Sentencing Memorandum
Sentencing Memorandum
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, hereby submits its
position paper as to sentencing factors, and asks this Court to impose a sentence
I. BACKGROUND
needed then-scarce personal protective equipment so that their staffs could safely
treat patients. Regrettably, they agreed to buy over $3 million worth of N95
company. Once they sent money to an account that Haggerty controlled—and falsely
claimed belonged to the company—Haggerty did not use the money to buy a single
multiple luxury cars for himself, and paid other personal expenses.
cancelled their orders and sought refunds of their payments. Haggerty repeatedly lied
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to one of the hospitals, denying that he had ever received the hospital’s wire transfer
and falsely claiming that he had requested a “skip trace” on the wire. He doctored a
bank statement to back up his lies, and he continued spending and transferring the
hospital’s money.
Once the first hospital (Hospital A) and his business partners discovered
Haggerty lies, defendant made a few partial payments to Hospital A—using some of
the money he had stolen from Hospital A as well as money from the other hospital
(Hospital B)—to lull Hospital A into believing he would make things right. Yet, even
then, he knew that he was not entitled to the funds from Hospital B that he had used
to pay Hospital A—he had simply robbed Peter to pay Paul. By that point, he had
few weeks after sending Hospital B’s funds to Hospital A, in yet another false
promise, he assured Hospital B that he would return its funds. He did not even begin
to do so, however, until almost two years later, after entering his guilty plea in this
Because of his scheme and his money laundering, defendant was charged by
indictment with four counts of wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1343 (Counts One through Four), and two counts of money laundering, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957(a) (Counts Five and Six).
1Further details of the defendant’s scheme are set forth in the Government’s Version of the
Offense, which is appended to the PSR.
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The government agrees with the offense level and criminal history calculations
in the PSR submitted by the United States Probation Office. With a total offense level
The Sentencing Guidelines provide a starting point and initial benchmark for
sentencing, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007), and must be considered
along with all of the factors set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).
Such a sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect the seriousness
of defendant’s crimes, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and
While his scheme did not span a particularly long time, it was brazenly
he directed the hospitals’ money toward his own lavish lifestyle. In the process,
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just below federal reporting requirements, so that he could launder the dirty funds
Haggerty’s overriding concern was in keeping the profits of his fraud, no matter
the cost to others. His falsification of a bank statement, his multiple lies to the
hospitals, his money laundering, and his retention of millions of dollars in ill-gotten
funds—even after the jig was up—were all particularly egregious aspects of his
conduct, and they show that his crimes were not merely a temporary lapse in
The defendant is 46 years old, has enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle, and was
more than capable of earning honest money. He has a limited criminal history that
primarily consists of DUIs. PSR ¶¶ 51, 53, 54. Unlike many defendants who come
before this Court, the defendant had a stable childhood, with two working parents
and no reported abuse or neglect. PSR ¶ 62. Defendant lives in a large, six-bedroom
home worth more than $800,000; he owns multiple vehicles; and he reports a seven-
figure annual salary from his current employer. PSR ¶¶ 63, 64, 76, 84. He has no
reported health issues and denies that his conduct resulted from any addictions or
substance abuse. Id. ¶¶ 68, 70. Likewise, although the defendant’s involvement in
this offense has been stressful—a consequence of his own making—he has not sought
treatment for, nor been diagnosed with, a mental health condition. PSR ¶¶ 68-69.
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mental health care or therapy, or any reason other than simple greed. Cf. United
States v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 966 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[w]hile many criminals commit
crimes from lack of opportunity and desperation, [defendant] acted out of greed”).
This is also evident from the kinds of expenditures defendant made with his fraud
proceeds—including purchases of three luxury cars. As the Seventh Circuit has noted,
“[c]riminals who have the education and training that enables people to make a
decent living without resorting to crime are more rather than less culpable than their
desperately poor and deprived brethren in crime.” United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d
payments to Hospital A. Although the payments do reflect some effort toward making
his victims whole, they are relatively small in light of his purported income, and they
are not particularly illuminating with respect to his contrition or remorse. While they
should be acknowledged, as the First Circuit has noted, over-crediting such efforts by
engendering the public’s belief in the fairness of the justice system and deterring
white-collar crime. See United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006)
(desirable sentencing goals include “the deterrence of white-collar crime (of central
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collar offenses, and limits on the ability of those with money or earning potential to
C. The Need for Just Punishment, to Promote Respect for the Law,
and to Afford Adequate Deterrence
imprisonment to fully account for the harm caused by the crimes, to deter further
As this case illustrates, exploitation of the Covid-19 pandemic was (and still is)
a highly profitable business. Both public and private actors have had to devote
lives. With such resources on the table, there will always be individuals, like
defendant, who see an opportunity for undeserved profit. Given this unfortunate
truth, in addition to specifically deterring the defendant, the sentence must afford
Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Considerations of (general) deterrence
argue for punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are
difficult to detect and punish, since both attributes go to increase the expected
benefits of a crime and hence the punishment required to deter it.”); see also United
States v. Brown, 880 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 2018) (“endors[ing] the idea that white-
collar criminals act rationally, calculating and comparing the risks and the rewards
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before deciding whether to engage in criminal activity. They are, therefore, prime
candidates for general deterrence”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The question isn’t solely how much [crime] this sentence will prevent.
It’s how much crime will occur if we don’t faithfully and meaningfully
prosecute and penalize this kind of conduct. Because if we contribute to
an idea that well, this is just white collar crime, this is crime that people
get a slap on the wrist for, this is a crime where there’s no meaningful
criminal sanction, so why should I bother obeying the rule of law when
others are not doing so? That’s the danger that needs to be combatted
here, and that’s the role that this sentence also has to play in
contributing to confidence that this kind of criminal conduct will be met
with significant criminal sanctions.
Here, a sentence within the Guidelines range is sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to accomplish these goals. Such a sentence would account for both the
defendant’s limited criminal history and the large amount of money he took—factors
that are included as part of the Guidelines calculation—as well as both the relatively
brief duration of the scheme and the defendant’s extraordinary exploitation of two
part of the Guidelines calculation. On balance, these factors point to the need for a
by other would-be offenders who seek to unlawfully profit from the Covid-19
pandemic.
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D. Supervised Release
reduction of recidivism.” United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2015).
For the reasons below, the conditions recommended by the Probation Office will meet
release set forth by the Probation Office. PSR ¶ 94. The government also agrees with
the discretionary and special conditions they recommend, which are (1) necessary to
facilitate supervision by the Probation Office; (2) necessary to ensure he meets the
dependents; (3) necessary to promote his respect for the law, deter him from
committing future crimes, and to protect the public from further crimes by him;
(4) necessary in light of his prior alcohol-related convictions; and (5) necessary to
#5, which the government proposes should restrict defendant’s occupation, business,
or profession as follows: With respect to any entity for which defendant is not the sole
owner, defendant shall not control and/or manage the entity’s finances, including its
bank accounts. The government believes this condition is necessary in light of the
specific manner in which defendant conducted his scheme (i.e., transferring money
from organizational accounts to which he had access into his own personal accounts;
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falsifying bank statements; and money laundering), and bears a “reasonably direct
E. Restitution
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3663A, the Court must order
defendant to make full restitution to victims, and defendant also has agreed,
pursuant to the plea agreement, to pay the full amount of loss to these victims, which
is $2,578,825. The loss amounts for each victim are as follows, as noted in PSR ¶ 82:
Victim Amount
Hospital A $1,645,000
Hospital B $933,825
Total $2,578,825
F. Forfeiture
money judgment in the amount of at least $1,645,000, which represents some of the
proceeds traceable to the offense. Notably, this amount reflects only the proceeds of
the conduct related to Hospital A. It is the government’s position that the personal
proceeds traceable to the offense—both the Hospital A and the Hospital B conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated here, the government respectfully requests that this
Court impose a sentence within the Guidelines range, a period of supervised release,
Respectfully submitted,