S. schools (although it is not a s~严
.ficient condition by itse瓦）. At the same time, they did not believe their own
speech s抄les to be incompatible with school success. (151)
240 CHAPTER 8 Educa • ional Ineq uality
Although most teachers have good intentions, the reality is that teachers are
members ofour society and, like all ofus, they are inundated with media images that
reinforce stereotypes. 咀1e prevalence of stereotypes about blacks and criminality,
for example, influences how teachers respond to black boys who misbehave.τhis,
in turn, affects black boys' schooling outcomes. Ann Arnett Ferguson (2001)
offers a poignant example from a school in California where a white teacher
compared black children who didn’t return library books t。“looters.” Instead
。dultify When a teacher of seeing the children as careless or forgetful, the teacher resorted to racialized
or other at1thority figure stereotypes ofblack men as thieves. Ferguson argues that cultural representations
interprets children's ofblack men as criminals serve to adulti马r black boys in the eyes ofteachers. 币1us,
behavior as if they were instead of seeing black boys as “ just being boys'' when they misbehave, teachers
adults. were inclined to say things such as “ that boy has a jail cell with his name on it.”
Moes ha
.......... . ......................................... . ............ . ......................... . .........................
Prudence Carter's (2003) work introduces us to a young African American woman

named Moesha, who had recently graduated from high school, found an entry-level
job, and taken a few college courses. Moesha was what Carter calls a “ cultural
straddler” in that she was able to use “ black” cultural capital as well as dominant
cultural capital, depending on the situation. However, Moesha perceived that there
. are tensions between dominant and “ black” cultural capital.

Moesha explained to Carter in an interview:
We’re [African Americans] not ignorant; there are just certain ways that
we talk to each other. It might not seem right, but that doesn't mean we’re
dumb. See I know people who can act ignorant [clownish] as anything, but
they are also smart, and they can also talk in an intelligent way. It ’sjust that
when you talk with your friends, you talk in a certain way. Or when you’re at
work or wherever you’re at, you have to act intelligent.
Later, Moesha explained how these ideas were carried over into the school setting:
There were like certain teachers, they would give you attitude for no reason.
And you’re like ... I didn’t do anything. But for me, it was only like for certain
friends that I had [who] were outspoken, and me I was very passive. I在 let
whoever say whatever. And [my friends] weren’t like that. I guess ... for my
friends, I didn’t like the way that the teacher would talk to them. I had friends
that ... were very smart. They were very, very smart, and the teachers think
that because they are a certain way, and they act a certain way, that they are not
smart. And that's not true. They are; they are very smart. It's important that
you learn about people.
The Ac hi evemen • G ap: Soc io logical E× p Ia nat io ns for Pe rs istent Ine q ua Iit y 241
Even though Moesha had learned that she was expected to use Standard
English and deferential modes of behavior in school to gain t he teacher’s
favor, she recognized that these expectations also meant that students who
were more outspoken were mistreated.
It is also important to think about the fact that whereas white, .
middle-class students can use the same speech styles and behavioral man-
nerisms at home and at school, children from working-class and non-white
communities are expected to alter their behavior when at school. This puts
a certain burden on students who do not hail from the dominant culture. In υ、
addition, it sends home a strong message when a teacher tells a student that
the way he or she (and his or her parents) speaks at home is “ ignorant.”
Sot1rce: Carter 2003.

……………................. . ........................ . ....... . .. . ..................... . ...............
Hidden Curricula and the School-to-Prison Pipeline

Schools are sites of socialization and learning: students learn to become
members of society and develop the skills necessary to be successful.τhe offi-
cial curricula of schools include subjects such as math, science, history, and,
increasingly, test-taking skills. Schools are also meant to function as sorting
mechanisms: students who work hard and perform well will become the future
leaders of society. Some education scholars argue that there is also a hidden hidden curriculum
curriculum, in that the school curriculum is designed to reflect the cultural Underlying cu1·riculum
hegemony and ensure the class interests of the dominant group. From this designed to reflect and
perspective, schools also function as sorting mechanisms, but not in a merito- promote the interests of
cratic fashion. Instead, schools reproduce the status quo. tl1e dominant class.
One of the ways that schools reproduce racial inequality is through rules and
punishment. Students are evaluated not only on their achievement, but also on
their ability to conform to rules. Punishment for rule breaking becomes a mecha-
nism of social differentiation and normalization. 咀1e disciplinary techniques used
by schools label children as “good，”“bad，”“gi丘ed，” and “ troublemakers,” and chil-
dren are judged on their ability to conform to school rules (Ferguson 2001, 52).
In her book Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity, Ann
Arnett Ferguson argues that teachers are more likely to interpret the behavior school斗。－prison pipeline
of African American boys as defiant or inappropriately expressive (2001). As A set of practices that
a result of this interpretation and labeling, these students are more likely to lead to children being
receive punishment.τhere is a certain circularity here: since punishment o丘en funneled from public
involves exclusion from the classroom, these students fall further behind. schools into the juvenile
卫1is circularity is a crucial part ofwhat some scholars call the school-to-prison and criminal justice
pipeline-a set of practices that leads to children being funneled from public system.
242 CHAPTER 8 Educa • ion a l Inequality
schools into the juvenile and criminal justice system. Factors contributing to this
pipeline include a rise in suspension rates across the country and increased polic-
ing of and arrests within schools. These practices build up over the course of a
child ’s educational career and have harmful effects on black and Native American
youth in particular. Across all age groups, starting with preschool, black students
are three times more likely than white students to be suspended from school, and
Native American students, twice as likely. Relatedly, black and Native American
students are also twice as likely as other students to be subject to school-related
arrests (U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rightρ014).
γeseαγc
The Asian American Achievement Paradox

In a 201 S book, Jennifer Lee and 岛1in Zhou explored the factors that have led to
Asian American educational success in the United States. One of the factors they
focus on is the hyperselectivi抄 of Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants-a pattern
whereby these immigrants have much higher rates of educational attainment than
the general population in their countries of origin. In China, for example, only about
4 percent of adults hold a bachelor’s degree or higher. In contrast, SO percent of Chi-
nese immigrants to the United States hold a bachelor’s degree or higher. Chinese
immigration to the United States is thus hyperselective in terms of college education.
Moreover, more than halfof college-educated immigrants have an advanced degree
such as a master’s or a doctorate, making Chinese immigrants far more educated than
those who do not emig时e.τhe numbers are not as stark for Vietname风 although
they are still quite remarkable. Whereas only S percent of people in Vietnam have col-
lege degrees, 23 percent ofVietnamese immigrants in the United States have college
degrees. Both Chinese and Vietnamese immigration is highly selective.
Selectivity works very differently in the case of Mexicans. People in Mexico are
much more likely to have college degrees than people in China-17 percent versus
4 percent. Only S percent of Mexican immigrants to the United States, however,
have bachelor’s degrees or higher. For Mexican immigrants, then, we witness nega-
tive educational selectivity, when compared with the general population in Mexico.
In addition to positive educational selectivity, Vietnamese immigrants to the
United States have received assistance from the United States government due to
their designation as refugees. Whereas Mexican immigrants are o丘en ineligible for
welfare, Vietnamese refugees received cash and other forms of assistance from the
government to assist them in ge仗ing settled.
Cone Ius ion and Discussio n 243
咀1e children of Chinese, Vietnamese, and Mexican

50
immigrants have different educational outcomes in
part due to the different circumstances they confront
40
in the United States. Over half of the children of Mex-
Non-Hispanic
。
ican immigrants have a parent who lacks a high school 0) Whites 31o/o
旦 30
diploma, compared with only 6 percent of their Chinese c
Q)
()
28°/o 28°/o
L囚
and 12 percent of their Vietnamese counterparts. 。 Non-Hispanic

a.. 20 Blacks 18°/o
As Lee and Zhou point out, the children of 孔1exi
17°/o
can immigrants in their study nevertheless achieved
10
tremendous intergenerational mobility. Even though
more than half of their parents did not graduate from
。
college, only 14 percent of the children dropped out Chinese Vietnamese Mexicans
of high school. 岛1oreover, the children of Mexican 口 BA Degree or Higher in Country of Origin
immigrants in their study had a college graduation • BA Degree or Higher in Foreign-Born

Co-ethnics in the United States
rate of 18 percent, which is three times that of their 口 BA Degree or Higher in General
U.S. Population
parents. In contrast, the college completion rate of
the Chinese children of immigrants in their study is FIGURE RF 8.1
only slightly higher than that of their parents. Immigrant Selectivity: Chinese, Vietnamese,
and Mexican Immigrants Age 25 or Older with a
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher
For Discussion
1. What is hyperselectivity, and how does it relate to
pa忧erns
of Chinese migration?
2. Why do Lee and Zhou argue that the children of Mexican immigrants expe-
rience higher rates of intergenerational mobility than the children of Chinese
immigrants?
Source: L ee and Z hou 2 015.
c 。 NCLUSI 。 N AND DISCUSSI 。 N
In the United States, one-third of adults over the age of twenty-five have a
bachelor’s degree. With the changing labor market and growing inequality,
postsecondary education has become increasingly important. An individual ’s
opportunities for financial stability increasingly depend on completing college.
In this chapter, we have explored the various dimensions of educational
inequality； τhere are many sociological explanations for why Native Americans,
Latinos, and African Americans are less likely than white adults to have a college
degree. Some of these reasons are historicalj the parents of many people of color
244 CHAPTER 8 Educa • ional Inequality
did not have college degrees because of extreme barriers to higher education
in the past. There are also socioeconomic explanations. For example, it is more
difficult to attend college ifyou are in a financially precarious situation, and whites
have, on average, higher incomes than other groups. 币1ere are also structural and
cultural explanations for racial disparities in educational outcomes.
What do we do with all of this information? Many fantastic public schools
across the country continue to be primarily or exclusively white. Meanwhile,
there are vastly underresourced and even dangerous schools that primarily
serve black, Latino, and Native American youth. What does it say about us as
a nation that we do not give truly equal opportunities to children from disad-
vantaged backgrounds?
Key Terms
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affirmative action 227 symbolic violence 238

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oppositional culture 235 school-to-prison pipeline 241

－
8.1 What are the dimensions of racial inequality in our educational

system? (pp. 220-228)
• The United States has a long history of educational inequality. In the early twen-
tieth century, Native American, African American, and Mexican American chil-
dren were relegated to separate and inferior schools. Segregation was outlawed in
1954, yet it has produced lingering effects.

> How has educational attainment across racial > What are some lingering effects of forced school
and ethnic groups changed over time? segregation?
》认That are Indian schools, and what were the > How might the concept of intergenerational
conditions like in those schools? trauma help us to understand racial inequalities
> On what basis could plaintiffs in the Brown v. today?
Board ofEducation case argue that schools were
not “ separate but equal ”?
》飞气Thy did it take so long for schools to become
integrated a丘er the 1954 Brown v. Board of
Education decision?
8.2 How important is the historical legacy of unequal educational opportunities?

(pp. 228-232)
• Asian and white students tend to do better on tests, have higher GPAs, and have
higher rates of college completion than African American, Native American, and
Latino students.

> What is the relationship between school segre- > Why is there so much variation in the educa-
gation and poverty? tional success rates between Asian American
》飞i\Thy have schools begun to resegregate since 1991? students of different nationalities?
8.3 How can we explain the continuing gap in the educational achievements of
white, Asian, black, Native American, and Latino students? (pp. 232-243)
• Sociologists offer several explanations for disparate educational outcomes, includ-
ing oppositional culture explanations, tracking, social and cultural capital, and
hidden curricula.
Review Specify which racial ideologies you are referring

> Give examples of the theoretical explanations to and how they are connected to inequality.
sociologists offer for the achievement gap. > Which explanation for the achievement gap do
> What is the difference between social and you find most convincing? Why?
cultural capital? How are social and cultural > To what extent do you think that black children
capital related to educational success? do less well in school than white children
because of the desire not to be perceived as
Critical Thinking “ acting white勺 On what empirical basis do you
> Explain and reflect on the tension some youth face
make your arguments?
between maintaining cultural authenticity and
> How are social and cultural capital important
being perceived as serious students. How much
for school success? Can you reflect on the
does this resonate with your personal experience?
importance of social and cultural capital in your
> How do racial ideologies play a role in reproduc-
own educational experiences?
ing racial inequalities within the school system?
Talking about Race

Imagine someone said to you that Asians are naturally gi丘edatmath.
Based on what you have read in this chapter, what are some ways you could
respond to such a statement? Could you talk about the variation in Asian
American rates of success? Could you talk about hyperselectivity? What
other factors do you think can help us unravel the model minority myth?
The Female Workers Were the Last to Arrive North (The Migration Series, Panel No. 57). Jacob Lawrence. 1940-1941. Casein
tempera on hardboard. (The Phillips Collection，怀7ashington, D.C叮 USA/Acquired 1942/Bridgemαη Images)
Chapter 。utline
Income Inequality by Race, Ethnicity,

。 nd Gender 250
Dimensions of Racial Disparities in

the Labor Market 254
Disparities among Women 254
. Disparities among Asian
Americans 256
Underemploymen( Unempfoymen(
and Joblessness 258
Voices J o 「red 259
Sociological Explanations for Income
and Labor Market Inequality 262
Individual-Level E× planations 263
Voices Latina P「ofessionals as
Racia lized Toke 门s: Lisa's S↑0「y 264
Structural E× planations 266
resea1·ch focus Discrimination i 门。
Low-Wage Labo 「 Ma 「ke↑ 267
Affirmative Action in
Employment 271
Entrepreneurship and
Self-Employment 273
Global View Racial Disc 「imination in

As Y。u Read Aus↑「alia 275

9.1 What is the extent of income inequality, and how does it
vary by race, ethnicity, and gender?
Talking abou • Race 279
9.2 What are some dimensions of labor market inequality?
9.3 How do sociologists explain labor market inequality?
9.4 Can a而rmative action be an appropriate remedy for labor
market discrimination?
9.5 What is the relationship between selιemployment and
labor market inequality?
248 CHAPTER 9 Inco me a nd Lab o 「 M a 「ket In equ ality
In the following excerpt, journalist David Cay Johnston describes the

IVIDED contours of growing inequality in the United States. Whereas average
wages have stagnated and even d ecreased, income at the top has
PERI LS
grown exponentially.
GROW
INEQUALIT
rom the end of World War II until the early 1970s, the vast majority of
IDltlt I
Americans enjoyed steadily improving lives. Wages increased and a
DAVID CAY JOHNSTON
growing share of workers benefited from steady employment with fringe
benefits such as health care, paid vacations, and pensions. 卫1e number of jobs
grew steadily, especially for work requiring a college education or advanced
degrees, as taxpayer investments in basic research produced tangible products and
life-extending services. Many more people became home owners, o丘en finding
that their monthly outlay was less than when they rented. Poverty remained a prob-
lem, but it was in decline, especially for older Americans. For most families with
children one income was enough. Americans had debt仙ut they grew in tandem
with the economy. Cars were typically bought on three-year loans, not the five-,
six-, and seven-year loans common toda予 τhe real income reported on federal tax
returns by the vast majority of Americans, the 90 percent, doubled between the
end of the war and 1973.
’Then the lives of the vast majority stopped ge忧ing better and, a丘er a few years,
began a long and painful slide backward. Unions dwindled, shi丘ing the power to
set pay from organized groups of workers with advice from market experts to indi-
vidual employees negotiating, or more o丘en just accepting, pay set by employers.
卫1e rising costs of health care diverted more compensation from cash wages to
insurance premiums. Trade rules that o丘en favored other nations destroyed many
well-paying manufacturing jobs, including more than 50,000 factories and 2.8 m il-
lion jobs offshored to China.
As a result, the vast majority’s average income rose above the 1973 level only
four times-1999, 2000, 2001, and 2007-and even then added only the equiv-
alent of one additional week ’s income to each year. By 2012 the average income
of the vast majority had shrunk to the equivalent of 45 weeks of 1973 income-a
13 percent decline to $30,997 from $35,584 in 1973, expressed in 2012 dollars.
Between 1998 and 2011, the median weekly wage-half make more, halfless-
stagnated between $533 and $546 in 2012 dollars, then dropped in 2012 to $529
and change, or $2'i飞519 for the year. Almost a third of the 153.6 million Americans
with a job at any time in 2012 made less than $15,000, averaging just $6,100.
CHAPTER 9 Income an d La bor Mar ket Ineq uality 249
In recent years nearly all of the income growth has been in jobs paying more
than $75,000-about one in every eight jobs. At the top, pay soared. In 2012
the number of people whose jobs paid cash wages of $5 million or more grew
by 27 percent to 8,982 workers while their inflation-a句usted combined pay
increased by 40 percent over 2011.
While the average income of the vast majority in 2012 fell back to the
level of 1966 (actually, $9 less than in 1966), the news got only better for the
top 1 percent. 咀1ey saw their average incomes rise from nearly $441,000 to
$1,264,000, a real increase that nearly tripled their pretax incomes. At the very,
very top, the news was nothing short of fantastic. The top 1 percent of the top
1 percent, or one in every 10,000 households, saw their average income
skyrocket from $5.4 million in 1966 to almost $30.8 million in 2012. 币1at
means that for every $1 in 1966 income, each household at the top reported
$5.67 in 2012. Most of these are not the same people, but the figures tell us
how, as a group, America rewarded its wealthiest, while the vast majority
(also not the same people, forty-six years later) saw their incomes wither.
Meanwhile, poverty is worsening. Among developed countries only
Romania has a larger share of its children in poverty二 In any recent yea鸟 more
than one in five American children lived in a home without enough food for
everyone at all times. Black and Hispanic children are five times more likely
than children overall to live in households with what our government euphe-
mistically calls “ very low food security.” Food banks report that their shelves
o丘en go bare before the lines of people are served and that most of their new
customers since 2008 are married couples with children who used to have two
jobs and now have none. To people accustomed to a pantry full of food and a
refrigerator with not enough shelf space for everything that comes home from
the grocery store, this may be hard to grasp. Yet one in every 且丘y-two people
you meet today, statistically, has no income except food stamps.
Source: Johnston 2015.
In Divided, Johnston (2015) considers the rise of income inequality in the

United States. A丘er World War II, quality of life for those in the working and
middle classes improved each year until 1973, when average income began to
fall. Meanwhile, the income of the upper classes began to skyrocket. Today, the
United States is one of the most unequal countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Moreover, inequality is mapped along race and gender lines, with African
250 CHAPTER 9 Income and Labo 「 Ma 「ket Inequ ality
Americans and Latinos earning substantially less than whites. We see this racial
inequality not just in income but also in the labor market as a whole. In this
chapter, we will take a closer look at income and labor market inequality and
develop a deeper understanding of racial inequality in the United States today.
Studies of labor market discrimination and income inequality clearly show
that men earn more than women and that white workers earn more than non-
white workers, even accounting for differences in education, skills, years on
the job, and productivity (Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009). Why are
employers willing to pay a premium for white male workers? It seems as if in
a capitalist society, employers should want to get the best worker they can for
the lowest price. Yet the evidence suggests that employers routinely pass over
highly qualified black and Latino candidates and offer raises and promotions
to white candidates (Pager and Shepard 2008). Why
do you think this is the case? Why are employers
less likely to hire black and Latino candidates? Why
are highly qualified Asians paid less than their white
counterparts?
INC 。ME INEQUALITY BY RACE,

ETHNICITY, AND GENDER
Before delving into inequalities among racial and
ethnic groups, it is worth pointing out that in the
United States, the difference in earnings between
the richest and the poorest people has widened over
the past few decades. Income inequality among
Americans has increased in large part because of tre-
mendous growth in the incomes of the highest earn-
ers and stagnation or decline in the incomes of the
lowest earners. Although the average national house-
hold income was about $64,500 in 2000, which was
60 percent more than it had been in 1980 (in constant
2014 dollars), the average income of the bottom 50
percent of earners was only $16,000-the same as
it was in 1980. By 2014, the top 50 percent of earn-
ers were taking in 88 percent of all income, up from
A With the Washington Monument in the
background, activists stand in place to form a “ 99% ,” about 80 percent in 1980. 咀1e top 1 percent alone
part of Occupy DC activities in 2011 to protest took in 20 percent of all income. In fact, the average
income and wealth inequality. income of the top 1 percent rose from $420,000 in
Income Ineq ua li ty by Race , E• hn ic ity, and Gen d e r 251
1980 to $1.3 million in 2014-81 times more than the average income of the
bottom SO percent (Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 2016).
You may recall the slogans of the “ Occupy Wall Street'' movement referring
to this income (and wealth) disparity, such as:“We are the 99%.” Tensions over
inequality in the United States have risen in recent years in response to rising
inequality. In 2013, the richest 20 percent of the U.S. population earned sixteen
times more, on average, than the poorest 20 percent. In this regard, the United
States compares unfavorably to both Mexico and Uruguay, as shown in Figure 9-1.
The United States has become one of the most unequal advanced economies
in the world in terms of income, with a Gini coe面cient of 43. (By comparison,
Uruguay 8.0
Venezuela 8.4
El Salvador 11.0
Peru 11.4
Ecuador 11.6
Mexico 12.1
Nicaragua 12.6
Chile 13.0
Argentina 14.2
Costa Rica 14.5
United States 16.0
Colombia 18.4
Pan a汀1a 1~.7 FIGURE 9-1.

Inequality in the Americas
Dominican Republic 20.1 The higher the 11umber,
the greater the economic
Bolivia 20.8
inequality, calculated by
Paraguay 20.9 dividing tl1e annt1al inco1ne
of the richest 20 percent by
Brazil 21.4 the annual income of the
poorest 20 percent.
Guatemala 22.4
Source: U.N. Econo 门1ic Co 付1 付1ission
for Latin America and the
Honduras 25.2 Caribbean and U.S. Census, cited
by Isacson (2013).
。 10 20 30
252 CHAPTER 9 Income a nd Labor Ma 「 ket Ineq uali ty
Gini coefficient A Norway's Gini coefficient is 23.) The Gini coe面cient is a measure from 1 to
meas11re of ineq11ality, 100, with O representing perfect equality (i.e., everyone earning exactly the
with O representing same amount) and 100 representing perfect inequality (i.e., a single person
perfect equality and 100 having all the earnings) (International Labor Organization 2013). This
representing perfect inequality is problematic both because it means that the United States has an
ineq11ality. increasingly large poor population and because inequality is related to a host
of health and social problems, including high rates of low birth weight, homi-
cide, mental illness, and violent crime (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).
Compared with similar nations, the United States is the most unequal on a
variety of other measures as well. In addition to having the highest Gini coe缸，
cient, it also ranks last in child poverty rates, has the largest ratio between the
richest 10 percent and the poorest 10 percent, and has the highest percentage
of people living below SO percent of the median income (Internationalcom-
parisons.org 2014; Figure 9之）．
Overall inequality is exacerbated by earnings inequality distributed
along racial and ethnic lines. In the United States today, Asians have the
highest median earnings, followed by whites and then blacks and Latinos
Australia
叫静 Canada
Denmark -
France 噩噩噩
Germany 噩噩噩
Italy
Japan Gini Index

Poverty rate (percent)
Netherlands
P90/P10 (percent)
N。rway 噩噩噩 Child income poverty
(percent)
FIGURE 9-2. Sweden -
Selected Inequality 运翅E陀~
Measures for Advanced U.K.
Economies. The United
l}t；二三＝ U.S.A.
States is one of the most
unequal advanced 。 10 20 30 40 50
economies in the world by Notes:
several measures. P90/P10 is a measure of inequality via the ratio of the richest 10 percent to the remaining
Source: International Comparison.
90 percent.
org (2017). Poverty rate is the percentage of people who make less than one-half of the median income.
Income lnequa li • y by Race, E• hnicity, and Gender 253
AT A GLANCE 9.1 Income and Labor Market Inequality
Median weekly earnings by race/ethnicity, 2016 Median weekly earnings by race/ethnicity and gender, 2016
1200
Men Women
1000
ω
』而＝
800
o℃．
ω
600
2．
400
Asian White Black Hispanic/
$1022 $881 $675 Latino 200
$646
一
。
／
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017 H an·lo
P 创
比
户u
Asian White Black Native
L
--nH
American*
Unemployment rate by race/ethnicity, 1973-2015 annual averages *Median earnings for Native
American men and women
20
are from the 2015 American
Black White Hispanic Asian
Community Survey.
15
Source: U.S. Bureau of
HCω』
Labor Statistics, 2017

10
Q。nL
。
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016
Underemployment rate of workers ages 16 or older, by race/ethnicity, 2000-2017
30
Black White H写可c
25
25
vcω』
15 14.8°/o
Q。nL
12.4°/o
10
7.5°/o
5
0
2000 2005 2010 2015
*Shaded areas indicate recessions EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics basic monthly Current
Population Survey microdata, 2017
254 CHAPTER 9 Income an d Lab o 「 M a 「ke t In equ ality
(At a Glance 9.1） .τhe median income of wl巾 workers in the United States
has been higher than that of black workers for as long as we have kept track
of income data. Such differences in earnings by group are called the earn-
阳山鸣
p Dm
t
咱 mm
mRU ’a mEmr
nn
mM
．，且、且
。
nuu冒』
α
ings gap. Sociologists provide a wide array of explanations for this gap, and
’E
ao u“
nv ar
n
o
·
we will go over many of them later in this chapter.

’且
叫
EE
How does income inequality by race and ethnicity further break down by
gender? As we see in At a Glance 9.1, the largest difference in income is between
Asian men-whose median weekly earnings were $1,147 in 2016-and Latina
women-whose median weekly earnings were $595 per week. Notably, the
gender income gap between Asian men and Asian women is also one of the
largest, with Asian men earning 26 percent more than Asian women.
wαge gαp Differences in In addition to the earnings gap, sociologists have identified a wage gap,
hourly earnings (wages). which refers to differences in hourly earnings among groups. Whereas the
earnings gap refers to overall income regardless of hours worked, the wage gap
refers only to the difference in the amount earned per hour worked. To under-
stand earnings and wage gaps by group, we need to account for broader forces
at work in the labor market.
DIMENSI 。 NS 。 F RACIAL DISPARITIES

IN THE LAB。 R MARKET
Dispar让ies in earnings and wages are tied to many facets of the labor market,
including unemployment rates, promotion practices, and employment sta-
bility.二 For example, black women are at a higher risk of unemployment than
white women, meaning they are even more economically disadvantaged than
the wage gap suggests (Pe忧it and Ewert 2009).
Is it harder for people from some racial or ethnic groups to obtain jobs?
Are some groups less likely to be promoted? Are some groups less likely to be
in stable employment? All of these factors are relevant to understanding the
extent of labor market disparities.
Disparities am。ng w。men

First, let’s look at how gender plays a role. ’There is a wage gap between men
and women in the United States: women earn, on average, 83 cents an hour
for each dollar that men earn (Gould, Schieder, and Geier 2016). Moreover,
earnings differences by gender within and across racial and ethnic groups
can be striking. White women earn 81 cents for each dollar that white men
make. However, black women make only 65 cents for each dollar tl时 white
men make, and Latina women o啡 58 cents (Economic Policy Instit眠 2016)
Dimensions of Racia I Di spa 「ities in the Labo 「 Ma 「ket 255
(Figure 9-3). Thus, analyses of racial inequality

Men $1.00
in the labor market that do not take gender into
account provide an incomplete picture (Browne w。men $0.83
and Misra 2003).

A study by Raine Dozier (2010) helps 时 under
stand how labor market forces affect the earnings White women $0.81
gap between black and white women. Her study

Black w。men $0.65
found that both groups experienced wage gains
during the 1980s and 1990s, but white women Latina women
gained more. Dozier explains that this disparity
$0.00 $0.20 $0.40 $0.60 $0.80 $1.00 $1.20
developed because white and black women were
not equally represented in the job sectors that FIGURE 9-3.
Women’s Hourly Earnings on the Dollar versus Men’s by
had the most earnings growth. Between 1980 and Race/Ethnicity
2002, more women entered the labor force and
s。urce: Economic Policy Institute 2016.
more highly paid professional positions became
available to them. White women were more like与
to attain these highly paid positions and thus gain more than their black
counterparts.
Black, white, and Latina women have different labor market outcomes, and
these vary further by level of education. Among high school graduates aged eigh-
teen to twenty-four, 61 percent of white women are employed, compared with
52 percent of black women and SS percent of Latinas. ’The trends are distinct
for college graduates: 86 percent of black female graduates aged 25 to 34 are
employed, compared w让h 82 percent ofwh让e graduates and 77 percent ofLatina
graduates ofthe same age (Alon and Haberfeld 2007). These higher rates oflabor
force participation among young college-educated black women, however, do
not translate into higher average incomes over the course of their careers.
Earnings disparities continue over the length of time spent in the work-
force. We can see this by looking at wage differentials over time. For unskilled
women-defined as women with a high school degree or less who do not
have a skilled trade-first entering the labor market, the average hourly rate
(in 1995 dollars) does not vary greatly by race and ethnicity: $6.28 for black
women, $6.42 for white women, and $6.67 for Latina women. However, by the
fourteenth year in the labor market, white and Latina women are doing, on
average, a lot better, with an average pay of $10.04 and $9.34 per hour, respec-
tively. In contrast, a丘er fourteen years of work, unskilled black women earn,
on average, only $7.48 per hour. Whereas the earnings of white and Latina
women in low-skill jobs tend to increase over time, this is not the case for black
women in low-skill jobs (Alon and Haberfeld 2007).
256 CHAPTER 9 In come and Lab o 「 Ma 「ket In eq uality
> In the United States,

women earn an average
of 83 cents for each dollar
that men earn. This pay
gap was one of the reasons
for the 2017 Women’s
March on Washington.
Bangladeshi $45,575
Dispαrities am。ng Asian Americans
Cambodian $47,873 Given the tremendous diversity within the Asian American popula-
Chinese $65,050 tion，让 canbe helpful to break these groups down by national origin
when analyzing economic disparities.τhere is a lot of variation in
Filipino $75,000
household income among Asian Americans of different national ori-
Hmong $42,689 gins (Figure 9-4). Whereas the average annual household income for
Indians in 2010 was $88,000, it was only $42,689 for Hmong house-
Indian $88,000
holds. Taking a close look at the average earnings of different national
Indonesian $56,207 origins among Asians is even more instructive because the average
Japanese $65,390 household income could include one, two, three, or more earners. In
contrast, when we look at hourly earnings, we get a better sense of
Korean $50,000
individual-level outcomes. In 2014, the median annual hourly earnings
Laotian $54,000 for Indian men was nearly $40 per hou乌 as compared to just less than
$30 for Indian women. In contrast, the average earnings for Hmong
Malaysian $61,523
men and women were both le创han $15 per hour (Figure 9-5).
Pakistani $60,000 In a study using data from the 2000 U.S. census, Emily Greenman
Sri Lankan $62,082 and Yu Xie (2008) looked at full-time, year-round workers between
the ages of twenty-five and fi丘y-five. ’They found that among men,
Thai $48,614
four groups had higher earnings than white men: Chine毗 Asian
Vietnamese $53,400 Indians, Koreans, andJapanese. However, among women, in addition
to those four groups, Cuban women and Filipina women also out-
FIGURE9-4.
Median Annual Earnings among Asian earn their white counterparts. Overall, Greenman and Xie found that
Americans by National Origin, 2010 white women earn seventy-one cents for each dollar that white men
Source: Pew Research Center (2012). earn and that white women have the largest gender disadvantage of all
Asian Indian
Japanese
Taiwanese
Chinese
Korean .
Pakistani
White+ Japanese
’ • • Men
WHITE
• W。men
White + Korean .
I
Filipino
White + Filipino
Vietnamese
Camb。dian
Thai
La。tian
Hawaiin
Hmong
I
’
$0 $5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40
FIGURE 9-5.
Median Annual Hourly Earnings among Asian Americans by Gender and National
Origin, 2014
Based on: https://fa mi lyi nequality.word press.com/2016/07/03／，。 n-asian 幡american-earnings/.
of the racial and ethnic groups. Korean women, for example, earned eighty-six
cents for each dollar that Korean men earned, and black and Filipina women
earned eighty-four cents for each dollar that their male counterparts earned.
’These results show that it is not the case that race and gender are additive fac-
tors in the labor market. Instead, racism and sexism operate in distinct ways
for different ethnic and racial groups.
Asian American men have the highest average earnings in the United
States. Does this mean they do not face discrimination? Not necessarily. Many
sociologists have pointed out that Asians earn more than whites, but that their
average earnings should actually be even higher because Asians have higher
average educational attainment than whites. Because of how our society is
organized, we should expect people with more education to earn more than
their less educated counterparts, not the same or less. One study, for example,
found that over half ofAsians born in the United States complete college, com-
pared with less than a third of whites. Asians are also more likely than other
groups to major in areas that have higher pay, such as science and engineering
(Kim and Sakamoto 2010).
258 CHAPTER 9 In come and Lab o 「 Ma 「ket Inequality
ChangHwan Kim and Arthur Sakamoto (201的 conducted a study on

whether Asian American men experience labor market discrimination. ’Their
study included only men who were college graduates. 卫1us, it considered labor
market discrimination among highly skilled workers. They found that Asian
American men who are college graduates do earn more than their white coun-
terparts. However, once you take into account the region where they live, their
field of study, and their college type, native-born Asian American men have an
8 percent earnings disadvantage. In other words, if an Asian American man
and a white man both live in New York, both went to selective universities, and
both studied engineering, we could expect that the Asian man would earn, on
average, 8 percent less than the white man. In contrast, Kim and Sakamoto
found that Asian American men born abroad who went to school and now
work in the United States do not experience a labor market disadvantage rela-
tive to white men.
Kim and Sakamoto’s 2010 study only included college-educated men. How-
eve乌 in a follow-up study published in 2014, the researchers revealed that
Asian American men without a college degree earn substantially less than
their white counterparts. Kim and Sakamoto explain that the model-minority
myth can have negative effects for Asians who do not achieve a certain level of
educational success. The follow-up study showed particularly striking results
for Asian American male high school dropouts, who earned significantly less
than white male dropouts (Kim and Sakamoto 2014).
Underemployment, Unemployment, and J。blessness

Earnings inequality is compounded by unemployment rates. Earnings data do
not factor in unemployed people, who may not be taking home any income. It
is thus important to consider the effects of unemployment and underemploy-
ment on the bigger picture. 卫1ese rates vary significantly by race and ethnicity,
as shown in At a Glance 9.1. Since 1970, the unemployment rate for blacks has
been about twice that for whites.
Wage differentials in the labor force provide a limited view of overall
inequality, as analyses of the earnings gap account only for people who are
actually working. Thus, the finding that the earnings gap between whites and
blacks has decreased since 1980 may not be as promising as it seems in terms
of racial equality, as we will see.τhe Bureau of Labor Statistics counts people
as unemployed when they do not have a job and have actively looked for work
in the previous month. Insofar as many people do not work and have given up
looking for work, the unemployment rate is only one measure of joblessness
(University of California Berkeley Labor Center 2013).
τhe labor market prospects of black and Latino workers also look bleak underempl。，yment A
when we take underemployment into account. ’The underemployment cat- category including jobless
egoηr includes jobless workers actively seeking work, people who are work- workers actively seeking
ing part time yet are available to work full time, and those who have looked work, people who are
for work in the past year yet are not actively seeking employment. In 2017, working pa时 time yet
15 percent of Latino workers and 13 percent of black workers met this defi- are available to work
nition of underemployed, compared with 8 percent of white workers. For all 如11 time, and those who
workers, these rates had improved since 2010, when 25 percent of black and have looked for work
Latino workers and 15 percent of white workers were underemployed (Bureau in the past year yet are
ofLabor Statistics 2017) (see At a Glance 9.1). not actively seeking
employment.
Jarred
··.. ....……·.. ……·. .…… ……·.. … ·.. …··.. … …·......… … …·· ...... .....·· .....·. ......... ...··.. .......
日'henfactories closed 仇 the 1980s,many workers found themselves unemployed

afterhαving worked decades at the samefactoψ．
Jarred, a forty-nine-year-old African American grandfather, has been

out of work for over a year. Unemployment is financially and emotionally
taxing. His story is similar to that of many African American men who live
in deindustrialized cities.
(con ti：悦~ued)
260 CHAPTER 9 In co me a nd Lab o 「 M a 「ke t In equ ality
Continued Jarred's first job began shortly after he graduated from high school. He
ωωυ－
worked at a turkey farm for four years. He feels fortunate to have secured
his second job in the better-paid manufacturing sector, where his father also
worked, at a local turbine factory. He worked there for fourteen years, until
a large-scale layoff in the 1980s-a time when many factories that provided
O＞
good jobs to working-class men were closing.

After the layo缸， Jarred was unemployed for nine months before securing
another job. This job was also in the manufacturing sector and provided a
living wage. Jarred was the only African American man in the plant where
he worked. He remained there for four years before being laid off again.
After his latest layoff, Jarred not only has trouble supporting his two
children and three stepchildren, but also feels emotionally drained. Jarred
defines his masculinity in part through his ability to work. Being unem-
ployed feels “ degrading” to him. He explained to Kenlana Ferguson, who
interviewed him:
Being unemployed [is] . .. rough. Now, I've been out ofworks切ce
October 28th oflast year, and 的 α degradingfeeling. ...扩you don't
mαtch it, it'll ruin your mαnhood beeαuse it comes to the point where
you justfeel like you worked all those years for nothing at all. ... I
justwαnt to keep building on whαtl've αlreαdyworkedfo饥．．．
Myw沪 andlhαve three grandkids living with us万tll time. So， α

Jam均 that size and you're goingfrom $60 grand α year to $15,900.
H云 α big loss.
Jarred's wife is disabled, and her disability check is not enough to support
their family. He continues to look for work, but his chances are relatively
low, given that he is nearly fifty years old and there are many other men
in the town where he lives who have also been laid off and are looking for
work.η1e chances of his finding a well-paying manufacturingjob are even
slimmer, as most of those jobs have moved overseas where employers can
take advantage of lower wages and a more vulnerable workforce.
Source: Adapted from K. Ferguson 2012.
………………………………………………………·.............................................
咀1e 2 million people in the criminal justice system are also mostly outside
the labor force, yet they are not included in the o伍cial counts of the unem-
ployed either. In 1999, a third of black men aged twenty-two to thirty were
jobless or incarcerated, compared with only 13 percent of their white coun-
terparts (Western and Pettit 2005). As one example of how the incarceration
rate affects the jobless rate, we can consider another study by Western and
Pettit (200功 that looked at the percentages of black and white high school
dropouts with jobs. ’The study found that without taking the incarcerated
population into account, SO percent of black high school dropouts aged
twenty-two to thirty had jobs, compared with 80 percent ofwhite high school
dropouts. A丘er factoring in the incarcerated population, however, this per-
centage dropped to less than 30 percent for black male high school dropouts,
compared with over 60 percent for their white counterparts (Figure 9-6;
Western and Pettit 2002).
Western and Pettit (2005) found that the gains in black men’s wages
between 1980 and 1999 must be assessed in light of the large numbers ofblack
men who went to prison and became jobless during that same time period.
Incarceration is an important factor in assessing labor market inequality for
black men. If we look at labor market inequality without taking into account
incarceration rates, we will have an incomplete picture because large numbers
of black men are effectively taken out of the labor market by imprisonment.
As Western and Pettit (2002) explained, when we take into account the incar-
cerated population, less than a third of black male high school dropouts are
employed.
One in three black men born in the twenty-first century can expect to spend
time in prison during his lifetime (Mauer and King 2007). While incarcerated,
people are either unemployed or employed at extremely low wages, as the min-
imum wage does not apply to prison labor. Moreover, the effects of imprison-
ment endure a丘er incarceration. People who spend time in prison o丘en have
trouble finding work once released because of the stigma of a criminal record
(Pager 2007). They also are likely to earn less tha
to prison, as their time in prison takes them out of the labor market, rendering
them incapable of gaining work experience during this time. In a recent stud如
Ratio= 1.2 Rati。＝ 1.6 Ratio= 1.3 Ratio= 2.4

80
t亨~
60
8 且
40
FIGURE 9-6.
~~ 20 Employment Percentages
。 of Male High School Drop-
White Black White Black White Black White Black outs, Aged 22 to 30, by Race
1980 1999 1980 1999 and Education History,
1980 and 1999
Standard empl。yment rates Empl。yment adjusted
f。r incarceration Source: Western and Pettit (2002).
262 CHAPTER 9 In come and Labo 「 Ma 「ket Ineq uality
Lyons and Pettit (2011) explored how spending time in p白on affects wage
trajectories for black and white men. They found that there was relatively little
difference between black and white men’s wage growth prior to incarceration,
but that a丘er incarceration, black men’s wages grew at a 21 percent slower rate
than the wages of their white counterparts.
s。Cl 。 t。GICAL EXPLANATI 。 NS F。 R INC 。ME

AND LAB。 R MARKET INEQUALITY
One question that arises from these disparities is whether the gaps in earn-
ings and employment are due to differences in human capital, labor market
humαn ca pitα｜ discrimination, or other factors. Human capital refers to educational attain-
Educational attainment, ment, skills, and job experience. Scholars who study labor market disparities
skills, and job experience. o丘en measure earnings gaps while taking into account human cap让al differ-
ences. The idea is that an individual ’s earnings should be based on his or her
qualifications. If disparities remain once we take into account human capital
differences, we can argue that labor market discrimination plays a role in the
earnings gap. Studies of the earnings gap consistently show that about 10 to
20 percent of this gap cannot be explained by human capital differences.
Sociologists o丘en consider the unexplained gap to be an indicator of labor
market discrimination (Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009).
τhe existence of an earnings gap tells us that labor market discrimination
is likely at play. Field research or audit studies provide further evidence of
labor market discrimination, particularly in terms of hiring. In these studies
(e.g., Pager et al. 200优 researchers send out people with similar qualific剖ions
but different racial and ethnic identities to apply for existing jobs to find out if
racial identity plays a role in employers’ hiring decisions.
τhe lower earnings of African Americans and Latinos can be attributed in
part to individual factors such as discrimination and lower levels of human
capital. But lower earnings are also attributable to structural factors such as
changes in the labor market. During the 1980s, for example, wages increased for
high-skilled jobs, government sector work declined, many unionized jobs went
overseas, and part-time and temporary work rose. These structural changes
affected labor market disparities. Of course, individual and structural factors
also work together. For example, blacks have, on average, lower educational
attainment than Asian Americans. This disparity has disadvantaged blacks
in recent years because of the diminished opportunities for low-skill work
that has resulted from outsourcing. ’This section considers both individual-
level and structural explanations for labor market inequalit予
Sociological Explanations fo 『 Income and Labo 「 Ma 『ke ↑ Inequality 263
lndividuαI-Level Explαnati。ns
One way to explain the earnings
gap among different racial groups
in the United States is on an indi-
vidual level. Some scholars argue
that the earnings gap is due to indi-
vidual human cap让al differences-
for example, if Asian Americans
have higher levels of education
than blacks, we can expect them to
have higher incomes.
In 2012, 84 percent of Asians,
69 percent of Latinos, 67 percent
of whites, and 63 percent of blacks
who graduated from high school A Bus drivers in Washington, D.C., have one of the few unionized jobs
immediately enrolled in college left in the country.
(Fry and Taylor 2013). Higher
levels of education among Asians are part of the reason they earn more than
other racial groups. But to what extent does educational attainment explain
overall patterns of income inequality?
Sociologists Moshe Semyonov and Noah Lewin-Epstein (2009) examined
the earnings gap between black men and white men by looking at individual-
level characteristics such as age, marital status, immigrant status, region of res-
idence, education, hours worked, and occupation. Using census data between
1960 and 2000 to examine how inequalities have changed over time, they
found that even when we take all of these characteristics into consideration,
black men continue to have an earnings disadvantage. Nevertheless, this dis-
advantage has lessened over time among men with similar occupational and
social statuses. In 1960, black men had an earnings penalty of 25 percent
(meani鸣 they earned 25 percent less than their white counterparts with simi-
lar backgrounds). This penalty declined to 10 percent in 1980 and was down to
4.2 percent in 2000. By 2000, black men earned 4 percent less than white men
with similar backgrounds. For Semyonov and Lewin-Epstei凡 human cap让al
and other individual-level characteristics explain most, but not all, of the earn-
ings gap between white and black men. When differences in earnings cannot
be explained fully by workers' labor market characteristics, many scholars
argue that the disadvantage can be explained by discrimination.
Racial discrimination in the labor market occurs when racial status plays
a role in an employer’s decision to deny a person a job, promotion, or raise.
264 CHAPTER 9 Inco me and Lab o 「 M a 「ket In equ ality
Latina Professionals as Racialized Tokens:

Lisa ’s Story
….... . ..... . .…·.. ...… ·....…· · ...…· . ..... . ..... … ..... . . · ·.... .··..……·.........…..... .….... .…··. .....
Glend，α F/,ores αT♂tes thαtLαtinαpr，旷essionαls α何？αciαlized tokens. ” When they
αre numerical minorities 仇 white-coll,αroccupαtions, they experience α series of
unco叫fort，α ble situαtions rooted in racial co吨fl,ict. F/,ores云 workonLαtinα doctors
introduces us to Lisα， α th仕协作ur-year-oldfam句 medicine physician born 切
. EZSαlvαdor.Lisα moved to the United St，α tes with herfamily αsαn 句fantand
settled in the Pico Union District in downtown Los Angeles.
Lisa explained that her college-educated, white-collar parents experienced
downward mobility upon arrival. As undocumented immigrants, they found work
in the garment industry. Lisa overcame obstacles associated with her parents’ low
socioeconomic status and earned her medical degree from the University of
California at Davis.
Despite experiencing intergenerational upward mobility and securing a pres-
tigious profession that paid over $100,000 a yea巳 Lisa shared that she frequently
experienced gendered and racial inequities in her interactions with colleagues and
patients, both co-ethnics and non-Latinos. In an interview, Lisa recounted a situa-
tion with a white physician:
I ended up doing wαy more[wor，叼 thαn that [white] doctor. TJ与αt doctor
slowed me down becαuse his Spαnishwαs broken αnd he did not know αny-
thing αbout medical Spαnish, which I hαve been studyin各 So they were using
me 切切terpret ljor him］ αndlwαS reαllymαd ... I ’m like “why αml doing
thαt?" . .. I am okay doing it but it wαs justfunny that [another] Lαt仇。
[doctor］， α Peruviαnguy,wαs putting him β·he white doctor] on α pedestαl
beeαuse he is mαle, white， αnd older αndl αm the opposite.
Later, Lisa, who had a very slight accent indicative of a native Spanish speaker,
explained how racial/ethnic inequality influenced how patients interacted with her
during office visits:
Therewαsαn intern who wαsαnAsiαnβηαle］ αnd hαdseen thispαtient. I
αm underst，αndingitwαs [an 切st，αncerooted 饥,J race beeαuse this is what
the [white] pαtient said. ... I αm tαlking [to the pαtient] in English αndhe
is like "I don't underst，αnd you. Bring bαck theAsiαn doctor. I don't under-
stαnd you." [I say] ''Sir, I αm speaking English!" He says, "no but I don亏
underst，αnd your Englishλ.. the CαUCαs切n[pαtients］ αre the ones that [it
hαs hαr:ppened with］ αt leαst in two situαtions. It is more r，αce αndlanguα：ge
beeαuse! do hαve αnαccent αndlreαlize that but I cαncommunicαte.
Sociolog ica l Explanations fo 『 Incom e an d Labo 「 Ma 『ke ↑ Ine q uality 265
While Lisa felt she was culturally competent to aid patients of various social and
economic backgrounds, she was aware that her race/ethnicity and gender meant that
both physicians and patients undermined her medical expertise, favoring medical
<
。
interns that held a lesser rank or less competent white doctors over her.
。。ω
White women also face gender discrimination in male皿dominatedjobs. However, ......
the experience is different for professional Latinas who encounter gendered racism.
Inequality in the professions manifests itself in different ways, and bilingual Latinas
working in the “ token” context often find themselves doing additional work- such as
translations- that others performing the same job are not asked to do.
Source: Glenda Flores, University of California at Irvine.
· ... ..……........… ……... ..…… ….... . ..……·..... ....... .…… …·. .··... . .. ......... ....... ..…… ··. . . ..
A survey conducted in 2001 found that more than 33 percent of blacks and
nearly 20 percent of Latinos believed they had experienced labor market dis-
crimination (Schiller 2004). Other studies have found that employers admit
they are hesitant to hire black workers (Pager and Shepherd 2008).
One way of measuring labor market discrimination is to use statistics to
identi马r systematic disparities between different groups. For example, if we
compare the earnings of thirty-five-year-old college-educated white men to
similarly situated black men and find a disparity, we can conclude that labor
market discrimination plays a role in the earnings disparity. As previously
mentioned, another method for uncovering discrimination involves the use
of field experiments or audit studies in which researchers send equally quali-
fi.ed individuals out to apply for jobs and calculate the extent to which race or
ethnicity affects employers’ hiring practices. Each of these methodologies has
revealed labor market discrimination (Pager and Shepherd 2008).
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004) conducted an
extensive audit study to find out if employers discriminate against African
Americans. ’They created four resumes-two high-skill and two low-skill-to
send to over 1,300 job ads in Chicago and Boston. To isolate the effect they
were studying, they randomly assigned either an A仕ican American-sounding
name (such as Lakisha Washington or Jamal Jones) or a white-soundi吨 name
(such as Emi与 Walsh or Greg Baker) to each resume. They found that appli-
cants with white-sounding names needed to send out about ten resumes to
get a callback, whereas applicants with African American-sounding names
needed to send about fi.丘een. 咀1is audit study shows that African Americans
have a harder time securing interviews that lead to employment than whites
in part because employers o丘en prefer white employees. 咀1is preference may
reflect conscious or unconscious bias.
implicit bias Unreasoned Researchers who study implicit bias explain that we all have biases at a sub-
judgmental inclinations conscious level. Owing to stereotypes, for example, a potential employer may
that operate without our exhibit bias in evaluating the same resume from “ Lakisha Washington" versus
conscious awareness. "Emily Walsh" without even being aware.
A clear example of implicit bias comes from a study of lawyers. A group of
researchers cra丘ed a fictitious legal research memo and asked sixty law firm
partners to evaluate the memo. 咀1e memo contained seven deliberate spelling
and grammatical errors.τhepa巾ers (which in
thirty-seven men, twenty-one racial/ethnic minorities, and thirty-nine
Caucasia叫 all received the same memo. However, half were told the author
was black, and the other halfwere told the author was white.τhe partners were
asked to find the errors in the memo. Evaluators who were told that the author
was black found more of the embedded errors and rated the memo as lower
quality than did those partners who were told the author was white. Speciι
ically, they found an average of 2.9 spelling or grammar errors in the memo
allegedly written by the white a忱。rney, as compared with 5.8 spelling/gram-
mar errors in the one supposedly wri忧en by the black a忱。rney. 卫1e author of
the study explains:“we see more errors when we expect to see errors, and we
see fewer errors when we do not expect to see erro旷（Reeves 2014, 6). The
evaluators were not people who think of themselves as racist or who hold a low
opinion of African Americans. Instead, their implicit biases were activated,
cαteg。rical exclusi。n A leading them to find more errors when they thought the author of the memo
mechanism of labor was black. Understanding these biases helps us to understand some ways that
market discrimination African Americans are disadvantaged in the labor market.
in which an applicant is ’The Research Focus sidebar in this section discusses a 2004 study of dis-
not given an opportunity crimination in the labor market. A more recent audit study by economists
to interview for a job Amanda Agan and So时a Starr (2016) shows that black applicants continue to
because of his or her race. face discrimination in the entry-level job market.
shifting standards A Structural Explanati。ns

mechanism of labor Some scholars have looked beyond individuals to explain the disparities
market discrimination between social groups in terms of larger structures. One prominent explana-
in which job applicants tion for earnings disparities between black and white men points to the chang-
of different races receive ing nature of U.S. cities, where the decline in manufacturing has meant the
different responses disappearance of work. 咀1is shi丘 in the labor market has affected black men
despite similar levels of in particular because of their concentration in the manufacturing sectors of
X PA r en e
ρIU
ρIU
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ρlu
many major cities.

A
Socio logical Explanations fo 『 Income and Labo 「 Ma 『ke ↑ Inequality 267
γeseαγch TOCUS
Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market
In 2004, the New York Hiring Discrimination Study sent out two teams of men,
each of which included a white, a Latino, and a black job teste马 all between
twenty-two and twenty-s议 years of age and of similar height. ’They were given
invented resumes presenting the applicants as high school graduates with steady
work experience. 卫1e men applied for 171 entry-level jobs in the retail and food
industries that were listed in the classifieds. ’The white testers received a callback
or job offer 31.0 percent of the time, the Latino testers 25.2 percent of the time,
and the black testers only 15.2 percent of the time. 咀1ese findings show that black
job applicants have to search, on average, twice as long as white job applicants to
secure entry-level employment.
The study then sent out another team of testers, this time telling the white
applicant to indicate that he had a prior drug conviction. In this experiment,
whites with criminal records received positive responses 17.2 percent of the time,
compared with 15 percent for the Latinos with no criminal record and 13 percent
for blacks with no record. In this round, whites with criminal convictions were
still slightly more likely than blacks without convictions to have a chance of
securing employment.
咀1e next step in the study involved determining the mechanisms through which
this form oflabor market discrimination occurred. 咀1e authors found three mech-
anisms: categorical exclusion, shi丘ing standards, and race-based job channeling.
Categorical exclusion occurred when the applicant was not given an oppor-
tun让y to interview for a job because of his race. One example was when the
three testers applied for the same job and the hiring manager dismissed the
black tester and then asked the white and Latino testers to come back the
next day at 5 p.m. to start work.
• Shifting standards occurred when black, white, and Latino testers received
different responses despite similar levels of experience. In one case, the three
testers applied for a line cook position. None of them reported any kitchen
experience. ’The white and Latino testers were told they could come in for a
trial period, whereas the hiring manager told the black tester that the restau-
rant was only looking for experienced line cooks. 咀1e black tester was not
given a chance.
(co’n tinued)
Race-based job channeling occurred when applicants were told they should
apply for a different job opening. For example, the three testers applied for a
sales position in a lighting store. ’The white and Latino testers were allowed
to apply for the position, but the hiring manager told the black tester that
he should apply for the stock boy position instead. Channeling occurred
in twenty-three cases. In most cases, the black and Latino applicants were
channeled into positions that required less customer contact-for example,
from server to busboy or from sales to stocking.
咀1is
study reveals persistent discrimination in hiring practices, even given an ideal
scenario in which articulate, clean-cut young men posed as high school graduates with
some work experience. In real-world situations, there may be even more discrimination
and unequal job opportunities.
For Discussion
Why do you think employers were less likely to call black and Latino job appli-
cants in for an interview?
Why do you think employers suggested that black testers apply for stock boy posi-
tions instead of sales pos让ions?
Have you seen evidence of similar discriminatory patterns in your experience?
Source: Pageη 讥Tes tern, and Bonikowski 2009.
rαce-based i。b
channeling A mechanism Deindustrialization, the shi丘 from a manufacturing to a service economy,
of labor market has affected working-class people in all racial and ethnic groups in the United
discrimination in which States. A丘er World War II, working families in the United States experienced
similarly qualified newfound prosperity as the U.S. economy grew rapidly with the production
applicants of different of automobiles and steel. 卫1ese manufacturing jobs o丘en paid well and came
races are told they should with benefits. Mostly men worked in these jobs, and many earned a family
apply for job openings at wage-an income sufficient to support their wives and children (Milkman
different levels. 1997; Sugrue 2014). Between 1950 and 1960, average incomes in the United
States increased steadily. However, these increases began to level off, and by
deindustrialization η1e the 1970s, incomes for the working poor had stopped increasing. 刀1e average
shift from a income for people with less than a high school diploma actually decreased from
manufacturing to a about $30,000 in 1967 to about $25,000 in 2014 (in constant 2014 dollars;
service economy. Cahalan and Perna 2016).
Sociologica l E× piano • ions for Income and Labor Mar l创 Inequality 269
One reason for the decreases in the average 40 寸

寸 Nov. 1943
pay for low-skilled workers is deindustrializa- = 38.75°/o
tion. In 1950, 40 percent of all jobs involved 35 • ....,. …… ·
the production of goods. By 1997, less than

30 千… … … … . .....… …四－－… ··
20 percent of all jobs were goods-producing
(see Figure 9-7). Whereas, historically, man- 25 •…………·
ufacturing jobs o丘 en offered stable employ-
ment and a family wage, service-sector jobs 20 •…·
are o丘en temporary and part time, and offer

15 • …………·
lower wages. Between 1979 and 1985, the
United States lost 10 percent of its manufac- 10 斗…………………………………………………………………－－ July 2009 ·
turing jobs. These losses were concentrated in = 8.99°/o
certain geographical areas, thereby amplify-

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
ing their localized effects.τhe Midwest lost
FIGURE 9-7.
over a million jobs and the Northeast lost Percentage of U.S. Labor Force in Manufacturing, 1939-2014
800,000. By contrast, the West gained 53,000
Source: BLS (2015).
manufacturing jobs (Sassen 1989). Detroit
was one of the cities hit hardest by global eco’
nomic restructuring: it lost 70 percent of its manufacturing jobs between

1969 and 1989. By the end of the 1980s, over a third of all African Americans
in Detroit lived in poverty, as did half of Detroit’s African American children
(Kodras 1997).
The decline in manufacturing was also accompanied by a decline in union-
ized jobs: In 1954, 35 percent of the nation’s workforce was unionized. By the
early 1980s, this figure had dropped to 20 percent. And, by 2008, the union-
ization 时e was 8 percent (Thompson 2010). As unionized workers tend to
earn more, the decline in unions has affected wage inequality (Morris and
Western 1999).
In the 1950s, many urban African American families lived in poverty, but
they were among the working poo马 as described in the opening excerpt of this
chapter. For example, in 1960, 69 percent of men over the age of fourteen who
lived in the Black Belt region of the city of Chicago were regularly employed.
By 1990, only 37 percent of men sixteen or over were regularly employed
(Wilson 1996）.四is figure is even smaller if we take into account the incarc町’
ated population, as discussed previously.
Up until the 1980s, many black men were employed in manufacturing jobs,
which provided benefits and a family wage, permi忧ing families to attain com-
fortable standards of living. Once these factories began to close, these com-
fortable lifestyles went with them. Black men were the hardest hit by this
270 CHAPTER 9 Income and Labo r Ma 「 ke t Inequa li ty
economic restructuring: Oliver and Shapiro (2006, 26) write that “ from 1979
to 1984 one-half of black males in durable-goods manufacturing in five Great
Lakes cities lost their jobs.”
When the economic crisis hit Detroit and other cities, white residents often
fled, whereas African American residents rarely had this option. As a result,
by the end of the 1980s, urban areas were much less white and much more
impoverished than they had been a decade earlier. ’The unemployment rates of
African American men in these urban areas rose to extraordinarily high
rates-by 1990, only 37 percent of males sixteen or over who lived in the Black
Belt in Chicago were regularly employed (Wilson 1996).
African American men were hit particularly hard by deindustrialization in
Detroit. This is due in part to the fact that, in 1970, 94 percent of employed
black men in Detroit had blue-collar jobs, the sector that experienced the
greatest decline (Sugrue 2014).’This deindustrialization trend that started in
the 1950s continued for five decades: three out of four production jobs disap-
peared from Detroit between 1972 and 1992 (Boyle 2001). As the availability
of manufacturing jobs declined, black men began to have di侃culty finding
work (Farley, Danzige乌 and Hozer 2000).
An understanding of the prevalence of black unemployment in deindustri-
skills mismatch hypothesis
alizing urban areas such as Detroit and Chicago is aided by an examination
The hypothesis that
of both the skills mismatch and the spatial mismatch that deindustrialization
African American men
has created. ’The skills mismatch hypothesis suggests that many African
in particular often do not
American men in particular often do not have the skills required to secure
have the skills required to
work in the current economy. Although there has been growth in employment
secure work in the current
sectors that require a college degree, many African American men do not have
economy二
the qualifications for these jobs.
spatial mismatch 咀1e spatial mismatch hypothesis sheds further light on these trends, as
hypothesis Hypothesis it explains that African American families have been excluded from buying
that African American homes in the suburbs where much of the job growth has occurred, thereby
families have been creating a disconnect between where African Americans live and where the
excluded from buying jobs are concentrated.Notably, in 1990, SO percent of employed blacks who
homes in the suburbs lived in the city of Detroit commuted to the suburbs for work. ’The “ spa-
where much of the job tial mismatch'' is not due to African Americans' refusal to move to white
growth has occurred, neighborhoods. Instead, as Thomas Sugrue 。01份 argues, in the 1940s
thereby creating a and 1950s, white Detroiters forced African American residents to stay in
disconnect between ghe忧oized areas by terrorizing black families through cross burning and
where African Americans other intimidation tactics when they attempted to move into white neigh-
live and where the jobs borhoods. As Detroit’s city center was being depleted of jobs, black families
are concentrated. were forced to stay in these hollowed-out areas due to white terror as well as
Aff irma • ive Act ion in Emp loyme n• 271
state policies that excluded black people from desirable areas of Detroit and
the outlying suburbs.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTI 。 N IN EMPL。YMENT
In a pro且t-based economic system, wages should be determined by competi-

tion, and the most qualified people should get the available jobs. If there are
lots of people with a certain skill set, wages will be lower for that job. In con-
trast, if there are fewer people with the requisite skills, then wages should be
higher. However, prior to the civil rights era, employers practiced overt dis-
crimination: they refused to hire African Americans and paid them less than
whites when they did hire them.
Edna Bonacich (1976) explains that historic disparities between blacks and
whites are due to a split labor market, which refers to a difference in the price split labor market A
of labor for two or more groups of laborers. For example, in 1927 in Virginia, difference in the price
the average daily pay rate for white bricklayers was $11.00, whereas it was $9.60 of labor for two or more
for blacks. Similarly, white cement workers earned an average of $6.33 per day, grot1ps of laborers.
whereas blacks earned an average of $4.42. While many companies paid
African Americans less, others refused to hire them at all.τhis seems some-
what illogical, as we would expect employers to hire the lowest-paid workers
they could find. However, racial discrimination is o丘en not based on logic.
One story from the late 1950s is that of Thomas Bailey, a skilled brickmason
who had trouble finding steady work. When he applied for jobs, foremen o丘en
told him that he had to be a member of a union to work there. Yet, when he
applied for membership in the union, the business agent told him he could only
be amemberifhewas activelyworking. Bailey, anAfricanAmerican, was caught
in a bind. He had trouble ge吐ing steady work because the unions o丘en refused
to allow black men to join, and the unions controlled access to construction
employment. When this issue came to the attention of local civil rights leaders,
they pressured the union to allow Bailey to join. He eventually was let in but
faced intimidation by other union members. Because of the widespread nature
of cases like Bailey’s, national leaders began to push for more systemic changes.
τhe construction industry was one of the first targets because it relied on federal
contracts. 卫1e federal government had the power to require these companies to
obey antidiscrimination laws as a condition of their cont肌ts (Golland 2011).
One of the proposed solutions to labor market discrimination came to be
known as affirn叫ive action. This term was fi时 used in 1935 in the National
Labor Relations Act, which specified that employers could not discriminate
against union members or organizers. If they did, they would have to take
272 CHAPTER 9 Income and Labo r Ma 「ke t Inequa lity
affirmative action to remedy the effects of that discrimination (Skrentny

1996).’Three decades later, President Lyndon] ohnson used the term in Exec-
utive Order 11246 (1965). In this order,Johnson called for federal contractors
t。“take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.”
Because of this order and other civil rights legislation and rules, by the
1960s, federal contractors had to sign pre-award affirmative action agreements
ensuring that contractors would actively recruit a diverse workforce to com-
抖ete the contract. Contractors also had to agree to sponsor nonwhite workers
for apprenticeships and training. In this way, in towns and cities across the
nation, African Americans and Latinos were able to secure employment in
what had been a primarily white employment sector (Golland 2011).
Today, affirmative action refers to policies and procedures designed to
combat ongoing discrimination in the workplace and in schools, as we began
to discuss in Chapter Eight. Affirmative action policies aim to keep discrimi-
nation from occurring by requiring employers to be proactive in their a忧empts
to diversify their workforce. In addition, affirmative action policies require
employers to be conscious of the racial and ethnic makeup of their employees
to ensure a more diverse workforce (Skrentny 1996).’The overarching goal of
affirmative action in employment is to decrease the influence of racial discrim-
ination on the employment prospects of people of color.
Government orders for contractors are one of four kinds of affirmative
action in the United States:
1. Government orders regulating government contractors and subcontractors

2. Regulations requiring affirmation action by public employers
3. Court orders based on antidiscrimination law
4. Employers' voluntary human resources policies
Since 1965, companies that do business with the federal government have
been required to meet affirmative action requirements. The U.S. Department
of Labor website (n.d.) indicates that “ for federal contractors and s由cont肌－
tors, a侃rmative action must be taken by covered employers to recruit and
advance qualified minorities, women, persons with disabilities, and covered
veterans. Affirmative actions include training programs, outreach efforts, and
other positive steps." In other words, any company that works with the fed-
eral government has to show it is taking positive steps to maintain or increase
En ↑「ep 「 eneurship and Self-Employmen • 273
the diversity of its workforce. One example is the promotion of broad recruit-
ment strategies: posting a job advertisement for at least 30 days, advertising
in a range of venues, and using objective evaluation criteria to review the
applicants.
In 1972, the Equal Opportunity Act created a provision that mandated that
employers found guilty of discrimination must implement affirmative action
policies. Since 1965, hundreds of employers have implemented affirmative
action voluntarily in their hiring and promotion strategies. Nevertheless,
despite fi丘y years of affirmative action, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian
Americans continue to experience labor market discrimination.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-EMPL。YMENT
Given the unequal conditions of the formal labor market, many racial
and ethnic minorities turn to self二 employment as a means to achieve the
American Dream and to be their own boss. Self二 employment rates vary
significantly among groups. In 2010, 13.S percent of white men were self-
employed, compared with 6.2 percent of African Americans, 34 percent of
Israelis, 27 percent of I(oreans, 10 percent of Mexicans, and 9 percent of
Dominicans. Most sociologists explain these disparities in self二 employment
rates by pointing to differences in social and ethnic networks and human
capital (Portes and Yiu 2013).
币1e self二 employment strategy has worked better for some groups than
for others. Chinese and Cuban small-business owners, for example, tend
to do better than their counterparts who are not self二 employed. However,
African American, Korean, and Mexican small-business owners o丘en expe-
rience severe setbacks. The work of both Adia Harvey Wingfield (2008)
and Zulema Valdez (2008a, 2011) adds complexity to traditional under-
standings of the ethnic enclave economy, which refers to clusters of small ethnic enclave economy
businesses that primarily serve people of the same ethnicity and work to Clusters of small
facilitate the success of co-ethnics.τhe ethnic enclave economy has helped businesses that primarily
immigrants of certain national origins, such as Cubans, attain economic serve people of the same
success in the United States. According to this framework, immigrants ethnicity and work to
such as the Chinese, Cubans, Greeks, and Koreans have attained success facilitate the st1ccess of
in small-business ownership because of their high human capital, social co-ethnics.
networks, and close-knit ethnic communities. However, both Harvey
认Tingfield and Zulema Valdez have criticized scholarship that focuses solely
on ethnicity and culture. They argue that it is critical to understand how
274 CHAPTER 9 In come a nd Labor Ma 「 ket Ineq uali ty
race, class, and gender-in addition to ethnicity and culture-play a role in

racial enclave economy the success of small businesses.
An econon1y in which a Harvey Wingfield (2008) draws on the concept of a racial enclave economy,
business's success is both in which a business ’s success is both shaped and limited by the racial group
shaped and limited by the membership of the business owner. She uses the example of black female
racial group membership owners of hair salons to elaborate on this concept. Valdez (2011) draws from
of the business owner. interviews with restaurant owners of different ethnic origins to explain how
race, class, and gender play a role in shaping the success of local businesses.
She uses the concept of an embedded market-a market economy embed-
embedded market A ded within interlocking systems of oppression and privilege, such as “ capital-
market economy ism, patriarchy, and White supremacy”一to explain disparities in the success
embedded within of small businesses (37). These systems of oppression affect an individual's
interlocking systems of possibilities for success as an entrepreneur. 飞气Thereas previous scholarship
oppression and privilege. on ethnic enclaves might presume that Mexicans have similar options in the
restaurant industry, Valdez explains that an upper-class male Mexican may
be able to open a highly profitable Italian restaurant in a wealthy neighbor-
hood, whereas a poor female Mexican may be limited to opening a taqueria in
the barrio.
Valdez (2008b) conducted a national study in which she looked at four
groups of entrepreneurs: white, Korean, Mexican, and black men. She found
Racial Discrimination in Australia

Alison Booth a 门d her colleagues conducted a large- The 「esults showed that the mea 门 ca ll back rate for
scale audi• study to measure l abo 「 marke↑ discri mi A「19 1 0-Sa×ons was 35 pe 「cent. Applications with an
natio门 agai 门st immig 「G门↑S a 门d indigenous people ｜↑a l ian-sounding 门。 me received 「esponses 32 perce门↑
in Aus•ralia, where one-fourth of the population is of the time, with only a small s•atistically significan•
foreig 门－bo「门. Thei 「 study i门eluded a comparison of d i ffe「ence . The differe 门ces we「e starker for the other
labor marke• options for Anglo-Sa× on Aus↑「alians (•he groups: indigenous applicants obtained an in•erview
majority group) with those for indigenous Aus•ralians 26pe「cen↑ of the time, Chinese appl icants 21 percent,
and immig 「ants f「om Italy, China, and the Middle East. and Middle Easter门ers 22 percent.
To measure discrimination, they sent 4,000 ficti- The largest discrepancies were for wa itstaff posi-
tious job applica•ions ou↑ fo 「 en↑ry-leve l jobs, in which •ions: Chinese and Middle Eas•ern applicants had
•hey varied only •he appa 「en↑ e↑h 门ici↑y of •he appli- to fill OU• •wice as many applications to ge• as many
cant by changing •he names. They applied for jobs i门 h↑e「vi ews as an Ang lo-Sa×on applican •. There was
「estaura 门怡， da↑o en↑「y, custome 「 service, 。 nd sales in less disc 「iminatio 门 in data en↑「y jobs, showing that
Aus阳 lia's three largest cities ：乌1d 门的， Melbou 「门e, and ethnicity is mos↑ i mpo 「b 时 in posi•ions in which
Brisbane. For each adve「↑ised posi•ion ,• hey submitted employees have to deal directly with cus↑0「ners .
four applications, each from a diffe 「e门↑ ethn ic group. Source: Booth, Leigh, and Varga nova 20 l 0.
Co ncl usion and Disc ussion 275
that 40 percent of the white owners earned over $75,000 a BY GENDER

yea乌 as did 25 percent of the I{oreans, 20 percent of the Mex- l[F. I阴阳…D - ' 54.7°/o
Men
icans, and 17 percent of the black business owners. In con- I REVEN 山 ES- 79.2°/o
trast, nearly half of the black business owners earned less than Women 36.2°10
$25,000 a yea乌 as did 41 percent of the Mexicans, 33 percent 11.3°/o
of the Koreans, and 24 percent of the white male business

owners. Her study found that this disparity can be explained BY RACE/ETHNICITY
in part by the fact that I{orean and white small business White 79.3
owners are more likely to have higher educational levels than 90.7
the Mexican and black business owners. Black and Mexican 9.4
Black
1.3
business owners with higher levels of education and more
access to bank loans are able to do much better with their 7 .1
Asian
5.5
businesses. Nevertheless, as Harvey Wingfield (2008) notes,
「 12.1
some African American women without college educations Hispanic
3.6
are able to do well for themselves in certain racial enclave
economies, such as hair salons. Harvey Wingfield, however, FIGURE 9-8.
further points out that the enclave places limits on the success Share of Business Revenue by Gender and
Race/Ethnicity
ofblack female hair salon owners: they are able to do well, but
Note: Among those 白 rms whose ownership can be
their profits tend to plateau a丘er about five years. classi 白 ed by gender and race/ethnicity. Hispanics/Latinos
can be of any race; white, black, and Asian 白 gures include
The 2015 State of Women-Owned Businesses Report empha-
Hispanics/Latinos.
sizes that there has been substantial growth in the number
Source: Desilver (2015).
of women-owned minority businesses over the past twenty
years. However, it also shows that revenues from minority-owned businesses
continue to lag behind those of white-owned businesses.τhe average revenue
for businesses owned by black women in 2015, for example, was just $39,893,
compared with an average of $155,477 for all women-owned firms (The State
of Women-Owned Businessεs Report, 2015, 7). As shown in Figure 9-8, whites
own 79.3 percent of all firms but take in 90.7 percent of all revenue. In con-
trast, African Americans own 9.4 percent of firms but take in only 1.3 percent
of all revenue.
Despite fi丘y years of affirmative action and scores of antidiscrimination laws

and lawsuits, nonwhites continue to be disadvantaged in the labor market.
币1ere are many reasons for this discrimination.
One reason is that it is difficult, or even impossible, to simply legislate away
discrimination. Employers may be discriminating against nonwhites and
women unconsciously. As mentioned in Chapter τhree, racial ideologies are
276 CHAPTER 9 Income and Labor Ma 「 ket Inequality
。丘en ingrained in our individual perceptions. A white hiring manager may

not be aware that he thinks that a white man is a “ natural leader'' because
of entrenched stereotypes and implicit biases. He also may not realize that
his presumptions that a black man is irresponsible or a Latina is incapable of
being professional are based on those individuals' race or ethnicity. In many
ways, labor market discrimination will not disappear until racial stereotypes
go away.
Another set of reasons for the earnings gap is structural: growth in certain
industries and contraction in others are due to global forces that are beyond
the control of a single government. Nevertheless, a government can provide
training programs to get people up to speed and to work in emerging fields.
This is an example of a race-neutral program that may help reduce racial
disparities.
A related reason for this gap is that the labor market and the small-
business market are structured by deeply entrenched inequalities, patriarchy,
and racial divisions. Racial segregation in housing and schools, for example,
leads to racially segregated social networks, which themselves reproduce
preexisting inequalities. We will learn more about the interlocking nature of
different systems of inequality in Chapter Ten, which focuses on structural
racism. As the United States becomes increasingly unequal, it is critical to
work toward ameliorating overall inequality while striving to reduce dispari-
ties among racial groups.
Key Terms
Gini coefficient 252 categorical exclusion 266 split labor market 271
earnings gap 254 shi丘ing standards 266 ethnic enclave economy 2 73
wagegap 254 race-based job channeling 268 racial enclave economy 274
underemployment 259 deindustrialization 268 embedded market 274
human capital 262 skills mismatch hypothesis 270
implicit bias 266 spatial mismatch hypothesis 270
9.1 What is the extent of income inequality, and how does it vary by race,
ethnicity, and gender? (pp. 250-254)
• Overall income inequality in the United States is at a historic high. This
inequality is exacerbated when we take racial, ethnic, and gender disparities into
account.

