G.R. No.

175822               October 23, 2013 Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter and On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive
the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling portion of which reads:
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she
YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,  was not given a copy of said damaging letter. 13 With the above experience, WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the
vs. respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent. mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral 26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for Defendants Michelle Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby
Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and
DECISION (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of moral, (₱50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
PERALTA, J.: nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation (₱20,000.00).
expenses.16
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; SO ORDERED.24
Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the
and Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. issuance of the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of
The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was faith when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office
Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed resolution denied the miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to about the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez). the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter
the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the to respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the
item has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed official receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: payment.25 Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the
outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to
go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent employer not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed
Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such
Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked to that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that Guess already
(Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and
shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment. 20 They malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was not privy to the
₱2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter
receipt5 issued by the store.6 was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions. 21 As contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the
counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment. 27 The appellate
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling
Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess expenses.22 respondent to collect moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner
employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she California Clothing Inc. was made liable for its failure to exercise
got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent
receipt issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at complaint and counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented,
the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good
the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28
to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8 believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment.
Considering that no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees Guess employees, the court held that when they demanded payment from Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the
allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no same was denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for
supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, respondent when the confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on
followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10 clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following
by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific grounds:
Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees,
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the
because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or I.
Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to
humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove
receive it as it did not concern the office and the same took place while
bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of
respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
damages.23
supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS
again refused to receive it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human
MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased.
HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY. person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to
would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a
II. another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the
acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice realized the supposed non-payment.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design
MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.30 to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36 It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance
The petition is without merit. Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in
whether she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her
abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly
relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to
her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she two parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. liability.38
purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item
official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. 39 In this case,
whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been petitioners obviously abused their rights.
did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty
causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40
The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is noteworthy: overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were
demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely manner that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall
spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, compensate the latter for the damage.
as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the thus:
principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral
Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to damages and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x 32 The elements of abuse plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a
blank expression and told me, "I can’t remember." Then I asked her how and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in
another.33 Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They
much money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100
bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus,
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication such denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the
between the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of how much change and if she received change from the cashier, she then wrong done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to
the receipt to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple questions, I am enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will
cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone. 43 We find that the
of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable
respondent who failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within vehemently refused saying that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37 under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to
their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not and litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of
collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such of₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.
right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused
respondent a cause of action against them. respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but
that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and
Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are 34
 Villanueva v. Rosqueta, G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010, On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of
AFFIRMED. 610 SCRA 334, 339. Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473, Records) selling, transferring and
35
 Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Calogcog, supra note 33. conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights
SO ORDERED. 36
 Gonzales v. Philippine Commercial and International Bank, and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of
G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 180, 202. ₱70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
Footnotes
37
 Rollo, p. 59. (Emphasis and italics in the original)
38
 Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, "4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the
510 SCRA 172, 179. account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1,
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate 1994." (Records, p. 47)
Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.,
39
 Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Calogcog, supra note 33; id.
40
concurring; rollo pp. 52-62.  Carpio v. Valmonte, supra note 31, at 362.
41
 Id. at 364. vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate
42 mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home
Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Pampio A. Abarintos,  Villanueva v. Rosqueta, supra note 34, at 341.
Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)
concurring; rollo pp. 70-71. 43
 Carpio v. Valmonte, supra note 31, at 365.
3
 Penned by Presiding Judge Gabriel T. Ingles; rollo pp. 40-51.
4 For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name
 Rollo, pp. 52-53.
of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October
5
 Records, p. 8. 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water
6
 Id. at 2. connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the
7
 Id. Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs.
8
 Id. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) months
9
 Id. corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and
10
 Id. at 3. February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was
March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos
11
 Id. G.R. No. 161921               July 17, 2013
12
later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water
 Id. line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
13
 Id. at 4. JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER, 
14
 Id. at 5. vs. On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N.,
15
 Id. at 1-7. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma.
16
 Id. at 5. CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting
17
 Id. at 38-46. GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS. of the water line (Records, p. 160).
18
 Id. at 41-42.
19
 Id. at 42. DECISION On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent]
20
 Id. at 43. Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and
21
 Id. PERALTA, J.: reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line
22
 Id. at 43-44. was cut off (Records, p. 161).
23
 Rollo, pp. 49-51. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
24
 Id. at 61. (Italics and emphasis in the original) Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband]
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 28, 2003 and filed [a] complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD and its
25
 Id. at 56.
26 December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
 Id. at 57. Decision affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision3of the
27
 Id. at 58. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored
28
 Id. at 61. CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. and reconnected when the [trial] court issued a writ of preliminary
29
 CA rollo, pp. 84-90. mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p. 237).4
30
 Rollo, p. 14. The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
31
 481 Phil. 352 (2004). After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
32
 Carpio v. Valmonte, supra, at 361-362. [Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S.
33
 Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Calogcog, G.R. No. 149241, August Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan xxxx
24, 2009, 596 SCRA 614, 624; Carpio v. Valmonte, supra note de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153) square meters
31, at 362. and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants SO ORDERED.7 THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR
did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER
good faith. Before disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE
Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF
plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE
Commercial Department of defendant COWD. There was one though, but applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8
due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with 7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
justice. Neither did they observe honesty. ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice
of disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses Pastorfide]."9 BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL
They should have investigated first as to the present ownership of the CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN
house. For doing the act because Ardiente told them, they were negligent. THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH
Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE
the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs Reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its Resolution dated HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH.
but she did not have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was December 17, 2003.
plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers. 7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
She should have been very careful. x x x5 COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus: technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit any AS AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were
ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004. petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA,
severally plaintiffs, the following sums: were impleaded as respondents in the instant petition. This cannot be
done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot,
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez,
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages; following Assignment of Errors: adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to
treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so,
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and 7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed
HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee. COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus,
UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.
Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the cutting off ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D.
of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were influenced by GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for
defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE review on certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with finality
be liable. PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision final and
EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD
WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS and Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the present
SO ORDERED.6 ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this time
RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON- as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA. PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS. previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.

On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing 7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the
as follows: GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED main issues raised by petitioner are factual and it is settled that the
TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the awarded damages is reduced NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present
to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, while attorney's WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE in this instant petition.13 This is especially true when the findings of the
fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants. FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its
instant petition lacks merit. faith. violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code would be proper.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was
respondent spouses' water supply, because she had no participation in the elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
actual disconnection. However, she admitted in the present petition that it government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable
was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. x x x18
water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross- damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court
claim against petitioner. While it was COWD which actually discontinued said: To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned
respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it was through provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses'
the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least
disconnected in the first place. codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent
Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent
COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely account.
However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
harm another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its
attach.16 In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.)
petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x. The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the
spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of
request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on the Civil Code.
xxxx
the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel
the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages
account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
was petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised respondent principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the
comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary damages,
she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their although it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent
the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9)
the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by months, and such deprivation would have continued were it not for the
There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When relief granted by the RTC.
Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith. a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human provides, among others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary
Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
observe honesty and good faith. Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law,
Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit: willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all other Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003
xxxx provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the AFFIRMED.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a
exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be SO ORDERED.
Footnotes Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro [subject land] from one Regina
Castillo (or Castillo) in whose name it was titled under Original
* Spelled as Gonzales in other parts of the rollo and records. Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 issued pursuant to Free
Patent No. V-79606. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with
improvements and planted the land with fruit trees, including
Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Noel G. Tijam,
about a thousand mango[es], more than a hundred Mandarin
concurring; rollo, pp. 60-67.
citrus, and more than a hundred guyabanos. He also had the title
2
 Id. at 68. transferred in his name and was issued TCT No. 45232.
3
 Penned by Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo, id. at 27-37.
4
 Rollo, pp. 60-62. Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith.
5
 Id. at 35-36. Unfortunately, it turned out that about 162,500 square meters of
6
 Id. at 37. this land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro and,
7
 Id. at 67. (Emphasis in the original) therefore, cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition
8
 Id. at 65. under any existing law, and is not registrable.
9
 Id. at 64.
10
 Id. at 219. Thus, in the Complaint (Annex "A", pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for
11
 Id. at 220. "Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion" filed by the Office of
12
 Id. at 14. the Solicitor General (or OSG) in behalf of the Republic
[petitioner], as represented by the Bureau of Forest
13
 Philippine National Bank v. DKS International, Inc., G.R. No.
Development (or BFD), it was explained that the source[,]
179161, January 22, 2010, 610 SCRA 603, 621.
Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 of Castillo,
14
 Id. issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606, is spurious,
15
 Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, fictitious and irregularly issued on account of:
510 SCRA 172, 179. G.R. No. 163794             November 28, 2008
16
 Id. a) ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND
17
 G.R. No. 184315, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 392. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Romeo T. FIVE HUNDRED (162,500) SQUARE METERS,
18
 Id. at 402-404. (Emphasis supplied) Acosta (formerly Jose D. Malvas), Director of Forest Management more or less, of the land covered by OCT No. P-2388
19
 Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural was, at the time it was applied for patent and or titling,
and analogous cases: Resources,petitioners,  a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD
xxxx vs. Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 and 1715. Copy of
HON. NORMELITO J. BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge, Branch said maps are attached hereto as Annexes "B" and
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
41, Regional Trial Court, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro and "C";
28. 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
DANILO REYES, respondents.
xxxx
20
 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently b) The 162,500 square meters covered by OCT No. P-
DECISION 2388 are entirely inside the 140 hectares Agro-
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same. Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of
21
 Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a NACHURA, J.: Atty. Augusto D. Marte4 [Atty. Marte], copy of the
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy Map of AFFLA No. 175 and AFFLA No. 175 are
shall compensate the latter for the damage. attached hereto as Annexes "D" and "E";
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
22
 Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
supra note 17, at 405. c) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession of the property
Appeals (CA) Decision  dated June 4, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52261,
2
because the rightful occupant is Atty. Augusto D.
which affirmed the Joint Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Marte by virtue of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, dated December 28, 1998.
Agreement [AFFLA] No. 175, issued to him by the
Ministry of Natural Resources in 1986 to expire on
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: December 21, 2011;

Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought d) Since the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
the subject 182,941-square-meter land at Bgy. Banus, 45232, in the name of defendant Danilo Reyes, is a
 part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD The defendants in this case did not assail the evidence of the Subject of Execution in Accordance with Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph
Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 & 1715, the same plaintiff but concentrated itself to the expenses incurred in the (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (motion).12 There he averred that:
cannot be the subject of any disposition or acquisition cultivation and in the planting of trees in that disputed areas. he occupied in good faith the subject land for around thirty years; he had
under any existing law (Li Hong Giap vs. Director of Aside thereto, the plaintiff cited that it is elementary principle of already spent millions of pesos in planting fruit-bearing trees thereon; and
Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Veno vs. Gov't of P.I. 41 Phil. law that said areas not being capable of registration their he employed many workers who regularly took care of the trees and other
161; Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5). inclusion in a certification of ownership or confer title on the plants. Reyes prayed that he and/or his agents be given at least one (1)
(pp. 18 to 19, rollo) registrant. (Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Judge year from the issuance of the corresponding order to remove his mango,
Jaime de los Angeles of the Court of First Instance of Balayan, citrus and guyabano trees, and that they be allowed to stay in the premises
Aside from the documentary evidence presented to support these Batangas, et al., G.R. No. L-30240) It is also a matter of within that period to work on the cutting and removal of the said trees. He
allegations, the Republic presented as well and called to the principle that public forest [are non-alienable public lands. also asked the RTC that in the meantime that these trees are not yet
witness stand: Accession of public forests] on the part of the claimant, however removed, all the unharvested fruits be appropriated by him, as provided
long, cannot convert the same into private property. (Vano v. for by law, to the exclusion of all other persons who may take advantage
Government of PI, 41 Phils. 161) of the situation and harvest said fruits.
a) Armando Cruz, the supervising cartographer of the
DENR, who explained that based on Land
Classification Map No. 1715 (Exh. "A") which was In view thereof, it appears that the preponderance of Petitioner opposed the motion, citing the principle of accession under
later amended to LC Map No. 2319 (Exh. "B"), the evidence is in favor of the plaintiff and against the Article 44013 of the Civil Code. It further argued that the subject land,
plotting shows that the 162,000 square meters covered defendants and therefore it is hereby declared that Free being timber land, is property of public dominion and, therefore, outside
by OCT No. 2388 are entirely inside the 140 hectares Patent No. V-79606 issued on July 22, 1957 with Psu No. the commerce of man and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object
of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 155088 and OCT No. P-2388 in the name of Regina Castillo of any contract. This being the case, there are no improvements to speak
in favor of Atty. Marte and the alienable and and its derivative TCT No. 45232 in the name of Danilo of, because the land in question never ceased to be a property of the
disposable area of Castillo's land is only around two Reyes is hereby declared null and void; and the defendant Republic, even if Reyes claimed that he was a purchaser for value and in
(2) hectares; Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered to surrender the owner's good faith and was in possession for more than thirty (30) years.
duplicate copy of TCT No. 45232 and to vacate the premises Moreover, petitioner averred that, assuming Reyes was initially a
and directing the defendant Register of Deeds of Calapan, planter/sower in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot be of
b) Alberto Cardiño, an employee of the DENR who Oriental Mindoro, to cancel the title as null and void ab absolute application since from the time the reversion case was filed by
conducted the survey on the land under litigation, initio; and declaring the reversion of the land in question to the petitioner on May 13, 1987, Reyes ceased to be a planter/sower in
corroborated the testimony of Cruz that only two the government subject to the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease good faith and had become a planter/sower in bad faith.14
hectares is alienable and disposable land; and Agreement No. 175, to form part of the public domain in the
province of Oriental Mindoro. Meanwhile, on March 2, 1998, Atty. Marte filed a Complaint for
c) Vicente Mendoza, a Geodetic Engineer, who Injunction With an Ancillary Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a
expounded on the procedure before the title could be The two-hectare lot, which appears disposable and alienable, Temporary Restraining Order against Reyes for allegedly encroaching
issued to an applicant for a disposable and alienable is declared null and void for failure to secure certification upon and taking possession by stealth, fraud and strategy some 16 hectares
public land. He clarified that he did not make the from the Bureau of Forest Development. of his leased area without his permission or acquiescence and planted trees
survey for Castillo but upon presentation to him of the thereon in bad faith despite the fact that the area is non-disposable and part
carpeta in open court he noticed that, while it appears of the public domain, among others.
to be valid, it however has no certification of the The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby denied for lack
Bureau of Forestry - an essential requirement before of merit, with cost against the defendant.6
title could be issued. But the respondent RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed Joint
Reyes appealed the aforementioned RTC Decision to the CA. In its Order and ruled in favor of Reyes, finding Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph
Decision7 dated September 16, 1996, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable. The RTC
For his side, Reyes presented evidence showing his extensive ratiocinated:
development of and investment in the land, but however failed His motion for reconsideration was denied.8
to traverse squarely the issue raised by the Republic against the
inalienability and indisposability of his acquired land. His lame Thus, Reyes sought relief from this Court via a petition for review Under the circumstance, it is but just and fair and equitable that
argument that the absence of the Certification by the Bureau of on certiorari. But in our Resolution9 dated June 23, 1997, we resolved to Danilo Reyes be given the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of his
Forestry on his carpeta does not necessarily mean that there was deny his petition for failure to sufficiently show that the CA had labor on the land which he honestly believes was legally his. He
none issued, failed to convince the court a quo. committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. On November was not aware that his certificate of title which was derived from
24, 1997, this Court denied with finality Reyes' motion for OCT No. P-2388 issued in 1957 by the government itself in the
reconsideration.10 name of Regina Castillo contained legal infirmity, otherwise he
Hence, Judge Edilberto Ramos, the then Presiding Judge of would not have expoused (sic) himself from the risk of being
Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon. Any
Mindoro, held5 that: On February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion11 to Remove Improvements way, if the court will grant the motion for the defendant's (sic)
Introduced by Defendant Danilo D. Reyes on the Property which is the
 Danilo Reyes to remove his improvements on the disputed THE DECISION IN THE REVERSION CASE HAD LONG legal solution to an important issue overlooked, if not ignored by the State
property, it will not prejudice Augusto Marte, otherwise, as the BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.19 and by the courts in their decisions in the reversion case; under Section 10,
court sees it, he will immensely [benefit] from the toils of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, he is allowed to remove the
Danilo Reyes. The OSG posits that Reyes' assailed motion is barred by prior judgment improvements; and the instant Petition failed to abide with the proper
under Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because manner as to the "proof of service" required under Section 13, Rule 13 of
and then disposed, as follows: said motion merely sprang from the civil case of reversion tried and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Most importantly, Reyes avers that the
decided on the merits by the RTC, and the decision is already final, after it land on which about 1,000 mango trees, 100 mandarin citrus trees and 100
was duly affirmed by the CA and by this Court. The OSG stresses that one guyabano trees are planted, was leased by the government to Atty. Marte,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to remove who entered into the possession of the subject land when the trees were
improvements filed by defendant Danilo Reyes dated January of Reyes' assigned errors in the reversion case before the CA was that the
RTC "erred in not granting his (Reyes') counterclaims as well as his already bearing fruits. Thus, if said trees are not removed, Atty. Marte
28, 1998 is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of would be unduly enriched as the beneficiary of these fruits without even
section 10, paragraph (d) of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil claims for improvements." The OSG claims that such assigned error was
duly resolved by the CA when it held, to wit: spending a single centavo, at the expense of Reyes. Reyes posits that it is a
Procedure and he is given a period of one (1) year from the well-established fact, unrebutted by the petitioner, that he planted these
issuance of this ORDER to remove, cut and appropriate the trees and to deny him the right to remove them would constitute a grave
fruit-bearing trees which he had planted in the property in The non-award of appellant's "counterclaims" is understandable. injustice and amount to confiscation without just compensation which is
disputes (sic). violative of the Constitution.
To begin with, no evidence whatsoever was presented by the
The COMMENT filed by the Office of the Solicitor General appellant to sustain his plea for damages. In fact, appellant never The OSG counters that copies of the instant Petition were properly served
dated August 11, 1998 is hereby denied for lack of merit. testified to prove his allegations as regards his counterclaims. as shown by the photocopies of the registry return cards. Moreover, the
OSG avers that granting, without admitting, that another person would
The [C]omplaint for Injunction filed by Augusto D. Marte on Then, too, there is no showing that appellant paid the docket stand to be benefited by the improvements that Reyes introduced on the
March 2, 1998 against Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered dismissed fees for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his purported land is beside the point and is not the fault of the petitioner because the
for lack of merit. counterclaims (Metal Engineering Resources Corp. vs. Court of particular issue of the improvements was already resolved with finality in
Appeals, 203 SCRA 273). the reversion case. The OSG claims that a lower court cannot reverse or
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed its Motion for Reconsideration15 which set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so will negate
was denied by the RTC.16 Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA Lastly, the allegations made in the Answer in support of the so- the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review - a
via Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure17 ascribing to called "counterclaims" clearly negate the nature of the claims as final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.23
the RTC grave abuse of discretion and acting without jurisdiction in compulsory counterclaim like that of reimbursement of the
granting Reyes' motion to remove improvements. useful expenses (Cabangis vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA The instant Petition lacks merit.
414).20
However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, and affirmed the In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
ruling of the RTC, in this wise: Thus, the OSG posits that the issue of the improvements cannot be made admit State ownership of the disputed land.24Indeed, the ownership over
the subject of the assailed motion on the pretext that such removal of the subject land reverted to the State by virtue of the decisions of the
It is notable that in the course of the suit for "Cancellation of improvements is merely incidental to the reversion case. The OSG submits
Title and/or Reversion" there was not an iota of evidence that the consideration of the issue is now barred by res judicata. Lastly, RTC and CA and our Resolution on the matter. But these decisions simply
presented on record that Reyes was in bad faith in acquiring the the OSG argues that: the RTC and CA cannot vary a decision which has ordered the reversion of the property to the State, and did not consider the
land nor in planting thereon perennial plants. So it could never already attained finality; for purposes of execution, what is controlling is improvements that Reyes had introduced on the property or provide him
be said and held that he was a planter/sower in bad faith. Thus, the dispositive portion of the decision; the RTC, except to order the with any remedy relative thereto. Thus, Reyes was left out in the cold,
this Court holds that Reyes sowed and planted in good faith, and execution of a decision which had attained finality, had long lost faced with the prospect of losing not only the land which he thought he
that being so the appropriate provisions on right accession are jurisdiction over the case; and the RTC erred and acted without owned, but also of forfeiting the improvements that he painstakingly built
Articles 445 and 448 also of the Civil Code.18 jurisdiction when it granted Reyes' motion to remove the improvements with his effort, time and money.
when the dispositive portion of the decision in the reversion case did not
provide for the removal of the same.21
Hence, this Petition based on the sole ground that: We cannot agree with the OSG that the denial by the CA of Reyes'
counterclaim in the reversion case had the effect of completely foreclosing
In his Comment  on the OSG petition, Reyes avers that the points raised
22
whatever rights Reyes may have over these improvements. We note that
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE by the OSG are merely rehashed arguments which were adequately passed
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HOLDING THAT THE the counterclaim was denied because Reyes failed to prove that it was in
upon by the CA. He fully agrees with the ruling of the CA that: he is a the nature of a compulsory counterclaim, and he did not pay docket fees
MOTION TO REMOVE IMPROVEMENTS FILED BY planter/sower in good faith, as such, Articles 445 and 448 of the New
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS BUT AN INCIDENT OF THE thereon, even as the CA found that Reyes "never testified to prove his
Civil Code are applicable; his motion is not entirely a new case, but allegations as regards his counterclaims." Yet, the records of the reversion
REVERSION CASE OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT merely an incident to the reversion case, a consequence of its grant and a
STILL HAS JURISDICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT case reveal that Reyes adduced ample evidence of the extent of the
improvements he introduced and the expenses he incurred therefor. This is of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and
reflected in the findings of the CA in the case at bench, and we concur ground, shall return the same to him. 546 of the Civil Code have been restricted. It is no longer feasible to
with the appellate court when it said: permit him to remove the trees he planted. The only equitable alternative
The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant would be to order the Republic to pay Reyes the value of the
But this Court notes that while Reyes was half-hearted in his case. There is enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State would improvements he introduced on the property. This is only fair because,
opposition to the reversion, he instead focused on proving the come into possession of -- and may technically appropriate -- the more after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon the expiration of the lease or
improvements he has introduced on the land, its extent and his than one thousand fruit-bearing trees planted by the private respondent. upon its cancellation if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all
expenses. Despite these proofs, the Decision of April 13, 1992 There is impoverishment on the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose permanent improvements on the land shall pass to the ownership of the
made no mention nor provision for the improvements on the the improvements he had painstakingly planted and invested in. There is Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify the lessee.
land. With this legal vacuum, Reyes could not exercise the lack of valid cause for the State to acquire these improvements, because,
options allowed the sower and planter in good faith. This thus as discussed above, Reyes introduced the improvements in good faith. However, the AFFLA is not due to expire until December 21, 2011. In the
left him no other alternative but to avail of Paragraph (d) of Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in ruling that Reyes interim, it is logical to assume that the lessee, Atty. Augusto D. Marte, will
Section 10 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in is entitled to the benefits of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. derive financial gain from the fruits that the trees planted by Reyes would
order to collect or get a return of his investment as allowed to a yield. In fact, Atty. Marte may already have profited therefrom in the past
sower and planter in good faith by the Civil Code. Thus, even if we accept the OSG's submission that Reyes' entitlement to several years. It is, therefore, reasonable to grant the Republic the right of
these benefits is not absolute because he can no longer claim good faith subrogation against the lessee who may have benefited from the
Correlatively, the courts in the reversion case overlooked the issue of after the filing of the reversion case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying improvements. The Republic may, thus, demand reimbursement from
whether Reyes, vis-à-vis his improvements, is a builder or planter in good that prior to that ― all the way back to 1970 ― he had possessed the land Atty. Marte for whatever amount it will have to pay Reyes for these
faith. In the instant case, the issue assumes full significance, because and introduced improvements thereon in good faith. At the very least, improvements.
Articles 44825 and 54626 of the Civil Code grant the builder or planter in then, Reyes is entitled to these benefits for the 17 years that he had been a
good faith full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the planter in good faith. As to the OSG's insistent invocation of res judicata and the immutability
premises until reimbursement is made. A builder or planter in good faith is of final judgments, our ruling in Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees
one who builds or plants on land with the belief that he is the owner However, we are mindful of the fact that the subject land is currently Union (TSIEU)-FFW, et al. v. Federation of Free Workers (FFW), et
thereof, unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds or covered by Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 al.33 is instructive:
plants on it. 27 issued by the Ministry of (now Department of Environment and) Natural
Resources in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte, which will expire on It is axiomatic that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
On this issue, we are disposed to agree with the CA that Reyes was a December 21, 2011. By the terms of the AFFLA, the lessee shall, among immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be
planter in good faith. Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the others, do all in his power to suppress fires, cooperate with the Bureau of modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
subject land; in fact, a TCT over the property was issued in his name. He Forest Development (BFD) in the protection and conservation of the forest correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be
tilled the land, planted fruit trees thereon, and invested money from 1970. growth in the area and undertake all possible measures to insure the made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the
He received notice of the Republic's claim only when the reversion case protection of watershed and environmental values within the leased area land. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be
was filed on May 13, 1987. The trees are now full-grown and fruit- and areas adjacent thereto. This obligation to prevent any damage to the struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior
bearing. land subject of the lease is consonant with fundamental principles and adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of
state policies set forth in Section 16,31 Article II and Section 4,32 Article what are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies
To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor XII of the Constitution. upon which judicial powers had been conferred.
of the State -- because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the
land is part of inalienable forest land and belongs to the State is already To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of a final
final and immutable -- would inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the subject land, even if he is legally entitled to do so, would be risking judgment are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-
State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith. substantial damage to the land. It would negate the policy consideration called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
underlying the AFFLA -- to protect and preserve the biodiversity and the party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.28 This basic doctrine on environment, and to prevent any damage to the land. Further, it would transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to violate the implicit mandate of Article 547 of the Civil Code which unjust and inequitable.
profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's expense. 29 There is unjust provides:
enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity,34 we rule in
or when a person retains money or property of another against the ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without favor of Reyes pro hac vice. We reiterate that this Court is not precluded
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.30 Article 22 damage to the principal thing, the possessor in good faith may from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the
of the Civil Code states the rule in this wise: remove them unless the person who recovers the possession doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of
exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the preceding article. justice for technicality.35 Indubitably, to order the reversion of the subject
ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of performance by land without payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard of the
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
rights of Reyes over the improvements which he, in good faith, introduced  CA Resolution dated January 24, 1997; id. at 102-104.
8 25
 Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
therein, would not only be unjust and inequitable but cruel as well. built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
 Id. at 105.
9 appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548,
June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals 10
 Id. at 106. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that: land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
11 builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
 Id. at 107-110.
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a
1) The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
Branch 41, is hereby DIRECTED to determine the actual 12
 SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. not choose to appropriate the building or trees after the proper
improvements introduced on the subject land, their current value indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and the amount of the expenses actually spent by private (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
respondent Danilo Reyes for the said improvements thereon execution. - When the property subject of execution contains
from 1970 until May 13, 1987 with utmost dispatch. improvements constructed or planted by the judgment 26
 Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
2) The Republic, through the Bureau of Forest Development of or remove said improvements, except upon special order of thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, is the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after
DIRECTED to pay private respondent Danilo Reyes the value of due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
such actual improvements he introduced on the subject land as same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
determined by the Regional Trial Court, with the right of defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
13
subrogation against Atty. Augusto D. Marte, the lessee in Agro-  ART. 440. The ownership of property gives the right of the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175. accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
No costs.  Florentino v. Supervalue, Inc., G.R. No. 172384, September
27
14
 OSG Comment dated August 11, 1998; rollo, pp. 111-114. 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 156, 171, citing Lopez v. Sarabia, 439
SO ORDERED. SCRA 35, 49 (2004).
15
 Id. at 119-130.
28
 No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.
Footnotes 16
 RTC Order dated February 17, 1999; id. at 131.
1
 Almocera v. Ong, G.R. No. 170479, February 18, 2008, 546
29

 Rollo, pp. 26-51. 17

 Petition for Certiorari dated April 5, 1999; id. at 132-144. SCRA 164, 176-177.
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (now 18
 Rollo, p. 63.  Allied Banking Corporation v. Li, Sio Wan, G.R. No. 133179,
30

deceased), with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and March 27, 2008, 549 SCRA 504, 524, citing Reyes v. Lim, 408
Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring; id. at 53-66. 19
 Id. at 36. SCRA 560 (2003).
3
 Penned by public respondent Judge Normelito J. Ballocanag; 20
 Supra note 7, at 97-98.  SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
31

id. at 115-118. people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
21
 Supra note 1. rhythm and harmony of nature.
4
 Also referred to as Atty. Augusto Sarte in other pleadings and
documents. 32
 SEC. 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by
22
 Rollo, pp. 195-200.
law the specific limits of forest lands and national parks,
5
 RTC Decision dated April 13, 1992; rollo, pp. 80-83. marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such
 OSG's Reply dated March 21, 2005; id. at 207-213,
23

citing Manila Electric Co. v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not
6
 Rollo, pp. 54-57. (Emphasis supplied) Inc., 374 SCRA 262 (2002). be increased or diminished, except by law. The Congress shall
provide, for such period as it may determine, measures to
 Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39105; penned by
7 prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.
 Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, April 29, 2005, 457
24

Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (a retired member of this SCRA 744, 764, citing Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of
Court), with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Honorio Dacut, 378 SCRA 206, 214-215 (2002).  G.R. No. 160993, May 20, 2008. (Citations omitted).
33

Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring; id. at 84-98.

