In order to have a 

corpus delicti a case requires a valid "cause of action." A valid cause of action requires
three elements. The three elements are: 1) a violation of a legal right, 2) damage or injury, 3) redress-
ability by the court.

B. Defendants Cannot Claim Innocence and Plead Guilty

Indiana courts have long required a defendant’s admission of guilt before a trial court may accept a
guilty plea. “[A] plea of guilty tendered by one who in the same breath protests his innocence, or
declares he actually does not know whether or not he is guilty, is no plea at all. Certainly it is not a
sufficient plea upon which to base a judgment of conviction.” 21 And, more recently, “a judge may not
accept a plea of guilty when the defendant both pleads guilty and maintains his innocence at the same
time. To accept such a plea constitutes reversible error.” 22 The Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed
those principles in Ellis v. State, 23 a case where the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of
attempted murder and two counts of attempted robbery. 24 Although the State’s theory was that Ellis
was an accomplice and not a principal, he maintained his innocence at the plea hearing, stating he
“didn’t do nothing . . . didn’t cut nobody . . . did not rob 16. 79 N.E.3d 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 17. Id. at
941. 18. Id. at 938-39. 19. Id. at 939. 20. Id. at 941 n.1. 21. Harshman v. State, 115 N.E.2d 501, 502 (Ind.
1953). 22. Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983). 23. 67 N.E.3d 643 (Ind. 2017). 24. Id. at 645.
1018 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1015 nobody.” 25 He testified he tried to stop the attack by telling
the co-defendant “don’t do it.” 26 Even though Ellis “contributed to his own demise by pleading guilty,”
the supreme court held the trial court should not have accepted the plea because it was “accompanied
with a protestation of innocence and unaccompanied by evidence showing a factual basis for guilt.” 27

What is a motion to withdraw a plea?

A motion to withdraw a plea is when the defendant in a criminal proceeding asks the court to reverse a
plea bargain.

According to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere (upon bringing a motion) when:

1. the court has not yet accepted a guilty plea, or

2. after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes a sentence. 1

As to this second condition, note that a defendant can only withdraw a plea if he/she can show a fair
and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.2

Most states in the United States have laws that resemble the Federal Rule in some form.

As to a “fair and just reason” for a plea withdrawal, a court is likely to make this finding if:

1. allowing a criminal conviction or a certain plea-bargaining arrangement would result in a clear

injustice,

2. the defendant entered a plea, or conducted plea negotiations, without a criminal defense

lawyer,
 3. the trial judge believes the accused has a good case to present at a jury trial,

4. new evidence arises that shows the defendant’s innocence,

5. upholding the defendant’s plea would violate the accused’s constitutional rights (for example,
his/her right to due process),

6. the criminal defense lawyer was incompetent, or the accused successfully asserts ineffective
assistance of counsel, or

7. the defendant did not understand the consequences of a plea of guilty.3

A defendant or his/her defense attorney can raise a motion to withdraw in either state court or federal
court (depending on whether the criminal charges are federal or state in nature).

If the defendant had a good excuse for violating the terms of the plea bargain, the judge may give the
defendant a pass.

withdraw their guilty or no contest pleas upon a showing of good cause.5

Examples of good cause include:

1. the defendant not having a criminal defense attorney or defense counsel at the time the plea
was made,