> How has inequality changed over the course of > How do the wage and earnings gaps represent
the twentieth century? different facets of inequality?
> How unequal is the United States compared 》飞气Thy has earnings inequality increased over the
with other countries? past fi丘yyears?
> What is the difference between the wage gap
and the earnings gap?
9.2 What are some dimensions of labor market inequality? (pp. 254-262)
• A complete understanding of racial disparities in the labor market requires a
consideration of gender, national-origin differences, incarceration rates, and
unemployment rates.

> Why is it important to take human capital > Ofthe explanations provided, which do you
into account when measuring earnings find most convincing for explaining the
disparities? earnings disparities between black men and
> How do racism and sexism operate differently white men? Why?
in the labor market?
9.3 How do sociologists explain labor market inequality? (pp. 262-271)

• Sociologists offer various explanations for labor market disparities, ranging from
human capital disparities to employer discrimination and structural changes in
the overall economy.
278 CHAPTER 9 Income and Labor Ma 「 ket Inequality

> To what extent are Asians advantaged or 》飞,Vhy does the author argue that the incarcer-
disadvantaged in the U.S. labor market? ated population should be included in counts of
> How do the individual-level explanations for the unemployed?
labor market disparities differ from the > Are audit studies a useful way to measure
structural explanations? To what extent could discrimination? Why or why not? What
these explanations work together? are the weaknesses and strengths of this
approach?
> Why is it important to take into account gender
when studying racial inequality?
9.4 Can affirmative action be an appropriate remedy for labor market

discrimination? (pp. 271-273)
• Few employers have affirmative action policies in place.τhose that do are
required to take positive steps to ensure that their company does not practice
racial discrimination and has a diverse workforce that reflects the working-age
population of the United States.

> How has a而rmative action been implemented 》斗\That strategiesdo you think could be
in the United States? implemented to reduce the earnings penalty for
nonwhite workers?
9.5 What is the relationship between selιemployment and labor market

inequality? (pp. 273-275)
• Self-employment and entrepreneurship have worked well for some racial minority
groups but not for others.

> In owning successful small businesses, what > Can people of color avoid discrimination
are some of the barriers that women and racial by becoming entrepreneurs ？飞N"hyor
minorities face in particular? why not?
> How is an embedded market related to
ethnic and racial enclaves? Evaluate how the
embedded market affects minority-owned
businesses.
Tall(ing about Race

Income inequality has increased overall in the United States since the
1970s: the rich have become richer while the poor have become poorer.
咀1ink of ways to use what you have learned in this chapter to talk with
people close to you about inequality. What is the relationship between
overall inequality and inequality between racial groups? How could a
decrease in overall inequality lead to a decrease in racial inequality? Do
you think there could be room for interracial solidarity in discussions
about income inequality?
The Block. Romare Bearden. 1971. Cut and pasted printed, colored and metallic papers, photostats, graphite, ink marker, gouache,
watercolor, and ink on Masonite. 48 x 216 in. (Image copyright © The Metropolitan M11,seum ofArt. Image source: Art Resource, Nγ）
. .
Chapter 。utline
. Land Ownership After Slavery 285

Residential Segregation 286
The Creation of Residential
Segregation 286
Discriminatory and Predatory
Lending Practices 289
research focus The Role of Real
Estate in Creating Seg 「ega↑ed
Cities 290
Neighborhood Segregation
Todaγ 292
voices Sabriya lhsan Williams on

Neighbo 「hood S↑e「eotyping 293
Wealth Inequalities 297
research focus: The Colo 「 of

Wealth i 门↑he Nation's Capital 299
Inequality in Homeownership and
Home Values 30 l
Wealth Inequality Beyond
Homeownership 30 l
Explaining the Wealth Gap in the
Twenty-First Century 302
As y。u Reαd Conclusion and Discussion 305

10.1 What are the historical reasons for housing and wealth Ta lking about Race 307
inequalities in the United States?
10.2 When and how did residential segregation become a
characteristic of U.S. cities?
” .3 What is the extent of wealth inequalities today in
homeownership and beyond?
10.4 What factors are perpetuating and exacerbating wealth
inequalities?
282 CHAPTER 10 Inequa lity in Housing and Wea lth
Inequalities in housing and wealth are deeply rooted in

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American history. The following excerpt from The Color of

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师告alth gives one example of how historical policies in the
~~ c,JlO~ United States still reverberate today.

F 飞｛tf民A
THE STORY DEH ’”D 1 tfl 勘 .,. , ,ACI, L WEALτH DIVIDE
racially mixed group is gathered in a church basement for a

workshop on the racial wealth divide. A trainer from United for
Mcizhu LI, U曲切，•R剧。‘ Botsy L回ndtlt 晰ight, Rooo 日叩闸’·阳回
a Fair Economy has just presented the facts that a typical white
肉。bocca Ad4mson, w创h Unltod fer D Fair Ce。”。my
family has about $121,000 in assets, compared to the typical family of

color, which has about $17,000 in assets.
In response, Ed, a middle-aged white man, raises his hand. “ I hear what you
are saying-that white people tend to have more mone予 But I don’t like that
what you are implying-that I should feel guilty about it. I swea乌 everything I
have, I worked hard for."
Ed has a point. He says he studied hard in college, worked hard at every job,
and saved steadily until he could buy a home. For the past several years, he and
his wife have been contributing to a retirement account.
’The trainers ask him who helped him become prosperous, and he says,“No
one.” When the discussion turns to affirmative action, he says he opposes
racial preferences and government handouts.
But then the trainers lead the group in an exercise in which participants put
milestones of their family’s history on a giant timeline on the wall.
In turns out that Ed ’s great-great-grandfather got a farm in Nebraska
through the Homestead Act-a program only available to whites.
His father, a World War II veteran, got a Veterans Administration mortgage
and went to college on the G.I. Bill-programs that black G.I.s couldn’t take
full advantage of because of housing and education discrimination. ’Thanks
to those boosts to earlier generations, Ed ’s college tuition as well as the down
payment on his home could be paid by his parents.
It may be true that he studied hard, worked hard, saved-and so can claim
some credit for his assets. But how much of the credit is his? How much is due
to public investments in his family?
A Latina woman, Larisa, asks Ed,“What about me? I studied hard, worked
hard, and saved just like you. But I didn’ t get the same rewards. Doesn't that
mean your money comes partly from your race ?” Ed admits that it does.
Source: Lui et al. 2013, 4-5.

CHAPTER 10 Inequality in Housi ng and Wealth 283
In this excerpt, why do you think the trainers in the church workshop thought
it was important for Ed to consider his family history? Are the programs his
family benefited from-the Homestead Act and the G.I. Bill-government
handouts? Are government handouts desirable? Why might it be useful to
understand these historical programs?
In this chapter, we will learn about wealth inequality-both overall inequal-
ity and inequality among racial and ethnic groups. Wealth is the sum total wealth The sum total of
of a person’s assets-cash in the bank and the value of all property, not only a person's assets minus
land but houses, cars, stocks and bonds, and retirement savings-minus debt. debt. Wealth is built up
It is something built up over a lifetime and passed on to the next generation over a lifetime and passed
through inheritances. on to the next generation
Wealth inequality in the United States is staggering: 1 percent of Ameri- through inheritances.
cans own nearly half of the wealth in the country (Norton and Ariely 2011).
Despite this tremendous inequality, the idea persists that if you work hard, assets Cash in tl1e bank
you will succeed. ’This ideology is deeply rooted in the American psyche and and the val11e of all
perpetuated through popular media and folklore. In the story at the start property, not only land
of this chapter, Ed believes he deserves what he has because he has worked b11t also houses, cars,
hard. Yet many people work hard all of their lives and die with no assets. As stocks and bonds, and
writer and activist George Monbiot (2011) put it, ''If wealth was the inev- retirement savings.
itable result of hard work and enterprise, every woman in Africa would be
a millionaire. ”
< If wealth were the

inevitable result of l1ard
work, these Berber women
would likely be wealthy.
284 CHAPTER 10 Inequality in Housing and Wealth
In Chapter Nine, we learned about income inequality. Wealth inequality, as

we will see, is both more entrenched and more severe. Most Americans think
wealth should be distributed more equally-even as they underestimate the
true extent of inequality. Most believe a fair distribution would mean a sub-
stantial amount of wealth for the middle class. The reality, however, is very
different, with the middle class holding very little or no wealth and the poor
having no wealth at all. These proportions-broken down into ideal, perceived,
and actual distributions-are shown in Figure 10-1. As this figure shows, the
United States is a highly unequal society in terms of wealth and is even more
unequal than most of us realize.τhe top 20 percent of the population controls
over 80 percent of the wealth (Norton andAriely2011).
When we add race into the equation, the numbers get starker. Black and
Latino families in the United States own just nine cents of wealth for each
dollar white families own (Pew Research Center 2014). How do we explain
such racial disparities in wealth?
As we will see, the reasons for these disparities run deeper than those for
income disparities. Wealth inequality is related to income inequality, but
wealth and income inequality function differently. 咀1e wealth inequality
between whites and blacks, for example, is a result of historically embed-
ded inequalities that go back to the time of slavery, the Jim Crow era, and
early-twentieth-century housing policies. Today, it is perpetuated and even
exacerbated by inequalities in homeownership, college attendance, inheri-
tance, and unemployment rates. Homeownership, o丘en considered the cor-
nerstone of the American Dream, is one of the primary driving forces behind
Top 20°/o 2nd 20°/o Middle 20°/o

4th 20°/o Bottom 20°/o
Actual
Estimated
FIGURE 10-1. Ideal

Ideal, Perceived, and
Actual Wealth Distribution
in the United States 0°/o 10°/o 20°/o 30°/o 40o/o 50°/o 60o/o 70°/o 80°/o 90°/o 100°/o
Source: Norton and Ariely (2011). Percent wealth owned
Lan d Owners hi p A fte 「 S l a very 285
racial disparities in wealth. In this chapter, we will take a close look at the his-
torical roots of wealth inequality, as well as contemporary trends, through the
lens of race. We will begin with slavery, which set the stage for contemporary
racial inequalities.
LAND 。WNERSHIP AFTER SLAVERY

At the end of the Civil War, African-descended people who had been enslaved
for generations were freed. Slaves had cleared the forests and made the land
productive, generating wealth for southern landowners.τhey ceased to be
the property of whites, yet had no property of their own. Enslaved Africans
played a tremendous role in creating prosperity for the United States, but their
enslavement prevented them from accumulating any wealth.
Slaves were, by definition, unable to own any type of property. With free-
dom came limited possibilities for land ownership. In 1865, General William
Sherman issued Special Field Order No. 15, which set aside land for former
slaves in an area that traversed the coastal regions of South Carolina and Flor-
ida. Sherman’s order specified that black families could settle on no more than
forty acres of tillable land. ’The order, however, stopped short of conferring
titles to the land. In less than a yea乌 40,000 ex-slaves had settled on 400,000
acres of land. 咀1e success of this program was short-lived: by the end of 1865,
President Johnson had ordered the removal of former slaves from the lands
they had settled and returned the lands to their former owners (Darity 2008;
Cimbala 1989).
In 1866, former slaves were given another opportunity to acquire land: the
Southern Homestead Act (SHA) reopened the door for former slaves to apply
for land. The SHA allocated 46 million acres of public lands for homesteading
in five southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Missis-
sippi. Both blacks and whites were permitted to apply for this land, much of
which was not productive ( Canaday, Reback, and Stowe n.d.). By 1900, only
one-quarter of southern blac】汇 farrr
2006） .τhe rest eked out a living w。此ing for others or eventually made their
way north to seek their fortunes in the cities there.
Although some black Americans found economic opportunities in north-
ern cities, they were not able to reap the same advantages over time as their residential
white counterparts. One of the main reasons for the inability of blacks to segregation The
build wealth has been the creation of housing segregation within U.S. cities. separation of different
Residential segregation happens when different groups of people are sorted groups of people into
into distinct neighborhoods. distinct neighborhoods.
286 CHAPTER 10 Ineq ua li ty in Hous ing a nd Wealth
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATI 。 N
Today, most U.S. cities are heavily segregated, yet this was not the case during
the nineteenth century. Urban residential segregation in the United States was
created in the early twentieth century and has had harmful consequences for
the wealth portfolios of black Americans.
币1e century following emancipation saw dramatic changes in the demo-
graphics of the United States. In 1870, 80 percent of black Americans lived in
the rural South. By 1970, this figure had reversed: 80 percent ofblackAmericans
had come to live in cities, equally divided between the North and the South.
During the same period that black Americans were migrating to the North,
European immigrants were arriving in U.S. cities.
At first, blacks in urban areas lived in close proximity to whites. Yet between
1900 and 1940, U.S. cities were transformed from having very little residential
segregation to having high levels of it. In Kansas City, for example, residential
segregation tripled between 1900 and 1930. By 1930, the typical black
Chicagoan lived in a neighborhood that was over two-thirds black. In effect,
the urban ghe忱。 in the United States was created in the first two decades of the
twentieth century (Massey and Denton 1993). How did this happen?
Part of the explanation is that African Americans moved into cities that had
previously had small numbers of nonwhites.τhe rise of segregation, however,
was not an organic process: white residents created segregation and ensured
that it persisted.
The Creation of Residentiαi Segregation

A combination of three forces led to residential segregation: collective racial
violence carried out by whites, practices created and reinforced by the emerg-
ing real estate industry, and federal housing programs that were made avail-
able almost exclusively to whites.
卫1e first factor that contributed to residential segregation was that through-
out the twentieth century, white residents used racial violence to keep blacks
out of primarily white neighborhoods ( Gotham 2000; Lipsitz 2006). Whites
engaged in cross burning and window breaking, and joined organized mobs
in nearly every major northern city. 卫1ere were hundreds of incidents of racial
racially restrictive violence intended to prevent blacks from moving into white neighborhoods in
covenants Contractual Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and other cities. In most cases, these violent
agreements that prevent actions went unpunisl叫（Sugr时 2008).
the sale or lease of The second factor was the creation of racially restrictive covenants-
prope1·ty within an area contractual agreements that prevent the sale or lease of property within an
to nonwhites. area to nonwhites-originated and reinforced by the real estate industry.
Res idential S eg 「e g at i o n 287
5. Th e lot . n。r 田1y p a rt t he r e of . shal 1 not b e s 。l d t o any p ersons e i t her of whole 。r p息r t < Deed f1·om 1929 noting
bl 。。d. of t h e ~longolian , M,iLlay 。r !::thi opian r a c e s , no r shall t he s ame nor any p唱rt t he r eof be renutd restrictions on renting
t o p e r s ons of such races .
or selling a home to
non whites in Seattle.
By the 1920s, deeds in nearly every new housing development in the northern steering A practice by
United States prevented the ownership or rental ofhouses in the development which real estate agents
by anyone who was not white. From the 1930s until the 1960s, the guidelines show homes in white
of the National Association of Real Estate Boards prevented realtors from neighborhoods only to
selling homes to nonwhites in white areas (Sugrue 2008). Kevin Gotham whites and homes in
(2000) argues that the primary motive for these covenants was economic: black neighborhoods only
real estate investors wanted to ensure their profits, and they believed that to blacks.
racially stable and all-white neighborhoods were the most likely to increase
in value over time. Federal Housing
In 1948, the Supreme Court declared these covenants unenforceable. And in Administration (FHA)
1968, the passage of the Fair Housing Act made these covenants illegal. Once Government agency
covenants became illegal, real estate agents developed new tactics to preserve established in 1934
residential segregation. One of the most common activities was steering, in with the purpose of
which real estate agents would show homes in white neighborhoods only to bolstering the economy
whites and homes in black neighborhoods only to blacks. For these and other and, in particular, the
reasons, over sixty years a丘er the passage of the Fair Housing Act, we still construction industry.
have high levels of residential segregation, which in turn exacerbate wealth
inequality.
卫1e final reason for residential segregation is the
nature of federal housing programs and policies.
We saw in Chapter Two that the early twentieth
century was a time when the color line for white
immigrants was in flux. Federal housing policies in
the 1930s would solidify the line between whites
and nonwhites for decades to come.
τhe Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
was established in 1934 with the purpose of
bolstering the economy and, in particular, the
construction industry. 咀1e FHA encouraged
the building of new homes for people living in . 、，
crowded tenements in inner cities by creating

a new, government-backed mortgage system.
A A sign in the integrated Long Island community of
Prior to the creation of the FHA, people had to Lakeview, New York, in 1962 reads:,“Negroes! This
come up with as much as half of the value of a community could become another ghetto. You owe it to
home before purchasing it. The FHA created the your ‘family’ to buy in another community.”
288 CHAPTER 10 Ineq uali ty in Hous ing and Wealth
conditions under which banks could loan people money to purchase homes
with small down payments and at reasonable interest rates.τhe vast majority
of new homes were built in city suburbs, where suburban living was enabled by
the simultaneous construction of highways and the development of suburban
services (Oliver and Shapiro 2006).
Banks used FHA guidelines to decide who should be permitted to
borrow money. 咀1e 1938 Underwriting Manual of the FHA stated that “ if a
neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue
to be occupied by the same social and racial classes.” τhe Manual further
recommended the implementation of restrictive covenants, which remained
in place until they were outlawed in 1949 (quoted in Oliver and Shapiro 2006).
Between 1933 and 1978, U.S. government policies enabled over 35 million
families to increase their wealth through housing equity. As homeowners,
millions of Americans were able to begin to accumulate the tax savings, home
equity, economic stability, and other benefits associated with homeownership.
White Americans benefited disproportionately from this shi丘 for two primary
reasons: (1) it was easier for white people to purchase homes, and (2) the homes
that whites bought increased in value more rapidly than those purchased by
blacks because of the perceived desirability of all-white neighborhoods. In
addition, few women were able to benefit directly from these policies, as they
did not have the financial stability to purchase homes on their own. Because of
racial endogamy in marriages (marrying within
one ’s race), white women benefited because their
white husbands purchased homes, whereas black
women only reaped either the same paltry bene-
fits as their husbands or hardly any at all if they
were single ( Oliver and Shapiro 2006).
One hundred years a丘er slavery ended,
these policies and practices related to housing
became one of the primary factors responsible
for inequality in the wealth portfolios of black
.
and white families in the United States. Racial
violence against blacks who tried to move into
white neighborhoods continued well a丘er the
civil rights movement of the 1960s. Real estate
A A real estate developer built a half-mile wall in Detroit
in 1940 to separate a black from a white community. agents continue to practice steering today, and
Today, because of white flight, the wall separates one the wealth generated by the properties pur-
black community from another. chased by whites who benefited from the federal
Res idential Seg 「egation 289
housing policies of the 1930s continues to be passed down to those individu-

als' children and grandchildren today.
For example, in 1948, houses in Levittown, New York, were available only
to white families. A white couple born in the 1920s could purchase a brand-
new home there for $8,000, with no down payment, by taking advantage of
the federal housing programs. In the 1960s, that family could use the home
equity built up in that property to take out loans to pay for their children’s
college tuition. And if the couple passed away in the 2000s, their children
would inherit the home, in a neighborhood still 98 percent white, valued at
$400,000. 卫1e opportunity to accumulate that kind of wealth was denied
to black families, who were not permitted to purchase homes in Levittown.
Eugene Burnett, for example, is a black Army veteran who tried to purchase
a home in Levittown in 1949. When he put in an application, the agent told
him that “ the owners of this development have not as yet decided whether
they’re going to sell these homes to Nψoes”（Lambert 1997). Those black
families who were able to purchase homes did not see their real estate values
climb in the same way. 咀1e average home value in the nearby, primarily non-
white Central Islip is about a third of the value of a home in the primarily
white Levittown.
Discriminatory and Predatory Lending Practices

Even though the FHA’s discriminatory housing programs have been dis-
continued, black and Latino families have continued to face disadvantages
through contemporary discriminatory lending practices. On average, blacks
are 2.7 times more likely than whites to be denied mortgages. Prospective
homeowners who are denied mortgages have to either forgo the opportunity
to accumulate wealth through homeownership or seek out a less favorable loan
with a higher interest rate. In fact, black homeowners pay 0.54 percent higher
interest rates than whites. This half二point differential adds up to tens of thou-
sands of dollars over the course of a loan. Thus, the racial disparity in lending
practices has far-reaching consequences. Bankers o丘en claim that blacks are
more o丘en denied loans because they do not have the same creditworthiness
as whites. Yet, a study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston revealed that
even when credit scores were taken into account, black and Latino mortgage
applicants were still 60 percent more likely to be turned down than whites
(Oliver and Shapiro 2006). Continued discrimination in home loans perpet-
uates the wealth inequality that was solidified with the FHA programs of the
1930s (Oliver and Shapiro 2006).
290 CHAPTER 10 Ineq ua Iity in Housing and Wea Ith
γ巳seαγc
The Role of Real Estate in Creating Segregated Cities

In 2011, Forbes magazine reported that Mission Hills in Johnson County,
Kansas, was the third-richest neighborhood in the United States, with a median
income of $243,000 （飞Tardi 2011). The Forbes article did not mention that the
neighborhood was 96.8 percent white in 2010 nor that most I(ansas City resi-
dents did not live in racially segregated neighborhoods prior to the twentieth
century. How did segregation happen? And how did it benefit whites? I(evin
Gotham’s (2000) research addresses these questions through an analysis of the
real estate industry.
Between 1900 and 1940, Kansas City went from being a racially integrated
city to one with a segregation index of 88.0-meaning that 88 percent of all
nonwhites would have to move to live in integrated neighborhoods. Gotham
(2000) argues that this segregation was facilitated and promoted by the real
estate industry.
One of the major facilitators of segregated communities was the National
Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB). In the early twentieth century,
NAREB published numerous pamphlets and periodicals that warned real
estate firms about the financial dangers of integrated neighborhoods. NAREB
actively promoted the ideology that all-white neighborhoods were desirable
and wise financial investments. In 1924, NAREB amended its code of ethics to
indicate that realtors should not facilitate the purchase of homes by nonwhites
in white neighborhoods. It became unethical for realtors to sell blacks homes in
white areas.
Racially restrictive covenants were one of the primary tools used to ensure
racial segregation in urban areas around the country. Between 1900 and
1947, Johnson County, Kansas, recorded 148 such covenants, accounting for
96 percent of all subdivisions within the county. The last restrictive covenant in
Johnson County was recorded in 1962.
咀1e J. C. Nichols Company was one of the pioneers of residential land develop-
ment in the area and one of the 岳rst and most prominent developers to use racially
restrictive covenants. Between 1908 and 1949, the Nichols Company built dozens
of racially restricted subdivisions, such as Mission Hills; the property deeds for
homes in these developments warned prospective buyers that blacks could not
be owners or tenants. Moreover, the Nichols Company distributed promotional
literature designed to convince middle-class whites that “ residential life in a
Residential Seg 「egation 291
racially segregated neighborhood was a mark of social status, upward mobility,

and protection from the chaos and social problems of the city."
l(ansas City continues to be a hypersegregated city today. Kevin Gotham’s
(2000) research on the real estate industry shows that this is not because of white
preferences to live in all-white neighborhoods, but because of the real estate
industry’s desire to see profits through the creation of all-white spaces and their
promotion of these spaces as desirable neighborhoods.
For Discussion
1. 认Tere there ever racially restrictive covenants in the area where you now live?
2. To what extent do you think that restrictive covenants were implemented for
profit motives? Does it matter whether the covenants were created to keep
property values high or to keep nonwhites out?
Source: Gotham 2000.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, bank lending became more predatory, segregation index
particularly for blacks and Latinos. Predatory lenders traditionally include Measure stating that 88
pawnshops, payday lenders, and check cashing services that charge very high percent nonwhites would
fees and interest rates. Following changes in lending laws, the late 1990s saw have to move in order
the rise of another type of predatory financial practice: subprime loans, or for the city to be fully
high-interest loans to people at high risk of defaulting. Black and Latino home- residentially integrated.
owners were much more likely than whites to receive loans with unfavorable
conditions such as prepayment penalties and high interest rates. Between 1993 predatory lender A
and 2000, the percentage of subprime mortgages in black and Latino neigh- pawnshop, payday lender,
borhoods rose from 2 to 18 percent. Overall, black and Latino families were or check cashing service
about twice as likely to receive subprime loans as white families. By 2009, over that cha1·ges very high
IS percent of s由prime loans were in foreclosure (Rugh and Massey 2010; fees and interest rates.
Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013).
Segregation exacerbated the effects of the economic crisis for black fami- subprime loan High-
lies. Metropolitan areas with higher degrees of racial segregation had higher interest loan to someone
rates of foreclosure. Additionally, black families in highly segregated cities at high risk of defaulting.
had been more likely to get subprime loans than their counterparts in less
segregated cities.τhe higher rate of subprime loans in segregated cities was
partly because unregulated mortgage brokers targeted black neighborhoods
where regulated banks were less likely to have branches. Notably, more than
half of all subprime loans made in the 2000s were for refinancing instead of
292 CHAPTER 10 Ineq ua Iity in Hous ing and Wea Ith
> In the aftermath of the

2007-2009 housing crisis,
protesters, like these in
Brooklyn in 2011, fought
back against predatory
lenders a11d foreclosures in
their communities.
purchasing new homes. When those homes in primarily black neighborhoods

failed to appreciate in value as expected or decreased in value, families who
had borrowed at high interest rates found themselves in financial trouble
(Rugh and Massey 2010; Dymk剑 et al. 2011).
Neighborhood Segregation Today

Even though the housing policies that contributed to residential segregation
have been repealed, neighborhood segregation persists today. How do we quan-
tify it? One measure is the dissimilarity index, which describes the extent to
dissimilarity index which two groups-such as blacks and whites-are found in equal propor-
Measure that describes tions in all neighborhoods. We can interpret this measure as the percentage
the extent to which two of individuals in either group who would have to move to achieve perfect inte-
groups-such as blacks gration. Another tool for measuring segregation is the isolation index, which
and whites-are found in compares a neighborhood ’s demographics against citywide demographics. If,
equal proportions in all for example, a city is 30 percent black, yet blacks live in neighborhoods that are
neighborhoods. SO percent black, the isolation index would be the difference, 20 percent.
Black-white segregation continues to have the highest national dissimilar-
isolation index Meas11re ity index. In 2010, Milwaukee had the highest black-white segregation index at
that compares a 81.S. In contrast, the segregation index for Hispanics/ Latinos in Milwaukee was
neighborhood's 57.0. 咀1e city with the highest Hispanic/ Latino-white segregation index was
demographics against Springfield, Massachusetts, at 63.4. Los Angeles had the second highest, at 62.2
citywide demographics. (Michigan Population Studies Center, n.d.). The black-white seg吨ation index
Residential Seg 「egat i o n 293
Sabriya lhsan Williams on

Neighborhood Stereotyping
…… … …. . . . ...... . . . . . . . .... . . . . . ...... . . . ...... . . . . . ........ . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . ... . ... . .... . . . . . ...... . . . ...... ..
Sabri·νa Ihsan Williams is a black Muslir.乱’woma：γL who lives 如 Washingto’n,DC.，如

a primarily wh·让e 叽eighborhoodjust afew houses do哑肌from Vice President Mike
Pence. In this ess叨， she expresses herfrustratio乱 that President Trump consistentl＇ν.
T飞fers toAfricanA；悦ericans as liv悦g i·乱飞饥乱er cities ” andi·饥 poverty. In contrast, .
Sabriya, her husbα悦d，乱饥d their two childre叽 live 悦。叽巳 ofDC ’s most exclusive
(a：γid whitest) neighborhoods. Although racial segregation is high in cities across the
U悦：ted States，悦。t allAfricanAmericans live in 飞饥叽er cities. ' ’
The reality of a Trump presidency was not something that I ever imagined would
happen. I believed this country had a moral compass that surpassed being Republi-
can or Democrat.
It saddens and angers me to hear Trump discuss “ the blacks,” and the inner city
and how we are “ living in poverty,” in con1n1unities that are,“in the worst shape ever”
as if this were a fact for every African American.
These statements are a clear indicator of how dis-
connected he is to African Americans and other
minorities. He pitted poor white communities
against blacks, Latinos, Muslims, anybody that
doesn't look like, speak like, or pray like him.
I am one of “ the Blacks.” I am a woman and a
Muslim and I don’t live in poverty. I live a stone’s
throw from where our Vice President made
his home in the Chevy Chase neighborhood of
Washington, DC. I am NOT who Trump thinks
of when he thinks of African Americans.
We have a voice and that was made clear by
the 94 percent of African American women that
did not vote for him. We all need to acknowledge Sαbr侈ααndherfam均 live 仇 αn affluent neighborhood
that we do not have a person in the White House in Washington, DC.
that wants diversity to thrive or who will close
large gaps in racial disparities that exist in this
country.
This is why I will be LOUD and HYPERVIGILANT and UNAPOLOGETIC every
time I read or hear him speak of “ the blacks,” and how downtrodden we are and I will
do the same when he does it to women, Latinos, Muslims, and the LGBTQ community.
(co’nti：饥.ued)
294 CHAPTER 10 Ineq ua Iity in Housing and Wea Ith
Co饥.tinued We are not one big monolith. We are many things-one of the most
important being fighters! We will not be silenced by this administration or
(/) put into a box. Contrary to what Trump would have you believe, my box isn’t
living in poverty in the inner city; it is right around the corner from Vice
President Mike Pence!
. Source: Ihsan Williams 2017.
………………·..................................................... ..................................
is consistently high in cities with large black populations, such as Detroit and
Chicago.τhis index in 2010 was 80 for Detroit and 76 for Chicago. 咀1e average
Detroit black resident lives in a neighborhood that is 81 percent black, and the aver-
age black person in Chicago lives in a neighborhood that is 67 percent black. Latinos
and Asian Americans have remained somewhat less segregated from whites, with
dissimilarity indexes of 48 and 41, respectively, in 2010 (Logan and Stults 2011).
Segregation is high in the United States, but it is not absolute: many people
share neighborhoods with people of different races. According to data from
the 2010 census, the average white American in a metropolitan area lives in a
neighborhood that is 75 percent white, whereas the average African American
lives in a neighborhood that is 45 percent white and 45 percent black. The aver-
age Latino lives in a neighborhood that is 35 percent white, and the average
Asian American lives in a neighborhood that is 49 percent white (see Figure
10 之）． τhe only group that, on average, lives in a primarilywl巾 neighborhood
is whites (Logan and Stults 2011).
Scholars sometimes refer to African Americans in urban areas as hyper-
hypersegregation segregated because of the high levels of segregation in these neighborhoods. In
Instances of notably high contrast, other racial and ethnic minorities tend not to experience such high levels
levels of segregation. of segregation. Studies show relatively low levels of Native American segregation
in urban areas, especially compared to the levels experienced by African Ameri-
cans (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). In 2000, 1.4 million Native Americans lived in
rural areas-accounting for about a third of all Native Americans. Most of these
rural Native Americans lived on Indian reservations, effectively separated from
non-Native Americans. Outside ofreservations, however, rural Native Americans
have relatively low levels of seg鸣ation (Lichter, Parisi, Grice, and Taquino 2007).
Racial segregation poses a problem not just because people of different
races have little contact with one another but because it exacerbates existing
inequalities. Black and Latino families of all economic statuses are more likely
than white families to live in neighborhoods with high poverty rates. Even
affluent blacks and Latinos live in neighborhoods with fewer resources than
those inhabited by poor whites (Logan 2013). Racial segregation 。丘en means
concentrated poverty, which in turn leads to underresourced neighborhoods
Resident ia l Seg 「ega t ion 295
Asians Blacks I Hispanics
Hispanics Blacks I Hispanics
Blacks Blacks I Hispanics
Whites Blacksl Hisp

FIGURE 10-2.
QO/o 20°/o 40°/o 60°/o 80°/o 100°/o
Diversity Experienced
in Each Group’s Typical
Neighborhood, by Race/
0/o White • 0/o Black • 0/o Hispanic Ethnicity, 2010
0/o Asian 0/o Other Source: Logan and Stults (2011).
with poor public schools, high levels of crime, and high unemployment rates.
High levels of racial segregation mean that black and Latino families are more
likely than white families to live in neighborhoods that are inhospitable to their
success. Children who grow up in segregated, high-poverty neighborhoods are
much less likely to finish high school and to secure employment.τhey are more
likely to experience violence growing up and to have children out of wedlock.
Residential segregation limits opportunities for middle-class as well as poor
black families (Charles 2003). One of the most longstanding consequences of
segregation is that black families in black neighborhoods are unable to build up
home equity and therefore lag far behind white families in wealth accumulation.
As we have seen, racial segregation in housing is driven by formal and infor-
mal policies and practices. It is also affected by whites’ preferences to live in pri-
marily white neighborhoods. Most white Americans balk at the idea of living
in a neighborhood with more than a few black families. Contrary to popular
perceptions, residential segregation is not due to black Americans' preferences
for living exclusively among other black Americans. Sociologists Maria Krysan
and Reynolds Farley (2002) analyzed survey data from 2,000 black families in
several cities and found that African Americans prefer racially diverse neighbor-
hoods. In the study, the interviewers showed respondents fictional representa-
tions of five neighborhoods, ranging from all black to all white, and asked them
to rank the neighborhoods in order of preference. They also asked respondents
296 CHAPTER 10 In eq uali ty in Hous ing and Wealth
’ ,,
』
111111
....
回一
回
a. Poor, primarily black/Latino neighborhood b. Upper-middle-class, primarily black neighborhood
c. Upper-middle-class, primarily white neighborhood d. Poor, primarily white neighborhood
A What do these photos

of neighborhoods in and if they would not want to live in one of the fictional neighborhoods. Half of the
a1·ound Washington, D.C.,
black respondents chose the neighborhood that was evenly split between black
tell you about the lives of
and white as their most preferred neighborhood. Only 20 percent of the black
the people who live there?
矶That do these photos tell respondents chose the neighborhood that was all black. African Americans in
you about neighborhood this survey expressed a strong preference for mixed neighborhoods. Although
stereotypes? only 35 percent of African Americans were willing to be the first black family to
move into a white neighborhood, nearly all of the respondents expressed willing-
ness to move into a neighborhood if it was primarily white, as long as there were
one or two other black families living there. In contrast, less than a third ofwhite
respondents indicated they were willing to move into a neighborhood that was
evenly split between black and white families.
WEALTH INEQUALITIES
Racial segregation in housing is one of the driving factors behind wealth dis par-
ities among racial groups. On average, African Americans and Latinos have less
than 9 percent of the wealth of whites (At a Glance 10-1; Pew Research Center
Wea l• h lnequali • ies 297
2014). The disparities between the wealth portfolios of wl巾S and Latinos and
between those of whites and blacks are about twice as large today as they were
prior to the recession that began in 2007, primarily as a result of residual effects
from the related crisis in the housing market.τhe housing crisis wiped out all of
the gains in wealth made by black and Latino families compared to whites since
1984, when the United States first began to track wealth inequality. In 2009,
one-third of black and Latino households had zero or negative wealth (Koch-
har, Fry, and Taylor 2011). By 2013, the median white household had 13 times
the net wealth of the median black household and 10 times the wealth of the
median Latino/ a household (Traub, Sullivan, Meschede, and Shapiro 2017).
Let’s briefly revisit the differences between income and wealth. Americans
primarily use their income to live on a day-to-day basis: to pay the rent or
mortgage, to buy food and other necessities, to pay for school, and to pay bills.
Income differentials o丘en translate into differences in standards of living.
飞叩ealth, by contrast, has a different functionality. 飞气7ealth includes an individual's
accumulated assets, such as savings, home equ让y, stocks, and business ownership.
People don't use wealth to pay for daily expenses (except in financial emergencies).
Instead, wealth grants financial stability and is often used to ensure the financial
success of future generations through inheritances. Melvin Oliver and Thomas
Shapiro (2006, 175) contend that “ wealth is money that is not typically used to
purchase milk, shoes, or other necessities... . It is used to create opportunities,
secure a desired stature and standard of living, or pass along a class status already
obtained to a new generation.” The vast discrepancies between black and white
wealth, then, translate into the solidification ofracial inequality across generations.
卫1ere are many reasons for wealth inequality. One of the main factors is
inequality in home values and homeownership. In 2005, blacks and Lati-
nos derived much greater proportions of their wealth from their homes than
whites. Looking at the loss in average wealth for families between 2005 and
2009, it is clear that nearly all of the losses for all families came from losses
in home equity (Figure 10-3). Since black and Latino families had almost
no other wealth-an average of $479 for Latino families and $626 for black
families-these households lost nearly all of their wealth as a result of the
housing crisis (Kochhar, Fry, and Taylor 2011).
In 2000, Native Americans were the racial group with the lowest average
incomes. Relatively little data is available on the wealth holdings of Native
Americans. However, Jay Zagorsky (2006) was able to use data from the
National Longitudinal Study of Youth to assess their wealth holdings. He
found that in 2000, the average Native American born between 1957 and 1965
had only $5,700 in wealth, compared with the $65,500 amassed by his or her
white counterpart. He also found that only 43 percent of the Native Americans
298 CHAPTER 10 In e q u a Ii t y in Ho us i n g a n d We a Ith
AT A GLANCE 10.1 Wealth Disparities in the United States
The wealth of the top 10°/o of Americans has grown considerably since 1995, while the wealth of the
other 90°/o has remained relatively stable or declined.
75
~ 60
-
一
0
"O
的 45
日 ~ Top 10 percent
飞5 30
ωco
＝＝』←
15
0
2) c争 <’3 <o 飞与民气。。
R5 与乌。勺。气
~
A、
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、气
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口
'V。
口
号 'V。 'V。 Data from CBO 2016
Racial and ethnic wealth gaps have grown since the great recession Wealth by race and ethnicity, 2007-2013
Median net worth of households, in 2013 dollars
- -
... 81,400
- ...
AM
HHGM
nudEEnu
n』
HOusehHo
J
82,300
1995 The median net 2013 The median net
worth of one white household worth of one white household
was 7 times that of a black was 13 times that of a black 2007 135,700
household and 6 times that household and 10 times that
of a Hispanic/Latino household. of a Hispanic/Latino household.
141,900
White household Black household Hispanic/Latino household
D挝a from Pew Research Center 2014 White 138,600
The racial wealth divide Forbes 400 net worth (the 400 richest Americans) 192,500
compared with all African American and Latino households, 2015.
11,000
Black 16,600
19,200
Forbes All All African

13,700
Top 400 Latinos Americans
$2.34 trillion $1 .82 trillion $1.56 trillion Hispanic/
16,000
Latino
Just 400 extremely wealthy individuals have as much wealth
as 15 million Hispanic/Latino households and 16 million 23,600
African American households.
Data from Pew Research Center 2014
Data from Institute for Policy Studies 2015
2005 • 2009
$168,103
$134,992
$113, 149
$78,066
FIGURE 10-3.
$18,359 Average Wealth of Families
$12,124
$6,325 $5,677 by Race/ Ethnicity in 2005
and2009
Source: Kochhar, Fry, and Taylor
Whites Hispanics/Latinos Blacks Asians (2011 ).
in this age group had bank accounts, compared with 65 percent of baby boom-
ers overall. Only a third of Native American baby boomers owned homes,
compared with 57 percent overall. Zagorsky (2006) found that Native Amer-
icans own fewer businesses, have lower rates of homeownership, and reside in
homes with lower values than the average person living in the United States.
γeseαγc 。cus
The Color of Wealth in the Nation's Capital

In Washington, D.C., white households have, on average, a net worth that is
81 times greater than that of black households. The Urban Institute carried out a
telephone survey in 2014 to assess the levels of wealth inequality in the nation’s
capital, which is 47.7 percent black, 35.7 percent white, 10.4 percent Latino, and
3.7 percent Asian. 卫1e study found substantial wealth disparities by race and eth-
nicity. The median net worth-the sum of all assets less the value of debts-for
white households was $284,000, compared with $13,000 for Latino households,
$3,500 for U.S. black households, and $3,000 for African households. Korean,
Asian Indian, and Vietnamese households all had a median net worth of over
$400,000, higher than that of the average white household.
(co ’n tinued)
300 CHAPTER 10 In eq uali ty in Hous ing and Wealth
The wealth inequalities are not due solely to income inequalities: in 2014, the
median income for both white and Chinese households in 斗\lashington, D.C., was
$110,000. For African American households, it was $72,000. Latino households
had the lowest median family income, at $59,000. These income differences pale
in comparison to wealth differences.
Just over half of white households in the study owned stocks, compared with
18.6 percent of U.S. black households, 14.6 percent of African households, and
25.9 percent of Latino households. 咀1is figure was just under SO percent for
Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Asian Indian households.
飞～There as only a quarter of black households and a fi丘h of Latino households
had individual retirement accounts, two-thirds of white, Chinese, and Asian
Indian households had these accounts.
Homeownership rates also varied between groups: 78 percent of white house-
holds, 90 percent of Chinese households, and 94 percent of Vietnamese house-
holds owned their homes, compared with 58 percent of U.S. black households
and about half of African black and Latino households. 咀1e home values also
varied: U.S. black and African households owned homes that were 67 percent
and 72 percent, respectively, of the median value of homes owned by whites.
Similar to other studies, k斗 akazi et al. found that even highly educated black
families have less wealth on average than white families. For white households
headed by an individual with a high school diploma or less, the average net worth
was $265,000, compared with $130,000 for black households headed by an
individual with a graduate degree. Whereas net worth for whites varies relatively
little between those who have a high school diploma or less and those with a
bachelor’s degree, for Latino households the difference is substantial: $5,500
versus $53,000. For black households, the largest gain is between a B.A. degree
($1究000) and a graduate degree ($130,000). At all educational levels, however,
net worth for blacks lags behind that for whites.
圄 Graduate degree 门 Bachelor’s degree • High school diploma or less
$366,000
Asian $705,000
$443,000
Latino 1 $53,ooo
1
$5,500
$130,000
Black $-19,000
0
’ 2, nununu
qu7
在 MM
hhv
一
一
.
沼m
mα
E
m
Median Net Worth by
nu 、，
圃
White ,
（，
1
趴
nU
Educational Attainment
Source: Kijakazi et al. 2016. Median Net Worth
l『、equαlity in H。me。w『1ersl、ipα 『1d Home Vαll

Using the 2001 American Housing Survey, Lauren Krivo and Robert Kaufmarl
(2004) found that over 70 percent of white households owned their homes,
compared with 46 percent of black households, 49 percent of Latino house-
holds, and SS percent of Asian households. In addition, they found that white
homeowners have more home equity than do blacks and Latinos. 咀1e median
value of home equity for blacks was $S2,882, and for Latinos it was $60,000. In
contrast, the median home equity value for whites was $80,000. At $111,100,
Asians had the highest average home equity. Moreover, blacks and Latinos
were the most likely to have high-interest mortgages: 4 percent of whites
had an interest rate higher than 9 percent, compared with nearly 11 percent
of black homeowners and 7 percent of Latino homeowners. Asians were the
least likely to have this kind of mortgage, with only 1. S percent reporting high
interest rates.
Between 2007 and 2009, blacks and Latinos were twice as likely as whites to
experience foreclosures (I{ochhar et al. 2011). Analyses of home loans made
between 200S and 2008 reveals that 790 African Americans experienced a
foreclosure by 2009 for each 10,000 loans, compared with 769 Hispanics and
4S2 whites. By 2010, 17 percent of Latino homeowners, 11 percent of African
American homeowners, and 7 percent of non-Hispanic white homeowners
had lost or were at imminent risk of losing their homes (Gr阳1stein Bocian, Li,
and Ernst 2010). The housing crisis thus exacerbated preexisting inequalities
in homeownership and home values.
Wealth Inequality Beyond Homeownership

Families can have negative wealth if the total of their debts exceeds the total
value of their assets. This situation has become increasingly common with the
expansion of home equity loans, falling housing prices, and rising student debt.
Wealth includes factors beyond homeownership, such as stock holdings.
When stock prices plummeted in 2007, black and Latino families lost the larg-
est shares of their holdings. Latinos who owned stocks and mutual funds saw
a 32 percent decline in their value between 200S and 2009, and blacks saw a
71 percent decline in the same period.τhe stocks owned by whites fell only
9 percent, and those owned by Asians actually increased 19 percent during
this same period (Kochhar et al. 2011). In 2013, on忖 3.3 percent of black
households owned stocks, as compared with 17.2 percent of white households
(Herring and Henderson 2016).
High levels of debt also help explain wealth inequality. In 2002, over a
quarter of black and Latino households had negative net worth, compared
302 CHAPTER 10 Ineq uali ty in Hous ing and Wealth
with 13 percent of white households.τhe numbers are even starker when

we consider gender: nearly half of all black and Latina women had zero or
negative wealth in 2007 (I{ochhar, Fry, and Taylor 2011). In 2013, over half
(54 percent) of young black households (aged twenty-five to forty) had stu-
dent debt, compared with 39 percent of young white households. Relatedly,
these young black households had a median wealth of $3,600, compared
with young white households' median wealth of $35,800 (Huelsman
et al. 2015).
EXPLAINING THE WEALTH GAP IN THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Rather than decreasing over time, inequalities among whites, blacks, and Lati-
nos are increasing.τhe wealth gap between blacks and whites tripled between
1984 and 2009. In 2013，币1omas Shapiro, Tatjana Meschede, and Sam Osoro
published a study that sought to explain why. Based on their study of 1,700
households, these analysts attributed the wealth gap to five factors:
1. Years of homeownership
2. Household income
3. Years of unemployment
4. College education
S. Inheritances or financial support from family members
Notably, Shapiro and colleagues did not find the wealth gap to be a con-
sequence of behavioral differences, such as consumption pa忧erns or the pro-
pensity to build savings. It is also not solely a function of income differentials.
Instead, the researchers were able to explain two-thirds of the wealth gap using
these five factors. Years ofhomeownership accounted for 27 percent of the diι
ference, household income for 20 percent, unemployment for 9 percent, and
college education and inheritances for S percent each (Shapiro, Meschede, and
Osoro 2013).
Figure 10-4 presents an explanation of the gap between black and white
wealth. Many people would expect household income to account for the dif-
ferences in wealth. However, as we have seen, income differences can explain
only a portion of wealth inequalities. And although it is true that college edu-
cation makes it easier to build up wealth, the fact that whites are more likely
to be college educated accounts for only S percent of the differences in wealth
between white and black households.
E× plaining the Wea l• h Gap in the Twenty-Fi rs• Century 303
In a follow叩 study, Amy Traub et al. (2017)

found that the factors many people think explain
wealth inequality, such as education and out-
of二wedlock birth, in fact do not. White adults
with less than a high school education who had
children but were not married and who did Other factors, 34o/o
not work full time had more wealth on average
than black and Latino adults who were married,
completed higher levels of education, or worked
longer hours. For example, among households
under age SS, the median white high school
dropout has a similar amount of wealth to the Inheritances of
financial support,
median black or Latino adult who graduated 5o/o
high school and attended some college. Addi- College education,
5°/o
tionally, white adults who attended college have Years of
unemployment, 9°/o
7.2 times more wealth than their African Amer-
ican counterparts and 3.9 times more than their FIGURE 10-4.
Latino counterparts. How Do We Explain the Black/White Wealth Gap Today?
Years of homeownership accounted for the Source: Shapiro, Meschede, and Osoro (2013).
largest portion of the differences in wealth
between white and black families. African American families tend to pur-
chase homes later in life because they face more obstacles in home buying
than whites. Further, black homeowners are less likely to build up equity
over the years because of residential segregation, and white families are more
likely to receive financial assistance in purchasing a home from their family
members. Even though homeownership accounts for, on average, 53 percent
of the wealth black families have, compared with 39 percent for whites, the
return on investment in housing turns out to be far greater for white than for
black households (Shapiro et al. Osoro 2013). Black families who are able to
purchase homes face outright discrimination by real estate agents who con-
tinue to steer them to black neighborhoods and by lenders who quote them
higher interest rates. 咀1e limited market potential for homes in primarily
black neighborhoods inhibits the possibility for the value of these homes
to increase, and the higher interest rates make it more di面cult for blacks
to pay off their mortgages quickly.τhese factors work together to reduce
the home equity of blacks, thereby enhancing the wealth gap (IZrivo and
I(aufman 2004).
τhe foreclosure crisis of 2007-2009 further decimated black and Latino
wealth portfolios. A study by the Center for Responsible Lending (Bocian, Li,
304 CHAPTER 10 Inequality in Housing and Wealth
and Ernst 2010) found that among recent borrowe问 nearly 8 percent of
black and Latino homeowners lost their homes, compared with 4.5 percent of
whites.Nearly two-thirds of all foreclosures between 2005 and 2008 were on
homes mortgaged using subprime loans, meaning that people with subprime
loans were three times as likely to experience a foreclosure than people with
conventional or government loans. And black and Latino borrowers were
the most likely to get s由prime loans with unfavorable conditions (Bocian
et al. 2010).
Whites and blacks at similar income levels tend to have vastly different
wealth portfolios. One reason is that whites are more likely to have jobs with
benefits. 咀1is means that they are less likely to dip into their savings for med-
ical emergencies and that their employers are more likely to be contributing
to a retirement plan (Shapiro et al. 2013). Blacks also tend to be in more pre-
carious employment situations and are more likely to lose their jobs. When
unemployment rose from 5.0 percent in December 2007 to 9.5 percent in June
2009, Latinos and blacks were hit the hardest, with black unemployment rates
peaking at 15.6 percent and the Latino rate at 12.6 percent in 2009 (I(ochhar
et al. 2011).
币1e 2013 study by Shapiro and his colleagues found that 36 percent of white
households inherited some money over the twenty-five-year period under
study, compared with only7 percent ofblackhouseholds. Moreover, the inher-
itances black households received were, on average, only about 10 percent of
the amount inherited by white households. Inheritances are thus another
important part of the legacy of inequality in the United States.
Wealth researchers such as john powell (2008), Melvin Oliver, and Thomas
。sset-based social policy Shapiro (2006) make a case for asset-based social policies that are designed
Proactive policy, at either to help narrow the wealth gap. ’These researchers contend that the FHA pol-
the individual or structural icies of the early twentieth century set the stage for the wealth gap and that
level, designed to help now the United States has the responsibility of reversing that trend by se仕ing
narrow the wealth gap. up proactive policies.τhese policies could include individual-level assistance
in buying homes as well as larger-scale efforts such as improvements to trans-
portation and investments in neighborhoods. For example, if the local, state,
or federal government invested money in a working-class black neighborhood
by building a transportation hub, transforming empty lots into parks, and revi-
talizing the business district, this would increase property values and provide
job opportunities for the local community, thereby enhancing their wealth
portfolios. It would take enormous investments to reverse the trend, but that
is primarily because of the decades of investment the federal government has
put into white communities.
In this chapter, we have seen how wealth inequalities are entrenched and
complex. Married white couples with college educations are well positioned to
accumulate wealth over the course of their lives. However, married black couples
with the same levels of education consistently earn less money and have much
less wealth. Wealth provides a safety net for emergencies, such as serious medical
issues or the loss of a job. This means that comfortably middle-class black families
are at a much greater risk of descending into poverty than similarly placed white
families. Not all white families have wealth, but historical racial disparities in
the United States, as well as ongoing discriminatory practices, ensure that white
families are more likely to accumulate wealth than black and Latino families.
Wealth also provides opportunities and allows families to invest in their
future and to take risks. Families with substantial home equity can use this
asset to 岳nance their children’s college educations. Families with significant
savings and a wide social net can use them to take risks and invest in business
opportunities. In these and other ways, wealth begets more wealth. For these
reasons, wealth inequality is hard to overcome.
Between 1933 and 1978, federal government policies enabled over 35 million
families to purchase homes in new suburban areas. As a direct consequence of
these policies, these families will pass on trillions of dollars of wealth to their
children through accumulated home equity. Nearly all these families are white
because nonwhite Americans were locked out of this tremendous wealth-
generating federal program. Today, most black families have no wealth to pass
on to their children. For this reason, many activists contend that it is time for
the federal government to enact new wealth-generating programs that, unlike
past programs, are not exclusive to white Americans (Oliver and Shapiro 2006).
Key Terms
wealth 283 Federal Housing Administration dissimilarity index 292
assets 283 (FHA) 287 isolation index 292
residential segregation 285 segregation index 291 hypersegregation 294
racially restrictive covenants 286 predatory lender 291 asset-based social policy 304
steering 2 87 subprime loan 291
306 CHAPTER 10 Inequa Iity in Housing and Wea Ith
IO.I What are the historical reasons for housing and wealth inequalities in the
United States? (pp. 282-285)
• Enslaved African Americans were unable to accumulate wealth. Once freed, their
opportunities for land ownership were limited.

> What does slavery have to do with contempo －沙 In the United States, why does the idea endure
rary wealth inequalities? that if you work hard, you will get ahead? Why
might this not be true, especially for people of
color?
Have any of the federal programs mentioned
>
in this chapter helped your family accumulate

wealth? How has your family's race, class, and
immigration history played a role in the accu-
mulation of wealth in your family?
I0.2 When and how did residential segregation become a characteristic

of U.S. cities? (pp. 286-296)
• Today, most U.S. cities are segregated, but this has not always been the case.
• Residential segregation was created in the early twentieth century by white resi-
dents who desired homogeneous neighborhoods, profit seeking by the real estate
industry, and federal housing programs that were exclusively available to whites.
• Whites are the only group that, on average, lives in primarily white
neighborhoods.
• Black families are the most likely group to be hypersegregated.

》飞'\That factors contributed to the creation of > Why is racial segregation problematic? Provide
residential segregation? at least three separate reasons.

> How is residential segregation related to the
racial wealth gap?
I0.3 What is the extent of wealth inequalities today in homeownership and

beyond? (pp. 297-302)
• On average, African Americans and Latinos have less than 9 percent of the wealth
of whites. 币1e 2007-2009 housing crisis exacerbated racial inequalities in wealth.

> What is the difference between wealth and > What distinct social challenges stem from over-
income? Why is this difference important in all wealth inequality and the racial wealth gap?
studies of racial inequality?
> Why and how did the wealth gap between
whites and other groups change between 2005
and 2009?
10.4 What factors are perpetuating and exacerbating wealth inequalities?

(pp. 302-304)
• Black families with incomes similar to those of white families have substantially
less wealth.τhis is because wealth is not solely a function of income differentials.
咀1e disparity is also attributable to years of homeownership, years of unemploy-
ment, college education, and inheritances.

> What programs and policies have contributed > To what extent would narrowing the racial
to the racial wealth gap, and in what ways? income gap contribute to narrowing the racial
> What other factors have exacerbated the wealth wealth gap?
gap in the twenty-first century? Give examples. > How would asset-based social policies work in
practice? Could theywork?
Talking about Race

τhe overall wealth inequality between white families and African
American or Latino families is staggering. Citing this issue is one way
to broach the topic of racial inequality. A丘er reading this chapter, have a
discussion with family and friends, mentioning that white families have,
on average, over ten times the wealth of African American or Latino
families. Highlight historical reasons for this disparity. How would you
respond to potential comments or questions about African Americans'
or Latinos ’ spending habits or educational levels? What empirical evi-
dence could you use to make your case?
』
F
t 、1
、
、
、
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、‘同＇
、
Man sitting on floor of jail cell. Ila11a Kol111. (Cop,yri!!;ht flα17 α， k·o/1 n/ Ilco n’ !111 αg·es)
.
Chapter 。utline
. . Mass Incarceration in the

United States 312
The Rise of Mass Incarceration 313
人11ass Incarceration in a Global
Context 314
GI。balView Prisons in Germany
and the Netherlands 316
Race and Mass Incarceration 316
v。ices Ea 「l Washington 317
The Inefficacy of Mass
Incarceration 319
Mass Incarceration and the War
on Drugs 320
Race, Class, Gender, and Mass
Incarceration 322
Institutional Racism in the Criminal
Justice System 323
Racial Profiling 323
v。ices Sandy Bia 门d 326
Sentencing Disparities 327
The Ultimate Sentence: Racial
Disparities in the Death Penalty 328
v。ices Troy Davis 3 29
The Economics of Mass
Incarceration 329
As Y。u Reαd
Private Prisons 332
11.1 What factors explain the rise of mass incarceration in the The Prison-Industrial Comple× 333
Beyond Incarceration: Collateral
United States?
Consequences 335
11.2 How are disparities in the criminal justice system reflective The Impact of Mass Incarceration
of institutional racism? on Families and Children 335
The Lifelong Stigma of a Felony:
11.3 How is the rise of mass incarceration tied to large-scale
"The New Jim Crow" 337
economic trends?
research focu s Can Felons
11.4 What are the collateral consequences of mass incarceration? Ge↑ Jobs♀ 337

Ta lking about Race 341
310 CHAPTER 11 Rae ism and the Crimi no I Justice Sys •em
In her book The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander a rgues that mass
incarceration has replaced prev ious systems of social control in the
United States. This excerpt uses the example of exclusion from the
ballot box to explain how mass incarceration resembles prior efforts
to exclude black m en from citizen ship.
arvious Cotton cannot vote. Like his father, grandfather, great-

grandfather, and great-great-grandfather, he has been denied the right to
participate in our electoral democracy. Cotton’s family tree tells the story
of several generations of black men who were born in the United States but
who were denied the most basic freedom that democracy promises-the freedom
to vote for those who will make the rules and laws that govern one's life. Cotton’s
great-great-grandfather could not vote as a slave. His great-grandfather was beaten
to death by the Ku I(lux Klan for a忧empting to vote. His grandfather was prevented
from voting by Klan intimidation. His father was barred from voting by poll taxes
and literacy tests. Today,Jarvious Cotton cannot vote because he, like many black
men in the United States, has been labeled a felon and is currently on parole.
Cotton’s story illustrates, in many respects, the old adage “τhe more things
change, the more they remain the same." In each generation, new tactics have been
used for achieving the same goals-goals shared by the Founding Fathers. Denying
African Americans citizenship was deemed essential to the formation of the orig-
inal union. Hundreds of years later, America is still not an egalitarian democracy.
刀1e arguments and rationalizations that have been trotted out in support of racial
exclusion and discrimination in its various forms have changed and evolved, but
the outcome has remained largely the same. An extraordinary percentage of black
men in the United States are legally barred from voting today, just as they have
been throughout most of American history.τhey are also subject to legalized dis-
crimination in employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury service,
just as their parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents once were.
What has changed since the collapse ofJim Crow has less to do with the basic
structure of our society than with the language we use to justify it. In the era of
colorblindness, it is no longer socially permissible to use race, explicitly, as a justifi-
cation for discrimination, exclusion, and social contempt. So we don’t. Rather than
rely on race, we use our criminal justice system to label people of color “ criminals ”
and then engage in all the practices we supposedly left behind. Today it is perfectly
legal to discriminate against criminals in nearly all the ways that it was once legal
CHAPTER 11 Rac ism and the C 「 im ina I Justice System 311
to discriminate against African Americans. Once you're labeled a felon, the old
forms of discrimination-employment discrimination, housing discrimination,
denial of the right to vote, denial of educational opportunity, denial of food stamps
and other public benefits, and exclusion from jury service-are suddenly legal. As
a criminal, you have scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, than a black
man living in Alabama at the height ofJim Crow. We have not ended racial caste in
America; we have merely redesigned it.
Source: A leχander 2010, 1, 2.
Writing at the turn ofthe twentieth century，飞气1. E. B. DuBois likened the prison
system t。 “slavery in private hands" (1904, 2). He explained that with the end
of slavery, the numbers of black convicts in the South rose substantially, in
large part because of vagrancy laws passed in the a丘ermath of emancipation.
Police officers o丘en used vagrancy laws to arrest African Americans whom
they perceived to be vagrants or dri丘ers. African Americans' testimonies in
courts were largely ignored, and any accusation by whites could result in con-
viction. Southern states, however, were not able to build prisons fast enough
to house these new convicts. τ】1us, a convict-lease system was born, whereby
convicts could be leased to the highest bidder to work as slaves. 咀1is practice
was legal because the Thirteenth Amendment allows forced labor as a punish-
ment for crime. Notably, in our present sy归m, prisons still can (and do) force
prisoners to work for little or no pay.
Convict leasing was a system of both forced labor and social control. Today,
prisons do not function to the same extent as a source of unpaid labor, yet
the element of social control persists. One place we can see this is in the life-
long stigma attached to being labeled a felon. As Michelle Alexander (2010)
explains, this stigma makes various forms of racial discrimination legal. Felons
face discrimination in housing, employment, and access to social services.
τhis chapter elaborates on these and other ways mass incarceration is a
tool of social control, and how this crime control strategy has disproportion-
ately affected people of color. 咀1e evidence presented makes it clear that mass
incarceration not only is ineffective at preventing crime, but also has been par-
ticularly detrimental to communities of color across the United States. This
chapter begins with a discussion of mass incarceration and then moves to an
analysis of institutionalized racism in the criminal justice system. It concludes
312 CHAPTER 11 Racism and the C 「 im ino I Jus tice System
with a consideration of the economic and collateral consequences of mass

incarceration.
The United States has more people in prison than any other country in the
world and today incarcerates people at a higher rate than at any other time in
history. Our crime rate, however, is not higher than that of other countries or
than it has been historically. Why, then, are so many Americans behind bars?
The answer lies in the United States’ use of mass incarceration as a strategy to
reduce crime and particularly to fight illicit drug use. Yet, mass incarceration
has not been effective at reducing crime and illicit drug use. It has, however,
destroyed families and communities and exacerbated racial inequality in that
the primary victims of intensified law enforcement efforts have been people
of color.
MASS INCARCERATI 。 N IN THE UNITED STATES

An understanding of the racially disparate consequences of the criminal
justice system in the United States must begin with an exploration of the
uniqueness of this system. 卫1e United States is distinctive among wealthier
nations in its liberal use of the prison system. While drugs such as mar斗uana
and cocaine have been decriminalized in western Europe, the United States
has enhanced the punishments for use of illicit drugs. Repeat offender laws
and mandatory sentencing have meant that in the United States, many people
> 111 the United States,

prisons are crowded with
nonviolent offe11ders.
Mass Inca 「ceration in the Uni • ed Sta • es 313
spend years behind bars for nonviolent crimes. Because of the racially disparate
implementation and character of these laws, their impact is most visible in
black and Latino communities.
The Rise of Mass Incarceration

Mass incarceration is a relatively new phenomenon in the United States and
marks a divergence from the attitudes of the mid-twentieth century. At that
time, Americans tended to view incarceration as an ineffective means of con-
trolling crime and searched for other solutions to make communities safer.
Prison was seen as a last resort, and accordingly, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
planned to close large prisons in Kansas，飞Nashington, and Georgia. In 1970,
Congress voted to eliminate nearly all federal mandatory minimum sentences
for drug offenders, as most Americans viewed drug addiction as a problem of
public health, not criminal justice (Alexander 2010).
Just ten years later, this mindset-that drugs are a public health problem and
prisons are barbaric-was pushed to the margins as a policy of mass incarcer-
ation took off. Many scholars attribute the start of this change to the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson
in 1968.τhis law was the convergence of liberal and conservative anticrime
agendas, as both parties realized that anticrime rhetoric could win elections.
Parties began to compete with one another over who could be tougher on
crime, and this competition led to a surge in incarceration rates (Murakawa
2014; Go仕schalk 2016).
The U.S. incarceration rate was about 1 per 1,000 residents for almost the
entire twentieth century until the 1970s.τhat rate doubled between 1972 and
1984, and again between 1984 and 1994. By the end of the twentieth century,
the United States had an unprecedented number of inmates: over 2 million,
more than ten times the number of U.S. inmates at any time prior to the 1970s.
In 2016, the rate was more than 7 per 1,000, and there were “ 2.3 million people
in 1,719 state prisons, 102 federal prisons, 942 juvenile correctional facilities,
3,283 local jails, and 79 Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons,
immigration detention facilities, civil commitment centers, and prisons in
the U.S. territories'' (Wagner and Rabuy 2016） .τhe increase in incarcer-
ation cannot be explained by a rise in crime, as crime rates have fluctuated
independently of incarceration 以es (Wacquant 2009; Gottschalk 2016).
Incarceration rates soared because the laws changed, making a wider variety
of crimes punishable by incarceration and lengthening sentences for those
incarcerated. By 2015, 6,741,400 people were under correctional supervision
in the United States, and 1,525,900 were incarcerated (Figures 11-1 and 11-2).
314 CHAPTER 11 Rae ism an d the Crim ino I Justice Sys • em
6,741,400
3,789,800
• Probation
• Parole
728,200
’ Local jail
田 Prison
FIGURE 11-1.
Total U.S. Adult
Correctional Population,
2015
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics
(2016). 870,500
8
ωcoω』φ巳FOωco
RUAU
丁
-三
--
一
2
FIGURE 11-2.
Total U.S. Adult
Incarcerated Population, 。
1980-2015 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics 一－ Total correctional - Total jail and

(2016). population prisoner population
Although the current incarceration rate is about 1 in 37 adults, it is the lowest

since 1994 (Bureau ofJustice Statistics 2016).
Mass Incarceration in a Global Context

τhe United States stands alone in its rate of incarceration. In 2017, 666 of every
100,000 U.S. residents were incarcerated-a rate nearly 8 times that of western
Europe’s average rate of84per 100,000 residents (Walmsley2017). The American
prison population also dwarfs that of other, larger, countries, including China,
in terms of sheer numbers. According to Walmsley (2017), in 2015, the United
Ma ss I nca 「cera t io n in the Uni ted States 315
States had 2,145,100 people behind bars. 卫1e next largest incarcerated population
was in China, with 1,649,804 prisoners, followed by Brazil and Russia, with about
600,000 each. No other country incarcerates more than a half a million people.
lcela叫 for example, had only 124 people behind bars.
咀1e so-called War on Drugs in the United States accounts for much of this
disparity. In the United States, a moral panic erupted in the 1980s surround-
ing the emergence of crack cocaine, which led to harsh laws against selling
or possessing crack and other narcotics. τhese laws in turn resulted in histor-
ically and globally unprecedented rates of imprisonment for drug sales and
possession ( Gottschalk 2016). In most other developed countries, a first-time
drug offense leads to no more than six months in jail, and rehabilitation is
more common than criminalization. In the United States, the typical man-
datory minimum sentence in federal court for a first-time drug offense is five
or ten years (Alexander 2010). At the state level, there are even more extreme
examples: in Florida, illegal possession of 100 grams or more of the painkiller
hydrocodone (one of the most frequently prescribed drugs in the United
States) leads to a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence (Riggs
2014). With more people in jail on drug charges for longer periods of time,
the U.S. incarceration rate has risen far beyond that of other countries. As
shown in Figure 11-3, Russia is the only European country with an incarcera-
tion rate remotely close to that of the United States.τhe United States has an
. ···
·-
Iceland -
Japan
Sweden
Denmark
.....
Netherlands .. ··
··
·-
Norway -
Germany
Greece
France .....
South Korea ··
··
-·········
.
China
United Kingdom
o
o
Australia --
········
Poland ...
New Zealand ··
South Africa FIGURE 11 3. ”
Brazil International Comparison

Russian Federation of Incarceration Rates
United States (per 100,000), 2017
。 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Source: Walmsley (2017).
316 CHAPTER 11 Rae ism and the Crimi no I Justice Sys • em
Prisons in Germany and the Netherlands

Germany and the Netherla 门ds inca 「cera↑e people at Typical sen↑e门ces are a lso much longe 「 in •he
abou • one-tenth the ra •e of the United States. More- Uni•ed S•ates. I 门 2012, 9 1 percen• of p「ison se门－
over, •heir prisoners live in bette「 con di•ions, and •ences in the Nethe「lands were for twelve months or
the primary aim of their correc•ions sys•ems is social less, and less than 5 pe「cent of Dutch sentences we「e
「ein↑egration －门0↑ punishment. The prison sys•ems for ove 「 two years. In the Uni•ed Sta•es, in co门↑「as↑F
in Germany and the Ne↑he 「lands are designed •o the average prison sen•ence is three years. Once
ensu 「e that when 「eleased, forme「 convicts G 「e able released from prison, offe 门ders in Germa 门y and the
to rein•egrate i 门↑o society and live life withou• com mi•- Ne•her I αnds do 「） 0↑ face any of the colla •eral conse-
N 门g mo 「e C「imes. que门ces we see i门 ↑he Uni •ed Sta•es, such as voting
｜门 these countries, i门ca 「ceration is a stra •egy of las• O「 welfare restrictions.
「esort. Both 「·ely heavily on punishments tha • do no• In G 「epo 「↑ issued by the Vera Ins•i•U•e (Sub 「ama
陪quire time behind bars, such as communi•y service, nian and Shames 2013), the autho 「S 「ecommend
fi 门es, or diversion programs. The fines imposed o 陪 • ha • the United S•ates adop• some of • hese practices,
based o门。 convict's income. In 2010, in Germany, 70 particularly fo 「 nonvio l e门↑ offenders, who make up
pe「ce门↑ of convic•ions involved the impositio 门 of a fine, • he majo 「i↑y of • he p「ison popu l atio 门 in the U门 i↑ed
a 「1d only 6 percen• involved inca 「ce「ation . By compa 「 S•G •es.
ison, in •he Uni•ed S•0 •es, 21 percen• of co 门victio 门S Source: Subramanian and Shames 2013.
involved fines，。nd 70 percen• involved inca 「cera↑ion.
incarceration rate seven times higher than that of other developed countries
such as Japan, South Korea, and Denmark (Walmsley 2013).
Race and Mass Incarceration

When we consider racial disparities in the U.S. incarceration rate, the picture
becomes even more unsettling. In 2008, less than one-third of the population
of the United States was black or Latino. In that same yea乌 blacks and Latinos
made up 58 percent of the nation’s prison population (Sabol, We叽 and Cooper
2009). In 2014, the imprisonment rate of white males was 465 per every
100,000 in the population, as compared to 1,091 per 100,000 Latino males,
and 2,274 per 100,000 black males. Black males were five times as likely to be
incarcerated as white males in 2013 (Carson 2015). At a Glance 11.1 shows
these rates by race and gender.
Much of the disparity is due to imprisonment for drug crimes, even though
people of all races use and sell drugs at similar rates (Alexander 2010). This
Mass I nca 「ceration in the Un i• ed Sta • es 317
Earl ashington
……· ·... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . ... . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . ..
Earl is African American and was born in Washington, DC, in 1974. When he was
six years old, his father went to prison. His mother, an in-home beautician, raised
him on her own until she was murdered in 1987. He testified in court at the trial of
his mother’s killer James Jones:
.
I am 15 years old. My mom died when I was 14. Ever since then I ’ve been in
and out of trouble.... I don’t care how much time you give Mr. Jones. I mean
I care but if you give Mr. Jones all of the time in the world it won't bring my
mother back.
Orphaned at age 14, Earl went to live with his aging grandmother. In elementary
school, he had been in the Gifted and Talented Program. Shortly after his mother
died, however, he dropped out. Earl still remembers the last day he went to school,
when he was 15. His friend saw him with a neon green notebook and asked him if he
was a square. Earl said he wasn’t, and he did not go to school that day-or ever again.
With no parents to guide him, he was led to the streets.
When Earl was 16, he was hanging out with some friends in his neighborhood.
When a group of young men from another neighborhood came around, he and his
friends decided to scare them away. What he did not expect was that one of his
friends would shoot and kill one of the other young men.
Earl was arrested for this crime and, although he was only 币， charged as an adult
with murder, armed robbery, assault with intent to kill, and a host of other charges.
He was sentenced to 15 to 80 years in prison.
He had only finished the seventh grade. When he got to prison, however, he began
reading books as a rite of passage, starting with The Autobiography of MαlcolmX.
Next, he read The Conj专ssions ofNtαt Turner and TheAfricαn World Revolution. In
p1·ison, he found that being sma1·t garnered respect.
In 2009, when he was 35 years old, Earl was released from prison. He has been
able to find work through a local nonprofit that helps formerly incarcerated people.
His story helps us see that in place of preventive interventions, incarceration has
been the typical response to challenges faced by poor black communities.
Source: Golash-Boza interview with “ Earl Washington”(a pseudonym) 2016.

