31. JAVIER VS CONCEPCION 1.) that they acquired Lot No.

12 partly by purchase and partly by inheritance

GR L-36566 NOV 7, 1979 and they, as well as their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession of
(Petitioner:URBANO JAVIER and LEONILA ALBIELA the same adversely, publicly, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of
(Respondents: HON. HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., Hon. ANDRES REYES, Hon. LUIS owners against the whole world since the Spanish time up to the present
REYES, LIM CHUA, TAN TIAN ON alias TAN TIAN UNA and TAN SIOK TAN alias TAN 2.) that they have title to it granted by the Spanish government on March 11,
SIOK TUAN,) 1888
DOCTRINE: Under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the person 3.) that the lot in question had been adjudicated to defendants-petitioners'
allegedly deprived of the land by a decree of registration obtained by fraud should file predecessors-in-interest by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (now
in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after the Quezon) in the decision dated January 14, 1930
entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. 4.) that they have declared the land for tax purposes since 1906 paying taxes
therefor
FACTS: 5.) that they have cleared the land and planted on it numerous trees without any
● On October 17, 1959, respondents as plaintiffs, Lim Chua, Tan Tian On alias interference from plaintiffs-respondents or their predecessors-in-interest
Tan Tian Una and Tan Sick Tan alias Tan Shiok Tuan filed against herein 6.) that plaintiffs-respondents had never been the owners and possessors of Lot
petitioners, then defendants- spouses, Urbano Javier and Leonila Albiela, with No. 12 or portion thereof, and if the same had been included in their title, the
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Quezon, Civil Case No. 6253, for registration and issuance of the same in their favor had been secured thru
the reconveyance to the former of a parcel of land with improvements fraud and deceit, by making it appear in the application for registration and
thereon, known as Lot 12 consisting of fifty (50) hectares, more or less, and the notices of publication that said Lot No. 6 belonged to them and is within
an accounting and recovery of the produce of the land from the time the the jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon, which is not true since the same is within
latter, i.e., petitioners herein, took possession of the same in 1945 up to the the jurisdiction of Candelaria, Quezon, thus deceiving the whole world of the
time possession is returned to the former. proper location of the land subject of registration and publication.
● Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big parcel of land designated as Lot 6, located ● On June 25, 1968 the court a quo rendered a decision, the court has arrived
in Quezon Province and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16817 at the conclusion that the property in question, consisting of about sixty (60)
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province in the name hectares known as Lot No. 12, is included and comprised within Plan Psu-
of herein respondents. 5967, for Lot No. 6. That Lot No. 6 covering and which includes lot No. 12, the
● It was further alleged that on April 10, 1930, said Lot 12 was ordered property in question, is covered by Transfer Certificate of 'Title No. 16817 of
excluded from Psu-16536, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25133 and in Plan Psu-13449, the Register of Deeds of Quezon and issued in the name of the herein
G.L.R.O. Record No. 26112 for the reason that the same was already awarded plaintiffs; that the defendant Urtano Javier, since 1924, knew of the fact that
to herein respondents as owners the property in question, Lot No. 12. plan Psu-13449, now Psu-16536-Amd, is
● In an amended answer, defendants below, now petitioners denied the a part and parcel of Lot No. 6.
material averments of the complaint and pointed out that Lot 12 could never
be a part of Lot 6, Plan Psu-5967, because between the two lots there exists a ISSUE/S: WON the CA erred in:
big river known as the Guhit River which serves as the natural boundary 1. holding that there was no fraud in the registration of Lot No. 12? (NO)
between the municipalities of Dolores and Candelaria of Quezon Province; 2. holding that the cause of action of the private respondents has not been
that Lot No. 6, Plan Psu-5967 is situated within the jurisdiction of Dolores, barred by the Statute of Limitation or by laches (NO)
Quezon while Lot No. 12 is situated within the jurisdiction of Candelaria, 3. in not ordering private respondents to pay for the improvements
Quezon. introduced by them on the land in question from 1945 (NO)
● As special defenses, defendants-petitioners alleged inter alia: HELD:
 1.) Fraud as a legal basis for review of a decree means actual or positive fraud as acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors' long continued possession for 37
distinguished from constructive or legal fraud. Since the existence or years, the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and the
attendance of actual or positive fraud is a question of fact, and respondent title thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee's
Court having ruled out the same, We have no basis to sustain defendants- inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
petitioners' contention that it attended the procurement of the title.
