Partial Execution of Decree Motilal Shivnarayan Marvadi v. Shivaji Sawalaram Dangale, 1953 SCC OnLine Bom 69

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1953 SCC OnLine Bom 69 : ILR 1954 Bom 873 : (1954) 56 Bom LR 164 : AIR
1954 Bom 273
In the High Court of Bombay

Appellate Civil
BEFORE MR. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND MR. CHAINANI, JJ.
Motilal Shivnarayan Marvadi … (Original Assignee from Decree-

holder), Appellant;
Versus
Shivaji Sawalaram Dangale and Others … (Original Defendants'
Heirs), Respondents.*
Second Appeal No. 479 of 1951
Decided on July 23, 1953
Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), O. XXI, O. 16, 15, s. 146—Decree granting decree-
holder separate and distinct reliefs—Assignment of one such relief by decree-holder, to
assignee—Whether assignee can execute decree in regard to relief assigned.
A decree provided that the defendants were to give to the Plaintiff possession of two pieces of
land and as to three others it provided that the defendants would be entitled to hold them as owners
if they paid to the plaintiff a certain amount within a year of the date of the decree but on their failure
to do so, the plaintiff was entitled to take possession thereof through Court. The plaintiff assigned his
rights in respect of the said three pieces of land in favour of an assignee for consideration. On
defendants' failure to pay the amount within the stipulated period, the assignee sought to execute
the decree and recover possession. On the Question whether the decree could be executed
piecemeal and whether a partial assignment of the decree would entitle the assignee to claim
execution,
Held, (i) that O. XXI, R. 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, did not prohibit a partial transfer of
a decree in favour of the assignee,
(ii) that the decree gave two separate and distinct reliefs: first with regard to two pieces of land
which was unconditional and immediate, and the second with regard to the three pieces which was
conditional;
(iii) that the plaintiff could execute the decree piece-meal in regard to the two reliefs separately,
and
Page: 874
(iv) that as the assignee was asking under O. XXI, R. 16 of the Code for what the plaintiff himself
could have claimed, he was entitled to execute the decree with regard to the three pieces of land
separately.
Where a decree grants two or more separate and distinct reliefs and the decree-holder assigns
one of such reliefs, the assignee can under O. XXI, R. 16, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, execute
the decree in regard to the part representing the relief assigned to him.
Panaji v. Ratanchand,(1) Kishore Chand Bhakat v. Gisborne & Co.,(2) Muthiah Chettiar v.
Govinddoss Krishnadoss,(3) Ram Sahai v. Madan Lal Kanhaiya Lal,(4) and Shankar Hari v. Damodar
Vyankaji,(5) referred to.
Forster v. Baker,(6) and Rothschild v. Fisher,(7) distinguished.
Siri Narain v. Eshan Ellahi,(8) dissented from.
The statement of the law contained in the head-note in Narayandas v. Tejmal(9) must be confined
to the case of a money-decree.
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SECOND APPEAL against the decision of R.K. Ranade, Assistant Judge, Ahmednagar, confirming the
decision of D.B. God-bole, Civil Judge (Junior Division), at Sangamner.
One Parashuram (plaintiff) obtained a decree against Savlaram and others (defendants) on
October 28, 1941, which provided as follows:—
“…The defendants do give to the plaintiff the possession of lands bearing survey Nos. 19 and 107
out of the suit lands together with the crop therein, on or before November 15, 1941 A.D. by the
right of ownership. If they fail to do so, the plaintiff do take possession from the defendants through
Court.
The defendants do pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 1,000 for value of the ownership right in
respect of the three lands bearing survey Nos. 18, 87, and 90, on or before October 28, 1942 and if
they fail to pay on that date, the plaintiff should wait for two months. And if the defendants fail to pay
the amount even within the said period as above, the plaintiff should then take the possession of the
three above-mentioned lands by ownership right through Court……”
A day after the date of the decree the plaintiff assigned his rights in respect of survey Nos. 18, 87
and 90 in favour of Motilal (appellant) in consideration of Rs. 400.
On June 11, 1946, Motilal filed the present darkhast as an assignee of the rights of the decree-
holder in respect of the said three survey numbers.
Page: 875
The trial Judge dismissed the darkhast on the ground that a partial assignment was invalid and the
darkhast was therefore not maintainable.
On appeal, the Assistant Judge confirmed the order of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal.