…… · ...... . ........................................... . ...... . ................... . ... . . . ................. . ...... . .
disparity has increased over time. In 1975, the ratio of black to white arrests
for drug crimes was 2 to 1. By 1990, the ratio was S to 1, even though there is
no evidence that blacks began to use or sell drugs at higher rates than whites
during this period (Wacquant 2009).
318 CHAPTER 11 Racism an d the C 「 i m i 门。 I Jus tice Sy stem
AT A GLANCE 11 .1 Criminal Justice Disparities
In 2015, 6°/o 。f all black males ages 30 t。 39 were in prison,

compared with 2o/o of Hispanic/Latino males and
...
1% of white males in the same age group
-c
。。
6
.. .
Hispanic/
Latin 。 ... • One in 3 black males in
the United States will be in
prison at some point in
~至 4
«l ::::::l
Black
their life, compared with
噜d n
c O • One in 6 Hispanic/Latino
8
. -且 '9-
a5 _f写
males and
CL b 啡，，
。 White ’ ??”’tt • One in 17 white males.
Black Hispanic White
Data from BJS 2016

？”’币”’ Data from The Sentenc的g Project 2013
Percentage 。f Drug Offenders at Each Level 。f Incarceration Number 。f Sentenced Inmates, 2015
At the federal level, nearly half of all inmates are in prison for nonviolent Total: 1,476 ,847
drug offenses. Overall, drug-related offenses account for one-fifth of the
incarcerated population. Female
Drug offenders: 104,968
208,000 (15.6°/o)
Local jails
Total population: 630,000
White 四ack
State pris。ns Drug offenders: 111,000 (17 .6°/o) 49;9,400 523，创汩
Total population: 1,330,000
Federal pris。ns
L Total population: 197,000
Drug offenders: 97,000 (49.2°/o) Hispanic/Latino
319,400
Data from Prison Policy Initiative 2017 Data from BJS 2016
Rate of lncarcerati。旷 per 100,000 U.S. Residents, 2015, by Gender and Race/Ethnicity
Much of the racial/ethnic disparity is due to imprisonment for drug crimes, even though people of all
races use and sell drugs at similar rates (Alexander 2010).
OOOOOF」＠且OVC
3,000
R
2,500
ωHCO
2,000
h
百U。』·ω2
1,500
」 C。＝
1,000
mw
．
』ωO」COC一
500
。 ...... .... ,.....

圃 ,......
All Men Women Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White
Men Men Men Women Women Women Data from BJS 2016
*In state or federal prisons.
Mass I nca 「cera t io n in the Uni ted States 319
By the end of the twentieth century, black men were seven times more likely
than white men to go to prison. Over the course of a black man’s life, he is
more likely to go to prison than to get a bachelor’s degree or join the military.
Whereas a white man is ten times more likely to get a college degree than to
go to prison, a black man is nearly twice as likely to end up in prison than to
finish college. Imprisonment has become an expected life outcome for some
black men: 1 in every 3 black males in the United States will be in prison at
some point in his life, compared with 1 in every 6 Latino males, and 1 in every
17 white males （τhe Sentencing Project 2013）.τhe number of incarce时ed
women has also increased over the past few decades-at a rate SO percent
higher than that of men since 1980 (The Sentencing Project 2016).
The Inefficacy of Mass lncarcerati。n

Incarceration has emerged as the most popular crime control strategy in the
United States. However, there is limited evidence that incarceration is an effec-
tive strategy to control crime, according to state-level incarceration trends.
Between 1998 and 2003, some states greatly increased the number of people
they sent to prison, while other states did not. 咀1e average decrease in crime
rates in these states, however, was similar. Additionally, the states with higher
increases in incarceration did not experience more substantial declines in their
crime rates (l{ing, Mauer, and Young 2005).
Incarceration has had a limited impact on crime rates for two reasons.
First, it is just one of many factors that influence crime rates: changes in the
economy, fluctuations in the drug market, and community-level responses
o丘en have more pronounced effects. Second, there are diminishing returns
from incarceration: incarcerating repeat violent
offenders takes them off the streets and thus
400
reduces crime, whereas incarcerating nonviolent
ω百一z
offenders has a minimal effect on crime rates

。oω3
(Ki吨 et al. 2005). 300

。
zooon
τhe rates of incarceration began to increase in

the 1970s, during a time when violent and prop- 200
erty crime rates were high. Even though crime
」ωF
且＠VCE
rates began to fall in 1993, incarceration rates 100

and populations continued to rise for another
decade. Some of the most draconian laws were 。
passed in the mid-1990s, a丘er crime rates had 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
started falling. Figures 11-4 and 11-5 provide a FIGURE 11-4.
visual representation of how violent crime and Property Victimization Rate, 1993-2015
property crime rates have decreased since 1993. Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics (2016).
320 CHAPTER 11 Rac ism an d the Crim ina l Justice Sys • em
80 Despite the low efficacy of imprisoning non-

Cl)
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号 60 prison population that has grown the fastest, and
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drug arrests are on the rise. Between 1970 and
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increased five-fold, in large part because of leg-
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islation designed to fight drugs. As such, drug
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of growth in incarceration in recent decades,
。
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
rising from 40,000 persons in prison and jail in
1980 to 450,000 today”( King et al. 2005，的. The
FIGURE 11-5.
irony is that the incarceration of drug offenders
Violent Victimization Rate, 1993甲2015
is a highly ineffective way to reduce the amount
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics (2016).
of illegal drugs sold in the United States. When
street-level drug sellers are incarcerated, they are
quickly replaced by other sellers, since what drives the drug market is demand
for drugs. Incarcerating large numbers of drug offenders has not ameliorated
the drug problem in the United States (IZing et al. 2005).
Despite the lack of evidence that increased incarceration rates lead to
decreased crime (Lynch 1999), we continue to build prisons and imprison
more people (Gilmore 2007). Nor have we changed our policies in response
to substantial evidence that being tough on crime does not lead to safer
communities. Politicians who invest money in the criminal justice system
can claim to their constituents that they are serious about law enforcement.
This strategy, creating the impression that they have the crime victims' inter-
ests at heart, has become essential for winning electoral campaigns (Simon
2007). In 1998, political activist and scholar Angela Davis pointed out :“Mass
incarceration is not a solution to unemployment, nor is it a solution to the vast
array of social problems that are hidden away in a rapidly growing network of
prisons and jails. However, the great majority of people have been tricked into
believing in the efficacy of imprisonment, even though the historical record
clearly demonstrates that prisons do not work ”(1998, 3） .τhe emergence of
mass incarceration as a solution to social ills can be attributed primarily to the
War on Drugs, as we will see.
Mass Incarceration and the War on Drugs

To understand why black men are imprisoned at seven times the rate of white
men and why the United States imprisons more people than any other country
in the world requires a consideration of the War on Drugs, which is largely
Mass Inca 「ce r ation in the Uni • ed Sta • es 321
responsible for the explosion in incarceration rates since 1980. 飞叫Thereas

only 41,000 people were behind bars for a drug offense in 1980, the figure
12.2°/o
had risen astronomically to about half a million in 2010 (Alexander 2010).
Many people are incarcerated for low-level drug crimes. Between 1993
and 2011, thirty million people were arrested for drug crimes. About 80
percent of these arrests were for drug possession, and only 20 percent were
for drug sales (Rothwell 2016; Figures 11-6 and 11-7).
Zealous enforcement of drug laws disproportionately affects people
of color, even though whites are more likely to use and sell drugs. In the
United States, black men are sent to prison on drug charges at thirteen
• Marijuana possession
times the rate of white men, yet five times as many whites as blacks use • Other drug possession
illegal drugs (Alexander 2010). According to results from the National • Marijuana sale/manufacture
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, white youth aged twelve to seventeen • Other drug sale/manufacture
are more likely than blacks to have sold illegal drugs (Alexander 2010). FIGURE 11-6.
These data are based on self二reports, yet they are confirmed by more Reasons for Drug Arrests
objective data: white youth are about three times as likely as their African Source: Alexander (2010).
American counterparts to end up in an emergency room for drug-related

emergencies. Whites who use and abuse drugs most o丘en buy their drugs
from white sellers, just as blacks who use drugs buy from black sellers
(Alexander 2010).
Law enforcement agents cannot fully enforce drug laws because drug
use and selling are too widespread. More than half of the people in the
United States have violated drug laws at some point in their lives, yet rel-
atively few have been punished for it. In any given yea乌 about 10 percent
of American adults violate drug laws. As law enforcement agents have nei-
ther the resources nor the mandate to prosecute every lawbreaker, they
must be strategic with their resources and enforcement tactics. Because of
stereotypes that drug law violators are black, combined with the relatively • Drug Possession
• Drug sales
weak political power of poor black communities, law enforcement agents
have targeted open-air drug markets in poor black communities instead of FIGURE 11-7.
Drug Sales Versus Drug
the places where whites use and sell drugs (Alexander 2010). Possession Arrests, 1993-2011
Crack cocaine is o丘en portrayed as public enemy number one in the War
Source: Rothwell (2016).
on Drugs. It is thus remarkable that crack cocaine hit the streets in 1985-
three years before the 斗Varon Drugs began,in 1982. 、气Then President Ronald
Reagan officially declared the War on Drugs, less than 2 percent of Americans
viewed drugs as the most important problem facing the nation. Public opinion
changed drastically a丘er the 飞'Var on Drugs was launched in 1982, and crack
cocaine became an urban problem in 1985. A media frenzy broke out over
the problems of crackheads, crack babies, and crackwhores. 咀1e media o丘en
322 CHAPTER 11 Racism and the Crim ina l Justice Sys • em
racialized the crack problem as a black problem by showing images of black

people in connection with stories about crack cocaine (Alexander 2010).
The penalties that emerged for possession and sale of crack cocaine were
the harshest drug penalties in U.S. history. When the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
was passed in 1988, it meted out a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for
simple possession of crack. 咀1is was unprecedented: prior to this legislation,
one year of imprisonment was the maximum sentence one could receive for
possession of any amount of any drug (Alexander 2010). Along with the fed-
eral laws, states began to pass stricter laws, including “ three strikes,"“truth
in sentencing," and “ zero tolerance'' legislation, which led to a huge upswing
in incarceration rates. By 1996, nearly three-quarters of all people admitted
to state prisons were nonviolent offenders with relatively minor convictions
(Ladipo 200 I).
At the federal level, three major laws were passed in 1984, 1986, and 1988
that marked the beginning of a new era in criminal justice:
• The 1984 Crime Control Act established mandatory minimum sentences

and eliminated federal parole.
．咀1e Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 imposed even more mandatory
minimum sentences. Most significantly, it set a five-year mandatory
minimum sentence for offenses involving 100 grams of heroin, 500 grams
of cocaine, or S grams of crack cocaine.
．咀1e Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 included a five-year mandatory
minimum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine, with no
evidence of intent to sell. Prior to 1988, one year of imprisonment had
been the maximum penalty for possession of any amount of any drug.
Race, Class, Gender, and Mass Incarceration

Mass incarceration has led to the filling of jails with black and Latino
working-class and poor men. Mass incarceration is thus evidently raced,
classed, and gendered. However, an intersectional analysis requires consider-
ation not only of the numbers of blacks, Latinos, and men behind bars, but also
of how mass incarceration affects people in distinct social locations differently.
When we look at women, for example, it becomes clear that there are three
specific ways that mass incarceration has directly affected women in distinct
ways from men:
1. Very few women were behind bars prior to 1970, so incarceration is a

relatively new phenomenon for women. Incarceration rates for women
Inst i• utional Racism in the Crimina l Jus • ice Sys • em 323
rose dramatically in the context of the War on Drugs. Between 1970 and
1997, the population of women in prison rose more than twelve-fold, from
5,600 to 75,000. With the addition of 35,000 more women in jails, there
were about 100,000 women incarcerated by the late 1990s ( Covington
and Bloom 2003). By 2015, the sum total of women in prison or jails, on
probation, or on parole was 1,24究900 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2016).
Similar to men, women of color are incarcerated at a higher rate than white
women. In 1990, black women were three times as likely as white women
to be incarcerated, and Latina women were twice as likely (Zatz 2000).
2. Women are more likely than men to have been the primary caregivers prior
to being incarcerated. 咀1is means that the incarceration of women o丘en
has a more direct and immediate effect on their children.
3. Women are more likely than men to have experienced physical or sexual
abuse. One study found that nearly 80 percent of women prisoners had
experienced some form of abuse in their lives. Many of the women serv-
ing time for violent crimes are in jail for retaliating against their abuser
(Covington and Bloom 2003).
INSTITUTI 。 NAL RACISM IN THE CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM
Racial disparities in incarceration rates are a classic example of institutional
racism. As discussed in Chapter Four, institutional racism is the creation of
racial disparities as a result of institutional practices and policies that dis-
tribute resources, powe巧 and advantages to whites. Racial inequalities in law
enforcement are institutionalized at every level of the criminal justice process,
from stops to arrests to charges to sentencing to release. Blacks and Latinos
are more likely to be arrested than whites.τhey are more likely to be charged,
more likely to be convicted, more likely to be given a longer sentence, and
more likely to face the death penalty. The cumulative effect of these disparities
at each stage of the process creates a situation in which black men are seven
times more likely than white men to be put behind bars.
Racial Profiling
币1e propensity of police 。而cers to pull over African Americans more often
than whites is so prevalent that the moniker “ driving while black ” has emerged
to explain this phenomenon. In the early 1990s, statistician John Lamberth
(1994) conducted a detailed investigation of police stops on the New Jersey
Turnpike.τhis study provided convincing evidence that police officers engage
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Lamberth ’s study revealed that only 13 percent of all cars on the New Jersey
-
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叫咱
- Turnpike had a black driver or passenger but that 35 percent of those stopped
on the turnpike were black, and 73.2 percent of those arrested were black.
Blacks were much more likely than whites to be stopped, even though blacks
and whites violated traffic laws at almost exactly the same rate. Studies in
other states have revealed similar results: police officers are more likely to pull
over African American drivers than white drivers. In Maryland, an American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) study found that 75 percent of drivers along
Interstate 95 were white, but between January 1995 and September 1996,
73 percent of the motorists that Maryland state police searched were black
(Harris 1999). Racial profiling also extends to Hispanics: a study in Volusia
County in Florida, for example, revealed that blacks and Hispanics were more
likely to be pulled over and much more likely to be searched once pulled over
than whites (Mauer 1999).
In response to these findings that police officers engage in racial profiling,
state legislatures began to mandate that police departments collect more data.
FrankR. Baumgartne乌 Leah Christiani, DerekA. Epp, Kevin Roach, and I{elsey
Shoub (2017) were thus able to analyze publicly available information about
racial profiling from hundreds of police agencies across 13 states. Baumgartner
and his colleagues focused their analysis on police searches following a traffic
stop.τhey wanted to know the likelihood that a motorist would be searched by
the police a丘er being pulled over and how that likelihood varies depending on
the race of the driver. A丘er analyzing 55 million stops and 1.9 million searches,
they found that police o面cers search an aveage of 3.2 percent of white drivers
that they stop, compared with 7.6 percent of black drivers and 8.7 percent of
Hispanic or Latino drivers. The Evanston (Illinois) Police Department had the
greatest disparity in its stops ofblack and white drivers: it was seven times more
likely to search a black d巾er than awl巾 d巾er.τhe CookCour盯（Chicago
metropolitan area) Sheriff's Department had the single largest racial disparity:
its police 。而cers were 18 times more likely to search a Hispanic or Latino driver
than a white driver. Of the 132 agencies surveyed, only 9 of them were less likely
to search black drivers than white drivers.
Racial profiling happens on street corners as well as highways, where police
officers stop and frisk blacks and Latinos much more frequently than they do
whites. African Americans make up 13 percent of the U.S. population and
14 percent of illegal drug users in this country. However, they account for
37 percent of the people arrested for drug offenses, in part because they are
more likely to be stopped and frisked than whites (Mauer 2009). In New York
Inst i• utional Racism in the Crimina l Jus • ice Sys • em 325
< Racial profiling leads

to disparate treatment of
whites, blacks, and Latinos
by police agencies.
City, for example, one study found that blacks account for half of all people
stopped by the police, even though they are only a quarter of the New York
City population ( Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007). Once stopped, New York
police officers are more likely to frisk blacks and Latinos than whites. Accord-
ing to data provided by the New York Police Department (NYPD), between
1998 and 2008, NYPD officers frisked 85 percent of blacks and Latinos that
they stopped, compared with only 8 percent of whites (New York City Bar
2013). A study in Seattle revealed similar results. Seventy percent of people in
Seattle are white, and the majority of those who sell and use drugs in Seattle
are white. However, blacks represent nearly two-thirds of all those arrested
for drug offenses (Barnes and Chang 2012). This is primarily because police
。而cers tend to target predominantly black neighborhoods in criminal law
enforcement operations.
Racial profiling leads to disparate treatment of whites, blacks, and Latinos
by police agencies. It also can have deadly consequences, as in the high-profile
cases of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray, and Sandra
Bland. Each of these cases began with police stopping or confronting a black
person. Sandra Bland, whose story is told in the Voices sidebar in this section,
was pulled over a丘er she failed to use her turn signal. Although it is di伍cult to
establish discriminatory treatment in particular situations, blacks and Latinos
are more likely than whites to be stopped by police (Baumgartner et al. 2017).
326 CHAPTER 11 Racism and the Crimina l Justice Sys • em
Sandy Bland
… · . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . ... . . . ... . .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . ..
Sandra Annette Bland-

who went by Sandy-was
born in 1987, in Chicago.
After completing high
school, she received a
. music scholarship at Prairie

View A&M University, a
historically black university
in Waller County, Texas. She
graduated in 2009 with a
degree in animal science.
Sandy secured a low- A protestor holds α sign 仇 remembrance ojS，αndra
paying job in nearby Blαnd.
Houston after graduating.

Driving around Houston, she racked up a series of traffic tickets. When she was
unable to pay them, a warrant was issued for her arrest. She later was arrested for
marijuana possession and was sentenced to 30 days in jail. She did that time in
addition to several days for the tra伍c tickets.
After that experience, Sandy moved back to Illinois, where she worked in several
low-paying jobs. While in Illinois, she battled depression, yet managed to hold on to
work most of the time.
In July 2015, Sandy applied for a job at Prairie View A&M University. When she
was called for an interview, she left her job in Chicago and drove down to Texas.
On July 10, she signed the papers for her new job. On her way home, Texas state
trooper Brian Encinia pulled her over.
Encinia claims that he pulled Sandy over because she had failed to use her turn
signal. Sandy claims she was trying to move out of the way so that he could pass.
As Encinia was writing her ticket, he asked her to put out her cigarette. Sandy,
annoyed tl1at she was getting a ticket for such a minor traffic offense, insisted that
she did not have to put out her cigarette as she was in her own car.
At that point, Encinia asked her to get out of l1er car. Sl1e refused, saying that
he did not have the right. Encinia opened her car door and told her that if she did
not step out, he would remove her. He tl1en began to use force against her while
Sandy insisted that he did not have the right to remove her from her car. Encinia
then stated she was under arrest. When she asked what for, he did not respond
but pulled a gun and yelled that she had to get out of the car. At that point, she
stepped out.
In st i• ut io nal Rac ism in the Crim in a l Jus • ice Sys • em 327
Sandy was a1~rested and taken to the jail. As she did not have funds for
bail, she remained there. Three days later, she was found dead in her cell,
and her death was labeled a suicide. (/)
Encinia was indicted for perjury because a grand jury decided he had
lied when he said he forced Sandy to get out of the car to conduct a safe
traffic investigation. He was fired by the Texas Department of Public Safety
after the indictment.
The family of Sandra Bland settled a wrongful death lawsuit against
。而cials in Waller County for $1.9 million.
Sol1rces: Cl1a.n1n1al1 2016; Chicα：g;o 1子ibune 2016; Natl1a.n 2016.

................................ . ......................................................... . ............ . ..
Sentencing Disparities
Blacks and Latinos are more likely to be arrested than whites. An arrest is
just the first point of entry into the criminal justice system, where blacks and
Latinos are likely to continue to find the odds stacked against them. A recent
study of federal offenders, for example, found that blacks and Latinos are more
likely to be sentenced to longer prison terms than whites, even a丘er taking
into account the severity of the charges. In contrast, whites are more likely
than blacks to get no prison time when that option is available. 咀1is study also
found that the disparities between sentences for whites and nonwhites is most
evident in drug-trafficking cases (Mustard 2001).
Although more whites are convicted of drug felonies than blacks, more
blacks are admitted to prison. 咀1is disparity is related to the differing severity
of sentences that blacks and whites receive in courts of law. Overall, blacks are
sent to prison on drug charges at nearly twelve times the rate of whites, even
though, as mentioned previously, blacks and whites use and sell drugs at about
the same rates (Alexander 2010). One of the main reasons for this disparity is
that police o面cers target open-air drug markets in black neighborhoods and
yet o丘en ignore the widespread usage of narcotics in primarily white suburban
areas and on college campuses. Because whites are less likely to be arrested
for drug offenses, they are less likely to be charged, convicted, or sentenced to
prison for drug offenses. 古1is means that harsh penalties for drug offenses have
had a disproportionate impact on people of color.
As the War on Drugs advanced in the 1980s, discretionary power was
increasingly taken away from judges out offear they might be so丘 on crime.
One of the trends in sentencing reform has been the introduction of manda-
tory minimum sentences and mandatory guidelines for calculating prison
sentences (Simon 2007). The implementation of mandatory prison terms for

certain drug crimes has had a disproportionate impact on African Americans.
咀1e 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act established mandatory prison terms of five
years for possession or sale of S grams of crack cocaine or 500 grams of powder
cocaine. 卫1is sentencing disparity is emblematic of how drug law enforcement
has meted out different sentences to blacks and whites.
Between 1986 and 2006, more than 80 percent ofpeople sentenced to prison
for c肌k cocaine were black (Mauer 2007). This statistic is especially rema也
able when we consider that two-thirds of regular crack cocaine users are either
white or Latino (Mauer 2009） .τhe 1986 act is one of many pieces of legisla-
tion that set mandatory minimum sentences, which have disproportionately
affected African Americans. Blacks are 21 percent more likely than whites to
receive a mandatory minimum sentence when facing an eligible charge, and
black drug defendants are 20 percent more likely than white drug defendants
to be sentenced to prison (Mauer 2009).
The Ultimate Sentence: Racial Disparities

in the Death Penalty
As a black man accused of killing a white man, Troy Davis had the odds against
him. A study conducted in California found that people accused of killing
whites are over three times more likely to be sentenced to death than those
who kill African Americans (American Civil Liberties Union 2003). Another
study examined all death penalty cases since 1977, when the death penalty
was reinstated, and found that although whites accounted for about half of all
murder victims, 80 percent of all death penalty cases involved white victims
(American Civil Liberties Union 2003). In addition, between 1976 and 2002,
only twelve people were executed for crimes in which the defendant was white
and the victim black, compared with the 178 black defendants who were exe-
cuted a丘er having been convicted of killing a white person (American Civil
Liberties Union 2003). Between 1976 and 2017, over 75 percent of murder
victims in death penalty cases were white, even though only about half of all
murder victims are white. In that same period, more than 1,400 people were
executed in the United States, and 34 percent of them were African Ameri-
can. Remarkably, more than 1SS people were released from death row in that
period a丘er being found innocent (Death Penalty Information Center, 2017).
In recent years, the death penalty has come under increasing scrutiny. New
Mexico and New Jersey have abolished the death penalty, and death sentences
have decreased since their peak in the 1990s. In addition, the U.S. Supreme
Court has abolished the death penalty for minors and mentally retarded
people (Amnesty International 2010).
The Econom ics of Mass Incarceratio n 329
Troy Davis
……· ·... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . ... . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . ..
On September 21, 2011, the state of Georgia

executed Troy Davis, an African American man
who was raised in Savannah, Georgia, where
he was a coach for the Savannah Police Athletic
League. His father was a former police 。而cer. .
In 1991, Troy Davis was convicted of the
murder of Mark MacPhail, a white off-duty police
。而cer. There is no physical evidence connecting
Davis to the crime scene. A murder weapon
has never been found. The conviction is based
primarily on eyewitness accounts, even though
seven of the nine witnesses who were not police Tγoy Davis.
of丑cers have recanted their testimonies since

Davis’s original conviction. Amnesty International, the NAACP, and several other
groups demanded clemency. Several prominent leaders, including Jimmy Carter,
Desmond Tutu, and Pope Benedict XVI, called for a closer examination of the
evidence.
Supporters of Troy Davis protested outside of the execution grounds right up until
the moment of his execution. Many of them claimed there was too much doubt about
his guilt for the state to proceed. One of the original jurors, Brenda Forrest, declared
on CNN:“If I knew then what I know now, Troy Davis would not be on death row.
The verdict would be ‘not guilty.’” Troy Davis's sister claims that the witnesses were
coerced and threatened with jail time. Another witness, Be时amin Gordon, alleged
that he had been coerced by police to implicate Davis. In addition, Gordon signed a
statement in 2008 that claimed he actually had seen another person shoot the o伍cer.
Because of these and other testimonies, Davis's supporters contended there was too
much doubt for Davis to be executed. The State of Georgia disagreed.
Source: Thomson 2011.

.....................................................................................................................
THE EC 。 N 。MICS 。 F MASS INCARCERATI 。 N
Mass incarceration is a consequence of laws passed at both the state and

the federal levels. Before the election of Ronald Reagan as president, how-
ev叽 keeping street crime in check had traditionally been the responsibility
of state and local law enforcement. To fulfill Reagan's campaign promise to
fight crime, his administration poured money into federal law enforcement
agencies, and Congress passed federal laws that enhanced the punishments
for drug-related offenses.
California led the states in prison buildup. Between 1977 and 2007, the
California State Assembly passed more than 1,000 laws extending and tough-
ening prison sentences (Wacquant 2009). The California state prison popula-
tion increased five-fold between 1982 and 2000, even though the crime rate
peaked in 1980 and declined therea丘er (Gilmore 2007). Notably, California’s
incarceration rate increased after the crime rate had begun to decrease.
California had built only twelve prisons between 1852 and 1964, yet built
twenty-three major new prisons between 1984 and 2004 (Gilmore 2007).
What happened? Why did California engage in this massive prison-building
project? Why did the legislature pass so many anticrime laws?
刀1e answers to these questions can be found through a consideration of the
economic restructuring that California underwent leading up to this period.
During World 飞叮ar II, much of California’s prosperity had been tied directly
to defense contracts: people from across the country flocked to California to
secure well-paying jobs building defense machinery. A丘erthewa鸟 California
invested in education and technology to ensure that defense contracts would
continue, and it endeavored to make itself uniquely able to provide research,
development, and manufacturing for the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD
contracts continued to come in until the 1980s, but they contributed to split-
ting the labor market into high-skilled, well-paid technology jobs on one hand
and low-skilled, poorly paid jobs on the other (Gilmore 2007).
The restructuring of California’s economy led to increases in unemploy-
ment, poverty, and inequality. By the 1980s, California was a highly unequal
state, with high poverty rates, high housing costs, and high unemployment
rates while also being home to some of the wealthiest people in the nation.
Over the next fi丘een years, its economy continued to change, with increasing
numbers oflow-paid manufacturing and service jobs and fewer high-paid man-
ufacturing jobs. Childhood poverty rates had increased 25 percent between
1969 and 1979, and they continued to soar over the next decade, increasing
another 67 percent between 1980 and 1995, so that by the end of the twentieth
century, one in four children in California lived in poverty (Gilmore 2007).
Beset with social problems, the California legislature attempted to use mass
incarceration as a solution to poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Prisons
serve the double purpose of providing employment to tens of thousands of
Californians and locking away a good proportion of the surplus labor force.
τhe economic restructuring in California mirrored that of the rest of the coun-
try, as did cuts in government spending. 飞气Then Ronald Reagan took office in 1980,
The Econom ics of Ma ss In ca rceratio n 331
he implemented Reaganomics, a set of economic policies that involved heavy Reaganomics The
cuts to a wide variety of social programs across the country. Christian Parenti economic policies of
(199究 40-41) explains :“In 1982 alone, Reagan cut the real value of welfare by former U.S. President
24 percent, slashed the budget for child nutrition by 34 percent, reduced fund- Ronald Reagan, involving
ing for school milk programs by 78 percent, urban development action grants by heavy cuts to a wide
35 perce叽 and educational block grants by 38 percent.”咀1ese enormous cuts in variety of social programs
social spending disproportionately affected low-wage people ofcolor in urban areas. across the country.
At the same time that states were cu忧ing spending on education and social
services, all but two states (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) increased
spending on incarceration. Nationwide, spending on state and local correc-
tions outpaced spending on PI(-12 education three-fold from 1979- 1980 to
2012-2013 (Figure 11-8). Public school expenditures increased by 107 percent
(from $258 to $534 billion), while total state and local corrections expen-
ditu邸 increased by 324 percent (from $17 to $71 billion
of this increase varied considerably from state to state. In New Mexico and
Wyoming, incarceration spending outpaced education spending eight-fold neoliberalism The ideology
(Stullich, Morgan, and Schak 2016). tl1at open markets,
Neoliberalism is a label for the ideology that open markets, liberalized trade, liberalized trade, and
and privatization are the keys to economic success. N eoliberalism is based on privatization are the keys
the idea that the government ’s primary role is to protect property rights, free to economic success.
markets, and free trade, not to hand out social ser-
vices to its citizens. Under this ideology, the gov-
350°/o
ernment does not provide any social assistance, 324°/o
and the needs of the poor are le丘 to the market. 300°!0 斗
Although neoliberalism demands that the govern-

250°!0 -i
ment cut back its social services, there is one area
that tends to grow when these policies are imple- 200°!0 -!
mented: its coercive arm (i.e., the police force and
150°/o -i
the military). Insofar as neoliberalism dimin- 107°/o
ishes opportunities and services for the poo马 100°!0 -!
the government must ensure that working-class
50°!o
and poor people do not pose a threat to the rich.
Government cutbacks in social services o丘en lead 0°/o
PK-12 Expenditures State and local
to dissent and increases in crime. 咀1e govern- corrections expenditures
ment responds by strengthening the police force
FIGURE 11-8.
and the military. Under neoliberalism,“in the
Percentage change in education expenditures (PK-12) and
United States, incarceration became a key state state and local corrections expenditures from 1979-1980
strategy to deal with problems arising among dis- to 2012…2013
carded workers and marginalized populations. Source: Stullich, Morgan, and Schak (2016).
τhe coercive arm of the state is augmented to protect corporate interests and, if
necessa叨 to repress dissent'' (Harvey 2005, 77).
At the same time as the government began to cut social spending, compa-
outsourcing The practice nies began to outsource manufacturing, moving jobs once held by Americans
of moving jobs once held overseas, where cheaper labor could be found. This practice, part of the larger
by Americans overseas, process of deindustrialization, led to the impoverishment of cities such as
where cheape1· labor can Chicago and Detroit. Detroit was hit particularly hard: it lost half of its popu-
be found. lation in the 1980s. In Detroit as well as other cities across the country, the 飞吁ar
on Drugs kicked off at the same time that inner-city communities were experi-
deindustrialization The
encing a dramatic economic crisis. As discussed in Chapter Ten, well-paying,
process of decline in
stable blue-collar jobs disappeared, leaving unemployment, as well as social
industrial activity in a
unrest, in their wake (Alexander 2010). This social unrest in turn led to the
region or economy.
expansion of the criminal justice system, which was designed to manage and
contain the underclass created by neoliberal economic policies.
When we tie economics into an analysis of the criminal justice system,
however, it also becomes clear that the Great Recession (2007-2008) finally
gave elected leaders the political will to make cuts to the prison system. In
2009, a丘er thirty years of prison building, California found itself with a mas-
sive prison system it was no longer able to finance, and it began to release
some prisoners to cut costs. Nationwide, the number of prisoners decreased
for the a川 time in thirty-seven years (Aviram 2015). By 2011, one-fourth of
states had closed or planned to close a prison (Clear and Frost 2014). In 2010,
then-president Barack Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act, which repealed
the five-year mandatory sentence for first-time offenders and for repeat offend-
ers with less than 28 grams of cocaine. 卫1e change also involved reducing the
100-to-l sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine convictions
to 18-to-l, in response to decades of activism (Murakawa 2014). And in 2016,
Obama announced that the federal government would be ending its contracts
with private prisons that held federal prisoners. When Donald Trump took
office in 2017, however, he decided not to honor that agreement.
Private Prisons
Private prisons in the United States date back to 1984, when the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA) was awarded its 且阶 government contract in
1984. During the 1990s, the CCA began to see substantial profits, and by 1998
its stock prices had hit $44 a share.τhe CCA was doing so well that at the end
of the twentieth century, the company began to build speculative prisons-
飞xcess prison space for inmates who did not yet exist ”(Wood 2007, 232)-with
the expectation that the prison population would continue to grow.
The Econom ics of Ma ss In ca rceratio n 333
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, rates of incarceration

leveled off, and the CCA faced serious problems. Its stock values fell from $44
in 1998 to a mere $0.18 in December 2000. By 2001, the CCAhad 8,500 empty
beds and was over a billion dollars in debt (Wood 2007). Its 巾al, Wackenhut,
also saw its stock lose a third of its value between 1998 and 2001 (Berestein
2008). Both companies had reinvested their immense profits in new prisons
that were now si仕ing empty, and funding options seemed bleak.
Because states had cut back funding for prisons, the CCA looked to the fed-
eral government. Its federal lobbying expenses increased from $410,000 in
2000 to $3 million in 2004, and these efforts appear to have paid off. Not only
has the CCA been awarded lucrative federal contracts in recent years to build
new prisons, but the government has increased its rate of immigrant detention,
leaving no doubt that newly built prisons can be kept full (Gola sh-Boza 2012).
咀1ere was a slight decline in CCA stock prices when Obama announced that
the Department ofJustice would not be using private prisons, but their stock
rebounded a few months later when Donald Trump-who had campaigned on
a promise of mass deportation campaign-was elected. 咀1eday a丘er Trump ’s
victory was announced, shares of the two largest private prison companies-
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group-increased
43 and 21 percent, respectively (Takai and Egan 2017).
卫1e CCA has been able to obtain favorable government contracts in part
because of its ties to current and former elected officials. The former head of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, J. Michael Quinlan, is one of the CCA’s top
executives. Both the CCA and its competitor Wackenhut have dominated
the private prison sector because of their political influence. As Phillip Wood
notes,“both benefit from extensive and intimate connections with state and
local politics and the public corrections sector as well as from the usual inter-
locking directorships with other corporations in prison services, construction,
the media and finance'' (2007, 231） .τhe enormous public and private invest-
ment in the criminal justice system has led some scholars to argue that we now
have a prison-industrial complex.
prison-industrial complex
The Prison-Industrial Complex (PIC) The vast network
τhe prison-industrial complex (PIC) refers to the vast network ofprisons, jails, of prisons, jails, courts,
courts, police officers, and other elements that purport to reduce the amount of police o伍cers, and other
criminal activity in our society. 咀1e PIC is a “self二perpetuating machine ”: the elements that purport
enormous investment in prisons, jails, and law enforcement, combined with to reduce the amount
the perceived political benefits of crime control, have led to policies such as of criminal activity in
mandatory minimum sentences that ensure that more people are sentenced to our society.
prison, thereby creating the need for more prison beds (Brewer and Heitzeg
2008, 637). A core feature of the idea of the PIC is that prisons are not built
solely to house criminals; instead, a confluence of interests has led to building
more prisons, enacting harsher laws, and mass incarcerating poor people. 刀1e
constituencies with interests in mass incarceration include the media, private
contractors, politicians, state bureaucracies, and private prisons (Davis 1998;
Scl山sser 1998; Do Valle, Huang, and Spira 2006; Gilmore 2007).
Ideas of racial otherness play an important role in the demonization of crim-
inals. 卫1is otherization allows politicians to play on public fears and portray
these groups as threatening public safety. As Michael Welch argues, the puni-
tive drug control legislation passed in the last decades of the twentieth cen-
tury to control crime and immigration is “ not only poorly formulated, but also
unjust and discriminatory against the poor and people of color” (2002, 14).
Welch further contends that these laws are passed in the context of a “ moral
panic, a turbulent and exagge时ed response to a putative social problem”(8).
卫1e PIC relies on the production of criminals through repressive laws and
tl叼ol比ingof commu剧创o fill the prisons it builds (Richie 2005). ’The cre-
ation of increasingly strict crime laws is partly due to campaign tactics used
by politicians who aim to play on fears regarding crime to capture more votes.
One of the most famous examples of a politician using the fear of crime as
a campaign tactic is the “ Willie Horton'' case. In the 1988 presidential race,
George Bush ’s campaign played on white Americans' fear of crime and racial
prejudices against blacks through use of an ad that featured “认Tillie Horton.”
Horton, a young black man, escaped from prison while on a weekend pass. He
then “ kidnapped and brutally assaulted a white couple in their home, raping
the woman and stabbing the man'' (Mendelberg 1997). An ad that featured
this story and a mugshot of Horton was used by the Bush campaign to portray
the opposing party as being lax on crime. This ad was part of Bush ’s successful
campaign to keep the presidency in Republican hands. It is just one of many
examples of politicians using fears about crime for political gain. Notably, the
飞'\Tillie Horton case used both the fear of crime and the fear of black men to
push forward a political agenda.
币1e PIC has come into being because it serves the interests of powerful
groups in our society. Politicians have used a tough-on-crime approach to gain
votes.τhe mass media have highlighted local crime to attract viewers (Chermak
1994). Rural areas have turned to building prisons to boost local economic
development-over two-thirds of the prisons built in California between 1982
and 1998 were built on formerly irrigated agricultural land that had ceased
production (Gilmore 2007, 105-106). Finally, private prisons have cashed
Beyon d I nca 「cera t ion: Colla • era I Conseq uences 335
in on growing rates of incarceration (Schlosser 1998; Do 飞7alle et al. 2006;

Brewer and Heitzeg 2008). For these reasons, not because of excessive 时es
of criminality, we now have over 2 million people behind bars in the United
States, over ten times as many as we did prior to the 1970s. Mass incarceration
of poor people has generated profits for private prisons and political capital for
politician乌 yet it has not made this country a町 safer (Hartery and Smith 2006).
BEY。 ND INCARCERATI 。 N:C 。 LLATERAL

c 。 NSEQUENCES
Incarceration affects most directly the 2 million people behind bars. It also
has a great impact on the 7 million people under criminal justice supervi-
sion. Because of the lifelong stigma associated with a felony, mass incarcera-
tion also affects the 12 million felons in the United States long a丘er they have
been released from prison. Incarceration not only influences the lives of these
19 million people who have been directly involved in the criminal justice
system: it also has wide-ranging collateral consequences for their children,
spouses, and communities.
The Impact of Mass Incαrceration on Fαmilies and Children

Over half of all inmates-more than 120,000 mothers and 1.1 million fathers
behind bars-have minor children (Pew Charitable Trusts 2010). Often,
when a family member is incarcer-
ated, legally innocent people have
to change their behavior, expec-
tations, and living arrangements
in response to the loss of a family
member or friend. They also may
suffer emotional or health-related
consequences (Comfort 2007).
Children are the most obvious vic-
tims of adult incarceration. More
than S million American childrerl J
a stagger g 7 percent (1 in 14)J
have had a parent incarcerated
at some point in their lives (Annie
E. Casey Foundation 2016).
Parental imprisonment deepens A Over half of all inmates have minor children, who suffer the collateral
racial inequality insofar as black consequences of mass incarceration.
and Latino families are disproportionately its victims (Wildeman 2009). Poor
black and Latino children face trauma and disadvantage because of parental
incarceration more often than do wl巾 children (Wildeman 2009). The incar-
ceration of a parent-usually a father-often has financial consequences for a
household. 卫1is is particularly the case when the father was working, as men
o丘en are the primary or only breadwinner in a family unit. Families with an
incarcerated member often have to change residence because of the loss of an
income. Relocating affects family members' access to neighborhood support
networks, and children may be forced to change schools (Geller, Garfinkel,
Cooper, and Mincy 2009).
Some mothers choose to maintain a relationship with the incarcerated
fathers of their children. However, doing so requires resources and o丘en
puts a financial strain on families, especially if they are poor (Woldoff and
Washington 2008）.τhe loss of a parent has economic costs, but there may be
other costs as well. When one parent is incarcerated, the other parent may have
less time and money to invest in his or her children. In addition, older siblings
may find themselves with new responsibilities, ranging from care of younger
siblings to housework to the need to seek outside employment (Foster and
Hagan 2009） .τhe stigma associated with the incarceration of parents may also
be a source of shame for children (Foster and Hagan 2009).
Although women are less likely to be incarcerated than men, female prison-
ers are more likely to have been primary caregivers for their children.τbus, the
incarceration ofwomen o丘en means that children’s lives are drastically altered,
as they frequently find themselves in a new home, either with their father for
the first time or with their grandparents. In the absence of any willing relative,
many of these children end up in foster homes. When children are placed in
foster care, parents face losing their children permanently. The 1997 Adoption
and Safe Families Act (ASFA) mandates the termination of parental rights
once a child has spent more than fifteen months in foster care ( Covington
and Bloom 2003).
Children with incarcerated parents have been found to suffer mental health
problems such as depression, anxiety, and aggressiveness. Some even exhibit
symptoms of pos忧raumatic stress disorder.τhese problems are exacerbated
when a parent is incarcerated because of child or spousal abuse ( Comfort
2007). Foster and Hagan (2009, 191) have “ found strong evidence that the
imprisonment of fathers has negative causal consequences for children.”古1ey
further contend that economic disadvantages are only one of many that chil-
dren of the incarcerated face: children also suffer educational and emotional
disadvantages when their parents are incarcerated.
Beyond I nca 「cerat i on: Colla • era I Consequences 337
The Lifelong Stigma of a Felony:”The New Jim Crow ”

In the 2016 presidential election, over six million adults in the United States
were prevented from voting because of laws restricting voting rights for those
convicted of felony-level crimes （τhe Sentencing P叫ect 2016). Voting restric-
tions are just one way that former inmates face legalized exclusion. When a
person is released from prison, he or she must not only figure out how to start
anew with few resources, but also deal with life as a felon. In the United States,
it is illegal to discriminate against people because of race, color, or national
origin. However, it is perfectly legal to discriminate against a person because
of a felony record. Felons can be excluded from employment, housing, voting,
public benefits, and jury service. In many major cities, three-quarters ofAfrican
American men have criminal records and are subject to legalized discrimina-
tion (Alexander 2010). Legal scholar Michelle Alexander (2010, 38) argues,
''’Today a criminal freed from prison has scarcely more rights, and arguably
less respect, than a freed slave or a black person living ‘ free ’ in Mississippi at
the height ofJim Crow. ”
γeseαγc
Can Felons Get Jobs♀

Sociologist Devah Pager (2007) deployed a field experiment to find out how
severe the stigma of a felony record is for people released from prison and whether
the stigma varies racially. Pager sent two white applicants to apply for 150 jobs.
She assigned them identical credentials, except that in some cases, the white
applicant had a criminal record, and in other cases the white applicant did not
have a criminal record. She found that the white person with the criminal record
received a callback subsequent to a job application 17 percent of the time. In con-
trast, the white person without a criminal record received a callback 34 percent
of the time. In other words, not having a criminal record doubled the chances of a
callback for the white jobseeker.
卫1en, Pager sent out a pair of black jobseekers to apply for 200 jobs. In their
case, the jobseeker with a criminal record received a callback in only S percent
of cases, as compared with the non felon, who received a callback in 14 percent
of cases. Notable here are that (1) a white felon had a better chance of getting a
(co’nti＇饥
. .ued)
338 CHAPTER 11 Racism and the C 「 im ino I Jus tice System
callback than a black nonfelon; (2) a white felon was one-half as likely as a white
nonfelon to get a callback, whereas a black felon was only one-third as likely as a
black nonfelon to get a callback; and (3) black felons got callbacks only 5 percent
of the time, meaning that, on average, they would have to apply for twenty jobs
just to get one callback, whereas white nonfelons would have to apply for only
three.
[_g~！！！？~巳~－~~~~~~！~g－~f~r .！~！？－~EE_~t巳~~t~i_~＿~ag巳均以句：｜
Blαck Men White Men
Felons 5o/o 17%
Nonfelons 14% 34°/o
咀1ese findings led Pager to argue that because of stereotypes about black
criminality, employers tend to think that a black person with a criminal record
is a criminal, whereas they are more likely to see a white person with a criminal
record as someone who made a mistake but is essentially a good person. Pager
refers to incarceration or a felony on the record as a “ negative credential" insofar
as it makes it more difficult for felons to get jobs. Because of this negative creden-
tial, about 75 percent of people released from prison are unable to find work in the
first year a丘er their release.
Sociologist William Julius Wilson (2009) has argued that discrimination is
no longer a determining factor for black Americans and that instead, inequality
between blacks and whites can be explained largely by structural changes in the
economy. Devah Pager's findings indicate that individual-level discrimination
also plays a role in blacks' relatively high rates of unemployment. For African
Americans, the mark of a felony on their record makes it very difficult for them to
find employment. In addition, this mark does not go away with time.
For Discussion
1. Why do you think a white felon has a better chance of ge忧ing an entry-level
job than a black nonfelon?
2. Pager argues that having a felony is a “ negative credential." Are there any other
characteristics jobseekers might have that also could be negative credentials?
3. Do you think that Pager would have had different results if she had included
women in the study? How so?
Source: Pager 20 07.

Legal scholar Michelle Alexander (2010) has recently made the case that mass
incarceration is the civil rights issue of the twenty-first century. She contends
that because incarceration has become a common life event for African
Americans, and because it is legal to discriminate against felons, our crimi-
nal justice system systematically denies rights and opportunities to African
Americans, effectively replacing openly racist policies of the past. According to
Alexander,“today it is perfectly legal to discriminate against criminals in nearly
all the ways that it was once legal to discriminate against African Americans.
Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of discrimination-employment
discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of
educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public benefits, and
exclusion 丘om jury service-are suddenly legal ”(2010, 2). As discussed previ-
ously, she even goes so far as to contend that “ today a criminal freed from prison
has scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, than a freed slave or a black
person living ‘ free ’ in Mississippi at the height ofJim Crow”(138). What do you
think? Is mass incarceration the “ New Jim Crow''?
Mass incarceration has been condoned by American voters because crime
control is considered a crucial element of a safe society. However, the evi-
dence presented in this chapter makes it clear that mass incarceration is not
an effective crime control strategy. Moreover, the consequences of zealous law
enforcement have been felt more deeply in already-disadvantaged communi-
ties. 认That if, instead of creating a safer society, mass incarceration has been
the root cause of poverty, violence, and instability in U.S. cities?
τhe incarceration rate appears to have leveled off in recent years, largely
because the global economic crisis has required states to cut back expenditures-
the highest of which are related to criminal justice. In short, states do not have
the budgets to incarcerate more people. But the question of whether we will
witness yet another turn in the history of criminal justice is an open one.
Key Terms
1984 Crime Control Act 322 racial profiling 324 outsourcing 332
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 322 Reaganomics 331 deindustrialization 332
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 322 neoliberalism 331 prison-industrial complex (PIC) 333
340 CHAPTER 11 Racism and the C 「 i minal Jus tice System
11.1 What factors explain the rise of mass incarceration in the United States?
(pp. 312- 323)
• The United States has one of the highest incarceration rates in the world.
Moreover, black and Latino men are disproportionately affected by harsh
crime-control policies.

> What is the difference between crime rates and ” What unique features of the United States
incarceration rates? might play a role in its high incarceration
> Explain the trends in property crime and rates?
violent crime rates between 1970 and 2000. > How has the War on Drugs affected mass
Compare these trends to incarceration rates. incarceration?

飞!\That differences do you see?
> How do incarceration rates in the United States
compare to those of other developed countries?

扮 Why does the author argue that the United
States is in the midst of an era of mass
incarceration?
11.2 How are disparities in the criminal justice system reflective of institutional
racism? (pp. 323-329)
．咀1e high rates of incarceration for black and Latino men can be traced to racial
profiling and sentencing disparities. Racial ideologies of black male criminality
have serious implications for the lives of African American men.

” How does racial profiling affect incarceration > Why do you think police o面cers are more
rates? likely to conduct drug raids in low-income,
> What roles do individual racism and black neighborhoods than in wealthier,
institutionalized racism play in maintaining primarily white neighborhoods?
the high rates of incarceration for African > What role might individual discrimination
Americans? play in maintaining the high incarceration
> What are three reasons African American men rates for African Americans?
are seven times more likely than white men to
be incarcerated?
11.3 How is the rise of mass incarceration tied to large-scale economic trends?
(pp. 329-335)
• Mass incarceration came about at the same time that inner cities began to lose
jobs. 咀1ere are profit motivations behind private prisons, and certain groups have
benefited economically 仕om mass incarceration.

> How is economic restructuring related to ” Evaluate the evidence presented in this chapter
incarceration and crime rates? for the connection between economic trends
> What is the prison-industrial complex? and mass incarceration.
> How did the Great Recession affect
incarceration rates?
11.4 What are the collateral consequences of mass incarceration? (pp. 335-338)
• Mass incarceration affects the 2 million people behind bars and the 7 million
people under criminal justice supervision. It also affects millions of felons in the
United States and their families and children.

> What are some of the ways that mass incarcera- > Evaluate the human cost of incarceration:
tion affects men and women differently? in what ways, beyond financially, does the
> What parallels does Michelle Alexander draw United States pay for mass incarceration?
between the Jim Crow Era and the present era?
> How are children affected when their parents
are incarcerated?
Tallfing about Rα，ce

τhe United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world.
In a discussion, consider why incarceration rates in the United States
continued to increase in the 1990s even as crime rates fell. How are our
distinctively high incarceration rates related to ideas about race? For a
contemporary example, you may be able to compare responses to the
current rise in heroin abuse versus the rise in crack abuse of the 1980s.
Telegraph Poles with Buildings. Josepl1 Stella. 1917. Oil on canvas, 36 1/ +× 30 1/+ in . (Terra Foundationjor A1nerican Art,
Chicago/.rl rt Resource. 1\Tγ〉
Chapter 。utline
. The History of Health Disparities in

the United States 345
Involuntary E× perimentation on
African Americans 346
Explaining Health Disparities by
. Race and Ethnicity Today 348
Socioeconomic Status and Health
Disparities by Race/Ethnicity 350
Segregation and Health 351
. research focus Health and Social
｜门equity in Ala 「neda Cou 门忡，
California 353
The E汗ects of Individual Racism on
. Health 354
Life-Course Perspectives 356
Culture and Health 357
Global View Health and Structural
. Violence in Guatemala 358
Genetics, Race, and Health 359
Environmental Racism 361
v。icesThe Holt Fσmily of Dickson,
Tennessee 363
Voices The Flint Water Crisis 367
As y。u Reαd Conclusion and Discussion 368
12.1 What is the racial history of health disparities in the Check You 「 Unde「standing 369
Talking abou • Race 371
United States?
12.2 How do health disparities in the United States today vary
by race and ethnicity?
12.3 What are the effects of environmental racism?
12.4 What are some co1nmunity movements for environmental
justice?
344 CHAPTER 12 Hea lth Inequa lities , E nv i 「onmenta l Racism, and Environmenta l Justice
Tl1llS t泣， we have exan1ined racial inequalities in edt1cation, in tl1e

RE· CRE ATE RAC E
IRST CE NTURY
labor market, in housing, and in the c1·i1ninal jt1stice system. The
acct1n1t1lated disadvantages for non~rhites, what Joe Feagin (2001)
AL calls “ syst en1ic racisn1," are also fou11d in the areas of health and the
environn1ent. Racial inequalities in the United St ates diminish not
TIO N
011ly opportu11ities for nonwl1ites, but also tl1e 1nost valuable asset we
l1ave- ot1r time on eartl1. A twenty-five-year-old African American
can expect to live five years less tl1an a twenty-five-year-old white
America11. Blacks and Latinos are much 1no1·e likely tl1a11 whites t o live
in neighborl1oods with toxic waste facilit ies. Hovv do we begin to 111ake
sense of the cost of· 1·acial ineqt1ality when we learn that racism lit erally
kills? 111 Fαtαl Invention, Dorothy Roberts offers poigna11t reflectio11s on
racial disparities in health.
magine if every single day a jumbo jet loaded with 230 African American pas-
sengers took off into the sky, reached a cruising altitude, then crashed to the
ground, killing all aboard. According to former surgeon general David Satcher,
this is exactly the impact caused by racial health disparities in the United States.
In a 2005 article, he and several other health experts reported that there had been
83,570 “ excess" black deaths in 2002 . 咀1at represents the number of African
Americans who would still have been alive that year if their life expectancy were
the same as that of whites.τhe number of excess deaths is closer to 100,000
today. In one generation, between 1940 and 1999, more than 4 million African
Americans died prematurely relative to whites. Overall life expectancy is actually
declining in some counties where there is a high proportion of African Americans.
In my hometown of Chicago, one third of all black deaths are excess in terms of
the black-white mortality gap. In other words, one out of every three black people
who died in 2000 would have survived if black and white death rates were equal.
Chicago is a very segregated city, so longevity varies geographically. Of Chicago’s
seventy-seven community areas, the twenty-two with the lowest life expectan-
cies are more than 90 percent black. There is a difference of sixteen years between
the white neighborhood with the highest life expectancy and the black neighbor-
hood with the lowest. Blacks are more likely to die prematurely (before the age of
sixty-five) from most m习or illnesses: cance鸟 stroke, diabetes, kidney disease,
The History of Hea lth Disparities in the Un i• ed Sta • es 345
AIDS, and coronary heart disease, to name a few. Race matters at the beginning of
life as well. Black infants are almost three times more likely than white infants to die
before their first birthday. Blacks also spend a greater portion of their lives in poor
health . τhey experience a rate of preventable hospitalizations more than double
that of whites. “’That ’s not a racial health gap: it ’s a chasm wider and deeper than a
mass grave,” says Harriet Washington, whose book Medical Apartheid chronicles
medical experimentation on black Americans from colonial times to the present.
Similarly dreadful statistics are available for other U.S. minority groups, includ-
ing Latinos and Native Americans. Recent immigrants from Latin America tend
to be in better health than white Americans, despite having higher rates of pov-
erty and less access to health care-a curiosity known as the 咀ispanic Paradox."
But their health advantage disappears in the generation born in the United States.
Latinos and blacks are about twice as likely as whites to have diabetes. In Novem-
ber 2009, President Barack Obama convened the largest gathering of Indian tribal
leaders in U.S. history-bringing together representatives from more than five
hundred tribes-to discuss their urgent health needs. “ Native Americans die of
illnesses like tuberculosis, alcoholism, diabetes, pneumonia and influenza at far
higher rates,” Obama said.
Source: Roberts 20121 81-82.
What explains these disparities in life expectancy? The answers we provide to

such questions are perhaps as important as the lives at stake.
In this chapter, we will explore the complexities of racial inequalities in
health and the environment. 咀1is discussion will shed light on why nonwhites
have lower life expectancies than whites, as well as a host of other facts related
to health disparities. We will continue to consider the effects of racial ideolo-
gies by asking,“How have unequal health outcomes been explained in the past,
and how do these explanations relate to changing racial ideologies over time ?”
THE HIST。 RY 。 F HEALTH DISPARITIES

IN THE UNITED STATES
Disparities in life expectancy for blacks and whites in the United States are
not new. Medical treatment of African Americans during and since slavery
has been at best subpar and at worst deadly. It is not difficult to imagine that
the lives of people of African descent were devalued in the past, but a look
346 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalities, Envi ronmen • al Racism, and Envi 「on men • a l Justice
into the history of health disparities and medical care also gives us insight into
present-day inequalities.
Inv。luntary Experimentαtion on African Americans

During slavery in the United States, medical care was brutal and ineffective for
most people. Slaves in particular suffered in innumerable ways under the care
of physicians, and they had no option to refuse treatment.τhe accounts that
remain about the treatment of slaves by southern doctors provide a window
into some of the brutality slaves endured. One account is that of]ohn Brown,
who escaped from slavery and lived to tell his story.
In 1847, a former slave who had been known as “ Fed ” escaped to England,
where he took on the name John Brown. In his memoir, Brown describes
how he was subjected to medical experimentation in Georgia in the 1820s
and 1830s. Dr. Thomas Hamilton had cured Brown’s former master of an
illness and, in exchange, asked to perform experiments on a slave. ] ohn Brown
describes several sets of experiments Dr. Hamilton performed on him. 刀1e
first was to subject him to extreme levels of heat in order to find a treat-
ment for sunstroke.τhe next set involved letting him bleed every day.τhen
Dr. Hamilton burned Brown in an effort to see how deep his black skin went.
Brown explained that Dr. Hamilton “ also tried experiments upon me, which
I cannot dwell upon”(quoted in Washington 2006, 54). We can only imagine
what those experiments involved.
Dr. Hamilton’s tactics, unfortunately, were not an isolated case.τhe famed
American doctor James Marion Sims (1813-1883) is sometimes called the
father of American gynecology. A lesser-known fact about Dr. Sims is that he
used involuntary subjects-many of them enslaved African Americans-for
experiments. During the nineteenth century, vesicovaginal 且stulas (abnormal
passages connecting the bladder and the vagina that o丘en developed as a result
of childbirth) were a serious problem for women of all races. In developing
a cure for the fistulas, Dr. Sims carried out a series of painful operations on
enslaved women.
Sims convinced the owners of eleven female slaves with the condition to
lend the slaves to him for treatment. It took Dr. Sims scores of experimental
operations to arrive at his cure: silver sutures to prevent infection. One of the
slaves, named Anarcha, was seventeen when she came under his care in 1844.
She developed a fistula and a torn vagina after a forceps-induced birth to a still-
born baby. Sims repeatedly sewed up Anarcha's vagina, yet it became infected
every time, and he had to painfully reopen the wounds. Sims knew about anes-
thesia but refused to administer it to Anarcha or to the ten other women. 认Then
The History of Hea lth Disparities in the United Sta • es 347
Sims began his experiments, he worked with several other doctors who helped
him hold down the women as he performed the surgeries. Within a yea鸟 how
eve乌 all the other doctors le丘y as they could not bear to hear the screams of
the women. From then on, the enslaved women had to hold one another down
as Sims operated without anesthesia. In 1849, Sims at last announced that he
had found the cure and succeeded in repairing Anarcha's 岳stula. It remains
unclear whether he repaired the fistulae of the other ten enslaved experimen-
tal subjects. 咀1is example is one of many situations in which treatments that
would primarily benefit whites who could afford a doctor were first tried in an
experimental fashion on slaves (Washington 2006).
卫1e practice of using involuntary black experimental subjects continued
a丘er slavery and involved both live and dead bodies. In 1989, construction
workers in Augusta, Georgia, uncovered nearly 10,000 human bones and
skulls beneath what was once the Medical College of Georgia. This discovery
led to an appalling finding: in the nineteenth century, doctors at the Medi-
cal College of Georgia had ordered porters at the college to remove bodies
from nearby cemeteries for medical dissection. Most were removed from an
African American burial ground. Overall, 7S percent of the bones belonged
to African Americans, even though blacks made up less than half of the local
population. When Harriet Washington (2006) researched the grave-robbing,
< Dr.James Marion

Sims carried out horrific
operations on enslaved
women such as Anarcha
without their consent.
348 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalities, Environmen • al Racism, and Envi 「on men • a l Justice
she discovered that faculty at the Medical College had sent a slave called
Grandison Harris to pull bodies from graves. Harris continued to work at the
Medical College and to rob African American graves a丘er emancipation until
his death in 1911.
Involuntary experimentation continued well into the twentieth century,
as evidenced by the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment (discussed in
Chapter Three). One area of research in which blacks were disproportionately
affected is the experimental use of radiation. In 1945, an African American
truck driver named Ebb Cade was in a serious accident. When he arrived at
the hospital in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, doctors determined that he would not
survive his i时uries. Unbeknown to Cade, the doctors were under contract
with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and had been waiting for a mor-
ibund patient so that they could test the effects of plutonium, a radioactive
element used in nuclear weapons and reactors. Without Cade's consent, they
injected him with plutonium.τhe doctors' expectation was that Cade would
soon die, but they hoped to keep him alive long enough to see the effects of the
high dose of radiation on his body. In order to do so, they extracted bone chips
Nuremberg Code Policy and pulled fi丘een of his teeth. Cade recovered, however, and escaped from
adopted by the U.S. the hospital six months later. He returned to his home in Greensboro, North
Depa1·tment of Defense Carolina, where he died in 1953 of heart disease, unrelated to his injection
in 1953 under which (Washington 2006).
research subjects have In 1953, the U.S. Department of Defense adopted the Nuremberg Code.
to be informed that Under this policy, any research subject has to be provided with information
participation is voluntary about the nature, duration, and purpose of the research before participating
and be provided with in it. Subjects also have to be informed that their participation in any research
information about the project is voluntary. Despite this order, approximately fi丘y more experimental
nature, duration, and radiation treatments on uninformed subjects occurred during the 1960s and
p11rpose of the researcl1. 1970s (Washington 2006).
EXPLAINING HEALTH DISPARITIES BY RACE

AND ETHNICITY T。 DAY
African Americans at every age have a much higher death rate than any other
racial or ethnic group (At a Glance 12-1). Black men have a life expectancy of
seven years less than white men ( Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2016), and the age-adjusted death rate is 15 percent higher for African Amer-
icans than it is for whites (MMWR 2017). Sociologists have offered a range of
theories to explain these and other health disparities by race and ethnicity, as
we will explore in this section.
E× plaining Health Disparities by Race and E• h n i city Tod a y 349
AT A GLANCE 12.1 Health Disparities and Inequalities by Race/Ethnicity
Age-Adjusted Death Rates, 2015
1,000
coz－
』＠巳
ω2且Om
800
ωZ币
600
］OOO
一
V。。
400 一一『
R
OOF
200
。
Total Black, White, Hispanic/
non-Hispanic non-Hispanic Latino Data from MMWR 2017
Prevalence of diabetes Rate of HIV infection diagnosis (per 100,000)
Asian 7.9°/o Native American 13.5
Black 11.3°/o Asian 8.4
Hispanic/Latino 11.5°10 Black 84.0
White 6.8°10 Hispanic/Latino 30.9
White 9.1
Early pre-term bi 同hs* (rate per 100,000)
* < 34 weeks gestation Age-adjusted death rates from coronary
heart disease and strokes
Native American 4.0
Native American 92.0
Asian 12.9
Asian I 67.0
Black 6.1
Black I 141 .o
Hispanic/Latino 13.3
Hispanic/Latino 186.5
White 2.9
White 117.7
Death rate from homicide

Black Americans are killed at 12 times the rate Infant mortality rate
of people in other developed countries (Silver 2015)
Native American 9.0 Native American 8.4
Asian 2.2 Asian 4.5
Black 19.9 Black 12.7
Hispanic/Latino 6.6 Hispanic/Latino 5.6
White 2.6 White 5.5
Data from CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities

350 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalities, Envi ronmental Racism, a nd Env ironmenta l Justice
Socioeconomic Statusαnd Health Dispαrities by Rαce/Ethnicity

