Rick Siegel

1 22971 Darien Street

Woodland Hills, CA 91364
2 323.864.7474 mobile
[email protected]
3 non-attorney representative for
Respondents
4
)
5 JUDE SALAZAR, an individual, ) CASE NO. 52862
)
6 Petitioner, )
)
7 vs. )
) RESPONSE TO PETITION TO
8 DIANE PARDOE and SARAH PARDOE ) DETERMINE CONTROVERSY
individually, and doing business as IRIS ) ASKING FOR DECLRATION THAT
9 TALENT MANAGEMENT, ) AS LABOR COMMISSIONER HAS
) NO AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY
10 Respondents. ) REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY
) TO HEAR THIS MATTER
11 )
___________________________________ )
12

13
I.
14
Quoting Petitioner’s Petition for Controversy, “Respondents dispute and deny that
15
Respondents violated the Talent Agencies Act or that the Petitioner has any right to
16
terminate upon violations of the Talent Agencies Act.” (Resp. Pet. At 2, lns. 22-24.)
17
To be more specific, Respondents dispute Petitioner’s claim that they “violated
18
Section 1700.4” because, opposite to how the Talent Agencies Act (“TAA,” “Act”) has
19
been enforced since 1967, it is impossible to violate a law that does not exist.
20 “Violations of law are ‘made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a prescribed
21 penalty. The former without the latter is no [violation].” Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
22 Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d) (1st ed. 1986). As noted three times in three
23 ways in Marathon v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 974, 991 (2008), decision, the TAA has no
24 prescribed penalties for unlicensed procurement, and thus there can be no violation.
25 As detailed hereinunder, a violation of a licensing statute can only occur when a

26 person a legislature has by codification made subject to regulation engages in a prohibited

27 activity, and equally important, there is a codified remedy to punish those who engage in
that prohibited activity.
28
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 This response focuses on four TAA statutes:
1
1. CA. Labor Code § 1700, which states that “managers” are subject to
2
regulation, but in full context clearly is using the term as one’s place in an
3
organization and nothing to do with one’s activities, responsibilities, or
4
occupation;
5
2. CA. Labor Code § 1700.5, which provides in its relevant part: “No person
6
shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first
7
procuring a license, it does not define what occupation is;
8 3. CA. Labor Code § 1700.4 (a), which defines a talent agent as one who
9 procures or efforts to procure talent for an artist, but has no language – nor is
10 there such language in any other code section of the licensing scheme – that
11 regulates that activity of in any way reserves procurement to talent agency
12 licensees; and relevant to the remedy the Labor Commission (“CLC”) metes
13 out, infringing on the unlicensed person’s right to be paid for their labors,

14 4. CA. Labor Code § 1700.44 (b), which states that no violation of the TAA can

15 be considered criminal.

16 The bottom line: an unlicensed person procuring employment for an artist is a legal
activity. Thus, the Petitioner’s claim must be summarily rejected, as, despite the long
17
history of doing so, the administrative agency has no authority to accept and hear a
18
controversy stemming from the Petitioner simply refusing to pay her owed commissions
19
and using this loophole as a ‘get out of management free’ card.
20

21 II.
22
Respondents are personal managers. As personal managers, they are not talent
23
agents, and in fact are and barred by the CLC from acquiring licenses (See Exhibit A, letter
24 from the CLC to personal manager rejecting application because he is not a talent agent).
25 Petitioner and Respondents entered into a written artist/personal management contract; a
26 contract Petitioner breached, one of the claims Respondents are raising in the proper forum
27 for these matters: Superior Court (Case Number 22STLC04635).
28
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 III.
1
As the Petition for Controversy notes, Respondents are not licensed agents nor
2
have never been licensed talent agents. In arguing that the Petitioner’s petition should be
3
summarily rejected, this Response only looks to answer one question: is it a violation of
4
law for an unlicensed person or entity to procure employment opportunities for an artist?
5
An examination of the verbiage, along with United States Supreme Court and
6
California Supreme Court precedents, tells a much different story; making it inarguably
7
clear that the Labor Commission has no legal authority to involve itself in the contractual
8 rights of an unlicensed talent representative. In fact, one could lawfully open called
9 “Unlicensed Talent Agency” and represent artists while heralding their unlicensed actions
10 with the motto “We procure for you.”
11 The California Supreme Court (“CSC”) first considered whether an unlicensed
12 person had the right to contract in 1914. In Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382, the Court
13 considered whether to void the contract of someone doing locksmithing without a