The assignee appealed to the High Court.
V.M. Tarkunde, with R.B. Kotwal and R.G. Samant, for the appellant.
V.V. Albal, for respondent No. 1.
V.V. Albal, with A.V. Albal, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
V.V. Albal with G.N. Vaidya, for respondents Nos. 4-6.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.:—
The short question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the darkhast
filed by the appellant is maintainable in law. A decree was passed in favour of one
Parshuram and against the respondents. This decree provided that the respondents
were to give to Parshuram possession of S. No. 19 and 107 before November 15,
1941. It further provided that as to S. Nos. 18, 87 and 90, if the respondents paid to
Parshuram Rs. 1,000 before October 28, 1942, they would be entitled to hold the said
property as owners; otherwise the decree-holder after waiting for two months should
take possession of those lands from the respondents. This decree was passed on
October 28, 1941. The next day the decree-holder assigned his rights in respect of S.
Nos. 18, 87 and 90 in favour of the present appellant for a consideration of Rs. 400. It
is as an assignee of the said rights that the appellant has filed the present darkhast on
June 11, 1946. Both the courts below have held that the assignment, in favour of the
appellant amounts to a partial assignment and since a partial assignment of a decree
is not permissible under the law, the darkhast filed by him is not maintainable. In
coming to this conclusion both the courts have relied upon a decision of this Court in
Narayandas v. Tejmal(10) . That is how the question which we have to consider is
whether the partial assignment of the decree in question in favour of the appellant
entitles him to claim execution of the decree under O. XXI, r. 16.
It would be convenient at the outset to consider this question in the light of the
material provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XXI, r. 16, enables the
assignee of a decree to apply for execution of the decree assigned to him. It provides
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Page: 876
that where a decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the

transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the
decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if
the application were made by such decree-holder. It would be noticed that the
assignee by act inter vivos is placed on the same footing as the person or persons on
whom the decree-holder's rights under the decree have devolved by operation of law.
No distinction is made between these two cases of devolution of the decree-holder's
rights. There can be no doubt that by operation of law the decree-holder's rights can
devolve upon more than one person. Cases of devolution of estates in favour of more
heirs than one are not unknown; and so wherever the decree-holder's rights have by
succession vested in more heirs than one, they or any one of them would be entitled
to apply to execute the decree under O. XXI, r. 16, read, if necessary, with O. XXI, r.
15. In other words, it would be no answer to the claim made by such an heir to
execute the decree to say that he does not represent the whole of the decree-holder's
interest in the decree. If that be so, it is difficult to see why such a limitation should
be imposed on an assignee of the decree by act inter vivos. In our opinion, therefore,
looking at the scheme of r. 16 of O. XXI, it does appear that this rule does not
expressly prohibit the partial transfer of a decree in favour of an assignee.
It is true that r. 16 itself provides that when an assignee seeks to execute the
decree, the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as if the application had been made by the decree-holder himself. If a
decree can be executed piecemeal, there is no reason why an assignee in whose favour
part of the decretal rights have been transferred should not be entitled to execute the
decree so far as it relates to the part assigned to him. It may be that if the decree is of
such nature that it cannot be executed piecemeal different considerations may arise.
Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether partial assignment of any given
decree is effective or not, it would always be necessary to consider the nature of the
decree, the rights under which are partially transferred to the assignee. It would not
be correct to lay down a general proposition either one way or the other.
It may be relevant in this connection to consider the provisions of s. 146 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. This section provides that except as otherwise provided by the
Code or by
Page: 877
any law for the time being in force, where any proceedings may be taken or
application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be made by or
against any person claiming under him. The argument based on the provisions of s.
146 is similar to the argument based on the wording of O. XXI, r. 16, where no
distinction is made between different heirs succeeding to the decree-holder's rights
and an assignee obtaining some of the rights of the decree-holder by assignment.
Under s. 146 there can be no doubt that a proceeding which could have been taken by
the original decree-holder can be taken by his heirs at law, even though each one of
those heirs may be entitled only to a part of the decree-holder's total rights. If that is
the position with regard to the heirs, there is no reason why the same principle should
not apply in regard to a partial assignee of the decree-holder's rights.
