011-2005-Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Cement20210505-13-1ql6utx

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 158540. August 3, 2005.]
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

Abundio D. Marapao, Jr. for V.T. Lao Construction.
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, Maria Lourdes A. Sereno for CMAP.
SYLLABUS
1.TAXATION; COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA); SECTION 29 OF THE
SAFEGUARD MEASURES ACT (SMA); VESTS JURISDICTION ON THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS OVER PETITIONS QUESTIONING THE NON-IMPOSITION BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE SECRETARY OF SAFEGUARD MEASURES. —” It should
be emphasized again that by utilizing the phrase "in connection with," it is the
SMA that expressly vests jurisdiction on the CTA over petitions questioning the
non-imposition by the DTI Secretary of safeguard measures. The Court is simply
asserting, as it should, the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the SMA.
Without "in connection with" or a synonymous phrase, the Court would be
compelled to favor the respondents' position that only rulings imposing
safeguard measures may be elevated on appeal to the CTA. But considering
that the statute does make use of the phrase, there is little sense in delving
into alternate scenarios. Respondents fail to convincingly address the absurd
consequences pointed out by the Decision had their proposed interpretation
been adopted. Indeed, suffocated beneath the respondents' legalistic tinsel is
the elemental question —” what sense is there in vesting jurisdiction on the
CTA over a decision to impose a safeguard measure, but not on one choosing
not to impose. Of course, it is not for the Court to inquire into the wisdom of
legislative acts, hence the rule that jurisdiction must be expressly vested and
not presumed. Yet ultimately, respondents muddle the issue by making it
appear that the Decision has uniquely expanded the jurisdictional rules. For the
respondents, the proper statutory interpretation of the crucial phrase "in
connection with" is to pretend that the phrase did not exist at all in the statute.
The Court, in taking the effort to examine the meaning and extent of the
phrase, is merely giving breath to the legislative will.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT A TARIFF SHOULD BE
IMPOSED IS AN ISSUE FRAUGHT WITH A TAX DIMENSION, DETERMINATION OF
WHICH CALL UPON THE SAME KIND OF EXPERTISE THAT A SPECIALIZED BODY
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
AS THE CTA PRESUMABLY POSSESSES. —” Philcemcor imputes intelligent
design behind the alleged intent of Congress to limit CTA review only to
impositions of the general safeguard measures. It claims that there is a
necessary tax implication in case of an imposition of a tariff where the CTA's
expertise is necessary, but there is no such tax implication, hence no need for
the assumption of jurisdiction by a specialized agency, when the ruling rejects
the imposition of a safeguard measure. But of course, whether the ruling under
review calls for the imposition or non-imposition of the safeguard measure, the
common question for resolution still is whether or not the tariff should be
imposed —” an issue definitely fraught with a tax dimension. The
determination of the question will call upon the same kind of expertise that a
specialized body as the CTA presumably possesses.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIM THAT THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS MAY NOT
EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER A DECISION NOT TO IMPOSE A SAFEGUARD
MEASURE FINDS NO STATUTORY SUPPORT. —” In response to the Court's
observation that the setup proposed by respondents was novel, unusual,
cumbersome and unwise, public respondents invoke the maxim that courts
should not be concerned with the wisdom and efficacy of legislation. But this
prescinds from the bogus claim that the CTA may not exercise judicial review
over a decision not to impose a safeguard measure, a prohibition that finds no
statutory support. It is likewise settled in statutory construction that an
interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity is not favored.
Respondents do not address the particular illogic that the Court pointed out
would ensue if their position on judicial review were adopted. According to the
respondents, while a ruling by the DTI Secretary imposing a safeguard measure
may be elevated on review to the CTA and assailed on the ground of errors in
fact and in law, a ruling denying the imposition of safeguard measures may be
assailed only on the ground that the DTI Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion. As stressed in the Decision, "[c]ertiorari is a remedy narrow in its
scope and inflexible in its character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal
workshop."
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERESTED PARTIES ARE NOT LEFT WITHOUT ANY
EFFECTIVE REMEDY SHOULD THE TARIFF COMMISSION ACT OR CONCLUDE
ERRONEOUSLY IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATION WHETHER THE FACTUAL
CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH NECESSITATE THE IMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL
SAFEGUARD MEASURE; AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE
ACTIONS OF THE TARIFF COMMISSION ARE NOT BEYOND THE PALE OF
CERTIORARI JURISDICTION. —” It is incorrect to say that the Decision bars any
effective remedy should the Tariff Commission act or conclude erroneously in
making its determination whether the factual conditions exist which necessitate
the imposition of the general safeguard measure. If the Tariff Commission
makes a negative final determination, the DTI Secretary, bound as he is by this
negative determination, has to render a decision denying the application for
safeguard measures citing the Tariff Commission's findings as basis.
Necessarily then, such negative determination of the Tariff Commission being
an integral part of the DTI Secretary's ruling would be open for review before
the CTA, which again is especially qualified by reason of its expertise to
examine the findings of the Tariff Commission. Moreover, considering that the
Tariff Commission is an instrumentality of the government, its actions (as
opposed to those undertaken by the DTI Secretary under the SMA) are not
beyond the pale of certiorari jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Philcemcor, it hinged
its cause on the claim that the DTI Secretary's actions may be annulled on
certiorari, notwithstanding the explicit grant of judicial review over that cabinet
member's actions under the SMA to the CTA.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 29 OF THE SAFEGUARD MEASURES ACT
EXPRESSLY CONFERS CTA JURISDICTION OVER RULINGS IN CONNECTION WITH
THE IMPOSITION OF THE SAFEGUARD MEASURE, AND THE REASSERTION OF
THE SAID MATTER IN THE COURT'S DECISION WAS A MATTER OF EMPHASIS,
NOT OF CONTRIVANCE. —” Philcemcor argues that assuming this Court's
interpretation of Section 29 is correct, such ruling should not be given
retroactive effect, otherwise, a gross violation of the right to due process would
be had. This erroneously presumes that it was this Court, and not Congress,
which vested jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of non-imposition rendered by
the DTI Secretary. We have repeatedly stressed that Section 29 expressly
confers CTA jurisdiction over rulings in connection with the imposition of the
safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point in the Decision was a
matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. The due process protection does not
shield those who remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure the
sporting play of procedural law. Besides, respondents' claim would also apply
every time this Court is compelled to settle a novel question of law, or to
reverse precedent. In such cases, there would always be litigants whose causes
of action might be vitiated by the application of newly formulated judicial
doctrines. Adopting their claim would unwisely force this Court to treat its
dispositions in unprecedented, sometimes landmark decisions not as
resolutions to the live cases or controversies, but as legal doctrine applicable
only to future litigations.
6.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF TAXATION; THE

SAFEGUARD MEASURES IMPOSABLE UNDER THE SAFEGUARD MEASURES ACT
FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF SECTION 28 (2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; BASIC POSTULATES INGRAINED IN THE PROVISION GOVERNING
THE PRESENT CASE. —” The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA
generally involve duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or
quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the country.
Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines,
these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, which states: The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. The Court acknowledges the
basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing in this case.
They are: (1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the
National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no
matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be. (2) The authorization
granted to the President must be embodied in a law. Hence, the justification
cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from
administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or
from the wisdom or whim of the President. (3) The authorization to the
President can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the law and is
further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose.
Consequently, if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a
given amount, the President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such
amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the
importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how
actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune
of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the
President. There is one fundamental principle that animates these
constitutional postulates. These impositions under Section 28 (2), Article VI fall
within the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole
province of the legislature under the Constitution.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT SECTION 28 (2), ARTICLE VI, OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS NO AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE
TARIFFS AND OTHER SIMILAR TAX LEVIES INVOLVING THE IMPORTATION OF
FOREIGN GOODS. —” Without Section 28 (2), Article VI, the executive branch
has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the
importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28 (2) Article VI did not
exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground
that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The
constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity,
and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the
President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. This
being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential
authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the
SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by
the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and
restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does
not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions
must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted
jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE TARIFF COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY MAY BE REGARDED AS AGENTS OF CONGRESS
WITHIN THEIR LIMITED RESPECTIVE SPHERES, AS ORDAINED IN THE
SAFEGUARD MEASURES ACT, IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW WHICH
SIGNIFICANTLY DRAWS ITS STRENGTH FROM THE PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER
OF TAXATION. —” The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the
President under Section 28 (2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with
legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department
secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the President's exercise of power to impose
tariffs under Article VI, Section 28 (2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance
who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional
instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by
Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such
measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter
ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports. Concurrently, the tasking of
the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the
same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent
power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to
limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the
DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited
respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said
law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of
taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of
Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not
the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts.
Without legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power,
authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because taxation is
inherently legislative, not executive.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; POSITIVE FINAL DETERMINATION BY TARIFF COMMISSION
PLAINLY REQUIRED BY SECTION 5 OF THE SAFEGUARD MEASURES ACT. —”
There is no question that Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly
imposed by Congress on the presidential authority under the SMA to impose
tariffs and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an
indispensable requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it
is the Tariff Commission which makes such determination, are legal
propositions plainly expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for
everyone but respondents.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CAUSAL CONNECTION IN SECTION 5 BETWEEN THE

IMPOSITION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL
SAFEGUARD MEASURE AND THE POSITIVE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE
TARIFF COMMISSION IS PATENT; RESPONDENTS' PREFERRED INTERPRETATION
IS NOT BASED ON THE EXPRESSED LANGUAGE OF THE LAW, BUT FROM
IMPLICATIONS DERIVED IN A ROUNDABOUT MANNER. —” It can be surmised at
once that respondents' preferred interpretation is based not on the express
language of the SMA, but from implications derived in a roundabout manner.
Certainly, no provision in the SMA expressly authorizes the DTI Secretary to
impose a general safeguard measure despite the absence of a positive final
recommendation of the Tariff Commission. On the other hand, Section 5
expressly states that the DTI Secretary "shall apply a general safeguard
measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission." The
causal connection in Section 5 between the imposition by the DTI Secretary of
the general safeguard measure and the positive final determination of the Tariff
Commission is patent, and even respondents do not dispute such connection.
11.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE EXCERPTS OF DELIBERATIONS CITED BY
RESPONDENTS ARE FAR MORE AMBIGUOUS THAN THE LANGUAGE OF THE
ASSAILED PROVISION. —” Respondents employed considerable effort to
becloud Section 5 with undeserved ambiguity in order that a proper resort to
the legislative deliberations may be had. Yet assuming that Section 5 deserves
to be clarified through an inquiry into the legislative record, the excerpts cited
by the respondents are far more ambiguous than the language of the assailed
provision regarding the key question of whether the DTI Secretary may impose
safeguard measures in the face of a negative determination by the Tariff
Commission. Moreover, even Southern Cross counters with its own excerpts of
the legislative record in support of their own view.
12.ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS EVIDENT FROM SECTION 5 OF THE SMA THAT THERE
MUST BE A POSITIVE FINAL DETERMINATION BY THE TARIFF COMMISSION THAT
A PRODUCT IS BEING IMPORTED INTO THE COUNTRY IN INCREASED
QUANTITIES AS TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF SERIOUS INJURY OR THREAT
TO THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY; ANY DISPUTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS, AT
BEST, THE PRODUCT OF WISHFUL THINKING. —” It will not be difficult,
especially as to heavily-debated legislation, for two sides with contrapuntal
interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective citations from the
legislative debate in support of their particular views. A futile exercise of
second-guessing is happily avoided if the meaning of the statute is clear on its
face. It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into
the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic
production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the
domestic industry. Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of
wishful thinking.
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY

HAS NO POWER OF REVIEW OVER FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE TARIFF
COMMISSION. —” Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be
played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision
that the President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over
the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional "alter
ego" principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it
would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law
instead to the NEDA. The Tariff Commission is an attached agency of the
National Economic Development Authority, which in turn is the independent
planning agency of the government. The Tariff Commission does not fall under
the administrative supervision of the DTI. On the other hand, the administrative
relationship between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission is established not
only by the Administrative Code, but similarly affirmed by the Tariff and
Customs Code.
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; IF CONGRESS INTENDED TO ALLOW THE TRADITIONAL
ALTER EGO PRINCIPLE TO COME TO FORE IN THE PECULIAR SETUP
ESTABLISHED BY THE SMA, IT WOULD HAVE ASSIGNED THE ROLE NOW PLAYED
BY THE DTI SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, THE BODY WHICH THE TARIFF COMMISSION IS ATTACHED UNDER
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. —” Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing
the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary
did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise
supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to
allow the traditional alter ego principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup
established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI
Secretary under the law instead to the NEDA, the body to which the Tariff
Commission is attached under the Administrative Code. The Court has no issue
with upholding administrative control and supervision exercised by the head of
an executive department, but only over those subordinate offices that are
attached to the department, or which are, under statute, relegated under its
supervision and control. To declare that a department secretary, even if acting
as alter ego of the President, may exercise such control or supervision over all
executive offices below cabinet rank would lead to absurd results such as those
adverted to above. As applied to this case, there is no legal justification for the
DTI Secretary to exercise control, supervision, review or amendatory powers
over the Tariff Commission and its positive final determination.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; A DECLARATION THAT THE TARIFF COMMISSION
POSSESSES QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS, EVEN IF ASCERTAINED FOR THE LIMITED
PURPOSE OF EXERCISING ITS FUNCTIONS UNDER THE SMA, MAY HAVE THE
UNFORTUNATE EFFECT OF EXPANDING THE COMMISSION'S POWERS BEYOND
THAT CONTEMPLATED BY LAW. —” A declaration that the Tariff Commission
possesses quasi-judicial powers, even if ascertained for the limited purpose of
exercising its functions under the SMA, may have the unfortunate effect of
expanding the Commission's powers beyond that contemplated by law. After
all, the Tariff Commission is by convention, a fact-finding body, and its role
under the SMA, burdened as it is with factual determination, is but a mere
continuance of this tradition. However, Congress through the SMA offers a
significant deviation from this traditional role by tying the decision by the DTI
Secretary to impose a safeguard measure to the required positive factual
determination by the Tariff Commission. Congress is not bound by past
traditions, or even by the jurisprudence of this Court, in enacting legislation it
may deem as suited for the times. The sole benchmark for judicial substitution
of congressional wisdom is constitutional transgression, a standard which the
respondents do not even attempt to match.
16.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION OF THE SMA

TRANSGRESSES FAIR PLAY. —” Respondents have belabored the argument that
the Decision's interpretation of the SMA, particularly of the role of the Tariff
Commission vis-Ã -vis the DTI Secretary, is noxious to traditional notions of
administrative control and supervision. But in doing so, they have failed to
acknowledge the congressional prerogative to redefine administrative
relationships, a license which falls within the plenary province of Congress
under our representative system of democracy. Moreover, respondents' own
suggested interpretation falls wayward of expectations of practical fair play.
Adopting respondents' suggestion that the DTI Secretary may disregard the
factual findings of the Tariff Commission and investigatory process that
preceded it, it would seem that the elaborate procedure undertaken by the
Commission under the SMA, with all the attendant guarantees of due process, is
but an inutile spectacle. As Justice Garcia noted during the oral arguments, why
would the DTI Secretary bother with the Tariff Commission and instead conduct
the investigation himself. Certainly, nothing in the SMA authorizes the DTI
Secretary, after making the preliminary determination, to personally oversee
the investigation, hear out the interested parties, or receive evidence. In fact,
the SMA does not even require the Tariff Commission, which is tasked with the
custody of the submitted evidence, to turn over to the DTI Secretary such
evidence it had evaluated in order to make its factual determination. Clearly, as
Congress tasked it to be, it is the Tariff Commission and not the DTI Secretary
which acquires the necessary intimate acquaintance with the factual conditions
and evidence necessary for the imposition of the general safeguard measure.
Why then favor an interpretation of the SMA that leaves the findings of the
Tariff Commission bereft of operative effect and makes them subservient to the
wishes of the DTI Secretary, a personage with lesser working familiarity with
the relevant factual milieu? In fact, the bare theory of the respondents would
effectively allow the DTI Secretary to adopt, under the subterfuge of his
"discretion," the factual determination of a private investigative group hired by
the industry concerned, and reject the investigative findings of the Tariff
Commission as mandated by the SMA. It would be highly irregular to substitute
what the law clearly provides for a dubious setup of no statutory basis that
would be readily susceptible to rank chicanery.
17.ID.; ID.; ID.; NO EVIDENT LEGISLATIVE INTENT BY AUTHORS OF THE

SMA TO PROVIDE FOR A PROCEDURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW; THE LAW IS
SILENT ON WHETHER THE POSITIVE FINAL DETERMINATION MAY OTHERWISE BE
SUBJECTED TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW. —” The Court has been emphatic that
a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission is required in order
that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure, and that the
DTI Secretary has no power to exercise control and supervision over the Tariff
Commission and its final determination. These conclusions are the necessary
consequences of the applicable provisions of the Constitution, the SMA, and
laws such as the Administrative Code. However, the law is silent though on
whether this positive final determination may otherwise be subjected to
administrative review. There is no evident legislative intent by the authors of
the SMA to provide for a procedure of administrative review. If ever there is a
procedure for administrative review over the final determination of the Tariff
Commission, such procedure must be done in a manner that does not
contravene or disregard legislative prerogatives as expressed in the SMA or the
Administrative Code, or fundamental constitutional limitations.
18.ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SMA IN HARMONY WITH

OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. —” In response to our citation of Section
28 (2), Article VI, respondents elevate two arguments grounded in
constitutional law. One is based on another constitutional provision, Section 12,
Article XIII, which mandates that "[t]he State shall promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopt
measures that help make them competitive." By no means does this provision
dictate that the Court favor the domestic industry in all competing claims that it
may bring before this Court. If it were so, judicial proceedings in this country
would be rendered a mockery, resolved as they would be, on the basis of the
personalities of the litigants and not their legal positions. Moreover, the duty
imposed on by Section 12, Article XIII falls primarily with Congress, which in
that regard enacted the SMA, a law designed to protect domestic industries
from the possible ill-effects of our accession to the global trade order.
Inconveniently perhaps for respondents, the SMA also happens to provide for a
procedure under which such protective measures may be enacted. The Court
cannot just impose what it deems as the spirit of the law without giving due
regard to its letter.
19.ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSAILED DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE RULING IN
TAÑADA VS. ANGARA. —” Public respondents allege that the Decision is
contrary to our holding in Tañada v. Angara, since the Court noted therein that
the GATT itself provides built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and
trade practices, which according to the public respondents, was a reason "why
the Honorable [Court] ruled the way it did." On the other hand, the Decision
"eliminates safeguard measures as a mode of defense." This is balderdash, as
with any and all claims that the Decision allows foreign industries to ride
roughshod over our domestic enterprises. The Decision does not prohibit the
imposition of general safeguard measures to protect domestic industries in
need of protection. All it affirms is that the positive final determination of the
Tariff Commission is first required before the general safeguard measures are
imposed and implemented, a neutral proposition that gives no regard to the
nationalities of the parties involved. A positive determination by the Tariff
Commission is hardly the elusive Shangri-la of administrative law. If a particular
industry finds it difficult to obtain a positive final determination from the Tariff
Commission, it may be simply because the industry is still sufficiently
competitive even in the face of foreign competition. These safeguard measures
are designed to ensure salvation, not avarice.
20.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; FORUM SHOPPING; NOT WILLFUL

AND DELIBERATE TO WARRANT DISMISSAL OF PETITION. —” We remain
convinced that there was no willful and deliberate forum-shopping in this case
by Southern Cross. The causes of action that animate this present petition for
review and the petition for review with the CTA are distinct from each other,
even though they relate to similar factual antecedents. Yet it also appears that
contrary to the undertaking signed by the President of Southern Cross,
Hironobu Ryu, to inform this Court of any similar action or proceeding pending
before any court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from knowledge
thereof, Southern Cross informed this Court only on 12 August 2003 of the
petition it had filed with the CTA eleven days earlier. An appropriate sanction is
warranted for such failure, but not the dismissal of the petition.
21.ID.; ID.; COURT REAFFIRMS NULLITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY'S DECISION, AND AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE,
NO FURTHER ACTION CAN BE TAKEN ON RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR
EXTENSION OF THE SAFEGUARD MEASURE. —” The Court of Appeals' Decision
was annulled precisely because the appellate court did not have the power to
rule on the petition in the first place. Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to
decide a case, and a court which does not have the power to adjudicate a case
is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We find no reason to disturb our earlier
finding that the Court of Appeals' Decision is null and void. At the same time,
the Court in its Decision paid particular heed to the peculiarities attaching to
the 5 August 2003 Decision of the DTI Secretary. In the DTI Secretary's
Decision, he expressly stated that as a result of the Court of Appeals' Decision,
"there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on the application."
Yet the truth remained that there was a legal impediment, namely, that the
decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Moreover, it
was declared null and void, and since the DTI Secretary expressly denominated
the Court of Appeals' Decision as his basis for deciding to impose the safeguard
measures, the latter decision must be voided as well. Otherwise put, without
the Court of Appeals' Decision, the DTI Secretary's Decision of 5 August 2003
would not have been rendered as well. Accordingly, the Court reaffirms as a
nullity the DTI Secretary's Decision dated 5 August 2003. As a necessary
consequence, no further action can be taken on Philcemcor's Petition for
Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Obviously, if the imposition of the general
safeguard measure is void as we declared it to be, any extension thereof should
likewise be fruitless. The proper remedy instead is to file a new application for
the imposition of safeguard measures, subject to the conditions prescribed by
the SMA. Should this step be eventually availed of, it is only hoped that the
parties involved would content themselves in observing the proper procedure,
instead of making a mockery of the rule of law.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., separate opinion:
1.TAXATION; COURT OF TAX APPEALS; HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY'S RULINGS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE IMPOSITION OF A SAFEGUARD MEASURE. —” I agree
with the Court's Resolution penned by Justice Tinga that the DTI secretary's
decisions —” whether imposing safeguard measures or not —” are subject to
review by the CTA, pursuant to Section 29 of RA 8800. The meaning of the
phrase in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure is not the
same as imposing a safeguard measure; otherwise, the law would simply have
sufficed without the qualifying connector. Consequently, all final rulings relating
to an application for the measure —” whether imposing, extending, terminating
or disallowing one —” are in connection with the imposition of a safeguard
measure, and thus appealable to the CTA.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; A HIGHLY SPECIALIZED COURT SPECIFICALLY CREATED FOR
THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING TAX AND CUSTOMS CASES. —” I believe that the
CTA is the proper and competent body to review the DTI secretary's decisions
involving safeguard measures. By the very nature of its functions, the CTA is a
highly specialized court specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax
and customs cases. It is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of
revenue-related problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the
subject. Thus, as a general rule, its findings and conclusions are accorded great
respect and are generally upheld by this Court, unless there is a clear showing
of a reversible error or an improvident exercise of authority.
3.ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARD MEASURES; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN THE

DETERMINATION THEREOF. —” While primarily intended to protect domestic
industries, safeguard measures are incidentally revenue-generating and
generally in the nature of, though not always equivalent to, tariff impositions.
They may consist of a tariff increase, duty, tariff-rate quota, quantitative
restriction, adjustment measure or a combination of these. In the determination
of their imposition, the following factors are to be taken into consideration: rate
and amount of increase in the importation of the product concerned; share of
the domestic market taken by the increased imports; and changes in the level
of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and
employment. Most of these factors involve data analysis which, by virtue of the
highly specialized technical expertise of the CTA, must be more familiar to it
than to the CA. Thus, as between the two appellate courts, the CTA should have
the jurisdiction to review decisions involving safeguard measures, whether
imposed or not. In either case, a review will necessarily entail a reappraisal of
the facts from which the decisions were based. In both instances, a factual
reassessment would encompass the same kind of knowledge and technical
expertise. Indeed, it would be absurd if only a positive decision is reviewable by
the CTA, while a negative one is passed on to the CA.
4.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER TO IMPOSE OR FIX
TARRIFS IS ESSENTIALLY LEGISLATIVE AND CAN BE DELEGABLE ONLY TO THE
PRESIDENT. —” The application of safeguard measures, while primarily
intended to protect domestic industries, is essentially in the nature of a tariff
imposition. Pursuant to the Constitution, the imposition of tariffs and taxes is a
highly prized legislative prerogative. Pursuant also to the Constitution, such
power to fix tariffs may, as an exception, be delegated by Congress to the
President. Under this constitutional provision, to no other official, except the
President, is the authority to fix tariff rates, quotas, imposts and other duties
allowed to be delegated. However, the Resolution authored by Justice Tinga
theorizes that Congress may delegate such power to fix tariffs to both the Tariff
Commission and the DTI secretary, "as agents of Congress." I believe that this
theory plainly violates the aforequoted Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution.
5.ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL WAY TO

UPHOLD THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY'S
IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS UNDER RA 8800 IS TO APPLY THE ALTER EGO
PRINCIPLE. —” I respectfully submit that the only constitutional way to uphold
the DTI secretary's imposition of tariffs under RA 8800 is to apply the alter ego
principle. In other words, the DTI secretary imposes safeguard measures (like
tariffs, import quotas, quantitative restriction, etc.) only in representation and
as an alter ego of the President in the field of trade and investment matters.
Thus, the law must be construed as delegating to the President —” through the
latter's alter ego on trade —” the power to impose safeguard measures. Under
the same Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, Congress may specify
"limitations and restrictions" on the President's authority to impose tariff rates.
However, such statutory limitations and restrictions must themselves conform
to the fundamental law. They cannot infringe, restrict, limit, degrade or dilute
the constitutional power of the President to control the entire Executive
Department.
6.ID.; ID.; PLENARY POWER OF CONTROL INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO
MODIFY OR SET ASIDE A DECISION OF A SUBORDINATE OFFICER AND CANNOT
BE RESTRICTED BY A MERE STATUTE PASSED BY CONGRESS. —” The power of
control includes the right to modify or set aside a decision of a subordinate
officer. Since the Tariff Commission is an agency in the Executive Department,
it is necessarily subject to the control and supervision of the President. Hence,
its decisions and recommendations cannot tie the hands of the Chief Executive
with finality. Consequently, the DTI head, acting as the President's agent
pursuant to RA 8800, may affirm, modify or reverse the Tariff Commission's
recommendation. To repeat, such plenary power of control cannot be restricted
by a mere statute passed by Congress.
7.ID.; ID.; TARIFF COMMISSION; PRIMARILY A FACT-FINDER; RA 8800 DOES

NOT EXPLICITLY STATE THAT THE TARIFF COMMISSION'S REPORT OR
CONCLUSIONS HAVE THE EFFECT OF FINALITY AND IRREFUTABILITY THAT
SHALL BIND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY HEAD, OR THE
PRESIDENT. —” Whereas the DTI secretary has to carry out a policy mandate
for the President, the Tariff Commission is but an investigatory arm that
submits reports of its investigations as provided under the law. Under RA 8800,
it is tasked to conduct a formal investigation upon the DTI secretary's referral of
an application/a petition for a safeguard measure. After completion of the
investigation, it submits to the secretary a report that contains its findings and
recommendations. Nothing in the law explicitly states that its report or
conclusions have the effect of finality and irrefutability that shall bind the DTI
head, or the President for that matter. As the cabinet official and alter ego of
the President on trade, industry and investment-related matters, the DTI head
necessarily has sufficient latitude and discretion in the pursuit of the
Department's mandate. On the other hand, being primarily a fact-finder, the
Tariff Commission is limited to submitting its report and recommendations to
the referring agency. In this scheme of tasking, absent any clear and direct
provision of the Constitution, the TC's mere recommendation cannot bind the
cabinet official, much less the President. As the solicitor general aptly suggests,
RA 8800 could not have intended that the alter ego of the President be a mere
rubber stamp who would be compelled to enforce the recommendations of a
purely investigatory agency in the Executive Department.
8.ID.; ID.; CONGRESS CANNOT ABOLISH OR RESTRICT THE PRESIDENT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF CONTROL OVER EXECUTIVE AGENCIES AND
OFFICIALS. —” The Tinga Resolution states —” erroneously, I submit —” that I
advocate the President's exercise of absolute and plenary control over
subordinates, such that the Chief Executive could order them to perform illegal
or irregular acts. I do not, and I have made no such preposterous statement.
Needless to state, the exercise of any power must be within the bounds of the
Constitution and law. True, Congress may reorganize the offices under the
Executive Department. It may even abolish or merge some of them. However,
it cannot abolish or restrict the President's constitutional power of control over
executive agencies and officials. The control power of the Chief Executive
emanates from the Constitution; no act of Congress may validly curtail it.
9.ID.; ID.; CONGRESS COULD NOT HAVE DIRECTLY CONSTITUTED THE

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY AS ITS OWN AGENT AS
THE CONSTITUTION CATEGORICALLY LIMITED THE DELEGATION OF SUCH
AUTHORITY TO THE PRESIDENT. —” To be consistent with the constitutional
clause, the law must be understood to mean that in delegating the authority to
impose safeguard measures, Congress designated the DTI secretary, being the
President's sulbaltern or alter ego on trade matters. Again, Congress could not
have directly constituted the cabinet official as its own agent, because the
Constitution categorically limited the delegation of such authority to the
President. The fundamental law expressly states that Congress may authorize
the President (and names no other official) to impose (subject to limitations and
restrictions that it may specify) tariffs, quotas, duties and other imposts. For
the legislature to delegate the authority to another official or entity, such as the
Tariff Commission, and to completely disregard or do away with the President
would be a blatant contravention of the Constitution.
10.ID.; ID.; AS THE PRESIDENT'S ALTER EGO ON TRADE MATTERS, THE DTI
SECRETARY EXERCISES, IN THE PRESIDENT'S STEAD, THE SAME PREROGATIVE
OF AFFIRMATION, MODIFICATION OR REVERSAL OVER ANY ACTION OF THE
TARIFF COMMISSION. —” [I]n imposing a safeguard measure, the DTI secretary
acts as the President's alter ego. Because the President's power of control over
any office in the Executive Department cannot be restricted or degraded by
Congress, by the same reasoning the exercise by the alter ego of such power of
control over actions of the Tariff Commission cannot be constitutionally
curtailed by Congress. Otherwise stated, the President —” through the
constitutional power of control over the Executive Department —” has the
prerogative to affirm, modify or reverse any action of the Tariff Commission.
Thus, the DTI secretary —” as the President's alter ego on trade matters —”
may exercise, in the President's stead, the same prerogative of affirmation,
modification or reversal over any action of the Commission.
11.ID.; ID.; DECISION TO IMPOSE A SAFEGUARD MEASURE HINGES ON
PUBLIC INTEREST, WHICH IS A POLITICAL QUESTION BEST ADDRESSED BY
ELECTED OFFICIALS LED BY THE PRESIDENT. —” [T]he congressional limitation
on the exercise of the delegated authority to impose safeguards does NOT refer
to the final determination or recommendation of the Tariff Commission that the
first two factual conditions are present or absent. Of course, these are
important considerations that are verifiable from the records of the proceedings
undertaken by the Commission. These data must be weighed accordingly. In
the same vein, many immeasurable and indirect variables have to be assessed
in ensuring that public interest is subserved. In the final analysis, the decision
to impose a safeguard measure hinges on public interest, which is a political
question best addressed by our people's elected officials led by the President.
12.ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT

AGENCY TASKED TO IMPLEMENT A STATUTE IS GENERALLY ACCORDED GREAT
RESPECT AND ORDINARILY CONTROLS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COURTS.
—” The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked
to implement a statute, is generally accorded great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts. The crafting of the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) of RA 8800 was a joint undertaking of several executive
agencies —” the Departments of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, and Finance;
the Bureau of Customs; the NEDA; and the Tariff Commission —” after
consultations with domestic industries. Rule 13.2 of the final IRR expressly
states as follows: "Rule 13.2. Final Determination by the Secretary "Rule 13.2.a.
Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Report of the Commission, the
Secretary shall make a decision, taking into consideration the measures
recommended by the Commission." . . . Indeed, the very administrative
government agencies tasked under the same law to implement its provisions
clearly understood that it is the DTI secretary who makes the final
determination or decision. In making a decision, the secretary merely takes into
consideration the recommendations of the Tariff Commission. On the other
hand, the latter, in making its recommendations, does not determine in an
adjudicative manner the rights, privileges and duties of private parties. Hence,
its functions, even under RA 8800, cannot be classified as quasi-judicial.
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PARAMETERS SET BY RA 8800 SHOULD ALLAY

PETITIONER'S FEAR OF A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS IN CASE OF REVERSAL
BY THE SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY OF THE NEGATIVE
DETERMINATION BY THE TARIFF COMMISSION. —” The DTI secretary could not
issue a decision arbitrarily, without substantial factual and legal bases. In
making a final decision —” whether to impose or not to impose a safeguard
measure —” the secretary is still bound by the conditions laid down in Section 5
of RA 8800. As earlier mentioned, those limitations are as follows: the
importation of a product in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to
the domestic production; an actual or a threatened serious injury to the
domestic industry as a result of increased importation; and the application of
the safeguard measure in the public interest. These parameters should allay
petitioner's fear of a violation of due process in case of a reversal by the
secretary of the negative determination by the Commission. Both may have the
same factual moorings on the basis of which they may, however, have
contrasting conclusions on the need for a safeguard measure.
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY CAN REJECT
BOTH A POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE TARIFF
COMMISSION. —” [U]nder petitioner's submission (upheld by the Second
Division) that the DTI secretary may impose the measure only upon a positive
determination by the Tariff Commission, a violation of due process would be
more probable in case of a negative determination by the latter. Following the
ponencia's literal interpretation of the law, the aggrieved party (the applicant)
in such a situation would be left with absolutely no recourse. A negative report
will then be not reviewable by anyone —” not by the DTI secretary who is
bound by it; not by the President, who has no direct role in the proceeding
defined under the law; and not by the courts, which may review only the DTI
secretary's decisions. Such a scheme of things constitutes an utter disregard of
the guarantee of due process under the Constitution. The ponencia even goes
further by declaring that "nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI [s]ecretary to
adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission." If the trade
secretary can reject a positive final determination of the Commission, what is
the rationale behind binding him to a negative determination by the same
body? I cannot think of more illogic.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF RA 8800 SHOULD BE GIVEN
UTMOST CONSIDERATION AND EFFECT; IN THE IMPOSITION OF SAFEGUARD
MEASURES, NOT ONLY THE ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL DATA IS INVOLVED BUT
LIKEWISE THE DETERMINATION THAT IT SERVES PUBLIC INTEREST. —” [T]he
object and purpose of RA 8800 should be given utmost consideration and
effect. The law was enacted primarily to protect or safeguard local industries
and producers from increased importation of foreign products, which cause or
threaten to cause serious domestic injury. RA 8800 was intended to secure our
local industry from the ill effects of global trade liberalization. It was aimed at
protecting Filipino interests vis-Ã -vis international trade policies. Toward these
ends, I believe this Court must give domestic industries every opportunity to
seek redress through the most expeditious means possible. On matters
concerning policy questions, it must allow the political departments ample
chances to make the proper determinations within their respective spheres of
competencies. Be it remembered that in the imposition of safeguard measures,
not only the analysis of technical data is involved but likewise, and perhaps in a
more crucial sense, the determination that it serves the public interest. The
proceeding does not merely relate to the settlement of conflicting claims of
private parties but, more important, the achievement of the national policy to
promote the competitiveness of domestic industries as a whole. In short, we
must give essence to the aim of the law to advance the industrial development
of the country.
16.ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE ON THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES SHOULD BE MADE TO WORK OUT. —” [T]he doctrine on the
exhaustion of administrative remedies should be made to work out. After all,
the administrative agencies of the government, particularly the Department of
Trade and Industry with respect to safeguard measures, possess the necessary
knowledge and expertise linked up with policy concerns. The Department
heads, especially because they serve as alter egos of the President, should not
be needlessly restricted in the exercise of their discretion. It is they who best
know how to address properly the nonjudicial interests of the people. Thus,
before resorting to courts, all possible administrative means should be
exhausted. While on the topic of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may I
add my personal belief that the Decision of the secretary of trade should be
appealable to the President. After all, the President cannot be deprived of the
power to review, modify or reverse actions of his or her alter egos. In the
present case, the Constitution expressly mentions the "President" as the official
whom "Congress may, by law, authorize" to impose "tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imports." Thus,
in the Executive Department, the President should have the final say on such
matters. However, I shall not dwell at length on this point because it was not
raised as an issue by the parties.

17.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FORUM SHOPPING; PETITION DOES NOT
DESERVE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL, THERE BEING NO SHOWING OF WILLFUL AND
DELIBERATE FORUM SHOPPING. —” With respect to the question on forum
shopping, I also agree with the Resolution of the Court that petitioner must
answer for its failure to give timely information to the Court of the Petition for
Review that the former filed with the CTA while the present case was pending
here. But there being no showing of willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
Petition does not deserve outright dismissal.
18.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S COUNSELS SHOULD BE SANCTIONED
WITH SEVERE CENSURE. —” Forum shopping has been characterized as an act
of malpractice that is prohibited, and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct, because it tends to
degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described as
deplorable, because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened
court dockets. Failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements in
Section 5 of Rule 7 does not, however, automatically warrant the dismissal of
the case with prejudice. The Rule states that the dismissal is without prejudice;
with prejudice, only upon motion and after hearing. And there must be
evidence that the erring party and counsel committed willful and deliberate
acts amounting to forum shopping as to warrant the summary dismissal of the
case and the imposition of direct contempt and the appropriate administrative
sanctions. In previous cases, the penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who
engaged in forum shopping ranged from severe censure to suspension from the
practice of law, in order to make them realize the seriousness of the
consequences and implications of their abuse of the judicial process and
disrespect for judicial authority. Based on the foregoing tenets, I believe that
petitioner's counsels should be sanctioned with severe censure.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J : p
Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. Still, the parties in this
case have done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their respective
positions, throwing in everything including the proverbial kitchen sink. At
present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has shifted to public respondents
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and private respondent Philippine
Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor), 1 who now seek
reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the
petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross).
This case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For respondents,
it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of
foreign competition. For this Court, it is about elementary statutory
construction, constitutional limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs
and similar measures, and obedience to the law. Just as much was asserted in
the Decision, and the same holds true with this present Resolution .
An extensive narration of facts can be found in theDecision. 2 As can well
be recalled, the case centers on the interpretation of provisions of Republic Act
No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act ("SMA"), which was one of the laws
enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement
on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
3 The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the imposition of
emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and

producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on
them. 4
A brief summary as to how the present petition came to be filed by
Southern Cross. Philcemcor, an association of at least eighteen (18) domestic
cement manufacturers filed with the DTI a petition, seeking the imposition of
safeguard measures on gray Portland cement, 5 in accordance with the SMA.
After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure, 6 the application was
referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section
9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine
whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray
Portland cement. The Tariff Commission held public hearings and conducted its
own investigation, then on 13 March 2002, issued its Formal Investigation
Report ("Report"). The Report determined as follows:
The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious
injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no
definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of
gray Portland cement. 7
The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still
impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of
the Tariff Commission. After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could
not do so under the SMA, 8 the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision 9
wherein he expressed the DTI's disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff
Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcor's application
for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light
of the Tariff Commission's negative findings. 10
Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus 11 seeking
to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commission's Report. It
prayed that the Court of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the
Report and to render judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued
that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review,
is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that
the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent
inferences and erroneous methodology. 12
The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision 13 penned by Court of

Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion, 14 partially granted Philcemcor's
petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul
the findings of the Tariff Commission, 15 it also held that the DTI Secretary was
not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings
are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretary's
discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI
Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commission's
recommendation. 16
On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that
the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcor's petition, as the
proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA,
and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-
existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard
measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. AICHaS
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals' Decision had not yet become
final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new
Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that in light of the appellate court's
Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding
Philcemcor's application for definitive safeguard measures. 17 He made a
determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local
cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges. 18
Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of
gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount
of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement. 19
On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a "Very Urgent
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction" ("TRO Application"), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from
enforcing his Decision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before
this Court. Philcemcor filed an opposition, claiming, among others, that it is not
this Court but the CTA that has jurisdiction over the application under the law.
On 1 August 2003, Southern Cross filed with the CTA a Petition for Review ,
assailing the DTI Secretary's 25 June 2003 Decision which imposed the definite
safeguard measure. Yet Southern Cross did not promptly inform this Court
about this filing. The first time the Court would learn about this Petition with the
CTA was when Southern Cross mentioned such fact in a pleading dated 11
August 2003 and filed the next day with this Court. 20
Philcemcor argued before this Court that Southern Cross had deliberately
and willfully resorted to forum-shopping; that the CTA, being a special court of
limited jurisdiction, could only review the ruling of the DTI Secretary when a
safeguard measure is imposed; and that the factual findings of the Tariff
Commission are not binding on the DTI Secretary. 21
After giving due course to Southern Cross's Petition, the Court called the
case for oral argument on 18 February 2004. 22 At the oral argument, attended
by the counsel for Philcemcor and Southern Cross and the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Court simplified the issues in this wise: (i) whether the Decision of
the DTI Secretary is appealable to the CTA or the Court of Appeals; (ii)
assuming that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, whether its Decision is in
accordance with law; and, whether a Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.
23
After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Court's
Second Division, to which the case had been assigned, promulgated its Decision
granting Southern Cross's Petition. 24 The Decision was unanimous, without any
separate or concurring opinion.
The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over
Philcemcor's Petition, the proper remedy under Section 29 of the SMA being a
petition for review with the CTA; and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative determination of the
Tariff Commission and could therefore impose the general safeguard measures,
since Section 5 of the SMA precisely required that the Tariff Commission make
a positive final determination before the DTI Secretary could impose these
measures. Anent the argument that Southern Cross had committed forum-
shopping, the Court concluded that there was no evident malicious intent to
subvert procedural rules so as to match the standard under Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court of willful and deliberate forum shopping. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 June 2003 was declared null and void.
The Court likewise found it necessary to nullify the Decision of the DTI
Secretary dated 25 June 2003, rendered after the filing of this present Petition.
This Decision by the DTI Secretary had cited the obligatory force of the null and
void Court of Appeals' Decision, notwithstanding the fact that the decision of
the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Considering that the
decision of the Court of Appeals was a nullity to begin with, the inescapable
conclusion was that the new decision of the DTI Secretary, prescinding as it did
from the imprimatur of the decision of the Court of Appeals, was a nullity as
well.
After the Decision was reported in the media, there was a flurry of
newspaper articles citing alleged negative reactions to the ruling by the counsel
for Philcemcor, the DTI Secretary, and others. 25 Both respondents promptly
filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
aICHEc
On 21 September 2004, the Court En Banc resolved, upon motion of

respondents, to accept the petition and resolve the Motions for Reconsideration.
26 The case was then reheard 27 on oral argument on 1 March 2005. During the
hearing, the Court elicited from the parties their arguments on the two central
issues as discussed in the assailed Decision, pertaining to the jurisdictional
aspect and to the substantive aspect of whether the DTI Secretary may impose
a general safeguard measure despite a negative determination by the Tariff
Commission. The Court chose not to hear argumentation on the peripheral
issue of forum-shopping, 28 although this question shall be tackled herein
shortly. Another point of concern emerged during oral arguments on the
exercise of quasi-judicial powers by the Tariff Commission, and the parties were
required by the Court to discuss in their respective memoranda whether the
Tariff Commission could validly exercise quasi-judicial powers in the exercise of
its mandate under the SMA.
The Court has likewise been notified that subsequent to the rendition of
the Court's Decision, Philcemcor filed a Petition for Extension of the Safeguard
Measure with the DTI, which has been referred to the Tariff Commission. 29 In
a n Urgent Motion dated 21 December 2004, Southern Cross prayed that
Philcemcor, the DTI, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff Commission be
directed to "cease and desist from taking any and all actions pursuant to or
under the null and void CA Decision and DTI Decision, including proceedings to
extend the safeguard measure. 30 In a Manifestation and Motion dated 23 June
2004, the Tariff Commission informed the Court that since no prohibitory
injunction or order of such nature had been issued by any court against the
Tariff Commission, the Commission proceeded to complete its investigation on
the petition for extension, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA, but opted to defer
transmittal of its report to the DTI Secretary pending "guidance" from this Court
on the propriety of such a step considering this pending Motion for
Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 5 July 2005, the Court directed the
parties to maintain the status quo effective of even date, and until further
orders from this Court. The denial of the pending motions for reconsideration
will obviously render the pending petition for extension academic.
I. Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals
Under Section 29 of the SMA
The first core issue resolved in the assailed Decision was whether the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari filed
by Philcemcor assailing the 5 April 2002 Decision of the DTI Secretary. The
general jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over special civil actions for
certiorari is beyond doubt. The Constitution itself assures that judicial review
avails to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. At the same time, the special civil action of
certiorari is available only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. 31 Philcemcor's recourse of special civil action
before the Court of Appeals to challenge the Decision of the DTI Secretary not
to impose the general safeguard measures is not based on the SMA, but on the
general rule on certiorari. Thus, the Court proceeded to inquire whether indeed
there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law that would warrant the allowance of Philcemcor's special civil action.
The answer hinged on the proper interpretation of Section 29 of the SMA,

which reads:
Section 29.Judicial Review . —” Any interested party who is
adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary in connection
with the imposition of a safeguard measure may file with the
CTA, a petition for review of such ruling within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof. Provided, however, that the filing of such petition for
review shall not in any way stop, suspend or otherwise toll the
imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption
of other appropriate safeguard measures, as the case may be. AcISTE
The petition for review shall comply with the same requirements
and shall follow the same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the
same disposition as in appeals in connection with adverse rulings on
tax matters to the Court of Appeals. 32 (Emphasis supplied)
The matter is crucial for if the CTA properly had jurisdiction over the
petition challenging the DTI Secretary's ruling not to impose a safeguard
measure, then the special civil action of certiorari resorted to instead by
Philcemcor would not avail, owing to the existence of a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 33 The Court of Appeals, in
asserting that it had jurisdiction, merely cited the general rule on certiorari
jurisdiction without bothering to refer to, or possibly even study, the import of
Section 29. In contrast, this Court duly considered the meaning and
ramifications of Section 29, concluding that it provided for a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy that Philcemcor could have resorted to instead of filing the
special civil action before the Court of Appeals.
Philcemcor still holds on to its hypothesis that the petition for review
allowed under Section 29 lies only if the DTI Secretary's ruling imposes a
safeguard measure. If, on the other hand, the DTI Secretary's ruling is not to
impose a safeguard measure, judicial review under Section 29 could not be
resorted to since the provision refers to rulings "in connection with the
imposition" of the safeguard measure, as opposed to the non-imposition.
Since the Decision dated 5 April 2002 resolved against imposing a safeguard
measure, Philcemcor claims that the proper remedial recourse is a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Interestingly, Republic Act No. 9282, promulgated on 30 March 2004,
expressly vests unto the CTA jurisdiction over "[d]ecisions of the Secretary of
Trade and Industry, in case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article . . .
involving . . . safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where
either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said
duties." 34 It is clear that any future attempts to advance the literalist position
of the respondents would consequently fail. However, since Republic Act No.
9282 has no retroactive effect, this Court had to decide whether Section 29
vests jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of the DTI Secretary not to impose a
safeguard measure. And the Court, in its assailed Decision, ruled that the CTA is
endowed with such jurisdiction.
Both respondents reiterate their fundamentalist reading that Section 29

authorizes the petition for review before the CTA only when the DTI Secretary
decides to impose a safeguard measure, but not when he decides not to. In
doing so, they fail to address what the Court earlier pointed out would be the
absurd consequences if their interpretation is followed to its logical end. But in
affirming, as the Court now does, its previous holding that the CTA has
jurisdiction over petitions for review questioning the non-imposition of
safeguard measures by the DTI Secretary, the Court relies on the plain reading
that Section 29 explicitly vests jurisdiction over such petitions on the CTA.
Under Section 29, there are three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must be
a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested
party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be "in
connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Obviously, there are
differences between "a ruling for the imposition of a safeguard measure," and
one issued "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." The
first adverts to a singular type of ruling, namely one that imposes a safeguard
measure. The second does not contemplate only one kind of ruling, but a
myriad of rulings issued "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard
measure."
Respondents argue that the Court has given an expansive interpretation

to Section 29, contrary to the established rule requiring strict construction
against the existence of jurisdiction in specialized courts. 35 But it is the
express provision of Section 29, and not this Court, that mandates
CTA jurisdiction to be broad enough to encompass more than just a
ruling imposing the safeguard measure.
The key phrase remains "in connection with." It has connotations that are
obvious even to the layman. A ruling issued "in connection with" the imposition
of a safeguard measure would be one that bears some relation to the
imposition of a safeguard measure. Obviously, a ruling imposing a safeguard
measure is covered by the phrase "in connection with," but such ruling is by no
means exclusive. Rulings which modify, suspend or terminate a safeguard
measure are necessarily in connection with the imposition of a safeguard
measure. So does a ruling allowing for a provisional safeguard measure. So too,
a ruling by the DTI Secretary refusing to refer the application for a safeguard
measure to the Tariff Commission. It is clear that there is an entire subset of
rulings that the DTI Secretary may issue in connection with the imposition of a
safeguard measure, including those that are provisional, interlocutory, or
dispositive in character. 36 By the same token, a ruling not to impose a
safeguard measure is also issued in connection with the imposition of a
safeguard measure. STaAcC
In arriving at the proper interpretation of "in connection with," the Court

referred to the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 37 and
New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins . 38 Both cases considered the
interpretation of the phrase "relates to" as used in a federal statute, the
Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974. Respondents criticize the citations
on the premise that the cases are not binding in our jurisdiction and do not
involve safeguard measures. The criticisms are off-tangent considering that our
ruling did not call for the application of the Employee Retirement Security Act
of 1974 in the Philippine milieu. The American cases are not relied upon as
precedents, but as guides of interpretation. Certainly, if there are applicable
local precedents pertaining to the interpretation of the phrase "in connection
with," then these certainly would have some binding force. But none avail, and
neither do the respondents demonstrate a countervailing holding in Philippine
jurisprudence.
Yet we should consider the claim that an "expansive interpretation" was
favored in Shaw because the law in question was an employee's benefit law
that had to be given an interpretation favorable to its intended beneficiaries. 39
In the next breath, Philcemcor notes that the U.S. Supreme Court itself was
alarmed by the expansive interpretation in Shaw and thus in Blue Cross, the
Shaw ruling was reversed and a more restrictive interpretation was applied
based on congressional intent. 40
Respondents would like to make it appear that the Court acted rashly in
applying a discarded precedent in Shaw, a non-binding foreign precedent
nonetheless. But the Court did make the following observation in its Decision
pertaining to Blue Cross:
Now, let us determine the maximum scope and reach of the
phrase "in connection with" as used in Section 29 of the SMA. A
literalist reading or linguistic survey may not satisfy. Even the U.S.
Supreme Court in New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins . 41
conceded that the phrases "relate to" or "in connection with" may be
extended to the farthest stretch of indeterminacy for, universally,
relations or connections are infinite and stop nowhere. 42 Thus, in the
case the U.S. High Court, examining the same phrase of the
same provision of law involved in Shaw, resorted to looking at
the statute and its objectives as the alternative to an
"uncritical literalism." A similar inquiry into the other
provisions of the SMA is in order to determine the scope of
review accorded therein to the CTA. 43
In the next four paragraphs of the Decision, encompassing four pages, the
Court proceeded to inquire into the SMA and its objectives as a means to
determine the scope of rulings to be deemed as "in connection with the
imposition of a safeguard measure." Certainly, this Court did not resort to the
broadest interpretation possible of the phrase "in connection with," but instead
sought to bring it into the context of the scope and objectives of the SMA. The
ultimate conclusion of the Court was that the phrase includes all rulings of the
DTI Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation
for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken. 44 This conclusion was
derived from the observation that the imposition of a general safeguard
measure is a process, initiated motu proprio or through application, which
undergoes several stages upon which the DTI Secretary is obliged or may be
called upon to issue a ruling.
It should be emphasized again that by utilizing the phrase "in connection

with," it is the SMA that expressly vests jurisdiction on the CTA over petitions
questioning the non-imposition by the DTI Secretary of safeguard measures.
The Court is simply asserting, as it should, the clear intent of the legislature in
enacting the SMA. Without "in connection with" or a synonymous phrase, the
Court would be compelled to favor the respondents' position that only rulings
imposing safeguard measures may be elevated on appeal to the CTA. But
considering that the statute does make use of the phrase, there is little sense
in delving into alternate scenarios.
Respondents fail to convincingly address the absurd consequences

pointed out by the Decision had their proposed interpretation been adopted.
Indeed, suffocated beneath the respondents' legalistic tinsel is the elemental
question —” what sense is there in vesting jurisdiction on the CTA over a
decision to impose a safeguard measure, but not on one choosing not to
impose. Of course, it is not for the Court to inquire into the wisdom of
legislative acts, hence the rule that jurisdiction must be expressly vested and
not presumed. Yet ultimately, respondents muddle the issue by making it
appear that the Decision has uniquely expanded the jurisdictional rules. For the
respondents, the proper statutory interpretation of the crucial phrase "in
connection with" is to pretend that the phrase did not exist at all in the statute.
The Court, in taking the effort to examine the meaning and extent of the
phrase, is merely giving breath to the legislative will.
The Court likewise stated that the respondents' position calls for split
jurisdiction, which is judicially abhorred. In rebuttal, the public respondents cite
Sections 2313 and 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC), which allegedly
provide for a splitting of jurisdiction of the CTA. According to public
respondents, under Section 2313 of the TCC, a decision of the Commissioner of
Customs affirming a decision of the Collector of Customs adverse to the
government is elevated for review to the Secretary of Finance. However, under
Section 2402 of the TCC, a ruling of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs against a taxpayer must be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, and
not to the Secretary of Finance. AcDaEH
Strictly speaking, the review by the Secretary of Finance of the decision of

the Commissioner of Customs is not judicial review, since the Secretary of
Finance holds an executive and not a judicial office. The contrast is apparent
with the situation in this case, wherein the interpretation favored by the
respondents calls for the exercise of judicial review by two different courts over
essentially the same question —” whether the DTI Secretary should impose
general safeguard measures. Moreover, as petitioner points out, the executive
department cannot appeal against itself. The Collector of Customs, the
Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance are all part of the
executive branch. If the Collector of Customs rules against the government, the
executive cannot very well bring suit in courts against itself. On the other hand,
if a private person is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs, he
can have proper recourse before the courts, which now would be called upon to
exercise judicial review over the action of the executive branch.
More fundamentally, the situation involving split review of the decision of

the Collector of Customs under the TCC is not apropos to the case at bar. The
TCC in that instance is quite explicit on the divergent reviewing body or official
depending on which party prevailed at the Collector of Customs' level. On the
other hand, there is no such explicit expression of bifurcated appeals in Section
29 of the SMA.
Public respondents likewise cite Fabian v. Ombudsman 45 as another
instance wherein the Court purportedly allowed split jurisdiction. It is argued
that the Court, in ruling that it was the Court of Appeals which possessed
appellate authority to review decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases while the Court retaining appellate jurisdiction of decisions of the
Ombudsman in non-administrative cases, effectively sanctioned split
jurisdiction between the Court and the Court of Appeals. 46
Nonetheless, this argument is successfully undercut by Southern Cross,

which points out the essential differences in the power exercised by the
Ombudsman in administrative cases and non-administrative cases relating to
criminal complaints. In the former, the Ombudsman may impose an
administrative penalty, while in acting upon a criminal complaint what the
Ombudsman undertakes is a preliminary investigation. Clearly, the capacity in
which the Ombudsman takes on in deciding an administrative complaint is
wholly different from that in conducting a preliminary investigation. In contrast,
in ruling upon a safeguard measure, the DTI Secretary acts in one and the
same role. The variance between an order granting or denying an application
for a safeguard measure is polar though emanating from the same equator,
and does not arise from the distinct character of the putative actions involved.
Philcemcor imputes intelligent design behind the alleged intent of

Congress to limit CTA review only to impositions of the general safeguard
measures. It claims that there is a necessary tax implication in case of an
imposition of a tariff where the CTA's expertise is necessary, but there is no
such tax implication, hence no need for the assumption of jurisdiction by a
specialized agency, when the ruling rejects the imposition of a safeguard
measure. But of course, whether the ruling under review calls for the imposition
or non-imposition of the safeguard measure, the common question for
resolution still is whether or not the tariff should be imposed —” an issue
definitely fraught with a tax dimension. The determination of the question will
call upon the same kind of expertise that a specialized body as the CTA
presumably possesses.
In response to the Court's observation that the setup proposed by

respondents was novel, unusual, cumbersome and unwise, public respondents
invoke the maxim that courts should not be concerned with the wisdom and
efficacy of legislation. 47 But this prescinds from the bogus claim that the CTA
may not exercise judicial review over a decision not to impose a safeguard
measure, a prohibition that finds no statutory support. It is likewise settled in
statutory construction that an interpretation that would cause inconvenience
and absurdity is not favored. Respondents do not address the particular illogic
that the Court pointed out would ensue if their position on judicial review were
adopted. According to the respondents, while a ruling by the DTI Secretary
imposing a safeguard measure may be elevated on review to the CTA and
assailed on the ground of errors in fact and in law, a ruling denying the
imposition of safeguard measures may be assailed only on the ground that the
DTI Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion. As stressed in the Decision,
"[c]ertiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in its character. It is
not a general utility tool in the legal workshop." 48
It is incorrect to say that the Decision bars any effective remedy should
the Tariff Commission act or conclude erroneously in making its determination
whether the factual conditions exist which necessitate the imposition of the
general safeguard measure. If the Tariff Commission makes a negative final
determination, the DTI Secretary, bound as he is by this negative
determination, has to render a decision denying the application for safeguard
measures citing the Tariff Commission's findings as basis. Necessarily then,
such negative determination of the Tariff Commission being an integral part of
the DTI Secretary's ruling would be open for review before the CTA, which again
is especially qualified by reason of its expertise to examine the findings of the
Tariff Commission. Moreover, considering that the Tariff Commission is an
instrumentality of the government, its actions (as opposed to those undertaken
by the DTI Secretary under the SMA) are not beyond the pale of certiorari
jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Philcemcor, it hinged its cause on the claim that
the DTI Secretary's actions may be annulled on certiorari, notwithstanding the
explicit grant of judicial review over that cabinet member's actions under the
SMA to the CTA. IEHTaA
Finally on this point, Philcemcor argues that assuming this Court's

interpretation of Section 29 is correct, such ruling should not be given
retroactive effect, otherwise, a gross violation of the right to due process would
be had. This erroneously presumes that it was this Court, and not Congress,
which vested jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of non-imposition rendered by
the DTI Secretary. We have repeatedly stressed that Section 29 expressly
confers CTA jurisdiction over rulings in connection with the imposition of the
safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point in the Decision was a
matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. The due process protection does not
shield those who remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure the
sporting play of procedural law.
Besides, respondents' claim would also apply every time this Court is
compelled to settle a novel question of law, or to reverse precedent. In such
cases, there would always be litigants whose causes of action might be vitiated
by the application of newly formulated judicial doctrines. Adopting their claim
would unwisely force this Court to treat its dispositions in unprecedented,
sometimes landmark decisions not as resolutions to the live cases or
controversies, but as legal doctrine applicable only to future litigations.
II. Positive Final Determination

By the Tariff Commission an
Indispensable Requisite to the
Imposition of General Safeguard Measures
The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of
the Court of Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general
safeguard measure absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff
Commission. The fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the
acknowledgment that the required positive final determination of the Tariff
Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutional limitation imposed on
the delegation of the legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the
President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Congressional Limitations Pursuant

To Constitutional Authority on the
Delegated Power to Impose
Safeguard Measures
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve
duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on
the importation of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign
importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall
within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the
Government. 49
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision,

and, hence, governing in this case. They are:
(1)It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff

rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance
Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade
Organization, no matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be.
(2)The authorization granted to the President must be embodied

in a law. Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent
executive powers. It cannot arise from administrative or executive orders
promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or whim of the
President.
(3)The authorization to the President can be exercised only
within the specified limits set in the law and is further subject to
limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently,
if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the
President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress
stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the
President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn
producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions
imposed by Congress must be observed by the President.
There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional

postulates. These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within
the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole
province the legislature under the Constitution.

Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no
authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the
importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not
exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground
that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The
constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity,
and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the
President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this
presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a
law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which
would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to
impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last
power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the
limitations and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally
accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of
members of the executive branch. aHIDAE
The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under
Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative
sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries.
Indeed, for purposes of the President's exercise of power to impose tariffs
under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts
as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein
it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their
capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly,
the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the President, to
levy tariffs and imports.
Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should
be likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of the
legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the
executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both
the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of
Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the
implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the
plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be
considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing
safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which
possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without
legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power,
authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because
taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to
impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the
President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of
Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of
right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act
beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed
by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the procedural framework
under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various
offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the
imposition of such measures, the task assignment including the factual
determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such
impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff
Commission their respective functions 50 in the legislature's scheme of things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the
limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI,
and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the
Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and
restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity
unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the
present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the
President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard
measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant
to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA, captioned "Conditions for the
Application of General Safeguard Measures," and stating:
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure
upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission
that a product is being imported into the country in increased
quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as
to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the
domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products,
the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard
measures will be in the public interest. 51
Positive Final Determination

By Tariff Commission Plainly
Required by Section 5 of SMA
There is no question that Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation
validly imposed by Congress on the presidential 52 authority under the SMA to
impose tariffs and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an
indispensable requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it
is the Tariff Commission which makes such determination, are legal
propositions plainly expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for
everyone but respondents. CEIHcT
Philcemcor attributes this Court's conclusion on the indispensability of the

positive final determination to flawed syllogism in that we read the proposition
"if A then B" as if it stated "if A, and only A, then B." 53 Translated in practical
terms, our conclusion, according to Philcemcor, would have only been justified
had Section 5 read "shall apply a general safeguard measure upon, and only
upon, a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission."
Statutes are not designed for the easy comprehension of the five-year old
child. Certainly, general propositions laid down in statutes need not be
expressly qualified by clauses denoting exclusivity in order that they gain
efficacy. Indeed, applying this argument, the President would, under the
Constitution, be authorized to declare martial law despite the absence of the
invasion, rebellion or public safety requirement just because the first paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII fails to state the magic word "only." 54
But let us for the nonce pursue Philcemcor's logic further. It claims that
since Section 5 does not allegedly limit the circumstances upon which the DTI
Secretary may impose general safeguard measures, it is a worthy pursuit to
determine whether the entire context of the SMA, as discerned by all the other
familiar indicators of legislative intent supplied by norms of statutory
interpretation, would justify safeguard measures absent a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission.
The first line of attack employed is on Section 5 itself, it allegedly not

being as clear as it sounds. It is advanced that Section 5 does not relate to the
legal ability of either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary to bind or
foreclose review and reversal by one or the other. Such relationship should
instead be governed by domestic administrative law and remedial law.
Philcemcor thus would like to cast the proposition in this manner: Does it run
contrary to our legal order to assert, as the Court did in its Decision, that a body
of relative junior competence as the Tariff Commission can bind an
administrative superior and cabinet officer, the DTI Secretary? It is easy to see
why Philcemcor would like to divorce this DTI Secretary-Tariff Commission
interaction from the confines of the SMA. Shorn of context, the notion would
seem radical and unjustifiable that the lowly Tariff Commission can bind the
hands and feet of the DTI Secretary.
It can be surmised at once that respondents' preferred interpretation is

based not on the express language of the SMA, but from implications derived in
a roundabout manner. Certainly, no provision in the SMA expressly authorizes
the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure despite the absence
of a positive final recommendation of the Tariff Commission. On the other hand,
Section 5 expressly states that the DTI Secretary "shall apply a general
safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff]
Commission." The causal connection in Section 5 between the imposition by the
DTI Secretary of the general safeguard measure and the positive final
determination of the Tariff Commission is patent, and even respondents do not
dispute such connection.
As stated earlier, the Court in its Decision found Section 5 to be clear,

plain and free from ambiguity so as to render unnecessary resort to the
congressional records to ascertain legislative intent. Yet respondents, on the
dubitable premise that Section 5 is not as express as it seems, again latch on to
the record of legislative deliberations in asserting that there was no legislative
intent to bar the DTI Secretary from imposing the general safeguard measure
anyway despite the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission.
Let us take the bait for a moment, and examine respondents' commonly
cited portion of the legislative record. One would presume, given the intense
advocacy for the efficacy of these citations, that they contain a "smoking gun"
—” express declarations from the legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose
a general safeguard measure even if the Tariff Commission refuses to render a
positive final determination. Such "smoking gun," if it exists, would characterize
our Decision as disingenuous for ignoring such contrary expression of intent
from the legislators who enacted the SMA. But as with many things, the
anticipation is more dramatic than the truth. IHaCDE
The excerpts cited by respondents are derived from the interpellation of

the late Congressman Marcial Punzalan Jr., by then (and still is) Congressman
Simeon Datumanong. 55 Nowhere in these records is the view expressed that
the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures if the Tariff
Commission issues a negative final determination or otherwise is unable to
make a positive final determination. Instead, respondents hitch on the
observations of Congressman Punzalan Jr., that "the results of the [Tariff]
Commission's findings . . . is subsequently submitted to [the DTI Secretary] for
the [DTI Secretary] to impose or not to impose;" and that "the [DTI Secretary]
here is . . . who would make the final decision on the recommendation that is
made by a more technical body [such as the Tariff Commission]." 56
There is nothing in the remarks of Congressman Punzalan which

contradict our Decision. His observations fall in accord with the respective roles
of the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary under the SMA. Under the SMA,
it is the Tariff Commission that conducts an investigation as to whether the
conditions exist to warrant the imposition of the safeguard measures. These
conditions are enumerated in Section 5, namely; that a product is being
imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative
to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or
threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the investigation of the Tariff
Commission, it submits a report to the DTI Secretary which states, among
others, whether the above-stated conditions for the imposition of the general
safeguard measures exist. Upon a positive final determination that these
conditions are present, the Tariff Commission then is mandated to recommend
what appropriate safeguard measures should be undertaken by the DTI
Secretary. Section 13 of the SMA gives five (5) specific options on the type of
safeguard measures the Tariff Commission recommends to the DTI Secretary.
At the same time, nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt
the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires
that the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard
measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff Commission's
recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure upon its positive final
determination. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive final
determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a general safeguard
measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that
recommended by the Tariff Commission.
Congressman Punzalan was cited as saying that the DTI Secretary makes
the decision "to impose or not to impose," which is correct since the DTI
Secretary may choose not to impose a safeguard measure in spite of a positive
final determination by the Tariff Commission. Congressman Punzalan also
correctly stated that it is the DTI Secretary who makes the final decision "on the
recommendation that is made [by the Tariff Commission]," since the DTI
Secretary may choose to impose a general safeguard measure different from
that recommended by the Tariff Commission or not to impose a safeguard
measure at all. Nowhere in these cited deliberations was Congressman
Punzalan, or any other member of Congress for that matter, quoted as saying
that the DTI Secretary may ignore a negative determination by the Tariff
Commission as to the existence of the conditions warranting the imposition of
general safeguard measures, and thereafter proceed to impose these measures
nonetheless. It is too late in the day to ascertain from the late Congressman
Punzalan himself whether he had made these remarks in order to assure the
other legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard
measures notwithstanding a negative determination by the Tariff Commission.
But certainly, the language of Section 5 is more resolutory to that question than
the recorded remarks of Congressman Punzalan.
Respondents employed considerable effort to becloud Section 5 with

undeserved ambiguity in order that a proper resort to the legislative
deliberations may be had. Yet assuming that Section 5 deserves to be clarified
through an inquiry into the legislative record, the excerpts cited by the
respondents are far more ambiguous than the language of the assailed
provision regarding the key question of whether the DTI Secretary may impose
safeguard measures in the face of a negative determination by the Tariff
Commission. Moreover, even Southern Cross counters with its own excerpts of
the legislative record in support of their own view. 57
It will not be difficult, especially as to heavily-debated legislation, for two
sides with contrapuntal interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective
citations from the legislative debate in support of their particular views. 58 A
futile exercise of second-guessing is happily avoided if the meaning of the
statute is clear on its face. It is evident from the text of Section 5 that
there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission
that a product is being imported into the country in increased
quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to
be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic
industry. Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of wishful
thinking.
For the same reason that Section 5 is explicit as regards the essentiality
of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, there is no need to
refer to the Implementing Rules of the SMA to ascertain a contrary intent. If
there is indeed a provision in the Implementing Rules that allows the DTI
Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure even without the positive
final determination by the Tariff Commission, said rule is void as it cannot
supplant the express language of the legislature. Respondents essentially
rehash their previous arguments on this point, and there is no reason to
consider them anew. The Decision made it clear that nothing in Rule 13.2 of the
Implementing Rules, even though captioned "Final Determination by the
Secretary," authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard
measure in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission. 59 Similarly, the "Rules and Regulations to Govern the Conduct of
Investigation by the Tariff Commission Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8800" now
cited by the respondent does not contain any provision that the DTI Secretary
may impose the general safeguard measures in the absence of a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission. cSTCDA
Section 13 of the SMA further bolsters the interpretation as argued by

Southern Cross and upheld by the Decision. The first paragraph thereof states
that "[u]pon its positive determination, the [Tariff] Commission shall
recommend to the Secretary an appropriate definitive measure . . .", clearly
referring to the Tariff Commission as the entity that makes the positive
determination. On the other hand, the penultimate paragraph of the same
provision states that "[i]n the event of a negative final determination", the DTI
Secretary is to immediately issue through the Secretary of Finance, a written
instruction to the Commissioner of Customs authorizing the return of the cash
bonds previously collected as a provisional safeguard measure. Since the first
paragraph of the same provision states that it is the Tariff Commission which
makes the positive determination, it necessarily follows that it, and not the DTI
Secretary, makes the negative final determination as referred to in the
penultimate paragraph of Section 13. 60
T h e Separate Opinionconsiders as highly persuasive of former Tariff

Commission Chairman Abon, who stated that the Commission's findings are
merely recommendatory. 61 Again, the considered opinion of Chairman Abon is
of no operative effect if the statute plainly states otherwise, and Section 5
bluntly does require a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission
before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure. 62
Certainly, the Court cannot give controlling effect to the statements of any
public officer in serious denial of his duties if the law otherwise imposes the
duty on the public office or officer.
Nonetheless, if we are to render persuasive effect on the considered
opinion of the members of the Executive Branch, it bears noting that the
Secretary of the Department of Justice rendered an Opinion wherein he
concluded that the DTI Secretary could not impose a general safeguard
measure if the Tariff Commission made a negative final determination. 63 Unlike
Chairman Abon's impromptu remarks made during a hearing, the DOJ Opinion
was rendered only after a thorough study of the question after referral to it by
the DTI. The DOJ Secretary is the alter ego of the President with a stated
mandate as the head of the principal law agency of the government. 64 As the
DOJ Secretary has no denominated role in the SMA, he was able to render his
Opinion from the vantage of judicious distance. Should not his Opinion, studied
and direct to the point as it is, carry greater weight than the spontaneous
remarks of the Tariff Commission's Chairman which do not even expressly
disavow the binding power of the Commission's positive final determination?
III. DTI Secretary has No Power of Review

Over Final Determination of the Tariff Commission
We should reemphasize that it is only because of the SMA, a legislative
enactment, that the executive branch has the power to impose safeguard
measures. At the same time, by constitutional fiat, the exercise of such power
is subjected to the limitations and restrictions similarly enforced by the SMA. In
examining the relationship of the DTI and the Tariff Commission as established
in the SMA, it is essential to acknowledge and consider these predicates.
It is necessary to clarify the paradigm established by the SMA and

affirmed by the Constitution under which the Tariff Commission and the DTI
operate, especially in light of the suggestions that the Court's rulings on the
functions of quasi judicial power find application in this case. Perhaps the
reflexive application of the quasi-judicial doctrine in this case, rooted as it is in
jurisprudence, might allow for some convenience in ruling, yet doing so
ultimately betrays ignorance of the fundamental power of Congress to
reorganize the administrative structure of governance in ways it sees fit.
The Separate Opinionoperates from wholly different premises which are

incomplete. Its main stance, similar to that of respondents, is that the DTI
Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, may modify and alter the
findings of the Tariff Commission, including the latter's negative final
determination by substituting it with his own negative final determination to
pave the way for his imposition of a safeguard measure. 65 Fatally, this
conclusion is arrived at without considering the fundamental constitutional
precept under Section 28(2), Article VI, on the ability of Congress to impose
restrictions and limitations in its delegation to the President to impose tariffs
and imposts, as well as the express condition of Section 5 of the SMA requiring
a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission.
Absent Section 5 of the SMA, the President has no inherent,

constitutional, or statutory power to impose a general safeguard
measure. Tellingly, the Separate Opinion does not directly confront the
inevitable question as to how the DTI Secretary may get away with imposing a
general safeguard measure absent a positive final determination from the Tariff
Commission without violating Section 5 of the SMA, which along with Section 13
of the same law, stands as the only direct legal authority for the DTI Secretary
to impose such measures. This is a constitutionally guaranteed limitation of the
highest order, considering that the presidential authority exercised under the
SMA is inherently legislative.
Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion brings to fore the issue of whether the
DTI Secretary, acting either as alter ego of the President or in his capacity as
head of an executive department, may review, modify or otherwise alter the
final determination of the Tariff Commission under the SMA. The succeeding
discussion shall focus on that question.
Preliminarily, we should note that none of the parties question the

designation of the DTI or Agriculture secretaries under the SMA as the imposing
authorities of the safeguard measures, even though Section 28(2) Article VI
states that it is the President to whom the power to impose tariffs and imposts
may be delegated by Congress. The validity of such designation under the SMA
should not be in doubt. We recognize that the authorization made by Congress
in the SMA to the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries was made in contemplation of
their capacities as alter egos of the President.
aIAcCH
Indeed, in Marc Donnelly & Associates v. Agregado 66 the Court upheld

the validity of a Cabinet resolution fixing the schedule of royalty rates on metal
exports and providing for their collection even though Congress, under
Commonwealth Act No. 728, had specifically empowered the President and not
any other official of the executive branch, to regulate and curtail the export of
metals. In so ruling, the Court held that the members of the Cabinet were
acting as alter egos of the President. 67 In this case, Congress itself authorized
the DTI Secretary as alter ego of the President to impose the safeguard
measures. If the Court was previously willing to uphold the alter ego's tariff
authority despite the absence of explicit legislative grant of such authority on
the alter ego, all the more reason now when Congress itself expressly
authorized the alter ego to exercise these powers to impose safeguard
measures.
Notwithstanding, Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles

to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not
envision that the President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory
powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the
traditional "alter ego" principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established
by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary
under the law instead to the NEDA. The Tariff Commission is an attached
agency of the National Economic Development Authority, 68 which in turn is the
independent planning agency of the government. 69
The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision
of the DTI. 70 On the other hand, the administrative relationship between the
NEDA and the Tariff Commission is established not only by the Administrative
Code, but similarly affirmed by the Tariff and Customs Code.
Justice Florentino Feliciano, in his ponencia in Garcia v. Executive

Secretary 71 , acknowledged the interplay between the NEDA and the Tariff
Commission under the Tariff and Customs Code when he cited the relevant
provisions of that law evidencing such setup. Indeed, under Section 104 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, the rates of duty fixed therein are subject to periodic
investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the President
upon recommendation of the NEDA. 72 Moreover, under Section 401 of the
same law, it is upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and
recommendation of the NEDA that the President may cause a gradual reduction
of protection levels granted under the law. 73

At the same time, under the Tariff and Customs Code, no similar role or
influence is allocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties. In fact,
the long-standing tradition has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to
proceed independently in the exercise of their respective functions. Only very
recently have our statutes directed any significant interplay between the Tariff
Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No. 8751
on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the
imposition of anti-dumping duties, and of course the promulgation a year later
of the SMA. In all these three laws, the Tariff Commission is tasked, upon
referral of the matter by the DTI, to determine whether the factual conditions
exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI of a countervailing duty, an anti-
dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure, respectively. In all three laws,
the determination by the Tariff Commission that these required factual
conditions exist is necessary before the DTI Secretary may impose the
corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in all three laws, there is no
express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to reverse the factual
determination of the Tariff Commission. 74
In fact, the SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no

mere flunky of the DTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final
recommendation of the former be indispensable to the latter's imposition of a
general safeguard measure. What the law indicates instead is a relationship of
interdependence between two bodies independent of each other under the
Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the ability of the DTI
Secretary to disregard the Tariff Commission's recommendations as to the
particular safeguard measures to be imposed evinces the independence from
each other of these two bodies. This is properly so for two reasons —” the DTI
and the Tariff Commission are independent of each other under the
Administrative Code; and impropriety is avoided in cases wherein the DTI itself
is the one seeking the imposition of the general safeguard measures, pursuant
to Section 6 of the SMA.
Thus, in ascertaining the appropriate legal milieu governing the
relationship between the DTI and the Tariff Commission, it is imperative to
apply foremost, if not exclusively, the provisions of the SMA. The argument that
the usual rules on administrative control and supervision apply between the
Tariff Commission and the DTI as regards safeguard measures is severely
undercut by the plain fact that there is no long-standing tradition of
administrative interplay between these two entities.
Within the administrative apparatus, the Tariff Commission appears to be

a lower rank relative to the DTI. But does this necessarily mean that the DTI has
the intrinsic right, absent statutory authority, to reverse the findings of the
Tariff Commission? To insist that it does, one would have to concede for
instance that, applying the same doctrinal guide, the Secretary of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) has the right to reverse the
rulings of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or the issuances of the Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA). As with the Tariff Commission-DTI, there is no
statutory authority granting the DOST Secretary the right to overrule the CAB or
the PCA, such right presumably arising only from the position of subordinacy of
these bodies to the DOST. To insist on such a right would be to invite
department secretaries to interfere in the exercise of functions by
administrative agencies, even in areas wherein such secretaries are bereft of
specialized competencies.
The Separate Opinionnotes that notwithstanding above, the Secretary of

Department of Transportation and Communication may review the findings of
the CAB, the Agriculture Secretary may review those of the PCA, and that the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may pass
upon decisions of the Mines and Geosciences Board. 75 These three officers may
be alter egos of the President, yet their authority to review is limited to those
agencies or bureaus which are, pursuant to statutes such as the Administrative
Code of 1987, under the administrative control and supervision of their
respective departments. Thus, under the express provision of the
Administrative Code expressly provides that the CAB is an attached agency of
the DOTC 76 , and that the PCA is an attached agency of the Department of
Agriculture. 77 The same law establishes the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau as
one of the Sectoral Staff Bureaus 78 that forms part of the organizational
structure of the DENR. 79
As repeatedly stated, the Tariff Commission does not fall under the
administrative control of the DTI, but under the NEDA, pursuant to the
Administrative Code. The reliance made by the Separate Opinion to those three
examples are thus misplaced. AIHaCc
Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion asserts that the SMA created a

functional relationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary,
sufficient to allow the DTI Secretary to exercise alter ego powers to reverse the
determination of the Tariff Commission. Again, considering that the power to
impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in the President but arises only
from congressional grant, we should affirm the congressional prerogative to
impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which do not normally
belong to the executive in the first place. Nowhere in the SMA does it state that
the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures without a positive
final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may
reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff
Commission.
Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played

therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that
the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise supervisory powers over the
Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional alter ego
principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would
have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead
to the NEDA, the body to which the Tariff Commission is attached under the
Administrative Code.
The Court has no issue with upholding administrative control and

supervision exercised by the head of an executive department, but only over
those subordinate offices that are attached to the department, or which are,
under statute, relegated under its supervision and control. To declare that a
department secretary, even if acting as alter ego of the President, may exercise
such control or supervision over all executive offices below cabinet rank would
lead to absurd results such as those adverted to above. As applied to this case,
there is no legal justification for the DTI Secretary to exercise control,
supervision, review or amendatory powers over the Tariff Commission and its
positive final determination. In passing, we note that there is, admittedly, a
feasible mode by which administrative review of the Tariff Commission's final
determination could be had, but it is not the procedure adopted by respondents
and now suggested for affirmation. This mode shall be discussed in a
forthcoming section.
T h e Separate Opinionasserts that the President, or his/her alter ego

cannot be made a mere rubber stamp of the Tariff Commission since Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution denominates the Chief Executive exercises
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. 80 But let us be
clear that such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the
structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding
degrees of administrative control and supervision, is not the exclusive preserve
of the executive. It may be effectively be limited by the Constitution, by law, or
by judicial decisions.
The Separate Opinioncites the respected constitutional law authority Fr.

Joaquin Bernas, in support of the proposition that such plenary power of
executive control of the President cannot be restricted by a mere statute
passed by Congress. However, the cited passage from Fr. Bernas actually
states, "Since the Constitution has given the President the power of control,
with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail
such power." 81 Does the President have such tariff powers under the
Constitution in the first place which may be curtailed by the executive power of
control? At the risk of redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI: "The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government." Clearly the power to impose tariffs belongs to
Congress and not to the President.
It is within reason to assume the framers of the Constitution deemed it

too onerous to spell out all the possible limitations and restrictions on this
presidential authority to impose tariffs. Hence, the Constitution especially
allowed Congress itself to prescribe such limitations and restrictions itself, a
prudent move considering that such authority inherently belongs to Congress
and not the President. Since Congress has no power to amend the Constitution,
it should be taken to mean that such limitations and restrictions should be
provided "by mere statute". Then again, even the presidential authority to
impose tariffs arises only "by mere statute." Indeed, this presidential
privilege is both contingent in nature and legislative in origin. These
characteristics, when weighed against the aspect of executive control
and supervision, cannot militate against Congress's exercise of its
inherent power to tax.
The bare fact is that the administrative superstructure, for all its
unwieldiness, is mere putty in the hands of Congress. The functions and
mandates of the particular executive departments and bureaus are not created
by the President, but by the legislative branch through the Administrative Code.
82 The President is the administrative head of the executive department, as
such obliged to see that every government office is managed and maintained
properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and
regulations, and empowered to promulgate rules and issuances that would
ensure a more efficient management of the executive branch, for so long as
such issuances are not contrary to law. 83 Yet the legislature has the concurrent
power to reclassify or redefine the executive bureaucracy, including the
relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus and
departments, and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive departments
and their components, hamstrung only by constitutional limitations. The DTI
itself can be abolished with ease by Congress through deleting Title X, Book IV
of the Administrative Code. The Tariff Commission can similarly be abolished
through legislative enactment. 84
At the same time, Congress can enact additional tasks or responsibilities

on either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary, such as their respective
roles on the imposition of general safeguard measures under the SMA. In
doing so, the same Congress, which has the putative authority to
abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to
alter or expand its functions through modalities, which do not align
with established norms in the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound
to recognize the legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter
how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the legislative power to restructure
the executive branch of government. SDEHIa
There are further limitations on the "executive control" adverted to by the

Separate Opinion. The President, in the exercise of executive control, cannot
order a subordinate to disobey a final decision of this Court or any court's. If the
subordinate chooses to disobey, invoking sole allegiance to the President, the
judicial processes can be utilized to compel obeisance. Indeed, when public
officers of the executive department take their oath of office, they swear
allegiance and obedience not to the President, but to the Constitution and the
laws of the land. The invocation of executive control must yield when under its
subsumption includes an act that violates the law.
The Separate Opinionconcedes that the exercise of executive control and

supervision by the President is bound by the Constitution and law. 85 Still, just
three sentences after asserting that the exercise of executive control must be
within the bounds of the Constitution and law, the Separate Opinion asserts,
"the control power of the Chief Executive emanates from the Constitution; no
act of Congress may validly curtail it." 86 Laws are acts of Congress, hence valid
confusion arises whether the Separate Opinion truly believes the first
proposition that executive control is bound by law. This is a quagmire for the
Separate Opinion to resolve for itself.
The Separate Opinionunduly considers executive control as the ne plus
ultra constitutional standard which must govern in this case. But while the
President may generally have the power to control, modify or set aside the
actions of a subordinate, such powers may be constricted by the Constitution,
the legislature, and the judiciary. This is one of the essences of the check-and-
balance system in our tri-partite constitutional democracy. Not one head of a
branch of government may operate as a Caesar within his/her particular
fiefdom.
Assuming there is a conflict between the specific limitation in Section 28

(2), Article VI of the Constitution and the general executive power of control
and supervision, the former prevails in the specific instance of safeguard
measures such as tariffs and imposts, and would thus serve to qualify the
general grant to the President of the power to exercise control and supervision
over his/her subalterns.
Thus, if the Congress enacted the law so that the DTI Secretary is "bound"
by the Tariff Commission in the sense the former cannot impose general
safeguard measures absent a final positive determination from the latter the
Court is obliged to respect such legislative prerogative, no matter how such
arrangement deviates from traditional norms as may have been enshrined in
jurisprudence. The only ground under which such legislative determination as
expressed in statute may be successfully challenged is if such legislation
contravenes the Constitution. No such argument is posed by the respondents,
who do not challenge the validity or constitutionality of the SMA.
Given these premises, it is utterly reckless to examine the

interrelationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary beyond
the context of the SMA, applying instead traditional precepts on administrative
control, review and supervision. For that reason, the Decision deemed
inapplicable respondents' previous citations of Cariño v. Commissioner on
Human Rights and Lamb v. Phipps, since the executive power adverted to in
those cases had not been limited by constitutional restrictions such as those
imposed under Section 28(2), Article VI. 87
A similar observation can be made on the case of Sharp International

Marketing v. Court of Appeals , 88 now cited by Philcemcor, wherein the Court
asserted that the Land Bank of the Philippines was required to exercise
independent judgment and not merely rubber-stamp deeds of sale entered into
by the Department of Agrarian Reform in connection with the agrarian reform
program. Philcemcor attempts to demonstrate that the DTI Secretary, as with
the Land Bank of the Philippines, is required to exercise independent discretion
and is not expected to just merely accede to DAR-approved compensation
packages. Yet again, such grant of independent discretion is expressly called
for by statute, particularly Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 6657 which specifically
requires the joint concurrence of "the landowner and the DAR and the [Land
Bank of the Philippines]" on the amount of compensation. Such power of review
by the Land Bank is a consequence of clear statutory language, as is our
holding in the Decision that Section 5 explicitly requires a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission before a general safeguard measure
may be imposed. Moreover, such limitations under the SMA are coated by the
constitutional authority of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, is this administrative setup, as envisioned by Congress and

enshrined into the SMA, truly noxious to existing legal standards? The Decision
acknowledged the internal logic of the statutory framework, considering that
the DTI cannot exercise review powers over an agency such as the Tariff
Commission which is not within its administrative jurisdiction; that the
mechanism employed establishes a measure of check and balance involving
two government offices with different specializations; and that safeguard
measures are the exception rather than the rule, pursuant to our treaty
obligations. 89
We see no reason to deviate from these observations, and indeed can add
similarly oriented comments. Corollary to the legislative power to decree
policies through legislation is the ability of the legislature to provide for means
in the statute itself to ensure that the said policy is strictly implemented by the
body or office so tasked with the duty. As earlier stated, our treaty obligations
dissuade the State for now from implementing default protectionist trade
measures such as tariffs, and allow the same only under specified conditions. 90
The conditions enumerated under the GATT Agreement on Safeguards for the
application of safeguard measures by a member country are the same as the
requisites laid down in Section 5 of the SMA. 91 To insulate the factual
determination from political pressure, and to assure that it be conducted by an
entity especially qualified by reason of its general functions to undertake such
investigation, Congress deemed it necessary to delegate to the Tariff
Commission the function of ascertaining whether or not the those factual
conditions exist to warrant the atypical imposition of safeguard measures. After
all, the Tariff Commission retains a degree of relative independence by virtue of
its attachment to the National Economic Development Authority, "an
independent planning agency of the government," 92 and also owing to its
vaunted expertise and specialization. IaSCTE
The matter of imposing a safeguard measure almost always involves not

just one industry, but the national interest as it encompasses other industries
as well. Yet in all candor, any decision to impose a safeguard measure is
susceptible to all sorts of external pressures, especially if the domestic industry
concerned is well-organized. Unwarranted impositions of safeguard measures
may similarly be detrimental to the national interest. Congress could not be
blamed if it desired to insulate the investigatory process by assigning it to a
body with a putative degree of independence and traditional expertise in
ascertaining factual conditions. Affected industries would have cause to lobby
for or against the safeguard measures. The decision-maker is in the unenviable
position of having to bend an ear to listen to all concerned voices, including
those which may speak softly but carry a big stick. Had the law mandated that
the decision be made on the sole discretion of an executive officer, such as the
DTI Secretary, it would be markedly easier for safeguard measures to be
imposed or withheld based solely on political considerations and not on the
factual conditions that are supposed to predicate the decision.
Reference of the binding positive final determination to the Tariff

Commission is of course, not a fail-safe means to ensure a bias-free
determination. But at least the legislated involvement of the Commission in the
process assures some measure of check and balance involving two different
governmental agencies with disparate specializations. There is no legal or
constitutional demand for such a setup, but its wisdom as policy should be
acknowledged. As prescribed by Congress, both the Tariff Commission and the
DTI Secretary operate within limited frameworks, under which nobody acquires
an undue advantage over the other.
We recognize that Congress deemed it necessary to insulate the process

in requiring that the factual determination to be made by an ostensibly
independent body of specialized competence, the Tariff Commission. This
prescribed framework, constitutionally sanctioned, is intended to prevent the
baseless, whimsical, or consideration-induced imposition of safeguard
measures. It removes from the DTI Secretary jurisdiction over a matter beyond
his putative specialized aptitude, the compilation and analysis of picayune facts
and determination of their limited causal relations, and instead vests in the
Secretary the broad choice on a matter within his unquestionable competence,
the selection of what particular safeguard measure would assist the duly
beleaguered local industry yet at the same time conform to national trade
policy. Indeed, the SMA recognizes, and places primary importance on the DTI
Secretary's mandate to formulate trade policy, in his capacity as the President's
alter ego on trade, industry and investment-related matters.
At the same time, the statutory limitations on this authorized power of the
DTI Secretary must prevail since the Constitution itself demands the
enforceability of those limitations and restrictions as imposed by Congress.
Policy wisdom will not save a law from infirmity if the statutory provisions
violate the Constitution. But since the Constitution itself provides that the
President shall be constrained by the limits and restrictions imposed by
Congress and since these limits and restrictions are so clear and categorical,
then the Court has no choice but to uphold the reins. CSTDEH
Even assuming that this prescribed setup made little sense, or seemed
"uncommonly silly," 93 the Court is bound by propriety not to dispute the
wisdom of the legislature as long as its acts do not violate the Constitution.
Since there is no convincing demonstration that the SMA contravenes the
Constitution, the Court is wont to respect the administrative regimen
propounded by the law, even if it allots the Tariff Commission a higher degree
of puissance than normally expected. It is for this reason that the traditional
conceptions of administrative review or quasi-judicial power cannot control in
this case.
Indeed, to apply the latter concept would cause the Court to fall into a
linguistic trap owing to the multi-faceted denotations the term "quasi judicial"
has come to acquire.
Under the SMA, the Tariff Commission undertakes formal hearings, 94
receives and evaluates testimony and evidence by interested parties, 95 and
renders a decision is rendered on the basis of the evidence presented, in the
form of the final determination. The final determination requires a conclusion
whether the importation of the product under consideration is causing serious
injury or threat to a domestic industry producing like products or directly
competitive products, while evaluating all relevant factors having a bearing on
the situation of the domestic industry. 96 This process aligns conformably with
definition provided by Black's Law Dictionary of "quasi judicial" as the "action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action,
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." 97
However, the Tariff Commission is not empowered to hear actual cases or
controversies lodged directly before it by private parties. It does not have the
power to issue writs of injunction or enforcement of its determination. These
considerations militate against a finding of quasi-judicial powers attributable to
the Tariff Commission, considering the pronouncement that "quasi-judicial
adjudication would mean a determination of rights privileges and duties
resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation." 98
Indeed, a declaration that the Tariff Commission possesses quasi-judicial
powers, even if ascertained for the limited purpose of exercising its functions
under the SMA, may have the unfortunate effect of expanding the
Commission's powers beyond that contemplated by law. After all, the Tariff
Commission is by convention, a fact-finding body, and its role under the SMA,
burdened as it is with factual determination, is but a mere continuance of this
tradition. However, Congress through the SMA offers a significant deviation
from this traditional role by tying the decision by the DTI Secretary to impose a
safeguard measure to the required positive factual determination by the Tariff
Commission. Congress is not bound by past traditions, or even by the
jurisprudence of this Court, in enacting legislation it may deem as suited for the
times. The sole benchmark for judicial substitution of congressional wisdom is
constitutional transgression, a standard which the respondents do not even
attempt to match.
Respondents' Suggested Interpretation

Of the SMA Transgresses Fair Play
Respondents have belabored the argument that the Decision's
interpretation of the SMA, particularly of the role of the Tariff Commission vis-
Ã -vis the DTI Secretary, is noxious to traditional notions of administrative
control and supervision. But in doing so, they have failed to acknowledge the
congressional prerogative to redefine administrative relationships, a license
which falls within the plenary province of Congress under our representative
system of democracy. Moreover, respondents' own suggested interpretation
falls wayward of expectations of practical fair play.
Adopting respondents' suggestion that the DTI Secretary may disregard
the factual findings of the Tariff Commission and investigatory process that
preceded it, it would seem that the elaborate procedure undertaken by the
Commission under the SMA, with all the attendant guarantees of due process, is
but an inutile spectacle. As Justice Garcia noted during the oral arguments, why
would the DTI Secretary bother with the Tariff Commission and instead conduct
the investigation himself. 99
Certainly, nothing in the SMA authorizes the DTI Secretary, after making
the preliminary determination, to personally oversee the investigation, hear out
the interested parties, or receive evidence. 100 In fact, the SMA does not even
require the Tariff Commission, which is tasked with the custody of the
submitted evidence, 101 to turn over to the DTI Secretary such evidence it had
evaluated in order to make its factual determination. 102 Clearly, as Congress
tasked it to be, it is the Tariff Commission and not the DTI Secretary which
acquires the necessary intimate acquaintance with the factual conditions and
evidence necessary for the imposition of the general safeguard measure. Why
then favor an interpretation of the SMA that leaves the findings of the Tariff
Commission bereft of operative effect and makes them subservient to the
wishes of the DTI Secretary, a personage with lesser working familiarity with
the relevant factual milieu? In fact, the bare theory of the respondents would
effectively allow the DTI Secretary to adopt, under the subterfuge of his
"discretion", the factual determination of a private investigative group hired by
the industry concerned, and reject the investigative findings of the Tariff
Commission as mandated by the SMA. It would be highly irregular to substitute
what the law clearly provides for a dubious setup of no statutory basis that
would be readily susceptible to rank chicanery.
Moreover, the SMA guarantees the right of all concerned parties to be
heard, an elemental requirement of due process, by the Tariff Commission in
the context of its investigation. The DTI Secretary is not similarly empowered or
tasked to hear out the concerns of other interested parties, and if he/she does
so, it arises purely out of volition and not compulsion under law. cADEHI
Indeed, in this case, it is essential that the position of other than that of
the local cement industry should be given due consideration, cement being an
indispensable need for the operation of other industries such as housing and
construction. While the general safeguard measures may operate to the better
interests of the domestic cement industries, its deprivation of cheaper cement
imports may similarly work to the detriment of these other domestic industries
and correspondingly, the national interest. Notably, the Tariff Commission in
this case heard the views on the application of representatives of other allied
industries such as the housing, construction, and cement-bag industries, and
other interested parties such as consumer groups and foreign governments. 103
It is only before the Tariff Commission that their views had been heard, and this
is because it is only the Tariff Commission which is empowered to hear their
positions. Since due process requires a judicious consideration of all relevant
factors, the Tariff Commission, which is in a better position to hear these
parties than the DTI Secretary, is similarly more capable to render a
determination conformably with the due process requirements than the DTI
Secretary.
In a similar vein, Southern Cross aptly notes that in instances when it is
the DTI Secretary who initiates motu proprio the application for the safeguard
measure pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA, respondents' suggested
interpretation would result in the awkward situation wherein the DTI Secretary
would rule upon his own application after it had been evaluated by the Tariff
Commission. Pertinently cited is our ruling in Corona v. Court of Appeals 104 that
"no man can be at once a litigant and judge." 105 Certainly, this anomalous
situation is avoided if it is the Tariff Commission which is tasked with arriving at
the final determination whether the conditions exist to warrant the general
safeguard measures. This is the setup provided for by the express provisions of
the SMA, and the problem would arise only if we adopt the interpretation urged
upon by respondents.
The Possibility for Administrative Review

Of the Tariff Commission's Determination
The Court has been emphatic that a positive final determination from the
Tariff Commission is required in order that the DTI Secretary may impose a
general safeguard measure, and that the DTI Secretary has no power to
exercise control and supervision over the Tariff Commission and its final
determination. These conclusions are the necessary consequences of the
applicable provisions of the Constitution, the SMA, and laws such as the
Administrative Code. However, the law is silent though on whether this positive
final determination may otherwise be subjected to administrative review.
There is no evident legislative intent by the authors of the SMA to provide
for a procedure of administrative review. If ever there is a procedure for
administrative review over the final determination of the Tariff Commission,
such procedure must be done in a manner that does not contravene or
disregard legislative prerogatives as expressed in the SMA or the
Administrative Code, or fundamental constitutional limitations.
In order that such procedure of administrative review would not

contravene the law and the constitutional scheme provided by Section 28(2),
Article VI, it is essential to assert that the positive final determination by the
Tariff Commission is indispensable as a requisite for the imposition of a general
safeguard measure. The submissions of private respondents and the Separate
Opinion cannot be sustained insofar as they hold that the DTI Secretary can
peremptorily ignore or disregard the determinations made by the Tariff
Commission. However, if the mode of administrative review were in such a
manner that the administrative superior of the Tariff Commission were to
modify or alter its determination, then such "reversal" may still be valid within
the confines of Section 5 of the SMA, for technically it is still the Tariff
Commission's determination, administratively revised as it may be, that would
serve as the basis for the DTI Secretary's action.
However, and fatally for the present petitions, such administrative review
cannot be conducted by the DTI Secretary. Even if conceding that the Tariff
Commission's findings may be administratively reviewed, the DTI Secretary has
no authority to review or modify the same. We have been emphatic on the
reasons —” such as that there is no traditional or statutory basis placing the
Commission under the control and supervision of the DTI; that to allow such
would contravene due process, especially if the DTI itself were to apply for the
safeguard measures motu proprio. To hold otherwise would destroy the
administrative hierarchy, contravene constitutional due process, and disregard
the limitations or restrictions provided in the SMA.
Instead, assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA
that may conduct such review following the principles of administrative law,
and the NEDA's decision in turn is reviewable by the Office of the President. The
decision of the Office of the President then effectively substitutes as the
determination of the Tariff Commission, which now forms the basis of the DTI
Secretary's decision, which now would be ripe for judicial review by the CTA
under Section 29 of the SMA. This is the only way that administrative review of
the Tariff Commission's determination may be sustained without violating the
SMA and its constitutional restrictions and limitations, as well as administrative
law.
In bare theory, the NEDA may review, alter or modify the Tariff
Commission's final determination, the Commission being an attached agency of
the NEDA. Admittedly, there is nothing in the SMA or any other statute that
would prevent the NEDA to exercise such administrative review, and
successively, for the President to exercise in turn review over the NEDA's
decision.
Nonetheless, in acknowledging this possibility, the Court, without
denigrating the bare principle that administrative officers may exercise control
and supervision over the acts of the bodies under its jurisdiction, realizes that
this comes at the expense of a speedy resolution to an application for a
safeguard measure, an application dependent on fluctuating factual conditions.
The further delay would foster uncertainty and insecurity within the industry
concerned, as well as with all other allied industries, which in turn may lead to
some measure of economic damage. Delay is certain, since judicial review
authorized by law and not administrative review would have the final say. The
fact that the SMA did not expressly prohibit administrative review of the final
determination of the Tariff Commission does not negate the supreme
advantages of engendering exclusive judicial review over questions arising
from the imposition of a general safeguard measure. AIHECa
In any event, even if we conceded the possibility of administrative review

of the Tariff Commission's final determination by the NEDA, such would not
deny merit to the present petition. It does not change the fact that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative
final determination of the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary acted
without jurisdiction when he imposed general safeguard measures despite the
absence of the statutory positive final determination of the Commission.
IV. Court's Interpretation of SMA

In Harmony with Other
Constitutional Provisions
In response to our citation of Section 28(2), Article VI, respondents
elevate two arguments grounded in constitutional law. One is based on another
constitutional provision, Section 12, Article XIII, which mandates that "[t]he
State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods and adopt measures that help make them
competitive." By no means does this provision dictate that the Court favor the
domestic industry in all competing claims that it may bring before this Court. If
it were so, judicial proceedings in this country would be rendered a mockery,
resolved as they would be, on the basis of the personalities of the litigants and
not their legal positions.
Moreover, the duty imposed on by Section 12, Article XIII falls primarily
with Congress, which in that regard enacted the SMA, a law designed to protect
domestic industries from the possible ill-effects of our accession to the global
trade order. Inconveniently perhaps for respondents, the SMA also happens to
provide for a procedure under which such protective measures may be
enacted. The Court cannot just impose what it deems as the spirit of the law
without giving due regard to its letter.
In like-minded manner, the Separate Opinion loosely states that the
purpose of the SMA is to protect or safeguard local industries from increased
importation of foreign products. 106 This inaccurately leaves the impression that
the SMA ipso facto unravels a protective cloak that shelters all local industries
and producers, no matter the conditions. Indeed, our country has knowingly
chosen to accede to the world trade regime, as expressed in the GATT and WTO
Agreements, despite the understanding that local industries might suffer ill-
effects, especially with the easier entry of competing foreign products. At the
same time, these international agreements were designed to constrict
protectionist trade policies by its member-countries. Hence, the median, as
expressed by the SMA, does allow for the application of protectionist measures
such as tariffs, but only after an elaborate process of investigation that ensures
factual basis and indispensable need for such measures. More accurately, the
purpose of the SMA is to provide a process for the protection or safeguarding of
domestic industries that have duly established that there is substantial injury or
threat thereof directly caused by the increased imports. In short, domestic
industries are not entitled to safeguard measures as a matter of right or
influence.
Respondents also make the astounding argument that the imposition of

general safeguard measures should not be seen as a taxation measure, but
instead as an exercise of police power. The vain hope of respondents in
divorcing the safeguard measures from the concept of taxation is to exclude
from consideration Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
This argument can be debunked at length, but it deserves little attention.

The motivation behind many taxation measures is the implementation of police
power goals. Progressive income taxes alleviate the margin between rich and
poor; the so-called "sin taxes" on alcohol and tobacco manufacturers help
dissuade the consumers from excessive intake of these potentially harmful
products. Taxation is distinguishable from police power as to the means
employed to implement these public good goals. Those doctrines that are
unique to taxation arose from peculiar considerations such as those especially
punitive effects of taxation, 107 and the belief that taxes are the lifeblood of the
state. 108 These considerations necessitated the evolution of taxation as a
distinct legal concept from police power. Yet at the same time, it has been
recognized that taxation may be made the implement of the state's police
power. 109
Even assuming that the SMA should be construed exclusively as a police

power measure, the Court recognizes that police power is lodged primarily in
the national legislature, though it may also be exercised by the executive
branch by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power. 110 Considering these
premises, it is clear that police power, however "illimitable" in theory, is still
exercised within the confines of implementing legislation. To declare otherwise
is to sanction rule by whim instead of rule of law. The Congress, in enacting the
SMA, has delegated the power to impose general safeguard measures to the
executive branch, but at the same time subjected such imposition to
limitations, such as the requirement of a positive final determination by the
Tariff Commission under Section 5. For the executive branch to ignore these
boundaries imposed by Congress is to set up an ignoble clash between the two
co-equal branches of government. Considering that the exercise of police
power emanates from legislative authority, there is little question that the
prerogative of the legislative branch shall prevail in such a clash.
V. Assailed Decision Consistent

With Ruling in Tañada v. Angara
Public respondents allege that the Decision is contrary to our holding in
Tañada v. Angara , 111 since the Court noted therein that the GATT itself
provides built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices,
which according to the public respondents, was a reason "why the Honorable
[Court] ruled the way it did." On the other hand, the Decision "eliminates
safeguard measures as a mode of defense." DCASIT
This is balderdash, as with any and all claims that the Decision allows
foreign industries to ride roughshod over our domestic enterprises. The
Decision does not prohibit the imposition of general safeguard measures to
protect domestic industries in need of protection. All it affirms is that the
positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is first required before the
general safeguard measures are imposed and implemented, a neutral
proposition that gives no regard to the nationalities of the parties involved. A
positive determination by the Tariff Commission is hardly the elusive Shangri-la
of administrative law. If a particular industry finds it difficult to obtain a positive
final determination from the Tariff Commission, it may be simply because the
industry is still sufficiently competitive even in the face of foreign competition.
These safeguard measures are designed to ensure salvation, not avarice.
Respondents well have the right to drape themselves in the colors of the
flag. Yet these postures hardly advance legal claims, or nationalism for that
matter. The fineries of the costume pageant are no better measure of
patriotism than simple obedience to the laws of the Fatherland. And even
assuming that respondents are motivated by genuine patriotic impulses, it
must be remembered that under the setup provided by the SMA, it is the facts,
and not impulse, that determine whether the protective safeguard measures
should be imposed. As once orated, facts are stubborn things; and whatever
may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot
alter the state of facts and evidence. 112
It is our goal as judges to enforce the law, and not what we might deem
as correct economic policy. Towards this end, we should not construe the SMA
to unduly favor or disfavor domestic industries, simply because the law itself
provides for a mechanism by virtue of which the claims of these industries are
thoroughly evaluated before they are favored or disfavored. What we must do
is to simply uphold what the law says. Section 5 says that the DTI Secretary
shall impose the general safeguard measures upon the positive final
determination of the Tariff Commission. Nothing in the whereas clauses or the
invisible ink provisions of the SMA can magically delete the words "positive final
determination" and "Tariff Commission" from Section 5.
VI. On Forum-Shopping
We remain convinced that there was no willful and deliberate forum-
shopping in this case by Southern Cross. The causes of action that animate this
present petition for review and the petition for review with the CTA are distinct
from each other, even though they relate to similar factual antecedents. Yet it
also appears that contrary to the undertaking signed by the President of
Southern Cross, Hironobu Ryu, to inform this Court of any similar action or
proceeding pending before any court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days
from knowledge thereof, Southern Cross informed this Court only on 12 August
2003 of the petition it had filed with the CTA eleven days earlier. An appropriate
sanction is warranted for such failure, but not the dismissal of the petition.
VII. Effects of Court's Resolution
Philcemcor argues that the granting of Southern Cross's Petition should
not necessarily lead to the voiding of the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 5
August 2003 imposing the general safeguard measures. For Philcemcor, the
availability of appeal to the CTA as an available and adequate remedy would
have made the Court of Appeals' Decision merely erroneous or irregular, but
not void. Moreover, the said Decision merely required the DTI Secretary to
render a decision, which could have very well been a decision not to impose a
safeguard measure; thus, it could not be said that the annulled decision
resulted from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals' Decision was annulled precisely because the
appellate court did not have the power to rule on the petition in the first place.
Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does
not have the power to adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We
find no reason to disturb our earlier finding that the Court of Appeals' Decision
is null and void.
At the same time, the Court in its Decision paid particular heed to the
peculiarities attaching to the 5 August 2003 Decisionof the DTI Secretary. In the
DTI Secretary's Decision, he expressly stated that as a result of the Court of
Appeals' Decision, "there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on
the application." Yet the truth remained that there was a legal impediment,
namely, that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and
executory. Moreover, it was declared null and void, and since the DTI Secretary
expressly denominated the Court of Appeals' Decision as his basis for deciding
to impose the safeguard measures, the latter decision must be voided as well.
Otherwise put, without the Court of Appeals' Decision, the DTI Secretary's
Decision of 5 August 2003 would not have been rendered as well.
Accordingly, the Court reaffirms as a nullity the DTI Secretary's Decision
dated 5 August 2003. As a necessary consequence, no further action can be
taken on Philcemcor's Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure.
Obviously, if the imposition of the general safeguard measure is void as we
declared it to be, any extension thereof should likewise be fruitless. The proper
remedy instead is to file a new application for the imposition of safeguard
measures, subject to the conditions prescribed by the SMA. Should this step be
eventually availed of, it is only hoped that the parties involved would content
themselves in observing the proper procedure, instead of making a mockery of
the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, respondents' Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
Respondent DTI Secretary is hereby ENJOINED from taking any further
action on the pending Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. TIESCA
Hironobu Ryu, President of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation,

and Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz, counsel petitioner, are hereby
given FIVE (5) days from receipt of this Resolution to EXPLAIN why they should
not be meted disciplinary sanction for failing to timely inform the Court of the
filing of Southern Cross's Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals, as
adverted to earlier in this Resolution .
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario

and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice A. V. Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see Separate Opinion (concurring & dissenting).
Ynares-Santiago, J., I join J. Panganiban in his dissent.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I join Justice Panganiban in his dissent.
Carpio, J., took no part. My former law office appeared before DTI for a
party.
Corona, J., is on official leave.

Carpio-Morales, J., I join the dissent of J. Panganiban.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
"As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for

determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially
when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on
how the law should be effectively enforced." 1
Once again, this Court is faced with a controversy that ultimately affects
the economic life of the country. While on its face, the problem appears to be
merely one of legal construction of a statute, its consequences and implications
dig deep into the ability and power of the Executive Department to protect
domestic industries from injurious importations of foreign products.
Indeed, the main substantive issue of this case boils down to the dexterity
of the secretary of trade —” the government's principal official empowered to
superintend the nation's commercial life and to promote investments —” to
impose safeguard measures to protect the local cement industry from the
onslaught of unfair foreign competition.
I respectfully submit that, absent any patent violation of laws or grave

abuse of discretion, the top trade official should be given the widest discretion
to be able to promote the best interest of the country in the field of trade,
industry and investments. I believe that this Court should not interfere
unnecessarily in commercial and economic policies, but allow our executive
officials to meet head-on the vicissitudes of international trade competition
spawned by globalization, deregulation and liberalization.
As will be demonstrated later on, I firmly submit that law, justice, equity,
reason, logic, national interest and common sense impel the maintenance of
this Court's policy of laissez-faire. In short, the judiciary should be
deferential to the powers residing in, and respectful of the actions
taken by, the top government official who has primary responsibility
for the commercial development of the nation.
Background Information
Before the Court en banc are Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision
2 promulgated by this Court's Second Division, filed by 1) the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of public respondents and 2) the Philippine
Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor). 3 The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is DECLARED NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 is also DECLARED
NULL AND VOID and SET ASIDE. No costs."
In a Resolution dated September 15, 2004, the Special Second Division

referred to the Court en banc the respective Motions to refer the case to the
banc, filed by the solicitor general and private respondent. On September 21,
2004, the full Court resolved to accept the referral.
On March 1, 2005, the 15 members of the Court heard oral arguments on
the two main issues involved: 1) whether a decision of the secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) denying the imposition of a safeguard
measure is appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA); and 2) whether the
DTI secretary may impose a general safeguard measure, only upon a positive
final determination by the Tariff Commission (TC).
To recall, the assailed Decision answered both questions in the
affirmative. 4 It held that the CTA, not the Court of Appeals (CA), had the
jurisdiction to review the DTI secretary's decision, whether imposing a
safeguard measure or not. It explained that the proviso "in connection with the
imposition of a safeguard measure" in Section 29 5 of Republic Act (RA) 8800
pertained to "all rulings of the DTI [s]ecretary . . . which arise from the time an
application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure
is taken," 6 including the final decision imposing or not imposing such measure.
Because the law clearly provided aggrieved parties with a legal remedy
(petition for review with the CTA), a special civil action for certiorari did not
avail. Hence, the CA Decision was declared void and set aside. TIEHSA
The Decision of the Second Division also ruled that, pursuant to a literal
interpretation of Section 5 7 of the law (RA 8800), the DTI secretary could
impose a safeguard measure only upon a positive final determination by the
Tariff Commission. The Decision differentiated between the power to make a
final determination of the presence of serious injury or threat to the domestic
industry and the authority to impose the safeguard measure. It held that the
power to make a final determination was lodged in the Tariff Commission; and
the authority to impose the safeguard, in the DTI secretary.
The present Resolution written by the esteemed Justice Dante O. Tinga
upholds the assailed Decision in toto. I beg to differ.
While I agree that the CTA has jurisdiction to review the DTI secretary's
decision either imposing or not imposing a safeguard measure, I respectfully
disagree, however, that the said cabinet official is bound by the
recommendations of the Tariff Commission and may thus impose a safeguard
measure only when it so recommends. I respectfully submit that the DTI
secretary has the power to impose safeguard measures even if the TC
does not recommend such imposition.
The First Issue:

Jurisdiction to Review the
Secretary's Decisions
The OSG's Position
The OSG avers that the Decision, as far as it disposed of the first issue,
"was based solely on an expansive interpretation of . . . Section 29 of [RA] No.
8800." This interpretation allegedly undermines the rule against the
presumption of jurisdiction and could bring about erroneous interpretations of
provisions on jurisdiction that would result in fatal consequences for the parties
or in endless litigation. 8
Purportedly, Section 29 expressly limits CTA jurisdiction to cases in which
a safeguard measure is imposed, not when the DTI secretary does not impose
the measure. Thus, the OSG submits that the CTA had no jurisdiction over the
April 5, 2002 Decision of the DTI secretary; and that it was proper for herein
private respondent to have resorted to a special civil action for certiorari before
the CA.
The government counsel further contends that RA 9282, 9 a new law that
was enacted on March 30, 2004, now expressly confers upon the CTA
jurisdiction over decisions "to impose or not to impose" safeguard measures.
Supposedly, this new explicit provision only shows that RA 8800 did not intend
to include a review of DTI decisions involving the non-imposition of the said
measures.
Private Respondent's Contentions
Philcemcor similarly contends that Congress limited the power of review
of the CTA to the "single situation of an imposition by the [s]ecretary of
safeguard measures to the exclusion of the situation of non-imposition . . . ."
Respondent also argues that the TC is not a quasi-judicial body; it neither

determines private rights nor decides controversies. Thus, its acts "are per se
administratively reviewable." Otherwise, an error on its part will have far-
ranging consequences, "cut[ting] across sectoral boundaries in the national
economy, and across industry boundaries within each sector of the economy.
Thus, its recommendations should be subject to review by the DTI secretary
whose mandate has a macroeconomic scope . . . and who has the statutory
burden of promoting the development of industry and other sectors of the
economy." 10 Corollarily, not being a quasi-judicial body, its reports are not
appealable to either the CTA or the CA, according to Philcemcor.
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner, on the other hand, agrees with the assailed Decision holding
that the DTI secretary's ruling in either instance is appealable to the CTA.
Petitioner reiterates the interpretation that the phrase "in connection with" in
Section 29 of RA 8800 means "if it has connection with or reference to." Thus,
the DTI secretary's Decision not to impose a safeguard measure is reviewable
by the CTA, because it relates or has reference to the imposition of that
measure.
This interpretation is allegedly confirmed by RA 9282, Section 7(a)(7) 11 of

which provides that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a decision
of the DTI secretary "to impose or not to impose" safeguard measures.
Petitioner posits that this provision merely reflects or reiterates Section 29 of
RA 8800; it does not constitute an expansion of the CTA jurisdiction. Otherwise,
an absurdity would arise: in case the DTI secretary imposes a definitive
safeguard measure, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to appeal to
the CTA; but in case the decision is not to impose the measure, the remedy
would be to appeal to the CA. 12
My Submission:
The CTA Has Jurisdiction
A CTA Review of the DTI Secretary's
Rulings Provided for by RA 8800
On the issue of jurisdiction, I agree with the Court's Resolution penned by
Justice Tinga that the DTI secretary's decisions —” whether imposing safeguard
measures or not —” are subject to review by the CTA, pursuant to Section 29 13
of RA 8800. AEIHaS
The meaning of the phrase in connection with the imposition of a

safeguard measure is not same as imposing a safeguard measure; otherwise,
the law would simply have sufficed without the qualifying connector.
Consequently, all final rulings relating to an application for the measure —”
whether imposing, extending, terminating or disallowing one —” are in
connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure, and thus appealable to
the CTA.
Let me clarify, though, a rather loose statement in the Court's Resolution

that the "entire subset of rulings that the DTI [s]ecretary may issue . . .,
including those that are provisional, interlocutory . . ." are in connection with
the imposition of a safeguard measure; and also "the phrase ['in connection
with'] includes all rulings of the DTI [s]ecretary which arise from the time an
application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure
is taken." Both statements seem to imply that all aforementioned rulings are
therefore appealable to the CTA pursuant to Section 29.
It is a legal truism, however, that interlocutory orders are not subject to
an appeal or a petition for review until the main case is finally resolved on the
merits. 14 RA 8800 does not explicitly state which rulings of the DTI secretary
are reviewable by way of a petition for review with the CTA. However, the Rules
of Court and settled jurisprudence provide that only judgments or final orders
disposing of the merits of a case may be the subject of appeals or petitions for
review. 15 Since RA 8800 does not amend the extant Rules (assuming arguendo
that Congress had the power to amend the Rules of Court), they must be
applied to the intended appeals.
In the present case, private respondent did not appeal the DTI secretary's
Decision to either the CTA or the CA, but instead invoked the CA's certiorari
power under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. But one of the requisites of a special civil action for certiorari is that
there be no appeal; or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. 16 As discussed, RA 8800 expressly provides for a legal remedy
to question the DTI secretary's decisions —” that of filing a petition for review
to the CTA. Given this expedient and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
as provided by law, private respondent's recourse to certiorari before the CA
must necessarily fail. As a consequence, it has inopportunely lost its legal route
for a judicial review of the DTI ruling.
In any event, as the determination of the case is dependent on current
pertinent econometric data and their effects on the domestic industry, the
peculiar circumstances make a ruling on the merits inadvisable at this time.
The original application for a safeguard measure was filed way back in 2001,
and it has been almost four years since the imposition of the provisional
safeguard measure. 17 The cement import statistics on record may no longer be
relevant at present. I agree with the Resolution that the available remedy at
this time is to file a new application for the imposition of a definitive safeguard
measure, if warranted under the present circumstances.
The CTA's Essential
Technical Expertise
Moreover, I believe that the CTA is the proper and competent body to
review the DTI secretary's decisions involving safeguard measures. By the very
nature of its functions, the CTA is a highly specialized court specifically created
for the purpose of reviewing tax and customs cases. It is dedicated exclusively
to the study and consideration of revenue-related problems and has necessarily
developed an expertise on the subject. 18 Thus, as a general rule, its findings
and conclusions are accorded great respect and are generally upheld by this
Court, unless there is a clear showing of a reversible error or an improvident
exercise of authority.
While primarily intended to protect domestic industries, safeguard

measures are incidentally revenue-generating and generally in the nature of,
though not always equivalent to, tariff impositions. They may consist of a tariff
increase, duty, tariff-rate quota, quantitative restriction, adjustment measure or
a combination of these. 19 In the determination of their imposition, the following
factors are to be taken into consideration: rate and amount of increase in the
importation of the product concerned; share of the domestic market taken by
the increased imports; and changes in the level of sales, production,
productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment. 20 Most of
these factors involve data analysis which, by virtue of the highly specialized
technical expertise of the CTA, must be more familiar to it than to the CA.
Thus, as between the two appellate courts, the CTA should have the
jurisdiction to review decisions involving safeguard measures, whether imposed
or not. In either case, a review will necessarily entail a reappraisal of the facts
from which the decisions were based. In both instances, a factual reassessment
would encompass the same kind of knowledge and technical expertise. Indeed,
it would be absurd if only a positive decision is reviewable by the CTA, while a
negative one is passed on to the CA.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that laws should be given a
sensible construction, so as to give effect to their rationale and intent and thus
avoid an unjust or absurd interpretation. 21 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis
semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. When there is
ambiguity, an interpretation that will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. 22 In other words, a rational interpretation must be effectuated.
Contrary to the contention of the solicitor general, Section 7(a)(7) of RA
9282 merely restates in clearer language Section 29 of RA 8800. Undeniably,
the imperfect craftsmanship of the latter has spawned some ambiguity. I
believe that Congress did not mean to add, via Section 7(a)(7) of RA 9282, a
new matter to the jurisdiction of the CTA. For all along, the legislative intent has
been to vest in the CTA the power to review the imposition or non-imposition of
safeguard measures. aESTAI
Between the enactment of RA 8800 in 2000 and RA 9282 in 2004, there

has been no significant supervening change in circumstances in our economic
or trade environments or even in our judicial structure, which would justify
Congress to add to the jurisdiction of the CTA the review of the non-imposition
of a safeguard measure. The only significant intervening event that seems
worth considering is the present proceeding, which precisely reveals an
ambiguity that Congress did not intend when it enacted RA 8800. Section 7(a)
(7) of RA 9282 now explicitly expresses the law's intent.
Consequences of the
CA Decision
Because the CA wrongly exercised its limited certiorari power, its June 5,
2003 Decision was rendered without jurisdiction and, hence, null and void. 23
Held to be dead limbs on the judicial tree are void judgments, which should be
disregarded or ignored. 24
Likewise, the DTI Decision dated June 25, 2003, issued pursuant to the
void CA judgment, is necessarily invalid. A void judgment is worthless and has
no legal effect. 25 It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. Thus, all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. 26
Accordingly, the present Petition, which seeks a review of a void Decision
of the CA should, in the ordinary course, also be dismissed. Generally, this
Court cannot review a legally inexistent judgment. 27
Exceptions When Supreme Court
May Exercise Jurisdiction
In not a few cases, though, this Court has exercised its discretionary
power to take cognizance of a petition, if compelling reasons or the nature and
importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction. 28 For instance, in Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 29 while
recognizing that the Board of Investments had primary jurisdiction over the
merits of the case, this Court nevertheless proceeded to exercise its review
powers. It justified its act on the basis of "procedural expediency and
consideration of [the] public interest involved in the questions before us which
bear on the certainty and stability of economic policies and proper
implementation thereof." 30
Also in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 31 the
Court resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction, inasmuch as the petition
involved only "constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest." It
noted that cases that had to be remanded or referred to a lower body as the
proper forum, or as the one that was better equipped to resolve the issues,
generally involved factual questions. Such a remand is merely in accordance
with the principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in taking
jurisdiction over the petition, "unnecessary delays and expenses" would be
avoided.
In the present case, it is indisputable that the only issues raised are legal
in nature. They relate to the ability of the Executive Department to exercise its
discretionary powers over an economic policy matter. At the core of the
controversy is the correct interpretation of a law enacted to address a
primordial concern of the State. That concern is to serve and protect the Filipino
people 32 by developing a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by them, 33 in the face of global competition brought
about by world trade liberalization. It should also be recalled that the State, in
promoting industrialization, is constitutionally mandated to protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. 34 The
Safeguard Measures Law was precisely enacted to give life to these
constitutional policies.
In addition, if the issues before us are left unresolved, they will most likely
crop up again in a similar application under the law. All the parties involved —”
the DTI, the Tariff Commission and the private entities —” would then still be in
a quandary with respect to whether the DTI head is bound by or may review
(and modify or reverse) recommendations of the Commission; as well as
whether the latter should make a final determination or simply submit its
recommendations. These questions of law would ineludibly be brought before
this Court again, creating unnecessary delays and expenses —” the undesirable
ills sought to be banished by the Court's oft-repeated policy of administering
justice efficiently, effectively and promptly.

Thus, the Court is well within its powers to resolve the main substantive
issue at this time, in view of higher public interests; and the speedy, efficient
and proper administration of substantial justice.
The Second Issue:
Reviewability of the
Tariff Commission's Report
The OSG's Position
With respect to the second main issue, the solicitor general avers that the
DTI is not bound by the recommendation of the Tariff Commission. A careful
scrutiny of Section 5 of RA 8800 allegedly reveals "no indication whatsoever
that it is only upon a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission that
a general safeguard may be imposed. . . . . Thus, the law necessarily permits
instances when general safeguard measures may be imposed despite the
absence of such determination" by the Commission. 35
The OSG also argues that RA 8800 must be interpreted in congruence
with Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
Congress may delegate to the President the authority to impose tariff rates.
Being a mere agency in the Executive Department whose officials serve at the
pleasure of the President, the Tariff Commission could not have been
authorized by the law to impose its views on the Chief Executive. Neither could
the law have intended a situation in which "an alter ego of the President would
be a mere rubber stamp that would be compelled to enforce the
recommendations of a mere agency in the Executive Department." 36
Furthermore, the OSG claims that under the charter 37 of the Commission
(and likewise under RA 8800), the latter's functions are primarily investigatory
and, at most, recommendatory. The TC has no power to decide or adjudicate.
Hence, the Implementing Rules of RA 8800 required that, after concluding its
formal investigation, the TC should submit a report to the DTI. "[T]he act of
submitting documents to another body necessarily implies the power of the
receiving body to review and [to] evaluate the submitted documents . . . ." 38
Besides, legislative deliberations also reveal that "[t]he intent of Congress is to
vest [the] DTI [s]ecretary with the final authority over recommendations of the
Tariff Commission." Even the TC's own chairman 39 concedes that the
Commission's report, made after public consultations, is only recommendatory.
40
Finally, the intent and spirit of the law is purportedly to protect domestic
industries from the ill effects of import surges. 41 According to the OSG, to hold
the DTI secretary bound to the Tariff Commission's negative determination
would deprive of any remedy a domestic industry suffering from serious injury.
42
Private Respondent's Arguments

Private Respondent Philcemcor essentially agrees with the OSG. The
former claims that the Decision misreads Section 5 of RA 8800 when it
interprets "the proposition 'if A, then B' as if it stated that 'if A, and only A, then
B. ' " 43 A textual and contextual analysis of related provisions 44 allegedly
reveals otherwise. Even the record of legislative deliberations does not support
the Second Division's reading of the term "final determination" by the Tariff
Commission. Similarly, the SMA's implementing rules and regulations 45 and
relevant administrative orders, 46 as well as the public statement made by the
Commission chairman, 47 uniformly state that the TC's findings and
determinations are not binding or conclusive on, but merely recommendatory
to, the DTI secretary. ATEHDc
The relationship of the Commission and the DTI, according to Philcemcor,

is that of recommending authority and decision-maker, respectively.
Accordingly, the DTI secretary may adopt, modify or reject the TC's Report.
The Commission supposedly cannot make a determination, much less a

decision, that would oust the secretary of jurisdiction over the application for
safeguard measures. For "[t]he law has seen fit to give its findings no more
than the legal effect of a report or recommendation." 48 In contrast, in the
scheme of government, the DTI secretary is allegedly the alter ego of the
President in the implementation of the State's economic goals and is
specifically mandated to achieve the constitutional goals on the national
economy and patrimony. 49 As the President's alter ego in the discharge of the
executive power to implement the SMA, the DTI secretary has the power of
"supervision and control" over the Commission's functions under the law.
In Philcemcor's view, "it is unthinkable that the DTI secretary is not free to
adopt his own independent judgment on" matters that "he considers as
erroneous conclusions arising from a flawed framework and methodology." 50
The department head's function would then be reduced to performing purely
ministerial acts rather than rendering decisions that require the exercise of
discretion. 51
Petitioner's Contentions
On the other side of the fence, petitioner insists that the DTI secretary is
empowered to impose safeguard measures only if the Tariff Commission makes
a positive final determination of the existence of the "core elements of a
safeguard situation." 52 Petitioner avers that the presence of those elements is
a conditio sine qua non for the imposition of a safeguard measure. The final
determination of their existence is allegedly conferred by law upon the
Commission, which was established and exists mainly to evaluate and impose
tariffs. In contrast, the DTI secretary has no competence or institutional
experience in dealing with tariff-related matters. 53
Petitioner also claims that the Tariff Commission exercises quasi-judicial
powers, as RA 8800 requires it "to make the final determination of the presence
or absence of the core elements for the imposition of a safeguard measure." 54
Such determination supposedly involves the application of the law to the facts
and results in the adjudication of the rights and obligations of the affected
parties. 55
My Submission:
DTI Secretary Not Bound
by the TC's Recommendations
I agree with the OSG and private respondent.
The Power to Impose Tariffs

Is Essentially Legislative;
It is Delegable Only to the President
Briefly, my submission, which I shall expound on presently, is as follows.
The application of safeguard measures, while primarily intended to protect
domestic industries, is essentially in the nature of a tariff imposition. Pursuant
to the Constitution, the imposition of tariffs and taxes is a highly prized
legislative prerogative. 56 Pursuant also to the Constitution, such power to fix
tariffs may, as an exception, be delegated by Congress to the President.
Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution provides for that exception, as

follows:
"Sec. 28.. . .
(2)The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix,
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government."
Under this constitutional provision, to no other official, except the

President, is the authority to fix tariff rates, quotas, imposts and other duties
allowed to be delegated. However, the Resolution authored by Justice Tinga
theorizes that Congress may delegate such power to fix tariffs to both the Tariff
Commission and the DTI secretary, "as agents of Congress." I believe that this
theory plainly violates the aforequoted Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution.
I respectfully submit that the only constitutional way to uphold the DTI
secretary's imposition of tariffs under RA 8800 is to apply the alter ego
principle. In other words, the DTI secretary imposes safeguard measures (like
tariffs, import quotas, quantitative restriction, etc.) only in representation and
as an alter ego of the President in the field of trade and investment matters.
Thus, the law must be construed as delegating to the President —” through the
latter's alter ego on trade —” the power to impose safeguard measures.
Under the same Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution, Congress
may specify "limitations and restrictions" on the President's authority to impose
tariff rates. However, such statutory limitations and restrictions must
themselves conform to the fundamental law. They cannot infringe, restrict,
limit, degrade or dilute the constitutional power of the President to control the
entire Executive Department.
The power of control includes the right to modify or set aside a decision of
a subordinate officer. Since the Tariff Commission is an agency in the Executive
Department, it is necessarily subject to the control and supervision of the
President. Hence, its decisions and recommendations cannot tie the hands of
the Chief Executive with finality. Consequently, the DTI head, acting as the
President's agent pursuant to RA 8800, may affirm, modify or reverse the Tariff
Commission's recommendation. To repeat, such plenary power of control
cannot be restricted by a mere statute passed by Congress. 57
Let me now discuss my proposition in more detail.
Executive Power Vested

Upon the President
For better clarity, there is a need to put our government's administrative
structure in perspective. Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution vests
executive power upon the President, the highest official of the land. In the
exercise of this power, the President, acting in many capacities, assumes a
plenitude of authority. 58 Because of the sheer multitude of the tasks of the
Chief Executive, however, the heads of the various executive agencies act as
the former's alter egos or agents in the performance of multifarious executive
and administrative functions. HTCDcS
I n Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 59 this Court described the role of the

President's top officials thus: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads
of various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that
of the President. . . . '[E]ach head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.' . . . [Thus,] their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."
The DTI Head as President's
Alter Ego on Trade Matters
Executive Order 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987) outlines the
administrative structure and functions of the national government. In the realm
of trade, industry and investment-related matters, the President's alter ego is
the DTI secretary, to whom is given the following mandate:
"Section 2.Mandate. —” The Department of Trade and Industry
shall be the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory
arm of the Executive Branch of government in the area of trade,
industry and investments. It shall promote and develop an
industrialization program effectively controlled by Filipinos and shall
act as catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to
accelerate and sustain economic growth through; (a) comprehensive
industrial growth strategy, (b) a progressive and socially responsible
liberalization program, (c) policies designed for the expansion and
diversification of trade, and (d) policies to protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. " 60
In line with the above mandate, the DTI is tasked under RA 8800 to apply
general safeguard measures, when warranted, to protect domestic industries
and producers from increased imports. 61
On the other hand, the Tariff Commission is primarily tasked to

investigate "the administration of, and the fiscal and industrial effects of the
tariff and customs laws of this country . . . [and,] in general, to investigate the
operation of customs and tariff laws, including their relation to the national
revenues, their effect upon the industries and labor of the country, and to
submit reports of its investigations . . . ." 62 It is also tasked to investigate
"the tariff relations between the Philippines and foreign countries . . . the effect
of export bounties and preferential transportation rates; . . . the volume of
importations compared with domestic production and consumption; [as well as]
conditions, causes and effects relating to competition of foreign industries with
those of the Philippines, including dumping and cost of production." 63
Whereas the DTI secretary has to carry out a policy mandate for the
President, the Tariff Commission is but an investigatory arm that submits
reports of its investigations as provided under the law. 64 Under RA 8800, it is
tasked to conduct a formal investigation upon the DTI secretary's referral of an
application/a petition for a safeguard measure. 65 After completion of the
investigation, it submits to the secretary a report that contains its findings and
recommendations. 66 Nothing in the law explicitly states that its report or
conclusions have the effect of finality and irrefutability that shall bind the DTI
head, or the President for that matter.
As the cabinet official and alter ego of the President on trade, industry
and investment-related matters, the DTI head necessarily has sufficient latitude
and discretion in the pursuit of the Department's mandate. On the other hand,
being primarily a fact-finder, the Tariff Commission is limited to submitting its
report and recommendations to the referring agency. In this scheme of tasking,
absent any clear and direct provision of the Constitution, the TC's mere
recommendation cannot bind the cabinet official, much less the President. As
the solicitor general aptly suggests, RA 8800 could not have intended that the
alter ego of the President be a mere rubber stamp who would be compelled to
enforce the recommendations of a purely investigatory agency in the Executive
Department. 67
As Chief Executive of the Republic, the President exercises control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. 68 Control is defined as "the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter." 69 The President's power extends to "all
executive officers from cabinet member to the lowliest clerk. It is at the heart of
the meaning of 'Chief Executive.'" 70
Pursuant to the power of control over subalterns, the President may
modify or set aside a recommended action of a subordinate office. Indeed, in
accordance with its investigatory findings, the Tariff Commission may
recommend to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) an
increase in tariff rates in general; and the latter may in turn endorse the tariff
increase to the President who, however, is not bound to impose such increase.
The Chief Executive may, in the interest of the public, choose not to follow the
recommended action. So, too, may the alter ego, who merely acts as an
extension of the President.
The Tinga Resolution states —” erroneously, I submit —” that I advocate
the President's exercise of absolute and plenary control over subordinates,
such that the Chief Executive could order them to perform illegal or irregular
acts. I do not, and I have made no such preposterous statement. Needless to
state, the exercise of any power must be within the bounds of the Constitution
and law. True, Congress may reorganize the offices under the Executive
Department. It may even abolish or merge some of them. However, it cannot
abolish or restrict the President's constitutional power of control over executive
agencies and officials. The control power of the Chief Executive emanates from
the Constitution; no act of Congress may validly curtail it.
Neither am I asserting that the President's subalterns may control actions
of subordinate officials or agencies over which they have no direct functional
relationship as established by law. Such outlandish proposition would truly
produce absurd results. Indeed, the secretary of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) has no right to reverse the rulings of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) or the issuances of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA),
because there is no law granting the DOST secretary any power to do so. aIcDCA
But, it cannot be denied that the secretary of the Department of

Transportation and Communications may review the rulings of the CAB; of the
Department of Agriculture, those of the PCA; and of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the decisions of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau. In doing so, the heads of these departments act as the
agent or alter egosof the President in their respective spheres of authority.
That the TC was placed under the administrative supervision of the NEDA
does not give the latter the sole power to review the Commission's reports.
Precisely, RA 8800 creates a functional relationship between the Commission
and the DTI secretary. It provides for the administrative interplay between the
two agencies —” but only with regard to the application of general safeguard
measures. More precisely, when the DTI secretary reviews (and ultimately
affirms, modifies or reverses) the recommendation of the Commission, he or
she does so, not as one who is higher than the Commission in the
administrative stratum, but as the alter ego of the President who, by
constitutional fiat, is the only official to whom the authority to impose such
measures may be delegated by Congress.
Authority to Impose Tariffs

Allowed to be Delegated Only
to the President and Subalterns
Elementary is the rule that the power to tax is inherent upon the State,
but can be exercised only by Congress, unless allowed by the Constitution to be
conferred upon another qualified government instrumentality. 71 The power to
fix tariff rates also lies in the legislature. However, the delegation of that power
to the President is permissible, under Section 28 of Article VI of the
Constitution, as earlier mentioned.
RA 8800 must be construed in harmony with the said constitutional
provision. In delegating to the DTI secretary the power to impose safeguard
measures, Congress could have done so only within the constitutional
restriction. The legislature could not have simply chosen the DTI secretary and
the Tariff Commission as its agents in imposing the measure. Its delegation of
the power to impose tariffs to whomsoever it chose (other than the President)
was beyond its constitutional authority. To read the law in such a manner would
inevitably result in the statute's unconstitutionality.
To be consistent with the constitutional clause, the law must be

understood to mean that in delegating the authority to impose safeguard
measures, Congress designated the DTI secretary, being the President's
subaltern or alter ego on trade matters. Again, Congress could not have directly
constituted the cabinet official as its own agent, because the Constitution
categorically limited the delegation of such authority to the President. The
fundamental law expressly states that Congress may authorize the President
(and names no other official) to impose (subject to limitations and restrictions
that it may specify) tariffs, quotas, duties and other imposts. For the legislature
to delegate the authority to another official or entity, such as the Tariff
Commission, and to completely disregard or do away with the President would
be a blatant contravention of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of RA 8800 on this ground has, however, not been
raised by the parties. Besides, courts should hesitate to rule upon a
constitutional question if the controversy may be resolved on other justifiable
grounds. 72 In any case, I submit that the law is susceptible of interpretation in
such a manner as to remain consistent with the Constitution.
To reiterate, RA 8800 delegates to the trade secretary, as subaltern of the
Chief Executive —” not Congress' own agent —” the power to prescribe
safeguard measures.
Clearly then, in imposing a safeguard measure, the DTI secretary acts as
the President's alter ego. Because the President's power of control over any
office in the Executive Department cannot be restricted or degraded by
Congress, by the same reasoning the exercise by the alter ego of such power of
control over actions of the Tariff Commission cannot be constitutionally
curtailed by Congress. Otherwise stated, the President —” through the
constitutional power of control over the Executive Department —” has the
prerogative to affirm, modify or reverse any action of the Tariff Commission.
Thus, the DTI secretary —” as the President's alter ego on trade matters —”
may exercise, in the President's stead, the same prerogative of affirmation,
modification or reversal over any action of the Commission.

Congress' Restrictions on the
Imposition of Safeguards
Needless to state, the President's (and the subalterns') power of control
surely cannot be exercised on mere whim or caprice. Indeed, in exercising the
authority delegated to impose tariffs or other safeguard measures, the
President (and the subalterns) may not do so without rhyme or reason or just to
appease external pressures or political forces. The Chief Executive is indeed
bound by the valid restrictions or limitations laid down in RA 8800.
Section 5 of that law specifies the conditions for the application of

safeguard measures, as follows: (1) the importation of a product in increased
quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production; (2) an
actual or a threatened serious injury 73 to the domestic industry as a result of
increased importation; and, (3) most important, application of the safeguard
measure to serve the public interest.
These are the substantial conditions or limitations specified by the law for
the imposition by the DTI head (or, principally, the President) of a safeguard
measure. 74 The Tariff Commission is tasked to determine the presence of the
first two conditions —” matters that may be ascertained by factual
examination. The final factor is left to the discretion of the DTI secretary. Public
interest is something in which the public or community at large has some
pecuniary interest affecting their legal rights or liabilities. 75 Because it
concerns the general public, its determination is not quantifiable in exact
terms. There are no definite parameters by which it may be established solely
by judicial authorities. Its determination is indubitably a political question; thus,
it is addressed to a policy maker who is answerable to the people, not a fact
finder or investigatory body that has no electoral mandate. SHCaDA
To emphasize, the congressional limitation on the exercise of the

delegated authority to impose safeguards does NOT refer to the final
determination or recommendation of the Tariff Commission that the first two
factual conditions are present or absent. Of course, these are important
considerations that are verifiable from the records of the proceedings
undertaken by the Commission. These data must be weighed accordingly. In
the same vein, many immeasurable and indirect variables have to be assessed
in ensuring that public interest is subserved. In the final analysis, the decision
to impose a safeguard measure hinges on public interest, which is a political
question best addressed by our people's elected officials led by the President.
Contemporaneous Administrative
Construction Prevailing
The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is
tasked to implement a statute, is generally accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. 76
The crafting of the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of RA 8800
was a joint undertaking of several executive agencies —” the Departments of
Agriculture, Trade and Industry, and Finance; the Bureau of Customs; the NEDA;
and the Tariff Commission —” after consultations with domestic industries. 77
Rule 13.2 of the final IRR expressly states as follows:
"Rule 13.2.Final Determination by the Secretary
"Rule 13.2.a.Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Report of

the Commission, the Secretary shall make a decision, taking into
consideration the measures recommended by the Commission."
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the very administrative government agencies tasked under the

same law to implement its provisions clearly understood that it is the DTI
secretary who makes the final determination or decision. In making a decision,
the secretary merely takes into consideration the recommendations of the
Tariff Commission. On the other hand, the latter, in making its
recommendations, does not determine in an adjudicative manner the rights,
privileges and duties of private parties. Hence, its functions, even under RA
8800, cannot be classified as quasi-judicial. 78
If RA 8800 intended to transform the Tariff Commission into a quasi-
judicial body, as private respondent asserts, I think no less than the
Commission would have been happiest to don the new vest. But, aptly, it has
shown no such presumptuousness. In its own TC Order No. 00-02, it described
its task as "fact-finding and administrative in nature." 79 In interpreting the
requirement of the law, it fully understood that "[b]ased on its findings, the
Commission shall submit to the [s]ecretary . . . [its] Investigation Report [and]
proposed recommendations . . .," among others.
Commission Chairman Edgardo Abon was clearly cognizant of the TC's
role in the proceedings on the original application for a safeguard measure. As
the solicitor general submits, during the public consultation conducted by the
Commission in relation to this case, its chairman categorically stated that their
(TC members') "recommendation is but recommendatory. . . . . That's why the
Tariff Commission's investigation is called fact-finding. . . . . [B]ut of course the
recommendation can be persuasive because the [s]ecretary will have a strong
argument, must really have a very, very strong arguments (sic) for him to
overturn the recommendations. It has a persuasive effect, that's what [I'm]
saying, but at the end of the day[,] you know . . . the [s]ecretary has, for reason
I think in the law the matter of public interest is left to the discretion of the
[s]ecretary . . . . 80
Chairman Abon could not have been more precise. Indeed, 1) the role of
the Commission is fact-finding and recommendatory; 2) its recommendation is
persuasive (being based on public consultations); and 3) the secretary must
have very strong and substantial reasons to overturn the Commission's
proposed action.
The last item is important. The DTI secretary could not issue a decision
arbitrarily, without substantial factual and legal bases. In making a final
decision —” whether to impose or not to impose a safeguard measure —” the
secretary is still bound by the conditions laid down in Section 5 of RA 8800. As
earlier mentioned, those limitations are as follows: the importation of a product
in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic
production; an actual or a threatened serious injury to the domestic industry as
a result of increased importation; and the application of the safeguard measure
in the public interest.
These parameters should allay petitioner's fear of a violation of due
process in case of a reversal by the secretary of the negative determination by
the Commission. Both may have the same factual moorings on the basis of
which they may, however, have contrasting conclusions on the need for a
safeguard measure.
In addition, the decision of the secretary, as I have stated at the outset

and as provided under RA 8800, is reviewable by the CTA.
In contrast, under petitioner's submission (upheld by the Second Division)

that the DTI secretary may impose the measure only upon a positive
determination by the Tariff Commission, a violation of due process would be
more probable in case of a negative determination by the latter. Following the
ponencia's literal interpretation of the law, the aggrieved party (the applicant)
in such a situation would be left with absolutely no recourse. A negative report
will then be not reviewable by anyone —” not by the DTI secretary who is
bound by it; not by the President, who has no direct role in the proceeding
defined under the law; and not by the courts, which may review only the DTI
secretary's decisions. Such a scheme of things constitutes an utter disregard of
the guarantee of due process under the Constitution. ECcTaS
The ponencia even goes further by declaring that "nothing in the SMA
obliges the DTI [s]ecretary to adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff
Commission." 81 If the trade secretary can reject a positive final determination
of the Commission, what is the rationale behind binding him to a negative
determination by the same body? I cannot think of more illogic.
Giving Meaning to the

Intent and Purpose of the Law
Moreover, the object and purpose of RA 8800 should be given utmost
consideration and effect. The law was enacted primarily to protect or safeguard
local industries and producers from increased importation of foreign products,
which cause or threaten to cause serious domestic injury. RA 8800 was
intended to secure our local industry from the ill effects of global trade
liberalization. It was aimed at protecting Filipino interests vis-Ã -vis
international trade policies.
Toward these ends, I believe this Court must give domestic industries
every opportunity to seek redress through the most expeditious means
possible. On matters concerning policy questions, it must allow the political
departments ample chances to make the proper determinations within their
respective spheres of competencies. Be it remembered that in the imposition of
safeguard measures, not only the analysis of technical data is involved but
likewise, and perhaps in a more crucial sense, the determination that it serves
the public interest. The proceeding does not merely relate to the settlement of
conflicting claims of private parties but, more important, the achievement of
the national policy to promote the competitiveness of domestic industries as a
whole. In short, we must give essence to the aim of the law to advance the
industrial development of the country.
In line with this aim, the doctrine on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies should be made to work out. After all, the administrative agencies of
the government, particularly the Department of Trade and Industry with respect
to safeguard measures, possess the necessary knowledge and expertise linked
up with policy concerns. The Department heads, especially because they serve
as alter egos of the President, should not be needlessly restricted in the
exercise of their discretion. It is they who best know how to address properly
the nonjudicial interests of the people. Thus, before resorting to courts, all
possible administrative means should be exhausted.
While on the topic of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may I add my
personal belief that the Decision of the secretary of trade should be appealable
to the President. 82 After all, the President cannot be deprived of the power to
review, modify or reverse actions of his or her alter egos. In the present case,
the Constitution expressly mentions the "President" as the official whom
"Congress may, by law, authorize" to impose "tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imports." Thus, in the
Executive Department, the President should have the final say on such matters.
However, I shall not dwell at length on this point because it was not raised as
an issue by the parties.
Peripheral Issue:
Forum Shopping
With respect to the question on forum shopping, I also agree with the
Resolution of the Court that petitioner must answer for its failure to give timely
information to the Court of the Petition for Review that the former filed with the
CTA while the present case was pending here. But there being no showing of
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the Petition does not deserve outright
dismissal.
It should be recalled that pursuant to the June 5, 2003 Decision of the CA,
the DTI secretary immediately issued on June 25, 2003, a new Decision (this
time imposing a definitive safeguard measure), notwithstanding the Petition for
Review filed just two days earlier by Southern Cross Cement before this Court.
Hence, in view of its pending Petition here, petitioner filed with this Court on
July 7, 2003, a Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the DTI secretary from
enforcing his new Decision. In addition, pursuant to Section 29 of RA 8800,
petitioner filed before the CTA a Petition for Review of the June 25, 2003 DTI
Decision. Petitioner did not, however, give timely information to this Court of
the CTA Petition, in which the parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought were
indeed the same as those in the instant Petition. 83 Hence, private respondent
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss this Petition, on the ground of forum
shopping.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:

"Sec. 5.Certification against forum shopping. —” The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be

curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as
a cause for administrative sanctions."
The foregoing Rule behooved petitioner to inform this Court of any similar
action pending before any court, tribunal or agency within five days from
knowledge of the proceeding. Yet, petitioner did so only after 11 days, without
a satisfactory and justifiable explanation. TIDHCc
Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is

prohibited, and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It constitutes improper conduct, because it tends to degrade the
administration of justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable,
because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened court
dockets. 84
Failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements in Section 5
of Rule 7 does not, however, automatically warrant the dismissal of the case
with prejudice. The Rule states that the dismissal is without prejudice; 85 with
prejudice, only upon motion and after hearing. And there must be evidence that
the erring party and counsel committed willful and deliberate acts amounting to
forum shopping as to warrant the summary dismissal of the case and the
imposition of direct contempt and the appropriate administrative sanctions. 86
In previous cases, the penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who engaged in
forum shopping ranged from severe censure to suspension from the practice of
law, in order to make them realize the seriousness of the consequences and
implications of their abuse of the judicial process and disrespect for judicial
authority. 87
Based on the foregoing tenets, I believe that petitioner's counsels should
be sanctioned with severe censure.
Summary
In sum, I submit that the CTA has jurisdiction over the DTI secretary's
decisions issued pursuant to RA 8800. Accordingly, the CA acted arbitrarily in
giving due course to private respondent's Petition for Certiorari seeking to set
aside the DTI secretary's April 5, 2002 Decision. Therefore, its June 5, 2003
Decision is void and has no legal effect.
Having ruled the CA Decision void, this Court should normally dismiss the
present Petition. However, because the remaining issue before it is purely legal
and imbued with public interest —” touching as it does upon the economic
security of our domestic industries —” it is proper for the Court to resolve it
once and for all, as an exception to the general rule. The resolution of this legal
issue now would avoid unnecessary delays and costs, consistent with the
Court's policy of prompt and proper administration of substantial justice.
The application of a safeguard measure, while primarily intended to

protect domestic industries, is essentially in the nature of a tariff imposition.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the imposition of tariffs and taxes may be
exercised only by Congress. However, Section 28 of Article VI of the
Constitution provides for an exception: it allows Congress to authorize the
President to fix —” subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose
—” tariff rates, quotas and other duties. To no official, other than the
President, is that power allowed to be delegated.
Consistent with the foregoing principle, RA 8800 must be construed as
having delegated the power to apply safeguard measures to the President,
through the alter ego on trade and investment matters —” the DTI secretary.
While Congress may specify limitations in the President's authority to
impose tariffs, such legislative restrictions must operate within the bounds of
the Constitution. These limitations cannot impinge upon, restrict or overturn the
President's constitutional power of control over the entire Executive
Department.
The power of control includes the right to modify or set aside a decision of
a subordinate officer. The Tariff Commission, being a mere agency in the
Executive Department, is necessarily subject to the control and supervision of
the President. Hence, its decisions and recommendations cannot tie the hands
of the Chief Executive with finality. Consequently, the DTI head, acting as the
President's alter ego pursuant to RA 8800, may affirm, modify or reverse the
Tariff Commission's recommendation.
As I have said at the outset, the DTI secretary, as the prime mover of the
country's trade and commercial affairs, must be given broad latitude in the
pursuit of the agency's mandate. The country's topmost trade official,
handpicked by the President, is presumed to possess the competence and the
erudition to steer the Department towards the achievement of State goals
within the DTI's sphere. As the Chief Executive's alter ego in the area of trade,
the secretary must be allowed to exercise ample discretion on matters vested
in the position. And so long as the Department head's decisions are not
reversed or modified by the President, they should be accorded the highest
respect by the courts.
The principal duty of the judiciary is to adjudicate actual controversies
involving rights and obligations of persons; it has no business interfering in the
realm of policy making. Basic is the rule that courts should adopt a hands-off
approach with respect to non-judicial concerns of government. The only ground
upon which they can review apparently policy questions is when an act of an
agency or instrumentality of government, including the Presidency and
Congress, is blatantly contrary to law or the Constitution or clearly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. 88 In these exceptional instances, it becomes the
bounden duty of the Court to nullify the act. 89
Otherwise, the official acts of the Executive and the Legislative
Departments are presumed to be regular and done in good faith. Unless clear
and convincing proof is presented to overthrow such presumption, the Court
will resolve every doubt in their favor. 90
Whether such acts are beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. That matter is between the elected policy makers and the
people. 91 To repeat, the Court's judicial role comes into play only when those
acts are clearly unlawful or unconstitutional or performed with grave abuse of
discretion. In nullifying them, the Court does so merely to uphold the rule of
law. For indeed there can be no meaningful economic and social progress
without an effective rule of law in place. 92
This Court should maintain its deferential stance respecting acts

emanating from government agencies, especially those involving the economy.
Far from being an unwanted interloper in economic matters not within its field
of expertise, the Court, in recent Decisions nullifying government contracts, 93
steadfastly upholds one of the most revered policy axioms in the business
community —” the "leveling of the playing field." 94 To paraphrase what the
Court said in a recent case, 95 the "Constitution and the law should be read in
broad, life-giving strokes. They should not be used to strangulate economic
growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests." Rather, they should be
construed to grant the President and his or her alter egos sufficient discretion
and reasonable leeway to enable them to secure for our people and our
posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. ACETID
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the Motion in part and to REVERSE the

assailed Decision, insofar as it held that the secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) was bound by the recommendations of the Tariff
Commission. More emphatically, I vote to UPHOLD the authority of the
secretary to impose safeguard measures, even if the Tariff Commission does
not recommend their imposition. I also vote that, for violation of the anti-forum
shopping rule, petitioner's counsels should be sanctioned with SEVERE
CENSURE.
Footnotes
1.Since renamed Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines. See Rollo , p.
1634. Considering that the Decision referred to the private respondents by
their old name, this Resolution shall do so as well, for the sake of continuity.
2.See Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers
Corporation, G.R. No. 158540, 8 July 2004, 434 SCRA 65, 69-80.
3.See Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 556 (1997).
4.Supra note 2 at 69.
5.Philcemcor's application covered gray Portland cement of all types and excluded
white Portland cement, aluminous cement, and masonry cement. Rollo , p.
127.
6.In an Order dated 7 November 2001. Rollo , p. 128.
7.Id. at 303.
8.Id. at 334-341.
9.Id. at 343. Dated 5 April 2003.

10.Id. at 343.
11.Id. at 345-416.
12.Among other claims, Philcemcor alleged that the Tariff Commission arbitrarily
ignored the nature of the cement industry in evaluating the injury factors.
Rollo , p. 394.
13.Dated 5 June 2003.
14.Rollo , pp. 67-84. And concurred in by Justices P. Aliño-Hormachuelos and E. F.
Sundiam.
15.Citing the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are binding upon
the courts and its corollary, that courts should not interfere in matters
addressed to the sound discretion and coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies. Rollo , pp. 75-76, citing Litonjua v.
Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 136, and Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products
Corporation v. Macaraig, 299 SCRA 491.
16.Id. at 82.
17.Rollo , p. 685. Prior to the promulgation of this new Decision, Southern Cross was
already apprehensive that the DTI Secretary might act favorably on
Philcemcor's petition in light of the Court of Appeals ruling. Southern Cross
sent a letter dated 19 June 2003 to DTI Secretary Roxas, informing him that
Southern Cross would be appealing the Court of Appeals Decision to the
Supreme Court, and that "[w]e trust that, in accordance with the Rules of
Court, you will refrain from assuming jurisdiction or from taking any action on
the Application for Safeguard Measures filed by Philcemcor until after the
Supreme Court shall have finally decided on our appeal . . . ." See Rollo , pp.
679-680.
18.Id. at 688-690.
19.Id. at 681-699.
20.Id. at 775. The pleading's self-explanatory caption was "Reply to PHILCEMCOR's
Opposition (to Petitioner's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order
And/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction)."
21.Id. at 952-1005.
22.In a Resolution dated 4 February 2004. See Rollo , p. 1191.

23.TSN, 18 February 2004, p. 3.
24.The Decision was penned by the author of this Resolution, and concurred in by
Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chairman of the Second Division),
Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Alicia Austria-Martinez and
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
25.Southern Cross filed a Manifestation and Motion dated 20 July 2004, alleging a
barrage of press releases by Philcemcor, the DTI and their allies critical of
this Court's Decision, characterizing such as a "well-orchestrated and
malevolent scheme obviously intended to coerce and pressure this
Honorable Court to reverse the Decision and/or to influence its resolution."
Without giving credence to these allegations, the Second Division of the
Court found it prudent to issue a Resolution dated 15 September 2004
enjoining the parties and their counsels, whether directly or indirectly, from
making any public comments in any public forum until the case was finally
adjudicated. See Rollo , pp. 2582-2585.
26.Rollo , p. 2587.
27.See note 22.
28.See TSN dated 1 March 2005, p. 5.
29.A copy of this petition was attached as Annex "E" to Southern Cross's "Urgent
Motion" dated 15 December 2004. Rollo , p. 2970.
30.Id.
31.See Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Building Care
Corp. v. NLRC, 335 Phil. 1131, 1138 (1997); Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,
341 Phil. 413, 425 (1997); BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 507,
519 (1998); Tan v. Sandiganbayan , 354 Phil. 463, 469 (1998).
32.Before the passage of Republic Act No. 9282 on 30 March 2004, appeals from
the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals was to the Court of Appeals.
33.Interestingly, while the Separate Opinion accedes to the majority ruling that the
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcor's petition considering
the availability of appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, it makes the curious
statement that "[a]ccordingly, the present Petition, which seeks a review of a
void Decision of the CA should, in the ordinary course, also be dismissed.
Generally, this Court cannot review a legally inexistent judgment". Separate
Opinion, infra . In support of this proposition, the case of Velarde v. SJS , G.R.
No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283, is cited. However, a perusal of
Velarde, which was penned by the Separate Opinion's author, reveals the
Court's actual statement as follows: "Indeed, the assailed Decision was
rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of
facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent.
Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or
even just modify." Velarde, id . Obviously, the averment in Velarde meant
that the Court would be hard put to review a decision that had no finding of
facts to evaluate, or a disposition to reverse, affirm or modify. However, as
transmuted in the Separate Opinion, it would now conclude that a "legally
inexistent" or void decision of the Court of Appeals, or any other court for
that matter, cannot be reviewed by this Court.
34.See Section 7, Republic Act No. 9282 (2004).
35.Rollo , p. 2435.
36.The Separate Opinion characterizes this statement as "loose", citing the legal
truism that interlocutory orders are not subject to an appeal or a petition for
review until the main case is finally resolved on the merits. However, Section
29 does not qualify which rulings of the DTI Secretary are exempt from
judicial review by the CTA. On the other hand, the provision states that all
rulings of the DTI Secretary issued in connection with the imposition of a
general safeguard measure, such as on whether provisional safeguard
measures are warranted even before the matter is referred to the Tariff
Commission. A ruling imposing a provisional safeguard measure is in a sense
interlocutory, since such ruling does not finally dispose of the case. Although
pending factual investigation by the Tariff Commission on referral by the DTI
Secretary, the ruling could produce financial damage and by reason thereof,
it is only fair that the party aggrieved may avail of judicial remedies even
during the investigation. The language of Section 29, despite the loose use of
the nomenclature "petition for review", allows such ruling on a provisional
safeguard measure, "interlocutory" as it may be, to fall within the ambit of
review of the CTA, which after all has the specialized competence to adjudge
the propriety of the provisional measure.
37.463 U.S. 85 (1983).
38.514 U.S. 645 (1995).
39.Rollo , p. 2437.
40.Ibid.
41.514 US 645 (1995).
42.Id. at 656.
43.Southern Cross, supra note 2, at 87.
44.Id. at 88.
45.Cited as 295 SCRA 470 (1998).
46.Memorandum for Public Respondents dated 1 April 2005, p. 75.
47.Rollo , p. 2509.
48.Southern Cross, supra note 2, at 91.
49.Article VI, Section 28 (2), 1987 Constitution. Emphasis supplied.
50.As delineated under the SMA, the DTI (for non-agricultural products) and
Agriculture (for agricultural products) Secretaries are authorized under
Section 5 to impose the general safeguard measures upon a positive final
determination made by the Tariff Commission. Preliminary to such
imposition, the secretaries are authorized under Section 6 to conduct an
initial review of a petition for imposition of such measures, or motu proprio
initiate a preliminary safeguard investigation, and to impose a provisional
safeguard measure under Section 7 even before transmittal of the
application to the Tariff Commission for investigation. Upon a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission, the Secretaries may, under Section
13, now choose which appropriate definitive safeguard measures to adopt.
Under Sections 18 and 19, the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries are similarly
tasked, in conjunction with the Tariff Commission, to act upon actions to
reduce, modify or terminate the existing safeguard measures, and to extend
or reapply such safeguard measures.
The Tariff Commission is empowered, upon referral of the application by the DTI or
Agriculture Secretaries, to conduct its investigation pursuant to Sections 9 to
11 of the SMA, and to arrive at its final determination of the existence of the
factual conditions listed under Section 5 and 12. It likewise is tasked to
investigate the factual basis for actions to reduce, modify, terminate, extend
or reapply the existing safeguard measures under Sections 18 and 19 of the
SMA. Its findings are to be contained in a report submitted to the DTI or
Agriculture Secretaries, under Section 14. Finally, pursuant to Section 20, it
likewise conducts an evaluation of the effectiveness of the actions taken by
the domestic industry after termination of the safeguard measures.
51.Section 5, Rep. Act No. 8800. Emphasis supplied.
52.While Section 5 denominates the DTI or Agriculture Secretary as the officer who
imposes the safeguard measures, it should be understood that they do so as
alter egos of the President, the person who is allowed by the Constitution to
be delegated the authority to impose tariffs and restrictions. Infra.
53.Rollo , p. 2398.
54.See Section 18, Article VII, Constitution, the provision which authorizes the
declaration of martial law. The only time the word "only" is used in the
provision is in the context of limiting the extent of the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. "The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only
to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion."
55.Conducted on 28 September 1999. Punzalan, who died in May of 2001, was the
author of House Bill No. 7613, which eventually became the SMA.
56.Rollo , pp. 14-15.
57.Particularly telling are the remarks of then Senator Raul Roco: "But the
Secretary does not act alone. There must be a positive finding by the
Commission." Rollo , p. 2818, and that of then Congressman Sergio Apostol:
"The final decision is in the choice of actions to impose rather than in the
choice of whether to impose or not despite a positive determination of
injury." Rollo , p. 2819. Interestingly, Southern Cross likewise cites the
comments of Congressman Punzalan similarly relied on by the petitioner.
58.As noted in the Decision, "it is easy to selectively cite passages, sometimes out
of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading interpretation . . .
Minority or solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional
crude witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by
the sole virtue of their publication in the authoritative congressional record."
Southern Cross, supra note 2, at 95. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia has been quoted as saying, "We are governed by laws, not the
intention of legislators." Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993), Scalia
J., concurring. He added that statements on the legislative floor even by the
bill's author or sponsor are not ratified by the legislative body as a whole and
thus do not reflect more than the individual desire of the person making the
statement. Ibid.
59.Southern Cross, supra note 2, at 99-104.

60.See Section 13, Rep. Act No. 8800. Notably, the duty of the DTI Secretary to
immediately issue through the Secretary of Finance, a written instruction to
the Commissioner of Customs authorizing the return of the cash bonds is the
only role allocated by the SMA to the DTI Secretary in the event of a negative
final determination.
61.Separate Opinion, infra .
62.In fact, the remarks of Chairman Abon can even be construed the other way. He
speaks of the Commission as making recommendations, and indeed the
Tariff Commission is obliged to recommend what particular safeguard
measures to implement. The advice of the Commission on this point may be
highly persuasive, yet it does not bind the DTI Secretary. Nor would the Tariff
Commission have the power to implement the general safeguard measures.
However, the fact remains that the Tariff Commission must come out with a
positive final determination before the DTI Secretary may impose the general
safeguard measures.
63.Southern Cross, supra note 2 at 74.
64.See Section 1, Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV, Administrative Code.

66.95 Phil. 142 (1954).
67."The fact that the resolution was approved by the Cabinet and the collection of
the royalty fees was not decreed by virtue of an order issued by the
President himself does not, in our opinion, invalidate said resolution because
it cannot be disputed that the act of the Cabinet is deemed to be, and
essentially is, the act of the President." Marc Donnelly v. Agregado, id ., at
146-147
68.See Section 16, Chapter 4, Subtitle C, Title II, Book V, Administrative Code of
1987.
69.See Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title II, Book V, Administrative Code of
1987.
70.Respondents point out that the DTI Secretary is a member of the NEDA Board,
unto which the powers and functions of the NEDA are vested. See Section 3,
Chapter 4, Subtitle C, Title II, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987. While this
may be so, it cannot mean that the DTI Secretary, on his own, can exercise
the powers and functions of the NEDA, such as administrative supervision
over its attached agencies. The DTI Secretary is only one of eleven (11)
members of the NEDA Board, and it is only in the capacity of NEDA Board
member that the person of the DTI Secretary can execute any act that would
be representative of the NEDA. In such case, such act would require either
the concurrence of the other ten (10) members of the NEDA Board or under a
valid delegation of authority by the NEDA Board. Certainly, the DTI Secretary
cannot execute a unilateral act without prior delegated authority from the
NEDA board and then claim that such act was executed by the NEDA or its
Board.
71.G.R. No. 101273, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 219.
72.See Section 104, Tariff and Customs Code. See also Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, id. at 224.
73.See Section 401, id .
74.The similarities in the procedure as laid down in Rep. Act Nos. 8751, 8752 and
8800 are striking indeed, especially as they lay down the common limitation
of a positive determination by the Tariff Commission as a requisite to the
imposition of the corresponding duty or safeguard measures. From the
beginning, Southern Cross has invoked the provisions Rep. Act No. 8751 and
8752 as applicable by analogy to the Safeguard Measures Act. The Court is
not wont to rely on indirect analogical justifications if, as in this case, the law
is explicit. Still, the analogy is apropos to the Safeguard Measures Act, and if
anything, reveals a common track of mind on the part of the Tenth Congress
which enacted all three laws.
76.See Section 23, Chapter 6, Title XV, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987.
77.See Section 47, Chapter 6, Title IV, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987.
78.See Section 16, Chapter 3, Title XIV, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987, in
relation to Chapter 3, Title XIV, Book IV of the same statute.
79.See Section 5, Chapter 1, Title XIV, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987.
81.See Separate Opinion, infra .

82.Notably, the Administrative Code of 1987, though embodied in an executive
order, was promulgated by President Aquino in the exercise of her then
extant legislative powers under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution. See
Phividec v. Capitol Steel, G.R. No. 155692, 23 October 2003, 414 SCRA 327,
331; citing Sec. 7, Article XVIII, Constitution.
83.See Phividec v. Capitol Steel, id ., at 332; citing VINCENT G. SINCO, PHILIPPINE
POLITICAL LAW 234-235 (11th ed., 1962), as cited by J. Mendoza, dissenting,
in Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 1014-1015.
84.Such abolitions of course subject through presidential approval or legislative
override of a presidential veto.
85.Separate Opinion, infra.
86.Ibid.
87.See Southern Cross, supra note 2, at 97-99.
88.G.R. No. 93661, 4 September 1991, 201 SCRA 299.
89.Southern Cross, supra note 2, at 105-106.

90.See also id . at 106.
91.Ibid. Philcemcor argues that the WTO Safeguards Agreement do not require that
conclusive effect be given to the findings of a first-level fact finding body, or
that the Philippines makes it difficult for domestic producers to obtain
safeguard measures. Respondent's Memorandum dated 4 April 2005, p. 41.
The effectiveness of that argument is undercut by the fact that even
assuming that the Safeguards Agreement does not impose such
requirements, the SMA enacted by Congress, the validity of which
respondents do not question, may anyway require such impositions, as it
does in this case, based on Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
92.Supra note 69.
93.See J. Stewart, dissenting, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1967); J.
Thomas, dissenting, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
94.Section 8, Rep. Act No. 8800.

95.Id.
96.Including, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the
products concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic
market taken by the increased imports, and changes in the level of sales,
production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and
employment. See Section 12, Rep. Act No. 8800. Moreover, the Tariff
Commission is precluded from making a positive determination unless the
investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence
of the causal link between the increased imports of the product under
consideration and serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry.
Id.
97.BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, Sixth Edition (1990), at 1245. Accord H. de Leon & H.
de Leon, Jr., Administrative Law: Text and Cases, Third Edition (1998) at 144.
98.See Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77372, 29 April 1988; 160 848,
856.
99.See TSN dated 1 March 2005, p. 171.

100.Expressly, the DTI Secretary's role as evaluator of evidence submitted by the
concerned parties is limited to the review documentary evidence attached to
the verified petition requesting for safeguard measures, but only for the
purpose of determining whether the imposition of a provisional safeguard
measure is warranted. See Section 7, Rep. Act No. 8800.
101.See Section 10, Rep. Act No. 8800.
102.Under Section 14, Rep. Act No. 8800, the enumerated contents of the Report
by the Tariff Commission is limited to (a) the investigation report; (b) the
proposed recommendations; (c) a copy of the submitted adjustment plan;
and (d) the commitments made by the domestic industry to facilitate positive
adjustment to import competition. This is not to mean that the Tariff
Commission is absolutely barred from forwarding such evidence to the DTI
Secretary, but the fact that there is no mandate under Rep. Act No. 8800 for
it to do so further bolsters the apparent legislative intent that it is the Tariff
Commission, and not the DTI Secretary, that is empowered to make the
necessary factual determinations that precede the imposition of the general
safeguard measures.
103.See Footnotes No. 15 & 16, Southern Cross, supra note 2, at 71-72 for a list of
the parties who participated in the investigation conducted by the Tariff
Commission.
104.G.R. No. 97356, 30 September 1992; 214 SCRA 378.
105."The aggrieved party should not however, be one and the same official upon
whose lap the complaint he has filed may eventually fall on appeal. Nemo
potest esse simul actor et Judex. No man can be at once a litigant and
judge." Id. at 389.
107.As U.S. Chief Justice Marshall once said, the power to tax involves the power to
destroy. McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheaton 316, cited in Sison v. Ancheta ,
G.R. No. L-59431, July 25, 1984.
108."[T]axes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain
availability is of the essence." Id., citing Vera v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L31364,
March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 199.
109.Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 152 (1955); citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1; McCulloch v. Maryland,
supra note 96.
110.See I. Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 46.
111.Supra note 3.
112.Attributed to the American President John Adams.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1.Philippine Association of Service Exporters; Inc. v. Drilon , 163 SCRA 386, 393,
June 30, 1988, per Sarmiento, J.
2.434 SCRA 65, July 8, 2004.

3.Now the "Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines."
4.In brief, the antecedents of the Second Division's Decision are as follows:
1.May 22, 2001 —” Private respondent Philcemcor filed before the DTI an
application for the imposition of a safeguard measure on the importation of
gray Portland cement.
2.Nov. 7, 2001 —” DTI issued an Order imposing a provisional measure equivalent
to P20.60 per 40-kg bag of imported gray Portland cement, effective for 200
days from issuance by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) of the implementing
Customs Memorandum Order.
3.Dec. 10, 2001 —” BOC issued the pertinent Customs Memorandum Order.
4.Mar. 13, 2002 —” The Tariff Commission came out with its Formal Investigation
Report, in which it concluded that "[t]he elements of serious injury and
imminent threat of serious injury not having been established, it is hereby
recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on
the importation of gray Portland cement."
5.Apr. 5, 2002 —” After noting that it was in disagreement with the TC's
recommendation, the DTI issued its Decision denying the application for a
safeguard measure, in accordance with that recommendation.
6.Apr. 22, 2002 —” Philcemcor filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, praying. that the DTI Decision and TC Report be
set aside; and that the DTI secretary be directed to render an independent
judgment.
7.June 5, 2003 —” The CA promulgated its Decision holding that (a) it had
jurisdiction over the Petition for Certiorari, allegedly because of grave abuse
of discretion; and (b) the DTI secretary was not bound by the factual findings
of the TC, which were merely recommendatory. The CA remanded the case
to the DTI secretary for the latter to render a final decision in accordance
with RA 8800 and the Implementing Rules.
8.June 23, 2003 —” Southern Cross filed the present Petition, grounded on the
following: (1) the CA had no jurisdiction, the proper remedy being a petition
for review with the CTA; and (2) the TC's factual findings are binding upon
the DTI secretary.
9.June 25, 2003 —” the DTI secretary issued a new Decision, prescinding from the
CA Decision that it was not bound by the TC recommendation imposing a
safeguard duty of P20.60 per 40-kg bag of imported gray Portland cement for
3 years.
10.July 7, 2003 —” Southern Cross filed with the SC a Very Urgent Application for a
TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the DTI secretary
from enforcing the Department's June 25, 2003 Decision, in view of the
pending Petition before this Court.
11.Aug. 1, 2003 —” Southern Cross filed with CTA a Petition for Review of the June
25, 2003 DTI Decision.
12.Subsequently, Philcemcor filed before this Court a Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss this Petition, on the ground of forum shopping.
5."SEC. 29. Judicial Review. —” Any interested party who is adversely affected by
the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard
measure may file with the Court of Tax Appeals, a petition for review of such
ruling within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof: Provided, however, That
the filing of such petition for review shall not in any way stop, suspend or
otherwise toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or
the adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures, as the case may be.
"The petition for review shall comply with the same requirements and shall follow
the same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the same disposition as
in appeals in connection with adverse rulings on tax matters to the Court of
Appeals."
6.Emphasis in the original.

7."SEC. 5. Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures. —” The
Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final
determination of the Commission that a product is being imported into the
country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic
production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to
the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the
Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard
measures will be in the public interest."
8.Citing Arevalo v. Benedicto, 58 SCRA 186, July 31, 1974, the solicitor general
claims as follows:
". . . . For the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject matter renders the
judgment void and a mere nullity. Considering that a void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no
rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars anyone, and under
which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and
considering, further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is
not a decision in contemplation of law, and hence, can never become
executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to
another case by reason of res judicata. Not being barred by res judicata,
there can be no end to litigation and thus, the administration of justice will
severely be prejudiced." OSG's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9.
9.An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the CTA.

10.Philcemcor's Memorandum, p. 50.
11."SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. —” The CTA shall exercise:
(a)Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
xxx xxx xxx
"(7)Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural
product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and counter
vailing duties under Sections 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and
Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where
either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties."
12.The following reasons are mentioned. First, both instances involve a tax aspect
or the propriety of enforcing a safeguard measure. Second, in either case, a
private party will be aggrieved. Third, the same issues —” the factual basis of
and/or the methodology used in the determination —” will be raised in either
case. Fourth, the CTA has specialized expertise in tax and customs laws.
Fifth, the parties' right to equal protection of the law would in effect be
violated by the difference between the proceedings before the CTA, which
are in the nature of trial de novo; and those in the CA, which are not. Lastly,
there is no sound and cogent reason to split the jurisdiction over appeals
from the DTI secretary's decision and, indeed, the legislature did not intend
any distinction. Philcemcor's Memorandum, pp. 48-51.
13.See footnote 5.
14.Villegas v. Fernando, 27 SCRA 1119, April 28, 1969; Go v. Court of Appeals, 358
Phil. 214, October 8, 1998; Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on
Higher Education, 356 SCRA 767, April 4, 2001.
15.Augusto v. Risos , 417 SCRA 408, December 10, 2003.
16.Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 1089, April 15, 1998; Del Mar v. Court of
Appeals, 429 Phil. 19, March 13, 2002.
17.Under Â§15 of RA 8800, "[t]he duration of the period of an action taken under
the General Safeguard Provisions of [the] Act shall not exceed four (4)
years," including the period in which a provisional safeguard relief under
Section 8 was in effect. In the present case, the provisional safeguard
measure took effect on December 10, 2001.
18.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 322, April 18,
1997 (citing Philippine Refining Company v. Court of Appeal, 256 SCRA 667,
May 8, 1996; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wander Philippines, Inc.,
160 SCRA 573, April 15, 1988); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. General
Foods (Phils.), Inc., 401 SCRA 545, April 24, 2003.
19.See Â§Â§8 & 13, RA 8800.
20.Â§12, ibid.
21.Cosico Jr. v. NLRC, 338 Phil. 1080, May 23, 1997.
22.Ibid. (citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA
184, 187, January 15, 1992).
23.Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. v. NLRC , 218 SCRA 77, January 29, 1993;
Velasco v. Ople, 191 SCRA 636, November 26, 1990; Solid Homes, Inc. v.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, August 29, 1989; Republic of the Philippines v.
Sangalang, 159 SCRA 515, April 8, 1988; Goodrich Employees Association v.
Flores, 73 SCRA 297, October 5, 1976.
24.Soliweg v. Workmen's Compensation Commission , 88 SCRA 569, February 27,
1979.
25.Ibid.
26.AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. NLRC , 267 SCRA 47, January 28, 1997.
27.Velarde v. Social Justice System , 428 SCRA 283, April 28, 2004.
28.Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation , 346 SCRA 485,
November 29, 2000 (citing Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998;
Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, August 21, 1997; Ramos v. CA , 269 SCRA
34, March 3, 1997).
29.372 SCRA 548, December 18, 2001.
30.Id., p. 565, per Kapunan, J.
31.307 SCRA 394, May 19, 1999, per Panganiban, J.
32.Â§4, Art. II of the Constitution.
33.Â§19, ibid.
34.Â§1, par. 2, Art. XII, ibid.
35.OSG's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 27. Emphasis in the original.

36.Id., p. 46. Original in boldface and underlined.
37.See Â§505, Tariff and Customs Code.
38.OSG's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 36 (citing Sharp International Marketing v.
Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299, September 4, 1991). See also Philcemcor's
Memorandum, p. 4.
39.Then Chairman Edgardo Abon.
40.OSG's Memorandum, p. 50.
41."SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. —” The State shall promote the competitiveness
of domestic industries and producers based on sound industrial and
agricultural development policies, and efficient use of human, natural and
technical resources. In pursuit of this goal and in the public interest, the State
shall provide safeguard measures to protect domestic industries and
producers from increased imports which cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to those domestic industries and producers."
42.Other reasons proffered by the OSG are the following. First, the Decision
emasculates the principle behind safeguard measures; it violates the
Constitution, specifically, Section 12 of Article XII, which exhorts the State to
favor local labor, industries and products over foreign ones. RA 8800 gives
local industries and the agricultural sector a temporary breathing space to
adjust to imports; yet, the Decision "effectively creates higher, more
stringent standards for the availment of safeguard measures . . . ." This
argument has also been raised by Philcemcor. (See its Motion for
Reconsideration, pp. 41-44; and Memorandum, pp. 35-36.) Second, Section
13 of RA 8800 is the controlling provision with respect to "negative final
determinations." Nowhere in this provision is it stated that the Tariff
Commission would render such determinations; on the contrary, the
provision mentions the DTI secretary only; hence, it is to the secretary that
the law grants the power to render a final decision. Third, Section 19 of the
law empowers the DTI head to extend the effectivity of a safeguard measure;
this power is merely incidental to the general power of making the final
decision on whether to impose definitive safeguard measures. It would be
illogical if the Department secretary were authorized to exercise only
incidental functions, while another body possesses the general power over
the same matter.
43.Philcemcor's (or CMAP's) Motion for Reconsideration, p. 11; rollo, Vol. IV, p.
2398.
44.Â§Â§5, 6, 7, 8, 13 & 17.
45.Joint Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 2000, issued by the secretaries of
Agriculture, Trade and Industry, and Finance; the Bureau of Customs
commissioner and the Tariff Commission chair.
46.E.g. TC Order No. 00-02.
47.Philcemcor's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 17; rollo, Vol. IV; p. 2404.
48.Id., p. 16.
49.Â§Â§1 & 2, Title X, Book IV of the Administrative Code; Article XII, Constitution.
50.Philcemcor's Motion for Reconsideration, supra, pp. 34-35 (citing an official
statement of the DTI secretary issued on April 1, 2002); rollo, pp. 2421-2422.
51.Other arguments of Philcemcor include the following. First, Congress delegated
to the DTI secretary the authority to prescribe safeguard measures, while
assigning to the Commission the task of providing the necessary support for
that function; but the ultimate responsibility for the proper exercise of the
delegated authority is lodged in the DTI head. (Motion for Reconsideration, p.
24; rollo, Vol. IV, p. 2411; and Memorandum, p. 14;) Second, under the
doctrine of implied grant of powers, "all powers necessary for the discharge
of the express powers are also granted, unless expressly withheld."
(Memorandum, p. 7.) The power of the DTI secretary to impose safeguard
measures is not legally conditioned on a positive recommendation by the
Commission; referral to the latter of the application and the holding of public
hearings are only part of the due process guarantee. Third, the imposition of
safeguard measures is primarily an exercise of the police power, not the
taxing power, of the State. The law's singular objective is to protect local
industries; thus, prior to the imposition of the measure by the DTI, the Tariff
Commission is tasked to ascertain the existence of injury or serious threat to
the local industry.
52.Petitioner quotes the following from private respondent Philcemcor's
Memorandum:
"The basic obligations of WTO Members under the Agreement on Safeguards are
the OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS in the adoption and application of any
safeguard measure, AND THE NECESSITY OF A PRINCIPLED FINDING
ON THE PRESENCE OF THREE CORE ELEMENTS OF A SAFEGUARD
SITUATION. These core elements are the following: (a) that products from
one Member (the exporting country) of the WTO are being imported into the
territory of another Member of the WTO (the importing country) in such
increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and (b)
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products; and (c)
the causal link between increased imports and serious injury or threat thereof
(Art. 2, para. 1, and Art. 4, para. 2(b), Agreement on Safeguards. . . . .)."
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner.) Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 9.
53.Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 16.
54.Id., p. 39. Underscoring in the original.
55.Petitioner submits these other contentions:
1)To allow the DTI secretary to reject the positive final determination of the
Commission would result in an anomalous situation when it is the former
who initiates the proceeding pursuant to Section 6 of RA 8800. In that event,
the secretary will become the complainant and reviewing body at the same
time, a situation declared abhorrent by the Supreme Court. (Petitioner's
Memorandum, p. 16 [citing Corona v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 378,
September 30, 1992]).
2)A modification or reversal by the DTI head of the Commission's final
determination will be a deprivation of the due process rights of the concerned
parties, who will not have the opportunity to be heard prior to the DTI's
action.
3)Making a distinction as to whether the imposition of a safeguard measure is an
exercise of police power or the power of taxation only serves to muddle the
issues, "for it has been settled that the taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power." (Id., p. 22 [citing Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil.
148, December 22, 1955]. Emphasis in the original). In any event, "police
power is lodged primarily in Congress, not the Executive, and . . . it is only by
virtue of a valid delegation by Congress that it may be exercised by the
President . . . ." (Id., p. 28 [citing Cruz, Isagani A, Constitutional Law, 1995, p.
44]).
56.City Government of San Pablo, Lacuna v. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353, March 25,
1999; Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcus, 261 SCRA 667,
September 11, 1996.
57.Bernas, Joaquin G., SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary (1988), Vol. II, p. 205. ("Since the Constitution has given the
President the power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the
Constitution alone which can curtail such power.")
58.Cruz, Isagani A, Political Law (1998), pp. 185-186.
59.67 Phil. 451, 463, 464, April 21, 1939, per Laurel, J.
60.Title X, Chapter 1, Book IV of EO 292.
61.Â§2, RA 8800.
62.Â§505(a) & (h), Tariff and Customs Code. Emphasis supplied.
63.Â§505(e), (f) & (g); ibid.
64.For instance, under Section 506 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the
Commission is tasked to give information and assistance to the President and
Congress; under Section 401, to recommend to the NEDA a tariff rate
increase.
65.Â§Â§7 & 9, RA 8800.
66.Â§Â§9 & 14, ibid.
67.OSG's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 46.
68.Â§17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
69.Cruz, supra (citing Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, May 30, 1955, per Padilla,
J.).
70.Bernas, supra, p. 204.
71.City of Ozamiz v. Lumapas, 65 SCRA 33, July 15, 1975. For instance, under Â§5,
Art. X of the Constitution, on local governments are directly conferred the
power of taxation within their respective area jurisdictions.
72.People v. Pinca , 318 SCRA 270, November 17, 1999 (citing Sotto v. Comelec, 76
Phil 516, 522, April 16, 1946); Pimentel Jr. v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 393 SCRA 227, November 29, 2002.
73.Â§4(o) of RA 8800 defines serious injury as "a significant impairment in the
position of a domestic industry after evaluation by competent authorities of
all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing
on the situation of the industry concerned, in particular, the rate and amount
of the increase of imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative
terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports,
changes in levels of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profit
and losses, and employment."
74.Procedure-wise, the requirements are stated in Â§Â§6, 7, 9 & 10. For other
limitations, see Â§15.
75.F.B. Moreno, Philippine Legal Dictionary, 3rd ed. (citing Banco Filipino v.
Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 533, July 8, 1986).
76.Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 355 Phil. 181, July 31, 1998.
77.See Â§32, RA 8800.
78.See Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights , 204 SCRA 483, December 2, 1991;
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348,
March 16, 1989.
79.Â§2.
80.The OSG's Memorandum, pp. 28-29. See also Philcemcor's Memorandum, pp.
21-22.
81.Resolution, p. 32.
82.See Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 666, April 29, 2003.
83.". . . [T]o determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping,
the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another. Otherwise stated, the test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought." Young v. Keng Seng,
398 SCRA 629, March 5, 2003. See also First Philippine International Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259, January 24, 1996.
84.Chemphil Export & Import Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 257, 291-292,
December 12, 1995; Ong v. Court of Appeals, 384 SCRA 139, July 5, 2002.
85.Barroso v. Ampig Jr., 328 SCRA 530, March 17, 2000; Sto. Domingo-David v.
Guerrero, 296 SCRA 277, September 25, 1998.
86.Barroso v. Ampig Jr., supra.
87.Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development
Corporation, 410 SCRA 604, September 11, 2003 (citing Benguet Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. National Electrification Administration , 193 SCRA 250,
January 23, 1991; Villanueva v. Adre, 172 SCRA 876, April 27, 1989; Vda. de
Tolentino v. De Guzman, 172 SCRA 555, April 19, 1989.
88.There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or when it is executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippine v. Commission on Elections, 419
SCRA 141, January 13, 2004 (citing Republic v. Cocofed, 372 SCRA 462, 493,
December 14, 2001; and Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 79, May 2, 1997.
89.See Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 346 Phil 321, November 5, 1997; Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, July 9, 2002; Agan v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402 SCRA 84, May 5, 2003, and 420
SCRA 575, January 21, 2004; Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415
SCRA 45, November 10, 2003; Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. Commission on Elections, supra.
90.Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 604-605, May 2, 1997.
91.Ibid.
92.See Panganiban, Liberty and Prosperity, a speech delivered before the 10th
National Convention of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Baguio City on
April 20, 2005.
93.Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra ; Agan v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., supra; Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. Commission on Elections, supra.
94.See Panganiban, Leveling the Playing Field, 2004 ed., pp. 46-59.
95.La Bugal B'laan v. Ramos , GR No. 127882, December 1, 2004, per Panganiban,
J.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 158540. August 3, 2005.]

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

6.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF TAXATION; THE

10.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CAUSAL CONNECTION IN SECTION 5 BETWEEN THE

13.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY

16.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION OF THE SMA

17.ID.; ID.; ID.; NO EVIDENT LEGISLATIVE INTENT BY AUTHORS OF THE

18.ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SMA IN HARMONY WITH

20.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; FORUM SHOPPING; NOT WILLFUL

21.ID.; ID.; COURT REAFFIRMS NULLITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

3.ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARD MEASURES; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN THE

5.ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL WAY TO

7.ID.; ID.; TARIFF COMMISSION; PRIMARILY A FACT-FINDER; RA 8800 DOES

9.ID.; ID.; CONGRESS COULD NOT HAVE DIRECTLY CONSTITUTED THE

12.ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT

13.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PARAMETERS SET BY RA 8800 SHOULD ALLAY

16.ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE ON THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

emergency measures, including tariﬀs, to protect domestic industries and

The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision 13 penned by Court of

On 21 September 2004, the Court En Banc resolved, upon motion of

The answer hinged on the proper interpretation of Section 29 of the SMA,

Both respondents reiterate their fundamentalist reading that Section 29

Respondents argue that the Court has given an expansive interpretation

In arriving at the proper interpretation of "in connection with," the Court

It should be emphasized again that by utilizing the phrase "in connection

Respondents fail to convincingly address the absurd consequences

Strictly speaking, the review by the Secretary of Finance of the decision of

More fundamentally, the situation involving split review of the decision of

Nonetheless, this argument is successfully undercut by Southern Cross,

Philcemcor imputes intelligent design behind the alleged intent of

In response to the Court's observation that the setup proposed by

Finally on this point, Philcemcor argues that assuming this Court's

II. Positive Final Determination

Congressional Limitations Pursuant

The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision,

(1)It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariﬀ

(2)The authorization granted to the President must be embodied

There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional

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Positive Final Determination

Philcemcor attributes this Court's conclusion on the indispensability of the

The ﬁrst line of attack employed is on Section 5 itself, it allegedly not

It can be surmised at once that respondents' preferred interpretation is

As stated earlier, the Court in its Decision found Section 5 to be clear,

The excerpts cited by respondents are derived from the interpellation of

There is nothing in the remarks of Congressman Punzalan which

Respondents employed considerable eﬀort to becloud Section 5 with

Section 13 of the SMA further bolsters the interpretation as argued by

T h e Separate Opinionconsiders as highly persuasive of former Tariﬀ

III. DTI Secretary has No Power of Review

It is necessary to clarify the paradigm established by the SMA and

The Separate Opinionoperates from wholly diﬀerent premises which are

Absent Section 5 of the SMA, the President has no inherent,

Preliminarily, we should note that none of the parties question the

Indeed, in Marc Donnelly & Associates v. Agregado 66 the Court upheld

Notwithstanding, Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles

Justice Florentino Feliciano, in his ponencia in Garcia v. Executive

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In fact, the SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariﬀ Commission is no

Within the administrative apparatus, the Tariﬀ Commission appears to be