LACSON VS. PEREZdocx
LACSON VS. PEREZdocx
PEREZ
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MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
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RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO
MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
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RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National
Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were
thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave
a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court –
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact
and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been
rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is
being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has
issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion." He states that
what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement
Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments:
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to
obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and
until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary investigations will henceforth be
conducted.
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16;
G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)
With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the
petitions at bar.
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao
pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed
to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally
resolved." This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges
have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later
filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for
by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly issued warrant.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and
void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold
departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the
near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that
purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which
remains speculative up to this very day.
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that
the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an
encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or
interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an
exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion…" Thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No.
141284, August 15, 2000):
x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot
be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon
which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to
gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. x x x
(at pp.22-23)
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this
power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party
must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by
a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise
of the court's remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]).
Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court.
Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a
warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened
with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the
name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under
imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming
that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this
Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the
Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No.
147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, separate opinion.
Kapunan, dissenting opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
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MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued warrantless arrests for acts related to,
or connected with, the May 1st incident but respectfully dissent from the order of dismissal of
the petitions for being said to be moot and academic. The petitions have raised important
constitutional issues that, in my view, must likewise be fully addressed.
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MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
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RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO
MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
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DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been characterized as belonging "in the
catalog of indispensable freedoms."
Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of
the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the
first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need
only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people know that the human personality
deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions
are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police. 1
Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, petitioners Panfilo Lacson, Michael
Ray Aquino and Cezar O. Mancao II now seek a temporary restraining order and/or injunction from the
Court against their impending warrantless arrests upon order of the Secretary of Justice. 2 Petitioner
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), likewise, seeks to enjoin the arrests of its senatorial
candidates, namely, Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator Gregorio
B. Honasan and General Panfilo Lacson.3 Separate petitioners were also filed by Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile.4 Former Ambassador Ernesto M. Maceda, 5 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, 6 Senator
Gregorio B. Honasan,7 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8
Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition leaders and police officers stems from the
following facts:
On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was arrested upon the warrant issued by the
Sandiganbayan in connection with the criminal case for plunder filed against him. Several hundreds of
policemen were deployed to effect his arrest. At the time, a number of Mr. Estrada's supporters, who
were then holding camp outside his residence in Greenhills Subdivision, sought to prevent his arrest. A
skirmish ensued between them and the police. The police had to employ batons and water hoses to
control the rock-throwing pro-Estrada rallyists and allow the sheriffs to serve the warrant. Mr. Estrada
and his son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were then brought to Camp Crame where, with
full media coverage, their fingerprints were obtained and their mug shots taken.
Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the EDSA Shrine to show its support
for the deposed President. Senators Enrile, Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial candidates
including petitioner Lacson, as well as other political personalities, spoke before the crowd during these
rallies.
In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son were brought to the Veterans memorial
Medical Center for a medical check-up. It was announced that from there, they would be transferred to
Fort Sto. Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided to march to Malacañang Palace. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was called to reinforce the Philippine National Police (PNP) to
guard the premises of the presidential residence. The marchers were able to penetrate the barricades
put up by the police at various points leading to Mendiola and were able to reach Gate 7 of Malacañan.
As they were being dispersed with warning shots, tear gas and water canons, the rallyists hurled
stones at the police authorities. A melee erupted. Scores of people, including some policemen, were
hurt.
At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila:
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,
clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the
EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting upon the
instigation and under the command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have and
continue to assault and attempt to break into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of
overthrowing the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize power, and have and continue
to rise publicly, shown open hostility, and take up arms against the duly constituted
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government certain bodies
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and to deprive the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and
prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters
have continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted
Government and seize political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the
President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such
armed forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law hereby recognize and confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion
compelling me to declare a state of rebellion;
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order NO. 1 in accordance with Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution calling upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPIENS AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,
clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the mass gathering at the
EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated and incited and, acting upon the
instigation and under the command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have and
continue to assault and attempt to break into Malacañang with the avowed purpose of
overthrowing the duly constituted Government and forcibly seize political power, and have and
continue to rise publicly, show open hostility, and take up arms against the duly constituted
Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, and to deprive the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of
her powers and prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable
under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and plotters
have continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly constituted
Government and seize political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the
President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such
armed forces to suppress the rebellion;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the opposition were ordered arrested. Senator
Enrile was arrested without warrant in his residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Likewise arrested
without warrant the following day was former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda. Senator Honasan and
Gen. Lacson were also ordered arrested but the authorities have so far failed to apprehend them.