2. the accused not being aware of the consequences of the deal, 6

3. the defendant getting coerced into a plea bargain, 7

4. a bargain violating a defendant’s rights, and

5. the defense counsel being incompetent. 8

No. 11SC664, People v. LaRosa – Corpus Delicti Rule – Due Process The supreme court abandons the
corpus delicti rule, which requires the prosecution to prove that a crime occurred using evidence other
than a defendant’s confession. In its place, the court articulates the trustworthiness standard, which
requires the prosecution to present evidence that proves that a confession is trustworthy or reliable. To
determine whether corroborating evidence proves the trustworthiness or reliability of a confession, the
supreme court holds that the trial court must find that corroboration exists from one or more of the
following evidentiary sources: facts that corroborate facts contained in the confession; facts that
establish the crime which corroborate facts contained in the confession; or facts under which the
confession was made that show that the confession is trustworthy or reliable. Because the corpus delicti
rule has been consistently applied for over one hundred years, the supreme court holds that applying
the trustworthiness standard here would violate LaRosa’s due process rights. Hence, the court affirms
the court of appeals’ decision reversing LaRosa’s convictions under the corpus delicti rule.
Having agreed with the People that we should abandon the corpus delicti rule, we next address what
corroboration requirement, if any, we should articulate in its place. On this issue, the People present
alternative arguments. The People argue in favor of the trustworthiness standard because it better
accomplishes the purpose that the corpus delicti rule is meant to serve. In the alternative, the People
argue that any corroboration requirement, including the trustworthiness standard, conflicts with the
sufficiency of the evidence test announced in People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973),
because it treats confessions as inherently unreliable and prohibits the trial court from considering
confessions in the light most favorable to the prosecution. As such, the People argue that we should
abandon any corroboration requirement and analyze confessions under the sufficiency of the evidence
test articulated in Bennett. ¶33 There is support for the People’s contention that Bennett conflicts with
the corroboration requirement. Bennett requires a court, when ruling on a motion for a judgment of
acquittal, to analyze the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether
it is “substantial and sufficient to support a 16 conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is
guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bennett, 183 Colo. at 130, 515 P.2d at 469. A
corroboration requirement, by contrast, would require a reviewing court to invalidate a conviction that
satisfies Bennett if it rested solely on an uncorroborated confession. See United States v. Brown, 617
F.3d 857, 862 (6th Cir. 2010). The People’s contention highlights the substantive and procedural overlap
between the sufficiency of the evidence test and the corroboration requirement, but they are not in
irreconcilable conflict.

The sufficiency of the evidence test is constitutionally mandated to ensure that the prosecution proves
every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 127 (Colo.
1983). By contrast, the corroboration requirement is not constitutionally mandated but requires the
prosecution to present corroborating evidence of a defendant’s confession to assuage our long-standing
concern about false confessions.

Further, both doctrines are satisfied by different evidentiary requirements. The sufficiency of the
evidence test is an elemental test. Its focus is on the “substantive elements of the criminal offense.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 n.16 (1979). It requires the court to consider whether a reasonable
mind could conclude that “each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Bennett, 183 Colo. at 132; 515 P.2d at 470; see also Gonzales, 666 P.2d at 128 (applying the
Bennett test to the specific statutory elements of possession of contraband). By contrast, the
corroboration requirement is not an elemental test because it does not require the court 17 to review
the evidence as it relates to the specific elements of the crime. Instead, it focuses on whether the
prosecution presented evidence to corroborate a confession

To determine whether corroborating evidence proves the trustworthiness or reliability of a confession,

we hold that the trial court must find that corroboration exists from one or more of the following
evidentiary sources: facts that corroborate facts contained in the confession; facts that establish the
crime which corroborate facts contained in the confession; or facts under which the confession was
made that show that the confession is trustworthy or reliable.

Never checked out the facts…ladder. Holden finding the phone case after Christine had looked on the
balcony. I simply offered answers to the cops questions and did not offer voluntary statements.
What are the five elements of the corpus delicti?

§ Actus Reus (Criminal Act)

§ Mens Rea (Criminal Intent)

§ Concurrence (Actus Reus)

§ Causation

§ Harm

Without a valid "cause of action" there's no corpus delicti. If there's no corpus delicti a case has no
standing. There are numorus cases dealing with corpus delicti and all say the same thing. Without
a corpus delicti the plaintiff has no standing.

In order to have a corpus delicti a case requires a valid "cause of action." A valid cause of action requires
three elements. The three elements are: 1) a violation of a legal right, 2) damage or injury, 3) redress-
ability by the court.

One must raise the corpus delicti motion pre-trial so that the court has a chance to view the evidence in
a purely corpus delicti mode as opposed to having the court consider all of the evidence that might be
presented at trial.

Appellant argues the corpus delicti for the crime of inflicting injury in the course of a robbery was not
established and therefore the court erred in not expunging from his confession an admission that he
intended to rob the victim. The State contends the corpus delicti was sufficiently established. We agree
with appellant.

Indiana law has consistently held the defendant's confession or out-of-court statement is not admissible
unless there is independent proof of the corpus delicti. The State must produce evidence, other than the
confession or admission, which establishes the specific crime charged was committed by someone.
Hudson v. State, (1978) Ind., 375 N.E.2d 195; Cambron v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 660, 322 N.E.2d 712;
Jones v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 235, 252 N.E.2d 572; Perkins v. State, (1979) Ind. App., 392 N.E.2d 490;
Murry v. State, (1979) Ind. App., 385 N.E.2d 469. The corpus delicti need not be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, Jackson v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 289, 263 N.E.2d 649, and may be shown by
circumstantial evidence, Perkins v. State, supra. The State is not required to establish the corpus delicti
before introducing the statement as the order of proof is within the trial court's discretion. Ballard v.
State, (1974) 262 Ind. 482, 318 N.E.2d 798.
The basis for appellant's challenge to the corpus delicti is the lack of independent evidence on intent to
rob. Appellant is correct. In fact, the record contains evidence of a lack of intent. Under direct
examination by the prosecutor the victim testified her attacker never attempted to take her purse
despite the fact she had been knocked to the floor between two church pews.

II. JUDGMENT ON THE EVIDENCE

At the close of the State's case, appellant made a motion for judgment on the evidence on Count II,
inflicting injury in the course of a robbery. The court denied the motion and appellant asserts error in
this denial. The assertion is well taken.

To withstand the motion for judgment on the evidence it was necessary for the State to establish a
prima facie case, i.e., there must have been probative evidence on each element of the crime charged.
Robinson v. State, (1974) Ind. App., 309 N.E.2d 833. It was therefore necessary for the State to produce
evidence showing a robbery or attempted robbery. In view of our decision in section one of this opinion,
there was a dearth of evidence to establish this crucial element. In fact, with appellant's admission
properly excluded the testimony of Ms. Toczek positively demonstrates the absence of this element. It
was error for the court to deny appellant's motion.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence deals exclusively with the identification of
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Because of our decision as to Count II, we will address this
issue solely within the context of Count I, aggravated assault and battery.

The portion of appellant's brief devoted to that specification deals with alleged errors which properly
belong in a motion for a new trial. Appellant further fails to point out that any timely objections were
made in the trial court in order to save the alleged error for consideration on appeal. It is a fundamental
principle that a party may not sit by during a trial and make no objection or complaint, await the
outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then claim error which could have at the time been promptly
called to the attention of the trial court. A trial court should be given the opportunity to correct its own
mistakes before asking a review from a court of appeals.

tem 3 claims error on the ground that the court permitted the admissions and confessions of the
appellant to be introduced in evidence before there was any independent proof made of the corpus
delicti. It is well settled the order of proof is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Sometimes,
because of the nature of the testimony, it cannot be easily separated and presented in strictly logical
sequence. There appears to be no abuse of such discretion here. 8 I.L.E., Criminal Law, sec. 185, p. 281;
Shively v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 17, 141 N.E.2d 921, (Cert. Den. 78 S. Ct. 273, 355 U.S. 898, 2 L. Ed. 195.)

Item 4 claims error on the ground that State's Exhibit No. 16 (the defendant's signed confession) was
admitted in evidence over the objection of the appellant. There is no evidence or contention made that
the confession was coerced, or obtained in violation of due process. It is, however, urged that the
corpus delicti was not proved and therefore, since the confession was *190 not properly corroborated, it
was not admissible evidence against the appellant.

The confession of the appellant, if competent evidence, amply sustains the verdict; but because of the
extremity of the penalty inflicted we are constrained to review the evidence particularly as to whether
or not the extrajudicial confession is adequately corroborated by independent evidence. The rule
requiring proof of the corpus delicti of a crime has its origin and basis in the hesitancy of the law to
accept without adequate corroboration, the confession of a defendant (extrajudicial) unless it be one
made in open court as a plea of guilty. Corpus delicti has been defined as "The body of a crime.... In a
derivative sense, the substance or foundation of a crime; the substantial fact that a crime has been
committed." Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 413.