This circumstance obtaining in the Mejia de Lucas case is not present in the case at
The lot in question, Lot No. 12, Plan Psu-16536-AMD was also found to bar.Here, there are no intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or
be "part and parcel of Lot No. 6" for which TCT No. 16817 of the Register of prejudiced by a decision directing the return of Lot No. 12 to plaintiffs-respondents,
Deeds of Quezon was issued on July 9, 1941 in the name of plaintiffs, now Hence, the equitable defense of laches will not also apply as against the registered
respondents. This factual finding stands in the absence of weighty owners in this case.
considerations to warrant its reversal. As held in Evangelista & Co., et al., v.
Abad Santos "It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh 3.) Petitioners did not act with evident bad faith in occupying the land in question. This
such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors being likewise a question of fact, and there being substantial evidence in the records to
of law that might have been committed by the lower court." Moreover, the support the finding. As possessors in good faith, petitioners are entitled to the fruits
factual conclusion in the case at bar, has been arrived at after weighing both received before their possession was legally interrupted upon receipt of judicial
the testimonial and documentary evidence presented. Finally, the decree of summons in connection with the filing of the complaint for reconveyance on October
registration has long become final, absent a showing that the same was 17, 1959.
questioned within one (1) year after the entry thereof was made.
However, the records do not show when the summons were received by the
Under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the defendants-spouses, Javier, In the absence of such proof and in the interest of justice,
person allegedly deprived of the land by a decree of registration obtained by We hold that possession in good faith was legally interrupted on November 11, 1959,
fraud should file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review when their amended answer was filed. Petitioners should also be refunded the
within one year after the entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser necessary and useful expenses, with the right to retain the land until reimbursed of the
for value has acquired an interest. Thus, granting that there was actual or same, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, respondents
positive fraud in securing the title, defendants-petitioners are now barred have the option to refund the amount of useful expenses or to pay the increase in value
from questioning the same. which the land may have acquired by reason thereof. In this connection, petitioners
have placed the market value of improvements on the property consisting of various
2.) The established rule being that one cannot acquire title to a registered land by fruit trees, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong materials.
prescription or adverse possession. Adverse, notorious and continuous possession
under claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens In view of Article 544 of the Civil Code, supra, petitioners shall be accountable for the
title. it is likewise settled that the right to secure possession under a decree of fruits of subject property only after 1959, not from 1945.
registration does not prescribe.

The court cited Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, wherein the land in question came into
the possession of the defendant-appellant Gamponia after a series of transfers from 32. HALILI VS CIR
Domingo Mejia, the original owner and plaintiff-appellee's (Mejia de Lucas') GR L-24864 MAY 30, 1996
predecessor-in-interest to three other persons and their successors-in-interest, whose
rights and obligation would have been affected by a contrary decision. In the Mejia de DOCTRINE:
Lucas case, The court holds that while defendant may not be considered as having
Section 48 of PD 1529 states that such a certificate shall not be subject to collateral Hence present case: the union filed a Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification, also
attack. And it cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in seeking the recovery of the subject real property.
accordance with law for that purpose.
ISSUE/S: Can the Union be granted the property? NO. The petition is a collateral attack
The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only on the title. [Motion to recover = objective is to nullify MMPCI’s title]
be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
HELD:
FACTS: ü The NLRC’s jurisdiction[1] does not include recognizing cases involving
(1) For unpaid overtime pay, 897 employees of Halili Transit filed several actions reconveyance making the outright dismissal proper.
against Fortunato Halili with the Court of Industrial Relations in 1958. After ü The fact that the subject real property was registered under the Torrens System
Halili’s death, the cases were settled amicably. of registration in the name of respondent MMPCI under Transfer Certificate
(2) The amicable settlement covered the transfer of the title to a 33,952 sqm of Title No. 301151 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 14, 1983,
tract of land in San Bartolome, Caloocan in addition to a cash payment of makes the instant petition all the more dismissible, considering that the best
P25,000 to the employees. proof of ownership of a piece of land is the Certificate of Title.