  Chieng v. Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007, 531
34
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother due to force majeure, "specifically, but not limited to, radio noise and
SCRA 730, 748, citing National Development Company v. Editha left for Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception
Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation, 458 Phil. 1038, 1055 Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined from of the telegraphic message";14 the clause in the Telegram Transmission
(2003). January 30, 1991 to March 21, 1991. Form signed by Grace absolved it from liability for any damage arising
from the transmission other than the refund of telegram tolls;15 it observed
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; and at all
15, 1991.4 On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a events, any cause of action had been barred by laches.16
messenger of RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery
thereof as it was another messenger who previously was assigned to The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the
deliver the same but the address could not be located, hence, the telegram questioned telegram was not apparently the proximate cause of the death
was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger finally found of Editha," ruled out the presence of force majeure. Respecting the clause
the address on February 15, 1991. in the telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court held that it partakes of
the nature of a contract of adhesion.
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5,
1991,5 demanded an explanation from the manager of the Service Quality Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the
Control Department of the RCPI, Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by telegram to the addressee at the earliest possible time but that it did not in
G.R. No. 164349             January 31, 2006 letter of March 13, 1991,6 as follows: view of the negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter and
the concomitant delay in delivering the telegram on time, the trial court,
Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly upon the following provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(RCPI),Petitioner,  processed in accordance with our standard operating procedure. However,
vs. delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI. there being at fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND Among others, during the transmission process, the radio link connecting Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
FORTUNATO CATIBOG, Respondents. the points of communication involved encountered radio noise and between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
interferences such that subject telegram did not initially registered  (sic) in provisions of this Chapter.
the receiving teleprinter machine.
DECISION
Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the
Our internal message monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus, a "omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the
CARPIO MORALES, J.: repeat transmission was made and subsequent delivery was effected. obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the
(Underscoring supplied) time, or the place."
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the
Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her Verchez’s lawyer thereupon wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian, by letter of In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram
daughter Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon July 23, 1991,7 requesting for a conference on a specified date and time, to the addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is the early delivery of
Branch of the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) but no representative of RCPI showed up at said date and time. the telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its
whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida employees, the defendant failed to discharge of its obligation on time
Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS making it liable for damages under Article 2176.
Village, Quezon City1 reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." For On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
RCPI’s services, Grace paid P10.502 for which she was issued a receipt.3
On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption
Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI of negligence on the part of the employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no
response was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their
thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the rendered judgment against RCPI. Accordingly, it disposed:
aid. telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage
and prejudice,8 for which they prayed for the award of moral and WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
exemplary damages9 and attorney’s fees.10 rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, to wit:
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her
husband Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her
arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram. After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue11 was Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount:
denied12 by Branch 5 of the RTC of Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer,
alleging that except with respect to Grace,13 the other plaintiffs had no
privity of contract with it; any delay in the sending of the telegram was
 1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual
as moral damages; having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. obligation to transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to
Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at the given address
2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every and should provide a system whereby in cases of undelivered messages
attorney’s fees; and infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one the sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages sent
who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent than
obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his those which can wait for the mail.25
3. To pay the costs. exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous
event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability. 23 (Emphasis and xxxx
SO ORDERED.18 underscoring supplied)
People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27, In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the emotional stress or pressing financial needs. Knowing that messages
2004,19 affirmed the trial court’s decision. shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it. about the illnesses or deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a family,
important business transactions, and notices of conferences or meetings as
Hence, RCPI’s present petition for review on certiorari, it raising the RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and in this case, are coursed through the petitioner and similar corporations, it
following questions: (1) "Is the award of moral damages proper even if the interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception is incumbent upon them to exercise a greater amount of care and
trial court found that there was no direct connection between the injury of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could concern than that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to inform
and the alleged negligent acts?"20 and (2) "Are the stipulations in the not locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that senders of the non-delivery of messages should be undertaken.26
‘Telegram Transmission Form,’ in the nature "contracts of adhesion" he was able to deliver the telegram.
(sic)?21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of
between its delay in transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.22 x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct the telegram, as well as the basis for the award of moral damages, thus:27
that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible The request to send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the
contractual or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have existence of urgency that private respondents’ allegations that ‘time was of
regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents. concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; the essence’ imports. A check drawn against a Manila Bank and
nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the transmitted to Sorsogon, Sorsogon will have to be deposited in a bank in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from Sorsogon and pass thru a minimum clearing period of 5 days before it may
liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s be encashed or withdrawn. If the transmittal of the requested check to
participation – whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act Sorsogon took 1 day – private respondents could therefore still wait for 6
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor days before the same may be withdrawn. Requesting a check that would
applicable to acts of God. take 6 days before it could be withdrawn therefore contradicts plaintiff’s
thereof, are liable for damages. (Underscoring supplied)
claim of urgency or need.28
xxxx
Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained:
At any rate, any sense of urgency of the situation was met when Grace
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible Verchez was able to communicate to Manila via a letter that she sent to the
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract for a fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was same addressee in Manila thru JRS.29
and the failure of its compliance justify,  prima facie, a corresponding right inevitable. In other words, there must be an exclusion of human
of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not intervention from the cause of injury or loss.24 (Emphasis and
permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance xxxx
underscoring supplied)
of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A
breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for As far as the respondent court’s award for moral damages is concerned,
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from the same has no basis whatsoever since private respondent Alfonso
to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least Verchez did not accompany his late wife when the latter went to Manila
his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she by bus. He stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week before he
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in could have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies proceeded to Manila. 30
had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his the fault or negligence.
interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:
When pressed on cross-examination, private respondent Alfonso Verchez branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform
could not give any plausible reason as to the reason why he did not functions. Grace of the non-delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to
accompany his ailing wife to Manila.31 deliver it again, knowing – as it should know – that time is of the essence
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and in the delivery of telegrams. When its second long-delayed attempt to
xxxx household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even deliver the telegram again failed, it, again, waited for another 12 days
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent
obligation indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth
It is also important to consider in resolving private respondents’ claim for requisite is thus also present.
moral damages that private respondent Grace Verchez did not accompany xxxx
her ailing mother to Manila.32
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons damages in cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty of
xxxx herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
father of a family to prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied) contractual obligation.36
It is the common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wife’s side as
much as possible. The fact that private respondent Alfonso Verchez stayed RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week convincingly demonstrates that he father of a family to prevent damage.
himself knew that his wife was not in critical condition.33
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) presence of the following requisites to justify the award is in order:
xxxx
RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
liability is, it bears repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
the presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed to or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
rebut this presumption. omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of damages sustained by
the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages. instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the
Civil Code.34 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents following mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts,
Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides: Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
respondents was correctly appreciated by the CA in this wise: action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of xxxx
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the appellees on time, disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this blamed each other for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
Chapter. (Underscoring supplied) involved the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes.35 another. (Emphasis supplied)

RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly
prove that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent are present. disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents.
damage. Article 2180 of the Civil Code so provides: As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity"
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides: among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil
responsible. damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
xxxx contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is
in order, as is the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise compelled to litigate to protect their rights.
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the  RTC records, p. 2.
1
 Mindex Resources Development v. Morillo, 428 Phil. 934,
24

"Telegram Transmission Form" is not a contract of adhesion. Thus it 944-945 (2002) (citations omitted).
argues:  Exhibit "A," RTC records, p. 7; Exhibit "C," records, p. 9.
2
25
 Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Rodriguez,
Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of  Exhibit "A," supra note 2.
3 G.R. No. 83768, February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 899, 905
adhesion as held by the respondent court. The said stipulations were (citations omitted).
all written in bold letters right in front of the Telegram Transmission  Supra note 1.
4

Form. As a matter of fact they were beside the space where the telegram  Id. at 908 (citations omitted).
26

senders write their telegraphic messages. It would have been different if  Exhibit "D," RTC records, pp. 10-11.
5

the stipulations were written at the back for surely there is no way the  Rollo, pp. 12-15.
27

sender will easily notice them. The fact that the stipulations were located
 Exhibit "E," RTC records p. 12.
6
in a particular space where they can easily be seen, is sufficient notice to  Id. at 13.
28

any sender (like Grace Verchez-Infante) where she could manifest her
disapproval, leave the RCPI station and avail of the services of the other  Exhibit "F," RTC records, p. 13.
7

 Id.
29
telegram operators.37 (Underscoring supplied)
 RTC records, p. 4.
8
30
 Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the
 Id.
9
readability of the stipulations nor their physical location in the contract  Id. (citations omitted).
31
determines whether it is one of adhesion. 10
 Id. at 4-5.
32
 Id.
A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties 11
 Id. at 19-30.
imposes a ready-made form of contract, which the other party may accept  Id. at 15.
33
or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. One party prepares the 12
stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his  Id. at 42.
34
 Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. Court of
signature or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation and
13
 Id. at 60-61. Appeals, 437 Phil. 76, 84 (2002); see also Gamboa, Rodriguez,
depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal
Rivera & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117456, May
footing.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
14 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 68 (citations omitted).
 Id. at 61.
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable,  CA rollo, p. 97 (citations omitted).
35
since it is construed strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to
15
 Id. at 61-62. See also p. 30.
any ambiguity therein, it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or
 See Sarmiento v. Sun-Cabrido, 449 Phil. 108, 116-117 (2003).
36
subversive of public policy when the weaker party is imposed upon in 16
 Id. at p. 62.
dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the 37
alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the  Rollo, p. 55.
17
 Id. at 393 (citations omitted).
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.39
 Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of
38
18
 Id. at 394.
Appeals, 325 Phil. 588, 597 (1996).
This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the parties’
contract is one of adhesion which is void is, given the facts and  Penned by Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with the
19

circumstances of the case, thus well-taken.

39
 Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95536, March 23,
concurrence of Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Vicente Q.
1992, 207 SCRA 498, 528; Philippine Commercial
Roxas.
International Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra; Sweet Lines, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of v. Teves, G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978, 83 SCRA 361
20
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.  Rollo, p. 9. (citations omitted).

Costs against petitioner.

21
 Ibid.

22
 Id. at 12.
SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 179736               June 26, 2013
 FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
23

Footnotes Corporation, 435 Phil. 333, 341-342 (2002) (citations omitted).

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,  In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties. 31 The fallo
vs. not install the video surveillance cameras,16nor did they order their reads:
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction. 17 They also
CHOACHUY, Respondents. clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed
DECISION Ruling of the Regional Trial Court orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the
respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
DEL CASTILLO, J.: On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application
for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order reads: SO ORDERED.32
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for one's personality as a unique individual whose claim to WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Issues
privacy and non-interference demands respect."1 Writ of Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of
a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let a Writ of Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy,
Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove
the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building I.
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.
overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
Factual Antecedents within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED
facing the road. 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint 5 for IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary II.
Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as
Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Respondents moved for a reconsideration  but the RTC denied the same
21

Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23Thus: THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
(Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 lack of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance with
the Order dated 18 October 2005. AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL
situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED
1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; 7 that respondents IT IS SO ORDERED.24 SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y
constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER
1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed Preliminary Injunction.
that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that III.
the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is
adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Ruling of the Court of Appeals THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO
allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY
of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their employees and clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on- the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was IV.
going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of
remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting the building, they could not have installed video surveillance THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
illegal surveillance.14 cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE
PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED
15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.
X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33 not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
to be let alone."47
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to
parties to this suit. them against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.
recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore,
Petitioners’ Arguments even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers
under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
of their homes.48 individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore,
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to
Preliminary Injunction because respondents’ installation of a stationary residences.
camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation
of petitioners’ right to privacy. 34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil of the Civil Code covers business offices The "reasonable expectation of
Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of privacy" test is used to determine
others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s whether there is a violation of the right
where the public are excluded to privacy.
residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that
petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said therefrom and only certain individuals In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts
provision.37 use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines
are allowed to enter. whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that
petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a
respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate fiction.38 They right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where committed against him by other individuals. It states: expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society
the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices
consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39 may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
Respondents’ Arguments similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall circumstances surrounding the case.54
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property involved is not used (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by xxxx expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
Aldo, the registered owner of the building, 41as additional security for its privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be
building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43 used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right
would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any
Our Ruling Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of
another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into the
The Petition is meritorious. privacy of another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary
residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo Injunction, ruled that:
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. M. Tolentino:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution  and in our laws. It is
44 Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a revolving
defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s residence." This does not mean, however, that only the residence is camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A business privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." 45 It is the right of an office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded does not only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at
individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans
through a good portion of the land of petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact 1
 Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415,434 (1968).
was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video 2
 Rollo, pp. 10-33.
monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the surveillance cameras.
purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the  CA rollo, pp. 111-116; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P.
3

building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio L.
towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used Villamor and Stephen C. Cruz.
to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application
over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents 4
 Id. at 128-129.
as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55 concerns but they did not seem to care, 60 and thus, he reported the matter 5
 Records, pp. 1-8.
to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there 6
 Id. at 2.
of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family
a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these
facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper
7
 Id. at 3.
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we parties to be impleaded. 8
see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need  Id.
not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct
on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be 9
 Id.
from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation
interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the managed by the Choachuy family.63
court.56 Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. 10
 Id.
Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an
injunctive writ. Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim 11
 Id.
that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the
compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building
12
 Id. at 4.
parties to this suit. and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the
video surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for
13
 Id. at 5.
A real party defendant is one who has a reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of
correlative legal obligation to redress a the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video 14
 Id. at 8.
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these
the defendant's act or omission which instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge. 15
 Id. at 23-26.
had violated the legal right of the
former. All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that 16
 Id. at 24.
respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that 17
 Id. at 25.
respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
18
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who  Id. at 24.
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court 19
 Id. at 51-56; penned by Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap.
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and
the real party-in-interest. SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of 20
 Id. at 55-56.
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. 21
 Id. at 75-79.
redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former."57 SO ORDERED. 22
 Id. at 98-99.

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that Footnotes 23
 Erroneously dated as February 6, 2005.
since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video
24
 Records, p. 99. judge after examination under oath or affirmation of LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, 
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, vs.
25
 CA rollo, pp. 2-12. and particularly describing the place to be searched FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.
and the persons or things to be seized.
26
 Id. at 111-116. RESOLUTION
 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R.
45

27
 Id. at 113-114. Nos. 157870, 158633 & 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA
NACHURA, J.:
410, 431.
28
 Id. at 114. It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing
 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
46

Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 Edition, Volume I, p. 108. to the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular
29
 Id. individuals.1 The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an
47
 Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 970 (1998). individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a
30
 Id. at 115. duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suffered a
special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-
 Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Judge Español, 493
48
performance.2
31
 Id.
Phil. 507, 516 (2005), citing Villanueva v. Querubin, 150-C
Phil. 519, 525 (1972).
32
 Id. at 116. Emphases in the original. By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision3 in this
 Pineda, Ernesto L., Torts and Damages (Annotated), 2004
49 case.
33
 Rollo, pp. 20-21. Edition, p. 279.
As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows:
34
 Id. at 173-176. 50
 Supra note 46 at 110.
35
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No.
 Id. at 172.  In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
51
7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its
Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 715 (2006). effectivity, cigarette brands 'Champion," "Hope," and "More"
36
 Id. at 174-175. were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at
52
 Supra note 47 at 980. the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days
37
 Id. before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93
53
 Id. at 981. reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally
38
 Id. at 27. manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope,"
54
 Id. at 980.
39
 Id. "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA
55
7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured
 Records, p. 55. cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and
40
 Id. at 153-154.
which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the
 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration v. Chavez, G.R.
56
minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per
41
 Id. at 152. No. 169802, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 451, 471. pack."
42
 Id. at 154.  Reyes v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, 551
57
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner
SCRA 86, 92. Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to
43
 Id. at 152. Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On
58
 CA rollo, pp. 114-115. July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a
44
 Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides: certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993,
59
 Records, p. 3 respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30,
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 60
 Id. at 54. 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from
G.R. No. 141309             December 23, 2008
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition
probable cause to be determined personally by the for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on
September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the certification against forum shopping was cured by the public at large and no one individual could single himself out
implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, submission of the corporate secretary's certificate giving and assert that they were duties owing to him alone. So,
1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and authority to its counsel to execute the same. 4 [Citations and members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only
unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the underscoring omitted.] wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the
deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. duty was owing to himself rather than to another. Highway
This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by
this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Court of Appeals (CA) and directed the trial court to continue with the considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening
Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.5 or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular
short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. individual of the community.
Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint of the said decision.6 After respondent filed its comment, the Court, in its These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed
for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. April 14, 2008 Resolution,7 denied with finality petitioner's motion for that they are sufficient to define the general doctrine.
Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for reconsideration.
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the 2. Of Duties to Individuals. - The second class above referred
issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against to includes those who, while they owe to the public the general
deprivation of property without due process of law and the right Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the
case] to the Honorable Court En Banc.8 She contends that the petition duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet
to equal protection of the laws. become, by reason of their employment by a particular
raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The
earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) officers, and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They
respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi- serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation
RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and judicial powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal from fees paid by each individual who employs them.
within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her
merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private
one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of National Internal Revenue Code.9 Petitioner hence moves for the suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision.10 an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment,
certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent's a notary public in protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of
counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector, each
principal party who should sign the same. In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,11 the Court referred the case to the En
Banc. Respondent consequently moved for the reconsideration of this owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but
resolution. he is also under a special duty to the particular individual
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due
dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner performance.12
would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without We now resolve both motions.
allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper
defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined
respondent's submission of the corporate secretary's certificate to the public collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent
authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum particular individuals, thus: Floyd R. Mechem instructs, "[t]he liability of a public officer to an
shopping. x x x x individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to
1. Of Duties to the Public. - The first of these classes embraces the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to
xxxx those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public that one he can incur no liability."13
collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for individual; who act for the public at large, and who are Stated differently, when what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in
certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ordinarily paid out of the public treasury. general", an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against
ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or
arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but
The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the class are numerous and the distinction will be readily no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the
Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no
public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special that the laws are properly executed, that fit and competent duty to him as an individual.14 The remedy in this case is not judicial but
law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered political.15
faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and
sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of
a particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improper against the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.32
performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the
never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner.
public only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the Without any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondent's
damage alone does not constitute a wrong. 16 A contrary precept (that an respondent. The phrase "financial and business difficulties" 26 mentioned in complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article
individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot 32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court
an action against a public officer on account of an improper performance translate into a "particular injury." In contrast, the facts of the case in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals(CIR v.
or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the CA),33 where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her
deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might have respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had "fallen short of a valid
the like-the complaining individual has no better right than anybody levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93. and effective administrative issuance." This is a logical inference. Without
else.17 If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that
rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a With no "particular injury" alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no respondent's rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the
public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would laws were violated by the petitioner's administrative issuance would be
the grounds upon which all actions are founded.18 violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her
tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, motion to dismiss.
Juxtaposed with Article 3219 of the Civil Code, the principle may now because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer right of another.27 But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional;
personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that certainly not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the
violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that
injury to the former. This is consistent with this Court's pronouncement in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum
its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioner's motion for or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring prior notice before RMC's could
reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort for respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part become "operative." However, this Court did not make an express finding
impairment of rights and liberties."20 of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a of violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal
breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may protection, CIR v. CA said: "Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for maintain an action for recovery of damages.28 likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation;" a statement that does not
damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondent's
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of constitutional right. Even if one were to ascribe a constitutional
plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal action is to set up this defense in a motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A infringement by RMC 37-93 on the non-uniformity of tax provisions, the
responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the nature of the constitutional transgression falls under Section 28, Article
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. VI-not Section 1, Article III-of the Constitution.
law.21 Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,22 we granted the petitioner's claim However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and
for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of his motor launch due material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible This Court's own summation in CIR v. CA: "All taken, the Court is
to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a
upheld the right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there was an of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject valid and effective administrative issuance," does not lend itself to an
injury sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding of his to judicial notice."29 interpretation that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaint's
horserace prize winnings. reliance on CIR v. CA-which is cited in, and a copy of which is annexed
The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is to, the complaint-as suggestive of a violation of due process and equal
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officer's duty owing to the obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled protection, must fail.
public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau to any relief.30
of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph
Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, 2.02 of respondent's complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid
hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under
Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue cause of action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is
v. Court of Appeals,24 we declared as having "fallen short of a valid and merely the allegation that only respondent's "Champion", "Hope" and
effective administrative issuance."25 A public officer, such as the even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of
constitutional rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,31 where we "More" cigarettes were reclassified.
petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty
to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the said:
requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of
to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted respondent's cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be
affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule. with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a paragraph 2.01, which reads:
 2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may under the First Amendment. A number of other cases 40 with virtually the
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter referred to as be instructive. same conclusion followed.
RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying specifically "Champion", "Hope"
and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign 42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against
brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached hereto and 1871, presents a parallel to our own Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it government tax officials and employees may prosper, if we consider the
made an integral part hereof as ANNEX "A". The issuance of a states: pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,41 that
circular and its implementation resulted in the "deprivation of a Bivens remedy will not be allowed when other "meaningful safeguards
property" of plaintiff. They were done without due process of or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the plaintiff)" are
law and in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not appropriate in
protection of the laws. (Italics supplied.) the civil service system42or in the military justice system.43
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, "done without due process of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the
law" and "in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit United States of America,44 petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action
laws" are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in in equity or other proper proceeding for redress. against agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he
petitioner's motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, (Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment,
are not deemed as facts. confiscated Vennes' business, forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes out
This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many
petitioners intending to win liability cases against government officials of business, when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of Appeals,
In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., when they violate the constitutional rights of citizens. Eighth Circuit, ruled:
Ltd.,34 this Court declared that the test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a
facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Investigation,36 has emerged as the leading case on the victim's entitlement taxpayer's remedies under the Internal Revenue Code preclude
prayer of the complaint. In the instant case, since what remains of the such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority,
complaint which is hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant
and unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal and we have found none. Though the Supreme Court has not
reclassification of respondent's cigarettes, there will not be enough facts addressed this precise question, it has strongly suggested that the
for the court to render a valid judgment according to the prayer in the narcotics officers broke into Bivens' home at 6:30 a.m. without a search
warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed district court correctly applied Bivens:
complaint.
Bivens, searched his premises, employed excessive force, threatened to
arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip search in the federal court When the design of a Government program suggests
Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and booked him. When that Congress has provided what it considers adequate
premised on violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize Bivens was brought before a United States Commissioner, however, remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that
the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, charges against him were dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of may occur in the course of its administration, we have
particularly those related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice the Fourth Amendment "by a federal agent acting under color of authority not created additional Bivens remedies.
may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his
amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes constitutional conduct," the U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is
provide ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, xxxx
entitled to recover damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the
were availed of by the respondent-without even having to pay the agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment.
assessment under protest-as recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA, viz.: Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for
taxpayers who challenge overzealous tax assessment and
A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, collection activities. A taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy
In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate in Scheuer v. Rhodes,37 a liability suit for money damages was allowed
division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, assessment both administratively and judicially, and may sue the
against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three government for a tax refund, and have authorized taxpayer
reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was students who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State
denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, actions against the United States to recover limited damages
University as they protested against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. resulting from specific types of misconduct by IRS employees.
the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency In Wood v. Strickland,38 local school board members were sued by high
amounting to P9,598,334.00. These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in the
school students who argued that they had been deprived of constitutional politically sensitive realm of taxation, Congress's refusal to
due process rights when they were expelled from school for having spiked permit unrestricted damage action by taxpayers has not been
On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. inadvertent. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Vennes's
with the CTA.35 In Butz v. Economou,39Economou, whose registration privilege as a Bivens claims against IRS agents for their tax assessment and
commodities futures trader was suspended, without prior warning, by collection activities.
The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that
the opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies, the suspension was aimed at "chilling" his freedom of expression right
contradict the respondent's claim of due process infringement.
In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS SO ORDERED. and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
employees for alleged violation of due process rights concerning a tax damages:
dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said: Footnotes
(1) Freedom of religion;
In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, * On leave.
judicial and otherwise, for correcting and redressing wrongful (2) Freedom of speech;
acts taken by IRS employees in connection with any collection 1
 Cruz, The Law of Public Officers, 2007 ed., p. 223.
activities. Although these provisions do not provide taxpayers (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
with an all-encompassing remedy for wrongful acts of IRS periodical publication;
2
 Moss v. Cummins, 44 Mich. 359, 360-361, 6 N.W. 843, 844
personnel, the rights established under the Code illustrate that it
(1880).
provides all sorts of rights against the overzealous officialdom, (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the government
for a refund if forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the  Rollo, pp. 630-645; Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco
3

Corporation, G.R. No. 141309, June 19 2007, 525 SCRA 11. (5) Freedom of suffrage;
collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the
remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage
suit against IRS employees.45
4
 Id. at 632-634. (6) The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law;
5
American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the  Id. at 643.
(7) The right to a just compensation when private
petitioner. property is taken for public use;
6
 Id. at 646.
Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax 7 (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
Reform Act of 1997), which provides:  Id. at 859.

8
 Id. at 860-882. (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house,
Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
Internal Revenue Officer. - When an action is brought against 9 seizures;
 Id. at 860-864.
any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of
any act done in the performance of official duty, and the (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
Commissioner is notified of such action in time to make defense
10
 Id. at 881.
against the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment, (11) The privacy of communication and
damages or costs recovered in such action shall be satisfied by
11
 Id. at 891.
correspondence;
the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or
if the same be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or  Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and
12
(12) The right to become a member of associations or
reimbursed to him. Officers (1890), pp. 386-387.
societies for purposes not contrary to law;

No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed

13
 Id. at 390.
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to
in behalf of a person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, petition the Government for redress of grievances;
14
or with willful oppression.  Id. at 390-391.
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in
Because the respondent's complaint does not impute negligence or bad
15
 Supra note 1. any form;
faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her
16
will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the  Supra note 12, at 390-391. (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.46
17
 Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns. 223, 10 Am. Dec. 219 (1821). (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioner's motion for and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
18
reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision and DENY respondent's  Id. the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case public trial, to meet witnesses face to face, and to have
No. CV-97-341-MK, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina 19
 Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private compulsory process to secure the attendance of
City, is DISMISSED. individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates witnesses in his behalf;
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
 (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness  Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
30

against one's self, or from being forced to confess Ltd., G.R. No. 159648, July 27, 2007.
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity
or reward to make such confession, except when the  G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 602.
31

person confessing becomes a State witness;

32
G.R. No. 168906             December 4, 2008
 Id. at 620-621.
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and
unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or  G. R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996.
33 PERLA S. ESGUERRA, petitioner, 
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not vs.
been judicially declared unconstitutional; and JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, J. WALTER THOMPSON
 G.R. No. 159648, July 27, 2008.
34
COMPANY (PHILS.), INC., and AGL MARKET RESEARCH
(19) Freedom of access to the courts. INCORPORATED, respondents.
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
35

No. 119761, August 29, 1996, 261 SCRA 236, 244.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the DECISION
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 619
36
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil 37
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution  416 U.S. 232 (1974).
(if the latter be instituted) and may be proved by preponderance Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
of evidence.  420 U.S. 308 (1975).
38 are the Decision1 dated 31 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 79075 which denied the Petition for Prohibition
 434 U.S. 994 (1978).
39 and Certiorari/Mandamuswith application for Temporary Restraining
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Perla S. Esguerra
damages may also be adjudicated.
(Esguerra); and the Resolution2 dated 12 July 2005 of the appellate court
 E.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Martinez v. State
40
in the same case denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a of California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.  487 U.S. 412 (1988).
41 Esguerra is a licensed nutritionist-dietitian presently employed as the
Chief Dietitian of the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), located at East
Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City. Respondents J. Walter Thompson
20
 Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, supra note 3.  Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
42
Company3 (JWT) and AGL Market Research, Inc. (AGL) are corporations
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. On 15 May 2000, AB
21
 Sps. Custodio v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 575 (1996), cited  Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
43
Food and Beverages4 Philippines (AB Food) entered into a contract with
in Laynesa v. Uy, G.R. No. 149553, February 29, 2008, 547 JWT whereby the latter would handle the advertising, marketing,
SCRA 200.  26 F. 3d 1448 (1994), 74 A.F.T.R. 2d 94-5144.
44
promotional and general publicity requirements of the former.
22
 No. L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299.  Tonn v. United States of America, 847 F. Supp. 711, 73
45
Esguerra filed an Amended Complaint5 for Damages with Prayer for
A.F.T.R. 2d 94-727 Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against JWT and
23
 G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 602, 621. AGL, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and raffled to
 See Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. Court
46
Branch 87 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), presided by
24
 G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996, 261 SCRA 236. of Appeals, 214 SCRA 286. respondent Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala (Judge Asdala).
25
 Id. at 252. In her Amended Complaint, Esguerra alleged that on 14 May 2003, AGL,
thru its Director/General Manager Nicanor G. Aguirre (Aguirre), wrote a
26
 Rollo, p. 686. letter to the PHC, inviting nutritionists from the said hospital to participate
in a study it was conducting. Aguirre gave the assurance that "all
27
 Drilon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106922, April 20, 2001. information that would be generated from this study would be kept
completely confidential," and the AGL representative bearing the letter
28
 Id. made it understood that, among other things, a talent fee of P20,000.00
would be paid to the nutritionist who would be chosen to appear in a
29
 Id. commercial that would subsequently be shot.
Esguerra narrated that she showed up at the Cravings Restaurant in San by JWT and AGL, the Ovaltine commercial showing Esguerra continued RTC-Branch 87, however, subsequently issued an Order dated 28 August
Juan at the appointed time on 16 May 2003 to participate in the AGL to be broadcasted on a daily basis up to the time she instituted Civil Case 2003 in which it ruled on Esguerra’s application for preliminary injunction
"study." The first stage thereof consisted in being "interviewed" by a lady No. Q-03-50205. and/or TRO, thus:
about two unnamed products with disclosed ingredients and nutrients; the
second product had evidently higher nutrients. Esguerra was requested to Esguerra thus prayed of the RTC-Branch 87 the following: From the given facts (par. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) in the complaint,
compare the two products and asked whether she would endorse use of the this Court finds that not only did [herein petitioner Esguerra]
higher-nutrient product. In the second stage of the supposed study, clearly fail to point the specific acts committed by each of the
Esguerra was taken inside a room where she was asked additional WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioner
Esguerra] most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that: [herein respondents JWT and AGL] in alleged violation of her
questions by another lady, while a man, apparently representing JWT, right or which has caused her or will cause her injustice,
focused a video-camera on her. She was then asked to uncover and find [Esguerra] likewise failed to show in her application the material
out for herself the product she preferred to endorse. Her candid reaction to 1) Pending hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, and substantial right she claims to have been invaded by [JWT
the "discovery" was that it was Ovaltine. The incident was taped on the a Temporary Restraining Order be immediately issued enjoining and AGL] to warrant the issuance of preliminary injunction.
video-camera. As Esguerra emerged from the room, a third lady [herein respondents JWT and AGL] from airing the subject
approached her asking her to sign a piece of paper and telling her that it Ovaltine commercial featuring the appearance therein of
had to do with the taping that just took place. Since she was in a hurry to [Esguerra]; and after such hearing, for a preliminary prohibitory Since facts have not been sufficiently shown by [Esguerra] in
keep another appointment in Quezon City, Esguerra signed the document, injunction to issue against such airing; her application to bring her case within the conditions required
which appeared to be a contract of agreement, but expressly writing at the by Sec. 3, Rule 58,7 this Court has to refuse injunction, more
side thereof that in case she would be chosen to appear in the commercial, considering the fact that the action for damages which
2) Following trial on the merits, judgment be rendered in favor [Esguerra] has already instituted against [JWT and AGL] would
which she thought would still be shot at some future time, clearance from of [Esguerra] and against [JWT and AGL], making said
the Director of the PHC must first be obtained before such commercial adequately compensate the injuries caused her.
injunction already permanent, and further ordering [JWT and
may be shown to the public. Esguerra also verbally informed the third lady AGL] as follows:
of this condition. From an overall judicious examination of [Eguerra’s] allegation
in support of her application for injunction, this Court finds that
a) To pay the amount of P20,000.00 as [Esguerra’s] issuance of an injunctive relief based on the facts obtaining is
On 16 June 2003, at about noontime, an Ovaltine commercial was aired on talent fee plus interest at the legal rate thereon until
television with Esguerra appearing therein. The said commercial showed a not warranted.
fully paid;
portion of Esguerra’s interview videotaped on 16 May 2003. According to
Esguerra, there was absolutely no advice from either JWT or AGL prior to WHEREFORE, [Esguerra’s] application for injunction is
the airing of the commercial that she had been chosen to so appear therein. b) To pay the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of DENIED for lack of merit.8
Neither did JWT and AGL secure the required clearance from the PHC moral damages;
Director nor did they pay Esguerra any talent fee for the commercial. This led Esguerra to file another Urgent Motion9 which sought, among
c) To pay the sum of P300,000.00 as and by way of other reliefs, reconsideration of the Order dated 28 August 2003 of RTC-
That same afternoon of 16 June 2003, after being informed of the exemplary damages; Branch 87 and resolution of her Motion for Inhibition. She averred in her
unexpected airing of the Ovaltine commercial, and fearful of any adverse Urgent Motion that the denial of her application for injunctive relief was
consequences, disciplinary sanction, or misunderstanding which may d) To pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the amount highly irregular, having been issued without a summary hearing, in
result therefrom, Esguerra allegedly took the following actions: (a) she due, as and by way of attorney’s fees; violation of the provisions of Section 4(d), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
immediately called up JWT Account Director Joef Peña to protest against Civil Procedure.
the showing of the commercial; (b) she wrote a letter dated 17 June 2003
e) To pay the costs of suit.6
to JWT, copy furnished AGL, to formally protest the airing of the However, without waiting for the resolution of her Urgent Motion by
commercial and to demand the immediate pull-out of the same; and (c) she RTC-Branch 87, Esguerra filed a Petition10before the Court of Appeals,
furnished the PHC Director and her Association with copies of her 17 June Esguerra claimed to have made several inquiries on the status of her
application for preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79075, in which she sought the issuance of:
2003 letter to inform and explain to them that what happened anent the (a) an Order to expedite the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205;
Ovaltine commercial was not of her volition. Order (TRO) with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court. She was assured that
her application would be set for hearing. After almost three weeks of (b) a Writ of Prohibition permanently enjoining Judge Asdala of RTC-
waiting without her application for injunctive relief being set for hearing, Branch 87 from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-
Esguerra averred that JWT responded by transmitting to her, on 24 June 50205 and an Order to re-raffle the said case to another judge; and (c) a
Esguerra filed on 26 August 2003 an Urgent Motion for Inhibition of RTC
2003, a communication officially informing her for the first time of her Writ of Certiorari to annul and set aside the denial of Esguerra’s
Judge Asdala, asserting therein that "by failing to act swiftly on her
selection as one of those who would appear in the Ovaltine commercial, application for injunction/TRO. In the alternative, Esguerra prayed for the
application for TRO as mandated under the law, [RTC Judge Asdala] has
for which she would receive remuneration in the amount of P5,000.00. issuance of: (a) a Writ of Mandamusordering Judge Asdala to conduct
already displayed partiality and bias against her and in favor of the [herein
Not satisfied therewith, Esguerra, through her counsel, wrote JWT on 4 summary hearing on Esguerra’s application for injunction/TRO; (b) an
respondents JWT and AGL], whether or not for `valuable’ consideration."
July 2003 a second missive seeking, among other demands, the immediate Order directing Judge Asdala to pay damages sustained by Esguerra; and
cessation of the airing of the Ovaltine commercial and payment of the (c) an Order enjoining Judge Asdala from conducting further proceedings
agreed upon talent fee of P20,000.00. Despite her letter-protest, received in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205.
On 3 September 2003, Judge Asdala issued an Order explaining why no Q-03-50205 was then re-raffled on 2 October 200313 to the Quezon City The hearing of the application for preliminary injunction set on
hearing was conducted on the prayer for TRO filed by Esguerra. The RTC-Branch 215, presided over by Judge Maria Luisa Quijano-Padilla November 19, 2003 is maintained.17
Order of Judge Asdala reads: (Judge Padilla).
After conducting a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction
Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides At the hearing held on 10 October 2003, Esguerra informed the trial court prayed for by Esguerra, RTC-Branch 215 issued on 8 June 2004 another
that, a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may (Branch 215) that the Ovaltine advertisement had ceased to be aired on Order likewise granting Esguerra’s application for preliminary injunction:
be granted only when: (a) the application in the action or television and that she was therefore desisting from asking for the
proceedings is verified, and (b) the application shows facts temporary restraining order and/or injunction without prejudice to again WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
entitling the applicant to the relief demanded. The Rules further avail herself of the said reliefs should the showing thereof resume.14 restraining and enjoining [respondents] from airing the subject
states that the application for a temporary restraining order shall commercial pending the resolution of the main case upon
only be acted upon in a summary proceeding which shall be Acting on Esguerra’s motion, RTC-Branch 215 issued an Order dated 27 posting of a bond in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
conducted within 24 hours after the sheriff’s return of service October 2003, in which it decreed: (P500,000.00) Pesos pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the 1997
and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle. Rules of Civil Procedure.
From this particular provision, it is clear that the conduct of a
summary hearing within 24 hours after the sheriff’s return of WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court declares as
service is subject to the condition that the summons, as well as, follows: Let this case be set for pre-trial conference on July 14, 2004 at
the complaint and the verified application for temporary 8:30 a.m.18
restraining order have been properly served upon the adverse a) The application for TRO is rendered moot and academic by
parties, which requirement however, has not been satisfied in the the manifestation of [herein petitioner Esguerra] that she is Henceforth, RTC-Branch 215 carried on with the proceedings in Civil
instant case. withdrawing the same with a reservation to revive should it be Case No. Q-03-50205.
deemed necessary;
A perusal of the record shows that there is no verified Since Esguerra did not withdraw her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075,
application for temporary restraining order on record, neither is b) The Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the the Court of Appeals also proceeded with the same.
it shown that the applicant has provided the adverse parties with application for preliminary injunction is likewise rendered moot
any verified affidavit in support of her application. What is and academic pursuant to the above-cited reason; In its Decision dated 31 March 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed
shown is service of the summons and the amended complaint to Esguerra’s Petition. It reasoned that Judge Asdala resolved Esguerra’s
only one defendant, J. Walter Thompson Company (Phils.), but c) The Motion to Admit Answer filed by [herein respondent] J. application for injunction/TRO in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 in the
not to defendant AGL Market. Indeed, there are more reasons Walter Thompson is granted; exercise of her judicial function. Esguerra assailed in her Petition an
than one, as to why this Court did not conduct a summary official act of Judge Asdala, for which the latter cannot be made
hearing within the 24 hours period after the sheriff’s return of answerable for damages.
service of summons to defendant J. Walter Thompson and those d) The Urgent Motion (to declare [herein respondent] J. Walter
reasons are, as just stated. Thompson in default) is rendered moot and academic with the
admission of the Answer of said [respondent].15 The Court of Appeals also pointed out in its Decision that the writ
of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no
Plaintiff’s complaint at the inception was already defective but plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and in
despite sufficient time allowed for her to correct that, plaintiff Again, claiming that the airing of the commercial resumed, Esguerra filed
another Urgent Motion16 once more urging the RTC-Branch 215 to issue a this case, the writ of certiorari is a remedy not yet available to Esguerra at
did not, complacent, that the Court will overlook them in her the time she filed her Petition for the same. It noted that Esguerra filed her
favor. With such defects and the filing of the amended preliminary injunction/TRO as she originally prayed for in her Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205. Petition even before the resolution by the RTC-Branch 87 of her motion
complaint, on August 7, 2003, eight (8) days after the Sheriff’s for reconsideration of its Order dated 28 August 2003. And even though
return showing that service of summons and the complaint Esguerra already withdrew her application for injunction/TRO, the denial
without a verified affidavit or verified application for temporary On 14 November 2003, RTC-Branch 215 issued an Order granting the of which by RTC-Branch 87 she was assailing in her Petition, she still
restraining order, the Court is not obliged to conduct a summary TRO Esguerra prayed for, to wit: wanted to pursue the Petition in apprehension that her reinstated
hearing, because the essential "time element" is deemed to have application for injunctive relief would again be denied by RTC-Branch
been waived by the plaintiff herself when she filed the amended 215. This practice of taking shortcuts of the established rules of procedure
Accordingly, let a temporary restraining order issue against the
complaint only on August 7, 2003; the non-service of the would not be countenanced by the appellate court.19
[herein respondents] J. Walter Thompson Company (Phils.) Inc.,
complaint and affidavit/application for temporary restraining
AGL Market Research Incorporated, and AB Food and
order to the defendants.11
Beverage Philippines, directing them to cease and desist from Esguerra’s Motion for Reconsideration20 of the Decision dated 31 March
airing on different television networks the commercial of 2005 of the Court of Appeals was denied by the same court in its
In the meantime, during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 before Ovaltine where [herein petitioner Esguerra] appears as an Resolution dated 12 July 2005.21
the Court of Appeals, Judge Asdala issued an Order 12 dated 18 September endorser of said product for a period of twenty (20) days from
2003, inhibiting herself from Civil Case No. Q-03-50205. Civil Case No. receipt of this Order.
Esguerra is presently before us via the Petition at bar, raising the following file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with reconsideration from the adverse 28 August 2003 Order of RTC-Branch
issues: certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or 87 was still available to, and was in fact, availed of by Esguerra.
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
1) Whether or not the case had become totally moot and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Esguerra would also later on withdraw her application for preliminary
academic. injunction/TRO. At this point, the question of whether RTC-Branch 87
SEC. 2. Petition for Prohibition. – When the proceedings of any properly denied the said application, became moot and academic. 24 There
2) Whether or not the public respondent may be held liable for tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether is no more justiciable controversy insofar as the denial of the petition for
damages. exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are preliminary injunction/TRO is concerned, so that a declaration thereon
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in this regard to which Esguerra would be entitled and which would be
3) What is the amount of damages that should be awarded.22 there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate negated by the dismissal of her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 by the
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved appellate court.25 Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
Esguerra wants us not only to reverse and set aside the assailed Decision thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved.
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, but also to hold Judge Asdala the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered Courts will not determine a moot question.26
answerable for damages in the amount of P2.2 million, plus costs of suit commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings
and attorney’s fees. in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting Esguerra still insists that her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 cannot be
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. moot and academic because the issue of Judge Asdala’s liability for the
In sum, Esguerra asserts that she suffered damages by reason of the damages Esguerra sustained survived Esguerra’s withdrawal of her
continued showing of the offending commercial from the time the TRO SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, application for injunctive relief and Judge Asdala’s inhibition from Civil
should have been issued by Judge Asdala of RTC-Branch 87, to the time it corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the Case No. Q-03-50206, and still needed to be resolved.
was actually issued by Judge Padilla of RTC-Branch 215. By Esguerra’s performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
determination, Judge Asdala could and should have issued the TRO as duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully It is indubitable that Judge Asdala’s Order dated 28 August 2003 denying
early as 1 August 2003, since summons were already served on excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office Esguerra’s application for a preliminary injunction/TRO was rendered in
respondents on 29 July 2003 and Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 was raffled to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, the exercise of her official function as the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch
to the RTC-Branch 87 on 31 July 2003. Under Section 4(d) of Rule 58, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the 87 which had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-03-50206 and all its
Judge Asdala was obliged to already conduct a summary hearing on person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the incidents, including the said application. Judges cannot be subjected to
Esguerra’s application by the very next day, 1 August 2003, but Judge proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that liability – civil, criminal or administrative – for any of their official acts,
Asdala dilly-dallied in acting on the application too long. From 1 August judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when
2003 to 17 November 2003, the date when JWT and AGL received copies or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance, may they be
of the Order dated 14 November 2003 of RTC-Branch 215 granting a required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to held criminally or administratively responsible.27
TRO in Esguerra’s favor and, when the showing of the Ovaltine pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
commercial was actually stopped, the said commercial was already shown wrongful acts of the respondent.
110 times more.23 Worse, Judge Asdala also delayed ruling on Esguerra’s In Ang v. Quilala,28 we further explained that it is settled doctrine that
Motion for Inhibition. Esguerra bases her claim for damages on the judges are not liable to respond in a civil action for damages, and are not
It does well for Esguerra to remember that at the threshold of every special otherwise administratively responsible for what they may do in the
omission or failure of Judge Asdala to do what was clearly required of her civil action under Rule 65, the person seeking the writs must be able to
by the law. exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers
show, on pain of dismissal of his petition, that his resort to such and jurisdiction. Certain it is that a judge may not be held administratively
extraordinary remedy is justified by the "absence of an appeal or any accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold
The Petition is not meritorious. The Court of Appeals did not err in plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
dismissing Esguerra’s Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. Esguerra utterly fails in this regard for there is nothing in her Petition in upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
CA-G.R. SP No. 79075, not even an allegation therein, that she had no justice can be infallible in his judgment. More importantly, the error must
Esguerra’s Petition before the Court of Appeals is one for certiorari, appeal or any other efficacious remedy against the 28 August 2003 Order be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad
prohibition, as well as mandamus, all special remedies under Rule 65 of of RTC-Branch 87 denying her application for preliminary injunction. The faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
the Rules of Court, relevant provisions of which read: Court of Appeals, therefore, was compelled to dismiss Esguerra’s Petition imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
SEC. 1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted As the Court of Appeals noted, at the time Esguerra filed her Petition in affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse CA-G.R. SP No. 79075, her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated or ill will for ulterior purposes.
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and 28 August 2003 of RTC-Branch 87 denying her application for injunctive
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy relief was still pending. This only shows that the remedy of a motion for Although Ang v. Quilala is an administrative case, our pronouncements
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may therein are equally relevant to the instant case, a special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, in which petitioner Esguerra It is clear from the foregoing that in petitions for certiorari, prohibition, 4
 Manufacturer of Ovaltine food product; rollo, p. 243.
additionally seeks civil compensation from Judge Asdala. Not every error and mandamus, the public respondent, such as Judge Asdala herein,
committed by a judge in the exercise of his official functions would make should not actively participate in the proceedings as a general rule, unless 5
 AB Foods was not impleaded in the Amended Complaint but
him liable for the damages which a party may sustain by reason thereof, directed otherwise by the court. The inclusion of the public respondent in was referred to as one of defendants in Civil Case No.Q-03-
unless it is shown that such error was so gross or patent, deliberate and such petitions is more of a formality, since it is still the private 50205 although the Records are silent as to when AB Foods was
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith. respondent/s who must contest the said petitions. It is likewise explicitly impleaded in the case. (CA rollo, p. 17.)
stated in the afore-quoted provision that the public respondent in petitions
The records do not show that Judge Asdala was moved by bad faith, ill under Rule 65 shall not be liable for the costs which may be awarded to 6
 CA rollo, p. 20.
will or malicious intent when she did not grant the TRO and preliminary the petitioner/s. It can be rationally deduced therefrom that in such
injunction Esguerra prayed for. Bad faith must be proved by clear and petitions, the public respondent is not meant to incur or shoulder personal 7
 Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A
convincing evidence.29 It is not presumed and the party who alleges the liability for his official actions, even if the writs of certiorari, prohibition
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
same has the onus of proving it.30 Esguerra has not, in fact, adduced any or mandamus are so issued against him.
proof to show that impropriety attended the actions of Judge Asdala. (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
Esguerra’s subsequent reinstatement of her application for injunction/TRO demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
While we have earlier ruled that the question of the propriety of the denial before RTC-Branch 215 did not revive the grounds for her Petition in CA- consists in restraining the commission or continuance
of the application for preliminary injunction has become moot and G.R. SP No. 79075. She sought recourse with the Court of Appeals of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
academic, still let it be stated that Judge Asdala’s ruling is not manifestly because RTC-Branch 87 denied her previous application for injunctive performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
unjust nor did it constitute gross ignorance. Her reasons for denying relief. In contrast, RTC-Branch 215, upon reinstatement by Esguerra of period or perpetually;
Esguerra’s application for injunctive relief were clearly stated in her Order her application, actually granted her a TRO and also a preliminary
of 28 August 2003. She had obviously applied therein the basic injunction. Esguerra, however, cannot use her reinstated application for
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
requirements, as laid down in jurisprudence, for entitlement to injunctive injunctive relief which was favorably acted upon by RTC-Branch 215, as
performance of the act or acts complained of during
relief and found that Esguerra’s application failed to comply with the the basis for her then pending Petition before the Court of Appeals in CA-
the litigation would probably work injustice to the
requisites. G.R. SP No. 79075. This, certainly, will be repugnant to the fundamental
applicant; or
due process which Judge Asdala must not be deprived of.
We also refer Esguerra to Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
governing her Petition before the Court of Appeals, which provides: Finally, Esguerra is still litigating her civil case against JWT and AGL threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
before RTC-Branch 215, Quezon City, in which she also prays for suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
compensation for the damages she had suffered from the airing of the violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. – When the Ovaltine commercial. To insist on recovering damages from Judge Asdala subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, for the same act, i.e., the showing of the Ovaltine commercial, render the judgment ineffectual.
quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or suspiciously appears to be an attempt to recover double compensation.
person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or
respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the
8
 CA rollo, p. 29.
person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is denied for
court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 March 2005 9
 Id. at 32.
appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf and its Resolution dated 12 July 2005 CA-G.R. SP No. 79075
of the public respondent or respondents affected by the are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. 10
 Id. at 2.
proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor
of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, SO ORDERED. 11
 Rollo, pp. 43-44.
and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public Footnotes 12
 CA rollo, p. 46.
respondent or respondents.
13
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao with  Rollo, p. 224.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Edgardo F. Sundiam,
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or concurring. Rollo, pp. 89-98. 14
 Id. at 215.
file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading
therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, 2
 Rollo, p. 106. 15
 CA rollo, p. 60.
the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal
parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the 3
 Present name is WPP Marketing Communications; rollo, p. 16
 Id. at 61.
court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings
243.
therein.
17
 Rollo, p. 54. with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.4 Charmaine subsequently
filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5 under Article 334 of the
18
 CA rollo, p. 117. Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16,
19
 Rollo, p. 97. 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an
Information6 against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
20 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
 Id. at 99.
Branch 61.1awphi1
21
 Id. at 106.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
22
 Id. at 2.
G.R. No. 137567               June 20, 2000 Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued
that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
23
 Id. at 114. posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,  Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the
24
 Kho v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 140, 151 (2002). vs. Order7 dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December
 Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 337 Phil.
25 FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 9, 1998.
654, 657-658 (1997). 139, Makati City, respondents.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the
 Korea Exchange Bank v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139460, 31
26
BUENA, J.: concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
March 2006, 486 SCRA 166, 176. City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31,
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for
 Contreras v. Judge Solis, 329 Phil. 376, 388 (1996), citing
27
Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an Order9 dated
Valdez v. Valera, 171 Phil. 217, 221 (1978). issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition
Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated
28
 444 Phil. 742, 747-748 (2003). "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The of his petition.
 Gatmaitan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 149226, 26 June 2006, 492
29 said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
SCRA 591, 605. preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner
 Sesbreño v. Igonia, A.M. No. P-04-1791, 27 January 2006,
30 on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of
480 SCRA 243, 256. nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36
question.
of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed: wife.