14 locksmith’s license. Wood holds that for an adjudicator to have the authority to impair or

15 void a violator’s contractual rights, the licensing scheme must “declare that a contract
made by any one in the conduct of the various businesses for which licenses are provided
16
to be procured … be invalid.”
17
Further, there must be a “provision therein indicating” that a failure to have a
18
license is intended to affect in any degree the right of contract.”
19
Noting that California’s licensing scheme for locksmiths had neither declared that
20
anyone found engaging in locksmithing without a license would have their rights to
21
contract invalidated, nor had a statutory provision stating that anyone failing to have a
22
locksmith’s license would have their right to contract in any way affected, the Court
23 refused to void the unlicensed locksmith’s contractual rights.
24 In 1947, as part of a matter related to an alleged violation of contractors working
25 together not having valid contractors’ licenses at the time they did contracting work, the
26 CSC emphasized how it “has repeatedly declared in this state that ‘a contract made
27 contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the public and prescribing a
28
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and no action may be brought to
1
enforce such contract.” Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603, 607.
2
In Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259 (1920), the CSC agreed to consider whether a
3
contract can be valid when a party has violated a statute that “imposes a penalty for the
4
doing of an act without expressly declaring such act illegal and void.” Id. at 261. It found
5
in part (at 262-263), “The imposition by statute of a penalty implies a prohibition of the
6
act to which the penalty is attached, and a contract founded upon such act is void.”
7
As the CSC noted in Severance v. Knight-Counihan, 29 Cal. 2d 561 at 568, "The
8 general rule controlling in cases of this character is that where a statute prohibits or
9 attaches a penalty to the doing of an act, the act is void…” which hints that only a statute
10 expressly prohibiting someone from engaging in a specific activity is enough to render an
11 activity unlawful. But Severance then immediately quotes Smith, likewise holding for an
12 adjudicator to have authority to void a contract, there must be an “imposition by statute of
13 a penalty [which] implies a prohibition of the act to which the penalty is attached.”

14 The CA Supreme Court has specifically spoken to how this prohibition of

15 assigning uncodified remedies relates to administrative agencies:

“An administrative agency cannot by its own regulations create
16
a remedy which the Legislature has withheld. 'Administrative
17 regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its
scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to
18 strike down such regulations.’”
19 Dyna-Med Inc. v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1385,1388 (1987).
20 “It is fundamental an administrative agency may not usurp the
legislative function.”
21
Id. quoting Agri. Lab. Relations Bd. v. Sup. Court, 16 Cal.3d 392, 419 (1976).
22 While Dyna-Med limited its review and prohibition to creating remedies to
23 punitive damages, in Peralta v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 52 Cal. 3d 40, 60 (1990)
24 the CSC similarly held that without statutory authority, administrative agencies are barred
25 from creating compensatory remedies. In short, no administrative agency, which
26 incorporates the Labor Commission, has the authority to mete out any penalty that has

27 not been legislatively codified.

28
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 Requiring notice of the potential consequences one risks being subjected to for
1
engaging in a prohibited activity not unique to California, it is in fact hornbook law.
2
“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in this Court’s constitutional
3
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will
4
subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
5
impose.” BMW of America v. Gore 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1995).
6
“Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is
7 sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is
8 required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before
9 penalties are assessed.” Lambert v. CA. 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) See Consumer
10 Advocacy Group Inc. v. Kintetsu Ent. of America, 150 Cal.App.4th 953, 960 (2007).
11 To repeat for emphasis: “Violations of law are ‘made up of two parts, forbidden
12 conduct and a prescribed penalty. The former without the latter is no [violation].” Wayne
13 R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d) (1st ed. 1986); see

14 also U.S. v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (at 485-486).

15 Quoting Evans, for the Court to assign…

“one of the possible penal consequences Congress may have had in
16
mind … goes beyond dispelling ambiguity in the usual sense of
17 judicially construing statutes,” it requires this Court to invade the
legislative function and, in effect, fix the penalty. The argument is
18 therefore not merely that a rule of strict construction … it is rather
19 that the choice the Government asks us to make is so broad and so
deep, resting among such equally tenable though inconsistent
20 possibilities, that we have no business to make it at all.”
21
Evans holds that regardless of how obvious it may be a legislature wants to punish a
22
violator; notice is needed. At issue was a federal statute prohibiting both smuggling
23 undocumented persons into the country and harboring undocumented persons already in
24 the country. However, because Congress had only codified a remedy – five years in
25 prison – for the smuggling, and Evans had harbored an undocumented person, the Court
26 ruled itself without authority to decide upon and mete out a remedy for Evans harboring
27 the illegal alien. Assigning a penalty without statutory guideposts “is a task outside the
28 bounds of judicial interpretation;” reserved only for and by legislative action. Id at 495.
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 Again, this is hornbook law: “Where a statute fails to provide a penalty it has been
1
uniformly held that it is beyond the power of the court to prescribe a penalty.” New
2
Jersey v. Fair Lawn. Service Center, Inc. (N.J. 1956) 120 A.2d 233, 236.
3
Uniformly held. Except in one instance… California’s Talent Agencies Act.
4
How did this happen? It seems that for at least the last seventy years, the Labor
5
Commissioner has ignored the fact that the Legislature never chose to codify a remedy
6
for unlicensed procurement, nor in fact to create a statute expressly reserving that activity
7 for licensees.
8 In 1953, the California Labor Commissioner submitted an amicus brief in Radin v.
9 Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778 that gives a history and interpretation of the statutory
10 scheme, and “where [the Commissioner] contends” the unlicensed talent agents should
11 lose all contractual rights for his efforts to procure, a contention the Court of Appeals
12 found premature without “regular trial procedure” (at 783). The Commissioner’s Amicus
13 Brief does not, nor could it reference a statute in the licensing scheme that gives he or the

14 Court authority to void the representative’s contractual rights.

15 Fourteen years later, the Court of Appeals decision in Buchwald v. Superior Court,
254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967), followed the Commissioner’s interpretation as submitted in
16
another Amicus Brief, which again ignored the Act’s omissions. And ever since, the
17
Labor Commission and courts following the Commissioner’s interpretation has enforced
18
the Act as if procuring employment for an artist without a talent agency license was a
19
codified violation of law whereby any unlicensed person committing that violation loses
20
their contractual rights.
21
Here again, neither the Buchwald ruling, nor the amicus brief explaining the
22 CLC’s interpretation of the Act, which the Court then followed, cited statutory authority
23 to void the unlicensed representative’s contract, rather they cited the four previously
24 mentioned CA Supreme Court cases -- Wood v. Krepps, Smith v. Bach, Severance v.
25 Knight-Counihan, Loving & Evans v. Blick – which all, in different ways, inform
26 adjudicators that the only way one’s contractual rights can be impaired or voided is when
27 the Legislature first codifies such remedies. Which again, it did not do re: procurement.

28
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 As the California Legislature never imposed a penalty for unlicensed persons
1
efforting to procure work for an artist, the finding in Buchwald wrongly misinterpreted all
2
four of the High Court holdings it claims to be following and as such is a judicial error.
3
It is past confounding and in truth, seemingly conspiratorial that the administrative
4
agency has spent over a decade defending Buchwald when these facts are clear.
5
The CLC went as far to, in briefs to a Federal District and subsequently a Federal
6
Ninth Court where Respondent’s non-attorney representative was challenging its
7
interpretation and enforcement, argue that the four authorities Buchwald cites should be
8 ignored because they have nothing to do with licensing. A government agency is not
9 supposed to care about winning at all costs, it is supposed to be seeking fair and just
10 results. If Wood, Smith, Severance and Loving are ignored, as Buchwald did not and
11 could not cite statutory authority and if you remove the precedents Buchwald is left with
12 zero authority – simply an arbitrary decision – and legally unsupportable.
13 But to say that, for example Wood, where the Court upheld an unlicensed person’s