Ambassador Maceda was temporarily released upon recognizance while Senator Ponce Enrile was
ordered released by the Court on cash bond.
The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether the arrest or impending arrest without
warrant, pursuant to a declaration of "state of rebellion" by the President of the above-mentioned
persons and unnamed other persons similarly situated suspected of having committed rebellion is
illegal, being unquestionably a deprivation of liberty and violative of the Bill of Rights under the
Constitution.
The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution which reads:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to call out the armed forces in
cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion. 9 In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or
invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. However, in the
exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Constitution does
not require the President to make a declaration of a "state of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless
violence or invasion). The term "state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is vague and amorphous
and does not give the President more power than what the Constitution says, i. e, whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such a declaration
is "legal surplusage." But whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-
protected rights, such as the right to due process,10 the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances, 11 and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures,12 among others.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,13 the Court held that:
x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one hand, and the power to suspend
the privilege of the write of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand) places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
xxx
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the "calling out"
power because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of
which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by Congress and, in appropriate cases, review by
this Court.
On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is to arrest persons
without warrant and detain them without bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional safeguards for the
citizens' civil liberties, the so-called "state of rebellion" partakes the nature of martial law without
declaring on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye so as to
practically make it unjust and oppressive, it is within the prohibition of the Constitution. 14 In an ironic
sense, a "state of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to effect warrantless arrest and detention for an
unbailable offense places a heavier burden on the people's civil liberties than the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the declaration of martial law because in the latter case, built-in
safeguards are automatically set on motion: (1) The period for martial law or suspension is limited to a
period not exceeding sixty day; (2) The President is mandated to submit a report to Congress within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation or suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is subject to
review by Congress, which may revoke such proclamation or suspension. If Congress is not in session,
it shall convene in 24 hours without need for call; and (4) The sufficiency of the factual basis thereof or
its extension is subject to review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding. 15
No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without these rights, all other individual
rights may not exist. Thus, the very first section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights, Article III, reads:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially against government impairment,
Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or any person acting under her
direction to make unwarranted arrests. The existence of "lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" only
authorizes the President to call out the "armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion."
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law
authorizes the President to order the arrest of any person. The only significant consequence of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power to issue the writ whereby
the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not by itself authorize the President to order the
arrest of a person. And even then, the Constitution in Section 18, Article VII makes the following
qualifications:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Nor did she declare
martial law. A declaration of a "state of rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the nation that it exists,
and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did. Such declaration
does not justify any deviation from the Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued by a court. In very circumscribed
instances, however, the Rules of Court allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A police officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
xxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights
that a person may only be arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by a "judge" after
determining "personally" the existence of "probable cause" after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Its requirements should, therefore, be
scrupulously met:
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrests is strictly construed. Any exception must
clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would
infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of
full protection.16
A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had facts and circumstances before him
which, had they been before a judge, would constitute adequate basis for a finding of probable cause
of the commission of an offense and that the person arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense. That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that when arrested, the person "arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" in the presence of the
arresting officer. Or if it be a case of an offense which had "just been committed," that the police officer
making the arrest "has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it."
Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without warrant for acts of rebellion ostensibly under
Section 5 of Rule 113. Respondents' theory is based on Umil vs. Ramos,17 where this Court held:
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes
or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assault
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.18
Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a person who "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit" rebellion and may be arrested without a warrant at any time so
long as the rebellion persists.
Reliance on Umil is misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein, although effected a day or days after
the commission of the violent acts of petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court because at the time
of their respective arrests, they were members of organizations such as the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the National United Front Commission, then outlawed groups
under the Anti-Subversion Act. Their mere membership in said illegal organizations amounted to
committing the offense of subversion19 which justified their arrests without warrants.
In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for their alleged participation in the
"rebellion" on May 1, 2001 are members of an outlawed organization intending to overthrow the
government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), there must be a showing that
the persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit
the offense of rebellion.20 In other words, there must be an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking
place in the presence of the arresting officer. In United States vs. Samonte,21 the term" in his [the
arresting officer's] presence" was defined thus:
An offense is said to be committed in the presence or within the view of an arresting officer or
private citizen when such officer or person sees the offense, even though at a distance, or
hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof; or the
offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made. 22
This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest of Senator Enrile. In the Court's
Resolution of May 5, 2001 in the petition for habeas corpus filed by Senator Enrile, the Court noted
that the sworn statements of the policemen who purportedly arrested him were hearsay. 23 Senator
Enrile was arrested two (2) days after he delivered allegedly seditious speeches. Consequently, his
arrest without warrant cannot be justified under Section 5(b) which states that an arrest without a
warrant is lawful when made after an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer or
private person has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person arrested has committed the offense.
At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being inapplicable to the cases at bar, Umil is not
without any strong dissents. It merely re-affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,24 a case decided during the
Marcos martial law regime.25 It cannot apply when the country is supposed to be under the regime of
freedom and democracy. The separate opinions of the following Justices in the motion for
reconsideration of said case26 are apropos:
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officers are not sure what
particular provision of law had been violated by the person arrested. True it is that law
enforcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the law. However, erroneous
perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would result in the
violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right
to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution, p. 18) that he was exercising a
right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No person
should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived
his action.27 (Underscoring supplied)
Insofar as G.R. NO. 81567 is concerned, I joint the other dissenting Justices in their
observations regarding "continuing offenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of
continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion.
Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and
simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused
of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved
guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a
rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the
majority opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress
and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels
who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually
taking up arms against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well-grounded on past events, that the
petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate
warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await
the petitioner's surfacing from underground, and ounce on him with no legal authority instead of
securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension.28 (Underscoring supplied)
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal
arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights
were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seem some of us have
short memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the
ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who,
out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security.
Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the
protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That
is what democracy is all about.29 (Underscoring supplied)
12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate
function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and
dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts
comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been
committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not
be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be
committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for
mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where
the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and
end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal
detention or arson) but rather or such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with
or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the
overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts a
function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance, the following
acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive association:"
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
xxx
xxx
xxx
k) Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such
association or organization.
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests
and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is
not our Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for
police forces but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must
simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities
which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy,
whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our policy
worth protecting and saving.30 (Underscoring supplied)
It is observed that a sufficient period has lapsed between the fateful day of May 1, 2001 up to the
present. If respondents have ample evidence against petitioners, then they should forthwith file the
necessary criminal complaints in order that the regular procedure can be followed and the warrants of
arrest issued by the courts in the normal course. When practicable, resort to the warrant process is
always to be preferred because "it interposes an orderly procedure involving 'judicial impartiality'
whereby a neutral and detached magistrate can make informed and deliberate determinations on the
issue of probable cause."31
The neutrality, detachment and independence that judges are supposed to possess is precisely the
reason the framers of the 1987 Constitution have reposed upon them alone the power to issue
warrants of arrest. To vest the same to a branch of government, which is also charged with
prosecutorial powers, would make such branch the accused's adversary and accuser, his judge and
jury.32
A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its burden of proving probable cause.
The declaration does not constitute a substitute for proof. It does not in any way bind the courts, which
must still judge for itself the existence of probable cause. Under Section 18, Article VII, the
determination of the existence of a state of rebellion for purposes of proclaiming martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus rests for which the President is granted ample,
though not absolute, discretion. Under Section 2, Article III, the determination of probable cause is a
purely legal question of which courts are the final arbiters.
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez is reported to have announced that the lifting of the "state of
rebellion" on May 7, 2001 does not stop the police from making warrantless arrests. 33 If this is so, the
pernicious effects of the declaration on the people's civil liberties have not abated despite the lifting
thereof. No one exactly knows who are in the list or who prepared the list of those to be arrested for
alleged complicity in the "continuing" crime of "rebellion" defined as such by executive fiat. The list of
the perceived leaders, financiers and supporters of the "rebellion" to be arrested and incarcerated
could expand depending on the appreciation of the police. The coverage and duration of effectivity of
the orders of arrest are thus so open-ended and limitless as to place in constant and continuing peril
the people's Bill of Rights. It is of no small significance that four of he petitioners are opposition
candidates for the Senate. Their campaign activities have been to a large extent immobilized. If the
arrests and orders of arrest against them are illegal, then their Constitutional right to seek public office,
as well as the right of he people to choose their officials, is violated.
In view of the transcendental importance and urgency of the issues raised in these cases affecting as
they do the basic liberties of the citizens enshrined in our Constitution, it behooves us to rule thereon
now, instead of relegating the cases to trial courts which unavoidably may come up with conflicting
dispositions, the same to reach this Court inevitably for final ruling. As we aptly pronounced in Salonga
vs. Cruz Paño:34
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
Petitioners look up in urgent supplication to the Court, considered the last bulwark of democracy, for
relief. If we do not act promptly, justly and fearlessly, to whom will they turn to?
(3) Issue a WRIT OF INJUNCTION enjoining respondents, their agents and all other persons
acting for and in their behalf from effecting warrantless arrests against petitioners and all other
persons similarly situated on the basis of Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1 of the
President.
SO ORDERED.
Footnote
1
Dissention Opinion, J. Jackson, in Brinegar vs. United States, 338 U.S. 2084 (1949).
2
G.R. No. 147780, for Prohibition, Injunction, Mandamus and Habeas Corpus.
3
G.R. No. 147810, for Certiorari and Prohibition.
4
G.R. No. 147785, for Habeas Corpus.
5
G.R. No. 147787, for Habeas Corpus.
6
G.R. No. 147781, for Mandamus.
7
G.R. No. 147818, for Injunction.
8
G.R. No. 147819, for Certiorari and Mandamus.
9
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al. G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000.
10
Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
11
Constitution, Article III, Section 4.
12
Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
13
G.R. No. 141284, supra.
14
See Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.
15
Id., at Article VII, Section 18.
16
People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 14 (1986).
17
187 SCRA 311 (1990).
18
Id., at 318.
19
187 SCRA 311, 318, 321, 323-24. (1990).
20
Under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, these acts would involve rising publicly and
taking up arms against the Government: (1) to remove from the allegiance of the Government
or its laws, the entire, or a portion of Philippine territory, or any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or (2) to deprive the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers or prerogatives.
21
16 Phil 516 (1910).
22
Id., at 519.
23
G.R. No. 147785.
24
121 SCRA 472 (1983).
See Note 396 in Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
25
Commentary, p. 180.
26
Umil vs. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991).
27
Id., at 274.
28
Id., at 279.
29
Id., at 284.
30
Id., at 293-295.
32
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, 171 SCRA 348 (1989).
Manila Bulletin issue of May 8, 2001 under the heading "Warrantless arrest continue" by Rey
33
G. Panaligan:
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez said yesterday the lifting of the state of rebellion in Metro
Manila does not ban the police from making warrantless arrest of suspected leaders of the
failed May 1 Malacañang siege.
In a press briefing, Perez said, "we can make warrantless arrest because that is provided for in
the Rules of Court," citing Rule 113.
34
134 SCRA 438 (1985).
----------------------------------------
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
----------------------------------------
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO
MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The exercise of certain powers by the President in an atmosphere of civil unrest may sometimes raise
constitutional issues. If such powers are used arbitrarily and capriciously, they may degenerate into the
worst form of despotism.
The chain of events which led to the present constitutional crisis are as follows:
On March 2, 2001, the Supreme Court rendered the landmark decision that would bar further questions
on the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency. 1 In a unanimous decision, the Court
declared that Joseph Ejercito Estrada had effectively resigned his post and that Macapagal-Arroyo is
the legitimate President of the Philippines. Estrada was stripped of all his powers and presidential
immunity from suit.
Knowing that a warrant of arrest may at any time be issued against Estrada, his loyalists rushed to his
residence in Polk Street, North Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan, Metro Manila. They conducted vigil in
the vicinity swearing that no one can take away their "president."
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Estrada,
his son Jinggoy, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan
and Delia Rajas.2 Emotions ran high as an estimated 10,000 Estrada loyalists, ranging from tattooed
teenagers of Tondo to well-heeled Chinese, gathered in Estrada's neighborhood. 3 Supporters turned
hysterical. Newspapers captured pictures of raging men and wailing women. 4 When policemen came,
riots erupted. Police had to use their batons as well as water hoses to control the rock-throwing
Estrada loyalists.5
It took the authorities about four hours to implement the warrant of arrest. At about 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day, Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Director General Leandro R.
Mendoza, with the aid of PNP's Special Action Force and reinforcements from the Philippine Army and
Marines, implemented the warrant of arrest against Estrada. 6
Like a common criminal, Estrada was fingerprinted and had his mug shots taken at the detention
center of the former Presidential Anti-Organized Task Force at Camp Crame. The shabby treatment,
caught on live TV cameras nationwide, had sparked off a wave of protest all over the country. Even
international news agencies like CNN and BBC were appalled over the manner of Estrada's arrest
calling it "overkill." In a taped message aired over radio and television, Estrada defended himself and
said, "I followed the rule of law to the letter. I asked our people now to tell the powers to respect our
constitution and the rule of law."
Being loyal to the end, the supporters of Estrada followed him to Camp Crame. About 3,000 of them
massed up in front of the camp. They were shouting "Edsa Three! Edsa Three! They vowed not to
leave the place until Estrada is released. When asked how long they planned to stay, the protesters
said, "Kahit isang buwan, kahit isang taon.7
At about 6:00 o' clock in the afternoon, also of the same day, the PNP's anti-riot squads dispersed
them. Thus, they proceeded to the Edsa Shrine in Mandaluyong City where they joined forces with
hundreds more who came from North Greenhills.8 Hordes of Estrada loyalists began gathering at the
historic shrine.
On April 27, 2001, the crowd at Edsa begun to swell in great magnitude. Estrada loyalists from various
sectors, most of them obviously belonging to the "masses," brought with them placards and streamers
denouncing the manner of arrest done to the former president. 9 In the afternoon, buses loaded with
loyalists from the nearby provinces arrived at the Edsa Shrine. One of their leaders said that the
Estrada supporters will stay at Edsa Shrine until the former president gets justice from the present
administration.10
An estimated 1,500 PNP personnel from the different parts of the metropolis were deployed to secure
the area.11 On April 28, 2001, the PNP and the Armed Forces declared a "nationwide red
alert."12 Counter-intelligence agents checked on possible defectors from the military top officials.
Several senators were linked to an alleged junta plot.
During the rally, several Puwersa Ng Masa candidates delivered speeches before the crowd. Among
those who showed up at the rally were Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Gregorio Honasan, Juan
Ponce Enrile, Edgardo Angara, Vicente Sotto and former PNP Director General Panfilo Lacson and
former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda. 13
On April 30, 2001, the government started to prepare its forces. A 2,000-strong military force backed
up by helicopter gunships, Scorpion tanks and armored combat vehicles stood ready to counter any
attempt by Estrada loyalists to mount a coup. And to show that it meant business, the task force parked
two MG-520 attack helicopters armed to the teeth with rockets on the parade ground at Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City. Also deployed were two armored personnel carriers and troops in camouflage
uniforms.14 Over 2,500 soldiers from the army, navy, and air force were formed into Task Force Libra to
quell the indignant Estrada loyalists.15
On May 1, 2001, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, the huge crowd at Edsa started their march to
Malacañang.16 Along the way, they overran the barricades set up by the members of the PNP Crowd
Dispersal Control Management.17
Shortly past 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, the marchers were at the gates of
Malacañang chanting, dancing, singing and waving flags. 18
At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the police, with the assistance of combat-ready soldiers,
conducted dispersal operations. Some members of the dispersal team were unceasingly firing their
high-powered firearms in the air, while the police, armed with truncheons and shields, were slowly
pushing the protesters away from the gates of Malacañang. Television footages showed protesters
hurling stones and rocks on the advancing policemen, shouting invectives against them and attacking
them with clubs. They burned police cars, a motorcycle, three pick-ups owned by a television station,
construction equipment and a traffic police outpost along Mendiola Street. 19 They also attacked Red
Cross vans, destroyed traffic lights, and vandalized standing structures. Policemen were seen clubbing
protesters, hurling back stones, throwing teargas under the fierce midday sun, and firing guns towards
the sky. National Security Adviser Roilo Golez said the Street had to be bleared of rioters at all costs
because "this is like an arrow, a dagger going all the way to (Malacañang) Gate 7."20
Before noontime of that same day, the Estrada loyalists were driven away.
The violent street clashes prompted President Macapagal-Arroyo to place Metro Manila under a "state
of rebellion."
Presidential Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao told reporters, "We are in a state of rebellion. This is not
an ordinary demonstration."21 After the declaration, there were threats of arrests against those
suspected of instigating the march to Malacañang.
At about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested in his house in
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City by a group led by Reynaldo Berroya, Chief of the Philippine National
Police Intelligence Group.22 Thereafter, Berroya and his men proceeded to hunt re-electionist Senator
Gregorio Honasan, former PNP Chief Panfilo Lacson, former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda, Brig. Gen.
Jake Malajakan, Senior Superintendents Michael Ray Aquino and Cesar Mancao II, Ronald Lumbao
and Cesar Tanega of the People's Movement Against Poverty (PMAP). 23 Justice Secretary Hernando
Perez said that he was "studying" the possibility of placing Senator Miriam Defensor – Santiago "under
the Witness protection program."
Director Victor Batac,24 former Chief of the PNP Directorate for Police Community Relations, and
Senior Superintendent Diosdado Valeroso, of the Philippine Center for Transnational Crime,
surrendered to Berroya. Both denied having plotted the siege.
The above scenario presents three crucial queries: First, is President Macapagal-Arroyo's declaration
of a "state of rebellion" constitutional? Second, was the implementation of the warrantless arrests on
the basis of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" constitutional? And third, did the rallyists commit
rebellion at the vicinity of Malacañang Palace on May 1, 2001?
The first and second queries involve constitutional issues, hence, the basic yardstick is the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines. The third query requires a factual analysis of the events which
culminated in the declaration of a state of rebellion, hence, an examination of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code is in order.
On May 7, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 39, "DECLARING THAT THE
STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION HAS CEASED TO EXIST", which in
effect, has lifted the previous Proclamation No. 38.
I beg to disagree with the majority opinion in ruling that the instant petitions have been rendered moot
and academic with the lifting by the President of the declaration of a "state of rebellion".
I believe that such lifting should not render moot and academic the very serious and unprecedented
constitutional issues at hand, considering their grave implications involving the basic human rights and
civil liberties of our people. A resolution of these issues becomes all the more necessary since, as
reported in the papers, there are saturation drives (sonas) being conducted by the police wherein
individuals in Metro Manila are picked up without warrants of arrest.
Moreover, the acts sought to be declared illegal and unconstitutional are capable of being repeated by
the respondents. In Salva v. Makalintat (G.R. No. 132603, Sept. 18, 2000), this Court held that "courts
will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review'
…"
Nowhere in the Constitution can be found a provision which grants upon the executive the power to
declare a "state of rebellion," much more, to exercise on the basis of such declaration the prerogatives
which a president may validly do under a state of martial law. President-Macapagal-Arroyo committed
a constitutional short cut. She disregarded the clear provisions of the Constitution which provide:
"Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may,
in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released." 25
Obviously, the power of the President in cases when she assumed the existence of rebellion is
properly laid down by the Constitution. I see no reason or justification for the President's deviation from
the concise and plain provisions. To accept the theory that the President could disregard the applicable
statutes, particularly that which concerns arrests, searches and seizures, on the mere declaration of a
"state of rebellion" is in effect to place the Philippines under martial law without a declaration of
the executive to that effect and without observing the proper procedure. This should not be
countenanced. In a society which adheres to the rule of law, resort to extra-constitutional measures is
unnecessary where the law has provided everything for any emergency or contingency. For even if it
may be proven beneficial for a time, the precedent it sets is pernicious as the law may, in a little while,
be disregarded again on the same pretext but for evil purposes. Even in time of emergency,
government action may vary in breath and intensity from more normal times, yet it need not be
less constitutional.26
My fear is rooted in history. Our nation had seen the rise of a dictator into power. As a matter of fact,
the changes made by the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the martial law text of the Constitution
were to a large extent a reaction against the direction which the Supreme Court took during the regime
of President Marcos.27 Now, if this Court would take a liberal view, and consider that the declaration of
a "state of rebellion" carries with it the prerogatives given to the President during a "state of martial
law," then, I say, the Court is traversing a very dangerous path. It will open the way to those who, in the
end, would turn our democracy into a totalitarian rule. History must not be allowed to repeat itself. Any
act which gears towards possible dictatorship must be severed at its inception.
Neither can we find the implementation of the warrantless arrests justified under the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Pertinent is Section 5, Rule 113, thus:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
x x x."
Petitioners cannot be considered "to have committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense" at the time they were hunted by Berroya for the implementation of the warrantless arrests.
None of them participated in the riot which took place in the vicinity of the Malacañang Palace. Some of
them were on their respective houses performing innocent acts such as watching television, resting
etc. The sure fact however is that they were not in the presence of Berroya. Clearly, he did not see
whether they had committed, were committing or were attempting to commit the crime of rebellion. But
of course, I cannot lose sight of the legal implication of President Macapagal-Arroyo's declaration of a
"state of rebellion." Rebellion is a continuing offense and a suspected insurgent or rebel may be
arrested anytime as he is considered to be committing the crime. Nevertheless, assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional, it is imperative that the said
declaration be reconsidered. In view of the changing times, the dissenting opinion of the noted jurist,
Justice Isagani Cruz, in Umil v. Ramos,29 quoted below must be given a second look.
"I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile that subversion
is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person at any time as long as
the authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a
dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as
when he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the
ground that he is committing the 'continuing' offense of subversion. Libertarians were appalled
when that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this
new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of
the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of
the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to
reject the past oppression and commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that
the military should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that fight
must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe that in fighting
the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely what we are fighting
against. I submit that our more important motivation should be what are we fighting for."
I need not belabor that at the time some of the suspected instigators were arrested, (the others are still
at-large), a long interval of time already passed and hence, it cannot be legally said that they had just
committed an offense. Neither can it be said that Berroya or any of his men had "personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the persons to be arrested have committed a crime." That would be far
from reality.
III – The acts of the rallyists at the vicinity of Malacañang Palace on May 1, 2001 do not
constitute rebellion.
From the foregoing provisions, the elements o the crime of rebellion may be deduced, thus: first, that
there be (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the government; second, that the purpose of
the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to said government or its
laws (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) anybody of land, naval or other armed
forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.30
Looking at the events on a magnified scale, I am convinced that the two elements of the crime of
rebellion are lacking.
First, there was no "taking of arms" against the government. To my mind, "taking arms" connotes the
multitude's deliberate and conscious resort to arms or weapons for the purpose of aiding them in
accomplishing any of the purposes of rebellion. Admittedly, the Estrada loyalists pelted the policemen
with rocks and stones and attacked them with sticks and clubs, but such was merely a result of the
heightening tension between opposite camps during the period of dispersal. The stones, rocks, sticks,
clubs and other improvised weapons were not deliberately resorted to by the Estrada loyalists to further
any of the purposes of rebellion. They availed of them, at the precise moment of dispersal (this
explains why their weapons were those which could be easily gathered on the street) and only for the
purpose of stopping the policemen from dispersing them. In this age of modernity, one who intends to
overthrow the government will not only settle for stones, woods, rocks, sticks or clubs as means to
disable the government. It will be extremely pathetic and the result will only be in vain. Unlike a true
rebellion which is organized, what happened at the vicinity of Malacañang was merely a riot, a mob
violence, or a tumultuous uprising. At this juncture, it bears stressing that the crime of rebellion is a
vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.31 It must be distinguished from riot
and offenses connected with mob violence. In rebellion/insurrection, there is an organized and armed
uprising against authority.32
Second, the purpose of the Estrada loyalists was neither (a) to remove from the allegiance to the
government or its laws (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any part of land,
naval or other armed forces; nor (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives. I looked at the chronology of events, and one thing surfaced – the
Estrada loyalists mainly demanded that their beloved "president" should not be incarcerated. The
crowd at Edsa swelled in great magnitude on April 25, 2001, the day Estrada was arrested. In fact,
when they followed Erap at Camp Crame, they were shouting "Edsa! Edsa! And they vowed not to
leave until Estrada is released."33
One must not be swayed by the theory of respondents that the purpose of those people who gathered
in Edsa and marched to Malacañang was to commit rebellion. For sure, there were a thousand and
one reasons why they proceeded to Edsa. In determining their purpose, one must trace the roots, -
what prompted them to go to Edsa? They were the Estrada loyalists who wanted him to be freed. If
indeed there were minorities who advocated another cause, the same should not be considered as the
prevailing one in the determination of what crime was committed. Facts should not be stretched just to
build a case of rebellion. This runs counter to the principle of due process.
As a final word, I subscribe to the principle that the rule of law implies the precept that similar cases be
treated similarly. Men can not regulate their actions by means of rule if this precept is not followed.
Edsa I, Edsa II and Edsa III are all public uprisings. Statements urging people to overthrow the
government were uttered in all these occasions. Injuries were sustained, policemen were attacked,
standing structures were vandalized… in all these scenarios, one cannot be said to be extremely away
from the other. The only difference is that the first two succeeded, while the last failed. This should not
result to an unbridled or unlimited exercise of power by the duly constituted authorities. It is during
these trying times that fealty to the Constitution is strongly demanded from all, especially the authorities
concerned. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, I vote to give DUE COURSE to the petitions and GRANT the same and to enjoin the
respondents from arresting the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 147780, 147781, and 147799 without the
corresponding warrants.
SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt
Footnote
1
G.R. Nos. 146710-15, G.R. No. 146738, Estrada v. Desierto et al.
2
Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 13.
3
Inq7.net, April 26, 2001, p. 1.
4
Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 14.
5
Inq7.net, April 25, 2001, p. 1.
6
Manila Bulletin, April 26, 2001, p. 1.
7
Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), April 26, 2001, p. A15.
8
PDI, April 26, 2001, p. A15.
9
Manila Bulletin, April 27, 2001, p. 8.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28, 2001, p. 1.
13
Ibid., April 29, 2001, p. 1.
14
Inq7.net, April 30, 2001, p. 1.
15
philsar.com, May 1, 2001, p. 2.
16
Inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.
17
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
18
Ibid., p. 3.
19
Inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.
20
Inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.
21
Inq7.net, May 2, 2001, p. 1.
22
Inq7.net, May 1, 2001.
23
Inq7.net, May 01, 2001, p. 1.
25
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
26
Smith/Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 13.
27
Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 Edition, p. 789.
28
Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.
28(a)
Article VII, Section 18 (par. 4), Id.
29
187 SCRA 311 (1990).
30
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, Thirteenth Edition, 1993, p. 73.
31
Ibid., p. 74.
32
46 CJS, section 1, p. 1058.
33
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2001, p. A15.