(3) The administratrix of Halili’s estate then later executed a deed of conveyance o Section 48 of PD 1529 states that such a certificate shall not be
of real property, transferring the title to the subject tract of land to the Halili subject to collateral attack. And it cannot be altered, modified, or
Bus and Conductor’s Union, to be held in trust by the said union for the cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law for
employees. that purpose.
(4) The parcel of land was then registered without any encumbrance under a ü A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct
new certificate of title. statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner.
(5) Atty. Benjamin Pineda of the union then filed a motion with the Ministry of ü The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting that authority be given to sell the exactly the real interest of its owner. With very few exceptions, this title once
land, as well as the Supreme Court, which was granted by both. registered should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
(6) Relying on the authority, Atty. Pineda then filed a motion for authority to sell enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
the land to the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., which was also granted ü If the rule were otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.
by the MOLE through the decision of Labor Arbiter Valenzuela.
(7) After the sale’s consummation, a new certificate of title was issued to In the case at bar, the Union seeks from MMPCI the recovery of the subject property. It
MMPCI. is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify MMPCI’s title to the property in
(8) The Supreme Court, however, later set aside both orders granting the motion question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was
to sell to MMPCI after the same were challenged by the Solicitor General (for decreed, an apparent a collateral attack, which is not permitted under the principle of
being issued without due process). indefeasibility of a Torrens Title
(9) On the basis of the Resolution setting aside the authorizations by the LA, the ü The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued,
Union then filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence,
(NLRC) to compel MMPCI to reconvey the property to the union. whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the land in
question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding.
NLRC: dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, (subject matter is a
proper subject of the regular courts).
Moreover, all portions the subject land (now the Holy Cross Memorial Park) have (c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
already been sold out to individual lot buyers, who are innocent purchasers for value, bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
and contain the interred remains of the lot owners and/or their relatives. enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
ü Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the CT issued, Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
acquire over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (As
the total cancellation of the certificate. amended by Section 9, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Ownership of the lot had already been vested in the Union upon the sale of Halili’s 33 MADRID VS SPOUSES MARTINEZ
estate – they had every right to dispose of it. GR 150887 AUG 14, 2009
ü Cannot look into the validity of the property’s disposal because the judgments
have become final and executory. DOCTRINE:
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and
Petition dismissed rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the
title immune from collateral attack

[1] Article 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. FACTS:
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have · Spouses Mapoy (respondents – plaintiffs) are the absolute owners of two
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar parcels of land (with a combined area of 270 sqm.) in Sampaloc Manila under the
days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, TCT issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all · April 4, 1988: Spouses Mapoy sought to recover the possession of the
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: properties through an accion publiciana which was filed in the RTC of Manila
(1) Unfair labor practice cases; against the Mirandas and two other unnamed defendants who were later on
(2) Termination disputes; identified as Francisco Madrid and Edgardo Bernardo (petitioners).
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that · Spouses Mapoy alleged that they acquired the properties from Spouses
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and Castelo under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1978.
other terms and conditions of employment; o According to them, they only tolerated the occupancy and
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages possession of the petitioners until it became illegal after they
arising from the employer-employee relations; refused to vacate the properties after repeated demands of
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, Spouses Mapoy.
including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; · The Mirandas countered that Gregorio Miranda owned the properties by
and virtue of an oral sale between him and the original owner, Antonio.
(6) Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, o They claimed that Gregorio Miranda was a carpenter of
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from Antonio, and that they had a verbal contract for him to stay,
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in develop, fix, and guard the properties – as a reward for his 20
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five years of loyal servies, Antonio gave the properties to him.