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and
Quezon City.1 the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might
declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the
children,2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling
Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.3 suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if
petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological
incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix
petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner
alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived
could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other 3 
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.
married man. than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
4 
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable. With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, 5 
Petition, Annex "F," Rollo, pp. 69-70.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action is void from the beginning is not a defense. 6 
Petition, Annex "H," Rollo, pp. 80-81.
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova   cited in Donato
1

not the criminal action may proceed. 11 vs. Luna 14 where this Court held that:
7 
Petition, Annex "I," Rollo, pp. 82-83.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage . . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
8 
Petition, Annex "J," Rollo, pp. 84-100.
is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should 9 
Petition, Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 33-39.
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and 10 
Petition, Annex "C," Rollo, pp. 52-54.
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
the accused would necessarily be determined. presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
11 
Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25 [1997].
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides: nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted 12 
226 SCRA 572 [1993].
for bigamy.
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
13 
22 SCRA 731 [1968].
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage
declaring such previous marriage void. should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same 14 
160 SCRA 441 [1988].
must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists
provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore,
other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
of said Decision read: Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does
not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a
party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for SO ORDERED.
the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, JJ., concur.
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely Footnotes
to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. 1 
Amended Complaint, Annex "E," Petition, Rollo, p. 61.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner
need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
2 
Annex "E," Rollo, p. 61. G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,  After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question
vs. petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to was in accord with law. 15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents. inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure
petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case. to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the
DECISION prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the
The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated elements of bigamy.16
KAPUNAN, J.: November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted
because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of
against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the for lack of legal basis.10 the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent
Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the Resolution suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a
dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, civil case.17
Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity
The facts of the case are as follows: towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.18
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to
civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was
stopped visiting her.3 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.11 I

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR
subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL
Santella (Santella).4 license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE
of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF
respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime
in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 12 When the Board denied the said
information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of II
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.5 This case was Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6 abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against
an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3)
ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and
concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does III
that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC
obligations.7 Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL
against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.14 QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner
and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from The petition has no merit.
the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and the same set of facts.
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time
of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of
With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the
act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC
was still single.8 the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic,
and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s
the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy
guarding and controlling precepts and rules.20 valid and subsisting. against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer
were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial doubt.33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.29 petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.34
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that
determined.21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima
case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be facie case against him, the trial court was already making a
decisions.22 suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held
against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case: by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the
civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. 35 The RTC’s
respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or
that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant
registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its
terminated. case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without conclusion.36 Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a
private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 23Petitioner’s before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his
continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in
obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge
initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.30 The
The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 and People vs. Aragon25 cited by exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when
existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of proceedings before the PRC Board.
a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said
is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for
the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel
Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not
be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely
declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical
even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that: respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to
were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to
nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no inhibit.
only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage by him ever took place.31
exists.28
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall
annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.32 In this
to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner SO ORDERED. 16 
Id., at 35.
against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased
and had prejudged the case.37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., 17 
Id., at 36.
Appeals,38this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been concur.
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under
Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 18,
18 

judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing 1996, Id., at 103.
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.39 Footnotes
19 
Petition, Id., at 18-24.
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit Arthur Te, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Cesar C. Peralejo as Judge, RTC
1 

are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the of Quezon City, Branch 98 and People of the Philippines, 20 
Salonga vs. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).
Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the Respondents.
sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states: 21 
Librado vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, 309-310 (1982).
Arthur Te, Petitioner, vs. Board of Civil Engineering,
2 

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall Professional Regulation Commission and Liliana Choa Te,
Respondents. Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25, 33 (1997)
22 
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as citing Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 (1995).
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, Rollo,
3 
23 
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in p. 29. The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) the
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision 4 
legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or
Ibid. subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. has all the essential requisites for validity. (REYES, LUIS B.
5 
Id., at 29-30. THE REVISED PENAL CODE ANNOTATED, Vol. 2 ,
Thirteenth Edition, p. 828.)
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those
6 
Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p.1.
mentioned above.
24 
95 Phil. 843 (1954).
7 
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and
25 
100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
deciding the case. 8 
Id., at 30.
Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000; Bobis vs.
26 

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in 9 
Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 37. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000; Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy,
denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986).
propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a 10 
Id., at 33.
fair and impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly 27 
22 SCRA 731(1968).
exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel
did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the
11 
Id., at 6-10. 28 
Id., at 734, citing 3 VIADA, PENAL CODE 275.
denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal
proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and These cases were: (1) Arthur Te, vs. Liliana Choa-Te, Civil
12 
29 
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement Case No. 90-6265 for Annulment of Marriage, Regional Trial Ocampo vs. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, 271 (1974).
that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim Court of Quezon City, Branch 106; and (2) People of the
that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such Philippines vs. Arthur Te, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 for 30 
Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 18-19.
requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure Bigamy, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98.
that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and 31 
Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-23.
unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the 13 
Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, p. 15.
court’s business promptly.41
32 
People vs. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).
14 
Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 6-10.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
33 
People vs. Cruz, 144 SCRA 677, 681 (1986).
15 
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 33-34, 36.
 34 
Section 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court. JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,  WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
vs. Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is,
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971
35  MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE for lack of merit, DENIED.
and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo, pp. 35-36. PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SO ORDERED.4
People vs. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8445; Salonga vs Cruz
36  DECISION
Pano, supra note 20 at 450. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005
CARPIO, J.: Order,5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971
37 

and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo, p. 33. The Case Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court
38 
309 SCRA 705 (1999). Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision2 of the of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. RTC Quezon City.
39 
Id., at 709-710. 91867.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Associacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-
40  The Antecedent Facts
Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294. In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision: petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated
41 
parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of
Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct. the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court
(RTC Quezon City). of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the
under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological marriage is still subsisting.
incapacity.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the of Appeals’ decision.
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship The Issue
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The Ruling of this Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that
the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The The petition has no merit.
RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be Civil Case Must be Instituted
tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in Before the Criminal Case
question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides: ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the Footnotes
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage
dated 1 September 2010.
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is ** Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 September
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2010.
not the criminal action may proceed. 1
 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to  Rollo, pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E.
2

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the Maambong with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.
Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City
on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the 3
 Id. at 50-51. Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon A. Cruz.
The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence 4
 Id. at 51.
and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the 5
 Id. at 53.
Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent 6
 Dated 1 December 2000.
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-
filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the 7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was 7
 Rollo, p. 54.
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if 8
 Id. at 56.
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
filing of the criminal action. could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of 9
 Id. at 61-65.
the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
 Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA
10

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question 773.

in Criminal Case for Parricide We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the  Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 150329-30, 11 September
11

ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration 2007, 532 SCRA 574, 577-578.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned 12
 People v. Dalag, 450 Phil. 304 (2003).
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of 13
 Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of 14
 Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that 15
 Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal 16
 See Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration 17
 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as: of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are 18
 Id. at 744. Italicization in the original.
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical concerned."19 19
 Id. at 742.
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
determined.11
SO ORDERED.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
 Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil
the court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate
neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the
consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time
it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso,
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child;
action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding
dismissed the complaint. Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que
the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court. 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del
sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho
conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit.,
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly page 271)
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn
child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970 the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a
purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred
de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, 
ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee. heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code). ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn morals, good customs or public policy shall
children may be accepted by those persons who would compensate the latter for the damage.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
legally represent them if they were already born.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some,
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
REYES, J.B.L., J.: whether living at the time of the execution of the will following and analogous cases:
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and
xxx xxx xxx
another order denying amendment of the same pleading. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of 'representation. (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished
plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality
complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the
was doubly in error. majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional
dissenting opinion. personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows: specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute
conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
ordered. Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz)
for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur. were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally
to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary
at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not
consent, to the abortion. found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the
appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
G.R. No. L-16439             July 20, 1961 found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict
granted certiorari.
it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,  are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
vs.
in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not
error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner. death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at
A.P. Salvador for respondents. endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim
REYES, J.B.L., J.: consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
"Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of
having rights and obligations.
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from physician who caused the same. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on
 personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the
administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between
of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin 23 and 25."
which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries. de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred
with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon
appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and mother. them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela
morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage contested by the petitioner. The importance of the question whether applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:
that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa,
lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon "It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of established by proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there
dismissed. Without costs. Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already
C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage. died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the
the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the living the German Club in the company of his father and the witness, and
investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts decision of the Court of Appeals as follows: that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the
may warrant. son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during
raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is
Natividad, JJ., concur. with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the
the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a
of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her
G.R. No. L-5426             May 29, 1953 building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by
Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells. We
people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,  decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that
The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot
vs. a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent. join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be
the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be
Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule
Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
TUASON, J.:
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
including Angela Joaquin. "The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of of the question whether she and her deceased children perished in the
Manila in the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez
wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for
managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three
deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that
days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter
handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same
be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa
Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and
Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols,
turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review. usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same battle, some
who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-
in-law. may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause
sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife
children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese
Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30;
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We
Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three the applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out were out 15 meters away from the building but I could see what
daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the was going on.
Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California
is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr." said: xxx     xxx     xxx

Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between
334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of it can be inferred" that one died before the other it means that the two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say
the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
and that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which
of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, would shown, or which would tend to show, probably that one
under article 33, be held to have died at the same time. died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of
App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a fifteen minutes? — A. Possible, but not probable.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory
consideration when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40
because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient minutes.
the reasons to be presently set forth. when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The
inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, xxx     xxx     xxx
speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads: Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then
the statue of the presumption." Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A.
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, Yes, sir.
battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that
and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin
be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are die? — A. Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the
resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them,
the following rules: the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
evidence controls.
xxx     xxx     xxx xxx     xxx     xxx
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor: inference of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give
drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this positive evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not
two or more persons who would inherent one from the other, the necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin
persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that credence." actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and
they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I
one to the other shall take place. Lopez testified: presumed she died there.

Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the xxx     xxx     xxx
substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir. Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr.
which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's
unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down. wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and
death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since they were shooting people outside, so we thought of running
the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of away rather than be roasted.
fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A.
Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.) Yes, sir.
xxx     xxx     xxx
 Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if
Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same
were already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes. had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the
very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir. even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour
the place and exposing themselves to gun fire. before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not
airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.
near the entrance, because most of the people who were shot by This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may
the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as well give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the
I can remember they were among those killed. clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before
strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without
death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother
xxx     xxx     xxx Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by
minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil
few minutes before you left the place? — A. That is what I Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as
think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the
inside especially those trying to escape. longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the
Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the
xxx     xxx     xxx bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63,
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are
mean? A — . There were many people shot because they were speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the
trying to escape. against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by appellant impugns, and which has been discussed, involves findings of
her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well
could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the
xxx     xxx     xxx been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and
Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has
the building, can you explain that? — A. They were trying to beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the
escape probably. likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and
death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness does not cease to
son's departure and his death. be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate
evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or
Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is
conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the
believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and
necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
"particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be
died before his mother.
that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In reviewed by the Supreme Court."
speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled
is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory
out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must
(In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other
York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.).
way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while
622.) As the California courts have said, it is enough that "the The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of
running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the
circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such evidence refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. By
prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or
as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about
less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the
evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must often which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on
building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started
reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the
to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so
that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not directly general rule.
that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She
proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in
could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the
such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the natural-born. The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the scheme of political powers, as devised by the Constitution, are Manila when she turned 18 years old.17 The Commission on Elections
the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of likewise different from the other ways to raise questions of citizenship. issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills,
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.18
the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of
her son. Without costs. Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a
David (David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, Philippine passport.19 Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19,
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18,
Labrador, JJ., concur. Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed 2014.20Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine
November 17, 2015 Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto diplomatic passport on December 19, 2013.21
filed by David, which sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace
Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to
office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed obtain her college degree.22 In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in
December 3, 2015 Resolution5 denied David's Motion for Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.23
Reconsideration.
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since birth.24 The
biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan,
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the Manila.25 On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016 church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. 7 He later turned her over her husband.26 For some time, she lived with her husband and children in
to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office the United States.27
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v.  of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6,
1968.9 She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian),
Militar.10 Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).28 Brian was born
SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET) AND MARY GRACE in the United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998,
Birth/Foundling Certificate stating:
POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents. and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
Philippines.29
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH
DECISION
CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October
A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS 18, 2001.30 She was subsequently given a United States passport.31
LEONEN, J.: PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO
MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO . . .11 Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously Republic of the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. 32 To support
exclude all foundlings from public service. On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she returned to the
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa United States on July 8, 2004.34 It was during her stay in the Philippines
despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). 12 The Decision also that she gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.35
reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad
conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.13 October 27, Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually
should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen. 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had "slipped into a coma."36Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on
When these inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the become final in a Certificate of Finality.14 December 13, 2004.37 On December 14, 2004, her father died.38 She stayed
exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative to decide the qualifications in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to
of the members of the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of discretion On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the attend to the settling of his estate.39
remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section Decision of the San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator
I of the Constitution. Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never
and Jesusa Poe.15 This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's looked for work again in the United States.40
foundling certificate:
This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. 41 After consulting her
single foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. children, they all agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving
unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. Susan Roces.42 In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools
138.16 Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines
the following semester.43She came back on May 24, 2005.44 Her children 2006 and 2009 using her United States Passport No. 170377935.59 She Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang
also arrived in the first half of 2005.45 However, her husband stayed in the used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin
United States to "finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
family home there."46 American citizenship on 20 October 2010."60 The following are the flight gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at
records given by the Bureau of Immigration: ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig at
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Departures Flight No.   tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at
Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.47 November 1, 2006 SQ071   mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan
July 20, 2007 PR730   ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito,
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of October 31, 2007 PR300   nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
the Philippines:48 October 2, 2008 PR358  
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and April 20, 2009 PR104   Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the July 31, 2009 PR730  
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of October 19, 2009 PR102  
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng
November 15, 2009 PR103   Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis in the original)
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
December 27, 2009 PR112   Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
March 27, 2010 PR102   of the United States68 in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.49
    Briers on July 12, 2011.69 On this occasion, she also filled out the
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-
acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S.
Arrivals Flight No.  
9225.50 She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of Citizenship.70 On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a
November 4, 2006 SQ076  
her three children who were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The certificate was
July 23, 2007 PR731  
time."51 approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on
November 5, 2007 PR337   February 3, 2012.72
May 8, 2008 PR103  
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation October 5, 2008 PR359  
on July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. 73 On
May 21, 2009 PR105   September 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was
Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52 August 3, 2009 PR733  
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant submitted to the Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won
November 15, 2009 PR10361   and was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75
petition indicate that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed
Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural
Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the
born Philippine citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen and is now
Classification Board (MTRCB).62 On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6,
a holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States 2015.76 He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply
taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7,
of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship,63 stating: with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine
Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the original) Constitution."77
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01
Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, requiring David "to correct the formal defects of his petition." 78 David
9225."54 Until now, the Order "has not been set aside by the Department of do hereby depose and state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and filed his amended Petition on August 17, 2015.79
Justice or any other agency of Government."55 voluntarily renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship,
together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally, Electoral Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the
Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her children. 56 It stated that voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or undue Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file
Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship influence.64 (Emphasis in the original) an answer to the amended Petition.80
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative
Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion
per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy 2010.65 On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Subpoena the Record of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and
M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."57 Chairperson and assumed office on October 26, 2010.66 Her oath of office related documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August 25,
stated: 2015.81The documents requested included Senator Poe's record of travels
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN and NSO kept Birth Certificate. 82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate
City on August 31, 2006.58 Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion.83 The
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa same Resolution directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and to the concerned officials of the Bureau of Immigration and the National
Statistics Office.84 The subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the period of fifteen (15) days from notice."108 The Resolution also set oral
September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the Secretary of the Philippines, as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. arguments on January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through
Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents.85 The subpoenas the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on December
were complied with by both the Bureau of Immigration and the National Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the 30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.111
Statistics Office on September 1, 2015.86 Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of
Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with citizenship. This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission
(1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on on Elections case on the issue of private respondent's citizenship.
Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to . . . .
Cite David for Direct Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for
Indirect Contempt of Court.87 To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal
renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today. jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on
No. 15-05 requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or its finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
before September 9, 2015.88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is
Conference on September 11, 2015.89 During the Preliminary Conference, Constitution.
DISMISSED.
the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on the ground of
prescription."90
No pronouncement as to costs. I
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted) Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review
21, 2015.91 The parties were then "required to submit their respective
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
[memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.101 The Senate Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
[Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date."92
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on
giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for private respondent's citizenship.
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the
submission of DNA test results.93The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted Reconsideration.102
the Motion on October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08.94On
November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a
of DNA Testing,95 which stated that "none of the tests that [Senator Poe] Reconsideration on December 1, 2015.103David's Motion for consideration of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this Court's
took provided results that would shed light to the real identity of her Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second,
biological parents."96 The Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was December 3, 2015:104 the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for certiorari—through
to continue to find closure regarding the issue and submit any WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral
development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship as a foundling David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.
for resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in her submissions to the I. A
Tribunal."97 On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated
Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered the 24 November 2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives
case submitted for resolution."98 to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit Constitution:112
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] ARTICLE VI
assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, NOTE the Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted The Legislative Department
therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.99 The Decision stated: by Dean de Castro before the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus Mary Grace . . . .
Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."
1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original) have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
citizenship. On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
received by David.106 On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
. . . . for Certiorari before this Court.107 three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
Filipino citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino and Senator Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non-extendible the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal)
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. may be initiated. A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal
(Emphasis supplied) invokes the jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" is a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal
on Elections113) the power to rule on contests114 relating to the election, judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's express is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of
returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the statement that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an
House of Representatives). These powers are granted to a separate and . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion independent civil action.122 The viability of such a petition is premised on
distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or an allegation of "grave abuse of discretion."123
the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is, therefore, still
is exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only possible. In Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120 The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to
task; it performs no other function. The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
[House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of [T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
our legal system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
purpose."115 The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
Commission, independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave.124
judge of all contests relating to members of the National Assembly. 116 This on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the
was a departure from the system introduced by prior organic acts enforced even affect the same." Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes
under American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of
the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve such contests The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or
in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was amended to make exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not
room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was made Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of the accounted for.125
for there to be separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however,
Congress.117 The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
but they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution. jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions— grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion. 126 The
which provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
the Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge. very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." departs from settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal: 118
This can be a badge of hostile intent against a party.
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled
jurisdiction conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." approach to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its
legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of
characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear and complete." . . . Under Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived the evidence;127 (b) where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective
the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be
that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . . so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation
The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.119 This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals grossly unreasonable";129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.130
returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an
of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before error in judgment. I. C
them that post-election challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President I. B
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion constitutional intent.133
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. 134 The Constitution is truly
and exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that a public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of
intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions. she failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the the People exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a
essence of the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution,
citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular, rather than
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate insists that as private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she technical-legal, understanding. Thus:
Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the could never leave reverted to natural-born status despite the performance We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
citizenship status of children whose biological parents are unknown, of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is
considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
makes reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to exercise its couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
point, was without judicial precedent. Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
1 of the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
make a reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines." consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in
the established personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not Petitioner similarly claims that, as private respondent's foundling status is the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
have asked the impossible of private respondent, sending her on a settled, the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With private the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy respondent having supposedly failed to discharge this burden, the of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
before it arose because private respondent's parentage was unknown and supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not a natural-born Filipino. people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for
has remained so throughout her life. construction is reduced to a minimum.135(Emphasis supplied)
III Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with
the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that
not insist on burdening private respondent with conclusively proving, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be animates each of its components through the dynamism of these
within the course of the few short months, the one thing that she has never Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical components' interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire
been in a position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should,
conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts known about possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit—ut magis
her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping foundling, remains unknown.132 Resolving this controversy hinges on valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision must be understood and effected in
with the degree of proof required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial constitutional interpretation. a way that gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its
body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or foundational principles to its finest fixings.137
preponderance of evidence, but "substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color
justify a conclusion."131 sovereign's purpose so as to identify which among competing each provision at the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil
interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:138
construction. Primarily, the actual words—text—and how they are situated It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with within the whole document—context—govern. Secondarily, when provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
the misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
from reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable. subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
Tribunal did justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular
the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
service. Constitution. defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.
II III. A
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must lean in favor of construction which will render every word operative,
that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of the provision being rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 139 (Citations
citizen of the Philippines." interpreted is the principal source from which this Court determines omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A is, judicial decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters or
previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously concerns),148 as well as thematically similar statutes and international
founded on the basic principle that "judicial decisions applying or doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative norms that form part of our legal system. This includes discerning the
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster. purpose and aims of the text in light of the specific facts under
system."140 Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law. consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when external aids may be
Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the framers, as
text itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is because is erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. articulated through records of deliberations and other similar accounts, can
judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static. be illuminating.
brings to effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of
considering prior interpretation as immutable. The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic III. C
rather than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring
text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social ideals. meaning from the supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original
of the re-adoption—often with accompanying re-calibration—of The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which understanding of the individuals who adopted the basic document is the
previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the weakest approach.
often introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution — saligan —
of previously existing rules. demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy. These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation.
Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the
One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current framers is not necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation.
iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes records of deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have
Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of
in syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive not actively engaged in interpellation and debate may have voted for or
the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing
changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in against a proposition for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in
the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more complete agreement with those articulated by the more vocal. It is even
norm that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals
moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension possible that the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely
of those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the
between consistency and change galvanizes meaning. erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding can also
Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of actions made
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are within specific historical episodes through detached, and not necessarily
citizens of the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, III. B
better-guided, modern lenses.
not only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws 142and in similar
mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may
be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. 146 It is Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not
still resonate today. always uniform with the original understanding of the People who ratified
only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a it. In Civil Liberties Union:
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
interpretation must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to
verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading. proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had
Elections,144 this Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
interpretation: Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the
realization that the business of understanding the Constitution is not terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
(respectively) construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our
constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government, and individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
distinction between direct purchasers and those who purchase via even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave
subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section 5.2(a)'s the instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means that requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality at which
interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance in the parties' interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
positions, considering that they are both banking on what they claim to be moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a
framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle people adopting it than in the framer's understanding
the Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
ambiguity. underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory
opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that IV
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.147 Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine
foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal citizen without the need for an express statement in the Constitution
interpretation are commonsensical and need not be belabored. These making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a
dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that
reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The and jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical
Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,159 thus:
the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.150 (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines (b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their outside of Spain,
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
provision, which principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, (c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
in Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This definition must be born citizens. (Emphasis supplied) (d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
harmonized with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.160
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term
parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of 1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were
factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate who are citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 ceded by Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris,
Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances specifically articulates those who may count themselves as natural-born. which was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not
adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino
parentage. automatically convert the native inhabitants to American
citizens.161 Instead, it left the determination of the native inhabitants' status
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural- The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better to the Congress of the United States:
born unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is appreciated when supplemented with an understanding of how our
necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole concepts of citizenship and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As will Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its be seen, the term "natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal defined, foreign concept. may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case they
protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born V. B Spain by making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such
status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international have rights."151 It is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a they may reside.
instruments. political community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy
political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally Thus -
V through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievance.152 The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
commencement from birth means that private respondent never had to do Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which Congress.162
anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. one is part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants
Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection who had ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing
upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic. been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth. United States."163

Tecson v. Commission on Elections 154 reckoned with the historical The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in
V. A development of our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of
colonial rule.155 Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine 1902:164
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects."156 Church Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
of the Philippines: records show that native inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: alternative identification of native inhabitants as subjects or as indios eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and
demonstrated the colonial master's regard for native inhabitants as their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
inferior.157Natives were, thus, reduced to subservience in their own land. citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
adoption of this Constitution; Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by special The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; laws.158 It was only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of
April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place public office in the Philippine Islands.
of birth), which was operative in the United States, applied to the (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
Philippine Islands.165 (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. adoption of this Constitution;

On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso read:
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the and
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the 1935 Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.174
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United and Vice-President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 read:
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice- Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United President, unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified definition of natural-born citizens, as follows:
States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.166 voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding the election. from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended:167 not define the term.
born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects law provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by that was transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then women who marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards Constitution's eligibility requirements for President and Vice-President of
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be women.170 The 1973 Constitution rectified this problematic situation: the Philippines.
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United term "natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the eligibility requirement for the presidency.175 It is not defined in that
ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of adoption of this Constitution. Constitution or in American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein a requirement for the presidency are not even found in the records of
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. constitutional deliberations.176 However, it has been suggested that, as the
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do United States was under British colonial rule before its independence, the
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against
not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the foreign infiltration in the administration of national government:
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if response to a letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably
residing therein. to other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our
Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of deemed, under the law, to have renounced her citizenship.171 national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief
April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899,
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a
(2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a
"natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution natural born Citizen.
citizen of some other country."168
provided: Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who
There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the had served valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent
acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the
reference to parentage vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship.169 Article
perfect his Philippine citizenship.172 resulting constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the
III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign
Constitution on citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed monarch.177
to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the the 1935 Constitution."173 sanguinis.
adoption of this Constitution.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:
V. C citizens. It does not even require them to conform to traditional
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private respondent parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
and naturalized. is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything
to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage.
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino. The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no
citizen of the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a
naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of She did not.
Representatives Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this definition by Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino
dichotomy: citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding,
At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through which substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is the actual naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and citizen.
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present more effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization of total
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who and utter lack of proof. V. F
is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these
Filipino.179 proceedings attests to how at least one—if not both—of her biological
At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the parents were Filipino citizens.
foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with
concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson:
naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory
naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically
mechanisms for naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised.
undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She
The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children, individuals
to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the was abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a
whose capacity to act is restricted. 184 It is a glaring mistake to liken them
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens."180 handful of those who, in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still
to an adult filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to
become a Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or lucidly render testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding.
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may
generally required to file a verified petition.181 He or she must establish. Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive.
among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different
and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, premise from the restrictive process of naturalization. However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private
or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a significant period of respondent to establish her parentage.
time.182 Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not be a threat
to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs.183 In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-
born status is clear. It should be with the actual process of naturalization evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185
V. D that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of
relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the any inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof
unbridled diminution of the status of citizens. of fact or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This probable consequence.186
V. E
constitutional definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which People v. Raganas187 further defines circumstantial evidence:
delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than
with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification is thoroughbred. the fact in issue, which by experience have been found so associated with
deemed written into the interpreted text, thus establishing its such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory
contemporaneous intent. conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance,
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be
stipulates when circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction
a citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to in criminal proceedings:
establish bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It
divines Section 1's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
succeeding Section's unequivocal definition.
and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino
 1966 1,437 823,342 evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 1967 1,440 840,302 allegations;198 that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a 1968 1,595 898,570 issue"199 Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 1969 1,728 946,753 shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial 1970 1,521 966,762 prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The other party then bears the
evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has 1971 1,401 963,749 "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence considering that which has
nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other 1972 1,784 968,385 ostensibly been established against him or her.
proceedings.189 There is no rational basis for making the use of 1973 1,212 1,045,290
circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the
1974 1,496 1,081,873
considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is
1975 1,493 1,223,837
administrative proceedings. ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before
2010 1,244 1,782,877
quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
2011 1,140 1,746,685 quantum of proof is substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's to
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a 2012 1,454 1,790,367
conviction (which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of
2013 1,315 1,751,523 evidence shifts to the respondent.
anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would 2014 1,351 1,748,782
require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence
suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible]197 prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the
stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only identities of private respondent's biological parents are not known, it does
substantial evidence.190 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
99.8% probability that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt,
Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most however, is by no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie
—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her case and shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.
population.192 Private respondent is described as having "brown almond- parents after half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to
shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage. Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner
face."193 She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously
was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. VI established as substantive evidence of private respondent's parentage:
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is (2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a
her biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic sustained by a general assumption on foundlings arising from a newborn;
Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous construction (3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;
in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have of the Constitution, and considering that we have just discussed the (4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was
behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes evidence pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent's birth, it is registered as a foundling;
the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly opportune to consider petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore (5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and the burden of proving—through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born (6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of
leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her status. typical Filipinos.
physical features nonetheless attest to it. Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent bias. As against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on upon a mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error. inference from these facts is that at least one of private respondent's
Elections,195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more parents is a Filipino.
probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that
a foreigner. He submitted the following table is support of his statistical all newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines VII
inference:196 are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE prove the circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen
PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014 condition. To require proof from private respondent borders on the absurd consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition
when there is no dispute that the crux of the controversy—the identity of of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the
YEAR FOREIGN CHILDREN FILIPINO CHILDREN her biological parents—is simply not known. Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the
BORN IN THE BORN IN THE Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother
PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES "Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.
1965 1,479 795,415 issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof
must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go v. VII. B
not Filipino citizens. Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions cannot
be entertained in citizenship cases. The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at
VII. A least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-
Paa, decided in 1967, stated: born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."211
Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural- presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with
born citizenship may be indulged in resolving this case. 203 He insists that it citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not
is private respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her of the State.209 (Emphasis supplied) be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional
Filipino parentage. These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee equal
more recent ruling in Tecson. protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service,
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense and to respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with
dictates that actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be the Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public
issues based on presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence. indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous
to "the claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling duty of "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement— administrative actions, and international instruments.
on the allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe using the definitive article "the"—reveals that its conclusion was specific
(more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born only to Chan and to his circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
Filipino citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that: first, used generic language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could have require the state to enhance children's well-being and to project them from
Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime in 1870, used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no presumption can conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their development.
while the country was still under Spanish colonial rule;204 and second, that be indulged in favor of aclaimant of Philippine citizenship." In the Fulfilling this mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions and,
Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as indicated in his dearth certificate, alternative, it could have used other words that would show absolute or especially, dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that hide behind
must have also been his place of residence before death, which subjected sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can be indulged in the veneer of the legal apparatus:
him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino favor of any/everyclaimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no presumption ARTICLE II
citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. 205 This Court then can be indulged in favor of all claimants of Philippine citizenship."
noted that Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son and . . . .
Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case.
would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born while the Its statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, State Policies
1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to clear evidence was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was
Filipino fathers, was in effect: registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was . . . .
likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut the door to any SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would citizenship. patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not civic affairs.
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino appear that the same pronouncement was generally applicable:
....
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt ARTICLE XV 
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.210 (Emphasis The Family
his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would supplied)
. . . .
have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation.
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, In any case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. overturn Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first Likewise, Go's factual and even procedural backdrops are different from . . . .
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens those of this case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly illegal and
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.206 undesirable alien, not an election controversy. In Go, copies of birth (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
certificates unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of Go and of nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
his siblings were adduced.
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] . . . .
(Emphasis supplied) Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens State Policies are human persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized
of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices nation, respect. Thus:
exclusive to natural-born citizens: . . . .
ARTICLE II
(1) President; 212
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
(2) Vice-President;213 for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by . . . .
law.
(3) Senator;214 State Policies
....
(4) Member of the House of Representatives; 215
. . . .
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court; 216 ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service guarantees full respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
Commission;217 SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property VII. C
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the
protection of the laws.
Elections;218 confines of constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-
.... born citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit;219
citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;220 parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution
ARTICLE XIII 
with acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines,
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;221 and Social Justice and Human Rights
as well as acts of executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration,
Civil Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
Rights.222 measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
include, among others, city fiscals, 223 assistant city fiscals,224 Presiding constitutional mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has
the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
Judges and Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other public ratified treaties that put this mandate into effect.
offices.225 Certain professions are also limited to natural-born citizens, 226 as The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like
are other legally established benefits and incentives.227 circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and
of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against Welfare Act of 2006, provides:
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"228 SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall
They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible be observed at all times:
capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial
such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the distinction229 differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino . . . .
actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's protection
by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged from the moment of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to (b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through
proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular identify the parents who abandoned them—an inability arising from no measures that will ensure the observance of international standards of
politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to child protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not party. Proceedings before any authority shall be conducted in the best
inferiority through no fault of their own. entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those who interest of the child and in a manner which allows the child to participate
know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it and to express himself/herself freely. The participation of children in the
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is. is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their program and policy formulation and implementation related to juvenile
lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation. justice and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access (Emphasis supplied)
to opportunities for public service: This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ,
ARTICLE II mandated to effect the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the
the well-being and development of children. It is not our business to reify child" as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most
discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth. congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child
and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
development." status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the
child's parents, legal guardians, or family members. 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United Nations a name.
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the Article 3
states-parties' protection of: first, children's rights to immediate 3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
registration and nationality after birth; second, against statelessness; and
third, against discrimination on account of their birth status.231 Pertinent 1. In all actions concerning children, whether
. . . .
portions of the Convention read: undertaken by public or private social welfare
Preamble institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
The State Parties to the present Convention, shall be a primary consideration.
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of protection and care as is necessary for his or her opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of (Emphasis supplied)
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written
legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the measures. particular designation."233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987
dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate before they
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, . . . . became binding:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Article 7 effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Senate.
proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and
1. The child, shall be registered immediately after The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding
freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, by transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
the right to acquire a nationality and as far as Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
social origin, property, birth or other status,
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:234
her parents. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
Nations has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
assistance,
these rights in accordance with their national law and into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
their obligations under the relevant international legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
. . . .
instruments in this field, in particular where the constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis domestic law.
Have agreed as follows:
. . . . supplied)
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
Article 2 pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that
The Philippines likewise ratified  the 1966 International Covenant on
232
"[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
Civil and Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set Child, this treaty requires that children be allowed immediate registration
Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a
forth in the present Convention to each child within after birth and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them against
process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, discrimination:
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. 235 (Emphasis
irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or supplied)
legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, Article 24
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social . . . .
otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government—including
origin, property, disability, birth or other status. the judiciary—is duty-bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour,
maxim pacta sunt servanda.
2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the
ensure that the child is protected against all forms right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the
object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by by law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private
and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive foreigners: respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001,
them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship .
discriminate them, and undermine their development. SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost
certified true copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the his original and amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect applicant is a minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3)
the constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children and case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A. No. 8043, days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and
protecting them from discrimination. Other legislative enactments the following, shall be required: Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.
demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth. Shortly after, this Petition was granted.241

Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 242 and
Adoption Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules the Death Certificate of the child's parents, or the Deed of Republic Act No. 8171243specifically "to do away with the provision in
and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Voluntary Commitment executed after the birth of the child. Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
Purposes. It was enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
and assistance through foster care or adoption of every child who is DSWD. countries."244
neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."236
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate. 238 (Emphasis The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed,
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by supplied) in its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become
Republic Act No. 8552:237 citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the Philippine citizenship."245 This Court shed light on this in Calilung v.
citizenship on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody Commission on Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the
of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.
parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall country."247
be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied) Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs
have recognized her natural-born status. This status was never questioned Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-
throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect
Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing
a viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:
the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and
the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares, private SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to
for Other Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes
respondent's natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be adopted:
various official public acts. have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
the subject of inter-country adoption, hi order that such child may be from the domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was
considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted: to Republic:
granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under "I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
the Board: Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
a) Child study; Chairperson—an office that requires natural-born citizenship.239 authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate; VIII and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
of parents; natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
d) Medical evaluation/history; natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who,
when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she
after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and  complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
"retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity
of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied) VIII. A attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as
of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided
enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or of Nationality of the United States259 before Vice-Consul Somer E.
another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice
"reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned Consul Jason Galian's issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on
and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in officers in the armed forces of the country which they are December 9, 2011261 and the approval of this certificate by the Overseas
conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied) Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.262
reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and
intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-born
wish to run for elective public office must comply with all of the
status as though it was never lost at all. Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born
following requirements:
citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other requirements for
VIII. B eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of VIII. D
retention or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino.249 This
natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and
also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all
political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
responsibilities."248 However, other conditions must be met for the with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a
solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.250
exercise of other faculties: natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re- Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and citizenship.
Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence
the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in
elections.252 and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and
as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet born Filipino citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the termination of his or her natural-born status.
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
"the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section
oath."253 This, along with satisfying the other qualification requirements
existing laws; 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix
under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
"re" signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is to this status
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall quo ante that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,254 this
"the way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to mean the
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the required sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section
investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have used a word such
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the
as "reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
new citizens whose citizenship commences only from the moment of
citizenship before any public officer authorized to employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
compliance with its requirements.
administer an oath; immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law."255 It is also in view of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that
seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the repatriation involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of
armed forces of other countries from being appointed or elected to public
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to one's original nationality:
office in the Philippines.
their assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
VIII. C restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
oath;
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the natural-born Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied)
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
Philippines.256 Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or the country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
extended to, those who: Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed citizenship."264 In Bengson's words, the once naturalized citizen is
an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of "restored" or brought back to his or her natural-born status. There may
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.258This was have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the
complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation
interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural- of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and for him for which she replied: "of course."8Mr. Reyes then went up with
born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not December 3, 2015 Resolution. the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s
become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture
forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr.
birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de facto. citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr.
Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
SO ORDERED. embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who
Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. 11 In a
taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, and Caguioa, JJ., loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who
solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents concur. were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the
to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born Carpio, J., no part. party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na
citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as Leonardo-De Castro, J., no part. lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. 13 Dr.
there is no singular, extended process with which the former natural-born Brion, J., no part Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him
citizen must comply. thus adding to his shame and humiliation. 14 Not long after, while he was
still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
IX approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a common
criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. 16 Claiming
To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless265 is not damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One
only to set a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
accomplice to injustice. Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17

Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the
justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter.
fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those gave them life, Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past
G.R. No. 154259             February 28, 2005
foundlings are compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage. twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday
Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly remedied by any party of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. 19 The year
economic relief. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,  1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an
vs. exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent. was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends
tolerate an interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those
misfortune because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be DECISION invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter
rendered inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat. ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party
intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller
against other reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart
us to consider legal text, but always with justice in mind. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not
Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms.
It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. 25 Ms.
we must always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he
the less fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to
people. petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to
leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain
constitutional competence when it ruled that private respondent is a under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the
natural-born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to
petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the leave the party as he was not invited. 29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When
and Resolution. evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to
Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a vicinity.30However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food,
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat,
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in … HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND
ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE
turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE
leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
even threatened to dump food on her.33 1awphi1.nét Reyes in private: FILART’S INVITATION"

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by III.
court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they
Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the … DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL
volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY
was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation,
to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited.36 All the appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee
while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw Filart is equally liable. IV.
him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and
she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was ... … IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED
embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40 UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT
THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20
Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for V.
Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad
uninvited: faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It … IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309
to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. SCRA 603).44 Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine
Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not
Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the
against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42 Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who
affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this
found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. reconsidered."46 doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if
Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party,
several guests: Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in – under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he unnecessary ridicule and shame.
should not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing I.
distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in
customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he
damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New … NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT
INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under
Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim
legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily
Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with liable with her.
impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to II.
morals or good customs.43
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the and she shouted? performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét
such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito,
facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of bumaba ka na lang." Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which
law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to
Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for ... one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. 61 These standards
damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55 honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party. right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible? she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are pertains to damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
court’s findings of fact. contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
court was correct in observing that –
First, let us put things in the proper perspective. Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each compensate the latter for the damage.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, 53 for-
invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have
national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the aware of what transpired between them. . . morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest with intent to injure.66
list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the
Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, police to take him out.56 A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act
would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush complained of must be intentional.68
manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it
affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not
boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two
certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13
the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for
personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim,
Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice
satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party
to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at
formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross- the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need
examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19
Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss: and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
its employee.58
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you
while you were at the buffet table? How close was she when she Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave
approached you? was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this
grievances. Article 19 states:
regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other. that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first
verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of
one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. 35 
Violeta Filart’s "ANSWER WITH COMPULSORY
of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s COUNTERCLAIM," RTC Records, p. 21.
act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially 36 
Supra, note 34 at 17.
because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that 37 
Or "Captain Batung" from the testimony of Ruby Lim; Id. at
Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. 71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of 18.
bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad Footnotes 38 
Id. at 19.
faith.
1 
39 
Ibid.
Now Dusit Hotel Nikko. 40 
Ibid.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners
2 
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices
Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring
41 
Dismissed as well were the counterclaims filed by then
Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary
(Rollo, pp. 48-57). defendants Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, Ruby Lim and Violeta
damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The
Filart, RTC Records, p. 347.
Court of Appeals held – 3 
Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada. 42 
RTC Records, p. 342.
4 
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices
Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring
43 
CA Rollo, p. 205.
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the 44 
latter’s lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. (Rollo, pp. 59-60). Id. at 208-209.
In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not 5 
TSN, 08 March 1995, p. 8.
45 
Id. at 238.
sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for 6 
Id. at 10.
46 
CA Rollo, pp. 239-240.
decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of 7 
Ibid.
47 
E.L. Pineda, Torts and Damages Annotated, p. 52 (2004 ed).
example or correction for public good and to avert further commission of 8 
Id. 11.
48 
Garciano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96126, 10 August
such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73 1992, 212 SCRA 436, 440.
9 
Id. at 13.
49 
10 
Id. at 13 & 16. cf. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs Court, G.R. No. 74553, 08 June 1989, 174 SCRA 80, 88.
11 
COMPLAINT, RTC Record, p. 2.
counter with the very facts of the case and the evidence on 50 
Sangco, Torts and Damages Vol.1 , pp. 83-84.
hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in
12 
Supra, note 5 at 17.
13 
51 
Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, 02 June 1995, 244 SCRA
question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio Supra, note 11.
713, 720.
program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer
14 
Ibid. 52 
Ibid.
(MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz 15 
Id. at 2-3. 53 
TSN, 22 May 1999, p. 11.
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the 16 
Id. at 3.
KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of 17 
54 
Admitted by Mr. Reyes, see TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 10.
Ibid.
humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct
55 
TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 20.
18 
TSN, 27 July 1996, p. 9.
examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75 and 56 
RTC Records, pp. 340-341.
nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of
19 
Id. at 10. 57 
Danny Rodinas and Pepito Guerrero (TSN, 18 May 1995),
any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby
20 
Id. at 12-13, 15. Alexander Silva (TSN, 21 June 1995).
Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
21 
Id. at 15-17, 25. 58 
Article 2180, Civil Code.
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis. 22 
Id. at 25. 59 
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
23 
Id. at 27. G.R. No. 81262, 25 August 1989, 176 SCRA 779, 783.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any 24 
Ibid. 60 
Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise 25 
Id. at 31-32. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 25.
of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, 26 
Id. at 33. 61 
Supra, note 61 at 783-784.
must be his to bear alone. 27 
Id. at 37. 62 
Ibid.
28 
Id. at 38-39. 63 
Supra, note 62.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and 29 
Ibid. 64 
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of 30 
Petition, Rollo, p. 18. negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 31 
Supra, note 29 at 41-42. for the same. See Globe Mackay, supra, note 61 at 784.
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby
32 
Id. at 42-43.
65 
Civil Code.
66 
AFFIRMED. No costs. 33 
Answer, pp. 32-33, RTC Records; RTC Decision, Rollo p. 62; Supra, note 62 at 25.
TSN, 27 July 1995, pp. 43-46. 67 
Civil Code.
68 
SO ORDERED.
34 
TSN, 05 November 1997, p. 15. Ibid.
 69 
"COMMENT," Rollo, p. 302; "MEMORANDUM," Rollo, p. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard pounding sounds outside,
417. PANLILIO, Petitioners,  prompting her to open the door of the locker room upon which she saw
70 
CA Rollo, p. 209. vs. five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure
71 
In fact, Mrs. Filart herself, in her testimony and in her ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, were not employees of the hotel,4 forcibly opening the door of the union
pleadings, consistently disclaimed having invited Mr. Reyes to VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and office.5 She even saw one of the men hid something behind his back. She
the party such that when Mr. Reyes was being escorted out of GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents. then closed the door and went back to bed. Soon after she heard the door
the penthouse, she lifted nary a finger to his rescue. of the union office opened.
72 
Art. 2234, Civil Code. DECISION
73 
CA Rollo, pp. 209-210. In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying in
74 
Appellant’s Brief, CA Rollo, p. 27; see also TSN, 08 March CARPIO MORALES, J.: vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she
1995, pp. 7-8. had witnessed at dawn.
75 
TSN, 29 October 1998, p. 11. The present Petition for Review on Certiorari partially assails the Court of
Appeals Decision1 of March 26, 2004 holding herein petitioners Silahis Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer.
International Hotel, Inc. and Jose Marcel Panlilio, along with Floro And he fetched a locksmith, Efren Guevarra, who tried to assist him,
Maniego and Steve Villanueva, civilly liable for damages under Article 32 Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open the door. At that instant,
of the Civil Code, for violation of respondents’ constitutional right against men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta
unreasonable search of their office. and his companions, drawing them to run to the female locker room, and
to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where they called for
police assistance.6
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for
Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while
respondents Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito Santos, Edna Bernate While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latter’s
(Edna), Vicenta Delola (Vicenta), and Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were request, met. At the meeting, Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the
employees of the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union union office where they would settle the mauling incident, to which Babay
Chapter, the hotel employees union (the union). replied that the door of the office could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon
instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once
inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the
Petitioners’ version of the antecedents of the case are as follows: objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant.7 A
plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of
the Rapier Enforcement Professional Investigation and Security Agency, As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union
Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, had office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a
been receiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, complaint against the 13 union officers,8 namely: Babay, Isaac Asuncion,
and prostitution were going on in the union office at the hotel and that Jr., Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta, Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene
there existed a theft syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with the Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato Lina, Avelino Meneses, Matilla, and
approval of Panlilio, of suspected members and officers of the union.2 Norman Agtani9 was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas
In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security
guard Steve Villanueva (Villanueva) entered the union office located at An Information10 indicting the union officers was subsequently filed by
the hotel basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay the Fiscal’s Office before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
(Babay) who was apprised about the suspected illegal activities, and
searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic
bag under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of After trial, Branch 5 of the RTC acquitted the accused. The trial court
marijuana.3 Panlilio thereupon ordered Maniego to investigate and report disposed:
the matter to the authorities.
WHEREFORE, with the specimen and/or the marijuana flowering tops
On the other hand, respondents’ version follows: allegedly found inside the Union Office occupied by the accused not
admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of
G.R. No. 163087             February 20, 2006 confiscation, for lack of sufficient evidence, accused Henry Babay, Isaac
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the Asuncion, Jr., Rogelio Soluta, Teodoro F. Gimpayan, Vicente Delola,
hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the
Edna Bernate, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Avelino All the counterclaims of the defendants are likewise dismissed for lack of Code. They argue that Aruta does not involve Article 32 as nowhere in the
Meneses, Florentino Matilla and Norman Agtani, are ACQUITTED of the factual and legal basis. decision is there any reference to Article 32.19
charge. The bonds they put up for their provisional liberty are cancelled.
Costs against the remaining defendants. Similarly, petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not
The Branch Clerk is directed to turn over the custody of the seized plastic covered by the standards set forth in Aruta as the constitutional protection
bag containing flowering tops of marijuana to the NBI Director as SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) against illegal searches and seizures is not meant to be invoked against
Permanent Custodian of the seized Dangerous Drugs. private individuals.20
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) court’s decision. It found herein petitioners et al. civilly liable for damages Petitioners further argue that the search of the union office was reasonable
for violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against illegal under the circumstances,21 given that the hotel owns the room where the
Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter search, not for malicious prosecution, set aside the award of actual union holds office; the search was not without probable cause as it was
filed before the Manila RTC a Complaint12against petitioners et al. damages to respondent union, and reduced the award of actual damages to conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the union
including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who individual respondents to ₱50,000. The dispositive portion of the appellate office was being used as a venue for illegal activities, particularly the sale
assisted in the prosecution of the case against them, for malicious court’s decision reads: and/or use of prohibited drugs;22 and the search was conducted with the
prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal consent and in the presence of union officer Babay.23
search. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the first The petition fails.
After trial, Branch 55 of the Manila RTC, by Decision 13 dated June 2, paragraph of the dispositive portion should read:
1994, held the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly and Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
severally liable for damages as a result of malicious prosecution and "1. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta
illegal search of the union office. The dispositive portion of the trial Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, jointly, the sum of P50,000.00 as ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
court’s decision reads: actual damages, and the further sum of P1,000.00 each for the same directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
plaintiffs in the same concept and nature." or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered be liable to the latter for damages:
ordering the defendants Silahis International Hotel, Inc., Jose Marcel The Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Panlilio, Floro Maniego and Steve Villanueva, individually and xxxx
collectively, jointly and severally, to pay to:
SO ORDERED.15
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects
1. Plaintiffs Union, Rogelio S. Soluta, Joselito Santos, against unreasonable searches and seizures;
Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, Hence, the present petition of Panlilio and the hotel, they contending that:
jointly, the sum of P70,900.00 as actual damages, and the
further sum of P1,000.00 each for the same plaintiffs, except the THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS xxxx
Union, in the same concept and nature. CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THAT: The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also
2. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, be adjudicated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay the sum of 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APPLICATION OF PEOPLE
P100,000.00 each for moral damages. V. ARUTA (288 SCRA 626[1998]) AND SECTION 13, RULE As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house,
126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a
3. Plaintiffs Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola INSTANT CASE IS LEGALLY FLAWED. lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not
and Edna-Bernate-Dacanay the sum of infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a
P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages. 2. PETITIONERS’ SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN penal offense or not, must be guarded against. As the Code Commission
THE INSTANT CASE WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLE noted,
4. To all the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.16
P30,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees. xxxx
While petitioners concede that the appellate court correctly cited the
The complaint, insofar as plaintiff Erlisa Ilustrisimo and defendants principles enunciated in People v. Aruta17 and Section 13, Rule 12618 of (3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the
Ramos, Bautista and Tutaan are concerned, is DISMISSED for lack of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it gravely erred when it applied Aruta to freedoms named are not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect
merit. justify petitioners’ alleged liability under Article 32 of the New Civil ways which do not come within the pale of the penal law. It is in these
cunning devices of suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are not While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and Petitioners cite People v. Marti31 to support their thesis that the
criminally punishable, where the greatest danger to democracy lies. The seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a determinants in the validity of the constitutional right against searches and
injured citizen will always have, under the new Civil Code, adequate civil waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and seizure cannot be invoked against private individuals.
remedies before the courts because of the independent civil action, even in convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a
those instances where the act or omission complained of does not waiver thereof.28 There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of
constitute a criminal offense.24 exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or whether "an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of [one’s]
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person constitutional rights, [may] be invoked against the State." In other words,
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver the issue in that case was whether the evidence obtained by a private
officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence person, acting in a private capacity without the participation of the State, is
enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even shows otherwise, however. admissible.
necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is That a violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent
the effective protection of individual rights.25 It suffices that there is a seizure can be the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. As
violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code, there is no reflected above, Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the
doubt. Since the complaint29 filed before the trial court was for damages Civil Code, allows so.
In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own claim, due to malicious prosecution and violation of constitutional right against
already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial court of actual damages to
respondent union was correctly set aside by the appellate court. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, the petition is
undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the DENIED.
union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and
their companions barged into and searched the union office without a Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and Costs against petitioners.
notwithstanding the objection of Babay. liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to SO ORDERED.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. 30 Such
falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the Footnotes
allowed by law. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for
constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in
accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in  Rollo, p. 34, penned by Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with Justices
1
the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Romeo A. Brawner and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador concurring.
relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 26 a case for unfair 2
 Id. at 71.
competition, the progression of time between the receipt of the Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
information and the raid of the stores of the therein private respondents’ analogous cases:
3
premises showed that there was sufficient time for the therein petitioners  Id. at 72.
and the raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Yet they did not apply xxxx
for one. They went on with the raid and seized the goods of the therein 4
 Ibid.
private Respondents. Under the circumstances, this court upheld the grant (6) Illegal search;
of damages by the trial court to the therein private respondents for 5
 Ibid.
violation of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
xxxx
6
 Id. at 73.
As for petitioners’ contention that property rights justified the search of
the union office, the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34
occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the and 35. (Emphasis supplied) 7
 Ibid.
search and seizure.27
Petitioners magnify the citation by the appellate court of Aruta allegedly 8
 Id. at 124.
Neither does petitioners’ claim that they were allowed by union officer "to justify [their] liability" under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which
Babay to enter the union office lie. Babay’s account of why petitioners petitioners allege is erroneous as said case did not involve Article 32. 9
 Records, p. 12.
and company went to the union office – to consider Panlilio’s suggestion
to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim that he Aruta was, however, cited by the appellate court, not to justify petitioners’ 10
 Id. at 30.
protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a search liability but to rule out the legality of the search in the union office as the
warrant. search was not done as an incident of a lawful arrest.
11
 Id. at 23.  Records, pp. 1-11.
29
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a
bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the
12
 Id. at 1.  Aberca v. Ver, No. L-69866, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA, 590,
30 employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and
606. sisters) based on the following:
13
 Rollo, pp. 68-88.
 G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57.
31 2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
14
 Id. at 87-88.
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
15
 Id. at 47-48.
G.R. No. 182836               October 13, 2009 xxxx
16
 Id. at 20.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
17
 G.R. No. 120915, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 626. CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs. xxxx
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S.
 Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec.13. Search incident to lawful
18
MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a the following manner:
(NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
search warrant.
xxxx
DECISION
19
 Rollo, p. 22.
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
20
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents
 Id. at 23.
(parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal
21
 Id. at 24. Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4
Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
22
 Id. at 25. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5
23
 Id. at 26. granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According to
Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child. the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died
24
 Report, Code Commission, 31 (January 26, 1948). during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: insufficiency.6

 I Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 at 129-130.

25

See Lim v. Ponce de Leon, No. L-22554 August 29, 1975, 66 Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity
SCRA 299, 309. Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7
26
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union)
 G.R. No. 86720, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 227, filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave
233. Vide People v. Aruta, supra Note 17. Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of
 47 Am Jur. 508, cited in Lim v. Ponce de Leon, No. L-22554,
27 and the Union, which reads: conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting
August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299, 308. the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment
 Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695
28 (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement
(1938); People vs. Aruta, Supra Note 17, p. 648. xxxx dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for
voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their
2 fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. 10 The parties mutually chose In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11 Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P.
the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos
Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño. included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of
whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing
and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and definition of the latter term.
other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that
Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the for lack of merit.
must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred
could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the
separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer
Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death
Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein
under similar provisions of their CBAs. "company practice." dispositions.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the
CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. 15 Dugan’s child was only 24 Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting
weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child thus: Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death
who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor. benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any
representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was
their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate". bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union. legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be
determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a)
in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer. there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c)
such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed
presented.18 Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of interpreted death to mean as follows:
the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an
to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be [Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in
none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and
Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of
civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve.
never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon
moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus
could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA
provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon
employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in
[Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent,
term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of
bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
[Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to negotiation of the CBA. dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification,
simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes
especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in
conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental states that civil personality is extinguished by death. relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on
Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical who is a legitimate child, viz:
purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly
Appeals reads: civil personality, which reads: no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family
Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to
AFFIRMED and UPHELD. and may be lost. be as follows:

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21 We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the
Motion for Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel. incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of unborn child upon the latter’s death.
death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited
dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality. Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano
We are not persuaded. that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.1avvphi1
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under
Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not
dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the
and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the
requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the
could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other
brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should
legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate. have been granted by Continental Steel.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted
that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be
death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but SO ORDERED. womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less
died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
alive but died subsequently. twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb.
Footnotes
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement
leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect
the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in 1
 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando E. Villon determined by law, by contract and by will.
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29 In concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.
the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor  CA rollo, pp. 24-34.
17
of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations 2
 Id. at 42.
Commission,30 we pronounced:
 Id. at 32.
18

 Penned by Atty. Allan S. Montaño, Accredited Voluntary

3

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the Arbitrator; records, pp. 381-392. 19
assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro  Id. at 2-18.
and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of
labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation
4
 CA rollo, p. 26.
Art. 262-A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section
of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is 7, Rule XIX of Department Order No. 40-03 series of 2003
involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between 5
 Rollo, pp. 84-92. provides that the decision, order, resolution or award of the
private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and executory after ten (10)
the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and 6
 Id. at 93. calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision
justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold. by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
7
 Id. at 86.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA
451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:  Rollo, pp. 38-39.
20
8
 Id. at 33.
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the 9
 Id. at 39.
21

scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be  CA rollo, p. 60.
counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the  Id. at 153.
22
underprivileged worker. 10
 Id. at 67.

 Id. at 136-143.
23
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 11
 Id. at 46.
SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared: 24
 Black’s Law Dictionary
12
 Id. at 25.
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy. 13
 Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution reads in full:
25
 Id. at 62-65.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
14
 Id at 66-72. protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which
15
 Records, pp. 46-53. life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine 16
 Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable the support of the Government.
(₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing the following article. 26
 As opposed to the more limited or precise definition of a
Corporation. dependent child for income tax purposes, which means "a
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted child chiefly
is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if such dependent
 is not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over
not gainfully employed or if such dependent, regardless of age, Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of
is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith
defect." legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically
in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that
27
 G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 363, 369. became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs
foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction appealed.
of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to
28
 483 Phil. 483, 491 (2004). answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down
certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their to the issue as to the validity of the lower court's judgment against the
 Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology
29
undertaking). deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was never
(FAMIT) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164060, 15 June 2007, served with summons.
524 SCRA 709, 716. Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the
decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was
30
 325 Phil. 618, 634-635 (1996). Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam
public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97;
under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The
sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962. As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in
Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He
was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to
when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42,
Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Civil Code).
Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212,
Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared
as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule
Case No.  14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976 Soliven, the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by
signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf and again
signing for his co-defendants. But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as
Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA
follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that
DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,  Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants
vs. Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee. the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Oria as a co-defendant.
Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee. deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No.
Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it 28732 is also void. No costs.
learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case
No. T-662, was filed.
SO ORDERED.
AQUINO, J.:p
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were
aware of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
Case No. 
 claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of
and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed their love was aflame.
"Escaño," respectively.2
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following: Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was
not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of
of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño").
student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to- Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her
32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The (Exh. "B-4").
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register. On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a
passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to
the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of
saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the
pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get said tribunal.
married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought
some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of
was their usual trysting place. Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10
September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the "D"-2).
elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back
to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo
nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has
home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand
G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965 of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a
clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,  Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
vs. whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees. whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while
from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
REYES, J.B.L., J.: between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and
Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter,
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion
of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal. following:
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
directly to this Court. The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved those which have for their object public order, policy and good
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following: (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when in a foreign country.
Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu.
complaint;. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous
her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding. discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the
heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;. members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and. From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the
consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance
by the plaintiff. remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages. "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also expressly provided: excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran
because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
law in force at the time) expressly provided that — Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.
(Emphasis supplied) The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not
provided the following: divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became
IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding
that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1). absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of
marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a
foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith interest. Said this Court in that case:
patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view
 As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her
celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does
natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied) (27 Am. Jur. 130-132). damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was
not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although
involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art.
that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this
action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that
marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her
the trial court committed error. which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that
contrary is proved. appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the attorney's fees.
status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law
where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr.
Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the
58 Phil. 667: stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have
distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present
the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72) acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore,
motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not Summing up, the Court rules:
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not
husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his country;
on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he
defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a
by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the separation conformably to Philippine law;
and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good applicable in the case of advice given to a son. (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one
manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine consort entitles the other to recover damages;
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under
consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
on their part.
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950,
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu,
and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño; promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy
G.R. No. L-14628             September 30, 1960 developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff- after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
fees; FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, 
vs. February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima,
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
way of damages and attorneys' fees. Regino Hermosisima for petitioner. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4,
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents. 1954.
Neither party to recover costs.
CONCEPCION, J.: Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry.
Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
a decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an
Footnotes obligation to contract marriage. No court shall entertain any
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral
1
 The latter was substituted by her heirs when she died during damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity
the pendency of the case in the trial court. ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private
of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of
ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the
2
 The original complaint included the Roman Catholic Church as ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who
a defendant, sought to be enjoined from acting on a petition for alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse
the ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage between Pastor reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño; the case against the defendant decision the dispositive part of which reads: reason of the promised marriage.
Church was dismissed on a joint motion.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the
3
 In the present Civil Code the contrary rule obtains (Art. 53). child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,
and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
4
 She was naturalized as an American citizen only on 8 August pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos
1958. (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for
and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the
plaintiff, with costs against defendant. Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change
the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on
said Proposed Civil Code:
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages,
which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
 Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's
marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who cause a marriage seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love
The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected. and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party damages may be recovered from him under the provision of
provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what he or Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise
that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be of the marriage. Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly
broken.1awphîl.nèt the paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in
Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof: which we quote: Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which
admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who around
impliedly. marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
by the future spouses. more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered
this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States. "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they
consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male had the benefit of clergy."
between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female See statutes of:
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a
consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344 monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500,
cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762 representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn
breach of the promise. Nevada 1943 — p. 75 during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141 compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223 attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of
age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though California 1939 — p. 1245 P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical
approved by the parent or guardian. Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326 attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009 representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the Michigan 1935 — p. 201 moral damages to P7,000.00.
criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall not New York 1935
be affected. Pennsylvania p. 450 With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
to marry may be brought. progression trend in legislation when it provided for breach of
promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be of years of experience are doing away with them, may well
brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor without the prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional
assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to
not only material and pecuniary losses but also compensation for sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
mental and moral suffering. damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court
of Appeals said award:
 marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which
So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët provides:

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
the issues involved are purely of law. manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers
and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the
1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals,
stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have
occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court
family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to
as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point,
the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties
Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a
each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each
other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better
rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them.
sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman,
their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
G.R. No. L-17396             May 30, 1962 deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The
affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless. We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,  tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than
vs. Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee. at their residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact
1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted
sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: of defendant's. In English it reads: affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their
to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the this month and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of morning at 10 a.m. proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless,
litigation. defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from
the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this
Reply chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to
up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her
Love
a valid cause of action. and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it
appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a
appellee. be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an
Dizon, JJ., concur. negative. We sustain him. order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979,
the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case,
Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue
C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
Paz B. Abayan. the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that of the accused in a criminal case.5
petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June
30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It
the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of
consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988 second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the
deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through
for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed deceit.
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, 
by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage
vs.
license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only
ABAYAN, respondents. Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for
petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case
contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question states that:
which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent. proceed.
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the
marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent. In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case suspension of the case. In order that the case of
of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
the criminal case can proceed as scheduled. question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
GANCAYCO, J.:
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such
marriage must be the one that was obtained by means
 of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner 1 22 SCRA 731.
in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the 2 68 SCRA 1.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's
At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage 3 People va. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Isip vs. Gonzales,
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for 39 SCRA 255; Rojas vs. People, 57 SCRA 243.
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the 4 Libra va. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303.
ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to
only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to 5 Ibid.
the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living
the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than
should be declared null and void on the ground of 6 22 SCRA 73.
five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments
force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force,
marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent
petitioner, the fact would not be material to the marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent
outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one
same must be submitted to the judgment of the day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage
competent courts and only when the nullity of the and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so nullity.
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28,
prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the
not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to
failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner. the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation
and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private
respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats,
force and intimidation.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the
respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before
Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is
markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela
Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of G.R. No. 148595             July 12, 2004
marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as sustained.
SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T.
contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private PAHANG, petitioners, 
respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby vs.
for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional
was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already SO ORDERED. Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST
rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null COMPANY, respondents.
and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
civil case.
Footnotes
 DECISION amount determined and established as true and exact obligation questioning the validity of the mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure
of plaintiffs to defendant bank.7 thereof cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser at public auction. The appellate court ruled that after a title on
After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee, the issuance of a writ
CALLEJO, SR., J.: of possession becomes a ministerial act of the trial court. Furthermore, the
consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed property. Consequently,
TCT No. 44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its name. On July right of the respondent bank to possess the property was based on its right
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses 23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the of ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale. The
Antonio and Lolita Pahang, for the nullification of the Decision 1 and RTC of Mandaue City (Branch 56), docketed as LRC Case No. 3.8 CA explained that the ruling in the Belisariocase was inapplicable because
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157. it involved a complaint to enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed
property within the period of redemption, whereas, the complaint filed by
The petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the annulment of the
The Antecedents Intermediate Appellate Court,9 opposed the petition on the ground that the mortgage or extrajudicial sale which was not equivalent to an offer to
core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 constituted a redeem the property.19
On January 5, 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, prejudicial question, which warranted a suspension of the proceedings
received a short-term loan of one million five hundred thousand pesos before the court. The petitioners averred that the filing of their complaint
within the period to redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent to an The Present Petition
(P1,500,000.00) from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by Non- offer to redeem the same, and had the effect of preserving such right. They
Negotiable Promissory Note No. 1906013 and was, likewise, secured by a also asserted that the respondent acted in bad faith in procuring the title The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the decision, having
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of over the property despite the pendency of their complaint in Civil Case been denied by the appellate court, the petitioners filed this instant
Title (TCT) No. 29607.4 As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the No. MAN-3454. petition, assigning the following errors:
interest and the penalties due thereon, the respondent foreclosed the real
estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the mortgaged property On March 28, 2000, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, rendered a 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
was sold at public auction on January 8, 1998 to the respondent bank as decision in LRC Case No. 3 granting the petition and ordering the FINDING PETITIONERS’ RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OVER
the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by Pasnonito D. issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent.10 THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY AS HAVING EXPIRED
Antiporda as Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the respondent on January 14, ON JANUARY 26, 1999, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR
1998 and was registered with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City on PENDING COMPLAINT TO ANNUL THE FORECLOSURE
Citing the case of Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,11 and Gawaran v. Court of
January 27, 1998. FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE ONE-YEAR
Appeals,12 the RTC ruled that since the petitioners failed to redeem the
property within one year from the foreclosure, the respondent was entitled REDEMPTION PERIOD, ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD,
On December 29, 1998, the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one- to a writ of possession as a necessary consequence of the readjudication of AND CONSIDERING FURTHER THEIR SPECIFIC PRAYER
year redemption period of the property would expire on January 27, ownership and the corresponding issuance of the original certificate. 13 The THEREOF FOR DETERMINATION OF THEIR TRUE
1999.5 Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, on January petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the court OBLIGATION WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND TO
19, 1999, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale against the issued an order denying the motion, stating that it was merely its ALLOW THEM TO PAY THE SAME AND/OR TO REDEEM
respondent bank and the Sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu ministerial function to issue a writ of possession.14 THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY.20
(Mandaue City), Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
3454.6 Therein, the petitioners alleged that the respondent bloated their 2. PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
obligation of P1,500,000.00 to P2,403,770.73 by including excessive past THE FORECLOSURE OF THEIR PROPERTY WITH A
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59157 for the nullification of the March 28,
due interest, penalty charges, attorney’s fees and sheriff’s expense. They PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
2000 Decision and the May 19, 2000 Order of the RTC. Thepetitioners
claimed that such exorbitant charges were made to frustrate their chance to INJUNCTION TO STOP THE ISSUANCE OF A DEFINITE
alleged that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
pay the loan, and to ensure that the respondent bank would be the highest DEED OF SALE AND CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE OF
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent
bidder during the auction sale. They also asserted that the respondent THEIR PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 instead of suspending the
failed to remit to the Sheriff the purchase price of the property and was, RESPONDENT, WHILE GIVING PREFERENCE AND
proceedings therein based on the ruling of this Court in Belisario vs. The
likewise, guilty of fraud, collusion, breach of trust or misconduct in the ACTING WITH DISPATCH ON PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
Intermediate Appellate Court.15
conduct of the auction sale of their property. Besides praying for PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION ON
injunctive relief, the petitioners prayed for the following alternative THE SAME PROPERTY, BY GRANTING THE WRIT OF
reliefs: The Ruling of the Court of Appeals POSSESSION THEREON THEREBY RENDERING MOOT
AND ACADEMIC PETITIONERS’ PRAYERS IN THEIR
3. After trial on the merits, and after determination of plaintiffs’ Finding that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE.21
true obligation with defendant bank, to declare the foreclosure the issuance of the writ of possession, the CA rendered a decision on
on the subject property as null and void, and to allow the March 2, 2001, dismissing the petition. 16 Citing the rulings of this Court 3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
plaintiffs to pay the same; as alternative prayer, to allow the in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals17 and Navarra v. Court of FINDING THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE
plaintiffs to redeem the subject real property based on the Appeals,18 the CA explained that the pendency of a separate proceeding SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF BELISARIO VS. THE
 INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L-73503, the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial court The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the
WHEREBY "THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT TO and declared, thus: extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the
ENFORCE REPURCHASE WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of their property at
REDEMPTION IS EQUIVALENT TO AN OFFER TO Further, as to the applicability of the case of Belisario vs. public auction for P2,403,770.73 are null and void, whereas, the issue in
REDEEM AND HAS THE EFFECT OF PRESERVING THE Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. L-73503, Aug. 30, LRC Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank was entitled to the
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION" INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE 1988, 165 SCRA 101, 108), suffice it to say, that the cause of possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption had
OF PETITIONERS.22 action therein was to enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed lapsed and title was issued .
property within the period of redemption, which the Supreme
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN Court held that it has the effect of preserving the right of Our ruling in Belisario has no application in this case because in the said
NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE OR redemption. Whereas, Civil Case No. MAN-3454 filed by the case, no prejudicial question was involved. We merely held therein that
ISSUES JOINED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT petitioners is for the annulment of mortgage or extrajudicial sale, the filing of an action to enforce redemption within the period of
BEFORE RESPONDENT JUDGE DOCKETED AS CIVIL which is not in effect an offer to redeem. Verily, the pendency of redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, and should the Court
CASE NO. MAN-4353 (sic) IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION said civil case does not preserve the right of redemption of the allow the redemption, the redemptioner should then pay the amount
TO THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF petitioners after the period of redemption.26 already determined. In fine, the filing of an action by the redemptioner to
POSSESSION IN LRC CASE NO. 3.23 enforce his right to redeem does not suspend the running of the statutory
The Court’s Ruling period to redeem the property, nor bar the purchaser at public auction from
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN procuring a writ of possession after the statutory period of redemption had
HAVING FAILED TO CONSIDER THE VALID CAUSES OF lapsed, without prejudice to the final outcome of such complaint to
The contentions of the petitioners have no merit. enforce the right of redemption.31
ACTION OF PETITIONERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR
ANNULMENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4354 (sic).24
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is The remedy of the petitioners from the assailed decision of the RTC in
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of LRC Case No. 3 was to appeal by writ of error to the Court of
The threshold issues are as follows: (a) whether or not the complaint of the which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a
petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial Appeals.32 However, instead of appealing by writ of error, the petitioners
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and filed their petition for certiorari. Certiorari is not proper where the
sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for the there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3; and, (b) whether or aggrieved party has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue Moreover, the error of the trial court in granting the respondent bank a
not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure
excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent in writ of possession, if at all, was an error of judgment correctible only by
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale an ordinary appeal.
LRC Case No. 3 and in issuing the writ of possession in its favor. behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.27
The issues being interrelated, the Court shall resolve the same It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the
simultaneously. issuance of a writ of possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of redemption, is summary in nature.33 The trial court is mandated to issue a
Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondent’s petition for the writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for
The petitioners contend that their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, redemption without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It
and the respondent’s petition for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, cannot be validly argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it
were raffled to Branch 56 of the RTC. Although their complaint in Civil therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two merely complied with its ministerial duty to issue the said writ of
Case No. MAN-3454 was for the nullification of the extrajudicial sale at actions.28 A similar issue was raised in Manalo vs. Court of possession.34
public auction on the ground of fraud, they also prayed, as an alternative Appeals,29 where we held that:
remedy, that they be allowed to redeem the property based on the amount
to be determined by the court after trial. Hence, they assert, the filing of IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE
At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in COURSE. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
their complaint before the expiry of the redemption period to enforce their Case No. 98-0868 must be considered determinative of Case No.
right of redemption was equivalent to a formal offer to redeem the No. 59157 is AFFIRMED.
9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the respondent, as
property and had the effect of preserving their right of redemption. They the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may
argue that the RTC should have suspended the proceedings in LRC Case be compelled to have the property repurchased or resold to a Cost against the petitioners.
No. 3 pending the final resolution of Civil Case No. MAN-3454 so as not mortgagor’s successor-in-interest (petitioner); while that in the
to render moot and academic the latter case, conformably with the ruling latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the SO ORDERED.
of the Court in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court,25 after all, extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ of
the two cases were pending before the same court. The petitioners, thus, possession after the statutory period for redemption has expired.
aver that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
The two cases, assuming both are pending, can proceed
excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent separately and take their own direction independent of each
bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3. They, likewise, aver that other.30
 Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
Footnotes of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed
1 
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009
Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Elvi John S. Asuncion, and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If
concurring. indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen,
2 
Rollo, pp. 38-39. the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his
3 
Id. at 111. Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
4 
Id. at 112.
5 
CA Rollo, p. 42. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be
6 
Rollo, p. 41. presented as public documents2 of a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference to a
7 
Id. at 51.
8 
foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
Id. at 73-76. deciding a case.
9 
165 SCRA 101 (1988).
10 
Rollo, pp. 40-42. Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the
11 
265 SCRA 493 (1996). United States "providing that a person who is divested of American
12 
162 SCRA 154 (1988). G.R. No. 195649               July 2, 2013 citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such
13 
Rollo, p. 42. American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."4
14 
Id. at 43. CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, 
15 
Supra. vs. American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d)
16 
Rollo, pp. 31-37. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y of the Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us,
CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS. given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he
17 
184 SCRA 294, 302 (1990).
18 
204 SCRA 850, 853 (1991). was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an
RESOLUTION American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign
19 
Rollo, p. 36.
20 
law that serves as the basis for Arnado’s disqualification to run for any
Id at 18. local elective position.
21 
Id. at 20. SERENO, J.:
22 
Id. at 21. With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act
23 
Id. at 23. This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
respondent on May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for
24 
Id. at 24. another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
25 
Supra. citizenship under the conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to the
26 
Rollo, p. 36. reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those who
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public
27 
Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 752
the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
(2001); Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, 393 SCRA 143 (2002).
therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief
28 
Ibid. sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration
29 
Supra. This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when
is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnado’s election or
read together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code 7 which
30 
Id. at 766. affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local
31 
Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 189 (2000). position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office
32 
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former
Appeals, 169 SCRA 244 (1989). reversal of this Court’s Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign
33 
Ibid. presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del passport – which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the
34 
Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, supra.; Government Service Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only individual as its national – even after the Filipino has renounced his
Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, supra. twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the
taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a
Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this
situation of doubt.
Court.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 1
 Benedicto v. CA, G.R. No. 125359, 4 September 2001, citing
Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local 4 June 2010. Vda. de Perez v. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722, 735 (1994), which in
elective positions. turn cited Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin,
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the 58 SCRA 266 (1974).
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21
2
 See Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of
or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that their presentation in evidence, documents are either
person named therein as its national. his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the public or private.
travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado Public documents are:
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April (a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six. tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also Philippines, or of a foreign country.
indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was 3
 Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
his U.S. passport at least six times. because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of
him for his use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete already received his Philippine passport. Arnado’s travel records show that copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado. record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S. passport was may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnado’s legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe. of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
without a country".1âwphi1 On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found
of his office.
Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those 4
Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we  Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2
that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their
5
 Sec. 2, RA 9225.
6
of candidacy. foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports,  Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who
we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will
Government Code. liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
Philippines and the following conditions:
discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental (2) Those seeking elective public office in the
only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality. Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded such public office as required by the Constitution and
or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
SO ORDERED. certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.9
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. 7
 SECTION 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are
that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., joins the disqualified from running for any elective local position:
American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, dissent of J. Brion.
which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and […]
Brion, J., I dissent. (d) Those with dual citizenship;
which agreed with Arnado’s claim that he only used his U.S. passport on
8
those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The  Raniel v. Jochico, G.R. No. 153413, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA
COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used Footnotes 221, 227, citing Gala v. Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation, 463
his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January Phil. 846, 859 (2003).
 9
 Id., citing Industrial Refractories Corporation of the Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they her daughter’s father were never married because the latter had a prior
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 36, 48 (2002). be corrected. subsisting marriage contracted in China.
10
 Rollo, p. 66.
The trial court then issued an Order,1 which reads: In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials
of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To
substance, let the hearing of this case be set on December 27, from 1948 to the present.
1999 before this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights, Tubod,
Iligan City at 8:30 o’clock in the afternoon at which date, place The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present
and time any interested person may appear and show cause why any evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by
the petition should not be granted. attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.

Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and
in the City of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del Norte once a rendered judgment as follows:
week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the
petitioner. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the
records of the petitioner straight and in their proper perspective,
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at the petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is
134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of
the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, the petitioner, to wit:
Iligan City.
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
SO ORDERED.
2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)"
During the hearing, respondent testified thus: to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";

First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". 3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by
She has been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question
G.R. No. 153883             January 13, 2004 marriage certificate.2 She presented a clearance from the "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  consistency in her use of the surname "Yu". 4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
vs.
CHULE Y. LIM, respondent. Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was SO ORDERED.4
written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu
DECISION Dio To (Co Tian)."
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision.5
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been
Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only
her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the citizen. I
Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 considering that her parents were never married. CHULE Y. LIM FROM "CHINESE" TO "FILIPINO"
in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del
DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER
Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her
Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL
record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and
her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
 II married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same
and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,16 we held:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a
RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER FATHER’S Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the
SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. use of aliases, allows a person to use a name "by which he has
IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.6 been known since childhood" (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v.
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error Florencio Mallare,12 we held: Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the
respondent’s recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De
indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).17
register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to While judicial authority is required for a change of name or
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos surname,18 there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname
If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra which a person has already been using since childhood.19
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic,
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that
Valencia7 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the to which he is rightfully entitled.13 future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate community in general.20 In this case, the Republic has not shown that the
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter future mischief. In respondent’s case, the change in the surname that she
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of the right has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community
been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive in general.
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.8 act of election of Philippine citizenship.15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
Republic’s failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case Appeals’ decision in allowing respondent to use her father’s surname 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil
properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering despite its finding that she is illegitimate. Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections
that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial. in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
The Republic’s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent allow respondent to use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the 1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship 2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU
court pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname. DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held: 3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?";
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at and,
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the this time from using her father’s surname which she has used for
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and four decades without any known objection from anybody, would 4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the changing one’s name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."10 SO ORDERED.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna,
Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimatechildren. These do not apply in "by which he has been known since childhood." JJ., concur.
the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never
Footnotes Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
their motion for reconsideration. against petitioners.
1
 Exhibit "B", Records, p. 14.
2
 Exhibit "J", Records, p. 35. Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772 We hold that it is.
3
 Exhibit "L", Records, p. 37. otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. The information alleges:
4
 Penned by Judge Gerardo D. Paguio. A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and
5
 CA-G.R. CV No. 68893, penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its
Reyes; concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao Lapulapu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To
and Amelita G. Tolentino; Rollo, pp. 29-40. of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the
6
 Rollo, p. 16. [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
7
 141 SCRA 462, 474, G.R. No. L-32181, March 5,1986. Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or
8
 Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 382 SCRA mutually helping with one another, without the issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence
22, 27, G.R. No. 130277, May 9, 2002. knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA of the accused.2 Rule 111, §5 provides:
9
 Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, Ching, Bar Matter TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
No. 914, 1 October 1999, 374 Phil. 342, 349. feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance
10
 Id., at 350. Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two
of the said owner by occupying or possessing a (2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are:
11
 Supra. portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon
12
 In re: Florencio Mallare, Adm. Case No. 533, 12 September (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
1974, 59 Phil. 45, 52. 13250, situated in Agus Lapulapu City, whereon they
13
 Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, Ching, supra. action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
14
constructed their respective residential houses against whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 TSN, February 13, 2000, p. 7. the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused
15
 In re: Florencio Mallare, supra, cited in Co v. Electoral have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, land, to her damage and prejudice because despite In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece
30 July 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 707. repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, of land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the
16
 No. L-27298, 4 March 1976, 162 Phil. 22, 29. as they still fail and refuse to vacate the premises latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the
17
 Rollo, pp. 38-39. above-mentioned. knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners
18
 Civil Code, Art. 376. occupied or took possession of a portion of "her property" by building
19
 Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils., No. L-27298, 4 March 1976, their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land
162 Phil. 22, 29. Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground to her damage and prejudice.
20
 Llaneta v. Hon. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054, 15 May 1974, 156 that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case
Phil. 21, 24. being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the
Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-
Lot No. 3635-B.1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution,
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995 of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of
question among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of petitioners criminal liability for squatting.
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners,
JACALAN, petitioners,  three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case
vs. filed against them. rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and
HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, her husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in common by
and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and the spouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents Filomeno
TIGOL, respondents. proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the decision in that
plea (not guilty) to the charge. case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the
point is that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of
ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence
On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of
MENDOZA, J.: their motion was denied by the court in its order dated September 21, the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they
1993. Hence, this petition. are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are the
This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family.3
Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No.
Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral motion for the suspension of 3635-B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial
their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of the
Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can be This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision Norte, and that it was committed with evident
ejected from his property since the only issue in such a case is the right to which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the premeditation.
its physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can also be petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable
prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law. doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District
the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages. rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a
piece of land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his The petitioners were charged under the following information: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy
property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia
the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby
Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based on her FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and
claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and
the question in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in
the meantime be suspended. ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary
RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
ordered to SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of
the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows: The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David
with finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo
civil case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo
Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal case. o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their
SO ORDERED. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this criminal participation in the crime charged.
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur. Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town
  Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the
Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted
and mutually helping one another, and acting without municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72)
to close their stall located at the Public Market, hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the
Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory
and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00
destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
and other massive instruments, and carrying away the
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO
goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and
and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,  The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family
vs. states:
in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum
of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners. appealed from in the sense that the appellants are
That in committing the offense, the accused took acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are
The Solicitor General for respondent. advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants
the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino
who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the
extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER From all appearances, they should have been
holding that: CRIME. prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief.
But the law does not allow us to render judgment of
xxx xxx xxx IV conviction for either of these offenses for the reason
that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The
information under which they were prosecuted does
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING not allege the elements of either threats or malicious
whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN mischief. Although the information mentions that the
facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND act was by means of threats', it does not allege the
taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS particular threat made. An accused person is entitled
complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES. to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him
on record established that complainants suffered actual before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid
damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct. The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent information.
court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been
that: charge. proved in accordance with law.

I Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is While appellants are entitled to acquittal they
included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the
GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from stall and loss of some of their properties. The
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111,
WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE. v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51
Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the
Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise,
II Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the
before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit properties contained therein; exists, and this is not
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the denied by the accused. And since there is no showing
IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other that the complainants have reserved or waived their
1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect
WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action.
ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL mischief.
DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
III
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A provision, the violence must be employed against the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN person, not against property as what happened in the instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party
JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS case at bar. ... expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS xxx xxx xxx
TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS,
DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal
PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE an offense other than coercion? of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa,
ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also
NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to
the act as a crime. where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in
Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption
the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities that: of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting
against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising When the accused in a criminal prosecution is serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the
from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To
liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in damages for the same act or omission may be would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and
2177 of the Civil Code provides: of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court money on the part of all concerned.
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the damages in case the complaint should be found to be The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from malicious. evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:
the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based xxx xxx xxx
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In
the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be (9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that: inferred from the text of the decision whether or not Galdones, complying with the instructions contained
the acquittal is due to that ground. in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the
all cases not included in the preceding section the More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal premises in question, with the aid of his policemen,
following rules shall be observed: case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal
the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution: of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same
time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
xxx xxx xxx them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent
said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out
xxx xxx xxx Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of
benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact liability arising from the offense charged, which is the been made known.
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner declaration would not bar a civil action filed against
provided by law against the person who may be liable an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal On the morning of February 8th, because the said
for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the
for the damage suffered. legal considerations other than the commission of the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police
offense charged. A person may be acquitted of Galdones and some members of his police force, went
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers,
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the show that he did not misappropriate the public funds demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not
civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to present or around, and after having first inventoried
by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. restore said funds or at least to make a proper the goods and merchandise found therein, they had
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for them brought to the municipal building for
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 a manner not permitted by applicable rules and Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203) merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do
estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who so.
 The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a
them were: following the dictates of logic and common sense. court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on
reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a
Cost of stall construction As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco: remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a
P1,300.00 criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
Value of the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be
furniture and in the criminal action, may it render judgment availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed
equipment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive
judgment him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer permissible mode of recovering damages.
destroyed to this question would be consistent with the doctrine
300.00 that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win
(a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a
action, or one based on quasi-delict or other judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same
Value of goods and equipment criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal
taken 8,000.00 independent civil action, and of presenting the same
evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however,
expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from
P9,600.00 enable him to take advantage of the free services of which civil liability might arise did not exist.
the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the implications of permitting the reinstitution of a A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial
grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi- requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one
away its contents. The defense that they did so in delict, or other independent civil actions. who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act
order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. ... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the
The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving
the government which allowed them to lease the stall. should be amended because it clearly and expressly at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to
It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a provides that the civil action based on the same act or make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation
nuisance per se which could be summarily abated. omission may only be instituted in a separate action, by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
away. They state: of any other civil action, would likewise render, one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on without any significance, and would violate the miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate. reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, evident that there is much sophistry and no the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to civil liability cannot be demanded.
store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods award in the same proceedings damages against the
found in said store, and brought these goods to the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. This is one of those cases where confused thinking
municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Treasurer, ... character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive demarcation between criminal liability and civil
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond not because the act or omission is punishable but distinct from each other. One affects the social order
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment
may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289). or correction of the offender while the other is for
substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
 party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of wholesome business of her own. He also proposed that they meet in
the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the Manila, to which she assented. Alfred gave her money for her plane fare to
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. the Philippines. Within two weeks of Ederlina's arrival in Manila, Alfred
But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining joined her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in the
party, why should the offense also be proved beyond Philippines and engage in business, even offering to finance her business
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of venture. Ederlina was delighted at the idea and proposed to put up a
every private right to be proved only by beauty parlor. Alfred happily agreed.
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? G.R. No. 143958             July 11, 2003 his wife in Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she
(Code Commission, pp. 45-46). replied that they should wait a little bit longer.
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner, 
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be vs. Ederlina found a building at No. 444 M.H. del Pilar corner Arquiza Street,
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case EDERLINA P. CATITO, respondent. Ermita, Manila, owned by one Atty. Jose Hidalgo who offered to convey
has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as his rights over the property for P18,000.00. Alfred and Ederlina accepted
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court the offer. Ederlina put up a beauty parlor on the property under the
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil CALLEJO, SR., J.:
business name Edorial Beauty Salon, and had it registered with the
aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a Department of Trade and Industry under her name. Alfred paid Atty.
separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals Hidalgo P20,000.00 for his right over the property and gave P300,000.00
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it in CA-G.R. CV No. 53485 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional to Ederlina for the purchase of equipment and furniture for the parlor. As
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 17,817 dismissing Ederlina was going to Germany, she executed a special power of attorney
separate civil action to be filed. the petitioner's complaint, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals on December 13, 19835 appointing her brother, Aser Catito, as her
denying his motion for reconsideration of the said decision. attorney-in-fact in managing the beauty parlor business. She stated in the
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals said deed that she was married to Klaus Muller. Alfred went back to Papua
did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal. The Antecedents3 New Guinea to resume his work as a pilot.

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court As gleaned from the evidence of the petitioner, the case at bar stemmed When Alfred returned to the Philippines, he visited Ederlina in her Manila
of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit. from the following factual backdrop: residence and found it unsuitable for her. He decided to purchase a house
and lot owned by Victoria Binuya Steckel in San Francisco del Monte,
SO ORDERED. Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218429 for
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent.
US$20,000.00. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified
He is an electrical engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the
from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio- New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started
would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as well as in
Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur. engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married
the title covering the same. After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina
Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated
and he believed that after their marriage, the two of them would jointly
from bed and board without obtaining a divorce.
Aquino, J., concur in the result. own the property. On January 23, 1984, a Contract to Sell was entered into
between Victoria Binuya Steckel as the vendor and Ederlina as the sole
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vendee. Alfred signed therein as a witness.6 Victoria received from Alfred,
De Castro, J., took no part. vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a massage for and in behalf of Ederlina, the amount of US$10,000.00 as partial
where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao payment, for which Victoria issued a receipt. 7 When Victoria executed the
Concepcion, Jr. J., is on leave. City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was deed of absolute sale over the property on March 6, 1984, 8 she received
married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried from Alfred, for and in behalf of Ederlina, the amount of US$10,000.00 as
her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as final and full payment. Victoria likewise issued a receipt for the said
a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub. She was fluent in German, and amount.9 After Victoria had vacated the property, Ederlina moved into her
Alfred enjoyed talking with her. The two saw each other again; this time new house. When she left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her father
Ederlina ended up staying in Alfred's hotel for three days. Alfred gave Narciso Catito and her two sisters occupy the property.
Ederlina sums of money for her services.4
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina.
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop He returned to Australia and sold his fiber glass pleasure boat to John Reid
working at King's Cross, return to the Philippines, and engage in a for $7,500.00 on May 4, 1984.10 He also sold his television and video
business in Papua New Guinea for K135,000.00 to Tekeraoi Pty. Ltd.11 He Alfred purchased another parcel of land from one Atty. Mardoecheo Alfred and Ederlina's relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not
had his personal properties shipped to the Philippines and stored at No. 14 Camporedondo, located in Moncado, Babak, Davao, covered by TCT No. been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for
Fernandez Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The proceeds of 35251. Alfred once more agreed for the name of Ederlina to appear as the bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To
the sale were deposited in Alfred's account with the Hong Kong Shanghai sole vendee in the deed of sale. On December 31, 1984, Atty. avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and
Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon Branch under Bank Account No. Camporedondo executed a deed of sale over the property for P65,000.00 cut off all contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina
018-2-807016.12 When Alfred was in Papua New Guinea selling his other in favor of Ederlina as the sole vendee.21 Alfred, through Ederlina, paid the complained that he had ruined her life. She admitted that the money used
properties, the bank sent telegraphic letters updating him of his lot at the cost of P33,682.00 and US$7,000.00, respectively, for which the for the purchase of the properties in Davao were his. She offered to
account.13 Several checks were credited to his HSBC bank account from vendor signed receipts.22 On August 14, 1985, TCT No. 47246 was issued convey the properties deeded to her by Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo
Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation, Westpac Bank of Australia and to Ederlina as the sole owner of the said property.23 and Rodolfo Morelos, asking Alfred to prepare her affidavit for the said
New Zealand Banking Group Limited and Westpac Bank-PNG-Limited. purpose and send it to her for her signature.30 The last straw for Alfred
Alfred also had a peso savings account with HSBC, Manila, under Savings Meanwhile, Ederlina deposited on December 27, 1985, the total amount of came on September 2, 1985, when someone smashed the front and rear
Account No. 01-725-183-01.14 US$250,000 with the HSBC Kowloon under Joint Deposit Account No. windshields of Alfred's car and damaged the windows. Alfred thereafter
018-462341-145.24 executed an affidavit-complaint charging Ederlina and Sally MacCarron
Once, when Alfred and Ederlina were in Hong Kong, they opened another with malicious mischief.31
account with HSBC, Kowloon, this time in the name of Ederlina, under The couple decided to put up a beach resort on a four-hectare land in
Savings Account No. 018-0-807950.15 Alfred transferred his deposits in Camudmud, Babak, Davao, owned by spouses Enrique and Rosela On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlina's father, complaining that
Savings Account No. 018-2-807016 with the said bank to this new Serrano. Alfred purchased the property from the spouses for P90,000.00, Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtually
account. Ederlina also opened a savings account with the Bank of America and the latter issued a receipt therefor.25 A draftsman commissioned by the penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for
Kowloon Main Office under Account No. 30069016.16 couple submitted a sketch of the beach resort.26 Beach houses were themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He
forthwith constructed on a portion of the property and were eventually demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New Guinea, he received a rented out by Ederlina's father, Narciso Catito. The rentals were collected "stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina
Letter dated December 7, 1983 from Klaus Muller who was then residing by Narciso, while Ederlina kept the proceeds of the sale of copra from the during their coverture.32
in Berlin, Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been coconut trees in the property. By this time, Alfred had already spent
married on October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life until Alfred P200,000.00 for the purchase, construction and upkeep of the property. Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a Complaint33 dated October 28, 1985,
intruded therein. Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlina's against Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for
amorous relationship, and discovered the same sometime in November Ederlina often wrote letters to her family informing them of her life with recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and
1983 when he arrived in Manila. He also begged Alfred to leave Ederlina Alfred. In a Letter dated January 21, 1985, she wrote about how Alfred Manila. In his complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia, that Ederlina, without
alone and to return her to him, saying that Alfred could not possibly build had financed the purchases of some real properties, the establishment of his knowledge and consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint
his future on his (Klaus') misfortune.17 her beauty parlor business, and her petition to divorce Klaus.27 account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same bank.
Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties subject
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close friend of Ederlina. of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was
Because Ederlina was preoccupied with her business in Manila, she established with his own funds, and that the Quezon City property was
He inquired if there was any truth to Klaus' statements and Sally executed on July 8, 1985, two special powers of attorney28 appointing
confirmed that Klaus was married to Ederlina. When Alfred confronted likewise acquired by him with his personal funds.34
Alfred as attorney-in-fact to receive in her behalf the title and the deed of
Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed, married. But she sale over the property sold by the spouses Enrique Serrano.
assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Alfred
agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of adduced his evidence ex parte.
Ederlina's petition for divorce. After all, he intended to marry her. He In the meantime, Ederlina's petition for divorce was denied because Klaus
retained the services of Rechtsanwaltin Banzhaf with offices in Berlin, as opposed the same. A second petition filed by her met the same fate. Klaus
wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines In the meantime, on November 7, 1985, Alfred also filed a
her counsel who informed her of the progress of the proceedings. 18 Alfred complaint35 against Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City,
paid for the services of the lawyer. before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a
bigamy case against Ederlina.29 for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal
properties, sum of money, and damages. He alleged, inter alia, in his
In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase another house and lot, owned complaint:
by Rodolfo Morelos covered by TCT No. 92456 located in Peña Street, Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or as an
Bajada, Davao City.19 Alfred again agreed to have the deed of sale made alternative, the establishment of a corporation, with Ederlina owning 30%
of the equity thereof. She initially agreed to put up a corporation and 4. That during the period of their common-law relationship,
out in the name of Ederlina. On September 7, 1984, Rodolfo Morelos plaintiff solely through his own efforts and resources acquired
executed a deed of absolute sale over the said property in favor of Ederlina contacted Atty. Armando Dominguez to prepare the necessary documents.
Ederlina changed her mind at the last minute when she was advised to in the Philippines real and personal properties valued more or
as the sole vendee for the amount of P80,000.00.20 Alfred paid less at P724,000.00; The defendant's common-law wife or live-
US$12,500.00 for the property. insist on claiming ownership over the properties acquired by them during
their coverture. in partner did not contribute anything financially to the
acquisition of the said real and personal properties. These
properties are as follows:
 I. Real Properties (1) TCT No. T-92456 (with residential house) located WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that the Honorable
at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of 286 square Court adjudge defendant bank, upon hearing the evidence that
a. TCT No. T-92456 located at Bajada, Davao City, meters, registered in the name of the original title the parties might present, to pay plaintiff:
consisting of 286 square meters, (with residential owner Rodolfo Morelos but already fully paid by
house) registered in the name of the original title plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00; 1. ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
owner Rodolfo M. Morelos but already fully paid by HUNDRED AND THIRTY U.S. DOLLARS AND NINETY
plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00; (2) TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located EIGHT CENTS (US$126,230.98) plus legal interests, either of
at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of 600 square Hong Kong or of the Philippines, from 20 December 1984 up to
b. TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located meters, registered in the name of Ederlina Catito, with the date of execution or satisfaction of judgment, as actual
at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of 600 square the Register of Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte, damages or in restoration of plaintiffs lost dollar savings;
meters, registered in the name of Ederlina Catito, with valued at P144,000.00;
the Register of Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte 2. The same amount in (1) above as moral damages;
valued at P144,000.00; (3) A parcel of agricultural land located at
Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte, 3. Attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to TWENTY FIVE
c. A parcel of agricultural land located at Camudmud, consisting of 4.2936 hectares purchased from Enrique PER CENT (25%) of (1) and (2) above;
Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte, consisting of 4.2936 Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano. Already fully paid by
hectares purchased from Enrique Serrano and Rosela plaintiff. Valued at P228,608.32;
4. Litigation expenses in the amount equivalent to TEN PER
B. Serrano. Already paid in full by plaintiff. Valued at CENT (10%) of the amount in (1) above; and
P228,608.32; c) Declaring the plaintiff to be the sole and absolute owner of
the above-mentioned real and personal properties;
5. For such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the
II. Personal Properties: circumstances.42
d) Awarding moral damages to plaintiff in an amount deemed
a. Furniture valued at P10,000.00. reasonable by the trial court;
On April 28, 1986, the RTC of Quezon City rendered its decision in Civil
Case No. Q-46350, in favor of Alfred, the decretal portion of which reads
... e) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00 as attorney's as follows:
fees for having compelled the plaintiff to litigate;
5. That defendant made no contribution at all to the acquisition, WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
of the above-mentioned properties as all the monies (sic) used in f) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 incurred as rendered ordering the defendant to perform the following:
acquiring said properties belonged solely to plaintiff;36 litigation expenses also for having compelled the plaintiff to
litigate; and
(1) To execute a document waiving her claim to the house and
Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor: lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon
g) To pay the costs of this suit; City in favor of plaintiff or to return to the plaintiff the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is acquisition cost of the same in the amount of $20,000.00, or to
respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of Plaintiff prays other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.37 sell the said property and turn over the proceeds thereof to the
plaintiff and against defendant: plaintiff;
In her answer, Ederlina denied all the material allegations in the
a) Ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding deeds of complaint, insisting that she acquired the said properties with her personal (2) To deliver to the plaintiff the rights of ownership and
transfer and/or conveyances in favor of plaintiff over those real funds, and as such, Alfred had no right to the same. She alleged that the management of the beauty parlor located at 444 Arquiza St.,
and personal properties enumerated in Paragraph 4 of this deeds of sale, the receipts, and certificates of titles of the subject properties Ermita, Manila, including the equipment and fixtures therein;
complaint; were all made out in her name.38 By way of special and affirmative
defense, she alleged that Alfred had no cause of action against her. She (3) To account for the earnings of rental of the house and lot in
interposed counterclaims against the petitioner.39 No. 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City,
b) Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all the above
real and personal properties or their money value, which are in as well as the earnings in the beauty parlor at 444 Arquiza St.,
defendant's name and custody because these were acquired In the meantime, the petitioner filed a Complaint dated August 25, 1987, Ermita, Manila and turn over one-half of the net earnings of both
solely with plaintiffs money and resources during the duration of against the HSBC in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City 40 for recovery properties to the plaintiff;
the common-law relationship between plaintiff and defendant, of bank deposits and damages. 41 He prayed that after due proceedings,
the description of which are as follows: judgment be rendered in his favor, thus: (4) To surrender or return to the plaintiff the personal properties
of the latter left in the house at San Francisco Del Monte, to wit:
 "(1) Mamya automatic camera However, after due proceedings in the RTC of Davao City, in Civil Case HIS MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE
No. 17,817, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1995 in PROPERTIES.47
(1) 12 inch "Sonny" T.V. set, colored with remote favor of Ederlina, the dispositive portion of which reads:
control. and
WHEREFORE, the Court cannot give due course to the
(1) Micro oven complaint and hereby orders its dismissal. The counterclaims of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
the defendant are likewise dismissed. HOLDING THAT THE INTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
(1) Electric fan (tall, adjustable stand) IS NOT TO OWN REAL PROPERTIES IN THE
SO ORDERED.44 PHILIPPINES BUT TO SELL THEM AT PUBLIC AUCTION
TO BE ABLE TO RECOVER HIS MONEY USED IN
(1) Office safe with (2) drawers and safe PURCHASING THEM.48
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of
the three parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court
(1) Electric Washing Machine further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the properties; he had no Since the assignment of errors are intertwined with each other, the Court
cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as an shall resolve the same simultaneously.
(1) Office desk and chair alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the
Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null The petitioner contends that he purchased the three parcels of land subject
(1) Double bed suits and void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was of his complaint because of his desire to marry the respondent, and not to
precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent. violate the Philippine Constitution. He was, however, deceived by the
(1) Mirror/dresser respondent when the latter failed to disclose her previous marriage to
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals45 in which the Klaus Muller. It cannot, thus, be said that he and the respondent are
petitioner posited the view that although he prayed in his complaint in the "equally guilty;" as such, the pari delicto doctrine is not applicable to him.
(1) Heavy duty voice/working mechanic court a quo that he be declared the owner of the three parcels of land, he He acted in good faith, on the advice of the respondent's uncle, Atty.
had no intention of owning the same permanently. His principal intention Mardoecheo Camporedondo. There is no evidence on record that he was
(1) "Sony" Beta-Movie camera therein was to be declared the transient owner for the purpose of selling aware of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring real
the properties at public auction, ultimately enabling him to recover the property in the Philippines when he purchased the real properties subject
money he had spent for the purchase thereof. of his complaint with his own funds. The transactions were not illegal per
(1) Suitcase with personal belongings
se but merely prohibited, and under Article 1416 of the New Civil Code,
On March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the he is entitled to recover the money used for the purchase of the properties.
(1) Cardboard box with belongings At any rate, the petitioner avers, he filed his complaint in the court a
decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner
knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering quo merely for the purpose of having him declared as the owner of the
(1) Guitar Amplifier the money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that to properties, to enable him to sell the same at public auction. Applying by
allow the petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of the analogy Republic Act No. 13349 as amended by Rep. Act No. 4381 and
properties would embolden aliens to violate the Constitution, and defeat, Rep. Act No. 4882, the proceeds of the sale would be remitted to him, by
(1) Hanger with men's suit (white)."
rather than enhance, the public policy.46 way of refund for the money he used to purchase the said properties. To
bar the petitioner from recovering the subject properties, or at the very
To return to the plaintiff, (1) Hi-Fi Stereo equipment left at 444 least, the money used for the purchase thereof, is to allow the respondent
Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, as well as the Fronte Suzuki car. Hence, the petition at bar. to enrich herself at the expense of the petitioner in violation of Article 22
of the New Civil Code.
(4) To account for the monies (sic) deposited with the joint The petitioner assails the decision of the court contending that:
account of the plaintiff and defendant (Account No. 018-0- The petition is bereft of merit.
807950); and to restore to the plaintiff all the monies (sic) spent THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
by the defendant without proper authority; APPLYING THE RULE OF IN PARI DELICTO IN THE Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE BY THE FACTS AS
(5) To pay the amount of P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, NARRATED IN THE DECISION IT IS APPARENT THAT
THE PARTIES ARE NOT EQUALLY GUILTY BUT RATHER Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
and the costs of suit.
IT WAS THE RESPONDENT WHO EMPLOYED FRAUD AS transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
WHEN SHE DID NOT INFORM PETITIONER THAT SHE associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
SO ORDERED.43 domain.50
WAS ALREADY MARRIED TO ANOTHER GERMAN
NATIONAL AND WITHOUT SUCH FRAUDULENT
DESIGN PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE PARTED WITH
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be Vinuya (sic) although married to a foreigner, we It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware that as a non-citizen of the
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire agreed and I consented in having the title to subject Philippines, he was disqualified from validly purchasing any land within
or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether property placed in defendant's name alone although I the country.61
individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of paid for the whole price out of my own exclusive
the public domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring funds." (paragraph IV, Exhibit "W.") The petitioner's claim that he acquired the subject properties because of
private lands.51 his desire to marry the respondent, believing that both of them would
and his testimony before this Court which is hereby quoted: thereafter jointly own the said properties, is belied by his own evidence. It
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered is merely an afterthought to salvage a lost cause. The petitioner admitted
into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the ATTY. ABARQUEZ: on cross-examination that he was all along legally married to Teresita
Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.52 A contract that violates Santos Frenzel, while he was having an amorous relationship with the
the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and respondent:
creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. 53 The petitioner, Q.         In whose name the said house and lot placed, by the
being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and way, where is his house and lot located?
ATTY. YAP:
ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or
property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which A.         In 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco, del Monte, Manila.
involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his Q         When you were asked to identify yourself on direct
losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is examination you claimed before this Honorable Court that your
Q.         In whose name was the house placed? status is that of being married, do you confirm that?
unyielding.54 The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. 55 Under Article 1412
of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject properties A.         Ederlina Catito because I was informed being not a A         Yes, sir.
deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the Filipino, I cannot own the property. (tsn, p. 11, August 27,
purchase thereof.56 Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit 1986).
Q         To whom are you married?
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.57 Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the xxx             xxx             xxx
defendant is in the stronger position . . . it signifies that in such a situation, A         To a Filipina, since 1976.
neither a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. 58 The
COURT:
rule is expressed. in the maxims: EX DOLO ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI Q         Would you tell us who is that particular person you are
DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.59 married since 1976?
Q.         So you understand that you are a foreigner that you
cannot buy land in the Philippines?
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, A         Teresita Santos Frenzel.
nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty
than the respondent. The petitioner is charged with knowledge of the A.         That is correct but as she would eventually be my wife
that would be owned by us later on. (tsn, p. 5, September 3, Q         Where is she now?
constitutional prohibition.60 As can be gleaned from the decision of the
trial court, the petitioner was fully aware that he was disqualified from 1986)
acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even before he A         In Australia.
purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional xxx             xxx             xxx
prohibition, the petitioner had the deed of sale placed under the Q         Is this not the person of Teresita Frenzel who became an
respondent's name as the sole vendee thereof: Australian citizen?
Q.         What happened after that?