14 contractual rights because a licensing scheme did not have a penalty provision, has

15 nothing to do with a case where an unlicensed person is claiming his contractual right
should be upheld because the licensing scheme does not have a penalty provision… it is
16
past unethical and truly downright Trumpian. Shameful.
17
In that brief, the CLC, and the Associate Attorney General who represented the
18
administrative agency, knowing it was flatly impossible to claim they had the right to
19
create a penalty the legislature did not, simply ignored the Dyna-Med and Peralta
20
holdings. But that does not remove the ethical violation of not admitting that in creating a
21
penalty, the CLC disregarded the law as memorialized in those to CASC holdings, but
22
again fought to keep enforcement that was knowingly wrong and unconstitutional.
23 It is not as if there is a lack of clarity on the subject:
24 “The [Talent Agencies] Act is silent – completely silent – on the subject of the
25 proper remedy for illegal procurement.” Marathon v. Blasi, 42 Cal.4th 974, 991 (2008).
26 “The [Talent Agencies] Act has no remedy for its violation.” Id., at 991.
27 “The Legislature has not seen fit to specify the remedy for violations of the Act.”
28 Id., at 995.
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 In not properly following the uniform State and Federal High Court holdings of
1
Wood, Smith, Severance, Loving, Dyna-Med v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., Peralta v.
2
Fair Empl. & Housing Comm, U.S. v. Evans, BMW of America v. Gore, Lambert v. CA,
3
New Jersey v. Fair Lawn Service Center and so many others, some $500,000,000 of
4
otherwise deserved compensation to personal managers, attorneys, producers and other
5
representatives has been forfeited, abandoned, diverted to litigators and/or settled out
6
because the Labor Commission, and the Courts who by law must give the Labor
7 Commissioner’s interpretation substantial weight, (see Styne v. Stevens, 26 Cal.4th 42, 53
8 (2001)) follow a judicially flawed lower court holding.
9 There is unwanted irony in the very organization created to ensure all Californians
10 are paid fairly fighting to continue a practice where an artist employs a personal manager,
11 receives the benefit of the personal manager’s labors, and then chooses not to pay the
12 personal manager for their labors. It is also beyond incomprehensible and must stop.
13
IV.
14
Per the parties’ contract, Petitioner was not compelled to remain a client, but she
15
was required to meet her fiscal obligations, which she has not. Petitioner also would,
16 while a client and thus in breach of the parties’ agreement, have her agents reach out to
17 her directly for auditions, and not inform Respondent of at least one commercial booking.
18 This is fraud, but not a violation of the TAA because the Act neither specifically bars that
19 action nor affixes a penalty to it, just as there neither a penalty nor specific prohibition of
20 procurement by an unlicensed person.
21 The Labor Commissioner has, without statutory guidance or authority, for some

22 eighty years has interpreted procurement, the primary defining activity of a talent agent,

23
as a regulated activity. It is a completely unsupportable assumption.
It is a basic legal maxim: what is not prohibited is allowed. An activity should not be,
24
cannot be considered a regulated activity simply because it is listed as a defining action of a
25
regulated profession or occupation. An activity is regulated, reserved for licensees, only
26
when a legislature has codified a provision stating that activity is expressly reserved for
27
those with the requisite license; or conversely, a codified provision expressly
28
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 memorializing the legislature’s action to make it unlawful to engage in that action without
1
accreditation. That accreditation, a valid license to engage in that activity, may at times also
2
include additional certification over and above the basic license (for example, see CA
3
Business & Professions Code (“BPC”) §§ 7028 – 7029 of the State Contractors Act).
4
California has dozens of licensing schemes. Most statutorily bar non-licensees
5
from engaging in some or all activities of the regulated profession. Some, like the
6
Nursing and Psychology Acts, only reserve the title of the regulated profession to
7 licensees; anyone can engage in the defining activity(ies) with the codicil they are barred
8 from calling themselves by the occupation’s title. Though enforced otherwise, as written
9 the TAA mirrors the schemes that only regulate title.
10 Most of California’s licensing schemes limit the defining activities of the regulated
11 professions to those who have qualified to obtain the requisite license. For instance, the CA
12 State Contractor’s Act makes it unlawful to advertise (BPC § 7027.1 - §7027.4) or engage

13 in the activity of contracting (BPC § 7028). It specifically defined each activity that is

14 reserved for licensees (BPC 7026.3 – 7026.12, § 7055 – 7058), including those that require
additional certification (BPC 7058.5 – 7058.7), and assigns individual remedies to each
15
violation. BPC § 7027.1 (c), § 7027.3, § 7028 (a) – (h), § 7028.1 (a) and (b).
16
In California, only licensed cytotechnologists can lawfully examine cytological
17
slides (BPC §1270 (a); only licensed physicians may prescribe drugs (BPC § 2052); only
18
those with valid California veterinary licenses can practice veterinary medicine (BPC §
19
4825.1), and only those with valid locksmith licenses can engage in the activities of a
20
locksmith (BPC § 6980.10). Similarly, the occupational licensing schemes for dentists
21 (BPC § 1700), respiratory therapists, (BPC 3760 (a) and (b)), pharmacists (BPC § 4051
22 (a)), veterinarians (BPC § 4825), acupuncturists (BPC § 4935), professional engineers
23 (BPC § 6730), geologists (BPC § 7830), and among others, structural pest control
24 specialists (BPC § 8550(a)) create clear demarcation lines between the activities anyone
25 can engage in and those that require a license
26 Anyone can engage in many of defining activities of an accountant. Non-licensed

27 persons “must be permitted to use the terms ‘accountant,’ ‘accounting,’ or ‘accounting

28 services,’ if the use of those terms is further qualified by an explanation, disclaimer or

9
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 warning stating that the advertiser is not licensed by the state, or that the services being
1
offered do not require a state license, thereby eliminating any potential or likelihood of
2
confusion regarding those terms.” Moore v. CA Board of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal. 4th
3
999, 1023.
4
BPC § 5050 of the CA. Accountancy Act states, “no person shall engage in the
5
practice of public accountancy in this state unless the person is the holder of a valid
6
permit to practice public accountancy.” The legislature also expressly regulated some of
7 the defining activities of accountancy. Only licensees can engage in the activities defined
8 in BPC § 5051 (a) to (e); but left the defining activities in § 5051 (f) to (i) unregulated,
9 with the codicil that anyone engaging in those activities “does not hold himself or herself
10 out, solicit or advertise for clients using the certified public accountant or public
11 accountant designation.”
12 For example, as keeping books, preparing statements or reports and making audits

13 are activities listed in § 5051 (f), “[u]nlicensed persons are permitted to make ‘audits’ and

14 prepare ‘reports.’” Id. at 1024.

While the Accountancy Act expressly states which defining activities that
15
unlicensed persons can engage in, more often CA’s licensing schemes, by defining an
16
activity without a provision(s) reserving activities for licensees, it is the absence of a
17
statute expressly barring non-licensees that, following the maxim that what is not
18
prohibited is allowed, that gives notice that the activity is only a defining, but not a
19
regulated one.
20
For instance, BPC § 2903 (a) of the State Psychologists Act defines the practice of
21 psychology as, “rendering or offering to render … any psychological service involving
22 the application of psychological principles, methods, and procedures of understanding,
23 predicting, and influencing behavior, such as principles pertaining to learning, perception,
24 motivation, emotions, and interpersonal relationships…”
25 Per BPC § 2903 (c), psychotherapy is using “psychological methods in a
26 professional relationship to assist a person or persons to acquire greater human

27 effectiveness or to modify feelings, conditions, attitudes, and behaviors that are

28 emotionally, intellectually, or socially ineffectual or maladaptive.”

10
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 The Psychologists Act has no statute expressly reserving these activities to those
1
with a psychologist’s license, nor are there examples of Scientologists, who regularly
2
engage in constructing, administering and interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes,
3
interests, etc. to affect others’ behavior being found in violation of § 2903. Nor has any
4
court found a pastor, rabbi, salesperson, life coach, teacher, trainer, doctor, physical or
5
drug rehabilitation professional, advertising executive, nurse or any others who use
6
psychological principles to understand and influence the behavior of others in violation of
7 law in and of itself, without the accused claiming to be a psychologist or some other
8 infraction.
9 Other examples include the CA Landscape Architects Act, where BPC § 5615
10 defines its practitioners as those who maintain and beautify outdoor areas; and the CA
11 Geologists Act, where BPC §§ 7802.1/7803 define the profession by its primary activity:
12 examining the Earth’s materials. While the statutory schemes mirror that of the Talent

13 Agencies Act, no California Court has ever alleged a violation of those licensing schemes

14 because someone engaged in the defining activities of those professions.

The CA Vocational Nursing Act offers a bit more clarification, informing non-
15
licensees they can engage in all the activities as a licensee, “provided that such person
16
shall not in any way assume to practice as a licensed vocational nurse.” BPC § 2861. The
17
Talent Agencies Act is the only licensing scheme, and procurement the only activity,
18
where people have been compromised for engaging in a defining responsibility of a
19
licensed profession that has no statures expressly reserving the activity for licensees. And
20
following the statutory rule of construction, that interpretation is unsupportable.
21
“[Adjudicators] must first look to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the
22 language its usual, ordinary import; and according significance, if possible, to every
23 word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction
24 making some words surplusage is to be avoided.” Dyna-Med Inc. v Fair Emp. &
25 Housing Comm. (1987) 43.Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387. If the TAA enforcement has been
26 correct, and just being a defining activity in a licensing scheme reserves that activity for
27 licensees, all the verbiage with language barring non-licensees from engaging in a

28 regulated activity is surplusage. Conversely, if the TAA is being enforced correctly,

11
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 every person engaging in a defined activity of a regulated profession, unless there is
1
language allowing them to do so under certain conditions, are at risk of the same hells
2
unlicensed folks helping artists get work face.
3
Those things are absurd; as is the enforcement of the TAA. It must stop.
4
The CLC’s choice to entwine personal managers and attorneys that do not also
5
have talent agency licenses into TAA controversy lacks logic. Marathon included dicta
6
that personal managers were included because Labor Code 1700, which defines what a
7
person is in the licensing scheme, includes the word manager. It was clearly dicta; the
8 issue was not argued by the parties. As the party in Marathon, I am aware of this, because
9 had it been argued, Marathon would have pointed out that in that instance, “manager” is
10 listed with individual, company society, firm, partnership, association, corporation,
11 limited liability company or their agents or employees. The list has nothing to do with
12 occupations, but rather as someone’s place in an organization.
13 For a law to be constitutional there must be clear notice of:

14 (1) who is subject to the enacted regulation;

15 (2) what conduct is being regulated; and

16 (3) what are the consequences found violators of the statute may face.

17
See Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, Virginia Law Review (Sept.
1973), Vol. 59, No. 6, pg. 1108.
18
Respondents understand that the Labor Commissioner does not have the authority
19
to hear and decide constitutional issues; however, that does not give CLC agency to act
20
unconstitutionally.
21
There is no notice that anyone but those holding themselves out as Talent Agents
22
are subject to TAA regulation, the enforcement is based on assumption and, it seems,
23
some prejudices.
24
There is no notice that only licensed talent agents can engage in the defining
25 activity of procurement, it is an assumption that bastardizes every rule of statutory
26 construction.
27 And there is no notice of remedy, it is a wholly made-up remedy and against a
28 mountain of “uniformly held” State and U.S. Supreme Court precedents. As procuring
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 employment for an artist is an activity anyone, licensed or unlicensed can engage in, there
1
can be no TAA violation for procuring work for an artist and thus no reason for the Labor
2
Commission to be involved in this or like contractual disputes.
3
The personal manager is the artist’s CEO, supervising their clients’ sales teams. A
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successful hyphenate client (performer/writer/director) can have separate literary, directing
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and talent agents for television and another set for film. They can have a personal
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appearance agent, a book agent, a voiceover agent and an on-camera celebrity commercial
7 agent, all hired by and reporting to the personal manager. Is procuring the procurers –
8 enlisting the sales team – a violation of the Talent Agencies Act? The TAA as written
9 provides no guidance.
10 Personal managers help create their artists’ sales materials: they choose the music
11 their musician clients will present for sale; help develop the scripts their writers hope to
12 sell; choose the pictures, resumes and help choose what video will be part of an actor or