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied o Bernardo asserted that he became a ward of Miranda in 1965
with a claim for reinstatement. when he was 10 years old and helped in the development of
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases the properties and constructed a bodega and a house within
decided by Labor Arbiters. the properties.
 o Madrid claimed that he stated occupying a portion of the action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is
properties in 1974, and constructed a house on this portion in made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be
1989 with the permission of Bernardo (son of Miranda). distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an
· Petitioners invoked Sec. 6 of the Urban Land Reform Law, granting legitimate action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
tenants of 10/more, who have built their homes and continuously resided there judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the
for the past 10 years, the right of first refusal to purchase the lands within a judgment had been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs
reasonable time and price. title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
· RTC: upheld the rights of the respondents-plaintiffs right of possession as
registered owners of the property. The petitioners-defendants attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs
o No merit in the petitioners’ claims of ownership via oral sale title, by claiming that fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It
given the absence of any public instrument or note to support is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the properties in an
their claims. "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity
· CA: dismissed the appeal. The certificate of title in the name of the of the judgment granting the title. This is the attack that possession of a Torrens Title
respondents serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much less accord credit to, the
properties. petitioners-defendants claim of fraud to impugn the validity of the respondents-
· Hence, this petition. plaintiffs title to their property.

ISSUE/S: 34. CARBONILLA VS ABIERA

Whether or not the court committed error in ruling that the respondents are the GR 177637 JULY 26, 2010
rightful owners of the properties – NO.
FACTS:
HELD: ● Petitioner Dr. Discoro Carbonilla filed a complaint for ejectment against
PETITION IS DENIED. THE DECISION OF THE CA IS AFFIRMED. respondents Marcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
Accion Publiciana and Ownership ● The complaint alleged that
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ○ Petitioner is the registered owner of the parcel of land located in
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may Barangay Canturing, Maasin City
pass upon the issue to determine who between or among the parties has the right to ○ The land is covered by a certificate of title and declared for
possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding assessment and taxation purposes in the petitioner’s name
determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the ○ Petitioner is also the owner of the residential building standing of
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of the land which he acquired through a Deed of Extrajudicial
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and
an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in Quitclaim of Ownership
short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. ○ Such building was merely occupied by the respondents by mere
tolerance
Claim of Fraud a Prohibited Collateral Attack ○ He intend to use the building as his residence, thus he sent a
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title demand letter to the respondents asking them to leave the
and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders premises but failed. Conciliation efforts with the barangay proved
the title immune from collateral attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another futile
● To prove his claim he presented the following ○ Unlike the MTCC, RTC ruled that the petitioner is also the owner of
○ Copies of transfer certificate of title - to show that the land was the building.
originally registered in the Name Diosdado Carbonila ○ RTC placed the burden upon respondents to prove their claim that
○ Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (RESIDENTIAL BUILDING) they built it prior to petitioners’ acquisition of the land, which
with waiver and quitclaim of ownership executed by heirs of burden, the court found, respondents failed to discharge.
Garciano ○ Either way, whether the building was constructed before or after
○ Tax Declaration petitioner acquired ownership of the land, the petitioner, as the
○ Demand letter owner of the land, would have every right to evict the respondents.
● Respondents denied petitioners allegation and asserted that ○ if the building was erected before petitioner or his predecessors
○ As to the building acquired ownership of the land, then Article 445 of the Civil Code
■ They occupied the building as owners, having inherited would apply.Thus, petitioner, as owner of the land, would be
the same from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, deemed the owner of the building standing thereon, considering
respondent Marcelos parents and respondent Maricris that, when ownership of the land was transferred to him, there was
grandparents. no reservation by the original owner that the building was not
■ They have been in possession of the building since 1960, included in the transfer.
but it has not been declared for taxation purposes. ○ On the other hand, if the building was constructed after petitioner
○ As for the subject land, became the owner of the land, it is with more reason that
■ They inherited the same from Francisco Plasabas, petitioner has the right to evict respondents from the land
grandfather of Alfredo Abiera. They pointed out that the ● Respondents filed a petition for review with CA. It reversed the ruling finding
land had, in fact, been declared for taxation purposes in that there was no evidence to prove that respondents possession of the
the name of Francisco Plasabas building was by mere tolerance. The complaint was that of a forcible entry,
■ the building was previously a garage-like structure but, in hence the action has prescribed since the 1 year period for filing had already
1977, Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano repaired lapsed.
and remodeled it, for which reason, they obtained a
building permit ISSUE/S: Whether the petitioner sufficiently established his ownership of the subject
● To prove their claim, Respondents presented copies of the two TDs in the properties (building), hence has the right to recover possession? NO
name of Francisco Plasabas and the Building Permit.