Such being the case, the plaintiff is subject to the constitutional A         I am not sure, since 1981 we were separated.
A.         She said you foreigner you are using Filipinos to buy
restrictions governing the acquisition of real properties in the
property.
Philippines by aliens.
Q         You were only separated, in fact, but not legally
Q.         And what did you answer? separated?
From the plaintiff's complaint before the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 84, Quezon City in
A:         I said thank you very much for the property I bought A         Thru my counsel in Australia I filed a separation case.
Civil Case No. Q-46350 he alleged:
because I gave you a lot of money (tsn., p. 14, ibid).
Q         As of the present you are not legally divorce[d]?
x x x "That on account that foreigners are not allowed
by the Philippine laws to acquire real properties in
their name as in the case of my vendor Miss Victoria A         I am still legally married.62
The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen. Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code 6
 Exhibit "C."
Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. which reads: 7
 Exhibit "E."
The evidence on record shows that the petitioner in fact knew of the 8
 Exhibit "D."
respondent's marriage to another man, but nonetheless purchased the Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by 9
 Exhibit "F."
subject properties under the name of the respondent and paid the purchase another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
prices therefor. Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent
10
 Exhibit "G."
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal 11
 Exhibits "H" to "H-12."
and the petitioner were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still ground, shall return the same to him.66
disqualified to own the properties in tandem with the respondent.63
12
 Exhibit "J."
13
 Exhibits "K" to "K-5."
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code
14
 Exhibit "L."
DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich 15
which reads: himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has  Exhibit "M."
been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem
16
 Exhibit "V."
17
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely verso.67 This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is  Exhibit "N."
prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari 18
 Exhibits "O" to "O-4."
protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby delicto doctrine. 68 It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from 19
 Exhibit "P-4."
enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.64 filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from 20
 Exhibit "P" & "P-1."
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord 21
 Exhibit "Q" & "Q-1."
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson:69 "The objection
that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the
22
 Exhibits "Q-4" to "Q-6."
in order to benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab 23
 Exhibit "Q-20."
initio. The sales of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is
not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is 24
 Exhibits "V-4"–"V-10."
foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they
were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the 25
 Exhibit "R-5."
petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the 26
 Exhibit "R-13."
the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy. plaintiff." 27
 Exhibit "BB."
28
 Exhibits "S" and "T."
Neither may the petitioner find solace in Rep. Act No. 133, as amended by IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The 29
 Exhibit "BB."
Rep. Act No. 4882, which reads: decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. 30
 Exhibits "CC" to "CC-4."
31
 Exhibit "U;" Entitled and docketed as Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs.
SEC. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Costs against the petitioner. Ederlina P. Catito, Civil Case No. 46350.
private real property may be mortgaged in favor of any 32
 Exhibit "GG."
individual, corporation, or association, but the mortgagee or his SO ORDERED. 33
 Entitled and docketed as Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs. Ederlina P.
successor-in-interest, if disqualified to acquire or hold lands of Catito, Civil Case No. Q-46350.
the public domain in the Philippines, shall not take possession of Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ ., concur. 34
 Exhibit "W."
the mortgaged property during the existence of the mortgage and Quisumbing, J ., is on leave. 35
 Entitled and docketed as Alfred Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito,
shall not take possession of mortgaged property except after Civil Case No. 17,817.
default and for the sole purpose of foreclosure, receivership, 36
enforcement or other proceedings and in no case for a period of  Records, p. 2.
more than five years from actual possession and shall not bid or
37
 Records, pp. 4–5.
take part in any sale of such real property in case of Footnotes
38
 Exhibit "5."
foreclosure: Provided, That said mortgagee or successor-in- 39
 Records, pp. 13–16.
interest may take possession of said property after default in 1
 Penned by Justice Martin Villarama, Jr., with Presiding Justice
40
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 18,750-87.
accordance with the prescribed judicial procedures for Cancio C. Garcia and Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
41
 Exhibit "5;" Records, pp. 194–198.
foreclosure and receivership and in no case exceeding five years 42
2
 Penned by Judge William M. Layague.  Exhibit "5-D;" Records, pp. 197–198.
from actual possession.65 3
 The petitioner adduced testimonial and documentary evidence.
43
 Exhibit "X-2"–"X-3."
The respondent did not adduce any testimonial evidence, but 44
 Records, p. 232.
From the evidence on record, the three parcels of land subject of the adduced as Exhibit "5," the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case 45
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 53485.
complaint were not mortgaged to the petitioner by the owners thereof but No. 18,750-87 filed with the RTC of Davao City. 46
were sold to the respondent as the vendee, albeit with the use of the  Rollo, p. 30.
4
 Exhibits "A" to "D-4." 47
 Id., at 16.
petitioner's personal funds. 5
 Exhibits "B" and "B-1." 48
 Id., at 19.
49
 An act to authorize the mortgage of private real property in Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes,
favor of any individual, corporation or association subject to located at San Pascual Street, Malate, Manila. Respondents had built their
certain conditions. houses on the land which, over the years, underwent continuous
50
 Supra. The conveyances subject of the case were executed improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her
when the 1973 Constitution was in effect. son Victor Reyes. Sometime in 1986, Victor informed respondents that,
51
 Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341 [1994]. for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would
have a right of first refusal to buy the land. Sometime in the early part of
52
 Alexander Krivenko, vs. Register of Deeds, et al., 79 Phil. 461
1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by them
[1947]; Rellosa vs. Hun, 93 Phil. 827 [1953]; Caoile vs. Peng,
was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure
93 Phil. 861 [1953]; Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
53 title to the property in her name.
 Francisco Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, et al., 307 SCRA 394 [1999].
54
 Aikman vs. City of Wheeling, Southeastern Reporter, 667 On 25 May 1989, Cynthia Ortega, filed a petition for condemnation,
[1938]. docketed Condemnation Case No. 89-05-007, with the Office of the
55 Building Official, City of Manila, of the structures on the land.
 Rellosa vs. Hun, supra.
56
 ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden
cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of
following rules shall be observed: Manila a suit for the "Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," docketed as Civil
Case No. 89-49176, made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting
upon their right of first refusal which was claimed to have been impinged
parties, neither may recover what he has given by
upon the sale of the land to petitioner Ortega without their knowledge.
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of
the other's undertaking. . .
57
 Corkins vs. Ritter, 40 N.W., Reporter, 2d 726 [1950], Daley After due hearing in the condemnation case, the Office of the Building
vs. City of Melvindale, 260 N.W. Reporter, 898 [1935]. Official issued a resolution, dated 27 November 1989, ordering the
58
 19 Am. Jur., Equity, Section 478. demolition of the houses of respondents. Copies of the resolution were
served upon respondents and their counsel on 07 December 1989. The
59
 Bough & Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil. 209
following day, or on 08 December 1989, Cynthia Ortega, together with her
[1919], Reporter.
father and co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired workers to commence the
60
 Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 193 SCRA demolition of respondents' houses. Due to the timely intervention of a
93 [1991]. G.R. No. 138964            August 9, 2001 mobile unit of the Western Police District, the intended demolition did not
61
 Records, pp. 230–231. take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel who
62
 TSN, 7 April 1987, pp. 2–3 (Frenzel). VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband pleaded that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to be
63
 See note 57. Roberto Ortega, petitioner,  implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11 December 1989,
64
 Supra. vs. respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the
65
 Supra. GONZALO PELLOSIS, INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO Building Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once again hired
66 RADAM, respondents. workers and proceeded with the demolition of respondents' houses.
 Supra.
67
 Id., at 85.
VITUG, J.: Resultantly, respondents filed Civil Case No. 89-49176 before the
68
 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., Vol. I, p.
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, praying that petitioners be
85.
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fee, for
69
 Cited in Marissey vs. Bologna, 123 So. 2d 537 [1960]. "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
the untimely demolition of the houses. After trial, the court dismissed the
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
complaint of respondents and instead ordered them to pay petitioners
good faith." 1 This provision in our law is not just a declaration of
moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on the basis of its
principle for it can in itself constitute, when unduly ignored or violated, a
findings and conclusions, reversed the decision of the trial court and
valid source of a cause of action or defense.
ordered petitioners to pay respondents the following sums:

The case seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals in not countenancing an

"1) Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), or Twenty Five
attempt to abridge and render inutile a legal right to contest an adverse
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for each appellant, by way of
ruling of an agency of government.
moral damages;"
 "2) Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), or Twenty Five Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to 1 
Art 19, Civil Code.
thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for each appellant, by way of enjoy5 and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
exemplary damages;" thereof,6 but the exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The 2 
Rollo, p. 128.
abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
"3) Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as and for attorney's every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith.7 When a right is exercised in a manner which
3 
Rollo, pp. 123-124.
fees; and
discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, 4 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1324.
"4) The costs of suit."2 the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the
order of demolition as the question of whether or not petitioners have 5 
Art 428, New Civil Code.
The appellate court ruled: acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by
Article 19 of the Civil Code. 6 
Art. 429, New Civil Code.
"Thus, by the clear provisions of paragraph 23 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD 1096 (otherwise At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five
known as the Building Code), above, appellants, being the days after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 217
7 

parties adversely affected by the November 27, 1989 Resolution and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor SCRA 16.
of the Office of the Building Official, had fifteen (15) days from of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building
receipt of a copy of the same within which to perfect an Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the
administrative appeal. Thus, since appellants received a copy of houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal), the
the Resolution on December 7, 1989, they had until December latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that the order of
22, 1989 within which to perfect an administrative appeal and demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and
until such time, the said Resolution was not yet final and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point
executory." where they were able to secure an order of demolition was not
condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of
xxx           xxx           xxx respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
held utterly indefensible.

"It cannot be denied, therefore, that when appellees commenced GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C.
to demolish appellants' houses as early as December 8, 1989 and The Court, however, finds the award of P75,000.00 exemplary damages HENDRY, petitioners, 
eventually on December 12, 1989, neither the Resolution of the and another of P75,000.00 moral damages for each respondent to be rather vs.
Building Official nor the Demolition Order itself were final and excessive given the circumstances; the awards must be reduced to the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M.
executory."3 reasonable amounts of P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P20,000.00 TOBIAS, respondents.
moral damages.

Petitioners filed the instant petition contending that the appellate court Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
gravely erred in ruling that the premature demolition of respondents' WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
houses entitled them to the award of damages. Petitioners pointed out that MODIFIED by reducing the awards of P75,000.00 exemplary damages
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
the order of the Office of the Building Official was eventually upheld on and of P75,000.00 moral damages to each respondent reduced to
appeal by the Department of Public Works and Highways in its decision of P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P20,000.00 moral damages for each
14 March 1990. Furthermore, petitioners added, the structures subject respondent. In all other respects, the decision of the appellate court is
matter of the demolition order were declared to be dangerous structures by AFFIRMED. No costs.
the Office of the Building Official and, as such, could be abated to avoid CORTES, J.:
danger to the public. SO ORDERED.
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe
The Court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision. Melo, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ ., concur. Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., is on leave. capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost
statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long
several thousands of pesos.
usage,4 constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against
another. Footnotes
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the
anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate
superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE
MACKAY. Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal. PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers
of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the from petitioners that his employment has been terminated effective certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain
number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were
to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as
leave the office keys. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its
decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost
from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work
after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President.
"crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to latter's complaint for illegal dismissal. justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
determine his complicity in the anomalies. and good faith.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed
participation in the anomalies. by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
stated that further investigation was still to be conducted. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge
Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When
ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
criminal charges against him. thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been
report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed. Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law,
signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents provides that:
involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for
detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results. damages to private respondent. Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the the latter for the same.
anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.
its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any
Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to
documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners'
abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private
complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides
through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he
had suffered. that:
Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through
Seizure of Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were
refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
 customs or public policy shall compensate the latter the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set which defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10,
for the damage. forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the Rollo, p. 11].
right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of
actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971,
[Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-
SCRA 237, 247]. petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to 13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file
dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged
19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And
not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court
circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages
of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence,
Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were
94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, dismissed.
391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else
15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and
rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges
21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-
each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear 44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit
and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code]. by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution
have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified. The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a
to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith
private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this
plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners
and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias,
to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn observing that:
(petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent
do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that
"it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or xxx
Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction
towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or
employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five
ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of
Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting commercial document and one for violation of Art.
such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets
petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of thru seizure of correspondence," and all were
petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The
November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the
work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably
crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above
made by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10, complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the
1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and
 detention in the military stockade, but this was involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10)
frustrated by a presidential decree transferring coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts. other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals
in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
xxx
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners.
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts,
embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross
fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is
negative results of the lie detector tests which the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and
defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful
although the police investigation was "still under as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is
follow-up and a supplementary report will be damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be
defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
falsification of commercial document and one (1) for Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and the
violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on
Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to SO ORDERED.
much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases
were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and,
Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
"Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to
is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was Feliciano, J., took no part.
the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there reasonable under the circumstances.
can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be  
motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper,
oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff. invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he
only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) Footnotes
xxx could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from
his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants- ** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred
appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18]. in be Justice Josue N. Bellosillo and Justice Venancio
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236]. D. Aldecoa Jr.
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal
significant that the criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25,
the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915);
the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967,
noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears
six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to
filed one hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was
transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be
good faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was
In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by
like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering petitioners.
the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they
were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against
petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court
has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, G.R. No. 151866             September 9, 2004
notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from
SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,  A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte Petitioner contends that the appellate court’s conclusion that she publicly
vs. demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to humiliated respondent does not conform to the evidence presented. She
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent. the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words complained
result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to of, it was not shown that she did so with malice and in bad faith.
DECISION the letter. Thus, on 20 February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages
against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the factual
268. In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay conclusions reached by the appellate court. The cardinal rule adhered to in
TINGA, J.: actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. this jurisdiction is that a petition for review must raise only questions of
law,3 and judicial review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation
Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of the Court of Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered words or of the sufficiency of evidence unless there is a showing that the findings
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69537,1promulgated on 17 January done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the investigation complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are
2002.2 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision denying and claimed that everything that transpired after the theft incident was so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.4 This
respondent’s claim for damages against petitioner and ordered the latter to purely a police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed Court, while not a trier of facts, may review the evidence in order to arrive
pay moral damages to the former in the amount ofP100,000.00. for the dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte at the correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so when
liable on her counterclaim. the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from
Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding on The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000, dismissing the facts is manifestly mistaken.5
10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Valmonte’s complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner sought
Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her Contrary to the trial court’s finding, we find sufficient evidence on record
arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there including the right and if damage results from a person exercising his legal right, it tending to prove that petitioner’s imputations against respondent was
bride, the bride’s parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, is damnum absque injuria. It added that no proof was presented by made with malice and in bad faith.
the official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those present Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad faith in
was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to pointing to her as the culprit. The court said that Valmonte failed to show
dress up for the occasion. Petitioner’s testimony was shorn of substance and consists mainly of
that she suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social humiliation, or that denials. She claimed not to have uttered the words imputing the crime of
her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner’s wrongful act. theft to respondent or to have mentioned the latter’s name to the
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the authorities as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled
items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception erred in finding that petitioner did not slander her good name and evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and
was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the reputation and in disregarding the evidence she presented. cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.6
noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner
allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte has
lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioner’s testimony.
lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the testimony of Serena Quite credibly, she has narrated in great detail her distressing experience
one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag. It turned out that after Manding, corroborating Valmonte’s claim that petitioner confronted her on that fateful day. She testified as to how rudely she was treated by
Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that and uttered words to the effect that she was the only one who went out of petitioner right after she returned to the room. Petitioner immediately
the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper the room and that she was the one who took the jewelry. The appellate confronted her and uttered the words "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.
bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings, one court held that Valmonte’s claim for damages is not predicated on the fact Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang kumuha."
(1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of that she was subjected to body search and interrogation by the police but Thereafter, her body was searched including her bag and her car. Worse,
about one million pesos. The hotel security was called in to help in the rather petitioner’s act of publicly accusing her of taking the missing during the reception, she was once more asked by the hotel security to go
search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room jewelry. It categorized petitioner’s utterance defamatory considering that it to the ladies room and she was again bodily searched.7
were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court concluded that
trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers petitioner’s verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in Sereña Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondent’s testimony.
arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and bad faith since it was made in the presence of many people without any She testified that petitioner confronted respondent in the presence of all
fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was solid proof except petitioner’s suspicion. Such unfounded accusation the people inside the suite accusing her of being the only one who went
being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the entitles Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount of out of the comfort room before the loss of the jewelry. Manding added that
words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmonte’s car which was ₱100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and respondent was embarrassed because everybody else in the room thought
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded embarrassed. However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify she was a thief.8 If only to debunk petitioner’s assertion that she did not
nothing. the award of actual damages. utter the accusatory remarks in question publicly and with malice,
Manding’s testimony on the point deserves to be reproduced. Thus,
Hence, this petition.
Q After that what did she do? Q Who was the person you [were] alleging "na nakakahiya" remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
whose (sic) being accused or being somebody who stole those Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
A Then Leo came out from the other room she said, she is (sic) item of jewelry? universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that
the one I only saw from the comfort room. spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve
A "Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan siya. Sa as guides for human conduct. 13 First of these fundamental precepts is the
dami namin doon siya yung napagbintangan." principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the
Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs. Carpio on that Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his
matter? rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
Q And who is Leo, what is her full name? his due and observe honesty and good faith." To find the existence of an
A She said "siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R." abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal
A Leo Valmonte. right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or
Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant referring to? prejudicing or injuring another.14 When a right is exercised in a manner
Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people inside the which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong
room? is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.15 One is not
A Leo Valmonte. allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary
prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good
Q Did she say anything else, the defendant? A Yes, the mother of the bride. customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and
Q And who else did she talk to? good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.16
A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she saw in the
C.R. After that she get (sic) the paper bag then the jewelry were
already gone. A The father of the bride also. Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which read, thus:
Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte regarding that Q And what did the defendant tell the mother regarding this
fact? matter? Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
A Yes. A "Nawawala yung alahas ko." Sabi naman nung mother baka
naman hindi mo dala tignan mo munang mabuti.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the plaintiff, Mrs.
another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good customs
Valmonte? Q Who was that other person that she talked to?
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

A "Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas ko." A Father of the bride.9
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of
damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits
Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to plaintiff Mrs. Significantly, petitioner’s counsel elected not to pursue her cross- an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which
Valmonte were there other people inside the room? examination of the witness on this point following her terse and firm though not constituting a transgression of positive law,
declaration that she remembered petitioner’s exact defamatory words in nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party
A Yes, sir. answer to the counsel’s question.10 aggrieved.

Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to Mrs. Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise contradicted In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was
Valmonte? petitioner’s allegation that she did not suspect or mention the name of certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew
respondent as her suspect in the loss of the jewelry.11 that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper
bag.17 This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
A Yes, sir.
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room
Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs. Carpio said that the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and
to Mrs. Valmonte? constitute a cause of action.12 ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually
branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain
A "Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang magnanakaw the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act
siya. Kasi marami na kaming nandodoon, dumating na yung proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which,
or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any
couturier pati yung video man and we sir. by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had
willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to * On Official Leave. (4) Adultery or concubinage;
morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing 1
 Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. concurred in by (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales and Sergio L. Pestaño. (6) Illegal search;
justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but 2
 Rollo, pp. 32-37. (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions 3
 Abalos v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 419 (1999]; Viloria v. (8) Malicious prosecution;
of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 851 (1999].
accountable. (9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
4
 Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 225 (1999). (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27,
5
 Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Intermediate 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to factual Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72110, November 16, 1990, 191
conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial xxxx
SCRA 411; Ferrer v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98182, March 22
court,18 we sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court  Fule v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 349 [1998]; Zulueta v. Pan
1, 1993, 219 SCRA 302.
that respondent’s claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with 6
American Airways, Inc., 151 Phil. 1 (1973).
 People v. Sernadilla, G.R. No. 137696, January 24, 2001, 350 23
satisfactory evidence during the trial and must therefore be denied. To be  Simex International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
SCRA 243; People v. Preciados, G.R. No. 122934, January 5,
recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree 88013, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 360.
2001, 349 SCRA 1; People v. Baway, G.R. No. 130406, January
of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or 24
 Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820 [1998]; Radio
22, 2001, 350 SCRA 29.
guesswork.19 Communications of the Phils., Inc. v. Rodriguez , G.R. No.
7
 TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 6, 13-19. 83768, February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 899.
8
 TSN, December 15, 1998, pp. 10-12.
Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages.
Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or
9
 TSN, December 15, 1998, pp. 9-12.
omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering,
10
 TSN, February 9, 1999, p. 14.
11
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded  TSN, May 27, 1998, pp. 9,12, and 16.
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury20in the cases 12
 Sangco, Torts and Damages, Vol. II, 1994 Edition, p. 941.
specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil 13
 Report on the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code
Code.21 Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral of the Philippines, p. 39 cited in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into account all Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25,
the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to 1989, 176 SCRA 779.
their discretion.22 Worthy of note is that moral damages are not awarded to 14
 BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil.
penalize the defendant,23 or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the 262 (1998); Globe Mackay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to 81262, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 779; NPC v. Philipp
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant’s Brothers Oceanic, Inc., , G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001,
culpable action. In any case, award of moral damages must be 369 SCRA 629.
proportionate to the sufferings inflicted.24 15
 Rellosa v. Pellosis, 414 Phil. 786 [2001].
16
 See 1 Tolentino, The Civil Code, 1990 Ed. p. 61.
Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we rule that the 17
 TSN, March 17, 1998, pp. 15-16; p. 26.
appellate court did not err in awarding moral damages. Considering 18
 Bañas Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 144 [2000];
respondent’s social standing, and the fact that her profession is based
Compania Maritima, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 278
primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the
[1999]; Borromeo v. Sun, 375 Phil. 595 [1999].
imputations made by petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and
will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings with her clients, the
19
 Bayer Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109269,
award of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 437; Congregation of the
reasonable assessment of respondent’s damages. Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 591
[1998]; Marina Properties Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 355
Phil. 705 [1998].
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. 20
 Art. 2217, Civil Code.
21
 Art.2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
SO ORDERED. and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, 
Puno, Austria-Martinez*, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
GONZALES, respondents.
Footnotes acts;
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to 1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff
form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent. alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he moral damages.
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor 2. Condemning further the defendant to play the
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos
her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at
DAVIDE, JR., J.: deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and
unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into 3. All other claims are denied.6
seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety
1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that
of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages. (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
agreed upon, to wit: persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
The antecedents of this case are not complicated: him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of 1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and 1987 up to the present; has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality,
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the
is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan 2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter second year medicine proper; reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition
that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed
end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing
then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 school graduate;
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started 4. That the parties happened to know each other when virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend
to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny before, defendant started courting her just a few days
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of August 3, 1986. several times and she accepted his love as well as his
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which
her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil same day he went with her to her hometown of
someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and her parents and inform them of their relationship and
less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads: their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs.
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
Civil Case No. 16503. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he
and against the defendant. intended to marry her during the semestral break in
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his
 proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they unfortunate experience with defendant and never had he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
with plaintiff during the few days that they were in barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have lust on her. 11
to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in allowed 
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of "herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was and then concluded:
October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry
and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. so the plaintiff must have thought because of the was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to have allowed herself to be photographed with that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
marry her until he told her that he could not do so We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming
went to talk to defendant to still convince him to manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
not do so because he was already married to a girl in when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made,
parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single. defendant have left Dagupan City where he was under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that do in its decision in this case. 12
after defendant had informed them of his desire to was (sic) some kind of special relationship between
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the them? And this special relationship must indeed have
wedding, started preparing for the reception by led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21
invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
wedding. 8 restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial
Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
March 7, 1988). ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged man of good moral character and must think so low made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In and have so little respect and regard for Filipino excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the women that he openly admitted that when he studied to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4)
following analysis: in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling
B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been
met defendant who was already 29 years old at the In other words, he also lived with another woman in solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the
private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);  helpless, even though they have actually suffered
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary material and moral injury, the Commission has
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are rule:
is not actionable. 14 conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set Art. 23. Any person who wilfully
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main causes loss or injury to another in
the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents a manner that is contrary to
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of morals, good customs or public
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with. Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of policy shall compensate the latter
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record for the damage.
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which An example will illustrate the purview of the
boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having the trial and appellate courts must be respected. been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had And now to the legal issue. the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
affect the result of the case. 15 The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the committed, and though the girl and family have
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
alter the result of the case. Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: proposed article, she and her parents would have such
a right of action.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy
evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina United States and in England has shown that no other impossible for human foresight to provide for
vs.Asistio, Jr.,  16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing specifically in the statutes. 21
exceptions: women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience
which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
xxx xxx xxx so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
states. . . . 19 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically the provisions of this Chapter.
is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion
a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,  As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is
are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, But the Code Commission had gone farther than the an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
 Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high And in American Jurisprudence we find:
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, On the other hand, in an action by
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the the woman, the enticement,
Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts court of first instance found that, complainant persuasion or deception is the
which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, essence of the injury; and a mere
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to proof of intercourse is insufficient
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even to warrant a recovery.
21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it before they had the benefit of clergy.
has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. 23 Accordingly it is not seduction
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at where the willingness arises out of
possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was sexual desire of curiosity of the
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction female, and the defendant merely
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were affords her the needed opportunity
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his made in the said case: for the commission of the act. It
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate has been emphasized that to allow
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that a recovery in all such cases would
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only the example set forth in the Code Commission's tend to the demoralization of the
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had female sex, and would be a reward
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that for unchastity by which a class of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a adventuresses would be swift to
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
morals, good customs or public policy. xxx xxx xxx
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's 595). Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said —
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent To constitute seduction there must voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single in all cases be some sufficient appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind promise or inducement and the exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The woman must yield because of the and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under promise or other inducement. If yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the she consents merely from carnal without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the lust and the intercourse is from promises of marriage, and would have cut short all
seduction. mutual desire, there is no sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill
Seduction, par. 56) She must be his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied induced to depart from the path of under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause
in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral virtue by the use of some species of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied of arts, persuasions and wiles, Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
recovery of damages to the woman because: which are calculated to have and
do have that effect, and which In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L.
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner result in her person to ultimately Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is submitting her person to the promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages
approximately ten (10) years younger than the sexual embraces of her seducer may be recovered:
complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years (27 Phil. 123).
 . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty
the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any of the parties, where his transgression has been
vs. Court of Appeals,  injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own brought about by the imposition of undue influence of
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L- doing, 33 for: the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 principally rests, or where his consent to the
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L- . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter transaction was itself procured by 
17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that fraud. 36
be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without
moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at
security. Her family is in dire need of financial fault, there should be no action by one against the
because here mutual lust has intervened). . . . assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that however, has been interpreted as applicable only
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as may have been offered by the petitioner. 34 where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate
Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471). These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs.
is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion: private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent,
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
vs. Marcos,  30 still subsists, notwithstanding the moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into higher values of morality and dignity.
but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
influence, but the woman, already of age, has proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
that there is an injury which can be the basis for brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It SO ORDERED.
indemnity. can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, obligations. Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because  
an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs
may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman and traditions.
thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful # Footnotes
act and a resulting injury, there should be civil The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
liability, even if the act is not punishable under the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, 1 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate
criminal law and there should have been an acquittal she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, concurred in by
or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason. lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Jaime M.
qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out Lantin.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in
2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
3 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24.
the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
4 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25. 20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 237 [1978].
5 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33. Per Judge
Antonio M. Belen. 21 Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This
passage is quoted, except for the last paragraph, in
6 Id., 33. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994, 996-
997 [1966]; the Article 23 referred to is now Article
21.
7 Rollo, 31-33.
22 Report of the Code Commission, 161-162.
8 Rollo, 54-55.
23 TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and
9 Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50. Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72.
10 Annex "G", Id.; Id.; 53-62.
24. Rollo, 61.
11 Rollo, 58-59.
25. Supra.
12 Rollo, 61.
26. Supra.
13 Id., 11.
27 At pages 997-999.
14 In support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliosco, [CA]
64 O.G.; Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 [1964]; 28 Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I,
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 Eleventh ed., (1984), 91-92.
[1960]; and Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
29 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
15 People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 76-77,
Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, omitting footnotes.
92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1
[1980]; People vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984];
People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. 30 7 Phil. 156 [1906].
Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414 [1991]; and People vs.
Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991]. 31 Article 21.

16 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote omitted; see also, 32 Supra.

Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988].
33 Rollo, 16.
17 Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629
[1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960]. 34 Id., 16-17.

18 58 Phil. 866 [1933]. 35 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004.

19 Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 36 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting citations.
14 May 1949, 2352.
37 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also, Liguez vs. Court of
Appeals 102 Phil. 577 [1975].