First, we should note that health disparities are clearly linked to socioeco-
nomic status.τhese disparities are evident in our earliest records and have
been found in every country where they have been examined: people with
higher incomes live longer, healthier lives. Moreover, it is not just poverty that
affects health-relative poverty is also important. One way this relationship
can be seen is through a comparison of life expectancies in Japan and Great
Britain. In 1970, these two countries had similar life expectancies and similar
levels of inequality. Over the next two decades, inequality increased dramati-
callyin Great Britain while it narrowed in Japan. By 1990,Japan had the high-
est life expectancy in the world, while Great Britai的 had declined (Williams
and Collins 1995).
Every step up in income and wealth translates into an increased likelihood
of having good health. However, once we begin to parse these outcomes by
race, a different story emerges. African Americans do not experience the same
health gains as whites do by virtue of an increase in socioeconomic status-
though they do experience some health gains.τhere is clearly a relationship
between health and socioeconomic status, but these factors work in different
ways across racial and ethnic lines.
Black/ white disparities do not disappear as African Americans gain more
education and income. In 2008, for example, the birth rate for black women
without a high school education was 60 percent higher than it was for white
women with a similar background and level of education. In contrast, the infant
mortality rate for black women with a college education was 78 percent higher
than it was for white women with a college education. Whereas the dispari-
ties among white women, Asian women, Native American women, and Latina
women narrowed with higher levels of education, the gap actually expanded
for black women (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2011).
Studies ofbirthweight by race/ ethnicity and level of education reveal a sim-
ilar pa忧ern. Babies born with low birthweight are at a higher risk for death,
making birthweight an important factor for health scholars to consider. As
shown in Figure 12-1, African American mothers with college degrees are
more likely than whites, Hispanics, and Asians with less than a high school
education to have low-birthweight babies (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2011).
One example of health outcomes that vary by race is that ofJasmine Zapata,
an African American medical student at the University of Wisconsin.Jasmine,
studying to be a doctor, knew the importance of proper prenatal care. She
neither smoked nor drank during her pregnancy and carefully followed her
E× plaining Health Dispa rities by Race and E• hnicity Today 351
18°/o
16°/o
14°/o
12°/o
• White
10°/o • Black
8°/o • American Indian
• Asian
6°/o
• Hispanic FIGURE 12-1.
4°/o Low Birth Weight Among
Mothers 20 Years of Age or
2°/o Older, by Race/Ethnicity
0°/o and Education of Mother
No HS HS Some B.A. degree Source: Centers for Disease Control
diploma diploma college or 盯1ore and Prevention (2011).
doctor’s advice. When she felt pain in her abdomen during her twenty-f说hweek
of pregnancy,]asmine knew something was wrong. When she began to bleed
profuse！只 she mentally prepared herself to lose the baby. ] asmine ’s daughter,
Aameira, was born shortly a丘erward. Weighing just over a pound, her daugh-
ter miraculously survived.]asmine was overjoyed but couldn’t help but wonder
why her daughter was born prematurely (Johnson and Ghose 2011).
Researchers continue to investigate why African American women have
poorer birth outcomes than white women. Furthermore, why is it the case that
health outcomes for African Americans do not improve with higher levels of
income and education? If socioeconomic status alone does not explain these
disparate outcomes by race and ethnicity, what does? Sociologists and public
health scholars have offered several different explanations, which we will con-
sider next.
Segregation and Health

David Williams and Cl吨uita Collins (2001) argue that racial residential
segregation is the primary cause of black/white health disparities because it
affects the educational opportunities of children, concentrates poverty and
resources, and forces many African Americans to live in environments that are
unhealthy on a variety of levels. Williams and Collins suggest that segregation
has adverse health outcomes for blacks because it creates “ pathogenic residen-
tial conditions''-unsafe streets where people are scared to exercise, have few
opportunities to buy fresh produce, see more advertisements for alcohol and
tobacco, and live with higher rates of violent crime. One study in Baltimore,
352 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalit ies, Env ironmen • al Rac ism, a nd Env i 「o n me n• a l Justice
for example, found that neighborhoods with a high percentage of African

Americans are more likely to have liquor stores than are white communities
(LaVeist and Wallace 2000). People living in disadvantaged neighborhoods
also have higher incidences of heart disease, diabetes, obesity, tuberculosis,
infant mortality, and hypertension.
Availability of healthy food is one way that segregation can affect health out-
comes. A study in New York compared East Harlem, which is 6 percent white,
with the Upper East Side, which is 84 percent white. East Harlem has the high-
est prevalence of diabetes and obesity in New York City, whereas the Upper
East Side has the lowest. The researchers who carried out the study wanted to
know if stores in these neighborhoods carried foods that doctors recommend
for people with diabetes. ’They surveyed stores to find if they had diet soda,
I percent or fat-free milk, high-fiber bread, fresh fruit, and fresh vegetables.
They found that Upper East Side stores were three times as likely to carry all
of the recommended food items as East Harlem stores (Horowitz, Colson,
Heb叫 and Lancaster 2004). The lack of access to healthy food in poor neigh-
borhoods is a national problem (Ghosh-Dastidar 2014).
Persons of low socioeconomic status, blacks, and Latinos all have higher
obesity rates than the general population. One possible explanation for this
disparity is the resources available in the neighborhoods where they reside.
Public health scholars have found that people who live close to supermarkets
and have safe places to exercise are less likely to be obese. Low-income and
nonwhite people are more likely to live far from supermarkets with healthy
produce and closer to fast-food outlets and convenience stores.
They are also more likely to live in areas where crime is higher,
making it less safe to walk around the neighborhoods. By concen-
trating poverty and people of color, segregation can contribute to
higher levels of obesity in these groups (Lovasi, Hutson, Guerra,
andNeckern
American Indians, African Americans, and Hispanics are about
twice as likely as whites to be diagnosed with diabetes (Isaac
2012） .τhese disparities are clos均r related to diet. What people eat
is a result of their personal food preferences as well as what food
is available where they live.τhe Tohono 0 ’odham and Pima Indi-
ans of southern Arizona have the highest rate of type 2 diabetes
in the world-nearly SO percent of the people in their community
A Residents of low-income have diabetes. A century ago, there were almost no cases of dia-
neighborhoods often have limited betes among these American Indian tribes. What happened ？ τhe
access to fresh, high-quality produce. film Bad Sugar explains that the Tohono O'odham diet changed
E× plain ing Hea lth Disparities by Race and E• hnicity Today 353
when the government cut off their irrigation water supply, preventing them
from growing their own food. Instead of growing and eating the food they had
eaten for centuries, they consumed food from the U.S. Commodity Supple-
mental Food Program (Adelman 2008). Prior to 199究 this program included
no fresh produce. When the Tohono O'odham people began to consume large
amounts of white flour, shortening, suga鸟 and canned foods, their diabetes
rate skyrocketed. We see similar patterns, though not as drastic, in black and
Latino neighborhoods, which have high concentrations of fast-food restau-
rants and corner stores selling many more packaged, processed foods than
fresh produce. Diet is influenced by what food is available, and what we eat
affects our health outcomes.
γesea~γc 。cus
Health and Social Inequity in Alameda County, California

According to a report carried out by the Alameda County Public Health
Department in California (2008), in Alameda County, poor whites are less
likely than poor blacks to live in poor neighborhoods. Over half of poor whites
live in neighborhoods with less than 10 percent poverty, compared with only
10 percent of poor blacks. The concentration of poverty for African Ameri-
cans translates into a variety of negative health outcomes. Blacks in Alameda
County are more likely to live in areas with high levels of diesel particles in
the air, few good options for public transportation, limited options for healthy
eating and exercise, and a larger presence of stores that sell liquor and cigare忧es.
卫1ese stressors in turn translate into poor health outcomes. Black children are
2.5 times more likely to have asthma, blacks and Latinos are more likely to be
hurt in pedestrian or cycling accidents, and blacks have higher infant mortality
and overall mortality rates than whites.
The disparities are at their most striking when comparing a white child born in
the relatively well-off Oakland Hills with a black child born in low-income West
Oakland. Compared with the white child, the black child is:
1.5 times more likely to be born premature or at a low birthweight

Seven times more likely to be born into poverty
(co’nti＇饥
. .ued)
354 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Ineq ua lities, Env ironmen ta l Ra cism, a nd Env iro nm e nta l Justice
Two times more likely to live in a home that is rented

Four times more likely to have parents with only a high school education or
less.
’These disparities continue over the life course:
• By fourth grade, the black child is four times less likely to read at grade level.
By adolescence, the black child is 5.6 times more likely to drop out of school.
By adulthood, the black child is five times more likely to be hospitalized for
diabetes, twice as likely to be hospitalized for and to die of heart disease,
three times more likely to die of stroke, and twice as likely to die of cancer.
The black child born in West Oakland can expect to die almost fi丘een years ear-
lier than the white child born in the Oakland Hills.
For Discussion
1. Do you think these disparities are unique to Alameda? Why or why not?
2. Is the community you are from more similar to Oakland Hills or West Oak-
land? How so?
3. How are racial disparities in health distinct from other forms of racial disparities?
Source: Alameda County Public H ealth Departm ent 2008.
The Effects of Individual Racism on Health

To explain why A丘ican Americans have the worst health outcomes on nearly
every measure, some scholars point to perceived discrimination.τhey argue
that African Americans are disproportionately exposed to racial discrimina-
tion, that discrimination can produce stress, and that stress can lead to neg-
ative health outcomes. When African Americans experience discrimination,
their responses may include ange马 resentment, fear, frustration, and other
stress responses. Scientists have found that these responses cause the adrenal
gland to produce hormones that inhibit immune responses and increase vul-
nerabilityto disease (Clark, Anderson, Clark, and Williams 1999).
Although African Americans have higher levels of most physical ailments, it
turns out they have lower levels of mental illness. Public health scholar James
Jackson and his colleagues (Jackson, Knight, and Rafferty 2010) offer an
explanation for this finding.τhey contend that African Americans have devel-
oped coping strategies tl时 enable them to deal with stress (such as that related
E× plaining Health Disparities by Race and E• hnicity Today 355
to individual racism), but that these same coping strategies ultimately have
negative physical health outcomes. For example, many African Americans are
confronted with stressful conditions such as poverty, crime, poor housing,
and racial discrimination. In response, many engage in unhealthy behaviors
such as smoking, alcohol use, and overeating of fatty foods to alleviate stress.
] ackson and his colleagues found that African Americans are likely to eat com-
fort foods to deal with stress because fatty foods inhibit the release of certain
hormones and do provide short-term stress relief. However, the consumption
of these foods leads to long-term health problems, obesity, stroke, and cardio-
vascular disease.τhey argue that the consumption of comfort foods does help
reduce stress in the short term, thus leading to lower levels of mental illness,
but has long-term physical effects.
One effect of eating to cope with stress is obesity. About half of all
African American women are obesej the rate for white women, by contrast, is
30 percent. Christie Malpede and her colleagues (2007) explored the extent
to which weight-related beliefs and attitudes are linked to obesity among black
and white women. When the researchers asked black women how being black
affected their weight, the most common responses included the consumption
of unhealthy foods and lack of exercise. In contrast, white women responded
that being a white woman meant that they had distorted expectations of body
type, that they thought their success depended on being thin and beautiful,
and that they had negative body images. Overall, black women talked more
about food choices, and white women talked more about body image when
asked about their weight-related beliefs.
τhe majority of the research on racism and health focuses on African
Americans (Williams and Mohammed 2013). However, a few recent studies
have shown similar pa忧erns for other people of color. For example, Paradies
et al. (2015) found a stronger association between poor mental health and
racism for Asian Americans and Latinos than for African Americans, whereas
the association between racism and poor physical health is strongest for
African Americans. In another study, Diane Lauderdale (2006) found that
Arab women who gave birth in the six months following the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, had a higher risk of poor birth outcomes than those
who gave birth before 9/ 11. She attributes this higher risk to heightened dis-
crimination against Arabs in the a丘ermath of 9/ 11. A study of emergency
room care providers found implicit biases against Native American adults and
children, which are likely to affect their care in these se忧ings (Puumala et al.
2016). Ongoing research in the area of racism and health will help us better
understand these nuances, yet the current research demonstrates that racial
356 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Ineq ua lities, Env ironmen ta l Ra cism, an d Env iro nm e nta l Justice
discrimination continues to be prevalent in our society and leads to negative

health outcomes for people of color.
Life-Course Perspectives
Health inequality increases with age across a range of outcomes. For example,
older African Americans have significantly higher levels of daily function limita-
tions and disability than do older whites. Because of this type ofhealth disparity,
life-course perspective A scholars have offered life-course perspectives, which focus on how health out-
fra1nework used to comes change over the life course. Two of the most accepted life-course expla-
explain how health nations are the cumulative disadvantage perspective and the weathering
outcomes change over the hypothesis. 咀1e first explanation focuses on how disadvantages accumulate
life course. over the life course, and the second focuses on how constant exposure to stress
accelerates health declines for blacks （τhorpe and Kelle)
cumulative disadvantage τhe cumulative disadvantage perspective provides a framework to explain
perspective A the increasing divergence between blac】汇 and white health outcomes. It focuses
framework used to on the fact that many health conditions are related to stressors that accumulate
explain the increasing over the life course. ’These stressors include poor nutrition, discrimination,
divergence between and living in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Thorpe and I(elley-Moore 2012).
black and white health Scholars who adopt the weathering perspective contend that the health
outcomes that focuses status of blacks declines more quickly than that of whites as a consequence of
on how disadvantages long-term exposure to unhealthy conditions. According to this perspective,
accumulate over the life black Americans age more quickly than whites because of the social, eco ’
course. nomic, and environmental conditions they face. ’The focus in this perspective
is on the effects of sustained stressors-constant discrimination, financial
weathering hypothesis A
stress, family crises, and fear-which can wear down the body in tangible ways
framework used to
(Thorpe and I(elley-Moore 2012).
explain the increasing
Jan Warren-Findlow (2006) interviewed black women with early-stage
divergence between
heart disease to better understand how the weathering perspective could be
black and white health
applied to their lives. She found that two-thirds of the women she interviewed
outcomes that focuses on
were taking antidepressants or anti-anxiety medication as a response to high
how constant exposure to
levels of stress. All of the women talked about being stressed for reasons such
stress accelerates health
as family problems, neighborhood violence, and financial strain. One woman
decline for blacks.
explained that the stress of living “ one paycheck away from homelessness'' was
''killing ” her. Warren-Findlow argues that high levels of stress over the life
course of these African American women contributed to their development of
heart disease and the worsening of their condition.
A recent study found that although blacks and Mexican Americans have
worse health outcomes than whites overall, Mexican Americans do not expe-
rience cumulative disadvantage or weathering in the same way that African
E× plaining Health Disparities by Race and E• hnic i• y Today 357
Americans do. Instead, Mexican Americans' higher likelihood of having

serious medical conditions does not increase with age (Brown, 0 ’ Rand,and
Adkins 2012).
Culture and Health

Is simply being or becoming an American bad for your health ？币1e United
States ranks fairly low for a country in the developed world on a wide range of
health indicators. Moreover, immigrants o丘en have better health than their
native-born counterparts. In the United States, foreign-born women have sub-
stantially better pregnancy outcomes than women born in the United States.
Gopal Singh and Stella Yu (1996) found that foreig卧born women have lower
infant mortality rates, lower rates of low birthweight, and lower rates of teen-
age births than their counterparts born in the United States. However, their
study found some important variations.τhe reduced risk for infant mortality
is most pronounced among Cuban immigrants-compared with Cubans born
in the United States, they have 39 percent lower risk. Black immigrants also are
25 percent less likely to experience infant mortality than native-born blacks.
Overall, foreign-born blacks, Cubans, Mexicans, and Chinese have lower risks
for infant mortality and low birthweight than their native-born counterparts.
Health outcomes for Latinos compare favorably with those of other groups on
a wide variety of measures. Recall At a Glance 12-1. In 2013, the age-adjusted
death rate for Latinos was lower than that of all groups except Asians, and Latina
women had the lowest rates of low扣rthweight babies ( Center for Disease Con-
trol 2016). And even though Latinos have, on average, a lower socioeconomic
status than white叭hey have comparable infant mortality 时es (La问 Gamboa,
I{ahramanian, Morales, and Bautista 2005). Scholars have come up with ma盯
explanations for this phenomenon, which is known as the Hispanic Paradox. Hispanic Paradox The
One hypothesis to explain the Hispanic Paradox is that many Hispanics obse1~vation that even
are immigrants and have better health behaviors than native-born Americans. tl1ough Latinos have,
There is some support for this explanation, but the results are mixed. Mari- on average, a lower
aelena Lara and her colleagues (2005), for example, found that Latinos who soc1oeconom1c status
are more acculturated into U.S. society are more likely to engage in unhealthy than whites, they have
behaviors such as eating unhealthy foods, smoking, and drinking alcohol. In comparable health
contrast, there were positive factors associated with acculturation, or the outcomes to whites.
process by which immigrants adopt the behaviors and preferences of the host 。cculturation
A process
society: more acculturated Latinos were more likely to go to the doctor, get by which immigrants
preventative care, be screened for cance乌 and have health insurance. Overall, adopt the behaviors and
the researchers found that acculturation has negative effects in terms of health preferences of the host
behaviors, but positive effects in terms of health care usage and access. society.
358 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalities, Envi ronmental Racism, and Environmenta l Justice
Health and Structural Violence in Guatemala

Many clear links e× is• betweens•ress a 门d 怡。｜↑h OU •- of their chi l dre门 go↑ sick a 门d •hey needed the mo门ey
comes. Cecilia Menjiva 「＇s (2011) work on s↑「uctural •o pay for ↑hei 「 children's medicine.
violence in Guatemala helps us bet•er u 门derstand Menj iva 「 argues that the se 「ious health issues the
its effects on women ’s bodies. Menjiva 「’s work with women she in↑e「viewed encoun↑e「ed we 「e due to
women in eas•ern Guatemala points to the physical s↑「uctu 「al violence: poverty, isolation, interpe 「son a l
e× pressions of violence that we can see in women ’s violence, pa ↑ria 「chy, a 门d lack of access to hea Ith
lives: headaches, nervous b「eakdowns, and constan• ca 「e . The ex•reme s•ress C「ea↑ed by th is s↑「uctu 「al
stomach pain. Nearly all the women that Men jiva 「 violence has physical manifes•ations. One poig 门。 nt
interviewed for he 「 book spoke of some form of e× ample comes from a woman named Azucena .
「nental o 「 physicalαilme门↑． When he 「 second daugh↑e「 was born, Azucena's
Many of the wome 门 igno 「ed thei 「 own health husband was ou• of town and she had 「un ou• of
issues because of societal p「essures ↑o pu•• heir hus- food. Her ne i ghbo 「s gave he 「 some ↑0「↑ii las, b「ead,
bands and chi l dre 门 first. One woman Gracia Ma 「ia and sugar, bu• she and her children we 「e still hungry.
•old Menjivar that she never complained about he 「 She e× plained that the tension made her feel awfu l,
ow门。 ilments because he「 child 「en's and husband's "like cancer." Like ma 门y women , •he e×↑「eme s•ress of
heal•h were all that mattered. Thus, even •hough pove「↑y - combined with her husband igno 「ing her
Gracia Maria had an e×↑「eme ly difficult p「eg 门。门cy needs - c「ea ↑ed physica I st「esses on her body.
with her fifth child and could not sit up fo 「↑wo mon•hs Menjiva「’s concep• of "s•ructural violence" is also a
afte 「 bir↑h, she acquiesced •o her husband's desi 「e useful way to consider the rela •ionship among health ou•-
and had another child. Othe 「 women e×pla i 门ed that comes, race, gender, and poverty in the Uni•ed States.
they s↑opped ↑「eatment for their own ailments if one Source: Meniivar 2011.
Research by Edna Viruell-Fuentes (2007), however, challenges these find-

ings on acculturation. Viruell-Fuentes acknowledges that Mexican immi-
grants often have better health outcomes than Mexican Americans; yet, she
argues this is because Mexican Americans are more attuned to racial discrim-
ination in the United States and that this discrimination leads to stress, which
has negative effects on their health. Viruell-Fuentes's interviews with Mexican
immigrants and Mexican Americans shed light on the differences between
these two groups. Mexican immigrants are likely to live in ethnic enclaves,
where they have few interactions with non-Mexicans and thus are less likely
to experience discrimination. In contrast, Mexican Americans experience
persistent discrimination, exclusion, and “ othering” beginning in elementary
school. Mexican Americans recounted to Viruell-Fuentes that they grew up
feeling angry about being excluded by white Americans. 古1is exclusion was
E× plaining Health Disparities by Race and E• hnicity Today 359
alienating and psychologically straining. Viruell-Fuentes argues that these

stressors-not acculturation-can explain why Mexican Americans have
worse health outcomes than Mexican immigrants.
Most of the research on acculturation and health has focused on Latinos.
However, there may be similar pa忧erns for other groups. A recent study (Al
Dahir et al. 2013) investigated the relationship between acc此u时ion and dia-
betes risk among Arab Americans in southeastern Louisiana-a group that
has higher than average rates of diabetes and other chronic diseases.τhe find-
ings were mixed: men who were less acculturated to U.S. society had lower
risk for diabetes, whereas women who were less acculturated had a higher risk.
Across groups, immigrants tend to have worse health outcomes the longer
they stay in the United States. Research continues on why this is-and how to
change it (Oza-Frank, Stephenson, and Na町an 2011).
Genetics, Race，。nd Health

Although most social scientists accept that there is no biological basis for
dividing humans into distinct racial groups, it can be hard to fully divorce our-
selves from the idea that there are races and that they are distinct. Some med-
ical researchers continue to hunt for genetic explanations for racial disparities
in disease rates. One example is the Genetics of Asthma Lab, which studies
the interplay between genes and the environment to determine the causes of
asthma. It is certainly true that black and Latino children are more likely to
suffer from asthma than white children. Most scholars, however, would attri-
bute that disparity to the fact that black and Latino children are more likely to
live in highly polluted areas. A 2007 report entitled Toxic Wastes and Race at
Twenty-1987一2007: Gγassγoats Struggles to Dismantle Environmental Racism
in the United States (Bullard 2007) used 2000 census data and databases of
hazardous waste facilities to find out if there were racial disparities in the loca-
tion of toxic waste facilities. ’The authors discovered that “ people of color make
up the majority of those living in neighborhoods within two miles of hazard-
ous waste facilities, and toxic neighborhoods have twice the percentage of
minorities as nontoxic neighborhoods.” Despite substantial evidence linking
asthma and unhealthy air, some scientists insist on searching for genetic expla-
nations for these and other disparities. What could their motive be?
A primary motive for seeking genetic explanations is profit potential. If dis-
eases have genetic causes, corporations can design personalized medicine to
cure them. In contrast, no profit is to be found in addressing deep structural
inequalities that contribute to health disparities. In Fatal Invention, Dorothy
Roberts (2012) explains how race is increasingly being used as a proxy for
360 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalit ies, Env ironmen • al Rac ism, a nd Env iro nme n• a l Justice
genetics to explain health disparities. Rather than blame structural inequality

for poor health outcomes among people of color, researchers point to race and
genetics.
Myths that “ black ” diseases exist may also motivate some researchers to seek
genetic explanations for racial disparities in health. Many people, for example,
believe that sickle cell disease is a black disease, but this is not true. Sickle cell
disease is common wherever malaria is common. 咀1us, you can find sickle cell
disease in parts of Africa as well as in parts of Europe, Oceania, India, and the
Middle East-all regions where malaria is common (Figure 12之） . In contrast,
large swaths of Africa are unaffected by both malaria and sickle cell disease. If
doctors were to look for sickle cell disease only in black patients, theywould risk
the lives of many other patients who also are vulnerable to the disease. Sickle
cell disease is more common among African Americans than other groups in
the United States because the ancestors of many African Americans were from
parts of Africa where malaria is common. African Americans whose ancestors
came from other parts of Africa, however, are at much lower risk of sickle cell
disease than people from Saudi Arabia, where malaria is also common.
FIGURE 12-2.
In terms of health outcomes, race is o丘en used as a stand-in for a more pre-
Frequency of Sickle Cell
Gene in the World cise genetic explanation. For example, if researchers find that a certain glau-
Source: Malaria Atlas Project (2013). coma drug works better for blacks, the most likely explanation is that the drug
、
、．
‘民幢’比，
‘ .
Frequency of Sickle Cell 、
Gene in the World

HbS allele frequency (0/o )
0 .18
0 .15
0 .12
0 .09
0 .06
Okm 2500
0 .03
0 O miles 2500
Environ men • al Racism 361
actually works better for people with dark eyes and thus could be harmful for
blacks with light eyes. Or a drug found to require a low dose for Asians could be
related to weight, not to Asian ancestry. When scientists find that drugs work
better for some races than for others, or in different doses depending on race,
these racial explanations are most likely explained by another factor. Racial
dosing and racial prescribing are imprecise and potentially harmful because
race is always a stand-in for a better explanation (Roberts 2012).
ENVIR。 NMENTAL RACISM

As discussed earlier, African Americans and Latinos are more likely to live in
neighborhoods where they have less access to fresh produce, parks, jogging
trails, and healthy foods. In addition, people of color and poor people are also
more likely to live close to places that can directly damage their health-toxic
waste dumps, highly polluted freeways, and other environmental hazards. In
this way, health disparities can be linked directly to environmental racism: environmental
institutional policies and practices that differentially affect the health out- racism Institutional
comes or living conditions of people and communities based on race or color. policies and practices that
The disparities between the living conditions of white and nonwhite commu- differentially affect the
nities are clear. health outcomes or living
In the United States, poor people and people of color are more likely to be conditions of people and
exposed to environmental hazards. Black children are five times more likely communities based on
than white children to have lead poisoning. More than 68 percent of African race or color.
Americans live within thirty miles of a coal-fired power plant, compared with
56 percent of white Americans. In 2000, neighborhoods with hazardous waste
facilities were, on average, 56 percent nonwhite, and neighborhoods without
such facilities were 30 percent nonwhite. In the southeastern region of the
United States-the area once dominated by slaves and slaveowners-three out
of four of the largest hazardous waste land岳lls can be found in majority-black
areas (Checker 2006). Commercial hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities sited between 1966 and 1955 were placed in locations that
were disproportionately poor and nonwhite at the time of siting; not surpris-
ingly, those neighborhoods have become poorer and more nonwhite over time
(Mohai and Saha 2015). As shown in Figure 12-3, neighborhoods with hazard-
ous waste facilities-called host areas-have, on average, higher percentages
of people of color than nonhost areas.
卫1e placement of hazardous waste facilities affects community health.τhe
lack of basic plumbing also has serious consequences and renders communities
vulnerabletoahostofdiseases.In 1950, 27percentofhousesin the United States
362 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalit ies, Env ironmen • al Rac ism, a nd Envi 「o n me n• a l Justice
90°/o
Areas with hazardous waste facilities
80°/o
Areas without hazardous waste facilities
70°/o
"'-
.2 60°/o
0
u
FIGURE 12-3. 崎－－
0
。 50°/o
Percentages of People of a.
0
Color Living in Q)
A忏
nUc//
a.
HCO』
3
Neighborhoods with and
Without Toxic Waste
Q nL
φ
Facilities, in States with 30°/o

the Largest Discrepancies
Reprinted, by permission,
20°/o
from Toxic Wastes and Race at
Twenty 1987-2007: A Report
Prepared for the United Church
10°/o
of Christ Justice & Witness
Ministries - www.ucc.org/
0°/o
environmental ” ministries toxic-
waste ♂0. Figure 4.3 Copyright
© March 2007 by the United
Church of Christ. All rights
reserved.
lacked complete plumbing facilities. By 2000, this percentage had dropped to

0.64 percent-a great improvement. However, nearly 700,000 households,
representing 1.7 million people in the United States, continued to live with-
out complete plumbing facilities in 2000, and a half a million households in
2014 still w盯 withou lun灿1g (Byrr 2015). The lack of plumbing contin-
ues to disproportionately affect nonwhites. In 2000, 0.47 percent of whites
lived without plumbing, compared with 1.1 percent of blacks; 1.47 percent
of Hispanics; and 4.41 percent of American Indians and Alaska Natives,
primarily concentrated on reservations (Rural Community Assistance
Partnership n.d.).
Faced with these disparities, communities around the United States have
fought to have their communities cleaned up and to gain better access to clean
air, wat问 and soil. 币1ese struggles can be contentious, and the possible out-
comes are not always clear. What does a community do when it realizes that
a toxic waste dump is in its backyard? Should everyone leave ？ τhey can’t, in
good conscience, sell their properties, so are they stuck? As profiled in the 且rst
Voices box in this chapter, the struggles of the Holt family in Dickson, Tennes-
see, put a human face on widespread environmental injustices.
Enviro nme nta l Justice 363
ENVIR。 NMENTAL JUSTICE

The movement for environmental justice focuses on the right to live in non- environmental justice
toxic neighborhoods. Many scholars locate the beginning of the environmen- Efforts to ensure the
tal justice movement in the 1980s, when primarily nonwhite communities right to live in nontoxic
began to come together and insist on their right to live in nontoxic neighbor- neighborhoods, regardless
hoods. Melissa Checker (2006) traces this activism back to earlier struggles of race.
to get city services in low-income and primarily black communities. Dorceta
Ta泸or (2009) agrees and argues that blacks ’ fights for lead screening, Chicano
and Filipino struggles against the use of pesticides in agriculture, and Native
Americans' battles for fishing rights in the 1950s and 1960s are all part of the
movement for environmental justice. Environmental justice movements fight
for causes ranging from the creation of parks and open spaces to clean-up
efforts by toxic waste producers to clean air and water and other initiatives to
improve the health and quality of life in neighborhoods.
The Holt Family of Dickson, Tennessee

....................................................................................................... ..............
Dickson, Tennessee, is a town of 12,244 located about thirty-five miles west of

Nashville. In 1946, the city of Dickson purchased seventy-four acres of land to be
the city’s open, unlined dump. In 1964, the Scovill-Schrader automotive company
opened a plant that manufactures automotive tire valves and gauges, producing a
large amount of hazardous waste. It is no coincidence that both of these hazardous .
waste sites were opened in the primarily black neighborhood of Eno Road. Dickson
County covers nearly 500 square miles. In 2000, the town was only 4.5 percent
African American. However, the only cluster of solid waste facilities in the county is
located in the Eno Road community.
In 1988, government 。而cials discovered trichloroethylene (TCE)-a suspected
carcinogen-in a well that belonged to a black family, the Holts, who lived just
fifty-four feet from the Dickson County Landfill. However, government o伍cials told
the family that they could continue drinking the water. A couple of years later, similar
levels were found in a white family ’s well, and they were told not to drink the water.
By 2000, every member of the Holt family had health problems, including various
forms of cancer. In that same year, the Holt family well was retested. This time,
Environmental Protection Agency o伍cials found twenty-four times the recom-
mended amount of TCE in the Holt family's drinking water. At that point, the family
was given access to city drinking water-years after white families had been provided
with that option.
(conti·叽.ued)
Co饥.tinued In 2008, the Holt family filed a lawsuit against the Dickson City and
Dickson County governments, seeking redress for the harm inflicted on
(/) their family by the contaminated water and racial discrimination. In 2011,
the family reached a settlement with the city and county governments for
over $5 million. In addition, they were awarded a $1.75 million settlement
. for racial discrimination, since the county had responded to complaints by
white residents but not by black residents.
This type of legal victory is relatively rare, as it can be hard to prove that
disparities are the result of racial discrimination. Despite the difficulties
involved in bringing lawsuits, movements for environmental justice have
sprung up around the country.
Source: Bullard 2007, 2012.
……………................. . ..................... . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . ... . .... .. .. . . . .... ... ... . . . ..
Melissa Checker (2006) conducted an in-depth study of Hyde Pa也 a black

community near Augusta, Georgia, that has long struggled for environmental
justice. In 1970, Hyde Park residents won a two-year struggle to get sewage,
paved roads, and running water in their community. In many ways, this was
both an environmental battle and a battle against racism, as the conditions in
the neighborhood during heavy rains were toxic, and the white neighborhoods
had long had adequate city services.
In Hyde Park, the struggle for environmental justice is clearly linked to the
fight for civil rights. In the late 1960s, Hyde Park residents formed an organi-
zation called the Hyde and Aragon Park Improvement Committee (HAPIC)
to fight for better services for their neighborhood. 咀1is same organization
survived over many decades and evolved into a movement for environmental
justice during the 1990s, when it became clear that many of the nearby facto-
ries were emi忧ing toxic chemicals and poisoning the community. Residents of
Hyde Park became increasingly incensed as a junkyard in their neighborhood
continued to expand-at times practically into their backyards-and when
dust from a ceramics factory le丘 white powder sprinkled on their cars and
smelly waters filled their ditches during heavy rains.
Residents began to tie these environmental hazards to high rates of disease
and death in their small community of 250 people. For Hyde Park residents,
the environmental hazards were evident in the fact that whereas they once
were able to grow bountiful gardens, their plots became less productive a丘er
the factories and junkyards moved in. In 1991, researchers from the Univer-
sity of Georgia confirmed their suspicions when they found elevated levels of
Enviro nme nta l Justice 365
A Residents of Hyde Park

near Augusta, Georgia,
faced a long struggle for
arsenic and chromium in the local soil and produce and warned residents not environmental justice as
to eat the produce from their gardens. factories and junkyards
Around that same time, residents of the neighboring Virginia subdivision polluted their community.
filed a lawsuit against Southern Wood Piedmont-the local wood-processing
plant-for contamination. Although the neighborhoods are very close and the
same water travels between them, the primarily white residents of the Virginia
subdivision did not include Hyde Park residents in their lawsuit.
Hyde Park residents decided to file their own lawsuit in 1991. When the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) tested the air, water, and soil in Hyde
Park, they found weak evidence of contamination. However, when HAPIC
commissioned its own studies, a neuropsychologist found a high degree of
neurological abnormalities among residents, and a dermatologist found a high
rate of arsenical keratosis. For Hyde Park residents, it was clear that they had
a high number of health issues and that their neighborhoods were toxic and
filled with smelly air and water. EPA testers, however, were unable to find con-
clusive evidence of a connection between contamination and their illnesses. In
all, Hyde Park residents filed three separate lawsuits between 1991 and 1995.
One was dismissed, and 岳丘een years later, the other two were still pending.
At the end of the twentieth century, Hyde Park residents were finally able to
secure government grants to clean up the toxic waste near their neighborhood
and to clear out a junkyard. 卫1e struggle for a clean environment, however,
continues ( Cl肌ker 2006).
How is the fight for environmental justice in Hyde Park tied to race? Many of
the residents of Hyde Park interpret their experiences through a racial lens: the
failure of the local, state, and federal governments to respond to their need is
part of a history of exclusion that African Americans have faced since slavery.
Additionally, African Americans are more likely to live in toxic neighborhoods

than whites-meaning that we can tie their plight to structural racism in the
United States insofar as environmental rules, laws, and policies reproduce his-
torical racial disparities.
咀1e struggle in Hyde Park is decidedly local: residents of this Georgia com-
munity experienced the direct effects of the emission of toxins by industrial
facilities that were right in their community.τhey won a small victory when
some of the toxic waste was cleaned up. But where did that waste go? It is con-
ceivable that it went to another country. Ninety percent of the hazardous waste
in the world is produced in industrialized nations such as the United States,
Japan, and European countries. Much of it is eventually shipped to Latin
America, the Caribbean, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa. In some cases,
environmental clean-up in the United States can have detrimental effects on
poor countries that accept the hazardous waste in exchange for much-needed
cash (Pellow 2007).
τhe United States has only S percent of the world ’s population, yet generates
19 percent of the world ’s waste.τhe waste output of residents of the United
States is the highest in the world (Pellow 2007). Within the United States,
there is continued controversy over what to do with the waste. One solution is
to incinerate it. However, this produces incinerator ashes, which also must be
disposed of.
In 1986, the mayor of Philadelphia found himselfwith 15,000 tons of inciner-
ator ash, and nowhere to dump it. Local environmental activists had succeeded
in closing the Kinsley landfill, and Philadelphia found itself with tons of ash.
咀1e city contracted a local company to get rid of the ash, which in turn handed it
over to Amalgamated Shipping, a company headquartered in the Bahamas. 咀1e
shipping company loaded the ashes onto the I(hian Sea, and the ship set sail for
the Bahamas on September S, 1986. However, officials in the Bahamas refused
to accept the toxic waste, which then traveled to the Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Guinea-Bissau, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, and the Dutch Antilles. Each
port refused to accept the waste. Finally, in December 1987, the boat landed at
Gonaives, Haiti, where the captain was able to work out an agreement with the
military regime, in part because he told them the ash was fertilizer. The crew
succeeded in unloading 3,700 tons of ash onto the beach before local activists
and authorities became suspicious and were able to stop the dumping. 咀1e ship
le丘 Haiti, leaving the ashes on the beach. The I(hian Sea continued its journey,
unable to get rid of the remaining waste . 刀1e ship's captain later admitted he
dumped the ashes in the middle of the Indian Ocean several months later. But,
the 3,700 tons of ash dumped on the beaches of Gonaives still remained. It took
Enviro nm e nta l Jus tice 367
years of local and international activism until the toxic ash was finally removed
from Haiti in April 2000.
The story of the I(hian Sea is part of a story of global environmental i时us
tice. Wealthier countries consume more resources than poorer ones and thus
produce more waste. 咀1is global inequality is exacerbated when wealthy coun-
tries dump their waste in poorer countries.τhese inequalities are also drawn
along racial lines: western European countries and the United States a忧empt
to dump their waste in Africa and the Caribbean.
The Flint ater Crisis

.. . . . . . ... .. . ... . ........ . . . .. . ... . ..... . . . .... . ...... . ..... . ...... . ........ . . . ...... . ..... . . . .... . ..................
In March 2016, the Flint

Water Advisory Task 司λ匾
Force Report found that
the residents of Flint,
Michigan, a majority-black .
and overwhelmingly poor
city, had been exposed to
environmental and health
hazards due to water-supply
decisions made by city
officials. The report also
showed that these decisions Residents of Flint pick t1p bottled water and water
were made with outright filters from Red Cross disaster relief volunteers.
disregard for the lives and
health of the residents of Flint, Michigan.
For nearly five decades, Flint had obtained clean drinking water fron1 Lake
Huron, the third largest body of fresh water in the world. Beginning in June 2012,
however, in an effort to save money, Flint city officials began to seek out alternative
water sources. At the time, Flint was on the verge of financial collapse, and the city
was being run by a governor-appointed emergency manager, Darnell Earley. City o岳－
cials calculated that Flint could save $200 million over twenty-five years if it built its
own pipeline to derive water from the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). However,
by 2014, it became clear that the transition to the KWA would be delayed. 。面cials
then decided to connect a temporary pipeline to obtain water from the Flint River,
beginning in April 2014.
(co乱.tinued)
368 CHAPTER 12 Hea l• h Inequalit ies, Env ironmen • al Racism, and Envi 「on men • a l Justice
Co饥.tinued City o伍cials received advice that they should add an anticorrosive ele-
ment to the water, but they decided not to do this because it would cost $100
(/) a day二 The Flint River water was highly corrosive, however, and shortly after
the switch to it, residents began to complain about the water’s smell and
color. In August 2014, test of the water revealed the presence of E. coli and
. total coliform bacteria. Residents were advised to boil their water before
consuming it. They began to complain of skin rashes and hair loss, among
other issues, as they became ill due to the water. City officials ignored nearly
all complaints. In fall 2014, only one complaint was finally answered-that
of General Motors.
The owners of the General Motors factory in Flint had become concerned
about the water quality, as it was causing their car parts to corrode. In
Oct ober 2014, they complained to Governor Rick Snyder, who used
$440,000 of state funds to reconnect the factory to the Lake Huron
pipeline. Nevertheless, the other residents of Flint remained connected to
the contaminated Flint River water.
In January 2015, Flint was found to be in violation of the Safe Drinking
Water Act. A month later, the water was found to contain extremely high
levels of lead, a highly toxic element. In September, a local study reported
that following the switch to the Flint River water, twice as many children
under the age of five had elevated levels of lead in their blood.
In October 2015, Flint switched back to the Lake Huron water supply,
but the corroded, lead-tainted pipes were still in use. One year later, in 2016,
many residents continued to distrust the city’s government and to doubt the
water’s safety. Two years later, in 2017, Flint still did not have clean water.
Sources: Bosman, Davey, and Smith 2016; Kennedy 2016; New Yo忱 Times 2016;
Sanburn 2017.
…… … … … … . . . ... ... . . .... .. . ... . . ... . .... . . . . . .... . ..... .. ... . . . .... . . . ... ... . . ..... . . ... ..... . . ..
During slavery, medical professionals had no qualms about using slaves as

involuntary subjects in medical experiments. We no longer live in such brutal
times, but we can’t ignore our legacy. One hundred and fi丘y years a丘er the
abolition of slavery, whites continue to receive better medical care than blacks.
Moreover, it is hard to say that white and black lives are equally valued when
black life expectancy continues to be years lower than that of whites.
卫1e ability to breathe clean air, eat healthy food, have access to good medical
care, and spend time outside in green spaces all lead to better health outcomes.
In this way, the movement for environmental justice is intimately tied to the
fight against health disparities.
Outright disregard for people of color informed the decisions made by
industry and local leaders in the early twentieth century to place toxic waste
facilities in primarily nonwhite neighborhoods.τhese same sentiments meant
that nonwhite neighborhoods and towns were o丘en the last to receive sewage
infrastructure and piped water in their homes. By 2000, most communities
had clean wate马 but nonwhite households continue to be the most likely to
lack basic services.
Social scientists and public health scholars have provided the data we need
to see the persistence of these disparities. These scientific studies leave little
room for doubt that white Americans, on average, have better access to clean
air and water and healthy communities than do nonwhite Americans. People
of color in the United States and around the world are the most likely to have to
contend with the health and environmental consequences of toxic dumping.
How do we explain these disparities? In each chapter, we have seen how
racial ideologies help explain and justify inequalities. When looking at health
and the environment, we can also uncover ideologies that serve this purpose,
such as the misconception that African Americans are not interested in healthy
eating and exercise. Such ideologies blame African Americans for their high
prevalence of heart disease and diabetes while overlooking the structural rea-
sons for health disparities, such as the lack of fresh vegetables and safe places
to exercise in black neighborhoods.
One of the United States’ core values is the right of everyone to have an
equal opportunity to flourish. How does the ideology of equal opportunity
coexist with the reality that nonwhites have less access than whites to educa-
tion, to jobs, and to services and circumstances that promote health? How is
this discord related to racial ideologies?
Key Terms
Nuremberg Code 348 weathering hypothesis 356 environmental racism 361
life-course perspective 356 Hispanic Paradox 357 environmental justice 363
cumulative disadvantage acculturation 357
perspective 356
370 CHAPTER 12 Hea lth Inequa lities, Environmenta l Racism, and Environmenta l Jus • ice
12.1 What is the racial history of health disparities in the United States?
(pp. 345-348)
• During and even following slavery, African Americans were subjected to involun-
tary experimentation that was o丘en brutal and had no therapeutic effects.

” What is involuntary experimentation? > Why is it important to understand the history of
> Why was the Nuremberg code important? health i叫ustice in the United States?
> What factors led doctors to conduct cruel
experiments on African Americans?
12.2 How do health disparities in the United States today vary by race and
ethnicity? (pp. 348-361)
• African Americans have lower life expectancies than whites, and racial disparities
in health can be found from the womb to the deathbed. Many of these disparities
are due to structural and individual-level discrimination.

沙 Describe the differences in infant mortality > How does our understanding of health dis par-
rates for black and white women. ities change when we take into account both
> How are health disparities related to race and socioeconomic status?
segregation? > Is segregation at the root of health disparities?
” 飞!\Thy has diabetes become a problem for Native Or are there more deeply rooted causes?
Americans? Explain your position.
> How can racial discrimination affect health? > What role do you think acculturation plays in
扮飞!\That is a life-course perspective on health explaining the Hispanic Paradox?
disparities?
” What is the Hispanic Paradox?
12.3 What are the effects of environmental racism? (pp. 361-362)

• Black and Latino neighborhoods are more likely to host toxic waste facilities
than white neighborhoods. These facilities have negative health outcomes for the
residents.

> How prevalent is environmental racism? > What are some reasons that genetic explana-
tions for health disparities may be problematic?
12.4 What are some community movements for environmental justice?

(pp. 363-368)
．咀1e fight for clean neighborhoods has come to be called the environmental justice
日1ovement.

> How did the environmental justice movement > How is the fight against toxins in Hyde Park
get started? related to race and racism?
Fα：lki：η~g α：bout Rα，ce

In light of this chapter’s data on racial disparities in health outcomes,
consider the findings most relevant to your own experiences. What
information in this chapter could you draw from to have a conversation
about health disparities and environmental racism in your community?
For example, does your family live in a neighborhood with access to
healthy food and green spaces? What structural explanations might
explain why or why not? How are racial ideologies used to explain per-
sistent health disparities?
Homeless. Dane Cl1a11ase. 1930. Oil 011 panel, 72 × 48 i11. (Photog·ruph by }.![e1噜edith Ke.ffer, courtes_y <~[Beve1切 Sαck·s Fine Art Inc.)
.
Chapter 。utline
/
. voices Rober• Bau•ista - Denied Due
Process 376
The Racialized History of U.S.
Immigration Policy 378
. . Race and the Making of U.S.

Immigration Policies: 1790 to
1924 379
Global View Whitening and
Immigration Policy in B「αzil 381
. Nativism Between l 924 and l 964:
Mass Deportation of Mexicans
。nd the McCarran Internal
Security Act 3 82
The l 965 Immigration and
Nationality Act and the Changing
Face of lmmigra •ion 384
Latin American and Caribbean
Immigration 390
Illegal Immigration and Policy
Response 394
The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (!RCA) and
Notivism 394
Proposition l 87 and the Lead-Up to
/JR肌L\ 396
The l 996 Laws and the Deter廿ion

and Deportation of Black and
As y。u Reαd Latino Immigrants 398
13.1 How does the history of U.S. immigration policy reflect racism voices Hector, a Guatemalan
Depor•ee 400
and nativism?
Immigration Policy and Nativism in
13.2 How has U.S. policy responded to undocu1nented immigration? the Twenty-First Century 404
13.3 What is the relationship between nativism and racism in the
v。ices The Zarou 「 Fami ly 407
twenty-first century?
Thinking about Race 41 1
374 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nativi sm, and Imm q 「at i on Po li cy
Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR)-which the United States has ratified-sta尤es,
“[T]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the state.” It further states
that all men and women have the right “ to marry and to found a
AND
family.” Because the United States has ratified this covenant, we l1ave
a responsibility to uphold these principles. Immigration law, however,
is often at odds with the human right to have a family. The story of
Ramon and Lupita illust1~ates how U.S. immig1~ation policy can tear
families apart.
am6n and Lupita met in California in 1995. 咀1ey were both originally from
Mexico City, and both had migrated to California as young adults in search
of work. Ramon arrived in California in the early 1980s as an undocumented
immigrant, and in 1986, he applied to become a lawful permanent US resident
through the IRCA amnesty program. Lupita came to the United States without
papers in 1992, a丘er the amnesty program had ended.
When Ramon and Lupita got married in the late 1990s, Ramon could have
filed a petition for Lupita’s lawful residency then. But the wait for such a process
was long-about four years at the time-and a new law, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, had made the pro-
cess more difficult. Lupita and Ramon were afraid they might be separated if they
filed, and they decided to wait and hope for another change in law, maybe even
another amnesty program, that would allow Lupita to change her status without
risking separation from Ramon.
Over the course of the next ten years, Ramon and Lupita lived in California as a
mixed-status family, and they had three US citizen children together-all boys. In
2005, they moved to Chicago and bought a house on the city’s south side.τhen, in
2008, Ramon became a US citizen. Because he was now a US citizen, the process
forge忧ing Lupita’s residency would be much shorter. And with no immigration
reform on the horizon, they decided to stop waiting and apply to change Lupita’S
immigration status.
Ramon and Lupita consulted with an a忧orney and began filing the paperwork
and paying the fees they would need for Lupita’s application for a “ green card,"
or immigrant visa that confers lawful residency. First, Ramon filed a “ family
CHAPTER 13 Racism, Na • ivism, and Immigration Policy 375
petition,” which would make Lupita eligible to apply for a green card based on
their marriage. A丘er that petition was approved, Lupita received a notice in
the mail with the date and time of an interview with a US Department of State
official. Because Lupita is a Mexican citizen and she had never legally entered
the United States, her interview was scheduled at the US consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico.
The week before Lupita’s interview, on a warm June day in 2011, Ramon,
Lupita, and their three sons drove to 0 ’ Hare airport, where Lupita boarded
a plane headed for Ciudad Juarez. Lupita had to get a physical examination in
Juarez, and then have her fingerprints taken before the day of the interview.
On the morning of her interview, Lupita arrived at the US consulate in Juarez
early二咀1ere were hundreds of people already lined up outside, most of them
clutching thick files of paperwork. Lupita entered the consulate with her own
thick file, was handed a number, and then sat down to wait for her turn to speak
with an agent.
When Lupita’s number was called, she walked up to a long countertop,
where an official was seated behind a thick pane of glass. Lupita slid her file
under the glass and explained that she had come to the United States nearly
twenty years earlier. Now that she had a US citizen husband and three US cit-
izen children, she told him, she hoped she could change her status.τhe agent
reviewed Lupita’s paperwork, then informed her that her application for a green
card was denied; in fact, he said, she would not be able to return to the United
States at all. “ For how long?” she asked him. “ Ninety-nine,” answered the o币，
cer. “ Ninety-nine what ?” Lupita asked. “ Ninety-nine years. ” Stunned, Lupita
left the consulate to call Ramon and break the news. When I met Ramon and
the three boys at their Chicago home a month later, they were still in shock-
reeling from the blow of Lupita's unexpected banishment and unsure how to
move forward.
Source: Gombeγg-Mu仇。z in Golash-Boza 2018, 67-68.
Lupita is one of thousands of people barred annually from returning to the

United States, where her family lives. Lupita’s application was denied because
she had returned once to Mexico and reentered illegally. As her case shows,
U.S. immigration policy is o丘en harsh and unforgiving. Today, as in the past,
the country’s punitive immigration policies primarily affect people who are
considered nonwhite.
376 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nativism, and Imm ig 「ation Po licy
咀1is chapter examines the history of immigration policy in the United States
and the extent to which racist and nativist sentiments have played a role in
this policy and legislation. Although U.S. immigration policy has shi丘ed dra-
matically over the years, two trends have remained constant: ( 1) nativism has
always been an integral part of policy debates, and (2) the policy and its con-
sequences have been more disadvantageous to people considered nonwhite
than to those considered white. 认That has changed over time is the removal of
explicitly discriminatory language from U.S. immigration laws. Here we will
consider the racially disparate consequences of immigration laws and policies.
Robert Bautista- Denied Due Process

……………………… … …… . . . ...... . . . . . ..................... . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ..... . ........ . .
In 2009, immigration agents arrested Robert Bautista as he was returning
from vacation in the Dominican Republic, his country of birth. Once arrested,
Mr. Bautista was placed in detention without the possibility of a bond hearing.
He had been a legal permanent resident of the United States for twenty-five years,
had been married for over a decade, had three school-age children, and was the
. owner of a successful business in Pennsylvania. His mandatory detention caused his
business to be destroyed and his family to lose their home. His wife, a U.S. citizen,
visits Mr. Bautista every week at York County Prison, often bringing the children
with her. Their children, all of whom are U.S. citizens, must bear witness to their
father being treated as if he were a criminal, but without the procedural protections
normally accorded to people charged with crimes.
Mr. Bautista's two years in immigration detention are not pursuant to any
criminal convictions. In 2002, M1~. Bautista was found guilty of third-deg1~ee
attempted arson for carrying a container of gasoline near his own vehicle and was
sentenced to five years of probation. By 2009, he had completed his probation.
When immigration agents arrested and detained him, it was not because he was
charged with a crime. Instead, he was detained because he faced deportation and
was not eligible for a bond hearing.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained Robert Bautista on the
grounds that his 2002 conviction of third-degree attempted arson was a crime
involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Because of this prior conviction, Mr. Bautista was
considered to be seeking admission to the United States, as if he were not present in
the country and as if he had not been living and working lawfully in the country for
over two decades. As a person not technically inside the United States, Mr. Bautista
was not protected by the Constitution. 认Tith a record of a CIMT, Mr. Bautista could
still seek out cancellation of removal: his deportation order could be rescinded.
CHAPTER 13 Rac ism, N at iv ism, a nd I mmig 「αt i on Policy 377
Just one hour b efore his hearing, however, DHS made an additio11al
argt1ment: that tl1ird-degree attempted arson is also an aggravated felony,
n1eaning that Mr. Bautist a would be subject to mandatory det ention and <
deportation without jt1dicial review.
。
。。ω
Mr. Bautista's lawyer, Raymond Lahoud, contest ed this classification, as .......
no previous case of tl1ird-degree atte1npted arson had been declared to be an

aggravated felony. If Mr. Bautista could win the argument that 让 was not, an
in1migration judge would have tl1e cl1ance to hear the equ让ies in his case. But
in an aggravated felony case, it does 11ot matter if you have lived in the United
States for three decades, ifyou have three children, if' you have no relatives
in your cot1ntry of origin, or if yot1r family depends on you for their SUI飞rival.
Noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies are not given a fair and reasonable
hearing of the sort that would meet international human rights standards.
In Octob er 2011, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) heard
Mr. Bautista's case and decided that third-degree attempted arson is an
aggravat ed felony. This det ermination m eans that Mr. Bat1tista could
not challenge his deportation on the basis of his ties to t he United States.
Inst ead, he faced 1nandatory deportation t o the Dominica n R epublic,
where he would b e labeled a criminal dep ortee and face a bleak future. The
Dominican government treats arriving criminal deportees as if they are
criminals. They are b ooked at the city jail, and their d eportation is recorded
on their crin1inal record, n1aking it nearly impossible to secure employm ent.
If Mr. Bautista had been afforded the due process protections we give to
cri1ninals, he would l1ave had a bond heari11g and likely wot1ld not have been
detained for over two years. Inst ead , he vvould have had the opportt1nity for
a trial in which a jt1dge could weigh the equities in l1is case, and he may have
been eligible for a public defender. Mr. Bautista was fortunate that a lawyer
decided to take his case pro bono. W让h tl1e help of this lawyer, in February
2014, in an a1Jpeals case, the U.S. Third Circt1it Court of Appeals found that
third-degree atten1pted arson is not an aggravated felony, thereby overtu rning
the BIA decision and permitting Bautista to apply for cancellation of ren1oval.
Sot1rce: Golash-Boza 2 012； βαtltista v. Attorney Gen,eral ofth,e United States,

No. A038-509-855 (3rd Cir. LAR 34.1也） Se1)te111ber 20, 2012).
… · . .……·.... . ..... . .. . .……·.... . . .…...…·...... . ……·.... .. ……....……·.......... . .. . ...
As Robert Bautista's story in the Voices sidebar makes clear, U.S. immigra-
tion policy can be draconian-even long-term legal residents can have their
rights stripped away for minor transgressions. In this chapter, we explore both
the history of U.S . immigration policy and present-day laws and policies. 币1is
378 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nativism, and l mmig 「ation Po licy
historical overview shows that immigration policy is severe in targeting people

defined as outsiders to the nation. Lawmakers consistently have used immi-
gration policy to influence the racial and ethnic makeup of the nation. In this
nativism The presumed process, racism has o丘en become indistinguishable from nativism, which pre-
supe1·iority of native-born sumes the superiority of native-born citizens.
citizens, favoring the Immigration policy continues to be at the forefront of the political agenda in
allocation of resources the United States today. It is hard to imagine a time when the country had no
to them over immigrants immigration policy, yet just one hundred years ago, there was no Border Patrol,
and promoting a fear of and passports and visas were not required for entry to the United States. When
foreign cultures. the United States began to pass immigration laws governing the entry and res-
idency conditions of the foreign-born at the end of the nineteenth century, the
laws were overtly racialized and expressed a clear preference for people from
northern and western Europe.
THE RACIALIZED HIST。 RY 。 F

U.S. IMMIGRATI 。 N P。 LICY
The history of U.S. immigration policy is a reflection of societal racism
and nativism. Whereas racism presumes the superiority of a racial group,
nativism favors the allocation of resources to native-born citizens over
immigrants and promotes a fear of foreign cultures. As various scholars
have noted (e.g., Sanchez 1997j Johnson 2004j Lippard 2011), racist nativ-
ism is a prominent feature of contemporary American society: the fear of
foreigners is clearly racialized, and nativist sentiments are directed at par-
ticular racial groups, such as Mexicans and people from the Middle East.
Through an examination of the history of immigration policy and nativist
responses to immigration, we will see how nativism and racism have been
intertwined in U.S. history and how nativism today is distinct from that of
the past.
U.S. Immigration and Deportation Policy

1790 I 1882 I 1924 I 1924 I 1924 1942-1964 I 1943
。
Naturalization Cl1i11ese Immigration Act Oriental C1·eation of Brace1·。 Repeal of
Law I Exclusion Act I (Johnson-ReedAct) Exclusion Act Border Patrol program Chinese
Exclusion Act
The Racia lized Histo 「y of U.S. Immigration Policy 379
Race and the Mαking of U.S. lmmigrati。n p。licies: 1790 t。 1924

币1e United States was a sovereign nation for a full century before immigration
restrictions became a subject of political debate, let alone law. Although the
country did not begin to pass immigration laws until the late 1800s, Congress
passed an important piece of legislation in 1790 related to people born abroad.
亚1e Naturalization Law of 1790, discussed in Chapter Two, was not an immi-
gration policy in that it did not regulate entry. Instead, it stated that only free
white persons who had lived in the United States for at least two years were
eligible for citizenship. 咀1is first piece oflegislation related to the foreign-born
is particularly notable because it contained a racialized provision, defining cit-
izenship as accessible solely to whites. 亚1e purpose of this clause was to deny
citizenship to African-descended slaves, and it was later used to deny Asians
naturalization or the granting of citizenship a丘er birth.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the first major piece of immigration legisla-
tion was the Chinese Exclusion Act, signed into law in 1882. This act denied
entry to one specific group: Chinese laborers. In specifically excluding a
group because of race and class, the Chinese Exclusion Act set the stage for
twentieth-century immigration policy, which had both overt and covert racial
and class biases (Lee 2002). Al tho吨h the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed
in 1943, the court cases that stemmed from it continue to shape how we treat
immigrants today.
An 1893 landmark Supreme Court case, Fong 卫ie Ting v. United States,
involved three Chinese nationals who claimed they deserved constitutional
protections in their deportation cases.τhe court held that the power to deport
noncitizens was inherent in the nature of sovereignty and that constitutional
protections, including the right to a trial by jury, did not apply. 百1is case defined
deportation as simply an administrative procedure and not a punishment. 卫1e
idea of deportation as a nonpunitive action was based on a distinction between
deportation and banishment. Banishment removes a person from a country
1950-1954 I 1965 I 1986 I 1996 I 1996 I 1996 12012

Operation I111migration Im1nigration Anti-Terroris1n Illegal Perso11al Respo11sibility Deferred
Wetback and Reform and and Effective Immigration and Work Opportunity Action for
Nationality Act Control Act Death Penalty Reform and Reconciliation Act Childl1ood
Act (AEDPA) Immigrant (PRWORA) Arrivals
Responsibility (DACA)
Act (IIRIRA)
380 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Na • ivism, and l mmig 「ation Po licy
where he or she belongs, whereas deportation returns a person to where he or

she belongs and thus is not considered punishment. According to the Fong 卫-te
Ting decision, which still holds in court today, deportation is a procedure to
ensure that people abide by the terms of their visas. When they do not, they
face the possibility of being returned to where they belong. It is remarkable
that this court decision, which was made in the context of strong anti-Chinese
sentiment, continues to hold the status of legal precedent today.
The Chinese Exclusion Act was passed in the midst of a great wave of immi-
grants from both Europe and China. In the 1840s, the United States began
to experience large-scale immigration for the first time since its founding.
This influx dramatically changed both the country’s cultural landscape and
its official stance toward immigrants. Between 1841 and 1850, 1.7 million
immigrants ar巾ed in the United States (see Figure 13-1), and in the following
decade, 2.6 million arrived. In 1870, immigrants constituted nearly 14 percent
of the total population. In each subsequent decade until 1924, millions contin-
ued to arrive. Toward the end of this wave of immigrants in the early twentieth
century, the United States began to implement policies governing the entry of
the foreign-born.
In 1924, the U.S. Congress implemented three restrictive 日1easures
that effectively cut off immigration from most countries.τhe first of these
measures was the overtly racialized Immigration Act of 1924, or the
FIGURE 13 -1. 45.0°lo

coz－
45M
Immigrants as Total Immigrants as a percentage of the U.S. population
4
03525
nunununu
WKWKWKW15
ω
Number and as a Number of immigrants

3巳OBω 20£ 右。。而言
40M
Percentage of the
．
U.S. Population, 35M
ωvcgpε
．
1850to 2015
30.0°lo 30M
Source: Migration Policy Institute
(2015).
25M
－3ε』
ω20血而
02ε3Z
20.0°lo 20M
/ >
15M
ω而
ω259εε
10.0°/o 10M
5.0°/o 5M
－
0.0°/o OM
1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Year
丁 he Racia lized His ↑0 「 y of U.S. l mmig 「ation Policy 381
Johnson-Reed Act (Chapter Two), which greatly reduced immigration from Oriental Exclusion Act
southern and eastern Europe by introducing quotas, or limits on the number 1924 l egi sl ati on t h at
of people from these countries allowed to enter the United States. The next expanded t h e Chinese
major piece of immigration legislation was the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act, E xclusi on Act and
which expanded the Chinese Exclusion Act and prohibited most immigration pr ohib ited m ost
from Asia. 卫1e motivation for both of these laws, as explained in Chapter Two, immig r ati on f r om Asi a to
was to improve the racial stock of the United States. The final measure imple- t h e U nited St ates.
mented in 1924 was the creation of the Border Patrol to prevent illegal entry
into the United States.τhese restrictive measures were effective: immigra-
tion dropped drastically and did not pick up again until the 1960s, when the
national origin quotas were expanded and the overtly racial nature of the
immigration laws was rescinded.
After the aboli•ion of slavery in 1888, with a large B「azilian intellectuals accep•ed European ideas of
e×古l ave a 门d f「ee black and mu la 计o population, and white superiority bu↑「ejected the notion that racia l
under •he specter of scie门↑ific racism , •he B「azilian mi×↑U 「e was dege门era ↑ive. They argued that Brazil
govern men• openly promo•ed whi↑e 门i 门9 ↑hrough was becoming a whi •e na•ion through mestizaie-
European immigration . In additio门， the governme 时 racial and cultural mi×↑U 「e Many Brazilian thinkers
paid white immigrants' passage to Brazi l. In the fou 「 embraced •his whi↑e门i 门9 ↑heory, 。s it provided •hem
decades after emancipation, ove 「 2 million Eu 「opean with the ideological framework for their na tio门－bu i ldi门9
immigran•S arrived in Sao Pau lo alone, nea 「ly a million projec• (Eakin 1985). A •• he same time, schola 「S such
of whom had •heir passages paid for by the sta•e as O liveira Vian 门G (1883-1 951), 。 l awyer a 门d his-
govern men• (Andrews 1991, 54). torian, demonst「αted that the wh i•e population was
Des pi•e substantia l European immigration, Brazil inc「easi 门g . Via 门 na compared B 「azil's 1872 and
门eve 「↑ransformed into a white 门。↑i on. North American 1890 censuses a 门d argued that whi •es had i门C「eased
and European i 门↑e l lec↑ua ls lamented Brazil ’s large from 38 to 44 pe陀e门↑ of the B「azil i an population,
门onwhi↑e popu lation and predic•ed a dim future fo「 while blacks had fa llen from 20 pe陀en↑ ↑O under
•he country. I 门 response, Brazilian intellectuals devel- 15 percen•( Skidmore 1993). Through a combination
oped their own ideas of racial progress. This new of European immigration and wh i↑e门 i ng through i 门↑er
ideology put forth •he mulatto as Brazil ’s hope for marriage, Brazilian in•ellectuals in the early •wen •ieth
the futu 「e . Through whi •ening, Brazil would be able cen •ury were confide 门↑ ↑hei 「 coun↑「y would eventua lly
to progress from black to mulatto to white. By the become whi •ened .
early ↑we 门↑ieth century, Brazilian scholars confiden•ly Sources: Andrews 1991: Skidmore 1993: Eakin 1985.
「epo「↑ed that the whiten ing of Brazil was well under
way and that co 门cerns abou↑ inferio 「「acia l elements
could be quelled (Skidmore 1993).
382 CHAPTER 13 Rac ism, Na ti vism, and l mm i g 「ation Po licy
Nativism Between 1924 and 1964: Mass Deportation of Mexicans and

the McCarran Internal Security Act
币1e period between 1924 and 1964 was an exceptional period in U.S. history
in that the country welcomed relatively few immigrants.τhe 1924 measures
significantly curbed the flow of immigrants until the 1965 overhaul of U.S.
immigration laws. These trends are evident in Figure 13-1 and in Figure 13 么
which displays the number of people who attained legal permanent resident
legal permanent resident status by decade. A legal permanent resident is a foreign national who is
A foreign national who granted the right to remain in the United States and who will be eligible for
is granted the right to naturalization a丘er a period of three to five years. To become a U.S. citizen
remain in the United today, a legal permanent resident must have been a permanent resident for at
States and who will be least five years ifhe or she is not married to a U.S. citizen for at least three years
eligible for naturalization ifhe or she is the spouse of a U.S. citizen.τhe applicant must also be a person of
after a period of three to good moral character; have basic knowledge of U.S. history and government;
five years. and, in most cases, be able to read, write, and speak basic English. In addition,
the applicant must pay the filing fees, which were $725 in 2017.
Mexicans have a long history of immigration to the United States. The first
group of Mexicans to enter the United States were not immigrants, however,
but became Americans following the U.S. takeover of large swaths of Mexi-
can land under the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 卫1e first substantial
wave of Mexican immigrants came between 1910 and 1930, when the Mexican
immigrant population tripled from 200,000 to 600,000. 咀1is wave was due
largely to instability caused by the Mexican Revolution and to the growth of
ag巾usiness in the United States (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Ngai
2004; Hernandez 2010).
FIGURE 13-2. 12,000,000

Number of People
Attaining Legal Permanent 10,000,000
Resident Status in the
8,000,000
United States, 1820-2015
Source: U.S. Department of 6,000,000
Homeland Security, Office of
Immigration Statistics (2015).
4,000,000
2,000,000
。
丁 he Rac ia lized H i s ↑0 「 y of U. S. l mmig 「ation Pol icy 383
< Mexican workers in a

flax field, 1946.
τhe second wave of Mexican immigration came during the bracero bracero program A U.S.
program (1942-1964). Under this program, created by the U.S government government program that
to meet labor shortages caused by World War II, 4.6 million Mexicans, called brought in temporary
braceros (a Spanish term that can be roughly translated as “ farmhands ”), came workers from Mexico
to work in agriculture in the United States. Mexicans also continued to immi- between 1942 and 1964.
grate to the United States illegally because not all workers qualified for the
bracero program and the costs associated with immigrating as a bracero were
prohibitive to some.
τhe United States carried out mass deportations of Mexicans twice during
this period, first in the 1930s and again in the 1950s, when the bracero program
was in full swing. ’The United States deported 1,751 Mexicans in 1925, but this
number increased dramatically to 15,000 in 1929, when the U.S. stock market
crash triggered the onset of the Great Depression. Subsequently, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, in cooperation with local officials, mounted
a repatriation campaign, under which over 400,000 people of Mexican origin
were returned to Mexico (Ngai 2004). In the 1950s, the U.S. Border Patrol
deported over a million Mexican immigrants under Operation Wetback.
Operation Wetback
World 飞'Var II created a Mexican American middle class, and during this time
Mexicans were also accorded an improved social standing in the borderlands.
384 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nativism, and I mm ig 「ation Po li cy
By the late 1940s,“No Mexicans Allowed'' signs had disappeared, and high
schools were increasingly integrated. At the same time, the Border Patrol
became more firmly entrenched as part of the federal government, meaning
that its policies often reflected Washington's interests more than local interests
along the border.τhis shi丘 created tensions, as ranchers and farmers in Texas
wanted to employ undocumented Mexicans, whereas it was the duty of Border
Patrol agents to stop immigrants 丘om crossing over (Hernandez 2010).
In 1950, the Border Patrol began massive roundups of Mexicans in a series of
Operation Wetback operations that would come to be known as Operation Wetback. One exam-
Massive ro11ndups of ple of an Operation Wetback raid happened on July 30, 1952. At dawn, about
Mexicans by the U.S. one hundred Border Patrol agents began to arrest Mexicans by the hundreds
Border Patrol from 1950 in an area near Brownsville, Texas. By the end of the day, they had made 5,000
to 1954. arrests and had transported all of those people to the bridge that led back to
Mexico.τhese sorts of roundups continued through 1954. In October 1954,
McCarran Internal the Border Patrol announced it had deported more than one million Mexican
Security Act A 1950 immigrants. 咀1ese mass arrests created fear and tension in immigrant com-
U.S. law designed to munities, as Mexicans were forced to leave their loved ones, their belongings,
combat Communism. and their lives in the United States and return to Mexico (Hernandez 2010).
It req11ired members of
the Communist Party The McCarran Internal Security Act
in the United States to Mexicans were not the only target of nativism during this period; at the same
register with the federal time, the United States was gripped by a pervasive fear of Communism, which
government, and it was portrayed as a product of foreign influence. 咀1e McCarran Internal
allowed for the deportation Security Act, signed into law in 1950, was designed to combat Communism,
of foreign nationals who both outside and within the borders of the United States. Anyone in the United
were members of the States who was a面liated with the Communist Party was required to register
Com1nunist Party. with the federal government. In addition, this act allowed for the deportation
of foreign nationals who were members of the Communist Part予 Between
1946 and 1966, deportation proceedings were initiated against 15,000 foreign
1965 Immigration and
nationals on ideological grounds (primarily becau创heywere Communists or
Nationality Act Legislation
suspected Communists). Of the 15,000 people put into deportation proceed-
that put an end to tl1e
ings, 253 were deported. Deportation for ideological reasons remained legal
racially biased quotas set
until the Immigration Act of 1990 repealed these provisions (T位凸k2004).
forth in the 1924 Oriental
Excl11sion Act and the
Immigration Act of 1924. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and the Changing
It set a universal quota Fαce of Immigration
of 20,000 immigrants One of the most significant changes to U.S. immigration law in the twentieth
for every country in the century was the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, also called the
world. 1965 Hart-Cellar Act. ’This act put an end to the racially biased quotas set
丁 he Rac ia lized H i s ↑0 「 y of U.S . l mmig 「ation Pol icy 385
forth in the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act and the Immigration Act of 1924.
In the spirit of the civil rights movement, the 1965 act set a universal quota of
20,000 immigrants for every country in the world. Each country could send
up to 20,000 qualified immigrants a yea乌 with no racial restrictions. Poten-
tial immigrants could now qualify for entry based on either family ties to the
United States (relatives could petition for their entry) or their skills (employ-
ers could request immigrants based on their skills and education). The 1965
act had two main consequences: (1) it increased immigration from Asia, Latin
America, and the Ca由bean; and (2) it increased undocumented immigration
from Mexico.
Asian Immigration
Historically, immigrants from India, China, Japan, the Philippines, and Korea
had come to the United States to work as laborers. However, the longstanding
prohibitions on Asian immigration between 1882 and 1965 greatly decreased
Asian immigration. 咀1e 1965 act opened up the possibility of immigration
from Asia by removing racial quotas, and large numbers of Asians began to
migrate to the United States once again.
Between 1820 and 1849, only210 people came to the United States from Asia
as legal permanent residents. In the 1850s, 36,080 people from Asia became
legal permanent residents. Asian immigration peaked in the first decade of the
twentieth century, with nearly 300,000 people from Asia becoming legal per-
manent residents. A丘er the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act, this number
dropped off, and only 19,231 Asians gained legal permanent residency in the
1930s. Asian immigration again increased in the 1950s to 135,000 and then
increased exponentially to nearly 1.5 million in the 1970s, 2.4 million in the
1980s, and 2.9 million in the 1990s (see Figure 13-3). In the first decade of
the twentieth century, almost 3.5 million Asians became legal permanent res-
idents. The most prominent countries of origin of Asian immigrants today are
China, the Philippines, India, l(orea, and Vietnam-each with its own his-
tory of immigration to the United States. By 2015, Asia was the largest sending
region for legal permanent residents. In that year, 419,297 Asians (40 percent
of the total) became legal permanent residents of the United States (Baugh
and Wistman 2017).
Immigration from Asia increased dramatically with the passage of the 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act. Asians did not come from every country
in the region, but specifically from countries with which the United States
had longstanding ties. In fact, with the exception of Vietnam, those Asian
countries that send large numbers of immigrant to the United States today
386 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nativism, and Imm ig 「at ion Po licy
4,000,000
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
FIGURE 13-3.
Number of Asians to Attain 500,000
Legal U.S. Permanent
。
Resident Status, by Decade
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、，l
d
are the same countries that sent substantial numbers of immigrants in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.τhese immigration pa忧erns can be
directly linked to both family ties and high skills provisions in the 1965 Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.
Chinese Immigration
Chinese immigrants to the United States predate many other immigrant
groupsj the large-scale migration of Chinese to the United States began when
U.S. contractors recruited laborers to build railroads in the mid-nineteenth
century. Around the same time，肌ruiters in Hawaii (which would not become
a U.S. state until 1959) bro吨ht tens of thousands of Chinese to work in agri-
culture and other industries. Chinese immigration peaked in the 1870s, with
133,000 Chinese becoming legal permanent residents of the United States.
Following the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, however, immigration dropped
off dramatically and did not begin to rise again until decades a丘er the act was
repealed in 1943.
Following the 1943 repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese immi-
gration to the United States slowly began to pick up again. 古1e presence of
Chinese immigrants and their descendants in the United States facilitated
future waves of immigration. In the 1980s, 171,000 Chinese immigrated
to the United States. Chinese immigration increased in the next decade to
342,000 and to 592,000 in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
丁 he Racialized His ↑0 「 y of U.S. l mmig 「ation Policy 387
C归 I NE .s· 丘只 R,
、
-.
,,
-
咱胁
‘, ,-‘
…. .. . < Chinese immigrant
'
.-,_ .. .. 4 .
...-.·-
氢
·”
labore1·s working on the
rail1·oad, ca. 1910.
Filipino Immigration
The United States has a longstanding relationship with the Philippines, as well
as a protracted migration history. 咀1is helps explain why this relatively small
(with a population of 88 million, compared to China and India’s billion-plus
people) and quite distant country sends large numbers of its nationals to the
United States. The Philippines was a U.S. colony from 1898 until 1946. From
1898 to 1934, Filipinos were American nationals and could freely come to the
United States. Many were recruited as laborers by Hawaiian sugar plantations,
and by 1931, around 113,000 had migrated to Hawaii alone. Manufacturers and
vineyard owners in California also recruited Filipinos as workers, a忧racting
over 5,000 to the mainland by 1920. With the passage of the 1924 Immigra-
tion Act, which ended the flow of Japanese laborers, agribusiness turned to
Mexican and Filipino labor, such that by 1930, there were 56,000 Filipinos on
the West Coast. As the numbers of Filipinos began to increase in the 1920s,
whites increasingly began to see Filipinos as a problem and a threat. In 1929,
the California legislature asked Congress to restrict Filipino immigration.
Congress eventually responded by passing the Tydings岛1cDuffe Act in 1934,
which limited Fil毕ino immigration to an annual quota of fi丘y-the smallest of
any countr予 τhe onset of World War II and racial violence on the West Coast
also contributed to slowing Filipino immigration. Between 1946 and 1965,
33,000 Filipinos immigrated to the United States, nearly half of whom were
wives of U.S. servicemen (Liu, Ong, and Rosenstein 1991; White, Biddlecom,
and Guo 1993; Ngai 2004).
As with other countries, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act changed
immigration pa忧erns from the Philippines to the United States. Between 1965
and 1985, about 667,000 Filipinos obtained visas to come to the United States.
These Filipino migrants consisted of two groups of people. The first group,
which constituted about two-thirds of Filipino immigrants, came on family
reunification visas from the networks of the pre-1965 migrants.τhe second
included migrants who obtained employment visas, mostly as professionals
and other highly trained individuals (Liu, Ong, and Rosenstein 1991). In
2015, S percent of all new legal permanent residents were from the Philippines,
making it the fourth-largest sending country (Baugh and Wistman 2017).
Indian Immigration
India is another country that sent large numbers of immigrants to the United
States prior to passage of the Johnson-Reed Act. As with other Asian countries,
immigration from India resumed a丘er 1965. Between 1966 and 1981, 215,640
Asian Indians came to the United States. 咀1is rate of 14,376 immigrants per year
is twenty times higher than the rate at the previous peak in the period just before
World War Lτhe majority of these new immigrants were professionals, with less
than 1 percent working in farm labor occupations (Gonzales 1986). In 2015, India
was the third-largest sending country for legal permanent residents, as 64,116
Indians became legal permanent residents that year (Baugh and Wistman 2017).
Korean Immigration
咀1e pa忧ern is similar for Korea. Over 7,000 I{oreans migrated to Hawaii to
work on sugar plantations between 1903 and 1905. I{orean migration was cut
off, 且rst as a result of restrictions placed on emigration by the Japanese impe-
rial power and later by the 1924 restrictions.τhese restrictions were li丘edin
the aftermath of the I{orean War (1950-1953), and more than 3,000 Koreans
were admitted between 1950 and 1965, the vast majority of whom were wives
of U.S. servicemen stationed in Korea. 飞机th passage of the 1965 Immigration
and Nationality Act, Koreans quickly became one of the largest immigrant
groups in the United States. In 1965, 2,165 I{oreans entered the United States.
In 1970, 9,314 came. And in 1977, 30,917 entered (Reimers 1981; Min 1990).
Between 1975 and 1990, Korea sent more immigrants to the United States than
any other country, with the exception of Mexico and the Philippines. Korean
immigrants were relatively highly educated, and 30 percent in the 1970s came
丁 he Racia lized His ↑0 「 y of U.S. lmm i g 「at i on Policy 389
on skills-based visas.τhe remaining 70 percent came on family reunification

visas (Min 1990).
Vietnamese Immigration
Vietnam is distinct from the other Asian countries in that there were almost no
Vietnamese in the United States in the early twentieth century, or even prior
to the Vietnam War. Today, however, there are over one million Vietnamese
in the United States. 咀1e first wave came as refugees; between 1971 and 1980,
150,000 Vietnamese were admitted to the United States (White, Biddlecom,
and Guo 1993） .τhe reunification provisions of the 1965 act led to the growth
of the Vietnamese population in the United States well after the Vietnam
War ended (Kelly 1986） .τhose Vietnamese who were in the United States
already had the right to bring their family members to the country under
the family reunification provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Legal immigration through family reunification policies, combined with ille-
gal immigration, led to the continued growth of the Vietnamese population.
币1e 2000 census reported the presence of over one million Vietnamese, nearly
a quarter of whom had been born in the United States (Hoefer, Rytina, and
Campbell 2007). In 2010, Vietnam came in at number nine in the list of the
top twenty countries sending legal permanent residents to the United States,
with 310,000 Vietnamese legal permanent residents in the country (Rytina
2011） .τhree other countries in Asia had larger populations of legal permanent
residents in the United States: the Philippines (560,000), China (550,000),
and India (500,000).
Figure 13-4 shows the distribution of the population of undocumented
immigrants in the United States in 2013: 56 percent of undocumented
migrants in the United States come from Mexico, 15 percent from Central
America, and 14 percent from Asia.
342,000 260,000 FIGURE 13-4.

423,000 Region of Birth
of Undocumented
690,000 6, 194,000
• Mexico Immigrants Residing in
• Central America the United States, 2013
• Asia Source: U.S. Department of
1,509,000 Homeland Security, Migration
• South America Policy Institute (2015).
• Europe/Canada/Oceania
• Africa
• Caribbean
1,603,000
390 CHAPTER 13 Rac ism, Na ti vism, and Imm i g 「ation Po li cy
Lαtin Americanαnd Caribbean Immigration

There were very few immigrants from Latin America or the Caribbean in the
United States prior to the twentieth century, and those who did come were
mostly from Mexico. Latin American migration increased dramatically in
the 1990s, when S million Latin Americans became legal permanent residents
(DHS, 。而ce of Immigration Statistics 2016). This surge was largely due to a
piece of legislation called the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
which permitted the legalization of millions of immigrants. Figure 13-5 shows
the number of people from the Americas who have obtained legal permanent
resident status since 1820. In recent years, the number of new legal permanent
residents from the Americas has decreased. In 2015, fewer people people from
the Americas (366,126) attained legal permanent residency than from Asia
(419,297) (Baugh and Wistman 2017).
Latin American Immigration

τhe vast majority of Latin American migrants have come from Mexico. How-
eve乌 substantial numbers of Central American and South American immi-
grants began to enter the country beginning in the 1980s.
Up until the 1970s, over 80 percent of Mexicans who came to the United
States were temporary farm workers. By 1997, only 40 percent of Mexicans
could be described as such (Massey et al. 2002). With passage of the 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act and the subsequent 1986 mass legalization
laws, increasing numbers of Mexicans have chosen to reside permanently in
the United States.
Central Americans have been coming to the United States since the late
nineteenth century, but they did not begin to arrive in large numbers until
FIGURE 13 -5. 6,000,000

Persons from the
Americas Attaining Legal 5,000,000
Permanent Resident
-
Status, 1820-2009 4,000,000 -
Source: U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Office of 3,000,000
-
2,000,000
-
1,000,000 -
「1 - r,
-
。
[
the 1960s, with passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act.Around
8,000 Central Americans entered the United States legally between 1900 and
1910; this number increased to 17,000 in the next decade, around 6,000 in the
1930s, 21,000 in the 1940s, and about 45,000 in the 1950s. In the 1960s, the
presence of U.S. companies in Central America increased, with a concomitant
increase in the presence of Central Americans in the United States. Between
1971 and 1980, more than 130,000 Central Americans legally entered the
United States (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991).
In the 1980s, immigration to the United States from El Salvador and other
Central American countries increased rapidly as a result of both political vio-
lence in Central America and the economic setbacks that this violence entailed
(Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991). In neighboring Nicaragua, the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency financed and organized a counterrevolution against the
Sandinista government. In El Salvador, the U.S. government supplied military
equipment to the government in the 1980s, which was used to kill thousands
of civilians (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991). As part of its Cold War strategy,
the U.S. government also supplied the Salvadoran government with more than
$6 billion in military and economic aid between 1980 and 1992 (Quan 2005).
The civil war in El Salvador caused massive population displacements, and
many of those displaced came to the United States. While the conditions in
El Salvador were the motivation for leaving, the nation’s longstanding ties to
the United States turned the latter country into a preferred destination when
Salvadorans began to seek refuge (Menjivar 2000).
Caribbean Immigration
Immigrants have been coming to the United States from the Caribbean as
long as the nation has been keeping records. Between 1820 and 1900, nearly
90,000 people from the Caribbean came to the United States. Immigration
from this region first reached a peak in the first three decades of the twentieth
century, when 300,000 people from the Caribbean became legal permanent
residents. In the last three decades of the twentieth century, 2. 5 million people
from the Caribbean became legal permanent residents of the United States.
Another million migrated legally in the 曲st decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury (Golash-Boza 2012). Since the passage of the 1965 Immigration and
Nationality Act, large numbers of immigrants from the Dominican Republic,
Cuba, and Jamaica have entered the country.
τhe United States has been heavily involved in the affairs of the Dominican
Republic and has been the destination of many immigrants as a consequence
of this close relationship. Between 1961 and 1968, for example, the United
392 CHAPTER 13 Rac ism, Nativism, and Imm i g 「ation Po licy
> Following the passage

of the 1965 Immigration
and Nationality Act, more
people f1·om the Dominican
Republic ente1·ed the
United States than from
a11y other cot1ntry in tl1e
Western Hemisphere
except Mexico.
States was closely entangled in the Dominican Republic ’s presidential elec-

tions, to the point of ensuring that the democratically elected le丘－wing pres-
ident Juan Bosch was ousted in 1965. 咀1is time of intense involvement in
the Dominican Republic coincided with the passage of the 1965 Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, which paved the way for Dominicans to enter the
United States. During this time, more people from the Dominican Repub-
lic entered the United States than from any other country in the Western
Hemisphere except Mexico. Emigration from the Dominican Republic has
continued to rise. By 1980, there were 169,000 Dominican immigrants in
the United States. By 1990, there were 348,000, and by 2012, there were
nearly a million (Garrison and Weiss 1979j Hernandez 2004j Nwosu and
Batalova 2014).
Cuba is another Caribbean country that has had a longstanding relation-
ship with the United States. In the early twentieth century, more than 20,000
Cubans lived in the United States, and by the end of the 1950s, that number
was about 50,000. 币1is population continued to increase following the 1959
victory of Fidel Castro in the Cuban Revolution. By the end of the 1980s, there
were nea由 one million Cubans in the United States (Perez 2003). The exiles
who came in the early 1960s came because of a long history of U.S. military
interventions into Cuba, with the expectation that the U.S. government would
assist in ousting Castro's government. Those migrants who come today come
more o丘en for economic than political motives, and because of ties they have
in the United States, in the context of an immigration policy that has been
generally favorable toward Cubans. President Lyndon B. Johnson established
an “ open door'' policy that encouraged Cuban emigration. In the mid-1990s,
President Bill Clinton changed that policy to a “ wet foot, dry foot'' policy that
repatriated Cubans found at sea but allowed those who reached land to stay.
In his last days in 。而ce in January 2017, President Obama ended this policy,
thereby ending Cuban migrants ’ special treatment (Eckstein and Barberia
2002; Perez 2003; Pew Hispanic Center 2006).
Relatively few Jamaicans came to the United States prior to 1965, in part
because]amaicans were primarily emigrating elsewhere: to Central America,
other islands, and Great Britain. However, just as Great Britain passed a series
of restrictive immigration laws in the 1960s, the United States passed the
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which facilitated the increased immi-
gration of Jamaicans on skills- and family-based visas. By 2009, there were
about 637,000 Jamaican migrants in the United States ( Glennie and Chappell
2010). Nearly half ofJamaicans in the United States live in New York City, and
another 28 percent live in southern Florida.τhere are also significant popula-
tions in Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta (Vickerman
1999). Notably, over half ofJamaican migrants to the United States are women
(Foner 2008; Glennie and Chappell 2010).
Migrants to the United States from Puerto Rico are not technically immi-
grants, as Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens. Nevertheless, Puerto Ricans share a
similar migration history with other Caribbean countries, in terms of its rela-
tionship to the U.S. mainland. Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States
in 1898, and the island became a U.S. territory. In 1917, Puerto Ricans became
citizens of the United States. Shortly thereafter, employers in the United States
began to recruit Puerto Ricans to work in the mainland United States due to
labor shortages caused by World War I. The recruitment of Puerto Ricans 一
and thus the migration-intensified in the aftermath of World War II when
labor shortages in the mainland United States were even more severe. Just as
Mexicans filled key labor needs in the western and southwestern United States
during this time, Puerto Ricans were the primary source of migrant labor in
the northeastern United States in the aftermath of 飞,Vorld War II. 咀1e post-
World War II period of massive migration of Puerto Ricans to the northeast-
ern United States is o丘en referred to as the “ Great Migration'' owing to the
large numbers of Puerto Ricans who le丘 the island. ’This migration tapered off
in the late 1960s and 1970s, as migrants from other Caribbean countries were
able to more easily migrate to the United States following the passage of the
394 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nativism, and l mmig 「ation Po licy
1965 Immigration Act (Po巾S and Grosfoguel 1994） .τhere has been a resur-
gence of migration from Puerto Rico to the mainland United States in recent
years, related to a protracted economic crisis on the island. Between 2010 and
2013, an average of 48,000 Puerto Ricans le丘 the island each yea鸟 which is
over three times the average number that le丘 each year in the 1980s and 1990s.
By 2012, about 1.4 million Puerto Ricans we削iving on the mainland (Cohn,
Patten, and Lopez 2014).
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATI 。 N AND P。 LICY RESP 。 NSE
τhe 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act instituted quotas of 20,000

immigrants per country. At first glance, this blanket quota may seem fair.
However, most of the 180-plus countries in the world do not send 20,000
immigrants per year to the United States, and a handful of countries send
many more. Mexico is a case in point. Prior to 1965, there were no limits on
the number of immigrants who could be admitted from Mexico, and tens
of thousands of Mexicans came to the United States each year. The 1965
act initially established a ceiling of 120,000 immigrant visas for the entire
Western Hemisphere. In 1976, the law came fully into effect, and a quota of
20,000 immigrants per year was extended to all countries in the Western
I{emisphere, including Mexico (Joppke 1998). However, the imposition of a
quota did not end large-scale migration from Mexico because, in the 1970s,
many employers depended on Mexican labor to thrive, and many Mexicans
desired to work in the United States.
卫1e imbalance between the number of Mexicans allowed to enter the United
States legally and the need for Mexican labor to sustain economic growth in
the United States led to increased undocumented immigration, which was rel-
atively easy at the time because there were hardly any Border Patrol agents
(Massey et al. 2002). In the 1970s, undocumented immigration reached
unprecedented levels and became a matter of public debate for the first time.
During the 1980s, public opposition to undocumented immigration grew, and
politicians began to get tough on immigration. Eventually, another major leg-
islative change took place in 1986.
The Immigration Reform and Contr。l Act of 1986 (IRCA)

and Nativism
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is hard to imagine that there
was ever a time when illegal immigration was not seen as a problem. Remark-
ably, this issue did not figure on the national agenda until the 1980s, when
Illegal l mm i g 「ation a nd Policy Resp onse 395
the tightening economy, combined with the arrival of increasing numbers of

Latin Americans, generated waves of nativism and anti-immigrant sentiment.
咀1e concern over large numbers of undocumented migrants o丘en had a racial
tenor: the debates made it clear that the “ problem'' with immigration was the
high and increasing numbers of Mexicans in the United States (Inda 2006).
The debates leading up to passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 1986 Immigration Reform
Act of 1986 (IRCA) invoked racialized sentiments about Mexicans taking and Control Act (IRCA)
jobs from Americans, overusing welfare, and refusing to assimilate, despite A series of immigration
evidence to the contrar予 As Pier时te Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) argues, the provisions that (1) offered
debates surrounding IRCA were not so much about the presence of Mexicans a legalization option for
as about the reality that increasing numbers of Mexicans were settling in the undocumented workers
United States. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) contends that the nativism pervad- living in the United States
ing the debates over IRCA focused on three claims: (1) allegations that immi- and (2) i1nposed sanctions
grants were stealing jobs from Americans, (2) concerns that immigrants were on employers who hired
overusing the welfare system, and (3) worries that the newcomers were too undocumented workers.
different and “ unassimilable.” By the end of the twentieth century, immigra-
tion restrictionists were no longer concerned about the inability of southern
and eastern Europeans to assimilate. Now, the target was Mexicans.
币1e passage of IRCA involved a series of compromises and constituted the
last mass legalization of the twentieth century. As the name implies, IRCA
included immigration reform and control provisions. 咀1e twin prongs of
IRCA were (1) to offer a legalization option for people who lived in the United
States but did not have the proper authorization to work in the country and
(2) to impose sanctions on employers who hired people not authorized to work
in the United States. 咀1e imposition of sanctions was meant to deter employ-
ers from hiring undocumented workers. Instead, these sanctions ultimately
created an industry that produced fraudulent documentation, making it easy
for anyone to obtain the (false) documents they needed to work (Fragomen
and Bell 2007).
One of the major consequences of IRCA was to encourage the permanent
settlement of Mexican immigrants, who had formerly come primarily as tem-
poraryworkers. Until the 1970s, over 80 percent of Mexican immigrants were
temporary workers who came to the United States to work in the agricultural
sector for a few months and then returned to Mexico with their savings. By
1997, only 40 percent of Mexican migration was for temporary work in the
agricultural sector (Avila, Fuentes, and Tuiran 2000). The legalization of
temporary workers encouraged more migrants to settle permanently in the
United States and to bring their families with them (Massey et al. 2002). Once
migrants obtained legal residence or citizenship, they were able to bring over
family members under family reunification provisions. As increasing numbers

of Mexicans settled permanently in the United States, racialized fears of immi-
grants intensified.
Proposition 187 and the Lead 心p to IIRIRA

Fear of immigrants o丘en has racial undertones.τhe vast majority of immi-
grants to the United States are people of color (Figure 13-6). According to
Office of Immigration Statistics data, in 2015, one million people became
legal permanent residents. Just over 10 percent were from primarily white
countries: 90, 789 of them were from Europe, 3,795 from Australia, 978 from
New Zealand, and 19,309 from Canada. Thus, any discourse about immigra-
tion today has the subtext of minority incorporation into society (Johnson
2004). The racialization of immigrants, and especially of undocumented
immigrants, became clear in the campaign to push forward Proposition 187 in
California, a ballot initiative that would deny social services and educational
opportunities to the undocumented.
When Proposition 187 was being debated in the early 1990s, California
was on the verge of becoming a majority-minority state, and demographic
changes were at the center of the fears expressed by Proposition 187 suppo时，
ers. For example, in Robin Dale Jacobson’s interviews with supporters, one of
her respondents told her that the proposition was a response to the “ Mexican
impact on the state of California.” Another interviewee was more forthright:
“ So, I
just wanted something to be done about too many Mexican people all of
a sudden”( Jacobson 2008, 39） .τhese fears about the increase in the Mexican
FIGURE 13.6. 100

U.S. Immigrant Population
by Origin 80
Source: Migration Policy Institute 60

(2016).
40
20
0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0/o of immigrants residing in the U.S. born in

• Mexico • Other Latin America*
• South and East Asia Europe/Canada
*Includes the Carribean and Central/South America
Illegal l mmig 「ation and Policy Response 397
population were exacerbated by the conflation of Mexicans with “ illegals ” and

“ criminals." Supporters of the proposition o丘en took the fact that undocu-
mented migrants had crossed the border illegally or overstayed their visas to
indicate that they were prone to criminal activity more generall予 Governor
Pete Wilson fanned the flames of this fire by “ widely publicizing the estimated
costs of keeping illegal aliens in prison'' (Jacobson 2008, SS). In addition to
criminalizing undocumented immigrants, much of the discourse surround-
ing Proposition 187 racialized undocumented immigrants as Mexican.
币1us, many of its supporters interpreted the “ invasion” of undocumented
workers as a racial takeover of California (Jacobson 2008, 117).
The political campaigns that promoted the passage of Proposition 187 drew
on racial imagery. Television ads supported by Governor Wilson “ showed
shadowy Mexicans crossing the border in large numbers ”(Johnson 2004, 43).
l(evinJohnson (2004) argues that the Proposition 187
campaign was a clear manifestation of the racial fears
of white Californians. While it would have been polit-
ically unsavory to launch an overtly racist attack on
people of color, targeting undocumented immigrants
without mentioning race directly was permissible.
In the context of an economic downturn, job
losses, and state cutbacks in social services, many
Californians found undocumented immigrants to be
appropriate scapegoats for their economic troubles,
and in 1994, Propo州on 187 was passed (Alvarez
and Butterfield 2000). Although there was no clear
connection between the presence of a large undoc-
umented population and the hard economic times,
gubernatorial and state legislature candidates in
California were able to use the presence of undocu-
mented people to their advantage by advocating for 00) !Jfj
harsh policies that were not guaranteed to improve
the fiscal health of the state. Politicians used undoc-
umented immigrants as scapegoats by blaming them
for the poor economic conditions, and their promises
to get tough on illegal immigration helped them win
elections. In California, 60 percent of voters voted
in favor of Proposition 187. The bill was not imple- A In 1996, members of an anti-immigration group
mented, however, as it was found to be unconstitu- in California protest immigration from Mexico into
tional in 1997 (Diamond 1996). the United States.
398 CHAPTER 13 Rac ism, Na ti vism, and Imm i g 「ation Po li cy
Anti-Terrorism and Although Proposition 187 was found to be unconstitutional, the debates
Effective Death Penalty Act surrounding it set the stage for passage of three laws in 1996 that negatively
(AEDPA} 1996 legislation affected immigrants: the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
that, among other (AEDPA), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
provisions, eliminated Act (IIRIRA), and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
judicial review of some Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
deportation orders and 卫1e PRWORA was designed t。“end welfare as we know it.” It also had
required mandatory nativist provisions that denied services to noncitizens. Contrary to popular
detention for many belief, undocumented migrants have never been eligible for welfare services
non-c1t1zens. such as cash benefits, Medicaid, food stamps, or public housing.τhe root of
the myth that undocumented migrants benefit from need-based programs
Illegal Immigration such as food stamps is that their U.S.-citizen children are eligible for the
Reform and Immigrant
same set of benefits as any other U.S. citizen. When PRWORA was passed,
Responsibility Act
it extended the limitations on welfare benefits to legally present immigrants.
（川 RIRA} 1996 legislation
Touted as a money-saving measure, PR认TORA denied most benefits to legally
under which legal
present migrants, at least for the first five years of their stay in the United
permanent residents face
States (Tumlin and Zimmerman, 2003). Now, let ’s turn to the other two laws
mandatory deportation
passed in 1996.
if they are convicted of
“ aggravated felonies. ”
The 1996 Laws αnd the Detention and Deportαtion of Black
and Latino Immigrants
Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity In 1996, Congress passed two laws that fundamentally changed the rights of
Reconciliation Act all foreign-born people in the United States: the Anti-Terrorism and Effec-
(PRWORA} 1996 tive Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
legislation that denied Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). These laws were striking
government services and in that they eliminated judicial review of some deportation orders, required
benefits to legally present mandatory detention for many noncitizens, and introduced the potential
migrants. for the use of secret evidence in certain cases. Some of the most pernicious
consequences of these laws are related to the deportation of legal permanent
residents, commonly referred to as “ green card holders."
Under IIRIRA, legal permanent residents like Robert B川sta (whose story
was featured in the Voices sidebar on p. 376) face mandatory deportation if
they are convicted of “ aggravated felonies. ” These include crimes for which a
person is sentenced to at least one year in prison, regardless of whether the sen-
tence is served or suspended.τhese crimes can also be relatively minor, such as
the the丘 of baby clothes from a department store or two counts of minor drug
possession. 咀1ese cases do not require judicial review-that is, people do not
have the right to have a judge hear the specifics of the case or consider the ties
that a person has to the United States. Furthermore, the law can be applied
retroactively. 咀1is means that any legal permanent resident charged with
Illegal lmmig 「ation and Policy Response 399
< Immigrants fro1n Latin

America and the Caribbean
h·
are more likely to face
;.:.---
圃，，， deportation because of
AEDPA and IIRIRA laws.
a crime at any time during his or her stay in the United States could be subject
to deportation. For example, a person could have come to the United States
legally at age two, been convicted of resisting arrest at age eighteen, and-
twenty years later, after the passage of IIRIRA-be subject to deportation at
age thirty-eight. Even adopted children of U.S. citizens have faced deportation
under these laws, specifically in those cases in which parents failed to natu-
ralize their children prior to age eighteen (Morawetz 2000; Master 2003). In
light of the heavy policing of black and Latino neighborhoods, and of black and
Latino youth in particula乌 immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean
are more likely to face deportation because of these laws.
刀1e 1996 laws are punitive and harsh. Moreover, they have disproportionately
affected blacks and Latinos. Johnson (2004) argues that since the vast majority
of immigrants who come to the United States each year are people of color, the
differential treatment of noncitizens in U.S. legal practices amounts to racial dis-
crimination. Joe Feagin (2000, 31) defines systemic racism as “ a diverse assort-
ment of racist practices; the unjustly gained economic and political power of
whites; the continuing resource inequalities; and the white-racist ideologies and
attitudes created to preserve white advantage and power.” He further contends
that “ one can accurately describe the United States as a ‘ total racist society’ in
which every major aspect of life is shaped to some degree by the core racist real-
ities.” The system of deportation and detention of immigrants is no exception: it
is clearly shaped by the “ core racist realities'' of the United States.
400 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nati vis m, and Imm i g 「ation Po licy
As described in Chapter Eleven, the criminal justice system systematically

disadvantages black and Latino men. Even though black and white men have
similar levels of criminal activity, black men are seven times more likely than
white men to be imprisoned, and Latinos are four times as likely (Feagin 2000;
P. H. Collins 2004; Western 2006). In the case of drug offenses, the data are
Hector, a Guatemalan Deportee

…. . . . ... . . .. .·. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . . ..... .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . ........ . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . . . ..
Hector moved to the United States with his mother when he was three years old, in
1984. They joined his father, who had been there since he was a newborn. In 1990,
his parents applied for political asylum, as Hector's mother had worked for the
Guatemalan government and could be subject to persecution if they returned. They
were issued work permits and waited for their cases to be heard. In 1999, Hector
. and his family were able to legalize under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act (NACARA). Hector became a legal permanent resident of the
United States.
Hector spent most of his childhood in the San Fernando Valley, where he com-
pleted elementary, middle, and high school. He did well in high school and attended
the University of California. After he finished college in 2004, his first job was on
campus as a coordinator for a smoking prevention and cessation program.
While working on campus, Hector also began to work part time at a computer
company. When the grant funding his university job ran out, he switched over to
full-time work at the computer company. There, he quickly moved up from entry- to
mid-level management. Things were going well for him. He was earning good money
at the company and was promoted several tin1es.
Hector frequently traveled back to the San Fernando Valley to visit his parents and
old friends. It was there he reconnected with some people who encouraged him to
join them in a credit card fraud scheme. Hector and his friends were caught forging
credit cards, and he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. After
finishing his time, Hector faced automatic deportation to Guatemala.
At Hecto1~’s deportation hearing, it did not matter that he had come to the United
States when he was three years old, that he was a legal permanent resident, that he
had a college degree, and that he had no i1n1nediate fa1nily in Guatemala. The only
consideration the judge could take into account was the fact that he had been con-
victed of an aggravated felony. Hector was deported to Guatemala, where he had to
remake his life from the ground up.
Sot1rce: Golash-Boza 2012.
· .... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ...
Illegal l mm i g 「at ion a nd Po Iicy Resp o nse 401
particularly striking. In the United States, black men are sent to prison on drug
charges at thirteen times the rate of white men, yet five times as many whites
use illegal drugs as blacks (Alexander 2010). Although whites use drugs more
frequently than blacks, blacks are much more likely to end up incarcerated.
τhese data are important for understanding deportations, as about a third
of all deportees are deported for drug charges, and most deportees are men
(Golash-Boza 2015).
Racism in the criminal justice system has severe implications for black and
Latino/ a immigrants. Many Jamaicans, Dominicans, and Haitians experience
the same set of resource deprivations and racist ideologies and practices that
have led to the mass incarceration of black men. Immigrants from Latin
America o丘en live in Latino neighborhoods that are heavily policed. Thus,
immigrants of African and Latin American descent are more likely to be
jailed and eventually deported than immigrants of European or Asian descent
who are not subject to the same set of prejudices and discriminatory actions.
Whereas the immigrant population includes many whites and Asians, blacks
and Latinos almost exclusively make up the group of detainees and deport-
ees. Black and brown people from Latin America and the Caribbean are
substantially more likely to be deported than are whites or Asians; 98 percent
of deportees are sent to the Americas (see Table 13-1).
TABLE 13-1 I
Top Ten Countries to Which Deportees Were Sent, 2014 I
Number Percent Cumulative Percent

Mexico 275,911 66.57% 66.57%
Guatemala 54,153 13 .07% 79.63%
Honduras 40,560 9 .79% 89.42%
El Salvador 26,685 6.44o/o 95.86%
Dominican Republic 2,045 0.49% 96.35%
Ecuador 1,511 0.36% 96.71%
Colombia 1,309 0.32o/o 97.03%
Nicaragua 1,284 0.3lo/o 97.34%
Jamaica 1,027 0.25% 97.59%
Brazil 931 0.22% 97.81%
Others 9 ,065 2.19% 100.00%
Source: U.S. Dep a rt m ent of Homeland Security，，。而ce of Immigration Statistics, 2016.

402 CHAPTER 13 Rac ism, Na ti vis m, and Imm ig 「ation Po li cy
Earlier in this chapter, we looked at the five countries of origin from which
most legal permanent residents in the United States come: China, India,
Mexico, the Philippines, and Vietnam. With the notable exception of Mexico,
these are not the countries to which we send most deportees. 咀1e top five coun-
tries of origin of deportees in 2014 were Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. These five countries alone accounted
for over 96 percent of all people deported in 2014. Table 13-1 lists the top ten
countries to which deportees were sent in 2014.τhese ten countries repre-
sent 97.81 percent of people deported in 2014. ’These data call attention to a
glaring fact: Asians are prominent among immigrants overall, whereas Latin
Americans and Caribbean nationals are overrepresented among deportees. At
this point, it will be useful to take a closer look at the numbers. As Figure 13-7
shows, even when we take into account the relative numbers of undocumented
migrants in the country, Latin Americans are still much more likely to be
deported than Asians.
Deportation policy also has gendered effects. About 90 percent of all deport-
ees are men, even though about half of all immigrants are men (Golash-Boza
2015). This disparity is due to the way criminal and immig川ion laws are
enforced. Men are more likely than women to be in public places-driving,
walking, or standing on the corner-and thus are more likely to come to the
attention of the authorities. Although more men are deported than women,
0.14
0.13
0.12
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
FIGURE 13 -7. 0.02
Ratio of Undocumented 0.01
Migrants to Deportees, 0
2014
Source: U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, Office of
Illegal l mm i g 「ation and Pol icy Response 403
deportation policy does not affect only deportees-it also affects their farni-
lies. When a person is deported, a family o丘en loses a breadwinner.
Current immigration laws, practices, and policies further enhance the
extent to which our society is riddled with racism and repression . 卫1e general
climate of strict enforcement of immigration laws in the post-September 11
era has further exacerbated the situation. A recent nationally representative
survey of Hispanics found that nearly one in ten Latinos had been stopped
by authorities and asked about their immigration status, and a similar per-
centage had experienced discrimination in housing. Remarkably, 1S percent
of all Latinos between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine said they had
experienced some form of discrimination. It is thus no wonder that the major-
ity of those Latinos surveyed said they worry about deportation (Lopez and
Minushkin 2008). These numbers indicate that the racial profiling of Latinos
is widespread and that Latinos are targeted in immigration enforcement
efforts.
卫1e 1996 deportation laws were punitive. Moreover, they have had a dis-
proportionate effect on people of color.τhis pa忧ern is consistent with other
pa仗erns of systemic racism in this country二 τhe racism embedded in immigra-
tion policy is not an isolated case, but a foreseeable by-product of a society that
systematically denies the dignity and humanity of people of color. The crimi-
nalization of black men leads to the deportation of a disproportionate number
of Dominicans and Jamaicans. 卫1e stereotype of Mexicans, and of those who
look “ Mexican," as “ illegals” leads to the targeting of Mexicans and Central
Americans in immigration enforcement efforts.
卫1ese practices and policies do not simply isolate and remove immigrants
of color, but also have detrimental effects on their families, who are, in
most cases, also people of color. ’Those children, spouses, and parents who
witness their loved ones being mistreated and banished are also victims of
this systematic denial of human rights. In light of pa忧erns of segregation,
there are whole communities of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in which
children are growing up not only experiencing structural racism in terms
of resource provisions, but also witnessing their mothers, fathers, brothers,
sisters, neighbors, and community leaders being told they have no right to
be here and, in many cases, being forcibly removed from their communities.
Just as African American children o丘en grow up knowing that blacks are
more likely than other groups to be “ locked up," Mexicans and other Latin
American and Caribbean people grow up knowing that people like them
are being expelled from this country at the rate of nearly 1,000 people a day
(Golash-Boza 2015).
404 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nati vis m, and Imm ig 「ation Po licy
IMMIGRATI 。 N P。 LICY AND NATIVISM

IN THE TWENTY” FIRST CENTURY
At the end of the twentieth century, the United States began to witness a surge
in nativism not seen since the 1920s. Historian George Sanchez (1997) sug-
gests that three factors distinguish contemporary racialized nativism from
that of a century ago:
• The rise of extreme antipathy toward languages other than English.

卫1is feeling is exemplified in a campaign against having t。“press 1 for
English'' and in local efforts to keep libraries from purchasing
foreign-language books.
• The concern that Asian, Caribbean, and Latin American immigrants are
taking advantage of affirmative action programs designed to help native-
born minorities, especially African Americans. This concern can be seen
in conversations regarding the high numbers ofWest Indians entering Ivy
League schools.
．咀1e worry that immigrants are draining public resources through the use
of welfare, education, and health care services.τhis sentiment persists
even though laws passed in 1996 severely limit immigrants’ access to
welfare and health services. The Supreme Court decided in Plyer 1人 Doe in
1982 that any child in the United States has the right to an education. Yet
nativists see the education of immigrant children as a burden rather than
an investment in the future.
The rise of nativism in the United States is closely tied to economic uncertain-
ties. Nativism in the 1920s was connected to the country's difficult transition
from a primarily agricultural economy to a massively industrialized one. At the
end of the twentieth century, the United States experienced rapid deindustri-
alization and the rise of a service-oriented economy. These structural changes
in the economy produced economic uncertainty, especially among the working
class and poor. Moreover, as native-born blacks, whites, and Latinos/ as have
been displaced from factory jobs, immigrants have come in to fill jobs in the ser-
vice sector. As the economy has shi丘ed, native-born workers have not always
been able to retool their skill sets or displace themselves to areas ofhigh growth.
The widespread perception that immigrants are “ taking our jobs” is intimately
tied to the rise of nativism.
During Donald Trump ’s presidential campaign, he played into these fears
using nativist and racist language, running his campaign on an anti-immigrant
Immigration Policy and Nativism in the Twenty-Firs • Cen • ury 405
and anti-Muslim platform. He made calls to ban all Muslims from the United
States. He referred to Mexicans as “ rapists'' and emphasized the importance
of keeping out “ bad hombres." Moreover, he made specific promises to revoke
the rights of immigrants. Trump ’s rallying cry t。“ build a wall'' played into his
constituents' racialized fears related to economic and demographic changes in
the United States.
Donald Trump did not invent these discourses, but he did tap into them.
Despite President Obama's record-high deportations, many people in the
United States argued that he was not doing enough to fix what they viewed
as the immigration “ problem." But Obama also issued an executive order-
Deferred Action for Childhood Ar巾als (DACA)-which granted reprieve
from deportation and a work permit to qualified immigrants who arrived to
the United States as minors.
During the Obama presidency, many states passed their own restrictive laws
targeting immigrants.τhe first major state law was A归ona's Senate Bill (SB)
1070, the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. 咀1is
law was followed closely by Alabama's 2011 House Bill (HB) 56, the Alabama
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act; and by Georgia’s HB 87, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011. Many of these laws have
backfired: when Alabama passed laws restricting the rights of undocumented
people, the state experienced a massive outflow of immigrants.τhese immi-
grants left jobs behind that went unfilled, as immigrants in Alabama who
picked tomatoes for a living could not easily be replaced by the urban unem-
ployed.Native-born workers are unlikely to see the benefit of moving from the
city to the countryside to pick tomatoes. 卫1e idea that Alabama could simply
rid itself of undocumented workers and thereby 且x its unemployment problem
was ill conceived and riddled with nativist logic.
When Arizona SB 1070 went into effect in July 2010, it sparked national
debate, protests, and boycotts. 卫1e law required local law enforcement agents
to determine the immigration status of any person with whom they interacted
during the course of their duties. 咀1is meant, for example, that if a police o缸，
cer responded to a call for domestic violence, he would be required to check
the immigration status of both the perpetrator and the victim, ifhe had reason
to believe that either might be in the country unlawfully. SB 1070 was sub-
sequently modified with the enactment of HB 2162 on April 30, 2010, which
changed the language such that police officers would only be required to check
the immigration status of people during a lawful stop, detention, or arrest.
With these modified provisions, SB 1070 only required intervention in those
406 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nati vis m, and Imm ig 「ation Po li cy
cases in which a person was suspected of violating state laws.τhese modifica-

tions relieved some concerns that the law would make victims of crimes less
likely to contact law enforcement officials, yet the possibility of racial profil-
ing remained a substantial problem. According to an amicus brief filed by the
AmericanlmmigrationLawyersAssociation (AILA) (2010, 5), ''there is simply
no unbiased means of implementing the term 'unlawful presence,’ because as
a legal status there are no observable characteristics of 'unlawful presence,' or
readily available means by which a police officer could discern 'unlawful pres-
ence ’ in any stop, detention, or investigative encounter. ” In 2012, a Supreme
Court decision blocked three provisions of the Arizona law, but it upheld the
provision that required officers to demand papers from individuals. However,
in 2016, the National Immigration Law Center and other immigrants' rights
groups won a lawsuit against the state of Arizona. As a result, officers are no
longer required to ask for papers during stops, although they may do so at their
own discretion.
τhe nativist restrictions in immigration law sometimes also manifest as
Islamophobia (discussed in Chapter Four). One example is the “ Muslim ban."
In January 2017, shortly a丘er taking o岳ce, Trump signed an Executive Order
called Protecting the Nation 卢om Fore您n Terrorist Entry into the United States,
temporarily banning the admission of people from seven majority-Muslim
countries: Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. 咀1e ban was
implemented as flights from these countries were in midair, which caused
chaos and widespread panic. An outcry on social media followed, and thousands
flocked to airports to protest the ban.τhere was also resistance in the courts:
several states and individual plaintiffs sued the federal government on the
grounds that the ban was not constitutional. In February 2017, a district
judge in Washington State suspended the ban nationwide with a temporary
restraining order. Six days later, a district appeals court upheld that ruling. In
May 2017, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 10 to 3 against Trump ’s
travel ban, reaffirming the lower court ’s decision.
The underlying motive for the president’s desire to ban the admission of
people from these seven countries is Islamophobia, which manifests here as
the fear that people from Muslim countries are the most likely to commit acts
of terrorism against the United States. 咀1is fear is unfounded.τhe sum total of
people killed by nationals from those seven countries between 1975 and 2015
is zero (Nowrasteh 2017). The Muslim ban would not make America any safer,
but it would have harmful effects on the lives of many people, as the Voices
story of the Zarour family shows.
Immigra tion Policy and Nativism in the Twenty-F irs • Ce n• ury 407
The Zarour Family

……· ·... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . ... . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . ..
The scent of black tea and rice wafts through the bare apartment the Zarour family
has come to call home after fleeing Syria.
It's been three months since they arrived in El Cajon, [California,] home to the
second-largest Iraqi diaspora in the United States .... Starting a new life has been
difficult, she says, but it is better than the alternative they escaped four years ago: the .
crack of strafing fire from government or rebel troops in what was once the city of
Homs, and explosions that left only gaping craters or rubble where bustling urban life
once hummed....
Zarour, her husband, and her five children are among the nearly 800 Syrian
refugees who ar1~ived in San Diego County last year and settled in El Cajon.
California led the nation in resettlement of Syrian refugees in fiscal 2016, taking
in 1,450 immigrants, according to the Pew Research Center.... Here, grocery
store signs are in English and Arabic. Posters advertise realty and investment
services in both languages, alongside signs for concerts headlined by Arab
pop stars.
At the downtown El Cajon farmers market, resettlement agencies set up booths to
explain their services and hand out ACLU pamphlets about the right to wear a hijab.
Iraqi vendors work one table ov陀 selling cilantro, turnips and herbs from a commu-
nity garden maintained by immigrants and refugees. A sign hanging from their tent
in Arabic asks shoppers not to haggle over vegetable prices ....
The stress of starting anew has been amplified in recent weeks by President
Trump's executive order that placed a 120-day ban on all refugee admissions and an
indefinite suspension of admission for Syrian refugees.
The travel ban is on pause after a federal judge in Seattle issued a temporary
restraining order, but Zarour's husband, Ahmad, who still has family in Jordan and
Syria, wonders whether the order will affect them.
“飞再Thy does he view us as terrorists？矶le are people looking to start a new life ,'’
he says of Trump. “ We aren’t like that. We are Muslims, but we are very
kind.” . . .
Two years after the Syrian civil war began, Zarour abandoned his small super-
market in Homs and gave up his work molding custom ceilings. The family settled in
Damascus before it too became too dangerous. They fled to Zaatari refugee camp, a
squalid but sprawling outpost near the Jordanian-Syrian border. They spent 20 days
in the camp before they moved to another town....
(conti＇饥
. .ued)
408 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Nativism, and Imm ig 「ation Po licy
Co饥.tinued Early in their stay in Jordan, they registered as refugees with the United
Nations. Eventually, after two years of interviews, the U.N. High Commissioner
(/) for Refugees referred them for resettlement in the United States..
Adjusting to a new life in America has bruised the pride of a man accus-
tomed to providing for his family.
. He struggles to learn the skills taught in workshops mandated by resettle-
ment agencies-basics such as learning English, navigating public transpor-
tation or how to open a bank account. Attending those classes is tied to the
financial aid the family receives.
To fit all seven people in their small two-bedroom apartment, the five
children sleep wall-to-wall in the master bedroom. He and his wife sleep in
the spare room.
The three couches in his living 1~oom were donated.
Before the war in Syria, he had a home of his own, lived near his siblings,
and held a government job that helped him pay the bills. As he places a glass
of tea on the cardboard box he now uses as a coffee table, Zarour wonders if
he will ever find a piece of the happiness he once knew.
Source: Parvi11i 2017.
........ . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. ..... . ... . .... . . . . . .. . . . . . .... . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .. . . . . . ... .. ..... . ... . .... . . . . ..
How far have we come since 1882, the year the Chinese Exclusion Act was
passed ？咀1e immigration laws enacted since 1965 in the United States do
not have overt racial provisions like the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act or the
1924 Oriental Exclusion Act. We also have not seen anything as egregious
as the 1954 Operation Wetback. Laws with these names would be untenable
in the twenty-first-century United States. Nevertheless, we continue to see
both the racially uneven consequences of immigration laws and racialized sen-
timents directed at particular national-origin and racial groups.
This chapter has shown that U.S. immigration policy has been racialized
from the beginning. At the same time, the way these policies have been racial-
ized has changed over time, as racial ideologies have shifted. Throughout his-
tory, nativism has also consistently reared its head, although in different ways
over time.
Harvard professor Aristide Zolberg titled his 2009 book on immigra-
tion policy A Nation by Design, hinting at the ways that immigration policy
has been deployed with the goal of creating an ideal populace. In 1882, the
Chinese Exclusion Act was passed to end the influx of Chinese laborers. 咀1e
1924 Immigration Act was designed to recruit immigrants from northern and
western Europe and to exclude immigrants from the rest of the world. The
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act was passed in the name of civil rights
and ostensibly to create a diverse society, yet ended up creating a large undoc-
umented Mexican population. 币1e 1986 laws were passed with the hope of
ending immigration. When that did not work, the 1996 laws made life more
di而cult and precarious for immigrants.τhe current state laws are designed
with the hope that immigrants will self二deport. 卫1e push toward changing
immigration laws at the national level is driven in large part by a desire to limit
the number of nonwhite immigrants allowed to enter the United States. As the
number of nonwhite immigrants has grown since 1965, we have seen increas-
ingly harsh and restrictive immigration laws and proposals.
Key Terms
nativism 378 1965 Immigration and Nationality Illegal Immigration Reform and
Oriental Exclusion Act 381 Act 384 Immigrant Responsibility Act
1986 Immigration Reform and (IIRIRA) 398
legal permanent resident 382
Control Act (IRCA) 395 Personal Responsibility and Work
bracero program 383
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Opportunity Reconciliation Act
Operation Wetback 384 (PRWORA) 398
Penalty Act (AEDPA) 398
McCarran Internal Security
Act 384
13.1 How does the history of U.S. immigration policy reflect racism and nativism?
(pp. 378-394)
• N ativism and racism have been intertwined in U.S. immigration policies since the
beginning of the nation’s history.
．咀1e first piece of immigration legislation was the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.
Laws continued to be racialized over the course of the twentieth century.
410 CHAPTER 13 Racism, Na • ivism, and Immigration Po licy

》飞八That is the significance of the Chinese > How has immigration changed the United
Exclusion Act and the court cases that stemmed States?
from it? > How have economic circumstances played a
》飞气Thy was Operation Wetback important? role in the passage of immigration laws?
> How did U.S. colonial and imperial relation-
ships with other countries affect migration
flows?
13.2 How has U.S. policy responded to undocumented immigration?

(pp. 394-403)
• Prior to 1965, there were no numerical restrictions on Mexican immigration.
• Passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and the subsequent 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act created the problem of illegal immigration.
Since then, more restrictive laws have been passed.

> What were some major changes brought about > Are IRCA and IIRIRA related to racialized
by the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act? sentiments? How so?
> What legislative changes sparked Asian and
Latin American immigration in the late twenti-
eth century?
》认That restrictive immigration laws were passed
in the late twentieth century?
13.3 What is the relationship between nativism and racism in the twenty-first
century? (pp. 404-408)
．咀1e 1996 laws were restrictive and have led to the deportation of thousands of
immigrants-mostly black and Latino men.

η How does contemporary nativism differ from ” Why are Latin American immigrants the most
that of previous historical periods? likely to be deported?
Talking about Race

There are no statutes of limitations for illegal entr
long a丘er events a case may begin), as there are for most other crimes.
τhe next time you hear someone say something such as “ what part of
illegal don’t you understand ?” try bringing up statutes of limitations.
For example, you could explain that a person who shopli丘ed in 2010
wouldn’t be brought to trial for it in 2018, yet an immigrant can be
deported for illegal entry even decades a丘er the original offense. Use
this as an entry point for broader discussions of illegal immigration.
、
..
「〈注
“ Civilization is a method of living, an attitude of equal respect of all men,”- Jane Addams, Speech, Honolulu, 1933.
From the series Great Ideas of Western Man. George Git1sti. 1955. I11dia ink and got1ache on paper, 2 今－7/8 x 18- 5/ 16 i11.
飞...')1nitl1sonia12 A,nericαnAγT lYluseunz, vf!ash ing·to11, DC/Art Resource, NY]
. .
Chapter 。utline
. . Perspectives on Racia l Justice 415

Recognition, Responsibility,
Reconstruction, and Reparations 416
Civil Rights 419
Human Rights 421
Struggles for Racial Justice 424
Racial Justice and the Foreclosure
Crisis 425
voices Fighting Agains↑ Fo「ec l osu 「es:
A Racial Justice Story 426
DREAMers and the Fight
for Justice 428
voices Th 「ee Leade 「ship Lessons
f「om Opal Tometi 431
Moving Beyond Race 434
lntersectional Analyses:
Race, Class, Gender 434
Racism and Capitalism 435
Check You 「 Unde 「standing 438
As y。u Reαd
14.1 What does racial justice look like?
” .2 How can we achieve racial justice?
14.3 What is the connection between racial justice and empathy?
14.4 Why is a sing11lar focus on racism insufficient to achieve racial
justice?
414 CHAPTER 14 Rocio I Jus • ice in • he United Sto • es Todoy
On the fiftieth anniversary of the 1963 March on Washington, civil

rights lawyer, author, and activist Michelle Alexander posted the
following update on her public Facebook page. Her comments provide a
great starting point for a conversation about racial justice, the limits of
civil rights, and the connections between mass incarceration and other
forms of exclusion l1ere and abroad. Her work also raises important
questions about the relationship between racism and capitalism.
or the past several years, I have spent

virtually all my working hours writing
about or speaking about the immo-
rality, cruelty, racism, and insanity of our
nation's latest caste system: mass incarcer-
ation. On this Facebook page I have written
and posted about little else. But as I pause
today to reflect on the meaning and signifi-
cance of the SOth anniversary of the March
on Washington, I realize that my focus
has been too narrow. Five years a丘er the
March, Dr. I(ing was speaking out against
the Vietnam War, condemningAmerica’s militarism and imperialism-famously
stating that our nation was the “ greatest purveyor of violence in the world.” He
saw the connections between the wars we wage abroad, and the utter indifference
we have for poor people, and people of color at home. He saw the necessity of
openly critiquing an economic system that will fund war and will reward greed,
hand over fist, but will not pay workers a living wage. Five years a丘er the March
on Washington, Dr. I(ing was ignoring all those who told him to just stay in his
lane, just stick to talking about civil rights. Yet here I am decades later, staying in
my lane. I have not been speaking publicly about the relationship between drones
abroad and the War on Drugs at home. I have not been talking about the connec-
tions between the corrupt capitalism that bails out Wall Street bankers, moves
jobs overseas, and forecloses on homes with zeal, all while private prisons yield
high returns and expand operations into a new market: caging immigrants. I have
not been connecting the dots between the NSA spying on millions ofAmericans,
the labeling of mosques as “ terrorist organizations," and the spy programs of the
1960sand ’ 70s-specifically the FBI and COINTELPRO programs that placed
Pe 「spec tives on Racia l Justice 415
civil rights advocates under constant surveillance, infiltrated civil rights organi-
zations, and assassinated racial justice leaders. I have been staying in my lane. But
no more. In my view, the most important lesson we can learn from Dr. I(ing is not
what he said at the March on Washington, but what he said and did a丘er. In the
years that followed, he did not play politics to see what crumbs a fundamentally
corrupt system might toss to the beggars of justice. Instead he connected the dots
and committed himselfto building a movement that would shake the foundations
of our economic and social order, so that the dream he preached in 1963 might
one day be a reality for all. He said that nothing less than “ a radical restructuring
of society” could possibly ensure justice and dignity for all. He was right. I am still
committed to building a movement to end mass incarceration, but I will not do
it with blinders on. If all we do is end mass incarceration, this movement will not
have gone nearly far enough. A new system ofracial and social control will be born
again, all because we did not do what King demanded we do: connect the dots
between poverty, racism, militarism, and materialism. I ’m ge忧ing out of my lane.
I hope you’re already out ofyours.
Source: Aleχander 201 3 .
A former civil rights lawyer, Michelle Alexander has focused on mass incar-
ceration as one of the most pressing racial justice issues for African Ameri-
cans today. In her Facebook post of A吨ust 28, 2013 (see box), she reflects on
the possibility that her focus has been too narrow. Drawing inspiration from
Dr. Martin Luther I(ing Jr., Alexander considers the fact that l(ing also con-
demned America’s militarism and imperialism and explored the connections
among wars, poverty, and racism. She reflects on the fact that there are rela-
tionships among the outsourcing of jobs overseas, home foreclosures, mass
detention of immigrants, and mass incarceration.
In this book, we have focused on the history of the idea of race, the changing
nature of racism, and various ideologies and institutions that perpetuate racism.
Where do we go from here? Now that we know the extent of racism in U.S. society,
what do we do about it? Moreover, is a singular focus on race and racism enough?
PERSPECTIVES 。 N RACIAL JUSTICE

What is racial justice? There is no correct answer to this question, as racial jus- racial justice The creation
tice looks different depending on your perspective, but we will define it broadly of a society devoid of
here as the creation of a society devoid of racial oppression. For some people, racial oppression.
416 CHAPTER 14 Rocio I Jus• ice in • he United Sto• es Todoy
racial justice involves the passage of effective laws and policies that create a non-
discriminatory society. ’These laws also look different according to your perspec-
tive. For some, racial justice requires granting reparations for people who have
suffered racial i时ustices. For others, strengthening civil rights law is the most
effective strategy. Still others advocate for a human rights perspective. And, as
we will discuss later, some people advocate for a much more expansive perspec-
tive on racial justice-one that addresses gender and economic justice as well.
For many thinkers, racial justice involves the eradication ofwhite supremacy.
Recognition, Responsibility, Reconstruction，。nd Reparations

Racism has caused tremendous harm, and some argue that this harm merits a
response. One proposed solution involves providing compensation for victims
of racism. Eric Yamamoto (2009) delineates four steps on the path to racial
justice from this perspective: recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and
reparations. He argues that these four steps are necessary to begin to redress
the harms created by racism. Let ’s take a look at each step so that we can eval-
uate the extent to which they might lead us to racial justice.
recognition The first of Recognition is the first step, when we recognize the harms created by racism.
Yamamoto’s (2009) four This step requires empathy, illustrated by society's ability to understand the
dime11sions of racial ange鸟 hurt, and material loss caused by racism. For example, empathetic moth-
justice: recognizing the ers of white boys would relate to how mothers of black boys felt a丘er Cleveland
harms created by racism.
> Children wave U.S. flags

at the fiftieth anniversary
of the 1963 March on
Washington.
Pe 「s pec ↑ ives on Rac ia l Justice 417
police officer Timothy Loehmann shot and killed twelve-year-old Tamir Rice
within two seconds of arriving outside a recreation center where the sixth-grader
was playing with a pellet gun. Recognition extends to the particularity of differ-
entgroups ’ experiences, such as how African Americans feel about slavery, Native
Americans about genocide, and Japanese Americans about internment. Recogni-
tion is viewed as an essential first step because it allows us to reflect on the gravity
of racial harms. We must come to terms with the fact that these wrongdoings con-
tinue to affect people’s lives and outlooks today. Recogn让ion permits everyone to
see, for example, that African Americans are unlikely to take jokes about slavery
or lynching lightly and that Native Americans are o丘en deeply offended when
sports teams use names that are racial slurs, such as the Redskins.
Responsibility asks people to acknowledge that someone is responsible for responsibility The second
harms inflicted on racial groups. 咀1e question of responsibility o丘en comes ofYa1namoto’s (2009)
up with regard to the enslavement of African Americans. Who is responsible? four dimensions of racial
Individual slaveowners? Their descendants ？ τhe financial institutions that justice: acknowledging
supported slavery? All whites? The U.S. government? How do we think about that someone is
responsibility for slavery given that it was abolished in the United States in responsible for the harms
1865 ？咀1ese are difficult questions, but it is clear the United States has yet to inflicted on racial groups.
atone for the i时ustice of slavery.
Reconstruction, the third dimension of racial justice, involves acting on reconstruction The third
the acknowledgment that harm has been committed. Once you recognize that of Yamamoto’s (2009)
harm has been done and figure out who should be held responsible, it is neces- four dimensions of racial
sary to take action. One form such action can take is an apology. In 1995, the justice: acting on the
Southern Baptist Convention issued a resolution apologizing “ to all African knowledge that harm has
Americans for condoning and/or perpetuating individual and systemic racism been inflicted on racial
in our lifetime'' (Southern Baptist Convention 1995). In 200究 the U.S. Con- gro11ps.
gress issued a formal apology for slavery.τhe apology, however, came with the
caveat that it was not meant to provide the basis for 均arations （τhompson
2009). The idea of reconstruction raises the question of how tl以Jnited States
can act on the acknowledgments that slavery is part of the nation's history and
that Native Americans' lands were unlawfully taken.
Reparations, the fourth and ultimate dimension of racial justice, refers reparations The fourth
to the act of repairing damage and providing restitution for past harms. A of Yamamoto’s (2009)
program of reparations has three main objectives: acknowledgment of past fo11r dimensions of racial
i时 ustice, redress for the i时ustice, and closure. One example of reparations justice: repairing damage
is the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which acknowledged that a great injustice and providing restitution
had been committed against Japanese Americans when they were interned for past harms against
during World War II.τhe act mandated that Congress pay each victim of racial groups.
internment $20,000 in reparations and renewed the question of reparations
for African Americans.
418 CHAPTER 14 Racial Jus tice in the United Sta •es Today
Economist William Dar

occurred that justify reparations for African Americans: slavery, legal seg-
regation, and ongoing present-day discrimination. Darity's arguments are a
reminder that reparations should contend not only with slavery but with the
long shadow it cast, from Jim Crow to contemporary racism.
What would reparations for slavery look like? A丘er emancipation, freed
slaves did not receive land in return for their years of labor. Darity (2008)
argues that if such land reform had taken place, each former slave would have
received ten acres of land. He further estimates that the land would have
cost about $10 per acre in 1865 . 咀1at means that the 4 million slaves who
were emancipated at the end of the Civil War would have received a total of
40 million acres of land, valued at $400 million. τhe 2008 value of that money
would amount to $1 .3 trillion today-or about $400,000 per contemporary
descendant of enslaved Africans.
Darity's calculation of $400,000 per person accounts only for slavery, not
for decades of legal segregation or for contemporary discrimination. Other
scholars have calculated the racial losses and gains of labor market discrim-
ination. Darity's estimate is that discrimination in employment from 1929 to
1969 produced a total benefit of $1.6 trillion to whites by the 1980s (Dar
2008). The figure would be much higher if adjusted to present-day dollars.
Studies continue to show that whites earn an average of 10 to 20 percent more
than blacks with similar educational levels and work experie肌e (Pager，飞厅est
err
ination is in the trillions. How do we grapple with the fact that discrimination
has real monetary costs for African Americans?
Because ofhistorical and ongoing discrimination, some scholars are calling
for reparations for African Americans. These reparations could take the form
of direct cash transfers. However, reparations do not have to mean sending
checks to each African American family. Alternatively, they could also involve
investment in education in African American communities, educational
scholarships, community development funds, construction of monuments
and museums dedicated to African American culture and history, and land
grants.
One question we can raise about reparations is whether they would address
ongoing racism. Reparations usually focus on past wrongs, yet racism is an
ongoing issue. Many white American families accumulated wealth during slav-
ery as a direct result of the enslavement of Africans. There are also many Afri-
can American families whose impoverishment can be traced back to slavery.
It can, however, be very difficult to tease out exactly which families benefited
Pe 「spec t ives on Racia l Justice 419
< An activist at a 2017

march in San Francisco
calls for reparatio11s for the
descendants of slaves.
from slavery. Nevertheless, it is clear that slavery has had a lasting impact on
our society, and it may be unreasonable to expect African Americans to move
on and forget about it without some sort of response from the state. Moreover,
as conceptualized by William Darity, reparations programs would redress not
only the harms of slavery, but also the harms of Jim Crow laws and ongoing
discrimination.
Another question about reparations concerns how such a program would
take into account the different facets of racism in our society. Racism affects
people in different ways depending on their social location and factors such as
their race/ ethnicity, class, gende鸟 sexuality, and citizenship. For example, if
a reparations program built community centers in impoverished urban com-
munities, it would be helpful mostly to people in those communities, but not
to people in rural areas or to middle-class people who would never use those
community centers.
Civil Rights
Michelle Alexander is one of many African Americans who have taken up the
issue of civil rights as a means to fight for racial justice. Civil rights, according civil rights Governn1ent-
to Roy Brooks, are “ government-sanctioned freedoms and privileges designed sanctioned protections
to promote equal oppo巾nity" (2009，份 . Brooks further notes that equal against discrimination.
opportunity may require different treatment for groups that are situated diι
ferently in society.
420 CHAPTER 14 Racial Jus • ice in • he United S• 0 • es Today
Civil rights include the right to a fair trial, the right of each adult in the
United States to a vote, the right to not face discrimination in employment,
and the right to have equal access to public education. The main idea is that we
have the right to not be discriminated against, as stated in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 币1us, even though we have the right to vote, the government is not
required to provide free transportation to voting booths. Instead, the spirit of
the law is that the government or other bodies cannot make it more di侃cult for
some groups to vote than others.
A key victory in the civil rights movement was the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
which was designed to prevent discrimination from occurring at the voting
booth. Prior to passage of this act, some jurisdictions had measures in place
that were specifically designed to prevent African Americans from voting.
Just as an act can be passed, its provisions can be repealed. In 2013, the
Supreme Court did just that, holding that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act
was unconstitutional. Section 4 required nine states, mostly in the South,
to seek federal approval prior to changing their election laws, voting dis-
tricts, or voter ID provisions, a process called preclearance. 咀1is part of the
act had been included because of the history of discrimination in these nine
states. In the 2013 decision, the Supreme Court decided that this measure
was unconstitutional and that states could change their voting laws if they
so desired.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg issued a dissent in response, arguing that
the Voting Rights Act is needed because minority voters continue to experi-
ence barriers to voting. She noted that the Voting Rights Act ’s requirement
of preclearance of all voting laws for the nine identified states has a history
of effectiveness in 叩holding minority voting rights (Shelby County, Alaban问
Petitioner v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., A时orney General, et al扎 In contrast, the Court
held that these provisions were no longer necessary in today’s world. It is
remarkable that the Court made this decision even though North Carolina一
one of the states in question-had used the new rules to redraw its districts
such that there were ten Republican districts and three Democrat districts.
Even though North Carolina is evenly divided between Republicans and
Democrats, the voting districts have been successfully gerrymandered to
ensure that ten out of thirteen seats in North Carolina went to Republican
candidates in 2016.
卫1e 2013 repeal of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act points to a major bar-
rier to civil rights work in the United States: it is hard to legislate against dis-
crimination when many people believe it is no longer a problem. 咀1e Supreme
Court’s justification for repealing these provisions was that racial dynamics
Pe 「spec↑ives on Rae ia I Justice 421
have changed since 1965. As outlined in Chapter Three, they have. However,
many would argue that racial inequality in voting rights continues to be an
issue. Remarkably, the Supreme Court agreed in a subsequent decision. In
May 2017, the Supreme Court struck down North Carolina’s redistricting
laws, ruling that packing the majority of African Americans into two districts
is unconstitutional.
Civil rights victories, despite setbacks, have been monumental in the United
States. Nevertheless, the civil rights discourse has its limits. One issue is that
in a society in which everyone decries racism and few people consider them-
selves racist, it can be extremely di面cult to prove that a person has indeed
been discriminated against. For example, simply showing that African Amer-
icans get longer sentences than whites for similar offenses is not enough to
prove that African Americans' civil rights have been violated, due to a 1987
Supreme Court decision-McCleskeyv. Kemp.
Warren McClesky, a black man, was sentenced to death for murder of a
white police officer. McClesky provided statistical evidence that death sen-
tences were more likely to be given to African Americans convicted of killing
whites than vice-versa and thus argued that his sentence was discriminatory.
In a 5-4 ruling, the justices ruled that it was not sufficient to show there were
statistical differences as these did not show intent.τhat decision meant that
racial bias in sentencing cannot be challenged unless there is clear evidence of
discriminatory intent-which is very difficult to prove. Since the McCleskey
v. Kemp decision, clear evidence of discriminatory intent must be provided to
have a court case.
A second limitation of the civil rights approach is that U.S. civil rights laws
only provide for protection from discrimination and equality of opportu-
nity.τhey do not guarantee any sort of equality of outcomes. For example,
if a corporation pays all of its black employees 20 percent less than its white
employees, even though they have similar levels of human capital, a civil
rights case could not be brought against the corporation without proof of
mechanisms that actively produce this discrimination. Simply showing that
the black employees earn less than the white employees is not su 而cient evi-
dence to bring a case.
Human Rights
Some thinkers contrast the civil rights vision with a human rights vision
(Blau and Moncada 2005). Civil rights laws tend to provide protection from
discrimination but do not provide the right to anything in particular; they
are thus called negative rights. By contrast, positive rights provide the right
422 CHAPTER 14 Rocio I Jus • ice in • he United S• 0 • es Todoy
to something specific, such as health care. For example, under a civil rights
vision, you could say that doctors cannot discriminate against patients on
the basis of skin color. Under a human rights vision, we could advocate for
the right to health care for all, regardless of skin color. 飞叫1e could also envision
making demands for the rights to adequate housing and education.
human rights Universal A human rights framework, based on the Universal Declaration of
rights such as access to Human Rights (UDHR) and other doctrines, is more comprehensive than
health care, adequate a civil rights framework. It encompasses civil rights and thus includes the
housing, and ed11cation. right to not face discrimination. Yet, it is broader than just civil rights, and
it argues for the universal extension of rights such as good health care and
an adequate standard of living. In Belarus, for example, the national consti-
tution guarantees the right to health care. In South Africa, the constitution
guarantees the right to adequate housing. These rights are derived from the
UDHR and other documents, such as the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
Excerpts frolll the Universal Declaration

of Hulllan Rights
Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard ofliving adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his famil~ including food1clothing, housing and medical care and nee-
essary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disab山切 widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his
control ....
Article 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education sh all be free1 at least in the elementary
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and
to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It sh all
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or reli-
gious groups, and sh all further the activities of the United N ations for the mainte-
nance of peace.
Pe 「spec ↑ ives on Rae ia I Justice 423
Excerpt froin the International Covenant

on Econoinic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Article 12
1. 卫1e States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. 卫1e steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full
realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
a. The provision for the reduction ofthe stillbirth-rate and ofinfant mortality and for
the healthy development of the child;
b. The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
c. The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and
other diseases;
d.τhe creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical
attention in the event of sickness.
The trouble with the human rights framework is that it is not part of U.S.
law, and therefore these claims are unenforceable. Incorporating human rights
into U.S. law would require changing the Constitution, which some scholars
have advocated (Feagin 2001; Blau and Moncada 2006). Judith Blau and
Alberto Moncada (2006, 20), for example, argue that people in the United
States have no legal recourse when they become homeless, have no health care,
or cannot afford to pay for college or even to put dinner on the table, because
“ the U.S. Constitution fails to give them rights to housing, a job, an education,
food security, health care, and so forth.τhe United States has not signed the
international treaties that make states responsible for upholding the rights of
their citizens. ”
In light of these limitations of our Constitution, scholar Joe Feagin also
advocates for a new Constitutional Convention. Unlike the first Constitutional
Convention in 1787, Feagin’s assembly would not be made up entirely of white
male property owners. Instead, it would have representation from every sector
of society二 It would have equal representation of men and women; proportional
representation from each racial group; and diversity in terms of sexual
orientation, disability, and class status. A new Constitutional Convention
would provide this country with a renewed chance to create a society that is
not built on systemic racism.
424 CHAPTER 14 Racial Justice in the United Sta •es Today
STRUGGLES F。 R RACIAL JUSTICE