13 comedian’s demo tape. Is creating the sale materials be considered part of the procurement

14 process, and thus a violation of the TAA? The Act as written provides no guidance.
A truism about representation: talent agents only want to invest time into an artist
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already with a proven ability to find work. More often than not, the artist was first helped
16
by a personal manager. Artists, be they writers, directors, actors or live performers, are
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both the product being sold to employers, and the Chairman of the Board of their personal
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businesses. Personal managers are the artists’ chief executive officers, overseeing and
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supervising the artist’s publicist (VP of public relations), business manager (VP of
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finance), transactional attorney (VP of business affairs), and assorted television and film,
21 literary, music, publishing and personal appearance agents (the vice-presidents of sales).
22 Like with any small/growing business, before the company has individuals for each
23 task, those responsibilities fall onto the CEO’s desk. Under the current enforcement, the
24 most common way artists start their career, getting a personal manager that believes in
25 them, puts the manager at risk of a TAA controversy because no agent is willing to share
26 the representational load. This happens more often than not with comedy performers; Drew

27 Carey, Jerry Seinfeld and Tim Allen are just examples of comedians who only found

28 agency representation after achieving success on their own television series.

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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 Like the realities at the beginning of most artists careers, when their clients cannot
1
interest a talent agent to invest time in them, Plaintiff cannot back away from his fiduciary
2
duty. As that involves maximizing the quality and quantity of career opportunities without
3
a licensed talent agent involved, there needs to be a bright line so he, personal managers,
4
producers, publicists and attorneys know what activities put non-licensed representatives
5
at legal risk.
6
The California Labor Code Sections 1700, 1700.4 (a) and 1700.5 are all on their
7 face and as applied unconstitutionally vague, as there is confusion as to who is subject to
8 regulation, what the regulations are, and undeniably, what penalties should be meted out if
9 a violation is found.
10 To repeat for emphasis: as procuring employment for an artist is an activity anyone,
11 licensed or unlicensed can engage in, there can be no TAA violation for procuring work for
12 an artist and thus the Labor Commission has no authority to be involved in this or like

13 contractual disputes.

14 WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT prays that the Labor Commissioner:

15 (1) Declare that as procuring employment for artists is a defining activity for

16 talent agents, but not by statute regulated and only reserved for licensees,

17
and that anyone licensed or unlicensed can engage in that activity,
(2) And that because the TAA has no statutory remedy for the activity of
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procuring employment opportunities for artists without a license,
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(3) That as uniformly found in every State and Federal High Court decision,
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without a statutory prohibition and more important, statutory remedy, the
21
act of procuring employment for artists is a lawful activity, whether done
22
by licensed or unlicensed persons, and as such the Labor Commission has
23
no authority to be involved in this or other like contractual disputes.
24 Respectfully Submitted,
25 ///Rick Siegel///
26 Rick Siegel
Serving as Respondents non-attorney representative
27

28 PROOF OF SERVICE
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER
 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
1

2
On August 11, 2022 I served the interested party in the action entitled JUDE
3 SALAZAR v. DIANE PARDOE AND SARAH PARDOE by placing a true copy
4 thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope as follows:

6
[ X ] BY U.S. MAIL I deposited such an envelope in the mail at Los Angeles,
7 California, with postage thereon fully prepaid.
8 [ ] BY FAX I caused such documents to be faxed to the
9 above mentioned address(es).

10 [ ] BY MESSENGER I caused such envelope to be messengered to the above

mentioned address(es).
11

12 [ ] BY PERSONAL I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the

offices of the SERVICE address(es).
13

14 [ X ] STATE I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
15
[ ] FEDERAL I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of
16
the bar of this Court whose direction the service was
17 made.

18

19
Executed on August 12, 2022 at Los Angeles, California
20

21

22 Jennie Nigrosh
23

24

25

26

27

28
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REPLY TO TAA PETITION ASKING FOR DECLARTION THAT AS THE LABOR COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL
AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN ANY REMEDY, IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER