Military Information Support Operations
Military Information Support Operations
07 January 2010
Incorporating Change 1
20 December 2011
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PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of
military information support operations in support of joint, multinational, and interagency
activities across the range of military operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of
the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for
interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It
provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other
joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and
training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their
appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC
from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most
appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of
combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of
these commands, and the Services.
WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
VADM, USN
Director, Joint Staff
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Preface
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
CHANGE 1 TO JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13.2
DATED 7 JANUARY 2010
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Summary of Changes
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
CHAPTER II
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS
• General .......................................................................................................................II-1
• Roles and Responsibilities .........................................................................................II-1
• Relationships ..............................................................................................................II-8
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL
CHAPTER IV
PLANNING
CHAPTER V
JOINT MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROCESS
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Table of Contents
CHAPTER VI
EMPLOYMENT
CHAPTER VII
ENABLERS
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
FIGURE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
Overview
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Executive Summary
Legal Framework and The employment of MIS units is governed by explicit legal
Authorities authorities that direct and determine how their capability is
utilized. This legal foundation establishes MISO as a
communications means and allows their integration with
those strategies that apply the instruments of national
power. Leaders and planners interpret relevant laws and
policies to conduct MISO in any situation or environment,
internationally and domestically.
The Purpose of MISO MISO are used to establish and reinforce foreign
perceptions of US military, political, and economic power
and resolve. In conflict, MISO as a force multiplier can
degrade the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce civilian
interference, minimize collateral damage, and maximize the
local populace’s support for operations.
Key Considerations for Key considerations for effective MISO include: early
Effective MISO planning and sustained employment; integration of MISO
with the communication strategies of the USG and
multinational partners; the use of indigenous assets;
command emphasis and resourcing; a responsive MISO
approval process; and a quantifiable and timely assessment
criteria.
Guidance for Combatant The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Strategic
Commanders Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provide direction and guidance to
combatant commanders (CCDRs) concerning joint
operation planning and their respective responsibilities.
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Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
MISO and Information MISO play a central role in the achievement of the joint
Operations force commander’s (JFC’s) information objectives through
their ability to induce or reinforce adversary attitudes and
behavior favorable to these objectives. In order to ensure
all aspects of IO are properly integrated and synchronized
into the combatant command planning process, an IO cell
chief is chosen. This cell chief convenes meetings of the
IO cell periodically in order to facilitate the integration of
information-related capabilities. Within the IO cell, the
MISO representative integrates, coordinates, deconflicts,
and synchronizes the use of MISO with other IO
capabilities.
MISO and Computer Computer network operations support MIS forces with
Network Operations dissemination assets (including interactive Internet
activities) and the capabilities to deny or degrade an
adversary’s ability to access, report, process, or disseminate
information.
MISO and Military MISO create and reinforce actions that are executed to
Deception deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers
about US military capabilities, intentions, and operations.
Military deception operations that integrate MIS unit’s
targeting input provide the JFC with the ability to influence
the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions), giving
the joint force an advantage.
MISO and Operations It is essential that MISO plans and messages are protected
Security prior to execution through the proper use of information
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Executive Summary
MISO and Public Affairs PA and MISO activities are separate and distinct, but they
must support and reinforce each other, which requires
coordination, synchronization, and occasionally
deconfliction. JFCs must ensure that appropriate
coordination between MISO and PA activities are
consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy
or statutory limitation, and security.
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Executive Summary
The Joint Military The JMISTF is responsible for providing MISO support to
Information Support Task joint or multinational operations at the tactical and
Force operational levels. The JMISTF is also responsible for
deconflicting all MISO that occur under the joint task force
and other commands as designated by the establishing
authority.
Organizing Military If the JFC determines that MISO planning and execution
Information Support requires control by a component command with that
Forces mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests
establishment of a JMISTF or MISTF. Control should
favor centralized planning and direction and
decentralized execution. Considerations for MISO may
dictate that control be at high national levels.
Planning
Joint Operation Planning Guidance for Employment of the Force and the JSCP set
and Phasing priorities for activities undertaken in the near term—
usually the period covered by budget execution (present
through two years). These plans define how a GCC will
conduct all DOD activities within their area of
responsibility. Joint planning integrates US military
actions with other instruments of national power and
multinational partners to achieve specified end states.
CCDRs translate national and theater strategy into strategic
and operational concepts through the development of
security cooperation strategies and implementation plans,
and operation and campaign plans. MISO have significant
impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to
mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously
isolating the adversary, taking away its ability to muster
popular support.
Planning Considerations To plan for the effective employment of MISO, JFCs and
their staffs must possess a thorough knowledge of national
security policy and objectives, as well as national and
theater military objectives. They must ensure planning is
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Executive Summary
Crisis Response and In military operations involving the use or threat of force,
Limited Contingencies MISO offer SecDef options for engagement that potentially
avoid the employment of additional combat forces, reduce
the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic instruments.
Major Operations and CCDR activities executed during the shape phase assist in
Campaigns determining the character of future operations. MISO can
be employed to gather information, undermine a potential
opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhance the
capabilities of multinational forces.
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Executive Summary
US MISO are developed The joint MISO process is a standard framework by which
and executed through a MISO assets and critical enablers plan, execute, and
multiphase approach. evaluate MISO with proficiency and consistency
throughout major campaigns, operations, and peacetime
engagements. The joint MISO process consists of seven
phases: planning; target audience analysis (TAA); series
development; product development and design; approval;
production, distribution, dissemination; and evaluation.
Each of these phases is designed to apply to any type or
level of operation. Collectively, the phases address
important considerations and include the necessary
activities for the proper integration of MISO with the
CCDR’s military strategy and mission.
Target Audience Analysis: During this phase of the joint MISO process, foreign
Phase II groups or individuals are examined carefully and closely
for their ability to be influenced. This provides insights on
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Executive Summary
Product Development and The work completed during the planning, analysis, and
Design: Phase IV series development phases are vital for designing the
prototypes of MISO products. Evaluating the TA’s
understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed
in a MISO product is a key task. Pretesting products also
helps establish a foundation for conducting post testing of
entire series after dissemination occurs.
Approval: Phase V A judicious and efficient approval process for MISO series
and the management of the series development and
approval process are fundamental in providing supporting
MISO to emerging, ongoing, and future operations.
Production, Distribution, MIS units from group to detachment level may deploy with
and Dissemination: Phase organic production assets or utilize reachback to fixed
VI assets at higher levels. Once production is complete,
products are transferred to the disseminating unit or agency
in accordance with a predetermined timeline. The most
appropriate dissemination means are determined through
TAA, and intelligence about the operational area. Radio
and television broadcasts, the Internet, aerial leaflet drops,
and loudspeaker transmissions are some of the means used
throughout the world to disseminate MISO messages.
Messages also are communicated through planned face-to-
face contact with the local populace.
Evaluation: Phase VII Assessing the effects of MISO product series on TAs relies
on MISO impact indicators and analyses produced in
earlier phases. MISO assessment criteria are focused on
the achievement of supporting MISO objectives by TAs.
The results of the evaluation are thus two-fold as they yield
substantive information about the trends toward achieving
the supporting MISO objectives and contribute data that are
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Executive Summary
Employment
Support to Unified Action MISO are integrated in joint and multinational military
operations as well as actions conducted by other designated
governmental agencies. To be effective, MISO must be
fully integrated with the supported organization’s planning
and decision-making activities. MISO are a key capability
in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression, and to
maximize the commander’s efforts to shape the operational
environment, insert combat forces, neutralize the threat,
and secure the region. When authorized, MIS forces may
be used domestically under a designated lead federal
agency’s or other US civil authority’s public information
efforts during domestic emergencies.
MISO and the Range of Employing MISO in conjunction with other activities to
Military Operations further national security goals in specific locations may
prevent escalation of hostilities, shorten the duration of
hostilities, or hasten a return to normalcy.
Crisis Response and During crisis response and limited contingency operations,
Limited Contingency MISO are executed to mitigate the effects of the crisis and
Operations stabilize the operational environment.
Major Operations and MISO are planned and integrated throughout all phases of
Campaigns operations or campaigns. During major operations, MISO
are integrated with both conventional and special
operations (SO) activities.
MISO and Special SO are relevant across the range of military operations and
Operations Activities the eleven core activities, including MISO should be
integral parts of a theater strategy, OPLAN, or campaign
plan. SO usually are most effective when integrated with
operations conducted by conventional forces.
Direct Attack Support MISO can be integrated in all direct attack activities,
employing within the physical and political risks,
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Executive Summary
Foreign Internal Defense MISO are employed to prepare key audiences for US
and Security Force foreign internal defense and security force assistance
Assistance Support operations, and to directly assist the host nation in
establishing an environment that promotes internal stability
and security through democratic systems.
Civil Affairs Operations MISO can be integrated with civil affairs operations
Support activities to increase support for the HN government and
reduce support to destabilizing forces.
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Executive Summary
Enablers
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Executive Summary
Capabilities
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Executive Summary
United States Army Assets Army Service MISO assets provide a vital instrument of
engagement across all military phases in support of the full
In addition to dedicated range of military operations and interagency coordination
military information in a foreign setting and under special circumstances during
support units, domestic emergencies as well.
conventional Army units
can also support MISO. United States Army Special Operations Command is the
With routine interaction Army component command of United States Special
with target audiences, they Operations Command. Its mission is to command (if
are in an ideal position to directed), support, and ensure the combat readiness of
support MISO product assigned and attached Army MIS forces for worldwide use.
dissemination and collect
limited measure of Army Active Component Military Information Support
effectiveness indicators for Group organizes, equips, and collectively trains assigned
transmission to MISO and attached forces to rapidly deploy anywhere in the
planners. world and conduct MISO and other specified
communication tasks in any environment in support of
CCDR and the interagency as directed by the President and
SecDef.
United States Navy Assets The US Navy employs a wide range of dissemination
assets, product reproduction capabilities, and planning
resources that can support joint and Service MISO
missions. Navy afloat and ashore IO cells coordinate with
joint MISO experts to identify maritime audiences, develop
themes and products, and plan dissemination. The Navy
has ultrahigh frequency, very high frequency, and high
frequency broadcast capabilities to deliver MISO messages
to afloat and ashore target audiences. Boarding parties can
disseminate products to crews of civilian vessels to achieve
MISO objectives. Several Navy aircraft support MISO.
United States Air Force United States Air Force (USAF) MISO is focused on the
Assets employment of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities as
the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and
exploiting the cognitive dimension of the operational
environment. USAF MIS forces support JFC objectives
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Executive Summary
United States Marine The Marine Corps has the capability to conduct MISO at
Corps Assets the tactical level via MIS teams using loudspeaker
broadcasts, print media, and face-to-face communication.
The Marine Corps expeditionary MIS capability is found
within the Marine Corps Information Operations Center
(MCIOC). The MCIOC coordinates and integrates the
conduct of MISO programs that complement IO with the
JMISTF, CCDRs, interagency, DOS, intelligence
community, IGOs, NGOs, and others as necessary.
CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
“In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great
changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the
development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon.”
1. General
b. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department
of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG)
communications strategy. DOD communications strategy and the separate and unique
capabilities of military information support operations (MISO), public affairs (PA) (to
include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) address a
variety of communication roles and specific audiences as permitted by operational
parameters and policy. DOD informational activities can be used to inform, direct, or
persuade. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the
credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities.
See Chapter II, “Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships,” for additional clarification of
DOD information activities.
c. MISO play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned
use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and
policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately
the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner
favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals
follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the
environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned
messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable,
measurable behavioral responses. It is important not to confuse psychological impact
with MISO. Actions of the joint force, such as strikes or shows of force, have psychological
impact but they are not MISO unless their primary purpose is to influence the perceptions
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Chapter I
and subsequent behavior of a TA. Regardless of the mission set, all MISO are conducted
within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product
approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities.
(1) In peacetime, MISO are planned and integrated to further national defense
strategies through the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan
(TCP). CCDRs incorporate MISO programs and integrate them into the broad range of
activities required for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence (i.e., Phase
0). For example, in steady-state geographic combatant command TCPs, MIS units can
deploy to support approved counterinsurgency (COIN), demining, or foreign humanitarian
assistance (FHA) programs under either a joint force commander (JFC) or US diplomatic
control.
(2) MISO reinforce US policies that center on preventing hostilities and advocating
peaceful resolutions when possible. MISO are key in furthering US endeavors to deter
aggression and to maximize the JFC’s efforts to shape the operational environment. MIS
units communicate well-orchestrated and planned information to international audiences to
clarify intent, prevent escalation of tension, ease concerns, and mitigate the potential effects
and capabilities of adversary information activities.
(3) When diplomatic and other measures fail to deter conflict and lethal capabilities
are employed, MISO can assist the JFC by setting conditions for the insertion of combat
forces; neutralizing threats; facilitating efforts to contain conflict; stabilizing the operational
area; and enhancing efforts to achieve conditions that allow a return to steady-state
operations. MISO can inform, direct, educate, and influence targets to increase US combat
power and decrease enemy hostile aggression. Proper integration of MISO may reduce
operational risk and collateral damage, as well as military and civilian casualties.
(4) MIS forces can also be used to provide civil authority information support
(CAIS). CAIS are DOD information activities conducted under a designated lead federal
agency or other US civil authority to support dissemination of public or other critical
information during domestic emergencies.
a. Introduction
(1) The employment of MIS units is governed by explicit legal authorities that
direct and determine how their capability is utilized. This legal foundation establishes MISO
as a communications means and allows their integration with those strategies that apply the
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Overview
instruments of national power. Leaders and planners interpret relevant laws and policies to
conduct MISO in any situation or environment, internationally and domestically. The
outcome is the incorporation of MISO as an integral component of US measures designed to
achieve national objectives.
(2) MIS units are employed during military operations as well as operations led by
civilian agencies. They can be a vital asset to government departments and agencies in many
situations when DOD is not the lead. The legal framework for MISO allows this DOD
capability to be integrated with national-level strategies and support other USG departments
and agencies.
b. Law
(1) The legal authorities for MISO are established in a number of documents and
are in place to enable the proper integration of MISO. The legal framework for MISO
applies to:
(d) Establishing authorities for use of MIS forces in civil support operations
(domestic operations) and for use of MISO in sovereign territory, air, seas, and airways.
(2) Although the following list is not all-inclusive, consideration should be given to
the following specific legal issues when conducting MISO:
(a) The requirement that US MISO will not target US citizens at any time, in
any location globally, or under any circumstances.
(c) International agreements with host countries may limit the activities of MIS
units (e.g., status-of-forces agreements).
c. Policy
(1) Policymakers develop realistic and relevant policies that are within the
capabilities of MISO to support. Executive- and agency-level policies reflect the laws and
provide the necessary guidance to place MISO into action to achieve objectives. DOD
policy, for instance, addresses the intent of the organization, guides decision making, and
prompts action to integrate MISO into military operations and other USG strategies.
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Chapter I
(2) Military leaders and planners consistently refer to and interpret both broad and
specific policies on issues that affect our national security. They study US positions
formulated to address a number of issues, such as terrorism, trafficking of illegal drugs, and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). An in-depth understanding of MISO,
and how they are best integrated with other US capabilities, is a prerequisite to determining
how MISO contribute to US communication objectives in dealing with these and other
global issues.
(3) MISO can assist USG mitigation efforts of issues that arise from unintended
consequences.
d. Strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the CCDRs refer to
national strategies as they establish guidance that provides the necessary strategic direction
for employment of MISO. CCDRs’ analyses of the national strategies’ objectives are a
critical step in determining MISO requirements. Understanding other government
department and agency approaches in executing national strategies is another important step
for decision makers for determining how MISO are to be employed, i.e., MISO contributions
to strategic communication (SC) efforts.
3. Levels of War
a. Joint MISO support policy and commanders’ objectives from strategic to tactical
levels. The impact of these operations at one level may have significant implications at other
levels. Although military leadership and local key communicators are examples of TAs
engaged at the operational and tactical levels that are capable of affecting the
accomplishment of a strategic objective.
b. MIS forces normally plan and execute operations in support of operational and/or
tactical-level headquarters with a defined joint operations area. However, MIS forces may
support USG departments and agencies, GCCs, or multinational partners. This is often the
case when supporting a broad USG approach designed to achieve strategic objectives. MISO
that support strategic objectives are often transregional in character and normally involve
detailed coordination with one or more GCCs and interagency partners.
c. Commonly, MISO conducted at the operational level support regional policies and
military plans.
“To seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to
surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by
slaughter.”
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Overview
4. Purpose
a. Every activity of the force has potential psychological implications that may be
leveraged to influence foreign targets. MISO contribute to the success of wartime strategies
and are well-matched for implementation in stable and pre-conflict environments. MISO are
applied across the range of military operations and, as a communication capability, constitute
a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign groups to promote particular
themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. MISO are used to establish and
reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve. In
conflict, MISO as a force multiplier can degrade the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce
civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and maximize the local populace’s support
for operations.
b. MISO are integrated with US ambassador and GCC’s theater-wide priorities and
objectives to shape the security environment to promote bilateral cooperation, ease tension,
and deter aggression. MISO convey the intent of the GCC by supporting public diplomacy
efforts, whether to foster relations with other nations or to ensure their collaboration to
address shared security concerns.
5. Missions
a. The purpose of joint MIS forces is further clarified by the application of their
activities across the range of military operations.
(1) MISO in Support of Combat Operations. MISO are planned to influence the
perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of adversary,
friendly, and neutral audiences and key population groups in support of US combat
operations and objectives. Operations supported by joint MIS forces support include the
following:
(a) Offense.
(b) Defense.
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Chapter I
(d) Support to USG country team or host nation (HN) civil programs (e.g.,
counterdrug, demining, human immunodeficiency virus awareness, security institution
building, ethnic tolerance, and reconciliation).
(3) Defense Support to Civil Authorities. MIS forces provide support to public
information efforts when authorized by SecDef or the President in accordance with Title 10,
United States Code (USC). This support is provided during natural disaster relief following
domestic incidents. Per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.05D,
Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006,
MIS forces do not provide their full capability. MIS forces deliberately exclude their
development capability and support dissemination of messages developed by civil
authorities. The National Response Framework establishes command relationships and
responsibilities of DOD forces in support of domestic operations. Command of federal
military and civilian personnel and resources is retained by SecDef when supporting civil
authorities.
(1) Military information support should be integrated into all plans at the initial
stages of planning to ensure maximum effectiveness. This enables the JFC to shape the
cognitive dimension of the information environment and set terms of initial and subsequent
engagement. Early planning of MISO and employment of MIS forces will maximize the
potential to influence foreign audiences within the area of interest.
b. Integration of MISO. MISO must be planned, coordinated, and integrated with the
communication strategies of the USG and multinational partners at all levels from strategic
to tactical. The synchronization of MISO with all other actions of the US and multinational
forces precludes messages or actions at one level from contradicting or weakening the
effectiveness at another.
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Overview
e. Responsive MISO Approval Process. Once delegated, the MISO approval process
belongs to the commander. MISO approval authority should be delegated to the lowest
practical level authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A time-sensitive process
is crucial to providing responsive MISO.
f. Assessment
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CHAPTER II
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS
1. General
The UCP and JSCP provide direction and guidance to CCDRs concerning joint
operation planning and their respective responsibilities. The roles, responsibilities, and
relationships contained in this chapter reflect general guidance derived from a combination
of this strategic guidance as well as directives, instructions, joint and Service doctrine, and
current practices within the MISO community.
a. Secretary of Defense
(3) Provides strategic MISO advice to USG departments and agencies and
multinational partners.
(4) Approves all MISO programs submitted as part of a CCDR’s operation plan
(OPLAN).
(1) Approves and oversees all MISO policy and programs not delegated to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]).
(2) Delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level
for peacetime programs.
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Chapter II
(3) Retains approval authority for strategic-level and politically sensitive products
during contingency and wartime operations.
(4) Approves all MISO programs not submitted as part of a CCDR’s OPLAN.
For a full description of MISO program and product approval authorities, see CJCSI
3110.05, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
(1) Ensures appropriate intelligence support and coordination are provided for
MISO plans, programs, and activities.
(2) Oversees the integration and support of MISO into information operations (IO)
plans, programs, and activities, and capabilities, as appropriate.
(1) Acts as principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to SecDef, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and USD(P) on MISO matters.
(2) Provides guidance on the planning and conduct of MISO activities and their
integration into USG activities during peacetime, and more specific guidance for the
planning and conduct of these activities across the range of military operations.
(3) Develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy for
MISO activities.
(4) Reviews, evaluates, coordinates, and oversees MISO plans, programs, and
resources to ensure adherence to approved policy and planning guidance.
(5) Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates the various policies, processes, and programs
of the DOD components that impact on the capability to plan, resource, prepare forces, and
execute MISO; initiates and coordinates actions or taskings that enhance the readiness,
capabilities, and effective use of MIS forces.
(7) Makes recommendations to the USD(P) for all matters concerning the CCDRs’
MISO plans, programs, activities, and requests for deployment of MISO personnel and
equipment.
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Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
f. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs provides PA guidance for MISO
plans and programs.
g. General Counsel, DOD, conducts legal reviews of all proposed MISO plans and
programs for consistency with US public law, regulations, and internationally recognized
legal standards as applicable.
(1) Advises the President, SecDef, and National Security Council on all MISO
matters.
(2) Represents SecDef on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization MISO Working
Group and in other multinational military forums.
(3) Coordinates and directs the preparation of multinational MISO plans and US
participation in multinational MISO training programs.
(5) Provides the general policy and establishes production priorities for the MISO
Studies Program.
(7) Prepares strategic plans and issues policy for the use of MISO across the range
of military operations.
(8) Reviews the MISO plans and programs of the CCDRs to ensure they are
adequate, feasible, and consistent with USG and DOD policy.
(9) Provides MISO plans and programs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for review and approval.
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Chapter II
(14) Apportions MIS forces to the combatant commands through the JSCP.
(15) Prepares integrated logistic and mobilization guidance for MISO capabilities.
(17) Ensures integration of MISO into the CJCS Exercise Program and Joint
Experimentation Program.
(1) Ensure that staffs and organizations within their commands have sufficient
representation and working proficiency in the planning and conduct of joint MISO.
(2) Request liaison officers from other USG departments and agencies when
appropriate.
(3) Working in coordination with the Joint Staff and the United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), develop plans and programs to support MISO
requirements identified by supported CCDRs.
(4) Develop and submit to the CJCS additional MISO requirements necessary to
support CCDR plans and programs.
(5) When directed by SecDef, accept the attachment of MIS forces and employ
those forces as directed.
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Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
(8) Plan, support, and conduct MISO in support of theater military missions and US
national and regional objectives.
(10) Prepare plans and, upon approval, conduct MISO to support the execution of
operations.
(11) Foster cooperative MISO policies among multinational military forces and
regional security organizations.
(12) Ensure advance contingency planning for use of non-DOD informational and
related capabilities in MISO.
(14) Integrate MISO into the preparation and review of joint OPLANs to ensure
appropriate collaboration and deconfliction of IO, PA, and civil-military operations (CMO).
(1) Prepares program and budget to fund approved MISO programs for assigned
forces. In fulfilling this responsibility, CDRUSSOCOM coordinates with the CJCS, Service
Chiefs, and the other CCDRs to ensure that all MISO and support requirements are
addressed.
(2) Provides trained and ready MIS forces to support SecDef and the other CCDRs
with MISO support.
(3) Performs as joint proponent for development of MISO in joint doctrine; training
and education for individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint mission-essential task lists;
and identification of critical individual skills, training, and experience.
(4) Prepares and provides assigned MIS forces to the other CCDRs and USG lead
agencies, when directed by SecDef.
II-5
Chapter II
(6) Develops joint MISO programs of instruction, and when directed, trains DOD
and foreign military personnel in MISO techniques and procedures.
(7) Recommends MISO policy guidance to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and US
military commanders, as required.
(8) Develops and validates priorities for MISO training, intelligence, and military
requirements and provides these to the CJCS to support Service, combatant command, and
Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to MISO.
(9) Provides visibility of MISO issues, activities, tasks, and capabilities to the
CJCS, Service Chiefs, and commanders at other US military command levels.
(10) Coordinates with the Joint Staff and combatant commands to integrate MISO
activities into joint training and experimentation plans and programs.
(12) Observes and evaluates MIS forces in exercises to develop joint tactics,
techniques, and procedures for MIS forces.
(13) Manages the MISO Studies Program and coordinates MISO input to the
Defense Intelligence Production schedule.
(15) Coordinates with the Service Chiefs for planning and providing sustainment of
MIS forces assigned to the other CCDRs for conduct of MISO.
k. The Joint Staff supports transregional MISO programs and activities as well as the
programs and plans of GCCs with integration and coordination of applicable strategic IO
capabilities assigned to the Joint Staff under the UCP.
(1) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate MISO training and
planning skills.
II-6 JP 3-13.2
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
(2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute MISO actions and
develop such dedicated MIS forces and equipment as directed by SecDef and CJCS.
(3) Develop Service MISO doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to
the particular Service.
(4) When directed by SecDef, provide global force management of MIS forces (not
assigned to CDRUSSOCOM or under the operational control [OPCON] of a GCC) to
support the regional MISO plans, programs, and activities of the combatant commands and
other USG departments and agencies.
(6) Incorporate MISO instruction into Service training and education programs.
(7) US Army Reserve Command provides RC MIS forces for the Department of
the Army to the combatant commands or other USG departments and agencies when directed
by SecDef.
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Chapter II
(1) Implement multinational MISO plans to the extent consistent with international
law, including the law of armed conflict, and treaty/international agreement obligations in
relations with the governments of countries where US forces are assigned.
(1) During peacetime, the Department of State (DOS) provides overall direction,
coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. In peacetime
operations or in conflict, the DOS may restrict MISO messages and themes used within
specific countries or areas.
3. Relationships
a. General. There are a variety of functions and capabilities that help a JFC formulate
the command’s message and communicate with local, international, and US domestic
audiences as part of broader policy and in support of operational objectives. DOD
information activities include IO, MISO, PA (to include visual information), and DSPD. See
Figure II-1 for additional details concerning DOD information activities.
(1) PA and MISO are separate and unique activities that are governed by policy and
practice in terms of audiences, focus, and scope. SC integrates various instruments of
national power with other activities across the USG to synchronize crucial themes, messages,
images, and actions. SC is policy driven and generally conducted under DOS lead. DOD
SC activities are designed to support the continuity of DOD strategic- and operational-level
messages and activities with overall USG policy and SC themes.
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Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
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Chapter II
(2) Although each of these activities is distinct, commanders must ensure that there
is a general compatibility of messages within the broader communications strategy. This
must be accomplished without blurring traditional lines of separation between PA and MISO
and their respective audiences. To this end, it is critical that all DOD military information
activities are conducted in a manner that reinforces the credibility, veracity, and
legitimacy of DOD and USG activities. In very narrow circumstances, MISO may support
military deception (MILDEC) operations designed to preserve operational surprise and the
safety of friendly forces, but this is done only after the commander and staff carefully weigh
the likely benefits of a deception operation against a potential short- and long-term loss of
credibility with the media or local audiences.
(1) SC consists of a focused USG effort to understand and engage key audiences to
create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests,
policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages,
and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.
(2) MISO are a key capability that supports SC by influencing foreign audiences in
support of US objectives. Given its focus on foreign TAs, MISO personnel should possess a
good understanding of the language and culture of the TA and ensure this knowledge is
effectively used in the preparation of MISO products and related activities.
(1) General. MISO play a central role in the achievement of the JFC’s information
objectives through their ability to induce or reinforce adversary attitudes and behavior
favorable to these objectives. MISO can be particularly useful during pre- and post-combat
operations, when other means of influence are restrained or not authorized. Because of its
wide ranging impact, it is essential MISO be fully coordinated and synchronized with
relevant activities and operations. This is normally facilitated through the combatant
command IO cell.
(3) In order to ensure all aspects of IO are properly integrated and synchronized
into the combatant command planning process, an IO cell chief is chosen (in accordance with
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual [CJCSM] 1630.01, Joint Information
Operations Force). This cell chief convenes meetings of the IO cell periodically in order to
facilitate the integration of information-related capabilities. Within the IO cell, the MISO
II-10 JP 3-13.2
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
representative integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes the use of MISO with
other IO capabilities. Specific examples of this kind of interaction between MISO and the
other information-related capabilities follow:
For further guidance concerning IO, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information
Operations.
(1) MISO are used to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of foreign TAs
in a manner favorable to US objectives.
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international and domestic audiences, PA puts operational actions in context, facilitates the
development of informed perceptions about military operations among information
consumers, and undermines adversarial information efforts. PA operations and activities
shall not focus on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion.
(a) PA and MISO activities are separate and distinct, but they must support and
reinforce each other, which requires coordination, synchronization, and occasionally
deconfliction. These planning activities are generally accomplished in the IO working
group, the IO cell, or other planning groups. In the event that formal planning groups are not
established, informal coordination should be accomplished between these two capabilities as
well as with other related capabilities. JFCs must ensure that appropriate coordination
between MISO and PA activities are consistent with the DOD Principles of Information,
policy or statutory limitation, and security.
(b) PA is normally the source for official information for the media.
Information disseminated by the joint force regardless of source or method of distribution
will reach unintended audiences. Efforts of one capability must not undermine those of
another. While PA will have no role in executing MISO, PA can use MISO products to
educate the media about MISO missions, as appropriate.
II-12 JP 3-13.2
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL
“As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy,
both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them.”
1. General
a. In accordance with SecDef and Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables,
CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM over all assigned Active Component (AC) MIS forces.
Designated RC MIS forces and other MIS functions tasked to the Services remain under the
control of the parent Service during training and mobilization. When directed by SecDef, the
losing commander transfers MIS forces to the supported geographic or functional combatant
commander. When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining and
losing commanders over those forces must be specified. In most cases, the gaining unit
commander will have OPCON. MISO planning should consider the requirements to
delegate directive authority for common support for MIS forces.
c. During planning, the CCDRs identify the capabilities required to execute their
assigned missions. CCDRs establish subordinate joint forces and designate the required
subordinate components. The requested MIS force size and planned disposition may exceed
the command and control (C2) capabilities of the joint force components. In these cases, the
CCDR may identify the requirement to establish a joint military information support task
force (JMISTF) or military information support task force (MISTF) as a component of the
joint force. The CCDR may decide to establish the JMISTF or MISTF as a component of an
existing joint force component such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or SO
task force. MIS forces may be organized as large as a JMISTF or as small as a military
information support team that provides a planning capability. Establishing a JMISTF gives
the JFC flexibility in arranging the C2 structure of the attached or assigned MIS forces. The
JFC may delegate OPCON of all MIS forces to the JMISTF commander or may exercise
OPCON of specified MIS forces through the commander of the units or components to
which they are assigned.
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Chapter III
JMISTF commander may request direct liaison authority to coordinate and synchronize
operations with other USG departments or agencies, or multinational officials.
(2) The JMISTF is also responsible for deconflicting all MISO that occur under the
JTF and other commands as designated by the establishing authority. Deconfliction is
accomplished through the MISO approval process, establishment of direct coordination lines,
liaison, and the synchronization conducted by IO staffs. In the absence of a MIS component,
the requirement to deconflict MISO is executed in the same manner as all operations are, in
the operations staff sections.
(3) Mission requirements will dictate the JMISTF organizational structure and the
functions it will perform. It also may be organized as a combined joint military information
support task force (CJMISTF) if multinational partners provide psychological operations
staff personnel and forces to support operations.
(c) An order (e.g., execute order, operation order, or fragmentary order) will
often provide additional guidance for MISO product approval and dissemination/release
procedures. The scope and limits of MISO activities and products will be provided. As an
example, the MISO scope (e.g., operational, tactical), means (e.g., satellite, Internet, or
leaflets), TA (e.g., adversary leaders, foreign populace), or message content (e.g., humor,
specific symbols, detainees’ photos) may be restricted to various levels of command. In all
cases, the risk of unintended effects is weighed with ensuring there is a timely approval
process/authority for commanders.
d. MISO planners will identify TAs and MISO objectives, themes, activities, and
products that support the JFC’s plan. Subordinate commanders will identify requirements
for MIS forces to the JFC. Depending on mission requirements, MISO staff support may be
provided to the commander of a subunified command, JTF, or component command to
enhance planning and coordinating capability.
a. If the JFC determines that MISO planning and execution requires control by a
component command with that mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests
establishment of a JMISTF or MISTF. These may serve as a component or staff element of
the JFC or as a subcomponent or staff element under an existing component such as a
III-2 JP 3-13.2
Command and Control
JSOTF. Control should favor centralized planning and direction and decentralized
execution. Control is exercised from the lowest level that accomplishes the required
coordination. Considerations for MISO may dictate that control be at high national levels.
(2) Retention of OPCON of the JMISTF by the JFC and integration of its functions
optimizes interaction with other operational activities and streamlines the approval process.
(4) Factors that will affect the size and composition of the MIS force include, but
are not limited to:
(c) Policy, funding, and foreign or HN sensitivities and their impact on other
combatant command and supporting component objectives.
For more information on joint force organizational options, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States, or JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
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activities intended to produce psychological effects and coordinate those efforts with the
JMISTF. For further detail, refer to Appendix A, “Capabilities.”
d. The entire US MISO capability is available for employment by the supported GCC.
MIS units apportioned for theater planning purposes are identified in Annex D to the JSCP.
f. The high demand for MIS forces to support worldwide operations make reachback a
critical component for MISO success. Reachback assets must be considered during planning
to minimize transportation requirements and provide flexibility to support future operations.
Improvements in technology will continue to increase the ability of MISO to support
multiple geographic areas with limited assets. The AC MIS media operations center (MOC)
located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is capable of providing multimedia reachback support
to deployed MIS forces.
For further details concerning JOPES, refer to CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning
and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, and CJCSM
3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning
Formats.
III-4 JP 3-13.2
CHAPTER IV
PLANNING
“Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of
shaping behavior―of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in
between.”
Robert Gates
Secretary of Defense
26 November 2007
a. General
(1) GEF and the JSCP set priorities for activities undertaken in the near
term―usually the period covered by budget execution (present through two years). The
GEF is used mainly by the CCDRs and those who support them to guide the development of
campaign and OPLANs. The JSCP specifically tasks CCDRs to develop OPLANs
consistent with the GEF. These plans define how GCCs will conduct all DOD activities
within their AOR.
(2) Joint planning integrates US military actions with other instruments of national
power and multinational partners to achieve specified end states. This chapter focuses on
security cooperation and joint operation planning. Joint operation planning includes
contingency and crisis action planning and can result in campaign plans, OPLANs, or
operation orders depending on the scope and complexity of the situation. Joint operation
planning and planning for a campaign are not separate planning types or processes; rather,
campaign planning represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements
in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. CCDRs translate national
and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of
security cooperation strategies and implementation plans, and operation and campaign plans.
MISO have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to mobilize the
civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary, taking away its ability to
muster popular support.
b. Phasing. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire
operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time,
space, and purpose. Integration of MISO into the joint operation planning process assists in
synchronizing planned MISO activities with other joint operations and the activities of the
other instruments of national power to create the effects required to achieve objectives and
attain the end state.
For additional information on phasing, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and JP 3-0,
Joint Operations.
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Chapter IV
(1) Shape Phase. Joint, multinational, and various interagency activities are
performed to dissuade or deter adversaries from placing US interests at risk and to assure or
solidify relationships with friends and allies. CCDRs are able to take shaping actions before
committing forces to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future
operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future multinational
partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen
future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. Joint MISO can be key
contributors to shaping the international security environment and are routinely employed to
shape the operational environment during peacetime. Joint MISO may provide an effective
means to deter adversary actions, build international partnerships, and prevent or contain
local disruptions. MISO shall be based on the GEF and must be thoroughly integrated and
consistent with the GCC’s security cooperation strategy and any other direction provided by
the President or SecDef. Peacetime MISO programs are coordinated and integrated with
each component and the country team in each country involved. When MIS forces are
deployed under a GCC peacetime MISO program, approval authority for products and
actions is typically delegated to the chief of mission, who then further delegates the authority
to a member of the staff.
(2) Deter Phase. The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action
by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. The objective is to convince
adversaries that planned or potential actions that threaten US vital interests will result in
outcomes that are decisively undesirable and cause alternative courses of action (COAs)
more favorable to US objectives. During shape and deter phases the GCC expands
partnerships, enhances relationships, and conducts actions to prepare for potential crises.
Flexible deterrent options supported by MISO may be initiated in this phase as part of
pre-hostility activities.
(3) Initiative Phase. During this phase, MISO objectives may include, but not be
limited to, the following:
(e) Develop the situation by seizing the initiative in the environment, thus
forcing the adversary to react without sufficient time to plan.
IV-2 JP 3-13.2
Planning
(h) Retain the initiative which requires planning beyond the initial operation
and anticipating possible events. Follow-on forces are tailored to meet specific concerns of
the long-term mission. Initiative requires delegating decision-making authority to the lowest
practical level.
(4) Dominate Phase. During this phase, MISO objectives may include, but not be
limited to, the following:
(a) Change behaviors of selected TAs that will generate support for US and
multinational operations.
(e) Reduce casualties and collateral damage and hasten a transition to post-
conflict operations.
(5) Stabilize Phase. During this phase, MISO objectives may include, but not be
limited to, the following:
(a) Change the perceptions and behavior of selected foreign TAs toward
favoring US and multinational objectives.
(6) Enable Civil Authority Phase. During this phase, MISO objectives may
include, but not be limited to, the following:
(b) Change the behavior of a specific TA that can support the accomplishment
of US and local civil authority’s objectives.
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Chapter IV
A building block approach for leaflet operations was used, with the first
leaflet themes being ones of peace and brotherhood. Increasing the
intensity of the PSYOP message as events evolved, leaflet themes
transitioned to emphasizing the United Nations (UN) imposed 15 January
deadline. After the UN deadline passed and Operation DESERT STORM
began, themes emphasizing abandonment of equipment and desertion were
used. Exploiting the effects of specific munitions leaflets were also used to
inform Iraqi units that they were going to be bombed. Feedback from
interviews with enemy prisoners of war validated the success of leaflet
operations.
“Voice of the Gulf” was the Coalition’s radio network that broadcast from
ground based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The
radio script was prepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi
propaganda and disinformation, and encouraged Iraqi defection and
surrender.
IV-4 JP 3-13.2
Planning
2. Planning Considerations
a. General. To plan for the effective employment of MISO, JFCs and their staffs must
possess a thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national
and theater military objectives. In addition, MISO planners must possess joint operation
planning skills, with knowledge of MISO doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and force
structure, and a thorough understanding of the customs, morals, and values of the foreign
TA. They must be able to integrate with IO and other related information activities. MISO
planners must understand SC as a means to advance national interests and objectives through
the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with
other instruments of national power. They must ensure planning is consistent with IO, PA,
and DSPD planning as well as overall USG objectives. In addition, they must ensure all
MISO are closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure that consistent themes and
messages are communicated to TAs. Lessons learned in planning include:
(1) Integrated planning occurs at the onset of the planning stage of operations and
continues throughout the remaining stages to mitigate the effects of potentially rapidly
changing political and diplomatic circumstances.
(2) Positive information-related effects increase when MIS forces are integrated
with conventional forces. MIS forces use their knowledge of local customs and attitudes to
prepare conventional forces for the cultural context of their operations. Conventional forces
apply that information which reinforces MISO messages and themes. This result is more
profound in prolonged stability operations where there is sufficient time to generate
observable effects.
(3) There is a great need to share information between agencies and with
multinational partners to ensure that MISO are part of a well-orchestrated information effort
that generates consistent messages across multiple media outlets. The appropriate delegation
of MISO approval authority to the lowest practical level enables the timely delivery of MISO
products.
(1) CCDRs submit requests for MIS forces to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is
responsible for validating MIS force requests and will assign the appropriate joint force
provider, depending on the activity, type of forces necessary, and availability. Army AC
MIS units will predominantly support SO missions and contingency operations, and Army
RC MIS units will predominantly provide support to conventional forces. However, based
on the capability requirement or availability of forces, the exact composition of the force
may be a mixture of AC and RC MIS forces from across the services.
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Chapter IV
(a) Peacetime MISO programs shall be submitted to the Joint Staff for each
fiscal year concurrent with the security cooperation strategies. As a minimum, they will
contain the CONOPS, objectives, the potential TA list, themes to stress/avoid, product and
dissemination approval authorities, means of dissemination, funding sources and
requirements, and MOEs. Examples of MIS in peacetime engagement activities include
supporting and executing military-to-military programs, support to combating terrorism and
counterproliferation (CP) activities, humanitarian demining operations, security force
assistance (SFA), and supporting security cooperation objectives.
For further details concerning security cooperation planning, refer to the GEF, and JP 3-0,
Joint Operations.
IV-6 JP 3-13.2
Planning
favorable terms. MISO support joint and multinational activities across the range of military
operations to include strikes and raids, counterterrorism (CT), FID, enforcement of
sanctions, maritime intercept operations, peace operations (e.g., peace enforcement
operations), noncombatant evacuation operations, or other flexible deterrent options as
directed. In military operations involving the use or threat of force, MISO offer SecDef
options for engagement that potentially avoid the employment of additional combat forces,
reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic instruments of national power. Examples of MISO activities are shown in Figure
IV-1.
e. Major Operations and Campaigns. CCDR activities executed during the shape
phase assist in determining the character of future operations. The most comprehensive
activity is preparing the operational area, which involves intelligence operations, to
understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential adversaries,
as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area.
During the deter phase, MISO provides powerful operational leverage in support of
flexible deterrent options. MISO can be employed to gather information, undermine a
potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhance the capabilities of
multinational forces. MISO during war are shown in Figure IV-2.
(1) Coordination of DOD MISO with other USG departments and agencies facilitates
the communication of the objectives of each organization and synchronization of effort. The
joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) at the combatant command headquarters is an
interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working
relationships between
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Chapter IV
IV-8 JP 3-13.2
Planning
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Chapter IV
civilian and military operational planners. The JIACG will assist the JTF, when formed, to
provide interagency connectivity by either deploying forward to the JTF location or by
providing a reachback point of contact at the combatant command location. MISO planners
at the JTF level should coordinate with other government departments and agencies through
the JIACG or designated centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working
groups, and planning teams. The JIACG does not veto or approve plans but provides inputs
and assists with coordination of those plans.
(3) In addition to DOS, MISO should be coordinated with other USG departments
and agencies, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; International
Broadcasting Bureau; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Departments of Commerce,
Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug Enforcement Administration;
and the US Coast Guard.
(4) When MISO are planned during multinational operations, planners must
coordinate with multinational partners to ensure the attainment of US and multinational
security objectives.
For more on interagency and multinational operations, refer to Chapter VI, “Employment.”
Allied Joint Publication-3.10.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. (The
DOD change in terminology from psychological operations to MISO does not affect non-US
use of related psychological operations terminology, doctrine, or organizations.)
3. Guidance
IV-10 JP 3-13.2
Planning
(1) Research and Analysis. Research is conducted and requisite information and
relevant data are collected and analyzed to plan MISO. The intelligence, information, and
data are further assessed to determine competing and complementary US objectives and
strategies and the supportability of COAs to achieve these objectives from a MISO
standpoint. The planner determines key questions about friendly, neutral, and adversary
intentions, capabilities, and activities. The answers to these key questions are termed critical
information and are used to develop requirements for intelligence collection and analysis.
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Chapter IV
a. General. Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as “a violent struggle among state and
non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and
other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”
(1) Some of the operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW are
insurgency; COIN; unconventional warfare (UW); terrorism; CT; FID; stability, security,
transition, and reconstruction operations; MISO; CMO; intelligence and counterintelligence
activities; transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing,
and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW; and law enforcement activities
focused on countering irregular adversaries. (Some IW activities, such as terrorism and
transnational crime, violate international law. US law and national policy prohibit US
military forces or other government departments and agencies from engaging in or
supporting such activities. However, since our adversaries employ terrorism and
transnational criminal activities against the interests of the US and its partners, these
activities are included below as examples of the range of operations and activities that can be
conducted as part of IW.) IW provides a logical, long-term framework for analyzing the
irregular threat and is both a form of armed conflict and warfare.
(3) When MISO occur in IW, their role usually is much greater than during major
operations and campaigns. They impact directly on the operational focus of IW in ways
unlike that of combat operations.
(1) Direct Approach. The direct approach addresses the requirement to pursue
adversaries and their infrastructure and resources. Some adversaries, such as terrorists and
insurgents fighting for a religious or tribal cause, may be so committed that they simply
cannot be persuaded or coerced into laying down their arms; these individuals must be either
killed or captured.
(2) Indirect Approach. MISO are key supporting operations to each contextual
application of indirect approaches to executing IW.
IV-12 JP 3-13.2
Planning
military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. Both
approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be
decisive.
(b) Disturb, disrupt, and displace adversaries by attacking them physically and
psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than attacking
where they are strongest or in the manner they expect.
(c) Empower, enable, and leverage interagency and other partners to attack
adversaries militarily or confront them nonmilitarily, rather than relying on direct and
unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces.
(d) Take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups to influence
adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly.
(f) Subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant
populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and
international support through the use of MISO, public diplomacy, and PA activities; security
operations; population and resource control measures; and other means.
c. Military Information Support Operations and IW. The ideological and political
factors associated with IW create a fertile field for MISO. Examples of MISO applications to
selected activities within IW are:
(1) FID. MISO are used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against
internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and
encouraging empathy between HN armed forces and the civilian populace. MISO also may
be used to modify the behavior of selected TAs toward US and multinational capabilities.
The main objectives of MISO during FID are to build and maintain support for the host
government while decreasing support for insurgents.
(2) CT. MISO are an essential part of the capabilities required for CT, in particular
in application of the indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in
which violent extremist organizations (VEOs) operate. CT focuses on populations, and in
some operational areas, the information presented can determine which side will gain the
favor of public opinion. Terrorist groups have gained sympathy and support of moderate
audiences through disinformation partly based on their propaganda focusing on miscues of
the friendly forces. In CT operations, TA identification and the use of MISO to influence the
TAs’ behavior are important. Within an operational area there may be several TAs and
multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. The
intent of MISO in CT operations is to shape and influence the terrorist network’s
informational environment.
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Chapter IV
(5) UW. UW involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors
which promote intense, emotional partisanship. These human factors, associated with armed
resistance activity, create a situation that MIS units are uniquely suited to engage. MIS units
support all phases of UW; therefore, MISO planning is immediately integrated into the
planning process.
IV-14 JP 3-13.2
CHAPTER V
JOINT MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROCESS
1. General
a. US MISO are developed and executed through a multiphase approach. The joint
MISO process is a standard framework by which MISO assets and critical enablers plan,
execute, and evaluate MISO with proficiency and consistency throughout major campaigns,
operations, and peacetime engagements. The integration and execution of MISO hinge upon
the proper implementation of this process.
b. The joint MISO process consists of seven phases: planning; target audience analysis
(TAA); series development; product development and design; approval; production,
distribution, dissemination; and evaluation. Each of these phases is designed to apply to any
type or level of operation. Collectively, the phases address important considerations and
include the necessary activities for the proper integration of MISO with the CCDR’s military
strategy and mission.
2. Planning: Phase I
a. CCDRs are required to obtain approval prior to conducting MISO. To gain approval,
the CCDR submits a proposed MISO program(s) through the Joint Staff to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for interagency coordination and SecDef approval. CJCSI 3110.05D,
Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006,
contains a list of MISO programs approved for use by the CCDRs for SecDef-approved
missions, operations, and UCP directed activities. Some of these programs include security
institution building and operations such as maritime interdiction, noncombatant evacuation,
counterdrug, and FHA. However, MISO programs can be proposed to meet whatever unique
operational need or situation arises for the CCDRs.
b. Peacetime. MISO programs are integrated with the TCP. The TCP reflects national
security and defense strategies and planning guidance. MISO programs are devised to
support both the GCC’s objectives in the region and the embassies’ country plans. The Joint
Staff forwards proposed MISO programs to the Office of the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) for review,
interagency coordination, and USD(P) approval. The appropriate combatant command
receives the approved MISO program from the Joint Staff to execute. Peacetime MISO
planning facilitates the transition to contingency planning by integrating knowledge and
experience of the operational area into the joint planning processes.
c. Contingencies and Major Operations. MISO programs are designed to support all
phases of a campaign or OPLAN. During contingencies, CCDRs may submit their program
V-1
Chapter V
as part of their overall OPLANs. The Joint Staff forwards all OPLANs to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for review, interagency coordination, and execution authority. The
Office of the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) reviews and staffs the MISO portions of the OPLANs
through the interagency coordination process. SecDef approves the program normally as
part of the OPLAN. An execute order is sent to the combatant command containing
approval for the program, the MISO execution authority, the approval authority for products
and actions, and other related guidance. If there is a need to conduct MISO prior to gaining
approval for an OPLAN, the CCDR submits a proposed program in accordance with the
procedures used during peacetime.
d. The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, UCP, GEF, and the JSCP
provide guidance to the geographic combatant commands to devise theater strategies.
Theater strategies form the basis for employment planning, drive peacetime planning, and
provide a point of departure for force projection operations and general war planning. MISO
planners on the GCC staff are responsible for devising specific execution strategies and
objectives to meet the mission requirements. A program describes these in conjunction with
establishing the appropriate authorities and guidelines that reflect precisely national policy
objectives and the CCDR’s intent and objectives. In addition to objectives and themes,
national policies for execution include the attribution posture the USG takes in
acknowledging origination or responsibility for messages and actions. US involvement can
be open, partially (technical assistance only) or not acknowledged at all as determined by the
CCDR. The attribution posture allows the commander to attribute actions to US, concurring
partner nations, or, in the case of sensitive activities, acknowledged as soon as operationally
feasible.
e. A MISO program (see Figure V-1) provides the required SecDef guidance for
execution. All actions, products, and messages for psychological effect are required to
comply with, complement, and adhere to the stated parameters in the approved program.
MISO objectives, usually determined by the highest-level MIS authority involved in the
operation (e.g., CCDR) provide the framework for developing the MISO plan.
f. The goal of MISO planning is to integrate MISO into the commander’s vision and
CONOPS. MISO programs are initiated as a result of the first phase of the MISO process.
These programs are developed by the executing element and continue through subsequent
phases. Staff planners adjust the MISO plan as necessary to support the commander’s
objectives.
g. MISO programs become part of the TCP or OPLAN. Further MISO planning is
based on the commander’s objectives and takes into account the key components of an
approved MISO program including MISO objectives, potential TAs, themes to stress and
themes to avoid, the appropriate attribution status, the necessary dissemination platforms for
MISO messages, and the choices of media authorized. Phase I activities are summarized in
Figure V-2.
V-2 JP 3-13.2
Joint Military Information Support Operations Process
a. An approved MISO program contains a list of potential foreign TAs. During this
phase, the JMISTF, or other designated MIS element analyzes these foreign groups and
individuals by following a model specifically tailored for MISO. Much of the data required
to initiate and complete a thorough analysis of potential TAs are obtained through the
supported commander’s collection efforts. These requirements are determined early in the
planning phase as intelligence organizations and other enablers provide much of the
necessary data and information. The data are derived from a multitude of classified and open
sources, such as finished intelligence, unit documentation, and special studies, or through
technological means and assessments.
b. During this phase of the joint MISO process, foreign groups or individuals are
examined carefully and closely for their ability to be influenced. This provides insights on
how best to persuade the TA to change its behavior to one that is more favorable to US
interests. The results of TAA provide the foundation for the remaining phases of the
process, which in turn allows for the achievement of the objectives expressed in the
supporting program(s). Analysis does not stop but continues throughout the entire operation,
updating information as information is learned, the environment changes, and new TAs are
required or selected.
V-3
Chapter V
PHASE I
ACTIVITIES
The information learned as a result of TAA is used in the development of products and
actions. MIS personnel design a series of products and actions, determine the appropriate
mix of media, and develop an execution plan. Each series focuses on a single objective and
TA. Series are reviewed for their suitability, length or duration, potential to affect the
intended audience, accuracy of persuasive arguments or techniques to influence behavior
change, and the resources available to execute them.
The work completed during the planning, analysis, and series development phases are
vital for designing the prototypes of MISO products. There are three categories of MISO
products: visual, audio, and audio-visual used to target selected audiences. Fixed and
deployable US MISO capabilities, assets belonging to partner nations, and commercial
vendors provide the technical expertise and tools to design and create all types of products.
The MISO program lists the types of media including the use of electronic messages that are
approved for production and dissemination to support the CCDR’s mission. During phase
IV, evaluating the TA’s understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed in a MISO
product is a key task. Pretesting products also helps establish a foundation for conducting
post testing of entire series after dissemination occurs.
V-4 JP 3-13.2
Joint Military Information Support Operations Process
6. Approval: Phase V
A judicious and efficient approval process for MISO series and the management of the
series development and approval process are fundamental in providing supporting MISO to
emerging, ongoing, and future operations. During phase V, MISO series undergo a formal
internal review by MIS personnel. The commander of the MIS unit producing the series is
the first official approving authority in the MISO approval process. The potential of the
series to achieve the desired outcome and the continuity of messages and media are judged.
Once approved by the MISO commander, the series is formally submitted through an
established approval process to obtain final approval for production and dissemination. As
the series passes through the approval process, action officers responsible for obtaining
approval of the series at each echelon maintain visibility of the series until returned to the
originating unit. MISO series are approved at the lowest level of command as dictated by
SecDef deployment order. Final approval may reside at the CCDR, JFC, JTF, or by
maneuver unit commanders to assist in the timely approval and subsequent execution of
MISO series.
a. MIS units from group to detachment level may deploy with organic production assets
or utilize reachback to fixed assets at higher levels. They also have the ability to request
other USG resources or locally controlled resources within theater. Once production is
complete, products are transferred to the disseminating unit or agency in accordance with a
predetermined timeline. Products are distributed via air or ground transport, or transmitted
digitally via secure means or through multiple means. Products are distributed using US
military or multinational modes of transportation, HN assets or nationalized enterprises,
commercial vendors, NGOs, other government departments and agencies, or a combination
of these modes.
b. The most appropriate dissemination means are determined through TAA and
intelligence about the operational area. Radio and television (TV) broadcasts, the Internet,
aerial leaflet drops, and loudspeaker transmissions are some of the means used throughout
the world to disseminate MISO messages. Messages also are communicated through
planned face-to-face contact with the local populace.
a. Assessing the effects of MISO product series on TAs relies on MISO impact
indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases. Initial assessment criteria are established
in phase I and are refined in phase II. MISO assessment criteria support the commander’s
MOEs, and help determine the effectiveness of an operation. MISO assessment criteria are
focused on the achievement of supporting MISO objectives by TAs. MISO planners have an
established procedure to evaluate the effectiveness of MISO and continuously assess the
effectiveness of MISO on achieving the commander’s objectives.
b. The impact of MISO are evaluated within the context of competing information,
spontaneous events, and other uncontrollable environmental and psychological factors that
V-5
Chapter V
(1) Yield substantive information about the trends toward achieving the supporting
MISO objectives.
(2) Contribute data that are relevant for the commander’s overall MOEs.
V-6 JP 3-13.2
CHAPTER VI
EMPLOYMENT
“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the
fighting man and the thinking man is liable to have its fighting done by fools and its
thinking done by cowards.”
a. MISO are integrated in joint and multinational military operations as well as actions
conducted by other designated governmental departments and agencies. MISO are employed
across the range of military operations in both conventional and SO activities. To be
effective, MISO must be fully integrated with the supported organization’s planning and
decision-making activities.
VI-1
Chapter VI
d. Major Operations and Campaigns. MISO are planned and integrated throughout
all phases of operations or campaigns. During major operations, MISO are integrated with
both conventional and SO activities.
a. SO are relevant across the range of military operations and the eleven core activities,
including MISO should be integral parts of a theater strategy, OPLAN, or campaign plan.
While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives,
the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the
overall theater campaign.
(1) Direct Action (DA). DA are short-duration strikes and other small-scale
offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture,
exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. MISO can be integrated in all DA activities,
Counterterrorism
Unconventional Warfare
Counterproliferation of
Foreign Internal Defense Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Direct Action
Information Operations
Special Reconnaissance
Civil Affairs Operations
VI-2 JP 3-13.2
Employment
employing within the physical and political risks, operational techniques, and use of force to
achieve specific objectives. MISO can increase the collection of relevant information used
to shape and determine if, when, or DA activities are required. MISO can increase the
success of DA strikes and raids by decreasing civilian interference, target resistance, and the
need for on-site consequence management through cultural and linguistic expertise in direct
(face-to-face) communication. MIS forces collect video, still imagery, and voice data that
can be used to counter adversary misinformation and reduce the need for future DA activities
by informing audiences of DA success, capabilities, and legitimacy.
For further guidance concerning DA, SR, and UW, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.
(4) FID. From the SOF perspective, activities that support FID center on
enhancing an HN’s ability to appropriately and effectively integrate legitimate security or
military forces with other national-level capabilities to eliminate internal threats and prevent
the emergence of new threats. The same is true when conducting SFA in support of foreign
security forces. MISO are employed to prepare key audiences for US FID/SFA operations
and to directly assist the HN in establishing an environment that promotes internal stability
and security through democratic systems. MISO increase HN support for programs that
provide positive populace control and protection from adversary activities. MIS forces
advise, train, and assist HN counterparts and government agencies to develop and implement
effective information activities. The end state is the HN ability to conduct information
activities in support of achieving and maintaining internal security.
For further guidance concerning FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.
VI-3
Chapter VI
(5) CT. CT is action taken directly and indirectly against terrorist networks to
influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Ideological
support serves as the center of gravity for violent extremist movements. Global media and
mass communication provide terrorists and extremists with a cost-effective capability to
recruit, train, plan, legitimize, and resource lethal and nonlethal operations. MISO are a
critical capability in conducting CT through the application of the direct and indirect
approaches in support of DOD’s global operations against terrorist networks.
(a) The four MISO missions can be integrated in CT activities and provide the
following additive capabilities to enable partners to combat VEOs, deter tacit and active
support for VEOs, and erode support for extremist ideologies.
(b) MISO inform, direct, and influence targets at all levels of war to increase
USG efforts to effectively defeat violent extremism. MISO provide cultural, linguistic, and
social expertise required to analyze the human environment influenced by extremist
ideology. As a DOD contribution to USG SC, MISO mitigate the effects of VEO
information, thus reducing their credibility and access to resources and safe havens.
(c) When authorized, MIS forces support national security or disaster relief
within US territory to reduce civilian casualties and suffering.
For further guidance concerning CP, refer to JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
(7) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO are military operations conducted by
civil affairs forces that enhance relationships between military forces and civil authorities
through the application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of
civil government. MISO can be integrated with CAO activities to increase support for the
HN government and reduce support to destabilizing forces. MISO can publicize the
existence and successes of CAO to enhance the positive perception of US and HN actions in
the AOR and transregionally. MISO inform and direct civilians concerning safety and
welfare to reduce civilian casualties, suffering, and interference with military operations.
VI-4 JP 3-13.2
Employment
(8) IO. IO are described as the integrated employment, during military operations,
of information-related capabilities, in concert with other lines of operation to influence,
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while
protecting our own. IO are conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range of
military operations, and at all levels of war. MIS forces can be employed in conjunction
with other IO capabilities and provide a critical means of communicating with foreign
audiences to inform, direct, and influence. MIS units provide personnel to conduct IO staff
functions to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict information-related capabilities. SO and
conventional forces working within the same operational area should synchronize plans and
activities to prevent duplication of effort and information inconsistencies, fratricide,
inadvertent destruction of intelligence sources, and information inconsistencies.
4. Interagency Coordination
a. Military operations are synchronized with operations of other USG departments and
agencies as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations for the
purpose of accomplishing objectives. Success depends on the ability to blend and engage all
instruments of national power. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the
military instrument of power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of
power as well as the efforts of NGOs and IGOs. Successful interagency coordination
enables agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective
operation.
5. Multinational Operations
a. MIS units should be integrated into all multinational operations to ensure that
MISO are coordinated.
VI-5
Chapter VI
b. MISO must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for
the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used
from day one of an operation. MISO provide the commander with a controlled mechanism
to communicate with all elements of a population: civilians, military, or belligerent factions.
A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, religion, political climate, and military
organization can help the multinational force commander to effectively conduct MISO to
communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly
forces.
c. When the Armed Forces of the United States are integrated into a multinational
command structure, peacetime MISO policies and wartime conduct should be coordinated
and integrated to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational
security objectives. However, US MISO normally will be approved in US channels
regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command.
6. Civil Authority Information Support Within the United States and Its Territories
a. In the same manner that infantry units with a primary mission to find, fix, and kill the
enemy can be used to provide humanitarian relief to US citizens following natural disasters
or other crises, MIS forces can provide a civil authority information support element
(CAISE) within the US and its territories.
b. When authorized for employment in this manner, MIS forces utilize their media
development, production, and dissemination capabilities to deliver public and other critical
disaster information to populations in the impacted area. Their role is to assist in
dissemination of messages developed by civil authorities. Messages typically include such
things as the location of relief sites, how to obtain essential services, disease prevention tips,
current civil authority instructions, and similar messages. MISO dissemination assets such
as radio broadcast systems, print production, and loudspeaker teams also can augment
commercial or civil capability shortfalls associated with the contingency.
c. All CAISE efforts should be coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal
agency PA efforts.
d. During periods where CAISEs will be needed, such as the annual hurricane season,
scheduled national special security events, or times of crisis, CAISEs need to be prepared to
deploy to provide support at designated locations.
VI-6 JP 3-13.2
CHAPTER VII
ENABLERS
“The enemy bombards our front not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a
drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen also
throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.”
1. Intelligence Operations
b. Ongoing intelligence support is critical to all phases of the MISO process. MISO
require detailed analysis of the conditions which exist within the operational environment
and detailed demographics on potential TAs. The greatest demand for detailed intelligence
support to MISO takes place during phase II (Target Audience Analysis) and phase VII
(Evaluation).
VII-1
Chapter VII
techniques. It should include basic intelligence and country studies on foreign cultures and
particular target groups as well as current intelligence on foreign group attitudes, behavior,
and capabilities.
f. MIS units and staff elements should communicate mission-specific requirements for
raw and finished intelligence products to the intelligence community so time-sensitive
requirements are prioritized, tasked, processed, exploited, and disseminated in a timely
manner. MIS units and staff elements ensure that information gaps are identified and
prioritized as intelligence requirements to drive collection.
(1) Conflict threats are those that stem from state and non-state actors using
military and economic power to gain control of a region and influence or counter the
strategic intent of the US and its multinational partners. MISO planners should identify
specific information requirements for which the intelligence collection manager can levy
collection requirements, assisting the MISO planner in recognizing the MISO effort to
influence the behavior of individuals toward a desired goal.
(3) Instability in one country’s economic, religious, cultural, and political structures
can threaten regional stability. These changes may be sudden or anticipated, temporary or
permanent, and may alter the perceptions held by the country’s populace. This can pose a
threat to the success of US MISO if planners do not recognize the potential for these changes
in perception. The MISO planner needs to submit specific information requirements so the
collection manager can task collection assets to assist in determining changes to political,
religious, economic, and cultural structures.
VII-2 JP 3-13.2
Enablers
(1) ISR assets also are critical in collecting data to confirm or deny MISO MOEs.
(2) Allocation of ISR to collect MOE data takes place during phase VI of the MISO
process.
For further detail concerning intelligence support to operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series.
2. Communications System
a. Communications between commands that are planning and executing MISO are
necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint MISO communications plan should be
prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Theater
communications architecture must include plans for integration of MISO support
requirements into secure voice and data nets, satellite communications systems, and a
capability to communicate with US national-level agencies, multinational, and HN
communications systems.
(1) DOD Message Traffic Archive. The archive contains daily defense message
system (DMS) messages from different government departments and agencies and military
sources, including the DOS, Central Intelligence Agency, and Director of National
Intelligence Open Source Center. The system has the capability to do full searches and
retrieval from DMS message traffic with a continuous real-time message feed and indexing.
This feature allows the immediate retrieval of material for analysis that provides information
used to determine behavioral trends in selected target groups over time. The message
archives are extensive, covering October 1989 to the present, and readily accessible.
(2) MISO Study Collection. This collection holds all existing MISO studies and
assessments produced by the strategic studies detachments (SSDs). This collection contains
the most complete archive of available MISO studies.
(3) Radio and TV Collection. This collection has statistics on radio and TV
facilities in various countries. It includes such information as location, equipment range, and
frequencies, and users can search the collection based on facility characteristics.
(4) The MISAS electronically archives studies and also offers analysts access to
various classified and unclassified databases. Most of these studies can be obtained through
the 4th Military Information Support Group (MISG) (Airborne) home page on the SIPRNET
or through the SIPRNET Intelink Web site. MISO relevant intelligence information and
products of all types are posted on this site as soon as they are completed. All MISO studies
are posted on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Intelink
VII-3
Chapter VII
Web site along with studies that are excluded from the SIPRNET Intelink Web site because
of dissemination restrictions or classification constraints. On JWICS, they can be found on
the USSOCOM home page under intelligence products. In the unlikely event that an end
user does not have access to SIPRNET or JWICS, but requires and knows of a specific study,
the MISAS staff can, by exception, forward a copy.
3. Logistics
a. The execution of the joint MISO process (described in Chapter V, “Joint Military
Information Support Operations Process”) in sustained operations requires critical logistic
support. The combatant command or appropriate Service component staff must integrate
MISO logistic support into planning. MIS units are dependent primarily on the supported
unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support, commercial item restock, and
dissemination contracting support. For major operations and contingencies, supported units
have the responsibility to fund and acquire the logistic support to develop, produce,
disseminate, and assess the effects of multimedia products. Moreover, gaining units
facilitate the repair and maintenance of MISO production and dissemination equipment
through funding and contracting support. See Figure VII-1 for MISO logistics requirements.
b. It is critical for the supported unit to understand both common and unique MISO
sustainment requirements to insure continuous, responsive, and effective MISO. The gaining
unit must identify these items and forecast their procurement and sustainment in advance. In
addition, fixed site facilities also may be required during extended operations to house and
secure sizeable and highly technical equipment and electronic components used for large-
scale production and dissemination of multimedia MISO products.
(1) Service Common. MIS forces use a broad range of equipment that require
service common expendable and major end-item components from across the categories of
supply. These assets are generally acquired and sustained through normal supply channels.
(2) MISO Unique. MIS forces use specialized production assets, communications
systems, and broadcast platforms. Parts and maintenance for this equipment are coordinated
at the theater level and must be programmed during planning.
d. The potential for MISO to rely on less sophisticated equipment found in various parts
of the world must be considered. Host-nation support (HNS) personnel and organizations
may perform many of the support-related functions needed, thus reducing the strain on US
logistic systems. Locally available resources for required supplies and services, whether
through the host government or commercial entities, must be identified in advance.
Early identification of HNS is critical to the establishment of agreements or contracts to
provide needed supplies, equipment, and facilities for MISO.
VII-4 JP 3-13.2
Enablers
VII-5
Chapter VII
VII-6 JP 3-13.2
APPENDIX A
CAPABILITIES
“To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a
regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one
hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the
enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme
importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his
alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is
to attack cities.”
Sun Tsu
The Art of War
1. General
2. Studies Programs
a. The SSD of the 4th MISG (Airborne), is an important source of finished MISO
analytical intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire MIS force, the
combatant commands, and the intelligence community. The CJCS provides general policy
guidance and establishes production priorities for the program. CDRUSSOCOM, as the
supporting CCDR, manages the MISO Studies Production Program, issues taskings, and
monitors production. Products of the MISO studies program primarily are designed to
support the operational requirements of the combatant commands and of US MIS forces
worldwide, although they also are used by a variety of other organizations (e.g., DOS).
Studies provide CCDRs with MISO perspectives on issues of direct significance to
peacetime strategy, joint operation planning, and operational preparations. Studies on all
topics of interest can be requested through a combatant command’s MISO staff officer or
intelligence request for information manager, who will enter them in the community online
intelligence system for end users and managers system for managing intelligence production
requirements.
b. MISO studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products can
contain this type of intelligence information. In general, they profile the salient features of a
country or its people; provide an analysis of the influences that lead different social,
occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; discuss issues that elicit
strong responses from the indigenous population; assess attitudes; identify vulnerabilities;
and suggest ways and means to influence people.
A-1
Appendix A
a. Army Service MISO assets provide a vital instrument of engagement across all
operational phases in support of the full range of military operations and interagency
coordination in a foreign setting and under special circumstances during domestic
emergencies as well.
(2) Assisting in developing joint and Army MISO doctrine, organization, institution
training, materiel, supplies, and services.
(3) Preparing and submitting Army MIS forces program and budget documents.
(4) Prepare and deploy ARSOF MISO for contingency operations, SO missions, as
well as missions in a joint environment in peacetime, conflict, and war.
(5) Planning and conducting other training, operations, and support, as directed.
(b) Execute tactical MISO in support of rapid deployment forces, SOF, and
other contingencies.
A-2 JP 3-13.2
Capabilities
(a) SSD. The group manages the SSD’s strategic and operational analysis
efforts necessary for mission planning. The SSD is organized into regionally focused
strategic studies teams comprised of civilian MISO analysts holding advanced degrees and
regional expertise. Analysts specialize in target regions and provide MISO-relevant
information, strategic analysis, and advice during the planning and execution of missions.
The SSD publishes and disseminates MISO studies.
(a) Validate, deploy/redeploy, and sustain all assigned and attached forces.
A-3
Appendix A
(c) Organize and execute operational-level task forces in support of JFCs and
provide augmentation to GCCs for theater-level MISO support.
(a) MIS Battalion. The battalion provides support to corps-level units and
below, task forces, and SOF. The battalion’s companies are the primary providers of MISO
support to conventional forces and enhance the commander’s ability to influence the
behavior of TAs within his operational area.
e. Military Information Support Operations Staff Planners. The Army provides the
preponderance of MISO planners assigned or attached to the joint force. Responsibilities of
MISO staff planners include:
(1) Plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate MISO into operations to create
effects required to meet the commander’s intent and support achievement of objectives.
(5) Request, receive, and integrate MIS units and capabilities into operations.
g. In addition to dedicated MIS units, conventional Army units can also support MISO.
With routine interaction with TAs, they are in an ideal position to support MISO product
dissemination and collect limited MOE indicators for transmission to MISO planners.
A-4 JP 3-13.2
Capabilities
b. Navy afloat and ashore IO cells coordinate with joint MISO experts to identify
maritime audiences, develop themes and products, and plan dissemination. Also, within the
fleet, capabilities exist for most Asian and European languages.
c. The Navy has UHF, VHF, and HF broadcast capabilities to deliver MISO messages
to afloat and ashore TAs. Boarding parties can disseminate products to crews of civilian
vessels to achieve MISO objectives.
d. Several Navy aircraft support MISO. F/A-18 HORNET aircraft can drop PDU-5
leaflet canisters to disperse print materials deep inland over hostile territory. The P-3
ORION airframe is certified to drop the PDU-5b. Shipborne helicopters can provide leaflet
drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. Navy C-2A GREYHOUND transport aircraft can
disperse a large volume of leaflets by static-line airdrops from the aft cargo ramp. EA-6B
PROWLER aircraft (and its successor, the EA-18G GROWLER) can jam adversary
broadcasts and also transmit brief .wav files on a wide range of frequencies.
e. The Navy employs the Sound Commander tactical loudspeaker system and
conventional loudspeakers for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore audio communications. This
includes the delivery of MISO messages.
f. The Navy has two combat camera units: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command,
Detachment Combat Camera, located in Norfolk, Virginia, and Fleet Combat Camera Group
Pacific, located in San Diego, California. These units can produce audiovisual products to
support MISO. The ships and aircraft of the fleet can also provide limited audiovisual
production capabilities.
g. The Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Norfolk, located at the Little
Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Norfolk, Virginia, provides limited specialized training in
planning and executing MISO, and is available to assist fleet units. NIOC San Diego
provides similar training to units in the Pacific. NIOC Norfolk maintains a close relationship
with the 4th MISG (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for training, equipment
employment, product dissemination, and tactics, techniques, and procedures development in
the area of Navy MISO.
For additional information see Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-53, Navy Psychological
Operations.
A-5
Appendix A
a. USAF MISO is focused on the employment of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities
as the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and exploiting the cognitive
dimension of the operational environment. The USAF uses the term “influence operations”
to group the activities of MISO, MILDEC, and OPSEC.
b. USAF MIS forces support JFC objectives through a variety of operations and
activities that include development of psychologically informed targeting strategies. USAF
IOTs are located in joint air operations centers (JAOCs) and assist commanders in the five
core capabilities of IO. MISO officers coordinate and liaise between the JAOC and the JTF
IO staff to utilize all-source analysis of an adversary’s sociological, cultural, and
demographic information to recommend effective MIS strategies. USAF MIS forces fill
individual billets on joint manning documents and are capable of providing direct support
and general support roles to units conducting MISO.
c. Many USAF platforms are used to execute missions in support of JFC MISO
objectives. EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft are equipped to broadcast MISO radio
and TV products. Transport aircraft perform static line leaflet airdrop missions. USAF
fighter and bomber aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping leaflet canisters.
d. USAF MISO capabilities are growing beyond the traditional dissemination roles of
airborne broadcasts and leaflet drops. Behavioral influences analysis (BIA) provides an
analytical framework to facilitate understanding and exploitation of the perceptual and
behavioral context of the operational environment. BIA directly supports MISO TAA,
providing a more robust assessment of TAs.
e. Because of the global nature of USTRANSCOM and its Air Force component, Air
Mobility Command (AMC) is in a position to be aware of the synchronized IO efforts across
the geographic combatant commands. Thus AMC IO and MISO planners are uniquely
postured to observe and support MISO in addition to supporting the operational-level MISO
efforts of a single geographic combatant command. Coordination with USTRANSCOM IO
planners and the AMC IO team is highly encouraged.
a. The Marine Corps has the capability to conduct MISO at the tactical level via MIS
teams using loudspeaker broadcasts, print media, and face-to-face communication. The
Marine Corps expeditionary MIS capability is found within the Marine Corps Information
Operations Center (MCIOC). The MCIOC provides reachback capabilities for forward
deployed MIS teams in the form of audience analysis and interdepartmental coordination.
While forward deployed, Marine MIS units receive MISO guidance from the MCIOC or an
existing JMISTF.
b. The MCIOC coordinates and integrates the conduct of MISO programs that
complement IO with the JMISTF, CCDRs, interagency, DOS, intelligence community,
IGOs, NGOs, and others as necessary.
A-6 JP 3-13.2
APPENDIX B
CONSIDERATIONS FOR
TAB A (MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS) TO
APPENDIX 3 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)
1. Overview
The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of tab A (Military Information
Support Operations) to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) for
plans and orders.
a. Situation
(3) What are the significant operational environment factors influencing MISO
activities?
(4) What are the competing MISO objectives in the operational area?
(3) What will be the general phasing of current actions with future actions?
(1) What are the projected actions of the neutral populations under various
circumstances?
(2) What activities and resources are available to these neutral intentions?
(3) What actions and behavior by the neutral population(s) support mission
objectives?
(4) Which actions and behavior may interfere with mission objectives?
(6) What objective and subjective factors could affect decisions and resource
effectiveness?
B-1
Appendix B
(7) What are the characteristics of decision makers and their key advisors, major
staff planners, staff sections (to include particularly influential individuals), and intelligence
system analysts?
d. Adversary Perspectives
(c) Who are the decision makers who can direct development or allocation of
resources of COAs pertinent to the task assigned?
(d) What are the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key
advisors, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts)?
(a) What are the intelligence systems that support decision makers and their
staffs?
(b) What are the intelligence systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation?
(c) What are the objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of
collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of
information gathering resources?
(d) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical
information?
(e) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful
appreciations for each group?
(a) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness
in task accomplishment?
(d) What are the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each
group?
(e) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various
ways?
B-2 JP 3-13.2
Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to
Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations)
(f) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful
appreciations for each group?
(a) What communications systems and command centers will be used to plan
COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA?
(b) What is the purpose and what are the characteristics of each C2
communications net?
f. Execution
(a) Overview
B-3
Appendix B
1. What are the valid military information themes to promote strategic and
theater MISO objectives?
1. What is the guidance for the conduct of military operations, actions, and
personnel behavior to promote valid military information themes?
2. What is the guidance for avoiding military operations and actions and
personnel behavior that would result in harmful foreign TA attitudes and behavior?
3. What are the command and staff arrangements? Who are the
supporting commanders?
4. What resources are required to plan and conduct MISO actions? Include
civil capabilities, indigenous assets, exploitation of detainees for MISO, and MISO
resources.
B-4 JP 3-13.2
Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to
Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations)
(b) What is the requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates
of target appreciations responsive to information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and
current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security
monitoring results, and implementing actions?
(3) Control
(c) How will implementation planning and supervision of the planned action
be accomplished?
(4) Tasks
B-5
Appendix B
(1) Logistics
(a) What is the guidance for stocking MISO and information materials and
provisions to disseminating organizations?
(b) What are the provisions for the maintenance of MISO-unique equipment?
(c) What are the provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous
equipment and materials?
(2) Administration
(b) What are the requirements for planning and operations in support of
education programs regarding detainees?
2. Tab A Format
CLASSIFICATION
B-6 JP 3-13.2
Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to
Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations)
d. List plans, estimates, basic MISO studies, special MISO studies, special MISO
assessments, and other documents that have a significant bearing on the conduct of MISO.
1. ( ) Situation. Summarize the psychological situation in the operational area, any ongoing
MISO programs, and any significant factors influencing MISO activities.
a. ( ) Overview. Describe the general situation, competing goals, and the task to be
accomplished.
b. ( ) US (or US and Allied) Perspective. Outline intentions (how the assigned task will
be accomplished), capabilities (resources to be used), and activities (current actions and
general phasing of future actions).
d. ( ) Enemy Perspectives
(1) ( ) Decision Maker and Staff. Identify the decision makers who can direct
development or allocation of required resources of MISO COA execution pertinent to the
task assigned. Outline feasible alternative actions that would favor or harm friendly
operational effectiveness. Indicate COAs that might affect friendly task accomplishment and
summarize resources available to execute each COA. Describe the characteristics of
adversary decision makers, their key advisers, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts).
B-7
Appendix B
characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and
selection of information gathering resources.
(3) ( ) Target Audience. Identify groups that can influence plans, decisions, and
operational effectiveness in task accomplishment, and identify their susceptibility to MISO.
State group behavior favorable and harmful to task accomplishment. Describe the apparent
goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group and key leaders who can influence or
motivate groups to behave in various ways.
2. ( ) Mission
3. ( ) Execution
a. ( ) Concept of Operations
(1) ( ) Overview. State the commander’s intent. Outline the overall concept for
using MISO in support of task accomplishment. Sequentially address MISO in peacetime
and in support of deterrence options; MISO in support of sustained hostilities (conduct of
war globally or in a region, and support for campaigns and operations); and joint tactical
MISO in support of operational COAs. State who will plan and conduct each MISO and
specify the supported/supporting commands.
(2) ( ) Provide the following as general guidance to units and forces involved:
B-8 JP 3-13.2
Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to
Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations)
(4) ( ) In the basic concept description and in each tab describing separate
operations, provide OPSEC planning guidance. The guidance should address planning for,
preparing for, and conducting MISO and MISO actions to maintain essential secrecy for the
commander’s intentions and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive
MISO COAs.
B-9
Appendix B
a. ( ) Logistics
(2) ( ) Provisions for the supply and maintenance of MISO-unique supplies and
equipment.
b. ( ) Administration
5. ( ) Command and Control. Describe command and staff arrangements for MIS forces
supporting the operation and indicate supported/supporting command relationships. Refer to
appropriate sections of annex K and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the
basic plan or annex K, including:
b. ( ) Electronic policy.
d. ( ) Code words.
B-10 JP 3-13.2
APPENDIX C
REFERENCES
d. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.
C-1
Appendix C
c. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume
I, Planning Policies and Procedures.
d. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume
II, Planning Formats.
6. Joint Publications
h. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.
C-2 JP 3-13.2
References
C-3
Appendix C
d. Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3300.1C, Department of the Navy Law of War
Program.
e. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 51-4, Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.
g. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-401, Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance
with the Law of Armed Conflict.
C-4 JP 3-13.2
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint
Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting
Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA
23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency,
and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the USSOCOM, and the Joint Staff doctrine
sponsor for this publication is the operations directorate of a joint staff.
3. Supersession
4. Change Recommendations
b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and
Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support
Division, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD.
c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Distribution of Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET),
and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
D-1
Appendix D
b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant
commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or
foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to
DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling,
Washington, DC 20340-5100.
D-2 JP 3-13.2
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AC Active Component
AFDD Air Force doctrine document
AFI Air Force instruction
AFPD Air Force policy directive
AMC Air Mobility Command
AOR area of responsibility
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASD(SO/LIC&IC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
DA direct action
DMS defense message system
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DOS Department of State
DSPD defense support to public diplomacy
EW electronic warfare
GL-1
Glossary
HF high frequency
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
GL-2 JP 3-13.2
Glossary
PA public affairs
RC Reserve Component
RDO request for deployment order
RFF request for forces
SC strategic communication
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SFA security force assistance
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SO special operations
SOF special operations forces
SR special reconnaissance
SSD strategic studies detachment
TA target audience
TAA target audience analysis
TCP theater campaign plan
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data
TV television
GL-3
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
joint military information support task force. A military information support operations
task force composed of headquarters and operational assets that assist the joint force
commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical military information
support operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Also called
JMISTF. (Approved for replacement of “joint military information support operations
task force” and its definition in JP 1-02.)
military information support operations support element. None. (Approved for removal
from JP 1-02.)
GL-4 JP 3-13.2
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE
JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP
JP 3-0
3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0
COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEM
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-13.2 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
Approval Development