The provisions of O. XXI, r. 15, may also have to be considered in dealing with this
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question. This rule deals with applications for execution by joint decree-holders and its
provisions enable any one or more of joint decree-holders to apply for the execution of
the whole decree for the benefit of them all. It is perfectly true that in entertaining an
application for execution of the whole of the decree at the instance of one of the joint
decree-holders it is open to the Court to make an order as may appear to the Court
necessary for protecting the interests of the other decree-holders who have not joined
in the application for execution. But it is clear that the provisions of this rule expressly
authorise one of the joint decree-holders who is not the owner of the totality of the
decretal rights to execute the whole of the decree. It is hardly necessary to add that if
a joint decree passed in favour of two or more decree-holders grants separate and
distinct reliefs to each one of them, it would be open to each one of them to execute
the decree so far as the relief granted to him is concerned. This is the position with
regard to a joint decree.
Now, it is often said that piecemeal execution should not be encouraged and is
indeed not permissible in law. If this statement is intended to lay down a general rule
of universal application, an important exception to this rule must be mentioned; and
this exception relates to decrees which give two distinct and different reliefs to the
decree-holder. If under a decree the decree-holder is entitled to obtain possession of
Page: 878
immovable property and mesne profits, it would be open to him to execute the said
decree piecemeal, first, by claiming possession of the property, and next by asking for
mesne profits, or vice versa in panaji v. Ratanchand,(11) Chief Justice Beaumont and
Mr. Justice Murphy had to consider the question as to whether it was permissible to
the holder of a money decree to execute the decree first for the amount of the decree
and secondly for the interest due from the date of the decree to the date of payment.
They held that a decree for the payment of money and interest is a single and
indivisible decree and it cannot be said to give different forms of relief. Therefore, such
a decree must be executed wholesale and cannot be permitted to be executed
piecemeal. Dealing with this point, Beaumont C.J. observed that this rule which
prohibits piecemeal execution of decree is subject to one important exception and that
is where the decree in question awards two or more different and distinct reliefs. And
he added that upon the soundness of the rule which allows piecemeal execution of
such decrees he did not desire to cast any doubt whatever. Then he went on to
consider the position of a money decree under which interest is awarded to the decree
-holder and he held that the two reliefs granted by the decree for the payment of the
principal and the payment of interest were not different and distinct reliefs and the
decree was and continued to be a single money decree. The next question which the
learned Judges had to consider in the said case was, whether it is the first application
for partial execution which should be dismissed or the second, and they held that it is
the second application which should be dismissed and not the first. They took the view
that there can be no legal bar to the decree-holder executing his money decree only
partially because there is nothing to prevent him from giving up a part of his decretal
claim. If after executing the money decree partially the decree-holder were to apply
again for the execution of the said money decree to recover the balance due to him,
the second application must be dismissed on the ground that piecemeal execution of
such money decree is not permitted under the law. Strictly speaking, the provisions of
O. XXI, r. 2, are not applicable to execution proceedings and if we may point out with
respect, until this judgment was delivered decrees of this type used to be executed
piecemeal. But after this judgment was delivered, so far as this Court is concerned it
must be taken
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Page: 879
to be settled that in regard to a money decree which awards interest to the decree-
holder, it is a single decree, it is indivisible and must be executed whole-sale and not
piecemeal.
If we apply the principles laid down by Beaumont C.J. to the facts of this case there
can be no doubt, in our opinion, that the decree in question gave two separate and
distinct reliefs to the decree-holder. The first relief was with regard to the possession
of S. No. 19 and 107. To this relief the decree holder was unconditionally and
immediately entitled. The second relief related to the possession of S. Nos. 18, 87 and
90. This relief was granted to the decree-holder conditionally. It was only if the
defendants did not pay the decree-holder an amount of Rs. 1,000 before the date
specified in the decree that his right to obtain possession of the said survey numbers
arose. Whereas the first relief could have been claimed immediately after the decree
was passed, the second relief could not have been enforced until the period stipulated
in the decree for the payment of the amount had passed and even then, only if the
said payment was not made within the said period. Therefore, in our opinion, there can
be no doubt that the two reliefs are distinct and different and that the decree-holder
could have executed this decree piecemeal, as indeed he was bound to do, having
regard to the conditions imposed by the decree in regard to the three survey numbers
just mentioned.
If that be the true position, then Mr. Tarkunde is entitled to contend that under the
provisions of O. XXI, r. 16, the assignee is asking for no more and no less than what
the decree holder would himself have asked. Mr. Tarkunde says that the limitation
which is imposed upon the rights of the assignee applying for the execution of the
decree under O. XXI, r. 16, is that the decree should be executed in the, same manner
and subject to the same conditions as if the application had been made by the decree-
holder. Mr. Tarkunde argues that the decree-holder could have filed an application for
execution in regard to these three survey numbers alone separately and the assignee
is, therefore, entitled to ask for the same relief. In our opinion, Mr. Tarkunde is right.
There is, however, a decision of this Court which apparently seems to be against Mr.
Tarkunde's contention. That is the judgment of Mr. Justice Mirza in Narayandas v.
Tejmal.(12)
Page: 880
The head-note of this case reads thus: “An assignee of a portion of a decree is not
entitled to execute the decree as a whole or in part.” It is this head-note, in fact,
which is substantially responsible for the view taken by the Courts below that the
appellant in the present case, who is an assignee of a portion of decree, is not entitled
to execute the decree, though the decree clearly grants two distinct and different
reliefs to the decree-holder. We think that in considering the judgment of Mr. Justice
Mirza we must not forget that the learned Judge was dealing with a money decree,
and, as I have already pointed out, a money decree cannot be executed piecemeal and
if there is a partial assignment in respect of a money decree the assignee cannot
purport to do what the decree-holder himself could not have done. Mr. Tarkunde, no
doubt, contends that in regard to the partial assignment of even a money decree it
would be open to the assignee to ask the Court to treat him as a joint decree-holder
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along with the original decree-holder and to execute the decree under the provisions of
O. XXI, r. 15. It is not necessary for us to consider this aspect of the matter in the
present appeal. Mr. Justice Mirza, while dealing with a money decree, referred to the
English practice and came to the conclusion that though there is no specific provision
in the Code of Civil Procedure prohibiting an application for execution by an assignee
of a part of a money decree, he should not be allowed to execute the decree partially,
following the English practice. In support of his conclusion the learned Judge referred
to the two English decisions in Forster v. Baker,(13) and Rothschild v. Fisher.(14) He also
considered the other decisions of the Indian High Courts which were cited before him
and he ultimately held that
“The reason why the transferee cannot be permitted to execute a part of the
decree only is this, that the decree-holder himself would not be so permitted. A
decree for purposes of execution must be regarded as a whole and indivisible; when
it is sought to execute it must be executed as a whole and not split up into parts.”
Then the learned Judge went on to add that “even in the case of a joint decree the
joint decree-holder is required under the provisions of O. XXI, r. 15, to apply for the
execution of the whole decree”, and so he ultimately held that “a part assignee cannot
be regarded as a joint decree-holder.” With respect, if these observations were
intended to apply to all decrees without making any distinction as to the character and
the nature of
Page: 881
the reliefs granted by them, we are disposed to think that they do not correctly
represent the position of the law. With respect again, the observation made by the
learned Judge may perhaps have been right in regard to the money decree with which
he was dealing. The criticism which Mr. Tarkunde has made even on this part of the
judgment need not be considered by us in the present case. But we must hold that in
regard to a decree which grants to the decree-holder two or more distinct and different
reliefs it would not be correct to say that if one of the reliefs so granted by the decree
is assigned by an act inter vivos, the assignee could not be permitted to execute that
decree. In our opinion, the test which has been correctly laid down by the learned
Judge yields an answer which is against the view which he has so broadly expressed,
because the test is, whether the transferee should be permitted to execute a part of
the decree if the decree-holder himself could not be so permitted. It must follow from
the application of this test that if the decree-holder can execute the decree in part, an
assignee of a distinct and separate part would also be entitled to execute the decree in
regard to that part. Therefore, in our opinion, the statement of the law which is
contained in the head-note in Narayandas' case must be confined to the case of a
money decree which in law amounts to a single and indivisible decree.
Incidentally, we may point out that the two English decisions to which Mr. Justice
Mirza referred were also concerned with money decrees. In Forster v. Baker(15) a
judgment creditor had assigned part of the judgment debt for valuable consideration
and the assignee thereupon applied under O. XLII r. 23, for leave to issue execution.
Mr. Justice Bray who dealt with this application disallowed the prayer on the ground
that there cannot be an absolute assignment within the meaning of s. 25, sub-s. 6, of
the Judicature Act, 1873, of a definite part of an existing debt or other legal chose in
action. In other words, according to Mr. Justice Bray the assignment itself was not
valid and effective in view of the provisions of s. 25(6) of the Judicature Act. When the
matter went in appeal, Vaughan Williams L.J. put his decision on the ground that the
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decree-holder had only one judgment, and upon that judgment he could issue only
one execution. Despite the assignment the remedy is still the same and so an
assignee in whose favour a part of the decretal debt is assigned is not entitled to
execute the decree. Fletcher Moulton L.J., who agreed with, this
Page: 882
conclusion, put his decision also on the ground which had found favour Mr. Justice
Bray. He held that even if the provisions of s. 25(6) of the Judicature Act were
construed broadly and liberally, “the remedy of which the appellant seeks to avail
herself is not a legal remedy within the meaning of that sub-section.” The other
decision to which Mr. Justice Mirza has referred is reported in Rothschild v. Fisher.(16)
The point which arose for decision in this case was whether a receiver should be
appointed in a particular case, and following Forster v. Baker it was held that the
plaintiff could not split up into different parts his judgment-debt which included both
interest which had accrued due before and interest which had accrued after the date of
the marriage, and so it was not a case in which a receiver ought to be appointed. It
would thus be seen that in both the cases the learned Judges were dealing with the
principle applicable to a decree for the payment of money and this principle was that a
money decree is one and indivisible and it cannot be executed piecemeal or in part.
We think there is no justification for applying the same principle to the case of a
decree which awards to the decree-holder two distinct and different reliefs.
Mr. Tarkunde has then referred us to several decisions of the High Courts in India
which have not accepted the broad proposition that a partial assignment is invalid and
that the assignee of a part of the decree cannot execute the decree under O. XXI, r.
16. These decisions are: Kishore Chand Bhakat v. Gisborne & Co.(17) Muthiah Chettiar
v. Govinddoss Krishnadoss,(18) and Ram Sahai v. Madan Lal Kanhaiya Lal.(19) Mr.
Tarkunde has also invited our attention to the fact that a Division Bench of this Court
in Shankar Hari v. Damodar Vyankaji,(20) have approved and accepted some of the
principles laid down by the Madras High Court in Muthiah Chettiar's case though Mr.
Justice Mirza has dissented from the said judgment. The only decision which has taken
the same view as Mr. Justice Mirza is reported in Siri Narain v. Eshan Ellahil(21) . In this
case Khosla and Kapur JJ. were dealing with a decree for partition which also awarded
mesne profits and costs and they held that such a decree cannot be split up into a
decree for partition and a decree for mesne profits plus costs. In their opinion the
decree must be taken as a whole and must be executed as a
Page: 883
whole and not piecemeal. With respect, this view is inconsistent with the decision of
this Court in Panaji v. Ratanchand,(22) to which I have already referred. It does not
appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges that the view which
they were taking was opposed to the consensus of judicial opinion amongst the other
Indian High Courts. Having regard to the authorities cited before us at the Bar we
think it would be correct to say that except for this decision of the Punjab High Court
all the other High Courts have taken the view which is consistent with the decision of
Beaumont C.J. to which I have already referred. Indeed, some of these decisions
would seem to support the view that partial assignment of even a money decree is
valid and effective. As I have already pointed out, we are not called upon to consider
in this case whether partial assignment of a money decree is totally ineffective and the
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assignee can take no steps to execute it under O. XXI, r. 16, or under O. XXI, r. 15.
Therefore, we must hold that the courts below were wrong in dismissing the
appellant's darkhast on the ground that the assignment in his favour is only in respect
of a part of the decretal rights.
Mr. Albal for the respondents has argued that even if the assignee be held entitled
to execute the decree, he would not be justified in claiming to recover possession of
the three survey numbers, because what has been assigned in his favour is merely the
decree-holder's right to claim Rs. 1,000 as mentioned in the second clause of the
decree. We do not think that this contention is well founded. The assignment sets out
the description of the properties and the contents of the decree which is being
assigned. Then the document says that the lands, meaning the three survey numbers,
18, 87 and 90 are in the possession of the judgment-debtors. If the judgment-debtors
do not pay the amount of Rs. 1,000 in time the decree-holder is to recover possession
of the lands through Court. “This decree” says the document, “I am assigning to you.”
Therefore, there can be no doubt that what was assigned by this document was the
whole of the decretal rights in regard to these three survey numbers. It is no doubt
true that the document then goes on to add that according to the terms of the decree
the decree-holder was entitled to receive Rs. 1,000 from the judgment-debtor and it
authorises the assignee to receive that amount. In construing this clause it must be
remembered that the assignment took place the very next day after the decree was
passed and the only right
Page: 884
which the decree-holder then had was to receive Rs. 1,000 with in the Specific time. If
the amount had been paid, the decree-holder would never have been entitled to claim
possession of the lands in question. That is why, having assigned the whole of the
decree-holder's right in respect of this clause, the document warns the assignee that
as the matters then stood if the specified amount was paid during the period
mentioned, he was bound to take that amount. Reading the document as a whole we
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the right to recover possession of
the properties in case default was made by the judgment-debtors in paying the
amount of Rs. 1,000 has been assigned to the appellant. Therefore, in our opinion, he
is entitled to claim possession of the properties in the present darkhast.
Mr. Albal has further contended that there has been an adjustment of this decree
between his clients and the assignee himself, and Mr. Albal says that now that the
application for execution is held to be competent we must give him an opportunity to
prove this adjustment. Unfortunately for Mr. Albal, however, it is not open to him to
take this point in these proceedings. He had applied to the Court that passed the
decree praying that the adjustment pleaded by him should be certified. This
application was made on January 4, 1944. Parties were heard and the learned Judge
who dealt with this application dismissed it on the ground that the alleged adjustment
had taken place more than ninety days before the application had been made and that
the protection of s. 71 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act was not available to an
adjustment of this type. On this view he rejected the application for certifying the
alleged adjustment. This order was passed under O. XXI, r. 2, and was clearly
appealable. It does not appear that Mr. Albal's clients challenged this order by going
to the appellate Court and so far as the present execution proceedings are concerned
he is precluded from disputing the validity, the correctness or the propriety of the said
order. Therefore, in our opinion, it is now too late for Mr. Albal to contend in the
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present proceedings that there has been a valid adjustment of the decree.
The result is, the appeal must be allowed and the application made by the appellant
to execute the decree sent back to the executing Court for disposal in accordance with
law.
In regard to the costs of this appeal, however, we cannot forget the fact that some
settlement appears to have been made
Page: 885
between the parties. The decision of the learned Judge by which he refused to certify
the adjustment itself shows that the fact of the adjustment was not then seriously in
dispute. Therefore, in our opinion, the best order as to costs would be that the parties
should bear their own costs of this Court and the lower appellate Court. Costs in the
trial Court will be costs in the execution.
Appeal allowed.
K.B.S.
———
* Second Appeal No. 479 of 1951.
(1) (1933) 35 Bom. L.R. 620.
(2)
(1889) 17 Cal. 341.
(3) (1921) 44 Mad. 919, F.B.
(4) (1926) 48 All. 432.
(5)
(1944) 47 Bom. L.R. 104.
(6) (1910) 2 K.B. 636.
(7) (1920) 2 K.B. 243.
(8)
(1951) A.I.R. Punj. 324.
(9) (1932) 35 Bom. L.R. 1162.
(10)
(1932) 35 Bom. L.R. 1162.
(11)
(1933) 35 Bom. L.R. 620.
(12) (1932) 35 Bom. L.R. 1162.
(13) [1910] 2 K.B. 636.
(14)
[1920] 2 K.B. 243.
(15)
[1910] 2 K.B. 636.
(16) [1920] 2 K.B. 243.
(17)
(1889) 17 Cal. 341.
(18) (1921) 44 Mad. 919, F.B.
(19) (1926) 48 All. 432.
(20)
(1944) 47 Bom. L.R. 104.
(21) (1951) A.I.R. Punjab 324.
(22) (1933) 35 Bom. L.R. 620.
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Partial Execution of Decree Motilal Shivnarayan Marvadi v. Shivaji Sawalaram Dangale, 1953 SCC OnLine Bom 69

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Partial Execution of Decree Motilal Shivnarayan Marvadi v. Shivaji Sawalaram Dangale, 1953 SCC OnLine Bom 69

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SCC Online Web Edition, © 2022 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Sunday, August 28, 2022

In the High Court of Bombay

Motilal Shivnarayan Marvadi … (Original Assignee from Decree-

that where a decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the

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