Struggles for racial justice are being waged right now. One recent example is
the fight of Native Americans against the Dakota Access Pipeline-a con-
struction project that could endanger the lives and well-being of a Native
American tribe. North Dakota has recently undergone an oil boom, in part
owing to a new technology called £racking, which allows for oil to be drilled
from beneath the earth. One issue oil companies face is ge忧ing the oil from
North Dakota to the rest of the country. Pipelines allow for crude oil to be
transported underground.
In 2015, a coalition of business interests known as Energy Transfer Partners
began the process of constructing a pipeline to transport crude oil from North
Dakota to Illinois. When the Standing Rock Tribe learned the pipeline would
pass through their reservation, they requested a full archaeological investi-
gation, which never took place (Sammon 2016). Although North Dakota has
experienced economic growth thanks to the oil boom, the Standing Rock
Sioux reservation sits in one of the poorest counties in the nation. Nearly
40 percent of the residents of the reservation live below the poverty line, and
the unemployment rate is 86 percent. They do not stand to benefit economi-
cally from construction of the pipeline, yet they will face consequences if the
pipeline bursts.
Members of the Standing Rock Sioux feared the pipeline could burst and
contaminate the Missouri River. For this reason they mounted a protest in
opposition to the pipeline. On April 1, 2015, members of the tribe launched a
prayer camp to protest the pipeline. They called on other tribes to join them.
Over 300 tribes came together in solidarity in an effort to shut down construc-
tion of the pipeline (Democracy Now 2016).
Energy Transfer Partners began construction in May 2016. In July 2016, the
Army Corps of Engineers granted permits for the pipeline to cross beneath the
Missouri and Cannon Ball rivers. Although this pipeline would pass through
tribal lands, the Army Corps of Engineers did not seek approval from the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. As a result, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 且led a
lawsuit against the Army Corps of Engineers onJuly2τ2016, and asked them
to stop construction immediately (EarthJustice 2016).
On September 3, 2016, bulldozers came to prepare the ground to install the
A Protesting the Dakota pipeline. Hundreds of protestors gathered to protest the construction. When
Access Pipeline in 2016.
the protestors went through the fence, the result was violent confrontation.
Tl1e construction of the
pipeline could e11danger Security guards hit and pushed protestors, unleashed dogs on them, and
the lives and well-being of a sprayed pepper spray in protestors’ faces. Eventually, the protestors were able
tribe of Native Americans. to stop the construction for that day (Democracy Now 2016).
S ↑「 uggles fo 「 Racial Jus • ice 425
Over the next couple of months, thousands of people gathered at Stand-

ing Rock to protest the pipeline. By December 2016, there were 7,000 people
camping at Standing Rock in solidarity with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.
Even though authorities have deployed pepper spray, rubber bullets, and water
cannons at the protestors, and even though temperatures are well below freez-
ing, the protestors persisted (Mele 2016). However, shortly a丘er taking office,
on January 24, President Donald Trump signed a memorandum ordering the
Secretary of the Army to expedite approval of the Dakota Access Pipeline.
And, on February 22, 2017, state officials ordered the protestors to evacuate.
Just before the final evacuation, protestors set fire to the camp.
卫1ese struggles for justice are sometimes victorious. We saw a positive devel-
opment, for example, in the case of Marissa Alexander, an African American
woman who went to prison in 2012 for firing a warning shot in self-defense.
Marissa's husband, who had assaulted her in the past, had called her names
and threatened to beat her a丘er she gave birth to a premature baby. Becoming
scared, she picked up a gun and fired a warning shot into her kitchen wall,
an act that resulted in her arrest. Marissa was sentenced to twenty years in
prison, even though this was her first conviction, her warning shot did not
hurt anyone, and even though she was subject to the same self二defense laws in
Florida as George Zimmerman was in the Trayvon Martin case. When activ-
ists heard of her case, they launched a campaign to have her freed from prison.
A丘er two years, Alexander’s case was overturned, and she was issued a new
trial but remained behind bars (Salzillo 2013). However, owing to activism
around the country, she was released just in time for Thanksgiving. Prior to
Alexander ’s retrial, she pleaded guilty to three felony charges of aggravated
assault and received a sentence of three years in prison. Since this sentence
included the 1,030 days she had already served, she returned to prison for only
an additional 65 days and was released from prison in]anuary 201 S.
Racial Justiceαnd the Foreclosure Crisis

In Chapter Ten, we learned about racial disparities in housing, including those in
the most recent foreclosure crisis. As you may recall, in the 1990s and early2000s,
predatory lenders began to aggressively target black and Latino homeowners and
potential buyers, offering subprime loans. By 2000, 18 percent of black or Latino
homeowners had these loans-up from only 2 percent in 1993. In comparison,
less than 10 percent of white homeowners had subprime loans in 2000. By 2009,
over 15 percent of subprime loans were in foreclosure (Rugh and Massey 2010;
Dymksi, Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013). Many of these foreclosures happened
because homes in black and Latino neighborhoods did not increase in value as
anticipated.τhe unfavorable loans le丘 homeowners owing more money than
426 CHAPTER 14 Racial Jus tice in the United Sta •es Today
their homes were worth, so that foreclosure was o丘en their best financial option.
However, as the story of the Garretts shows, sometimes foreclosure is not the
best option, especially for families. Family homes have important sentimental
value, and some families are simply not willing to walk away from them.
Fighting Against Foreclosures: A Racial

Justice Story
……·· . .. .. .. . .. . . . . . .................. ... ............ . ... .. . . ... . .. . .. .. .. . .. . ... . ....... . ...... . ... . . .. ... . ......
In 1990, William and Bertha Garrett purchased their

dream home in Detroit and were able to move out
of their rented apartment. William owned a barber
shop, and Bertha was a homemaker and author. They
. were happy to find out that most of the residents on
the block were, like them, African Americans born in
the South who had relocated to Detroit in search of
opportunities.
They moved into the hon1e with their six children
and immediately got to work beautifying the house
and turning it into their family home. They were esp •
cially pro11d of tl1e expansive backyard, which l1osted
Berthααηd 阿吃lliαm
three family weddings. Gα1·1·ett.
Witl1in a few years, the Garretts were able to pay
off their $40,000 mortgage in full. In 1998, Bertl1a received a call from a lender who
convinced her to take out a second mortgage for $45,000. He told l1er the equity i11
her ho1ne was just sitting there and that she should invest it. Although Bertha did
not know it, this man was a predatory lender wl10 sought out families and convinced
them to take on loans with unfavorable conditions. A disproportionate number of
people who took on these loans were African American.
W让h children in college and ministry school, the extra money seemed like a good
idea. It may have been a good idea, and Bertha may have qualified to take out a
second mortgage from a bank witl1 a fixed rate. However, she was not aware of the
unfavorable conditions of the loan from the predatory lender and signed on to a nevv
adjustable-rate mortgage. This mortgage meant that they initially had a low interest
rate, but when interest rates went up, their debt ballooned to $190,000-quadruple
what they l1ad i11itially borrowed. The Garretts were unable to keep up witl1 the rising
payme时s and turned to tl1eir da11ghter, Michelle, for l1elp.
Michelle bo11ght the home fron1 them and negotiated the debt down to $125,000.
This brought their monthly payments down to $900. Soon, however, the payments
S t「 u gg l es fo 「 R ac i a l Justice 427
went up to $1,300. 引Tith this type of mortgage, rates go up and down with
the prevailing interest rates. Meanwhile，引Tillia1n fell ill and became legally
blind. As a result, he had to close the barber shop and no longer had an <
1nco日1e.
。
。。ω
Bertha applied for a loan modification in an effort to reduce tl1e monthly .......
n1ortgage. Instead, her payments rose to $1,650 a montl1. Micl1elle agreed to
help her mother with the payments. She did, until she was laid off from her
own job.
Once the Garretts missed payments, the bank sold their n1ortgage to
anotl1er company, and the payments jumped to $2,500 a month. These
mortgage payments were for much more than the house was worth: a house
down the street sold for $3,500 during this ti1ne.
Un"villing to give 11p their home, the family continued to scrape together
the money to pay until tl1ey simply co11ld not and had nothing left to sell. In
December 2010, the Garretts received a foreclosure notice.
Shame kept Bertha Garrett fron1 telling anyone abot1t the pending fore-
closure. Her husband’s healtl1 was not i1nproving. Sl1e did not know it, but
several other homes on her block were also in foreclosure. In the city of
Detroit, banks foreclosed on over 100,000 homes between 2000 and 2010.
A bank bot1ght Bertha's home for $12,000, a11d she received an eviction
notice in November 2011. She was still not willing to leave her home. On
her eviction day in January 2012, a small crowd formed arot1nd the Gar-
retts’s ho1ne. Bertha had finally reached out, and several activist groups got
together to support her and fight her eviction. Under Detroit law, an eviction
cannot take place without a dumpster parked in front of the l1ome. 引币1en tl1e
dumpster arrived, the residents refi1sed to let it down tl1e street. The driver
eventually gave up and left.
Meanwhile, Bertl1a was downtown, insisting that she be give11 an oppor-
tunity to speak with a representative from her 1nortgage company二引而en the
secretary told her she couldn’t speak with anyone, Bertha lay down in front
of the door of the New York Mello11 Corporatio11 and refused to move. Her
demand was that the corporation sell her the house she called l101ne for the
$12,000 tl1e corporation l1ad paid for it.
Eventt1ally, the mortgage company gave in to the activist presst1re and
the press attention and sold Mrs. Garrett back her home for $12,000. (This
price may sound low, bt1t on January 31, 2013, the house next door sold for
$14,000.)
Sources: Gottesdiener 2013; Abbey-Lambertz 2012; and Zillow.com.
…………….......··.............……………………………………………………….…..
DREAMers and the Fight for Justice

The United States currently has about 11 million undocumented immigrants.
Many of them are youth who have grown up in the United States and who feel
that they belong in this country. In many ways, their struggle for rights is a
struggle for racial justice because the vast majority of undocumented immi-
grants are people of color.
In 2001, immigrant rights groups pushed Congress to propose a bill called
the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act.
Although they were unsuccessful in ge忧ing the bill passed, their efforts led
to a movement designed to fight for the rights of DREAMers-youth who
are undocumented and yet have grown up in the United States and have com-
pleted most of their schooling in this country. Many of these youth identify as
Americans. 0丘en, their parents do not tell them they are undocumented until
they are teenagers. It can be devastating for them to find out that they do not
have permission to live in the land they call home.
Many of these youths came together and fought for passage of the DREAM
Act, which would grant them a path to U.S. citizenship. During the first
decade of the twenty-first century, these youth created various organizations,
including United We Dream, National Day Labor Organizing Network, and
the Immigrant Youth Justice League. But still Congress failed to pass the
DREAM Act.
In May 2010, four undocumented youth and their legally present allies
decided it was time to move beyond lobbying.τhey occupied the office of
Senator John McCain in Tucson, Arizona, urging him to sign the DREAM
Act.τhree of the undocumented youth-Mohammad Abdulahi, Yahaira
Carrillo, and Lizbeth Mateo, along with legal resident Raul Alcaraz-were
arrested. This was a huge risk for these youth, as they could have been
deported a丘er being arrested, but fortunately for them, they were released
the following day.
Since then, undocumented youth activists have continued to organize sit-
ins and other actions to demand their right to stay in this country. In addition
to sit-ins, they have organized to fight against deportations on a case-by-case
basis. For example, Rigo Padilla was arrested for driving under the influence
in January 2009.τhe Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights,
along with other organizations, held rallies and circulated petitions against
Padilla's deportation. In August 2009, he was granted a reprieve from deporta-
tion (Puente 2009). Immigrant rights organizers have successfully prevented
the deportation of hundreds of people through similar actions.
S t「 ugg l es fo 「 Racia l Justice 429
Undocun1ented students
from around tl1e cot1ntry
demand passage of tl1e
DREAM Act despite
tl1e threat of arrest and
deportatio11.
In 2012, DREAMers were able to successfully pressure President Obama

into providing deferred action and work permits to undocumented youth.
In June 2012, the president issued the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) memo阳
tion for two years. To qualify, undocumented immigrants must have been
under the age of thirty-one on June 15, 2012; have arrived in the United
States before the age of sixteen; and be currently enrolled either in school
or in the armed forces or already have completed high school. At the time
DACA was issued, the Migration Policy Institute estimated that there
were 1.76 million eligible youth and that 85 percent were Latin American,
9 percent were Asian, and about 6 percent were from other parts of the world
(Batalova and Mittelstadt, 201 功. The passage of DACA was a 吗nificant
victory for the immigrant rights movement, yet it still le丘 activists with a lot of
work to do. DACA applied only to a small portion of undocumented people;
it le丘 DREAMers' parents in the same situation and was viable for only
two years.
Although candidate Donald Trump had promised to end DACA as one of
his first steps he would take as president, as of April 2017, he had not done so.
Because DACA is an Executive Order, Trump or any subsequent president can
revoke DACA with the stroke of a pen. 币1e struggle for the rights ofDREAMers
and other undocumented migrants thus continues.
RACIAL JUSTICE AND EMPATHY

These stories of communities fighting for their rights are inspiring. Why don’t
we hear about more of them? How can we stand by in good conscience as
people are losing their homes, being unfairly incarcerated or deported each
yea马 or being shot by police o面cers and security guards without cause? In
many cases, we allow these things to happen because we think that the people
who face these extreme circumstances brought it on themselves. Undeniably,
the majority of people who come into contact with the punitive arm of the
state are black or Latino and working class or poor. Yet many middle-class
white Americans believe that this country is fair, in part because they them-
selves are shielded from i叫ustice.
Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others.
When people in the United States hear that the father of three children was
deported, many respond that the person was here illegally and should have
known better. People who make such pronouncements tend to imagine this
father to be a Mexican man. What would happen if they imagined a white
man? What if a white woman heard that her sister’s husband, who came to the
United States when he was five, was facing deportation because he allowed
his visa to lapse? Would she have more empathy? What if you heard your
uncle was going to jail for twenty years because he had been charged with
marijuana possession for the third time? What if the first charge occurred
when he was eighteen, the second when he was twenty-two, and the third
when he was forty岳ve? How would you feel if it happened to you or some-
one close to you? What if you heard that your sister was going to jail for ten
years because she threatened her abusive husband with a shotgun in order to
escape from her home?
Once you are capable of imagining that something like foreclosure or
outrageous medical bills or incarceration or deportation could happen to
you or someone like you, it is a lot easier to see how u叫ust our laws are.
However, if you think that these things only happen to “ people like them''
or irresponsible people or criminals, you might not see our justice system as
problematic. Racism is an ideology that makes us believe that some people
are less worthy than others. Can we imagine a society in which all human life
is valued equally?
In the final Voices excerpt in this section, Opal Tometi, co-founder of
#BlackLivesMatter, shares her reflections on justice through leadership les-
sons. She encourages us to take stock of our history-to face our past and to
learn from it. Throughout this book, you have learned about many types of
racial injustice. 认That will you do with that knowledge?
Racial Justice and Empa • hy 431
Three Leadership Lessons from

Opal Tometi
…………… … ………………………… … …··.... .
Opal Tometi, co-Jou：叫erof#Black
LivesMatter, shared these r飞flectio邸’with 豆 MIGRANT >
the 2016 graduates ofthe University of '*
Arizo’n a, her alma mater.
豆豆滔 ·;1, w 告
.
Lesson #1: Take Stock of Your History
Graduates, I encourage you to embrace
your history, have the courage to glean
the aspects of it that were positive and of
use-values that you'd want to nurture so
that they would blossom in your own life.
We must have the courage to face our past,
some of which we'll find is positive and
some negative. There are terrible histories
that you may want to distance yourself
from-like the killing and displacement of Opal Tometi
indigenous peoples, the kidnapping and
enslavement of people of African descent, the internment of Japanese people and
so on-but it's your responsibility to know and learn from that history. Whether we
like it or not, we are the products of it. Each of us inherits certain privileges, beliefs,
and resources, and unless we do the work of examining our past, distilling the
values, choosing the ones we want and deliberately discarding the others we know
don’t serve humanity-we'll find ourselves repeating the same errors of the past.
And instead of feeling guilty about the past or the privilege, it is more meaningful
to be accountable to it, learn from it and choose which side of history you will be on.
I hope you'll join me and choose the side of freedom.
Lesson #2: Don't Fear Obstacles; They Are Opportunities

Not too long ago, there was anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric being circulated in
everyday conversations and throughout the media. There was talk of new laws that
would infringe on people’s ability to access basic services, threats to LGBTQ rights,
increased surveillance of Muslims. There was a terrible war going on and stories of
civilians and children being brutalized and killed. There was hysteria surrounding
all of this, and it all seemed to peak with an impending election. There were many
(conti·叽.ued)
Co饥.tinued candidates, but only two received the most attention. And there was one
candidate in particular who many thought couldn’t win; yet despite all odds,
(/) this candidate was triumphant. His victory seemed to defy all logic.
I was in shock in 2004 when I learned that George W. Bush was reelected
into office. I was equally disturbed by the violent, immoral laws and bankrupt
. values that were being proposed by our “ leaders” at the federal, state and
local level. I had seen it firsthand because I worked actively on the campaign
to defeat Proposition 200, a piece of legislation that would further disen-
franchise undocumented immigrants-people I believe to be the most noble
and courageous beings on our planet-people who are so in touch with their
inherent human dignity, and that of their families, that they flee dire situa-
tions, brave scorching deserts, and perilous waters-in order to have a chance
at a better life. So, as a student in 2004 I was dis1nayed that Prop 200 passed.
I literally thought this had to be the bleakest moment in Arizona and
US history! The gorgeous community of friends I had acquired, and the
communities from around the world I had learned about through my history
books, seemed to be insignificant after the 2004 election, like thei1~ lives did
not matter. I felt defeated. Until one day, as I wiped away the tears, I began
to see more clearly. I realized I didn’t need to sit through any more classes; I
just needed to get out into the world and begin the work. I saw an opportu-
nity to graduate early and engage the world.
I turned my second major into a minor and wrote my capstone project, a
social history of women in Kosovo.
Now, please do not misconstrue the intent of this stor予 It’s not a political
fable because in my view standing for human rights and justice should not
be partisan. I share this story of my coming-oιage to illustrate that everyday
people have power, too. We cannot hand over our agency to those with official
titles. For me, the 2004 election was catalytic. And so my second lesson to you,
dear Wildcats, is not to fear obstacles but to see them as opportunities.
Lesson #3: Create + Live a New Story

And this leads to my third and final leadership lesson-and it's derived
from my early use of social media. It was a campaign to demand that Chan-
nel 3 stop using the term “ illegal” to describe undocumented people.
I had become passionate about the use of language in a history class I
had taken on the Holocaust, where I learned that genocide didn’t happen
overnight. It was gradual and seemingly ordinary. And it began with lan-
guage about Jewish people, and their value in the wo1~ld. I was deter1nined
to apply the knowledge from my class to the current context. So I invited
”飞呀’ friends on [social n1cdiaJ to call the news station and dcn1and they stop
usingpcjm混tivc lan伊age in thcit reporting. 11四忧rn1 ["illegal’皿 a nouri]
is both insensitive and downright negligent. Reporters were behaving as if <

innuigrants were not living, breathing human beings, whose lives actually
。
（
UOω
ina忧ercd. Stories of ranchers and Border Patrol Agents conta1ninatingor 一·
c、·en emptying bo忧lcs of water left in the desert t >z tnigrants as they crossed
proved to me the gravity of the issue. 111ese actions w白c despicable and
凹’tcntially deadly. And our everyday, seemingly ordinary language gave
permission to that.
I was deter1nincd to apply my history lesson to write a nc,vfuturc. One
where no one wonld be so dehumanized that they could be dcctncd illegal and
d叫）（）sable And that旨 why I launched [ this c盯ly social media] can1paign. A
ver·sion LO of online social justice organizing n1eant to impact 陀al lives o胃line.
And this 且me logic led n1e to partner with two other organizers to eo-crcatc
the Black Lives Ma忧er platform and chapt臼－based network A sort of 2.0 vcr-
sion of organizing! This campaign and now n1ove1ncnt has demanded an end
to anti-blackn四sand an end to the dchun1anization of Black people, capturing
the hearts and tninds of1nillions and ,nobilizing people of conscience aeross
the globe. We were notonlydetenuincd to write a new story but live a new
story so that we could have a world where one day all lives would final I)•’ n1atter.
You too 削e equipped with 回me of the most trans岛rn1ative knowledge
to ere ate a ne,v world Your dcgr时s have disproportionally gifted you 叫th
the tools to be soeial 盯ehiteets. You have the eapaeity to imagine and build
臼1 entirely different wol'ld. One ,vhcrc we 自nally have a 白1nctioning，叫brant
den11>craey that works for all of时，、、曹he陀 the breadth of our hu1nan exp心Ei
-
cnce ar、d the beauty 。f our spirits ar·c 创nbraced 由1d we arc all able t。 thri、，e
Y。u
ll。thing inconsequential about being alive in this mon1ent in history and
1)()sscssing the type ofinfonnation ）唱u have. But he，·℃’s the clincher-you
1nust apply the !cs捕ns 归u have learned here cthicall）•飞 and \\~ th hca rt.
You 出℃ eaeh ealled to lead ,vith courage and ,vith grace-knowing that
it’s a gift to be alive in this monient-and your being here is no mistake.

Future gener巩tions will judge us for what takes plaee during this pi,,otal
time in US and 矶＇orld history. And in a time fnll of uncertainty-one thing is
cert归n-we need you to lea，乱 And here's how: (1) take stock and l阳 accotmtahle
协冈山 histOJγ；（2) see the ohstacle and seize the opportmiity; and 创，vrite and
live a new and better story!
Source. Tometi 2016.
.. . ,. . . ... . . .. ,.,. . .. . . . .,.. . .. . . ' .… ……. e
434 CHAPTER 14 Racial Jus • ice in • he United S• 0 • es Today
M。YING BEY。 ND RACE

Racism is just one of many forms of oppression that are interlocking and per-
vasive. 咀1us, some scholars argue that a singular focus on racism is insufficient
to achieve racial justice. Institutionalized racism is a system of social control,
yet this system interlocks with other systems of social control and domination,
and racial injustice cannot be addressed in isolation.
lntersectional Analyses: Race, Class, Gender

In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars began to focus increasingly on the con-
intersectionality A nections among race, gender, and class.τhese scholars of intersectionality
simultaneous look at argued that racism, sexism, and classism cannot be studied independent of
race, ethnicity, class, and one another. Instead, we need to focus on how forms of oppression intersect.
gender oppression. A scholar of intersectionality would argue that the forms of oppression expe-
rienced by a working-class, black lesbian will be different from those faced by
Barack Obama, for example. These two very different people will confront
different forms of oppression and will experience their blackness in different
ways because of how their statuses interact with one another. An antiracist
agenda designed to help people like Barack Obama may do little or nothing for
working-class or poor African Americans.
Sociologist Zulema Valdez (2011) argues that the social structure in the
United States is composed of three interlocking systems of oppression: cap-
capitalism A profit-based italism, patriarchy, and white supremacy. Capitalism produces inequal-
economic system that ity through a profit-based system. Patriarchy is a system of oppression that
produces inequality二 ensures male dominance in terms of power and propert予 White supremacy
is a system of racial stratification that places whites at the top of the hierarchy.
patriarchy A system of Valdez (2011), following the work of Patricia Hill Collins (2004), contends
oppression that ensures that these three systems are interdependent and that we cannot understand
male dominance in terms one system of oppression without looking at the others.
of power and property. In 1991, Kimberle Crenshaw published a foundational article on intersec-
tionality arguing that this framework is necessary to understand the experi-
white supremacy A system ences of women of color who have survived domestic violence. In her study
of racial stratification that of women in a Los Angeles shelter, Crenshaw (1991) found that the women
places whites at the top of who seek protection are usually poor.τheir poverty is in part a result of lim-
the hiera1·cl1y. ited opportunities for women of color. They end up at the shelter because they
are fleeing domestic abuse and also because their poverty means they cannot
afford to go elsewhere. Women with financial means at their disposal do not
end up at the shelter. In general, women’s experiences of domestic violence
are linked to patriarchy, and the state ’s response (or lack thereof) is related
Moving Bey。nd Race 435
to racism. In su,n, to understand why women of color are overrepresented ,n

domestic violence shelters, we must look at this issue through the lenses of
race, class, and gender. Alone, each of these frameworks provides us with a
more lim ited understanding th归1 an intersectional framework can.
四世 focus of most intersectional work is a nalytical; it thus helps us under-
stand how racism ,-,orks in conjunction with other forms of oppression. How-
eve月 this body of work leaves open the question of how racial justice looks
from an intersectional perspective. Do we need to dismantle patriarchy to
fight racism? Do we need to undo class oppression to achieve racial justice?
How might we do that?
An intersectional framework could be used to critique the reparations per-
spective.τhe argument would be that since the disadvantaged status ofAfrican
Americans, for example, varies by gender, class, and sexuality, any approach to
reparations must take these distinctions seriously. Otherwise, the approach
risks reproducing patriarchy and capitalist inequality.
Racism and Capitalism

币1e consideration of inte四ectionality brings us to questions about capitalism’s
role in racial inequality. ls it possible to eradicate racism without eradicating
capitalism> Is racism a necessary component of capitalism?
τhe other side of this question is: How would capitalism look without
racism? What if everyone in the United States, regardless of racial status, had
< Arizona resident Le.she

Evans wipes tears 仕om
her cv，队 as she talks about
、、-hat 1t is like to be stuck
in the cycle of dome就ic
vmlence An intersectional
fr扭扭work can shed hght
onw如y women of c<>! or
are ov时represented m
domestic v10lence shelters.
436 CHAPTER 14 Rocio I Jus• ice in • he United Sto• es Todoy
an equal chance of being rich, middle class, or poor? Would that be racial jus-
tice? Even in that scenario, with so many poor people in the United States, mil-
lions of nonwhites would continue to be poor. Millions of people would still
lose their homes and be homeless. Is it even possible to eradicate racism with-
out eradicating capitalism? Or, as Michelle Alexander (2010) argues, would
another system of social control emerge to justify enormous inequalities?
It is clear that racism and class oppression are connected. For example,
African Americans are disproportionately represented among the poor. In this
sense, racial oppression is in large part-though not exclusively-a question
of class oppression.
West Indian historian Eric Williams famously wrote in 1944 that “ slavery
was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery." Both
Williams (1944, 6) and Audrey Smedley (2007) argue that racism arose from
the exploitative relationships of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism. In this
historical sense, racism cannot be separated from capitalism. Racial divisions
among workers continued well a丘er slavery. In the 1880s, white Californians
used racial vitriol to protest against Chinese workers. In the 1930s, divi-
sions between black and white workers prevented unions from forming and
demanding fair wages and benefits for all. In the 1960s, racial divisions in the
civil rights movement weakened the movement. It is conceivable that without
racism, some other ideology would have arisen to justify inequality and to pre-
vent the working class from uniting to promote its own interests. However, it is
also clear that racism has been detrimental to all members of the working class.
Racism in this country has evolved over time, from codified racial dispari-
ties to the color-blind racism that predominated during the Obama presidency
to the rise of neo-N azism today. Similarly, capitalism has changed from mer-
chant and industrial capitalism to the neoliberal and global capitalism of today.
Racism is simultaneously a system of oppression and a set of ideologies.
When we think about how to overcome racism, we have to keep this dual
character in mind. Racism needs to be rooted out at the ideological, psycho-
logical, and systemic levels. These processes have to be concurrent-they can’t
happen separately.
Let ’s think about this concretely: Is it possible for us to have a society free of
racism in which all of the gardeners are both underpaid and Latino men? If we
worked extremely hard to rid people of biases without changing the system, it
seems that plan would backfire because new ideologies (or the same old ones)
would emerge to explain the racially unequal system. Conversely, if we fought
to rid the world of racial inequalities and yet did nothing to work against
deeply held racist beliefs, it would be hard to maintain racial equality. If people
Conc lusion and Discuss ion 437
continued to think that black men are lazy, employers would continue to be
less likely to hire them for jobs. In this simplified version, you should be able to
see that the ideologies and practices of racism work together.
Our society is remarkably unequal. Racial disparities are enormous: black
and Latino families have just S percent of the wealth of white families. Over-
all disparities are also staggering: 1 percent of Americans own nearly half of
the wealth in this country (No巾n and Ariely 2011). In the context of mas-
sive overall inequality, it makes no sense to ask questions about the utility of
fighting against racism without paying attention to the economic inequalities
created by capitalism. Even if there were no racial disparities in income and
wealth, millions of people of color in the United States would still be poor.
Globally, billions of nonwhite people would continue to be poor because of the
extent of global inequality.
At the same time, perhaps racism is what permits this massive inequality
to exist. Perhaps a world without racist ideologies would inherently be a more
equal world. Perhaps the devaluation of black lives is what makes it possible
for the United States to have the largest prison system in the world. Perhaps
the devaluation of Arab lives is what made the wars in Iraq and A也hanistan
possible.
What do you think? Is racism integral to capitalism, or can we root out
racism without fundamentally changing the economic structure? Would a
battle against racism necessarily create less economic inequality? What about
a ba忧le against patriarchy? Do these battles have to be fought in co叫unction?
咀1ese are big questions, but we do not have to answer them before moving
toward racial justice.
咀1is chapter raises more questions than it answers. 咀1is is because there is
neither a clear-cut path toward racial justice nor a unified vision. Racism is a
scourge on our society, yet it is so deeply entrenched that seeing a way out of it
is difficult. However, activists and everyday people continue to fight for racial
justice in many ways.
Some people advocate for civil disobedience in response to particular racial
injustices, as we have seen in the stories in this chapter. Others contend we
need to work in the legal arena. Still others argue we need a new Constitutional
Convention. Some activists are fighting for reparations, while some are advo-
cating for a complete overthrow of the systems of white supremacy, capitalism,
and patriarchy.
438 CHAPTER 14 Rac ial Jus tice in the United Sta •es Today
What do you think？飞叩hat is your vision for racial justice? Do you see a place
for yourself in the struggle?
Finally, we can reflect on the fact that racial oppression affects each of us
differently. Nevertheless, racial divisions among blacks, whites, Asians, Latinos,
and Native Americans are harmful to all of these groups.No matter your social
location, you can fight against mass incarceration, mass deportation, school
closings, and predatory lenders. You can fight against the fear and loathing that
make these problems so widespread. And you can fight this fight because win-
ning it will create a better society for all.
Key Terms
racial justice 415 reparations 417 capitalism 434
recognition 416 civil rights 419 patriarchy 434
responsibility 417 human rights 422 white supremacy 434
reconstruction 417 intersectionality 434
14.1 What does racial justice look like? (pp. 415-423)

• Three main perspectives on racial justice are reparations, civil rights, and human
rights. Each perspective has its benefits and limitations.

> What are the steps toward racial justice that ” What do you think of the suggestion for a new
Yamamoto (2009) outlines? Give examples of Constitutional Convention? What are some
each. issues that such a convention might address?
” What are the differences between civil and 协 Does racial justice look different for various
human rights? groups? In what ways?
14.2 How can we achieve racial justice? (pp. 424-429)

• Communities can achieve victories in the fight for racial justice by coming
together.

> Why is the struggle for legalization of immi- > What activist tactics do you think are most
grants a question of racial justice? effective for securing racial justice, and why?
14.3 What is the connection between racial justice and empathy? (pp. 430-433)
• Achieving racial justice is especially challenging when people lack empathy.
Review Questions Critical Thinking

> What is empathy? > What is the role of white Americans in the
struggle for racial justice?
> Is racism harmful to white Americans? Why or
why not?
14.4 Why is a singular focus on racism insufficient to achieve racial justice?

(pp. 434-437)
• Race intersects with other forms of oppression; these interlocking oppressions
must be taken into account in any a忧empt to achieve racial justice.
Review Questions Criticαl Thinking

> What is the relationship between racism and > Is it possible to achieve racial justice in a capital-
capitalism? ist society？飞,Vhy or why not?
> How is intersectionality relevant to racial > How does racism affect different racial groups
justice? in distinct ways, and what does that mean for
racial justice?
Tα：lking α：bout Rαce

Empathy requires recognizing that other people might feel differently
than you do. For example, it is hard for some people to understand why many
African Americans are deeply offended by the usage of imagery such as nooses
and chains-objects that hearken back to slavery. It can also be hard for white
people to understand why some Halloween costumes are racist. During the
Halloween season of 2013, some white people dressed up as Trayvon Martin
and George Zimmerman. In one instance, a young man painted his face
black, wore a hoodie with a bloodstain on it, and was carrying Skittles in one
hand and iced tea in the other. How can consideration of racial empathy
inform a conversation about potentially offensive Halloween costumes?
Nelson Mandela. 飞、＇erner Op;tz <dicK’ki '" rt 1.1/u"'!/ Stu,k J唤。，。）
. .
Chapter 。utline
How Do Other Countries Differ

from the United States in Racial
Dynamics♀ 443
Race and Racism in France 446

French Colonies in Africa 446
α
oce
飞
The French Antilles 448

。 cisms in ranee,
l
〈
African Immigration to Fronce 448

o
门U
Discrimination and Racial and Ethnic

rica, an razi Inequality in France Today 449
voices Justice for Theo 451
Race and Racism in South Africa 454
Colonialism in South Africa: The
British and the Dutch 454
The Apartheid Era (1948- 1994) 454
voices South African Coloured 457
The Persistence of Inequality in the
Post- Apartheid Era 459
research focus The Poli•ics of White
You• h Ide n•i•y in South Africa 460
Race and Racism in Brazil 462
Portuguese Colonization and the
As y。u Reαd Slave Trade in Braz il 462
Whitening Through Immigration and
15.1 How do other countries differ from the United States in racial
Intermarriage 462
dynamics?
The Racial Democracy Myth in
15.2 In France, what are the effects of the government’s insistence Brazil and Affirmative Action 464
on not recognizing racial categories? v。1ices BraziI’s Color Bind 466
15.3 In South Africa, how does the legacy of apartheid affect racial Racial Categories in Braz il Today 468
dynamics?
research focus Racial Ideology and
15.4 In Brazil, how does the government-promoted idea of a racial Black- Whi•e In•erracial Marriages
democracy affect race relations? in Rio de Janei 「0 469
Talking abou• Race 473
442 CHAPTER 15 Thinking Globolly
VVh创1 journalist Eugene Robinson t raveled to Brazil, he had t rouble

figuring oul v, ho was black and who was white. To find out, he asked
other people. The answers \Vere not always ,vhat he expected. He
describes 1nany of the把 interactions in his book C<>al tο Crea1n
－「hese 阴阳’t trivial questions. I could see that there 阴阳 black people in
I Brazil, just like in the United States, and white people, although the pro-
I portions were obviously different. I knew that there had been a history
of slavery and eventual emancipation. And yet I had the sense that the w·ay
people here thought of race was not at all the same way I thought of it. Even
缸nong my group at the beach, with the range of skin tones and hair types pre忧y
much covering the whole spectrum, there was none of the obvious discomfort 1
had o仕en felt whenever race came up in a mixed group in the States, none of the
paralyzing fear of saying the wrong thing. Still, 1 wasn’t making much sense of the
inconsistent and contradictory things I was hearing. Race was important; race was
trivial.τhere were tons of black people in Brazil; no, there really weren’t that many.
lwasn’ t ge眈ing it.
1 decided to give up on theoretical classification and focus instead on the con-
cept of race 目lati。ns, which l figured would translate more easil予 I turned to my
colleague's Brazilian girlfriend, whose name I recall as Velma, and asked what it
was really like being black in Brazil.
She answered with a look of genuine surprise.
“ But I'm not,' she said. "I'm not black.”
,
She smiled at me as one smiles at a child ~ho just doesn’t understand, an isn、
he.-precious kind of smile. But then 1 saw her quickly glance around at the others,
making eye contact, and I had the sense she was somehow seeking to validate the
declarati。n she had just made.
Velma had been born more than a thousand miles away, in the poor northeast-
町n part of Brazil, the equivalent of our Deep Sou由－a place where a plantation
economy once flourished, where millions of African slaves had worked the 且elds,
where slavery had persis坦d a full generation past the end of the American Civil
War. It was obvious to me at 且rst glance that Velma was primarily a descendant of
those slaves. 刊ere was a lot of Indian in her, but mostly African. She was a small
womanwi由 longjeιblack hair，自a ring nostrils, high cheekbones, and brown skin
at least a couple. of shades darker than mine. ltwasn’ t even a close call, in my book
But she was telling me she " 'asn't black.
How Do O ↑ he 「 Countries Differ from the Uni • ed Sta • es in Rocio I Dynamics? 443
I blurted out,“But you must be, Velma. I ’m black, and you’re as dark as I am.”
She put her arm next to mine, to compare: Yes, she was darker. Positively, defin-
itively darker.
“ But this color isn’t black," she said. “卫1is isn’ t black at all.”
Trapped on what she clearly saw as the wrong side of the color line I was trying
to draw, Velma maintained flatly that as far as she was concerned, I wasn’t really
“ black ” either. I explained that in the United States I certainly was and always
would be, and that so, in fact, would she. Velma found this hard to understand,
and certainly wasn’t about to accept it. She allowed that I might not be “ white,” but
insisted that at the very least I fit well within the ill-defined parameters of pardo,
which roughly means light-brown-skinned. “ Black” was for her more of a descrip-
tion than a group designation, and it meant people with skin much darker than
mine.
Or, of course, hers.
Source: Robinson 1999, 11-13.
In this excerpt, we see how Robinson struggles to come to terms with the
fact that while he may see Velma as “ black,” she disagrees. As we have read
throughout this book, race is a social construction. People are not born “ black''
or “ white. ” Instead, people label each other as “ black ” or “ white” according to
social conventions. It is thus possible for Robinson to perceive Velma as black
while she herself does not, and it would be inaccurate to say that one of them is
right and the other wrong. The exchange between the two is an example of how
racial categories can be constructed differently in different places.
In fact, one of the best ways to grasp how racial ideologies work is to examine
racial ideologies in distinct locales. In this chapter, we will compare the United
States with France, South Africa, and Brazil.τhrough these comparisons, we
will see how distinct ideologies and practices can be deployed to achieve simi-
lar outcomes-the dominance and privilege of one group over others.
H 。W D。。THER C。 UNTRIES DIFFER FR。M THE

UNITED STATES IN RACIAL DYNAMICS?
The United States has a unique racial past-one that includes the geno-
cide of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, mass repatriation of
Mexicans, and the denial of citizenship to Asians. Additionally, the United
444 CHAPTER 15 Thinking G lobally
States implemented a formal segregation system for several decades in the

early twentieth century.τhe legal history of segregation in the United States
differentiates it from many countries, with the notable exception of South
Africa.τhe idea of race is important in the United States. However, this idea
was not invented here. Instead, as we learned in Chapter One, the idea of race
emerged from the oppressive systems of colonialism, slavery, and European
expansion. 咀1ese systems had a global impact, and concepts of whiteness
and blackness exist in each place touched by them.τhe countries examined
here-France, South Africa, and Brazil-each had unique dynamics of colo-
nialism and slavery, and these dynamics influenced the racial ideologies that
evolved in them.
Today, France, South Africa, Brazil, and the United States have distinct
racial makeups. In the United States and France, people of African descent
are a minority; in South Africa, they are a majority; and in Brazil, people of
African and European descent are about equal in number. These distinct racial
demographics have played a role in the evolution of racism and interracial rela-
tions in each cour山y (Marx 1996).
Brazil and South Africa have, in some ways, histories that are polar oppo-
sites. Brazil ’s self-identity has historically been one that celebrates racial
mixing and upholds the idea of a racial democracy. In contrast, South Africa
αpαrtheid Legally formed its national identity on a legacy of apartheid-legally enforced racial
e11forced racial segregation-and banned racial mixing. However, both countries have under-
segregation tl1at endt1red gone signi且cant changes in recent decades. South Africa ended apartheid in
fron1 1948 to 1994 in 1994 and now proclaims itself a “ rainbow nation," a country that embraces
South Africa. its diversity. Brazil has recognized the persistence of racial inequality and has
instituted racial quotas to increase the numbers of black and brown people
who can attend university (da Silva 2006, 2012).
France has historically maintained a color-blind stance, meaning that
anyone, regardless of skin color or place of birth, can become French. The
country distinguishes officially only between French nationals and foreign-
ers. People are either French or they are not-ethnic categories such as Mar-
tinican French or Senagalese French are not legally recognized in France.
Unlike the United States, France does not collect official data on the racial
self-identifications of its residents.
France has no history of official segregation or of denial of citizenship to
people based on their race. In the colonies, African subjects who attained a
certain social status were permi忧ed to become French citizens. There were no
laws that prevented Africans from becoming French because of their ances-
try. France also transformed some of its colonies into overseas departments
How Do O ↑ he 「 Countries Differ f 「om the Un i• ed Sta • es in Ra c ia I Dy na mics? 445
A Mourners sing outside the home of former South African president and
anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela following his death in 2013. Even after the
end of apartheid, t1·emendous inequality has persisted in South Africa.
(similar to states) of the French Republic. In 1946, for example, Guadeloupe,

Martinique, Reunion, and French Guiana became overseas departments.
People born in these places hold French citizenship. Despite an official rheto-
ric of equality, however, French people of African and Arab descent continue
to be socially and economically marginalized both on the mainland and in
these overseas departments.
Apartheid has finally been dismantled in South Africa, yet tremendous
inequality persists even without official barriers in place. In this respect, South
Africa is similar to other countries that maintain racial inequality through
entrenched practices instead of laws. Apartheid nevertheless shapes how
South Africans understand racial inequality. Graziella 岛1oraes Dias da Silva
(2012) found that South African blac】汇 profe蚓onals O丘en attributed continu
ing racism in the postapartheid era to competition for economic resources 一
which was one of the main reasons for instituting the apartheid system. One
black banker in South Africa told her that racism is “ about resources.” He, like
many other black South Africans, argued that racism is a strategy to ensure
that whites continue to hold political and economic power. Moraes Dias
da Silva contrasts this assessment with racial dynamics in Brazil, where the
446 CHAPTER 15 Thinking Globally
absence of a recent history of official racism has created a situation in which

blacks are more likely to blame history or ignorance for racism and unlikely
to attribute racial inequality to institutional racism. In this way, Brazil is simi-
lar to France, where institutional racism is not recognized, even though there
is a lot of evidence that people of color are treated differently than whites
(Body-Gendrot 2010).
In each of these countries, people of African descent are the most likely to
occupy the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. What is interesting for
our purposes here is that this same outcome has been achieved through very
different mechanisms, although a colonial legacy is a common factor.τhese
distinct mechanisms have, in turn, created a unique brand of racial discourse
and racial inequality in each place.
τhe United States, Brazil, and South Africa were all colonized by Euro-
pean powers. In contrast, France was a significant colonial power in its own
right. The vast majority of immigrants in France come from France's former
colonies. In Brazil, laws and customs set in place during the colonial period
continue to negatively affect people of African descent. In South Africa, colo-
nialism can be seen as a precursor to apartheid, which continues to influence
racial inequality today. In the United States, the idea of freedom invoked in
the struggle for independence from England was limited to white men, and
this creed continues to affect the nation today. As we will see, each country
has a unique history, yet racial inequality and race-based subordination are
constants.
RACE AND RACISM IN FRANCE

France established colonial ventures in the Caribbean, North Africa, Asia,
and sub-Saharan Africa. During the mid-l 700s, the French were involved in
the capture and transport of nearly half a million slaves from Africa to the
Antilles-Haiti, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. 币1e French participated in the
slave trade until slavery was abolished in French colonies in 1848. The end of
the slave trade, however, did not mean the end of French interests in Africa.
French c。l。nies in Africα

In 1854, a Frenchman, Louis Leon Cesar Faidherbe (1818-1889), was
appointed governor ofSenegal, marking the establishment ofthe French empire
in sub-Saharan Africa. As the French army continued its march across Africa,
it named governors of each territory it claimed, including Sudan, Guinea, and
the Ivory Coast. Togethe马 these countries formed the French 认1est African
Race and Racism in F 「G nce 447
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French Territories and Colonies from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century
Metropolitan France Temporary Settlements 18th Century Empire Napoleonic Empire 20th Century Empire
FIGURE 15-1.
French Territories and Colonies from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century
Federation, which was founded in 1895 and headquartered in Dakar, Senegal.

Later, Chad, Togo, Nige鸟 Mali, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and Cameroon were
brought under French control (McNamara 1989) (Figure 15-1).
τhe French designated Africans as subjects rather than as citizens. One
reason for this is that many French people viewed Africans as too primitive
to be able to fully exercise their rights as citizens. In 1912, France passed a law
that permitted educated, property-owning, and taxpaying African subjects to
become French citizens. 卫1is law applied, however, to only a very small per-
centage of African subjects.
τhe French justified their forcible acquisition of African lands by assert-
ing that these were civilizing missions, designed to upli丘 inferior races. Their
stated goal was to liberate and civilize Africans. ’The French viewed Africans
as backward and stuck in traditional ways, and they justified their takeover of
African lands as part of their mission to modernize the continent. To this end,
the French developed schools that taught Africans hygiene along with basic
reading and writing skills. ’These schools also taught African children to speak
French (Conklin 1998).
τhe French colonial empire in Africa endured until 1960 (McNamara

1989） .τhe end of this empire was also the beginning of a large-scale mig时ion
of sub-Saharan and North Africans to France-primarily to work in the low-
skill, low-wage sector of the labor market in large urban areas.
The French Antilles

French interests in the Caribbean were initially related to the cultivation of
sugarcane for export. To this end, the French brought hundreds of thousands
of African slaves to the Caribbean. 飞气Tith the end of the slave trade, French
interests in the region shi丘ed. The French developed public schools in the
Antilles much earlier than in Africa, beginning in the 1880s. In these schools,
French teachers taught children in Guadeloupe and Martinique how to be
French. Many of these Antillean children were later sent to the African col-
onies as military and state officials of the French empire (Grosfoguel 1999).
People from the French Antilles may travel to mainland France freely, as
they have French citizenship. However, Antilleans did not begin to migrate in
large numbers until the early 1960s, when many traveled to mainland France
to work in the French public service. Today, nearly half a million first- and
second-generation migrants from the Antilles reside in France-more than
the entire population of Ma巾1ique (400,000) (Fleming 2012).
Although Antilleans were given access to public administration jobs in
France, they have encountered a glass ceiling: even with proper qualifications,
they rarely receive promotions to higher levels of government. Moreover,
with the shrinking of the French government in the 1980s and 1990s, second-
generation French Antilleans did not have access to the same public adminis-
tration jobs as their parents did (Grosfuguel 1989).
Africαn lmmigrati。n f。 France

Prior to 1974, people who lived in former French African colonies were able
to travel freely to France, through what has been called the open-door policy.
Most of these African migrants were men who traveled to France in search of
temporary labor. However, a丘er the end of the open-door policy in the 1970s,
more migrants decided to settle permanently in France, fearing they would not
be able to return (Sargent and Larchanche-I{im 2006).
In the 1970s and 1980s, France passed a series of restrictive immigration
laws.τhe new laws had two primary unintended con叫uences: (1) they
encouraged migrants to stay instead of engaging in temporary labor migra-
tion, and (2) clandestine migration networks emerged. The 1974 laws ended
temporary labor migration, yet allowed for family reunification. As a result,
Race and Racism in F 「ance 449
lf/NISTERE
OE!) REGULARJS
,:OlJS LES SANs.p1
PAPIERS
LL
A A demonstration for the regularizatio11 of undocumented migrants
(les sαns-pαpieγ·s) in Paris, France.
more families migrated permanently to France to join their husbands and

fathers. As immigration laws tightened, many immigrants were transformed
into undocumented or clandestine immigrants. In France, undocumented
migrants call themselves les sans-papiers: those without papers (Sargent /es sans-papiers Literally,
and Larchanche-Kim 2006). About 10 percent of the 61 million people who “ those without papers”;
live in France are foreign-born, and only a small percentage of these immi- undocumented migrants
grants are undocumented. This situation is distinct from the one that exists in France.
in the United States, where, in 2013, nearly a quarter of immigrants were
undocumented.
Discriminα时。nαnd Rαciαlαnd Ethnic lnequαlity

in Frαnee y。dαy
τhe outskirts of French cities-called banlieues-are, in many cases, under- banlieues The outskirts or
served neighborhoods that are home to minority populations. Former French suburbs of French cities.
president Nicolas Sarkozy o丘en commented on the undesirability of immi-
grants, especially North Africans, who, he contended, do not wish to become
French. For example, just before the uprisings of the immigrant community
in October and November 2005, Sarkozy referred to immigrant youth in the
bar山ues as “ racaille ” (scum or rabble, a word with racist connotations).
Many banlieues consist of public housing built in the 1970s to accommodate

immigrant families.τhe banlieues continue to house primarily immigrants,
people from overseas departments, and their children. ’These immigrants
come primarily from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the French Antil-
les (Body-Gend时 2010). Today, over half of France's immigrants from sub-
Saharan Africa and Tunisia live in public housing, as do about 40 percent of
the nation's immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia and 40 percent of main-
land residents from the overseas departments (Pan I(e Shon 2009).
The term banlieues could be translated as suburbs. However, these neighbor-
hoods have more in common with inner cities in the United States than with
suburbs, as their inhabitants are primarily poor or working class and mostly
nonwhite. In some banlieues, the unemployment rate is as high as 40 percent-
similar to the rate in some inner cities in the United States. Police harassment
is endemic, and police officers routinely ask residents to show their papers.
In late October 2005, these suburbs burst into rebellion across France
in response to high unemployment, poor schools, and police harassment
(Murray 2006）.τhe unrest lasted for twenty-one days. The uprisings, t鸣－
gered by the death of two young men who were electrocuted while hiding
from the police, spread across France to 250 towns and cities. Three weeks
later, nearly 3,000 people had been arrested and 9,000 cars had been set
on fire. 咀1e police responded with a show of force, using tear gas, stun gre-
nades, and rubber bullets.τhe vast majority of those who rioted were young
second-generation immigrants in the banlieues，咀1e 2005 rebellions are part
of a long history of uprisings in the banlieues, O丘en in response to police vio-
lence (Body-Gedrot 2010).
It is difficult to be sure how much racial or ethnic inequality there is in
France because, by law, the state cannot collect systematic data on race or
ethnicity (Body-Gendrot 2010） .τhe 础1ctance to collect such data emanates
from the state’s entrenched denial that race and ethnicity are important in
France. However, over the past few years, a few studies have provided empiri-
cal support for the claim that people of African and Arab descent are margin-
alized in France. For example, some studies have reported that immigrants
from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as mainland residents from
overseas departments, have fewer educational opportunities than the majority
population. The children of immigrants from North Africa are less than half as
likely as their counterparts with French parents to have a high school diploma
(Brinbaum, Moguerou, and Primon 2010).
Unemployment is also higher for minority than for majority popula-
tions. In France, 81 percent of the male majority population is employed.
τhe employment rates are similar for immigrants but not for their children.
The rates are much lower for second-generation male immigrants than for
the majority population: only 53 percent of second-generation sub-Saharan
Africans and 61 percent of second-generation Moroccans and Tunisians are
employed (Lhommeau, Meurs, and Primon 2010). Overall ur
French university graduates is S percent, but 26 percent for North African uni-
versity graduates who live in France (Murray 2006).
Justice for Theo

…………………·............... . ...... . .. . ...... . .. . . . . ... . ....................... . ...………………….. . .
France has been rocked by
tensions that flared up over
a police officer allegedly
sexually assaulting with a
truncheon a 22-year-old
.
black man called Theo in the
Parisian suburb of Aulnay-
内
Sous-Bois. This brutal ) · ' ~ .
aggression is the latest police

violation to dominate head-
lines in French mainstream
media and to trigger protests
P1吩testors in P，αris in 2017 hold αbαnner reαding
against police brutality.
飞Justice αnd Dignity/Stop Police Impunity. ”
Theo was on his way to
visit a friend when the police stopped him to check his ID. A video of Theo's violent
arrest by the police [that] circulated on the internet shows him on the ground
against a wall, being beaten by four policen1en. In his account to the media, Theo
explained how he fell face down as police spat racist insults and sodomised him with
a police baton during the brutal arrest. The French police called the violent assault
“ an accident.”
Theo was subsequently treated in l1ospital. His case triggered protests in seve1~a1
Parisian suburbs which at times turned into riots. Protesters and the police clashed,
notably in the suburban town of Bobigny, where cars and buses were burned and
stores were ransacked.
At this stage, the French Court of Justice is looking into how to assess the nature
of the assault against Theo and whether it should be considered rape or an act of
violence. This, according to the court, can be established only by determining the
nature of the perpetrator's intention at the time of the incident.
(conti·叽.ued)
Co饥.tinued The French Penal Code reserves a harsl1 punishment for rape. Article
222-23 of the law states that:“'Any act of sexual penetration, whatever its
(/) nature, committed against another person, through violence, constraint,
threat or surprise, is a rape. Rape is punishable by 15 years of imprisonment.”
A conviction of rape and a jail sentence for the police1nan could be con-
. sidered by Theo's family a victory and satisfy people’s demands for justice.
But if the policeman is acquitted, a repeat of the 2005 riots-triggered by the
deaths of two teenagers during a police chase-is highly probable.
....
In April 2009, Amnesty International published a report denouncing the
French police violations and the failure of the French justice system to put an
end to such acts. “ Police ill-treatment, racial abuse and excessive use of force
continues while procedures for investigating such allegations are still failing
to meet the standards required by international law."
But neither the Amnesty International report nor the French court rulings
nor the denunciations of the French civil associations could put an end to
the phenomenon. The French police continues to justify its abuses with the
lack of human and n1aterial resources, as if respecting individuals' human
dignity is somehow associated with material resources and/or the number of
policemen on the ground.
An acute crisis of confidence has long existed between the inhabitants of
suburban neighbourhoods and the French state that almost always mani-
fests its presence in the suburbs only through its police force. Such a dynamic
automatically transforms its relationship with French citizens of the suburbs
into a purely authoritarian one.
As Amar Henni, a leading youth worker in the district of La Grande
Borne on the southern outskirts ofParis, told The Guαrdiαη：“the biggest
unresolved problem is the relationship between youth and police. The state
took a security approach, rather than a social or edt1cation response.”
Therefore, in the absence of a genuine policy on integration and urban
development in these “ sensitive urban zones”(as designated by the French
administration), where unemployment is more than twice the national rate
and where schools have a high turnover of often inexperienced teachers, and
as long as the successive governments refuse to acknowledge their responsi-
bility for this social failure, without real commitments and changes, unfortu-
nately riots and cars and shops set on fire will continue to occur every time
the police commits such horrible acts.
When state violence becomes systematic and rarely punished, the society
falls into a vicious cycle where violence only triggers more violence. The case
of Theo is a natural outcome of the failure of the state-on all levels-to

combat racism and discrimination and to put an end to police violence and
abuses against the inhabitants of the suburbs.
Source: Saad 2017.
..........................................................................................................
Minority populations are also more likely to report having poor health.
Immigrant men are 30 percent more likely than native-born French men to
report bad health. Immigrant women are 80 percent more likely. ’These health
disparities are in large part the result of the lower socioeconomic status of
immigrants (Pan Ke Shon and Robello 2010).
Very few data are available on racial profiling by police in France. However,
in one study, researchers recorded the racial or ethnic status of each person
stopped by police in train stations, as well as the status of each person who
walked by.τhey found that people who appeared to be of Arab origin were
stopped 7.8 times more than those who appeared to be white and that those
perceived to be black were 6 times as likely to be stopped. Black and Arab
youth who wore particular clothing styles were the most likely to be stopped.
When the researchers presented the French police with these findings, the
police denied that racial profiling was going on. ’The French police agreed that
the disparities existed but responded that they are instructed to stop anyone
who appears to be involved in youth gangs and that the police were therefore
just doing their job (Body-Gendrot 2010).
币1e question of discrimination has finally begun to be discussed in the
public arena in France. A European Union survey conducted in 2015 found
that 64 percent of people in France believe that ethnic discrimination is wide-
spread, and 46 percent reported that there was employment discrimination
based on skin color or ethnic origin (Eurobarometer 2015). Another study
found that 53 percent of French men and 60 percent of French women believe
that people in France frequently experience discrimination on the basis of
their skin color or immigrant origin. At the same time, 78 percent of people
born in an overseas department reported that they had experienced discrim-
ination on the basis of their skin color, as did over 80 percent of immigrants
from sub-Saharan Africa. Eighty岳ve percent of Algerians reported having
faced discrimination on the basis of their national origin, as did 87 percent
of Moroccans and Tunisians (Brinbaum, Moguerou, and Primon 2010).
Recognizing the wide disparities that exist will be the first step toward creat-
ing a more just society in France.
RACE AND RACISM IN S 。 UTH AFRICA

South Africa has a well-known history oflegally sanctioned segregation and con-
tinued white racial dominance. Although people of African descent were, and
remain, a majority of its population, Europeans were able to subjugate the native
black population and subject it to repressive racial domination for centuries.
c。l。nialism in s。uth Africα： The British αnd the Dutch

Europeans first arrived in South Africa in the seventeenth century. 咀1is first
group was primarily Dutch and settled in what became the Cape Colony.τheir
Afrikaners Descendants of descendants began to call themselves Afrikaners (Aj云icans in Dutch) and
the Dutch colonists who slowly developed their own language, culture, and identity distinct from those
settled in South Africa. of their ancestors in Holland. Eventually, however, Britain set its sights on the
Cape Colony as a viable trading point at the southern tip ofAfrica. In 1806, the
British took control of the Cape Colony from the Afrikaners, transforming it
into a British colony.τhe Afrikaners were resistant to British rule and opposed
to what they viewed as the more liberal racial policies of the British.τhousands
of Afrikaners trekked out of the Cape to the north of South Africa, where they
established their own republics in the 1850s. However, the discovery of dia-
monds in those republics in 1877 and of gold in 1886 meant that the British
were no longer content to allow the Afrikaners to control the north.τhe Brit-
ish desire to control the lands of the Afrikaners, who had become known as the
Boers, led to the Boer War.
Boer War Also called the Also called the Second War of Freedom, the Boer War (1899-1902) was
Second War of Freedon1; waged by the British to bring all of South Africa under its colonial power so
a conflict from 1899 to that Britain would have access to South Africa’s mineral wealth. The Afrikan-
1902 in which the British ers fought hard for their independence and control over their land but even-
fought tl1e Dutch to bring tually lost. Following the end of the wa鸟 the two British colonies ( Cape and
all of South Africa under Natal) merged with the two Boer republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State)
British colonial power. to create a unified South Africa in 1910. South Africa would remain a British
colony until 1961.
The Apαrtheid Era (1948-1994)

A丘er the costly British victory in the Boer 认Tar, the British had good reason to
desire reconciliation with the Afrikaners. 咀1e Afrikaners asked the British to
create policies excluding the native Africans from positions of power to ensure
their own upward mobility. In 1936, the South African government removed
native Africans from the voting rolls. In 1948, the government imposed apart-
heid, which was devastating to native Africans but brought socioeconomic
Race and Racism in Sou • h Africa 455
success to Afrikaners. ’The proportion ofAfrikaners working in white-collar jobs

more than doubled between 1946 and 1977, from 29 to 65 percent (Marx 1996).
Apartheid was a system of formal, legal racial segregation that endured from
1948 to 1994 in South Africa. Under this system, interracial sex and marriage
were prohibited, and residential segregation by race was mandated. 飞气Tith the
1950 Group Areas Act, almost one million people were forcibly removed from
where they lived because the government declared those areas to be exclusive to
whites. Segregation was enforced in all areas oflife: housing, hospitals, transpor-
tation, education, and public facilities such as beaches and parks. Under apart- coloured According
heid, white children were afforded the best educational opportunities and soon to South Africa's 1950
were able to secure the best employment options, both because of their educa- Population Registration
tion and because of enforced segregation. Blacks were largely blocked from edu- Act, a person who is not
cational opportunities that would lead to economic success (Seekings 2008). white or native.
飞机th the advent of apartheid, every South African citizen was obliged to reg-
ister as a member of an officially designated race. However, it was not always Population Registration
clear-cut whether South Africans were white,“coloured,” or natives. Prior to Act 1950 act that defined
1948, racial status had a contextual quality: people with some African descent three 1·acial groups in
were sometimes classified as white if they had lived among whites most of their South Africa-white,
lives, and people with no European descent could be designated as coloured native, and coloured-
if they were educated and of a certain class status. In 1950, the Nationalist and mandated that
government passed the Population Registration Act, which mandated that every citizen be issued
every citizen be issued an identity document specifying his or her race as identification specifying
white, native, or coloured (Posel 2001). his or her race.
The Population Registration Act defined three racial groups in South Africa:
A white pe γson is one who in appeaγance is) o γ who is generally accepted as)
a white peγson) but does not include a peγson who) although in appearance
obviously a white peγson) is geneγally accepted as a colouγεd peγson.
A native is a person who is in fa cto γ is generally accεpted as a 附价εγ ofa均
aboriginal γace oγtγibe ofAfrica.
Acolo肌dpeγson is one who is not a wfi此person oγ a ri附i比（Posel 2001) 10功
币1e category “ Indian” was later added in reference to people of South Asian
ancestry, and “ native ” was replaced by the labels “ Bantu'' and “Black.”咀1e
South African definitions of race were social definitionsj they did not depend
exclusively on ancestral or physical characteristics. Instead, white people
were those who were socially accepted as white, blacks were those accepted as
native Africans, and all the rest were coloureds. With apartheid, many people
who had been socially accepted as white were designated as coloured by the
456 CHAPTER 15 Thinking Globa lly
South African government and forced to move from the whites-only neigh-
borhoods in which they were living. Apartheid was designed in part to ensure
white racial purity二 However, most South Africans knew it was very difficult
for any white South African to be sure that his or her ancestry did not include
any nonwhites (Posel 2001).
Under apartheid, South Africa was divided into four provinces and ten rural
homelands. Whites lived in the provinces, along with Asians, coloureds, and some
blacks. 卫1e vast majority of blacks were relegated to the economically margin-
alized homelands, which constituted only 13 percent of the land area of South
Africa and offered very few economic opportunities for their residents. ’The
average unemployment rate in the homelands continues to be about 75 percent
(Ozler 2007). For this reason, many black families rely on remittances from other
family members who work outside the homelands and send money home.
From the 1950s to the 1980s, many black South Africans who had formerly
lived in the provinces were forcibly relocated to the homelands. The provinces
contained the best economic opportunities, and their mortality profiles and
rates of infectious diseases were similar to those of middle-income countries
such as Brazil or Mexico. By contrast, the homelands looked more like the
much poorer neighboring countries in southern Africa such as Zimbabwe
(Burgard 2002).
f • …’• ．『吁一
" THE DIVISION柑 COUNCIL· Qf THE CAPE • •
BY ORDER SECRETARY
－－τ...， ‘·．
DIE Af DELINGSAAAD VAN DIE KAAP
磊F
.
’虽
. OP 二 LAS SEI\RETARIS •
’ - -- ..
·, 、
A Sign designating outdoor space for whites only二 South Africa, 1976.
Race and Racism in Sou • h Af 「 ica 457
During the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa began to see mass mobilizations
in opposition to apartheid. In 1990, these mobilizations, combined with inter-
national pressure, led the government to announce its intention to end apart-
heid (Marx 1996), which it finally did in 1994.
τhe fight to end apartheid in SouthAfrica was long and bloody and was waged
on both domestic and international fronts. During the 1960s and 1970s, South
Africans, inspired by Ghandi, engaged in peaceful protests and civil disobedi-
ence. One of the most well-known protests is the Soweto uprising. OnJune 16,
1976, South African students in Soweto took to the streets in a peaceful pro-
test against apartheid and educational inequalit予 Their protest was met with
extreme police violence: police shot and killed hundreds of schoolchildren.
’The violent response to this youth-led protest galvanized youth activists across
the count予 Activists from the Black Consciousness (BC) Movemen飞 led by
Steve Biko, and the African National Congress (ANC), founded by Nelson
Mandela, began to intensify their anti-apartheid efforts. In 1977, Biko was
arrested because of his political activity二 He was beaten and tortured during
his detainment, and died as a result. As state repression ramped up, so did the
opposition. During the 1980s, mass mobilization against apartheid intensified
both in South Africa and around the world. For example, in 1988, 1SS universi-
ties and colleges in the United States had fully or partially divested themselves
from South Africa, pu忧ing serious financial pressure on the country二币1ese
decades of struggle finally bore fruit when apartheid was officially ended in
1994 (Knight 1990; South African Democrac
South African Coloured Identity

… …… … · · ... . ... ... .. . ........ ... .... . ..... .. ... . ....... .. ... . ....... .. ........... .. ............ . ....... . . . .. . ... . . .
When asked about his racial identity, Xam, a father, mechanical worker, and part-
time DJ in South Africa, reflected:“Nobody sat me down and said,‘·we are coloured
because we are this.' It was never like that.” But he did recall one influential experi-
ence when the concept of race became meaningful in his life.
He was a young boy attending elementary school in a primarily coloured town- .
ship, Mitchells Plain, in South A仕ica in the late 1970s. Demonstrations against the
repressive, white minority, apartheid government were becoming more common
across the nation. During one particularly heated struggle, Xam recalls that his
“school was teargassed by accident, supposedly” by the police.
Xam raced home to find his mother, a school teacher, hiding older kids who had
been part of the demonstration. “'.And, um, that evening, my mother hαd to have
that conversation." Xam said that her approach was careful, that she did not want to
(continued)
458 CHAPTER 15 Th inking G lobally
Continued instill hate in him, but that she did explain:‘'at the momenι 仇的“ country,
ωωυ－
’we are not seen the sam比 asothe·γ people：’
After that day, Xam began to put things together thinking,“Okay, the
complexion of the people that are chasing me-is not the complexion that I
have, so, obviously I came to that on my own, you know." He recognized that
O＞
he, as a coloured South African, looked, talked, and experienced life differ-
ently from the white officers who came into his community. Whereas many
in his community lived in crammed spaces and lacked access to resources
like safe schools and reliable transportation, the white o伍cers arrived in
shiny police vehicles and commanded power in all interactions. Xam not
only realized differences between his race and theirs, but also learned that
the o伍cers’ group was considered “right” and was afforded power and priv-
ileges that members of his own racial group were not. As he shared:“I was
born into racism. I was born into the apartheid system.”
Given the apartheid goal of complete separation of the races, most
people in Mitchells Plain were coloured, defined by apartheid legislation
挝、 person who is not a white person or a native C:blackJ.” Throughout
apartheid, the coloured group was mainly viewed as a people who had racial
mixture in their lineage, but also included anyone who could not fit into the
black or white category, such as people of 'Malay’ descent who were brought
to the Cape as slaves from Southeast Asia.
It was resisting the white Afrikaners in power that taught Xam of his
coloured identity and also about a broader collective identity as South
Africans of color. “We needed to unify so that we could fight one enemy”
Xam explained. Many South Africans felt similarly to Xam and joined the
United Democratic Front (UDF), which was launched in 1983 in Mitchells
Plain. The UDF swelled to over three million multiracial members and was
a largely successful organizer against the apartheid state. W讪 internal civic
action and external pressures from international states and agencies, the
apartheid system began to crumble.
Finally, in 1994, South Africa held its first election by universal adult
suffrage. A majority of South Africans voted for Nelson Mandela, a black
African and former political prisoner and candidate supported by the Afri-
can National Council (ANC), securing his victory as the president of the new
Republic of South Africa. Since then, the ANC has remained in power. The
end of apartheid represented a shift 仕om an oppressive, white, minority-led
system, to a black, majority-led democratic system. Race continues to shape
individual life experiences, but there are now clear protections against dis-
crimination on the basis of race.
R。ce and R。cism in s。uth Africa 459
Ho,vcv，盯， th is transition in powc1· h础。n配 again complicated the ways

n1any coloureds think a bout race and their place in the new South A白ica.
AsXam e巧》lains，飞he so-called colonred people feel that they have hecn
betrayed. TI1ey feel that they gave their lives. They gave their fuh1rcs for the
liberat ion struggle, and they were sold out.句 De.spite their act.ion against
ap盯thcid, many coloureds feel they have been left out of the transition of
仰，wcr. Coloureds today conti nuc to suffer，、vith low levels of educational
attainn1cnt, high rates ofuncn1ployn随时， and poor health outcon1cs.
Still frustrated with the plight and position of coloureds, Xan1 is one of
n1any who arc seeking to redefine what it 1neans to he c旧lour℃d today飞： Xam
would like g1·catcr recognition of the Khoikhoi, the indigenous South A命i
eans to whmn 1nany coloured people tr ace thei ,. roots.
Often called Bushn1cn, the Khoikhoi were the first to interact with the
Dutch in tl1e Cape. ~! any coloureds believe that idcntifying as Kh。ikhoi
further d四tances thc1n fron1 由e legacy of apartheid and better solidi自由
their 吨hts to land and a四oUJ·ces in South Afriea. Xa1n is now prepared for
臼1othcr fight: "Th is is who I am. TI1is is who I nced to he. Th is who I need
to live like, and I need to st.and for that. Because, you know what? On this
planet 臼 enough space for me to be n1c And if you’, c uot gonna allow n1e for
that space to be me, I'm gonna fight you for that spa四 to he n1e."
s.>111-cc:: l'i1tle ♀017,
The Persistence of Inequality in the Post-Apartheid Era

Although apartheid was dismantled, racial inequality has not been erad·
icated. Racial segregation is no longer legally enforced, but it continues in
schools and residential areas. About 15 percent of Africa11 students and a
larger percentage of coloured and Indian students are enrolled in previously
white schools. Mea nwhile, ,vhite students have not enrolled in formerly
black schools, which remain exclusively black and primarily underprivileged
(Moodley and Adam 2000).
A discussion of inequality in South Africa would be incomplete without
mentioning the AIDS epidemic. About 17 percent of adults aged 自仕een to
forty-nine in South Africa are H IV positive-one of the highest rates in the
world. 刀、e AIDS epidemic is both raced and gendered: the majority of people
with HIV are African women (Morrell,Jewkes, and Lindegger 2012).
One of the most notable changes since the end of apartheid has been the rise
of an African middle class. Today, in South Africa, nearly all poor pe.ople are
of African descent, “ are most of the working class, and the middle and upper
460 CHAPTER 15 Thinking Globa lly
0.5°/o classes include white as well as African-descended

people. ’The rise ofblacks into the middle class was
accomplished by providing better educational
opportunities as well as by enforcing affirmative
action policies. For example, the 1998 Employ-
• Coloured race
ment Equity Act required midsized and large
• White
• Asian private employers to set and enforce diversity tar-
• Black gets (Seekings 2008). Still, in 2010, 28 percent of
• Other blacks in South Africa were unemployed, com-
pared with S percent ofwhites (Morrell et al. 2012).
South Africa’s 2012 census revealed that racial
inequality continues to be a problem. Over
three-quarters of South Africans are black, and
切由 1
。在
F- G U vw
m
S2
oOu M -m s vdr ace
ku they earn, on average, about one-sixth of what whites earn (see Figure 15-2).
- ’The end of apartheid has meant the end of absolute white racial dominance in
Source: South African Census

South Africa. However, the country continues to be tremendously unequal, and
(2011 ). a disproportionate number ofblacks remain at the bottom of the socioeconomic
ladder. ’The end of apartheid in South Africa has actually led to more overall
inequality二币1e country's Gini coefficient-a measure of inequality on a scale of
Oto 1 (see Chapter Nine)-increased from 0.5 in 1995 to 0.73 in 2005 (Morrell
et al. 2012), and then decreased to 62.5 in 2013. To achieve a more just society,
South Africa will have to address both race and income inequality二
γesea~γc
The Politics of White Youth Identity in South Africa

With the dismantling of apartheid, many exclusivelywhite schools in SouthAfrica
opened their doors to black and coloured children. Sociologist Nadine Dolby was
curious about how white students experienced and talked about this transition.
To find out, she conducted research at Fernwood High School in Durban, South
Africa, in 1996.
Under apartheid, Fernwood was a white government school. In 1991, it opened
its doors to black and coloured pupils. By 1996, over 60 percent of the students
were black, 7 percent were coloured, and about 3 percent were Asian. Whites con-
stituted only 30 percent of the student body at that point, and many of the white
students as well as the white teachers were not happy about the rapid transition.
R。ce and Roe罔m in Soυth Africa 461
M。st 。f the white students would have le丘 the sch。。l if they could have, but they
had not done well enough academically to get into the more prestigi。us and
whiter public schools in Durban.
D。，！by found that white students at Fernwo。d, similar t。 those in the United
States, use the discursive phrase ·r don’twant to sound racist, but ...• when talking
ab。ut blacks in South Africa. In interviews, white students 。ften described how
blacks were violent t。ward whites. Howeve马 these students supported their
ace。unts with st。ries of violence they had seen in the media or heard about
through their friends. D。lby reported that when the white students t。Id these
stories, they positioned themselves and other whites as morally superior and not
pronetosim过ar acts ofviolence.
D。lby c。ntended that white students are scared of black violence as well as
black ec。nomic prosperity. White students come 台·om families that have been
able t。 d。 well financially because of the privileges traditi。nally associated with
whiteness in S。uth Africa. However, ending apartheid has meant that whites no
longer have a monopoly on the lab。r market. Thus, even though whites c。ntinue
t。四perience privilege in s。uth Africa, they d。 not have the en。rm。us economic
advantage their parents had.
One white student t。ld D。lby：“It is hard to get used t。 seeing so many black
pe。ple n。w having big car鸟 now having g。。d clothing." Another white student
claimed that many black people are homeless but have 阻pensive cars. Others
commented on the flashy fashion styles of black students. As white students
struggled to understand their own lo臼。f economic security, they claimed that
blacks d。 not knowhow t。 spend money wisely. 古1ese claims give them m。ral
authority and a sense 。f righte。usness.
。。！by explained that the whiteness with which white South A丘icans at Fern-
wood 地nti句 is not so much a South African but a global whiteness. τhese
students listen t。 music produced in 。ther countries and dream 。f。ne dayemi-
grating to a c。untrywh町e, they perceive, whites still have the upper hand.
For Discussion
1. D。 you think there are parallels between white s。uth Africans and whites in
the United States?
2. Do you think that whites in South Africa experien臼d fear a丘er the ab。liti。n
。f apartheid?
3. Howd。 you think the end ofapartheid affected blackst udents in S。uthAfrica?
Sourc<o Dolby 却OJ.

RACE AND RACISM IN BRAZIL

Both Brazil and the United States were once inhabited by an indigenous pop-
ulation and later colonized by Europeans who brought African slaves with
them. In addition, both countries experienced large waves of immigration
from Europe and Asia a丘er the emancipation of their African slaves. Yet Brazil
differs dramatically from the United States, as well as from South Africa, in
that it never instituted formalized legal segregation. Similar to France, Brazil
has invoked a particular brand of nationalism一“We are all Brazilians''-to
deny the possibility of racial inequality in the country.
p。rtuguese c。l。nizαti。nαnd the Slave h’·αde in Brazil

The history of race and racism in Brazil begins with the landing of the Por-
tuguese in 1500. Soon a丘erward, Portuguese colonists began to capture
members of the indigenous population and force them to work on sugarcane
plantations.τhe brutal treatment of indigenous Brazilians, combined with
diseases brought over by the Portuguese, quickly decimated the native pop-
ulation. The Portuguese therefore turned to African slaves as an alternative
labor force. By the time the slave trade ended in 1850, over 3 million Africans
had been forcibly brought to Brazil as slaves. Brazil was the last country in the
Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery, ending it in 1888 (Telles 2004).
Very few Portuguese women lived in Brazil during the time of slavery, and
not surprisingly the Portuguese men there frequently engaged in consensual
and nonconsensual sexual relations with African, indigenous, and mixed-race
women. As a result, large numbers of mixed-race children were born in Brazil.
When slavery ended in 1888, the population was overwhelmingly nonwhite
(Skidmore 1993).
Whitening Through lmmigr。“。n and lntermar，切ge

Believing that whites were superior to other racial groups, the leaders of Brazil
came up with a plan to promote European immigration in the aftermath of
slavery. 卫1e Brazilian government paid European immigrants ’ passage to
Brazil, with the goal of whitening the country. In the four decades a丘er eman-
cipation in 1888, more than 2 million European immigrants arrived in the city
of Sao Paulo alone, nearly a million of whom had had their passage paid for by
the national governrr
North American and European intellectuals lamented Brazil's large non-
white population and predicted a dim future for the country. In response,
Brazilian intellectuals developed their own idea of racial progress. 咀1is new
Race e nd Racism in Brazil 463
ideal。gy put forth racial mixture as Brazil’sh。pef.。r the future. Brazilian elites
believed that white genes were stronger than black or indigenous genes, and
that intermarriage between whites and 。ther groups would lead t。 a gradual
whitening of the country. Tor。ugh intermarriage, Brazil would be able t。
progre臼 from black to mula忱。 t。 white (Skidmore 1990).
Brazilian intellectuals accepted European ideas 。f white superiority but
叫ected the notion that racial mixture was problematic. They argued that
Brazil was becoming a white nati。n through a proc臼s of racial mixing, called
mestifagem. Silvio Romer。（1851-1915), one 。£Brazil's foremost literary crit- mesti~ogem The
ics ofthe late nineteenth century, proclaimed the mestizo-an individual with Po此ugucscw’＇Oro for
a mixed black, white, and Indian background-to be the prototypical Brazil- racial 1nixing.
ian and the pers。n best suited t。 Brazil's tropical climate. Like other Brazil-
ians, Romer。 predicted that racial mixture would lead to whiteness. mes位。 A Brazilian racial
M叫 Brazilian thinkers e础raced this whitening theory (Eakin 1985; category d臼cribinga
Skidmore 1990). At the same tin即cholars such as the lawyer and historian mixture of black, white,
Oliveira Vianna (1883- 1951) demonstrated that the white populati。n was and Indian.
increasing. C。mparing the 1872 and 1890 censuses, Viannaargued that whites
had increased from 38 to 44 percent of the Brazilian population, while blacks
had fallen from 20 percent t。 less than 15 percent (Skidmore 1990). Vianna
contended that the whitening p叫ect was working and that Brazil would even-
tually be a whitened nation.
τhis self二appraisal as a whitening nation was accompanied by the rise 。f
some individuals of African descent into the elite, including the writer J。岳
quim Maria Machad。 de A臼is (1839-1908) and the scientist Juliano Moreira
(1873-1932). Some prominent Brazilians saw racial mixture as acceptable
insofar as it was a temporarywaypoint 。ntheroadt。 racial whitening. Others,
such as Octavi。 Domingo臼， argued that the succ臼s 。f some mulatt。s was
proof that constructive miscegenation (racial interbreeding) was viable and
that mulattos were not inferior t。whites (Stepan 1991). Whereas in the United
States, miscegenation was prohibited, in Brazil, it w'as enc。uraged. Elite Brazil-
ianssupp。rted interracial marriages, and darker Brazilians s。ught 。ut lighter
partners with the intention 。fh凹ing lighter children (Twine 1998).
刀1e celebration 。f mestifagem became the hallmark of Brazilianness and
reached its apex in the work of Gilbert。 Freyre (1900-1987), a Brazilians。cial
hist。rian, Freyre published his b。。k Casa Grandee Senzala in 1933. This b。。k
described Brazil as a th。roughly racially mixed country. Howeve马 instead
of arguing that Brazil's mixture began with slavemastcrs forcing themselves
on African slaves, Freyre ar伊ed that the mixture was a result of the natural
attraction between blacks and whites. He took this mixture as evidence of
464 CHAPTER 15 Thinking G lo bally
racial democracy in Brazil, a country he saw as free of the racist legacies that
one could find in the United States. Freyre argued further that the racial mix-
ture between Brazilians meant that there were no racial groups in Brazil and
thus no racial discrimination. Freyre and other writers compared Brazil favor-
racial dem。cracy A society ably with the United States and Nazi Germany and argued that Brazil's racial
in which color and ethnic democracy should be a model for the wor
differences do not affect is a society in which color and ethnic differences do not affect life chances.
life chances.
The Racial Democracy Myth in Brazil
and Affirmative Action
卫1e myth of Brazil ’s racial democracy attracted international attention. In
the 1950s, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO) sponsored several research projects designed to reveal
Brazil ’s secret to its racial harmony. To their surprise, this funding led to a
series of published works that debunked Brazil's supposed racial democracy
and showed that, to the contrary, racial inequality was pervasive in the coun-
try. These studies revealed disparities in education, income, and health among
black, brown, and white Brazilians.
Racial inequality in Brazil continues to be pervasive. In 1999, blacks
accounted for 45 percent of the total population but 64 percent of the nation’s
poor. In 2003, only 2 percent of the deputies in the national congress identi-
fied as black, and none of Brazil ’s ambassadors were black. In that same yea鸟
the average income for white Brazilians was Rsl480, compared with Rs780
for black and mixed Brazilians. By 2013, the average income for white Bra-
zilians was Rs2097, compared with Rsl213 for black and mixed Brazilians-
proportionately almost the same as i川003 (Nolen 2015).
In the early 2000s, state policy on race in Brazil changed dramatically. The
government shi丘ed from denying the existence of racial inequality to admit-
ting that racism was a problem and instituting affirmative action policies as
a form of redress. At the national and state levels, policymakers introduced
racial quotas; notably, three states approved laws that reserved 40 percent
of university admission slots for Afro-Brazilians (Htun 2004). By 2013, a
majority of Brazil ’s federal and state universities, which are attended by over
three-quarters of Brazilian students in public higher education, used a quota
system to determine acceptance. 古1e quotas are based on race and class and
mandate that a certain percentage of the university entrants must be black,
brown, or indigenous, or have attended public secondary schools. In contrast
to public education, however, there are very few a面rmative action policies in
the employment arena in Brazil (Telles and Paixao 2013).
Race a nd Rac ism in Bra z iI 465
A Afavela (sl11m) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, with luxury buildings beyond.
Scholars such as Stanley Bailey (2009), Robin Sheriff (2001), and Donna
Goldstein (2003) maintain that the ideal of racial democracy in Brazil, tho吨h
not an accurate depiction of reality, is a crucial part of Brazilian society. 卫1ey
argue that racial democracy is a utopian ideal to which Brazilians aspire. Bailey
(2009) argues that most Brazilians recognize the existence of societal racism.
Yet, because they uphold racial democracy as an ideal, black, white, and brown
Brazilians are all supportive of anti-racist organizing and race-specific pol-
icies such as a面rmative action. In the United States, most blacks recognize
the prevalence of racism, whereas most whites deny it. In contrast, in Brazil,
whites, browns, and blacks all recognize the pervasiveness of racism in fairly
similar proportions. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, only 7 percent of whites
and 3 percent of blacks reported that there was no racial prejudice in Brazil
(Bailey 2009). A study in Sao Pat山 revealed that 67 percent of whites and
67 percent ofblacks agreed that there was discrimination against nonwhites in
Brazil (Bailey 2009).
Bailey (2009) found that Brazilians of all colors support race-targeted pol-
icies similar to a面rmative action. However, he also reported differences in
the level of support for such policies: 46 percent of white Brazilians support
university quotas, compared with 63 percent of nonwhites . τhis difference

is much less stark than that in the United States, where 30 percent of whites
versus 80 percent of blacks support university quotas that favor the admission
of black applicants (Bailey 2009).
Brazil's Color Bind

……..··. . .·· . .… . . . . . ... . .... . .…… … ·. . . . ……·.. . .….......··. · ... · ·... … ……··........ . ...... . ..…...
When Daniele de Araujo
found out six years ago that
she was pregnant, she set out
from her small house on a
dirt lane in the outskirts of
. Rio de Janeiro and climbed

a mountain. It is not a big
mountain, the green slope
that rises near her home, but
the area is controlled by drug
dealer飞 so she was anxious,
hiking up. But she had some-
Dαniele de Araujo αnd herfamily.
thing really important to ask
of God, and she wanted to be somewhere she felt that the magn让ude of her request
would be clear.
Sl1e told God she wanted a girl, and she wanted her to be l1ealtl1y, but one tl1ing
mattered above all:“The baby has to be white."
Ms. de Ara均o knows about the q11ixotic 011tcomes of· genetics: She has a white
1notl1er and a black father, sisters wl10 ca11 pass for " rhite, and a brother nearly as dark-
skinned as she is-"I'mreallyblack," she says. Her h11sband, Jo11atas dos Praseres, also
has one black and one white parent, but l1e is light-skinned-when he reported for l1is
compulsory militar丁y service, an o面cerwrote “ white” as his race on tl1e for1ns.
And so, when their baby arrived, the sight of'her filled Ms. de Araujo with relief:
Tiny Sarah Asl1ley was as pink as the sheets she was wrapped in. Best of all, as sl1e
grew, it became clear that she had straight hair, not cabelo ruim一“bad hair”- as
tightly curled black hair is universally known in Brazil. These days, Sarah Ashley
has tawny cu1·ls that t11mble to tl1e small ofl1er back; tl1ey are her mother's great joy
in life. The little girl’s skin tone falls somewhere betwee11 those of her parents-but
she was light enough for tl1em to register her as “ white ,” just as they l1ad hoped.
(Many o面cial documents in Brazil ask for “ race a11d/or colour" alongside otl1er
basic identifying information.)
Race and Rac i sm in B 「azil 467
Daniele de Ara白jo with Jonatas dos Praseres and their daughter, Sarah
Ashley: Her family “ congratulated me,” she says, when they first met her
future husband,“because I was lightening the family, right? It felt like I
was doing some great thing. ” Still, she prayed that Sarah Ashley be born
light-skinned.
Ms. de Arauio and Mr. dos Praseres keep the photos from their 2005
wedding in a red velvet album on the lone shelf in their living room. The
glossy pictures show family members of a dozen different skin colours, arm
in arm, faces crinkled in stiff grins for the posed portraits. There are albums
with similar pictures in living rooms all over this country: A full one-third
of marriages in Brazil are interracial, said to be the highest rate in the world.
(In Canada, despite hugely diverse cities such as Vancouver and Toronto, the
rate is under five per cent.) That statistic is the most obvious evidence of how
race and colour in Brazil are lived differently than they are in other parts of
the world.
But a range of colours cannot disguise a fundamental truth, says Ms. de
Araujo: There is a hierarchy, and white is at the top.
Many things are changing in this country. Ms. de Ara白do left school as a
teenager to work as a maid-about the only option open to a woman with
skin as dark as hers-but now she has a professional job in health care and a
house of her own, things she could not have imagined 15 years ago. Still, she
says,“This is Brazil." And there is no point being precious about it. Black is
beautiful, but white-white is just easier. Even middle-class life can still be a
st1~uggle here. And Sarah Ashley’s parents want her life to be easy二
Brazil's history of colonialism, slavery and dictatorship, followed by
tu1nultuous social change, has produced a country that is at once cultur-
ally homogenous and chromatically wildly diverse. It is a cornerstone of
national identity that Brazil is racially 1nixed-1nore than any country on
Earth, Brazilians say. Much less discussed, but equally visible-in every
restaurant full of white patrons and black waiters, in every high rise where
the black doorman points a black visitor toward the service elevator-is the
pervasive racial inequality.
Brazil's experience stands in marl
are playing out in the United States. A mass shooting like that in Charleston,
S.C., allegedly carried out by a white supremacist, would be unimaginable
here. So would a speech by the president calling on the country to confront
its racial inequality. 认That happened to Rachel Dolezal-a blue-eyed white
woman who chose to pass as black, and was pilloried-is equally alien to
Brazil, where racial identity is always fluid, and has been wilfully subsumed (conti·饥包，ed)
Co饥.tinued into questions of colour. Many Brazilians, of all races, cont1~ast their own
country favourably with the U.S., where the discussion of racism is overt and
(/) often angry.
Yet discrimination is every b让 as powerful a force in Brazil, and it exacts
a high price here, too. This cost takes obvious forms (fo1~ example, the dis-
. proportionately huge number of young black men in prison) and more subtle
ones, such as the conversations that Ms. de Ara均o and Mr. dos Praseres have
about their daughter, and whether she is white “ enough.”
But there is change afoot here, as well: It is sluggish, may prove to be
transient, and is certainly fragile. But for all that, it is happening, through
both institutional reforms and personal choices. In the process, it is calling
into question centuries-old constructions of identity, and offering people
such as Ms. de Ara句 o whole new ways of imagining their lives.
Source: Nolen 2015.
...... . ... .. . . ... . ...... ..... ....... ... . . ... . .. . . ... . .. ... . ..... . ... .. . .. ... . . . ... ..... .... . .... . . . .......
RαciαI Cαteg 。ries in Brαzil T。dαy

Brazil has o丘en been contrasted to the United States in terms of racial label-
ing. 咀1e traditional thinking has been that Brazil has many racial categories,
whereas the United States has only a few; that racial identity in Brazil, but not
the United States, alters as one moves up socially; and that race relations in
Brazil are more harmonious than in the United States. Furthermore, the think-
ing has been that brown Brazilians receive privileges that black Brazilians do
not, whereas in the United States brown and black people are lumped together.
Over the past twenty years, each of these assumptions has been either com-
pletely disproven or shown to have much more nuance.
One popular comparison of Brazil to the United States involves the argu-
ment that in the United States, anyone with one drop of black blood is black,
whereas in Brazil, people are considered black only if they have no evidence of
white ancestry. Whereas in the United States race refers to ancestry, in Brazil
it has to do mostly with skin color and physical appearance. One way to char-
genotype Genetic acterize this difference is as genotype versus phenotype. Genotype refers to
makeup. genetic makeup, whereas phenotype refers to physical appearance. Of course,
these terms are related, for one's ancestry plays an important role in determin-
phenotype Physical ing one's physical appearance. Nevertheless, a person in Brazil with a black
appearance. grandmother who has no visible African ancestry would not be considered
“ black,” but such a person could be considered black in the United States.
Race and Racism in B 「azi l 469
γeseαγc OCUS
Racial Ideology and Black-White Interracial Marriages in
Rio de Janeiro
Scholars of race in Brazil have long argued that darker-skinned individuals in
that country aspire to marry people with lighter skin with the goal of increas-
ing their social status and having children lighter than themselves. Sociologist
Chinyere Osuji was intrigued by this practice, often called “ whitening,” and
interviewed Brazilians in interracial relationships to find out what they think
about whitening.
Os叫i interviewed twenty-five married couples composed of one black and
one white partner. None of the black partners told her they had married with the
goal of having lighter children or a忧aining higher social status; rather, they cited
their partner's intelligence and social skills as the qualities that attracted them.
When she asked what they liked physically about their partners, none of them
mentioned skin color. They found it offensive for anyone to suggest that they had
married a white partner because of his or her color.
Whereas earlier studies of interracial marriages in Brazil in the 1950s and
1960s showed that many Brazilians openly admitted to desiring a lighter part-
ne乌 Osuji's study shows that things have changed. However, her interviewees
also told her that their family members made comments about their interracial
marriages. 咀1e neighbors of one white woman, for example, commented that she
would have children with “ hard hair'' because of her marriage to a black man. A
black woman reported that her cousins had commented that her children would
be lighter because of her marriage to a white man. Although the people Osuji
interviewed argued that they did not marry their partner because of his or her
race, their friends and family members still saw their relationship through the
lens of whitening or darkening.
Os叫i observed that her research showed that there is no longer a universal
aspiration for whitening in Brazil and that the appreciation of blackness is grow-
ing. Black-white couples in Brazil did not frame their relationships as an a忧empt
at whitening, and they were offended by any such suggestion.
Nevertheless, the perception that lighter is better has not altogether disap-
peared, as evidenced by the value-laden comments from friends and family.
(co’nti＇饥
. .ued)
470 CHAPTER 15 Thinking Glo ba lly
For Discussion
1. What has changed in Brazilian race relations？认That has not?
2. Why do people marry across races? Why don’t they?
3. Do you think the concept of social whitening applies to the United States?
Source: Os叫i 2013.
Studies on skin color and social status have shown that skin color mat-
ters in the United States in much the same way as in Brazil. Lighter-skinned
people of African descent in both countries have certain privileges that their
darker-skinned counterparts do not. The perception of whether a person is
black in the United States is influenced to some degree by his or her social
status (Sape川ein 2012). Studies of racial attitudes in Brazil have demon-
strated similar findings.
Overall, Brazil is different from the United States, though this difference
is not easily captured largely because of course neither country is static and
because racial ideologies are constantly in flux in both places. This flexibility is
at the heart of what makes racial ideologies so powerful.
In the United States and South Africa, the end of official segregation led to the
growth of an African-descended middle class. In Brazil, the introduction of
quotas for university admissions has contributed to larger numbers of people
ofAfrican descent a忧aining middle-class status. In France, there is also a black
middle class, albeit a small one. In each place, the recognition of racial dis-
crimination and a忧empts to do something about it have led to concessions.
At the same time, the poverty profiles of large numbers of people of African
descent in these countries have changed little.
In each of these countries, people ofAfrican descent have achieved positions
of political and economic power. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela became the
first black president in 1994j the United States did not elect its first black pres-
ident, Barack Obama, until 2008. In Brazil, a few black politicians have had
success. In France, however, politicians ofArab or African descent continue to
be notably absent. One pa忧ern common to these three countries is that racial
ideologies have changed to some degree, yet inequality persists.
In Chapter One, we saw that racial ideologies are products of the colonial
encounter. Ideas of race and racism emerged to justify the enslavement of Afri-
cans and the genocide of Native Americans. We also saw how racial ideologies
justified colonial endeavors in Africa. 咀1is last chapter drives home the point
that 500 years later, we are still dealing with the repercussions of the colonial
legacy-both in the United States and around the world.
Key Terms
比，创创
i164
中
MK
kα4
E
n
cJ
apartheid 444 Boer 飞rvar 454
dV
me
ePAVc86
nepiV / A
A
巳
O
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1i
．
les sans-papiers 449 coloured 455 J -···
臼
σoPA
、
banlieues 449 Population Registration Act 455
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J 业
b
m
8
Aj玩ikaners 454 mestifagem 463 』 J
15.1 How do other countries differ from the United States in racial dynamics?
(pp. 443-446)
• The American racial structure is just one of many possible ways in which racial
hierarchies could be organized.

> What are some differences and similarities in > Pick one of the three countries discussed and
the manifestation of colonialism in France, explain how dominant racial ideologies there
South Africa, and Brazil? have transformed over time.
> How have racial demographics influenced racial
ideologies in the countries discussed?
15.2 In France, ,vhat are the effects of the gover111nent's insist巳nee on not
recog nizing racial cat鸣。ries? (pp. 446- 453)
• In France, the government does not recognize that there are disparities between
French people with European ancestry and French people with African ancestry,
yet these dispariti时盯e persistent and deep.
Review Questi。”s Critical Thinking

» How have France's colonial endeavors 1nflu- » Compare the racial dynamics in Prance to those
enced the racial and ethnic makeup of France in 由e United States. How are they different?
today? How are they similar?
» What is the difference between Franc.e's former
colonies in Africa and its overseas departments?
汾 Characterize the ex恒旧。f racial and ethnic
inequality in France today.
15.3 In South Africa, ho,v does the legacy of apartheid affect racial
dynamics'? (pp. 454-461)
• Ap盯theid has ended in South Africa, yet racial inequalities persist.
Review Questi。ns Critical Thinking

沁 How was the Boer W：盯 important in the history ” How was apartheid in South Africa similar to or
。fSouth Africa? difierent from the Jim Crow Era in the United
>, What is apartheid? States?
15.4 In Brazil, how does the government-promoted idea of a racial democracy

affect race relations? (pp. 462-470)
• Brazil is no longer portrayed as a racial paradise, yet it is clear that racial dynamics
in Brazil are distinct from those in the United States.

> What are some strategies Brazil historically > Compare the racial dynamics in Brazil to those
used in the effort to whiten the country? Were in the United States. How are they different?
they successful? How are they similar?
> What is the racial democracy myth in Brazil?
Fα：lki：η~gabout Rαce
τhe discussions in this chapter make it clear that people who are per-
ceived as black experience marginalization in the United States, South
Africa, Brazil, and France. At the same time, these four countries vary in
how they define blackness. How could you use this knowledge-that a
person can be black in the United States, coloured in South Africa, and
white in Brazil-in a conversation about race and racism? What does
this tell us about the social construction of race?
ossar
1851 Indian Appropriations Act Legislation that 。cculturation A process by which immigrants adopt
created reservations for Native Americans and the behaviors and preferences of the host society.
provided funds for tribes to relocate to these achievement gap The disparate educational out-
communal lands. comes of whites, Asians, blacks, Latinos, and
1871 Indian Appropriations Act Legislation that Native Americans.
declared that the U.S. government would no 。cting white A term used to refer to nonwhites who
longer sign treaties with Native American are perceived as behaving in ways associated
tribes. with white people.
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act 咀1e first major piece of 。dultify 飞气Then a teacher or other authority figure
immigration legislation; it was overtly racist in interprets children’s behavior as if they were
that it specifically prohibited Chinese laborers adults.
from entering the United States. affirmative action Policies and procedures designed
1887 Dawes Act Legislation that forced Native to combat ongoing discrimination in schools
Americans to give up their communal lands and the workplace.
and claim individual ownership of their lands. Afrikaners Descendants of the Dutch colonists
1934 Indian Reorganization Act Legislation that who settled in South Africa.
ended allotment and facilitated tribal selι Allotment and Assimilation Period The oppression
government to a degree. of Native Americans that took place from the
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act Legislation 1870s to the 1920s, when two-thirds of Native
that put an end to the racially biased quotas set American lands were lost and indigenous
forth in the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act and children were obliged to go to federal boarding
the Immigration Act of 1924. It set a universal schools where they were taught to shun their
quota of20,000 immigrants for every country native ways and languages.
in the world. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 Legislation that
1984 Crime Control Act An act that established imposed even more mandatory minimum
mandatory minimum sentences and elimi- sentences. Most significantly, it set a five-year
nated federal parole. mandatory minimum sentence for offenses
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) involving 100 grams of heroin, 500 grams of
A series of immigration provisions that cocaine, or S grams of crack cocaine.
(1) offered a legalization option for undocu- Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 Act that included a
mented workers living in the United States and five-year mandatory minimum sentence for
(2) imposed sanctions on employers who hired simple possession of crack cocaine, with no
undocumented workers. evidence of intent to sell.
。bstract liberalism 咀1e first of Bonilla-Silva's 。nti幽Semitism Discrimination, hostility, or preju-
“ frames ” of color-blind racism. It involves dice against Jews.
using liberal ideas such as equality of opportu- Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
nity or freedom of choice to explain or justify (AEDPA) 1996 legislation that, among other
racial inequality. provisions, eliminated judicial review of some
475
476 GLOSSARY
deportation orders and required mandatory Cantina Girl A stereotype of a Latina as an avail-
detention for many noncitizens. able sexual object.
。partheid Legally enforced racial segregation that capitalism A profit-based economic system that
endured from 1948 to 1994 in South Africa. produces inequality.
asset-based social policy Proactive policy, at either categorical exclusion A mechanism of labor market
the individual or structural level, designed to discrimination in which an applicant is not
help narrow the wealth gap. given an opportunity to interview for a job
assets Cash in the bank and the value of all prop- because of his or her race.
erty, not only land but also houses, cars, stocks Chinese Exclusion Act Legislation that denied
and bonds, and retirement savings. Chinese laborers entry to the United States.
assimilation A process whereby immigrants lose civil rights Government-sanctioned protections
their ethnic distinctiveness and become part of against discrimination.
the mainstream. civil rights movement A series of mass protests
banlieues The outskirts or suburbs of French between about 1950 and 1980 aiming to
cities. achieve racial equality in law and practice.
beauty queue A concept explaining how sexism collective black People who are black, as well as
and racism interact to create a queue of women other groups that receive similar treatment as
ranging from the lightest to the darkest, in black people, such as Hmong or dark-skinned
which the lightest get the most resources. Puerto Ricans.
biological racism The idea that whites are geneti- colonialism 咀1e practice of acquiring political con-
cally superior to nonwhites. trol over another country, occupying it with
birthright citizenship Also known as jus soli, the settlers, and exploiting it economically.
concept that citizenship is determined by color-blind racism An ideology in which race is
where one is born, not by the nationality, race, not explicitly acknowledged, but individual
or citizenship of one’s parents. prejudices, acts of racial discrimination, and
Black Lives Matter A hashtag and movement aimed structures of inequality work to benefit whites.
at ending antiblack racism and violence in all color-blind universalism The idea that we should
its permutations. ignore skin color.
Boer War Also called the Second War of Freedom; colorism The idea that, within races, lighter is
a conflict from 1899 to 1902 in which the better.
British fought the Dutch to bring all of South coloured According to South Africa’s 1950 Pop-
Africa under British colonial power. ulation Registration Act, a person who is not
bracero program A U.S. government program that white or native.
brought in temporary workers from Mexico controlling images Raced, gendered, and classed
between 1942 and 1964. depictions in the media that shape people ’s
Brown 以 Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas Land- ideas of what African Americans are and are
mark 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in not.
which the Court determined that separate cultural capital Cultural resources that offer social
educational facilities were inherently unequal and other benefits.
and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cultural racism (Bonilla-Silva) The third of
of the U.S. Constitution. Bonilla-Silva’s “ frames ” of color-blind racism,
Butterfly A stereotype of an Asian woman who is a relying on culturally based explanations
demure, devoted, and submissive wife. such as the idea that blacks live in poor
GLOSSARY 477
neighborhoods because they don’t work hard ethnic enclave economy Clusters of small busi-
enough to get out of the ghe忱。． nesses that primarily serve people of the same
cultural racism A way of thinking that attributes ethnicity and work to facilitate the success of
disadvantaged racial groups' lack of prosperity co-ethnics.
to their behavior and culture, rather than to ethnicity Group identity based on notions of simi-
structural factors. lar and shared history, culture, and kinship.
cumulative disadvantage perspective A framework eugenics 咀1e practice of controlled breeding to
used to explain the increasing divergence increase the occurrence of desirable character-
between black and white health outcomes that istics in a population.
focuses on how disadvantages accumulate over Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Government
the life course. agency established in 1934 with the purpose of
dei ndustrial ization 咀1e process of decline in bolstering the economy and, in particular, the
industrial activity in a region or economy that construction industry.
involves a shi丘 from a manufacturing to a ser- Freedom Riders Civil rights activists who rode
vice economy. buses in 1961 to test the U.S. Supreme Court’s
diaspora A dispersion of people from their ori- ruling that segregation in interstate bus and
ginal homeland. rail stations was unconstitutional.
discrimination 卫1e practice of t reating people gen。cide The mass killing of a group of people,
differently. especially those of a particular ethnic or racial
dissimilarity index Measure that describes the group.
extent to which two groups-such as blacks gen。type Genetic makeup.
and whites-are found in equal proportions in Gini c。efficient A measure of inequality, with O
all neighborhoods. representing perfect equality and 100 repre-
Drαgon Lady A stereotype of an Asian woman as a senting perfect inequality.
sinister, cra丘y, and destructive seductress. global c。lor hierarchy A worldwide system in
earnings gαp Differences in annual earnings which white (or light) skin is privileged and
among groups. people-especially women-strive to become
embedded market A market economy embedded lighter.
within interlocking systems of oppression and hegemony When racial ideologies become so widely
privilege. accepted that they become common sense.
enlightened racism 咀1e idea that the United States hidden curriculum Underlying curriculum designed
is a land of opportunity and that African to reflect and promote the interests of the
Americans could do better if they only tried dominant class.
harder. ” Hispanic Paradox" The observation that even
envir。nmental justice Efforts to ensure the right to though Latinos have, on average, a lower
live in nontoxic neighborhoods, regardless of socioeconomic status than whites, they have
race. comparable health outcomes to whites.
envir。nmental racism Institutional policies and honorary white People who are not considered
practices that differentially affect the health white but can be treated as if they were white.
outcomes or living conditions of people and human cαpital Educational attainment, skills, and
communities based on race or color. job experience.
erotic capital A concept linking the attractiveness humαn rights Universal rights such as access to
and sensuality of a woman to her skin color. health care, adequate housing, and education.
478 GLOSSARY
hypersegregation Instances of notably high levels is。lation indexMeasure that compares a neigh-
of segregation. borhood ’s demographics against citywide
hypodescent The idea that having any amount of demo gr叩hics.
black ancestry makes you black. Jezebel A name with biblical origins that has
ideology A set of principles and ideas that benefit come to signify a stereotypically oversexed or
the dominant group. hypersexual black woman.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Resp。nsibility Jim Crow laws A system of laws passed in the late
Act (IIRIRA) 1996 legislation under which legal 1800s denying nonwhites equality.
permanent residents face mandatory depor- Johns。n-Reed Act of 1924 Legislation that made
tation if they are convicted of “ aggravated passports and visas a requirement for entry
felonies.” to the United States and established national-
lmmigrαtion Act 。f 1917 Legislation expanding the origin quotas for European immigrants. 币1e
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and denying entry act was overtly racist in that it was designed to
to the United States for anyone coming from increase the Nordic population in the United
the “'Asiatic Barred Zone," which included States and put a stop to the growth of other
India, Burma, the Malay States, Arabia, and groups.
A龟hanistan. legal permαnent resident A foreign national who
Immigration Act 。f 1924 / Johnson-Reed Act Legis- is granted the right to remain in the United
lation that greatly reduced U.S. immigration States and who will be eligible for naturaliza-
from southern and eastern Europe by intro- tion a丘er a period of three to five years.
ducing quotas, or limits on the number of /es sαns-pαpiers Literally,“those without papers”;
people from these countries who were allowed undocumented migrants in France.
entry. life-course perspective A framework used to explain
implicit bias Unreasoned judgmental inclinations how health outcomes change over the life
that operate without our conscious awareness. course.
Indian RemovαI Act of 1830 Act that enabled the Mammy A stereotypical image of a black maid.
administration of U.S. president Andrew McCαrrαn Internal Security Act A 1950 U.S. law
Jackson to use military power to displace at designed to combat Communism. It required
least 70,000 Native Americans, killing tens of members of the Communist Party in the
thousands in the process. United States to register with the federal gov-
individuαI racism When one person discrimi- ernment, and it allowed for the deportation
nates against another on the basis of race or of foreign nationals who were members of the
ethnicity. Communist Party.
institutional agent A person who occupies a position meme An idea, image, video, or phrase that
of power and is able to access or negotiate spreads in a culture.
resources for others. mes ti仁αgem 咀1e Portuguese word for racial
..
institutionαI racism
Policies, laws, and institutions m1x1ng.
that reproduce racial inequalities. mestizo A Latin American classification of people
intelligence testing 卫1e a吐empt to quantify intellec- of European and indigenous ancestry.
tual ability using scientific measures. minimization of racism 咀1e fourth “ frame ” of
intersectionality A simultaneous look at multiple color-blind racism, suggesting that discrimina-
forms of oppression, such as race, ethnicity, tion is no longer a central factor affecting life
class, and gender oppression. chances for people of color.
GLOSSARY 479
”m。del minority" myth 哑1e stereotype that Asians Oriental Exclusion Act 1924 legislation that
are the racial minority group that has “ made it" expanded the Chinese Exclusion Act and
in the United States. prohibited most immigration from Asia to the
mulatt。咀1e progeny of blacks and whites; a class United States.
of mixed-race people who are darker than 。υts。urcing 卫1e practice of moving jobs once held
whites but lighter than blacks. by Americans overseas, where cheaper labor
multiracial A person whose parents identify with can be found.
different racial groups. pαrdo A Brazilian census category meaning “ brown.”
nativism 咀1e presumed superiority of native-born patriαrchy A system of oppression that ensures male
citizens, favoring the allocation of resources to dominance in terms of power and property.
them over immigrants and promoting a fear of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
foreign cultures. Rec。nciliation Act (PRWORA) 1996 legislation
naturalizati。n 咀1e process whereby people that denied government services and benefits
become citizens of a country where they do to legally present migrants.
not have birthright citizenship. phenotype Physical appearance.
nαfυrαlizαti。n(B。nilla-Silva） τhe second “ frame" pigment。cracy A society in which blacks, Asians,
of color-blind racism, which permits people and Latinos have different social statuses
to explain racial phenomena as if they were according to their skin color.
natural. Plessy 以 Ferguson 1896 U.S. Supreme Court
Naturalizαtion Law of 179。在1e first piece of U.S. decision in which the Court determined that
legislation relating to the foreign-born, stating state laws requiring racial segregation in public
that only free white persons who had lived in facilities were constitutional, as long as they
the United States for at least two years were were "separate but equal."
eligible for citizenship. Population Registrati。n Act 1950 act that defined
neoliberalism 咀1e ideology that open markets, three racial groups in South Africa-white,
liberalized trade, and privatization are the keys native, and coloured-and mandated that
to economic success. every citizen be issued identification specify-
new racism An ideology in which it is not accepting his or her race.
able to make overtly racist statements, yet predatory lender A pawnshop, payday lender, or
racial inequality persists. check cashing service that charges very high
Nuremberg Code Policy adopted by the U.S. fees and interest rates.
Department of Defense in 1953 under which prejudice 咀1e belief that people belong to distinct
research subjects have to be informed that par- racial groups with innate hierarchical differ-
ticipation is voluntary and be provided with ences that can be measured and judged.
information about the nature, duration, and prison-industrial c。mplex 币1e vast network of
purpose of the research. prisons, jails, courts, police officers, and other
Operation Wetback Massive roundups of Mexicans elements that purport to reduce the amount of
by the U.S. Border Patrol from 1950 to 1954. criminal activity in our societ予
。ppositi。nal culture Signithia Fordham and John pseudoscience Beliefs or practices appearing to be
Ogbu's (1986) thesis that black children scientific but not based on the scientific method.
receive signals from both the white and black rαce A social construction to describe a group of
communities that lead them to reject school- people who share physical and cultural traits
ing as a route to success. as well as a common ancestry.
480 GLOSSARY
race-based job channeling A mechanism of labor Reαgαn。mics The economic policies of former
market discrimination in which similarly U.S. president Ronald Reagan, involving heavy
qualified applicants of different races are told cuts to a wide variety of social programs across
they should apply for job openings at different the country.
levels. 陀C。gni
racial democracy A society in which color and dimensions of racial justice: recognizing the
ethnic differences do not affect life chances. harms created by racism.
racial enclave economy An economy in which a reconstruction The third ofYamamoto’s (2009)
business’s success is both shaped and limited four dimensions of racial justice: acting on the
by the racial group membership of the business knowledge that harm has been inflicted on
owner. racial groups.
rαcial form饰。n As defined by Michael Omi and 陀parati。ns τhe fourth ofYamamoto's (2009) four
Howard Winant (1994), "the sociohistorical dimensions of racial justice: repairing damage
process by which racial categories are created, and providing restitution for past harms
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed." against racial groups.
racial ideol。gy A set of principles and ideas that residential segregati。n 咀1e separation of different
(1) divides people into racial groups and groups of people into distinct neighborhoods.
(2) serves the interests of one group. responsibility The second ofYamamoto’s (2009)
racial justice The creation of a society devoid of four dimensions of racial justice: acknowledg-
racial oppression. ing that someone is responsible for the harms
racial microaggression Daily, commonplace insults inflicted on racial groups.
and racial slights that cumulatively affect the rhetorical strategy Way of expressing racist ideas
psychological well-being of people of color. without being labeled as racist.
racial profiling 卫1e use of race or ethnicity as Sαpphire One of the main characters on the tele-
grounds for suspicion. vision show Amos 'n' Andy; the caricature of an
racial project As defined by Michael Omi and angry black woman.
Howard Winant (1994), a way of giving school-t。”prison pipeline A set of practices that lead
meaning to racial categories through cultural to children being funneled from public schools
representations and social structures. into the juvenile and criminal justice system.
racialization 咀1e process by which people come to scientific racism 咀1e use of science or pseudo-
be recognized as part of a racial group. science to reproduce and/or justify racial
rαcialized assimilati。n 卫1e process through which inequalities.
immigrants adopt the racial identities of their segregati。n A policy of racial separation ensuring
host country. that whites have access to the best opportun-
racially restrictive covenants Contractual agree- ities and facilities .
ments that prevent the sale or lease of property segregati。n index Measure that describes the
within an area to nonwhites. percentage of 88 percent nonwhites who would
racism (1） τhe belief that 肌es are populations of have to move in order for the city to be fully
people whose physical differences are linked to residentially integrated.
significant cultural and social differences and shifting standαrds A mechanism of labor market
that these innate hierarchical differ’ ences can discrimination in which job applicants of dif-
be measured and judged. （纱布e practice of ferent races receive different responses despite
subordinating races believed to be inferior. similar levels of experience.
GLOSSARY 481
skills mismαtch hypothesis τhe hypothesis that subprime l。αn High-interest loan to someone at
African American men in particular o丘endo high risk of defaulting.
not have the skills required to secure work in Suffering Senorita A stereotype of a Latina who
the current economy. suffers physical harm while protecting her
skin-color privilege τhe privilege ofbeing consid- Anglo love interest.
ered more beautiful, intelligent, or otherwise symbolic violence As described by Pierre Bourdieu
superior as a result of having lighter skin. (1984), the power of a socially dominant grou
skin-color stratification A system in which resources to make its preferences, tastes, and norms
such as income and status are distributed appear to be superior to those of the nondomi-
unequally according to skin color. nant group.
slave c。des Laws enacted in the 1660s that clearly systemic racism As defined by Joe Feagin (2001), a
spelled out the differences between African diverse assortment of racist practices, encom-
slaves and European indentured servants. passing daily microaggressions, deep-seated
social capital Relationships and networks that inequalities, historical inequalities, and anti-
offer social and other benefits. black ideologies.
s。cial construction An idea or way of viewing Tr，αils of Tears 币1e forced displacement of the
people based not on biological differences but Cherokee of Georgia, the Apalachicola of
on social perceptions. Florida, the Peoria of Illinois, the Shawnee of
socioI。gicαI theory of rαcism Sociological explan- Ohio, and a host of other tribes.
ation for how racial inequality is created and underemployment A category including jobless
reproduced. workers actively seeking work, people who are
spatial mismatch hypothesis Hypothesis that working part time yet are available to work full
African American families have been time, and those who have looked for work in
excluded from buying homes in the suburbs the past year and yet are not actively seeking
where much of the job growth has occurred, employment.
thereby creating a disconnect between where Vαmp A stereotype of a Latina who uses devious
African Americans live and where the jobs are and cunning stratagems to get what she
concentrated. wants.
split labor market A difference in the price of labor wαge gαp Differences in hourly earnings (wages)
for two or more groups of laborers. among racial groups.
steering A practice by which real estate agents wage of whiteness As defined by 飞N. E. B. DuBois
show homes in white neighborhoods only to in 1936, psychological benefits that white
whites and homes in black neighborhoods only workers received by aligning with the dom-
to blacks. inant group, their white bosses, as opposed
stereotype A widely held but fixed and oversim - to developing working-class solidarity with
plified image or idea of a type of person or recent忖丘eed black slaves.
thing. wealth 咀1e sum total of a person’s assets minus
sterilization racism Racist health care policies and debt. Wealth is built up over a lifetime and
practices that a忧empt to control the reproduc- passed on to the next generation through
tive capacities of women of color. inheritances.
structural racism Interinstitutional interactions weathering hyp。thesis A framework used to
across time and space that reproduce racial explain the increasing divergence between
inequality. black and white health outcomes that focuses
482 GLOSSARY
on how constant exposure to stress accelerates white supremacy A system of racial stratification
health decline for blacks. that places whites at the top of the hierarchy.
white pers。n 。f color A person who appears to be whitening The process by which a person and his
white, yet identifies with a nonwhite group. or her offspring become whiter as a result of
white privilege The advantages inherent in being social status and/ or intermarriage.
categorized as white.
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re i•s
PH 。T。 CREDITS
Chαpter 1
p. 4: Book cover from AP，εople's History of the United States: 1492-Present by Howard Zinn.
Copyright © 1980 by Howard Zinn. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers;
p. 5: courtesy of Tiffany Hinton; p. 9: Photo by DeAgostini/Getty Images; p.10: Photo by
Time Life Pictures/Mansell／τhe LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images; p.13: Photo by
DeAgostini/Getty Images; p. 20: Sarin Images/ Granger, NYC -All rights reserved; p. 26:
Photo By Al MoldvayIτhe Denver Post via Getty Images; p. 29: illustration 丘om Josiah
Clark Nott and George Robins Gliddon's Ind也enous Races of仇eEar仇（ 1857)
Chapter 2
p. 36: How the Irish Became White by Noel Ignatiev; p. 39: Sueddeutsche Zeitung Photo/
Alamy Stock Photo; p. 41: Arthur Estabrook Collection - SUNY Albany; p. 45: Contraband
Collection/ Alamy Stock Photo; p. 48: Japanese American National Museum; p. 49: Bhagat
Singh 咀1ind Materials/David 咀1ind; p. 52: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs
Division Washington, D.C. 20540. LC-DIG-nclc-04306; p. 54: appropriation of Native
American lands; p. 56: Photo by Keystone-France/Gamma-l(eystone via Getty Images;
p. 57: Photo by Photo12/ UIG/Getty Images
Chapter 3
p. 64: The Persi伽ce of the Colo山ne, by Randall l(ennedy; p. 67 (left): AP Photo/G叫
WG阳11 Orlando Senti
飞N'iedel Photolibrary / Alamy Stock Photo; p. 70: AdamJones/Wlkipedia; p. 73: Bettmann/
Ge忧y Images; p. 74: MANDELNGAN/ AFP/Gettylmages; p. 75: National Archives,
Atlanta, GA ( 1932) Tuskegee Syphilis Study Pictures; p. 77: Bettmann/ Getty Images; p. 79:
Bettmann/ Getty Images; p. 的： Sco町. Ferrell/ Congressional Quarterly / Alamy Stock
Photo; p. 87: REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo
Chapter 4
p. 96: FromMU,SLIM GIRL: A Coming of Age by AmaniAl-Khatahtbeh. Copyright© 2016
by Amani Al-Khatahtbeh. Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc. All rights
reserved; p. 101: So-CoAddict/iStockphoto; p. 103: Courtesy of Monica Carillo; p. 104:
David Grossman / Alamy Stock Photo; p. 107: AP Photo/Houston Chronicle, Melissa
Phillip; p. 114: from 咀1e New York Public Library; p.117: Photo by τhad Allender/
Lawrence Journal-World
Chαpter 5
p.128 ：讥吊 Con ' Be Alright: Notes on Race and Resegregration, by Jeff Chang; p. 132: AP
Photo /Ric Fra肌is; p. 134(a): Photo by Silver Screen Collection/Getty Images; p. 134(b):
Bettmann/ Getty Iπ吨es; p. 134(c): Juanmonino/iStockphoto; p. 135: screen capture from
Black-ish, Season 2, Episode 16; p. 138: AF archive/ Alamy Stock Photo; p. 140: courtesy of
508
CREDITS 509
the Arabian Street Artists; p. 141: Gilles Mingasson/ ABC via Getty Images; p. 143: GDA via
AP Images; p.144: Courtesy of Emma Halling
Chapter 6
p. 158: Bone Black: Memories of Girlhood, by bell hooks; p. 162: Photographs and Prints
Division, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, The New York Public Library,
Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations; p. 163: Museo Nacional del 飞Tirreinato; p. 165:
screen capture from Seoul Secret beauty ad; p. 167: Photo by Peter Power/ Toronto Star via
Getty Images; p. 172: SEYLLO U DIALLO I AFP I Getty Images; p. 173: Massey, Douglas
S., and Jennifer A. Martin. 2003. 咀1e NIS Skin Color Scale - http:/ / nis.princeton.edu/
downloads/ NIS-Skin-Color-Scale.pdf; p. 175: © 2014 BlackStar Creative. Photo by Noelle
Theard; p. 177: buzzfuss/ 123RF; p. 179: Cook/ Variety/ REX/ Shutterstock; p. 180: By
permission ofNamira Islam
Chapter 7
p. 186: Cover from How Did You Get to Be Mexican? A White/ Brown Man's Search Joγ Iden ti抄
by Kevin R. Johnson. Used by permission of Temple University Press. 。 1999 by Temple
University. All Rights Reserved; p. 190: REUTERS/ Stephen Lam TPX; p. 191: Westend61
GmbH / Alamy Stock Photo; p. 193: Jeff Greenberg/ fotoLIBRA; p. 199 (left): Se啊
Ryzhov/ 123RF; p. 199 (right): AP Photo/ Detroit News, Max O血； p. 207: Cour
Tanya Golash-Boza
Chapter 8
p. 218: Savage Inequalities: Childγen in America's Schools, by ] onathan Kozol; p. 220:
Bettman/ Getty Images; p. 221: Images Provided courtesy of Carlisle Indian School Digital
Resource Center; p. 222: Photograph by J. N. Choate, ca 1880. BPA 2 #3273/ Ge忧y Images;
p. 224: Photo by Peter Stackpole／τhe LIFE Picture Collection/ Getty Images; p. 228: AP
Photo/Jacquelyn Martin; p. 231: Anne Cusack/ Los Angeles Times; p. 236: Ariel Skelley/
Ge忧y Images; p. 237: Amy Davis/ Baltimore Sun/ MCT via Getty Images
Chapter 9
p. 248: Divided： τhe Perils of Our Growing 11'.叫uality by David l(ay ] ohnston; p. 250:
AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin; p. 256: Courtesy of l(atrina Golash; p. 259: Meewezen
Photography/ Shutterstock; p. 263: Photo by Tracy A. Woodward／τhe Washington Post via
Getty Images
Chapter 10
p. 282 ：刀ze Color of Wealth: The Stoγy Behind the U.S. Racial Wealth Divide - Copyright
© 2006 by United for a fair Economy. Reprinted by permission ofτhe New Press. www.
thenewpress.com; p. 283: Christian Goupi ／咿 footstock; p. 287 (top): No阳1, Michael
I. and Dan Ariely 2011. "Building a Better America-One Wealth Quintile at a Time:'
Perspectives on Psychological Science 6: 9; p. 287 (bottom): AP Photo; p. 288: FSA/ OWI
Collection, Prints & Photographs Division, Library of Congress, LC-USF34-063679-D.
Photo byJohn Vachon; p. 292: Photo by Andrew Lichtenstein/ Corbis via Getty Images;
p. 293: Courtesy of Sabriya Williams; p. 296: Courtesy of Katrina Golash
Chapter 门
p. 310: The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness - Copyright © 2010,
2012 by Michelle Alexander. Reprinted by permission ofτhe New Press. www.thenewpress.
com; p. 312: California Department of Corrections; p. 325: Frances Roberts / Alamy Stock
510 CREDITS
Photo; p. 326: KENA BETANCUR/AFP /Getty Images; p. 329: AP Photo/The Savannah

Morning News, File; p. 335: Photo ByJoe Amon／τhe Denver Post via Ge向r Images
Chαpter 12
p. 344: Fatal Intervention - Copyright© 2011 by Dorothy Robert. Reprinted by permission
ofτhe New Press. www.thenewpress.com; p. 347: Collection of the University of Michigan
Health System, G的 of Pfizer Inc. United States, J. Marion Sims: Gynecologic Surgeon.
UMHS.30; p. 352: Courtesy of Tanya Golash-Boza; p. 365: Anthropology News, Volume 46,
Issue 6, page 43, September 2005; p. 367: Jim West/ Alamy Stock Photo
Chαpter 13
p. 374: cover of Forced Out and Fenced In edited by Tanya Golash-Boza; p. 383: P20: 1208,
Extension Bulletin Illustrations Photograph Collection, OSU Archives; p. 387: George
Grantham Bain Collection (Library of Congre叫 p. 392: Bettmann/Getty Images; p. 397:
AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes; p. 399: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Chapter 14
p. 414: Photo by Aaron Salcido. Courtesy ofZ6calo Public Square/ zocalopublicsquare.org;
p. 416: AP Photo I Jim Beckel，咀e Oklahoman; p. 419: David Bacon/ Alamy Stock Photo;
p. 424: Courtesy of Tanya Golash-Boza; p. 426: Photo by Terηr Hall, Occupy Detroit;
p. 429: Mark Abramson／τhe Washington Post via Getty Images; p. 431: Courtesy of Opal
Tometi; p. 435: AP Photo/Arizona Daily Star James Gregg
Chapter 15
p. 442: From COAL TO C也AM: ABlackMa的 Journey Beyond C伽 toanA茹：rmation of
Race by Eugene Robinson. Copyright © 1999 by Eugene Robinson. Reprinted by permission
of Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. All rights reserved; p. 445: AP Photo/
Ma忧 Dunham; p. 449: Sipa via AP Images; p. 451: TESSON/ EPA/REX/Shutterstock;
p. 456: AP PHOTO; p. 465:Jose b也guel H ernandez Leon/Shutterstock; p. 466: Photo by
Mario Tama/ Getty Images
TEXT CREDITS
Chapter 1
pp. 4-5: Pages 25-6 from A People's History of 仇e United States: 1492-Prese叫 by Howard
Zinn. Copyright © 1980 by Howard Zinn. Reprinted by permission of Harper Collins
Publishers; p. 12: T. Todorov. 1984. The Co叫uest ofAmerica: 1在ε Question of the Other.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. p. 139; p. 22: Excerpts from BULLWHIP DAYS
copyright © 1988 by James Mellon. Used by permission of Grove/Atlantic, Inc. Any third
party use of this material, outside of this publication, is prohibited.
Chapter 2
pp. 36-37: from Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became M功it，马 pp. 2-3. Copyright © 1995 by
Noel Ignatiev. Reprinted by permission of Routledge.
Chapter 3
pp. 64-65: Excerpt(s) fror口HE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL
POLITICS AND THE OBA岛1A PRESID ENCY by Randall Kennedy, copyright © 2011
by Randall l(ennedy. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf
Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.
CREDITS 511
Chapter 4
pp.96-9 ’7: From MUSLIM GIRL: A Coming of Age by Amani Al-IZhatahtbeh. Copyright ©
2016 by AmaniAl-Khatahtbeh. Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc. All rights
reserved; pp. 101-102: The Microaggressions Project (www.microaggressions.tumblr.com),
Eds. Lu, Vivan Chenxue and Zhou, David Wei.
Chapter 5
pp. 128-129: pp. 55-56: From the book WE GON' BE ALRIGHT: Notes on Race and
Resegregation, by Jeff Chang. Copyright © 2016 by Jeff Chang. Reproduced by permission
of Macmillan; pp. 135-136: Why 'black-ish’ Is τhe Show We Need Right Now, by Daren
Jackson: http:/ / watercoolerconvos.com/ 2016/ 02/ 25/ why-blackish-is-the-show-we-need-
right-now/; pp. 139-140: Heba Amin, Caram Kapp, and Don Karl a.k.a Stone - h仗p: //
www.hebaamin.com/ arabian-street-artists-bomb-homeland-why-we-hacked-an-award-
winning-series/ .
Chapter 6
pp.158-159 :“Chapter 31 ” from the book BONE BLACK: Memories of Girlhood, by bell
hooks. Copyright © 1996 by Gloria Watkins. Reproduced by permission of Macmillan;
pp. 167-168: Ismath Mohideen. 2009. 古1e fair skin battle. Brown Girl Magazine. h忧p: //
browngirlmagazine.com/ 2009/ 02/ the-fair-skin-battle/; pp. 175-176: From CNN,
December 9, 2012 © 2012 CNN. All rights reserved. Used by permission and protected
by the Copyright Laws of the United States. 咀1e printing, copying, redistribution, or
retransmission of this Content without express written permission is prohibited; pp. 180-
181: By Namira Islam, Executive Director of the Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative
(MuslimARC) from: http: //www.muslimarc.org/a丘ernotfairandlovely/ .
Chapter 7
pp. 186-187: Excerpt from “ Introduction" from How Did You Get to Be Mexican? 1.生讥币iite/
Brown Mat你 Search for Iden ti抄 by Kevin R. Johnson. Used by permission of Temple
University Press. 。 1999 by Temple University. All Rights Reserved; pp. 193-195:
Explaining White Privilege To A Broke White Person, by Gina Crosley-Corcoran, H吵ngton
Post, 05/ 08/ 2014; pp. 201-202: Mirna Zaher from: https:/ / www.theodysseyonline.com/
white-without-the-privilege.
Chapter 8
pp. 218-219: Excerpt(s) from SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN 灿伍阳CA'S
SCHOOLS by Jonathan Kozol, copyright © 1991 by Jonathan Kozol. Used by permission
of Crown Books, an imprint of the Crown Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random
House LLC. All rights reserved; pp. 240-241: Patricia Carter. 2003. Black cultural capital,
status positioning, and schooling conflicts for low-income African American youth. Social
Problen-
Chapter 9
pp. 248-249: Excerpt from Divided：万ie Perils of Our Growing Inequali抄“ Copyright ©
2014 by David Cay Johnston. Reprinted by permission ofτhe New Press. www.thenewpress.
com; pp. 259-260: Adapted from: I(enlana R. Fer思1son. 2012. In their own words：万ie lived
仰erienαs ofu阳nployedAj阳叫merican men. Ph卫 diss., Western Michiga川Jniversit予
Http:// scholarworks.wmich.edu/ cgi/ viewcontent.cgi ?article= 1083&context=dissertations;
pp. 264-265: Glenda Flores 2016.
512 CREDITS
Chapter 10
p. 282: Excerpt from The Color of Weal伽： τhe Story Behind the U.S. Racial Wealth Divide -
Copyright © 2006 by United for a Fair Economy. Reprinted by permission ofτhe New Press.
www.thenewpress.com; pp. 293-294: Sabriya Ihsan Williams 2017.
Chapter 门
pp. 310-311: Excerpt from 刀zeNew Jim Cγow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
- Copyright © 201 O, 2012 by Michelle Alexander. Reprinted by permission ofτhe New
Press. www.thenewpress.com.
Chapter 12
pp. 344-345: Excerpt from Fatal Invention - Copyright © 2011 by Dorothy Roberts.
Reprinted by permission ofτhe New Press. www.thenewpress.com.
Chapter 13
pp. 374- 375: By permission of Oxford University Press, USA; pp. 376-377: Tanya Golash-
Boza. 2011 . Treat them like criminals. Social Scientists on Immigration Pol比如 November 8.
http://stopdeportationsnow.blogspot.com/ 2011 / 11/ treat-them-like-criminals.html; p. 400:
Tanya Golash-Boza. 2012. Immigration Nation: Raids, Detentions, and Deportations in the
United States. Boulder, CO: Paradigm; pp. 407-408: Sarah Parvini/ The Los Angeles Times.
Chapter 14
pp. 414-415: Used by permission of Michelle Alexander; pp. 431-433: Opal Tometi.
Chapter 15
pp. 442-443: From COAL TO CREAM: A Black Man’sJourney Beyond Color to
an A且rmation of Race by Eugene Robinson. Copyright © 1999 by Eugene Robinson.
Reprinted by permission of Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster1 Inc. All rights
reserved; pp. 451-453: Ali Saad/ Al Jazeera; pp. 457-459: Whitney Pirtle.
n e×
Page numbers followed byf and t refer to figures and tables, respectively. Italic page numbers refer to images.
Abdulahi, Mohammad, 428 educational inequality for, 220, AILA (American Immigration Lawyers
Ability, white privilege, 195 223-27 Association), 406
Abstract liberalism, 85 environmental racism against, 361, Ainsworth-Darnell,James, 234, 236
Academy Awards (2017), 148 362,365,366 Ajrouch, Kristine, 199
Accountability, for racial health inequalities for, 344-46, 348, Akresh, Ilana Redstone, 161
inequality, 111-12 350-55,360 Alabama, 285
Acculturation, 357-59 and immigrants, 36, 53 Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen
Achievement gap, 232-43 incarceration of, 113-14 Protection Act, 405
ACLU (American Civil Liberties income inequality for, 249-50 Alameda County, California, 353-54
Union 324 individual racism against, 99 Al-Arian, Laila, 138
Acting wh ite, 235-36 involuntary experimentation on, Alaska Natives, 231-32, 362. See also
Adamson, Rebecca, 282 346-48 Native Americans
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), labor market inequalities for, 262, Alcaraz, Raul, 428
336 265-66 Alexander, Marissa, 425
Adultify (term), 240 life-course perspectives for, 356 Alexander, Michelle, 113-14, 310-11,
Advanced placement (AP) classes, media images of, 148-51, 151t, 337, 339, 414-15, 419, 436
237, 237 153-54 Alexander the Great, 8
AEDPA (Anti-Terrorism and Effective microaggressions against, 99-100 Algerians, 453
Death Penalty Act), 398, 399 multiracial identification for, 203 Ali,Jose, 213
Affirmative action, 226-28, 233, 271-73, as murder victims, 328 Ali, Mahershala, 148
404, 464-68 neighborhood stereotyping for, 293 Alien Land Laws (1917), 72
Afghanistan and Afghanis, 43, 197 new racism against, 81 Alien registration cards, 45
Africa and Africans racial categorization for, 205 Al-Khatahtbeh, Amani, 96-97
beauty standards of, 178 racial profiling of, 323, 324 All India Democratic Women’s
color hierarchy for, 170-72 reparations for, 417-19, 419 Association, 168
colorism for, 164-65 school-to-prison pipeline Allotment and Assimilation Period,
French colonies in, 446-48, 447 for, 241-42 54-55
in global racial dynamics, 446 segregation policy for, 70 Alpine race, 40
hazardous waste facilities in, self-employment of, 273-75 Alsultany, Evelyn, 138
366, 367 in split labor market, 271 Amalgamated Sh ipping, 366
immigrants from, 45-46, 448-49 structural violence against, 55-57 America 1985 (Ong), 34
intermarriage by, 19-20 symbolic violence against, 238-39 American Civil Liberties Union
scientific racism against, 29, 30 systemic racism against, 106-8 (ACLU), 324
skin-color stratification for, 160 Donald Trump's com ments about, 89 American Immigration Lawyers
slaves from, 11, 13-15, 18-19, 22-23 in Tuskegee syphilis experiment, Association (AILA), 406
wealth inequality for, 300 75-76 American Indians. See Native Americans
African Americans unemployment rates for, 88t American Revolution, 23
achievement gap for, 234-37 wealth inequality for, 297, 300 American Slavery, American Freedom
a面rmative action for, 272 See also Blacks (Morgan), 4-5
citizenship for, 310-11 African National Congress (ANC), Americanus group, 28
civil rights for, 420, 421 457, 458 Americas
in civil rights movement, 76-80 Africanus gro吨， 28 colonization of, 6, 12-14
class oppression for, 436 Afrikaners, 454-55, 458 colorism in, 160-64
colorhierarchyfor, 168, 170, 172-76 Afro-Brazilians, 464 Europeans and indigenous people
with criminal records, 337 Afro-Latin America, 212 in, 10-12
cultural capital for, 239-40 Afro-Peruvians, 103, 143 income inequality in, 251
cultural racism against, 82-83 Agan, Amanda, 266 legal permanent residents from, 390
deindustrialization for, 269-70 AIDS epidemic, 459 slavery in, 1切 18-19, 18f
513
514 INDEX
Americas (continued) Asian Americans Berry, Halle, 168

Amin, Heba, 139-40 achievement of, 237, 242-43 Bertrand, Marianne, 265
Amnesty International, 329, 452 beauty standards of, 177-78 Beyoncι168
Amos 'n' Andy (television series), 130, in civil rights movement, 77 BIA (Board of Immigration Appeals), 377
132, 132, 133 color hierarchy for, 166-68 Bigotry, responses to, xxii
Anarcha (enslaved woman), 346-4τ 347 cultural racism against, 83 Biko, Steve, 457
ANC (Africa川、.J ation al Co吨ress), educational inequality for, 223, Binet, Alfred, 38
457, 458 228-30, 229j Biological racism, 81-82, 89
Anderson, Tanisha, 145, 146 health inequalities for, 355 Birmingham, Alabama, 79
Angelou, Maya, 64 income inequality for, 252, 254 Birthright citizenship, 46-47
Angola, 14-15 labor market inequality for, 256-58, Black (classification), 162, 164, 209,
Annie E. Casey Foundation, xxi 2561' 25布 262,263 212-13,468
Anniston, Alabama, 79 media images of, 140-42 Black Consciousness (BC)
Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1986), 322, 328 m icroaggressions against, 100 Movement, 457
Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1988), 322 racial categorization for, 204-7 Black-ish (televisio川eries), 128, 135,
Anti-Semitism, 53-54 segregation for, 70, 294 135-36
Anti Terrorism and Effective Death
“ Asiatic Barred Zone, 43, 71 Black Lives Matter, 69, 69, 202, 430,
Penalty Act (AEDPA), 398, 399 Asiaticus group, 28 431, 433
Apalachicola, 25 Asset-based social policies, 304 Blacks
Apartheid, 444, 445, 454-59 Assets, 283 in Alameda County, California,
AP (adva肌ed placement) classes, Assimilation, 49-55, 212, 221 353-54
237, 237 Athletes, 133 in American film and television, 130
Appropriation, 54-55 Aunt Jemima, 134 in apartheid-era South Africa,
Arab Americans, 138-40, 199-202, 359 Australia, 274 455,456
Arabs, 43 Average National Assessment of birthright citizensh ip for, 4 7
health inequalit ies for, 355 Educational Progress (NAEP) in Brazil, 233, 464, 465, 466
media images of, 138-40, reading score, 23矿 detention and deportation of,
149-50, 152t Awkward Black Girl (webseries), 134 398-403
racial profiling of, 453 Ayoub, Abed, 96 discriminatory/ predatory lending
racism against, 119-20 Aztecs, 11 policies for, 289, 291, 292
in video games, 144 Azucena (G山temalan woman 358 drug crimes for, 321-22
Aranda, Elizabeth, 198 educational inequality for, 228-30,
Arawaks, 11 Bacon’s Rebellion, 20, 20-21 229f
Arend, Patricia, 203 Bad Sugar (film), 352-53 in environmental justice
Argentines, 206 Bahamas, 366 movement, 363
Arizona, 405-6 Bailey, Stanley, 465 health inequalities for, 357, 359-61
Arkansas, 285 Bailey，卫1omas, 271 homeownership for, 288, 289, 301
Armenians, 47-48 Bakke, Allan, 227 home values for, 301
Army Corps of Engineers, 424 Balderrama, F. E., 71 incarceration of, 316-19, 318五 322,
Army Mental Tests, 39, 46 Balogun, Oluwakemi M., 178 323,336-38
Aryan Indians, 164, 166 Baltimore, Maryland, 351-52 income inequality for, 252, 254, 263
ASFA (Adoption and Safe Families Banishment, 379-80 institutional racism against, 104
Act), 336 Banlieues, 449-50 and Irish immigrants, 51
Asia and Asians Barrino, Fantasia, 168 labor market inequalities for,
color hierarchy for, 166-68 Baumgartner, Frank R., 324 254, 255
colorism in, 160, 164 Bautista, Robert, 376-77, 398 land ownership by, 285
home values for, 301 BC (Black Conscio时时臼） Movement, 457 in Latin American, 210
immigrants from, 43-46, Bearden, Romare, 280 media images of, 129, 130-36, 136f
385-89, 429 Beauty, skin color and, 176-81 in Peru, 84
legal permanent residents Beauty queue, 176-77 racial divisions between whites
from, 390 Becker, Bradley, 102 and,436
media images of, 130, 140-42, Beirut, 139 racial justice for, 425-26
152,152t Belarus, 422 racial profiling of, 325, 453
in South Africa, 455, 456 Belize, 169 racism against, 116
and U.S. immigration policy, 45-46, Benavides,Jorge, 143, 143 residential segregation for, 292,
71, 381, 385-89 Benedict XVI, pope, 329 294-96
in video games, 144 Berber women, 283 sentencing disparities for, 327, 328
wealth inequality for, 299-302 Bernier, Frans:ois, 27 in South Africa, 459-60
INDEX 515
underemployment, unemployment, Burgess, Melinda, 144 Charles, Christopher A. D., 163, 172
and joblessness for, 258, 259, 261 Burma, 43 Charles II, 18
wealth inequality for, 284, 299-304, Burnett, Eugene, 289 Charleston, South Carolina, 23, 467
303五 437 Burundi, 447 Checker, Melissa, 363, 364
Black 飞Nomen's Lives Matter, 145-46 Bush, George H. W., 334 Chemawa School, 222
Bland, Sandra, 325, 326, 326-27 Bush, George 认，.， 89, 432 Cherokee, 25, 26
Blau, Judith, 423 Bushmen, South African, 459 Chesapeake Colonies, 1万
Blind (Chanase), 62 Butterfly (stereotype), 140 Chicago, Illinois, 104, 269, 270, 286, 294,
Block, The (Bearde吗 280 Buxtun, Peter, 76 332, 344
Blumenbach,Johann, 28 Chicanos, 77, 363. See also Latinos/as
Board oflmmigrationAppeals (BIA), 377 Cacahenda, Caculo, 15 Children, of inmates, 335, 335-36
Boer 飞Nar, 454 Cade, Ebb, 348 Child welfare system, 118-19
Bolivia, 169 California Chileans, 206
Bonacich, Edna, 271 affirmative action in, 227-28 China and Chinese, 230
Bone Black (hooks), 158-59 educational segregation in, achievement of immigrants from,
Bonikowski, B., 267-68 223-24,230 234五 242-43
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, 6-7, 85-86, 108, immigrants in, 71, 72, 387, 397 color hierarchy in, 166
111, 112, 160, 206-7 mass incarceration in, 330, 332, 334 deportation/ detention of immigrants
Booth, Alison, 275 Cambodians, 206, 230, 234 from, 402
Bosch,Juan, 392 Cameroon, 447 health outcomes for immigrants
Bourdieu, Pierre, 238 Canada, 118-19, 396 from, 357
Boycotts, 77-78, 148 Candelario, Ginetta, 212 incarceration rate in, 314, 315
Boynton v. Virginia, 78 Cantina Girl, 137 labor market inequalities for,
Bracero program, 383 Cape Colony, 454 256,275
Brain size, 38 Capitalism, 434-37 self-employment for, 273
Brazil Captivity narrative, 142 and U.S. immigration policy, 45,
color hierarchy in, 168 Cardoza, Kavitha, 179 379-81, 385, 386, 387
colorism in, 164 Caribbean wealth inequality for, 300
educational inequality in, 233 color hierarchy in, 169 Chinese Americans, 206, 223
immigration policy in, 381 deportation/detention of immigrants Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 43-46, 71,
incarceration rate in, 315 from, 399, 401, 403 379-81, 386
intermarriage in, 469-70 European encounters in, 10, 10-11 Chisholm, Shirley, 65
nation-making in, 24 French colonies in, 448 Choctaw, 26
race and racism in, 444, 462-70 hazardous waste facilities in, Choueiti, Marc, 130
racial categories in, 442-43, 468-70 366,367 Chow, Kevin, 142
racial democracy in, 464-68 and U.S. immigration policy, 385, Christiani, Leah, 324
slaves in, 14, 462 391-94 Christianity, 119-20, 199-200, 221
whitening of, 210, 462-64 whitening in, 210 CIMT ( Crimes involving moral
Brazzaville, Congo, 171 Carlisle Indian School, 55, 221, 222 turpitude), 376
Brewer, Rose, 282 Carmichael, Stokely, 102, 105 Citizenship, 46-47, 194, 310-11, 382,
Broca, Paul, 30 Carrillo, Yahaira, 428 444, 445, 448
Brooklyn, New York, 292 Carter,Jimmy, 74, 329 "Civilization in a method of living, an
Brooks, Roy, 419 Carter, Prudence, 239-40 attitude of equal respect of all m叫N
Brooks, Siobhan, 177 Castas, 163 -Jane Addams, Speech, Honolulu
Brown, John, 346 Castille, Philando, 145 (Giusti), 412
Brown, Michael, 69, 145, 325 Castizos, 163 Civil Liberties Act (1988), 417
Brownsville, Texas, 384 Castro, Fidel, 392 Civil rights, 55-57, 419-21
Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka, Categorical exclusion, 266, 267 Civil Rights Act (1866), 47
Kansas, 57, 76, 220, 224-25 Catholic Church, 8, 51, 52 Civil Rights Act (1964), 5τ7咒 420
Bruch, Sarah, 173-74 Caucasians, 29, 48, 49 Civil Rights Act (1968), 7咒 226
Brunsma, D. L., 203 CCA ( Corrections Corporation of Civil rights movement, 41, 68-70, 76-80,
Bryant, Kobe, 133 America), 332-33 113-14, 224, 436
Bryant, Roy, 68 Celts, 50, 51 Civil War, 25, 55, 285, 418
Buck, Carrie, 41, 41 Central Americans, 390, 391 Clarendon County, South Carolina,
Buck, Emma, 41, 41 Central Pacific Railroad, 43 224,225
Buck, Vivian, 41 Chad, 447 Class, 120-21, 150-52, 192-96, 322-23,
Bullard, 2017, 359, 363-64 Chanase, Dane, 62, 372 434-36, 459-60
Bullwhip Days (Mellon 22 Chang,Jeff, 128 Clinton, Bill, 89, 393
516 INDEX
Cloaked websites, 147 Creek, 26 Democracy, racial, 464- 38

Coal to Cream (Robinson), 442- 43 Crenshaw, Kimberle, 120, 145 - 46, 434 Denmark, 316
Cochran, Dav时， 84 Creole identity, 175 - 76 Deportation, 380
COINTELPRO programs, 414- 15 Crime, fear of, 334 of Robert Bautista, 376- 77
Cold War, 391 Crime Cor山olAct (198吗， 322 of blacks and Latinos1 398- 403
Collective black, 206 Crime rates, 312- 13, 319- 20 demonstrations against, 428
Collins, Chiquita, 351 Crimes involving moral turpitude under McCarran Internal Security
Collins, Patricia Hill, 66, 149, 150, 434 (CIMT), 376 Act, 384
Collins, Suzanne, 147 Criminal justice system, 309- 39 of Mexican immigrants, 70 - 72,
Colombia, 210 collateral consequences for inmates, 382- 84
Colonialism (colonization 335- 38 of undocumented migrants, 402f
in Brazil, 462 in Germany and Netherlands, 316 U.S . policies on, 37可－379f
and colorism, 164- 65 immigrants in, 400 - 401 Desi culture, 168
by France, 446- 48, 447 institutional racism in, 104, Desperate Housewives (television
settler, 116, 118- 19 323- 29 series), 137
slavery during, 11- 15 and joblessness, 260 - 62 Detention, of immigrants, 376- 77,
in South Africa, 454 mass incarceration in United States, 398- 403, 406
See also North American colonies 113- 14, 312- 23 Detroit, Michigan, 269 - 7 1, 286, 288,
Color-blind racism, 66, 68, 85 - 86 in ηzeN，εw Jim Crow, 310- 11 294,332,427
Color-blind universalism, 83 - 85, 88 racial disparities in, 318f Development Relief and Education
Color hierarchy, global, 165- 75 role of economics in, 329- 35 for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,
Colorism, 157- 82 and school-to-prison pipeline, 428,429
in Bonε Black, 158- 59 241- 42 DHS (U.S. Depa巾nent of Homelan
and Creole identity, 175- 76 and sociological theories of Securitρ， 376 -77
and global color hierarchy, 165- 75 racism, 97 Diabetes, 349耳 352 -53,359
history of, 160- 65 white privilege in, 189- 90 Diary of a Mad Black Woman
and relationship of gender, beauty, Criminals, discrimination against, （且lm), 153
and skin color, 176 - 81 310 - 11, 337 Diaspora, 166, 170- 75
and school suspension rate, Critiques, in conversations about race, xxi Diaz, Bernal, 11
173- 74 Crosley-Corcoran, Gina, 193- 95 Diaz, Cameron, 212
Color of We alt儿 The (Lui, et al.), 282 Cuba and Cubans, 12, 24, 206, 256, 273, Dickson, Tennessee, 363- 64
Coloured people1 455 - 59 357, 391- 93 Diet, diabetes and, 352- 53
Columbus, Christopher, 4, 10, 10, 15 Cultural capital, 237, 239- 40 Dietrich, David R., 160
Comfort food, 355 Cultural racism, 82- 84, 89 Discipline, in schools, 239, 241 - 42
Communist Party, 384 Cultu叫肌ism (frame), 85 - 86 Discrimination
Confederacy, 25 Culture, 235 - 36, 357- 59 in Brazil, 4651 468
Congress, U .S., 46, 313, 330, 417 Cumulative disadvantage and civil rights, 420- 21
Co吨ress of Racial Equality (CORE), 78 perspective, 356 against criminals, 310- 11, 337
Conley,Jim, 53 Curiel, Gonzalo, 89 in France, 449- 53
Conquistadores, 12- 13 labor market, 257- 58, 262, 263,
Constitution, U.S., 106, 423 DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood 265- 66, 275, 418
Constitutional Convention, 23, 423 Arrivals), 405, 429 and new racism, 81
Controlling images, 149- 51 Dakar, Senegal, 171 and racial ideologies, 66
Convict-lease system, 311 Dakota Access Pipeline, 424, 424- 25 religious, 119- 20
Cook County Sheriff's Department, 324 Daniels,Jessie, 146- 47 and sociological theories of
CORE (Congress of Racial Equality4), 78 Darity, William, 212, 418, 419 racism, 97
Coronary heart disease, 349f Davenport, Lauren, 203, 204f in split labor market, 271
Correctional population, 314f Davis, Angela, 320 Discriminatory lending policies, 289- 92
Corrections Corporation of America Davis1 Troy, 328, 329 Dissimilarity index, 292
(CCA), 332- 33 Dawes Act (1887), 55 Diversity, neighborhood, 294, 295.£ 296
Cortes, Hernando, 11 De Ara白jo, Daniele, 466, 466 - 68 Divided ： τhe Perils of Our’ Growing
Co句 Show, The (television series), 132 Death penalty, 328- 29 Inequali抄（Johnston
Co忧on,Jarvious, 310 Debt, wealth inequality and1 301- 2 DoD. See U.S . Department of Defense
Courts, U.S ., 47- 49, 223- 25 . See also Declaration of Independence, 23 Dolby, Nadine, 460 甲 61
Supreme Court, U.S. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Dolezal, Rachel, 467
Crack cocaine, 321- 22, 328, 332 (DACA), 405, 429 Domestic violence, 434- 35
Craniometry, 38 DeFina, Robert, 173- 74 Domination, 110
Crawford,John, 68- 69 Deindustrialization, 268- 7 1, 332 Domingues, Octavio, 463
INDEX 517’
Dominican Republic and and sociological theories of race as concept for, 6, 7

Dominicans, 211 racism, 97 racial ideologies of, 7-9
deportation/ detention of immigrants in South Africa, 459 scientific racism favoring, 29-30
from, 377, 401-3 Egyptians, 9 taxonomies of, 27-28
income of, 206 Elias, S., 111-14 toxic waste produced by, 366, 367
self-employment rates for, 273 Ellis Island, 39, 39 undocumented, 71
self-identification of, 212-13 El Salvador, 391, 402 and U.S. immigration policy, 45, 380,
and U.S. immigration policy, Emancipation Proclamation, 25 381, 396, 462-63
391-92,392 Embedded market, 274 Evans, Leslie, 435
Dornbusch, Sanford M., 238 Empathy, 430 Evanston Police Department, 324
Dos Praseres,Jonatas, 466 Empire (television series), 128 Everett, Anna, 144
Doty, Roxanne Lynn, 110 Employment Executive Order 9066, 73
Dowdy, Daniel, 22, 23 a面rmative action in, 271-73
Dowell v. Oklahoma City, 225-26 for dropouts, 260-61, 261f Faidherbe, Louis Leon Cesar, 446
Downey, Douglas, 236 for felons, 337-38 Fair, use of term, 180-81
Dozier, Raine, 255 and sociological theories of Fair Housing Act (1968), 287
Dr. !{en (television series), 128 racism, 97 Fair & Lovely, 167, 168, 179-81
Dragon Lady, 140 in South Africa, 460 Fair Sentenci吨 Act (2010), 332
DREAM (Development Relief and and wealth inequality, 304 Families, 335-36, 403
Education for Alien Minors) Act, Employment Equity Act ( 1998), 460 Fami妙的 Woγk Togethe飞 The (Rivera), 216
428,429 Employment of Negroes in Agriculture Family petition, 374-75
Dred Scott v. Sandfoγd, 55 (Richardson), 2 Farley, Reynolds, 295
Drug crimes Encinia, Brian, 326-27 Fatal In阳1tion (Roberts), 344-45,
incarceration for, 312-13, 315-17, Energy Transfer Partners, 424 359-60
3181' 320-22, 321f England and English, 8, 14-19, 51, 446. Fathers, incarceration of, 335-36
racial profiling and arrests for, See also Great Britain and British Favelas, 465
324-25 English language, 238-39, 241, 404 FBI (Federal Bureau of
sentencing for, 327-28 Enlightened racism, 132 Investigatio吗 414
Duany,Jorge, 210 Entrepreneurship, 273-75 Feagin,Joe, 87, 99, 105-8, 111-14, 118,
DuBois, W. E . B., 188, 191, 311 Environmental justice, 363-68 344, 399, 423
Dunbar High School (Washington, Environmental Protection Age Federal Bureau of Investigation
D.C.), 225 363,365 (FBI), 414
Dungey, Channing, 128 Environmental racism, 361-62 Federal Bureau of Prisons, 313
Dunne, Finley Peter, 36 Epp, DerekA., 324 Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
Dutch. See Netherlands and Dutch Equal Oppo巾nity Act (1972), 273 287-89, 304
Erotic capital, 177 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 289
Earley, Darnell, 367 Espaiiole乌 163 Felons, 337-38, 398-99
Earnings, 253f Ethiopia and Ethiopians, 8, 9, 45 Female Workers Were the Last to Arrive
Earnings gap, 254, 262, 263 Ethnic enclave economy, 273-74 North， τ？叭Lawrence〕， 246
East Saint Louis, Illinois, 57 Ethnicity(-ies) Ferdinand II of Aragon, 8
Eckford, Elizabeth, 79 achievement gap by, 235f Ferguson, Ann Arnett, 83, 240, 241
Economics, 273-74, 329-35, 404 changes in, 207-10 Ferguson, Kenlana, 259-60
Education defined,6,211 Fernandez, Paula, 177
and health inequalities, 350, 351f in France, 449-53 Fernandez-Kelly, Patricia, 205
and income equality, 262-63 health and, 348-61, 349f Fernwood High School (Durban, South
intelligence testing in, 38-39 incarceration rate by, 318f Africa), 460-61
and net worth, 300f income by, 250-54 Ferreira, Roquinaldo, 14
parental, 234 and race, 6-7, 211-13 FHA(Fede叫 Housing Administration)
and skin color, 169, 170, 174 wealth by, 298员 29变f 287一89, 304
spending on, 331, 331f Eugenics, 40-42, 46 Filipinos. See Philippines and Filipinos
and wealth inequality, 303 Eugenic Sterilization Law, 40 Fisher, Abigail, 228
Educational inequality, 217-44 Europaenus group, 28 Fisher v. τhe University of Texa叭28
and achievement gap, 232-43 Europe and Europeans Flint water crisis, 367-68
in Brazil, 233, 464-66 and colorism in Africa, 164-65 Flores, Glenda, 264-65
current state of U.S., 228-32 incarceration in, 312, 314 Florida, 285
history of, 220-28 and indigenous people in Americas, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 379-80
for immigrants, 53 10-12 Food, access to healthy, 352, 352
in Savage Inequalities, 218-19 intermarriage laws in, 19-20 Food security, 249
518 INDEX
Forced Out and Fenced In (Golash-Boza)J GEO Group, 333 Hairstyling rituals, 158- 59
374『75 Georgia, 405 Haiti, 366- 67, 401
Fordham) SignithiaJ 235- 36 Germany, 50, 74, 316 Hall, Mya, 145) 146
Foreclosure crisis (2007- 2009)) 303- 4, Ghana, 170- 71 Haller, William, 205
425 - 27 GhandiJ Mohandas, 457 Halling, Emma, 144
Forrest, Brenda, 329 G .I. Bill, 282, 283 Hamamoto, Darrell, 140
FourteenthA1nend1nent, 47 Gini coefficient, 252 Hamilton, Charles) 102) 105
France, 446 - 53 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, 420 Hamilton) Thomas, 346
Frank) Leo, 53 Girls (televisio川eries), 129 Haney-Lopez) Ian, 47- 49
Frank) Reanne, 161 Giusti, George) 412 Hannon, Lance, 173- 74
Frankenberg, R., 189 Glenn, Evelyn Nakano, 178 HAPIC (Hyde and Aragon Park
Freedom, 23 - 25 Gliddon, George Robert, 29 I mprovement Committee), 364, 365
Freedom Riders) 78- 80 Global color hierarchy, 165- 75 Harlem, New York, 162, 162- 63) 172, 352
French Antilles, 448 Global views of race and Harris) Grandison, 348
French Court oηustice, 451 racism, 441- 71 Harris-Perry, Melissa, 133- 34
French Guiana, 445 from Brazil) 462- 70 Hart-Cellar Act (1965). See Immigration
French Penal Code) 452 in Coal to Cream, 442- 43 and Nationality Act (1965)
French West African Federation, from France, 446 - 53 Harvey 飞N'ing且eld, AdiaJ 87) 273 - 74
446, 447 racial dynamics in U11ited States vs. Haskell Indian Nations University, 117
Fresh Off the Boat (television series), other countries, 443- 46 Haskell Indian School) 222
128, 141) 141 from South Africa) 454- 61 Hate speech, 146
Freyre, Gilberto) 463- 64 Gobnineau,Joseph-Arthur de, 29 Hawaii, 72) 386, 387, 388
Friedman) Samuel Robert, 105 Goddard, H. H., 38- 39 Hayek, Salma, 176
Frost, Peter, 164- 65 Golash-Boza, Tanya) 212) 374- 75 Hazardous waste facilities) 359,
Fulani, 18 Goldstein) Donna) 465 361- 64, 362f
F.W. Woolworth store, sit-in at, 78 Gomberg-Munoz) Ruth, 374- 75 Health inequalities, 343- 69
Gomez, Selena, 176, 177 in Alameda County, California,
Gallagher, Charles) 205 Gonaives, Haiti, 366- 67 353- 54
Game of Thrones (television series), 141 Gone with the Wind (film)) 133, 134 and culture, 357- 59
Garcia, Juan) 12 Gordon, Be时 amin, 329 environmental justice movement)
Garner, Eric, 68, 145, 325 Gosine, Kevin, 118- 19 363- 68
Garrett, Bertha, 426 - 27, 427 Gotham, Ken, 287, 290- 91 and environmental racism, 361- 62
Garrett, William, 426 －约 427 Gould) Stephen Jay, 29) 30) 39 in Fatal Invention, 344- 45
Garrido,Juan, 12 Gracia Maria (Guatemalan woman)) 358 in France, 453
Gatekeeping nations, 44 GramsciJ Antonio, 110 and genetics, 359- 61
Gates, Henry Louis,Jr., 143 Gra11t, Madison, 40, 81 in Guatemala) 358
Geary Act (1892), 44 Gray, Freddie) 145, 146, 325 history of U.S., 345- 48
Gel Eclaircissant, 170- 71 Great Britain and British, 46, 350, 393, and individual racis1n, 354- 56
Gender 454. See also England and English life-course perspectives on, 356- 57
and beauty/ skin color, 176 - 81 Great Depression, 71, 383 reasons for current, 348- 61
and incarceration rate, 318.,l Great Migration, 393 and residential segregation, 351- 53
322- 23 Great Recession, 122, 298.,l 332 and socioeconomic status, 350- 51
and income inequality) 250- 54 Greece and Greeks) 6, 8, 9，咒 273 in South Africa) 459
and likelihood of deportation/ Green cards, 44, 45) 374 Hebrews, 50
detention, 402- 3 Greenman, Emily) 256 - 57 Hector (Guatemala叫eportee), 400
in media images, 150- 52 Greensboro, North Carolina, 78 Hefny, Mostafa, 199, 199
oppression related to, 434- 35 Grey's Anatomy (television series), Hegemony) 66, 80, 110
and race/ class) 120- 21 141, 153 Hennessy, David) 52
and school suspension rates, 173- 74 Gγ惮川. County Sιhool Board of Prince Henni, Amar, 452
and wealth inequality, 301 Edward County) 225 Henson, Drew, 133
and white privilege, 192- 96) 194 Grosfoguel, Ramon) 120 Herring, Cedric, 160
See also Women Group Areas Act (1950), 455 Herrnstein, Richard, 41, 82
Gender identity) 195 Guadalupe Hidalgo) Treaty of, 382 Hersch,Joni, 160
General Motors, 368 Guadeloupe) 445) 448 Herskovits, Melville, 162- 63
Genetics, 359- 61 Guatemala) 358, 400, 402 Hidden curriculum) 241
Genetics of Astl1ma Lab, 359 Guillory, Raphael, 231- 32 Higher education, 226 - 28, 231- 33
Genoci缸， 7, 1布 1 16 Guinea, 446 H斗 ab, 1 99
Genotype, 468 Guyana, 169 Hindus, 29
INDEX 519
Hispanic/Latino (census category), Hyperselectivity, 242-43 eugenics in, 40

207-8, 208f Hypodescent, 162 exclusionary, 42一矶 4矿－ 43f
Hispanic Paradox, 345, 357 in Forced Out and Fenced In, 374-75
Hispanics. See Latinos/as 144
“ I Am Not Trayvon Martin" video, of France, 448-49
Historical construction, 7 ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and illegal immigration, 394-403
Hitler, Adolf, 40 and Political Rights), 374 Immigration and Nationality Act
HIV infection, 349五 459 Iceland, 315 (1965), 384-94
Hmong, 206, 230, 256 Identity(-ie。 and Latin American/Caribbean
Hockaday, Meagan, 145 in Brazil, 467-68 immigration, 391-94
Hollywood, people of color in, 128 Creole, 175-76 and mass deportation of Mexicans,
Holmes, Oliver 飞Nendell, 41 Latino, 186-87 70-72
Holocaust, 432-33 of multiracial children, 203, 204f nativism in, 382-84, 404-8
Holt family, 363-64 in South Africa, 457-61 racialization in history of, 378-94
Homeland (television series), Ideology, 7. See also Racial ideologies as racial project, 110
138-40, 140 Igbo, 18 of Donald Trump, 96-97
Homelands, South African, 456 Ignatie飞 Noel, 36-37 Immigration Reform and Control Act of
Homeless (Chana臼）， 372 IIRIRA (Ill咿1 Immigration Reform and 1986 (IRCA), 390, 394-96
Homeownership, 284-85, 288-92, 297, Immigrant Responsibility Act), 374, Implicit Association Test, 98
300-303 398-99 Implicit bias, 266
Homestead Act, 282, 283 Illegal immigration, 394-403, 432-33 Incarceration. See Mass incarceration
Home values, 288, 301 Illegal Immigration Reform and Incas, 29
Homicide, 349f Enforcement Act (2011), 405 Income, 170, 206-7, 233-34, 297, 350
Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette, 395 Illegal Immigration Reform and Income inequality, 252,t 253五 437
Honduras, 402 Immigrant Responsibility Act in Brazil, 464
Honorary whites, 206 (IIRI队）， 374, 398-99 in Divided, 248-49
Hooks, bell, 158-59 Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and by race, ethnicity, and gende乌
Horwang, Cris, 165-66 Refugee Rights, 428 250-54
House ofPayne (television series), 153 Immigrants sociological explanations for, 262-71
Housing crisis (2007-2009), 301, 303-4 assimilation and racialization in South Africa, 460
Housing inequality of, 49-54 See also Labor market inequality
and achievement gap, 232 country of origin of, 396f Indentured servants, 16-18, 17f
and homeownership rates/home educational achievement of, 234:五 India and Indians, 8
values, 301 242-43 beauty standards in, 178, 179
for immigrants, 53 in France, 448-49 color hierarchy in, 166, 167
and income inequality, 270-71 health inequalities for, 345, 357-59 colorism in, 164
and individual racism, 98 intelligence testing for, 39 deportation/detention of immigrants
and land ownership a丘er slavery, 285 labor market discrimination from, 402
and residential segregation, 286-96 against, 275 determinations of whiteness for, 48
How Did You Get to Be Mexican? racial justice for, 428-29 education of, 234
(Johnso吗 186-87 skin-color stratification for, 160 income of, 206
How the Irish Became White (Ignatiev), in U.S. population, 380f labor market inequalities for, 256
36 一37 white privilege for, 188-89, 205 U.S. immigration policy and, 43, 45,
How to Get Away with Mu er (televis rl See also spec忻cgroups 386, 388
series), 128, 153 Immigrant Youth Justice League, 428 wealth inequality for, 300
“ How to Talk About Race," xxi Immigration Act (1917), 43, 44 Indian Appropriations Act (1851), 54
Human capital, 262 Immigration Act (1924), 44-46, 380, Indian Appropriations Act (1871), 54-55
Human rights, 40, 41, 421-23 381, 385, 387, 388 Indian Removal Act (1830), 25-27
Hume, David, 28 Immigration and Nationality Act (1965), Indian Reorganization Act (1934), 55
Humor Special, The (television series), 384-94 Indian schools, 55, 221-23
143,143 Immigration and Naturalization Indigenous peoples
Hunger Game乌 The (film), 147 Service, 383 appropriation of lands from, 16
Hunter, Margaret, 170, 176 Immigration policy, 373-409, 378f-379f in Brazil, 464
Huron, Lake, 367, 368 from 1790 to 1924, 379-81 encounters ofEuropeans and, 10-12
Hurricane Katrina, 107-8 from 1924 to 1964, 382-84 enslavement of, 12-13
Hyde and Aragon Park Improvement and Asian immigration, 385-89 genocide of, 1万
Committee (HAPIC), 364, 365 Robert Bautista on, 376-77 intergenerational whitening of, 210
Hyde Park, Georgia, 364-66, 365 in Brazil, 381 labor market discrimination
Hypersegregation, 294 current, 404-8 against, 275
520 INDEX
Indigenous peoples ( continued) color hierarchy in, 166 self-employment for, 274
in Latin America, 169 colorism in, 164 U.S. immigration policy and, 386,
legitimized racism against, 114-16 determinations of whiteness for, 388-89
in Peru, 84 47,48 wealth inequality for, 300
in South Africa, 459 health inequalities for, 350 I(orematsu, Fred Toyosaburo, 74, 74
See αlso spec项c groups, e.g.: Native incarceration rate for, 316 Kozol,Jonathan, 218-19
Americans income of, 206 I(panake, Lonzozou, 172
Indios, 163 internment of, 72-74, 417 I(ravitz, Lenny, 147
Individual racism, 98-103, 262, 354-56 labor market inequalities for, 256 I(rivo, Lauren, 301
Indonesia, 164, 166, 178-80 racial categories for, 197 I(rysan, Maria, 295
Infant mortality, 349五 357 toxic waste produced by, 366 Ku Klux Klan, 56, 56, 310
Insecure (television series), 134-35 U.S. immigration policy and, I(usow, Abdi, 199
Institutional agents, 238 387, 388 I(WA (Karegnondi Water Authority), 367
Institutional racism, 102, 104, 105, Jarred (African American man), 259-60
323-29, 434, 445-46 J.C. Nichols Company, 290-91 Labor market discrimination, 257-58,
Intelligence quotient (IQ), 39 Jefferson， τhomas, 23-24, 30-31 262, 263, 265-66, 275, 418
Intelligence testing, 38-39 Jews, 8, 50, 53-54, 89, 188, 432-33 Labor market inequality, 250, 253/
Intergenerational mobility, 243 Jezebel (stereotype), 133 and affirmative action in
Intermarriage, 19-20, 203, 206-7, 463, Jhally, Sut, 132 employment, 271-73
467, 469 Jim Crow laws, 57, 70, 76, 80, 113-14, 419 among Asian Americans, 256-58
Internal segregation, 236-37 Joblessness, 258-62 in Australia, 275
International Covenant on Civil and Johnson, Andrew, 285 and colorism, 174
Political Rights (ICCPR), 374 Johnson, Kennard, 186-87 and entrepreneurship/self-
International Covenant on Economic, Johnson, Kevin, 186-87, 397, 399 employment, 273-75
Social, and Cultural Rights, 422, 423 Johnson, Lyndon B., 272, 313, 393 for immigrants, 53, 161
Internment, 72-74, 417 Johnson County, Kansas, 290 and individual racism, 98
Intersectionality, 120-21, 194-95, Johnson-Reed Act. See Immigration for low-wage jobs, 267-68
434-35 Act (1924) sociological explanations
“ Invisible knapsack" of white privilege, Johnston, David Cay, 248-49 for, 262-71
190-91 Jones, Finn, 141, 142 underemployment, unemployment,
IQ(intelligence quotient), 39 Jones,James, 317 and joblessness rates, 258-62
Iran, 406 Justice for τheo demonstrations, 451-53 for women, 254-56
Iraq, 200, 406 Lagos, Nigeria, 171
IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Kandaswamy, Priya, 121 Lahoud, Ra丁rmond, 377
Act of 1986), 390, 394-96 Kansas City, Missouri, 286, 290-91 Lakeview, New York, 287
IRCA amnesty program, 374 Kao, G., 237 Lambrath,John, 323-24
Ireland and Irish, 8, 16, 36-37, 49-51, 188 Kapp, Caram, 139-40 Lamont, Michele, 239
Iron Fist, The (webseries), 141-42 Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), 367 Land, 16, 54-55, 285
Iroquois, 29 Karl, Don “ Stone," 139-40 Landale, Nancy, 210
Isabella I of Castile, 8 Kaufman, Robert, 301 Language, 238-39, 241, 404, 432-33
Islam, Namira, 180, 180-81 Keith，飞Terna, 160 Laotians, 230, 234
Islamophobia, 96, 119-20, 406 Kelly, Grace, 37 La Placita raid (Los Angeles), 71
Isolation index, 292 Kennedy,John F., 37 Lara, Mariaelena, 357
Israelis, 273 Kennedy, Randall, 64-65 Lareau, Annette, 239
Italy and Italians, 46, 47, 50-53, 52, 74 Khan, Aisha, 178 Latin America
Ivory Coast, 446 l(hian Sea incident, 366-67 color hierarchy in, 163-64, 168-69
Khoikhoi (Bushme吗 459 deportation/detention of immigrants
Jabara, Khalid, 201, 202 Kim, Chang Hwan, 258 from, 399, 401, 403
Jackson, Andrew, 25 King, C. Richard, 133 hazardous waste facilities in, 366
Jackson, Daren W., 135-36 King, Martin Luther,Jr., 78, 83, 84, 147, health of recent immigrants
Jackson,James, 354-55 414,415 from, 345
Jackson,Jesse, 87 Knights of the White Camellia, 56 illegal immigration from, 395
Jacobson, Matthew, 52 Kohn, Ilana, 308 intergenerational whitening in,
Jacobson, Robin Dale, 396 Kopacz, Maria, 148 209-10
Jamaica, 172, 391, 393, 401, 403 Korea and Koreans, 273, 386 nation-making in, 24
Jamestown, 5, 14, 15, 20 color hierarchy in, 166 racial ideologies in, 68
Jane the Virgin (television series), 138, 138 incarceration rate in, 316 racial justice for immigrants
Japan and Japanese, 45 labor market inequality for, 256, 257 from, 429
INDEX 521
skin-color stratification for League of United Latin American Mammy (stereotype), 133, 134
immigrants from, 160, 161 Citizens (LULAC), 224 Mandatory minimum sentences, 327-28
triracial order in, 206-7 Lebanon,200 Mandela, Nelson, 445, 457, 458, 470
and U.S. immigration policy, 385, Lee, Erika, 44 Manifest destiny, 25-27
390-91 Lee,Jennifer, 242-43 Man sitting on floor of jail cell (Kohn), 308
See also spec币c countries Lee, Spike, 148 Manufacturing sector, 266-71, 269f
Latino National Political Survey, 198, 212 Legalization, of immigrants, 390, 395-96 March on 飞N'ashington, anniversary of,
Latinos/ as Legal permanent residents, 382, 382五 414-15, 416
achievement gap for, 234, 237 385,386五 390, 390fi 399 Market, embedded, 274
a面rmative action for, 272 Legal system, 19-23, 47-49, 106 Marks, Jonathan, 42
in Alameda County, California, Legitimized racism, 114-16 Marr, R. H ., 52
353-54 Lending policies, 289-92 Martin,Jennifer A., 173
beauty ideals of, 176, 177 Leonard, David, 133 Martin, Trayvon, 66-68, 67, 425
color hierarchy for, 169-70 Leondar-Wright, Betsy, 282 Martinique, 445, 448
cultural racism against, 83 Levittown, New York, 289 Marx, Karl, 65
detention and deportation of, Lewin-Epstein, Noah, 263 Maryland, 19, 324
398-403 Lewis,Justin, 132 Massachusetts, 16, 331
discriminatory/predatory lending Liberalism, 85, 331-32 Massad,Joseph, 139
policies for, 289, 291 Liberia, 46 Massey, Douglas, 173
educational inequality for, Libya, 406 Mass incarceration, 311-23, 314f
226-31, 229f Life-course perspective, 356-57 class and gender disparities in rates
environmental racism against, Life expectancy, 344-45, 350 of, 322-23
361,362 Lincoln, Abraham, 25 collateral consequences of, 335-38
health inequalities for, 344, 345, 352, Linnaeus, Carolus, 28 economics of, 329-35
353, 355, 357, 359 Lisa (Latina woman), 264-65 in global context, 314-16
homeownership/ home values Lisbon, Portugal, 5 global view of, 315f
for, 301 Little Rock, Arkansas, 114 ine值ciency of, 319-20
incarceration of, 316, 319, 322, Loans, subprime, 291-92, 425-26 and labor market inequalities,
323,336 Loehmann, Timothy, 417 260-62
income inequality for, 250, 252 Logan, Enid, 87 as “ New Jim Crow," 113-14
intermarriage by, 207 London, England, 11 racial disparities in rate of, 316-19,
IQ§ of, 42 Longoria, Eva, 176 322-23
labor market inequalities for, 254, Lopez,Jennifer, 176 rise in, 313-14
255,262,265 L'Oreal, 180 and War on Drugs, 320-22
media images of, 129, 130, 136-38, Los Angeles, California, 71, 292, 294 Master race, 40
136五 149,152,152t Louisiana, 285 Mateo, Lizbeth, 428
new racism against, 81 Low-birthweight babies, 350-51, 35lf McCarran Internal Security Act
race vs. ethnicity for, 211-13, 212f Low-wage jobs, 267-68 (1950), 384
racial categorization for, 196, 204-9 Lu, Bo, 161 McClesky, Warren, 420
racial identities of, 186-87 Luanda, Angola, 15 McClesky v. Kemp, 420
racial justice for, 425 Lui, Meizhu, 282 McCreary Amendment, 44
racial profiling of, 323, 324, 325 LULAC (League of United Latin McDaniel, Hattie, 134
residential segregation for, 292, American Citizens), 224 Mcintosh, Peggy, 58, 190-91
294,295 Lundstr凸m, Catrin, 196 McKenna, Natasha, 146
sentencing disparities for, 327, 328 LUNDU, 103 McKinney, K. D., 99
underemployment, unemployment, Lupita (Mexican immigrant), 374-75 Media images, 127-54
and joblessness rates for, 259 Lynchings, 52, 53, 56-57, 57 of Arabs and Arab Americans,
in U.S. racial hierarchy, 197-99 Lyons, C., 262 138-40
in video games, 144 of Asians and Asian Americans,
wealth inequality for, 284, 297, Machado de Assis,Joaquim Maria, 463 140-42
299-304, 437 MacPhail, Mark, 329 ofblacks, 130-36
Lauderdale, Diane, 355 Mada, 18 influence of, 129-30
Laughlin, Harry H., 46 Madea Goes to Jail (film), 153 of Latinos/as, 136-38
Lavelle, Kristen, 107-8 Majors, Stanley Vernon, 201 of Native Americans, 142-43
Law of Social Quotas, 233 Malaria, 360 in Peru, 143
Lawrence,Jacob, 246 Malay States, 43, 458 raced, classed, and gendered, 150-52
Lawton, Bessie Lee, 148 Mali, 171,447 and racial ideologies, 66
Leadership, 431-33 Ma怡ede, Christie, 355 on social media, 144-48
522 INDEX
Media images (continued) Middle Eastern and North African NAACP. See National Association for the
in video games, 144 (census category), 200 Advancement of Colored People
in We Gon' Be Alrigh毛 128 Middle Easterners, 130, 139, 196, NACARA (Nicaragua川djustment and
Medical College of Georgia, 347-48 199-200, 206, 275 Central American Relief Act), 40 0
Medical experimentation, 346-48 岛1ielants, Eric, 120 Nadal, Kevin, 100
Mediterranean race, 40, SO, 51 Miele, Frank, 41-42, 82 National Association for the
Mejorando la γaza, 169 Migration Policy Institute, 429 Advancement of Colored People
Mellon, James, 22 Milam,]. W., 68 (NAACP), 76, 132, 329
Memes, 146-47, 147 Milwaukee，飞Nisconsin, 292 National Association of Real Estate
Men Minas Gerais state (Brazil), 233 Boards (NAREB), 28τ290
incarceration of, 335-36 Minimization of racism, 86 National Day Labor Organizing
media portrayals of, 137, 138, 140, Mission Hills, Kansas, 290 Network, 428
142,148, 149, 151, 152 Mississippi, 56, 285 National Immigration Law Center, 406
Mendez, Felicitas, 224 Missouri River, 424 Nationality Act (1940), 47
Mendez, Gonzalo, 224 岛1itchells Plain, South Africa, National Labor Relations Act (1935), 271
Mendez v. Westminsteη76,224,225 457, 458 National Security Administration
Menjivar, Cecilia, 358 Mochida family, 73 (NSA), 414
Mental illness, 354-55 “ Model minority” myth, 83, 230, 258 Nation-making, in Latin America, 24
Merskin, Debra, 137 Modern Family (television series), 128 Native Americans
Meschefe, Tatjana, 301 Moesha (African-American young achievement gap for, 237
Mestifagem, 463 woman), 240-41 birthright citizenship for, 4 7
Mestizaje, 24, 210, 381 Mohideen, Ismath, 167-68 in civil rights movement, 77
Mestizos, 109, 163, 168, 463 Monbiot, George, 283 college retention rates for, 231-32
Mexican (census catego巧）， 209 Moncada, Alberto, 423 cultural racism against, 83
Mexican Americans, 224 岛1onk, Ellis, 174 educational inequality for, 220-23,
color hierarchy for, 170 Monk-Turner, Elizabeth, 136-37 228, 229f
detention/ deportation of, Montana, 221 English views of, 8-9, 15-16
70-72, 403 Montana State University, 232 in environmental justice
educational inequality for, 220, Montgomery, Alabama, 77-79 movement, 363
223-24 岛1oraes Dias de Silva, Graziella, 445 environmental racism against, 362
harassment of, 80 Moreira, Juliano, 463 in European taxonomy, 2 7
health inequalities for, 356-59 Morgan, Edmund, 4-5, 16 health inequalities for, 345,
segregation policy for, 70, 76 Morocco, 450, 453 352-53,355
Mexican Revolution, 382 Morton, Samuel George, 29-30 in Immigration Act of 1924, 45
Mexico and Mexicans Moss, Kirby, 192-93 and Indian Removal Act of
achievement of immigrants from, Most Beautiful Girl in Nigeria 1830,25-27
234.£ 242-43 pageant, 178 individual racism against, 99
colonization of, 12 Mothers, incarceration of, 336 intermarriage by, 19, 207
color hierarchy in, 168 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 82, 83 media images of, 142-43, 148, 152t
colorism in, 178 岛1oynihan Report, 82 multiracial identification for, 203
deportation/ detention of immigrants Mr. Prejudice (Pippin), 94 racial categorization for, 206
from, 70-72, 382-84, 402, 403 Mulatos, 109, 163 school-to-prison pipeline for, 242
determinations of whiteness for, 4 7 Mulattos, 162, 164, 168, 209 scientific racism against, 29, 30
European encounters with, 11 Mullainatha, Sendhil, 265 segregation of, 70, 294
health outcomes for immigrants 岛1ullet, Etienne, 172 structural violence against, 54-55
from, 357-59 Multiracial people, 100, 202-4, 206 wealth inequality for, 297, 299
illegal immigration from, 394-97 Murguia, Edward, 170, 207 and white supremacy, 116-17
income inequality for, 206, 251 Murray, Charles, 41, 82 See also Indigenous peoples
nation-making in, 24 Muslim Anti-Racism Nativism, 44, 376, 378, 382-84, 394-96,
self-employment by, 273, 274 Collaborative, 180 404-8
Donald Trump’s comments about, Muslim ban, 96-97, 405-7 Naturalization, 46
89, 90, 405 Muslim Girl (Al-Khatahtbeh), 96-97 Naturalization (frame), 85
and U.S. immigration policy, 383, Muslims Naturalization Law (1790), 46, 379
387, 390 historical discrimination against, 8 Nazis and Nazism, 40, 53
Microaggressions. See Racial and Islamophobia, 96, 119-20, 406 NEAP (Average Natior叫 Assessment
microaggressions media images of, 138-39, 149-50 of Educational Progress) reading
Microaggressions Project，卫问 101-2 racial categorization for, 199-200 score, 235f
INDEX 523
Negro Mama (character), 143 Office of Management and Budget, Personal Responsibility and Work
Nelson Mandela (Opitz), 440 200, 207 Opportunity Reconciliation Act
Neoliberalism, 331-32 Ogbu,John, 235-36 (PRWORA), 398
Neo-Nazism, 436 Okeniyi, Dayo, 147 Peru, 84, 103, 143, 168, 169, 207, 210
Netherlands and Dutch, 18, 164, Oliver, Melvin, 108-9, 270, 297, 304 Peter, Christian, 133
316,454 Omi, Michael, 109-14 Peters, Mary, 22, 23
Net worth, 109五 300f Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Petit, B., 261, 262
New Hampshire, 331 Act (1968), 313 Pew Research Center, 204
New Immigrant Survey, 160 Ong, Diana, 34 Phagan, Mary, 53
NewJersey, 323-24, 328 Operation Wetback, 383-84 Phenotype, 468
New Jim Crow, The (Alexander), 310-11 Opitz，飞八lerner, 440 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 286, 366
New Mexico, 328, 331 Oppositional culture, 235-36 Philippines and Filipinos
New Orleans, Louisiana, 52, 107-8 Oppression, non-race related, 434-37 beauty ideals of, 178
New racism, 80-85, 113-14, 149 Orange County, California, 224 color hierarchy in, 166
New World, slavery in, 9 Orgy-Night of the Rich (Rivera), 184 deportation/detention of immigrants
New York, New York, 104, 129-30, Oriental Exclusion Act (1924), 381, 385 from, 402
324-25,352 Orientalism, 116 education of, 230
New York Hiring Discrimination Study, Oropesa, R. S., 210 in environmental justice
267-68 #OscarsSoWhite, 148 movement, 363
New York Mellon Corporation, 427 Osoro, Sam, 301 identification of, with Latinos,
New York Police Department Osuji, Chinyere, 469 211, 212
(NYPD), 325 Otherization, 334 labor market inequalities for,
New York State, 21 Outsourcing, 332 256,257
New Zealand, 396 Overt racism, 70-76, 80, 115-16 and U .S. immigration policy, 386-88
Nicaragua, 391 Ozawa, Takao, 48, 48-49 Phillips, Doret, 118-19
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Phillips, Lawrence, 133
Central American Relief Act Padillo, Rigo, 428 Phoenicians, 9
(NACA队）， 400 Page乌 Devah, 267-68, 337-38 PHS (Public Health Service), 75-76
Niger, 447 PaisanaJacinta, La (character), 143, 143 PIC (prison-industrial complex), 333-35
Nigeria, 178 Pakistanis, 230 Pieper, l{atherine, 130
T‘<olen, 2015, 466-68 Panama, 169 Pierre,Jemima, 170-71
Nordic race, 40, 45, 52, 81 Pantaleo, Daniel, 68 Pigmentocracy, 160
North Africans, 199-200, 448 Paradies, 2015, 355 Pima, 352
North America, racial justice struggles Parameswaran, Radhika, 179 Pinke忧， Jada, 148
in, 424-25 Pardo, 164, 168, 443 Pippin, Horace, 94
North American colonies, 14-19, Parenti, Christian, 331 Plessy v. Ferguson, 70, 76, 223, 224
161-62,207 Parents, 233-35, 335-36, 403 Plumbing facilities, 361, 362
North Carolina, 420 Parker, Candace, 133 P炒er v. Doe, 404
Northern Ireland, 46 Parks, Rosa, 77, 77-78 Police brutality, 68-69, 104, 135-36,
Norway, 252 Parvini, 2017, 407-8 145-46, 325, 451-53
#NotFairandLovely, 180-81 Patel, Dev, 148 Police officers, 323-25, 405-6
No民 Josiah Clark, 29 Patriarchy, 176, 434, 435 Politics, 86-89, 334, 378, 397, 460-61
Nuremberg Code, 348 Pearl Harbor, 72-73 Pon, Gordon, 118-19
NYPD (New York Police Penal Codes, 51 Population Registration Act (1950), 455
Depa时ment), 325 Pence, Mike, 293, 294 Portes, Alejandro, 205
People of color Portugal and Portuguese, 11-14, 24, 462
Oakland Hills, California, 353-54 in American films and television, Poverty, 226-27, 226!, 249, 295-96, 330
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 348 128, 130, 131f Prairie View A&M University, 326
Obama, Barack Hussein, 64-65, 69, 87, in domestic violence shelters, 434-35 Pratt, Richard, 55, 221
87, 332, 333, 345, 393, 405, 429, 434, See also speci扣 groups Preclearance, 420
436,470 People ’s History of the United States, A Predatory lenders, 291-92
Obama, Michelle, 88 (Zinn), 4-5 Prejudice, 66, 98
Obesity, 352, 355 Peoria (tribe), 25 Pre-term birth, 349f
Obstacles, as opportunities, 431-32 Perry, Tyler, 153 Prince Edward County, Virginia,
Ocampo, Anthony, 211, 212 Persistence of the Color Line, The 224,225
Occupy 飞八Tall Street movement, 250, 251 (Kennedy), 64-65 Prison-i叫ustrial complex (PIC), 333-35
Office of Immigration Statistics, 396 Persky, Aaron, 189, 190 Private Practice (television series), 153
524 INDEX
Private prisons, 332-35 Latinos/Latinas, 197-99 Racism, 6

Property crime rate, 319f multiracial, 202-4 exposing depths of, 112
Proposition 187 (California), 396-98 in South Africa, 455 in immigration policy, 378
Proposition 200 (A归ona), 432 in United States, 196-207 minimization of, 86
Proposition 209 (California), 227 and white majority in United States, oppression unrelated to, 434-37
Protecting the Nation from Foreign 204-7 of racial projects, 110-11
Terrorist Entry into the United Racial democracy, 464-38 and reparations, 418-19
States, 406 Racial difference, 19-23, 27 and sexism, 176-77
Protestants, 51 Racial enclave economy, 274 and slavery, 9, 436
Provine, Doris Marie, 110 Racial formation, 109-16 and white privilege, 191-92
PRWORA (Personal Responsibility and Racial hierarchy, U.S. See United States See also Sociological theories of
Work Opportunity Reconciliation racial hierarchy racism；早已φc types
Act), 398 Racial ideologies, 63-90 Radiation experiments, 348
Pseudoscience, 42 and civil rights movement, 76-80 Rae, Issa, 134-35
Public Health Service (PHS), 75-76 color-blind racism, 85-86 Rajgopal, Shoba Sharad, 141, 149
Public School 261 (Bronx, New York), consistency and change Ramon (Mexican immigrant), 374-75
218-19 in, 66-70 Rape culture, 189
Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans, 12, 77, evol四on of, 7-23, 72f-73f Reagan, Ronald, 321, 329-31
195-98, 206, 211, 393-94 and intermarriage in Brazil, 469 Reaganomics, 331
new racism, 80-85 Real estate industry, 286-87, 290-91
Quantico (television series), 128 overt racism in 20th century, 70-76 Rebollo-Gil, Guillermo, 198
Queen Nigeria pageant, 178 in The Persiste阳 of the Color Line, Recognition (social justice di口1ension)
Questioning, as response to bigotry, xxii 64-65 416 一17
Quilombos, IS and politics of race, 86-89 Reconstruction (social justice
Quinlan,]. Michael, 333 spread of, via mass media dimension), 417
(See Media images) Reconstruction era, 55
Race, 3-31 Racial inequality Redskins (NFL team), 115, 417
achievement gap by, 235f accountability of whites Refugees, 407-8
defined, 211 for, 111-12 “
Regen of the [ ! nit
and ethnicity, 6-7 in France, 449-53 Bakke, 227
evolution of racial ideologies, 7-23 and media images, 148-50 Reign, April, 148
and genetics, 359-61 in racial formation theory, 113-14 Religious discrimination, 119-20
healthineq叫ities by, 348-61, 349f in South Africa, 459-60 Reparations, 417-18
incarceration rate by, 316-19, Racial Integrity Act (1924), 41 Residential school system, 119
31 可 322-23 Racial issues, on social media, 147-48 Residential segregation, 286-96, 351-53
intersectionality of, 120-21, 434-35 Racialization, 51, 197, 212, 378-94, Responsibility (social justice
in Latin American nation-making, 24 396,397 dimension), 417
and manifest destiny/Indian Racialized assimilation, 49-54, 212 Reunion, 445
Removal Act, 25-27 Racialized social systems, 108 Rhetorical strategies, 86
in A People's History of the United Racialized tokens, 264-65 Rhimes, Shonda, 128, 153
States, 4-5 Racial justice, 413-38 Rice, Tamir, 145, 146, 417
politics of, 86-89 Michelle Alexander on, 414-15 Richardson, Earle Wilton, 2
rise of scientific racism, 27-31 civil rights in, 419-21 Richwine,Jason, 42
and slavery／丘eedom in United current struggles for, 424-29 Rihanna, 168
States, 23-25 defined,415 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 233, 465
solidification of, 22, 23 and empathy, 430 Rivera, Diego, 184, 216
wealth by, 299j four dimensions of, 416-19 Roach, Kevin, 324
Race-based job channeling, 268 human rights in, 421-23 Roanoke Islands, 15
Race riots, 57 and oppression unrelated to racism, Roberts, Dorothy, 344-45, 359-60
Racial categories, 196-213 434-37 Robertson, Dwanna, 99, 114-16
Arab Americans, North Africans, and Opal Tometi on, 431-33 Robinson, Anna, 134
Middle Easterners, 199-202 Racially restrictive covenants, Robinson, Eugene, 442-43
in Brazil, 442-43, 468-70 286-87, 290 Robinson, Kristina, 175, 175-76
changesin,207-10 Racial microaggressions, 99-103 Robles, Barbara, 282
ethnic vs., 211-13 Racial profiling, 323-25, 325, 453 Rock, Chris, 128
formation of, 109-16 Racial project, 110-11 Rock Hill, South Carolina, 78
in Latin America, 209-10 Racial redistricting, 205 Rockquemore, Kerry Ann, 203
INDEX 525
Rodriguez, Clara, 212, 213 and white privilege, 192- 93 Smedley, Audrey, 436
Rodriguez, Gina, 176 See also Apartheid Smith, Andrea, 116- 18
Rodriguez, R., 71 Segregation index, 290- 92, 294 Smith,John, 4
Romania, 249 Self-employment, 273- 75 Smith, Stacy, 130
Rome, ancient, 6 Self-identification, 207, 212- 13, 444 SNCC (St叫entNo盯iolent
Romero, Silvio, 463 Seminoles, 26 Coordinating Committee), 78
Rondilla,Joanne, 166, 177- 78 Semyonov, Mosh、 263 Snowz, 165, 165- 66
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 73 Senegal, 446 Snyder, Rick, 368
Roscigno, Vincent, 234 Sentencing, prison, 316, 327- 28 Social capital, 237- 39
Rosenblum, Alexis, 170 September 11 terrorist attacks, 96, 138, Social Colorism (Vicente), 156
Roth, Wendy, 203 201,355 Social construction, 6
Rousseff, Dilma, 233 Settler colonialism, 116, 118- 19 Social media, 144- 48, 432『33
Runaway slaves, 14- 15 Seville, Spain, 11 Social order, 21- 22
Russer, Aura, 145 Sex in the Ci抄（televisio川eries), 129 Social systems, racialized, 108
Russia, SO, 315 Sexuality, 121, 192- 96 Socioeconomic status, 233 - 35, 234.£
Rwanda,447 SHA (Southern Homestead Act), 285 350- 52, 460
Shapiro，百1omas, 108- 9, 270, 297, Sociological theories of income
Sachter, David, 344 301, 304 inequality, 262- 7 1
Saenz, Rogelio, 207 Shared goals, xxii Sociological theories of racism, 95- 122
Safe Drinking Water Act, 368 Shared values, xxi individual racism, 98- 103
Sakamoto, Arthur, 258 Sharpton, Al, 87 institutional racism, 102, 104
Salaita, Steven, 120 Shawnee, 25 intersectionality of theories of race
Salazar, Mary Helen, 186 Sheriff, Robin, 465 and, 120- 21
Salvatierra v. Del Rio Independent School Sherman, William, 285 Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism,
District, 224 Shi丘ing standards, 266, 267 119- 20
Sanchez, George, 404 Shiseido, 180 in Muslim Girt 96 - 97
Sanctions, 395 Shoub, Kelsey, 324 racial formation in, 109- 16
Sandinistas, 391 Sickle cell disea盹 360, 360f settler colonialism, 116, 118- 19
Sans-papiers, les, 449, 449 Silence, as response to bigotry, xxii structural racism, 106, 108- 9
Santo Domingo, 12 Sims,James Marion, 346, 347 systemic racism, 105 - 8
Sao Paulo, Brazil, 381, 462 Singh, Gopal, 357 wl1ite supremacy, 116- 18
Sapphire ( cha肌ter), 133 Sit-ins, 78, 428 Somalia, 406
Sarah, Clyde, 74 Skills mismatch hypotl1esis, 270 South Africa, 454- 61
Saraswati, Ayu, 164, 178 Skin bleacl山 ir (ski川ightenin apartheid in, 454- 57
Sarich, Vincent, 41- 42, 82 products), 163, 165 - 68, 170- 72, colonialism in, 454
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 449 171.£ 172, 178 - 80 colorism in, 165, 178
Sastre, Maria Teresa Munoz, 172 Skin color, 83- 85, 173- 74, 176- 81, coloured identity in, 457- 59
Savage Inequalities (Kozol), 2 18- 19 198 - 9 咒 19俘 See also Colorism human rights in, 422
Scandal (televisio川eries), 128 Skin-color privilege, 177 immigrants from, 46
School-to-prison pipeline, 241- 42 Skin-color strati且cation, 160, 162- 63, politics of white youth identity in,
Schwartzman, Luisa, 210 466- 67, 470 460 - 61
Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 71 Slave codes, 19, 21- 22 post-apartheid inequality in, 459- 60
Scientific racism, 27- 31, 38- 42 Slave communities, 15 racial makeup of, 444
Scott, Walter, 325 Slave rebellions, 20- 22 South Asia, 167- 68, 366, 455
Scottish, 16 Slavery, 5 South Carolina, 55, 285
Scovill-Schrader, 363 in Americas, 1布 18 - 19, 18f Southeast Asia, 366
Seattle, Washington, 280 325 in Brazil, 462 Southern Baptist Convention, 417
Segregation, 57, 70 during colonization, 11- 15 Southern Homestead Act (SHA), 285
and civil rights movement, 76- 80 before concept of race, 9- 10 Southern Wood Piedmont, 365
and educational inequality, 220- 21, and criminal justice system, 311 South Korea. See Korea and Koreans
223 - 27, 226f and educational inequality, 220 Spain and Spaniards, 8, 393
internal, 236, 236- 37 and freedom in United States, 23- 25 color hierarchy of, 163, 163
media portrayals of, 130 ownership of land a丘er, 285 encounters with indigenous people,
as overt racism, 70 and racism, 436 10- 12
and poverty, 226- 27, 227t reparations for, 417- 19, 419 in Latin America, 24
residential, 286- 96 responsibility for, 417 religious discrimination in, 120
in U.S. vs. other countries, 4 44 and solidification of race, 22- 23 slavery and colonization by, 11- 13, 18
526 INDEX
Spanish Inquisition, 8 Tanzania, 171-72 UNESCO (United Nations Educational,

Spatial mismatch hypothesis, 2 70 Tatum, Daniel, 236 Scientific, and Cultural
Special Field Order No. 15, 285 Tax policies, 109 Organizatio吗 464
Spencer, Herbert, 29 Taylor, Dorceta, 363 Unilever, 180
Spickard, Paul, 166, 177-78 TCE (tricholorethylene), 363 Unionized jobs, 269
Split labor market, 271 ηl喀raph Poles with Buildings (Stella), 342 United Democratic Front (UDF), 458
Springfield, Massachusetts, 292 Telles, Edward, 169, 170, 210 United for a Fair Economy, 282
Springfield, Ohio, 57 Temporary workers, 395-96 United Nations, 408
Springwood, Charles Fruehling, 133 Tenochtitl缸1, 11 United Nations Educational, Scientific,
Standard English (la吨uage), Terman, Lewis, 39 and Cultural Organization
238-39, 241 Terrorists, 138-39, 406 (UNESCO), 464
Standing Rock Sioux, 424-25 Texas, 223, 224, 327, 384 United States
Stanford-Binet test, 39 咀1ailand, 166 beauty ideals in, 176
Stanton-Salazar, Ricardo, 238 Theo (French victim of police assault), country of origin of immigrants
Starr, So叫 a,266 451-53 in, 396f
State of Women-Owned Businesses 咀1ind, Bhagat Singh, 49, 49 culture of, 357-59
Report, 275 Thomas, Lynn, 178, 179-80 educational inequality in, 219,
Steele, Liza, 169 Thompson,]. S., 237 228-32
Steeri吨（practice), 287 Till, Emmett, 68 film and television in, 129-30
Stella,Joseph, 342 “ Til Law Do Us Part”(Gomberg-Munoz), health inequalities in, 345-48
Stenberg, Amandla, 147 374-75 immigrant population of, 380f
Stephens, Dionne, 177 Title VI (Civil Rights Act of 1968), 226 immigration policy in, 49-52, 501,
Stereotypes, 66, 293-94. See also Media Todorov, T., 12 378-94, 37 可－379f
images Togo, 172, 447 income inequality in, 250-52
Sterling, Alton, 145 Tohono 0 ’ odham, 352-53 institutional racism in, 104
Stigma, for felons, 337-38 Tometi, Opal, 430, 431-33 mass incarceration in, 312, 312-23
Stock holdings, 301 Topeka, Kansas, 224 media portrayals of, 150
Stress, 354-56, 358-59 Torlino, Tom, 221 race in, 5-6
Stroke, 349f Torres, Saillant, Silvio, 212 racial dynamics of other countries
Structural racism, 106, 108-9 Tracking (of students), 236-37 vs., 443-46, 462, 466, 468
Structural violence, 54-57, 358 Trails of Tears, 25, 26, 26 racial formation in, 109-16
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Traub, Amy, 303 racial ideologies in, 66, 69-70
Committee (SNCC), 78 Tricholorethylene (TCE), 363 skin-color stratification in, 160
Subprime loans, 291-92, 425-26 Trinidad, 178 slavery and freedom in, 23-25
Sub-Saharan Africans, 448, 450, 453 Triracial order, 206-7 systemic racism in, 106
Suburbs, 450 Trump, Donald, 72, 80, 8 巧 87-90, 96-97, toxic waste produced by, 366, 367
Sudan, 406, 446 201, 293-94, 332, 333, 404-7, wealthineq叫ity in, 283, 2841,
Sue, Christina, 178 425,429 297-302, 298f
Sue, Derald Wing, 100 Trump University, 89 white majority in, 204-7
Suffering Senorita, 137 Tunisia and Tunisians, 450, 453 See also North American colonies
Sugrue，咀1omas, 270 Turner, BrockAllen, 189-90, 190 United States racial hierarchy, 51, 161,
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Tuskegee syphilis experiment, 196-207
Neighborhoods Act, 405-6 75, 75-76 Arab Americans, North Africans, and
Supreme Court, U.S., 42}-43耳 74, 106, Tutu, Desmond, 329 Middle Easterners in, 199-202
228, 286, 328, 406. See also specific Tyding Latinos/Latinas in, 161, 197-99
cases Tyson, Karolyn, 236 multiracial identifications in, 202-4
Suriname, 169 and white majority, 204-7
Suspension rate, school, 173-74 UDF (United Democratic Fro叫， 458 United States v. Bhagat Singh 刀iind, 48, 49
Sweden, 196 UDHR. See Universal Declaration of United We Dream, 428
Symbolic violence, 238 Human Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Syphilis, 75-76 Ugly Betty (television series), 137 (UDHR), 40, 41, 422
Syria and Syrians, 47, 200, 406-8 Underemployme叽 253耳 259 Universalism, 83一邸， 88
Systemic racism, 105-8, 344, 399, 403 Undocumented immigrants, 38号 4021, University of California at Davis Medical
428-29, 432, 449, 449. See also Illegal School, 227, 264
Taiwan,234 immigration University of California system, 228
Takao Ozawa v. United States, 48-49 Unemployment, 88t, 253五 258-62, University of Georgia, 364, 365
Tan, Lewis, 142 269-70, 450-51 University of Idaho, 232
INDEX 527
University ofMissouri, 102 Wage gap, 254, 262 Whitening theory, 209-10, 381,
University of Nebraska, 133 Wage of whiteness, 188, 191 462-64, 469
University of Texas, 228 Walmsley, Roy, 314-15 White person of color, 197
Urban Institute, 299-300 War on Drugs, 315, 320- 23, 327, 414 White privilege, 185-207
Uruguay, 251 Warren-Findlow,Jan, 356 as contested concept, 3 7
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 348 Washington, D.C., 104, 263, 296, described, 188-92
U.S. Border Patrol, 43, 383, 384, 394, 433 299-300 in How Did You Get to Be Mexican,
U.S. census, 196, 200, 202, 203, 205, Washington, Earl, 317 186-87
207-9, 208.£ 212 Washington, George, 23 impact of class, gende马 and sexuality
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 391 Washington, Harriet, 345, 347-48 on,192-96
U.S. Commodity Supplemental Food Washington State, 406 “ invisible knapsack ” concept of, 58,
Program, 353 Washington State University, 232 190-91
U.S. Department ofDefense (DoD), 9咒 Watkins, S. Craig, 144 and systemic racism, 106
330, 348 Wealth, 283, 297, 299f and U.S. racial hierarchy, 196-207
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Wealth gap, 298卫 302-4, 303f Whites
(DHS), 376刁7 Wealth inequality, 281-305, 284.£ accountability of, 111-12
U.S. Department ofJustice, 80, 333 298五 437 and achievement gap, 237
U.S. Department of Labor, 272 beyond homeownership, 301-2 in Alameda County, California,
U.S. Department of State, 375 in colonial North America, 21-22 353-54
in The Color of Wealt儿 282 as athletes, 133
Vagianos, Alanna, 189 current state of U.S., 296-302 birthright citizenship and
Vaid,Jyostna, 178 and land ownership a丘er slavery, 285 naturalization for, 46-47
Valdez, Zulema, 273, 274, 434 reasons for increases in, 302-4 in Brazil, 463-67
Vamp (stereotype), 137 and residential segregation, 286-96 and civil rights for African
Vargas, Nicholas, 198 and structural racism, 108-9 Americans, 55-57
Venezuela, 210 in Washington, D.C., 299-300 drug crimes for, 321
Vera Institute, 316 Weathering hypothesis, 356-57 emp挝hyof,430
Veterans Administration, 282 We Gon' Be Al句ht (Chang), 128 and environmental racism, 361, 362
Vianna, Oliveira, 381, 463 Welch, Michael, 334 in European taxonomy, 28
Vicente, Noe, 156 Welfare queen, 121 health inequalities for, 344, 350,
Vidal-Ortiz, Salvador, 197-98 Welfare services, 120-21, 398, 404 351-52,355
Video games, 144 Wellman, David, 111 homeownership for, 288, 289, 301
Vietnam and Vietnamese WestAfrica, 18 honorary, 206
achievement of immigrants from, Western, Bruce, 261, 267-68 in immigration policy, 379
234.£ 242-43 West Oakland, California, 353-54 incarceration of, 317, 319, 337- 38
color hierarchy in, 166 White （肌ial category), income inequality for, 252, 254, 263
deportation/detention ofimmigrants 196-97, 204-5 labor market inequalities fo乌
from,402 White, acting, 235-36 254,255
and U.S. immigration policy, 386, White, Frederick, 142-43 life-course perspectives for, 356
389 White,Jeremiah, 87 as majority in United States, 204-7
wealth inequality fo马 300 Whiteness, 35-58 media images of, 130, 136五 137, 150
Vietnam War, 389, 414 for Asian Americans, 166-67 as murder victims, 328
Vineland Training School for Feeble- and assimilation/racialization of new racism favoring, 81
Minded Boys and Girls, 38-39 immigrants, 49-54 racial divisions between other groups
Violence, 54-57, 238, 286, 358, 434-35 in Brazil, 164 and,436
Violent crime rate, 320f court determinations of, 47-49 racial microaggressions by, 100
Virginia, 4, 16, 18-22, 271 and exclusionary immigration/ and racial profiling, 324, 325
Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and citizenship policies, 42-47 segregation for, 70, 286, 292, 294-96
Feebleminded, 41 in How the Irish Became White, 36-37 self-employment for, 274, 275
Viruell-Fuentes, Edna, 358-59 for multiracial people, 203 sentencing of, 327, 328
Volusia County, Florida, 324 and scientific racism in 19th and 20th in South Africa, 455, 456, 460-61
Voting rights, 56, 310-11, 337, centuries, 38-42 in split labor market, 271
420-21, 458 in South Africa, 461 underemployment, unemployment,
Voting Rights Act (1965), 5τ7τ420-21 and structural violence against and joblessness rates for, 258,
native-born populations, 54-57 259, 261
Wackenhut, 333 wage of, 188, 191 wealth inequality for, 284, 297,
Wade, Peter, 210 See also White privilege 299-304, 303f
528 INDEX
\Vbit« {continu,d) 毛v。men Yamamoto, Erk, 416

飞Vbit< supremacy, IJ6-18, 1171, 434 as athletes, 133 Yancey, George, 205
\\Tide Open \Valls art village project Black\Vomcn's Lives Matter, 145-46 Yeakcy, Carol Camp, 102, 104, 105
(Kubencb, Gambia), 126 educational attainment of, 170 Ycmcn, 40 6
\Vilder,Jeffri Anne, 172 health disparities 岛r,355, 356 Yerkes, Robert, 39, 46
Wilkins, Amy, 195-96 homeownccship for, 288 York County Prison, 376
\Villiams, David, 351 incarceration of, 336 Yoruba, 18
1γilliam,, Eric, 436 labor market in叫“lity fo r, 254-57, YouTubc, 144, 148
、Villiams, Genevieve, 223 255!, 264-65 Yu, Stella, 357
\ Villiams,Jessc, 179, 179 m,>dia portr町als of, 13弘扬， 137, Yuen, Nanc如 130
\Villiams, J础ica, 145 140-42, 148-52 Yugoslavia, 46
1、iilliams, Sabriya lbsan, 293, 293-94 self-employment for, 274, 275, 27Sf Yuki, 54
、Villiams, Serena, 133 S四 alsoGend町
飞Villi四盹 Venus, 133 w。men’s March on Washington, 256 Zagocsky, J町， 299
气\Tillie Horton’ case, 334 、v。od, Phillip, 332, 333 Zahc马 Mima, 20 1-2
飞、｛ilmington, Delaware, 224 飞飞r。rld 飞飞far I,
388, 393 Zaire, 447
\\Tilson, Darren, 69 、飞lorld飞Var II, 40, 46, 53, 72-74, 248, 249, Zambia, 171
飞Vils。”， Pctc, 39? 268, 330, 383, 38?, 393, 417 Zapata,Jasminc, 350, 351
\Vils。”， William Julius,
338 、Vrigh鸟飞，Vinthrop, 210 Zarour fa mily, 407-8
\Vinant, Howard, 109-14 飞、ly。mi ng, 33 1 Zegar吨 Monka Caπillo, 103, 103, 143
、Vinfrey, Oprah, 64 Zhou, Min, 2 42-43
\Vintbrop,Jobn ,“ Xam(S。uthAf此an coloured man), Zimmerman, George, 66-68, 67, 425
飞Vise, Tim, 191 457-59 Zinn, Howard, 4-5, 19, 21
飞飞lolfe, Tim, 102 Xi乌 Yu, 256-57 Zolbcrg, Astride, 408-9

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丁A1NYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA

A C RIT IC AL APP RO AC H SECOND EDITION

TANYA MARIA GOLASH 嗣 BOZA

NEW YORK OXFORD

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© 2018, 2015 by Oxford University Press

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

List of Excerpts xvii

PART I RACIAL IDE。LOGIES

1 The Origin of the Idea of Race 3

PART II p。LICY AND INSTITUTI。NS

• 8 Educational Inequality 217

PART Ill c。NTESTING AND C。MPARING RACIAL INJUSTICES

PART I RACIAL IDE 。 i。 GIES

The Origin of the Idea 。f Race 3

Race, lmmigrati。n, and Citizenship fr1。m the 1840s

Exclusionary lmmigrati。n and Citizenship Policies 42

Racial Ide。l。gies fr。m the 1920s f。 the Present 63

Overt Racism in the Mid-Twentieth Century 70

v。ices Fred T~Y.?saburo Korematsu 74

s。ci。｜。gical The。ries 。f Race and Racism 95

Racial Formation 109

White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism 116

lslamophobia and Anti-Arab Racism 119

Racism in the Media: The Spread of Ide。l。gy 127

Media Images and Racial Inequality 148

c。l。rism and Skin-C。｜。r Stratificati。n 157

v。ices: The Fair-Skin Ba忖le 167

Latin America and Latinos/as 168

v。ices Colorism and Creole Identity 175

PART II p。 LICY AND INSTITUTI 。 NS

White Privilege and the Changing U.S. Racial

Whiteness, Class, Gender, and Sexuality 192

Muitiracial Identification and the U.S. Raciai

Changes in Racial and Ethnic Classifications 207

Educati。nal Inequality 217

The Achievement Gap: Sociological Explanations for Persistent

Hidden Curricula and the School-to-Prison Pipeline 241

Conclusion and Discussion 243

Inc。me and Lab。r Market Inequality 247

Structural Explanations 266

Affirmative Action in Employment 271

Inequality in H。using and Wealth 281

Racism and the Criminal Justice System 309

Mass Incarceration and the War on Drugs 320

Conclusion and Discussion 339

Health Inequalities, Environmental Racism, and

The History of Health Disparities in the United States 345

。 GLOBAL VIEW Health and Structural Violence in

Conclusion and Discussion 368

Racism, Nativism，。nd lmmigrati。n p。licy 373

The Racialized History of U.S. Immigration Policy 378

Conclusion and Discussion 408

PART Ill c。 NTESTING AND C。MPARING RACIAL INJUSTICES

Moving Beyond Race 434

Thinking GI。bally 441

Race and Racism in South Africa 454

四抽回 S。υth African c。loυred Identity 4~?

Race an d Racism in B『azil 462

Conclusion and Discussion 470

Tanya Maria Golash-Boza holds a B.A. in Philosophy from the University

’Thissecond edition of Race and Racisms engages students in significant ques-

voices boxes highlight individual stories related to race and racism,

Jj'y＝四ere a colonist, you k:new that y=r technolo1,"J} 削川叩erior to

villag，时， burned their cornfields. It pro四d yoi矿，iuperiority，仇明te oj'