● MTCC: in favor of respondents HELD:
○ While the petitioner owns the property, the building is owned by While petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no other
the respondents. Petitioner failed to refute the respondents’ claim piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed
that their predecessors has been in prior possession of the land to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the
○ In so ruling, the court applied Art. 546 of the Civil Code which possession of the building
allows the possessor in good faith to retain the property until he is
reimbursed for necessary expenses The court can’t accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential
● Petitioner elevated the case to RTC wherein the RTC reversed the MTCC Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof
decision that petitioner acquired ownership of the building.There is no showing that the
○ RTC agreed that the ownership of the land belonged to the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over
petitioner it. Ranged against respondents proof of possession of the building since 1977,
petitioner's evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.
 1. by filing an accion publiciana - recovering possession of his property. It is a
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an
However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual 2. by filing an accion reivindicatoria -, a suit to recover ownership of real
occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial property.
remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper. We stress, however, that the pronouncement in this case as to the ownership of the
land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land
Ejectment cases namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings.
The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to PETITION IS DENIED
the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto. It doesn't
even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. an ejectment case will not 35. ARANDA VS REPUBLIC
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the GR 172331 AUG 24, 2011
subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case Aranda v Republic of the Philippines
filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven Topic: Regalian Doctrine – Concept and effects
Doctrine: To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
The statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
detainer involves the persons withholding from another of the possession of the real reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the may also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are
formers right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied. A alienable and disposable.
requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must
be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the Facts:
expiration of the right to possess. 1. ICTSI Warehousing Inc., represented by its chairman Enrique Razon, filed for
a petition for original registration before the RTC over a parcel of land in
Petitioner failed to prove that respondents’ possession was based on his alleged Batangas.
tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garciano’s 2. The Republic opposed on the grounds that the land applied for is part of the
attesting that they tolerated respondents’ entry to and occupation of the subject public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title thereto
properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show under CA 141.
overt acts indicative of his or his predecessors permission to occupy the subject 3. ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application, citing the ff reasons:
property a. Petition was not accompanied by a cert. of NFS
b. Statement of technical description was based merely on the
Notably, no mention was made in the complaint of how entry by respondents was boundaries set forth in the tax dec.
effected or how and when dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence c. Due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor (Ramon Aranda)
showing such details. and applicant corporation cannot push thru. Hence, the tax dec. is
still in the name of Aranda and the land cannot be transferred to
ICTSI.
In any event, petitioner has some other recourse.
4. RTC: Admitted the amended application for registration of title now filed in
the name of Ramon Aranda (herein petitioner).
 5. Aranda invokes the liberal application of CA 141, having been continuous a. Property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly, and domain;
adversely for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application. In b. That the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
support of such, he presented testimonies of witnesses (his sister and one interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Luis Olan). possession and occupation;
a. Sister testified: In 1965, their father donated the land to Aranda as c. Such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
evidenced by documents which the siblings executed in 2000 (the 12, 1945 or earlier.
document embodying the donation was eaten by rats); that his 2. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Section 2, Art. 12 of the
brother has been tilling the land since 1965 but did not introduce 1987 Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
any permanent improvements. the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing
b. Luis Olan testified: His father has been farming said land and that to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
they had open continuous possession over it, until his father sold it Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
to Aranda in 1946; there was no copy of the document of sale as it person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
was given to Aranda. - To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
6. RTC: Granted application and ordered issuance of registration in favor of established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
Aranda. - To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
7. CA: Reversed. an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government;
- Aranda’s evidence does not satisfactorily establish the character and duration such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
of possession required by law, as Aranda failed to prove specific acts showing action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative
the nature of the possession by his predecessors in interest. act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
- Did not give evidentiary weight to the documents which were prepared only Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
in 2000, when the application for registration was filed, as factual proof of - Case herein: Due to the RTC’s directive, Asst. Regional Exec. Dir. For
ownership by the parties to the compromise agreement. Operations of DENR issued a certification stating that the subject property
8. Aranda argues: falls within Alienable and Disposable Land, Project 22-A of Lipa per LC Map
- Deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale in favor of Aranda and the 1965 718 certified on March 26, 1928. However, in another certification issued by
donation to Aranda are competent proof of transfer of ownership the DENR CENR, it stated that said land was under Project 39, LC Map 3601
notwithstanding that these were executed only in 2000. CA had no basis to certified on December 22, 1997.
doubt veracity of the donation and sale, and to conclude that the o SC: Aranda failed to explain the discrepancies in the dates of classification
confirmation deeds can be treated as compromise agreement, considering in the govn certifications. Hence, the status of the land applied for as
that the transactions had been previously completed and perfected by the alienable and disposable was not clearly established.
parties.
Other issues:
Issue: W/N Aranda met the quantum of proof required by law for judicial confirmation 1. Aranda’s evidence failed to show that he possessed the property in the
of his title. (NO) manner and for the duration required by law.
- Aranda presented tax decs and deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale and
Held: 1945 donation. However, the history of the land shows that it was declared
1. The Property Registration Decree or PD 1529 provides for original registration for tax purposes only in 1981. The Municipal treasurer also certified that
of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. A petition may be granted Aranda had been paying the corresponding taxes only beginning 1994—3
upon compliance with the ff reqs: years before the filing for original registration.
 - While as a rule, tax decs are not conclusive evid. of ownership. Nevertheless, (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
they are a good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
his right mind would be paying taxes for a prop that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute proof that holder has a claim of title By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
over the prop. was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
2. Aranda failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest. Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
- No evidence that witness’ father Lucio Olan declared the prop for tax FREEDOM ISLANDS.
purposes at anytime before he sold it to Aranda, and there is no showing that
Aranda declared the prop in his name from the time he bought it from Olan. Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
- Even assuming Lucio actually planted rice nad corn, such is not sufficient to Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
establish possession in the concept of owner. Mere casual cultivation does hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
ownership. Specific acts of dominion must be clearly shown. claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of
all scams”).
Fallo: A person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
possession by himself and by his predecessors in interest must prove his claim by
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
clear and convincing evidence. The court has a duty, even in the absence of
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
opposition, to require petitioner to show, by preponderance of evidence and by
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
positive and absolute proof, so far as possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of
contract is null and void.
the lands which he is attempting to register. Aranda failed to do so. Hence,
petition is DENIED. Issue:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent
events;
36. CHAVEZ VS PEA 2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of
GR 133250 JULY 9, 2002 governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative
DOCTRINE: To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be remedies;
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the 4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
constitutional ban ok private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land 5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going
of the public domain. neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to
FACTS: In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Constitution; and
Philippines (CDCP). 7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is
grossly disadvantageous to the government
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked
with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care Held:
of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project 1. The signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a
signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative
its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty,
the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention. The principle of exhaustion
its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. The constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI
Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation
title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of
Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case. The petitioner
Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to
of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. In the instant case, if comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here.
the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
AMARI.Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens. The thrust of the second
did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public. public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned
corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of 4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the
the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues
provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social,
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. economic and moral well being of the people. We rule that since the instant petition,
brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights — to information
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters of transcendental public
petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated
to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed 5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State
at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project. policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: “Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue
related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of
resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case. negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and
conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring
even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public
a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may
be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial,
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be
summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this
affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to chapter, and not otherwise.
inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents
and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as
government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only
and copying. allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service. However, government reclaimed and marshy
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows: lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is — only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
character; Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed,
as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
granted to private individuals.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means
public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.Property of public would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by
dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a
so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by
property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
activity to increase the national wealth.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State." Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Being neither
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall
department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987
use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that
private parties. the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such as
the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under apply to government units and entities like PEA. The grant of legislative authority to sell
water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically
areas under water whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The
empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can
sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. Clearly, the mere become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of
lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands." The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled corporations.
and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore,
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable 7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to
lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue
accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional involves a determination of factual matters.
ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does
not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property 37. REPUBLIC VS CA, NAGUIT
through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the event that GR 144057 JAN 17, 2005
the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may DOCTRINE:
be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission." Requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under § 14(1)
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands 1. That the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI domain;
to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the 2. That the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest
reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 occupation; and
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. 3. That such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of
title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot
FACTS:
1. Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and married to Manolito Naguit, filed alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by §14 PD 129, since
parcel of land. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.
imperfect title over the land.
2. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, ISSUE/S:
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. The court Whether it is necessary under §14(1) of PD 1529 that the subject land be firs classified
then issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to as alienable and disposable before the applicant's possession under a bona fide claim of
the oppositors. ownership could start?
3. The evidence on record reveals the following:
a. That the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation HELD:
purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 until 1. There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for
1991. registration under §14(1). [See doctrine]
b. In 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs 2. Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
of Honrato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father 1945 or earlier. Wrong! Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property
to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. sought to be registered be already alienable and disposable at the time the
c. Heirs of Maming executed a DOAS in favor of respondent Naguit, application for registration of title is filed.  CRUCIAL: At time of application,
who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted land must already be alienable.
Manuel Blanco as administrator of the same and the latter 3. “Since June 12, 1945,” as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
introduced improvements, planted trees (including coconut trees phrase “under a bona fide claim of ownership.” Generally speaking, qualifying
aged 50-60 years), and paid taxes due on the land. words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
d. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.
which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. 4. To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14
e. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land (1) would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it
openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as
private person or even the government until she filed her alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
application for registration. original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
4. The MCTC redered a decision ordering that the land be brought under the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said
operation of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) and that the title provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.
thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. 5. The more reasonable interpretation is that it merely required the property
5. Republic filed a MR. OSG stressed that the land was declared alienable and sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
disposable only on Oct. 15, 1980. – Denied. Appeal to RTC likewise denied. application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
6. CA affirmed. It held that there is no need for the government’s prior release application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
alienable or disposable within the meaning of PD 1529, and that Naguit had reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
7. Hence, this Petition by the Republic. It invokes Director of Lands v. IAC in in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
possession must first be alienable. Since Since the subject land was declared intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over
 the property. Even the petitioner admits that the property was released and ● Thereupon, Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy of the land
certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR. without first securing the corresponding transfer certificate of title in his
6. Moreover, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, name.
which governs and authorizes the application of “those who have acquired ● Lacamen introduced various improvements and paid the proper taxes. His
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing possession was open, continuous, peaceful, and adverse. After his death in
laws,” public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, 1942, his heirs remained in and continued possession and occupancy of the
continuous, and exclusive possession for at least 30 years. Thus, even if land. They too paid the taxes.
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June ● After the last Global War, Lacamen's heirs "started fixing up the papers of all
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, the properties" left by him In or about June, 1957, they discovered that
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of §14(2) Laruan's heirs, respondents-appellants, were able to procure a new owner's
of PD 1529. copy of Certificate of Title No. 420 by a petition filed in court alleging that
7. No reason to disturb the conclusion of RTC and CA that Naguit had the right their copy has been lost or destroyed. Through this owner's copy,
to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession of the land since respondents-appellants caused the transfer of the title on the lot in their
1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court names
generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, ● Refused of their demands for reconveyance of the title, petitioners-appellants
possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to sued respondents-appellants in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City on
60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax December 9, 1957, prayings among other things, that they be declared
declaration executed by Urbano in 1945. owners of the subject property; that respondents-appellants be ordered to
a. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are convey to them by proper instruments or documents the land in question;
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good and that the Register of Deeds of Benguet be ordered to cancel Transfer
indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his Certificate of Title No. T-775
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his ● In answer, respondents-appellants traversed the averments in the complaint
actual or at least constructive possession. and claim absolute ownership over the land. They asserted that their
deceased father, Laruan, never sold the property and that the Deed of Sale
38. HEIRS OF LACAMEN VS HEIRS OF LARUAN was not thumbmarked by him
GR L-27088 JUL 31, 1975 ● Court of First Instance of Baguio City found for respondents-appellants and
DOCTRINE: against petitioners-appellants. Forthwith, petitioners-appellants appealed to
FACTS: the Court of Appeals.
● Petitioners-appellants are the surviving heirs of Batiog Lacamen, while ● Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
respondents-appellants are the heirs of Laruan.
