Public Private Partnerships in Education

Public Private Partnerships in Education
i-xvi Prelims.indd 1 24/05/2012 15:16

Public Private
Partnerships in
Education
New Actors and Modes of Governance
in a Globalizing World
Edited by
Susan L. Robertson
University of Bristol, UK
Karen Mundy
University of Toronto, Canada
Antoni Verger
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
Francine Menashy
University of Toronto, Canada
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Susan L. Robertson, Karen Mundy, Antoni Verger and Francine Menashy 2012
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or
photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Published by
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A catalogue record for this book

is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Control Number: 2012935288
ISBN 978 0 85793 068 2 (cased)
Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

Contents
List of contributors vii

Acknowledgements xiii
List of abbreviations xiv
1 An introduction to public private partnerships and

education governance 1
Susan L. Robertson, Karen Mundy, Antoni Verger and
Francine Menashy
PART I THE RISE OF PPPS IN EDUCATION:

HISTORY AND CONCEPTUAL DEBATES
2 Governing education through public private partnerships 21

Susan L. Robertson and Antoni Verger
3 International PPPs in education: New potential or
privatizing public goods? 43
Alexandra Draxler
4 Public private partnerships, neoliberal globalization
and democratization 63
Mark Ginsburg
PART II UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL PPP ACTORS
5 The role of the International Finance Corporation in the

promotion of public private partnerships for
educational development 81
Karen Mundy and Francine Menashy
6 The GATS game-changer: International trade regulation
and the constitution of a global education marketplace 104
Antoni Verger and Susan L. Robertson
7 Private foundations, philanthropy and partnership in
education and development: Mapping the terrain 128
Prachi Srivastava and Su-Ann Oh

vi Public private partnerships in education
8 A disconnect between motivations and education needs:

Why American corporate philanthropy alone will not
educate the most marginalized 158
Justin van Fleet
9 Microsoft Corporation: A case study of corporate-led PPPs
in education 182
Zahra Bhanji
PART III THE IMPACT OF PPPS IN EDUCATION:

EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD
10 The role and impact of public private partnerships

in education 201
Felipe Barrera-Osorio, Juliana Guaqueta and
Harry Anthony Patrinos
11 Do public private partnerships fulil the right to education?
An examination of the role of non-state actors in advancing
equity, equality and justice 217
Maria Ron-Balsera and Akanksha A. Marphatia
12 Is low-fee private primary schooling affordable for the poor?
Evidence from rural India 243
Joanna Härmä and Pauline Rose
13 Why girls’ education rather than gender equality?
The strange political economy of PPPs in Pakistan 259
Shailaja Fennell
14 The role of central management structures in public private
partnerships: The case of Fe y Alegría schools in Peru 277
Analía V. Jaimovich
Index 296

Contributors
Felipe Barrera-Osorio is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of

Education, Harvard University. He applies impact evaluation methods to ind
causal effects of innovative programs in education. His research covers programs
such as conditional cash transfers, elimination of user fees, public-private part-
nerships, school based management and teacher incentives, among others. Until
2011, he was Senior Economist at the World Bank, evaluating programs in Chile,
Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, and Pakistan. Previously, he worked as the Deputy
Director of the Colombian think-tank Fedesarrollo. In 2008, he was awarded
the Juan Luis Londoño Medal – a recognition that is given every two years to a
Colombian economist under 40 years of age – for his research in education. Mr.
Barrera received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Maryland, College
Park and a BA degree in Economics from University of los Andes, Colombia.
Dr. Zahra Bhanji is a Policy and Research Manager at The Learning

Partnership, a Canadian education NGO. She leads the organization’s national
research and evaluation initiatives and multi-sector knowledge mobilization
activities. Zahra was a Ph.D. Associate with the Lee-Chin Institute for Corporate
Citizenship at the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto (UT)
in 2010–2011. Her research expertise includes non-state engagement and part-
nerships in education policy and practice. Zahra’s publishing record includes
articles in the Comparative Education Review and Globalisation, Societies and
Education. As a lecturer, she has taught bachelor and graduate courses at OISE/
UT and Humber College. Zahra also developed partnerships for the Aga Khan
Foundation (AKF) Egypt and conducted research for 8 months in rural Gujarat
as a CIDA/AKF International Development Management Fellow. Zahra holds
a Ph.D. in Education Administration and Comparative International Education.
Her research was on Microsoft’s education authority in Jordan and South Africa
and was funded by the International Development Research Centre.
Alexandra Draxler is an education specialist who worked for many years

for UNESCO. She was the Secretary of the International Commission on
Education for the Twenty-irst Century (created by UNESCO), whose report
‘Education: the Treasure Within’ (1996) was published in more than 30
languages. Currently she is an independent consultant working on education
vii

viii Public private partnerships in education
development policies, the use of technologies for education in developing

countries and public private sector collaboration for education in develop-
ing countries. She is a member of the Council of the Consultant Fellows of
UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning and Vice-President
of the Association for the Promotion of Education.
Shailaja Fennell is a University Lecturer in Development Studies and a

Fellow of Jesus College at the University of Cambridge. She has recently
completed a ive-year research project (2005–10) on the impact of public
private partnerships in the educational outcomes of the poor as part of a DFID-
funded research consortium on educational outcomes and poverty (RECOUP)
in Ghana, India, Kenya and Pakistan. Her recent publications include Rules,
rubrics and riches: the relationship between legal reform, institutional change
and international development (Routledge 2009) and Gender Education and
Development: conceptual frameworks, engagements and agendas (Routledge
2007) edited with M. Arnot. She is currently working on a monograph on the
relationship between educational policy and educational providers.
Mark Ginsburg is a senior advisor for research, evaluation, and teacher devel-
opment in the Global Education Center of the Global Learning Group at FHI
360 (USA); a visiting professor at Columbia University and the University of
Maryland; and co-editor of the Comparative Education Review. He previously
was a faculty member at the University of Aston in Birmingham (England,
1976–78), the University of Houston (Texas, USA, 1978–87), and the University
of Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania, USA, 1987–2004). He also served as President of
the Comparative and International Education Society (1990–91), Director of the
Institute for International Studies in Education at the University of Pittsburgh
(1987–93, 1996–2006), and Director of the Faculties of Education Reform project
of the USAID-funded Educational Reform Program in Egypt (2004–06). He has
published extensively on topics of policy/institutional reform, globalization, teach-
ers’ work, teacher education and policy/practice-oriented research and evaluation.
Juliana Guaqueta is an Education Specialist at the World Bank focusing

on the role of the private sector in education, the regulatory frameworks that
are conducive to improving quality and equity, and the impact of account-
ability policies on student learning. Her current work with the Education team
at the International Finance Corporation (IFC) involves conducting research on
education markets and trends to identify investment opportunities; carrying out
competition analysis for education products and services to evaluate market viabil-
ity; updating IFC’s education strategy and contributing to the strategic positioning
of IFC in the sector. Recently, Juliana served as a core member of the team for the
World Bank’s Education Sector Strategy 2020. She was also involved in creating

Contributors ix
the framework and analytic tools for the System Assessment and Benchmarking
Education for Results (SABER) initiative, and has co-authored publications
on school autonomy reforms in Bulgaria and public private partnerships in the
Philippines. She holds a Master’s degree in International Education Policy from
Harvard University, and a Bachelor’s Degree in Finances and International
Relations from Externado de Colombia University in Bogota, Colombia.
Joanna Härmä started working in education in India in early 2002, and earned
her doctorate from the University of Sussex in 2009 for a thesis exploring
parental school choice making in rural Uttar Pradesh. She is currently conduct-
ing research into private schools serving poor communities in urban and rural
Nigeria for ESSPIN, a DFID-funded education programme.
Analía Jaimovich is a doctoral candidate in Education Policy at the Harvard

Graduate School of Education. She holds a BA in Education Sciences from the
University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and an M.Phil. in Politics, Democracy
and Education from the University of Cambridge, UK. Analía’s academic
research focuses on public private partnerships in education in Latin America.
In the past, she has worked in programme evaluation and education policy
analysis at the Ministries of Education of Argentina, Mexico and Peru, and the
Academy for Educational Development and RTI International in the US.
Akanksha A. Marphatia has 20 years of experience in gender and educa-

tion issues in sub-Saharan Africa and India. She has worked as the Head of
International Education at ActionAid International and was elected to the
Education For All Fast Track Initiative’s Executive Board. Akanksha has
been seconded to Ministerial positions; has worked as a policy specialist with
UNESCO and the World Bank; a social scientist with the International Centre for
Research on Women and programme oficer with non-governmental organisa-
tions. Akanksha regularly lectures at universities and on expert panels on femi-
nist macroeconomics, gender and education, and human rights. Her publishing
record spans peer-reviewed journals, UN, Government and NGO reports. In
2011, Akanksha will begin her PhD in early childhood development in Brazil
and India at the University of Cambridge, UK, for which she was awarded an
Economic Social and Research Council fellowship. She holds a Masters Degree
in International Education Policy from Harvard University, Cambridge, USA.
Francine Menashy is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Comparative,

International and Development Education Centre of the University of Toronto/
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, on a fellowship funded by the Ontario
Ministry of Research and Innovation. Her project focuses on global governance
and the support of private sector engagement in education. Francine’s areas

x Public private partnerships in education
of research expertise include rights-based approaches to education, interna-

tional education policy analysis, and conceptions of private and public goods.
Her work has been published in such journals as Globalisation, Societies and
Education, the McGill Journal of Education and the Journal of Educational
Thought. In the past she has worked with an international education NGO in
Laos, and as a teacher in Canada. Francine holds a PhD from the University of
Toronto/OISE, EdM from the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and BA
from McGill University.
Karen Mundy is an Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair at the

Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto. Her
award-winning research has focused on the politics of international education
assistance in the developing world, educational reform in Africa, the role of civil
society advocacy in educational systems, and the issue of global education in
North American schools. Her recent research, published in more than two dozen
journal articles and chapters and in her ive co-edited volumes, is concentrated
on the evolution of global efforts to ensure ‘education for all’; the role of the
World Bank in education; and civil society activism in Africa. Dr Mundy has
been a consultant for, or carried out sponsored research for, such organiza-
tions as UNICEF, UNESCO, Hewlett Foundation, the World Bank, Mastercard
Foundation, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Open
Society Institute, UNESCO and USAID. She is also the founder and co-chair
of the Canadian Global Campaign for Education, a coalition of NGOs, teach-
ers’ unions and universities committed to advancing education for all.
Su-Ann Oh ([email protected]) is a Visiting Research Fellow at the

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, conducting research on
conlict, education, forced migration, exclusion and identity, and the every-
day experiences of displaced children. She is a co-founder of Room to Grow
Foundation (roomtogrowfoundation.org), a registered charity based on the
Thai-Burmese border which provides basic necessities to migrant and refugee
children living in camps and in migrant areas.
Harry Anthony Patrinos is Lead Education Economist at the World Bank.

He specializes in all areas of education, especially school-based management,
demand-side inancing and public private partnerships. He managed education
lending operations and analytical work programmes in Argentina, Colombia and
Mexico, as well as a regional research project on the socio-economic status of
Latin America’s Indigenous Peoples, published as Indigenous Peoples, Poverty
and Human Development in Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan 2006). More
recently he led an effort to benchmarking education policies around the world.
He is one of the main authors of the reports, Making Schools Work (2011),

Contributors xi
The Role and Impact of Public-Private Partnerships in Education (2009), and

Decentralized Decision-Making in Education (2009). Mr Patrinos has many
publications in the academic and policy literature, with more than 40 journal
articles. He has worked in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and North
America. He previously worked as an economist at the Economic Council of
Canada, and received a doctorate from the University of Sussex.
Susan L. Robertson is currently Professor of Sociology of Education,

University of Bristol, UK. She is Director of the Centre for Globalisation,
Education and Societies, as well as founding editor of the journal, Globalisation,
Societies and Education. Susan has published widely on the globalization,
regionalization and localization of education policy and practice, and the
governance of education systems. She has a long-standing interest in the state
and transformations of state power.
Maria Ron-Balsera is pursuing a PhD in Human Development at the Education

and Capabilities School at Bielefeld University. She has experience on policy
research and analysis with the Global Campaign for Education; has worked as
project oficer for the Right to Education Project; and produced a portal on the
justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights for and the Latin American
Campaign for the Right to Education. Maria was awarded a Marie Curie Eduwel
Early Stage Researcher for her current PhD and the Berkeley-Tulane Fellowship
for the Great Lakes, African Division at Human Rights Watch. She holds an LL.M
in Human Rights from Carlos III de Madrid University and an MSC Human Rights
from the London School of Economics and Political Sciences. She has written
articles on how the human capital discourse and education for girls, orphans and
vulnerable children in Rwanda (Journal of International Development), and on
the use of human rights indicators for advancing the education of Roma children
in Slovakia for the Education For All Global Monitoring Report.
Pauline Rose is currently Director of the EFA Global Monitoring Report

based at UNESCO in Paris. Before joining the GMR, Pauline was Reader in
International Education at the University of Sussex. The research on which
this chapter is based draws on her previous work undertaken as part of the
Non-Governmental Public Action Programme funded by the Economic and
Social Research Council under Project Number RES-155-25-0045, and for
the Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity
(CREATE http://www.create-rpc.org). Pauline has worked on a number of large
collaborative research programmes in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. She
has published extensively on issues that critically examine educational policy
and practice, including in relation to inequality, non-state provision, inancing
and governance, democratization, and the role of international aid.

xii Public private partnerships in education
Prachi Srivastava is currently Associate Professor at the School for

International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada.
She obtained her doctorate from the University of Oxford in 2005, and was
previously ESRC Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Oxford, and
Lecturer at the Centre for International Education, University of Sussex.
Prachi has published widely on issues of education and international develop-
ment, and was one of the irst researchers to undertake original empirical work
on low-fee schooling in India where she has conducted research for nearly
a decade. She has published more than two dozen contributions in the areas
of private non-state actors in education and development; private education;
education governance and reform in developing and conlict-affected coun-
tries; and international education policy discourse. She has provided expertise
and consulted for a number of international organizations including CIDA,
UNESCO, and the Open Society Institute.
Justin van Fleet is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Universal

Education. His research focuses on education in developing countries, particu-
larly the role of private sector philanthropy in inancing education systems and
the dynamics inluencing public private partnerships. Van Fleet graduated with
a PhD from the University of Maryland in international education policy and
holds a Masters degree from Harvard University in the same ield. His disserta-
tion mapped the magnitude, focus and motivations of the US corporate sector’s
philanthropic investment in education in developing countries. Prior to join-
ing Brookings, van Fleet founded an international education and development
consulting irm based in Washington, DC. Some of his clients have included
the Clinton Global Initiative University, MasterCard Foundation, Jolie-Pitt
Foundation, Teach For America, US Global Campaign for Education, and the
University of Pretoria in South Africa.
Antoni Verger is a ‘Ramon y Cajal’ researcher at the Department of Sociology

of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and a research fellow at the
Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR) of the University
of Amsterdam. His PhD research on the international liberalization of higher
education has been published in the book WTO/GATS and the Global Politics
of Higher Education (Routledge 2010). His main areas of expertise are, on
the one hand, global education policy and international development, with a
focus on the role of international organizations and transnational civil society
networks and, on the other hand, education privatization and quasi-markets
in education. He has published extensively on these topics in international
journals such as Comparative Education Review, Globalization Societies and
Education, British Journal of Sociology of Education, Revista de Educación
and Journal of Education Policy.

Acknowledgements
The editors would like to thank all of the authors for their contributions,
engagement and encouragement throughout this important project. It has been
a slower journey to inal publication than we might have wanted. That said,
rather than diminishing in importance, the issues that this collection raises
and engages with are more pressing today. We also especially want to thank
the IS Academie Education and Development programme at the University of
Amsterdam, the Netherlands – and particularly the support of Dr Mario Novelli.
This programme also provided much needed time and space for reading and
writing for one of us, Susan Robertson, with a funded four-month Fellowship
in 2008. This fed into a symposium titled Public Private Partnerships in
Education: New Actors and Modes of Education Governance in a Globalized
World in 2009 under the auspices of the IS Academie programme. Many of the
papers in this volume were irst aired at this event. However, we would like to
thank Elsevier for their permission to reprint the chapter by Prachi Srivastava
and Su-Ann Oh’s titled ‘Private foundations, philanthropy, and partnership
in education and development: Mapping the terrain’ which irst appeared in
the International Journal of Educational Development, 2010, Volume 30,
pp. 460–71. We would like to acknowledge the great support from Alex Pettifer
and Jennifer Wilcox at Edward Elgar in bringing this project to fruition as a
book. Finally, we are deeply grateful to our own institutions for their support.
xiii

Abbreviations
AA ActionAid
AED Academy for Educational Development
ANCEFA Africa Network Campaign on Education for All
ASPBAE Asia South Paciic Association for Basic and Adult Education
AusAID Australian Overseas Aid Program
BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CBO Community Based Organization
CEF Commonwealth Education Fund
CLADE Latin American Campaign to the Right to Education
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
CSTP Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DECPG International Finance Team Development Prospects Group
DEG German Private Sector Development Organization
DfID British Department for International Development
EFA Education for All
EU European Union
FyA Fe y Alegría
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCE Global Campaign for Education
GMR Global Monitoring Report
GNI Gross National Income
GPI Gender Parity Index
HDI Human Development Index
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICESCR International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IDA International Development Association
IEA Institute of Economic Affairs
IEG Independent Evaluation Group
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFI International Financial Institution
xiv

Abbreviations xv
IMF International Monetary Fund

KP Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
LDC Less Developed Country
LFP Low-fee Private
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MFN Most Favored Nation
MOU Memoranda of Understanding
MPCP Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
MSPE Multi-Stakeholder Partnership in Education
NFE Non Formal Education
NGO Non Governmental Organization
ODA Overseas Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PANEL Participation, Accountability, Non Discrimination and Link with
the Law model
PFI Private Finance Initiative
PiL Partners in Learning
PIPs Private School Implementation Partners
PPP Public Private Partnership
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTA Parent Teacher Association
RBA Rights Based Approach
RTA Regional Trade Agreement
SDC Swiss Agency of Development and Cooperation
SES Socio-Economic Status
SME Small and Medium Sized Enterprise
STEM Science Technology Engineering and Math Education
SWAP Sector-Wide Approach
TCO Total Cost of Ownership
TNC Transnational Corporation
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientiic and Cultural Organization
UPE Universal Primary Education
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UT Uttar Pradesh
WB World Bank
WEF World Economic Forum
WTO World Trade Organization

1. An introduction to public private
partnerships and education governance
Susan L. Robertson, Karen Mundy, Antoni
Verger and Francine Menashy
n the ield of international development, different decades seem to usher in new

champions of change: the developmental state in the 1 0s and 1 0s; free market
forces and non-governmental organizations (N Os) in the 1 0s and 1 0s. The
new millennium has offered up a hybrid variant of public-private partnerships
(PPPs) partnership has become a mobilising term implying all manner of desir-
able objectives can be achieved. (Utting and ammit 200 , p. 1)
NTRODUCT ON
Over the past two decades, signiicant changes in the governance of education
systems have been put into place as international institutions, governments,
irms, philanthropies and consultants have promoted more hybrid partner-
ship arrangements, involving new combinations of state and non-state actors
engaged in a range of activities within the education sector. These newer forms
of education governance often operate across scales, through interactions
between local, regional and national governments and intergovernmental orga-
nizations, and between these and national and transnationally conigured proit
irms, philanthropists, N Os and religious organizations.
A wide range of terms have now emerged to capture these developments,
though arguably in the international community it is the term Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs) that has been globalized and acquired iconic status. At the
broadest level, PPPs can be deined as cooperative institutional arrangements
between public and private sector actors’, or more elaborately as coop-
eration of some sort of durability between public and private actors, in which
they jointly develop products and services and share risks, costs and resources
which are connected with these products’ (Hodge, reave and Boardman
2010, p. ).
Based largely on papers presented at a symposium held in 200 at the
University of Amsterdam,1 this volume brings together both academics and
001-018 Ch1.indd 1 24/05/2012 15:19

2 Public private partnerships in education
researchers from a variety of international organizations and aid agencies to

explore the complexities of PPPs as a resurgent, hybrid mode of educational
governance that operates across scales, from the community to the global.
The volume’s authors draw from different disciplines (economics, sociol-
ogy, political science and comparative education, among others); they look at
different types of partnership arrangements; and take different positions about
the value of PPPs. An initial section of the book contains chapters exploring
how PPPs, as a policy idea, have been constructed in transnational agendas for
educational development and circulated globally. A second group of chapters
looks at the role played by a new generation of multilateral and transnational
private sector actors (including the World Trade Organization, the nternational
Financial Corporation, transnational corporations, venture philanthropies and
international nongovernmental organizations). n a inal section are chapters
exploring the role and implications of PPPs in developing countries, providing
arguments both for, and against, an expanding reliance on PPPs in national
educational systems.
Before turning to these chapters, this introduction provides a brief overview
of the origins, evolution and conceptual debates that frame current research on
PPPs in education. t explores the challenge of deining public and private roles
in education; and by corollary, of conceptualizing PPPs themselves. We review
different ways of understanding the historical resurgence of interest in PPPs
over the last two decades, and discuss some of the leading actors involved in
PPPs at the global level. A review of expanding forms of PPPs at the national
level is offered based on indings from chapters in this volume.
THE RO E OF THE PR VATE AND THE PUB C

N EDUCAT ON
Deining and unpacking the distinction between public and private roles in
education is an indispensible starting point for any conversation about PPPs.
Most educators and a majority of the authors in this volume take for granted
the idea that educational systems are putatively public, precisely because they
play a role in contributing to the public good. et private contributions, from
families, civil society and through the business sectors, have long played an
important role in the development of these putatively public systems.
Differentiating the public sphere from the private has been a target of
debate since Ancient reece (with Plato pondering the two realms), through
the Middle Ages and into the sixteenth century, with political philosophers
including More, ocke and Hobbes struggling with associated deinitional
issues (Mansbridge 1 ). A basic understanding dictates that the private
is contrasted with public to characterize that which lies beyond the states’
001-018 Ch1.indd 2 24/05/2012 15:19

An introduction to public private partnerships and education governance 3
boundaries, such as the market ’ (Starr 1 , p. ). Therefore, any educational

actor or organization that is apart from the State can be deined as private.’
However, in reality this distinction is not so clear-cut. For example, are reli-
gious or community schools that are funded by the public purse to be consid-
ered public or private entities? How does one categorize public schools which
charge fees for enrolment? As Verger and Robertson point out in this volume,
deining what is (and what is not) public education’ is a recurring point of
conceptual dispute in the World Trade Organization (WTO) educational
negotiations. n the context of the Trade in Services Council of the WTO,
Switzerland tried to solve this dispute by stating that private providers who
fulill the education standards ixed by the government can be part of the public
education system (regardless of whether they are national or foreign in origin),
should be considered to be providing a public service’. t is equally opaque in
OECD efforts to monitor private participation in educational systems, where
countries like Canada and the Netherlands, typically described in World Bank
publications as beneiting from large state-aided private education systems, are
presented as having close to 100 per cent enrolment in public sector schools
(OECD, 2010). As Starr concludes: Many things seem to be public and private
at the same time in varying degrees or in different ways. As a result, we quar-
rel endlessly about whether some act or institution is really one or the other’
(1 , p. ).
Education exempliies these quarrels, for it presents a case of a service, or
institution, considered by many to be signiicant in both the public and private
spheres. evin describes the peculiar nature of education’:
t addresses public interests by preparing the young to assume adult roles in which
they can undertake civic responsibilities, embrace a common set of values, partici-
pate in a democratic polity with a given set of rules, and embrace the economic,
political, and social life which constitute the foundation for the nation. All of this is
necessary for an effectively, functioning democracy, economy, and society At the
same time, education must address the private interests of students and their fami-
lies by providing a variety of forms of development which will enhance individual
economic, social, cultural, and political beneits for the individual Embedded in
the same educational experience are outcomes that can contribute to the overall soci-
ety as well as those which can provide private gains to the individual. (2000, p. )
As evin’s comments suggest, even the expectation that private interests

are antithetical to the public good’ raises challenges, because educational
outcomes serve private as well as public interests – and in many ways these
outcomes are inextricably linked through gains in the productivity and civic
eficacy of the individual learner, which in turn contribute to irms, societies
and states. Thus the notion of the public good (and the role of the private in
achieving this) will probably always be, and should be, a contested subject’
(Mansbridge 1 , p. ).
001-018 Ch1.indd 3 24/05/2012 15:19

Public private partnerships in education
Most current classiications of public and private are informed by the disci-
pline of economics, which contrasts the market’ to the state’. To method-
ologically and analytically determine what constitutes a public or private good,
Paul Samuelson’s theory of public goods delineates those goods which are
not adequately provided by the market, basing this distinction on the notions
of non-rivalrousness and non-excludability.2 The normative implication in the
ield of economics is that that the public sector should only take on issues or
services where there is market failure.
However, scholars in other disciplines take a less ixed view of private-public
distinctions, seeing both the state and the market, and therefore the public and
the private, as historical and cultural constructs. The distinction between the
public vs. private is therefore understood as something that has evolved based
on speciic types of exchange relations in human society, and the development
of different social and political orders. From this more culturalist viewpoint,
the construction of public-private distinctions deserves careful interrogation.
For example, as both Fraser and Waring have argued, crystallization of notions
of the public and private spheres have shaped the social and economic roles of
women (Waring 1 ).
ooking beyond conceptualizing the public from the private, the notion
that there is a clearly deined group of private actors who share similar
interests that can be characterized in opposition to the state seems far too
simplistic. nside the category of the private in education, for example,
actors may include households and students (paying fees, demanding qual-
ity), not-for-proit organizations, citizen groups, religious bodies and other
organizations dependent on public funding; as well as for proit businesses,
each with different motives and relationships to the state and to the market.
mportant distinctions exist among these different categories of actors and
the PPP mechanisms they sponsor. et deinitions of PPPs have typically
described private actors as any group that is not’ the State – conlating for-
proit and not-for-proit actors. For many economists, the distinction between
for-proit institutions and nonproit institutions is not salient, because either
type of provider can have a contractual relationship that makes it more
directly responsive to users than government providers of those services.
For others, for-proit provision suggests a conlict of interest with the
public good.
n the context of globalization, the debate about public vs. private roles in
education becomes even more complex. For example, education can be consid-
ered a global public good’, where cross-border and intergenerational impacts
of education are taken into account (Kaul et al. 1 ; Menashy 200 ; 2011).
On the other hand, within an emerging global knowledge economy, education
is also portrayed as essential to individual competitiveness (a private good
accruing to the individual) and to the economic competitiveness of nations,
001-018 Ch1.indd 4 24/05/2012 15:19

regions and cities (a public good accruing at the national and subnational rather
than the global scale).
n discussions about PPPs, one constant appears to be the addition of roles or
weight for the private’. Each of the chapters in this book describes a dimension
of this additionality’. And while the authors tackle deinitional and normative
debates about the public vs. private sphere in education in different ways, all
raise two key governance questions: n new partnerships arrangements, who
wins and who loses? And who has the power to decide?
THE R SE OF PUB C PR VATE PARTNERSH PS

N EDUCAT ON
iven the discussion above, it should not be surprising to ind that the term
public private partnerships’ has a diverse range of meanings and is portrayed
as including many different policy tools and mechanisms of governance. This
has led Hodge and reve (2010) to suggest we should view PPPs as both a
language game’ and a governance arrangement’.
Deined as a shift in governance arrangements’, the rise of the term PPPs can
be traced to the late 1 0s, when its usage began to invoke new or additional
roles for private actors in putatively public spheres of action (Bexell and Morth
2010; Bull and McNeill 200 ; Rosenau 2000; Wettenhall 200 ). This is not to
suggest that the private sector has historically played a minor role in education.
Far from it Around the world, education systems have often included durable
relationships’ between the public and the private sector. From faith-based orga-
nizations and small proprietary schools, to local community organizations and
philanthropies, and to textbook manufacturers, testing bodies and construction
irms – all have been vigorously engaged in a range of educational activities.
et as documented by a multitude of educational researchers and practitioners,
and by authors in this book, the term PPPs has been associated with a sharp
resurgence of interest in, and participation of, new kinds of private actors in
educational governance.
n this volume, chapters by Robertson and Verger, insburg, as well as by
Ron-Balsera and Marphatia, explain this rising interest in private participation
in educational systems by reference to shifts in the global political economy.
They suggest that neoliberal globalization, as captured in pressure to downsize
the state and open public services to greater competition from the domestic and
international private sector (alongside structural adjustment and the growth
of international private sector education service providers), have shaped
the global resurgence of interest in public private partnerships in education.
Draxler takes a somewhat different tack. She argues that the rising inluence
of transnational corporations in the global political economy has increased
001-018 Ch1.indd 5 24/05/2012 15:19

pressure on international organizations to expand PPPs. et these partnership

mechanisms, as argued by Draxler, Srivastava and Oh, Bhanji, and van Fleet in
this volume, often develop without a clear understanding of the driving force
of business interests in such relationships.
The term PPPs can also be understood as a language game’ that is used by
different policy actors to convey their position on the appropriate roles for,
and the comparative advantages of, state vs. private sector roles in education.
Many chapters in this book document the emergence of speciic networks or
partnerships among global policy actors who have acted as advocates for (or
critics of) the expansion of privately provided educational services. As argued
in this volume, the term public private partnerships’ is a semantic umbrella
that can cover quite heterogeneous phenomena, ranging from straight-out
private service provision, to contractually-based service arrangements, to
less formal types of collaboration and partnership between the private sector,
private philanthropic organizations and governments, based on trust and joint
commitment to the common good. While different actors and networks of
actors have found common ground in the term PPPs, when their usage of the
term is unpacked, sharp differences in expectations about lead actors, basic
mechanisms and motivations often emerge.
For example, economists working within international organizations have
typically preferred a more precise and narrow deinition of PPPs – one that is
focused on a contract made by a government with a private service provider
to acquire services of a deined quantity and quality at an agreed price for a
speciied period’ (Patrinos et al. 200 , p. 1; see also the deinition employed
by the FC in Chapter 5 p. 5– ). This type of PPP deinition is utilized by the
World Bank and in Chapter 10 of this volume composed by two economists
from the World Bank. While the educational services in this deinition of PPPs
may include (i) management, maintenance and support services; (ii) operation
services (such as pure management); and (iii) infrastructure; the focus is primar-
ily on those PPPs where the government guides policy and provides inancing
while the private sector delivers education services to students. Such a deini-
tion shares similarities with the one utilized by the OECD, which deines PPPs
as an agreement between government and a private partner(s) (that may
include the operators and inanciers) according to which the private partner(s)
deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of
government are aligned with the proit objectives of the private partners(s) and
where the effectiveness of alignment depends on a suficient transfer of risk to
the private partner(s)’ (OECD 200 , p. 1 ).
n contrast to the language of direct contracts between national governments
and private sector service providers, a softer and more encompassing notion of
PPPs sees them as joint initiatives between private, philanthropic and public
sector actors aimed at achieving the public good. Here we come closer to the
001-018 Ch1.indd 6 24/05/2012 15:19

An introduction to public private partnerships and education governance
term multistakeholder partnerships’ utilized by the United Nations and by

Draxler in this volume. n this deinition, PPPs are characterized by the
pooling and managing of resources, as well as the mobilization of competences
and commitments by public business and civil society partners to contribute to
the expansion and quality of education’ (200 , p. 1 ).
Such a conception of PPPs is much closer to that of Rosenau (2000), where
the idea of partnership is less driven by a formal contract for speciic services,
and more by the view that the pooling of different resources and competencies
can contribute to better quality outcomes in education. n this looser deinition
of public private partnerships, arrangements can vary tremendously based on a
number of factors. For instance, who are the actors involved? s there a lead’
actor, or coordination between actors? What are the motivations behind the
partnerships? At what scale does the partnership operate?
OBA PPP N T AT VES AND MECHAN SMS

N EDUCAT ON
enerally, on a global scale, PPPs have been framed using the softer and more
encompassing deinition above, focusing on shared objectives in achieving the
public good. et as argued by many authors in this volume it is important that
such a rose-tinted’ take on partnerships does not obscure the surprising vari-
ety of PPP mechanisms emerging globally and important questions of power,
motivation, sovereignty, citizenship and social justice that are raised by them.
n this volume several chapters look at how multilateral (intergovernmen-
tal) organizations act as advocates or critics of policies encouraging a more
robust role for the private sector in education. Organizations within the United
Nations have tended to take a positive, though cautious, approach to PPPs; one
that aims to leverage the strengths and resources available from corporations,
whilst privileging public sector delivery of services. For example, UNESCO –
the UN body with an educational mandate – has advocated publicly-provided
educational services, while also promoting special initiatives to improve
schooling that utilize funding and technical or business know-how from
the private sector. Another example, described by Bhanji, is the UN lobal
Compact, which brings together corporate leaders around a set of corporate
social responsibility initiatives (Bhanji 200 ). n education, the Education Fast
Track nitiative is a partnership that includes governance roles for corporate
actors (represented by the World Economic Forum) as well as governments,
intergovernmental organizations and civil society actors committed to acceler-
ating access to basic education.
nternational inancial institutions are a special instance of public private
partnerships. n one sense, they are PPPs in their own right, because they utilize
001-018 Ch1.indd 7 24/05/2012 15:19

publicly collected funds from member governments to raise private inance

that is in turn loaned out to low- and middle-income country governments for
educational reform. n critical international political economy approaches, the
MF and the World Bank are described as setting in place interlocking policy
conditionalities that force governments to enhance the role of the private sector
in the delivery of public services (see chapters by Robertson and Verger and
Ron-Balsera and Marphatia in this volume; see also Alexander 2002; Mehrotra
and Delamonica 2005). According to insburg, bilateral aid agencies, includ-
ing USA D and Df D, have also used funding, technical assistance and
research to advocate for increased private participation in the form of subsidies
and vouchers (Df D 1 ; USA D 200 ; 2011). However, other scholars view
the advocacy of public private partnerships by F s and other oficial donors
as a warranted response to state failure and to the greater eficiencies achiev-
able through such mechanisms (see, for example, Heyneman 200 ; Heyneman
2011; Patrinos et al. 200 ).
n this volume, Mundy and Menashy’s chapter adds to the debate about
F s and PPPs by providing the irst published research on the nternational
Financial Corporation ( FC) and education. The FC is the private sector arm
of the World Bank roup, which uses capital from the World Bank’s members
to invest in private education businesses. The FC also supports the expan-
sion of educational markets by providing technical assistance, research and
advisory services. While Mundy and Menashy question the distributional and
poverty impacts of FC investments, showing how the FC diverges from the
World Bank roup’s overarching poverty mandate, they also suggest that the
notion of the FC and the World Bank strategically combining forces to achieve
an expansion of private provision may be exaggerated.
Verger and Robertson explore another important multilateral actor in educa-
tion PPPs: the World Trade Organization (WTO). Their chapter shows how
the WTO’s eneral Agreement on Trade in Services (the ATS) and the
associated intergovernmental trade negotiations have created global regula-
tory frameworks that are highly conducive to private sector development in
education, gradually opening up national education systems to competition
and potential claims from national and international for-proit providers.
They raise several questions concerning the legal and political implications
of ATS, including the possible impacts of the agreement on public education
and educational global governance. The chapter argues that the most critical
implications for education may arise from the replication of the ATS rules,
principles and procedures in many other trade agreements of a bilateral and
regional scope.
001-018 Ch1.indd 8 24/05/2012 15:19

An introduction to public private partnerships and education governance
OBA PPP N T AT VES ED B CORPORATE ACTORS
This book also highlights a growing variety of global PPPs led and initi-
ated by private sector (corporate) actors. At the global level, private-led PPP
mechanisms include direct corporate contributions to educational institutions;
arms-length corporate philanthropies; as well as for-proit irms that provide
technical, research and testing services, and educational materials.
Over the past two decades, corporations have become steadily more involved
in sponsoring international educational programmes (see Chapters 2, , in this
volume). As ahra Bhanji has documented, the mechanisms used by corpora-
tions and the motivations that drive their engagement in education ranges from
business sustainability to philanthropy (Bhanji 200 ; this volume). n Chapter
, she provides a case study of Microsoft’s Partners in earning programme
(Pi ). Pi blends philanthropy and business sustainability objectives, with
the business marketing division of a corporation providing inance, products,
technical service and training to the public education system. n examining
the Pi programme in two countries, Bhanji shows how two different models
of PPPs are utilized. n South Africa, where there is strong national support
for open-source software and scepticism about the role of private corpora-
tions in public spaces, Microsoft provided free computers and software and
utilized nongovernmental intermediaries to deliver training to educators and
students. n ordan, where Microsoft faced less public sector resistance, it
provided more limited access to free products. t also chose to work primar-
ily through subcontracted private technology irms who provided training
and services.
Chapters by Srivastava and Oh and van Fleet in this volume also explore
the role of foundations and corporate philanthropy as a form of public private
partnership in education. Srivastava and Oh (Chapter ) look broadly at the
evolution of foundation-giving in education, noting in particular the growth of
venture philanthropy’ as a new modality for giving and also citing the recent
rise of Southern corporate foundations in the BR C economies. They note that
while foundations are often used to illustrate the softer, more locally consul-
tative end of the PPP spectrum, very little recent research in fact exists on
the motivations and impact of their educational activities. Van Fleet (Chapter
) studies the growing involvement of US-based corporations in education.
He shows that these companies generally support nonproit initiatives that are
uncoordinated with public sector services and that are focused both geographi-
cally and thematically on direct and indirect business interests. Most inter-
national corporate educational philanthropy dollars are thus concentrated in
the strongest emerging economies and in communities where businesses have
operations. He thus sees little chance that corporate philanthropy will do the
heavy lifting in meeting global EFA challenges.
001-018 Ch1.indd 9 24/05/2012 15:19

Additional chapters in this volume provide insights into several other lead-
ing private sector PPP actors: Bhanji discusses the lobal Education nitiative
of the World Economic Forum, which has a mandate to support PPPs in order to
improve public sector education, while Draxler shows that investment banks,
speciically in Europe, have invested in PPP initiatives. Robertson and Verger
and insburg document the rise of educational consulting organizations, either
for-proit or nonproit. Some consultancies have emerged as strong advocates
of PPPs globally (for example, the Council for British Teachers CfBt and
Academy for Educational Development AED ); while others, such as Deloitte
and Touche, and McKinsey and Company, are noteworthy for the extent to
which their services are subcontracted to perform research and inancial analy-
sis functions formerly the purview of national bureaucracies or international
organizations (see, for example, McKinsey 2010). There is also mention of
international for-proit education service providers that offer distance educa-
tion, tutoring, and school franchises, which are growing rapidly, sometimes
with public funding and support from intergovernmental bodies. However,
very limited research exists on them and their impact (Heyneman 2001; Knight
200 ).
Overall, global PPP initiatives led by the private sector appear to operate
in many different ways, ranging from arms-length support for public educa-
tion systems to direct delivery of private services; from for-proit initiatives to
philanthropic partnerships. No matter what the PPP type, chapters in this book
suggest that the corporate actors play an increasingly important role in shaping
national educational systems and opportunities.
NTERNAT ONA NON OVERNMENTA AND

C V SOC ET -BASED PPPS
Nonproit, secular nongovernmental organizations have for decades promoted

international education programmes, with roots extending even further back to
the growth of internationally focused faith-based charities over many centu-
ries. On the one hand, the work of these organizations has had controversial
implications for public provision of education: their activities have sometimes
not been linked up’ with government planning and services; and have been
accused of substituting for governmental effort. On the other hand, much
research has shown how international nongovernmental organizations have
partnered with communities to provide locally relevant schooling in less devel-
oped and conlict-affected countries (Destefano and Schuch Moore 2010).
n this volume, Ron-Balsera and Marphatia’s chapter details the work of
ActionAid, a major international nongovernmental organization working in
education, which historically provided grants to nonproit schools in order
001-018 Ch1.indd 10 24/05/2012 15:19

to ill gaps in public sector services (see also Archer 2010). Their chapter
explains how this organization shifted its approach to educational development
from providing direct assistance for non-state service providers, to working
with citizens to improve their ability to demand better public services. t also
describes a common (but not universal) stance among international N Os that
oppose the expansion of for-proit schooling and see the future in improved
public sector provision.
Ron-Balsera and Marphatia also briely explore the development of global
level civil society advocacy for expanded access and better quality public
education. Here they pick up on another growing mechanism for public private
partnerships, aimed at aggregating private voices to demand national govern-
ments and intergovernmental organizations to take action to ensure that basic
rights, like the right to education, are universal. A small critical literature on
this phenomenon has grown over the last decade (cf. Mundy and Murphy
2001; Mundy et al. 2010; Verger and Novelli 2012). t represents a very differ-
ent interface between private citizens and the public sphere than most other
PPP mechanisms described in this book.
PPPS AT THE COUNTR EVE
One of the most hotly debated issues in international educational policy today is
the expansion of private sector service provision and PPPs. As seen in chapters
by Robertson and Verger, Ron-Balsera and Marphatia and Barrera-Osorio et
al., among others, assessments of the value of expanded PPPs diverge sharply.
n one camp are those who believe that private providers increase accountabil-
ity, quality and diversity in educational systems, offsetting major weaknesses
in state-administered services, and sometimes releasing public resources for
targeted services to the poorest populations (Chakrabarti and Peterson 200 ;
Fielden and aRocque 200 ; Patrinos et al. 200 ). On the other side of this
debate are those who point out the neutral or even negative effects of PPPs (for
example, school choice and competition between schools) in dimensions such
as students’ achievement (see McEwan and Carnoy 2000; Rouse and Barrow
200 ), eficiency ( evin 2000) and, especially, equity (Alegre and Ferrer 2010;
Fiske and add 2005; uezada et al. 200 ; Reay 200 ; Waslander 2010).
Scholars that are critical or sceptical of PPPs believe that only comprehensive
public systems of education are likely to reach out to remote and disadvan-
taged populations (cf. ewin 200 ). n this camp are also those who are deeply
suspicious of the proit motive in the delivery of public services.
On the surface, there does seem to have been a substantial expansion in
private education service provision in many OECD and non-OECD countries.
Barrera-Osorio et al., for example, present evidence that private participation
001-018 Ch1.indd 11 24/05/2012 15:19

in education has increased dramatically over the last two decades across the
world’ (this volume, p. 20 ). t is important, however, to note that such trends
are not uniform. ndeed, in recent OECD data on both OECD and non-OECD
countries, a substantial number of countries show declines in private sector
provision, while the share of public support for private providers has remained
stable for a large number of others. n the developing world, key countries have
seen a reversal in private provision, including ndonesia, Colombia and, most
signiicantly, Brazil, while for many others (South Africa, for instance) growth
in private sector provision has occurred over a very small initial starting point:
from 1 per cent to 2 per cent of enrolment totals (OECD 200 ; 2010).
Furthermore, despite recent arguments about the beneits of enhanced
private provision (cf. Hanushek and Woessman 2010; Woessman 2005), top
country performers in international standardized tests continue to include those
with both signiicant private participation (the Netherlands) and those with
very little (Finland). Research on the impact of expanding participation in
privately operated schools, through vouchers and other forms of contracting to
private providers, show highly varied results (Waslander et al. 2010). Thus, as
Barrera-Osorio, uaqueta and Patrinos (this volume, p. 212) tell us, although
there is some positive evidence on the educational outcomes associated with
public provision of private services, including measures of student achieve-
ment, but is not extensive enough to justify either ignoring PPPs or expanding
them on a large scale’.
Part of this book, entitled The mpact of PPPs in Education: Evidence
from the Field’ presents a range of case studies and reviews of the PPP experi-
ence in less developed countries. t begins with two broadly-based selections
arguing for and against the expansion of PPPs. Chapter 10, by Barrera-Osorio,
uaqueta and Patrinos, leads the section with an overview of research on
private provision of schooling, its advantages, and mechanisms for expand-
ing it. The chapter combines data from a number of countries on voucher
programmes, subsidies, private management contracts and private inanc-
ing initiatives, and argues that private delivery can improve access to disad-
vantaged groups and encourage specialization and quality. n Chapter 11,
Ron-Balsera and Marphatia present a strongly opposing view of the value
of PPPs, based on research evidence and the experiences of ActionAid. The
tensions between human rights approaches to educational development and
PPPs as a policy solution for reaching the poor are amply illustrated in these two
contributions.
Three subsequent chapters explore the PPP experience in speciic countries.
H rm and Rose (Chapter 12) provide an overview of low-fee private schools
( FPS), reviewing evidence on affordability in ndia, Kenya, hana, Nigeria
and Malawi. As well, they discuss the limitations of vouchers in the contexts
of, for instance, Chile and Pakistan. But the main focus of their chapter is
001-018 Ch1.indd 12 24/05/2012 15:19

the costs to families of low-fee private schools. They demonstrate that such
schools cannot reach students from the bottom income quintiles, and docu-
ment parental preference for reform to the public system (over the expansion
of FP) because of long-term challenges to sustainability of individual FPS.
Also highlighted are the challenges that governments might face in administer-
ing voucher schemes, where household level cash transfers might be required
to cover fees. They conclude that it may be preferable to fund the improvement
of the government system, rather than the expansion of FPS.
Fennell’s chapter on girls’ education in Pakistan raises the issue of PPP in
education decontextualized from a gendered reality’. Her chapter focuses on
community perceptions of PPP in the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and
presents evidence that while parents are keen for both their sons and daughters
to beneit from private schools, students are more keen on teaching quality and
regularity within schools, independent of whether they are public or private.
She also inds that the gendered perspective in the way international orga-
nizations conceive PPP programmes is too narrow (usually focused on girls’
school access). Thus, there is a need to embed gender data and evidence within
community contexts, in order to better understand how the provision of educa-
tion by private providers can ensure gender equality.
aimovich’s chapter focuses on the Fe y Alegr a schools, all funded by
country governments but managed by a nonproit religious body. Such schools
can be found across atin America, Spain and – the country of focus for
aimovich – Peru. This is a case of a franchised’ school model. aimovich’s
study suggests that the secret to its success within this model is the provi-
sion (and enthusiastic reception) of intermediate level technical support
to schools focused on helping them align internal processes with improved
outcomes. While the chapter demonstrates the value of PPP that incorporate
school franchise or network type structures, it raises some key issues and chal-
lenges. As aimovich suggests, building capacity within private schools can be
quite varied depending on the organizational culture of the individual schools.
Private schools in well managed and technically advanced franchise networks
have differential abilities to utilize network-level supports. This is a problem
that characterizes most public systems, suggesting an opportunity for mutual
learning across public and private initiatives.
Combined, the country studies in this volume show that assessing the impact
of private sector engagement in education is clearly quite complex. Any eval-
uation of PPP is dependent on a wide range of contextual factors, such as
families’ education preferences, local social norms concerning education and
the role and structure of the private education sector in the territories in ques-
tion. Consequently, these case studies suggest that purely quantitative research
cannot capture the multiple dimensions of PPP impact, and that qualitative
approaches need to be taken more seriously into account.
001-018 Ch1.indd 13 24/05/2012 15:19

CONC US ON
This volume is intended to offer readers a fresh look at the public private part-
nership debate in education, by exploring the complexity and nuances of diverse
types of PPP mechanisms, and their impacts in varied contexts. Chapters in
this volume seek to review the evolution of global policy discourses on PPPs;
unpack the roles of new intergovernmental proponents of PPPs (like the WTO
and the FC); trace the motivation for, and shape of, new forms of corporate
philanthropy; and bring to light intriguing questions about non-state organiza-
tions who increasingly provide educational services in less developed countries.
Each chapter offers a distinctive answer to the question: In new partnerships
arrangements who wins and who loses? And who has the power to decide?
While a wider literature suggests that there are beneits to PPPs – they can
be pro-poor, harness new forms of innovation, tap into community preferences
and needs, and (especially when structured as philanthropies) offer new source
of inancial support for education – the majority of authors in this volume are
rather sceptical of the equity impacts of private sector participation, citing the
associated erosion of citizens’ voice as a contributor to change, and the poten-
tial ways in which PPPs can detract from the status of education as a public
good and a human right.
PPPs are clearly shifting the structures through which educational life
chances are organized and governed. Because of this, there is an urgent need
for both more empirical research, and more open-ended debate engaging advo-
cates and opponents of PPPs as a new arena of educational governance. At
every scale, public private partnership arrangements need greater scrutiny and
understanding, because they are certainly with us to stay.
NOTES
1 The symposium, titled Public-Private Partnerships in Education: New Actors and Modes
of Education overnance in a lobalized World’, was organized in the context of the S
Academie Education and Development’ programme. See: http: educationanddevelopment.
wordpress.com
2 f non-rival, a good’s consumption by one individual cannot be diminished by another indi-
vidual’s use. Therefore, an equal quantity is available to all. When non-excludable, no person
can be excluded from the use of the good or service. A common example of a public good is a
lighthouse, for it is helpful to any number of boats and no boat can be excluded from the use
of a lighthouse ( azier and Touffet 200 ; Kaul, runberg and Stern 1 ; Stiglitz 2000).
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001-018 Ch1.indd 18 24/05/2012 15:19
PART I
The rise of PPPs in education:

history and conceptual debates
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2. Governing education through public
private partnerships
Susan L. Robertson and Antoni Verger
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the globalization and governing of education though
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have generated considerable debate as to
their meaning, purpose, status and outcomes. This debate is particularly heated
in the education sector because of the widely-held view that education is a
complex social and political activity that should remain largely, if not wholly,
in the public sector serving public interests. The rapid expansion of Education
Public Private Partnerships (ePPPs), which increasingly involves private
actors in a range of public sector education activity, including more and more
of the traditional arenas of public education systems – policymaking, educa-
tion provision, inspection, school management (cf. Ball 2007; Bhanji 2008;
Hatcher 2006; Saltman 2010) – therefore deserves close scrutiny.
To some observers, ePPPs are simply a newer, friendlier, face on a longer-
standing ‘privatisation of education’ agenda (Hatcher 2006, p. 602), whilst
others regard ePPPs as an innovative means of inancing education that draws
upon the best of the public and the private with the potential to resolve deep
systemic problems in education systems, such as access, quality and equity
(King 2009). Whatever the veracity of either positions, PPPs are not only ‘…
increasingly professionalized, technical and rational’ (Hodge et al. 2010, p. 3),
they are also part of a rapidly growing corporate industry (Greve 2010). Yet
they remain an enigma, and their status as a contemporary governance practice
in education continues to be controversial.
At the centre of this debate are questions around what PPPs are, and why
they have become a favoured management tool of governments, corpora-
tions and international development agencies. Under the PPP umbrella it is
clear there has been a very rapid expansion of private sector activity in the
public education sector; far greater than had been realized under earlier market
liberalization policies that were launched in the 1980s. Critical though these
new private activities are, they are not the only dimensions of PPPs at issue.
For governing education through PPPs is more than a matter of coordinating
21
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 21 24/05/2012 15:16

education services involving public and private actors. Such governmental

arts, we will be arguing, are central in constituting particular kinds of (market)
citizens (Stoer and Magalhaes 2002), on the one hand, and in the reconstitution
of the education sector (as part of a rapidly growing global education services
industry), on the other.
n order to locate and explain the rise, signiicance and global expansion
of PPPs, we look back briely to the advance of economic liberalism, more
widely referred to as neoliberalism, as an alternative political project in the
1980s, and the subsequent transformations that took place in the organiza-
tion of social, political and economic life. We look particularly at the intro-
duction of neoliberalism (quasi-markets, competition and nascent forms of
privatization) into the education sector, and the opposition and challenges
its key proponents confronted in attempting to reconstruct education so that
it operates according to freer market principles. We then turn to the emer-
gence of ePPPs at the beginning of the millennium, and the promises made
by the idea of partnership. We focus on the role of a key global develop-
ment network in globalizing a particular kind of ePPP, and look at how this
its into a wider project which reconstitutes public education as an educa-
tion services industry to be governed as part of the construction of a market
society. Methodologically we draw on a number of sources of data: second-
ary literature, observations of ePPPs in action, and interviews conducted in
200 –10 with key oficials and experts engaged in promoting or researching
PPPs in the educational ield.
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND THE RESTRUCTURING

OF THE STATE-EDUCATION RELATION
To understand the signiicance of PPPs and the changing relationship between

the public and the private sectors in contemporary education governance, we
need to look back to the early 1970s, to the crisis of the post-war capital-
ist development project (a marriage between economic liberalism and social
democracy) (Harvey 2005; Hobsbawm 1994), and the subsequent introduc-
tion of free market economics as the dominant means of organizing social and
political life. Free market ideas had circulated from the 1930s onward, but had
not been able to secure a toehold in political and policy circles.
Instead, Keynesian ideas dominated post-war reconstruction efforts, cham-
pioning state-managed economic and social policies in order to smooth
over the cycle of booms and busts that characterized capitalist economies
and the need to repair market failures. Neoliberals, in contrast, argued that
state-driven Keynesian policy, and its tendency to create state monopolies,
‘crowded out’ the private sector from those areas where competition would
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Governing education through public private partnerships 23
generate eficiencies, greater risk taking and innovation. For neoliberals, the
appropriate role for the state was to create and preserve an institutional frame-
work that ensured the conditions for enabling the market to work effectively
(Harvey 2005, p. 2).
As neoliberal projects were rolled out in the 1980s, a cluster of key ideas
featured: the unpicking of the state’s protectionist policies to enable the freer
movement of inance, trade and labour across national boundaries (referred
to as deregulation); the implementation of competition policies across the
public and private sectors aimed at creating eficiencies; the privatization of
a range of former state activity; and the rescaling of state activity (involving
a dual process of decentralization and recentralization). The special status of
state activities as ‘public services’ either no longer applied, or else needed to
be radically rethought. Leys (2003, p. 3) remarks: ‘… state institutions were
restructured with three main aims: to make the state serve business interests;
to remodel its internal operations on business lines; and to reduce the govern-
ment’s exposure to political pressure from the electorate’. In policy and devel-
opment circles, this cluster of ideas came to be referred to as the Washington
Consensus (Williamson 1993).
These aims were then translated into new managerial discourses and strate-
gies, leading Hood (1991) to coin the term ‘New Public Management’ (NPM)
to refer to a clustering of elements that included performance targets, active
hands-on management by managers, the speciication of standards and indica-
tors, results-driven allocations, audit, and the outsourcing of a range of activity
that had once been a central part of the public sector. And whilst the outcomes
of neoliberalism as a political project differed somewhat from country to coun-
try, their broad form and the basis of how these interventions were being legiti-
mated did not. Markets and competition, and the role of the private sector in
new and old areas of service delivery (Ball 2007), were presented as ‘in the
national interest’, central to global economic competitiveness, as a means of
arresting poverty and slowing economic growth, and the basis for building
knowledge-based economies.
Yet, while there was considerable talk by the early 1990s that education had
been privatized and commodiied, much of the reform effort in high-income
countries centred on the introduction of competition and choice policies (better
known as quasi-markets) into the governance of education (Chubb and Moe
1988; Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe 1995), rather than straight out privatization
(Dale 1997). In the US and Canada, private interests tended to take the form
of commercialization, such as having exclusive rights to sell soft drinks, or
providing free curriculum materials in order to promote speciic products
(Molnar 2006).
Throughout this period, key international and governmental agencies, the
World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for
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Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) and United States Agency

for International Development (USAID), played an increasingly instrumen-
tal role in advancing free market ideas as the basis for development. In low-
income countries, neoliberal political projects – often referred to as ‘policy
in a suitcase’ – were advanced through the WB/IMF’s Structural Adjustment
Policies (SAPs) (Samoff 1994). This policy repertoire, which included decen-
tralization, privatization, user fees and community inancing, had devastating
consequences not only on the quality and capacity of these education systems,
but on their wider societies, with increased social polarization and greater
levels of inequality (Bonal 2002; Ilon 1994).
The OECD advanced a similar neoliberal agenda – though in this case aimed
at the high-income countries (Rizvi and Lingard 2006) – of devolution, institu-
tional autonomy (as opposed to bureaucratic forms of organization) and paren-
tal choice. And as Rizvi and Lingard (op. cit., p. 255) note:
…the ideology of privatisation, the notion that services are best delivered by the
private sector within a competitive market, has become something of a mantra
within the OECD. It has come to symbolise a new way of looking at public institu-
tions and the role of the state in managing the affairs of its citizens. …It is important
to note, however, [the question is] not whether to privatise, but which of its many
forms of privatisation might best produce the greatest amount of eficiency and
effectiveness.
While the governance turn against the state was advanced by market liberals,
it is important to recognize that hegemonies do not get built out of narrow sets
of interests. Instead, they arise out of the capacity to articulate with a range
of concerns, aligning these with particular kinds of possible solutions – in
this case the market as opposed to the state. Anna Yeatman (1997) argues that
the turn to contractualism that emerged with neoliberalism was a paradoxical
one in that it opened up the possibility of reviewing the basis of the post-war
welfare-state social contract, in particular as the citizen was a white, employed
male, and head of the household. However, as Hirsch (2003, pp. 243–44)
points out, many of the governance concepts that emerged, such as partner-
ships and regulatory networks, to ensure the coordination of services, tend
to reduce democracy to negotiation within civil society between extremely
unequal actors or simply to participatory mobilization. Government gave way
to governance, on the one hand, and the internationalization of the state as
both cause and effect of a fundamental restructuring of class relations, on
the other (Harvey 2005; Hirsch 2003; Sassen 2006). By cause, writers like
Harvey argue, the competition state and its internationalizing tendencies was
the outcome of the successful mobilization of power by the state and particu-
lar fractions of (inance), as well as the liberalization of the state’s policy and
regulatory environment which in turn put pressure on domestic labour unions
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 24 24/05/2012 15:16

(Harvey 2005, pp. 33–34). By effect we mean the reshaping of social class
relations that emerged as a result of these processes, in particular the redistri-
bution of resources upward, to corporate elites, and away from the working
and the middle classes.
A further set of dynamics were also at work in the education sector on
the demand side, as a result of greater competition for more, higher social
status education credentials in order to secure a job in an increasingly glob-
ally competitive labour market. Brown coined two terms that are useful
for our purposes; the ideology of ‘parentocracy’ and the idea of a growing
‘opportunity gap’ (Brown et al. 2002; Brown 2006). By parentocracy, Brown
means ‘…a child’s education is increasingly dependent upon the wealth and
wishes of the parent rather than the ability and efforts of the child’ (Brown
1 0, p. ). The deining feature of an education parentocracy’ is that it is
not the amount of education that is received, but the social basis on which
educational selection is organized. In other words, an education acquired
in a high-status private school, or a highly selective publicly-funded school
(albeit legitimated by policies such as school choice, or the value of ‘low-
fee’ schooling), or a highly selective university, has signiicantly greater
social value than one acquired at a school which is not able to be selective, or
whose basis of selection does not generate status. Brown’s concepts help us
understand why it is that families invest considerable (and growing) amounts
of their resources – money, time, opportunity costs – in choosing particular
kinds of education experiences, institutions, and augmenting experiences to
ensure access to diminishing opportunities in globally competitive econo-
mies. These ‘demands’ drive suppliers to respond, including the state. Brown
(1990, p. 66) argues that as education became more accessible, and more
equitable – the result of expanded state provision, and state policy on equity
of access and outcomes – a third wave in the socio-historical development
of education in advanced western economies has become evident, resulting
in a move away from the ideology of meritocracy to the ideology of ‘paren-
tocracy’. Parents become enrolled in this project – as those responsible for
enabling and realizing their children’s futures. They locate themselves in
the right neighbourhood, particularly if this is the basis of selection, or in
the right social networks. They also spend considerable sums of household
income on purchasing additional status resources or enablers, such as private
tutoring (for instance, in subject disciplines, cultural activity, languages) or
enrolling their children in ‘cram’ schools or other forms of what Bray (2011)
refers to as ‘shadow schooling’.
By the early 1 0s, however, this irst wave of pro-market policies that had
been advanced by governments and international agencies were being called
into question, because of their detrimental consequences for economic and
social development, and as a result of mounting opposition.
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‘PARTNERSHIPS’: MEDIATING OR MAKING

THE MARKET?
‘Partnerships’ emerged in the early 1990s promising to smooth over the damage
done by earlier forms of privatization whilst not abandoning them. Most impor-
tantly, partnerships enabled multiple framings, multiple interests, and multiple
objectives to be realized. (Newman 2001, p. 107)
The rebirth of ‘partnership’ also articulated with wider changes in the ideo-
logical and conceptual landscape of governance; towards a ‘third way’
between the state and the market (such as Blair’s ‘modernizing government’
in the UK (Newman 2001)). ‘Partnerships’ were a corrective to too much
state (Keynesianism), on the one hand, and too little state, on the other (priva-
tization). In acting as a bridge between each sector, partnerships were also
presumed to act as a conduit enabling the values of each partner to be capital-
ized upon:
The public sector draws attention to public interest, stewardship and solidarity
considerations… The private sector is thought to be creative and dynamic, bring-
ing access to inance, knowledge of technologies, managerial eficiency, and entre-
preneurial spirit The not-for-proit organization is strong in areas that require
compassion and commitment to individuals…. (Rosenau 2000, p. 218)
Such views were advanced by writers, like Osborne and Gaebler (1992),
whose inluential book, Reinventing Government, argued that government’s
monopolistic tendencies were no longer useful in a globalized economy (1992,
p. 33). Rather, governments had to learn to understand what they did best
– to ‘lead’ (steering) through setting policy frameworks rather than ‘doing’
(rowing) or providing services, ‘…it helps them insist on accountability for
quality performance: contractors know that they can be let go if their qual-
ity sags; civil servants know they cannot’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, p. 35).
However, Osborne and Gaebler also had in mind a different kind of public
service – a more entrepreneurial one that would ‘…habitually use resources in
new ways to maximize productivity and effectiveness’ (ibid., p. xix). Ball and
Youdell (2007) describe this as privatization in government as distinct from the
privatization of government.
Bovaird (2004, p. 206) points to another source that explains the rising
prominence of partnership; the work of economists, like Oliver Williamson
(1975), on the transaction costs associated with contracting. The high costs of
activities associated with complex contracts, such as designing, letting, moni-
toring and so on, meant an organization would be much better off undertaking
all of these activities within rather than outside the organization, unless rela-
tional contracts built on partnerships and trust could be set up. The strategic
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 26 24/05/2012 15:16

management literature that emerged as a result also laid the basis for the good
governance paradigm that underpins what was now referred to as the Post-
Washington Consensus (cf. Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997).
The good governance approach was critical of the excessive attention
to eficiency as the sole criteria for determining ‘value’ for money, arguing
that a preoccupation with eficiency’ can too quickly lead to actions that
damage reputations, such as unfair employment practices, lack of transpar-
ency, poor quality outputs and so on. A focus on effectiveness asks questions
about outcomes, and the meta-strategies (risk, experimentation) that might be
deployed to realize these outcomes, including opportunities for organizational
experimentation and risk taking to solve so-called ‘wicked problems’.
By the late 1990s, the large international agencies within the UN system,
including the World Bank, together with the OECD, and bilateral aid donors,
such as DFID, USAID and Danida (cf. Kirkemann and Appelquist 2008), had
all started to focus on partnerships, arguing that if countries were going to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals, they would need to advance a
new development paradigm (Martin 2000; Dunning 2006). Partnerships also
featured in the ten principles of the Global Compact launched by UN Director
Koi Annan in 1 (Bull 2010; Cammack 200 ). Under Annan, new emphasis
was placed on the market and entrepreneurship; the result of ideological shifts
in the wider political economy, and as a means of resolving longer-standing
inancial constraints. Argues Bull (2010, p. 1): PPPs were a means to
make corporations pull in the same direction as states and multilateral organ-
isations’. The pioneer among the UN organizations was the UN International
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which from an early point had sought business
funding and collaboration (op. cit., p. 483).
Major corporations were invited to adopt the Global Compact as part of their
social responsibility commitments, in cooperation with the UN (Bull 2010). In
2004, the UN had launched its PPP programme (Bull and McNeil 2007). And
while these partnerships had multiple purposes, they shared the same common
goal: to combine the efforts of states, multilateral organizations and the private
sector (such as the for-proits and N Os), in pursuit of commonly accepted
goals. In doing so, Bull and McNeil (2007, p. 1) argue, PPPs, albeit unevenly,
have transformed the multilateral system.
Whilst there are many different forms of ePPPs (see Chapter 1) ranging from
the construction, management and maintenance of infrastructure to resource
mobilization, advocacy, policy and the provision of services and operations
(Ball 2007, p. 43; Bull 2010, p. 484), they broadly share a common founda-
tion in a set of programmatic ideas that represent a continuation, rather than
a moderation, of economic liberalism. Linder (2000) also makes this argu-
ment when reviewing PPPs in the US context (see also Ginsburg in this book);
that although there are multiple meanings, or grammars, of partnership (as
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 27 24/05/2012 15:16

management reform, problem conversion, moral regeneration and so on), their

ideological referent points are an articulation of neoliberalism and neocon-
servativism. And whilst these two referent points are distinct – they have in
common a dislike of the state (for neoliberals it is because the state is inef-
icient; for neoconservatives it is because the state is perpetually overburdened
by demands made by the undeserving).
The idea of partnerships, therefore, appears to act as a useful portmanteau,
not just for bringing together different actors and therefore different constituen-
cies and kinds of expertise, but for brokering in, rather than mitigating or medi-
ating, privatization in, and of, education. In making this distinction, we agree
with Ball’s (2007, p. 13) point; that privatization typically involves a variety of
processes, and for this reason it is more appropriate to think about privatizations.
GLOBALIZING EPPP: POLICY ENTREPRENEURS AND

THE MAKING OF A MARKET SOCIETY
The rise of a global discourse on ePPPs has been particularly pronounced in

the education for development domain. This raises the question of how ideas
are articulated and represented. In this section we examine the role of a small
group of policy entrepreneurs and education experts who have played a central
role in promoting a particular version of ePPPs globally, through it is impor-
tant to note that we are not arguing that they have necessarily been effective in
materializing and embedding these ideas in a wide range of national settings
(see Mundy and Menashy in this volume and their argument that the IFC’s
ePPP portfolio has had relatively little impact).
This small network of policy entrepreneurs and education experts are located
at the interstices of a select range of international organizations, transnational
education consultancy irms and global universities (such as the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank [ADB], the International Finance Corporation
[IFC], the Centre for British Teachers [CfBT], and more recently Harvard
University), have been responsible for promoting the idea of ePPPs within the
wider development domain.1
In the 1990s, representatives of these organizations came together in the
World Bank Economics of Education Thematic Group and opened a research
and discussion line on private and alternative forms of education provision,
initially with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa.2 As a World Bank oficial acknowl-
edged, they started thinking about partnerships in education as an evolution of
the privatization agenda. However, he made also clear that their main goal was
not privatization, but improving learning outcomes. Thus, in the context of the
Thematic Group, the focus of analysis was to explore to what extent and how
the private sector could contribute to improve education outcomes.
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 28 24/05/2012 15:16

In 2001, the IFC launched a handbook on PPPs in education. The main

authors of this collaboration were Norman LaRocque, then Director of
Corporate Finance at Anderson Consulting Company in New Zealand, James
Tooley, Professor of Education Policy in the UK, and Michael Latham,
Education Advisor to CfBT Education Services, along with Harry Patrinos,
Senior Education Economist with the Bank. These individuals have been key
igures in advancing the PPPs agenda in education more globally.
This network of education experts is behind the most well known publica-
tions, policy-briefs and toolkits on ePPPs, culminating in the widely dissemi-
nated World Bank report The Role and Impact of PPPs in Education released
in 2009 (see Table 2.1). The network is also behind the organization and devel-
opment of a range of events where the ePPP idea has been discussed among
policymakers, donor agencies, international organizations staff and academ-
ics. The network is quite narrow in scope, but very cohesive. As observed in
the publications and events identiied, their members write and speak at each
other’s initiatives (publications, seminars, courses and so on).
A central assumption made by this policy network is that ‘…education
is a consumer good, and that the student is the principal consumer through
parents’ (IFC 2001, p. 1). What follows from this assumption is that in
order for parents (and students) to choose, the education sector needs to
Table 2.1 Core documents on ePPP (chronological order)
Organization Year Title Authors

ADB and WB 2000 The New Social Policy Agenda in Y. Wang (editor)
Asia
IFC 2001 Handbook on PPPs and Education N. LaRocque,
J. Tooley and
M. Latham
CfBT 2008 Toolkit on PPPs and Education M. Latham
CfBT 2008 PPPs in basic education. An N. LaRocque
International Review
WB and IFC 2008 The evolving regulatory context J. Fielden and
for private education in emerging N. LaRocque
economies
IFC-Edinvest 2009 Public-Private Partnerships in M. Latham
Education
WB 2009 The Role and impact of PPPs in H. Patrinos,
education F. Barrera-Osorio
and J. Guáqueta
Source: Verger (2012, p. 114).
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 29 24/05/2012 15:16

be organized so that it operates according to the logic of a free market;

this includes information on the nature of the education offered by vari-
ous provider’s including its quality; incentives that ensure the right kind
of performance behaviour; regulatory guarantees to protect the interests of
private investors and ensure fair competition amongst providers; and an
evaluation system that is able to feedback into the information system creat-
ing a virtuous circle (see Figure 2.1).
Source: Verger (2012, p. 119).
Figure 2.1 The Education Market Model
However, for this network of policy entrepreneurs, the role of the state in
the governance of education is important to ensure against market failure, and
to respond to equity concerns. PPPs are therefore the perfect umbrella, for
whilst the underlying purpose and logics for education governance are secured
by having the private sector provide education according to market logics, the
state ensures the enabling policy environment and, most importantly, funding.
As the Bank observes in their major text on PPPs:
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 30 24/05/2012 15:16

government guides policy and provides inancing while the private sector deliv-
ers education services to students. In particular, governments contract out private
providers to supply a speciied service of a deined quantity and quality at an agreed
price for a speciic period of time. These contracts contain rewards and sanctions in
which the private sector shares the inancial risk in the delivery of public services.
(Patrinos et al. 2009, p. 1).
The legitimacy of ePPPs as a tool of governance in education development lies

in its promise to resolve some of the intractable problems facing the development
community. This includes access to quality education, a key part of the Education
for All and Millennium Development Goals agenda, and poverty reduction. Yet,
as the Bretton Woods Project (2010) shows (see also Mundy and Menashy, and
Härmä and Rose in this volume), ePPPs have often not favoured the very poor,
and nor have they (in the case of the IFC) favoured low-income countries.
By also promising to resolve issues of quality through the use of competi-
tion and incentives, and removing the state as the perceived major cause of
poor quality education, these ePPPs are mobilized as signiicant tools in the art
of governing the education sector, including actors within the sector, such as
teachers, parents, students and so on. This version of ePPPs also restructures
the governance of the conditions of teachers’ work, their labour contract, their
incentives and rewards.
A key policy associated with the construction of ePPP consists of the liber-
alization of the education sector. Liberalization is intended to generate a regu-
latory environment conducive to the emergence of a more vibrant private
sector in education and to help private education entrepreneurs to lourish.
Liberalization crystallizes in the removal of regulatory barriers for private
sector development such as the prohibition of foreign-owned private institu-
tions, tariffs to repatriating surpluses coming from education activities, and
limits on the ability of private education institutions – both national and inter-
national – to set tuition fees at market rates and to operate as for-proit entities
(Fielden and LaRocque 2008; Patrinos et al. 2009).
ePPP’s imply the state moving away from direct education provision and
focusing on funding (via vouchers or subsidies), but also on regulation and
evaluation activities. Most ePPP experts consider that the public sector lacks
the accurate incentives to operate services, and that public provision under-
mines competition and affects negatively the quality and the cost of education
services (IFC 2001). However, they do not support the pure marketization or
privatization of education. They consider that the state should keep on regu-
lating and funding education – although preferably through demand funding
formulas. Indeed, regulation is the main tool that states count on to generate
an environment conducive to partnerships generating the expected outcomes
(LaRocque 2008). Moreover, under partnership frameworks, states should
evaluate and control the performance of schools, and reward or punish them
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according to their results. Some also suggest that the state should publish the
school evaluations to allow informed school choice by families. This way,
providing information (for example, developing an effective communication
strategy to inform parents about schools quality) would become a sort of new
state education function under ePPP frameworks.
In this sense, at the implementation level, the ePPP tools and procedures are
very detailed. First, the creation of an autonomous quality education assur-
ance agency is recommended. Among other functions, this agency should
specify the outcomes that schools should achieve, and elaborate upon the
corresponding performance indicators, but without prescribing how they
should be achieved.3 In parallel, a ‘partnerships contracting agency’ should be
formed. This agency would be in charge of managing the dialogue between
the private and the public sector and of creating a system of incentives for the
agents involved in the partnership, in particular the private service providers.
Afterwards, a bidding process for private providers must be organized. This
process should be open, transparent and competitive, and the entry require-
ments for the private providers should be clear. Once the ePPP is at work,
providers may receive higher or lower payments according to their perfor-
mance. In case they underperform, they can be punished with the termination
of the contract (IFC 2001; LaRocque 2008; Patrinos et al. 2009).
ePPP proponents also expect the state to modify its organizational culture
by learning from the private sector at the managerial level. Speciically, they
argue that public sector organizations should take advantage of their participa-
tion in partnership frameworks to learn from the organizational culture, quali-
ties and values of the private sector, such as lexibility, openness to societal
demands, incentives for innovation and eficiency, among others ( FC 2001;
LaRocque 2008).
Despite appearances, the ePPP proponents do not mask an anti-state
discourse or, at least, do not hope to challenge the state authority in education.
According to them, through the partnership process, the state should become
thinner, but actually more powerful. In other words, and paraphrasing the
metaphor of Osborne and Gaebler (1992), the role of the state should focus on
‘steering’ rather than on ‘rowing’ educational services. By getting rid of ‘nitty-
gritty’ responsibilities (as one interviewee described direct education provi-
sion), the state can focus on the strategic control and planning of the education
system. Summing up, ePPPs are not anti-state interventions, but they require
the redeinition of state functions in education. The ePPP proposal looks para-
doxical in this respect. On the one hand, it strongly supports market solutions
in education, but, on the other, state interventionism is seen as crucial to gener-
ate the conditions to make education markets work.
Whilst there are major criticisms that can be levelled at the way in which these
policy entrepreneurs conceptualize education (as a private good/commodity),
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 32 24/05/2012 15:16

frame causes and issues (failing state, lazy teachers, lack of incentives) and use
evidence very selectively (see also Verger 2012 for a discussion of important
aspects of this), for our purpose here, they provide an interesting window on
efforts to promote a particular version of ePPPs. Whilst it is clear this version
of ePPPs is not always the same as PPPs which operate in other contexts, as a
governance frame, PPPs now replace privatization. In our view PPPs is a meta-
narrative that is contributing to the transformation of the education sector,
particularly with regard to the range of private actors and the comcomittant
rise of private authority.
THE RISE OF PRIVATE ACTORS (AND PRIVATE

AUTHORITY) IN MAKING AN EPPPS INDUSTRY
As Stephen Ball has shown (cf. Ball 2007; 2008; 2009), the privatization(s)
of education are complex, multifaceted and interrelated. Importantly, these
processes involve the private sector in all domains of education, from making
policy and brokering in new ideas which further embed the interests of the
private sector, to the colonization of the infrastructures of policy, and their
global extension. Yet as Greve (2010) notes, whilst the literature is full of
evidence on how governments act to promote PPPs, much less is known about
the role of private actors, including corporate organizations, in the development
of PPPs – and the ways in which they not only help rationalize, industrialize
and professionalize this way of governing, but ensure that policy reversals are
increasingly dificult.
A specialist (increasingly corporate) industry has sprung up around PPPs,
particularly in those developed economies who have taken PPPs furthrest
(for instance, Australia, the UK, USA), and one which also services the UN
system (Bull 2010; Greve 2010). This industry, which is increasingly export-
ing its expertise globally, includes a rapidly growing number of private actors,
from foundations, specialist PPP irms, global consultancy irms, banks, local
consultants, think tanks, dedicated websites, rapid response teams and special-
ist law irms, who increasingly act as market-oriented sources of authority
which ‘…establish rules, norms and institutions that guide the behaviour of the
participants, and affect[s] the opportunities available to others’ (Cutler et al.
1999, p. 4). This specialist PPP industry is then part of an emerging education
services industry, that includes an expanding number of education consultants
operating globally, education management organizations, as well as education
foundations and philanthropists engaged in shaping education policy and prac-
tice (Saltman 2010).
The involvement of foundations has been a factor in the rising trend of
PPPs (Bull 2010, p. 479), though the current economic crisis may well curtail
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 33 24/05/2012 15:16

their inluence. The move toward PPPs in the UN system, for instance, has
involved signiicant contributions from foundations (such as the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, United Nations
Foundation), which in turn are often closely related to private businesses.
However, as Bull notes, the nature of the contributions from both foundations
and business varies, and in the case of private companies, inancial contribu-
tions are often at the margin. t is therefore dificult to determine where the
business contributes to the development goals of the UN, and where it simply
seizes new business opportunities. Empirical studies (such as that by Bhanji in
this volume) are important, as they enable us to see the link between contribu-
tions and outcomes.
Foundations are also playing a highly inluential role in education (Saltman
2010). As Scott’s research shows, in the US ‘…they are pouring large sums of
money into education reform, speciically targeting school choice, and priva-
tization expansion’ (Scott 2009, p. 107). These new (and old) philanthropists
function rather like a de facto advocacy coalition in the US, one that aims to
inluence governments and inluential educational leaders’ agendas for change:
competition, standardization, charter schools, vouchers and high stakes test-
ing. They are powerful in that they are key, active, drivers of policymaking,
research and advocacy. However, these newer philanthropists, such as the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation, Microsoft, the Robertson Foundation, the
Donald and Doris Fisher Foundation (Gap Clothing) or the Wal-Mart Family
Foundation, are different to the older philanthropic organizations – such as the
Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundation who all emerged at the beginning
of the twentieth century. These newer ‘venture’ philanthropists, whilst empha-
sizing the improvement of education for poor and minority children, fund
programmes and networks which utilize the language of the market for social
exchanges, and expect aggressive returns on their investment (Scott 2009,
pp. 114–16). Scott points to an important tension in this politics of philanthropy
and advocacy. As she says: ‘Wealth that comes largely from favourable public
policies is now directed into mostly tax-exempt foundations, where trustees
and philanthropists directly shape public policy for the poor without the delib-
erative process that might have been invoked over school reform policies were
that money in the public coffers.’
A small cluster of large, powerful, global management irms also have large
interests in ePPPs. These irms provide expertise on a range of aspects of
education, from undertaking major policy and research work for governments
(following much of this work being outsourced as a result of NPM reforms), to
strategic management and quality assurance. In the UK, for example, KPMG
(2011) is a partner with the City of London Corporation in a recently established
City Academy in 2009. ‘KPMG led the development of the education vision,
supported the development of a best practice approach in the provision of ICT
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 34 24/05/2012 15:16

facilities and back ofice functions, and assisted in the recruitment of excellent
staff to ensure that the values were delivered’ business (KPMG 2011). KPMG
is one of a small number of large companies (such as PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Deloitte and Touche, Grant Thornton, Ernst and Young, McKinsey, the Hay
Group) engaged in PPPs, and who control almost half of the world management
consulting market (Hodge 2006, p. 100; Saint-Martin 1998, p. 329). Together,
these irms have ofices in more than 1 0 countries, spreading out across the
world. Between 1 0 and 200 , the igure rose 00 per cent, from US billion
to US 120 billion in 200 (Hodge 200 , p. ). Estimates for 200 10 are put
at US 1 2 billion. All have major education portfolios. As reve (2010, p. 50 )
states: ‘For sheer expertise in the development of the legal frameworks concern-
ing PPPs and the actual practice on the ground in leading countries, the global
consultancy irms, given their superior knowledge of how PPPs are progressing,
have few rivals.’
Saint-Martin argues that it was not just the rise of NPM that accounts for
this increase. It is also the openness of governments to this kind of exper-
tise (economic knowledge/accounting), and the permeability of the sector to
outside experts: ‘…there is a close relationship between the development of
a given ield of social knowledge – in our case management consultancy –
and the openness of state institutions to the use of that knowledge’ (Saint-
Martin 1998, p. 325). And it is here the development agencies, such as the
World Bank, IFC, Asia Development Bank, along with the corporate consul-
tants, play a critical role in not only shaping the conditions for the delivery of
education, but in constitutionalizing market liberalism in the state’s policy and
regulatory frameworks. The term ‘consultocracy’ is used to describe the power
of consultants in advising government, and in shaping government policy. As
Hodge (2006, p. 99) notes, the concern voiced through this label ‘…is that the
interests of proit-maximising management consultants may become the key
determinants of managerialist policies’. Given that these consultants are, in
some cases, also the lawyers (cf. Lovells and Lee 2009) and auditors (Greve
2010) of PPPs, it is dificult not to conclude that some of these consulting
relationships raise major concerns over conlicts of interest, transparency and
accountability. For instance, Ball (2009, p. 89) shows from his research, not
only did the National Audit Ofice in the UK ind that more than a quarter
of the education consultancy contracts had not been put out to tender by the
Department for Education and Skills, but that its spending on consultants had
quadrupled (from £5 million to £22 million) in three years. Aware of the risks
these kinds of practices present for the ongoing viability of building an educa-
tion services sector governed through the market, the OECD (2008) has sought
to establish the basis of best practice on the management of PPPs, including
how best to run PPP units to ensure best practice in the so-called ‘education
industry’.
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Then there are the vast and rapidly growing array of globalizing education
companies, ranging from education consultants such as Cambridge Education,
education management organizations (for instance, operating charter schools
in the US, or academies in the UK); education corporations like Laureate, Cisco
Systems, deVry, Bridgewater, Edison Schools; and large conglomerate compa-
nies that have major holdings which include ‘education businesses’, such as
Apollo Global. All view the education sector as critical, offering a range of
education services investment potentials, as long as the conditions can be put
into place to realize proit-making (see, for example, Ball 200 ; Hentschke,
Lechuga and Tierney 2010; Saltman 2010). This means being able to pick over
those parts of the sector (testing, tutoring and so on) that will return the greatest
value (see Hentschke 2007, p. 183, for an excellent account).
How might we assess the rapid growth in private actors and their interests
in a sector like education? Cutler’s work on the legal implications of the blur-
ring of the separation between private and public authority is compelling. Not
only does she argue, like Gill (2003), that privileged rights of citizenship and
representation are conferred on corporate capital, but that as the state divests
itself of activity we traditionally associate with the public sector and in the
public interest, we can see an upward trend in the management of national,
regional and global affairs by economic and not state/political actors (Cutler
et al. 1999). Cutler calls this the rise of ‘private authority’; that is when an
individual or organization has decision-making power over a particular issue
(p. 5). In the education sector, the state’s ceding of the power to make decisions
(as to how to frame the regulatory and operational basis of education activity)
to economic actors (such as education corporations, consultant irms, venture
philanthropists), or those who do their bidding and bargaining (such as the
World Bank, the IFC), represents a shift in authority from the public to the
private realm, and from the national to the supranational. This has signiicant
implications for education, for societies and for democracy (Crouch 2011).
A GLOBAL EDUCATION SERVICES SECTOR:

TOWARDS A CRITICAL ACCOUNT
Whilst our concern in this chapter has been to focus upon governing educa-
tion through ePPPs, with particular attention paid to the ways in which global
policy actors and private consultants are reshaping the development domain,
it is evident that as Ball (2007) has shown, there are seismic shifts taking
place in the education sector that warrant detailed research and public discus-
sion. As he notes of the UK: ‘The “reform” of the public service sector is a
massive new proit opportunity for business the outsourcing of education
services is worth at least £1.5 billion a year’ (Ball 2007, pp. 39–40). Yet what
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 36 24/05/2012 15:16

is particularly important here is the way in which a particular conception of

education is being globalized, and governed, and that far from being a mecha-
nism to slow down the rate of economic liberalism, it would seem that ePPPs
have enabled its rapid advance, so that the private sector is now deeply embed-
ded in the heart of the state’s education services at all levels, from policy and
research work to delivering learning in classrooms.
Here we are reminded of Santos’ deinition of globalization, as a process
by which a given entity reaches the globe by enlarging its own ambit, and
by doing so, develops the capacity or the prerogative of naming as “local”
all rival entities’ (Santos 2004, p. 149). Viewing the globalization of public
private partnerships in education in this way, as a localism seeking to become
hegemonic, reminds us that ePPPs have their genesis in a particular place
and time. The globalization of public private partnerships in education is
one (albeit very important) outcome of processes associated with neoliberal
economic globalization: as arising from the increasing porosity of institu-
tional and national boundaries; the collapsing of the divide between the state/
public and other private, non-state actors; and the explosion of the number
of actors and projects operating on, and constitutive of, global and regional
scales. As we can see, these dynamics have resulted in a structural transforma-
tion of the national, as the state internationalizes, and as the global penetrates
the national (Mittelman 2000; Sassen 2006). ePPPs in education are therefore
mechanisms and outcomes that are transforming the sector.
These transformations have major implications for the education-state
social contract, and in particular for education as a complex social good. Such
developments demand strong questions, and robust answers. For instance, who
is engaged in the framing of the problem of education governance, and why
(and by whom) are ePPPs advanced as the solution? What are the effects of
these policies and programmes on education opportunities and outcomes in a
distributional, recognition and relational sense? And, on what basis do differ-
ent kinds of actors (individuals and organizations, public and private, state
and non-state) come to participate, or not, in these initiatives, and how do they
experience the consequences that follow?
Such questions bring to the fore the implications of weakened central control
by government, and how and where concerns over process and output legiti-
macy might be addressed. They also draw our attention to the ways in which
control over epistemic resources (Jayasuriya 2008, p. 4), such as we see with
the international agencies and consultants when they reshape the regulatory
architecture of the state, allow certain actors to determine the nature and form
of the institutional setting through which accounting takes place. A more criti-
cal, process and relational approach to ePPPs raises important issues about the
‘privatizations’ of, and in, the education sector, particularly in the shadow of
private authority (Ball and Youdell 2007; Pattberg 2005). In other words, the
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 37 24/05/2012 15:16

globalization of PPPs, as a tool through which to govern education sectors

and subjects, needs to be closely examined. In relation to the use of ePPPs in
governing the education sector, we need to be wary of viewing partnerships
as simply technical tools. This they are not. EPPPs are fundamentally about
social and economic relations (Weihe 2010); they involve questions of power,
authority, legitimacy, accountability and equality, and not just market-based
choices and eficiency ( ayasuriya 200 ). n relation to the subject, we repeat
Stoer and Magalhaes’ (2002) point; that when the new social contract between
the state and its citizens is mediated through market relations, then it is ‘the
subject as economic consumer’ who is being constituted, and not ‘the subject
who operates in the public/political realm’.
Fraser’s (2005) work on social justice is particularly helpful here. Fraser
develops a three-pronged approach to social justice: redistribution (economic),
recognition (cultural) and representation (political). She starts from the posi-
tion that justice means parity of participation. This requires social arrange-
ments that permit all to participate as peers in social life (Fraser 2005, p. 73).
She remarks:
People can be impeded from full participation by economic structures that deny
them the resources they need in order to interact with others as peers; in that case
they suffer from distributive injustice, or mal-distribution. On the other hand, people
can also be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierar-
chies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing; in that case they suffer
from status inequality, or misrecognition.
Fraser argues for a third dimension of social justice, chiely concerned with
the political – that is representation (p. 74). As she notes, the dynamics asso-
ciated with globalization have challenged the Keynesian-Westphalian frame-
work, raising important questions around the nature of the national state’s
jurisdiction, the decision rules by which it structures contestation, who can
make claims and how such claims are to be adjudicated. In other words,
membership and procedure are fundamental to the political dimensions of
social justice.
So how do PPPs in education fair in social justice terms? Clearly we cannot
make sweeping, or broad, a priori judgments; that is, that in all cases all public
private partnerships are per se a good, bad or neutral policy solution. Much is
dependent on how, and by whom, the key categories – public, private, part-
nership and education – are created, represented and materialized; how they
order social life; how they enable or disable participation in social life; and
how forms of accountability are established. As suggested in this chapter,
the frame adopted by global ePPPs entrepreneurs is based on market-based
logics and forms of accounting, rather than publicly oriented ones, wherein the
only viable mode of recognition is being a consumer, rather than a social and
019-042 Pt1 Ch2.indd 38 24/05/2012 15:16

political subject. This represents an impoverished view of education as social

activity. t also undermines the ability of social subjects to be capable, relex-
ive, actors by deining them primarily as economic agents whose actions are
exclusively framed in relation to markets.
Finally, as Jayasuriya argues (2008), when governance is located in multiple
sites, both the governance of educational PPPs and PPPs as a tool of gover-
nance over the education sector, becomes problematic. Who is the relevant
authority? Who is affected by decisions of various governments, transnational
irms, foundations, international agencies or consultants? From whom should
those affected by decisions seek account? Is the managerial discourse on risk
taking appropriate for the distribution of a public good as education? Does
managerial governance, with its focus on outputs and eficiency, pay sufi-
cient attention to the complexity of education processes? Alternatively, do
stakeholder-driven approaches to education, as we see with Multi-Stakeholder
Partnerships (see Draxler in this volume), have a suficiently broad view of
stakeholders (beyond the contributing organizations) to include publics, and
how are these forms of education partnership made to account to a broader
public beyond the stakeholders? In other words, stakeholder-driven approaches
tend to narrow the deinition of what counts as public. ndeed, are these stake-
holders suficiently knowledgeable about education as a complex social good
to ensure that Arendt’s (1958) sense of the ‘public’, as a space of debate and
contestation, is realized? We hope our chapter has contributed to opening up
this area of inquiry, and provides resources through which to engage others in
a debate on this crucially important topic.
NOTES
1 CfBT is a UK charity that provides a range of education services internationally.
2 James Tooley was initially involved in this network. However, he became a very ‘uncomfort-
able ally’ due to the radicalism of his proposals (Tooley is an advocate of pure privatization
formulas and masks a strong anti-state discourse), but also due to the perceived lack of rigor
of the data sources he uses to build his arguments. As a consequence, he became gradually
displaced from the network.
Decisions about stafing, curriculum, didactic and so forth should be taken by the schools in
the exercise of their autonomy (IFC 2001; LaRocque 2008).
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3. International PPPs in education: New
potential or privatizing public goods?
Alexandra Draxler
‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ – asked Alice.
‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to’ – said the Cat.
‘I don’t much care where’ – said Alice.
‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go’ – said the Cat.
(Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll 1865)
INTRODUCTION
The term ‘partnership’ has joined the fashion vocabulary of development as

the ‘new black’. Versatile, modern-sounding, ready for all occasions, it carries
seductive connotations of innovative solutions and magically-unearthed extra
resources; an exciting and energetic new way of doing things. It seems to
sweep away stodgy notions of inancial assistance programmes implemented
by bureaucratic government entities using cumbersome and ineficient proce-
dures. It replaces them with heady perspectives of actors liberated from the
ineffective yoke of useless constraints and brought together by the common
purpose of doing things more lexibly, rapidly, effectively and economically.1
When public private’ is added as a qualiier, the whole package seems to make
mouths water with the potential of business methods and talents working to
assure an ever more perfect public good.
What exactly is meant by ‘public private partnership’, or by the companion
term ‘multi-stakeholder partnership’, that parses the concept to include a wider
range of actors, notably nongovernmental organizations?2 Even at the deini-
tional stage, conceptual differences arise, and they are not benign. This chapter
highlights these conceptual issues and attempts to provide some markers for
clarifying roles and responsibilities involved in PPPs.
The purpose of this overview is to look at how ideology and corporate
interests, on the one hand, and frustration with obstacles to development, on
the other hand, have helped to deine public private partnerships. From the
perspective that education ought to be treated as a public good, and therefore
a public sector responsibility, this chapter examines some of the potential and
43
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pitfalls of PPPs, and also proposes some avenues of relection concerning the
needed precautions when public entities interact with the private sector in the
conception and delivery of education in developing countries.3
PPPS: A MOVEAB E FEAST
The notion that the private sector can and should be considered a partner in
development emerged from the United States in the 1980s (Mitchell-Weaver
and Manning 1991). In education, the Jomtien Conference (World Conference
on Education for All 1990) that revitalized the push towards Education for
All explicitly mentioned the contribution of the private sector as an element
of progress towards the EFA goals. But it is Agenda 21, produced by the Rio
de Janeiro environmental conference in 1992 (United Nations Environment
Programme 1992), that is widely seen as having been the launch pad for a
global interest in public private partnerships (Martens 2007, p. 13). Largely
under the insistent leadership of the United States, the United Nations for the
irst time sought out the private sector as a full partner in the process of devel-
opment. The plan of action agreed upon in Agenda 21 sets out ways in which to
strengthen the roles of what are called ‘major groups’, including a chapter on
‘Strengthening the Role of Business and Industry’. The text presents business
as a responsible development partner, taking ‘voluntary initiatives’ contrib-
uting to ‘promoting and implementing self-regulations and greater responsi-
bilities in ensuring their activities have minimal impacts on human health and
the environment’, all enhanced by ‘free-market mechanisms’ (United Nations
1992). Since then, the UN system has increasingly embraced public private
partnerships as a positive inluence on development, including through the
Global Compact (United Nations Global Compact 2007), established in 1999
as ‘…a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to align-
ing their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in
the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption’ (United
Nations Global Compact 2011).
Enthusiasm for public private partnerships stems on the one hand from a
perception that governmental and intergovernmental action is possibly too
slow, too ineficient and not cost-effective enough to achieve quality basic
education for all in the developing world. The private sector on the other hand
has a variety of reasons for engaging in partnerships. For instance, corporate
social responsibility is often seen as a necessary activity, encouraged in many
cases by iscal stimulus, while partnership with the public sector can increase
the impact and visibility of corporations’ actions. PPPs also open up useful
market opportunities for corporations, enhance reputation and image, and
provide luid links to governments.
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International PPPs in education 45
What are ‘public private partnerships’ or ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships’?

Some of the largest funders of education development, such as the World
Bank, USA D, DF D and T , use the expression public private partner-
ships’ to cover private provision of public services under contract, co-inancing
of development initiatives, or even private education that receives no govern-
ment subsidy. The World Bank deines all kinds of private sector involvement
in the market’ for education as partnerships: for-proit schools (that operate
as enterprises), religious schools, non-proit schools run by N Os, publicly
funded schools operated by private boards, and community owned schools’
(World Bank 2011). An evaluation of EU and European Investment Bank
projects presents a honed deinition of PPPs as those where the private sector
shares risks (Thomson, Goodwin and Yescombe 2005, p. 3). Other chapters
in this volume include private education supported, tolerated or inanced by
governments in the concept ‘public private partnership’. This includes vouch-
ers, charter schools and the like.
UNESCO and the World Economic Forum prefer to use the expression
multi-stakeholder partnerships’ that are deined as the pooling and managing
of resources, as well as the mobilization of competencies and commitments by
public, business and civil society partners, to contribute to the expansion and
enhanced quality of education’ (Draxler 2008, p. 16).
Notwithstanding my own reservations about the use of the word ‘partner-
ship’ to describe provision of public services by the private sector for proit,
public private partnerships are now very often understood to be arrange-
ments between the public and private sectors for the provision of education,
a conceptualization that some would argue is synonymous with privatization.
These arrangements have a long history, and are generally covered by contrac-
tual agreements whereby funding, responsibilities, oversight and arbitration
are spelled out, more or less successfully. Private education has a distin-
guished history in many countries, and has undeniably contributed a great deal
to expanded access, innovation and diversity among other areas. There is of
course hot debate about how privatization, which is often presented by advo-
cates as broadening choice for parents and learners, may compromise equal
opportunity and therefore not deliver the public good.
When private sector partnership in education development activities is not
of the contractual kind, it is generally a matter of collaboration with large
transnational corporations (often technology companies) as part of their
overall corporate strategy, often a component of a corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) strategy. At the international level, the Global Compact has
established an entirely self-regulated set of principles to which businesses
adhere. Businesses achieve legitimacy by signing up. Since adherence is
based on self-reporting, only public opinion or whistleblowing with clout can
dent the legitimacy. The partnership aspect is the announced commitment of
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business to ten principles concerning human rights, labour, the environment

and anti-corruption.
Using the word ‘partnership’ instead of ‘privatization’ is not entirely inno-
cent: it implies shared objectives and values. Indeed, the somewhat overheated
introduction to the lobal Compact on its home page (and on its Facebook
page) states: ‘Never before have the objectives of the international commu-
nity and the business world been so aligned. Common goals, such as building
markets, combating corruption, safeguarding the environment and ensuring
social inclusion, have resulted in unprecedented partnerships and openness
among business, government, civil society, labour and the United Nations’
(United Nations Global Compact 2011).
The September 200 inancial crisis vividly demonstrated that the interna-
tional inancial and business communities’ aims and goals are not automati-
cally in agreement with those of the international community. While the debate
about the role of deregulation in causing and exacerbating the inancial crisis
is highly ideological, there is little room for challenging the observation that
business is not in charge of ensuring the public good and that only govern-
ment entities can do so. International treaties and agreements (see Box 3.1)
that combat corruption and crime, safeguard the environment, and ensure
social inclusion notably through education, need regulation and supervision.
Mere informal partnerships and ‘openness’ do not mitigate what Jose Carlos
Marques and Peter Utting call ‘the rolling back of certain state functions and
capacities, the residual status accorded to social policy and the disregard for
power imbalances’ (2010, p. 1) that have been taking place in recent years and
that have been highlighted by the inancial crisis.
Thus the vocabulary shift to call private education partnership’ is signii-
cant and, I would argue, can be viewed as a matter of ideology revealed by
terminology. As long as private provision of public services (in particular at
the level of basic or compulsory education) falls under publicly-scrutinized
contractual arrangements, calling it a partnership doesn’t change much. On the
other hand, when ‘partnership’ becomes a way of describing the participation
of the private sector in the public sphere with, nominally, equal partnership and
shared values, the perspective changes. Then the original sense of partnership
– shared effort, risk and beneit – needs to be the standard of measurement.
Furthermore, although it is commonly assumed that the private sector can do
things equally well or better but with fewer resources, this assumption needs
to be tested against reality in each case.
A word is in order here about civil society, as the third arm of ‘public
private’ or multi-stakeholder partnerships. Many international civil society
organizations embrace public private partnerships, and participate in them in
a variety of ways. For example, the Education for All forums organized by
UNESCO have welcomed private sector participants. On the other hand, there
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BOX 3.1: INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS BEARING

ON EDUCATION WITH IMPACT ON PPPS
• International instruments
Dakar Framework for Action
Millennium Development Goals
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
•
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Mechanisms and processes
EFA Global Action Plan (March 2007)
Education for All International Coordination
EFA-Fast Track Initiative
The Paris Declaration
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
•
UN Delivering as One Process
Global frameworks for MSPEs
Global Business Coalition
IFC Edinvest
The Global Compact
World Economic Forum Global Education Initiative
are calls by a few outspoken NGOs for greater accountability in the estab-
lishment and management of PPPs (Education International 2009; Srivastava
2010). Teachers’ trade unions are frequently absent from discussions and
negotiations concerning PPPs or MSPEs, and unions are often not present in
private schools or projects involving public and private sector collaboration
(Education International 2009).
DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND PARTNERSHIPS
Development institutions and their recipient partners have been slowly moving
towards a system of increasing cooperation and collaboration between donors.
The objectives are to reduce the burden for recipients in their dealings with
donors, ensure as far as possible that partners do not engage in contradictory
policies and competing programmes, and focus development efforts where they
can be most effective. This has led to a shift from programme support to budget
and sector support, and from attention on results rather than conditionalities.
With a focus on poverty reduction, and as its corollary, the right to educa-
tion, there has been a conscious effort to try to take aid past the ruling elite to
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reach those who need it most. Processes and mechanisms such as Sector-Wide
Approaches (SWAPs) (Riddell 2007), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs) ( nternational Monetary Fund 2011), the Education for All national
plans, the Fast Track nitiative (Fast Track nitiative 2011), the UN Delivering
as one initiative (United Nations 2007), the Paris Declaration (OECD 2005),
have all been created with the aim of working towards mutually-agreed goals
that have system-wide impact, each providing added value.
All these efforts indicate that there has been a conceptual and opera-
tional shift in international aid and cooperation programmes, to programme
approaches that give preference to project approaches. Conditionality is giving
way to benchmarking and expenditure tracking through medium-term frame-
work planning (World Bank 2010).
PPPs, on the other hand, necessarily work more in project, partial and scat-
tered modes outside of inance ministry budget and expenditure decisions, and
in fact can have the effect of distorting national plans and objectives, notably in
the area of information and communication technology. The ICT elements can
compromise nationwide decisions about selection of hardware and software,
by introducing technologies not compatible with other initiatives, or even lock-
ing countries into a particular platform as a consequence of a pilot programme.
For example, when a prominent mobile phone multinational and several other
international corporations team up with the US government for an educational
and health programme on HIV and AIDS, the partnership acts for good but at
the same time achieves a signiicant market advantage for future development
(The United States’ President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 2010).
Based on agreements between (mostly multinational) corporations and
entities within governments or development institutions, public private part-
nerships can and do develop activities parallel to the mainstream and remain
outside normal accountability and transparency (examples can be found in
Farlam 2005). Thus, there can be contradictions between broad development
aims and partnerships conceived by a small number of actors to achieve some-
what narrow goals. Indeed, in large ICT programmes, there can be budget
conlicts between inancing schemes approved by donors and inance minis-
tries, and the implementation of programmes involving purchase and installa-
tion of computers in classrooms.
n Rwanda, for example, the nonproit One aptop per Child initiative
(Negroponte 2007) is introducing computers into primary schools. The laptops
are purchased by the government, at a unit cost of $200. Total cost of owner-
ship (TCO) is at least twice and up to ten times that. The cost of one laptop
could pay for the training of several teachers, or open up several additional
places in school, or build a number of latrines, or provide notebooks, a black-
board and background materials for several classrooms. These are important
choices.
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PARTNERSHIPS ARE THE SOLUTION. OR ARE THEY?
The heady years of the 1960s and 1970s failed to deliver on some of the funda-
mental development goals of democracy, poverty and universal education. At
the same time, in industrialized countries, with peace and prosperity seemingly
permanently part of the landscape, the perceived beneits of strong govern-
ments that delivered health care, quality education and various forms of social
protection faded in the minds of the public to a great extent (see also Robertson
and Verger in this volume). The notion emerged that less, not more, regula-
tion would lead to more rapidly increasing prosperity, more choice and better
provision of public goods and services. This impression acquired traction with
the help of the private sector and powerful lobbies that became interested in
the market opportunities in lucrative sectors such as energy provision, trans-
portation, water, health and education, for example ( ammit 200 , pp. 55– 2).
The idea that the private sector should become a partner in the provision of
public goods found a ready reception in the light of real inadequacies in access
and quality. The appealing notion of being able to free education from the
conservative inluence of powerful trade unions strengthened the notion that
the private sector had much to add. If this could be the case in the industrial-
ized countries, why would it not be so in the developing world?
Therefore, beginning in the 1 0s and intensiied during the 1 0s onwards,
a signiicant number of bilateral donors and multilateral agencies, among
whom USA D, DF D, the EU (European Commission May 2005), the World
Bank and T (Binder, Palenberg and Witte 200 ), joined in the chorus of
praise for bringing ‘non-state’ actors to the table of discussions about how to
improve education (Altenburg 2005; Binder, Palenberg and Witte 2007, p. 11
et seq.). In the 1990s, international gatherings on education (World Conference
on Education for All 1990) and the environment (United Nations Environment
Programme 1992) began, heralding the opportunities for collaboration with
the private sector. It was at this time that the United Nations established the
‘Global Compact’, aiming to bring businesses into the development process by
public commitment to common goals.
The question here is not one of whether PPPs should exist or whether or
not they can bring added value: that is to say, can private sector provision be
better’ overall or in some speciic areas than the public sector? t is not funda-
mentally in dispute, even among stern critics, that the private sector can have a
very useful role to play in the right circumstances. Other authors in this volume
give hypotheses and examples.
What is at issue is not whether the private sector should be part of the landscape
of universal education. This decision is one that can be made by governments,
under the – one would hope – watchful eye of citizens and voters. However, the
central questions concern the role of governments in building and managing
043-062 Pt1 Ch3.indd 49 24/05/2012 15:19

these partnerships, and the preservation of the public interest and good within
such partnerships. These will govern the future of universal education. In the
end, what counts for public policy is the effectiveness of partnerships in further-
ing the public good (Martens 200 ). As Utting and ammit put it:
Although there has been a rapid scaling-up of partnerships, relatively little is known
about their contribution to basic UN goals associated with inclusive, equitable
and sustainable development. While considerable effort has gone into advocating
partnerships, far less attention has been paid to developing the analytical tools and
capacities needed to adequately assess their development impacts and implications,
and to draw lessons for the way ahead. (2006, p. 1)
If private sector partners are merely trusted to do what is best, some will do
exactly that, some will manipulate the partnership relationship to maximize
proits without regard for social and environmental costs, and others will
merely walk away when unforeseen dificulties arise, leaving the remaining
cost to the public sector.
Furthermore, there is general agreement that partnerships are almost always
more costly of resources, particularly human resources, than single entity
endeavours, simply because of the effort that has to go into managing the part-
nership, foreseeing time and resources for coordination, reporting, monitoring
and evaluation, and so on. Taking this factor into account in weighing options
is very important (McKinsey and Company 2005).
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS
Decades of international negotiation, discussion and agreement have led to

an international framework governing rights and responsibilities concerning
education. The right to education is enshrined in the International Declaration
of Human Rights (United Nations 1948) and reinforced in recent years in all
the Education for All declarations and action plans, as well as the Millennium
Development Goals (United Nations 2000). The responsibilities of govern-
ments to ensure these rights and to be the primary provider of free, quality
basic education for all is hammered home in international declarations, as are
the responsibilities of international organizations. Yet, as 2015 approaches, and
the goal of universal primary education seems nearly as elusive as when it
was irst made oficial by a series of UNESCO ministerial conferences in the
1960s, the articulation of the commitments and the means of achieving them
have become somewhat wobbly, broadening out the notion of responsibilities
and qualifying the roles of governments.
Since the late 1 0s, hopeful references to new inancial resources’ that
will be mobilized, and to ‘partnerships’ that can enlarge the commitment base
043-062 Pt1 Ch3.indd 50 24/05/2012 15:19

and bring the private sector to the decision-making table, have increasingly
peppered agreements, statements and analytical literature on education. The
notion of the private sector as a ‘partner’ in development emerged as a direct
descendent of the structural adjustment policies of the 1970s that took as an
article of faith the virtues of deregulation and privatization, and posited the
imperative need to develop better theoretical and practical models of develop-
ment after two decades of frustration with classical models. The economic
sector, in particular transnational corporations (TNC), have naturally
applauded (and lobbied aggressively in favour of) all measures that lighten
oversight of its actions (ActionAid 200 ). With the World Bank and the MF
at the forefront, and a few OECD member countries enthusiastically joining
in, development assistance has been increasingly described and practised as
an undertaking involving both the public and private (including civil society)
sectors, often in an informal collaboration that is based more on trust than on
explicit rules and regulations (Kell 2003).
What norms and standards prevail in this new nexus? The Global Compact
relies entirely on guidelines, self-reporting and examples of good practice. As
one UN report from a different institutional base puts it:
Far less attention has been focused on critical thinking’ that is concerned with
winners and losers, conlicts of interest, contradictory policy agendas, the politics
of knowledge and institutional reform, imbalances in power relations, the relation-
ship between institutional innovations (of the type associated with partnerships) and
different models or patterns of development, and more transformative development
and governance alternatives.
When the word ‘partnership’ is merely a different term to describe a contrac-

tual relationship between the public and private sectors, it is covered by exist-
ing legal frameworks. Informal collaboration, however appealing, cannot
adequately manage conlicting objectives, ensure transparency and account-
ability, and monitor for matching results to expectations and resources. When
UN agencies enter into collaborative agreements with civil society organiza-
tions, these arrangements are covered by a legal and institutional framework
that has been developed and agreed by its governance structures. Oversight
and transparency are observed, and the procedures are subject to public scru-
tiny. By contrast, UN agency relations with the private sector, following the
lead of the United Nations, are almost always governed by memoranda of
understanding (MOU) that are not subject to prior scrutiny by their govern-
ing bodies and generally not available to the public. When, as is generally the
case, they are not registered with the United Nations, they have no status under
international law.
To take just the UNESCO example, the original partnership agreement with
Microsoft is described in a variety of documents available on UNESCO’s and
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Microsoft’s websites but is not in itself public. By contrast, the establishment

of oficial relations between UNESCO and a nongovernmental organization
has to follow a transparent procedure that involves consultation of the govern-
ing bodies. This is similar throughout the UN system.
It is important to point out that one cannot tax the economic sector with
a lack of attention to the public good. That is neither the structural purpose
nor part of the immediate objectives for which companies are responsible to
shareholders. It is governments and the public sector, ultimately chosen and
controlled by citizens and civil society organizations, that must watch over
the public good, providing the norms and standards to which the private sector
must adhere. The UN system is in a peculiar situation here. In a world riddled
with corrupt, incompetent and failed states, no one can argue with the logic of
attempting to diversify development models. Nevertheless, one of the major
achievements of the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions is to have
achieved international agreement on an impressive array of normative instru-
ments (bearing on education in the case that concerns this chapter) that in
principle protect the public good through rights, responsibilities and controls.
Allowing new arrangements to chip away at these achievements in the name of
innovative collaboration, modern management methods, or conidence in the
virtues of the market, attacks their foundations.
WHAT K NDS OF PARTNERSH PS DOM NATE

IN EDUCATION?
Most experiences of PPP that involve signiicant funds are in sectors other
than education: public services such as health, water, electricity, infrastructure;
general economic sectors in areas such as mining. The majority of education
development partnerships that are not sub-contracting of services or privatiza-
tion (building schools, providing textbooks or charter schools, for example)
are in the ield of technologies. As noted by Bhanji (this volume), companies
in this area have both expertise and interest in helping the emergence of a
technology-savvy generation, through the use of ICT in teaching and learning
and through training young people to use technologies in ways that will make
them employable and productive. UNESCO, for example, has an agreement
with Microsoft that promotes diversity, access, inclusion and exchange of best
practice, communities of practice, and the like. It works with Linux to develop
CT competency certiication. With Microsoft, ntel and Cisco, it has produced
ICT competency standards for teachers. Microsoft’s Chairman for Africa, Dr
Cheikh Diarra, is also a UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador. He announced a
new initiative between Microsoft and UNESCO to create a portal connecting
literacy experts and educators worldwide (Microsoft 2010).
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BOX 3.2: UN PRESS RELEASE SG/SM/8037 AND DEV/2354,

20 NOVEMBER 2001
‘Support from the private sector will be particularly important.

Fortunately, the use of ICT for development is one of the areas
where the long-term interests of the international community,
governments and private business most obviously coincide.
Empowering the poor and the marginalized can unleash vast
creative energies. It can help level the playing ield for entrepre-
neurs and for small- and medium-size businesses. And it can
help expand and create new markets. Private companies can, in
short, do well by doing good.’
These partnerships typically involve development and distribution of

software and electronic educational materials; ICT training for teachers and
students, often linked to corporate certiication programmes; job training; or
nurturing of local companies that work with the education sector. There are
other education partnerships, but the technology partnerships seem the most
obvious its, particularly appealing to both corporations and the public sector,
including development actors.
ADDED VA UE FOR WHOM?
Typical public sector expectations of the beneits of PPPs are (Draxler 200 ,
p. 54):
1. Obtaining additional resources.

2. Getting access to management and implementation expertise.
3. ncreasing economic relevance of education and reaching speciic groups.
4. Innovation and greater diversity of education provision, including
pedagogy.
5. Introduction or improved use of technologies in the learning environment;
6. Cost reductions.
7. Lower accountability compared to contractual arrangements.
The above are areas where business and public interests often converge or
are believed to converge (see Box 3.3), as found by the author in research for
a previous monograph (see Draxler 2008). However, each of these is justi-
ied only if it conforms to the overall public sector obligation to aim to serve
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BOX 3.3: EVALUATION OF PPPS IN PAKISTAN
‘Most PPP programmes remain ad hoc, have little systemic impact

in addressing the fundamental challenges of access, quality or
equity, and because of often being reliant on NGOs or donor funds
rather than the state resources face problems of inancial sustain-
ability. In an atmosphere where state oficials have high distrust
of the NGOs and the private sector and incentives for engaging in
partnership are lawed, the PPPs have limited ability to address
the fundamental challenges of meeting EFA goals… rather ad hoc
efforts can contribute to greater fragmentation of education plan-
ning and enhance regional disparities.’ (Bano 2008)
the whole population with quality education. When PPPs distract from the
achievement of broad education sector goals, or divert resources to pet projects
that are not open to public scrutiny, they can be counterproductive.
Typical corporate expectations (often surprising public sector partners)
relate to the overall health of their business. Corporation objectives are in
general within one of these categories (Draxler 2008, p. 51):
1. Enhanced corporate image.

2. Closeness to public-sector decision-makers in a non-commercial context.
Development of customer loyalty among programme beneiciaries.
3. Market penetration/reduced costs for same.
4. Reduced scrutiny compared to contractual activity.
5. Easy access to information about public sector planning.
Industry has an interest in helping develop a pool of competent and trained

people ready to take up jobs in places where they are active; they can test
new products, as well as ways of training and infrastructural innovations; their
management and marketing expertise is also useful in helping reach speciic
groups with targeted programmes. Intel, Microsoft, Cisco and others have their
own training programmes that operate with or without public sector partner-
ship arrangements.
However, the other side of the coin also needs careful consideration.
Corporations (as distinct from corporate foundations) rarely make large inan-
cial investments in education partnerships. They contribute products, exper-
tise and in-kind services for the most part. While there is some truth in the
optimistic ‘win-win’ view of public private partnerships, one also has to keep
in mind that the fundamental objectives of the public and private sectors are
043-062 Pt1 Ch3.indd 54 24/05/2012 15:19

quite different. As has already been pointed out, only the public sector can be
held responsible for the public good: in a well-functioning society, govern-
ments are elected and answerable to the whole of society, and if they underper-
form, can be voted out of ofice. Corporations are primarily responsible to their
shareholders, who may not, or indeed probably do not, wish for a particular
corporation to put the public good too far ahead of return on investment in
respect of their activities. Nevertheless, both short- and long-term interest of
corporations can be served by their CSR activities, but the CSR activities have
to be perceived as contributing to the health of the company in terms of image,
market penetration and expansion of the customer base (including by positive
name recognition among learners). Product contributions can be costly for the
recipient: total cost of ownership (TCO) of donated equipment is conserva-
tively estimated to be three to ive times more than the value of the equipment
(Vota 200 ), so that the inancial burden on the public authorities can be very
high.
BEYOND IDEOLOGY: WHAT CONSTITUTES SUCCESS?
Private provision of education is older than public education. It continues to

play a signiicant part in education, including basic education in almost all
countries of the world. Under contract, with agreed benchmarks and with trans-
parency in the awarding of contracts and in management, it is a valuable part
of the education landscape. The more recent trend to embrace public private
cooperation in the provision of public services has not been the subject of a
great deal of evaluation. Details about the resources involved are anecdotal,
and impact evaluations scarce. Partnership evaluation tools are generally based
on self-reporting, which is a good method for inding out the level of satisfac-
tion of partners, but not necessarily useful for gathering objective data about
outcomes (Boston Consulting Group 2007, p. 19). Useful statistics are almost
impossible to come by, not least because deinitions of PPP vary so widely.
Private sector partners are often reluctant to give precise igures, or to justify
those they give, citing issues related to competitiveness (not wanting partners
to learn the cost of equipment, software or time) or to the dificulties of putting
igures on in-kind contributions, for example.
Evaluations for the most part are devised towards or after the end of proj-
ects, and therefore cannot easily be measured against initial aims or objectives
(see Box 3.5). A review of available evaluations shows that few are principally
concerned with overall impact on the education system or even the local situ-
ation over time, but are on the whole satisied with short-term goals and satis-
faction of partners (see, for example, German Development Cooperation 2002;
McKinsey & Company 2005; Tomlinson and Macpherson 2007, p. 20). This
043-062 Pt1 Ch3.indd 55 24/05/2012 15:19

does not mean that such projects have no impact at all. Mainly, it means that
tools to evaluate whether bang for bucks has been created are not yet generally
available (see Box 3.4).
The proponents of PPPs have often pointed to the potential for narrowing
the inancing gap. However, in spite of hopes, PPPs seldom provide more
than a small fraction of development assistance spending. There are no reli-
able internationally-gathered statistics, as the OECD Development Assistance
Committee collects information only on lows at market terms inanced out of
private sector resources’ (OECD Development Assistance Committee 2011),
meaning commercial lows. However, an illustrative example is the lobal
Fund to Fight A DS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, set up in 2002 to be a new
mechanism that would be leaner, faster, and more “business oriented”… [and]
meant to add to, not duplicate, existing aid and global health institutions’
(Schocken 200 , p. 1). The lobal Fund does break down commitments and
disbursements. No more than 5 per cent of commitments since its inception are
from private sources, the rest from governmental and intergovernmental ones
( lobal Fund to Fight A DS 2010).
So, if substantial additional funds are not forthcoming through PPPs, then
their virtues must lie elsewhere, through their contribution to solving speciic
BOX 3.4: GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH

SOUTH AFRICA
Identiication of projects is more erratic than systematic. All the

projects are concerned with areas of intervention relevant for
development policy and show a “win-win-situation” for the public
and private sector, but sustainability does not always seem
secured … some of the set objectives seem to be too ambitious.
The dialog between the EA [executing agencies] and private
enterprises during the processes of setting objectives and doing
the planning was not always intensive enough. The objectives
of the private sector are not adequately expressed in the docu-
ments of the EA. The operational quality of the planning docu-
ments is not always satisfactory. The implementation of the
projects is driven especially by the dynamics of the private enter-
prises, which receive too little support from the EA. The internal
steering of the projects by the enterprises is generally quite good,
but there is little external steering by the EA. Monitoring is more
directed towards inputs than towards the impact of the projects.
(OECD 2006)
043-062 Pt1 Ch3.indd 56 24/05/2012 15:19

BOX 3.5: FROM THE FIRST REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON

SECONDARY EDUCATION IN AFRICA 2003
‘There is scant information available on public-private partner-

ships, so there are few web sites that a corporation or school or
ministry of education can access. The absence of widely-known
models, summaries of key experiences and shared lessons
learned makes the start up and monitoring of these partnerships
more challenging.’ (Quoted in McKinsey & Company 2005)
problems or by providing a window of innovation. One of the principal ques-

tions that must be asked about any particular PPP is: what is the aim, and are
the means chosen the most appropriate to reach it? Many PPPs focus mainly
on inputs such as provision of resources or materials, creation of consor-
tia, enhancing capacity of intuitions or local partners and so on. Unproven
or untested assumptions can be made about the pertinence of a particular
approach, such as the beneit of one-on-one computing in schools, without
necessarily offering evidence or seeking to develop it over time. Such experi-
mentation does no harm, provided it is subject to public scrutiny and debate,
to accountability, and to evaluation (including cost-beneit analysis). This
requires a focus on outcomes rather than inputs, and a healthy dose of regula-
tion and accountability.
A focus on outcomes includes (Draxler 2008, p. 16):
1. Deining needs: if it is assumed that better training is needed in a speciic

area in order to provide members of the workforce in a particular region,
then at a minimum it is important to consult the relevant potential employ-
ers, the community leaders and the education professionals; if one is
contemplating providing computers in classrooms, the TCO, the infra-
structure and the alternatives all have to be examined.
2. Deining and clearly articulating aims: what is the partnership intended to
achieve and why was a partnership chosen as a method?
3. Ownership by stakeholders: many innovations, particularly those that are
initiated from outside the education system, are introduced into educa-
tional institutions without adequate consultation and therefore with-
out subsequent support from key personnel. Technology, in particular,
requires an extra commitment of time from teachers and other staff to
acquire competence, to manage implementation and to troubleshoot.
4. Transparency in management and decision-making: partnerships can be
dificult and time-consuming to manage, and transparency can be seen as
043-062 Pt1 Ch3.indd 57 24/05/2012 15:19

adding to this burden; however, the damage done by lack of transparency

is often a factor in the lack of sustainability in projects.
5. Strong regulation and accountability: it is up to the public sector to estab-
lish guidelines and procedure for accountability; PPPs should be subject to
the same processes as public contracts and the same international norms.
6. Sustainability: voluntary partnerships can be fragile, with partners walk-
ing away when the going gets tough; clear deinitions of desired outcomes
and commitments of partners at the outset are one way of ensuring goals
are realistic and met.
CONCLUSION: SOLID POTENTIAL, NO MIRACLES
The premise of this chapter is that public private partnerships have been promoted
as tools for expanding choice, introducing innovation and enhancing resources
for education without suficient analytical work and public debate about the
means required to ensure they meet the hopes pinned on them, or at the very
least do no worse in serving the public good than the public sector acting alone.
Previous sections have pointed to some of the potential pitfalls of PPPs that
include distortion of national priorities, lack of suficient oversight, hidden costs,
no guarantee of sustainability for potentially costly initial investment, inad-
equate attention to equity and equality, and possible distortion of competition.
Regulation and accountability go together. Governments need to ensure that
informal partnerships do not distort national priorities or ly under the radar of
international agreements and national laws. Methods for selecting partners, the
use of explicit guidelines and written agreements about mutual responsibilities
can help iron out the complex process of ensuring that partners are responsive
to their own constituencies (shareholders, voters and so on) and meet their
obligations within partnerships. The public sector has to ensure that partner-
ships avoid conlict or interest by providing competitive advantages to corpo-
rations chosen. It also has to ensure that all partners assume some risk, and that
the entire cost of failure does not fall on the public sector. The latter is hard
to achieve in education, but is very important. PPPs can provide an exciting
laboratory to test new tools and pedagogy, to implement management reform,
to diversify the types of education on offer, and to involve new partners. But
proper planning, clarity about purpose, ensuring equity, care for cost-beneit
and scalability, democratic process, evaluation and sustainability remain the
foundation stones of any serious education initiative. Bypassing them in the
name of lexibility, informality and novelty is to play with the futures of chil-
dren and the people who manage their learning. It has not been the purpose
of this review to take a stand about the success or failure of public private
043-062 Pt1 Ch3.indd 58 24/05/2012 15:19

partnerships, present or future. Rather, this has been an attempt to look at how
PPPs can and should be held up to accepted standards of performance, trans-
parency, equity and rule of law. Many private sector entities see little problem
with these requirements; compliance by all must be assured by both govern-
ments and international organizations.
In the end, experimentation in education is all about seeking better ways
to ensure quality and equality for learners, in practice mainly children and
young people. This experimentation should of course do no harm, and its aim
should be to do good and at the same time increase understanding. Innovation
by deinition takes us into uncharted territory. But its impact is on real people,
individuals, whose lives can be deeply affected for better or worse by experi-
ments. Investing in planning, consultation, monitoring and evaluation are not
a luxury but a duty to them.
NOTES
1 For an analysis of the use of buzzwords to describe the relationship between developing
and developed countries, see A. Cornwall and K. Brock (2005), Beyond Buzzwords
‘Poverty Reduction’, ‘Participation’ and ‘Empowerment’ in Development Policy, Geneva:
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, available at: http://www.unrisd.
org 025 B C005BCCF httpNet TFramePDF?ReadForm parentunid F25D D D2 E
2A1ACC125 0CB002FFA A parentdoctype paper netitpath 025 B C005BCCF
(httpAuxPages) F25D D D2 E2A1ACC125 0CB002FFA A ile cornwall.pdf (accessed
29 July 2011).
2 Public private partnerships are arrangements between public sector entities and private sector
(business) entities. Multi-stakeholder partnerships extend this notion to include nongovern-
mental organizations, community groups and so on. In this text I use the term public private
partnership (PPP) because it is these that are of principal concern in terms of inancing, regula-
tion and transparency.
Public goods are deined as non-rival (meaning that their consumption by one person or group
does not reduce their availability to another person or group) and non-exclusive (meaning
that people cannot be excluded from using them). Examples are street signs, public safety, a
clean environment and increasingly education. I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M.A. Stern (1999),
Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, edited by Inge Kaul,
Copyright© 1999. Used by permission of Oxford University Press, Oxford University
Press, available at: http://www.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/Executive_Summary/executive_
summary.html#introduction (accessed 29 July 2011).
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4. Public private partnerships, neoliberal
globalization and democratization
Mark Ginsburg
INTRODUCTION
n this chapter, briely examine the growing popularity of public private

partnerships (PPPs) prior to identifying critical dimensions for conceptualiz-
ing PPPs, and analysing the reasons for different types of partners to become
involved and the roles they may play. then move to consider the implications
of different forms of PPPs, involving different types of partners, for two related
dynamics, neoliberal globalization and democratization within and between
societies. discuss separately the implications for these dynamics, the former
focusing on the economic dimension and the latter emphasizing the political
dimension of human experience. However, we should remember that these two
dimensions are interrelated. For instance, MacEwan observes how neoliberal
economic policies at local, national and global levels tend to undermine the
possibility for democratic forms of politics:
By removing as much activity as possible from the political realm and by erecting
high barriers between the economic and political realms – in the name of protecting
private property – the neoliberal programme makes democracy in the political realm
of limited relevance to economic affairs, that is, the central material aspects
of people’s lives. Of course, a political process’ does not necessarily mean a
democratic process , but once an activity is removed from the political realm a
democratic process becomes impossible. (2005, p. 172)
INCREASED POPULARITY OF PUBLIC PRIVATE

PARTNERSH PS
The concept and practice of PPPs are not new; indeed, at least from the eigh-
teenth century parts of this concept have been practiced in many countries
around the world’ ( ahya 200 , p. 1; see also Baker and McKenzie 200 ,
p.1; Choe 2002, p. 25 ). However, since the early 1 0s, PPPs have come to
enjoy remarkable acclaim in both oficial and scholarly circles’ ( inder 1 ,
63
063-078 Pt1 Ch4.indd 63 24/05/2012 15:19

p. 5), and have become one of the most popular reforms in public inan-
cial management’ (Michel 200 , p. 1). Moreover, PPPs are increasingly seen by
international development agencies as a positive strategy for delivering services
in the South (Miraftab 200 , p. ; see also D F D 1 ; Fiszbein and owden
1 ; USA D 1 ) and touted as an advantageous way of inancing and deliv-
ering education in developing countries’ (Srivastava Oh 2010, p. 0).
n the context of the United States, for example, PPPs were irst put into
practice, and therefore validated, in the late 1 0s (Choe 2002). However, an
even stronger push for PPPs came in 1 , when the newly-elected Clinton
Administration put technology – and public support of private R D in particu-
lar – at the center of its economic agenda, stating that government can play a
key role in helping private irms develop and proit from innovations ’ (Stiglitz
and Wallsten 1 , p. 5 ).
On a global scale, a number of organizations have adopted the notion of part-
nership both as a concept and programmic tool in reaction to changing priori-
ties and circumstances, including actors ranging from the European Union to
the Canadian Heritage Foundation ( inder 1 , p. 5). As an example of a
bilateral organization, the United States Agency for nternational Development
(USA D) has been working, particularly since the late 1 0s, with partners
such as foundations and nongovernmental organizations (N Os), where these
partners are granted a good deal of control over certain programmes (USA D
200 , p. 15). And in 2001, USA D extended its approach by establishing the
lobal Development Alliance as a new strategic orientation’ and new busi-
ness model for the 21st Century’. This initiative was designed to align public
resources with private capital, expertise and networks to deepen development
impact. T he lobal Development Alliance model of public private alli-
ances welcomed private sector partners as full collaborators in the implemen-
tation, design, and funding of development projects’ (USA D 2011, p. 1).
The World Economic Forum has also been active in facilitating public
private partnerships involving N Os and governments with businesses as part
of its lobal Education nitiative, which aims to utilize the strengths of the
private sector, along with government and civil society, to support education
reform, especially in information and communication. The Forum has estab-
lished a Centre for Public-Private Partnership to promote practical initiatives
to drive more effective action or improve public policy on global and regional
problems ’ (World Economic Forum 200 , pp. 2 –2 , emphasis added; see
also World Economic Forum 2005).
That PPPs have become prominent internationally is also indicated by the
existence of international training and consulting irms, such as the nstitute for
Public-Private Partnerships, nc. ( P ), which focuses on advancing public-
private partnership programs in the environmental (water sanitation and
solid waste), energy, transportation, technology, municipal service, health, and
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Public private partnerships, neoliberal globalization and democratization 65
education sectors’ and serves clients, including national state local govern-
ment agencies, multi- and bilateral development organizations, nongovern-
mental organizations, and private businesses’ ( nstitute for Public-Private
Partnerships, nc. 200 , p. 2, emphasis added).
CONCEPTUA N PPPS AND THE T PES

OF PARTNERS
n their analysis of public private partnerships focusing on education in atin

America, Brady and alisson note that a PPP can be a partnership between busi-
ness and the public sector, but also might involve N Os, civil society members
or donor agencies (200 , p. 15).1 Similarly, Hodge and reve (200 , p. 5 5)
write that PPPs can be loosely deined as cooperative institutional arrange-
ments between public and private sector actors’, but go on to comment that few
people agree on what a PPP actually is’. Miraftab reinforces the latter point:
Discussions of PPPs often use terminology ambiguously without being clear

who is being referred to by the public sector’, the private sector’ For exam-
ple, what kind of private sector is being referred to: small-scale, entrepreneurial
businesses or large local or multinational irms or foundations, charities, nonproit
grassroots groups, and other N Os ? Which tiers of the government make up
the public sector under discussion: national, provincial, and or local? (200 , p. 2,
emphasis added)
Miraftab’s questions can only be answered empirically, through examining

the participants involved in speciic partnerships and then looking for patterns
across partnerships within different sectors, and in different countries and
regions. For instance, the following summary of partnership arrangements
established in recent years focusing on education in Macedonia signals the
complexity of the nature of public-sector’ and private-sector’ partners:
lobal organizations (such as the World Bank, UNDP, and UNESCO) and national
governments (including those of China and the US) have worked with partners such
as AED a private, nonproit organization, to provide equipment, funding, and tech-
nical expertise to support the overnment of Macedonia in its efforts to revital-
ize the education sector and prepare young Macedonians to fully participate in the
global knowledge society ocal, national, and international actors from public
and private sectors have been mobilized to contribute to education in Macedonia.
Nationally, projects attracted the support of the Ministry of Education and
Science , the Ministry of Telecommunications, the Macedonian Civic Education
Centre, MAS T, On.Net, Microsoft Macedonia nternationally, AED secured
partnerships with acclaimed academic institutions, corporations, and foundations,
such as ndiana University, Motorola, Hewlett Packard, Earthwalk Communications,
and Oracle Education Foundation. (AED 200 , pp. 12 and 21)
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Table 4.1 Types and levels of partnering organizations
evel of organization
Type of organization ocal Community National International
Public (government)
Private (for-proit)
Private (nonproit)
Table .1 summarizes the types and levels of organizations that could partici-
pate in public private partnerships, thus providing part of a framework for
examining the structure and functioning of these increasingly popular arrange-
ments. Note that in addition to differentiating between public and private
(for proit as well as nonproit) organizations, we distinguish between local,
national and international organizations. This typology, of course, could be
further elaborated by contrasting the focus (education vs. other sectors) of
government agencies, type of commerce industry pursued by for-proit orga-
nizations, or the institutional base (for example, corporate foundations, reli-
gious-based charities, secular N Os) of nonproit organizations.
REASONS FOR PARTNERSH P AND RO ES

FOR PARTNERS
As in any partnership, the organizational participants in public private part-

nerships are motivated to participate for different reasons and play different
roles in contributing to the accomplishment of partnership goals (Brady and
alisson 200 ). One perspective on PPPs emphasizes that both the public and
private sectors’ needs are satisied more effectively by combining their differ-
ent sets of resources, skills and expertise (for example, see Reinicke and Deng
2000; ahya 200 ). For example, Roseneau (1 , p. 11) notes that
the public sector draws attention to public interest, stewardship and solidarity consid-
erations. The private for proit sector is thought to be creative and dynamic,
bringing access to inance, knowledge of technologies, managerial eficiencies, and
entrepreneurial spirit The not-for-proit (or third sector’) is strong in areas that
require compassion and commitment to individuals However, t oo much can
be made of these differences because the sectors have overlapping traditions.
For example, in the context of charter schools in the US, the inancial, human
and material resources varied on a case-by-case basis (Smith and Wohlstetter
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200 , p. 25 ). Additionally, while funding’ is a major motivation for nonproit

organizations’ involvement in PPPs ( azley and Brudney 200 , p. 1) and
many N Os involved in international development programs are inanced
through funds provided by bilateral and multilateral development agencies,
a number of international and national N Os working in the education
sector have established and maintained their programs using resources gener-
ated in other ways – e.g. charity contributions’ (Miller- randvaux et al.
2002, p. 40).
t is not surprising that (for-proit) private sector irms are at least partly
motivated to participate in PPPs for the funding they obtain directly. Bhanji
(200 ) discusses how such organizations have indirect inancial motives; that
is, securing sectoral and geographic markets globally. What is sometimes
categorized as corporate social responsibility’ and even the philanthropic’
activities of corporate foundations may be seen as driven at least in part by
business performance and proit motives (Martin 2000). However, there may
be situations in which such initiatives are motivated, partly or completely,
on moral or ethical concerns, without having an obvious business or proit
rationale (Waldman and Sully de unque 200 ). For instance, the Program for
Educational Development of Equatorial uinea is a partnership jointly funded
by the (international, private, for-proit) Amerada Hess Oil Company and
the overnment of Equatorial uinea, being implemented by the Ministry of
Education, Science and Sports with technical assistance from the Academy
for Educational Development (AED 200 a). While supporting this national
programme to improve the quality of primary education undoubtedly solidiies
Hess’ relations with the government, this initiative does not have as direct a
beneit for the irm than, for example, a training programme for workers of the
type needed to operate its oil exploration and extraction business.
Thus, rather than postulating that certain types of organizations only have
certain (different) reasons for participating in PPPs or that certain types of
organizations only play certain (different) roles in PPPs, would argue that
these are empirical questions to be posed and answered concerning speciic
PPPs in particular historical and geopolitical contexts. Table .2 is presented to
assist in such investigations. t distinguishes among inancial resources, human
resources and services products, with contrasts also made between contribu-
tors and receivers of each of these as well as between managerial and technical
types of human resources contributed or received.
The typology presented in Table .2 also draws attention to issues of power
and authority in decision-making with respect to goals, strategies, budgets,
personnel and evaluation criteria. Power relations, of course, are informed by
and organized through the use of inancial material and ideological resources,
and can be characterized in terms of power-over’ as well as power-with’
relations (see insburg et al. 1 5).2 The power dimension is not usually
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Table 4.2 Types and levels of involvement of an organization within a PPP
evel of involvement
Type of involvement None ow Medium High
Financial resources
Contributor
Recipient
Human resources
Managerial expertise
Technical expertise
Service or product
Deliverer provider
Consumer user
Decision-making authority
oals
Strategies
Budget
Personnel
Evaluation
highlighted in the literature as a reason for participation in PPPs, perhaps

because the concept of partnership evokes a sense of warm mutuality’; indeed,
their popularity may have as much to do with their feel-good factor as with
what they promised to deliver’ (Cornwall 200 , p. 5).
Nevertheless, the literature does mention issues of power in discussing
the functioning of PPPs and the roles that different organizations play. For
example, ates (200 , p. ) states that a public-private partnership will always
require some form of governance . The question is who has the most
power?’ Furthermore, Brady and alisson (200 , p. ) identify a continuum of
PPPs, ranging from donor-centric’ to partnership-centric’ based on the degree
of power or authority exercised by the (private-sector) donor. One could, of
course, theorize the existence of a government-centric partnership – further to
the right of this continuum – characterizing a situation where the public-sector
partner exercised a great degree of power or authority in relation to various
partnership decisions. Miller- randvaux et al. (2002) also highlight the issue
of power authority in their discussion of government-N O partnerships, stat-
ing that although government personnel often talk about partnerships with
N Os, they believe that the relationship should be government regulating
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Public private partnerships, neoliberal globalization and democratization
N Os’ (p. ). And Patrinos et al. (200 ) focus on a form of PPPs involving
governments contracting out services to private irms.
By combining the typologies in Table .1 and Table .2, we have a frame-
work for identifying the types levels of involvement of different types of local,
national and international organizations that may be involved in a PPP. For
example, in a given PPP one can identify types and levels of involvement of
local N Os, national governments, multinational corporations, and interna-
tional (intergovernmental) organizations: Which organizations are the main
contributors and receivers of inancial resources? Which are the main contribu-
tors of (managerial and technical) human resources? Which have more less
decision-making authority – that is, the technical, inancial and ideological
power to shape the various aspects of the PPP-focused activity?
The previous discussion includes attention to technical, inancial, ideo-
logical and power authority issues, but these issues are addressed internal to
the partnership. n the next two sections, situate these issues within their
broader context by analysing the implications of PPPs for two related dynam-
ics, neoliberal globalization and democratization within and between societies.
PPPS AND NEO BERA OBA AT ON?
Comparative educators and other social scientists have engaged increas-

ingly in debates about globalization’ (Burbules and Torres 2000; Carnoy and
Rhoten 2002; Clayton 200 ; Robertson et al. 2002; Stromquist and Monkman
2000; Tabb 2001). And while world-system or global-level dynamics are by
no means new phenomena, these debates have helped to call attention to the
ways in which economic, political and cultural features of a given society
can be understood as being constituted by global as well as national and local
processes. Here, will focus on the economic dimension, with particular refer-
ence to a neoliberal capitalist version of globalization.
n recent decades neoliberalism as an economic theory and ideology has
been diffused on a global scale, with implications for policy and practice in
a variety of sectors, including education. Neoliberalism promotes a minimal
role for the state and a maximal role for markets in organizing economic life’
(MacEwan 2005, p. 1 2). Neoliberal economic policies, which are framed by
the ideas of the conservative version of neoclassical economics and public
choice theory, call for a series of interrelated reforms: macroeconomic stabil-
ity; cutting back government budgets; privatization of government opera-
tions; ending of tariffs and other forms of protection; facilitating movement
of foreign capital; emphasizing exports; charging user fees for many public
services; and lower worker protection through lexible labor markets’ (Klees
200 , p. 12).
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n his discussion of the ideological forces driving PPPs, Miraftab states that
neoliberals want less of a role for government and more for the private
sector, on the grounds that government is ineficient’ (200 , p. 1; see also inder
1 , p. 1). This rationale can be seen in the notes about PPPs for current or
prospective clients developed by an internationally oriented law irm based in
Mexico: n general terms, a PPP is an agreement between the public sector and
the private sector for the purpose of having the private sector deliver a project or
service traditionally provided by the public sector in the most economically
eficient manner’ (Baker and McKenzie 200 , p. 1; emphasis added).
As mentioned above, PPPs may involve inancial resources being contrib-
uted by the private sector (for-proit or nonproit), and in such cases the impact
of and contribution to neoliberal globalization are less clear. However, it is
more usual for local, national or international intergovernmental organiza-
tions to be the source of funding and the private sector organization to receive
payment in return for services or products delivered. Several authors have
stressed that PPPs are in fact a combination of outsourcing and privatization
(National Council for Public-Private Partnerships 2002, p. ; cited in Monbiot
2000; ates 200 , p. 1).
ndeed, Hodge and reve (200 , pp. 5 – ) argue that:
the language of PPPs see Teisman and Klijn 2002 is a game designed to cloud’
other strategies and purposes. One such purpose is privatization and the encourage-
ment of private providers to supply public services at the expense of public orga-
nizations themselves. Privatization proponent Savas (2000) openly admits in his
book that contracting out’ and privatization’ are expressions that generate opposi-
tion quickly and that expressions such as alternative delivery systems’ and now
public–private partnerships’ can mute such opposition and thus make it easier
for private organizations to get a market share of public service provision.
Similarly, inder (1 , p. 1) claims that PPPs seem to offer a more pallia-

tive, less prickly, form of packaging around the contents of government’s shift-
ing functions to commercial enterprises’. Thus, Miraftab (200 , p. ) refers
to PPPs as a Trojan horse’ that facilitates the process of privatizing govern-
ment responsibilities – and promoting a neoliberal version of globalization
– by disguising the process. nterestingly, however, ates (200 ) claims that
PPPs, rather than being a Trojan horse’ for neoliberal globalization, actu-
ally undermine the free enterprise (for example, capitalist) system: P ublic-
private partnerships really amount to economic control’ (p. 1) by entities not
organized around a proit motive, such as governments, foundations or
nonproit sector entities’ (p. ).
The relationship between PPPs and neoliberal globalization, however, is
not limited to PPPs serving as a Trojan horse’ for privatizing government
responsibilities. Two other aspects are also worth mentioning. First, at least
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until the 200 –0 global economic crisis, neoliberal globalization has often
translated into the downsizing – or at least slowing the growth – of govern-
ment revenues expenditures in both developed wealthier and developing
poorer countries. For example, as a result of Proposition 1 in California and
other neoliberal-inspired referenda to limit governments’ taxing power in the
United States, c ounties, states, and communities have hit the tax wall,
meaning they have no more room to raise taxes. Doing so would either violate
some constitutional or statutory limit, or send people and businesses packing
for friendlier climes’ (National Council for Public-Private Partnerships 2002,
p. ; quoted in ates 200 , p. 2). Similarly, in developing poor countries, limi-
tations of government budgets have been negotiated’ by governments with the
nternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank in conjunction with neolib-
eral-informed structural adjustment programmes (see Miller- randvaux et al.
2002, p. ). These dynamics not only reduce government-funded activity; they
also provide a structural incentive – if not a requirement – to explore more
eficient’ forms of service provision, which (as we have discussed above) is
what proponents claim PPPs deliver. Moreover, as Srivastava and Oh observe,
while wealthier countries have devoted less-than-the-agreed-upon (let alone
needed) funds to overseas development assistance for the education sector,
international development policy discussions have at times stressed the need
for increasing non-state participation (this volume included).
Second, PPPs are viewed by some as a catalyst for attracting foreign invest-
ment, a key element of neoliberal globalization. For example, Baker and
McKenzie (200 , p. 1) describe how t hrough coordinated efforts by the
Ministries of Public Function, Communications and Transportation, Health,
Public Education, and Finance and Public Credit, the Mexican Federal
overnment is attempting to position Mexico as an attractive market for PPP
investors’. And the United States Agency for nternational Development, in its
report subtitled Public-Private Alliances for Transformational Development,
explains that public-private alliances i.e. partnerships can attract foreign
direct investment to developing countries by improving their business climate’
(USA D 200 , p. 1 ). From a different theoretical and ideological perspec-
tive, Bruhl (200 ) argues that such PPPs primarily serve the interests of the
transnational corporations, while promoting neoliberal globalization, because
developing countries – or at least the general population in such societies – do
not have shared interests with transnational irms.
Moreover, Bruhl (200 ) views PPPs as contributing to the privatization of
global political relations, at least with respect to decisions about economic
activity. This serves as a reminder that the economic dynamic of neoliberal
globalization and the political dynamic of democratization are interrelated
(MacEwan 2005), and thus PPPs likely have implications for both dynamics
at the same time.
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PPPS AND DEMOCRAT AT ON?
n the early to mid-1 0s, during a period of popularization of PPPs, some

scholars noted the universal enthusiasm for democracy’ ( iddens 1 ) and a
global resurgence of democracy’ (Diamond and Plattner 1 ), while others
expressed concerns about the vitality of democratic’ institutions in societies
around the world (Elshtain 1 ; asch 1 ). Similarly, proponents and crit-
ics of PPPs offer a different interpretation of how PPPs affect democratization.
For example, W lti et al. (200 , p. 10 ) celebrate how PPPs support demo-
cratic institutions and processes:
T here is little evidence that governance in PPPs tends to uncouple political issues
from traditional arenas of democratic legitimisation and from public debate. While
it is true that governance mechanisms call for secluded bilateral and multilateral
negotiations, they regularly involve decision-makers who are accountable to the
public and subject to parliamentary and or executive control. ( uoted in Skelcher
et al. 2005, p. 5 )
n contrast, PPPs are criticized because they accord responsibility for broader
economic and community interests to the whims of the private sector’ (Choe
2002, p. 25 ) and they tend to be a process dominated by the interest of
the private sector irm(s), which steer while the other actors only row ’
(Miraftab 200 , p. ). According to Rosenau, concerns are expressed about
corporate oficers rather than government oficials steering policymaking and
service delivery because there are lower expectations of the private sector
with regard to democratic considerations (1 , p. 15) and because there
is evidence that partnering can reduce citizen input into the policy process’
(p. 1 ). As Mintzberg (1 , p. ) explains: am not a mere customer of my
government am a citizen, with rights that go far beyond those of customers
or even clients.’
More speciically, Srivastava and Oh (this volume) raise questions about the
implications for democracy for public private partnerships involving private
foundations. They question the often-held assumption that partnerships with
and philanthropy by private foundations, in particular, are ideologically neutral
and procedurally effective and eficient’ (this volume). They argue that private
foundations are not apolitical’ (p. ) but rather are actively involved in
supporting changes that help to maintain and make more eficient an interna-
tional system of power and privilege (Arnove and Pinede 200 , p. ; quoted
in Srivastava and Oh 2010, p. ; see also Edwards, 200 ).
These different appraisals of the impact of PPPs on democratization relect,
in part, different meanings of the term democracy, as well as different concep-
tions of the implied role for citizens within democratic political economies:
public democracy’ vs. privatized democracy’. Public democracy, which
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Public private partnerships, neoliberal globalization and democratization
assumes active forms of citizenship and stems from the ideas of ean- acques
Rousseau, is based on the assumption that the common people are the only
actors who are able to ensure the government remains free from corruption
(Sehr 1 , p. ), and thus their active involvement in governing is essen-
tial. Otherwise the political system would be corrupted by those who would
seek only to preserve their own privileged positions (Heater 1 0, p. 21 ). For
Rousseau (1 2 1 5), it was people’s avid thirst for proits’, their tendency
to pursue private interests at the expense of their participation in public affairs
that constituted a serious threat to the well-being of democratic govern-
ment’ (Sehr 1 , p. 0). n contrast, privatized democracy, which implies
passive forms of citizenship and is based on writings of ohn ocke (1 ,
p. 1 ), is grounded on the belief that
people come together in political society for protection against constant exposure to
the invasion of others’. n this way, people effect the mutual preservation of their
lives, liberties, and estates’, all of which ocke referred to by the general name,
property’. T hese ideas encourage antipathy toward direct democracy’
in part because of fears about the people’s ability to govern themselves , without
threatening established property relations. (Sehr 1 , p. 2; see also Heater 1 0,
pp. 21 –15)
Proponents of PPPs – and those concluding that PPPs contribute positively to

democracy – seem to frame their views in relation to a privatized’ concep-
tion of democracy. This is evidenced not only in their enthusiasm for existing
capitalist property relations’, but also because they see beneits in PPPs oper-
ating at arm’s length to centres of elected political authority’, because this can
offer greater lexibility in decision-processes’ (Skelcher et al. 2005, p. 5 ).
And in discussing why international intergovernmental agencies (referred to as
donors) may prefer to work with N Os rather than with national governments,
Miller- randvaux et al. comment:
D onors beneit by working through N Os. First, it is easier to negotiate with

N Os than with governments. because the political messiness’ of negotiating
with governments is absent. After all, N Os have fewer stakeholders to consider
when engaging in discussions with a donor. N Os can ignore teacher unions, politi-
cal parties, dueling elites, and the public . (2002, p. )
t should be clear from the above statement that avoiding the messiness’ of
negotiating with governments is not just a question of the bureaucratic nature of
government institutions but also the reality that, at least to some extent, demo-
cratic’ governments are more constrained, while at the same time enabled, by
citizens’ ideas and actions – for example, what is at the heart of a public’
conception of democracy. For instance, by working with N Os an interna-
tional organization can limit the need to interact with public sector unions or
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with competing political parties. Nevertheless, Miller- randvaux et al. (2002)

claim that international intergovernmental agencies’ preference for working
with N Os also relects some elements of a public participatory conception
of governance, especially if one questions the extent to which a given nation
exhibits a broad-based participatory democracy: Both donors and international
N Os assume that creating stronger local N Os can strengthen civil society
Donors expect that N Os will foster democracy because they can strengthen
local institutions as civil society actors – enabling them to link horizontally
and vertically into mass movements that will provide organized countervailing
power to the state’ (p. 5 ). However, this point is weakened somewhat in that
Miller- randvaux and colleagues found in their study of PPPs in Ethiopia,
uinea, Malawi and Mali that due to a larger base of resources, international,
not local, N Os are those which often deine the types of N O programmes
that exist at the country level (2001, p. 2).
Those who criticize at least some types of PPPs for undermining democracy
appear to base their assessment on a public’ conception of democracy. For
instance, Skelcher et al. (2005) indicate that PPPs present problems of demo-
cratic governance because they do not accord with the doctrine of the primacy
of politics’ (p. 5 ) and go on to explain:
Our research shows that institutional design for partnership governance is signii-
cantly shaped by the managerialist discourse and its practices, moderated by conso-
ciational and participatory elements. This is shown by the overnance Assessment
data, with partnerships being subject to clear operational and corporate rules
of central control, but also disarticulating’ with notions of deeper democracy.
(Skelcher et al. 2005, p. 5 2)
CONCLUSION
n the above discussion, have suggested a need for careful examination of

PPPs in terms of the types and geopolitical levels of partners that participate,
the motives that drive the participation of different partners, and the kinds of
roles and degree of power exercised by various partners. While PPPs increas-
ingly populate the terrain of activity in education and other sectors interna-
tionally, we should not treat public private partnerships as a homogeneous
phenomenon. There is clearly a need for additional empirical research on the
nature of PPPs, how they vary across sectors, countries and time.
iven the heterogeneity of the concept and practice of PPPs, it is not
surprising that there are different views on the extent to which public private
partnerships contribute or detract from neoliberal globalization and support,
or undermine democratization at local, national and global levels. Such
views, of course, are also informed by how globalization and democratization
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are deined and evaluated. Thus, the research seeking to identify the types of
PPPs functioning in different sectors, countries and time periods could also
focus on the consequences of speciic PPPs in speciic (societal and temporal)
contexts.
n policy discourses and academic literature we ind general exhortations
for and against PPPs. From my perspective, it would be more appropriate to
celebrate or condemn the operation of particular public private partnerships,
depending on how they function, how they are structured, and what implica-
tions they have for neoliberal globalization and democratization.
NOTES
1 While Brady and alisson (200 , p. 1 ) emphasize the growth of public private partnerships
focused on education in atin America, they also report that a comprehensive study on
forms of private sector participation in education in Honduras PREA et al. 2001 found
that half of the 5 companies that invested in education acted independently. Only 12.5
percent coordinated their activities with the Ministry of Education and 2 percent coordinated
with N Os, local community organizations, or international donors.’
2 As Kreisberg (1 2, p. 5) explains, power over’ involves the capacity to get people to do
something, to not do something, or to not even consider doing something such that their action
or inaction is contrary to their interests, while power with’ is manifest in relationships of
co-agency, characterized by people inding ways to satisfy their desires and to fulill their
interests without imposing on one another’.
t is worth remembering that neoliberal capitalism is only one possible framework for
increased interaction and linkages on a global scale. One can also at least imagine other frame-
works, for example, based on other conceptions of capitalism as well as various religious (for
example, Buddhist, Christian, ewish, Muslim) utopias, human rights-based notions or social-
ist communist theories.
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PART II
Understanding transnational PPP actors
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5. The role of the International Finance
Corporation in the promotion of
public private partnerships for
educational development
Karen Mundy and Francine Menashy
INTRODUCTION
Formed in 1956, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) is the private

sector inancing arm of the World Bank roup. Though much less well known
than the Bank’s nternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development
( BRD) and nternational Development Association ( DA) facilities (which
lend directly to governments), the FC plays a unique role in the World Bank
roup’s overall support for public private partnerships in education.1 Over the
last 15 years FC education sector activities have grown substantially from a
few small initial projects in the mid-1 0s, to the adoption of education as one
of the organization’s ive strategic pillars’ in 200 . Today the FC describes
itself as the world’s largest multilateral investor in private health care and
education in developing countries’ ( FC 2010d, p. 2 ).
The FC is a unique actor in the growing arena of public-private partnerships
in education, as it is both a PPP in its own right (a partnership that marries
public funds and governance with private sector investment), and a purveyor
of PPPs. At the transnational scale, the FC pools publicly-generated intergov-
ernmental funding; it then uses this funding to provide investment capital to
private sector education service providers in low- and middle-income coun-
tries. The public funds managed by the FC are also used in a variety of ways
to support the technical capacity of individual private education providers and
to promote the extension of markets for educational services.
Our goal in this chapter is to analyse the recent expansion of the FC’s
education activities and their implications to the broader development of
PPPs in developing country contexts. To do so we draw on publicly accessible
reports, news releases and other documents from the FC and World Bank
websites, interviews with FC and World Bank staff, and a unique data set
81
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of FC project descriptions developed using a list provided by the FC and

the FC project browser (see Table 5.2).2 We begin by describing the FC’s
mandate and history, before turning to the genesis and evolution of the FC’s
move into education. Subsequent sections explore trends in the FC’s invest-
ments and advisory activities in education, and linkages between the FC and
the World Bank’s education activities. We conclude with a critical assessment
of the FC’s initiatives in education, summarizing key drivers, challenges and
gaps in its activities in light of the larger arguments made in this volume about
the role of multilateral organizations in restructuring educational governance
in the developing world.
OVERV EW OF THE FC AND TS MANDATE
The FC has the task, distinct from the other four branches of the World Bank
roup, of supporting the private sector in emerging markets. t was founded
as a separate arm of the Bank in 1 5 , when member governments became
concerned that private entrepreneurs were not being effectively supported by
multilateral lending agencies (Bell 1 1). The FC thus grew out of a belief
that economic development, and thereby poverty alleviation, was dependent
on a robust private sector ( FC 200 a; 200 b).
The FC operates like a bank, using paid in capital of approximately US 2.
billion from its members to generate loans and debt or equity inancing for
private sector clients in developing countries. An increasing share of the
FC’s portfolio involves provision of inancial guarantees to banks in devel-
oping countries (Bretton Woods Project 2011a). The FC also offers advisory
services to private sector clients and to governments interested in regulatory
issues in speciic industry sectors. Spending under the IFC advisory services
programmes has grown more than tenfold since 2001, and is increasingly
funded through special trust funds’ provided by rich member governments
( E 2011, p. xvii; nterview , FC).
The FC is governed by a Board, which is elected by the FC’s 1 2 member
countries and has essentially the same composition as the Board of overnors
and Directors for the DA and BRD. Voting is weighted based on paid-in
shares to the FC: thus the United States is the largest FC shareholder (2 .
per cent of voting power); followed by apan at 5. per cent. Overall, rich
countries hold two-thirds of the organization’s voting power (Bretton Woods
Project 2010; Moody’s 2010). Each FC investment must be approved by its
board, but is not subject to the same degree of disclosure as World Bank DA
and BRD projects.5
From its founding, the IFC has adhered to three core principles: a business
principle, of taking on the full commercial risks of its investments, accepting
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The role of the International Finance Corporation
no government guarantees and earning a proit from its operations; the prin-
ciple of being an honest broker, using its unique abilities as a corporation
owned by governments to bring together investment opportunities, domestic
and private capital, and experienced management’; and the goal of playing a
catalytic role, investing only in projects for which suficient private capital is
not available on reasonable terms’ ( FC 1 ).
Over the past decade IFC policies and strategic plans have paid increasing
attention to the issue of poverty ( E 2011; FC 2010d). The FC clearly posi-
tions itself as a signiicant contributor to the overall poverty reduction mandate
of the World Bank. Thus according to its website:
FC, as the private sector arm of the World Bank roup, shares its mission: To ight
poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results. To help people help
themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, build-
ing capacity, and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors. ( FC 2011d)
The FC has sought to address this poverty-reduction mandate in two ways:

irst by broadening its investments in low income ( DA-eligible countries),
which it describes as frontier markets’ (OE FC 2005); and second by
expanding its work in the sectors that directly address the needs of the poor:
inancial markets, infrastructure, health and education, and agribusiness ( FC
2010i; 2010k; FC World Bank 2011). n 200 it adopted ive Strategic Pillars,
which included:
Pillar 1: Strengthening the focus on frontier markets ( DA countries, Fragile

Situations and frontier regions in middle income countries); and
Pillar 4: Addressing constraints to private sector growth in infrastructure, health,
education and food supply chain ( FC 2010d, p. 15).
The adoption of these two pillars has resulted in signiicant shifts in the FC’s
portfolio. Between 2000 and 2010, for example, the share of FC invest-
ments to low-income and fragile countries increased from 1 to 1 per cent.
Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as the fastest growing region of investment
since 2005, and remains a key focus for future FC activities ( FC 2010a;
2010d). At the same time, the FC began to expand investments and advi-
sory activities in health and education, giving new priority to the Health and
Education Department created in 2001.6 Investments in health and education
are now per cent of the FC’s portfolio (up from less than 1 per cent a decade
ago) ( E 2010; FC 2010d, p. 20). The FC has also recently announced a
project to experiment with the use of more formalized development indicators
in its projects (Bretton Woods Project 2011b).
Another way that the FC has sought to enlarge its poverty impact has
been through partnerships with other development organizations and lending
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bodies. A notable recent example of this is the FC-World Bank Health in Africa
nitiative, which brings together the World Bank, the Africa Development
Bank, the DE (the erman private sector development inance organization)
and the ates Foundation in an initiative aiming to improve both access to
capital for private health providers in Africa, and the engagement by African
governments in the private health sector and its operating environment’ ( FC
2010d, p. ; FC and World Bank 200 ; 2011).
Overall, the IFC has interpreted its poverty mandate primarily through an
increased focus on low-income countries (though, as we argue in this chap-
ter, this remains weak in education). As a recent evaluation from the Bank’s
ndependent Evaluation roup ( E ) notes, the relative shares of FC invest-
ment in areas likely to reach the poor (infrastructure, agribusiness, health and
education) have not changed signiicantly over the last decade. nstead, invest-
ments in global trade inance have come to dominate FC lending ( E 2011,
p. 20). Furthermore, as the E report and our research suggests, individual
IFC investments pay limited attention to poverty and distributional issues
either in their design or in their performance outcomes measures ( E 2011,
p. xi). As the recent FC evaluation concludes: most FC investment proj-
ects generate satisfactory economic returns but do not provide evidence of
identiiable opportunities for the poor’ (p. ).
THE ENES S AND EAR RAT ONA E FOR THE FC

IN EDUCATION
Although the FC made its irst investment in education in 1 , it was only

after 1995 that its activities in education began to develop in earnest. At that
time, the creation of several new small enterprise funds, and the particular
entrepreneurship of a bank education sector specialist who saw opportunities
for improving education in Africa through private engagement, led the IFC to
reconsider education as a bankable’ sector for its activities. 8 A number of small
investments were provided to elite private schools in least developed countries,
while larger investments began to emerge in higher education, particularly in
atin America (Maas 2001; nterview , FC). n 1 , the FC gained its
irst lead specialist in the education sector (on loan from the World Bank’s
Education staff, and later made permanent). t held its irst regional conference
on private education in 1 in C te d’ voire and conducted reviews of the
business environment for private education in Kenya, Cameroon, ndia, hana
and China ( FC 1 ; Karamokolias and Maas 1 ).9 The FC’s Health and
Education roup was established in 2001.
During this period, the FC’s published documents suggest it was respond-
ing to several key shifts underway in developing countries. First, the policy
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The role of the International Finance Corporation 85
environment in many developing nations was becoming more accepting of

private sector involvement in education ( FC 2001, p. ). Second, families
were also seen to be more willing to pay for education than in the past, and thus
for-proit schools were already on the rise, in response to a growing demand.
But at all levels of education, this demand was not being addressed adequately
( FC 2001, p. ). Moreover, the late 1 0s saw an increase in primary school
completion in many countries, resulting in a greater demand for secondary and
tertiary education. The middle classes, in particular, were being underserved
(Ellena et al. 2002; FC 1 , p. 2; 2001, p. ). The client base for private
education was growing, and here the FC saw an opportunity.
The road to wider World Bank Board approval for FC engagement in
education was not without controversy. As reported by staff from this era, it
took some time for the FC itself to be convinced that education was a good
sector for investment. nside the World Bank, there were questions about the
role of the private sector in education and concerns that the FC was intruding
on Bank territory. uestions about FC capacity were also raised at the level
of the Board of Directors in 1 , after the approval of one of the irst FC
investments in education. n response, the FC commissioned ames Tooley
(then professor at the University of Manchester and fellow at the UK-based
Institute for Economic Affairs, IEA) to prepare a study on the global education
industry, later published jointly by the FC and the EA (Tooley 1 ; 2000).10
ust as these irst efforts began to get FC engagement in education off
the ground, a visit by the Bank’s then President, ames Wolfensohn to an
FC-supported Beaconhouse school in Pakistan raised even more serious chal-
lenges. Wolfensohn harshly questioned Bank funding of elite private schools
in poor countries, and called upon both the World Bank’s Vice President of
Human Development and the FC’s Executive Vice President to explain the
relevance of the FC’s new role in education. At Wolfensohn’s request, a irst
roadmap for FC engagement in education was prepared in 1 and submitted
to the Board in 1 ( FC 1 b). This version elicited considerable criticism
from France, Canada, Switzerland and Australia.11 Wolfensohn thus asked for
a second and more complete document explaining why the FC should engage
in the education sector ( nterview 1, World Bank; nterview , FC).
The second and still current FC education strategy was a response to
this request from the World Bank President. Prepared by Bank staffer Harry
Patrinos and FC staffer Tanya Scobie, the inal strategy presents a carefully
constructed case for engaging with the private sector in education. Early on,
the document makes the case that private engagement in education is perhaps
more needed in developing countries than elsewhere:
Few would argue against continued and increased public inancing of basic educa-
tion, which produces the broadest social beneits. However, there is no a priori
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reason for all education to be publicly provided and funded at all levels. The appro-
priate role for the public and private sectors in the provision and inancing of educa-
tion should depend on conditions speciic to each country. Some have very little
need for private activity, given the willingness of the taxpayers and the commitment
and ability of the government to support broad-scale, largely free public education
at all levels. In others (most developing and many developed countries), despite
signiicant in est ent in ed cation refor go ern ents str ggle to e tend ality
ser ices to t eir citi ens n t ese sit ations t ere is signiicant sco e for t e ri ate
sector to co le ent or artner it t e lic sector in ro ision and inancing.
( FC 2001, pp. –5, emphasis ours)
The strategy goes on to outline several key ways in which private educa-
tion can address the World Bank roup’s poverty reduction mandate, using
primarily World Bank research to support its case. First, private education is
described as attracting families who can pay fees away from the public tertiary
system, releasing government resources that can be used to target the poor
( FC 2001, p. 5). Second, private provision, is argued to expand a country’s
capacity for service delivery when government capacity is low, especially
when combined with demand-side inancing that allows publicly funded
students to go to private schools. Furthermore, because it operates based on
principles of a market where there is competition, private provision is argued
to promote quality, innovation and diversity (p. 6). Competition for clients
also promotes eficiency (in terms of lower unit costs). Private education is
presented as contributing to the growth and the strengthening of the middle
class’ which is described as underserved by the public system (p. ); and blur-
ring the distinction between rich and non-rich access’ (pp. 5, 1 ). nstances are
cited in which private education providers cross-subsidize lower-cost private
services for the poor.
n contrast to the irst roadmap ( FC 1 b), this inal FC education strat-
egy focuses much more of its argument on the potential contributions of the
private sector to the issues of poverty, social mobility and inequality. However,
in light of its business objective, the document also stresses that the FC will
only invest in inancially sustainable education projects. nvestments in higher
education, technical and vocational education, distance education and tech-
nology, are thus viewed as top FC investment priorities. Early childhood
education, primary education and secondary education are described as having
lower investment probability’, in part because the size of capital required for
these initiatives is on too small a scale for a typical FC investment (pp. 12–1 ).
Championed and guided through the Board by FC Vice President Peter
Woike, and supported by the World Bank’s education sector, the FC’s road-
map for education received inal approval from the Bank’s Board in 2001.
The FC’s oficial rationale for involvement in education has since remained
much the same – the FC’s 2011–1 Roadmap, for example, notes that FC
will continue to ill the gap left by the public sector in health and education’,
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by opening new private sector markets; and will address the needs of those
at the base of the pyramid by facilitating investments in health and education
SMEs small and medium sized enterprises and partnering’ (p. 15). Oficial
enthusiasm for working in education also appears to have remained quite
strong. Thus, according to the Roadmap: FC’s health and education sector
is expected to show the strongest relative program growth between F 0 and
F 1 ’ ( FC 2010d, p. ).
THE EVO V N PORTFO O OF FC NVESTMENTS

AND ACTIVITIES IN EDUCATION
As of March 2011, the FC publicly reported cumulative investments of over

US 500 million to education projects in 1 countries (the value of the busi-
ness initiatives invested in is US 1.5 billion) ( FC 2011c). As noted above, the
share of FC investments in education within its overall investment portfolio
has been growing. But at US 500 million, education investments still remain
a very modest part of the FC’s total US . billion investment portfolio in
health, education and agribusiness, far smaller than IFC investments in the
health sector ( FC 2010d, p. 1 ).
The FC’s inancial investments in education businesses can be broken down
in several ways. According to a recent presentation prepared by FC staff,
approximately per cent of its current investments are in least developed
countries ( FC 2011c). By subsector, per cent of the FC’s current projects
are at the tertiary or post-secondary levels; per cent in TVET; and 2 per cent
in primary or secondary education. eographically, the largest proportion of
active FC projects in education are in atin America ( per cent), followed
by 2 per cent in Africa ( FC 2011c).12
Based on a list of investments provided for us by the FC, we ran our own
analysis of its education portfolio, focused only on investments to education
made between 200 and 2010. ooking at this period, one can see a rather
signiicant growth in the overall volume of FC investments in education in
200 and 2010. New investments rose from annual levels of US 20– 0 million
USD, to well-over US 100 million per annum (Table 5.1). Furthermore, the
average size of FC investments has also grown signiicantly in the most recent
years (see the list provided in Table 5.2). This is due primarily to several recent
large-scale investments in higher education. On the other hand, the share of
recent investments in K-12 education has remained quite low, at 10. per cent
of total IFC education investments.
FC investments in education also appear to increasingly favour middle-
income countries. Over the ive-year period between 200 –2010, only .
per cent of FC education investments were made in low-income countries
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079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 88
Table 5.1 IFC investments in education, 2006–10 (US$ million)
Investment amount by level of education Investment amount by income level of country

Average
investment ower Upper
amount middle middle
ear Total per loan Higher Ed K-12 Other ow income income income High income
2010 12 . 2 1 . 2 10 .0 1 . . 00 .000 — . 2 .
200 1 . 2 1 . 2 121. 1 22.000 – 2.500 15. 125. 0 –
200 1.2 5 .25 .505 . – . 20. 1 . –
88
200 2 .5 1 . 0 2 .201 2. 0 – 2. 0 .000 20.201 –

200 0. 0 . 22. 11 2. 5 15. 2. 5 10. 10 2 . –
Total 0. 0 12.202 . 02 2 .2 1 .1 51. 2 0. 2 .
Percentage of total to education 2.1 11.8 6.1 . 1 .5 . .
Note: Country classiication is based on the World Bank’s categorization of low, low middle, upper middle and high-income countries.
Source: Calculated from a list of investments provided by FC staff to authors, May 2011.
24/05/2012 15:19
(dropping to just over per cent for the most recent year). nvestments in
lower middle-income countries averaged 1 .5 per cent for the same period.
The majority of investments target upper middle-income countries. A nota-
ble 11 out of 15 of the FC’s new investments in 200 and 2010 were made
in upper middle-income countries. And in 2010, 2 . per cent of investment
dollars went to a project in a high-income country (Saudi Arabia).
Two main drivers were described to us as guiding the FC’s selection of
speciic investments at these levels: irst, projects had to be viewed as inan-
cially sustainable to ensure a high chance of repayment at competitive rates
of interest, or of good returns on FC equity investments; second, projects are
screened for the quality of their academic services (as well as for various envi-
ronmental impacts). Based on the FC’s founding principles (which include
playing a catalytic’ role), investing is made in areas where there is insuficient
inancing available in the local market ( nterview 1, FC; nterview 2, FC).
However, according to interviews with FC staff and staff in the World Bank,
there are tensions between the catalytic entrepreneurial approach expected of
the IFC and its actual approach to investments, especially in the social sectors.
The FC generally looks for larger, already scaled investments that are proit-
producing. Most social sector initiatives that target the poor are small scale and
need venture start-up inance ( nterview 2, FC; nterview 1 , World Bank).
FC investments in education are varied, but can be subdivided into two
main groupings: at the post-secondary level, the FC provides direct inanc-
ing for institutions, holds equity in individual companies, and also supports
student loan facilities. n K-12 education, the FC invests directly in private
schools and school franchises, and provides credit guarantees to local banks
to encourage them to provide inancing to private schools. ndirectly, the FC
also reports that its investments in microinance and health insurance schemes
contribute to the ability of poor families to keep children in school ( FC 2010,
pp. 10, 2 ).
Direct investments in private K-12 schools were among the irst FC
ventures in education. Beginning with the Rainbow Academy in Kenya (1 )
and Beaconhouse Schools in Pakistan (1 ), these investments have primarily
been to elite private providers, inancing construction, education materials and
other capital needs, either at the initial phase of development of a new school or
for expansion of an established school. oan facilities to K-12 private schools
are a second way that the FC supports private providers of K-12 education.
Here, risk-sharing investments with inancing facilities (local banks) are estab-
lished to provide loans to schools and entrepreneurs in education sectors,
allowing the FC to support small private enterprises that would otherwise be
too small to meet the minimum project size expected by the FC. The most
widely publicized among such initiatives is the FC Africa Schools Program’,
which grew out of initial risk-sharing agreements with private banks in hana
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079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 90
Table 5.2 List of IFC Investments in Education, 2006–10 (US$ millions)
Status Sub- Orig Cmt- FC

Institution legal name Cmt date Country income sector bal
1. Socketworks td Feb 2 , 200 Nigeria M HE 2.500
2. Fundo de Educacao para o Brasil May 25, 200 Brazil UM HE 12.000
. Structured Student Financing Risk Sharing Facility Sep 15, 200 Indonesia M HE . 2
. Financiera Educativa de Mexico S.A. de C.V. Nov 22, 200 Mexico UM Other 15.
5. Kenya School Financing Facility Dec , 200 Kenya C K-12 0. 5
. Brookhouse Schools imited Dec , 200 Kenya C K-12 1.500
. nstitute of Business Management Dec 1 , 200 Pakistan M HE .
. Financiera Educativa de Mexico S.A. de C.V. Mar , 200 Mexico UM HE 0. 1
. hana School Finance Facility May 1 , 200 hana C K-12 2. 0
10. Socketworks td May 2 , 200 M HE .000
90
Nigeria
11. DUOC UC un 2 , 200 Chile UM HE 1 .2 1
12. Banco Real Student Financing Mar 5, 200 Brazil UM HE 1 .
1 . Banque Rwandaise De Developpment May 22, 200 Rwanda C K-12 .
1 . Bank of Palestine un 1 , 200 West Bank aza M HE 1 .000
15. Strathmore University un 25, 200 Kenya C HE 2.1
16. Omnix International un 0, 200 ordan M HE .
1 . Ashesi University College Apr , 200 hana C HE 2.500
1 . First Education Holding B.S.C. (c) un 25, 200 MENA Region UM K-12 22.000
19. Credit Agricole Egypt un 2 , 200 Egypt M HE 15.
20. Corporacion Universitaria Minuto de Dios Sep , 200 Colombia UM HE .000
21. American University of Antigua imited Sep 25, 200 Antigua Barbuda UM HE 0.000
22. DUOC UC Sep 0, 200 Chile UM HE 0.000
2 . deal nvest S.A. Nov , 200 Brazil UM HE . 1
24/05/2012 15:19
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 91
2 . Anhanguera Educacional Participacoes S.A. Dec 2 , 200 Brazil UM HE 2 .

25. Riyad Bank an 2 , 2010 Saudi Arabia H HE 2 .
2 . Curro Holdings PT imited Mar 1, 2010 South Africa UM K-12 .
2 . Ensino Superior Bureau uridico S.A. un 1 , 2010 Brazil UM HE 5.000
2 . Harmon Hall Holding S.A. de C.V. Aug 11, 2010 Mexico UM Other Ed . 00
2 . Trustco roup Holdings Sep 21, 2010 Namibia UM HE 12.100
0. Estacio Participacoes S.A. Dec 15, 2010 Brazil UM HE 0.000
1. Braeburn Schools imited Dec 1 , 2010 Kenya C K-12 .000
Note: The country categorization by income level uses the World Bank deinition for low income ( C), lower middle income ( M),
upper middle income (UM) and high-income (H ) countries.
Source: ist provided to authors by FC Staff, 5 une 2011.

91
24/05/2012 15:19
and Kenya (Nyagah 200 ). Approved in 200 , the Africa Schools Program
set aside US 50 million in FC credit guarantees to local African banks, with
initial investments in hana, Kenya and Rwanda. n addition to the credit guar-
antees, the FC Board agreed to provide US 5 million in advisory services
to support the business development of the schools themselves and provide
technical advice to the banks. Signiicant funding for the advisory side was
secured from the Dutch government ( nterview , FC). As of 1 uly 200 ,
schools serving ,10 students had received loans with support from this
programme. More recent announcements have been made announcing expan-
sion of this programme to iberia ( FC 2011b, secondary education and techni-
cal vocational education), Uganda ( FC 2010g) and Rwanda ( FC 200 b).
The FC promotes its inancing of K-12 schools as a central contribution
to the World Bank roup’s overarching poverty mandate. t has increasingly
targeted lower-fee private K-12 provision – citing, on its website for example,
fees of US 50–US 0 per term ( FC 2010k). However, our review of the
tuitions charged by the schools the FC directly inances, as well as those
in its Africa schools programmes, suggests that annual fees at these institu-
tions are typically well beyond the means of children in the bottom socio-
economic status (SES) quintile in most countries with FC K-12 projects.
A recent World Bank impact evaluation of the Africa schools programme in
Kenya, for example, cites average fees per term of US 2 (elementary) and
US 2 5 (secondary) in schools funded by this programme (Barrera-Osorio
and able 2011, p. 10).
At the post-secondary level, the FC made its irst major direct investments
in institutions between 1 and 2001, all but one focused on atin America.
Since that time FC investments in higher education have dwarfed those in
K-12, growing dramatically in individual project size to between US 20 and
US 5 million per project. t also increasingly inances private student loan
facilities for post-secondary education, which provide loans to parents and
students for tuition and university entrance fees. n keeping with the FC’s
focus on inding already scaled, proit-making investments, one area that staff
described as a growth opportunity for the FC is in the internationalization
of already existing higher education franchises (for example, University of
Phoenix, Devry) ( nterview 2, FC). However, while expanding access post-
secondary education to the bottom of the pyramid’ is a key rationale for proj-
ect selection, monitoring the impact on poverty of these projects appears to be
a secondary concern. Thus in project documents and conversations with FC
staff, we found that the FC gathers little information about the SES of students
served by these institutions or about the debt levels and ultimate employment
outcomes of these educational services ( nterview 2, FC; nterview , FC).
n addition to inancial investments in private sector initiatives, a major line
of FC activities in education is advisory services, which the FC provides to
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 92 24/05/2012 15:19

businesses and to governments. While there is no publicly available database of

all the advisory services provided by the FC, in interviews staff suggested that
advisory work in education is still on quite a small scale, and mainly focuses
on business effectiveness, risk management and so on. Private sector clients
must pay to access advice, though the IFC subsidizes the cost of its advice
when it is launching major new initiatives. The Africa Schools Program, for
example, utilizes resources from the Dutch government and other trust funds
to allow the FC to provide business advice to the local banks making loans
to schools. n addition, the FC hired CfBT1 to develop a suite of training
materials and workshops to support the business plans and managerial capaci-
ties of the small proprietary schools and their operators. The IFC has produced
various policy documents and resource materials to assist private education
providers – for example, its 2010 Education nvestment uide ( FC 2010c);
and guides that address the question of facility safety and money management
for parents ( FC 2010b; 2011e). A more recent initiative (launched in collabo-
ration with the World Bank), the Education for Employment programme in the
Middle East and North Africa, utilized trust funds for the development of a
strategic plan and conference to launch FC work in skills and training in this
region ( FC 2011a; World Bank 2011, p. 1). The FC’s regional ofices and
investment units are sometimes involved in the preparation of analytic reports
on markets for private education in speciic countries, but these are generally
used to guide internal IFC investment strategy and in general are not publicly
available (see, for example, CDC Consult 2010).
Advice to governments about private sector markets in education has
remained on quite a small scale. Through the FC’s nfrastructure Advisory
Services Department, governments can receive advice to help them structure
contracts with the private sector for the design, construction, delivery and
management of public services. Most of the FC’s PPP advisory activities have
focused on Private Finance nitiatives’ (PF s) – which limit private involve-
ment to the management of infrastructure, while keeping the delivery and
management of core services in the public domain’ ( FC 200 ). According to
interviews conducted in May 2011 the FC currently has three major advisory
mandates on PF s: two in higher education (Botswana, ujarat) and a large
K-12 project in Brazil ( nterview , FC).
THE FC – WOR D BANK CONNECT ON
While the World Bank’s two lending arms to governments ( DA and BRD)
and the FC were initially designated as autonomous organizations, collab-
oration between them has been pushed by various actors, most notably the
US government under the Bush administration in the late 1 0s who desired
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 93 24/05/2012 15:19

greater Bank support to the private sector, and so a stronger relationship with
the FC. n 1 , President Wolfensohn stated that strengthening Bank ties to
the FC was a priority of his presidency and introduced the high-level Private
Sector Development Working roup in an effort to coordinate Bank- FC
activities (Miller-Adams 1 ). Pressure from senior management for greater
collaboration and integration of World Bank and FC activities has continued
in the latest World Bank Education Sector Strategy (2020).
World Bank staff have played an important role in framing and conceptual-
izing FC work, drafting the FC’s irst education strategy, and preparing the
2001 Handbook on Public Private Partnerships as a tool to help guide Bank
education sector staff and others to understand the role the private sector can
play alongside public educational systems (Ed nvest FC 2001). A commu-
nity of practice on the private sector in education emerged across the two
institutions in the early 2000s, when staff from the FC and key igures in the
Economics of Education group in the World Bank’s education anchor launched
biannual conferences on PPPs in education and established the EdInvest
website (World Bank 1 , p. 5).1 Subsequent joint activities included the
publication of The Evolving Regulatory Context for Private Education in
Emerging Economies’ (Fielden and aRoque 200 ; World Bank 200 ), and
a recent impact evaluation of the Africa Schools initiative in Kenya (Barrera-
Osorio and able 2011). Convergence of beliefs about the value and role of
the private sector in education between the FC and the World Bank can be
seen in recent World Bank publications. These make routine references to
FC projects in education as evidence to support arguments promoting public
private partnerships (Patrinos et al. 200 , p. 5 ; World Bank 200 , p. ; World
Bank and MF 200 , p. 10 ). The convergence of beliefs is also relected in
collaboration on the new education for employment initiative between the
World Bank and the FC in the Middle East and North Africa region ( FC
2011a; World Bank, 2011).
Conceptually, a division of labour has emerged between the FC and
the World Bank, with the FC inancing private providers and student loan
schemes and the World Bank conducting policy research on private provision
and assisting governments to improve the regulatory and legal environment for
private sector delivery of educational services (see Table 5. , below).
Each of the three education sector strategies published by the World Bank
over the last decade (1 ; 2005; 2011) suggests a strong convergence of
approaches to the role for the private sector in education. They also promise
to accelerate the complimentarity between BRD DA and FC activities. The
1 Education Sector Strategy, for example, argues that: FC support for
private education can complement the Bank’s aim of having public monies
targeted more on helping the poor gain access to quality basic education ’
(p. 1 ). The 2005 Strategy update argues for even greater engagement of the
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 94 24/05/2012 15:19

a le ro riate roles for t e FC and orld an t at in ence t e

private education sector
Policy advisory Direct transactions

World ending to governments for policy, Public sector loans that are on-lent
Bank regulatory and legal reforms, to the private sector for speciic
including those that affect private activities.
sector activity:
• student inance
• expenditure programmes
• advisory and analytical work
• knowledge sharing
• capacity building.
IFC Support of private activities that ending directly to the private sector
can indirectly inluence the public to support both:
sector. • the provision of private education
through investment in education
institutions; and
• demand-side inancing of education
through investments in student loan
schemes.
Source: FC, 2001, p. .
FC in strategic planning of World Bank lending, by m aintaining closer

and more systematic collaboration between the Bank and the nternational
Finance Corporation’ (World Bank 2005, pp. –10). The most recent World
Bank roup Education Sector Strategy (2011) contains renewed emphasis
on leveraging private sector engagement in education and working with the
FC. The FC’s representative on the Bank’s Education Sector Board actively
participated in the document’s drafting, and the World Bank’s current
President is reported to have mandated greater inclusion of the IFC in the
inal version of the Education 2020 strategy ( nterview 1, FC; nterview
, World Bank). The new strategy closely echoes the four original rationales
offered for greater World Bank roup support for the private sector, and
commits the Bank to work with the FC so that the role of the private sector
in education is recognized and properly regulated in ways that will improve
outcomes’ (2011, p. xii).
et despite supportive oficial statements about complementarity, operational
engagement between the World Bank’s lending arm ( BRD DA) and the FC
at the country or regional levels has been quite minimal over the last decade. In
interviews, both Bank and FC staff reported very little collaboration between
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 95 24/05/2012 15:19

the two organizations. One FC staff member described the FC Bank relation-
ship at the country level in these terms: ntegrated certainly not. Coordinated
only as required’ ( nterview 1, FC). A senior education sector manager of
the World Bank agreed, describing the relationship as still at a very nascent
stage’ ( nterview , World Bank). This absence of collaboration was further
relected in a review of World Bank ( DA) K-12 project appraisal documents
between 200 and 2010 reviewed for this paper, where FC is rarely mentioned
and support for private provision or other forms of PPPs occur relatively rarely.
The rarity of private sector engagement in World Bank ( DA and BRD) lend-
ing programmes has been conirmed in other World Bank studies (Sosale 2000;
World Bank 200 , p. 1).
Why this lack of collaboration? When asked, informants in the two organi-
zations made a variety of suggestions. Some suggested that the World Bank
and the FC have different mandates and ways of working, which limits the
opportunity for operational cooperation. The IFC is focused on investments in
private sector ventures that are substantial in size and already scaled, through
which it can make a commercial investment return. Unlike the Bank, its entry
point is not the government, and beyond removal of regulatory barriers, it
has limited interest in shifting government policies or overall educational
systems. The FC’s project cycle is also much shorter than the Bank’s, making
synchronization of planning and implementation dificult ( nterview 2, FC;
nterview , World Bank; nterview 1 , World Bank). ndeed, Miller-Adams
notes that a major challenge of coordinating the activities of the Bank and FC
is b ridging the structural and cultural gaps and aligning their purpose’
(1 , p. 2).
The FC is also less interested in reaching the bottom of the pyramid’
in education, and more focused on the inancial return to its investments
( nterview 5, World Bank; nterview 1 , World Bank). t also has too few
staff in education to create for us a kind of partner when it came to talking
to ministers of inance, or involving the private sector’ ( nterview , World
Bank). From the FC point of view, we were also told that the Bank has not
been very effective in delivering support from governments for partnerships
with the private sector, especially at the K-12 levels. n fact, whether because
of governmental resistance or staff reticence, the Bank has only been able to
encourage new public subsidies for the private sector provision of K-12 educa-
tion in a very small number of cases ( nterview 1, FC; nterview 2, FC).
One might imagine a situation in which the Bank delivers funding to govern-
ments for vouchers and subsidies to private schools, while the FC provides the
funding for business development needed for private schools to take advantage
of these new forms of government funding. n practice, such joint promotion of
PPPs appears to have been rather rare.
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THE FC AND EDUCAT ON O N FORWARD: NASCENT

AND EVO V N ?
Our study of the FC’s work in education has suggested three main trends.
First, though growing, FC work in education is still a very small and rela-
tively weak component of its overall investments portfolio. Second, though the
FC and the World Bank may share similar views related to the advantages of
private sector engagement in education, in practice, collaboration between the
two organizations has been weak. Finally, we have raised questions about the
extent to which the FC’s activities in education contribute to the overarching
mandate of the World Bank roup: poverty alleviation.
The most recent statement of FC’s goals in education states that the orga-
nization plans:
to provide inancing for larger network providers who have the ability to invest
across borders and go down-market to reach poorer populations; inancing for
education to small and medium enterprises which typically target poor popula-
tions and to students through partner banks; and advisory services to companies to
support quality of education and to banks to ensure responsible lending to the sector.
(World Bank 2011, p. 2)
n keeping with this, staff at the FC are enthusiastic about opportunities they
hope to explore that might bring both regional and US educational providers
and franchises into the global education market. They spoke about the FC’s
new initiative in technical vocational education (the sector projected to be the
growth pillar of the portfolio’) in the Middle East and North Africa, Education
for Employment’ (E E). ( FC 2011; World Bank 2011, p. 1), and about emerg-
ing opportunities for capitalizing on the opportunity for much larger invest-
ments in higher education (where several recent grants have exceeded US 25
million) ( nterview 1, FC; nterview 2, FC).
However, there appears to be a disjuncture between the optimism of formal
policy statements on the FC’s role in education, and the size and success of its
education portfolio in education. High levels of subsidized advisory services
have been required to get innovative initiatives, like the Africa Schools
Program and the more recent Education for Employment initiative, off the
ground. Equity investments in education have proven risky for the FC: its
2010 annual report shows an internal rate of return of – 2 per cent in education
equity investments as compared to an overall IFC return of 15.5 per cent for
that year ( FC 2010, p. 11).15 The FC appears to be risk averse and not particu-
larly innovative: its irst priority is to ind already scaled, proit-making invest-
ment opportunities. Perhaps for this reason, while the educational mandate of
the FC is readily presented by the organization as a signiicant component of
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 97 24/05/2012 15:19

its overall operations, education continues to be a strikingly small share of its

overall portfolio.
A second disjuncture between the FC’s oficial commitment to using
education for poverty alleviation and its actual investments is also explored
in this chapter. The FC describes its work in education as contributing to
poverty alleviation, supporting the bottom of the pyramid’ and achieving the
Millennium Development oal for basic education ( FC 2010d, p. 2; 2010i).
However, the geographical distribution of its educational investments is not
targeted towards low-income countries, and its K-12 investments appear to
primarily support opportunities for middle-income children. FC investments
in higher education institutions and student loans appear to do somewhat better
in supporting expanded educational opportunities for the bottom of the pyra-
mid’. However, the organization does not formally track the distributional
outcomes of these investments, or monitor the sustainability of educational
costs for families and students that are implicit in its higher education activi-
ties. n its project appraisals, performance reporting, programme evaluations
and strategic planning, the FC measures success in terms of direct inancial
returns on investment, not in terms of poverty-lowering impacts.
A third disjuncture highlighted in this paper, and one closely related to the
previous discussion of the FC’s commitment to poverty alleviation, lies in the
relationship between the FC and the World Bank. While both oficial poli-
cies and informal conversation with staff suggest strong support for collabora-
tion between these two arms of the World Bank roup, in operational terms,
collaboration has been limited. This is a surprising inding from our study,
given a burgeoning critical literature on the interlocking set of conditionali-
ties – between DA, FC and the MF – in respect of private sector participa-
tion in basic services’ (Mehrotra and Delamonica 2005, p. 1 ). Our indings
suggest that rather than a neat system of interlocking conditionalities’, to
promote educational privatization, the FC World Bank nexus has provided
space for an entrepreneurial but to date operationally marginal community of
practice inside the Bank that promotes education markets as a reform solution
(cf. Verger 2011). World Bank roup advocacy for increased private sector
engagement in education is real and highly visible in discourse (policy state-
ments, research publications, seminars and so on). However, the link between
discursive advocacy and operational practices has remained quite weak, both
in terms of the gaps between poverty mandates and FC portfolio, and between
rhetorical support for the FC and engagement with the private sector in DA
and BRD projects.
This chapter has shown how the FC came to play a role in supporting the
expansion of private provision of education in middle and low-income coun-
tries, particularly at the post-secondary level. t also suggests, however, that
despite recent pronouncements to the contrary, public private partnerships
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 98 24/05/2012 15:19

remain a surprisingly disorganized’ arena of World Bank roup engage-

ment, delinked in substantive ways from the World Bank roup’s overarching
poverty alleviation mandate.
NOTES
1 References to the World Bank’ or the Bank’ include both the DA and BRD, unless noted
otherwise.
2 nterviews were conducted with four present and former FC staff during April– une 2011.
n addition, we draw on interviews from a larger research project, with 21 World Bank staff,
where the focus was on the World Bank’s role in engaging the private sector in its education
activities.
Financial products from the FC include market-rate loans; buying and holding equity in
various companies and inancial institutions; syndicated loans, allowing commercial banks
the opportunity to lend to companies; and trade inance, where advisory support is given to
emerging markets to help increase their share of global trade’ ( FC 200 b, p. ). The FC
offers inancial advisory services in a wide range of areas from environment and social
sustainability, privatization, establishing public private partnerships, and access to inance
including support to microinance institutions ( FC 200 b, p. ).
Under the Articles of Agreement of DA and FC, Executive Directors and Alternates of the
Bank serve ex oficio as Executive Directors and Alternates of DA and FC, as long as the
country that appoints them, or any one of the countries that have elected them, is a member
of IFC and IDA.
5 The FC makes publicly available a short summary of proposed investments and social
and environmental information. It expects its clients to publish information about invest-
ments for their affected communities but does not maintain a database of this information.
n contrast to the World Bank, proposal documents and materials and research developed
for FC investments in education are not routinely made public. See FC’s disclosure policy
at: http: www.ifc.org ifcext enviro.nsf AttachmentsByTitle pol Disclosure200 F E
Disclosure200 .pdf ( FC 200 a).
Health and Education investment activities are now housed in the Manufacturing,
Agribusiness and Services Department (MAS); educational advisory work is housed in the
FC’s advisory services unit.
According to the FC’s 2011–1 Roadmap, this initiative expects to mobilize up to US 1
billion over ive years in investment and advisory services through an equity vehicle (US 00
million), a debt facility (US 500 million) and a technical assistance program (US 200 million).
FC invested US 20 million in the Africa Health Fund (AHF) at the end of F 0 . Other inves-
tors (AfDB, ates Foundation and DE ) contributed US million at irst closing. Another
US 50– 0 million is expected at a second closing in early F 11’ ( FC 2010c, p. ).
8 In 1989, the IFC set up the Africa Enterprise Fund, and in 1996, the Small Enterprise Fund,
both intended to support small projects below the US 5 million minimum typical for FC
investments.
The other country cases were described in interviews as companion pieces to the Tooley
book, but were not available on the World Bank and FC websites. Additionally, Michael
atham from CfBT was reported to have completed four country cases on FC investments
in West Africa in 1 .
10 As well, Tooley’s paper resulting from this study entitled Educating Amaretch: Private
Schools for the Poor and the New Frontier for nvestors’ won irst prize in an FC-Financial
Times essay competition in 200 ( FC 200 b; Tooley 200 ).
11 Furthermore, despite broader pressure from the US for a greater Bank focus on private sector
development, one informant told us that the US Executive Director chose to remain mute
about support to FC involvement in education during this controversial period ( nterview
, FC).
079-103 Pt2 Ch5.indd 99 24/05/2012 15:19

12 These igures on FC investments in education were provided by private communication

from a PowerPoint presentation of FC staff to the authors. Different igures appear in other
publications by the Bank and FC: for example, the May 2011 World Bank roup Education
Sector Strategy says that the FC has invested US 500 million in private education proj-
ects, and in the period 1 –2010, about half of FC investments have been in higher educa-
tion, per cent in primary or secondary education, and 11 per cent in technical vocational
education. Nearly per cent of these investments were made in the atin American region,
2 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 1 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa
(World Bank 2011, p. vi).
1 The Centre for British Teachers, a not-for-proit education consultancy and service
organization.
1 Ed nvest was initiated in 1 as an …on-line investment information forum on private
sector development in education’. t began with initial funding from the World Bank
Development Marketplace as a joint venture between CfBT and FC’s Health and Education
Department. t has subsequently received inancial and in-kind support from both FC and
CfBT. See: http: www.ifc.org edinvest
15 The Annual report goes on to say that the very negative IRR for Education Services
was based on just eight active and closed-out equity investments with cumulative equity
disbursements of less than US 1 million’ (as compared to equity investments of over
US 200 million in health).
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6. The GATS game-changer: International
trade regulation and the constitution of
a global education marketplace
Antoni Verger and Susan L. Robertson
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was launched, joining a longer
standing set of international institutions with a mandate to govern economic,
social and political affairs at a global level. For education watchers, however,
the more remarkable element of this initiative was the inclusion of all levels of
education, from early years to higher and continuing education, as a services
sector in the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This
event led activists and commentators alike (cf. Kelsey 2003; Knight 2007) to
argue that the emergence of the GATS represents an extraordinary change in
the framing of the rules over global trade in services more generally, and most
importantly for our analysis, of the transformation of education, as largely a
nationally-located and governed public service, into a globally regulated trade-
able economic commodity. Indeed, the GATS aims at the liberalization of all
kinds of education services via the modiication (and or elimination) of a range
of state regulations, thus favouring trade and foreign investment in the educa-
tional sector.
Following Fligstein’s (1996, p. 657) insight, that ‘…the production of market
institutions is a cultural project’, we will be arguing in this chapter that the
signiicance of the ATS is its far reaching political ambition; to reshape the
architecture of the education sector to include ownership rights, more market-
oriented governance structures, the basis of rules of exchange, and conceptions
of control that in turn enables a market logic to lourish. ill describes this as the
constitutionalizing of neoliberalism at the global level since the GATS, together
with the other WTO agreements, are legal instruments that enable pro-market
rules to be ixed in the quasi-legal structure of different state spaces ( ill 200 ).
Whilst GATS is a distinctive political project, its importance for this book
on the changing and contested relationship between the public and private in
education is that it is anchored on the same ideological terrain that has given
104
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 104 24/05/2012 15:16

The GATS game-changer 105
rise to public private partnerships, multi-stakeholder partnerships and so on.

Indeed, multilateral organizations and other agencies supporting major private
sector involvement in social services perceive the GATS as a global lever to
promote various forms of privatization in education. As a trade agreement it
enables the establishment of regulatory frameworks that are conducive to an
expanding and more robust role of the private sector in education. Without
naming the WTO ATS explicitly, the last World Bank report on PPPs for
education states:
Promoting foreign direct investment in education can yield great beneits for the
domestic education sector. Foreign private schools can provide families with a wider
range of education options, increase competition among schools, and foster innova-
tion. They can also bring in much needed skills, technology, capital investment, and
knowledge. By increasing the stock of skilled labor resulting from well-functioning
school and higher education sectors, foreign direct investment may improve the
investment climate for subsequent foreign investment. (Patrinos et al. 200 )
The multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, OECD and the
nternational Finance Corporation ( FC), have not adopted an oficial position
concerning whether their member countries should embrace the GATS and
commit to education liberalization under its framework, largely because of the
considerable sensitivities on the issue. However, they have sponsored events
and openly expressed positive views on the agreement, convinced cross-border
education suppliers can contribute to improving access to, and greater quality
in, education in low-income countries by drawing on the expertise and surplus
capacity of the developed world (Larsen and Vincent Lancrin 2002; Robertson
2009; Sauve 2002). At the same time, many educationists distrust the GATS,
precisely because of its contribution to education privatization, and because it
implies that a ‘trade’ forum, with no expertise in educational affairs, is deeply
inluencing education governance.
This chapter analyses the GATS and its wider and deeper implications for
education governance, with a focus on its legal and political effects. The chap-
ter is structured into three main parts. n the irst part we show how education
is being constituted by the WTO as a ‘services sector’ and has become the
object of an increasing amount of trade lows within the global economy. n
the second part we explore the legal effects of ATS. Speciically, we aim to
respond to questions such as: What are the speciic regulatory implications of
ATS for the signatory countries in the ield of education? What are the barri-
ers to trade’ that the agreement aims to remove in the education sector? Does
the agreement affect the public education’ sector, and if so, to what extent?
In the third part of the chapter we step back to locate education within a wider
political and economic agenda in order to understand the implications of GATS
in the global governance of education, on the one hand, and the constitution of
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liberalized education markets at a range of scales, on the other. As we will argue,

one of the most important (and ongoing) political implications of the agreement
consists of the replication of its rules, principles and procedures, in a range of
regional and bilateral trade agreements which have lourished following the
ierce contestation surrounding the ATS in education, and its subsequent stall-
ing. Understanding the nature, scope and implications of the GATS is important
as it is part of a family of initiatives that are reshaping the education sector.
THE CONSTRUCT ON OF EDUCAT ON AS A

SERV CES SECTOR
Trade in services is estimated to be one of the most dynamic growth sectors

accounting for 20 per cent of global trade and one-third of global employment
(Karim and Naveed-Ahmed 2011). The US was the irst country to become
aware of its potential value in the face of its declining share of the production
of goods. For this reason, the US pushed for the introduction of ‘services’ in the
Tokyo Round of the ATT (1 – ), but faced signiicant opposition by many
countries, including those in Europe (Kelsey 200 ). After this irst defeat, the
US Trade Representative launched a strong campaign to introduce services onto
the international trade agenda; they also were able to count on the support of the
main service companies (among which American Express played a particularly
important role) (Feketekuty 2005) and their lobbies, such as the US Coalition
of Services Industry and the Liberalization of Trade in Services Committee, to
ensure that negotiations for the international liberalization of services could be
initiated (Robertson et al. 2002). A signiicant amount of resource, advocacy
and diplomacy was invested with the result that ‘services’ as a trade negotia-
tion item were able to penetrate the agenda of the Uruguay Round (1986–94).
During this round, the US was able to count on the support of the Europeans
and some emerging powers (Australia, Singapore, New Zealand), who, over
this time, had identiied their own major interests in advancing the develop-
ment of a services sectors. Consequently, a consensus on the topic was reached.
This resulted in a new agreement on trade in services, the GATS, described as
the ‘most ambitious and complicated commitment to liberalization of all the
Uruguay Round agreements’ (Weiss 2001, p. 271).
GATS Within the Growing Global Education Market
When the GATS was being established as part of the Uruguay Round, many
countries did not show a great deal of interest in the inclusion of education
in the global economic trading system. Instead, other services sectors – such
as inance and construction – were at the centre of discussions. However,
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for technical’ reasons concerning services classiication (speciically, the

adoption of the Central Prod ct Classiication drawn up by the Statistical
Division of the UN, which contemplated ‘education services’ as product
number 92), education became part of the WTO scope. However, since the
time of the Uruguay Round, the perception of education as an export industry
has changed drastically.
Today, many countries, mainly high-income countries, have prioritized
the export of educational services because of its positive effect on their trade
balances (Verger 2010). The economic weight of educational services in
the world economy has grown constantly since the 1990s. In 2005, the total
value of education exports was estimated at over 2 billion (Bashir 200 ),
whilst some estimates suggest that were the education sector to be liberal-
ized globally, it would have a value of at least $1387 billion (Robertson et al.
200 , p. 1 2). By 200 , the top ive exporting countries were the US, the UK,
Australia, ermany and France (OECD 2010). Education exports represent big
business in countries like New Zealand and Australia; for instance, in Australia
the value of education exports are not far behind coal and iron, generating a
yearly income of $2.9 billion (Australian Government 2009). In general terms,
rich countries, and speciically those from the Anglo-Saxon world, are both the
most active in constructing the emerging global education market, and beneit
from it the most (OECD 200 ). Universities from these and other countries
exploit more intensively than ever their services internationally as a means of
realizing new funding streams as government investment in education declines.
However, it is not only corporate universities or private education agents who
are involved in trade in education. Increasingly, public universities worldwide
are active in the education marketplace and, like private entities, they adopt
(quasi) corporate strategies’ to win bigger shares of this market (Wende 200 ,
p. 22). Regardless of whether education providers are public or private, their
commercial strategies promote education privatization globally. The reason for
this is that transnational providers who are public in their country of origin are
in most cases considered to be private providers in those countries to which
their services are exported.
Trade in education services lows have increased in the four main commer-
cial modalities that are deined by ATS. These modalities refer to:
cross-border supply (or mode 1) consisting of providing an educational

service at a distance, as in the case of e-learning;
consumption abroad (mode 2) that mostly concerns lows of interna-
tional students;
commercial presence (mode 3), which means the physical displacement
of the supplier to the importing country and, in many cases, involves
foreign direct investment operations; and
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 107 24/05/2012 15:16

Source: Authors with data from OECD (2010).
Figure 6.1 Main exporters of education (mode 2, higher education)
presence of natural persons (mode 4), which consists of international

teachers and researchers being contracted by schools and universities
(Knight 2007).
Of the four existing modes, data on trade in education services is most accu-
rate for mode 2 (international students). Figure 6.1 shows the recent evolu-
tion of the number of international students in the countries that attract bigger
numbers of them. The igure clearly relects the spectacular growth in trade in
education lows over time, as well as the above-mentioned dominance of the
Anglo-Saxon countries in the global education market.
Despite there being many actors and factors contributing to the constitution
of a worldwide education market, GATS needs to be seen as a key element
contributing to the generation of a global regulatory framework conducive to
the expansion and major dynamism of this market. In the following sections,
we detail how this trade agreement contributes to such an outcome at both
legal and political levels.
E A EFFECTS OF ATS
The main objective of the GATS is ‘…to establish a multilateral framework of

principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 108 24/05/2012 15:16

trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a

means of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the devel-
opment of developing countries’ (WTO 1994, p. 305). It is expected to do so
by guaranteeing the conditions of competition, reinforcing transparency, elimi-
nating trade barriers and price distortions, and avoiding divergence between
considerations of private and social eficiency (WTO 200 ). However, the
ATS is an evolving and uninished agreement: some of its articles still need
to be completed and others, especially those involving trade liberalization, are
evolving through continuous rounds of negotiation. Currently, the 150 plus
WTO member countries are negotiating whether and at what level they are
willing to open their services sectors to trade in the context of the Doha Round
(2001–ongoing).
It is important to remind ourselves that the GATS, as a multilateral inter-
national agreement, is also an international convention. Thus, for the WTO
member countries, the agreement is binding and requires obligatorily compli-
ance. Its content is divided into two main parts: one that is compulsory for all
signatories ( eneral obligations and disciplines), and another whose fulilment
is conditioned by the commitments established individually by members in
progressive negotiation rounds (Speciic commitments) (WTO 1 ).
General Obligations and Disciplines
General obligations and disciplines are ‘non-negotiable’ and apply to all

members and all sectors horizontally. These obligations and disciplines, most
of which are equivalent to those included in the ATT, are:
a) Most Favored Nation treatment (MFN) (Article II): this stipulates that
each member shall immediately and unconditionally treat the service
providers of a WTO member state in a way which is no less favourable
than that given to providers of any other member state. The aim of this
obligation is to ensure that there is no discrimination between member
countries. Its effect, thereby, is to spread and deepen the process of trade
liberalization in different territories.
b) Transparency (Article III): the aim of this obligation is to facilitate access
for transnational service providers to key information related to services
in each member country, such as administrative rules or licensing proce-
dures. According to the WTO, where this information is not available or
accessible, services companies could be relegated to a less advantageous
position. Members are therefore asked to create the appropriate instru-
ments to be able to respond to requests for information about their service
markets and to notify the Council for Trade in Services about the new
rules, laws or directives that could affect trade in services.
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 109 24/05/2012 15:16

c) Recognition (Article VII): in this article members are asked to recognize

the academic – or other – qualiications of service providers from other
countries. t emphasizes that the requirement for academic qualiications
must not lead to protectionist ends.
d) Monopolies and exclusive services providers (Article VIII): a monopolis-
tic provider must not act in a way that is incompatible with the obligations
of members in terms of the MFN treatment or in terms of the speciic
commitments acquired. The article does not specify whether this obliga-
tion extends to public providers.
e) General exceptions (Article XIV): a member may omit certain obligations
assumed within the framework of the GATS where they pose a danger
to the protection of public morals, or the protection of human, animal
or plant life. Exceptions because of national security reasons can be also
established. The text reiterates that exceptions may not be adopted for
protectionist reasons.
f) Increasing participation of developing countries (Article IV): this article
is the only one dealing with development issues. It stipulates that members
should especially attend to those market access demands coming from
poorer countries. At the same time, Less Developed Countries should not
be pressured too hard to establish liberalization commitments. It should be
pointed out that this is not a huge concession by rich countries since the
services markets in low-income countries are not generally very attractive
for transnational providers.
General Obligations and Disciplines to be Completed
As pointed out above, the GATS is an incomplete agreement primarily

because member countries failed to agree on the inal shape and expression
of important obligations and disciplines concerning domestic regulation and
rules during the Uruguay Round (Nielson 2003). At the beginning of the Doha
Round, two working groups were set up to try to develop and specify these
disciplines and obligations. The irst was the working group on domestic
regulation, whose remit was to develop Article VI of the GATS, and the other
was the working group on rules, in the context of which Articles X, XIII and
XV are discussed:
a) Domestic Regulation Working Group. Article VI of the GATS estab-

lishes that domestic regulations must not block the beneits derived
from the GATS’. The article mandates members to develop disciplines
so that certain types of rules (mainly requirements and procedures) are
non-discriminatory and do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in
services. The working group on domestic regulations covers this mandate.
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 110 24/05/2012 15:16

ts task, which should be inalized during the Doha Round, is centred

mainly on ive areas of regulation, including:
i) aliications or a tit de re ire ents (requirements relating to the
competence that has to be demonstrated by each provider wishing to
become authorized to provide a service in a speciic territory, such as
academic qualiications and other credentials that guarantee the abil-
ity of a provider to offer a speciic service);
ii) aliication roced res (administrative rules relating to the adminis-
tration of qualiication requirements);
iii) license requirements (requirements for obtaining authorization to
provide a service);
iv) license procedures (administrative rules relating to the award of
licenses);
v) technical standards (measures which establish the characteristics of
a service, and minimum quality standards). n short, the Domestic
Regulation Working Group oversees the establishment of disciplines
that guarantee that members’ regulations are not more onerous than
strictly necessary’ to warrant the quality of the services. To ensure
that members respect the disciplines adopted in the areas of regula-
tion covered by the Working Group, some countries have proposed the
introduction of a system of necessity tests. If accepted by the working
group, these tests will mean that a member country wishing to intro-
duce a certain regulation that is considered by another member country
too restrictive for trade will have to demonstrate that this new regula-
tion is absolutely necessary to achieve a legitimate objective. Necessity
tests have been applied to resolve some service disputes and on each
occasion they have worked against the regulator (South-Centre 2006).
b) Rules Working Group. The remit of this working group includes develop-
ing three of the GATS articles:
i) Safeguard mechanisms (Article X): these mechanisms would allow
member countries to establish a liberalization trial period for different
service sectors. f the member were not satisied with the liberaliza-
tion in a certain sector and could justify this convincingly, withdrawal
of the commitment could be speeded up. The low-income countries
have been the most keen to see an advance in these sorts of measures
(Jawara and Kwa 2004).
ii) Government procurement (Article XIII): the principles of the MFN,
and the commitments relating to national treatment and market
access, are not currently applicable to the government procurement
of services for oficial ends that do not involve commercial sales.
The Rules Working Group, and especially the high-income countries,
aspires to include this sort of operation in the GATS system, which
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 111 24/05/2012 15:16

will permit foreign suppliers, among other things, to participate in

PPP contracts in a range of services sectors, education among them.
iii) Subsidies (Article XV): the GATS considers that public subsi-
dies could have the effect of distorting trade in services, and so the
Working Group aims to develop multilateral disciplines to avoid
subsidies having these effects.
Speciic Commitments: Regulatory Barriers to Trade in Education
Despite the importance of the discussions in the two above-mentioned working

groups, the bulk of the ATS negotiations consist of the adoption of speciic
liberalization commitments. Unlike general obligations, speciic commitments
are adopted by member countries on a volunteer basis and in successive rounds
of negotiations. These commitments are ixed in liberalization lists that are
annexed to the text of the ATS when the round in question ends (WTO 1 ).
According to what is established in Part of the agreement, speciic commit-
ments are adopted with respect to two questions: market access (Article V )
and national treatment (Article XVII):
a) Market Access refers to the entry by foreign service providers in national

markets and the dificulties those providers encounter when trying to enter
them. These dificulties (or barriers) tend to be related to the dense regu-
lations to which the service providers are subjected. The six barriers to
Market Access that members can decide to eliminate during the GATS
negotiations refer to:
i) the number of service providers allowed in a certain territory and
sector;
ii) the value of service transactions or assets;
iii) the total number of service operations or the total number of services
produced;
iv) the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a sector
or by a speciic provider;
v) speciic legal or juridical designations of providers;
vi) speciic percentages for foreign share capital or the total value of
foreign investments. Members may adopt independent market access
commitments according to the different service sectors, sub-sectors
and modes of supply.
b) Commitments in National Treatment mean that foreign companies beneit
from a treatment that is no less favourable than that received by national
companies from the host country. This is one of the most characteristic areas
of the GATS negotiations and it is not present in other WTO agreements
such as the GATT. In practice, when a country allows National Treatment,
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 112 24/05/2012 15:16

it is allowing Market Access. As in the Market Access case, National

Treatment commitments can be adopted in the different sectors and trad-
ing modes independently. n contrast to Market Access, there is no speciic
number of limitations to be eliminated concerning National Treatment. The
Secretariat of the WTO describes eight possible limitations:
i) taxes and tariffs;
ii) subventions and subsidies;
iii) other inancial restrictions;
iv) nationality requirements;
v) residency requirements;
vi) qualiications, licenses, standards;
vii) registration requirements;
viii) authorization requirements (WTO 2000).1
As can be observed, barriers to trade in services are normally different from

those of trade in goods since they are not based on tariffs, but rather are incor-
porated into very diverse local and national regulatory frameworks (Berlinski
2001). Table 6.1 shows the main barriers to trade in educational services both
in National Treatment and Market Access according to the different modes of
supply contemplated by the agreement.2 As can be observed, some of the barri-
ers are of a sectoral nature (for example, they are educational measures), whilst
others cross-cut various services sectors (migration policy, rules for foreign
investment, employment regimes and so on). We can also see that most of the
trade barriers identiied are ixed by the importer countries, although some of
them are measures adopted by the exporter countries themselves (such as visa
requirements for foreign students).
The liberalization negotiations in the areas of Market Access and National
Treatment are politically sensitive because they are a one-way street. In line
with the hegemony of the trade liberalization principle in the context of the
WTO, the GATS opens up the possibility for countries at any point to intro-
duce new commitments in their lists – irrespective of the stage of the negotia-
tions underway. In contrast, the agreement contains hurdles to the withdrawal
of established commitments. With regard to this question, Article of the
GATS establishes that:
a) the members may not withdraw their commitments until three years after
their undertaking;
b) notiication of the modiication must be made at least three months in
advance; and
c) the members affected by the modiication may ile a lawsuit by means of
which it may be ruled that a country modifying a list has to compensate
those parties affected.
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 113 24/05/2012 15:16

Under these rules, the GATS effectively locks in those who sign up to them
(Robertson and Dale 2003).
To date, the liberalization negotiations of the GATS have not progressed
as fast as free-trade advocates would wish. Most liberalization commitments
in education have been adopted by developed countries (who clearly felt
conident in adopting such commitments due to the fact they count on strong
regulatory frameworks and a competitive national education industry) and by
new WTO members (most of whom have been forced to liberalize all kinds of
Table 6.1 Main barriers to trade in education services
Trading mode Examples in education Main barriers

1. Cross-border • Distance education • Lack of opportunity for accreditation
supply • E-learning as an institution capable of awarding
• Testing services qualiications
• Requirement for a local partner
• Legal barriers
• Restrictions on the importation of
educational material
2. Consumption • International students • Visa requirements
abroad • Recognition of foreign qualiications
• Fees for foreign students
• Working restrictions during the
study period
• Recognition of qualiications in the
country of study
• Limitations to currency withdrawal
from countries
3. Commercial • Educational branch • Prohibition of service provision to
presence centres abroad foreign entities
• Association agreements • No access to a license for awarding a
between local and foreign recognized qualiication
centres • Restrictions to contracting foreign
• Franchises with local teaching staff
institutions • High subsidies to local institutions
• Obligatory exams controlled by
professional organizations or states
• The existence of state monopolies
. Presence of • Lecturers, teachers and • Immigration or residency
natural persons researchers working requirements
abroad • Recognition of qualiications
• Employment regulations
Source: Authors.
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 114 24/05/2012 15:16

service, including education, as membership conditionality). Most developing

countries have been reluctant to adopt commitments in the education sector
(as well as in other kind of services) (Verger 2008). However, a provisional
list of liberalization offers presented by countries in the Doha Round shows
that a number of developing countries, such as Pakistan, Korea, ndia, Peru,
Colombia, Singapore, Oman and Bahrain, are willing to open up their higher
education sectors to GATS-based global trade rules.
Scope of the GATS: Does it Affect Public Education?
Part of the ATS (Scope and deinition of the Agreement) states that the
agreement is applicable to measures adopted by member countries that affect
trade in services. The sectoral scope of the agreement is very broad since it
affects ‘any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of
governmental authority’ (Article I.3.b). The latter type of services (services
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority) is deined as any service
which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one
or more service suppliers’ (Article . .c). This deinition has been the subject
of much academic debate about the actual scope of the GATS and its effects in
service sectors traditionally owned and provided by the state, such as education.
n determining if the public education system is affected by the ATS, irst,
it has to be acknowledged that the text of the agreement never uses the cate-
gories ‘public’ and ‘private’ when referring to its scope of competence. As
mentioned above, the GATS states that it does not cover services ‘supplied
in the exercise of government authority’, which, in other words, means that it
only covers the service sectors that are provided on a commercial basis or in
competition with one or several service providers. However, most of the WTO
member countries’ education systems fulil at least one of these conditions and
consequently are affected by the agreement. This is often the case in educa-
tion where quasi-markets were introduced during the early phases of neolib-
eral reforms from the 1980s onwards. For instance, it is increasingly common
for educational systems to include private institutions with public inancing,
public institutions with private funding, or public institutions that offer courses
at market prices and compete against private centres for students. Based on the
content of GATS article 1.3, Figure 6.2 shows whether governmental educa-
tion is affected by the GATS. It suggests that the ability for education systems
to remain on the edge of competition and, consequently, of ATS may be
highly limited in most countries. In her interpretation of Article I.3, Kelsey
(200 ) concludes that very few public services , as traditionally deined,
come within that narrow window’ (p. 274).
The only existing education communication from a WTO member coun-
try that deals directly with the public private dilemma is that of Switzerland
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 115 24/05/2012 15:16

Source: Adaptation of Fidler et al. (2005).
Figure 6.2 Governmental education within the GATS
(WTO-Switzerland 2005). Switzerland considers that private agents, whether

domestic or foreign, which fulil the conditions and standards ixed for educa-
tion by governments (such as respecting basic curricula), form part of the
public education system and thereby provide a public service:
private and public education exist side by side in Switzerland. In some cases, private
education services are publicly inanced if they fulil certain speciied criteria, just
as public education services may be inanced by students or other private sources to
varying degrees. Private education services and public education services may be
delivered by the same institution, regardless of the form, status or constitution of
such an educational institution, just as non-education services may be supplied by
an educational institution (e.g. consulting services). (WTO-Switzerland 2005, p. 3)
This communication has been used as a reference by the WTO Secretariat to

try to resolve the debate on the coexistence of the public and the private sector
in the type of educational services that should fall under the scope of the GATS
(WTO 2005). The GATS also affects the regulatory actions of sub-national
(local and regional) governments. Article of the ATS speciies that the
agreement applies to the measures adopted by members which affect trade in
services and that among them are the measures applied by ‘(i) central, regional
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 116 24/05/2012 15:16

or local governments and authorities; and (ii) nongovernmental bodies in

the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or local governments
or authorities’ (Article I, pp. 305–6). Thus, in countries where educational
systems have been decentralized, local educational regulators have to obey
the obligations and commitments existing in the context of the Agreement that
have been endorsed by the national government.
THE OBA PO T CS OF ATS
Beyond the (extremely important) nitty-gritty of the technical and legal impli-
cations of GATS, the Agreement has broader political implications for the
governance architecture of education. The fact that the norms and rules of free
trade are more deeply penetrating the education sector means that education
itself is increasingly anchored in, and therefore imbricated with, market poli-
tics, including their regulatory frameworks and procedures. In other words,
the introduction of education into the framework of GATS has spilled over
into a new wave of political transformations in the ield of education, such as
the deepening of supranational structures for the governance of education, the
settlement of shared rules for the establishment of a global market for educa-
tion, the transnationalization of education politics, and inally the replication of
the GATS rules via free trade agreements of a regional scope. In the following
section we elaborate on each of these, before turning to a inal conclusion.
Deepening the Supranational Governance of Education
The WTO ATS is aimed at reinforcing and dramatically transforming the

global architecture for educational governance. As argued in Chapter 2 in
this volume, the global governance of education can be viewed as a complex
vertical and horizontal scalar patterning, with education policymaking and
its implementation distributed across a series of scales – from the local to
the global. This new method of governance involves international organiza-
tions, international NGOs, big corporations and other non-state actors in key
education governance areas such as funding, provision, ownership and regu-
lation (Dale 2003; Robertson et al. 2002). Since the 1950s important inter-
national organizations, such as UNESCO, the World Bank and the OECD,
have inluenced national education policy (Mundy 1 ;1 ). Traditionally,
international organizations inluence the governance of education by shaping
countries’ education agendas through the diffusion of norms, on the one hand,
and in funding of speciic policies and programmes, on the other. However,
with the exception of a few UNESCO conventions, education regulation was
predominantly realized at the national or sub-national levels.3 However, the
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 117 24/05/2012 15:16

emergence of the ATS has meant the relocation of speciic aspects of educa-
tion governance, traditionally placed at the state level, to the supranational
scale. Consequently, the state has lost its monopoly in the ield of educational
regulation (Robertson et al. 2002). In the global governance scenario, certain
decisions are thus increasingly centralized on a supranational scale and states
cannot intervene in some policy areas as autonomously as before. The services
trade agreement takes on a formal sovereignty in certain aspects of state educa-
tion policy (Robertson and Dale 2006). Many of the regulatory elements in
the ATS are ixed by the general obligations of the agreement, while others
are being negotiated or are in the process of being ixed. As shown previously,
this happens in fora such as the market access and national treatment negotia-
tions, in the working group on rules, and in the working group on domestic
regulation.
The re-scaling of education governance driven by GATS, beyond formal
and procedural aspects, also deals with the ideological and political orientation
of education policy. As Stephen Gill (2003) has stated, the WTO and its agree-
ments promote the constitutionalization of neoliberalism; for example, they
favour neoliberal rules and norms institutionalized in the quasi-legal structure
of the state and in the form of international policies.4 A number of education-
ists agree with Gill’s observation and consider that the trade regime promoted
by the ATS in the education ield is markedly neoliberal in its orientation
(Robertson et al. 2002; Scherrer 2007; Schugurensky and Davidson-Harden
200 ). According to neoliberalism, the best thing for eficient economic func-
tioning and the distribution of welfare is market integration and the opening
of national economies to international competition. The GATS favours neolib-
eral-driven education governance in the sense that it promotes deregulation,
the elimination of taxes and other types of limitations to foreign capital, and
opening up of national education markets to trade and competition.
However, it should also be acknowledged that the content of the GATS
overlaps, and to a certain extent contradicts, the content of other legal and
political instruments for the supranational governance of education, such as
the 1 worldwide declaration on higher education by UNESCO in which
principled values and prescriptions on the functions of higher education were
deined (UNESCO 1 ), and the OECD and UNESCO guidelines on the
cross-border provision of quality higher education (UNESCO 2005). These
and other instruments, which do not have the pro-market bias of the GATS,
may be neutralized by the services agreement since they do not contemplate
the capacity to ix binding rules that must obligatorily be complied with by
the signatory countries, and nor do they come with a Dispute Settlement Body
as powerful and effective as that of the WTO. The only global legal instru-
ment that might eclipse the GATS in terms of transnational educational politics
would be a UNESCO convention. However, UNESCO members have never
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 118 24/05/2012 15:16

approved a convention on education matters of a global scope that could clash

with the WTO rules.5 As a result, at least at the global scale of governance, the
GATS is unrivalled as a mechanism of transnational rule-setting.
Transnationalization of Education Politics
Educational internationalization is not an exclusive effect of free-trade agree-

ments, and nor is it a recent phenomenon, particularly in higher education. One
of the irst waves of internationalization of education took place during the
colonial period, when empires, such as Spain, France and Britain, introduced
university institutions in their colonies to educate the local political elites. The
commercialization of education services on an international scale is not new
either. n fact, many of the European medieval universities were already used
to registering signiicant numbers of foreign students (Brock 200 ). The main
novelty that free-trade agreements cause in terms of international relations in
the ield of education is the acceleration of the dynamics of transnationaliza-
tion, on the one hand, and the commodiication of education, on the other.
The key difference between the internationalization and transnationalization of
education lays not so much in the scale on which the different stakeholders are
operating, as in the way in which the relations between them are structured. The
internationalization of education was traditionally carried out through coop-
eration and international trade relations. For instance, universities exchanging
services on an international scale, or those that cooperated with universities
in other countries, tended to do so within international frameworks in which
the relationships are established and designed according to state borders, and
often in relation to aid programmes or international cooperation and exchange.
As van der Wende (2001) points out, internationalization entails an intercon-
nection between state education systems, and is implemented in such a way
that the borders and the authority of the state are not questioned. As a result,
the states and, speciically, state’s regulation frameworks, played a key role in
mediating international education relations.
Transnational relations, on the other hand, are developed through and
despite nations. Transnationalization consists of a series of exchange circuits
for the production, selling and consumption of education services, indepen-
dently of state borders and other conditioning factors in which the universi-
ties, lecturers and students circulate more freely. n the educational ield,
transnationalization may take place through, for instance, the capacity of
an education corporation to establish branch schools or campuses in differ-
ent countries with fewer restrictions than in the past, in being able to issue
certiicates that are automatically recognized abroad, or in being able to freely
contract international teaching and research staff. To date, the GATS is the
one supranational treaty that has been able to exert most pressure in favour
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 119 24/05/2012 15:16

of educational transnationalization. t promotes the redeining of territories

and infrastructures related to the production and consumption of services. The
GATS’ system of rules also promotes independence and convergence between
different state education systems, as well as in shaping the common regulatory
frameworks in several areas of educational policy. This means that the role of
the state and national territorial borders are diminished in some areas since part
of education’s regulatory framework have become reterritorialized and ixed at
the global or supranational scale.
‘Conceptions of Control’ and Other Global Education Market Rules
As stated earlier, the GATS is not necessarily the only, or most important,
causal force behind the emergence of an educational market at the global
level. Many other factors and actors are contributing to the emergence of this
phenomenon, including the strategies of universities and other service provid-
ers for generating revenue through the attraction of international students. The
GATS rules, however, are directly related to the stabilization and consolidation
of an educational market on a global scale.
According to Fligstein (1996), the shared rules necessary for shaping and
embedding markets are ownership rights, governance structures, rules of
exchange and conceptions of control, with the latter a fundamental element
in the stabilization of markets internationally. By conceptions of control we
refer to the formal and informal agreements that structure the perceptions of
how a particular market behaves. Conceptions of control enable the differ-
ent actors in the market to interpret their own environment and the actions of
others (governments, other business actors and so on), and to act accordingly
to control the situations that arise (Fligstein 1996). High conceptions of control
enhance market predictability, which is a policy principle especially valued by
free-trade promoters and the WTO in particular (WTO 2008).
Free-trade agreements affect many of the rules that shape markets dynamics,
including ownership rights, governance structures and rules of exchange, but
we focus here on how they particularly involve conceptions of control. They do
so in three ways. First, by reinforcing the principle of transparency; as shown
earlier, Article III of GATS forces countries to make available and public
all kinds of information related to the provision of services in their territory.
Second, they bring harmonization and standardization of the regulatory frame-
works of certain policy areas, and by doing so they order and unify the wide
range of existing multinational regulations. It should be acknowledged that
the existing regulatory ‘melting pot’ affecting services in different territories
tends to be viewed as a real obstacle by transnational service providers. Third,
as we saw in the previous section, the GATS is very effective when it comes
to i ing and locking in new transnational rules to which national governments
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become obliged. As set out in Article of the ATS, it is very dificult for
states to modify their liberalization commitments individually and at their own
discretion. This guarantees respect for the principle of pre-visibility, and the
transnational service providers know that they can act within an environment
that is legally stable. Furthermore, these three elements indicate that in the irst
place the GATS bestows and guarantees new rights to (transnational) capital,
whilst presenting new obligations and responsibilities for the states.
Forum Shifting: From GATS to Regional Trade Agreements
Many think that GATS is not as politically relevant as was initially expec-
ted because the Doha Round negotiations are advancing at a very slow pace.
However, one of the most important political effects of GATS is rather indirect,
and consists of the fact that its legal content has been emulated and replicated in
multiple regional and bilateral trade agreements (RTAs) that also are aimed at
the liberalization of education.6 Focusing on the regionalization of trade relati-
ons is important because in contrast to the multilateral agreement, liberalization
within regional agreements is advancing quickly. To date, there are 15 regional
trade agreements in force worldwide.7 The high number of RTAs, and the fact
that most countries have subscribed to various numbers of them, have genera-
ted a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of agreements with overlap between them, and with the
multilateral agreements, which is something that raises the concerns of the WTO
itself:
What has been termed the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of customs unions, common markets,
regional and bilateral free trade areas, preferences and an endless assortment of
miscellaneous trade deals has almost reached the point where MFN treatment is
exceptional treatment. Certainly the term might now be better deined as FN,
Least-Favored Nation treatment. (WTO, 2004, p. 19)
Most RTAs were created after the WTO was constituted (there were around
125 in the year 1995, and this number tripled in the following ten-year period).
The WTO itself recognizes that the numerous impasses that the multilate-
ral negotiations were confronted with was likely the cause of this dramatic
increase in numbers of RTAs (WTO 2004). However, as Susan Sell (2009)
also puts it, advocates of free trade who have been confounded by the slow
progress of WTO mechanisms have shifted forums vertically, from the multi-
lateral to the regional bilateral, in order to achieve their political goal of a more
liberalized global economy. Speciically, the US and the EU have embarked
on a sort of race to capture new markets through regional trade initiatives,
adopting what might be referred to as a two-track strategy; that is, they are
actively promoting trade liberalization at the global and bilateral levels simul-
taneously. In fact, regional forums are preferred as it is easier to impose their
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 121 24/05/2012 15:16

preferences at different scales, particularly as many of the developing coun-

tries have become better organized and empowered at the multilateral level
(Wilkinson 2004). It is not coincidental then that 44 per cent of the RTAs in
force have been promoted by the US or European countries.8
Another advantage of RTAs over the multilateral framework, at least in the
eyes of free-trade advocates, is that they promote more ambitious levels of
services liberalization than the GATS (Shadlen 2005). And whilst the articles
and rules contained in GATS and RTAs are very similar, the latter (above all
north-south Free Trade Agreements) are usually less lexible and less develop-
ment-friendly than GATS. Indeed, it could be argued that particular elements
make RTAs more liberal than GATS, and might well be called GATS-plus
(Abugattas 2005). To begin, the RTAs’ thematic scope is usually broader; for
instance, numerous regional agreements include government procurement disci-
plines, while GATS does not include these yet. Second, some RTAs, such as the
EU–Mercosur Association, do not allow exceptions to the MFN principle, and
others, such as the polemic and failed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas,
did consider national treatment as a general obligation, ergo non-negotiable
(Berlinski 2001). This implies that it would not be possible for members to main-
tain certain restrictions in terms of national treatment. Third, the RTAs’ system
for the acquisition of commitments is the negative list (instead of the GATS
positive list). Therefore, countries have to list the service sectors that they do not
want to open to trade, and it is assumed that all sectors that are not included can
become liberalized. Finally, some RTAs, such as the North America Free Trade
Agreement, contemplate the ‘like investor to state’ norm. This norm permits
private actors (normally transnational corporations) to make use of the dispute
settlement mechanism of the trade agreement without the mediation of any state.
CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that the GATS represents an ambitious political project in

market-making in education since it is the clearest expression of the multi-
lateral system working to open market opportunities for the private sector in
education systems worldwide. However, the WTO ATS is not the only force
producing a stable and expanding global education market. The constitution
of this market, as with any other institutional change, is driven by material,
normative and regulatory elements (Campbell 2004). Although these elements
are interlinked and also feed into each other, they are analytically different.
At the material level, the global education market is mostly supported by the
fact that cross-border trade in education is a growing business that gener-
ates billions of dollars annually. Thus, many education stakeholders, such as
governments, education corporations and universities, are strategically acting
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 122 24/05/2012 15:16

to take over a portion of this market. Multilateral organizations such as the

IFC are also supporting the expansion of this market via lending operations
(see Mundy and Menashy in this volume). At the normative level, the fact
that more and more education stakeholders, independently of whether they
are private or public, governmental or nongovernmental, perceive trade in
education as a legitimate source of income, and are increasingly aware of the
important economic revenue that education commerce generates, contributes
in signiicant ways to the constitution of an education market globally. The
World Bank and, especially, the OECD, also play an important role when it
comes to disseminating norms concerning the desirability of trade in education
services amongst their members, and in relation to the international education
community.
But it is the regulatory dimension where the ATS makes its primary inter-
vention. The WTO services agreement is the most important regulatory lever in
the constitution of a global education market. This trade agreement has become
a key element for the governance of education markets due to the fact that,
among other effects, it ixes transnational procedures and quality standards for
the international provision of education and sets in place iscal advantages and
non-discriminatory subsidy systems to stimulate the activity of transnational
education providers. The GATS rules also enhance market predictability and,
in Fligstein (1996) terms, contributes to a heightened conception of control
among the education industry over the educational market behaviours.
Despite the regulatory powers of GATS, there are some elements that seem
to limit its political impact. Amongst them is the fact that some articles of the
agreement are uninished and that important elements – such as market access
and national treatment – are still under negotiation. Although we have not
explored it in this chapter, another political barrier to education liberalization
under the GATS is the civil society resistance it has met at a range of scales
(Verger and Novelli 2010). However, the fact that its rules, principles and
procedures have been replicated and indeed even radicalized in hundreds of
regional trade agreements, contributes to advance the GATS political project
of a more globally liberalized education services market. The more open and
predictable the functioning of this marketplace via multilateral and bilateral
trade agreements, the greater the opportunities for those actors once relegated
to the private (non-state for-proit) sector to beneit from PPP contracts and
other education arrangements internationally.
NOTES
1 Clearly, many of the questions currently covered by NT coincide with those being discussed in
the Domestic Regulations and Rules Working roups. Consequently, once both groups have
deined the inal disciplines, NT questions will not be as central to the ATS negotiations.
104-127 Pt2 Ch6.indd 123 24/05/2012 15:16

2 Most of these barriers are included in the Communiqu s on Education issued by the delega-
tions of the US and Australia in the WTO Council on Trade in Services.
t could be argued that the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS), without having the
status of an international convention, had important legal implications in the education sector
in the late 1 0s early 1 0s. Via credit conditionality, they introduced privatization and pro-
market rules in the way social services were governed in a range of low-income countries.
4 It is interesting to note that the term constitutionalization is used by Gill as a metaphor to
indicate the legal weight of these agreements. However, the author does not express this force-
fully. The national constitution of many countries is legally subordinate to the results and
contents of the ATS and other free-trade agreements. Consequently, when a country ratiies
an agreement of this kind, it may ind it has to adapt the content of its national constitution to
the obligations included in the agreement.
5 This does not apply to the regional scale, since UNESCO has promoted numerous Regional
Conventions on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education’,
available at: www.unesco.org legal index.shtml (accessed 15 March 200 ). Although not
directly related to education, the existing UNESCO convention that directly contradicts the
principles and logic of the WTO agreements is the Convention on the Protection and Promotion
of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. t establishes that culture is not a commodity and that
the market cannot be the exclusive regulator of the international exchange of cultural goods
because it would mean the loss of cultural diversity. Therefore, policies for the protection of
cultural diversity should be allowed even if they become barriers to trade (UNESCO 2005b,
Article 2.2).
6 The particular form of RTAs can differ. The most common are economic association, free-
trade agreement and custom agreement.
See http: rtais.wto.org ui PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (accessed March 2011).
8 Ibid.
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7. Private foundations, philanthropy
and partnership in education and
development: Mapping the terrain
Prachi Srivastava and Su-Ann Oh
INTRODUCTION
‘Partnership’ between the public and private sectors is increasingly touted

as an advantageous way of inancing and delivering education in develop-
ing countries. Within this context, there is a general belief that partnerships
with, and philanthropy by, private foundations are ideologically neutral and
procedurally effective and eficient. This is despite previous research, though
largely focused on American foundations and Western philanthropy, which
shows highly complex and often self-interested motivations and colonial, neo-
colonial and imperialist paradigms underpinning education delivery through
private foundations (Arnove 1980; Berman 1983; Davis 1976; King 1971).
Given the reported increase of private foundations globally, and their growing
prominence in key international fora, such as the World Economic Forum, the
main purpose of this chapter is to more solidly grasp the role that private foun-
dations are currently playing in education inance and delivery in the global
South’. The guiding intention is to call attention to this inluential group of
actors, and establish a renewed research agenda on the topic.
Results of a review of key developments indicate that, as a set of actors, private
foundations form a complex matrix of local and international actors about which
we know very little, and claims about their eficiency and effectiveness in educa-
tion inance and delivery are premature. We argue that a renewed interest in
private foundations by international policy actors is driven by two particular
discourses – one resulting from the macro-policy backdrop for education inance
and the other entrenched in an uncritical ideological acceptance of a logic of
neutrality, and the eficiency and effectiveness of partnerships and philanthropy.
Our concern in this chapter is with the second discourse, with regard to philan-
thropy and private foundations. Additionally, the chapter identiies salient meth-
odological and substantive issues culled from the review for future consideration
and potential development of a research agenda on the issue.
128
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Private foundations, philanthropy and partnership in education 129
We used an operational deinition of private foundations based on Marten and

Witte’s (200 ) conceptualization of foundations fulilling the following mini-
mal conditions: not proit oriented; not part of the public sector; use their own
inancial resources (unlike N Os); led by an independent Board of Trustees or
CEO; and aim to face issues for the common good (for example, development,
environment) (p. 5). Additionally, according to Marten and Witte (2008):
The operational setup of foundations is extremely diverse. Broadly speaking though,

foundations can be classiied into two groups:
• Foundations as grant-makers inance projects and programs which are imple-

mented by other actors (typically NGOs).
• Foundations as operational actors inance and implement their own projects and
programs, either alone or in cooperation with other actors (p. 5).
The chapter begins by briely outlining the macro-policy and ideological back-
drops framing the general discussion and analysis. Following this, we present
the methods used to conduct the review and the resulting analytical themes.
We conclude with a discussion of the issues arising from the development of
a research agenda.
MACRO-POLICY BACKDROP
In recent years the role of private funding in international development rela-

tive to oficial development assistance (ODA) has been gaining prominence
in policy and academic circles (Adelman 2003; Bhattacharya 2008; Marten
and Witte 2008). The policy backdrop is a general realization that most DAC
donors have failed to meet the generally accepted ODA target of 0.7 per cent
of gross national income (GNI). Our review unearthed three main claims in the
recent literature. In fact, ODA as a percentage of GNI has not risen above 0.33
per cent over a six-year period from 2002 to 2008. According to current OECD
statistics, ODA levels rested at just 0. per cent in 200 , a slight increase from
0.28 per cent in 2007 (see Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 ODA as a percentage of GNI (in $US) – total disbursements,

2000–08
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

DAC countries 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.30
Source: OECD (2009, Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, QWIDS).
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Table 7.2 Share of education and basic education in aid commitments,

2000–06
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Education as a share of total 9 9 10 9 10 7 9
ODA (%)
Basic education as a share of 42 43 36 43 48 44 45
total aid to education (%)
Basic education as a share of 4 4 3 4 5 3 4
total ODA (%)
Source: Reproduced from UNESCO (2008, p. 209).
While the igures above are indicative of trends on total aid disbursements,
ODA to education has also reportedly been stagnating over the last few years
(UNESCO 2008, p. 208). Based on OECD-DAC data, the 2009 Education for
All Global Monitoring Report shows not only stagnating levels of aid to educa-
tion as a share of total ODA, but also a similar trend in basic education (see
Table 7.2).
These stagnating levels are further compounded by an ongoing concern that
there are inadequately disproportionate allocations to countries most in need;
for example, lower income countries and fragile states broadly construed. This
has spurred on discussions in international policy circles on increasing the
role of non-state actors through ‘partnerships’, and public private partnerships
(PPPs) more speciically, for delivery. This can be seen by the number of rela-
tively recent publications by key international actors on ‘mobilising the private
sector’ for education (Patrinos and Sosale 2007; Patrinos et al. 2009; UNESCO
n.d.), which strongly resonates in international policy circles in recent times
owing to the global recession and a general uncertainty about oficial aid lows.
Within this context, the independent resources of large private foundations
seem particularly attractive to supplement falling or stagnating aid levels to
inance education.
IDEOLOGICAL BACKDROP
Endemic to the analysis of private foundations in education development is the

construction of a particular ‘logic of neutrality’ by fusing two concepts – that
of partnership and philanthropy. However, as much literature on education and
development has argued, neither education nor development are neutral. Both
are quintessentially value-driven. Anthropologists and sociologists have long
argued that such value-driven ields are ripe for the construction of totalizing
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meta-narratives (or in the post-modern world, multiple meta-narratives1) that

ultimately serve to depoliticize contested ields by homogenizing contesta-
tion and neutralizing it through the presentation and afirmation of inane
generalities.
In much the same way, in her analysis of current development discourse,
Cornwall (2007) argues that concepts including ‘…partnership are as ubiqui-
tous as community, evoking much the same warm mutuality’ (emphasis in orig-
inal, p. 475), when, in fact, they disguise uneven power relations that continue
to shape the development agenda. Standing (2007) also argues that such
inherently warm and fuzzy words are ‘intended to invite automatic approval’,
leading Cornwall (2007) to conclude that their popularity has ‘as much to do
with their feel-good factor as with what they promised to deliver’ (p. 475).
The same, we argue, can be said of an uncritical acceptance of ‘philanthropy’,
which in the West is helped by its sustained historical relationship to ‘good-
ness’ and ‘benevolence’ traced to seventeenth-century Baconian concepts, and
further to Aristotle’s conception of ‘virtue’ (Sulek 2010).
Perhaps because of this long-standing idealistic association, the discourse
on philanthropy has faced relatively less criticism in the development literature
than that on partnership. More recently, alerts have been made on the latter’s
ability to disguise complex and changing power relationships between what
was long construed as a North (more powerful)–South (less powerful) relation-
ship (Cornwall 2007), its ability to ‘capture the mind’ of public sector reform-
ers without substantive understanding of the changes to state-market relations
in models proposed (Wettenhall 2003), and the sidelining of contestation in
favour of alternative models of education delivery and inance in view of its
apparent neutrality (Burgos 2004).
Burgos’ concern is particularly worrying as the gamut of actors open to
forming suggested partnerships include private corporations, NGOs, founda-
tions and others, each with their unique operating mechanisms, guiding logics,
and motives for delivery and inancing. Furthermore, the institutional frame-
works governing education delivery in different national contexts may inhibit
some of these actors from operating. For example, it was oficially unconstitu-
tional for proit-oriented actors to operate in education in certain countries (for
example, India). Other countries may have had other experiences of educa-
tion expansion. For example, NGO providers have been a primary force for
education expansion in some countries (for example, BRAC in Bangladesh),
and in still others, wide-scale government provision proved to be most effec-
tive in expanding access (for example, Malaysia). More speciically, and in
line with Burgos’ (2004) assessment, Srivastava (2010) argues that employing
PPPs in education in particular contexts is often undertaken uncritically with
no clear conceptualization of the partnership models under consideration, and
through a logic that is presented as neutral but is inherently contested within
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and between national contexts. This apparent neutrality is helped by conlating

the term ‘private or non-state actor’ to include all types of non-state actors (for-
proit and nonproit), and stressing the role of more socially palatable nonproit
and, increasingly, philanthropic organizations for education delivery.
Within this discourse, philanthropy and the role of private foundations in
particular is fast becoming a topic of debate. This is because of the estimated
increase in the numbers of new private foundations internationally, and the
emergence of ‘mega-donors’ such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
the David and Lucille Packard Foundation, and the UN Foundation (Adelman
2003, p. 11), known for the sheer scale of their development initiatives inter-
nationally. Thus, the term ‘philanthropy’ is unpacked and considered in greater
detail here.
Sulek’s (2010) historical analysis inds that the classically inluenced mean-
ing of philanthropy became almost entirely eclipsed by popular usage: either to
describe a socio-political movement, or to describe donating money to charita-
ble institutions’ (p. 198) during the second half of the nineteenth century. This
shift on donating money is important in shedding light on the current usage of
the term. In the broadest most contemporary common understanding, ‘philan-
thropy’ is deined as the desire to help others, especially through donation of
money to good causes’ (OED 2008), placing the emphasis on donating money
through organized structures rather than performing benevolent acts of virtue
as in the classical notion, while still retaining that association.
Analytically, philanthropy has been characterized as ‘private initiatives’
(Gardner 1961) and ‘voluntary action’ (Payton 1988) for public good and for
improving the quality of human life. This distinguishes philanthropy from an
ideal type of conceptualization of actions by government (public initiatives
for public good) or corporate (private initiatives for private good) actors. In
the Northern construction, large-scale and organized philanthropic actions
are often associated with the type of work that the three oldest American
private foundations (Carnegie Corporation, Rockefeller Foundation and Ford
Foundation) or ‘the big three’ (Arnove 1980) have conducted, often in the
form of inancial contributions to social causes, research and public works.
However, there is a myriad of other actors involved in philanthropic initiatives,
such as faith-based organizations, nonproit organizations, corporations and
nongovernmental organizations. Additionally, private contributions include
cash and other non-monetary resources, such as voluntary work, which can be
geared towards development both domestically and internationally.
Furthermore, with the rise in the success of social enterprise, different
models of giving involving a business or entrepreneurial orientation have
more recently emerged. In the literature they may be referred to as ‘venture
philanthropy’ and ‘philanthrocapitalism’, the latter which has garnered much
attention. Philanthrocapitalism’, as deined by Edwards (200 ), is the use
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of business and the market to transform philanthropy and foreign aid’ (p. 35).
Bishop and reen (200 ) deine it as a new mode of philanthropy which uses
the same business models that proit-oriented enterprises employ, claiming
that at the wider societal and ideological level, philanthrocapitalism describes
the ways in which capitalism works for the good of humanity. There is an
emphasis on intervention and control by the donor as a key factor in success-
ful programmes stemming from a belief that the market model has the best
chances of succeeding. In fact, Bishop (2008) takes the idea of donor interven-
tion one step further. Philanthropic donors, according to him, ‘now have an
opportunity to seek change by becoming like “activist shareholders” pushing
for a greater focus on results, and on restructuring the nonproit world to create
institutions capable of delivering it’ (p. 39). However, Edwards (2009) main-
tains that while a market-based model using business acumen and management
may extend access to socially and environmentally useful goods and services,
its application is questionable in addressing more dificult systemic issues of
inadequate infrastructure, unequal distribution of resources, political instabil-
ity and social inequality.
A conlation of actors and modes of philanthropy (for example, social enter-
prise, corporate social responsibility, philanthrocapitalism) and their relative
merits is evident in the literature. A discussion of all these models of philan-
thropy remains outside the scope of this chapter. Instead, taking Marten and
Witte’s (200 ) conceptualization of private foundations, we focus specii-
cally on them as a distinct set of actors and critically examine the assertions
of neutrality, eficiency and effectiveness in the literature as associated with
philanthropy and applied to private foundations.
First, much like the discourse on partnership, that on philanthropy and
private foundations rests on stressing the positive ideals of social service
and benevolence without a broader understanding of potential changes to the
responsibilities of the state in sectors such as education, which are typically
entrusted to it because of their association with the fulilment of fundamen-
tal human rights. This uncritical acceptance of an expanded role for private
foundations is helped by an ideological meta-narrative fusing partnership and
philanthropy.
Two further claims are made stressing the apparent advantages of philan-
thropy over ODA, stemming from neoliberal claims of the eficiency and
effectiveness of private actors. The irst is an eficiency claim. t is asserted that
private giving for international development will soon outstrip ODA (Adelman
200 ), and that large private foundations will have a signiicant role to play. n
the case of private foundations, this is tied to a belief that they are quicker to
respond, can mobilize signiicant resources and, unlike ODA, are more likely
to focus on contentious or neglected areas and marginalized groups because
of their relative independence from government negotiation. Though outside
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the scope of this chapter, the eficiency claim is most starkly exhibited in the
case of philanthrocapitalism, resting on ‘the use of business and the market to
transform philanthropy and foreign aid’ (Edwards 2009, p. 35).
The second is an effectiveness claim resting on a romanticized view of the
processes and outcomes of philanthropy resulting from disenchantment with
ODA processes. It is stressed that private philanthropy uses an approach engen-
dering local ownership, transparency, accountability and sustainability (Adelman
200 ). Owing to the inancial independence that large private foundations have
enjoyed, they have been particularly highlighted in this regard. These assertions
form the ideological backdrop to the discourse on philanthropy and private foun-
dations. The indings from our review will address each claim in turn.
METHODS
This chapter reports on a literature review that was conducted on the role of
private foundations in education and development as a speciic point of focus.
The research process involved three main steps: (1) searching; (2) screening;
and (3) reviewing.
Searching
The process began with framing the topic into concepts and questions that
could be managed and dissected for database research. Preliminary research
provided a working deinition for private foundations taking Marten and
Witte’s (2008) conceptualization. Associative keywords were determined
that could be used in the database. These were then divided into three main
groups in order to conduct the searches (see Table 7.3). Multiple searches were
systematically conducted by using the Keyword Group 1 in combination with
all of the keywords in Groups 2 and 3 (for example, ‘education’ AND ‘private
foundations’ AND ‘international development’).
Table 7.3 Keyword groups used in the literature search
Keyword group 1 Keyword group 2 Keyword group 3

Education Private foundations International development
Philanthropy Developing countries
Private donors
Public private partnerships
Non-state provision
Grant-making
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Table 7.4 List of umbrella databases in review
IDSa
World Bank
UNESCO
OECD
Scholars Portal-Social Sciencesb
Academic Search Complete
Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)
a
Notes: Included nine databases, b Included 54 databases.
A list of databases were generated by systematically assessing a master list

of databases available at the University of Ottawa library and making decisions
based on database descriptions and experience of prior use. Databases were
selected if they were deemed relevant in the areas of social sciences, inter-
national development, anthropology, sociology, political science, economics,
education and international relations. These database sources were also supple-
mented by relevant websites, personal research contacts and prior knowledge.
In total, 68 electronic databases were included for the search. Furthermore,
the University of Ottawa’s library, electronic library and a number of relevant
websites were consulted in the research process. The list of umbrella databases
included in the review is presented in Table 7.4.
Boolean logic was applied for more eficient searching in databases lack-
ing separate search boxes or that did not have the ability to apply key phrases.
Allotting keywords into a table and a speciic column number allowed for
a clear and simple way to track strategic searches and preserve consistency.
Keyword 1 was paired once with a keyword 2 and a keyword 3 (except with
the case of the DS database, which was already reined to search development
articles). If keywords 1 + 2 + 3 resulted in 0 hits, keyword 3 was removed to
broaden the search.
Screening
When screening documents, the titles and descriptors were used to grasp
the basic idea of what the resource material could provide. If the document
seemed relevant to the role of private foundations in education in international
development, the citation was marked, and in the case of electronic docu-
ments, the document was downloaded. The table of contents and executive
summaries were skimmed for a sense of how the document was divided and
for a brief description of what was discussed. If the abstract was ambiguous,
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the researcher applied the quick ind’ tool on the PDF reader for electronic
documents. For example, to determine if a document was speaking about the
‘foundations of education’ or about ‘private foundations in education’, the
researcher performed a quick search ‘foundation’ and read the context of the
highlighted results to determine relevance.
If a document was deemed relevant it was uploaded to the bibliographic
manager, RefWorks, where a database was created, along with its bibliographic
information to be read more thoroughly later on. Furthermore, the keyword
search chart was also added to count the ‘relevant hits’. Table 7.5 presents the
criteria for inclusion and exclusion of documents in the review. The screening
yielded a total of 79 works.
In line with Marten and Witte’s conceptualization of private foundations,
resources that dealt with ‘philanthrocapitalism’ and ‘social corporate respon-
sibility’ in the main were avoided. The researchers also excluded articles that
focused primarily on the role of private foundations in the development of
education programmes in the US or other ‘developed countries’. However, due
to the scarcity of literature on private foundations in education and develop-
ment, some indirect resources were used. This included references that focused
more broadly on philanthropy and non-state providers. Although these did not
speciically address private foundations, they were deemed relevant due to the
broader understanding of private foundations as philanthropic organizations
and non-state providers.
Table 7.5 Screening criteria for review
Criteria for inclusion Criteria for exclusion
• Are written in English • Are not written in English

• Are published in 1990 or later • Are published before 1990
• Focus on private foundations, public • Focused solely on nongovernment
private partnerships, philanthropic provision of education in the United
and non-state provision in education States or other ‘Northern’ countries
in developing countries
Reviewing
This involved the substantive reading of the documents deemed relevant for
the review. The documents that were screened in for the review were organized
into eight sub-folders in RefWorks: aid, EFA, foundations, NGOs, non-state
providers, philanthrocapitalism,2 philanthropy and PPPs.
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The following questions were used as a guide when reviewing the documents:
1. What data is available about the extent of private foundation involvement

in education and development?
2. How are private foundations in education and development positioned
within the literature? (For example, deinitions, mechanisms, areas of
operation, historically.)
3. What are the claims supporting the role of private foundations in educa-
tion and development? What is the basis of justiication?
4. What are the arguments against the role of private foundations in educa-
tion and development? What is the basis of justiication?
5. What are the areas of consensus?
6. What gaps remain for further research and analysis?
Each document was read and summaries were made recording the main argu-
ments of relevance in line with our research objectives. These were posted on
the database and shared. Documents and main themes were discussed between
the researchers before writing, and they were revised as appropriate.
ANALYTICAL THEMES EMERGING FROM THE REVIEW
This section presents the substantive analytical themes that emerged from the
review, addressing in particular the claims of neutrality, eficiency and effec-
tiveness of private philanthropy, and the role of private foundations in particu-
lar. The review found signiicant contestation regarding each of these three
claims.
Contestation Regarding Neutrality
(a) Private foundations are not neutral

There is little systematic examination of the motivations and aims of private
foundations, particularly those that have been more recently established.
Building on Arnove’s (1980) well known analysis of the ‘big three’ US foun-
dations, Arnove and Pinede (2007) stress that the apparent neutrality of philan-
thropic giving by large foundations was challenged as early as 1915 in the US
by the Commission on Industrial Relations which questioned their account-
ability to the public, status as tax exempt, and the danger of concentrating
substantial power in so few hands. These questions, particularly with the esti-
mated growth in numbers of foundations worldwide, are still relevant in the
current context. For example, some researchers have highlighted that private
foundations are not solely driven by altruistic concerns but with a certain level
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of calculated self-interest. For example, Berman (1983) argued that the big
three’s decision to concentrate funding on a limited number of universities in
Africa, Asia and Latin America, was not necessarily to help the most needy, but
calculated so that ‘we [the foundations] might get more for our money in the
long run if we pick one or two or three places that look pretty strong compared
to the others’ (p. 69). In the current context, some analysts argue that engaging
in philanthropic work can help to inculcate a positive brand image for their
benefactors’ corporate activities, a particular concern for philanthrocapitalists
(Arnove and Pinede 2007; Micklewright and Wright 2004). For example, Ted
Turner is reported as saying: ‘the more good I do, the more the money has
come in’ (quoted in Micklewright and Wright 2004, p. 11).
Despite assertions by private foundations that their expedience and wide-
spread reach is due to their politically neutral stance, Arnove and Pinede (2007)
maintain that they are not apolitical and, in the case of their international work
in education, may also be vested with spreading a new form of imperialism by
supporting changes that help to maintain and make more eficient an inter-
national system of power and privilege. Although these foundations claim to
attack the root causes of the ills of humanity, they essentially engage in amelio-
rative practice to maintain social and economic systems that generate the very
inequalities and injustices they wish to correct’ (p. ). Relecting on previous
research, it can be argued that the motivations of private foundations and their
benefactors have had a tendency to be framed within vested political interests in
response to perceived threats in the international order at speciic points in time.
King’s (1971) research on the Phelps Stokes Fund’s active philanthropic
interest in African education in the early part of the twentieth century posits
a strong interest in maintaining colonial structures and control: ‘…it was a
task of the [Phelps Stokes] commission to show the various sections of the
European community that interests of African and European were not neces-
sarily opposed’ (p. 101). Thus, colonial policies such as segregated schooling
and an ‘adapted’ curriculum of basic skills were propagated by key individu-
als in the Fund as a way of garnering larger funding from other philanthropic
partners and tacit support for its initiatives from the colonial community in
response to the fear that an educated African population would lead to libera-
tion struggles. Davis (1976) saw the Phelps Stokes Fund’s and the Carnegie
Corporation’s education activities in Africa as inluenced by American educa-
tion practice and rooted in South African and British colonial thought and prac-
tice (p. 90), and framed in a distorted sense of ‘goodness’: ‘Doing good on
behalf of Africans…meant opposing the repression they experienced but not
the system that imposed the repression’ (p. 88).
The end of World War II was also seen as a key turning point for larger
scale private investment in education by foundations in covertly concretizing
American foreign policy in a new emerging world order through the then new
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model of technical assistance, focusing on creating and developing universi-

ties (Berman 1983; Coleman and Court 1993). Berman’s (1983) Gramscian
analysis of the big three further positioned their work as a way of achieving
cultural hegemony and strengthening America’s position during the Cold War
by replicating American cultural capital through the expansion of a speciic
American-centric model of higher education abroad.
Much like earlier times, in the current context, similar questions about the
motivations behind the rising inluence of new Southern donors’ in parts of
the ‘South’, most notably China and India in Africa, are being raised coincid-
ing with a reported rise in the numbers of private foundations in the BRIC
countries, South Africa and the Middle East. Citing examples of scholarships,
exchange programmes and skills training programmes among other forms of
investment, analysts are trying to understand whether these are instances of
friendly South–South cooperation, some new form of colonial exchange, or
economic self-interest (McCormick 2008; Six 2009). It remains to be seen
if, like their Northern counterparts, Southern foundations, particularly from
BRIC countries quickly gaining prominence in a changing international order,
will aid in the establishment of a changed world polity through the inluence of
their soft power and, if so, in what ways.
In any case, as previous research has shown, given the strength of politi-
cal impulses that steer the activities of private foundations and the inluence
of personal background that drives their establishment by inluential individual
benefactors, it would be simplistic to assume that foundations are ideologically
and politically neutral entities, or indeed those with entirely benevolent inten-
tions. The OECD (2003) report on philanthropic foundations and development
cooperation, though generally positive about private foundations, highlights that:
At birth foundations relect the ideas of their founders especially in America
from a Protestant Christian background’ (p. 17). This Protestant work ethic is
traced by many analysts as undergirding the emphasis in many American foun-
dations on establishing programmes that create conditions to help individuals
help themselves. In education and development, this can be seen in an emphasis
on fellowship and scholarship programmes for emerging or established scholars
from developing countries, as exempliied by those of the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations, rather than on the kind of wide-scale structural educational change
that was envisioned (idealistically, in any case) at Jomtien and Dakar.
Of course, not all prominent foundations position themselves as politically
neutral. The Open Society Institute (OSI) and Soros Foundations Network
is an example of a network of foundations that are explicitly political. The
goal of the OSI Education Support Program is to ‘support education reform in
countries in transition, combining best practice and policy to strengthen open
society values. ESP works to facilitate change in education and national policy
development’ (see http://www.soros.org/initiatives/esp/about). This follows
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from the general vision of OSI to support democratic and open societies. In
fact, the Soros foundations are often treated with suspicion by government
actors precisely because of their mandate to promote open society (Oh and
Srivastava 2009). Thus, the point of analytic importance in the study of private
foundations is what their values and motivations are, and whether they are
explicitly or implicitly expressed in their aims and work.
(b) A move from global responsibility for development to individual giving

The review traced a move in the literature away from notions of international
development couched in ideals of global responsibility between countries
towards a preference for individual and private giving. This belief stems from
a view that ODA channels are lengthy, unresponsive and complicated, lead-
ing some analysts to conclude that organized and individual private giving
is a positive and more direct response. Furthermore, and despite the fact that
organized giving through private foundations or corporations, for example,
have different modalities and are further different from individual remittances,
they are becoming increasingly conlated in the literature under the broader
term of ‘philanthropy’. The addition of ‘remittances’ to the title of the annual
Global Index of Philanthropy in 2009, now the Global Index of Philanthropy
and Remittances, starkly highlights this viewpoint and, while outside the main
scope of the review, deserves some mention here.
The argument in the literature is that while the majority of remittances go
towards supporting the basic needs of migrants’ families, some are leveraged
to maximize development impact by directly funding community-based proj-
ects. According to Adelman (2009), in order to have a more accurate picture
of total private philanthropy, individual remittances and foreign direct invest-
ment should be added to funding estimates, adding that ‘the World Bank and
other studies are clear that the funds sent back by migrants to their families and
to community development projects are one of the strongest poverty reduc-
tion forces in poor countries’ (p. 23). Critics argue that while remittances and
foreign direct investment may have a substantial impact on development, these
are ‘complicated, contested and in some cases harmful to social and environ-
mental goals’ (Edwards 2009, p. 37). For example, there is evidence to suggest
that the distribution of remittances in communities and families is gendered,
‘challenge[ing] the mainstream perception of remittances as a neutral sum of
money or a largely positive force’ (Kunz 2008, p. 1400). Though premature to
assess, if the distribution of remittances is gendered, in the case of education
they may further aggravate existing gender-based decisions about schooling
access within households, particularly as levels of education increase.
In any case, the inclusion of remittances into the discussion on philanthropy
is, in our view, controversial. It takes us to deeper issues about what ‘develop-
ment’ and ‘philanthropy’ are, and the different meanings, values and practices
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that individual societies attach to them. Are remittances a philanthropic type

of giving? Do remittances help to signiicantly address persistent inequities in
education and other broad development goals? A more nuanced consideration
and further research is required to accurately assess their impacts. Nonetheless,
regardless of whether the focus is on organized philanthropy through private
foundations and corporations or on individuals through remittances, the
emphasis on private giving puts the onus on individuals and private benefac-
tors without questioning the persistent underfunding of internationally agreed
targets by donors and, within developing countries, by national governments to
sectors of priority. Ultimately, transferring government and collective account-
ability (for example, the target of 0.7 per cent GNI) to private actors is a step
away from the principles of the Paris Declaration. This is a fundamental issue
given the lack of public accountability that private actors have to existing inter-
national frameworks.
Contestation Regarding the Eficiency Claim
Proponents of the role of private foundations in development rest their argu-

ments on the generally accepted neoliberal discourse frequently associated with
the participation of the private sector, such as: relative eficiency of assistance
delivered through private channels; moving relationships from a traditional
donor–client relationship to a partnership at country level; and greater lexibil-
ity in responding to local needs (CGP 2008; OECD 2003). These arguments
are mirrored in the discussion on PPPs in education more broadly (Patrinos and
Sosale 2007; Patrinos et al. 2009). A nuanced view of private foundations is
missing. This is exempliied in the OECD (200 ) report, which characterized
them as being altruistic, astutely aware of development cooperation policy, and
being owed ‘the respect due to an elder’ (p. 11) because of their relatively long
history in international activities. These overly positive views were surprising
given concerns raised about and by private foundations such as fragmented
activities, a concern for expedience over eficiency, and short-term funding
priorities (Coleman and Court 1993; Oh and Srivastava 2009).
(a) Private foundation contributions are not necessarily outstripping ODA

There is an increasingly accepted view that global philanthropy and private
foundations can increase overall aid eficiency by illing in ODA gaps in
neglected sectors and regions, stemming from the low levels of ODA generally
and a fear that oficial assistance may further decline due to the global inancial
crisis. This has caused some analysts to consider whether assistance is higher if
funding from private donors, encompassing a wide range of proit and not-for-
proit actors, is included3 rather than questioning the persistent underfunding
itself:
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Global philanthropy and remittances will play the most important roles in help-
ing developing countries weather the inancial crisis that began in 200 . Oficial
Development Assistance (ODA), though important for the less than 25 percent of
countries whose oficial aid exceeds 10 percent of their gross national income ( N ),
represents only 1 percent of total inancial lows from developed to developing
countries. Taking a closer look at the forecast for international philanthropy and
remittances in 200 , we ind that the prospects may be less dismal than expected.
(CGP 2009, p. 5)
Taking the USA as an example, based on OECD, World Bank and Hudson
Institute data, the 2009 Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances esti-
mated that American ODA accounted for just per cent of total American
economic engagement with developing countries in 2007, a decrease from 12
per cent in 2006, while private philanthropy, through a variety of different
organizations, accounted for 16 per cent (Table 7.6).
It is interesting to note that according to the data above, the total amount of
engagement by US private foundations in developing countries decreased from
US$4 billion in 2006 to US$3.3 billion in 2007. However, despite the decrease,
at 9 per cent it claimed a much greater share of US engagement with develop-
ing countries in 2007 than the previous year. In fact, all areas of private philan-
thropy claimed a greater share of US engagement in developing countries
Table 7.6 American economic engagement with developing countries, 2006

and 2007
$US (billions) $US (billions) Per cent Per cent

2006 2007 2006 2007
US oficial development 23.5 21.8 12 9
assistance
• US private philanthropy 34.8 36.9 18 16
• Foundations 4 3.3 2 9
• Corporations 5.5 6.8 3 18
• Private and voluntary 12.8 10.8 7 29
organizations
• Universities and 3.7 3.9 2 11
colleges
• Religious organizations 8.8 8.6 5 23
US remittances 71.5 79 37 34
US private capital lows 62.3 97.5 32 41
US total economic 192.1 235.2 99 100
engagement
Sources: CGP (2008, p. 17), CGP (2009, p. 16).
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despite their absolute numbers. This may indicate a decreased commitment

in outlay to developing countries regarding American ODA during that time.
However, with the change in the American administration and the much publi-
cized commitments to international development (Rodham Clinton 2010), it
may be that ODA contributions will rise.
Nonetheless, accurate global igures on the volume of private resources
contributing to international development efforts are unavailable (Edwards
2009; Micklewright and Wright 2004) and less transparent than ODA data.
Edwards (2009) is critical of optimists who expect that contributions from
private foundations will increase over time and that development-related
investments of ‘newer’ (for example, Gates, Google) or ‘newly large’ founda-
tions (Foundation Center 2008, p. 2) (for example, Gordon and Betty Moore)
will create an estimated total expenditure of at least $100 billion during the
lifetime of their founders. He argues that even if these assumptions turn out to
be true, there are no data to support the claim that private resources will outrank
ODA in the next ten years, except in a small number of cases where private
actors already play an inluential role (for example, Bill and Melinda ates
Foundation’s role in establishing the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria), and unless funds from private remittances and foreign direct
investments are included in the total.
In fact, 42.7 per cent of respondents in a recent survey of public and private
foundations in the US felt that despite the overall growth in international
grants between 2002 and 2007, American foundations are likely to shift their
attention to domestic rather than international issues given the constrained
economic climate (Foundation Center 2008, p. 3). Furthermore, since rela-
tively few foundations fund initiatives outside of their country of domicile,
a particular concern when considering ‘Northern’ foundations, aid from these
foundations tends to be heavily skewed towards the priorities of a small
number that tend to work internationally (for example, Bill and Melinda Gates,
Rockefeller, William and Flora Hewlett) (Foundation Center 2008), which
may not contribute to the eficiency of the aid system overall. For example,
the Foundation Center (2008) estimates that while 46 per cent of the amount
of American international grants supported the MDGs, coverage was uneven
(p. 10). Goal 1 (extreme poverty and hunger) and Goal 6 (HIV/AIDS and other
infectious diseases) accounted for the largest share of funding (Foundation
Center 2008), the latter which is closely aligned to the Gates’ priorities. The
same report estimates that health garnered by far the largest amount of fund-
ing (more than 40 per cent of total amount) and education came in sixth out
of 11 funding areas at less than 10 per cent (Foundation Center 2008, p. 11).
In the case of education, it seems that the effect of large players may have an
adverse impact on the amount of additional funding that the education sector
can secure given the limited resources that foundations have in the current
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economic climate and the priorities of mega-donors favouring other sectors

ahead of education.
(b) Funding not getting to the poorest

Despite the belief that direct funding from philanthropic actors will address
some of the ODA shortfall (Desai and Kharas 200 ), and the eficiency claim
in the literature that private foundations are most likely to reach the poorest
areas and most marginalized groups because they are relatively free of govern-
ment restrictions and are more innovative, it is not apparent from available
data that the countries most in need of additional funding are in fact receiving
it from private foundations. Data from the Foundation Center reveal a discrep-
ancy in this belief when we examine the composition of direct recipients of
international grants from American foundations (see Table 7.7).
Table 7.7 Top 20 non-US country recipients of direct grants from American
grant-makers
Location Amount Recipient count Grant count

Switzerland $1,513,735,980 140 585
England $926,540,015 669 2367
Kenya $594,273,978 312 758
Canada $394,943,570 724 2410
South Africa $393,226,255 546 1911
India $325,334,104 848 1707
China $293,238,283 510 1799
Israel $283,845,805 613 1914
Mexico $255,151,016 536 1520
Brazil $223,743,833 489 1225
Germany $160,688,667 229 440
Russia $160,590,966 266 642
Australia $145,744,192 213 466
Nigeria $115,147,005 228 476
Philippines $98,287,013 255 422
Netherlands $91,505,615 144 288
Italy $83,838,054 168 384
France $80,412,831 272 578
Indonesia $78,069,944 229 457
Uganda $69,222,538 203 448
Source: The Foundation Center (2008, http://fconline.foundationcenter.org/maps/IntlNumber.php

?map=&unit=&y0=All).
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We see that eight of the top 20 country recipients (Switzerland, England,

Canada, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, Italy and France) of grants from
American foundations are clearly ‘Northern’ countries and DAC donors them-
selves. It is unclear whether or what proportion of the grants disbursed to these
eight countries in particular are in turn disbursed to developing country benei-
ciaries. A further ive are the BR C countries and South Africa, which while
they undoubtedly have persistent inequities, are not the most in need globally.
Out of the remaining seven countries, Uganda is the only one to be classi-
ied on the United Nations list of least developed countries (see http: www.
unohrlls.org/en/ldc/ related/62/). Furthermore, it is unclear what programming
objectives the disbursed grants are intended to achieve and whether the grants
address the needs of the most marginalized.
Edwards (2009) cites World Bank estimates showing that 45 per cent of inter-
national grant-making by American foundations goes to a handful of emerg-
ing economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, while only 23
per cent of the countries to which European foundations made grants in 2005
were classiied as least developed nations’. Marten and Witte (200 ) found
similar patterns based on data from the World Bank and from interviews which
suggested that only about 20–25 per cent of spending from American foun-
dations went directly to developing country partners (p. 9). Estimates by the
International Finance Team Development Prospects Group of the World Bank
(DECPG) show that only 10 per cent of US foundation grant-giving in 2004
went to international development, and that only 3 per cent of recipients were
International Development Association countries4 (DECPG 2006, p. 3). This is in
line with assertions in the literature that most foundations prefer to work within
their borders, and towards a small number of developing countries which are not
the poorest (Edwards 200 ), threatening the claim that overall aid eficiency will
be increased by private foundations focusing on neglected countries and areas.
Furthermore, similar to the trend noted in the analysis of the Foundation Center
data above, DECPG (2006) also noted that much of that funding was channelled
through international institutions like the WHO or NGOs in Europe, rather than
directly to the developing countries themselves (pp. 3–4). This pattern of indi-
rect funding is likely to create more complicated structures of disbursement not
less, and likely increase transaction costs, thereby decreasing eficiency.
Contestation Regarding the Effectiveness Claim
(a) Lack of systematic evaluation on potential effectiveness

Adelman (2009) claims that ‘[i]n all its forms, private philanthropy tends
to focus more on local ownership of projects, transparency, accountability,
sustainable outcomes, and eficient delivery of services’ (p. 2 ). While it is
true that philanthropic organizations such as private foundations have different
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modalities than traditional ODA agencies and institutions such as the World
Bank and regional development banks, there is little systematic evaluation of
whether they follow a process that encourages local ownership, transparency,
accountability and sustainable outcomes. Coleman and Court’s (1993) analysis
of the Rockefeller Foundation’s University Development Program5 sheds doubt
on uncritically accepting claims of private foundations favouring a process
that engenders local ownership. In this case, effectiveness was attributed in
no small measure to charismatic individual leadership stemming from a long
tradition of ‘the utilization of its [Rockefeller Foundation’s] own permanent
ield staff as key actors in the institution-building process’ (Coleman and Court
1993, p. 216). In fact, effectiveness seemed to be maximized by using selection
criteria for the 15 universities in the programme that favoured expediency and
that would most likely garner programme success, making it dificult to assess
the Foundation’s true value added. Among these selection criteria were: famil-
iarity, ‘the most determinative criterion…a pre-existing or currently operative
program at the institution’ (Coleman and Court 1993, p. 213), strong exist-
ing leadership, potential for change, receptivity of assistance, prospective for
external and local inance, regional and national exemplarity, and geopolitical
considerations. Similarly, the estimated $350 million in grant disbursements
by 2010 through the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa by the ‘big six’
(Carnegie, Ford, Hewlett, MacArthur, Mellon and Rockefeller) and Kresge,6
to strengthen higher education in Africa, favoured the selection of countries
(Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda)
with relatively better developed systems on the continent (see Manuh et al.
2007; Mario et al. 2003).
Table 7.8 provides a summary of the potential of and concerns about the
effectiveness of private foundations as culled from the review. The review
found that considering claims about the effectiveness of private foundations
regarding their lexibility, roles in capacity building, innovation and indepen-
dence must be carefully balanced and evaluated against associated concerns.
Most importantly, in order to substantiate the effectiveness claim evidence
based on systematic evaluation is required. However, the literature indicated
that this is a foremost concern regarding private foundations, even by their
proponents. The 2008 Index of Global Philanthropy notes: ‘Private donors still
lack rigorous assessment of their results. Too often evaluation consists of look-
ing at what was delivered to a grantee, not what inally happened with the
goods and services’ (CGP 2008, p. 12).
(b) A preference for technical over structural programming

The majority of the literature on private foundations focuses on their interven-
tions in the agriculture and health sectors. There remains a signiicant gap on
the role of private foundations in education despite the long-standing work of
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Table 7.8 Potential of and concerns about private foundations
Potential of private foundations Concerns about private foundations
• Sensitivity and lexibility • Structural inability to expand the scope

• May enable capacity building of civil and outreach of programmes and little
society replicability
• Not ixed to volatile political cycles • Depends on the legitimacy of civil
or public budgeting rules society within country
• Innovative and risk-taking due to • Accountability and transparency
independence • Poor or little evaluation of results; little
• onger inancial commitments than adoption of best practices in this area
traditional donors • May take a technocratic or isolated
• Opportunity to work with local actors approach to development without
for more contextually appropriate sustainable results
solutions • ‘Flexibility’ and ‘innovation’ may be a
• High-proile personalities attract preference to follow development fads
media attention and public support • Unclear or complicated organizational
structures
• Uneven balances of power in decision-
making and target setting between
headquarters and ield ofices operations
Sources: CGP (2008), Marten and Witte (2008), Schaerer (1995), Scott et al. (2003).
actors such as the MacArthur Foundation, contemporary inluential players

such as the Hewlett Foundation and the OSI and Soros Foundation Network,
and the emergence of new players in education such as the Putera Sampoerna
Foundation in Indonesia, established in 2001, the Lemann Foundation in
Brazil, established in 2002, and the Azim Premji Foundation in ndia, estab-
lished in 2001 by the chairman of Wipro Corporation.
The current focus on private foundations in international development stems
largely from the integral role that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has
played in coalescing efforts in global health initiatives. However, analysts
argue that the effectiveness of private foundations in development initiatives
more generally is questioned. Critics contend that the preference and sheer
scale of global giving in health stems from a preference for relatively tangible,
technical solutions over longer-term, fuzzy, structural work – the kind that
is required for meaningful change in education. As Micklewright and Wright
(2004) astutely note:
The funds … include the Vaccine Fund/Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation
(GAVI), the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. But as the names indicate, these funds are
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exclusively in the area of health – there is no lobal Fund to ight illiteracy for exam-
ple. Health seems especially attractive to a large donor looking for a problem that can
be solved by funding a ‘technical’ solution (emphasis added) (p. 18).
Despite the estimated annual $US16 billion funding gap for education
(UNESCO 2010), the creation of a Global Fund for Education supported by
President Obama in 2008 during his election campaign, or serious engagement
with the Education for All Fast-Track Initiative funding process, has as of yet
failed to capture the attention of and coalesce action by private foundations in
a way similar to that of the global health initiatives.7 This may be because the
more recently established large foundations from technological giants such as
Gates and Google, and organized philanthropic giving by what has been dubbed
the ‘California consensus’ (for example, philanthropic ventures from Silicon
Valley corporations) (Desai and Kharas 2008), rests on an approach that is
‘problem-oriented’ (Marten and Witte 2008) and focused on ‘ “results” usually
deined in terms of short-term, measurable, material outcomes’ (Edwards
2009, p. 36). This mindset is in line with practice in the parent industries of
these foundations, and favours a preference for a model based on giving for
scientiic research and discovery in technical areas.
However, this model predates the California consensus and newer mega-
donors. The OECD report (2003) traces the history of a number of key devel-
opment initiatives by private foundations and shows that a scientiic and
technical focus was favoured to provide a particular ‘niche’ in development
efforts. The result was the Green Revolution with substantial outlay from the
Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, a number of initiatives in biotechnology,
and the development of contraceptives for family planning. It may be that the
relative lack of focus on education is due to the long association of founda-
tions with health and agriculture initiatives in the past, and the media attention
garnered by large foundations such as Gates currently. Within the education
sector, the most common examples of foundation-led initiatives in the liter-
ature are scholarship programmes for students and research fellowships for
developing country scholars to attend ‘Northern’ universities, relatively short-
term adult literacy programmes, and a focus on school construction instead
of investments in soft skills for quality improvement. The predominance of
technical programming by private foundations in education in the literature
suggests that the full potential of their effectiveness is yet to be captured.
TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA
It is generally accepted that the role of private foundations in development,

and speciically in education, is under-researched. This chapter aims to
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provide a necessary irst step towards building a larger research agenda in

this area. Below, we highlight the complications unearthed in conducting the
review serving to indicate the potential pitfalls and gaps that exist in conduct-
ing research in this area. We found that a comparative analysis on the role
of private foundations in education and development is hampered by a lack
of systematic comparative data, deinitional inconsistencies, and a gap in the
literature on private foundations involved in education internationally.
Lack of Literature on Private Foundations in Education Internationally
We found a real lack of literature on private foundations on three fronts. The

irst was a lack of literature on private foundations outside of the US. The
results and discussion in this chapter relect that lack, though the guiding inten-
tion of the review was to construct a more comparative knowledge base on the
issue. Unfortunately, due to the limited literature and data, we were unable to
delve in suficient depth on this point.
We also found a preponderance of grey literature in the form of organiza-
tional reports or working papers, many times sponsored by particular foun-
dations or written by foundations themselves with very little peer-reviewed
academic literature on the topic. This lack is magniied in the case of private
foundations in education and development. In our review, out of 79 works, only
28 were academic pieces. The lack of available literature may be due to the data
collection problems noted here and the lack of organized hubs in the form of
think tanks or research centres on the issue outside of the US. There is a need
for systematic and independent research on the role that private foundations,
particularly ‘Southern’ foundations, are playing in education and development.
Third, most of the published literature on private foundations is on initia-
tives in the health or agriculture sectors. As previously mentioned, this may
be a relection of the overwhelming role that the Bill and Melinda ates
Foundation in particular played in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and
Malaria in recent years, and in earlier years the roles that the established Ford
and Rockefeller Foundations played in family planning and health initiatives,
and the latter’s role in the agricultural Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s
(Arnove and Pinede 2007). Nonetheless, given the substantial funding gap in
education and the potential that private foundations are assumed to have, it is
surprising that there is little substantive or cohesive information about their
role in education internationally.
Lack of Systematic Comparative Data
There is no central global data collection system that accounts for the amount
of total disbursement by foundations or disbursement by foundations according
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to the development sector at the source of allocation internationally. Thus, not

only is it dificult to gauge a global estimate on total disbursements for devel-
opment by private foundations, getting a precise amount for the education
sector is next to impossible.
Data on American foundations are compiled by the US Council on
Foundations and the US Foundation Center, in addition to reports by various
organizations such as the Center for Global Prosperity’s annual review (Marten
and Witte 2008). Data on European foundations are compiled by the European
Foundation Centre, though Marten and Witte (2008) point out that European
data are much less complete given the different legal requirements of reporting
in European countries. Despite the existence of the Asia Paciic Philanthropy
Consortium, there are limited data on Asian foundations. There is a similar
lack in foundations from the Middle East. There is little literature on private
foundations in Africa, though a World Bank report on ‘community develop-
ment foundations’ (Malombe 2000) highlights the continent as one where there
are potentially signiicant contributors to local development initiatives includ-
ing in education. This constitutes a major lack in our understanding given the
changing global context, the emergence of China and India as donors, and the
reported rise of private foundations in the ‘South’.
Furthermore, despite overly optimistic claims that private resources are
likely to eclipse or compensate for insuficient ODA (C P 200 ), the exact
contribution of private foundations to education and development is dificult
to track since data by speciic types of non-state actor are not usually collected
or disaggregated at the national level in recipient countries. This is further
complicated where the private foundation may not be international but local.
This brings us to the need to reconceptualize the type of giving by private
foundations, traditionally characterized as ‘international giving’, if we are to
account more seriously for allocations geared towards international develop-
ment activities. Given the reported increase of private foundations in ‘Southern’
countries and that they, like the majority of Northern’ foundations, may prefer
to work within their borders to address pressing development concerns, the
category of ‘international giving’ is unlikely to capture actual activity towards
development initiatives closely matching MDG or EFA goals.
Furthermore, tracking outlow by international giving does not necessarily
capture development efforts for or in developing countries even for private
foundations in ‘Northern’ contexts. For example, according to Foundation
Center data, while the total amount of international giving by American private
foundations was US$7.85 billion between 2003 and 2009, Switzerland was
the largest recipient of grants over this time, receiving approximately US$1.5
billion. Given the high number of UN and other international organizations
based in Switzerland, it may be that the majority of this money was channelled
to development initiatives in developing countries. However, it is clear that
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tracking disbursements by international giving does not provide an accurate

picture of allocations disbursed directly to recipients in developing countries
and for development initiatives.
arying egal Status Deinitions and odes of peration
A related problem for data collection and comparison are the extremely varied
legal requirements and deinitions of what constitutes a private foundation in
particular countries. These are tied to various legal and tax implications of an
entity that is or wishes to be considered a ‘foundation’, and which are deter-
mined by the home country of the organization. For the immediate purposes
of this review, we used an operational deinition of the term based on Marten
and Witte’s (200 ) conceptualization. We found the deinition useful as it high-
lights the sources of funding, type of management and modes of operation.
Additionally, it can be used to operationalize analyses in research and bypass
legal deinitions of foundations across different contexts which may inhibit
comparative analyses. However, it was also limiting in that it presupposes a
model of private foundations that is inherently entrenched in Western notions
of organized philanthropy. There is a need for further conceptualization of
‘private foundations’ as a distinct set of actors, incorporating understandings
from Southern contexts.
ore iterature on Big Foundations than on ittle nes
Much of the literature addresses the role and impact of large private founda-
tions, rendering the efforts of smaller foundations invisible. For example, in
education, work on the ‘big three’ US foundations (Arnove 1980; Arnove and
Pinede 2007; Berman 1983; Coleman and Court 1993), and now with the addi-
tion of the Hewlett, Mellon and MacArthur Foundations, the ‘big six’ (Manuh
et al. 2007; Mario et al. 2003), was prominent.8 Many local foundations in the
Soros Foundation Network have concerted programmes in education. The local
country foundations have the autonomy to set programme foci, and employ
local staff to address local education issues. Given the collective strength of the
Soros Network and the visibility of the benefactor, Soros foundations manage
to garner some attention in the literature (for example, Oh and Srivastava
2009; Silova and Steiner-Khamsi 2008). More fundamentally, however, while
the literature acknowledges the growing number of local foundations in BRIC
countries in particular, we could not ind any published academic studies on
education efforts of local private foundations in these and other develop-
ing country contexts. There is some cursory mention of the Escuela Nueva
Foundation in Colombia and the Punjab Education Foundation in Pakistan as
case studies in the literature, but these would be closer to Malombe’s (2000)
128-157 Pt2 Ch7.indd 151 24/05/2012 15:19

construction of community foundations in Africa or Asia rather than private

foundations as discussed here.
As previously stated, the limited literature on foundations in education and
development focuses mainly on the experience of American foundations, and
does not address the issues, modes of operation or impact of local private foun-
dations in developing countries. iven the integral role that cultural speciicity
and politics play in the implementation of education initiatives, this constitutes
a major lack resulting in an incomplete and disconnected understanding of the
true impact of private foundations as a collective on the education sector.
Foundations: New, Old, North, South
Some of the more recent literature presents private foundations as new actors
in international development. However, private foundations and philanthropy
are not a new phenomenon. Arnove’s (1980) now seminal work on the big
three – Carnegie Corporation (established in 1911), Rockefeller Foundation
(founded in 1913) and Ford Foundation (founded in 1936) – traces their history
regarding international efforts since the early part of the twentieth century.
This is not to say that organized philanthropy and private foundations did not
exist in other contexts at the time. A notable example is the Sir Ratan Tata
Trust established in 1919 in India, predating the Ford Foundation. Similar to
the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, it was set up by a
wealthy local industrialist. However, its philosophical orientation was differ-
ent and it was tied to strengthening the collective public interest, closer to
Indian social thinking of the time, rather than values of individualism inherent
to the Protestant work ethic. The Trust established schools, research institutes
and hospitals, and supported the arts and cultural and archaeological conserva-
tion, activities which continue today.
What may be new is the growing numbers of local private foundations in
‘Southern’ countries, particularly in countries that have experienced techno-
logical booms. In such contexts, many of these newer private foundations
seem to be linked to the fortunes of the global reach of the Silicon Valley, and
may be said to occupy a place in a global California consensus. As a result,
in the BRIC countries and in South Africa, there is anecdotal evidence of
increasing numbers of private foundations established by founders from tech-
nology (for example, Shuttleworth Foundation in South Africa, Azim Premji
Foundation in India). However, there is a dearth of systematic research on
them. While anecdotal reports suggest that there is a tendency to focus on
local needs, and on education in particular, the exact nature of their activities
are not clear. In addition, there is little known about the scale of ‘South–
South’ philanthropy and how this compares to ‘North–South’ philanthropy.
Anecdotal reports indicate that with the emergence of ‘Southern’ foundations,
128-157 Pt2 Ch7.indd 152 24/05/2012 15:19

there may be greater instances of South–South cooperation than was previ-

ously possible.
Besides the unknown scale of philanthropy emerging from the ‘South’, it
would be salient to consider some epistemological questions, such as: Does the
deinition and practice of philanthropy in a Northern context hold in a develop-
ing one? Are the models of philanthropy in the ‘North’ being used in the ‘South’?
What implications are there for assertions of ‘imperialism’ when ‘Southern’
foundations are the ‘givers’? What are the power dynamics between Northern-
based and Southern-based foundations? These questions are not apparent in the
literature, but they are important because they consider the underlying philoso-
phy and ideology of private giving within ‘Southern’ countries.
CONCLUSION
A recurring theme in the literature on philanthropy and international develop-

ment is a burgeoning hope that private foundations will be signiicant actors in
plugging the holes left by the chronic underfunding of ODA, and that they will
apply a model of development for social change particularly in sectors secur-
ing basic human rights such as education. These are worthy goals to aspire
towards. However, in order to accurately assess these goals, we need a more
nuanced understanding of and systematic approach to conceptualizing, collect-
ing data on, and analysing private foundations from and operating in education
in the global South’. This review was intended as a necessary irst step in this
process and it framed the issues around the three central claims of neutrality,
eficiency and effectiveness surrounding philanthropy and private foundations.
The analysis showed signiicant contestation in relation to the three claims.
However, given the exploratory nature of the review, the chapter has thrown
up many more questions, indicating a real need for systematic research to shed
light on the many gaps that exist in our understanding.
First, due to a lack of data and serious contemporary research on the topic
we do not know enough about the contributions and activities of the range of
private foundations (for example, smaller foundations; ‘Southern’ foundations)
to education internationally to be able to make an accurate assessment of their
role. In the wider context of ODA, the literature has shown that there is an emerg-
ing trend to include philanthropic giving from all sources, including individual
remittances, in an overall measure of international assistance for development.
While this may provide a more comprehensive picture of inancial lows from
private sources, it cannot be used as a substitute for actual ODA. This is because
ODA is a structured system of aid, supported by international agreements and
legal frameworks. Despite its faults, it is meant to be a concerted, coordinated
effort that holds countries internationally accountable. Private contributions to
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development undoubtedly have their strengths. However, we do not yet have

enough evidence to judge their effectiveness and eficiency in providing good
quality services (including education) which are part of a concerted effort to
enhance the quality of life in countries in the global ‘South’.
Second, the review challenges the supposed neutrality of philanthropy and
private foundations. Given the general consensus in the literature that estab-
lishing a foundation is highly personally driven, it follows that individual
private foundations will have diverse intentions and motivations. This must
be taken into account in any discussion about their role in education, and their
commitment to internationally agreed goals and targets. As Edwards (2009)
rightly points out: ‘[p]hilanthropy has always been an expression of individ-
ual desires and passions, and it is assumed that those desires draw from and
support more-broadly shared visions of development and social change. If they
do not, societies may be in trouble as philanthropy continues to expand’ (p. 41).
Third, given their relative independence as a set of actors, the type of assis-
tance provided by private foundations is not coordinated, seems to favour
certain types of projects over others, and does not necessarily reach the poor-
est. These three points bring to focus the fact that, in the private foundation
sector as a whole, little progress has been made towards the key principles
of ownership by countries, alignment with countries’ strategies, systems and
procedures, harmonization of donors’ actions, managing for results and mutual
accountability enumerated by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. By
their very deinition, private foundations are privately funded, and in the case
of the larger Northern foundations are largely self-supporting. Thus, they are
not, in the strictest sense, accountable to the countries in which they oper-
ate or to other key bodies involved in the architecture of international educa-
tion policy or aid. n this case, moral accountability to their beneiciaries must
assume primary precedence.
Finally, the systematic gaps we encountered during the review point to what
may be construed as action points for a future research agenda on the topic.
This agenda highlights areas of methodological weakness – lack of system-
atic comparative data, varying legal status, deinitions and modes of opera-
tion – and knowledge gaps – small foundations, ‘Southern’ foundations, and
private foundations in education internationally. It is hoped that this will serve
to pinpoint areas for further enquiry, so as to inform and add to the body of
work on philanthropy in education and international development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The review was conducted with the help of research assistant, Chalaine Chang,
University of Ottawa.
128-157 Pt2 Ch7.indd 154 24/05/2012 15:19

NOTES
1 This is not to ignore the wider debate in the anthropological literature which was led by
Lyotard about the ability of multiple meta-narratives to throw light on multiple experiences.
2 The sub-folders represented categories that emerged as a way to organize the references for
the literature search; hence, the folder for philanthrocapitalisim. Resources on philanthrocapi-
talism were consulted for contextual understanding only.
At the time of writing, the global inancial crisis is calling into question aid commitments,
particularly in countries where aid is a discretionary expenditure. Of course, it is likely that
private organizations and private foundations will not remain untouched from the crisis, the
effects of which remain to be seen on assistance provided to developing countries through
private mechanisms.
nternational Development Association or DA countries have been identiied by the Bank as
among the poorest, and are eligible for interest-free credits and grants.
5 This programme was implemented in 15 universities in 12 developing countries, and was
renamed the Education for Development Program (Coleman and Court 1993, p. xv).
6 See: http://www.kresge.org/index.php/what/south_africa_initiative/
This was a cause of major concern voiced by lobal Monitoring Report Director, Kevin
Watkins, and Chair of the Education for All Fast-Track Initiative Board, Carol Bellamy,
at the Canadian launch of the 2010 Global Monitoring Report in Ottawa, 25 March 2010.
Engagement with private foundations was also the main focus at the invited World Bank
research seminar on ‘Leveraging the Private Sector for Results in Education’, Washington,
DC, 30–31 March 2010.
8 These publications are part of a series of books on the big six’s higher education initiatives in
Africa, published in association with the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa.
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8. A disconnect between motivations
and education needs: Why American
corporate philanthropy alone will not
educate the most marginalized
Justin van Fleet
INTRODUCTION
The inancial support available to achieve universal, quality education for all
children falls far short of what is necessary to reach global education goals. At
the start of the twenty-irst century, the international community pledged an
increase in volume, predictability and coordination of external inancing and
monitoring for Education for All goals (UNESCO 2000). Despite the renewed
commitment, approximately million children are still without access to
primary education and the levels of learning for those enrolled is particularly
troubling (UNESCO 2011; van der aag and Adams 2010). Estimates report
that an approximate 1 .2 billion in external resources are needed to achieve
basic education goals (UNESCO 2010). Although these are estimates based on
many constantly changing factors and socio-political dynamics, they are the
best tool available for demonstrating a tangible lack of resources to achieve
global education goals set forth by the international community.
With the failure of national and donor governments to fully support their
commitment to education, the focus has shifted to developing new mechanisms
to increase resources for achieving global education goals. A need for innova-
tive inancing mechanisms, which may involve private philanthropic resources to
complement oficial development assistance to education, has surfaced (Adams
200 ; Burnett and Birmingham 2010; nternational Task Force on nnovative
Financing for Education 2011). New donor education strategies, such as the World
Bank, United States and the forthcoming United Kingdom strategy, aim to engage
the private sector as partners for education in developing countries (Colenso 2011;
US Agency for nternational Development 2011; World Bank 2011).
This need for external resources and the emergence of new donor educa-
tion strategies relying on private sector partners makes corporate philanthropy
158
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A disconnect between motivations and education needs 15
an important topic of examination. Corporations are playing an increasing

role in the global community in the new era of development, characterized
by a variety of new donors, innovative inancing methods, new implementa-
tion partners and hybrid public private partnership models that depart from
the traditional models of partnerships between donor and recipient countries
(Brainard and aFleur 200 ; Fengler and Kharas 2010). However, there is
limited data on the relationship between corporate philanthropy and education
in developing countries.
This chapter draws upon qualitative and quantitative data from a recent study
conducted by the author to ill this research void, assessing the magnitude,
focus and motivations driving corporate philanthropy (van Fleet 2011a; van
Fleet 2011b). The mixed method study combined quantitative survey data and
qualitative interview data and a literature review of corporate social respon-
sibility reports. A survey was distributed to US-based Fortune 500 compa-
nies. The response rate was .1 per cent (n 1) for Fortune 500 companies
identiied as making contributions to education in developing countries based
on a review of corporate social responsibility and philanthropy reports prior
to survey dissemination (N ). An additional set of nine respondents from
non-Fortune 500 companies also responded based on afinity group participa-
tion and information from key informants. n total, 50 US-based companies
provided data about inancial contributions during a 12-month period between
200 and 2010. All sectors based on a modiied version of the Standard
Poor’s lobal ndustry Classiication Standard were represented.
Following the analysis of the survey, semi-structured interviews were
conducted with representatives from 15 companies; informal interviews were
also conducted with an additional ive companies. The purpose of these inter-
views was to gain insight into the decision-making processes of those indi-
viduals responsible for managing corporate contributions to global education
and the rationale driving decisions of thematic and geographic focus. The
combined semi-structured and informal interviews represented individuals
from all eight industry sectors.
Based on this data, the chapter argues that reliance on corporate philan-
thropy as a key component in supporting education in developing countries
is not a complete solution for advancing global education goals, particularly
in the most marginalized situations. First, the chapter reviews what corporate
philanthropy brings to the public private partnership conversation. Second,
the chapter provides an overview of US corporate investments in education in
developing countries. Third, the chapter examines the motivations of corpo-
rate contributions to education resulting from the study. And lastly, the chapter
addresses the primary critiques of corporate philanthropy to education apply-
ing the results of the study to illustrate the limitations of corporate engagement
in education.
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1 0 Public private partnerships in education
WHAT CORPORATE PH ANTHROP BR N S TO THE

PUB C PR VATE PARTNERSH P CONVERSAT ON
Corporate philanthropy is a main corporate contribution to public private part-

nerships and encapsulates what a multinational company brings to the global
education community. t refers to any philanthropic, corporate social responsi-
bility, citizenship, grant making or community involvement activity or invest-
ment implemented by a US company or an associated corporate foundation or
trust. Corporate philanthropy is a unique form of giving based on an institu-
tional structure that employs millions of people in a context where charitable
giving can reinforce or stimulate voluntary activity of all kinds’ (R. evy
1 , p. 1 ). Valor (200 ) suggests that corporations have three types of assets
which in turn produce three objects of contribution’. The assets are inan-
cial, real and intangible. Financial assets allow the irm to contribute money;
real assets allow the irm to contribute tangible property to the community;
and intangible assets include contributing employee time and expertise (Valor
200 , p. 2 0).
Corporate philanthropy is different from traditional forms of philanthropy
and foreign assistance for two primary reasons. First, corporate philanthropy
exists at the convergence of two interests: philanthropy and business. The phil-
anthropic interests are driven by social beneit, whereas the business inter-
ests are driven by economic beneit. The term used to describe the potential
for corporate activities to have a mutual beneit by creating business success
and addressing societal challenges is shared value’ (Porter and Kramer 2011).
The unique assets that businesses can leverage to fulil philanthropic goals are
often closely tied to the particular industrial sector of each business.
Second, corporate philanthropy has evolved, based on distinct corporate
advantages, leading to several mainstream approaches to giving which are
distinct from those used by traditional donors. These approaches include
donations of cash, in-kind donations of products or services, volunteerism,
employee-matching programmes, employee-giving campaigns and cause
marketing. The donation of cash can take place through grant programmes,
matching grant programmes or challenge grants, all of which transfer cash to
a charitable cause (Rubenstein 200 ). Cash contributions can come directly
from the company or from its operating foundations and trusts. Corporate
operating foundations and trusts are used primarily for tax purposes, allow-
ing companies to write off inancial proits as charitable contributions. These
entities tend to share the same name as the company, have corporate senior
executives as the majority members on the board, are housed within the
company’s headquarters and have a mission to carry out the company’s phil-
anthropic activities. n-kind donations consist of the giving of tangible prod-
ucts or services from the company or its employees to a charitable cause. n
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A disconnect between motivations and education needs 1 1
education, these could include contributions of books, school supplies, tech-

nology equipment, software and so on. Volunteerism can take many forms at
the executive level or the employee level; some companies may allow paid
time off for employees to volunteer, while others may encourage employees
to use their skills for pro bono services to the community. Employee-matching
programmes are very popular and leave charity up to the individual worker
as a tactic to enhance morale. n matching gift models, when an employee
gives to a charity, the employer matches the gift, typically with a limit for
maximum amounts. Employee-giving campaigns are contributions that are
generated by employees through programmes organized or endorsed by their
company. The company creates a donation venue, but the resources come
directly from employees and do not have a matching component from the
company. And inally, cause marketing, which takes on a variety of forms,
generally promotes a company’s brand or image through the sale of particular
products, sponsorship of events or paid advertising linked to a cause (Porter
and Kramer 200 ; Rubenstein 200 ).
THE ANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE PH ANTHROP

D RECTED TOWARDS EDUCAT ON
The annual US corporate contribution to education in developing countries

is projected at just under half a billion dollars – . million (van Fleet
2011a; van Fleet 2011b). US companies in aggregate are the seventh largest
donor to education in developing countries, after the World Bank nternational
Development Association, France, ermany, the United States, the Netherlands
and apan (van der aag and Dharan 2010). Of this total, 0 per cent is in the
form of cash donations with the remaining 0 per cent in the form of in-kind
products and professional services (excluding volunteerism). The majority of
the cash contributions to education come directly from the company and not
the corporate foundation. This trend highlights the direct link companies see
between investing in education and the best interest of the business irrespec-
tive of the foundation’s philanthropic activities. Figure .1 breaks down the
total cash contribution into its speciic sources.
Contributions to education in the sample vary in size across industry
and revenue levels, with the energy and technology industries leading in
total contributions. Table .1 gives the mean total value of contributions by
US-based companies, sorted by industry, Fortune 500 status and Fortune 500
tiers.
At 1 million, the energy sector’s mean total contribution per company
to education in developing countries is the largest. The technology sector is
the second-largest contributor to education, totalling 10.1 million in average
158-181 Pt2 Ch8.indd 161 24/05/2012 15:19

Figure 8.1 Breakdown of Fortune 500 companies’ total cash contribution to

education in developing countries, 2009–101
annual contributions. Technology companies contributed a larger amount of

in-kind products than any other sector due to the market value of the products
they produce and their educational uses. The third-largest contributing sector
is consumer products, with an average contribution of .5 million. Similar to
the technology sector, the consumer industry often makes products that serve
educational purposes.
Contributions are largely directed to nonproit organizations in developing
countries with most companies not coordinating their contributions with other
actors; this is explored later in the chapter. Companies in the sample make
contributions to education in 11 different countries spanning all geographic
regions. At least half of the companies reporting made philanthropic contribu-
tions to education in ndia, China and Brazil; in Mexico, slightly less than 50
per cent of the companies made contributions. Figure .2 depicts the most
frequent recipients by country.
The most resourced philanthropic contribution areas are science, technol-
ogy, engineering and math education (STEM), entrepreneurship and youth
enterprise education, workforce and labour market training, and women and
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158-181 Pt2 Ch8.indd 163
Table 8.1 Mean contributions by industry and revenue level (millions of dollars)
Mean contribution Mean contribution

Industry
(Fortune 500) Total value Cash n-kind Fortune 500 rank Total value Cash n-kind
Consumer .5 2. 1. Fortune 500 (n 1) 5.5 . 1.
Energy 1 .0 1 .0 – Non-Fortune 500 (n ) 1.5 0.2 1.
163
Financials 2.2 2.2 –

Health care 0. 0. – Rank 1–100 11. .0 .
Industrials 1.2 1.2 – Rank 101–200 2.2 2.2 0.0
Materials 1. 1. – Rank 201– 00 1.1 1.0 0.1
Technology 10.1 5.5 . Rank 01– 00 2.5 0.5 2.0
Utilities 1.0 0.5 0.5 Rank 01–500 0. 0. –
24/05/2012 15:19
Figure 8.2 Percentage of companies making educational contributions
girls. However, they are not the only resourced areas of educational invest-
ment by companies. Many companies also focus on primary and secondary
education through access, teacher training, child literacy, infrastructure or
gender programmes.
WH COMPAN ES EN A E N OBA EDUCAT ON
Most philanthropy from US-based companies is more than a simple altruistic

contribution; it embodies elements of a strategic vision for investing in devel-
oping countries. This vision relects how corporate philanthropy simultane-
ously advances both societal and business goals. Few companies indicate that
their contributions are made in an altruistic way untied to business goals. Most
subscribers to this paradigm also agree that even the most seemingly altruistic
contributions to education are tied to the business in name and brand identi-
ication. The philanthropic giving process in these instances also serves as a
motivating activity to help employees feel part of a company that does good’
for the world.
The overarching rationale for making philanthropic contributions to educa-
tion varies across companies and is often a hybrid of several corporate business
strategies. Several conceptual rationales for corporate investments in educa-
tion surfaced as themes in the study. Most companies incorporated at least one,
if not several, key concepts into their philanthropic vision. These rationales are
important to highlight as they establish the corporate interest in engaging in
public private partnerships in education.
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Anticipating Global Market Opportunities
Many US-based companies have recently grown and expanded, experiencing

shifts in revenue and production sources overseas. This shift has led companies
to make contributions in developing countries on a more frequent basis. One
corporate philanthropy leader pointed this out at the onset of the interview:
’m speaking to you from rural part of America we’ve been here for over 100
years. We were established here for lots of reasons, but our growth was primarily
in the United States But our real growth has only begun to accelerate at a higher
pace than in our established geographies over the last –10 years so, we’ve been
in a number of these – what you might call emerging geographies’ – ndia, China,
the whole Southeast Asia region, etc. but we really see over the last number of
years and certainly the decades ahead of us that a disproportionate amount of our
growth is going to come in these emerging geographies.
Some companies indicate that philanthropy is a way to enter new markets,

make contacts, build relationships and develop skilled workforces based on
the future needs of the company. Hence, some companies invest in education
in emerging geographical areas where they anticipate the bulk of their future
growth, building a talent pool from which to draw in future years. Additionally,
because of this need to anticipate new markets, the current geographical base
of their revenue is not a determinant of where they make their contributions.
Strengthening Community Relationships
Companies indicate that it is important to understand who their key stake-

holders are in different geographical areas and how they can be engaged in
meaningful ways with the company at the community level. Community stake-
holders vary from company to company, sometimes including government,
local oficials, schools or the community at large. Companies with large, long-
term presences in a community ind it important to be identiied as a good
social partner. Ultimately, one respondent noted, while lots of countries and
lots of communities may need our help and our support, it made the most
sense to invest in places where we were likely to be a big part of the fabric
for a long time’. Some companies indicate that they want countries to feel
better off for having the company in the community, thus making community
relations a strong element of their business and philanthropy strategic plan.
Empowering and Engaging Employees
Employees’ interests in contributing to society and feeling good about their

company’s social mission is important. Several companies create programmes
158-181 Pt2 Ch8.indd 165 24/05/2012 15:19

or venues to actively engage employees in vetting and selecting the recipi-

ents of corporate contributions. Other companies operating in developing
countries focus on harnessing employees’ skills and talents to create substan-
tive volunteer opportunities for positive engagement with their communities.
One Fortune 500 philanthropy director notes that these volunteer experiences
not only make employees proud to work for the company but also build skill
sets that are useful for the business. One inancial company corporate social
responsibility representative mentioned:
we’re a inancial institution, what our people are able to give in terms of expertise or
volunteer hours actually make a lot more sense to us and we’re actually able to as
a inancial services company to do much more than just write a check, so this more
than a philanthropy mission, this is kind of way of operating.
Some interviewees indicate that when employees use their skills to engage
in community volunteer programmes, the company adds real value to the
community. Examples of employee volunteerism in education include teams
of employees working to build capacity at institutional levels in inan-
cial management, communications or information management or having
employees lead tutoring activities, inancial literacy or science education
programmes.
Developing a Workforce in Current Communities of Operation
Companies also ind it important to invest in developing the talents of their

workforce members who live in the communities where they currently oper-
ate. This investment includes technical, skill-based training, higher education
programmes and programmes in basic or inancial literacy. n countries where
companies need to recruit skilled labour, they often make contributions to
institutions of higher education and then later recruit employees from these
institutions. One corporate interviewee says that making sure that the higher
education ield is very strong is important because that is where we’re doing
a lot of our recruiting from’. Other companies focus on the educational needs
of less-skilled workers in supply chain communities.
Brand Recognition
A company’s philanthropy often relects what it wants to be known for and

stands for in society. ts philanthropy thus relects a brand identiication strat-
egy, particularly with in-kind contributions. Sometimes a company targets
underserved communities with branded product donations in order to make a
measurable social impact while promoting its name in the community among
resourced consumers. One company representative states that it is important
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to get our product out there and our solutions and services, so the company
is really highlighted in the community and we do that in a way that really has
measurable impact in underserved communities’.
Innovating With Products
Some companies that make products used in education – primarily in the

consumer and technology industries – indicate that product innovation in
education is another philanthropic strategy. By providing access to new tech-
nologies and other consumer products, these irms often empower individu-
als to become innovators who promote teaching and learning. According to
some technology company interviewees, the donation of in-kind products
facilitates innovation and creativity in the education sector and relates back to
the company’s brand image. n some instances, companies use the innovation
that unfolds through contributions to improve product design on the business
side of companies, enhancing products for consumers and other philanthropic
recipients. Companies placing a high value on innovation in education see
their products as a key enabler of educational breakthroughs. This offers prom-
ising opportunities for the education community to do more with corporate
philanthropy and for corporations to invest in impact evaluation to determine
which innovations are most effective in improving learning and scale.
Fostering Greater Economic Opportunity for Consumers
Investing in education is viewed by some companies as a strategic decision

because it leads to economic opportunity in communities, which, in turn, leads
to an increased ability to purchase goods and services. The theory is that by
helping people climb the economic ladder, individuals will choose to trust the
company’s brand and use its products and services. n the words of one respon-
dent: people everywhere would rather provide for themselves and their family
and without education it will be hard for them to do so. So we really see it as
a key to addressing a range of other issues – it was just a really, really higher-
leverage investment.’
Creating Demand in the Public and Private Sectors
Philanthropic contributions are also thought to strategically address commu-

nity needs in marginalized areas and thus serve the purpose of creating
demand in both the public and private sectors for consumer or technology
goods. Companies also indicate that by investing in education, it is possible
to create the perception that the public sector needs, can use and sees value in
the company’s products. This new exposure can create product demand and
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increase sales in the longer term. One respondent said that the complexity of
products and services purchased by nations becomes an enterprise sale’ and a
source of potential revenue for the company.
M TAT ONS OF CORPORATE PH ANTHROP N THE

PUB C PR VATE PARTNERSH P CONVERSAT ON
The motivations for corporate engagement in education inherently lead to

several limitations. This section reviews the critiques of corporate philan-
thropy directed towards education and assesses the data as it supports these
critiques. The critiques are categorized into four conceptual areas: philan-
thropy and government; the contradictory structure of philanthropy; self-
legitimizing nature of philanthropy for business; and the dependency and
inequality perpetuated by philanthropy.
Philanthropy and Government
At the intersection of public private partnership activities, there is an inherent

tension between the provision of public goods and promotion of welfare by
the state, community and market forces. There are four main lines of argument
which maintain the provision of public goods by corporate philanthropic activ-
ities through public private partnerships: a) undermine government capacity
to build an education system; b) are morally problematic; c) instigate a lower
degree of government accountability; and d) interfere with the democratic
nature of public education.
(a) Undermines government capacity

n public private partnerships, the term partnership’ is often vague and implies
an agreement that is at times unequally balanced in terms of the contributions
of different actors (Draxler 200 ; this volume). While the foreign assistance
community has come under scrutiny for burdensome inancing mechanisms
(OECD 200 ), the corporate philanthropic sector only complicates the erosion
of government ability to provide education for its citizens by increasing
the number of actors in the education sector, placing additional burdens on
national governments. And funding is not necessarily directed to areas priori-
tized by the country (Fengler and Kharas 2010). This study documented 50
corporate philanthropy programmes acting independently of one another,
operating in 11 countries. Fewer than 25 per cent of the companies reporting
for this survey coordinated their activities with a recipient government (van
Fleet 2011). Figure . depicts the low frequency of coordination of contribu-
tions with governments.
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Note: Respondents could select more than one coordinating entity.
Figure 8.3 Coordination of education contributions
Working directly with governments is often not a priority and compa-

nies frequently shy away from the direct contributions because they can be
interpreted as in violation of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1 ),
further discouraging collaboration. Thus the pattern of corporate engagement
in philanthropy to education fails to create systemic and sustainable change
for the education system. The fragmentation of investments in education in
developing countries is consistent with iroux’s (1 ) assertion that private
sector engagement does not lead to more eficient services for society. ndeed,
it points to the opposite: ineficiency.
n some countries where companies have made longer-term commitments
to education given the nature of their business objectives, particularly in the
energy industry, the data points to a risk of reaching Aperovitz’s (2005) tipping
point of corporate interference in public policy. The tipping point occurs when
society depends on the existence of the corporation for the provision of public
goods. n one interview, a corporate social responsibility director highlighted
the company’s work in a small African country. The corporate contributions
to education, in collaboration with a ministry, graduated nearly a third of the
primary school teachers in the country from an equivalent teacher training
programme. Additionally, the curriculum the company developed in collabo-
ration with the ministry reaches about half of the children enrolled in primary
school in the country. Although there have been large-scale changes in the
education system because of this contribution, viable alternatives to support
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the education system may not exist if the company no longer has a reason
to have a business presence in the country. Dependency produces long-term
sustainability risks.
(b) Morally problematic tensions between the government and

corporate philanthropy
According to some scholars, a philanthropic activity providing essential
services to citizens is morally problematic (Alperovitz 2005; Edwards 200 a;
iroux 1 ; N. evy 200 ; Shiva 200 ). evy (200 ) argues that essential
services should be provided by the government and not by philanthropy, as
corporate philanthropy will tend to favour particular countries, interests and
regions, as opposed to society at large. The data in this study demonstrates
this phenomenon as a handful of companies have the greatest frequency of
corporate philanthropic investments in education. The favouring of particular
interests to the exclusion of others through philanthropy is a similar argument
made by Edwards (200 a) about markets, suggesting the dichotomous roles of
markets and civil society: in markets, we are customers, clients or consumers,
whereas in civil society, we are citizens and each has very different implica-
tions’ (p. 2). Both evy (200 ) and iroux (1 ) argue that combining the
two concepts of markets and philanthropy is morally problematic, and caution
against the argument that corporate engagement through philanthropy leads
to more eficient services for society. iroux (1 ) suggests that corpora-
tions are essentially amoral, as corporate culture respects few boundaries and
social needs when left to its own devices. Shiva (200 ) concurs with iroux
and criticizes the marketization of goods necessary for survival, such as water,
food, health and knowledge. Such critiques suggest that reliance on corporate
philanthropic endeavours for services such as education, which should instead
be provided by the government, is morally problematic due to the nature of
corporate culture and the implications that come with a world treating citizens
as clients and consumers.
(c) Accountability tensions between the government and

With an increase of corporate activities in the public sphere, governments
may no longer view themselves as fully accountable for the provision of
public goods. When a government provides services such as education, it is
accountable for its action to the community. Citizens can protest, engage in
decision-making processes and participate in elections as ways of holding the
government accountable for the provision of quality education. However, as
corporations become engaged in the provision of public goods through their
philanthropy initiatives, lines of accountability become unclear and leave little
recourse for civil society. Valor (200 ) suggests that corporations have no
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legitimacy in the provision of public goods, given their obvious democratic

deicit and their lack of accountability’ (p. 2 1). When a corporation’s ultimate
accountability lies with its shareholders, society’s concerns over education
provided by corporate philanthropy are less likely to be heard.
Data points to low levels of coordination of corporate philanthropy with
host governments. This can blur the lines of accountability as to who is
responsible for education in developing countries in public private partner-
ship arrangements. Companies indicate that in many instances, coordination
with the government is rather supericial. One company noted that for small
contributions, it is not uncommon for education government oficials to show
up when we are handing over a cheque or unveiling a new school for what
we would consider a relatively small amount’. However, government public
involvement at this level is only a symbolic gesture. The visual symbolism
and presumed rhetoric surrounding these events can lead the public to view
the government as an actor in the projects, whereas in reality the extent of
participation is limited.
As these initiatives multiply in the ield of education and the roles of the
public and private sector are blurred, Edwards (200 b) suggests that citizens’
groups are no longer able to promote a system of checks and balances with
their own government.
t may be easy to shift blame to one actor or the other when initiatives do
not lead to beneicial results for the citizens. This lends itself to the question of
who is ultimately responsible for the provision of education and what role does
civil society have in ensuring accountability in public private partnerships.
To counter the blurring lines of accountability, Hahnel (2005) suggests that
governments should stand up to corporate engagement by demanding respon-
sibility from the corporate sponsors, while at the same time holding them-
selves accountable to the public interest. Nonetheless, when the private sector
supports education without a high degree of government oversight, the govern-
ment is likely relinquishing at least part of its sovereignty over the provision of
education as well as its accountability to the public.
(d) Democratic tensions between the government and

The third tension between government and corporate philanthropy goes to the
heart of the conversation: what is the purpose of education and who makes
decisions about the purpose of education in a democratic society? Some of the
functions of education in a democratic state include cultivating character and
developing skills to participate in democratic politics, establishing a founda-
tion for livelihoods and sharing in communities ( utmann 1 ). Although
corporations are not the enemy of democracy, according to iroux (1 ),
their engagement in education is only plausible with the presence of a strong
158-181 Pt2 Ch8.indd 171 24/05/2012 15:19

democratic civil society that limits the reach of corporate culture’ (p. 15).
Corporate philanthropy addresses varying functions of education in the study,
but most corporate resources align with the purpose of cultivating employ-
able skills in the workforce. While these are not the exclusive functions of
education for the corporate philanthropists, few companies focus on human
rights and social justice, citizenship and democracy education, or education in
the context of grass-roots social movements. Thus, the data show that corpo-
rate philanthropists place a greater emphasis on the livelihood component of
education than on democratic participation or sharing in communities.
Edwards (200 a) cautions that the concentration of corporate wealth has
already reached a point that endangers democracy. Alperovitz (2005) goes
even further to suggest that corporations are incompatible with democratic
practices. n this vein, they would also be incompatible with the democratic
principles of education. f a corporate entity engages in education through
its philanthropic endeavours, to some degree it becomes a decision-maker
in education policy. iroux (1 ) proposes that allowing corporations to
have any inluence in the management of public schools or the content of the
curriculum enables corporate values to threaten the democratic purposes of
public education. Therefore, corporate engagement in education may push an
agenda that supports corporate goals of proit with little incentive to promote
an agenda of democratic participation, especially if this aim is at odds with
corporate goals. When the goals of education shift to focus on corporation
deined labour needs, the role of education in developing a vibrant democratic
civil society can be compromised.
The Contradictory Structure of Philanthropy
The structure in which corporate philanthropy takes place contradicts the altru-
istic rhetoric that accompanies corporate philanthropy; this allows corpora-
tions to use philanthropy for private means and often through tainted money’
( ladden 1 5 200 ). The contradictory structure allows for a system whereby
the motivations and interests do not match the rhetoric used to describe phil-
anthropic behaviours. et, philanthropy is often regarded as a positive gesture
in society. Henry David Thoreau (1 52 200 ) notes the contradiction between
philanthropic motivations and interests and the perception of philanthropy;
he suggests that human selishness has overrated the role of philanthropy in
society. Consider the contradictions within the example of a company whose
purpose is to generate proit through the sale of cigarettes: one of their social
endeavours works to help adult smokers who have decided to quit be more
successful’. This same company spent 5 million in charitable contributions
in 1 and 100 million on an advertising campaign to promote these contri-
butions (Porter and Kramer 200 ).
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The results of the study provide additional evidence to support Thoreau’s

concern: corporate philanthropy to education in developing countries is almost
always accompanied by additional self-interested motivations: global market
opportunities, community relationships, workforce development, brand recog-
nition and public and private sector demand creation are just a few examples.
See Figure . for the survey results.
These motivations demonstrate how corporate philanthropy is contradictory
in terminology. Unlike altruism, corporate philanthropy, in practice, is accom-
panied by proit-generating motives. At the macro level, corporate philan-
thropy goes against the neoclassical capitalist structure and economic theories
under which the corporation exists. On the neoliberal end of the neoclassical
economic spectrum, Friedman (1 2) argues that only capitalism can provide
economic freedom, allocate resources eficiently and motivate people success-
fully while at the same time eradicating inequality through market forces of
supply, demand and price equilibrium. Hahnel (2005) reminds us that this
Fig re eneits of contri tions to ed cation
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perspective is intended to reward people as fairly as can be hoped for and

capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom’ (p. 5). The neolib-
eral perspective argues that government intervention only creates ineficiencies
and that markets naturally resolve equity and eficiency issues. However, more
liberal views of neoclassical economics would suggest that the market does
not always allocate resources eficiently and, at times, governments should
intervene for the provision of public goods, such as education. According to
both of these frameworks, the private corporation would never philanthropi-
cally provide for education unless it was in its interests, resulting from the
market forces of supply, demand and price. Corporations would certainly not
engage in pure, altruistic giving to education, as it contradicts the inherent
basis of corporate survival: the maximization of proit. According to arriga
and Mele (200 ), the corporation is an instrument of wealth creation and its
social activities are a means to achieving proit. Because corporations oper-
ate under the proit motive – and are legally accountable to their sharehold-
ers to do so (Hahnel 2005) – their self interest cannot be removed from any
type of giving deemed philanthropic’. This is consistent with the New ersey
Supreme Court ruling on the pretenses under which corporations can make
philanthropic contributions (The A.P. Smith Manufacturing Company v. Ruth
F. Barlow 1 5 ).
Philanthropy Legitimates Corporate Existence and Business Practices
Corporate philanthropy has a self-legitimating purpose for businesses in its

current structure. According to Schumpeter (1 2), the fundamental impulse
that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumer
goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the
new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates’ (p. ).
A primary way that corporations enter new markets is through philanthropic
activities to improve its competitive context; for example, the quality of the
business environment in the location or locations where they operate’ (Porter
and Kramer 200 , p. 1). mproving the competitive context is most closely
linked to the attraction and retention of labour. For example, using philan-
thropy to increase the skills of labour, improve a community to attract labour
to a particular location or provide higher compensation in the forms of wages
or beneits, such as health services (Committee for Economic Development,
200 ), legitimates the company’s existence in a community. But the integra-
tion of the corporation into society through philanthropy carries certain risks.
As Hahnel (2005) reminds us:
contrary to the teachings of Adam Smith, many of the most effective ways to
increase corporate proits is to do so at the expense of the public interest and the
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environment, as well as at the expense of employees and consumers, so it is na ve

and foolish to expect corporations to behave in socially responsible ways. (p. 05)
Education philanthropy is also used as a tactic to legitimate corporate existence

and business practices in a community. One example of how corporate philan-
thropy legitimates business can be found in the way in which some companies
measure the impact: community opinion of the company prior to and after a
philanthropic activity.
Philanthropy can also be used as a tool to legitimate the corporate existence
by neutralizing a business’s negative externalities in society. A study conducted
by odfrey, Merrill and Hansen (200 ) found that when companies experienced
negative events, those engaging in philanthropic activities had a social insur-
ance policy’ that protected the stock price during these periods. Additionally,
philanthropy can legitimate business practices by attempting to solve problems
that are caused wholly or in part by the corporation itself (Carroll 1 ; Fitch
1 ). For example, in the aftermath of the 2010 BP ulf of Mexico oil spill,
the company announced block grants of 0 million to help promote tourism
and mitigate the economic impact of the oil spill in ouisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida’ (BP 2011). f corporations can solve social problems in
which they are intimately involved, they also stand to proit by such ventures
and preserve their public image (Fitch 1 ). Thus, if corporations cause social
problems, this notion proposes they can then proit from resolving them through
proit-generating activities under the umbrella of philanthropy. This legitimates
the corporate actor in society, neutralizing any negative externalities exerted by
its business activities through new proit-based activities.
Dependency Perpetuated by Philanthropy
Corporate philanthropy is a social relationship based on a dependency in

which a recipient often acts as an implementer of donor priorities. The poli-
cies and activities developed through philanthropy are further legitimated via
this dependency relationship and at times can perpetuate inequality. Ostrander
and Schervish (1 0 200 ) observe that the common language of philan-
thropy looks at the giver in a one-way, giver-receiver relationship, and fails
to acknowledge the social relationship of giving and getting between donors
and recipients’ whereby the recipient takes part in deining what goes on in the
world of philanthropy’ (p. ). n this view, philanthropy is a social relationship
extending beyond an organization or institution; it is a transactional relation-
ship in a social structure whereby donors have more active choice and agency
than recipients about how to deine philanthropy. n an unequal social relation-
ship of philanthropy, recipients rely on donors for funds and recognition of
legitimacy, and donors tout their recipients as entities operating in their image
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and likeness (Ostrander and Schervish 1 0 200 ). n order to receive funds

to achieve their agenda, recipients often cater their operations to donor prefer-
ences. The resulting philanthropy is a loyalty-based giving system that largely
makes results-driven philanthropy the exception instead of the rule ( oldberg
200 ). n the education sector, preference is given to support organizations that
understand business culture, can communicate on behalf of the company in
communities and can provide connections for the company (van Fleet 2011).
These power relationships manifest themselves in educational philanthropic
projects by creating a sense of dependency on the donor and at times perpetu-
ating inequality. Samoff (200 ) notes that inequalities of power, authority and
wealth will not be managed for mutual beneit, but instead will perpetuate rela-
tions of dependence. And evidence shows that this can also occur on smaller
scales with contributions to nonproit organizations. iven the short-term
nature of the contributions and their inherent volatility, corporate philanthropy
contributes to a dependency among actors in the education sector on corpo-
rate support. Further data from the recipient side of corporate philanthropy
is needed to substantiate this claim. Arnove’s (1 0) assessment of interna-
tional technical assistance to education demonstrates this phenomenon in the
earlier years of corporate philanthropy. He notes that philanthropically-moti-
vated reforms provide nonconventional, technologically sophisticated ways
of reaching, credentialing and sorting out marginal populations on the basis
of different types and amounts of education and previously isolated or
excluded individuals can be mobilized for multiple purposes including the
fulillment of economic plans’ (p. 5 ). Thus, education functions as a tool for
creating a workforce that serves corporate interests, contrary to any democratic
aims of education for building a society.
Inequality Perpetuated by Corporate Philanthropy
Corporate philanthropy directed to education often naturally gravitates away

from the most marginalized populations. These individual efforts, though
perhaps helpful on small scales in particular circumstances, do not advance
goals of equitable education within and among countries. n fact, the data in
this study aligns with evy’s (200 ) critique that philanthropy favours particu-
lar countries and regions as opposed to society at large, which beneits when
the government provides education.
Emerging economies, more speciically Brazil, ndia, China, Mexico, South
Africa, Kenya and Argentina, receive the most attention from US-based compa-
nies with respect to education philanthropy. The rationale for the geographic
focus of contributions is linked closely to the motivations and strategic goals
of philanthropy. The main drivers of geographic focus of contributions include
communities where employees live and work, countries with current or
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emerging consumer bases, potential growth markets projected to be important

sources of production or sales in future years, communities in the company’s
supply chain and post-disaster regions.
This critique is underscored by the comparison of the percentage of corpo-
rate investments in education to countries with the highest levels of education
poverty, measured by the population age 1 to 22 years with fewer than four
years of education. The countries with the highest levels of educational need
to receive relatively few corporate philanthropic contributions: less than 20
per cent. Some countries, such as the Central African Republic, Somalia or
Mozambique, all with more than 50 per cent of the population age 1 to 22
years having fewer than four years of education, received an education contri-
bution from zero or one US company.
Table .2 delineates the relationship between the geography of corporate
contributions to education and the overall educational need. Not surprisingly,
in the context of corporate philanthropy, business strategy and educational
Table 8.2 Education poverty compared with percentage of corporations

contributing to education
Percentage Percentage
of US-based of US-based
Education companies Education companies
poverty investing in poverty investing in
Country ( ) education Country ( ) education
Central African .2 0 uinea-Bissau . 0
Republic
Niger . 4 Côte d’Ivoire .2 4
Burkina Faso 0. 4 Madagascar .
Mali . 10 Benin . 0
Chad . 4 Rwanda 5. 1
Somalia .5 2 ambia 0. 2
Ethiopia 1.1 1 Morocco .1 1
Senegal 5 . 1 Burundi .
Mozambique 5 .5 2 iberia 5. 10
uinea 5 . 4 uatemala 5. 10
Sierra eone 5 . 4 Pakistan .5 20
Note: The countries with more than one-third of the population living in education poverty
with available data are listed in the irst column after each column giving country names; the
second column after that giving the country names lists the percentage of US-based companies
making education contributions to the country. Some of the countries in greatest educational
need, primarily those in conlict areas, such as Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, are not listed here because no data on education poverty levels were available.
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need do not match up: arguably those countries in greatest need of resources
for education have little corporate support.
The prospect that potential market opportunities for corporate goods and
services is a driving motivation behind corporate investments in education
in developing countries arose as a cross-cutting theme throughout the inter-
views, particularly for the consumer and technology sectors. nvestments in
areas with potential market opportunities assume a degree of income suficient
to purchase goods and services of companies. Having disposable income is
synonymous with less poverty; in developing countries corporate resources
naturally gravitate to communities with greater incomes to the exclusion of
others with less inancial resources. All things being equal, corporate philan-
thropy motivated by business opportunity can be expected to gravitate to
communities with disposable income with the potential to not only facilitate
inequality among countries, but within countries. Financial companies provide
business education and skills to people most likely to advance to the next level
of income, which then allows them to use their inancial services. Similarly, oil
companies look for countries with natural resources which often already have
income from these resources to support the public sector. Countries with poorer
populations, or fewer natural resources to use as an investment bargaining chip,
appear to be less likely to attract corporate philanthropy for their education
systems.
CONC US ON
Many would argue that because corporate philanthropy is driven by self interest
and is self-legitimating and unfocused, it will never reach a point of advancing
social progress in education through public private partnerships. This concern
does not seem unique to education. According to Porter and Kramer (200 ),
a majority of corporate philanthropy programmes are diffused and unfocused,
consisting of small cash donations to aid local civic causes or general oper-
ating support to charities and universities in hopes of generating goodwill.
Despite the hopes for corporate philanthropy’s contributions to global educa-
tion through public private partnerships, the critiques provide more balance
to a viewpoint that philanthropic resources can solve global education chal-
lenges. ike most policies, corporate philanthropy has an agenda, and private
interests that accompany this agenda. Philanthropy poses moral, accountability
and democratic conlicts concerning the role of governments. The contradic-
tory structure in which it exists justiies wealth generated at the expense of
one for the social gain of another. Moreover, in its current structures, philan-
thropy from corporate entities can legitimate business practices and, based on
the interest of the irm, purposefully or incidentally perpetuate dependency,
158-181 Pt2 Ch8.indd 178 24/05/2012 15:19

inequality and marginalization. All of these aspects must be considered when

assessing philanthropy’s impact in education.
Corporate philanthropy has limitations. The data from the study demon-
strates that US companies align contributions to education with their private
interests in attempts to fulil their duties to maximize proit. n most instances,
the current power arrangement between corporate philanthropy and communi-
ties is not equal. However, while mixing corporate interests and public goods
is indeed challenging and problematic, it is not an impossible combination.
Acknowledging the need to shift relationships is the irst step in moving
towards more effective uses of corporate philanthropy for global education. t is
important for the global education community – ministries, donors, communi-
ties, local governments and practitioners – to acknowledge the assets of corpo-
rate philanthropy while also having a clear understanding of its limitations.
dentifying instances where shared value can result from corporate support
of government-deined, and -led, education activities may not only be good
for business, but it is good for society. On the other hand, accepting corporate
engagement at face value as a single strategy for education should be expected
to lead to more marginalization and inequality in the global education system.
NOTE
1 Source for all tables and igures: A Global Education Challenge, Harnessing Corporate
Philanthropy to Educate the World’s Poor, The Brookings nstitution, 2011 and A Half Billion
Dollars Adding Up to Small Change: The Promises and Pitfalls of Corporate Philanthropy to
Support Global Education, The University of Maryland, 2011.
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9. Microsoft Corporation: A case study
of corporate-led PPPs in education
Zahra Bhanji
This chapter focuses on Microsoft’s lagship international public private

partnership (PPP) in education, the Partners in earning (Pi ) programme.
Microsoft’s vision for the Pi programme is to:
Empower schools to help improve student achievement by applying resources such

as services, products and people at the local level. By partnering with schools and
government we aim to set a new high standard for digital inclusion for students and
work with schools to prepare students for the digital workplace; empower educators
to raise the level of CT literacy in their institution and support teachers and schools
in developing innovative cultures. (Microsoft Corporation 200 )
Since 200 , Microsoft has developed an elaborate organizational structure for

Pi , where they have donated software, invested 150 million per year, and
employed over 100 staff in the programme. The Pi programme in a given
country can involve any of three core components: the Pi Fresh Start for
Donated PCs; the Pi School Agreement programme; and the Pi rants
programme. The irst two core programmes aim to facilitate access to tech-
nology. The third initiative, a grants programme, aims to help educators and
students build their capacity to use technology in schools and throughout their
lives. Table .1 provides further details on the three programme components.
n scale and scope, this programme is one of Microsoft’s largest engagements
in education to date and larger than that of any other technology company oper-
ating in education. The Pi programme has reached over million teachers and
more than 1 0 million students in 11 countries (Microsoft Corporation 2011).
This chapter presents indings from research conducted in ordan and South
Africa.
Microsoft provided policy solutions in both of the countries, drawn from its
worldwide Pi framework which was primarily focused on the commercial use
of its software for educational purposes. nterestingly, the strategic aims for
Pi laid out in the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) of the very different
countries were exactly the same (though implementation, as we shall see, was
quite different):
182
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Microsoft Corporation: A case study of corporate-led PPPs 1
Table 9.1 PiL programme components
Programme component Aim Description

Pi Fresh Start for Facilitate access Provides schools with licensed copies
Donated PCs to technology of Microsoft software and manuals
for donated computers when original
licenses are not available.
Pi School Agreement Facilitate access Makes Microsoft’s core educational
to technology tools more affordable to schools
through price discounts.
Pi rants Build capacity by Funds CT-skills training and
helping teachers curriculum for teachers and students
and students use jointly with local governments and
CT education leaders.
Source: Microsoft Corporation (200 ).
To prepare students in ordan Education Sector South African schools for the
knowledge economy; to substantially raise the level of digital literacy with students,
teachers and the wider community; to help develop a culture of nnovators; to assist
in building a sustainable CT model for education. (Microsoft Corporation 200 )
Table .2 summarizes the Pi global framework and compares the two coun-
tries’ Pi programmes to the framework. The key tenets of the programme
were, for the most part, implemented in both countries.
This chapter presents a case study of Microsoft’s Pi programme to high-
light one way in which education sectors are being drawn into the global
economy and how, under the rubric of public private partnerships, education
has become an important site for advancing commercial interests. Although
Microsoft developed the Pi programme at least partly to meet corporate social
responsibility goals, argue that Microsoft’s aim through the Pi programme is
primarily tied to their business interests to stimulate the commercial use of its
software in schools. use a political-economy perspective, including issues of
power, production and world order to study the social processes that Microsoft
represents and participates in (Cox 1 1).
The chapter begins with a discussion on the knowledge-based economy
and the emergence of TNCs from the technology sector working in educa-
tion. provide an overview of corporate social engagement frameworks and
PPPs used by TNCs to enter the education sector. examine how Microsoft’s
choice of varied partners and its expert authority in education were critical
to successfully implementing MOUs in different policy contexts in ordan
and South Africa. ssues of PPP accountability, sustainability and impact are
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Table 9.2 PiL global framework and country MOUs in comparison
Pi global framework for CT in schools ordan South Africa

eadership: Advisory Committee, leadership No Tried but not
forums successful
Policy: Articulate to make clear what es es
government is trying to accomplish
Research: Build national institution with No (but used a es
knowledge and ability to measure consulting irm
with this expertise)
Access: Build refurbishment centres, create No es
national PC programmes, use satellite
broadcast
nnovative solutions: National agreements to es, discounted es, free software
provide software access to all schools software
Curriculum: et content for immediate es es (commissioned
use, build national capacity to create local (commissioned N O to customize
content, adapt existing curriculum corporation to Microsoft’s teacher
develop new K-12 training content)
CT-in-education
curriculum)
Training: T Academies in schools and es es
teacher training centres
Community and Partners: Build innovative es es
teacher networks, train partners to implement
and support
Support: Education support centres, school es es
helpdesk programme
School innovation technology centre Opened in 2005 Opened in 200
Source: Microsoft Corporation (200 ), Microsoft National DoE (2005), Microsoft

Corporation (200 c).
also discussed. astly, argue that Microsoft is using international PPPs as a

new mode of production to stimulate knowledge-based economies to further
advance its commercial interests in education.
THE KNOW ED E ECONOM , NFORMAT ON

COMMUN CAT ON TECHNO O AND
TRANSNAT ONA CORPORAT ONS N EDUCAT ON
New economic development strategies underpinned by knowledge as a new

factor of production have emerged. The pursuit of building knowledge-based
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Microsoft Corporation: A case study of corporate-led PPPs 1 5
economies has led to new service industries and product development activi-
ties (Robertson 200 ). Robertson (200 ) argues that:
The most signiicant political and policy development over the past decade – the
current inancial crisis aside is the emergence, globally, of a new, very powerful,
discursive imaginary; the assertion that we now live in, or are moving toward, a
knowledge-based economy, and that the recalibration of institutions (mergers), and
their desirable geographies (e.g. regions cities), are crucial to enable this to be real-
ized. (p. 1)
Castells (1 ) has deined information or knowledge as a new mode of

production or informational capitalism through his theory of the emergence
of a network society. The role of digital technology was also placed as a prior-
ity in his theory for breaking down barriers of time and space to generate
feedback in real time, thus enabling effective product and service develop-
ment. He argues that the application of such knowledge and information
to knowledge generation and information processing communication devices,
in a cumulative feedback loop between innovation and the uses of innovation
in pursuit of proit’ (Castells 1 , p. ). Efforts to develop new narratives,
ideas and constructs around the knowledge-based economy were stimulated by
western governments and international organizations such as the World Bank
and the OECD (Robertson 200 ). For example, the OECD developed indica-
tors to guide and measure country efforts toward a knowledge-based economy
that were based on innovation, new technologies, human capital and enter-
prise dynamics (OECD 1 ). Similarly, the World Bank’s Knowledge for
Development programme was based on four pillars that included an economic
and institutional regime, an educated and skilled population, an eficient inno-
vation system, and CTs (King 2002). These examples highlight how knowl-
edge is used to stimulate economic growth as well as how education is placed
at the centre of policy and politics (Robertson 200 ).
The CT sector is a key driver of knowledge-based economies. The indus-
try is one of the most lucrative and robust in the world today. n 200 , the
global revenue for CT was trillion. Spending on CT represented .
per cent of global ross Domestic Product ( DP) between 2001 and 2005
(W TSA 200 ). The focus on CTs in education has also increased given
the push towards stimulating knowledge-based economies globally. Castells
(2000) argues that globalization has placed a premium on CT skills given
increased demands for high productivity and a skilled labour force to attract
foreign investment and compete in global markets. There still however remain
signiicant gaps of technology access and use (Perraton and Creed 2000). For
example, there are an estimated 1.5 to 2.5 million sub-Saharan African users of
computers. n comparative terms, this means that there is one African user out
of every 250– 00 Africans; one North American and European user in every
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two people; and a global average of one user out of every 15 people (Computer
ndustry Almanac nc. 2005). Even under limited access to CTs in many coun-
tries, ministries of education have increasingly focused on the role of technol-
ogy in education to meeting the growing needs of the global knowledge-based
economy for a highly skilled lexible labour force (Dale 2000; Kozma 200 ;
auder 1 1; ingard 2000; Robertson 200 ; Robertson 200 ). n addition,
international organizations including the OECD and the World Bank have
highlighted that the development of CT sectors and competencies are key to
building sound knowledge-based economies (King 2002; OECD 1 ).
Knowledge-based economies have also stimulated the greater involve-
ment of non-state actors including TNCs working in education. Nation-states
have traditionally been the main regulator, funder and provider of educational
and other public services. However, today, nation-states increasingly work
with other autonomous, or partly autonomous, education-service providers
or as the primary regulators of privately provided services (Dale 1 ; Hill
2005). Nation-states are negotiating education policy with new transnational
actors, such as foundations (Arnove 1 0; Colvin 2005; Hewlett Foundation
200 ; agemann 1 ), nongovernmental organizations (Mundy and Murphy
2001; Mundy 2005; Weiss and ordenker 1 5), international organizations
(Dale and Robertson 200 ; Henry, ingard et al. 2001; Mundy 2002; Mundy
and hali 200 ) and, more recently, private corporations (Ball 200 ; Bhanji
200 ). Within the technology sector, TNCs are increasingly encouraged to
bridge the digital divide in education through collaboration with international
organizations and individually. nluential reports (Baird 2002; bridges.org
2002), task forces (UN CT Task Force 2001), declarations ( TU 200 ; World
Bank 2002) and events organized in the early 2000s (UN 2000; WS S 2005)
have changed the international education environment to include the active
engagement of corporations. TNCs are ultimately being called upon to deliver
their products, services and expertise, thus creating new markets and business
opportunities within the education sector around the world. Some of the most
elaborate and unique examples of international PPPs in education are from
the CT sector.
CORPORATE SOC A EN A EMENT AND PUB C

PR VATE PARTNERSH PS N EDUCAT ON
TNCs are participating in social sectors under the corporate social responsibil-
ity’ umbrella – referring to isolated, ad hoc corporate activities. The business
literature explores the motives behind TNCs’ increasing social engagement,
which range from philanthropy, based on moral and ethical grounds without a
clear business rationale (Donaldson and Preston 1 5; Waldman and Sully de
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unque 200 ), to self-interest that aims to link social engagement with busi-
ness performance and proit (Martin 2002; Porter 2002; Rowley and Berman
2000). Although in many cases there is no clear distinction between these two
motives. Table . presents a taxonomy of the ways in which corporations
work within the social sector, their interests and the organizational structures
through which they operate.
Speciic examples of the different types of corporate engagement activities
within the education sector are provided. For example, in December 200 ,
two of the largest private foundations in recent times joined in partnership to
support education projects in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The Bill and
Melinda ates Foundation contributed a philanthropic donation of 0 million
over three years to the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s 20 million;
totalling 0 million.
An example of corporate social responsibility is the work of Bradesco
Foundation, founded in 1 5 . The Foundation is the largest private provider
of education in Brazil. Over the last 50 years, half a million students have
been through these schools with dropout rates lower than per cent (World
Economic Forum 200 ). Corporate citizenship initiatives within the educa-
tion sector pursued by businesses include establishing the basic conditions for
effective learning, improving educational content and skill building, foster-
ing effective educational management and engaging in advocacy (World
Economic Forum 200 ).
astly, an example of a company operating through a business sustainabil-
ity framework is eapFrog, which develops touch-recognition products for
Table 9.3 Taxonomy of global corporate social engagement (GCSE) activi-

ties, interests and organizational structure
lobal corporate social nterests

engagement activity (philanthropic or business) Organizational structure
Philanthropic donations Philanthropic Within company or separate
foundation outside of it
Corporate social Primarily philanthropic but Foundation or corporate-
responsibility may also include business giving department within
interest company
Corporate citizenship Business Within company marketing
strategic philanthropic or other business department
Business sustainability Business Within company marketing
or other business department
Source: Bhanji (200 ).
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learning. The company has developed earning Pads’ and books at a low
cost for distribution in ndia through women’s self-help organizations. Women
are able to lease the earning Pads and accessories from eapFrog and then
rent the products out to students and their parents for a fee (World Economic
Forum 200 a).
The typology and examples presented highlight the complexity of the vari-
ous different mechanisms and motivations driving the work of TNCs working
in education. As we shall see below, Microsoft’s Pi programme falls between
the corporate social responsibility’ and the business sustainability’ mecha-
nisms described in my typology. t is thus an example of a mixed’ approach
which label corporate citizenship strategic philanthropic’.
Many corporate social engagement frameworks are mediated through PPPs.
Schaferhoff, Campe and Kaan (200 ) deine transnational PPPs as insti-
tutionalized trans-boundary interactions between public and private actors,
which aim at the provision of public goods’ (p. ). There are two dominant
theoretical camps in the transnational PPP literature: those who believe that
PPPs create situations where mutual need of the public and private sectors are
met through the pooling of resources, skills and expertise (Reinicke and Deng
2000); and those who believe that transnational PPPs are privatizing world
politics and that PPPs serve the interests of TNCs in furthering neoliberalism.
The second group argues that PPPs deepen the North-South divide and hinder
Southern countries’ development, because developing countries do not share
mutual interests with the corporate sector (Bruhl 200 ).
n recent years we have also witnessed PPPs that have been facilitated by
international organizations such as the World Economic Forum and the World
Bank. The interlinked roles of TNCs and nation-states are operating under new
generalized principles of conduct’ which are mediating the work of the private
sector within multilateral institutions, also termed market multilateralism’
(Bhanji 200 ; Bull and McNeill 200 ).
nternational PPPs are also emerging in education through corporate
programmes. As noted in Draxler (this volume), many of these companies are
from the CT sector, have headquarters in the United States, and run elabo-
rate global programmes in education. For example, Cisco Systems established
its Networking Academies Program in 1 , with more than 000 academies
in over 1 5 countries servicing over 00,000 students (Cisco Systems 2010).
ntel’s Train the Teacher programme started in 1 ; through it, the company
has trained more than million K-12 teachers in more than 0 countries on
how to bring technology tools and resources into the classroom. ntel’s aim
was to reach 1 million teachers by 2011 ( ntel Corporation 2010). These
examples highlight how corporate programmes mediated through PPPs are
providing TNCs entry and legitimacy in the education sector.
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M CROSOFT CORPORAT ON AND PPPS N EDUCAT ON
Microsoft Corporation has been working in the educational arena since 1 .

There was however growing awareness that Microsoft needed to work differ-
ently. Traditional sales models alone could not meet the unique needs of the
education sector. Purely philanthropic donations, as well, had not worked in
developing Microsoft’s educational marketplace niche. The company real-
ized that education, being in the public sector, had very different needs and
that Microsoft had to respond to these needs. n early 2002 it became clear
within the company that it should play a much larger, more focused corporate
social responsibility (CSR) role in education. Benchmarks for such a role had
already been set by other information technology companies, whose education
programmes predated Pi . Hence, the company needed to aggregate its previ-
ous CSR activities in education into a single programme. t was the culmina-
tion of new global norms about bridging the digital divide and PPPs, external
pressures on the company to play a more signiicant CSR role in education, and
concurrent internal pressures to change its approach to the education market
activities that led Microsoft to establish PPPs in education through its world-
wide Pi programme.
At the beginning, in late 200 to mid-2005, approximately 200 MOUs
were signed. MOUs vary, depending on the priorities of the national and
state provincial governments for the country and the policy context for CT
in education in each jurisdiction (Watson 2005). MOUs were drafted using a
standard template and then locally adjusted. An interviewee explains:
We tried to keep them fairly simple and open. An MOU is not meant to be a contract.
Business plans providing more detail were then developed by the country program
manager, in conjunction with the local country advisory group. There has got to be
some shared risk and some shared reward, you know.
A key consideration during the design of country Pi programmes was the

capacity of the country to implement the programme. A participant states:
We didn’t just want to shovel money into a country if they’re not prepared to imple-
ment. And we wanted to make sure we had people on the ground that can help guide
this. s government willing to partner with us? Do you want to partner with us? Do
they have productive programs that we can channel this into? One of the design
criteria of Partners in earning was that we didn’t want to show up and say we’ve
got the answers.
Pi was structured into buckets’, key areas where Microsoft could get
involved. This provided lexibility to pursue individual governments’ interests
in education, within an overall framework designed by Microsoft:
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There may be some tweaking for local differences, and obviously there is language
barriers, and so forth. But it’s 0:20: 0 per cent of what they need would be in the
Microsoft core curriculum, and they could stretch their money a lot farther if they
didn’t spend it in the very expensive process of creating curriculum.
A Microsoft employee explains how a country level Pi programme is typi-

cally designed:
What would happen often, well, we would go into a country say, We’re going
to do this in your country’ and folks there would say, t’s, like, we’ve actually
already got a very good program to do digital curriculum. We just need help with
that program. We don’t need another program.’ So this allowed us the lexibility to
go in and say, ook, there is an existing program to help with digital curriculum? f
not, you know we’ve got something we’ve done in other countries we can leverage
here,’ and leverage best practice. And, again, that’s something of value that we can
provide as well as help to fund it. f they do have a good one, well, let’s see how we
can partner maybe to bring some other program’s best practices and make yours
better. But also provide more funding to do more of what you have already done,
instead of us spitting out a whole new program just so we can come in with ours.
Ultimately, it is the MOU that structures Microsoft’s authority in education

within a particular country. The signing of MOUs launches the Pi programme
in each country or region and raises Microsoft’s proile there.
Bill ates and other senior executives signed some of the MOUs. During a
tour of the Asia-Paciic region in late une and early uly 200 , Bill ates and
Steve Ballmer announced commitments through the new Pi programmes in
China, apan and Malaysia (Microsoft Corporation 200 ). n Beijing, ates
stated: We believe that technology is one of the most powerful tools that
teachers and governments can use to educate and inform people of any age’
(Microsoft Corporation 200 ).
A research participant comments on the speed at which MOUs were nego-
tiated: think the fact that we’ve been able to generate two hundred MOUs
in 1 and a half years is phenomenal. Some of the partnerships are working,
and some of them haven’t worked, but that’s ine.’ n 200 , Pi programmes
were launched in Brazil, Canada, France, ermany, ndia, apan, Namibia,
Russia, Taiwan, Thailand and the United Kingdom, and in other countries
throughout 200 .
As MOUs were negotiated and signed in 200 and 200 , Microsoft received
valuable feedback and recommendations from governments and educational
stakeholders around the world about the needs of ministries and departments
of education. One of the key messages was that Microsoft needed to focus
on teachers. Stakeholders recommended that Microsoft support the training of
teachers, not in basic CT skills but how to integrate CT into different school
subjects. An interviewee elaborated:
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ou know, teaching how to use word processors and databases really wasn’t the
problem. The problem was how do you make a biology teacher more effective by
showing him sic how they can use a PC to do experiments, and show you know
how to do research in ways they couldn’t do before, and track things.
Stakeholders also recommended that Microsoft connect teachers virtually

with their counterparts around the world, because teachers usually work alone
and have little opportunity to connect with teachers outside their schools, let
alone outside of their own countries. n response to this feedback, Microsoft
developed curriculum and training support for teachers through the online
nternational Teachers Network. Pi programme staff at Microsoft headquar-
ters developed resources and adjusted the programme.
Next, examine how Microsoft’s choice of varied partners and its expertise
in the education sector was critical to successfully implementing MOUs in
different policy contexts.
FACTORS CONTR BUT N TO PARTNERSH P

MP EMENTAT ON N ORDAN AND SOUTH AFR CA
Varied Partners
Both ordan and South Africa used education as a key strategy to equip their
citizens with the necessary skills to actively participate in and contribute to
the knowledge economy. However, the policy processes in the two countries
differed, given their respective forms of governance. The educational policy
landscape in ordan was dominated by traditional, hierarchical top-down
management’ (World Bank 200 , p. ), relecting the country’s constitutional
monarchy where power is concentrated in the government. n South Africa,
the policy process is more diffuse, with many actors involved in a vibrant
CT-in-education policy process. South Africa’s democratic polity and active
grass-roots organizations may have pressured the government to respond by
developing CT-in-education policies, whereas there were no CT-in-education
policies in ordan.
Microsoft showed itself capable of inding strategic opportunities in two
political systems with different policy environments, including different capac-
ities in CT-in-education activity. n ordan, Microsoft paid a local corporation
to adapt its CT curriculum for K-10 public school students. Here, Microsoft
needed a partner with the resources and expertise the company was missing
within the ordanian context. n South Africa, Microsoft hired N Os to localize
the US-developed Pi teacher-training and CT curriculum. From a bottom-up
perspective, Microsoft engaged different subnational agents and used different
strategies in each country. Microsoft’s top-down and bottom-up approaches
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link the supranational policy arena to the subnational or subgovernmental, thus

creating a direct link between global and subnational players. n the past, such
direct relationships were rare and usually mediated by government.
Microsoft’s Expertise
Through its work in the education sector since 1 , Microsoft identiied

substantial gaps in education systems around the world; gaps that prevented
the education sector from maximizing the beneits of technology for educa-
tion (Bhanji 200 ). The research also revealed that Microsoft was able to
develop partnerships at high levels and with varied stakeholders given the
extensive expertise they brought to the CT-in-education sector. The compa-
ny’s expert policy authority operated at both transnational and national levels.
At the transnational level, the company developed an elaborate superstruc-
ture through the Pi programme, a superstructure that leveraged its corporate
power, reputation and resources in education. Microsoft’s policy authority
emerged through its ability to leverage its reputation and experience as one of
the most proitable and successful CT companies in the world. At the national
level, the research shows that in both ordan and South Africa, Microsoft’s
expertise was central to its policy authority in education. An interviewee in
ordan conirmed that Microsoft’s expertise and thought leadership in CT-in-
education were important:
The MOE feels that it’s not the money that we need, but we need the expertise. Both
the Minister of Education and the Minister of CT said that we’ll ind ways of ind-
ing money, but what are needed are experienced people and thought leadership that
Microsoft can provide. This will help us to be in tune with what is going on in the
rest of the world. Also, it will help us develop our human-resources capacity in the
country and region.
There was also an expertise vacuum in South Africa:
The state has lots of money if they want to spend it on this. overnment also has
good people but not enough of them. Money will be put into CTs; however, we
don’t have the human resources to support this. Those who know how to do educa-
tion and CTs get good jobs outside of the country.
n each country, Microsoft implemented signiicant Pi programme activities,

including curriculum development and teacher training to support the capac-
ity of education systems to effectively use technology in schools. n addition,
Microsoft mobilized this knowledge by developing relationships with key
educational stakeholders, facilitating policy networks, and a knowledge bank
of shared CT-in-education best practices’. Microsoft’s expertise enabled the
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company to successfully develop and implement partnership arrangements.

This in turn further enabled Microsoft to learn about new markets, enhance
its expertise and gain even more power and authority in education policy
worldwide.
PARTNERSH P ACCOUNTAB T , SUSTA NAB T

AND MPACT
The combination of global-level leverage and local-level partnerships that

characterizes the Pi programme raises questions about both the accountabil-
ity and sustainability of PPPs through private-sector actors in the governance
of public-sector activities. Keohane (200 ) suggests that, in the absence of a
formal global government, it is important to study the strategic interactions
between those in power and those to whom they are accountable. He argues
strongly for the development of pluralistic accountability measures to manage
the power held by private actors. n the case of Microsoft’s Pi programme,
there are gaps in accountability. As is the case for most corporations, Microsoft
staff are primarily accountable to the company’s board of directors and its
shareholders, whose interests mainly focus on corporate sustainability and the
enhancement of proit.
Accountability to governments and to citizens is much less developed
for TNCs such as Microsoft. MOUs with governments initiated the Pi
programme’s PPPs and deined Microsoft’s and governments’ goals, roles
and activities. However, these MOUs do not require Microsoft to account
for actions, nor are they open to public scrutiny. Furthermore, there appear
to be limited accountability mechanisms in place at the national government
level to oversee the quality of materials, pedagogy, curriculum frameworks
or teacher training provided by Pi -programmes. Although Microsoft showed
some lexibility in adapting the Pi -programme to each country’s goals, the
core elements of the programme were developed at Microsoft headquarters
in the United States. To date, there has been no formal evaluation of whether
Pi PPPs have met the pressing needs and priorities of education systems and
governments. Only limited research on the Pi programme was conducted by
Microsoft, and this research focused on outputs such as the number of software
licenses donated to governments or the number of teachers trained, not on the
impact of Pi activities on teaching and learning.
This research highlights that it is important for Microsoft to ensure that its
activities do not undermine its reputation in the education sector. The company
works with key educational stakeholders at transnational and national levels
to ensure that its work is aligned with the priorities of government. However,
reputational accountability (Keohane 200 ) is quite easy to manage for TNCs
182-198 Pt2 Ch9.indd 193 24/05/2012 15:20

working in education, because they do not have to formally report to an exter-

nal organization or meet a set of international policy norms for their behaviour.
Rather, as we have seen in the case of Microsoft’s Pi programme, TNCs can
use informal networks of educational stakeholders to seek feedback and advice,
and to give legitimacy to their work. No formal body or organization currently
has the mandate to evaluate the extent to which TNC initiatives such as the
Pi programme undermine or align with global education frameworks, such as
Education for All and the Millennium Development oals. So, for example,
questions about the extent to which Microsoft’s Pi programme activities at
the country level redirect limited government resources for education towards
the use of technology, away from other important education priorities, likely
remain unanswered.
ack of sustainability is another signiicant limitation of PPPs. How
much CT capacity among teachers and government oficials was devel-
oped by Microsoft’s Pi programme is questionable. Meaningful educational
change takes many years and requires sustainable programmes and funding.
Corporations, however, operate on 12-month sales cycles; their funding deci-
sions depend on the growth of sales and proit. Microsoft’s private authority is
also limited by the scale and reach of its activities. ts contribution to education
is miniscule, compared with the needs of governments worldwide. For exam-
ple, at the time collected data, only 00 teachers in South Africa out of a
total of 0,000 had been trained by the Pi programme. The implications and
limitations of PPPs are substantial and reach far beyond the scope and lifespan
of the Pi programme. Microsoft’s MOUs and programmes raise many ques-
tions about its motives and activities in the education sector.
CONC US ON
Microsoft both represents and participates in broader world order inluences

and social processes. As Cox (1 1) argues:
the production process as a critical element in the explanation of the particu-

lar historical form taken by a state society complex. The production of goods and
services which creates both the wealth of a society and the basis for a state’s ability to
mobilize power behind the foreign policy, takes place through a power relationship
between those who control and those who execute the tasks of production. (p. )
The construction of knowledge-based societies has opened up spaces for the

creation of new products and markets by adding some level of value to infor-
mation and knowledge. Knowledge-based economies with a political project
at their heart aim to build service-based economies, enabling the developed
nations and powerful transnational irms to create the regulatory, ideational
182-198 Pt2 Ch9.indd 194 24/05/2012 15:20

and material basis for new markets (Robertson 200 ). Education sectors
are being drawn into the global economy as important sites for advancing
commercial interests.
This chapter demonstrates the social processes of power, production and
world order through the lens of Microsoft’s Pi programme. TNCs such as
Microsoft are participating in the CT-in-education sector as a new mode of
production (Cox 1 1) to stimulate knowledge-based economies around the
world. Microsoft’s power as a leading TNC, its large economic contribution
and impact, and its strategic engagement through the Pi programme’s activi-
ties and structure, were critical factors allowing the company to gain entry
into the education sector. Microsoft also leveraged its organizational resources,
expertise, reputation and experience in education to further develop new ways
through which its services are used around the world. The Pi programme was
a nontraditional way of doing business. t was a strategic intervention, aimed
at creating new education markets, and it used PPPs to advance Microsoft’s
software in schools. Microsoft’s PPPs have enabled the company to trans-
form their vision and priorities into tangible activities around the world. These
partnerships ultimately aimed to deepen Microsoft’s inluence and propel its
commercial presence and interests through the signing of MOUs and program-
matic activities.
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PART III
The impact of PPPs in education:

evidence from the ield
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199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 200 24/05/2012 15:21
10. The role and impact of public private
partnerships in education1
Felipe Barrera-Osorio, Juliana Guaqueta
and Harry Anthony Patrinos
INTRODUCTION
ncreasing the private sector’s role in education may have several potential
advantages over traditional public delivery of education. Whether these bene-
its are realized depends greatly on the design of the partnership between the
public and private sector, on the regulatory framework of the country, and
on the capacity of the government to oversee and enforce its contracts and
partnerships with the private sector. When implemented correctly, the private
sector can increase eficiency and choice, and expand access to education
services, particularly for households that tend to be poorly served by tradi-
tional delivery methods.
Currently, private for-proit schools across the world are serving a full range
of communities – from elite families through middle-income families to the
poor. Public private partnerships (PPPs) may allow governments to take advan-
tage of the specialized skills offered by certain private organizations and to
overcome operating restrictions such as inlexible salary scales and work rules
that may prevail in the public sector. The main rationale for developing PPPs
in education is to maximize the potential for expanding equitable access to
schooling and for improving education outcomes, especially for disadvantaged
groups. This depends on the capacity of different PPP programmes to target
poor populations and the speciications of the contracts that will allow disad-
vantaged groups to get access to private schools. Different types of contracts
can help to meet these two objectives in different socio-economic and political
contexts. Speciically, contracts are used to hold all partners accountable and
are designed to produce measurable improvements in education outcomes.
Enrolment rates remain low in several developing regions despite recent
increases. Eficient and equitable access to education is proving to be elusive
to many people. Often low-income families, girls, indigenous peoples, and
other poor and disadvantaged groups have only limited access to education.
201
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Several sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries have yet to achieve
universal primary coverage, even though enrolment rates across all develop-
ing countries increased from 79 per cent in 1990 to 86 per cent in 2003. The
quality of education, as measured by standardized tests, is low and represents
a major challenge. The majority of students from those developing countries
who participate in international assessments score poorly, and this is the case
even in the absence of most low-income countries, which tend not to partici-
pate in such assessments (OECD 2010).
iven market failures and equity concerns, the public sector remains the
most important player in providing education services, but making high-
quality education accessible for all in developing countries requires innova-
tive programmes and initiatives in addition to public resources and leadership.
There are ways in which the public and private sectors can join together to
complement each other’s strengths in providing education services while help-
ing developing countries to meet the Millennium Development oals for educa-
tion and to improve learning outcomes in general. PPPs can even be tailored
and targeted speciically to meet the needs of low-income communities.
The concept of a PPP recognizes alternative options for providing education
services besides public inance and public delivery. Although there are many
forms of PPPs, including partnerships where private organizations support
the education sector through philanthropic activities and high-engagement
ventures, here we examine PPPs in which the government guides policy and
provides inancing while the private sector delivers education services to
students. n particular, governments contract out private providers to supply
a speciied service of a deined quantity and quality at an agreed price for
a speciic period of time. These contracts contain rewards and sanctions for
nonperformance and include situations in which the private sector shares the
inancial risk in the delivery of public services.
This partial deinition covers several types of contracts, depending on the
speciic services provided. The contracts vary in their degree of complexity.
For education, the services provided can range from the construction, manage-
ment or maintenance of infrastructure (often referred to as a private inance
initiative) to the provision of education services and operations, such as
voucher schemes or charter schools.
Building on previous work, the international literature, the results of recently
completed and ongoing impact evaluations, and the World Bank’s World
Development Report 2004 framework, we adopt a conceptualization of the
issues related to PPPs, provide a detailed review of studies with rigorous eval-
uations, and offer guidelines on how to create successful PPPs in education.
n the next section, we present general trends of private participation in
education based on the most recent data from the Education Statistics source
of the World Bank (EdStats) and on programmes in which the World Bank has
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The role and impact of public private partnerships in education 203
been involved. Also, we review programmes for which information is avail-

able online. We examine the concept of contracts’ as a mechanism to hold all
partners accountable and how contracts are designed to produce measurable
improvements in education outcomes or performance. We deine contracting
as the process whereby a government procures education or education-related
services of a deined quantity and quality at an agreed price from a speciic
provider for a speciied period of time, and this agreement between the funder
and the service provider is recorded in a contract (Taylor 200 ; Wang 1 ).
Drawn from a wide array of literature on the subject, we then present argu-
ments in favour and against PPPs and explore briely some theoretical argu-
ments about their beneits and costs.
The empirical evidence available on the impact of PPPs is then summarized.
The analysis is limited to the evidence provided by credible strategies in the
estimation of the causal effects of PPPs on education outcomes by using tech-
niques such as randomization, regression discontinuity and propensity score
estimation, among others. A wide range of education contracting models exist,
and all of them have the potential to improve the education system. We discuss
nine studies of voucher systems in several countries, three studies of subsidies
(two in South Asia and one in South America), four studies of private manage-
ment contracts (two in the United States and two in South America), and one
study of private inance initiatives (in the United Kingdom). The empirical
review of the causal effects of PPPs on education shows that few existing
programmes have been evaluated, and too few of these evaluations are rigor-
ous. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean some information about promising
approaches from a careful review of the existing studies.
PR VATE PROV DERS ARE P A N AN NCREAS N

MPORTANT RO E N EDUCAT ON
Private participation in education has increased dramatically over the last two
decades across the world, serving all types of community – from high-income
to low-income families. Although governments remain the main inanciers of
education (at least of primary and secondary education), in many countries
private agents deliver a sizeable share of education (Table 10.1). A number of
governments contract with the private sector to provide some of the services
involved in producing education, such as teacher training, management or
curriculum design. Other governments contract with a private organization to
manage and operate a public school, as is the case with charter and concession
schools. Other contracts still require private organizations to provide educa-
tion to a speciic group of students by means of a subsidy, a contract or a
voucher. n the most common type of PPP, the government provides subsidies
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to existing private schools or to fund student places. The continuum of the

extent to which countries are using PPPs ranges from those in which education
is provided only by the public sector to those in which it is largely publicly
funded and privately provided.
Some countries make a sharp distinction between the role of the public
sector as education inancier and that of the private sector as education
provider. For instance, in the Netherlands, all education is publicly inanced,
including private schools, which enrol more than two-thirds of all students. n
other countries, the private sector plays an important role in providing educa-
tion, but the government subsidizes some of the students who attend private
schools (for example, Chile). Several African countries have different types
of nonpublic schools, including government-subsidized independent schools
(for example, the ambia), partially subsidized mission or religious schools
Table 10.1 Growing private enrolment in primary education, 1990 and 2005,
selected countries
Primary Secondary
Country 1990 2005 Change 1990 2005 Change
Benin 3 12 300 8 25 213
Brazil 14 10 –29 35 12 –66
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 1 100
Chile 39 51 31 49 52 6
Colombia 15 19 27 39 24 –38
India 10 20 100 10 23 130
Indonesia 18 17 –6 49 44 –10
Jordan 23 30 30 6 16 167
Netherlands 69 69 0 83 83 0
Pakistan 25 27 8 24 25 4
Peru 13 16 23 15 22 47
South Africa 1 2 100 2 3 50
Thailand 10 16 60 16 13 –19
Togo 25 42 68 17 28 65
Tunisia 1 1 0 12 5 –58
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States 10 10 0 10 9 –10
Note: Compatibility across countries is limited because of different deinitions of education

expenditure. However, compatibility within each country across years is ensured. Most recent
data available within two years of the year indicated.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on latest available data from EdStats Database.
199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 204 24/05/2012 15:21

(for example, esotho), and at least partially subsidized community-organized

schools (for example, Kenya). Elsewhere, some countries have public schools
that are supported inancially by the private sector (for example, Pakistan).
While overall private participation is typically higher at the secondary level,
private participation at all levels continues to grow and there is signiicant
variation across countries (EdStats 2010). One way to categorize the types of
PPPs is to separate inancing from provision (Figure 10.1).
The governments of many developed countries have found a range of differ-
ent ways to leverage the capacity and expertise of the private sector to provide
education. n a subset of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) countries, more than one-ifth of public expenditure is trans-
ferred to private institutions, either directly or by subsidizing households to
pay for the school of their choice. Moreover, on average, OECD countries
spend 12 per cent of their education budgets in education institutions that are
privately managed (OECD 200 ). These governments have inanced a wide
variety of schools on a per pupil basis to meet demand for different kinds of
schooling. n the United States, the number of private companies providing
supplemental academic services (academic tutoring) increased by 0 per cent
in just one year, between 200 and 200 . This sharp increase was partly driven
by the 5 per cent increase in federal funds allocated to supplemental educa-
tion between 2001 and 2005 (United States Department of Education 200 ).
n several developing countries, governments subsidize private schools,
mostly operated by faith-based nonproit organizations, by inancing either
school inputs, such as teacher salaries and textbooks, or per pupil grants.
Although schools managed by faith-based organizations and local commu-
nities are often not considered to be strictly private, here the term private’
encompasses the whole range of nongovernment providers of education
Provision
Private Public
• Private schools • User fees

• Private universities • Student loans
• Home schooling
Private
• Tutoring
Finance
• Vouchers • Public schools

Public • Contract schools • Public universities
• Charter schools
• Contracting out
Figure 10.1 Financing and provision of services in public private partnerships
199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 205 24/05/2012 15:21

services. Across the world, enrolment in private primary schools grew by 5

per cent between 1 1 and 200 , while enrolment in public primary schools
grew by just 10 per cent. lobally, there are approximately 11 million
students in nongovernment schools; 51 million are at the secondary level
(UNESCO 200 ).
Public private partnerships are also being used to build school infrastructure.
PPPs can be a useful way to increase the funding available for constructing or
upgrading school buildings and often yield better value for money than tradi-
tional public sector investments. n such partnerships, the government typi-
cally contracts a private company to build and or maintain school buildings
on a long-term basis, typically 25 to 0 years. n this type of PPP, the private
sector supplier assumes responsibility for the risk inherent in the ownership
and eficient operation of the project’s facilities. This method of inancing
school buildings is used in many OECD countries but most extensively in the
United Kingdom. n recent years, several developing countries have also tried
this approach, although it is too early to see results (Patrinos et al. 200 ).
Private education providers are also playing an increasingly important role
in delivering education to low-income families. They include a range of school
operators including faith-based organizations, local communities, N Os and
private for- and not-for-proit schools. Some African and South Asian coun-
tries, where demand exceeds the supply of school places and public funds are
limited, have experienced growth in the number of private low-cost schools
that cater to low-income students, mostly at the secondary level (Patrinos et
al. 200 ).
THE AR UMENTS N FAVOUR OF PPPS
The theoretical literature in the topic suggests four ways in which the private
provision of public services affects educational outcomes (see Epple and
Romano 1 ; aRocque and Patrinos 200 ; Nechyba 2000; Savas 2000).
First, PPP contracts allow schools lexibility in how they manage and
provide education services. enerally, the public sector gives schools very
little lexibility over hiring teachers and organizing schools, so a lexible PPP
contract can make it possible for schools to create a better it between supply
and demand.
For example, two critical school management decisions – how teachers are
hired and how the budget is allocated. n general, schools operating under a PPP
contract have more freedom in teacher hiring and iring than public schools do.
Also, private schools can give their administrators more budgetary freedom,
which may lead to a more eficient allocation of resources. Finally, schools
199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 206 24/05/2012 15:21

operating under PPPs have more lexibility in determining such matters as the
length of the school day and the length of the academic year.
Second, private providers in PPP contracts are usually chosen through an
open bidding process based on quality and cost criteria. Furthermore, contrac-
tors are often required to produce certain outcomes, such as increases in test
scores in order to maintain funding. Thus, by itself, the contracting process and
the resulting contract can yield a higher quality of education.
This argument is especially relevant for the private management of public
schools. The process by which beneiciary schools are chosen can be transpar-
ent and, thus, can be directly observed. Some PPP programmes set quality
requirements for their contractors. For instance, concession schools in Bogota,
Colombia, are based on a bidding process in which the applicant must have
previous experience in the education sector (Barrera-Osorio 200 ). On top of
this, part of the assessment of the applicant’s bid includes examining its perfor-
mance in its other schools based on a national standardized examination. n
short, outcomes such as test scores and dropout rates are critical variables in
awarding and continuing with these contracts.
Third, a PPP contract can achieve an optimal level of risk-sharing between
the government and the private sector. This risk-sharing may increase efi-
ciency in the delivery of services and, consequently, may increase the size of
resources available for improved provision.
Measuring the optimal level of risk-sharing is not straightforward. Financial
indicators such as revenue-to-cost ratio, revenue-to-student ratio and cost-to-
student ratio can be proxies for measuring risk-sharing. n short, to ascertain
different risk-sharing options, it is irst necessary to examine quantiiable
inancial indicators.
And fourth, PPPs can promote competition in the market for education. The
private sector can compete with the public sector for students. n turn, the
public sector can react to that competition by improving the quality of the
education that it provides in its schools.
The argument in favour of competition is that students and families will
shop for the schools that provide the best quality of education if that option
is available to them; for example, in a voucher system (Friedman 1 55). For
competition to thrive a market for schools must exist and information on
the quality of schools must be freely and widely available. This argument
assumes that education quality is an important criterion to determine school
choice.
Realizing the beneits of PPPs depends greatly on the design of the part-
nership, on the regulatory framework of the country, and on the capacity of
the government to oversee and enforce its contracts and partnerships with
the private sector. As described above, PPPs can theoretically increase efi-
ciency and choice and expand access to education services, particularly for
199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 207 24/05/2012 15:21

households that tend to be poorly served by traditional delivery methods, but

clearly implementation issues in the contract of PPPs are critical for the real-
ization of higher eficiency and choice. For instance, the inclusion of account-
ability mechanisms in PPP contracts, and the proper instrument to enforce
them, can promote eficiency.
Also, ideally, contracts would include quality dimensions in the delivery of
the service. PPPs can also allow governments to take advantage of the special-
ized skills offered by certain private organizations and to overcome operating
restrictions such as inlexible salary scales and work rules that may prevail in
the public sector.
ikewise, governments can contract out to the private sector in a range of
initiatives that can include everything from nonacademic activities such as
food services and management contracts involving a few schools, to subsidiz-
ing the tuition at private schools for hundreds of thousands of students, to long-
term, multimillion dollar infrastructure partnerships. Contracting is a middle
ground between government delivery and outright privatization and does not
attract as much controversy and criticism as privatization, where governments
transfer largely the inancing, regulation and provision responsibilities to the
private sector market. n PPPs, governments maintain the important roles in
the regulation and inancing of education services, and transfer some of the
responsibility for provision to private providers. Contracting can also enable
governments to target initiatives towards particular groups in society or to
achieve speciic outcomes. n addition, it is a way to bring the private sector’s
skills and resources into the education sector (as is the case of capital invest-
ments for school construction under Private Finance nitiatives) and to increase
eficiency and innovation in the delivery of education (as is the case of charter
schools). Contracting can do all of this while also allowing governments to
keep schools accountable.
THE AR UMENTS A A NST PPPS
There is a body of literature that argues that there are negative outcomes asso-
ciated with the private provision of public services (see, for example, Fiske
and add 2000; add 2002; 200 ). Some of these arguments include: PPPs
will lead to the privatization of education and thus will reduce the govern-
ment’s control over a public service; increasing the educational choices avail-
able to students and their families may increase socio-economic segregation if
better prepared students end up self-selecting into high-quality schools, thus
further improving their outcomes; and PPPs will lead to poorer students being
left behind in the deteriorating public schools that lose the support of more
educated parents.
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Public private partnerships in education may face resistance from certain

stakeholders. For instance, teachers and other employees may see PPPs as a
threat to their job stability, while teachers’ and public sector unions may see
them as a way of diminishing their inluence over their members’ terms and
conditions of service.
There can also be some challenges and risks involved in PPPs. nputs to
education, processes and outputs are very different and require several differ-
ent forms of contracts (including management, support, professional, opera-
tional, educational services and infrastructure). All of these variations need
to be assessed separately as they require different approaches in order to be
effective. For example, in many countries, it is likely that the capacity of
public agencies will have to be developed before it will be possible to expand
the schooling options available to low-income students. n some cases, there
may even be a need to build the capacity of private operators to deliver high-
quality schooling.
While one advantage of PPPs is that they can be a more cost-effective way
in which to provide education than the traditional public sector approach, there
are some instances in which this may not be the case. For example, contract-
ing for facility availability may be more expensive than traditional procure-
ment methods when the costs of awarding and managing contracts or of private
borrowing are particularly high. Also, if poorly handled, contracting can even
reduce already low levels of government accountability and control. t can also
create opportunities for corruption in the awarding of the contracts. Therefore,
partnerships that provide inancing to private schools but do not demand
accountability can have negative consequences.
n countries where PPPs have not been extensively tried before, the govern-
ment may need to change their education policies and regulatory framework.
To make PPPs more effective, they could create an enabling framework that
includes:
1. eining t e lace of ri ate ro iders in t e national ed cation strat-

egy. Governments can encourage the participation of the private education
sector by explicitly recognizing their important role in legislation (Borja
200 ; aRocque 2002). n legislation, the government can provide clear
guidelines about setting and distributing tuition fees, allowing not-for-
proit and for-proit schools to operate and whether to facilitate foreign
direct investment to the sector.
2. Setting clear, objective and streamlined criteria that the private sector must
meet in order to establish and operate schools. overnments can strike a
balance between quality control policies and overly restrictive entry crite-
ria. This means that while it is essential to outline clear requirements to
operate and protect students from substandard education services, it is also
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critical to avoid deterring potential private providers to enter the education

market or increasing their costs, thus undermining their ability to deliver
effective and low-cost services. Entry criteria for private schools should
be realistic and achievable, objective and measurable, output-focused, and
applied consistently across levels of government.
3. Introducing school funding systems that integrate public and private
schools and that are neutral, responsive and targeted. There is a wide
range of inancing mechanisms for PPPs. One extreme is to provide one-
time funding from the outset that creates indirect incentives for private
school operation; these include free or discounted land and education
infrastructure. The other extreme is ongoing and direct inancial support
for private schools, such as those used in public-inance and private-
delivery arrangements like charter schools. Financing schemes for private
schools encourage a lexible operating environment (on the supply-side)
and reduce access barriers to families (on the demand-side). They can also
be used as mechanisms to improve the quality of services for low-income
families (for example, means-tested) and to encourage competition among
schools. Public funding systems should be similar for public and private
schools, based on per-capita measures rather than inputs to schooling,
clear and transparent.
4. Establishing effective quality assurance systems that balance autonomy
and accountability. uality assurance mechanisms should clearly outline
the desired outputs and performance standards that private schools must
fulil, and at the same time, deine sanctions for poor performance and
rewards for success. overnments must strike a balance between allow-
ing suficient management freedom, in areas such as stafing and budget
decisions (since greater lexibility is one of the premises that justify the
potential of PPPs to increase the quality of services), providing support
to schools in pedagogy and management areas if capacity is weak, and
enforcing accountability for the delivery of results.
ood design cannot ensure the success of a PPP in education as it must also
be implemented effectively and eficiently. To ensure this, governments should
choose their private partners by means of a transparent, competitive and multi-
stage selection process. Second, they should assign the roles of purchaser
and provider of education services to different entities within the education
administrative agencies. Third, they must ascertain that the private agency
involved has suficient capacity for the task in question. Also, government
education institutions must develop their own capacity, establish quality assur-
ance mechanisms, develop appropriate performance measures for contractors,
and devise incentives to achieve performance targets as well as sanctions for
nonperformance.
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THE EV DENCE
Existing evidence from around the world shows that the correlation between
private provision of education and indicators of education quality is positive,
which suggests that the private sector can deliver high-quality education at a
low cost. t has been shown that publicly-operated schools deliver lower test
scores than privately-operated schools, but publicly-funded private schools are
associated with higher academic achievement than publicly-operated institu-
tions (Woessmann 2005). Therefore, partnerships in which the private sector is
the operator and the public sector is the inancier have the potential to increase
enrolment while keeping the education budget in check.
Also, although more rigorous evidence is needed, it is clear that PPPs,
contracting and subsidy arrangements can rapidly expand access to school-
ing and increase quality, especially if coupled with rigorous quality assurance
mechanisms and such interventions as teacher training and school improve-
ment initiatives. n doing so, it particularly beneits disadvantaged groups and
the poor – the very groups who are ill-served by traditionally delivered public
services (Patrinos et al. 200 ).
Private school contracting programmes and programmes involving the
private management of public schools can provide the poor with low-cost or
free access to education. n fact, these contracting initiatives are usually aimed
directly at the poor, including the schools run by Fe y Alegr a, a esuit order
that provides education in remote rural areas under contract to the govern-
ments of several atin American countries (Allcott and Ortega 200 ; Brewer
et al. 200 ).
Strategic use of the private sector has led to the rapid expansion of access
to education in several countries. Colombia’s targeted voucher programme
provided places in private secondary schools for more than 100,000 students
from poor families (Angrist et al. 2002; 200 ). Voucher students were more
likely to pass college entrance exams, had higher graduation rates, and scored
better on standardized tests. The programme cost less than public second-
ary schools on a per pupil basis. n Bangladesh, BRAC’s (Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee) Non-Formal Primary Education Program started in
1 5 with 22 one-room schools. By 200 , it was serving more than 1.5 million
children in more than 20,000 pre-primary and 2,000 primary schools, which
accounted for 11 per cent of primary school children in Bangladesh. BRAC
schools teach the same competencies as government schools, but they enrol
and retain a higher proportion of hard-to-reach children, such as girls, who
constitute 5 per cent of students. There was a boom in the creation of private
schools in Pakistan between 2000 and 2005, with 15,000 new private schools
being set up. This increase happened to an equal extent in both urban and
rural areas and reached both low- and high-income households (Andrabi et
199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 211 24/05/2012 15:21

al. 200 ). The enrolment rate in private schools of children from the poorest
households in rural areas jumped from nil to per cent. The private schools
charge very low fees, less than 10 cents a day (Andrabi et al. 200 ). n this
way, private provision has increased enrolment in rural areas and among low-
income households at a very low cost (Andrabi et al. 200 ). These examples
show that, when implemented correctly, PPPs can help countries to satisfy
unmet demand for schooling.
With regard to the effects of the private management of public schools, some
useful lessons have emerged from a small set of empirical studies. Based on
evidence from Colombia and Venezuela, it is known that the private manage-
ment of public schools has a positive impact on student test scores (Allcott and
Ortega 200 ; Barrera-Osorio 200 ). However, we know less about the precise
characteristics of publicly-funded, privately-operated schools that make them
perform better than public schools, other than perhaps fewer civil service
constraints, more school autonomy and the increased length of the school year.
Nonetheless, it seems from existing evaluations that lexibility in the contract
is an important factor in determining positive education outcomes.
As with vouchers, there is much controversy surrounding them. n several
countries, governments allow parents to send their children to the school of
their choice, fund private and religious schools from the public budget, and
allocate resources to schools based on enrolment, which are all programmes
that deliver similar beneits to those offered in voucher programmes. Some
of these arrangements are over 100 years old (such as those in Denmark and
the Netherlands) while others are more recent (such as those in Chile and
Sweden). Colombia’s targeted voucher programme has been subject to exten-
sive analysis because of its randomized design. The evidence from Chile’s
voucher programme is mixed (see, for example, Hsieh and Urquiola 200 ;
Sapelli and Vial 200 ). Some studies have found that it has had several posi-
tive outcomes, but other studies have challenged this, arguing that the origi-
nal studies had problems of selection and a lack of adequate instruments.
Furthermore, for many years following the voucher reform of 1 1, overall
education quality in Chile did not improve. More recently, there have been
some rapid increases in test scores and an ongoing revision of the school
inancing formula as an attempt to reduce equity concerns. Universal school
choice (where all parents in a country can choose their children’s schools by
means of a voucher) in Europe has led to a more competitive schools’ market.
n most cases, this competition yields better outcomes overall, as would be
predicted by theory. Nevertheless, there is much that we still need to learn
about school choice and vouchers.
Thus far, there is some positive evidence on the educational outcomes asso-
ciated with public provision of private services, including measures of student
achievement, but is not extensive enough to justify either ignoring PPPs or
199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 212 24/05/2012 15:21

expanding them on a large scale. The few studies that have been carried out so
far suggest that contracting out to the private sector can have several beneits,
including greater eficiency, increased choice and wider access to education,
particularly for those households who have been poorly served by traditional
methods of providing education. n general, private management of public
schools tends to be eficient and yield higher test scores than public insti-
tutions when students reach the end of basic education. n addition, despite
being controversial, vouchers can improve academic outcomes, especially for
the poor.
However, few of the existing empirical studies of PPPs can be considered
to have yielded robust conclusions. There is a need to evaluate how PPPs
work most effectively in different contexts, particularly where contracting
models need to be improved or ine-tuned and in countries where partner-
ships are still nascent. While much is known about funding school choice,
much less is understood with regard to the characteristics of charter and
concession schools that lead them to perform better than public schools.
More research is also needed on universal vs. targeted school choice and on
private inance initiatives. These programmes should be piloted and rigorously
evaluated in different settings. Because of the pressing need to increase the
evidence base in these areas, this study provides guidance on how to carry
out better evaluations of a variety of aspects of public private partnerships in
education.
CONC US ONS
Where appropriate, PPPs can increase access and improve quality in education
by giving students choices and by putting competitive pressures on schools.
Public funding of private schools is justiied because disadvantaged students
will beneit from the opportunity to enrol in appropriate schools for their needs.
Nevertheless, ensuring academic quality in this kind of education system is
a persistent challenge. Experience with PPPs in various countries yields the
following recommendations:
• nclude output speciications that deine performance standards and

facilitate the measurement and tracking of quality and school eficiency.
Performance indicators can be quantitative, such as standardized tests or
enrolment igures, or qualitative, such as school and parent surveys or
school inspections. t is particularly important to include quality indica-
tors that will encourage improvements in the performance of private
schools and, equally important, to reinforce them with appropriate
supervision.
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• Deine operating requirements and performance standards that private

schools and operators should follow. Private schools should meet
eligibility criteria to receive public funding (such as infrastructure and
staff requirements), follow national curricula and meet performance
benchmarks.
• Reward innovation and quality improvements. One way to reward schools
is to provide monetary awards for good performance. Conversely, sanc-
tions for poor performance should include the revoking of any subsidies.
• Help private schools to deliver high-quality education and accom-
pany voucher programmes with capacity-building interventions. Some
private schools lack the capacity to improve the quality of the education
that they provide because their teachers lack qualiications, the schools
lack the resources to buy materials and textbooks, and school manage-
ment is not aware of the most effective teaching techniques and manage-
ment processes. Some ways to help build this kind of capacity in private
schools include increasing their access to capital and preferential loans
to improve infrastructure and other critical inputs, and providing tech-
nical assistance and quality certiication to enhance inancial manage-
ment, instructional delivery and school leadership.
• Establish a specialized group of authorities to manage the operation of
private schools and the low of funds from the government to public
schools, and to enforce qualifying criteria and regulations.
While governments remain the main inanciers of primary and secondary

education, a substantial share of education worldwide is now delivered by
private agents. n the most common type of PPP, governments fund exist-
ing private schools; more recently, governments have contracted with private
providers to generate alternatives to traditional forms of public education. The
expansion of private participation in the education systems of both developed
and developing countries is increasingly turning them into markets with the
potential to increase quality and eficiency. The few rigorous empirical studies
show promising results that need to be corroborated with more analytical work.
For public private partnerships to live up to their potential of bringing many
beneits to the education sector, they must be well regulated and designed.
This means two things. First, governments should recognize the role of private
schools as an important player in their education system and develop regula-
tory environments that are conducive to their effective operation. Second, the
regulatory environments should embody a series of parameters that encourage
a balance between transparency, autonomy and accountability. Poorly designed
PPPs can expose governments to signiicant inancial and policy risks such as
cost increases and unmet objectives.
199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 214 24/05/2012 15:21

NOTE
1 This is a summary of the book, The Role and Impact of Public-Private Partnerships in
Education, by Harry Anthony Patrinos, Felipe Barrera-Osorio and uliana uaqueta (200 ).
All errors are our own. The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the World Bank roup.
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199-216 Pt3 Ch10.indd 216 24/05/2012 15:21

11. Do public private partnerships
fulil the right to education?
An examination of the role of
non-state actors in advancing
equity, equality and justice
Maria Ron-Balsera and
Akanksha A. Marphatia1
INTRODUCTION
nternational human rights treaties and regional conventions, including the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1 , the nternational
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights ( CESCR) and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), all recognize education as a
fundamental human right and not just a basic need or social service.2 In prac-
tice, education has been reafirmed as a right in national constitutions and
supported by global frameworks, such as the goals that developed in omtien
and Dakar for Education For All (EFA). These frameworks also highlight the
strategic role of education for human, social and economic development.3 If
a State has committed to these international agreements and adopted national
legislation, then in practice it should ensure education is provided in accor-
dance to the Rights Based Approach (RBA) ( onsson 200 ).
These universal declarations recognize the State as the main duty bearer
and thus provider of education (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, CESCR C 1 : ). However, in most countries, education is increas-
ingly offered by multiple providers. These include non-state education provid-
ers such as nongovernmental organizations (N Os), strictly private initiatives
and variations in between such as public private partnerships (PPP). The role of
the State in these situations is often ambiguous in practice, though according to
the Human Rights framework, governments are obliged to respect, protect and
fulil the right to education, and therefore have the duty to ensure the educa-
tion offered by different providers (including the state itself) adheres to human
217
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rights standards and principles (CESCR C 1 : and and the CRC):

‘(A)ll education, whether public or private, formal or non-formal, shall be
directed to ards t e ai s and o ecti es identiied in article ’ (CESCR
C 1 : ). Thus states must ensure that private education also promotes the
full development of the human personality, effective participation in society,
respect for human rights, tolerance and understanding with other groups. This
applies in particular to arrangements such as PPPs where the State can elect to
make a inancial contribution to private institutions that manage schools. The
State must nevertheless ensure the education offered is free of discrimination
on any of the prohibited grounds (CESCR C 1 : 5 ).
Although the State plays a regulatory role in situations where education
is delivered by non-state providers, the underlying debate about whose legal
responsibility it is to provide education ensues. The argument often used to
open the sector to other providers is the lack of the State’s resources, inefi-
ciency and poor overall capacity.
n this chapter we argue that the 2 million children currently out of
school (UNESCO 2010) are precisely the reason to strengthen state systems
and increase resources for public education rather than seek a substitute in
private provision. We begin by outlining the key principles of the Rights Based
Approach (RBA) to education and illustrate how they promote education
which is available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable. We then show how
current PPP experiences in ndia and Chile have been unable to fulil the right
to education in a manner which promotes these principles. However, given the
rapid growth of non-state providers, the key to improving primary and second-
ary education provision may well be around greater accountability to rights
holders. To illustrate how communities can effectively participate in both
supporting the public education system and holding it accountable, we review
the experiences of non-state providers such as ActionAid nternational and the
Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF, which ended in 200 ), who have them-
selves evolved from direct service delivery to partnering with communities to
advocate for universal public provision of education from RBA.
THE R HTS BASED APPROACH TO EDUCAT ON
The Rights Based Approach to education differentiates between delivering a

service and enabling a right. t goes beyond the identiication of beneiciaries,
quantity and outcomes, and includes concepts of responsibility, quality and
processes ( onsson 200 ). The RBA stems from the standards and principles
enshrined in international human rights law; therefore, the RBA is a compi-
lation of legal frameworks and their oficial legal interpretations. n theory,
these concepts form the key elements of the PANE ’ model: Participation,
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 218 24/05/2012 15:21

o lic ri ate artners i s f lil t e rig t to ed cation 21
accountability, non-discrimination, empowerment and link with the law

(OHCHR 2002; 200 ). They are universal and inalienable, indivisible, inter-
dependent and interrelated. They promote equality, equity and inclusion.5
Private providers of education are accepted in human rights covenants as they
contribute to freedom of choice, a central part of the education components
of both the UDHR and the CESCR. However, freedom of choice can only be
understood to exist if the type of education delivered adheres to the guiding
human rights principles, which for education include:
Participation
n human rights terms, education shall enable all persons to participate effec-
tively in a free society’ ( CESCR: Art. 1 .1). Participation is linked to free
access to information regarding States’ decisions concerning education, moni-
toring bodies and private providers of public education. Whether it be civil
society or private providers, the State must ensure that accurate and appropri-
ate information on human rights conventions, principles and provision is made
available (CRC: Art. 2). Efforts must also be made by the State to ensure all
members of society, from children to community leaders, are able to partici-
pate and take action in decision-making processes without fear of persecution.
Accountability
States have the obligation to promote accountability in education. This

includes the creation of mechanisms both within the government and citizen-
led, to monitor and hold the State accountable for delivering on its obligation
to respect, protect and fulil the right to free education and for adhering to
minimum educational standards of quality learning (CESCR, C 1 : ).
These mechanisms must monitor education – including all relevant policies,
institutions, programmes, spending patterns and other practices – so as to
identify and take measures to redress any de facto discrimination’ (CESCR,
C1 : ). n the same vein, schools must also have transparent and effec-
tive systems for monitoring and local people should be involved in governing
bodies, management committees or parent groups.
Non-Discrimination
The right to non-discrimination means that all education must be accessible

and of good quality to all children, irrespective of the child’s or his or her
parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or
other status’ (CRC: Art. 2).
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 219 24/05/2012 15:21

Education must also be adaptable to diverse needs. For example, curri-

cula and teaching methods should be directed to upholding dignity, tolerance
and respect and facilitating effective participation. This requires the State
to collect disaggregated data while ensuring this information is not used in
ways to entrench the discrimination or the structural inequalities that main-
tain differences (CESCR, C 1 : ). Regardless of the provider, the State
must maintain a role in ensuring schooling does not lead to extreme dispari-
ties of educational opportunity for some groups in society’ (CESCR, C 1 :
0). Therefore, States must identify and take measures to redress a de facto
discrimination’ (CESCR, C 1 : 2).
Empowerment
The State must promote strategies which enable’ the beneiciaries to claim
their rights. This applies particularly to those that are marginalized, includ-
ing girls and women. This can be done by raising awareness about rights and
enhancing people’s capacity to use and demand their rights. t is important
that people’s voices are heard, that their capabilities are expanded so they
can transform their lives and the education system. The right to education is
considered an empowerment right or multiplier because it enables a person to
beneit from other rights (Coomans 2002).
Link to Law
This requires the education system to be explicitly linked to international

human rights law and its standards and to the principles of non-discrimination,
empowerment, participation and accountability. While the State must respect
private initiatives and the parental right to choose a provider other than itself,
governments are also obliged to ensure private and other providers adhere to
human rights principles and are regulated to meet minimum education stan-
dards (CESCR, C 1 : 2 ). The State’s failure to ensure private providers
adhere to these core principles is considered a violation of the right to educa-
tion (CESCR, C 1 : 5 ).
n the education ield, the human rights principles described by the PANE
model have been developed into the A’s’ framework to facilitate practical
implementation of the RBA in education. This framework was developed
by the irst United Nations Special Rapporteur to the Right to Education,
the late Katarina Toma evski (2001), who explains that good quality educa-
tion must adhere to these four related and indivisible principles: compul-
sory and available free of cost; accessible to all without discrimination;
acceptable in terms of good quality of teachers, curriculum and facilities;
and adaptable to all contexts to include groups’ diversity. The principles
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of participation, accountability and empowerment are embedded within this

framework.
Availability
States should actively develop a strong education system of schools, including

building adequate and quality classrooms, providing teaching materials, train-
ing teachers and paying them domestically competitive salaries (CESCR, C
1 : 50). States are obliged to allocate the maximum of available resources
in order to achieve progressively the full realization of the right to education.
Availability also refers to the freedom for parents to establish schools and
choose teaching according to their religious and philosophical convictions
( CESCR: Art. 1 ( )). For example, the European Court of Human Rights stip-
ulates that the purpose of the guarantee of education according to parents’ reli-
gious and philosophical convictions is to ensure the possibility of pluralism in
education and combat the risk of indoctrination. However, freedom of choice
has, in many cases, led not only to indoctrination, but also to gender and racial
segregation as well as discrimination of children with disabilities ( evin 1 ).
Accessibility
The education system should be non-discriminatory and physically (for

example reasonable distance to school) accessible to all. Education should be
compulsory and free of all direct and indirect charges until the minimum age
of employment. Positive steps should be taken to include the most marginal-
ized, eliminating legal and administrative barriers that hinder the enjoyment
of this right.
Acceptability
The content and methodology of education should be relevant, non-

discriminatory, culturally appropriate (for example, for minorities and indig-
enous peoples), of quality and in respect of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Schools should have professional teachers and be safe spaces free
of violence and any form of violation, respecting the prohibition of corporal
punishment.
Adaptability
Education should evolve with the changing needs of society and be locally
adapted to suit speciic contexts. Schools should be inclusive and not reinforce
existent societal patterns that discriminate against certain groups such as girls,
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children with disabilities, refugees, and so on. Education provision must take
the best interests of the child as the guiding principle and respect and value
human diversity.
E AMP ES OF PUB C PR VATE PARTNERSH PS
Proponents of greater private engagement in education argue that there is little

choice but to support private provision because the State is unable to meet the
growing demand for education. Constrained budgets, coupled with weakening
state capacity and a rapid increase in enrolments has led to the appearance of
PPPs in many countries. Over the past 20 years, the free market and competi-
tion discourse, underpinned by neoliberal values, has called for less state inter-
vention (Ron-Balsera 2011). Some authors, such as aidi (200 ), consider that
the role of the state has been eroded, demeaning its power and capacity to
regulate policies that promote and ensure the fulilment of citizens’ rights. He
argues that the growing inluence of the nternational Financial nstitutions
over nation-state economies is behind this shift. This market fundamental-
ism’, which is the essence of the Washington Consensus,10 has been advocated
by inancial institutions, when deciding under which conditions loans should
be made. Some commentators believe that a Post-Washington Consensus’
has emerged which softens reliance on market liberalization, and emphasizes
democratic governance, as the result of inancial institutions’ self-criticism.
However, this turn seems to be largely rhetoric since, in practice, lobbying
for economic liberalization and non-state providers in social services delivery
continues (Rose 200 , p. 1 ).
The Rights Based Approach recognizes that those institutions that are both
directly and indirectly associated with education, such as the international
inancial institutions (for example, the World Bank and the nternational
Monetary Fund), must also pay greater attention to the protection of the
right to education in their lending policies, credit agreements, structural adjust-
ment programmes and measures taken in response to the debt crisis’ ( CESCR,
C 1 : 0). The dominant neoliberal discourse prioritizes the goals of macro-
economic stability (as deined by iscal austerity and monetary prudence) over
human development (Marphatia et al. 200 ; Rowden 2005; Rowden 200 ). As
long as education and rights are not central to an institution’s philosophy any
initiative using the neoliberal approach is likely to fail in providing education
for all without discrimination (Ron-Balsera 2011).
Ahmad further explains (in aidi 200 , p. i):
the current context of privatization couches education in the language of the

market underpinned by human capital measures and education as a product’.
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 222 24/05/2012 15:21

This commodiication of knowledge as a purchasable and saleable good displaces

the creation and passing on of knowledge from the social sphere to the sphere of
production. Displacing and reinterpreting knowledge under these conditions raises
many fundamental questions from the purpose of education, to the content, and
the ethical obligation to make knowledge freely available to those who seek it.
Moreover, deining education institutions simply as service providers’ – bending
before the rewarding contact – is an unacceptable constriction upon the responsibil-
ity to society.
The World Bank advances this neoliberal agenda by encouraging private sector
involvement in education, arguing that this type of approach, puts
power in the hands of the end users of a service and makes that service more rele-
vant to their needs so schools more accountable and responsive to their consumers
and, as a result, more eficient in their use of resources and more effective in raising
student achievement levels. (World Bank 200 , p. 2 )
Private involvement in education is justiied by the perceived beneits derived

from cost eficiency, wider choice, greater accountability and lowering the
burden of the State (Chubb and Moe 1 0; Hanushek et al. 1 ; Patrinos
et al. 200 ). Patrinos further argues that the main rationale for developing
public private partnerships (PPPs) in education is to maximize the potential
for expanding equitable access to schooling and for improving education
outcomes, especially for marginalized groups’ (Patrinos et al. 200 , p. ). The
existence of multiple providers is seen to widen government choice, which can
lead to potential cost savings as the contractor with the best or lowest cost
proposal is then chosen’ (Patrinos et al. 200 , p. ). These lower cost options
are possible because the free market promotes greater lexibility in contracts.
Patrinos et al. explain the potential savings that can be derived from deregu-
lating employment conditions and salaries for teachers which, according to
UNESCO (2010) data, comprise between 0 and per cent of the education
budget – by arguing that the public sector has less autonomy in hiring teachers
and organizing schools than the private sector does’ (Patrinos et al. 200 , p. ).
Advocates of PPPs also argue that competition created through expanded
choice (for example, voucher schemes) enhances the quality of education and
supports the ability of parents to hold schools accountable: f a school offers
poor quality education, parents will not choose it, enrolments will decline’
(Belield and evin 2002, p. ). For example, Friedman cited the provision of
public education by the US government as an example of the failure of social-
ism’ (Friedman 1 0). He argued that schooling would be more eficiently
provided by the private sector and advocated for vouchers in order to give
parents the freedom to choose the teachers for their children and monitor the
school performance. The 1 0s voucher reform in Chile converted Friedman’s
shock program’ ideology into a virtual laboratory for a relatively unregulated,
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BOX 11.1: PRIVATIZATION IN CHILE: DOES INCREASING

COMPETITION AND CHOICE FOSTER EQUALITY IN ACCESS
AND QUALITY OF LEARNING?
During the 1980s, the voucher reform in Chile intended to expand

choice by encouraging a rapid growth in private school enrolment,
driven by an e pansion of non religious and for proit schools
Inluenced by ilton riedman s proposal, hile s military govern-
ment transferred responsibility for public school management from
the national Ministry of Education to local municipalities in 1980 and
began inancing public and most private schools with vouchers.
ach school s revenues were henceforth determined on a month
to-month basis by total enrolments and a government-determined
voucher. Teachers lost their status as civil servants, reverting to
municipal contracts, and school buildings and land were signed
over to municipal control arnoy and c wan , p. .
While the reform expanded the availability of education through
the creation of new schools and cut costs, researchers challenge
whether this increased competition and greater choice fostered
better quality of education. While there were savings in over-
all cost, these did not occur due to reducing wasting in school
budgets or investing where more necessary, but in lowering the
wor ing conditions of teachers and cream s imming students,
selecting lower cost and higher scoring students by locating
schools, on average, in higher income neighbourhoods and by
selecting a higher rate of return students. The cost and location
of the schools also prevented the inclusion of more children from
low-income backgrounds, especially in rural areas and those with
special learning needs including disabilities.
Student achievement fell marginally and working conditions
for teachers worsened, with a greater percentage on short-
term contracts. Although parental participation increased due
to a wider selection of schools, their participation was primar-
ily through choice and exit rather than in school governance/
decision-making, thus raising doubts about how accountable the
schools were to parents. owever, the for proit schools did not
necessarily increase accessibility, acceptability and adaptability
of education for all children.
Source: c wan and arnoy a and arnoy and c wan .
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 224 24/05/2012 15:21

decentralized, competitive market in primary and secondary education’ (Bravo

et al. 200 , p. 2). This reform was one of the deepest market-oriented reforms
carried out by the Junta Militar dictatorship, headed by Augusto Pinochet in a
range of sectors. Box 11.1 illustrates the experience of voucher systems in Chile.
Low-fee Private Schools
Another growing trend in education privatization has been community

schools’ and low-fee private schools’ ( FP). Although community schools
were often founded to ill a temporary gap in government provision, there
are concerns about their sustainability, lack of accountability, poor quality
and about the heavy burden that these types of schools pose on the poorest
and excluded members of the community (Rose 2002; 200 ). Tooley argues
that FP schools provide a viable alternative to increasing access to quality
education for the poor (2001; 2005). According to Tooley and Dixon, roughly
equal numbers of boys and girls attend private unaided schools, which have
better pupil-teacher ratios, higher teacher commitment, and sometimes better
facilities than government schools. A signiicant number of places in private
unaided schools are provided free or at reduced rates to serve the poorest of the
poor’ (2005, p. 1). The success of these schools is related to parental choice and
greater accountability of fee-paying consumers (Tooley 2001, p. 1 1).
Many researchers have refuted Tooley’s arguments and criticized his meth-
odology, arguing that competition is mostly valid for urban rather than rural
settings (Kingdon 200 ). Others question if FP schools have improved the
quality of learning in comparison to government schools or the affordability
of even very low fees by the poorer half of rural society (H rm 2010). Some
critics have highlighted the risk of ghettoization of FP schools (Vasavi 200 ,
p. ) and negative effects on equity (H rm 2010; see also H rm and Rose,
this volume). H rm concludes that fee-paying schools, even if FP schools,
discriminate, leaving behind those of low caste or minority religion, the land-
less, girls, and children born later in families and children of larger families.
. Marketised options are neither sustainable in the context of remote rural
villages, nor are they, most importantly, socially equitable’ (2010, p. ).
Box 11.2 illustrates the changes that are taking place in the ndian education
system due to the growth of private sector intervention.
PPPS AND THE RBA
The examples from Chile and ndia show that in some instances PPPs, in the
form of government subsidies to private providers, have made education more
available by expanding the number of schools. However, this does not imply
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BOX 11.2: PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN INDIA:

PROMOTING EQUITY OR INCREASING INEQUALITY?
In practice, public private partnerships PPPs in education in

India have existed since the 1960s when the government began
to provide inancial support to private schools on scale orld
an . In 2010, nearly 60 per cent of all secondary schools
are government aided or strictly private and the corresponding
percentage for elementary schools is around per cent orld
an , citing and I .
The Policy Framework for Reforms in Education Report
opened the door for the private sector into education policy-
ma ing Ambani and irla . The Tas orce on ducation
was headed by two prominent industrialists, Mukesh Ambani
and Kumarmangalam Birla, the latter representing big busi-
ness interests in running private educational institutions. The
th ive ear Plan ocument advocates for public
private partnerships, proposing multiple options for the entry of
non-state providers, to strengthen the educational system and
tap additional resources overnment of India . Another
recent development in that direction is the setting up of so-called
odel chools in PPP mode for secondary education. The ratio-
nale being offered for the growth of PPP is the perceived lack of
resources with the government for ensuring education with qual-
ity and the perception that private operators are more eficient.
The recent Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education
Act 2009 obliges private schools to give 25 per cent of school
places to randomly selected students from ‘the weaker sections
of society overnment of India . The present arrange-
ment amounts to partial or complete reimbursement of expenses
incurred by private schools by the State.
However, critics of this approach are concerned that the weak
and unaccountable regulatory system of private schools could
lead to misappropriation of funds transferred as subsidy for the
per cent quota a ocque et al. atham . Although
the 25 per cent aims to provide marginalized and excluded groups
with a wider choice, the reality makes this choice inaccessible
to these groups because of the location of new schools, lack of
infrastructure regulations to cater for children s diverse needs
and the lack of monitoring instruments to ensure curriculum and
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 226 24/05/2012 15:21

teaching techniques which promote human rights rm

ehrotra and Panchamu hi . e and amson and
Tila argue that the scarce resources are being drained
from state schools in support of a discriminatory system of private
schools. As a result, state schools now face the risk of becoming
ghettos for poor and marginali ed groups.
The PPP landscape in India is complicated because budget
private schools also exist and, on average, have been found to
have poorer physical infrastructure than government schools.
This is partly due to cost-cutting measures which include teacher
training and recruitment rm . An evaluation by P
in 1999 found that 80 per cent of private school teachers were
untrained. Budget private schools were able to implement these
measures by tapping into the loating pool of unemployed youth
and offering them low salaries.
In private schools, one study found that the participation of
parents only increased through choice and exit, with no consul-
tation to identify the needs of different communities and groups
rivastava . tudies have also found low levels of paren-
tal participation in private schools, attributable to low educational
levels of parents and lac of e perience with school systems
interaction was limited to payment of fees rather than discussing
concerns about the quality of education rivastava .
In terms of accountability, the PPP model promoted in India
raises questions about the commitment and capacity of govern-
ment to regulate the private sector s involvement in education.
Experience shows that many private schools have ignored
government regulations including government orders and ourt
verdicts and are operating through what has been described as
a shadow institutional framewor parallel to the e isting govern-
ment systems rivastava The longer term monitoring of
performance against standards and indicators requires proce-
dures and resources for inspection, reporting, and implementa-
tion of legislation. These presuppose government regulatory
capacity and competence that is very often lac ing oran and
atley , p. .
Source: Angela Taneja and Debdutt Panda, ActionAid International

India.
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 227 24/05/2012 15:21

that these schools have been able to ensure access to all children, especially
those in marginalized areas, or that they abide by the PANE principles and A
framework by offering consistently good-quality education.
The notion of PPPs offering greater choice is seen as a misnomer by Carnoy
and McEwan, who concluded that in Chile the for-proit schools select where
to locate themselves and as a result select a certain proile of students. They
explain the main reasons that increased choice seems to lead to greater ineq-
uity are that better privately-run alternatives to public schools are more likely
to locate in areas where they can attract lower cost students, and that many
parents do not realize their irst choice of schools’ (Carnoy and McEwan 200 ,
p. 20). Belield and evin ind that PPPs are seldom located in remote areas
where marginalized populations often live, thus often self-limiting the potential
beneits of these schools and making education available only to those with
reasonable inancial means (2002). For example, the Swedish free school initia-
tive which started in 1 was funded by the government on a parental voucher
basis that promoted non-fee-paying public schools owned and run by a variety
of educational providers, ranging from nonproit cooperatives and faith groups
to for-proit corporations: One strong argument in favour of this move was the
idea that parents in rural areas, without access to a local school, could come
together and receive funding for a school for their children, perhaps after a local
municipal school had closed down. However, 0 per cent of free schools
are located in the three main Swedish urban centres’ (Duncan Hall 2010).
Rural and poor families usually cannot beneit from the choice that the
PPPs claim to offer particularly due to the inability to contribute to any type
of fee-paying scheme.11 Since many private schools under PPPs charge fees
and recover educational costs, the poor and marginalized are unable to readily
access them (De and Samson 200 ).
The evidence also suggests that schools, particularly when competition is
fostered, discriminate against children with special education needs (Whitty
and Power 2000). Even in the strictly controlled Milwaukee experiment,12
where the government ensured high levels of accountability, the private schools
involved managed to turn away students with special problems’ (Carnoy and
McEwan 200 , p. 20). The experience of Chile reject(s) the hypothesis that
less-educated parents respond to the offer of higher performing, higher social
class schools to the same degree as do more educated parents, even when these
schools are available in equal numbers and even when their cost is approxi-
mately the same’ (Carnoy and McEwan 200 , p. 1 ). This social segregation
can be explained both by parents’ choice to enrol their children in schools that
best relect their socio-economic background and by schools’ selection criteria.
There is further evidence that education programmes which offer greater
choice in general are likely to further divide pupils and communities along
social, economic, ethnic and class lines, increasing social stratiication rather
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 228 24/05/2012 15:21

than enhancing educational equity. According to Molnar, who looked at the

Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) and Cleveland Scholarship
and Tutoring Program (CSTP) amongst other voucher programmes in the
USA, t he research on the education outcomes of students enrolled in
voucher schools shows little or no evidence that voucher systems would
consistently improve student achievement’ (Molnar 2001, p. 1 ). At the same
time, voucher programmes carry the very real risk of further draining public
education of needed resources, particularly in poor, urban districts where the
needs are greatest.
Furthermore, the type of accountability exercised by parents using vouchers
relies on choice; for example, the possibility to change schools if they are not
happy with the services offered, removing the need for effective participation
to improve school being left. The concept of greater choice is in fact at odds
with the practical experience of changing schools, which is not so easily done
and when it occurs, creates disruptions which impact on children’s well-being
and performance.13
Whereas proponents of the PPP model argue it is more cost effective, Tilak
argues that the cost of funding private delivery of education is signiicantly
higher than what it would have been if delivered by the government itself
(2010). This is particularly so when education budgets are decreased and redi-
rected to private providers, as is the case in ndia. As such, there is a risk of the
public education system becoming the de facto second-class system available
only to the poor and marginalized.
The experience thus far indicates that PPP approaches do not fulil the A
rights-based framework. They are not accessible to all children free of cost;
nor widely available to those in marginalized areas; the quality of education
does not always adhere to human rights standards and is often not adaptable
to different needs.
THE RO E OF NON OVERNMENTA OR AN AT ONS

IN EDUCATION
Overall, the concern that internationally set targets on education will not be
met unless different approaches are considered applies just as much to the
work of N Os as it does to PPPs (Rose 200 ). The involvement of N Os in
education takes many forms and varies in size, scope and political and reli-
gious afiliation. The activities range from direct provision of education; build-
ing schools; providing training for teachers; improving curricula and teaching
practices; and advocacy to ensure state provision of education for excluded
groups (Mundy and Murphy 2001). Some N Os have acted on their own,
while others have worked alongside governments.
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The outcomes of N O involvement in education are mixed. Rose inds that

although N Os provision of education has proven successful in some cases,
there is a lack of systematic analysis and many researchers consider that unsuc-
cessful cases of N O education provision are the majority’ (Rose 200 , p. 1 ;
Thompson 2001). Rose also considers sustainability to be a main criterion of
effectiveness: These generally small-scale programmes raise further chal-
lenges for the state as their efforts are often fragmented across different agen-
cies. Concerns are frequently raised that pilot projects do not move beyond a
pilot, and disappear when external funding inishes’ (Rose 200 , p. 2 ).
The evolution of ActionAid’s work over the past years is representative
of the changing role of many N Os in the education sector (Archer 2010).
AA’s activities have been both interchangeable and symbiotic with that of the
State. At the same time, the organization has also competed with the State,
challenging its effectiveness, and similar to the private sector, opting to do it
better’ itself. AA’s shift from a service delivery to an advocacy organization
signiies its critical analysis of roles and struggles over how best to implement
an RBA.
ActionAid International: From Providing to Enabling
ActionAid began in 1 2 as a sponsorship organization, focusing mostly

on increasing access to school for marginalized and poor children in ndia.
During the 1 0s and 1 0s the organization’s scope widened to include
school construction in Asia, Africa and South America because in the absence
of adequate school infrastructure, it could not guarantee sponsored children
access to education. Rather than building its own schools, the organization
partnered with communities to improve existing state infrastructure.
Providing funding for individual children and for building schools did make
schools available to some children especially in remote, marginalized areas.
However, evaluations showed that these investments have had little if any
impact on improving the accessibility, adaptability and acceptability of educa-
tion (Sathyabalan et al. 1 ). Overall, these efforts did not have any consider-
able impact on improving the quality of learning in classrooms.
n the 1 0s, frustrated by the inability of governments to reach the most
marginalized populations, ActionAid began to build and manage Non Formal
Education (NFE) Centres in collaboration with parents. These centres provided
accessible, low-cost schooling for the hardest to reach, increased the number
of girls in school, and enhanced learning abilities through the use of child-
friendly teaching techniques. They were also adaptable to suit harvest time
schedules to school timings, promoted reading, writing and arithmetic and
teaching in the mother tongue. As a result, in addition to access, ActionAid
was beginning to fulil the acceptability and adaptability aspects of the As.
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 230 24/05/2012 15:21

However, over time these NFE Centres proved to be unsustainable. They

could not be maintained by poor communities beyond the ten years of
ActionAid funding. Many of the centres also lacked clear accountability mech-
anisms. Though ActionAid had collaborated with parents and communities,
the focus was more on encouraging them to send girls to school and contribute
to the construction and maintenance of buildings rather than involving parents
in schools. As a result, community capacity to participate in school gover-
nance, monitoring the use of resources and the quality of education was not
systematically strengthened (Marphatia et al. 2010). Furthermore, though the
use of local people as teachers was revered as good practice, over the years the
impact that these mostly untrained and uncertiied teachers had on the quality
of learning and thus student achievement was questionable (Marphatia et al.
2010a).
Overall, similar to the experience of the PPPs, these schools were skew-
ing the patterns and motivation for government investment in education,
especially the marginalized areas (Archer 2010). Although the number of
schools ActionAid could maintain was miniscule compared to the reach of
the state, governments were not investing in the areas where these N O-run
schools existed. When funding ran out and communities could not maintain
the schools, they often closed. There was no safety net’ provided by the State
because it was not involved in setting them up.
Even more concerning was that often the education provided in the NFE
Centres was not recognized by the State. As a result, even if the teaching meth-
ods were more child-friendly and participatory, and the curriculum locally rele-
vant, children were not always able to continue their studies in State primary
and secondary schools. These outcomes raised doubts about how successful
ActionAid was in the long term in facilitating access to education.
n the late 1 0s, having learned from these lessons, ActionAid embarked
on a new strategy, moving from providing (service delivery, replacing and
competing with the State), to enabling. Rather than delivering education,
the organization realized it was best placed to partner with local groups and
communities to jointly advocate for the State to meet its obligations to respect,
protect and fulil the right to good quality education for all. This began with
building national education coalitions such as Elimu etu in Kenya to facilitate
civil society advocacy with the State and eventually led to the creation of the
lobal Campaign for Education ( CE), an international civil society coali-
tion. The goal was to create a platform where a united and strong civil society
voice could challenge international level inluence (for example, the World
Bank and UNESCO) while connecting to the realities in schools through the
national coalitions.
This global network also included Education nternational, the global feder-
ation of Teacher Unions. After years of animosity over the creation of a parallel
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 231 24/05/2012 15:21

system of teachers (unqualiied and untrained), the Teacher Unions united with
N Os under the common goal of improving teacher professionalism and qual-
ity of learning.
ActionAid’s interaction with excluded groups has also changed. Rather than
building schools for them, the focus is on creating greater awareness amongst
communities about their rights and the duties of the state, and other non-state
actors. A recent independent evaluation of ActionAid in 200 showed that
while there was more work to do in facilitating (rather than providing) the
As, an important factor in the organization’s work has been raising critical
consciousness of stakeholders around their roles and in holding each account-
able to their responsibilities (Sayed and Newman 200 ). This includes greater
accountability at all levels; for example, raising awareness of constitutional
and legislative commitments to education and how these link to international
human rights covenants through the continued development of Toma evski’s
Right-to-Education website,1 a more inclusive and relevant curriculum, and
strengthening learning to respect and promote human rights. n the 2000s,
ActionAid took on a larger research-focused agenda aimed at uncovering the
underlying constraints to education such as the inluence of the nternational
Monetary Fund and gender inequality. Publications on the MF have explored
the inluence of neoliberal macroeconomic policies on public education spend-
ing, revealing stringent budgetary constraints on teacher numbers and leading
to negative impacts on education quality ( CE 200 ; Marphatia et al. 2005;
200 ). Similarly, the organization has tried to take a more evidenced-based
approach to understanding gender inequality by partnering with research insti-
tutes to conduct baseline and longitudinal studies on gender and violence in
education.15
This transition to a rights-based approach has not been easy partly due to
the lack of conceptual clarity on how best to implement a human rights frame-
work. This has created some inevitable tensions around how to responsibly
phase out’ of service delivery and ensure the State takes on the ownership
of education especially in marginalized areas. There is also ambiguity around
the need to provide education in post-conlict situations in the absence of a
strong state. Better links are also needed between grassroots programming and
research efforts to challenge gender inequality in wider society as well as inter-
national policy dialogues challenging the F s.
Following the 200 review, education work for ActionAid has been focused
around three strands (quality, inancing and empowerment). These efforts are
underpinned by the concepts of rights, accountability, participation and equality
promoted by the PANE framework and A’s approach. The Pro oting ig ts
in Schools initiatives offers a portfolio of gender-sensitive education indica-
tors inspired by human rights constructs to be used by a range of stakeholders
from children to government oficials to monitor the quality of learning and the
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 232 24/05/2012 15:21

school and policy environment.1 Education inancing, the second goal, aims
to increase resources for education and enhance greater accountability of their
use, from the local to international level.1 The focus on women’s empower-
ment through literacy is brought back into the fold by reinvigorating the orga-
nization’s Relect’ approach, a Freirian-inspired critical analysis methodology
based on supporting participants to gain literacy skills in order to identify the
challenges facing their communities and organizing them to demand change.1
n 2011, ActionAid international will embark in a new strategy which will
continue to be guided by the rights-based approach.
Commonwealth Education Fund
The Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF) was supported by the UK Treasury

and illustrates a move towards greater collaboration around the common
goal of promoting the right to education amongst three large and previously
competing N Os – ActionAid, Save the Children and Oxfam. CEF’s main
goal was to improve the quality of education by strengthening greater civil
society participation and fostering greater accountability of state and other
non-state interventions. Speciically, it emphasized the importance of making
communities and schools non-discriminatory, gender sensitive and inclusive.
Many challenges and successes were not uniformly shared across countries
and not every coalition supported by CEF has achieved its goals (Tomlinson
and McPhearson 200 ; Woods 200 ). However, a few country examples illus-
trate the value of the RBA in increasing civil society participation in education
which contributed to greater accountability.
For example, CEF efforts in hana and Uganda supported community
participation using an RBA. After raising awareness about rights and account-
ability, CEF partners trained communities to track disbursement lows through
the education system, monitor expenditure and lobby to inluence national
budget allocations. This scrutiny helped to increase transparency in the use
of resources in schools and also between district ofices and local communi-
ties (Claasen 200 ). n hana, CEF enabled communities to participate and
monitor the performance of public education using scorecards, based on prin-
ciples of the As. This tool fostered greater accountability, which contributed
to improving the quality of education (Woods 200 ). CEF partners worked in
communities to address socio-cultural attitudes and practices that impede girls’
school attendance and inluenced government policies to include a gender
perspective. Working with parent teachers associations (PTAs), CEF enabled
communities to address discrimination and exclusion through monitoring
teacher and pupil attendance, advocating for gender equality and promoting
quality education for children with disabilities. As a result, more district funds
were allocated for schools to meet basic education needs, thus enhancing
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 233 24/05/2012 15:21

BOX 11.3: COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION FUND
comprised ommonwealth countries, regional

organizations and the Global Campaign for Education.
s objectives
•
•
Strengthening civil society participation in education planning.
•
Supporting innovative ways to get children into school.
Enabling communities to monitor local and national educa-
tion spending.
•
How?
Creating ways for adults and children to engage with
•
economic policy and service delivery issues.
Local efforts to address corruption – community ownership
•
key.
Linking local mechanisms and reporting to national resource
•
monitoring and allocation.
Cooperation between government and CSOs.
Source: www.commonwealtheducationfund.org/
adaptability (Hart 200 ). CEF also increased the availability, accessibility and
acceptability of education by recruiting and training volunteers from rural
and remote communities to become fully-trained teachers so they could assist
underserved schools in their communities. Furthermore, this effort across 1
communities was used to convince the District Assembly to take on the costs
of these volunteers and an additional 100 volunteers for 0 more communities
(Hart 200 ).
n Uganda, CEF partners linked micro and macro budget issues and advocacy
of excluded groups by promoting a pro-poor, equitable and gender sensitive
budget’ (Hart 200 , p. 5 ). Children’s participation was particularly encour-
aged and children were trained to monitor school performance and expenditure
in order to foster good quality education and accountability (Woods 200 ).
CEF partners’ advocacy efforts increased availability and acceptability of early
childhood care and development. Adaptability and accountability were also
enhanced as a result of lobbying the government to pass and implement the
Children Disability Act of 200 and the 200 national non-formal education
policy framework, which increased state provision of non-formal education,
with a recognized curriculum and qualiied teachers (Hart 200 ).
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o lic ri ate artners i s f lil t e rig t to ed cation 2 5
These examples from the CEF experience show how raising awareness
about the right to education so that right holders are empowered to hold states
to account can produce longer-term effects, therefore a higher rate of return,
than building a school and training a small number of teachers. These advo-
cacy and mobilization techniques promote effective participation by empow-
ering citizens to claim their rights and enable them to identify violations. The
training offered to communities helps to facilitate greater accountability, and
to unveil and address entrenched prevailing discriminatory social attitudes that
impede children enjoying their right to education.
Contrary to cost-effective measures of accountability provided by for-proit
initiatives which may lead to segregation and further inequalities, civil society
participation in budget processes ensures that the perspective and interests of
the excluded and marginalised are voiced and that the budget process caters for
their needs’ (Perry 200 , p. 2 ).
Although CEF closed its doors in 200 , learning from strengthening coali-
tions and civil society advocacy has been incorporated into the next generation
of advocacy programmes. The CEF experience has inspired, among others, the
development and operation of the Civil Society Education Fund, administered
by the CE, and its member regional coalitions ( atin American Campaign to
the Right to Education, C ADE; Asia South Paciic Association for Basic
Adult Education, ASPBAE; and the Africa Network Campaign on Education
for All, ANCEFA).
CONC US ON
The nebulous landscape of non-state education providers, which includes

private sector and N O involvement, is dificult to understand partly because
of the different iterations in which it presents itself, notably as we have shown,
through PPPs which represent both public and private sector efforts. However,
the existence of diverse providers need not be accepted as a fait accompli’ or
as the best way forward for expanding education from a rights perspective.
Even if N Os and the private sector are able to provide educational services,
should this be their role? s this the type of education parents want their
children to access? n ndia, H rm inds that what parents desire is
well-functioning, well-staffed government schools, inspected regularly and
sincerely to ensure accountability’ (200 , p. 1 ).
There is considerable tension between the RBA approach and the expansion
of private provision. First, as we have shown, private provision may evolve
without adequate State ability to regulate the As; and it may not respond to
the type of schooling parents require. Based on this evidence, we ind a funda-
mental contradiction between meeting the requirements of the RBA approach,
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 235 24/05/2012 15:21

which seem to require greater state provision and regulation; and the neoliberal
approach, which looks to separate state functions of provision and regulation.
n the end, neither PPPs nor N Os can release nor replace the State from
being the main duty bearer for the right to education. States have the obligation
to ensure that education provision is in conformity with human rights standards
and principles, such as the principles of non-discrimination, equal opportunity,
accountability and effective participation in society for all. Efforts to elimi-
nate discrimination require a fundamental review of the system of education
to expose and address patterns of discrimination and to reorient education to
avoid recreating a negative social reality.
t appears that many of the PPP initiatives are unregulated and operating in
uncharted territories, though what sets them apart is their motivation to enter
the education sector. Private sector efforts are often driven by proit-related
interests, either as a way to make money or to save costs’ in the name of
eficiency. The commodiication’ of education, as a service whose quality
depends on the cost one can pay, drives the model. Eficiency concerns, which
focus on cutting some areas in order to strengthen others, are in opposition to
rights, which are universal and indivisible.
The experiences of Chile and ndia show that where PPPs may have increased
access to schooling, they have not done so in a manner that supports greater
inclusion of marginalized and poor populations. Though they potentially offer
an attractive alternative to conventional state-led education by providing wider
choice, there is lack of evidence that they improve the situation of people from
lower socio-economic backgrounds. Some of the cases presented here provide
evidence that PPPs can exacerbate socio-economic disparities and violate the
principle of non-discrimination. Also absent from these efforts is the role of
civil society beyond being a consumer’ of these services.
On the other end of the spectrum is the RBA, which also comes in different
forms. Many N Os have also tried to ameliorate the situation by providing
education services to those who have not access to quality education. Although
it might have helped some individual cases, non-state provision still presents
many risks, particularly the lack of sustainability and systematic organization.
Thus, N Os cannot be expected to ill the gap left by lack of state education
provision in the long run. This bears consequences such as lack of government
expenditures in those areas where N Os are building and running schools.
The evolution of ActionAid’s work from a service delivery to advocacy
organization illustrates the trajectory of development work by N Os more
generally. ActionAid has learned that substituting for the State is not sustain-
able and thus not in the best interest of communities. As the CEF example
shows, partnering with like-minded groups to uncover the underlying barriers
to education through research and strengthening civil society advocacy is far
more beneicial to building a literate, critical, active and accountable citizenry.
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 236 24/05/2012 15:21

Education is, after all, about knowledge, and knowledge is power. t is about
how we view the world, understand it and act upon it to change it’ (Saigol
200 , p. 1 ). f private sector interests deine the content of education then
knowledge may be derived to increase competition, eficiency and not neces-
sarily rights.
Supporting individual capacity and talent through education requires
sustained commitment. The case studies used in this chapter show that while
it is easier to facilitate access and availability of education, making learning
adaptable and acceptable is much harder and can likely only be fulilled by
longer-term investment, that the State can provide. Furthermore, where the
private sector has failed in advancing accountability, participation and non-
discrimination, these non-state actors have succeeded, but not by doing it on
their own. Rather, it is their focus on empowering communities to know their
rights and to demand a just and equal education that makes a difference. Using
a rights-based approach to inluence the government to make education a polit-
ical priority than directly inancing, building and managing schools in place of
the State can create better eficient quality education systems and foster greater
accountability, thereby challenging the very justiication used for expanding
PPPs.
NOTES
1 Authors include Maria Ron-Balsera (mariaronbalsera hotmail.com) of the Right to
Education Project and Akanksha A. Marphatia (akanksha.marphatia post.harvard.edu),
Head of nternational Education, ActionAid nternational. The authors would like to
acknowledge the contributions of Anjela Taneja and Debdutt Panda to the ndia case study
and graciously thanks Angela Melchiorre and Peter Hyll- arsen for their guidance and feed-
back around the Rights Based Approach.
2 Particularly UDHR, 1 , art. 2 and CRC 1 , art. 2 , 2 . The CESCR, 1 , art. 1 and
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ eneral Comment No. 1 , 1
(CESCR C 1 ).
First launched in omtien, Thailand, in 1 0, it comprises six education goals. The interna-
tional community reafirmed its commitment to EFA in Dakar, in April 2000. n September
2000, 1 countries adopted the two EFA goals that are also Millennium Development
oals (MD s), universal primary education and gender parity.
For more general references to RBA see among others: Stamford nter-Agency Workshop,
tate ent of Co on nderstanding of a an rig ts- ased a roac to de elo ent
cooperation, 200 ; OHCHR, an rig ts in de elo ent at y and o , 2000. For
references to the different elements of the PANE model, see OHCHR, an ig ts and
Po erty ed ction Conce t al Fra e or , New ork and eneva, United Nations,
200 ; UN Philippines, ig ts- ased roac to e elo ent Progra ing raining
Manual, UNDP, 2002; OHCHR, raft g idelines a an rig ts a roac to o erty
red ction strategies, New ork and eneva, 2002.
5 ist included in OHCHR (200 , p. 1 ).
The eneral Comment No. 1 of the CESCR states that one of the aspects of the right to
education freedom (art. 1 . CESCR) refers to the fact that States parties undertake to
respect the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of
217-242 Pt3 Ch11.indd 237 24/05/2012 15:21

their children in conformity with their own convictions’ (CESCR C 1 : 2 ). ikewise,

The second element of article 1 ( ) is the liberty of parents and guardians to choose other
than public schools for their children, provided the schools conform to such minimum
educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State . This has to be read
with the complementary provision, article 1 ( ), which afirms the liberty of individu-
als and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions , provided the institutions
conform to the educational objectives set out in article 1 (1) and certain minimum stan-
dards.’ (CESCR C 1 : 2 ).
See the Right to Education Project for more details (www.right-to-education.org).
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR provides that n the exercise of any functions which
it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents
to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosoph-
ical convictions’. The Court has derived from this the principle of educational pluralism; the
State must act as guarantor of educational and teaching functions for which it is responsible
(http: www.europarl.europa.eu comparl libe elsj charter art1 default en.htm).
Stiglitz, Chief Economist of the World Bank from 1 to 2000, deines market fundamen-
talism as the belief that markets by themselves always work well – suggesting a minimal
list role for government’ (Stiglitz 200 , p. ).
10 The Washington Consensus advocated for capital market liberalization, free trade, macro-
economic stability – for example, reduction of deicit and inlation; resulting in the destruc-
tion of jobs, privatization of social services before adequate competition and regulatory
frameworks’ (Stiglitz 2002, p. ) were put in place. The excessive austerity was justiied by
the idea of trickle-down economics’, by which the beneits of a stronger economy would
trickle-down, eventually reaching the poor (Stiglitz 2002).
11 Duncan Hall, Suite101: Should the UK Adopt Plans for Swedish-Style Free Schools?’, avail-
able at: http: educationalissues.suite101.com article.cfm can-the-uk-afford-swedish-style-
free-schools-and-should-it ixzz0nWUR F p
12 The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 1 0s, involved 1 low-income students and
seven schools and it was supposed to increase the academic performance of poor children,
empower their parents, and force the Milwaukee public schools to improve by threatening
them with competition’ (Molnar 1 , p. 1).
1 Research shows that high rates of school mobility are signiicantly related to poor academic
performance (Felner, Primavera and Cauce 1 1).
1 www.right-to-education.org
15 Transforming Education for irls in Nigeria and Tanzania (http: www.actionaid.org main.
aspx?Page D 1 1 ) and Stop Violence Against irls in Schools (http: www.actionaid.org
main.aspx?Page D 1 0 ).
1 http: www.actionaid.org main.aspx?Page D 1 5
1 http: www.actionaid.org main.aspx?Page D 1
1 www.relect-action.org
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Rose, P.M. (200 ), N O Provision of Basic Education: Alternative or Complementary
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sector in ndia’, Comparative Education, Occasional Papers.
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12. Is low-fee private primary schooling
affordable for the poor?
Evidence from rural India
Joanna Härmä and Pauline Rose
INTRODUCTION
Basic education is often regarded in international agreements and national

constitutions as being a state responsibility. Since the 1990s, an international
consensus has formed around the need for primary schooling to be fee-free.
This consensus was deeply rooted in the World Forum for Education for All
held in Dakar in 2000. At the same time, concern for achieving Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) by 2015 has led to a
focus on the role that non-state providers can play in extending education access
and improving its quality, including at the primary level. Even though much of
this provision has grown by default, a more explicit international policy focus
towards non-state provision has become apparent in recent years as a response
to the limited resources available for education. The policy focus has been
further reinforced by the recent global economic crisis (Rose 2010). As such,
there has been a shift in international attention from advocating private inanc-
ing of public provision that predominated during the economic crisis of the
1 0s and 1 0s, towards public inancing of private provision in recent years.
Along with the increased international policy interest in non-state provision,
there is some evidence of growth in commercially oriented private schools
charging relatively modest fees in many developing countries, or low-fee
private (LFP) schools (Srivastava 2006). This has given rise to a lively debate
about the quality of such provision, its cost, and the implications that this has
for choices for the poor (see Rose 2009). On the one hand, growth in LFP provi-
sion is proposed by some to extend choice to the poor, who previously only had
recourse to government provision (Tooley and Dixon 2006). Through increased
competition, it is also seen as a means to improve the quality, accountability
and cost-effectiveness of education across the board: LFPs must compete with
government in order to win the ‘market share’, while government schools must
improve their quality to retain students. Some commentators advocate building
243
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 243 24/05/2012 15:21

partnerships’, with the state playing a greater inancial role in supporting the
development of such private provision (Patrinos et al. 2009). Other commen-
tators argue that the prominence of LFPs primarily highlights problems with
government schooling, and that public inancing needs to focus on strengthen-
ing government schools, which remain the only form of provision for the poor-
est who have no choice (see UNESCO 2009).
Reviewing evidence from developing countries, along with a more in-depth
case study in a part of rural India that highlights many of the issues debated
internationally, the chapter considers the extent to which LFPs are affordable
for the poorest households. The evidence presented in the chapter shows that a
policy approach that promotes LFPs for the poor is likely to reinforce inequali-
ties as the poorest households are unable to pay even relatively modest fees and
the other direct costs of attending these schools, or can only do so by making
great sacriices affecting resources available for their other basic needs. At
the same time, the chapter recognizes the unacceptable state of government
education in many developing countries. Rather than providing public inan-
cial support to LFPs, the chapter argues that governments and international
aid donors need to focus attention towards improving the quality of public
provision and strengthening its accountability given that it remains the only
source of education for the vast majority of vulnerable households in develop-
ing countries.
IS LOW-FEE PRIVATE SCHOOLING AFFORDABLE

FOR THE POOR? A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The growth in LFPs in parts of some countries has led certain commentators
to argue that these schools are accessible to the poor, and should therefore be
encouraged (Tooley and Dixon 2006). Research by Tooley and his collabora-
tors has primarily looked at the provision of LFPs in areas that are consid-
ered to be inhabited by poor people, such as urban slums in India and Kenya,
and peri-urban areas in hana, and inds a large number of children attend-
ing these schools. The extent of FP provision that this research identiies is
promising both in terms of the possibility of achieving Education for All, as
it suggests that more children could be attending school than acknowledged
through conventional data that tend to include only enrolment in government
schools and government-recognized private schools; and also because LFPs
could promote competition to improve standards in government schools.
However, much of the literature on FPs does not suficiently differenti-
ate between households living in poor urban areas, nor does it extend to rural
areas where many of the most vulnerable households are located. This restricts
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Is low-fee private primary schooling affordable for the poor? 245
an assessment of the extent to which LFPs are reaching the poorest. Some
commentators suggest that the least afluent are most likely to be in govern-
ment schools or not in school at all. To take one example, in Ghana’s capital,
Accra, around 40 per cent of total enrolment in basic education is in the private
sector. But households in the rural north and other areas where enrolment is
already low are far less likely to opt for LFPs, since school costs are already
the major reason their children are out of school. While LFPs are spreading in
rural hana, it is mainly where ishing and trading are the main occupations,
not in areas dependent on subsistence farming (Akyeampong 2009). Similarly,
a survey in Hyderabad, India, found that ‘it is the relatively wealthier of the
poor parents who in general send their children to private unaided schools’
(Tooley et al. 2010, p. 121). Of those in government schools, the vast majority
(87 per cent) were from the lowest income group (3000 Rupees or less), while
58 per cent of households who were sending their children to private schools
were in this income group (ibid.).
Evidence from urban slums in Nairobi, Kenya further highlights equity
concerns in LFP provision from a different perspective (Oketch and Ngware
2010). In this case, inadequate public spending on education in the slums has
meant that there are insuficient government school places in these locations.
overnment schools that are available are also of signiicantly lower quality
than government schools outside of slums. As such, the survey of slum and
non-slum areas inds that a large proportion (over 0 per cent) of the poorest
households living in slums were forced to pay fees to attend LFPs given it was
the only choice available to them, while wealthier households outside of slums
had a choice between government schools or private schools. For those with a
choice outside of slums, only around 5 per cent of the poorest households made
the choice in favour of private schooling, opting instead for fee-free govern-
ment schooling that their counterparts in the slums were unable to access.
Even where the poor are ‘choosing’ to pay for LFPs, questions arise concern-
ing the potential impact on the welfare of these households more broadly. The
2009 Education for All Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO 2009) raises the
concern that when poor households pay for education they are forced to divert
income from other areas, including nutrition, health, shelter and savings for
emergencies. Evidence from a variety of contexts illustrates the real trade-
offs facing poor households. In Hyderabad, India, it is estimated that a family
living on the minimum wage would have to spend roughly one-quarter of its
income for three children in a household to attend an LFP (Watkins 2004). In
urban Malawi, even the relatively modest fees cited by owners of LFPs (around
US$3 per term in 2004) would be beyond the reach of poor households, even
before taking the other direct costs of education into account. For the two-
thirds of the population living below the poverty line, fees at this level would
translate into over one-third of available resources per person per household
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(Kadzamira et al. 2004). In the economic heart of Nigeria, Lagos, which has
recently been found to have 12,098 private schools accounting for 57 per cent
of all school enrolments, there has been a recent drastic minimum wage revi-
sion from $48 per month to $121. The cost of sending one child to an LFP
school charging average fees for a year represented 48 per cent of the old mini-
mum wage, and even now one child will cost 18 per cent (and this is assuming
all wages have suddenly risen to meet the new regulation, which is extremely
unlikely) (H rm and Adeisayo, forthcoming). n each case, the extent of the
costs of LFPs seriously constrains resources available for other basic needs.
Concern over the cost burden of LFPs for the poor is not to deny that the
quality of government schools is often unacceptable. FPs are clearly ill-
ing a gap. It is also not to deny that there are circumstances under which the
private sector can play a role – evidence from Sweden (see UNESCO 2009)
and the Netherlands (see World Bank 2009) highlights this. However, these
are contexts with high levels of taxation, strong government provision, super-
vision and a broadly egalitarian society, and so the intention of competition
between private and public sectors can more easily be realized. But even in
these contexts, research raises concerns about increasing segregation as a
consequence of school choice (Ladd et al. 2009).
Given the failures of government systems in many developing country
contexts, and concerns over the potential reinforcement of inequality through
promoting private schooling, voucher schemes have become an increasingly
popular policy option proposed to address the unaffordability of LFPs for the
poorest. The intention is that vouchers will enable poor households to exer-
cise choice. Research on the impact of voucher schemes is, however, far from
conclusive. Most of the evidence available comes from countries with a rela-
tively well-developed institutional structure, and even then with mixed results
(Thapa 2009). Much of the research has found that such schemes are unlikely
to be effective in addressing equity and may even widen segregation, includ-
ing in Chile which has one of the world’s most developed voucher schemes
(McEwan et al. 2007).
Fischel considers voucher schemes in the United States, and argues that
vouchers as part of the school choice argument may apply well within urban
areas, but that in rural areas certain conditions, such as population density to
support a range of different providers, do not apply (2002). Levin (1999) has
commented on the serious administrative and regulatory requirements of an
effective voucher scheme which include record-keeping, school accreditation,
transportation, information and adjudication of disputes. Costs would inevi-
tably rise because a government body would need to keep track of student
attendance, voucher eligibility and redemption of vouchers on a statewide/
countrywide basis.
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More broadly, Lewin (2007) argues that support for voucher schemes are
‘coloured by ideology transposed from well developed, professionalised, regu-
lated, and partly marketised education systems in rich countries to partly devel-
oped, poorly professionalized, largely unregulated, systems’ (Lewin 2007,
p. 19). Many LFPs in developing countries do not meet government recogni-
tion requirements and tend to pay teachers signiicantly less than government
schools, sometimes less than the minimum wage. As a result, any decision
to buy places in LFPs for the underprivileged is likely to lead to an over-
all increase in government spending to enable the LFPs to gain government
recognition and pay teachers an acceptable wage.
Efforts to register and regulate LFPs to facilitate a voucher scheme require
additional work for governments already struggling to administer the exist-
ing public school system. Indeed, Muralidharan (2006), writing on the Indian
context, argues that this demands a much-expanded role for government in
continuing to fund its existing school system while also overseeing and provid-
ing quality-assurance to LFPs.
With the support of aid donors, Pakistan is one of the few poor countries that
have implemented a voucher scheme. The country has witnessed an expansion
in private schooling in recent years, with studies identifying that as many as
one in three primary school students attend a private school (Andrabi et al.
200 ). There is some evidence of a positive inluence on enrolment and learn-
ing outcomes of the voucher scheme that has been in operation since 2006
(Salman 2010). Yet the scope of the scheme remains limited, and focused on the
relatively prosperous Punjab province where overall primary school enrolment
is already high compared to other parts of the country. By 2012, the voucher
scheme had expanded to cover 80,000 students in 267 schools (personal
communication with Education Voucher Scheme Director, 23rd March 2012)
from its original scope of 1000 students in 13 schools (Salman 2010). While
the programme has expanded considerably, this is just a drop in the ocean in a
country where the number of out-of-school children is around 5.1 million. This
raises key questions about whether it is possible to expand the programme on
a suficient scale to reach those out of school, including the poorest households
living in remote areas, and whether FP providers have suficient incentive to
open in parts of the country where conditions are harshest (UNESCO 2009).
Where poor households are paying for education at LFPs due to the low
quality of government schooling available, this can either be viewed as a
market preference freely expressed, or as an act imposed by policy failures that
leave poor households with two stark options: paying for education through
severe sacriices in other areas, or accepting that their children have no oppor-
tunity for an education meeting minimum quality standards. Voucher schemes
are one policy response. An alternative would be for support to be directed
at improvements in the quality and accountability of government provision,
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 247 24/05/2012 15:21

ensuring it reaches populations in underserved areas such as urban slums and

remote rural areas. These issues are explored through a more detailed assess-
ment of the schooling preferences of poor rural households, and the costs of
different types of provision in the India case that follows.
PUBLIC EDUCATION POLICY FOR THE POOR IN INDIA
India has been at the forefront of many of the debates on LFPs, where the scale
of their provision has been recognized since at least the early 1990s (Kingdon
1996). At the same time, the country also has a long-standing tradition of fee-
free primary schooling, recently enshrined in legislation as a right. Despite
such commitments, the state is still failing to deliver adequate education to
large portions of the population. As the evidence below shows, parents are
‘choosing’ LFPs where they can afford to do so due to lack of alternatives in
the face of failing government provision. However, the poorest households do
not have this option, reinforcing a two-tier system.
India’s Policy Environment Towards LFPs
International trends towards support for private schooling through ‘public

private partnerships’ (PPPs) in education are clearly visible in India’s national
policy documents. Based on a review of India’s approach towards PPPs since
2000, Srivastava (2010) inds that recent government plans adopt the rhetoric
of partnership, even though they have failed to specify what this means (partic-
ularly in the 11th Five Year Plan for Education). As a result, the plans appear
to present a contradiction between the government promoting itself as playing
a central role in service provision (including through emphasis on the aboli-
tion of fees), while also putting forward strategies for privatized delivery with
implications for a diminished role for the state in inancing, management and
regulation. Thus, government plans are doing little to provide clear guidance
on its response to the mushrooming of private providers, which is commonly
seen to be occurring due to public dissatisfaction with the quality of public
provision.
On 1 April 2010 the Right to Education Act was brought into force which
can be seen as a break with these past, vague efforts to address the private
schooling phenomenon. Section 12 of the new law makes it mandatory for
all private schools to reserve 25 per cent of seats for the poor and underprivi-
leged, for whom the government will pay the applicable tuition fees: a kind of
‘student scholarship’. However, as discussed below, the tuition fee is only part
of the cost of attending an LFP, and families are left to pick up the rest of the
bill, meaning that payment of fees will help some families, but not the poorest.
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 248 24/05/2012 15:21

n addition, early and admittedly anecdotal evidence suggests that more aflu-
ent private schools are providing this provision to ‘the poor’ through separate,
after-hours ‘shifts’. This means keeping the children of ‘the poor’ separate
from their usual clientele, and sometimes using a separate, cheaper teaching
cadre (personal communication with families using private schools in Delhi,
2010). Section 19 outlines harsh penalties for schools that do not gain recog-
nition from the government within three years of the Act coming into force,
and it has been stressed that these schools will not be closed down in large
numbers but rather encouraged to register (R. Govinda speaking at the School
Choice National Conference in New Delhi, December 2009). As such, the Act
has been criticized as being a piecemeal response to the issues of government
school failure and encouragement of LFPs.
Low-fee Private Schools in India: Access Determined by Preference

or Poverty?
This section of the chapter looks in more detail at whether poor households
in a rural part of India can afford to choose LFPs. As the majority of India’s
population lives in rural areas, it is important to investigate the question in this
setting. The study was carried out over the winter of 2005–06 in rural western
Uttar Pradesh (UP). The survey included a random sample of 250 households
across 13 villages in one administrative block of District J.P. Nagar. Methods
for data collection involved a structured interview with a parent or guardian of
selected school-aged children, together with focus group discussions to deepen
the understanding gained from the survey work. All available schools in the
survey areas were visited, observations of facilities were recorded, and teach-
ers and head teachers were interviewed (see Härmä 2008, for further details on
the methodology).
The study area is remote, served only by earth roads and no public transport.
The people of the area are dependent on agriculture and very few associated
industries for survival. Half of the sampled families were landless labourers,
dependent on employment on the land of others, while half own at least some
small plot of land. A very small number of breadwinners were found to be
skilled labourers.
The setting was of particular interest because in almost all villages both
government schools (a school owned, funded and managed by the state govern-
ment) and LFPs (owned and managed by individual proprietors and privately
funded through parental fee payments) exist.1 There was a government school
in all of the 13 villages where households were interviewed, and in ten of these
villages there were also LFP schools. There were several villages where there
was more than one LFP, with one village having three such schools, mean-
ing that there was competition in some villages both between government and
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 249 24/05/2012 15:21

LFPs, and also between LFPs themselves. In total, 16 private schools were
found, half of which were government-recognized, while ten government
schools were identiied. This meant that parents must make choices.
These choices are not made in isolation: they are made based on the personal
experiences of the parents, on what parents observe to be happening in their
village schools and with their neighbours’ children. While parents engage in
‘chatter’ on the various schooling options available (Srivastava 2007), they
do not, undereducated though they may be, simply follow the crowd, and the
ultimate choices that they make are often impinged on by certain factors, such
as poverty. n the survey area, the study identiied that 5 per cent of sampled
children were attending government schools and 41 per cent were in LFPs (and
only just under 1 per cent out of school). This provided a good basis for assess-
ing whether the split was due to preference or poverty.
When parents were asked their views about the schooling options available
to them, over 94 per cent of parents stated that, under current conditions, LFPs
were their preferred school type, with no parents showing any awareness of
whether LFPs were government-recognized or not. The remaining 6 per cent
appeared to ‘prefer’ government schools mainly because they felt they would
never be able to afford LFPs, and so felt that LFPs were not even an option
to consider. Further investigation identiied that the preference for FPs was
not as clear-cut. Parents expressed a strong preference for a well-functioning
government sector, such that LFPs should only exist in the current conditions
of government sector failure.
An important reason for the preference for better-quality government school-
ing was that this was seen to be more sustainable. As one mother commented
during a focus group discussion: ‘you can’t really trust private schools; as they
are under the control of just one person, they can do just whatever they want.
You can’t trust them.’ Another parent, when questioned whether it might not be
best just to close the government schools in favour of private schools, replied:
‘no they should not be shut down. They should just improve the quality of
the schools… The quality of the education should be like the private school.’
This view suggests that widespread reporting of parents’ preferences for LFPs
(Muralidharan 2006; Tooley and Dixon 2006) may only be telling part of the
story. The fear of the unilateral control of one individual is relected in real-
ity, where LFP schools open and close in short periods of time, as Tooley and
Dixon acknowledge: ‘especially unrecognised or unregistered ones [LFPs],
may be opening and closing fairly quickly’ (2007, p. 20). Indeed, as many as
one-quarter of the sample LFPs had closed their doors within 18 months of
the end of the ield work for this study, eliminating competition between FPs
within villages.2
Despite the apparent overwhelming preference for LFPs among parents
surveyed in this study, only 41 per cent of children were actually attending
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 250 24/05/2012 15:21

LFPs when they are available. This raised a question why over half of children
were in government schools, which were viewed by parents as inferior. One
hypothesis was that poverty overrode preferences. This was supported by the
evidence that those in the poorest households were signiicantly more likely to
attend government schools (Figure 12.1).
Note: Quintile 1= poorest.
Figure 12.1 School choice per child by asset index quintiles
A logit analysis was used to identify factors associated with attendance in

government schools and LFPs. Along with wealth,3 the model controlled for
important socio-cultural aspects of the family and the child (described in detail
in H rm 2011). Briely, this analysis found that those in the poorest two quin-
tiles had little chance of attending LFPs, while those in the wealthiest quintiles
were highly likely to do so – indeed, children in the top quintile of wealth
were 11 times more likely to attend LFPs than those in the poorest quintile.
In summary, the study found that in this context of near universal desire to
access LFPs under current conditions, poverty was actually the main determin-
ing factor in school choice.
This picture shows that there is a limit to the outreach of LFPs to the poor-
est. When looking through the lens of social disadvantage, a similar, nearly as
stark image emerges. In India, members of ‘scheduled castes’ and ‘scheduled
tribes’ are found to be less advantaged than other groups, as are Muslims (see,
for example, Jeffery et al. 2001; Lieten 2003). The study found that over three-
quarters of scheduled caste children, and nearly 70 per cent of Muslim children,
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 251 24/05/2012 15:21

were attending government schools, while over two-thirds of medium or high

caste Hindu children were attending LFPs. The family’s occupation or liveli-
hood also interplays with traditional patterns of socio-economic status, with
the socially disadvantaged tending to own less or no land. In the study, 69 per
cent of children from labouring families attended government schools, while
only 45 per cent of children from farming families did so.
LFPs were also found to reinforce gender inequalities: 51 per cent of the boys
in the sample attended LFPs, compared with only 34 per cent for girls. Another
important factor was the number of children in the household – where there
were many children, the already limited income of the family was stretched,
whereas smaller families may be able to focus more of their resources on each
particular child. As the number of children in a family increased, the use of
government schools also increased. Given that poorest households tended to
have larger families, this reinforced the likelihood of them sending children to
government schools: families in the richest quintile had a mean of 3.8 children
compared with 4.1 in the poorest quintile.
All of these factors interplay to result in a situation where multiple disad-
vantages overlap and reinforce one another. Indeed, those who are from a
scheduled caste or tribe, or who are Muslim, are more likely to have a low
income and own less land, and are likely to have more children than their more
socially advantaged counterparts. However one looks at or deines poverty, the
cost of LFPs has a major impact on the sector’s ability to reach the poor and
disadvantaged.
Comparing Household Costs of LFPs and Government Schools
To understand why poverty had such an effect, the study quantiied the
direct inancial costs of schooling at both private and government schools.
Government schools offered several incentive schemes such as a midday meal,
free textbooks and a stipend of Rs3004 per year per child. At the time of the
study, not all children had received their stipend money. For the purposes of
considering costs, this stipend was disregarded, meaning that household costs
of government schools are, if anything, exaggerated.5 Government primary
schooling in ndia is oficially free of cost, although there are a few oficial
but very small fees (Table 12.1). Families reported that government schools
were also charging illegal fees for registration, examinations and textbooks.
Taking these into account, as well as the stationery that parents must provide,
the average de facto cost per year at a government schools was reported as
Rs148 (Table 12.1).
Despite the additional costs for attending government schools, the cost of
accessing LFPs is considerably greater. These schools charge a monthly tuition
fee which is the main cost most frequently cited in the literature (Srivastava
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Table 12.1 Average annual household cost of sending a child to school
Private schools
Recognized Unrecognized All Government
Tuition fee 588 502 550 35
Registration fee 72 42 61 14
Examination fees 58 34 48 14
Books cost 216 206 210 8
Stationery cost 173 149 160 78
Uniforms cost 215 187 202 N/A
Total spend per year 1322 1121 1231 148
Note: The mean total expenditures equate to roughly US$24.62 (all LFPs), $26.42 (recog-
nized), $22.40 (unrecognized) and $3.00 (government).
Source: Primary data collection UP 2005–06.
2006; Tooley and Dixon 2006). In addition, registration fees, examination

fees, and the costs of uniforms, books and stationery all had to be paid by
the parents. LFPs which were recognized by the government tended to charge
higher fees than those which were unrecognized. This breakdown illustrates
that the cost of accessing an LFP is at least eight times greater than accessing
a government school.
Tooley and Dixon (2006) report that LFPs reach out to the poor by offering
free and concessionary places for the worst-off however, this was not found
to be the case in the study area – indeed, during focus group discussions this
suggestion met with angry denial or even laughter from parents who had them-
selves sought such concessions in a bid to access private schooling. All sampled
LFPs were found only to offer one child’s monthly tuition free (while all other
costs still apply) where three children from the same family are enrolled, and
this was often insuficient (or inapplicable) to enable families to afford FPs.
The accessibility of LFPs to the poor is determined by what a given family
can afford to spend on each child, and this must be considered in the light
of the family’s entire circumstances. As already noted, education is just one
of several important areas of expenditure for families, which include health
care, routine costs of maintaining a household and livelihood inputs. Table
12.2 illustrates the proportion of household income that must be dedicated to
educating children at LFP and government schools.6 The evidence is striking.
It indicates that between 25 and 30 per cent of total household income must be
spent by the poorest two quintiles of households to access LFP schools. Lewin
(2007) considered 10 per cent as a reasonable proportion of a poor household’s
expenditure to be dedicated to all education needs. Based on this calculation
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 253 24/05/2012 15:21

and drawing on the evidence in Table 12.2, only government schools are
comfortably within the reach of the poorest 60 per cent of households.
Overall, the study found that the total cost of educating an average family
of four children in an LFP (taking into account all direct costs of schooling)
was half the mean annual income for households in the poorest two quintiles.
Unsurprisingly, most of these households sent their children to government
schools, with choice limited to better-off households; it is clearly not possible
to spend half of household income on food and to have the other half available
to pay for education.
Even for those sending children to LFPs, poor families reported that these
schools were really not affordable for them, and required serious sacriices.
As one parent put it, ‘it is not easy, we have to cut our stomach to afford
it’, highlighting the dificulties caused by high food prices. As another parent
stated: ‘private schools are good, but they are really expensive, we can’t afford
to pay Rs35 per month, plus exam fees etc. When they take so much money
then of course they teach because they have to show the parents the results
of what they are paying for. With the government, there is no incentive.’ This
observation from a village parent sums up the schooling context well: the LFPs
must keep standards high relative to the government alternative in order to
justify taking fees, and therefore parents feel that they perform better while
they observe government school teachers doing little.
This relates to a key argument advanced in favour of encouraging LFPs:
competition between providers is meant to drive up quality standards –
including those at government schools (for example, Muralidharan 2006), as
mentioned at the start of the chapter. With one-quarter of schools closing within
an 18-month period, the case study evidence suggests, however, that the rural
‘market’ in many villages cannot sustain more than one provider, indicating
Table 12.2 Percentage of average household income required to access each

school type by income quintiles, and according to average family
size and per child
Private
Government Unrecognized LFP Recognized LFP
Per family Per child Per family Per child Per family Per child
Quintile 1 3.9 2 30 15.9 25.6 13.6
Quintile 2 3.8 1.8 24.6 11.6 25.2 11.8
Quintile 3 2.5 1.2 16.1 8 19.6 9.7
Quintile 4 1.8 1 9.6 5.7 12 7.1
Quintile 5 0.5 0.3 4.2 2.4 6.3 3.5
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that this model of provision is unstable and therefore unreliable. Additionally,

competition between government and LFPs does not appear to have a positive
effect on the quality of government school provision – if anything, light from
government schools by those who can afford it could condemn the poorest
households to unreformed government schooling.
Can a Voucher Scheme Increase Accessibility of LFPs to the Poor

in Rural India?
As noted in earlier sections, voucher schemes are often proposed as a means to

promote choice, including for poor households. There has been limited experi-
ence of such voucher schemes for primary schooling in India. The country’s
irst ever voucher pilot project was launched in Delhi in 200 by a pro-school
choice organization, the Centre for Civil Society. An initial assessment of the
pilot scheme by the Centre found that, of the 371 government schoolchildren
issued vouchers to attend the school of their choice, 63 per cent made the
transition to the private sector. However, little is known about the cost of the
scheme or possibilities for it to be scaled up.
In order to identify the possibilities of scaling up, there is a need to calculate
the total unit cost of provision to estimate the cost to government of a school
place. This can be estimated by teacher costs, since this is the main cost of
primary schooling in both government schools and LFPs. According to reports
by teachers in the survey area, salaries in LFPs were around 10–15 per cent of
the level in government schools: Rs265 and Rs315 per child at recognized and
unrecognized LFP schools respectively, compared with Rs2368 in government
schools. However, while it is extremely dificult to quantify total unit costs in a
government school compared with a private school, it is apparent that the costs
of educating a student in a private school is not as low as might be expected on
the basis of the difference in teacher salaries alone. This is in part because the
average number of students in an LFP is lower than in a government school.
Moreover, as noted, in addition to fees, some of the direct costs of attending a
government school are paid for by government, including textbooks and food.
Unlike FPs, there is also more lexibility on the uniform that children wear to
government schools, which can reduce the costs substantially.
Taking this into account, on a conservative estimate, the total unit cost of
attending an LFP is estimated to be around one-half of the cost of a child in a
government school in the survey area. However, once all the costs are taken
into account, including those of administering a voucher system, government
spending on buying places in an FP is unlikely to be signiicantly different
to its spending on a child in a government school. The added advantage of
government schools is that they have the opportunity for sustainability unlike
LFPs and, as noted above, are the real preference of parents for this reason.
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If a voucher scheme were to be implemented in the case study area of rural

India, the government would need to provide an additional cash transfer to
parents in order to cover the direct costs that households must cover (books,
stationery and uniforms), adding to the already onerous administrative burden
that voucher schemes entail. In addition, there would be additional costs in regis-
tering and regulating the large numbers of small-scale LFPs which are prone
to closing down at short notice. It is assumed also that provision of vouchers,
which would boost the spending power of potential clients, would enable more
LFPs to be sustainable and compete in the market; however, with 60 per cent of
sample government schools having fewer than 80 pupils, essentially this would
mean that government schools would have to close down entirely in many loca-
tions. This again raises the question of whether government resources would be
better spent on improving the quality and accountability of government schools.
CONCLUSION
The chapter has highlighted the adverse effects on equity of unplanned growth
in LFPs. In contexts of limited household resources, due to high and increas-
ing levels of poverty, the reliance on LFPs charging school fees is likely to
be prohibitive for poor households. Emerging evidence from voucher schemes
suggest that, while they have had positive effects on enrolment and learning,
they have not operated on a suficient scale to reach the vast numbers of children
out of school. iven the administrative and inancial resources required for the
schemes to be successful and the limits to the market in areas where children
are most likely to be out of school, it is unclear if it would be possible to expand
voucher programmes to reach those currently marginalized in education.
In the light of the poor quality of government schooling that has given rise to
the proliferation of LFPs in countries such as India, there are some alternatives
to the conclusion that the private sector needs the support of government fund-
ing. A more appropriate resolution would be to use national and international
resources to support the quality and accountability of government provision so
this can become the gold standard of provision that parents demand and expect.
Since it is the poor quality of government provision that is driving children to
LFPs, the solution is to address the root of the problem – not the symptom.
NOTES
1 There is a third type of school in India, the private-aided schools (privately owned and
managed but with little autonomy due to the grant-in-aid given by government), which exist
mostly at the upper-primary and secondary levels in Uttar Pradesh. As there are none in the
study area, this chapter does not include a discussion of these schools.
243-258 Pt3 Ch12.indd 256 24/05/2012 15:21

2 Only the wealthier parents tend to consider sending their children outside of their own village
to access schooling.
3 The analysis used a wealth index of household assets. This has been found by other studies
to offer a more temporally stable and reliable measure of wealth than income in such a rural
setting (Hulme 2003).
At the time of the ieldwork, winter 2005–0 , the exchange rate was approximately Rs 0 to 1
or Rs50 to US$1.
5 Of note is the fact that where parents choose to access government schools and where the
stipend is delivered, they will actually be in proit – typically out of Rs 00 only Rs250–Rs2 5
would reach the parent, meaning a proit of at least Rs100.
6 The average number of primary aged children per family by income quintile has been utilized
in the calculations for each income level. Also the average spending reported at each income
level on each of the three school management types has been used as the basis of the calcula-
tion, taking into account that the poor access cheaper schools where available.
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Ladd, H., E. Fiske and N. Ruijs (2009), Parental Choice in the Netherlands: Growing
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13. Why girls’ education rather than
gender equality? The strange political
economy of PPPs in Pakistan
Shailaja Fennell
INTRODUCTION
The need to ensure Education For All (EFA) and the challenge of the
Millennium Development Goals have resulted in growing support for partner-
ships with the private sector as a vehicle that will increase the current provision
of education during the irst decade of the twenty-irst century. The importance
of PPPs has become particularly evident in the last decade, with both interna-
tional and national initiatives directed towards expanding educational partner-
ships in inance and provision to ensure access and quality within the education
system (Patrinos 2005). The term ‘partnership’ is taken to imply that more than
one sector – for example, government and a nonproit or for-proit collabora-
tion – provides a service. By implication, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)
are engagements between the state and non-state actors, who could be private
corporate, nonproit or philanthropy.
International institutions such as UNESCO have shown a preference for
cross-sector collaborations to provide education, leading to a new category of
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in Education (MSPE) which explicitly bring in
collaborations between civil society organizations and other sectors, whether
state or non-state actors (Draxler 2007). The MSPEs have been particularly
attractive as they allow a pooling of skills and resources from the private sector
as well as civil society organizations (Genevois 2008).
The increasing number of schools using either the PPP or the wider rang-
ing MSPE framework during the last decade, with their growing enrolment of
children, is regarded as a success. The irst measure of success is that providing
an alternative to the state permits households to exercise choice. The second
measure of success is the increased supply of schooling that permits competi-
tion between providers that has been brought about by these partnerships. The
ability to choose and the greater availability of schools for the poor is posi-
tive, yet there is also evidence that the poorest groups have less access to new
259
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 259 24/05/2012 15:21

partnership-based provision and that provision is of low quality and merely

substitutes for a non-functional state school (LaRocque 2008).
Neither of the PPP and MSPE models have a well-deined list of the types
of actors who might/might not constitute the ‘private’ sector in these partner-
ships. Consequently, the term ‘private’ has become a generic category that can
include a wide range of non-state actors: corporate entities, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations and so on. Indiscriminately
putting all these partners into a single model can result in a wide variance in
individual objectives and motivations among types of partners emerging from
their own historical evolution and economic motivations. For example, if a
community-based partnership that is imbued in local gender norms regards
certain occupations, such as engineering, as inappropriate for girls these will
not be offered as occupational aspirations for girls. In the case of religious-
based schools, there might be a very strict imposition of gendered rules
regarding free movement of boys and girls. In such a context, the operation of
particular objectives and motivations can result in very different types of social
transformation, particularly in relation to gender equality (Fennell 2007). The
educational objectives that each provider pursues within the educational sector
also inluence provision and pedagogy with ripple effects on the nature of
gender relations in the community. The different objectives and motives of
varied partners provide the intellectual motivation for embarking on a proj-
ect that examines the role of PPPs in the provision of education for the poor,
particularly in relation to gender equality (Fennell 2010). This is a priority
policy area as the under-provisioning of education is particularly evident in
the poorest sections of society, among whom the gendered-based marker of
marginalization continues to be prominent. The cost of sending girls to school
has been identiied as a major obstacle for poor households, constraining girls’
access and completion of basic education and the achievement of the MDG for
education (GMR 2004).
PPPS AND GENDER
In such environments where the cost of education is daunting, the private

sector is often viewed as a potential partner with whom to share the cost of
providing education. While the partnerships model has inancial and manage-
rial strengths, it must be noted that it was not built with girls’ education as its
primary objective, but in relation to the need to reach universal primary educa-
tion (UPE). The push for EFA has provided an important context within which
the signiicance of girls’ education has gained an international prominence
that has facilitated the designing of educational interventions, which are based
on the manner in which the social construction of gender works against the
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 260 24/05/2012 15:21

Why girls’ education rather than gender equality? 261
completion of basic schooling by girls.1 The relevant question here is how and
when PPPs can contribute to EFA and the MDG goals for education and gender
equality. This is a matter of some urgency as international organizations and
national policy frameworks have presumed that UPE programmes with PPP
components will automatically work for ensuring gender equality. A number
of interventions have been undertaken to improve the enrolment and reten-
tion of girls in primary and secondary schools. International agencies, such as
the World Bank, have used the approach of targeted voucher programmes to
underserved populations (such as girls and disadvantaged, ‘hard to reach’, and
minority students) to increase equity in access to schooling and in eventual
educational achievement. For example, a programme in Bangladesh that gave
stipends to girls substantially increased girls’ enrolment and in Pakistan helped
to solve the undersupply of education services in urban areas by encouraging
new private schools to open (Patrinos and Shoshale 2007). These programmes
are based on the perspective that demand-side problems prevent the most
deprived households from sending their daughters to school.
There is potential value of these partnerships to ensure the objective of girls’
education (Fennell 2006; Ramachandran 2004). The realization of this poten-
tial will depend on ensuring that the measures of gender equality go beyond the
simple statistical measures of gender parity and incorporate deeper measures
that can reveal how national educational interventions bring about social trans-
formations through educating boys and girls (Arnot and Fennell 2008). There
has been some discussion about the possibility that targeted initiatives can
reduce gender gaps in education as they have the ability to access dificult to
reach populations (Fennell 2006), but neither the current international goals
nor the new PPP initiatives have made modiications to their delivery mecha-
nisms to ensure gender equality (Mundy 2005). It is important to note that
gender equality will not be achieved if we continue to follow narrow statistical
measures, and we must redesign programme delivery to ensure that gender
equality is a central pillar, an approach known as ‘gender-mainstreaming’ in
the development literature (Elson 2008). In particular, development models
that do not take into account that the social construction of gender results in
a nonsymmetrical structure within which boys and girls access and experi-
ence the schooling system are not able to adequately measure the gendered
outcomes of inancial and service delivery. For example, if MPSE and PPP
educational frameworks provide vouchers and other demand-based instru-
ments to increase the enrolment of girls and are ‘gender blind’ – for example,
unable to see that gendered norms restrict the occupational choices available to
girls, the programmes devised will not result in reducing gender gaps but might
only shift the gender gap that is currently existent in the primary sector to the
secondary sector by encouraging the number of girls staying on in secondary
schooling. The inability to address the structural gender asymmetries and to
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 261 24/05/2012 15:21

only focus on the symptoms, such as the low number of girls in education, will
not remedy the social discrimination against girls’ education.
The global gender goals suffer from a shortcoming with regard to gender
mainstreaming, as they continue to be located in narrow statistical measures
(Colclough 2008). Global agencies have tended to use three measures: (1)
absolute access to education measured by the gross enrolment rate (GER);
(2) relative access to education measured by the ratio of enrolment of girls
to enrolment of boys; (3) the development indicator of gender measured by
the Gender Related Development Index (GRDI) which is a composite of life
expectancy, education and income for women relative to men in that particular
country. None of these measures are able to directly determine the relationship
between educational levels and gender equality (Lincove 2007).
The inability to bring in a substantive measure that can directly show how
girls’ education has promoted their participation and contribution to economy
and society is still lacking. This is, in part, due to the limited conceptual frame-
work that has been adopted for thinking about gender equality in education
(Unterhalter 2008).
Another shortcoming of focusing on a narrow set of statistical measures of
gender equality is that such statistics have come to be regarded as the major
constitutive indicator for evaluating the gender relations within any country.
While it is indeed the case that life expectancy, income and education are impor-
tant contributors to human development, it is not the case that these summary
measures can adequately relect the processes that are ongoing in the local sphere
through which gender relations are experienced on a daily basis (Fennell 2009).
In recent years, international agencies have increased their coverage
of gender indicators, most prominently the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, yet there is a tendency to evaluate
the success of donor aid with economic features such as reduction of paren-
tal costs for girls’ education due to the provision of targeted subsidies. The
gender equality measures used by international agencies could be improved by
drawing further on the academic literature on the relationship between gender,
education and development where qualitative research has shown that there
can be new indicators for gender equality in research in the ield of education
(Fennell and Arnot 2007). There is less evidence that gender has become a
major category for policymakers in developing country educational contexts
(Arnot and Fennell 2008).
PPPS IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan has gained considerable visibility in the last decade in international

policy circles.2 This has led to particular interest in the role of religious
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educational institutions and the possibility of countering the growing tendency

for religion, particularly the teaching radical Islamic and ideology, to intrude
into educational delivery through aid and other forms of international support.3
A re-conceptualization of the relation between educational aid and the type of
educational provision has become evident in the programmes of major donors,
including the British Department for International Development (DfID) and
the Australian government’s Overseas Aid Program (AusAID), and has sympa-
thy in the US and within institutions such as the World Bank (Robertson,
Novelli, Dale, Tickly, Dachi and Alphonse 2007). The knock-on effect has
been a greater focus on girls’ education as a counter to the indoctrination of
young men within the madrasa system of education.4 This newfound interest
in girls’ education among external donors can be contrasted with the low prior-
ity given to this aspect prior to 9/11.5
Within Pakistan, there has not been a consistent effort to focus on gender
equality using mechanisms such as PPPs and MPSEs within donor aid or
national educational plans. An evaluation report on the gender component of
education documents has pointed out that under UPE there is a greater push to
getting more girls to school through increasing the number of women teachers,
expanding secondary schooling provision for girls and additional support for
informal schooling for girls and women (Khalid and Mujahid-Mukhtar 2002).6
The Perspective Development Plan (2001–11), in contrast, remains gender
neutral/blind as it does not focus explicitly on girls’ education and merely indi-
cates a need to achieve universal primary education for both boys and girls.7
Pakistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) does indicate that PPPs
are central to dealing with the challenges of delivery of education (Bano 2008),
but does not provide a commentary on how PPPs might improve the type or
nature of interventions to improve girls’ education.
An example of this disjointed approach can also be seen in the manner in
which provincial educational programmes are implemented. In the case of the
province of Balochistan, the Pakistan (Balochistan) Basic Education Support
Project has been set up to encourage the establishment of new private schools
by providing per-student subsidies to Private School Implementation Partners
(PIPs). It provides a top-up fee of up to PRs300 for each PIP. There is also
a separate programme, the Pakistan (Balochistan) Urban Girls Fellowship,
providing a separate subsidy for private schools to increase enrolment of
girls from the poorest households in the districts of the province. While the
programmes coexist in the same province no attempt has been made to dovetail
these two so that there can be a better targeted intervention for girls from the
poorest households in the province.8
The lack of any formal mechanism in Pakistan’s education policy by which
to ensure girls’ education, far less gender equality, through the use of PPPs is
a major lacuna in its educational provision. There is, nonetheless, evidence of
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 263 24/05/2012 15:21

activity on the ground at provincial and district level. The key players have
been NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), who work with
municipal authorities to create partnerships (Farah and Rizvi 2007). There has
been a particular focus on local CBOs as part of the devolutionary process in
public inance over the last decade (Bano 200 ). The objectives of these part-
nerships focus on improving access through building new schools or improv-
ing quality in the existing schools and do not directly address the problems
of the poorest communities. Overall, however, very little inancial outlay has
been available for the public private partnerships: they have less than 1 per
cent of the ESR budget (Farah and Rizvi 2007).
The current measures indicate that Pakistan was ranked at 135 out of 182 in
2005 and fell to 141 out of 182 in 2009–10 in the HDI ranking. Primary gender
parity is at 0.82 and secondary gender parity at 0.78, while the primary enrol-
ment rate for girls is 83 per cent and the secondary enrolment rate for girls is
28 per cent.9 The poor performance with regard to ensuring gender equality
is well known among development partners and there has been a concerted
attempted by some aid agencies to push for a greater prominence of policies to
reduce existing inequalities. Mainstreaming gender has been a major pillar of
Swiss Agency of Development and Cooperation (SDC) in Pakistan.10 This is a
positive step forward and one that other aid agencies could beneit from work-
ing into their aid assistance in Pakistan.
Community Perceptions of PPPs in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
The research conducted by the public private partnerships and the Educational
Outcomes of the Poor project within the research programme on Educational
Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP)11 investigated the decisions made by
parents in relation to the school choice for sons and daughters. The intention
of the PPP project was to undertake community and school level studies to
identify how the introduction of new types of non-state providers had affected
the demand and supply factors operating in the educational sector.
The evidence from the PPP project12 on the choice of school uses the percep-
tions of the parental and youth generation. The indings presented in this chap-
ter are based on the data collected in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP). The ieldwork was conducted in both an urban and rural site with each
selected district, which was identiied as having an above median level of
poverty from government data. The local community in urban KPK repre-
sented one urban block consisting of 300 households and serviced by nine
schools – four private and ive public. The rural community, a village of 1
households, was serviced by eight schools, four of each type. The sample of
respondents included 25 parents (mothers and fathers were interviewed sepa-
rately) and 25 school-attending youth (between the ages 14 and 18) enrolled at
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 264 24/05/2012 15:21

higher secondary level. The head teacher and two teachers in each school were
interviewed providing a total sample of 18 head teachers and 36 teachers from
rural and urban public and private schools in KP.
The quantitative data obtained from the RECOUP household survey shows
that there remain a signiicantly larger number of girls out of school than boys
at all educational levels. For every 100 enrolled boys (aged ive to nine years)
only 82 girls were enrolled in primary school in 2004 (Aslam 2007).13 In 2006,
the Gender Parity Index (GPI) for primary education was below the parity level.
The Gross Enrolment Ratio was 0.82 and the Net Enrolment Ratio was 0.85.14
Gendered Parental Perspectives on Schooling
The parental perceptions that emerge from our qualitative study indicate
that both fathers and mothers are keen to get their children into good quality
schools. With the increase in private schools there is a growing preference to
send local youth to these schools. It is noteworthy that boys are more likely to
be sent to private school than girls. Additionally, while there are now girls who
do manage to complete secondary education at these schools, the chances of
them competing in a highly competitive market with boys coming from higher
quality private elementary schools is very slim:
Therefore if any parents have the means, they enroll their children in private school.
Or, if they have less favorable conditions, they will go for a less prestigious school.
(Father, rural)
Children go to government school, just because of poverty they are studying there
as I can’t afford to enroll them in a private school. (Father, urban)
Mostly everyone wants to enroll their children in private schools but since we
don’t have the means, we are forced to enroll them in government schools where
they are rarely taught anything. (Mother, rural)
There is also unanimous evidence of a strong parental desire to have their chil-
dren educated. This desire is present among the rich and poor alike and with
regards to boys and girls by families in the poor community (Fennell, Agbley
and Irfan 2010). The parental perception is that schooling outcomes improve
both personal development – that is, has an intrinsic value as well as being
critical for ensuring economic and social mobility:
Parents educate their children despite the expenses. They will bear the expense for
the education and the expense for the wedding and all this despite the fact that it is
dificult to make ends meet. We’re just grateful that there is a college in our village
that we can send our girls to 12th grade at least. We’re so proud to tell everyone that
our children study, because their father and I desperately want them to study. The
rest is up to God. (Mother, rural)
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The evidence that the parental generation in Charsadda was strongly in favour
of education as a way to ensure economic and social mobility also came with
a strongly gendered view regarding the preferred school types and their strate-
gies for deciding school choice for the youth in their community. Fathers in
the rural site were keen to ensure that the school had local teachers who had
a common social network and were more responsive to the educational needs
of their children:
When we send our children to the other village we fear whether the teacher would
look after our child or not? But, this is school and the teachers are of our village
which is a plus point. (Father 1)
The teachers from outside were when teaching here, they were not like this. If we
would ever grumble, they wouldn’t take any action. But now alhamdullillah when
we visit the school, things are pretty well. They listen to us and care a lot. Because
all these teachers belong to this village. (Father 3)
Mothers in Charsadda were not comfortable with teachers from the local
community as these individuals did not regard the women as worthy inter-
locutors within the social network of the village and took no heed of their
complaints. This perception was common among all mothers in the sample
whose children were enrolled in government school. They were unanimous in
the view that the government school disregarded their complaints.
The lodging of complaints in the event of dissatisfaction with the schools also
indicated marked gender differences. Fathers were reluctant to go to schools, that
had all, or predominantly, female teachers, to lodge complaints. Consequently,
individual complaints regarding girls’ education was undertaken by mothers, as
was the case in for all educational concerns in primary schools where there was
a majority of women teachers were primarily female. Mothers were regarded
by households as the major player with regard to lodging complaints, yet they
were particularly reluctant to do so on account of their low social position. Their
reluctance was due to the fear of retaliation against their children within the
uneven power equation in the community. In contrast, fathers who only tended
to make complaints with regard to their teenage sons, in the main, were of the
view that the schools were more responsive to their demands:
Fearing the consequences, the parents can’t openly go complaining as it might result
in an even worse situation where the administration of the school may avenge from
the kids of the complaining parents. (Mother, rural Charsadda)
Mothers also indicated that their inability to express their concerns regard-
ing poor schooling outcomes was a personal shortcoming. The unanimous
sense was that they had a deicit due to their own lack of education.15 The
sense of individual failure with regard to taking up educational concerns with
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school authorities was particularly noticeable in the rural interviews. Here,

the focus groups revealed considerable fear of intimidation mixed with a deep
inadequacy expressed concerning successful engagement with the school. In
such a strongly gendered local context, where mothers are the main potential
protagonists for girls’ education it appears that there is far less opportunity for
perceptions regarding girls’ education to be heard, either by the government or
the private school.
Gendered Youth Perceptions of Schooling Outcomes
There was also a strong intergenerational difference in the manner in which

educational outcomes from schooling were perceived. Two adolescent girls in
two separate focus groups (of which four were conducted) expressed the view,
unanimously agreed to by all respondents, that women in the community were
appreciative of the increased number of private schools but regretted that the
initiatives by private providers were restricted to primary years (until age 11).
This shortfall in provision of private secondary schooling results in a rapid
reduction in girls’ enrolling in secondary school as the only schooling option is
the government secondary school that is usually an even greater distance away
than the government primary school:
In the past, the number of government schools was larger than private schools.
Actually these government schools were situated somewhat far from us. Therefore
many private schools got started. Most of these private schools are primary schools
or just up to the middle standard. Nevertheless, the people got much relieved due to
the introduction of these private schools. These schools are much approachable and
the children now ind it quite convenient to travel between their schools and homes.
(Adolescent girl 1, rural)
The lack of private schools at secondary level has forced youth who did study
in the private sector at the primary level to change schools for secondary
education. Partnerships and private schools have tended to restrict provision
between 1st grade and 8th grade. This means that the students can only study
in the government school after the 8th grade. This bias in provision has created
enrolment levels that are similar in the 1st grade in both communities: rang-
ing between 32 and 87 in government schools and between 30 and 57 in the
private school in Sargodha, but fell to 5–10 in the 5th grade in private schools.
The absence of private schools in the top years of the secondary education
system and the disruption of changing schools has led to a preference for the
government school to bypass such a rupture in the educational experience of
the youth in the community. The female youth in the community pointed out
that the growth in enrolment in the government school in the secondary years
has resulted in an improvement in the government schools in recent years and
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 267 24/05/2012 15:21

did not regard private schools (whether community, faith or private) as neces-
sarily better than the government school:
In the past, I was in an Al-Madina private school. But there were no classes after 7th
class in that school. Therefore I got transferred to a government high school.
Things are changed and the government schools are much better today. Gone are
the days when the teachers used students to indulge their children or when these
students were running personal errands for their teachers. (Adolescent girl 3, rural)
The quality of teaching as well as the regular presence of the teacher in school,
both in the case of private and government schools, was a matter that concerned
young women in the rural site and they regarded a good school as one which
had qualiied and engaged teachers, and were less concerned about the type
of school. The beneit of good teaching emerged as equally important in the
perception of young men in rural Charsadda. There was considerable agree-
ment among the male youth that the type and manner of teaching of courses far
outweighed the type of school. They gave far more importance to the medium
of instruction in relation to learning strategies than to the branding that was
undertaken by both government and private schools:
We selected the school for the teachers teaching there. I was in fouji foundation
school before, but then I left it because I did not have good work. The teachers there
were only metric passed. (Adolescent boy 3, rural)
The school after 7th class was in Urdu medium although till 6th it would be in
English medium. Same as Govt School, the courses would transform in Urdu. It created
a real mess at college level, because on college level you don’t get the courses in Urdu.
So, I went for public school as it was a short distance to me. (Adolescent boy 7, rural)
The importance of teachers was further underlined in the focus group inter-
views with young men when they discussed the consequences they faced on
account of the low competence of various subject teachers. They were aware
that both local social networks as well as the larger political situation in the
province could have adverse effects on their schooling outcomes. The empha-
sis placed by both adolescent girls and boys on regular teaching and the quality
of teaching in achieving successful educational outcomes indicates that despite
strong gendered norms, they had a common sense of priorities concerning what
was regarded as key in the schooling process to achieve educational success.
While they identify the same criterion, they are affected by the gendered norms
within which they operate in different ways: with young women still strug-
gling to get into the secondary schooling system successfully, while young
men were more caught up with the need for a satisfactory academic perfor-
mance to complete their secondary education.
The evidence from Charsadda, KP indicates that while parents regard private
schools as a more likely pathway to economic mobility, there is little evidence
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 268 24/05/2012 15:21

that a single type of school has been identiied by the youth in the commu-
nity as a sure way for successful school outcomes. Furthermore, there is no
evidence from community perceptions that either the parental or the youth
generation regard private schools (on any type) as being particularly suitable
for girls’ education. The phenomenon of PPPs has brought about a new type
of provider in KP, but the youth are suspicious of the quality of education that
is being provided by these schools. The fact that it is only the parental genera-
tion that perceives the education provided by the new providers as facilitating
economic mobility does not bode well for high enrolment in these schools in
coming years. This prognosis is corroborated by the evidence on PPPs in KP.
The provincial administration in KP had embarked on the PPP plan in 2002, as
part of the educational decentralization initiative, but this programme had to be
disbanded due to a consistent lack of private partners after the irst few years:
We had an Urdu teacher, who would not teach us properly, he would ask us to work
ourselves. We told this to the principal, the teacher then came to the class and fright-
ened all the students, no one could speak a word even. The principal then said that I
would have changed him earlier, if he was an outsider, but he belongs to this village,
I cannot do anything. (Young man 2, urban)
In college there are many such protests and demonstrations launched. But they
have no cause. They are usually launched on a political basis. Our school principal
was kidnapped once. All the students had protested against it. Whenever a tussle
takes place between political parties in our college, colleges are kept closed after
that. (Young man 3, urban)
The negligible role that PPPs have played in the advancement of educational
goals in KP makes it even less likely that the role of the private sector can
be regarded as a signiicant contributor to advancing girls’ education in this
economically deprived area. While the region of KP is not showing much
evidence of improved educational outcomes from ield study, there is consider-
able importance accorded to the role of education in this terrorist-ridden prov-
ince of Pakistan.
MISCONSTRUED CONNECTIONS BETWEEN GENDER

AND EDUCATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
The relationship between private education and the schooling of youth in

connection with the war on terror has been made explicit in policy circles.
This analysis has focused on how private schools can counter the Islamic
propaganda provided by the madrasa education system at a time when the
state education system has already failed the poorer sections of Pakistani
society (Coulson 2004). A key criterion for the success of the private school
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 269 24/05/2012 15:21

is in relation to its ability to increase the enrolment of girls. This success of

private schooling has been highlighted in international analysis as evidence
that such approaches will help countries to move towards achieving the second
Millennium Development Goal (MDG2) of gender parity in education.16
While there is evidence that girls’ enrolment has risen as a consequence of
a growing number of private schools, this does not automatically imply that
further increases in the provisioning of private schools through the mecha-
nisms of PPPs or MPSEs will be suficient to bring about the achievement
of MDG2 in Pakistan. Coulson, the Director of the Educational Freedom
programme at the Cato Institute, notes that there is evidence that it is less
likely that the poorest sections of rural society are able to send their children to
private school (Coulson 2004), and this is corroborated by qualitative results
of the RECOUP PPP project.
Additionally, there are concerns that the current models of PPP are not
gender sensitive (Fennell 2008) and, consequently, lack the ability to provide
speciic interventions to ensure accessibility for girls in diverse and dificult
local contexts (Farah and Rizvi 2007). If partnerships are to ensure active
engagement with local communities, there is a need to ensure that enrolment
of girls does not remain a singular objective for private schools. Instead, these
partnerships should begin by acquiring a speciic knowledge of local gender
norms and their relation to the educational context. The signiicance of context
to understanding gendered identities and exclusions needs an understanding
of local circumstances rather than broad geographical locations (Arnot and
Fennell 2009). A decontextualized approach to educational objectives simpli-
ies the complexities of local social norms. There is a need to move from a
mere examination of the high dropout rates for girls (and regarding increased
enrolment as a criterion for success) to more nuanced local research of gender
norms so that we can understand how households make school choices for both
boys and girls in their community.
The notion that it is easy to identify dropouts as these tend to occur in well-
deined marginalized groups is also not evident from our qualitative research.17
While it is the case that the poorest sections of a community are unable to
access private schools there is a complex process of strategizing about the
school choice for each youth in the community that is also affected by asym-
metry of information, lack of community space and, consequently, little oppor-
tunity for collective action with regard to schooling outcomes of local youth
(Irfan 2010).18 Collective action is critical for a sustainable local solution,
which can ensure that programmes and initiatives do not only improve the
outcomes for a minority of individual women, but also create a new social
norm that promotes gender equality (Elson 2008).
Achieving gender parity is an important statistical achievement but it does
not necessarily result in a change in gender norms. While improving the
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 270 24/05/2012 15:21

educational outcomes of a number of individuals is a measure of success, it

remains both a small and a nonsustainable measure unless there has been a
social transformation of how gendered identities are constructed around access
to and outcomes of education. By ensuring greater enrolment of girls at rural
schools in KP, Pakistan, there is no surety of a change in the attitudes of the
community concerning the educational outcomes for girls leaving the school-
ing system after completion of secondary school.
The types of partnership that are currently being put forward by interna-
tional agencies and donor agencies do not show evidence of a gendered under-
standing of community perceptions regarding the acquisition and outcomes of
schooling and therefore are not well-placed to make an impact on gendered
norms, far less on improving gender equality in the provision of schooling by
new providers.
REWORKING THE CONTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL

PPPS TO GENDER EQUALITY
The inadequate treatment of gender equality in global partnerships is in no

way a problem unique to Pakistan. The PPP programme has not been created
with a focus on gender equality and has simply drawn on the EFA agenda of
improving girls’ enrolment and, more recently, on retention, at both primary
and secondary schooling. There remains a major lacuna in making important
connections between schooling, opportunities for decent work and sharing the
responsibilities of care (Elson 2008). This inability to link schooling and the
larger world within which women and girls access education and knowledge
results in very narrow policy parameters with which to understand the relation-
ship between education and gender equality.
If PPPs are to prove successful in improving gender equality there is a need to
identify embedded local gendered contexts within which the provision of educa-
tion is undertaken. In the case of Pakistan, the particularly marginalized posi-
tion in which mothers ind themselves with regard to registering their concerns
about girls’ education can only further hinder the achievement of gender goals.
This is particularly urgent, in a country where the adult female literacy rate
compared to the male literacy rate was 59 per cent in that year (UNGEI 2010).
According to the 2009 Global Monitoring Report (GMR) projections, Pakistan
is likely to be at the top of the list of out-of-school primary school-age children,
with a relatively higher share of girls in this category in 2015.
Mainstreaming gender can be built into the provision of education and will
help to go beyond current measures for gender equality. The gendered percep-
tions emerging from qualitative data collected in the RECOUP research point
to the existence of asymmetric schooling access and outcomes for young men
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 271 24/05/2012 15:21

and women. The consequence of this asymmetry remaining below the radar
screen is that policy initiatives to support the education of youth from the poor-
est households might continue to perpetuate gendered and unequal access to
girls. Such a structural inequality could be overcome by a more substantive
gender mainstreaming programme that targets women and girls in the commu-
nity to improve their participation in school spaces (Irfan 2010).
With the increased focus on private provisioning of education in many coun-
tries, achievement of gender equality may not occur through simple targeting
such as voucher-based schemes. It appears that it is important to look at the
quality of educational provision delivered by each type of provider. It is not
clear that the mere introduction of additional non-state providers will improve
the competition in educational service delivery between public and private
providers. More pertinent is what the provider can do in relation to the require-
ments of the community. Recent evidence shows that the objective of the
provider is also important and in the case of local community-based schools or
other private/NGO initiatives their success was the consequence of ensuring
greater participation for women or improved gender equality (Lincove 2007).
The importance of PPPs appears to lie in their ability to improve the provision
of education and there does not seem to be an automatic guarantee that this will
occur by the mere introduction of new partnerships.
The qualitative research from this study indicated that new partnership
schools did provide a possibility to increase the opportunity for schooling for
poor communities. The performance of these schools did not result in symmet-
rical results for young men and women in the community. There were also
divergent views between fathers and mothers as to the best school choice that
should be made for their children. Finally, the schooling outcomes that were
spoken of by both parents and youth did not overlap with any of the global
agendas for increasing education through partnerships: there was no relation
drawn between education and terrorism or acts of mass destruction in any of
the data that we collected. Far more evident was the violence inlicted on poor
youth, both young men and women. The consequences of corporal punish-
ment, teacher neglect and manual labour that young men and women had to
endure as part of their schooling experience point to the failure of the new
partnerships, as well as existing government schools of meeting the aspirations
of the parental generation or of ensuring the schooling success of youth.
The strange political economy of the global literature that forces together
the strands of education, privatization and security has brought together a
number of separate phenomena in the ield of international development to
push for a very narrow, and often misconstrued, notion of gender equality.
These odd bedfellows have not only created a false set of interrelations for
policy formulations and programme implementation, they have also pushed
global agendas to continue to pursue narrow statistical goals that continue to
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 272 24/05/2012 15:21

be unable to take on board the processual dimension of gender relations. This

has had negative consequences for any furthering of the framework of gender
mainstreaming that has been advocated by feminist development perspectives
(Seguino and Grown 2006).
CONCLUSION
The focus on girls’ education in Pakistan has been based on a false causal
relationship between terrorism, gender and education. While it is indeed the
case that girls’ education has lagged behind in Pakistan gender gaps in educa-
tion provision, it cannot automatically be regarded that the improvement in
girls’ enrolment in Pakistan can be an antidote to the rise in terrorist tendencies
among poor young men in parts of Pakistan. The evidence provided does indi-
cate that poor communities see education in particular types of school (govern-
ment or private, whether religious, community or commercial) as a pathway to
economic and social mobility. There is also an indication that there are differ-
ences in parental and youth perceptions of the value of school choice by type:
while the parents were concerned about school type, the youth were keen on
teaching quality and regularity.
There is little evidence of a conceptual clarity among national government
documents with regard to the relationship between new educational initiatives
and the advancement of girls’ education. While PPPs have been a small part
of the decentralization initiatives in Pakistan through the last decade there is
little indication that girls’ education is regarded as part of this initiative. It
continues to be the case that there exist small but separate programmes for
girls’ education which have yet to see any integration into a national policy
for gender equality. The PPP programme in KP has been slow to take off and
has been retracted by the provincial government due to this poor performance.
The federal government in Pakistan still regards PPPs as an important vehicle
to improve the managerial competence of schools and to increase competitive
forces in the educational sector.
While partnerships have emerged as a potentially important instrument to
bring more resources and cost effectiveness to the provision of education it is
erroneous to imagine that reducing the cost of girls’ education for the poor-
est families will lead to more than an improvement in statistical measures such
as enrolment. For this educational improvement to be relected within gender
relations in the community requires a conceptual framework that moves away
from huge simpliications: it is not possible to make advances in girls’ education
without building in a gender mainstreaming approach. The current models use
simple targeting attempts to reduce the importance of using educational policy
to ensure social change to educational programmes that reduce economic costs.
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 273 24/05/2012 15:21

The potential value of partnerships is in introducing agents who can create

new relations, such as community schools that increase participation, or part-
nership schools that improve the quality of education or new skills to improve
employment prospects. The ability of partnerships should not be regarded
as assured by their very existence, and qualitative research shows that the
mapping of the local community and the construction of process indicators
can help to understand how demand and supply of new educational provision
works itself out among men and women, across generations as they seek to
gain both instrumentally and intrinsically from schooling opportunities.
NOTES
1 See Fennell and Arnot (2008) for a set of studies that look at how global agendas affect
gender equality.
2 The increased interest is, in part, a consequence of post 9/11 recasting of the country as a hub
of terrorist activity (Robertson, Novelli et al. 2007).
3 In relation to the ‘civilizations’ approach, educational aid is directed particularly toward
translation and broadcasting programmes, such as an Arabic version of Sesame Street and
US-funded media broadcasting, aimed at winning ‘hearts and minds’ and promoting more
positive attitudes towards the West.
4 The linkage between the invasion of Afghanistan and the increased enrolment of girls in
school has been made by many in the Republican Party in the US. Laura Bush reiterated this
point in her speech supporting the re-election of Bush, available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/3617428.stm on Wednesday 1 September 2004.
5 Concerns about terrorism after the 9/11 attacks triggered interest that the countries that
nurture terrorists are disproportionally those where women are marginalized. The reason
there are so many Muslim terrorists, they argued, has little to do with the Koran but a great
deal to do with the lack of robust female participation in the economy and society of many
Islamic countries. As the Pentagon gained a deeper understanding of counterterrorism, and
as it found that dropping bombs often didn’t do much to help, it became increasingly inter-
ested in grass-roots projects such as girls’ education. Empowering girls, some in the military
argued, would disempower terrorists. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold discussions of girls’
education in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as they did in 2008, you know that gender is a serious
topic that its squarely on the international affairs agenda (Kristoff and WuDunn 200 ).
6 Conducted by UNESCO Pakistan in 2002.
7 Several evaluations focusing on the inability to achieve universal primary education for
girls identify low levels of participation rates generated by a combination of both supply-
as well as demand-related factors that include: (i) lack of political will and commitment
to education; (ii) high population growth rates; (iii) low levels of inancial allocation and
ineficient utilization of these limited resources; (iv) lack of coordination between federal
and provincial governments; (v) lack of school facilities (distance; lack or absenteeism of
female teachers; lack of privacy and security, etc.); (vi) poverty; (vii) cultural and family
constraints which hinder girls from attending school; and (viii) lack of community participa-
tion (UNESCO Pakistan 2002).
8 The lack of coordination is not only evident in the less developed provinces. Even in the
most economically advanced province of Pakistan the programme such as the Pakistan
(Punjab) Financial Assistance per Child Enrolled Basis Program (FAS), set up by The
Punjab Education Foundation, have found dificulties in meeting the criteria required to
have their membership renewed, and the gains that are made do not provide indication that
there has been any deepening of the partnership between the government and private sector
over the period of the programme.
259-276 Pt3 Ch13.indd 274 24/05/2012 15:21

9 World Bank, 2009; downloaded 20 October 2010.

10 (i) SDC’s partners will mainstream gender equality in all their projects and programmes;
(ii) analysing the roles of different groups of women and men, their level of access to and
control over resources; (iii) developing disaggregated indicators to monitor both project
outputs on women and men, and project outcomes in terms of social change; and (iv) apply-
ing gender responsive budgeting.
11 The RECOUP was a research consortium over the period 2005–10, awarded the DFID.
Both quantitative and qualitative data was collected over seven different research projects.
Information on the research and access to research outputs can be found on the consortium
website: http://recoup.educ.cam.ac.uk
12 The Public Private Partnership (PPP) project, funded under the RECOUP programme,
examined the impact of public private partnerships on the supply and demand for schooling
in Ghana, India, Kenya and Pakistan.
13 Based on household survey data for 9000 households in nine districts across Punjab and
KPK, that was conducted in 2006 under the RECOUP consortium.
14 Education for All: Mid-Decade assessment, Country Report: Pakistan, Ministry of Education,
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2007.
15 The interviewer notes regarding focus group discussions in Charsadda: ‘All the responding
mothers unanimously agreed upon this notion and admitted that it is their own mistake.
Saying, we never inquire and follow up about our kids that we have enrolled in government
schools and colleges. We never visit their school for complaining. As a result, the students
are not given full attention, the children are not taught properly by their teachers in these
institutions. Every respondent was agreed upon this opinion that it was their own fault not to
visit the school or college of their children for registering any complaints.’
16 The contribution made by private schools with regard to increasing the enrolment of girls
was highlighted by the Learning and Education Achievements in Punjab Schools (LEAPS)
report published by the World Bank in 2008.
17 Analysis by the AED (2006) puts the view that the way to bring marginalized groups into
education is through media campaigns and other targeted interventions.
18 While it could be presumed that these factors affect all poor sections in any society, our qual-
itative research shows that the importance of local context is critical for ensuring successful
educational outcomes. The different strategies and outcomes among the poorest sections,
consequent on both different social structures and gendered norms, are evident in patterns
emerging from our research in Pakistan and Ghana (Fennell, Agbley and Irfan 2010).
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Patrinos, H. and S. Shoshale (eds) (2007), Mobilising the Private Sector for Public
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‘Globalisation, Education and Development: Ideas, Actors and Dynamics’, DFID
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14. The role of central management
structures in public private
partnerships: The case of Fe y
Alegría schools in Peru
Analía V. Jaimovich
INTRODUCTION
Recent education reform trends have been focusing on public private part-
nerships (PPPs) as a potential avenue to improve education quality without
sacriicing equity (Chakrabati and Peterson 200 ; aRoque 200 ; World Bank
2010). Public private partnerships encompass a variety of policies, whereby
either the management of education or its funding is open to private sector
participation. A particular type of PPP is the contracting-out of operational and
management services. Under this type of arrangement, the education authori-
ties contract private organizations to handle a wider range of responsibilities,
in essence, to operate an entire public school . The aim of such contracts is
most often to free schools from public service constraints or to give schools
more autonomy’ (Patrinos, Barrera Osorio and u queta 200 , p. 11).
One of the tenets behind this type of PPP is that schools will be able to
improve the quality of education provided if they are freed from bureau-
cratic constraints, and decision-making power is devolved to local agents.
Accordingly, most studies on this form of PPP have taken individual schools
as the primary unit of improvement and have focused on school-level
factors, such as use of resources, internal management structures, decision-
making processes, community participation or teacher appointment policies
(Barrera-Osorio, Fasih and Patrinos 200 ; Briggs and Wohlstetter 200 ;
Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011; Malen, Ogawa and Kranz 1 0; Summers
and ohnson 1 ).
However, a fairly recent policy development are PPPs in which autonomous
schools are embedded within privately-operated larger management systems,
such as the case of charter school management organizations, franchise schools
and other types of school networks (Brewer and Hentschke 200 ). n these
277
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arrangements, each school receives support and oversight from higher levels in
the privately-operated management structure. This relationship between auton-
omous schools and higher-level management structures has largely remained
unexamined in the literature on the topic.
By focusing on school-level factors, previous research has tended to assume
that once schools are granted formal autonomy over their decision-making
processes, they will individually be able to make effective use of such auton-
omy to improve the quality of service. nstead, this chapter argues that the
relationship between school autonomy and school improvement may be less
linear than what previous research suggests. Formal school autonomy may not
be enough to improve education quality unless schools are able to develop the
capacity to align their internal structures and processes to improve practice
(Childress, Elmore, rossman and ohnson 200 ). Effective autonomy may
thus require the development of capacity for improvement at the school level.
The study of central management structures is thus relevant because they may
put in place structures and processes that help autonomous schools develop
internal capacity to improve instruction. n fact, the few studies that have
begun to analyse the relationship between autonomous schools and central
management structures in PPPs provide some grounds to suggest that there
may be a role for central management structures in school improvement (see
Bulkley and Hicks 2005; Elacqua, Contreras and Salazar 200 ; arcia, Barber
and Molnar 200 ; Wilson 2005; Wohlstetter et al. 200 ).
n this chapter, analyse a speciic case of PPPs, the Fe y Alegr a network
(FyA), from this point of view. explore how the FyA network manages
structures and processes to support school improvement. I study the value
of the central ofice as perceived by participants in the network, basing my
analysis on the perspectives of the people working at the central ofice and
at the school level. ind that the central ofice puts in place a number of
processes and structures aimed at supporting the development of schools’
capacity for autonomous decision-making, namely developing a shared
identity, mobilizing resources for schools, developing data analysis capacity
at the school level, and implementing a monitoring and teacher professional
development system aimed at improving instructional practice. Schools in
this study seem to be able to take advantage of these resources to develop
capacity to align their internal structures and processes to focus on instruc-
tional improvement. However, the schools in this study also seem to be able
to take advantage of the country network’s support differentially. hypoth-
esize that these differences may be due to a different level of development of
their own internal improvement structures, and suggest that further research
is necessary to better understand the interaction between central manage-
ment structures and the development of schools’ autonomous capacity to
improve instruction.
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The role of central management structures in public private partnerships 2
The Fe y Alegría Network
An international network of schools, the FyA nternational Federation oper-

ates through a three-tiered governance structure. First, each school within the
network is autonomous, having formal decision-making functions over its inter-
nal processes. The second tier is composed of 1 country ofices that provide
general support and oversight to each national network of schools. The third tier
is composed of an international council that serves atin America, Spain and
Chad, and provides support to the international network of country ofices. n
each country, FyA works as a public private partnership. Schools are funded by
the government, but privately managed by the network – managed by the Society
of esus – or other religious congregations. n most countries, FyA schools fall
under governmental regulations for private schools, while each country ofice
has its own management structures and regulations for its schools.
The focus for this study is the FyA Peru country network. Established in 1 5,
it currently operates schools (Federaci n nternacional Fe y Alegr a 2010).
About 0 of these institutions are primary and secondary schools in the outskirts
of ima, the capital city, while the rest are rural primary schools and technical
training institutions. After identifying the need for the creation of a new school
in a neighbourhood, the Peru FyA central ofice arranges for a religious congre-
gation to run the school. The central ofice provides funds for the construction
of the building, the government pays teacher salaries, and the religious congre-
gation appoints the principal of the school and pays his or her salary.
Although public funds are the main source of resources for the network
(about 0 per cent of the total budget of the organization), the FyA central
ofice also mobilizes resources through private local donations (1 per cent)
and international projects (1 per cent). Each school has formal autonomy over
the use of its resources, internal management structures, curriculum develop-
ment, and teacher appointment policies and practices. FyA schools in Peru
are required to organize instruction using the national curriculum, cannot
openly establish student selection procedures or charge tuition fees, and have
to participate in the national standardized tests used to analyse the quality of
education in the country.
Currently, the Peru central ofice is composed of about 0 people, who
work in a number of areas, including an institutional image and public rela-
tions department, an international projects and donations’ department, and
an instructional support department, among others. The instructional support
department provides support to schools on teaching practices, through the
development of teacher professional development programmes and other
activities. This structure is particularly relevant for the purposes of this study,
as it provides schools in the network with a number of services, such as curric-
ulum development, teacher professional development and resource generation,
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among others. n turn, as mentioned earlier, FyA schools in Peru have formal
autonomy over decision-making on a number of school-level functions. Thus,
the FyA Peru network constitutes an interesting case to analyse the interactions
between autonomous schools and central ofices in PPPs.
Previous studies suggest that FyA schools outperform comparable public
schools in student achievement in standardized tests, as well as in student lows
(Alc zar and Cieza 2002; Allcott and Ortega 200 ; Parra Osorio and Wodon
2010; Swope and atorre 1 ;1 ). As with other research on this type of
PPP, these results have been mostly attributed to school-level factors. Thus,
researchers have hypothesized that FyA’s comparatively better outcomes are
due to its community building practices at the school level; the fact that FyA
schools have a clear division between administrative and instructional leader-
ship (Alc zar 2005); or the fact that FyA schools have greater decision-making
capacity than public schools over issues such as teacher recruitment processes,
curriculum development and resource generation (Allcott and Ortega 200 ).
By focusing on school level factors, previous research on FyA has paid little
attention to the fact that the FyA network provides schools with a governance
structure (for example, the network’s national and international ofices) that
may provide an environment where schools can develop the capacity to make
better use of their autonomy. It is thus important to explore the mechanisms
through which the network promotes school improvement, focusing on the
role of the network’s central ofice, and the way in which schools process the
central ofice’s support to develop decision-making capacity over their own
improvement processes.
METHODS
The study follows the logic of a single-case study design ( in 200 ), analys-
ing the operations and management structure of one FyA country network.
focused my data collection on the internal processes of the organization with
regard to how it manages network processes (curriculum, teacher profes-
sional development, teacher appointment policies, evaluation, accountability
processes, budgeting and so on), as well as on the relationships the country
network establishes with the government and the nternational Federation.
Participants were asked to describe the internal structures and processes of the
organization, and to relect on why those processes and structures are in place,
what they contribute to, and their main outcomes.
The data sources have used for this study are 0 internal documents from
the central ofice and the FyA nternational Federation, and 15 interviews
with staff in management positions at the country ofice, school principals and
teachers in two F A schools. While the two schools selected are certainly not
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The role of central management structures in public private partnerships 2 1
representative of the varieties of FyA schools in this country network, they were
purposefully sampled looking for variation in organizational characteristics, so
as to help me analyse how schools in different levels of internal organizational
development interact with the country network. One of the schools is 0 years
old, large and well-established. The other is a new and small school that has
been functioning for two years. Schools in this study are taken as active agents
that make use of structures and processes developed by the central ofice in
ways that suit their own timing and speciic needs, hence the need to study
the interaction between the central ofice and schools with different levels of
development of their internal structures.
Data was coded using qualitative thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1 ), following
a grounded theory approach (Charmaz 200 ; Corbin and Strauss 200 ). concen-
trated on those processes and structures developed by the network that, according
to individuals working in the organization, are more closely related to school
improvement and the development of school-level decision-making capacity.
SCAFFO D N SCHOO AUTONOM FOR

MPROVEMENT
n this section, present my indings focusing on the FyA network’s theory of

action (City, Elmore, Fiarman and Teitel 200 ) about school improvement.
analyse how people working in the Peru FyA network think about the process
of improving instructional practice. I explore their views regarding what struc-
tures and processes are necessary for improvement, how these processes and
structures are related to one another, and what the relative role of the central
ofice and of school staff is in enhancing practice.
A central element of the FyA network’s theory of action is that although
schools are better equipped to take responsibility for the improvement of educa-
tional practice, they cannot do it on their own. They need the support of a central
structure to create an environment in which schools can exercise their autonomy,
as well as to provide access to knowledge, and skills staff at the school level
may look to improve practice. n other words, the role of the FyA central ofice
seems to be to scaffold schools in making more effective use of their autonomy.
Thus, staff at the central ofice talk about their role as a necessary scaffolding
derived from the dificulties schools ind in developing their own improvement
structures and the absence of a real supportive role from the government. In
their words, they intend their actions not to become straitjackets that make it
dificult for schools to achieve their aims. f schools can ind a way to improve
their practices, be it through governmental support, or through their own inter-
nal processes, then the role of the FyA central ofice is limited to responding to
schools’ requirements for support. That is, according to members of the central
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ofice, each school is supposed to receive as much support as necessary depend-

ing on how developed its internal processes for improvement are.
This idea of school responsibility over improvement coupled with support
from the central ofice seems to be translated, in the view of the participants,
into two main roles for the central ofice. On the one hand, the central ofice is
in charge of generating an environment that facilitates more effective auton-
omy at the school level. That is, it is in charge of generating the conditions
so that schools can free resources and efforts hitherto dedicated to adminis-
trative issues to focus instead on instruction. On the other hand, the central
ofice’s role is to help develop capacity at the school level. From this perspec-
tive, if schools are not improving on their own, it is because they are working
at the limit of their capacity, and the existing knowledge their staff has is not
enough to drive improvement practices. Hence the need for a central structure
to scaffold schools’ efforts towards improvement, and help generate capacity
(resources, knowledge, skills) at the school site.
These two main roles for the central ofice translate into a number of
processes and structures, purportedly aimed at creating the conditions for
schools to function at their best’ and make effective use of their autonomy
to improve practice. I have organized these elements into four categories:
developing a shared identity, mobilizing resources for schools, evaluating for
improvement, and enhancing instructional practice. While the irst two seem to
be more closely related in participants’ views to generating an enabling envi-
ronment for schools to be able to do their work, the last two seem to be specii-
cally aimed at developing instructional capacity at the school level.
n what follows, analyse each of these categories, focusing on three levels:
1) the rationale that supports a speciic course of action; 2) the processes and
structures developed to achieve the intended goals; and ) their perceived
outcomes with regard to enhancing schools’ capacity to act autonomously. I
take into account the perspective of staff working at the country central ofice
and the perspective of teachers and principals working in schools that partici-
pate in the network. thus analyse the structures and processes the central
ofice puts in place with the aim of supporting schools, and, in turn, focus on
how schools interact with the central ofice’s actions. address what beneits
and drawbacks school staff see in belonging to the network, how they make
use of network structures, and how they reinterpret these structures to make
them it their own improvement needs.
Developing a Shared Identity
Rationale: developing commitment, alignment and a sense of belonging

n the view of participants at both the school and central level, FyA has an
identity that clearly distinguishes it from other types of school. Such shared
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identity seems to be formed around the values of the network; that is, providing
disadvantaged children with access to a good quality education, in turn under-
stood as developing children’s academic skills, with an additional emphasis on
the development of technical skills and moral values. There seems to be some
sort of distinctiveness about being’ FyA, and it is this sense of distinctive
identity that drives, according to interviewees, their daily work.
Having a clear shared identity is said to be necessary for the work of the
network for three main reasons. First, it is said to be important to instil a sense
of commitment among network participants towards the work of the organi-
zation. As stated by one of the members of the central ofice, the idea is for
our personnel not to be like soccer players who will abandon your team and
go play for the team that pays a higher salary. To have that, you need people
who believe in the mission of the organization.’ At the school level, teachers
support the same idea. n their views, they do not work’ for FyA, they are’
FyA. They talk about falling in love with the project’, and committing to
their work because they see the importance of the mission of the organiza-
tion. Second, it purportedly provides vertical and horizontal alignment, across
levels of the organization and within each level of the structure. Since each
school is run by a different religious congregation, a shared mission purport-
edly helps what otherwise would be a collection of organizations to work as a
network. Third, it provides participants with the sense that their work is backed
by a larger structure; that is, that they have someone to look for help in case
they need it. nterviewees at the central ofice state that belonging to an inter-
national organization (the Fe y Alegría International Federation) brings to the
national network the sense that their work is backed, and that, as a collective,
they can achieve more than what they would independently, by using to their
advantage the inluence the network has in other countries. As a member of the
central ofice puts it: t gives us the leverage of saying to a government in one
country Mr. President, Mr. Minister of Education, there are 15 countries in
atin America where the government is paying FyA teachers’ salaries. Are you
going to be the only one who is not doing it?”.’
Network structures and processes to generate identity

There are a number of processes and structures that the FyA network puts in
place to develop this sense of shared vision, at the international, national and
school level. At the international level, the nternational Federation develops
projects that promote collaboration among country ofices, and this, according
to interviewees, fosters identiication with the mission of the organization.
At the national level, the country ofice also puts in place processes and
structures designed to develop and maintain what they call the FyA identity’.
There is a recruitment process for central ofice personnel purportedly aimed
at guaranteeing that new personnel are already well acquainted with the values
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of the organization and with internal mechanisms and processes. The central
ofice gives priority in the selection of new personnel to people who have been
teachers at FyA schools in the past, or have studied at FyA schools during their
childhood. n addition, the central ofice has developed a curriculum speciic
for FyA schools, as well as school management guidelines. These docu-
ments provide guidelines for schools on curriculum development and internal
management structures with the aim of promoting a shared language about
instructional and management practices throughout schools in the network.
Such shared language is also promoted through seminars and cultural events,
which help FyA staff interact often with their colleagues in other schools, and
thus feel they belong to the FyA family’.
At the school level, such a sense of belonging is also developed through
speciic mechanisms. First, each school selects its own teachers, paying atten-
tion to their potential commitment to the vision of the organization. According
to interviewees, the teacher selection process prioritizes teachers who are new
to the profession, so that they can grow as professionals within the FyA vision.
Although there are certain government requirements with which prospective
teachers must comply (such as having a teaching degree or having obtained a
speciic grade on the teaching qualiication exam), beyond these requirements
school leaders prioritize applicants who agree with the vision of the organiza-
tion, or who have graduated from an FyA school. Second, once new teachers
are appointed at the school, they go through an informal induction process
so that they can get acquainted with the ethos of the organization and the
processes put in place by schools. New teachers work jointly with colleagues
teaching the same grade, so that they learn to use the FyA curriculum, and class
plans are developed collegially. Teachers who do not embrace the institutional
culture of the school and the FyA identity are eventually invited to leave the
organization. n the words of one of the teachers in this study: teachers will
identify with the organization. There’s no alternative.’
Supporting school autonomy: symbolic back up from a larger structure

The identiication with the mission of the organization seems to serve the
purpose of creating a sense of belonging that helps school level staff feel their
work is backed by a larger structure, and use the network’s identity to limit
what they consider undue governmental inluence in their internal processes.
This is the case of curriculum development. Since 200 , FyA schools work
with a curriculum developed by the central ofice. The central ofice origi-
nally developed the curriculum because there was no national curriculum in
the country. However, in 200 the government issued a new curriculum, and
FyA schools are now required to comply with it. Teachers in FyA schools state
that they prefer to work with the FyA curriculum, because they feel they are
better acquainted with it and because they identify with it. Tensions arise with
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district oficials when they require schools to use the government curriculum
instead. Some schools have prioritized the use of the FyA curriculum, and
have developed a mechanism whereby they use the FyA curriculum to orga-
nize actual teaching sessions, but use the government curriculum to prepare
lesson plans to show district oficials. According to teachers in both schools in
the study, they use the fact that they belong to the FyA network to push back
on district requirements, and keep using the FyA curriculum instead. They see
the name of the network as a symbolic tool they can use to convince district
oficials that they need to continue using the FyA curriculum. As one teacher
put it: making the district supervisors understand was a little dificult, but in
the end they understood that we are a school, part of the FyA movement, that
has a different ethos, a different way of doing things’.
Mobilizing Resources
Rationale: securing a steady in o of resources

From the perspective of staff at the central ofice, one of their responsibilities is
to make sure that there is a steady resource inlow for schools in the network.
The central ofice sees its role as a resource hub’ that mediates between the
schools on one side, and the government, the nternational Federation and
private donors on the other. n participants’ views, this would shelter schools
from having to devote energy to look for their own resources, and thus concen-
trate more on instructional improvement.
Network structures and processes to secure access to resources

The central ofice mobilizes resources from the government, international donors
and the local private sector. It does so by tapping onto three facilitating conditions:
1) a high level of embeddedness with the government; 2) the name and prestige
of the organization; and ) its membership in the nternational Federation.
First, the central ofice has negotiated with the government an agreement
under which the government pays teacher salaries and schools’ current expen-
ditures. FyA teachers are hired by the government, although they are selected
at the school level by FyA staff. The FyA central ofice acts as a mediator
between schools and the government, negotiating the number of teaching posi-
tions to be opened at each school, keeping track of payments, and intervening
when payments are delayed. Such actions of the central ofice are facilitated
by a high degree of embeddedness with the government. People in leadership
roles in the FyA central ofice have traditionally maintained close ties with the
government. For example, a former director of the FyA Peru country ofice,
who is now in charge of the public advocacy department of the organization, is
also a permanent member of the board of the National Council of Education,
the governmental body in charge of deining policy guidelines for the country.
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FyA leaders also have personal connections to high-level government oficials,

and use those ties to facilitate agreements with the government. As a member
of the central ofice puts it:
There are things that you can do. f you have that type of connections, you know?
The truth is that in the case of Peru, we have had many years, many, of very direct
relations, very friendly relations, with ministers, vice-ministers, of being on a irst-
name basis, having dinner from time to time, socializing if they get sick they call
you, if their mother dies, you are there to give the eulogy, things like that. There is
a very strong personal relationship, and that facilitates obtaining certain things for
the organization.
Second, FyA has achieved prestige over the years, and the organization makes
use of this prestige to secure a regular inlow of resources, both from the public
and the private sector. n Peru, FyA schools are believed to be better than
public schools. Staff at the central ofice is well aware of this situation, and
have developed brand management mechanisms to make sure that the good
name of the organization is maintained and used to their advantage. From the
perspective of interviewees, the well-respected name of FyA motivates orga-
nizations from the private sector, international organizations and researchers,
to want to know more about the institution, and thus become potential sources
of funding and support. Thus, the central ofice has developed a public advo-
cacy department in charge of making the organization visible to the public,
through news campaigns, as well as the participation in conferences, forums
and boards of varied nature. The public advocacy department also takes advan-
tage of the prestige of the organization to mobilize public opinion to petition
with the government.
Finally, the country ofice beneits from its membership in the nternational
Federation. First, this membership allows the country ofice to beneit from
economies of scale. The FyA nternational Federation has set up an N O
in Spain (Entreculturas) in charge of mobilizing international cooperation
resources, mainly from the Spanish Cooperation Agency, to country ofices.
This is done through projects that the International Federation presents for
funding; projects that, according to a former director of the Peru country ofice,
would not be possible if each country were to apply separately. Such is the case
of the P1, a federation-wide project aimed at developing a data-driven culture
in the organization. Implementing the P1 as a federation-wide project allowed
hiring an international consulting irm to collect and analyse the data produced
within the programme, something the Peru country ofice would not have
been able to fund by itself. Second, membership in the international federa-
tion facilitates knowledge dissemination and best-practice sharing. According
to members of the Peru country ofice, the fact that the P1 is a federation-
wide project has allowed the exchange of ideas and best practices across
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country ofices participating in the programme, given that there have been
several international workshops aimed at generating coherence across country
ofices in the implementation of the programme. n addition, the nternational
Federation develops professional development programmes for staff and
teachers at the country networks. These programmes are intended to dissemi-
nate knowledge on management issues and instructional processes across the
network. nterviewees at the central ofice acknowledge that they make use
of such programmes to take ideas they can then replicate in the professional
development programmes they implement in their own country networks.
Supporting school autonomy: access to a network of resources

The role of the FyA central ofice as a resource hub seems to provide schools
with a sheltered environment that enhances their autonomy to make decisions.
First, staff at the school level mention that participating in FyA provides schools
with access to networks that facilitate the mobilization of material resources
(inancial, human and logistical resources) to support school processes. School
principals, appointed by the congregation that runs the school, see their role as
a bridge between the school and potential resources. They bring in resources
from their congregations, but also negotiate with the private sector to provide
donations to build or repair facilities. n their view, belonging to a prestigious
network facilitates the fact that private donors will be willing to invest in the
school. As a school principal puts it: look for donations, for example for the
cafeteria, for the dance room . There is a lot of help that comes because we
are a FyA school. As said, Santander, Saga Falabella, Novartis, have wanted
to help because of that.’
Second, schools see the central ofice as a potential political resource, and
take advantage of the level of embeddedness of the FyA central ofice with
the government to limit what they see as excessive governmental inluence on
their decision-making processes. For example, as mentioned earlier, teachers
are selected at the school level. However, their salaries are directly paid by the
government. Teacher appointments need thus to comply with governmental
regulations, namely having prospective teachers pass an entrance examina-
tion, and pass another examination after their irst year of teaching. Staff at
the school level state that they continually face dificulty in the teacher hiring
process because districts tend to try to impose a list of applicants. iven that
schools tend to select their teachers based on speciic characteristics (such
as their stated commitment to the values of the organization), schools are
reluctant to accept the district applicants. When faced with pressure from the
government to accept an applicant, schools irst resort to using the identity of
the network to support their decision. That is, they justify their decision not to
take in a speciic applicant the district is pushing for by stating that, as FyA
schools, they need to choose teachers based on speciic characteristics. When
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this is not enough, they resort to a more direct approach, asking the central
ofice to intercede with the government on their behalf.
The two schools participating in the study seem to have a different stance
towards the resource mobilization function of the central ofice. n the case
of school B, an older school that is quite well funded, school staff states that
having such a support structure helps them work in a resource-full environ-
ment that facilitates their work, but that they need to be strategic about what
resources to accept. Teachers in this school consider that when there are too
many projects mobilized by the central ofice to be implemented at the school,
attention has to be divided among the many projects, and it becomes dificult
to concentrate on improving classroom practice in a coordinated manner. They
thus have decided to ilter new projects mobilized by the central ofice, and
only take on those projects that are aligned with their improvement plan. n
contrast, such remarks were not present in the case of school A, a school that
has recently been founded and is still working with limited resources. Teachers
in this school saw all the resources mobilized by the central ofice as poten-
tially useful inputs. This school seems to be at a stage where the staff ind it
dificult to determine which of all the incoming resources are more necessary,
and thus has decided to take in as much as possible.
Evaluating for Improvement
Rationale: developing capacity to work with data at the school level

A fairly recently developed role of the central ofice is to promote a focus on
the quality of education provided by schools in the network. n the theory of
action of the organization, the focus on quality has to be centred on improving
schools’ capacity to operate with data and develop improvement plans (see
FyA, Programa de Calidad de la Educaci n 200 ). Members of the central
ofice understand that, since this is a new initiative in the network, schools may
not necessarily be equipped with existing structures to take on a thorough anal-
ysis of information, determine improvement priorities, develop improvement
plans, and implement and evaluate them. They see their role as facilitators of
the development of school internal structures to use data for quality improve-
ment, with a focus on changing school culture to a data-driven culture. From
their perspective, such a task would imply helping schools implement colle-
gially-developed plans based on the analysis of data about school outcomes
and processes.
Network structures and processes: the P1 project

Since 2005, the central ofice has been implementing a federation-wide
project aimed at evaluating the quality of education in FyA schools, the P1.
Within the P1, schools participate in an evaluation process that involves data
277-295 Pt3 Ch14.indd 288 24/05/2012 15:21

collection, the development of individualized reports for each participating

school, the creation of quality improvement teams at each school, and the
implementation of improvement plans. Members of the central ofice develop
workshops in schools to help them organize their internal structures to partic-
ipate in the evaluation process, and to develop capacity at the school level
to analyse information and use data to make decisions about improvement
priorities.
Supporting school autonomy: developing internal structures for

data-driven improvement
The P1 aims to help schools use data to determine improvement priorities.
Schools within the P1 seem indeed to be developing internal structures to
manage the data analysis and improvement process. School B, the older school,
has created a quality improvement team that is in charge of overseeing the data
analysis process and the general implementation of improvement plans. Staff
in leadership positions at the school level state that one of the outcomes of the
project thus far has been to help schools analyse what needs to be improved,
and to think about how to organize themselves to best address the perceived
problems. The school has thus decided on its improvement priorities, it has
organized relection groups with teachers to decide how to best address such
priorities and think about instructional approaches that may be most appropri-
ate, and has looked for out-of-network professional development opportunities
to make sure it has the necessary knowledge and skills at the school level to
tackle its goals.
n other schools, however, the quality improvement teams still seem to be
operating somewhat isolated from the rest of the school activities. Members of
the central ofice report that in some schools, teachers mention that they expe-
rience dificulty in integrating the data analysis process and the development
of school improvement plans into their daily routine. They see the project as
an additional thing to do’, rather than as a mechanism that may help determine
school priorities.
Enhancing Instructional Practice
Rationale: schools need to access knowledge and skills to improve

One of the central elements of the FyA network’s theory of action is that
processes that will lead to the improvement of instructional practice must
happen the closest possible to the locus of practice; that is, at the school level.
According to members of the central ofice, schools need to feel ownership of
their own improvement process, and have the capacity to align their resources
to focus on instructional improvement. Successful instructional improvement,
in turn, depends on the development of a collegial culture characterized by
277-295 Pt3 Ch14.indd 289 24/05/2012 15:21

common ideas about what good practice looks like, and by opening classroom
practice to scrutiny from peers. Central ofice members believe that not all
schools may be equipped with the necessary knowledge, skills and organiza-
tional processes that will lead to this approach to continuous improvement. It is
thus one of the roles of the central ofice to help develop capacity at the school
level for the analysis and improvement of instructional practice.
Network structures and processes: school monitors and teacher

professional development programmes
The central ofice has created a department in charge of developing capacity
at the school level for the continuous improvement of instructional practice.
This department implements a two-pronged strategy, consisting of teacher
professional development programmes, and a monitoring structure whereby
members of the central ofice (school monitors) visit the schools periodically.
This monitoring structure is aimed at developing capacity at the school level
for the analysis and support of instructional practice. The focus of the work is
mostly set on the pedagogic coordinators, teacher leaders in charge of oversee-
ing instruction at the school level. School monitors visit the schools regularly,
and observe classroom practice jointly with the pedagogic coordinators. They
then walk the pedagogic coordinators through the process of analysing the
information from the classroom observation and providing recommendations
for the teacher. According to members of the central ofice, they aim to develop
in each school a structure separated for the general management of the school
(under the responsibility of the principals appointed by the congregations),
and focused solely on instructional leadership. According to one of the school
monitors:
The important thing for us is that the pedagogic coordinator is left with ideas on how
to support teachers after we leave Our goal is that they organize the monitoring
and support at the school So, basically, we go into the schools so that they can
take up this role of support.
Each school monitor is in charge of no more than seven schools, and works
with the same schools for a period of at least four years. In addition to helping
develop schools’ internal structures for the analysis and support of instruc-
tional practice, this school support structure is aimed at generating information
about schools to design teacher professional development activities specii-
cally addressed to the needs of each school. School monitors discuss with
pedagogic coordinators the professional development needs of their staff, and
either teach themselves the necessary courses, or serve as a liaison between
the school and other school monitors. According to central ofice staff, this
ensures that the professional development activities designed by the network
are speciic to each school’s needs.
277-295 Pt3 Ch14.indd 290 24/05/2012 15:21

Supporting school autonomy: building capacity to improve

instructional practice
Teachers in both schools state that the monitoring structure developed by the
central ofice is useful for the improvement of their practice. They compare
this structure with the classroom supervisions developed by the government. In
their view, having a school monitor that closely follows each school allows this
support structure to focus on speciic teaching practices in context, whereas
the government supervision is detached of actual practice and does not provide
useful recommendations for improvement.
n addition to valuing the central ofice support, the two schools in the
study seem to be taking advantage of the central ofice’s structures to develop
instructional leadership and classroom observation structures at the school
level. However, they seem to be at different levels in terms of the development
of such structures, depending on whether the number of teaching positions
that the government supports at each school allows for a full-time pedagogic
coordinator. When pedagogic coordinators need to divide their time between
supporting teachers and teaching their own students, they are able to provide
general recommendations to teachers, but ind it harder to base their advice on
actual classroom observations.
The two schools seem also to be at a different level in the development of
a collegial culture to focus on instruction, another of the goals of the central
ofice’s capacity-building structure. n school B, the older school, teacher
collaboration seems to be well aligned with the analysis of student perfor-
mance. Teachers in this school state that they use their collaboration time to
talk about how students, as a group and individually, are doing in achiev-
ing the expected results. Based on this information, they then work on lesson
planning, as well as on deciding what tasks may be more appropriate to help
students master the content. n contrast, in school A, the newer school, teacher
collaboration on lesson planning seems to be developed without a system-
atic analysis of student performance. Teachers support one another in content
issues, and provide recommendations on what resources to use, but they spend
little time discussing speciic instructional approaches customized to their
students’ needs.
n addition, the schools in this study seem to have a different stance towards
the role of the central ofice with regard to teacher professional development.
Teachers at school A, the smaller, newer school, see the FyA teacher profes-
sional development programmes as something that is decided at the central
ofice, without input from the school. They believe that some programmes
may not be fully appropriate for their school, but, in absence of an alternative,
they prefer to make use of them. nstead, teachers and pedagogic coordina-
tors in school B, the older, larger school, talk about the teacher professional
development programmes in a rather different way. They have developed an
277-295 Pt3 Ch14.indd 291 24/05/2012 15:21

internal structure to determine teacher professional development priorities for

the school, based on classroom observations and an internal survey of needs.
Thus, they talk about negotiating with the central ofice concerning what
programmes may be more suited to their needs, based on their own assessment;
and when the programmes offered by the central ofice do not seem appropri-
ate, they hire appropriate programmes from out-of-network providers using
their own resources. Therefore, schools that are at different levels of develop-
ment of their internal organizational processes may process the support of the
FyA central ofice differently. n this study, while the newer school seems to
be taking everything it can from the central ofice, the older school seems to be
more selective, taking only that which its its perceived needs.
CONC US ONS AND MP CAT ONS

FOR FUTURE STUD
The analysis of the FyA case highlights that, at least from the point of view
of network actors, there is a role for central management structures in the
support of school improvement in this type of PPP. The theory of action of the
FyA network stresses that even when schools are considered to have primary
responsibility for the improvement of instructional practice, such responsibil-
ity needs to be reciprocated with external support to develop schools’ capacity
to act autonomously. Thus, the central management structure in this network
aims to support school autonomy through a number of processes and structures
namely, developing a shared identity, mobilizing resources for schools, evalu-
ating for improvement, and developing a monitoring and teacher professional
development structure aimed at enhancing instructional practice.
The analysis suggests that schools in this study seem to take advantage of
these processes and structures to develop decision-making capacity over their
own improvement processes. Thus, schools take advantage of their identii-
cation with the FyA identity to limit what they see as undue governmental
inluence on their internal processes, such as the choice of which curricular
document to use, or which teacher candidates are the most suitable for their
goals. Schools make use of network structures to access inancial resources
that otherwise would be hard to reach as independent schools. They also gain
access to a network of human resources and best-practice sharing that may
potentially increase the knowledge capital of school staff. Finally, they get
access to a system speciically aimed at developing the capacity of school
actors to focus on instructional improvement.
The analysis also suggests that the two schools in the study seem to have
a somewhat different stance towards some aspects of the central ofice’s
support, particularly those more directly related to the improvement of
277-295 Pt3 Ch14.indd 292 24/05/2012 15:21

instructional practice. The older school seems to be more selective with

regard to accepting support from the central ofice, while the newer school
seems to be taking as much as possible from whatever resources the network
can provide, without assessing how relevant those resources are for its current
needs. Elmore (200 ) provides a model of how schools are likely to improve
their performance. Such a model states that schools irst recognize problems
of performance by paying attention to student performance, and they then
focus their work on improving their individual and organizational capacity to
meet a determined performance target. This is what Elmore calls the initial
stages of the development of internal accountability; that is, making some
collective commitment to a goal associated with improving performance. If
schools succeed in addressing this problem of performance, they are typically
faced with the fact that they do not have the knowledge and skills necessary
to address the next level. Typically they then invoke the principle of reciproc-
ity: they demand from external structures the skills and knowledge necessary
to do the next level of work. The two schools in this study seem to be at
a different level of development of their internal accountability structures.
While the older school seems to be able to put in place processes to assess
what issues they should be focusing on to improve performance, and thus use
the external support provided by the network in a strategic manner, the newer
school seems to be inding dificulty coping with such support. For these
teachers, the central ofice’s support just feels jumbled, and they speak of it
as something that is given’ to the school, rather than something the school
actively seeks.
Thus, there seem to be some nuances in the relationship between school
autonomy and the central ofice’s capacity building efforts. While participat-
ing in the network provides schools with access to a number of structures and
processes that, according to school level staff, enhance their capacity to operate
autonomously, the extent to which these processes can be actively incorporated
by schools into a strategy for school improvement may be associated with the
stage of development of internal accountability structures at the school level. It
is thus relevant to study more in depth the interaction between external support
and schools’ internal accountability structures for the improvement of instruc-
tional practice.
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Index
Academy for Education Development Commonwealth Education Fund 218,
10, 65 233–4
ActionAid 10, 12, 218, 230–33, 236 Contracts
Africa Network Campaign on Education consultancy 35
for All 235 economic 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 26, 31, 32,
Alegre, M. 11 45–6, 52–5, 58, 69–70, 93, 108,
Alexander, N. 15 112, 114, 119, 123, 189, 201–03,
Arnove, R. 72, 128, 132, 137, 138, 149, 205–11, 214, 223–4
151, 152, 176, 219 social 24, 37–8
Asia Development Bank 35 teacher labor 31
Asia South Paciic Association for Basic Convention on Rights of the Child
and Adult Education 235 217–19
AusAid 263 Corporate philanthropy 170–79
Corporate Social Responsibility 45, 55,
Ball, S. 21 189
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Cox, R. 183, 194, 195
Committee 131, 211 Crouch, C. 36
Belield, C. 22 , 22 Culter, C. 33, 36
Bhanji, Z. 6, 7, 9, 10, 21, 34, 52, 67,
182, 186–8, 192, 195 Dale, R. 23, 114, 117–18, 126, 186, 263
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 34, Department for International
132, 143, 147, 149, 187 Development 8 , 27, 45, 49, 263
Bonal, X. 4, 126 Development Assistance Committee
Bray, M. 25 129, 145
Brown, P. 25 Dixon, P. 225, 243–4, 250, 253
Bull, B. 37, 33–4 Draxler, A. 39, 45, 53, 54, 57, 168, 188,
259
Cammack, P. 27
Carnoy, M. 69, 224, 228 Education consultants 33, 36
Centre for British Teachers (CfBT) 10, Education corporations 36, 122
28, 29, 93 Education for All 9, 44, 54, 136, 150,
Chakrabarti, R. 11 217, 243, 259–61, 271
Choice policies 23, 24, 25, 32, 34, 38, Education International 47
45, 49, 58, 69, 74 175, 201,
205–08, 212–13, 219, 222–9, Fe y Alegría 13, 211, 277–93
236, 243–6, 249–51, 254–5, 259, Fielden, J. 11, 29, 31, 94
264, 266, 270–73, 292 Fraser, N. 9, 38
Chubb, J. 23, 223
Cisco Systems 36, 52, 54, 188 Gender Parity Index 265
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Fund 229 106, 109, 112
296
296-304 Index.indd 296 24/05/2012 15:13

Index 297
General Agreement on Trade in Services Kingdon, G. 225, 248

8, 104–23 Klees, S. 69
German Private Sector Development
Organisation 84 Ladd, H. 208, 246
Gewirtz, S. 23 Lagemann, E. 186
Ginsburg, M. 67 LaRocque, N. 94, 277
Global Campaign for Education 231–2, Latham, M. 29, 226
235 Latin America 13, 65, 84, 87, 138, 211,
Global Compact 27, 44–7, 49, 51 235, 279, 283
Global Monitoring Report 260, 271 Latin American Campaign to the Right to
Globalization Education 235
deinition Lauder, H. 186
ICT 185 Levin, H. 11, 221, 223, 228, 246,
neoliberal form of 37, 63, 69–70 Leys, C. 23
processes of 21, 38, 71, 74 Linder, S. 27, 63–4, 70
Governance Lingard, R. 24, 186
democratic governance 74, 222 Low-fee private schools 12, 13, 225,
general 5, 14, 17, 22, 23, 24, 30, 31, 243–56
33, 37, 39, 51, 68, 72, 81–2, 104,
117, 120, 123, 191, 193 McKinsey & Company 35, 50, 55, 57
global scale 8, 105, 118–19 Menashy, F. 4, 8, 28, 31, 123,
Good Governance 26–7 Microsoft Corporation 9, 34, 52, 54,
managerial governance 39 184–95
school governance 279, 280 Millennium Development Goals 143,
150, 243, 260–61, 270
Hanushek, E. 12, 223 Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
Hatcher, R. 21 229
Heyneman, S. 8, 10 Molnar, A. 23, 229, 278
Hodge, G. 1, 5, 21, 35, 65, 209 Most Favored Nation 109–11, 121–2
Hood, C. 23 Multi-Stakeholder Partnership in
Human Rights 217 Education 47, 259–60
Mundy, K. 1, 8, 11, 28, 31, 81, 117, 123,
Independent Evaluation Group 82–4 186, 226, 261
India 243–56
Institute for Economic Affairs 85 Neoliberalism 22–4, 28, 67, 104, 118,
International Bank for Reconstruction 188
and Development 81–2, 91, 94, Newman, J. 26
96, 98 Non-Governmental Organization 1, 2,
International Covenant of Economic Social 9, 10–11, 27, 43, 45, 47, 52, 54,
and Cultural Rights 219, 222 64–8, 73–4, 117, 129, 131–2,
International Development Association 136, 145, 184, 186, 191, 205–06,
83, 93–6, 98 217, 229–32, 235, 236, 260, 264,
International Finance Corporation 6, 8, 272
14, 28–9, 31–2, 35–6, 47, 81–99
International Finance Team Development Organization for Economic Cooperation
Prospects Group 145 and Development 3, 6, 11–12,
International Monetary Fund 8, 23, 24, 24, 27, 48, 51, 56, 105, 107, 108,
51, 94, 98, 232 117–18, 123, 123, 130, 135, 139,
141, 142, 148, 168, 185–6, 202,
Jayasuriya, K. 37–9 205–06
296-304 Index.indd 297 24/05/2012 15:13

Overseas Development Assistance Robertson Foundation 34

129–30, 133–4, 140–44, 150, 153 Robertson, S. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 21, 49,
69, 104–07, 114, 117–18, 163,
Partners in Learning 9, 182–195 185–6, 195
Patrinos, H. 6, 11, 22, 29, 31–2, 42, 69, Rose, P. 31, 222, 225, 229
94, 105, 141, 201, 206, 211, 223, Rosenau, P. 5, 7, 26, 72
244, 251
Policy entrepreneurs 28, 30, 32 Saint-Martin, D. 35
Poverty 249 Saltman, K. 21
Private authority 33, 36, 37, 194 Santos, B.d.s. 37
Private Finance Initiative 93 Schools 291
Private School Implementation Partners autonomy 291
263 gender 265
Privatisation 22–33, 37, 45–6, 51, teachers
69–71, 98, 105, 107, 208, 222, improvement 280
224, 272 Scott, J. 34
Public good 2–7, 14, 43–52, 55, 58, 132, Services sector 35–6, 104
168–79, 188 Shadow schooling 25
Public Private Partnerships Social justice theories 38–9
accountability 58 Srivastava, P. 47, 64, 1, 72, 131, 140,
arguments against 208–10 141, 151
beneits PPPs 55– , Stiglitz, J. 64
civil society PPPs 10 Stromquist, N. 69
conceptualizing partnerships 45
deinition 1–2, , – , 21–2, 5, 51, Tooley, J. 85, 225, 243–5, 250, 253
63–6
democratization 72 UNESCO 7, 45–6, 50–52, 65, 117–8,
global PPPs 130, 135, 148, 158, 206, 218,
gender 259–74 223, 231
history of PPPs 5, 44 USAID 8, 24, 27, 45, 49, 71
IFC 81 Utting, P. 1
IFI and PPPs 7–8
means of governance 5 Valor, C. 170
PPP policy entrepreneurs 28–33 van Fleet, J. 6, 9, 158, 161, 168
PPPs and consultants 35 Verger, A. 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 29, 30, 33, 49,
private authority 98, 107, 115, 123
relation to the state 4, 66 Vouchers 255
role of the private 5
specialist industry in PPPs 35, 36 Weihe, G. 38
types PPPs 66, 68 Wettenhall, R. 5, 131
UN system and PPPs 7, 27, 34 William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
value of 2, 44, 53, 206–08 34
Williamson, J. 23
Reay, D. 11 Woessman, L. 12, 211
Rights-based approach to education World Economic Forum 7, 10, 45, 47,
218–36 64, 128, 187, 188
Risk 6, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 45, 46, 58, World Trade Organization 2, 8, 14,
82, 89090, 93, 97, 147, 169, 170, 104–05, 107, 109, 112–18, 123
174, 189, 202, 206, 207, 209,
214, 221, 225, 227, 229, 236
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Public Private Partnerships in Education

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Public Private Partnerships in Education

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

A catalogue record for this book

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012935288

ISBN 978 0 85793 068 2 (cased)

Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

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List of contributors vii

1 An introduction to public private partnerships and

PART I THE RISE OF PPPS IN EDUCATION:

2 Governing education through public private partnerships 21

PART II UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL PPP ACTORS

5 The role of the International Finance Corporation in the

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8 A disconnect between motivations and education needs:

PART III THE IMPACT OF PPPS IN EDUCATION:

10 The role and impact of public private partnerships

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Felipe Barrera-Osorio is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of

Dr. Zahra Bhanji is a Policy and Research Manager at The Learning

Alexandra Draxler is an education specialist who worked for many years

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development policies, the use of technologies for education in developing

Shailaja Fennell is a University Lecturer in Development Studies and a

Juliana Guaqueta is an Education Specialist at the World Bank focusing

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Analía Jaimovich is a doctoral candidate in Education Policy at the Harvard

Akanksha A. Marphatia has 20 years of experience in gender and educa-

Francine Menashy is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Comparative,

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of research expertise include rights-based approaches to education, interna-

Karen Mundy is an Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair at the

Su-Ann Oh ([email protected]) is a Visiting Research Fellow at the

Harry Anthony Patrinos is Lead Education Economist at the World Bank.

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The Role and Impact of Public-Private Partnerships in Education (2009), and

Susan L. Robertson is currently Professor of Sociology of Education,

Maria Ron-Balsera is pursuing a PhD in Human Development at the Education

Pauline Rose is currently Director of the EFA Global Monitoring Report

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Prachi Srivastava is currently Associate Professor at the School for

Justin van Fleet is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Universal

Antoni Verger is a ‘Ramon y Cajal’ researcher at the Department of Sociology

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IMF International Monetary Fund

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n the ield of international development, different decades seem to usher in new

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researchers from a variety of international organizations and aid agencies to

THE RO E OF THE PR VATE AND THE PUB C

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boundaries, such as the market ’ (Starr 1 , p. ). Therefore, any educational

As evin’s comments suggest, even the expectation that private interests

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THE R SE OF PUB C PR VATE PARTNERSH PS

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pressure on international organizations to expand PPPs. et these partnership