"In Indiana the independent evidence alone need not be sufficient to establish the corpus delicti beyond
a reasonable doubt, but there must be some evidence of probative value aside from the confession to
prove that the crime charged was committed." Parker v. State (1949), 228 Ind. 1, 7, 88 N.E.2d 556, 89
N.E.2d 442.

The whole concern about the phone being located and returned to Christine seemed to stop once I was
placed in jail and there was never any further concern for the phone.

In other words, the independent evidence must be of such a character that reasonable inferences may
be drawn to support a conclusion that a crime of the nature and character charged has been committed
by someone.

After examining the evidence to determine whether the confrontation clause violation constituted
harmless error, the court concluded it did not. The court stated that the child's testimony on the
videotape was straightforward and convincing, and thus constituted particularly damaging evidence
because no other direct evidence linked the defendant to the molestations. The judgment was therefore
reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

** the ‘statements’ that I made were not given freely and voluntarily but instead were answers I gave to
police who asked leading questions that were meant to establish probable cause for my arrest.

Black's Law Dictionary defines "corroborating evidence" as:

"Evidence supplementary to that already given and tending to strengthen or confirm it. Additional
evidence of a different character to the same point." Black's Law Dictionary 311 (5th Ed., 1979).

To "corroborate" is defined as

"To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence.
The testimony of a witness is said to be corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the
representation of some other witnesses, or to comport with some facts otherwise known or
established." Id.
Rule 102. Purpose
These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.
Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence
(a)      Preserving a Claim of Error.  A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude
evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and:
(1)       if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record:
(A)      timely objects or moves to strike; and
 (B)      states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context.
(2)      If the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of
proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context.
(b)      Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the court rules definitively
on the record at trial a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of
error for appeal.
(c)      Court’s Statement About the Ruling; Directing an Offer of Proof. The court may make
any statement about the character or form of the evidence, the objection made, and the ruling. 
The court may direct that an offer of proof be made in question-and-answer form.
(d)      Preventing the Jury from Hearing Inadmissible Evidence. To the extent practicable,
the court must conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by
any means.
(e)      Taking Notice of Fundamental Error. A court may take notice of a fundamental error
affecting a substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.
(f)       Preponderance of Evidence. When deciding whether to admit evidence, the court must
decide any question of fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
Rule 104. Preliminary Questions
(a)      In General. The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is
qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by
evidence rules, except those on privilege.
(b)      Relevance That Depends on a Fact. When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a
fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The
court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.
(c)      Conducting a Hearing So That the Jury Cannot Hear It. The court must conduct any
hearing on a preliminary question so that the jury is not present and cannot hear if:
(1)       the hearing involves the admissibility of a confession;
(2)      a defendant in a criminal case is a witness and so requests; or
(3)      justice so requires.
(d)      Cross-Examining a Defendant in a Criminal Case. By testifying on a preliminary
question, a defendant in a criminal case does not become subject to cross-examination on other
issues in the case.
(e)      Evidence Relevant to Weight and Credibility. This rule does not limit a party's right to
introduce before the jury evidence that is relevant to the weight or credibility of other evidence.
X Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence

Evidence is relevant if:

(a)      it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence;
and

(b)      the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence

Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:

(a)      the United States Constitution;

(b)      the Indiana constitution;

(c)      a  statute not in conflict with these rules;

(d)      these rules; or

(e)      other rules applicable in the courts of this state.

Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.

Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, or Other Reasons

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

Rule 410. Withdrawn Pleas and Offers

(a)      Prohibited Uses.  In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible against the
defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions:

(1)       a guilty plea or admission of the charge that was later withdrawn;

(2)      a nolo contendere plea; 

(3)      an offer to plead to the crime charged or to any other crime, made to one with authority to enter
into or approve a binding plea agreement; or

(4)      a statement made in connection with any of the foregoing withdrawn pleas or offers to one with
authority to enter into a binding plea agreement or who has a right to object to, approve, or reject the
agreement.

(b)      Exceptions. The court may admit such a plea, offer, or statement:

(1)       in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or plea discussions has
been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be considered together; or

(2)      in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement, if the defendant made the statement
under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.

Rule 613. Witness’s Prior Statement

(a)      Showing or Disclosing the Statement During Examination. When examining a witness about the
witness’s prior statement, a party need not show it or disclose its content to the witness. But the party
must, on request, show it or disclose its contents to an adverse party’s attorney.

(b)      Extrinsic Evidence of a Prior Inconsistent Statement. Extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior

inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the
statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so
requires. This subdivision (b) does not apply to an opposing party's statement under Rule 801(d)(2).
Rule 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court and Jury

(a)      Calling by Court. The court may not call a witness except in extraordinary circumstances or as
provided for court-appointed experts. All parties are entitled to cross-examine any witness called by the
court.

(b)      Questioning by Court. The court may question a witness regardless of who calls the witness.

Rule 616. Witness’s Bias

Evidence that a witness has a bias, prejudice, or interest for or against any party may be used to attack
the credibility of the witness.

** the cops were led to believe that I had admitted to stealing the phone and they in turn justified the
tactics they used to establish probable cause.

Rule 806. Attacking and Supporting the Declarant’s Credibility

When a hearsay statement or a statement described in Rule 801 (d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) has been admitted
in evidence, the declarant's credibility may be attacked, and then supported, by any evidence that would
be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. The court may admit
evidence of the declarant's inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or
whether the declarant had an opportunity to explain or deny it. If the party against whom the statement
was admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party may examine the declarant on the statement as
if on cross-examination.

Evidence which is the product of an unlawful detention or an illegal arrest is inadmissible. Dillon v. State
(1983), Ind., 454 N.E.2d 845, 851, cert. denied 465 U.S. 1109, 104 S. Ct. 1617, 80 L. Ed. 2d 145. However,
not every police-citizen encounter amounts to a "seizure" of the person so that an arrest or unlawful
detention has occurred. Id. In determining whether a person has been "seized" for Fourth Amendment
purposes, we must ascertain whether, considering all the circumstances surrounding the police-citizen
encounter, the defendant entertained a reasonable belief that he was not free to leave. Id.

We wish to emphasize, however, that when independent proof of loss or injury is lacking, there must be
strong corroboration of essential facts and circumstances embraced in the defendant's confession.
Corroboration of insignificant facts or those unrelated to the commission of the crime will not suffice.
We emphasize this point because although we have relaxed our corroboration rule somewhat, we
remain advertent to the reason for its existence, that is, to protect against convictions for crimes that
have not in fact occurred.

Under the corpus delicti rule, the State may not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession (or admission)
of a defendant to obtain a conviction; rather, the State must produce substantial independent
corroborative evidence that supports the facts underlying the confession. State v. Smith, 362 N.C. 583,
588 (2008) (citing State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222 (1985)). The independent evidence is sometimes referred
to as “evidence aliunde.”
As a general rule, a defendant who voluntarily and intelligently enters an unconditional guilty plea
waives all defects in the proceeding, including constitutional defects that occurred before entry of the
plea. See State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 395 (1979). Thus, for example, once a defendant enters an
unconditional guilty plea, he or she is barred from challenging the constitutionality of the stop that lead
to his or her arrest. There are however several exceptions to this general rule.

First, a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty plea isn’t barred from challenging “the very power
of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him.” Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974); Reynolds, 298 N.C. at 395 (discussing Perry). Thus, a defendant who has
pleaded guilty still can assert a jurisdictional defect, such as a fatal defect in the indictment or that no
part of the crime occurred in North Carolina. See, e.g., State v. Neville, 108 N.C. App. 330, 333 (1992)
(guilty plea does not waive a jurisdictional defect) (citing State v. Stokes, 274 N.C. 409, 412 (1968). See
generally  G.S. 15A-1415(b)(2) (MAR may assert jurisdictional issues).

Second, a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty plea isn’t barred from a claim that the plea itself
wasn’t knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. A plea waives a wheelbarrow full of constitutional rights,
including the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront witnesses. Waivers of constitutional rights
must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. If a plea isn’t knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, it isn’t
valid. Thus, a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty plea isn’t barred from claiming, for example,
that the trial judge failed to inform him or her of the maximum punishment or that defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the plea. See generally  G.S. 15A-1415(b)(3) (MAR
may assert claim that conviction was obtained in violation of constitutional law). Challenges to the
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of the plea are commonly known
as Boykin  challenges. See  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (articulating the constitutional
requirements of a plea).

To determine whether the defendant has proffered a “fair and just reason” to justify withdrawal, a
district court should consider, inter alia: (1) the amount of time that has elapsed between the plea and
the motion; (2) whether the defendant has asserted a claim of legal innocence; and (3) whether the
government would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea.

“[T]he purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure that a guilty plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice for
the defendant.” Id. (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162
(1970)). Following Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, “[A] Rule 11
violation occurs where a defendant is provided with a ‘mix of information’ that inaccurately sets forth
‘the nature of the charge to which a plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law …
and the maximum possible penalty provided by law.’” United States v. Harrington, 354 F.3d 178, 183 (2d
Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Gutierrez Rodriguez, 288 F.3d 472, 476 (2d Cir.2002)).

When the corpus delicti is once proved then the confession becomes admissible for the purpose of
proving the details of the felonious taking as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for a
conviction.

It is urged on behalf of the appellant that proving the corpus delicti means not only proving, in this case,
that a felonious homicide was committed by someone, but that the "specific" crime as charged must be
proved, namely a robbery, before the confession is admissible.
To hold otherwise would compel an acquittal where a defendant's confession was corroborated beyond
the doubt of a reasonable person yet not every specific allegation of the crime charged was supported
by independent evidence.

Proof of the corpus delicti should not be confused, as it sometimes is, with the recognized requirement
in all cases that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the material allegations as charged.
To so hold would give a meaning to the term synonymous with the regular proof sufficient for a
conviction. A confession would be of little value in a criminal prosecution if the entire crime first had to
be proved in all its details by independent evidence entirely outside a confession or admission. Proof of
the corpus delicti sufficient to corroborate a confession and make it admissible does not relieve the
state of the burden of proving the crime as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a confession
may be used for that purpose, as in the case before us, after the corpus delicti has been proved.

This definition reaffirmed the law of Indiana on corpus delicti, and is as clear and concise as language
could make it. There is no occasion to borrow from the confusing language of other authorities, and if
the policy of stare decisis is to mean anything, the rule *206 should not be changed. There is good
reason for the Indiana rule, and the reason still exists. The well considered precedents of this court
should remain the law of Indiana.

We reaffirmed the rule of the Parker case, supra, in Dennis v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 210, 216, 102 N.E.2d
650; Simmons v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 489, 492, 129 N.E.2d 121; and Taylor v. State (1957), 236 Ind.
415, 421, 140 N.E.2d 104. See also 8 Ind. Law Enc. p. 339, § 266. I cannot agree that preliminary proof of
the corpus delicti sufficient to admit a confession can be made by independent evidence from which an
inference may be drawn that a crime of the nature and character charged has been committed by
someone. To permit this would be to open the door to proof of a crime not charged as a basis for
admitting a confession of the crime charged.

The principal question raised by appellant is that there is not sufficient evidence, independent of his
extrajudicial confession and statements, to establish the corpus delicti.

Without citing any authority for the statement, the opinion by Judge Arterburn says that in order to
establish *207 the corpus delicti "the independent evidence must be of such a character that reasonable
inferences may be drawn to support a conclusion that a crime of the nature and character charged has
been committed by someone."

https://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/1958/29-661-2.html#:~:text=In%20Parker%20v.
%20State%20(1950,established%20by%20the%20foregoing%20authorities.

In the Watts Case this court, following seven pages of summary of the evidence (229 Ind. 93-100) with
which I will not burden this opinion by repeating, at page 101 of 229 Ind., said:

"In Indiana, the independent evidence alone need not be sufficient to establish the corpus delicti
beyond a reasonable doubt, but there must be some evidence of probative value aside from the
admissions to prove that the crime charged was committed." (My italics.)

It will be noted that in that case this court recognized that the "crime charged" must be proven in order
to establish the corpus delicti.
The fact that it was held in the Griffiths and Watts Cases that the evidence was sufficient to establish the
corpus delicti is, on the authority[2] cited and quoted in the majority opinion, not authority for holding
that the independent evidence here is sufficient to sustain the proof of corpus delicti. As is stated in the
quotation *218 referred to above "each case must depend on its own peculiar circumstances."

In my opinion there is not sufficient evidence here, independent of the extrajudicial statements of
appellant, from which a proper inference may be drawn, to show that Mildred Grigonis was killed by
someone in the perpetration of a robbery. For this reason the verdict of the jury is contrary to law and
the judgment should be reversed.

Emmert, J., concurs in this opinion as to the rule on independent proof of the corpus delicti, but believes
there was sufficient proof to admit the confession.

The Corpus Delicti Rule exists so that people are not convicted of crimes solely based on a nonjudicial
confession of guilt. Independent proof of the corpus delicti is required before the defendant may be
convicted upon a nonjudicial confession.Green v. State, 304 N.E.2d 845, 848 (1973). Proof of the corpus
delicti means “proof that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone.” Walker
v. State, 233 N.E.2d 483, 488 (1968). Before a confession or an incriminating statement may be
admitted, there must be some independent evidence of the commission of the crime charged. Workman
v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ind. 1999).

t it stands for the principle that the government cannot prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the defendant’s out-of-court statements alone.  In order to secure a conviction, the
government must also be able to prove that some crime – some wrong or illegality — actually occurred.
This means that the government must provide, as part of the basis for introducing the accused’s
statement, some independent corroboration of illegal activity.

Every crime consists of three elements. First, there is the occurrence of some type of injury or loss. 
Second, there is some type of wrongful or criminal behavior that led to this injury or loss. Finally, there
needs to be somebody who can be held responsible for the wrong. According to Wayne LaFave,
the corpus delicti consists of the first two elements.  In other words, it is the actual substance of the
crime.

Police will typically receive a report about a crime and then set about to determine who was
responsible.  In the case of my client in Philadelphia, the government had it backward.  They had
somebody – my client – who had admitted to a crime; in this case, the possession of a firearm by a
felon.  But they had no evidence independent of my client’s statement that anything illegal had actually
occurred.

Corpus Delecti (literally, "The Body of the Crime") is the requirement that the prosecution present actual
evidence that a crime was committed in order to convict a defendant. In popular culture it has often
been stated that an individual cannot be convicted of homicide without the production of the dead
body. However, an individual may be convicted of homicide even if the body cannot be found, as long as
there is enough circumstantial evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual
committed the crime. Rather than the literal body of the crime, corpus delecti refers to the body of
evidence that a crime was committed. Thus, Black's Law Dictionary defines corpus delecti as " "the fact
of a crime having been actually committed."
The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to guard against “the hasty and unguarded character which is
often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no
crime has in fact been committed.” [1]

Corpus delecti has often been interpreted as requiring additional evidence beyond a confession before
an individual can be convicted of a crime. In other jurisdictions corroborating evidence must be
introduced before a confession may be admitted at trial. Additional evidence may also be required
before an accomplice's confession may be admitted against the defendant.

Corpus Delecti does not typically require proof of each and every element of a crime before an out-of-
court confession becomes admissible. However, it does require independent evidence showing that the
charged crime occured.The principle of corpus delecti requires corroborative evidence that proves (1)
the occurrence of the specific kind of injury or loss and that (2) the injury or loss was caused by
someone’s criminal activity. Some jurisidictions may require some independent proof that the
defendant was connected to the criminal act.