● Sometime on January 28, 1928, Laruan executed a Deed of Sale in favor of ISSUE/S: Whether the deceased Batiog Lacamen and/or his heirs, herein petitioners-
Batiog Lacamen conveying for the sum of P300.00 his parcel of land situated appellants, have validly acquired ownership over the disputed parcel of land. (YES)
in the sitio of La Trinidad, Benguet, Mountain Province, comprising 86 ares
and 16 centares and covered by Certificate of Title No. 420 of the Registry of HELD:
Benguet. The deed was acknowledged before Antonio Rimando, a notary During the regime of the Commonwealth, C.A. 141 otherwise known as "The Public
public. Land Act" was passed — November 7, 1936 — amending Act No. 2874. However, it
● Immediately after the sale, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to contained a similar provision in its Section 120 that "Conveyances and encumbrances
Lacamen. made by illiterate non-Christians shall not be valid unless duly approved by the
Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu.
The contracting parties, Lacamen and Laruan, are bound by the foregoing laws, since
both of them are illiterate Igorots, belonging to the "non-Christian Tribes" of the At this state, therefore, respondents-appellants' Claim of absolute ownership over the
Mountain Province , and the controverted land was derived from a Free Patent or land cannot be countenanced. It has been held that while a person may not acquire
acquired from the public domain. title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of
the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his
The trial court did show cordiality to judicial pronouncements when it avoided the right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of
realty sale between Lacamen and Laruan for want of approval of the Director of the laches. Much more should it be in the instant case where the possession of nearly 30
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. For jurisprudence decrees that non-approved years or almost half a century now is in pursuance of sale which regrettably did not
conveyances and encumbrances of realty by illiterate non-Christians are not valid, i.e., bear the approval of the executive authority but which the vendor never questioned
not binding or obligatory. during his life time. Laruan's laches extends to his heirs, the respondents-appellants
Nevertheless, the thrust of the facts in the case before Us weakens the gathered herein, since they stand in privity with him.
strength of the cited rule. The facts summon the equity of laches.

"Laches" has been defined as "such neglect or ommission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, as will operate as a bar in equity." It is a delay in the assertion of a right "which
works disadvantage to another" because of the "inequity founded on some change in 39. BINALAY VS MANALO
the condition or relations of the property or parties." GR 92161 MAR 18, 1991
DOCTRINE:
Laruan's sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were it not for the FACTS:
sole fact that it lacked the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian ISSUE/S:
Tribes. There was impressed upon its face full faith and credit after it was notarized by HELD:
the notary public. The non-approval was the only "drawback" of which the trial court
has found the respondents-appellants to "have taken advantage as their lever to
40. REPUBLIC VS CA
deprive [petitioners-appellants] of this land and that their motive is out and out greed."
GR 103882 NOV 25, 1998
As between Laruan and Lacamen, the sale was regular, not infected with any flaw.
DOCTRINE:
Laruan's delivery of his certificate of title to Lacamen just after the sale symbolizes
FACTS:
nothing more than a bared recognition and acceptance on his part that Lacamen is the
ISSUE/S:
new owner of the property. Thus, not any antagonistic show of ownership was ever
HELD:
exhibited by Laruan after that sale and until his death in May 1938.

41. CHAVEZ VS PEA

From the transfer of the land on January 28, 1928, Lacamen possessed and occupied
GR 133250 JUL 9, 2002
the ceded land in concepto de dueño until his death in April 1942. Thereafter his heirs,
DOCTRINE:
petitioners-appellants herein, took over and exercised dominion over the property,
FACTS:
likewise unmolested for nearly 30 years (1928-1957) until the heirs of Laruan,
ISSUE/S:
respondents-appellants, claimed ownership over the property and secured registration
HELD:
of the same in their names. At the trial, petitioners-appellants have been found to have
introduced improvements on the land consisting of houses, barns, greenhouses, walls,
roads, etc., and trees valued at P38,920.00. 42. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS IAC
GR 73002 DEC 29,1986
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:

43. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ABAIRO

GR L-34602
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:

44. OH CHO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

GR L-48321 AUG 31, 1946
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE/S:
HELD:

45. REPUBLIC VS CA
GR 108998 AUG 24, 1994
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE/S:
HELD: