Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśibha A

जयरािशभट्िवरिचतः
तोपविसंहः
आङ्ग्लानुवादः
वी. एन. ् झा
Chinmaya Research Series: 6
Tattvopaplavasiṁha
of
Jayarāśibhaṭṭa
English Translation
by
V N Jha
Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan

Adi Sankara Nilayam, Veliyanad
Ernakulam, Kerala
2013
Chinmaya Research Series: 6
ISBN 978-93-80864-11-2
Tattvopaplavasiṁha of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa
English Translation: V. N. Jha
Published with the financial assistance of Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan,

Ministry of Human Resource Development, Govt. of India, New Delhi
General Editor : Dilip Kumar Rana, Director

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c Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan
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First Edition: February 2013, 500 copies

Price: |600
ु
िवषयानमिणका
Benediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
0.1 गर्न्थकरणपर्ितज्ञा . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0.2 न्यायसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
0.3 मीमांसकसम्मतस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
0.4 ताथागतसम्मतस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
0.5 सौगतसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
0.6 मीमांसकािभमतस्य पर्त्यक्षस्य िनरासः . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
0.7 सांख्यसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य िनरसनम्। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
0.8 नैयाियकािभमतस्यानुमानस्य िनरसनम् . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
0.9 आत्मानुमानस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
0.10 ताथागतसम्मतस्यानुमानस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
0.11 ष ड्वधाथार्प त्पर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
0.12 उपमानपर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
0.13 अभावपर्माणस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
0.14 सम्भवैितह्पर्माणयोिनर् रासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
0.15 शब्दपर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
0.16 गर्न्थोपसंहारः . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
पदसूची . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
तत्वोपप्लव संहगतािन िवशेषनामािन . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
तत्वोपप्लव संहगतािन अवतरणािन . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Benediction
The Tattvopaplavasiṁha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is a rare work on
skepticism of Indian thought of eighth century A.D. The author has
boldly criticized the means of valid knowledge stated by the various
systems of Indian philosophy, i.e. Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṁsā,
Vedānta, Buddhist and Jain respectively by declaring the obliteration
of all the principles. Although the tradition links it with the Cārvāka
systems of thought, its study leads a reader towards a skeptical
critique of all major systems of Indian philosophy. It is indeed a
unique work depicting Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa as a great dialectician. Also the
study of the text helps us understand the Pūrvapakṣa for without the
understanding and negation of the Pūrvapakṣa, the Siddhānta cannot
be truly established.
Prof. V. N. Jha, a renowned scholar of Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and
Vyākaraṇa has translated the text into lucid English on the basis of
Bauddhabhārati, Varanasi edition, 1987. The present book consists of
an introduction, detailed analysis, and English translation. All these
will be useful to readers. I hope that the publication of the text will
stimulate further discussion and research. I am extremely happy that
the Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan has brought
out such a text on the system of Indian thought for future generations
of scholars to edit and translate the text.
We are very grateful to Prof. V.N Jha for his unstinted support for
all the research activities at Chinmaya International Foundation and
its Shodha Sansthan. May God’s grace and Pujya Gurudev’s blessings
be ever with him.
In Shri Guru Smṛti

Swami Advayananda
President, CIF
Preface
Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa most probably flourished in between the later part of
the 8th century AD and the earlier part of the 9th century AD ( ca.
770-830) in Southern India. He was a philosopher, a skeptic, loosely
affiliated to the materialist Cārvāka/Lokāyata school of thought. He
is the author of one of the most extraordinary philosophical works
in India, the Tattvopaplavasiṁha (The Lion of the Dissolution of all
Categories). Its palm leaf manuscript was discovered in 1926 in a
manuscript library at Sanghavina Padano Bhandar, Patan by Sukhlalji
Samghavi and Bechardas Dosi. The text was brought to light in 1941
by them and they assigned 8th century AD as the date of the text.
This date was slightly modified by Sukhlalji Saṅghavi who placed
Jayarāśi’s Tattvopaplavasiṁha between 725 and 825 AD, which, in turn,
is accepted by Eli Franco (1987: 12–13). However, in the ‘Preface to
the second edition’ of 1994, the date of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa was modified
as 770–830 AD.
Cārvāka, also known as Lokāyata, is a system of Indian philosophy
that assumes various forms of philosophical skepticism and religious
indifference. It is named after its founder, Cārvāka, the author of
the Bārhaspatya-sūtra which is not available today except some
quotations here and there.
The present text of Tattvopaplavasiṁha is often regarded as belonging
to the Cārvāka school, which would make it the only extant authentic
text of that school.
The Tattvopaplavasiṁha reflects on various epistemological theories
offered by various schools of thought. He critically examines a number
of definitions of pramāṇas (process of knowing) accepted by various
Indian schools of thought and proves that none of them are sufficient for
establishing knowledge. Inference relies on inductive reasoning which
cannot be shown to be universal premises. Testimony requires the
reliability of the witness, which must be established by another the
pramāṇa. Even direct perception cannot be established as true, because
it cannot be distinguished from an erroneous cognition. Therefore,
Jayarāśi argues that none of the sources of knowledge is valid and
hence nothing can be known for certain. Jayarāśi also challenged
the āstika establishment’s belief in supernatural beings by attacking
viii
their epistemology with different arguments in a Vaitaṇḍika style. One

can find free use of epistemological terminology prevalent at the time
of Jayarāśi in this text.
Prof. V. N. Jha, a renowned scholar of Veda, Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya,
and Mīmāṁsā, and the Former Director, Centre of Advanced Study in
Sanskrit, University of Pune, has translated this text into lucid English.
He has arranged the entire text in a dialogue form and has translated it
in such a way that the arguments become clearer and the reading of the
translation becomes quite enjoyable. For translating, he has taken the
text of Baudhabharati, Varanasi edition, 1987 of Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi
and Rasiklal Parikhji. In this edition, at several places, the Sanskrit text
is broken and those sentences do not convey any sense. Hence, Prof. Jha
preferred to leave them without translation with a hope, perhaps, that
in future a better manuscript of the text may be unearthed.
The present book consists of an introduction and a detailed analysis of
the content of the text, over and above, the Sanskrit text in Devanagari
along with its roman transliteration and English translation. At the end,
an index of all technical terms used in the text has been appended,
which, I believe, will be very much useful to the readers. It is a
great pleasure for the Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha
Sansthan to bring out this work for readers and scholars of Philosophy.
I am very grateful to Prof. Jha for allowing our Shodha Sansthan to
publish this work which is of great historical importance. I am thankful
to all my colleagues for carrying out all necessary works connected
with the publication of this volume. We are very much grateful to
Rashtriya Snskrit Sansthan, New Delhi, for the financial assistance,
especially to Prof. Radha Vallabha Tripathiji, the Vice-Chancellor, for
his kind support and advice. My sincere thanks to Prof. K. G. Paulose,
Chairman, CIFSS for his kind support and guidance. At last, I pray
Pujya Gurudev and the almighty God for their blessings.
Dilip Kumar Rana

Director, CIFSS
Acknowledgements
Some time back in 2010 Prof. Muraleemadhavan, the former Chairman
of the CIFSS, requested me to prepare the English Translation of
Tattopaplavasiṁha of Jayarāśi for the Rashtriya Sansakrit Sansthan,
New Delhi. I readily accepted his request because of my love for
Śāstra and translated it. He also suggested that the translation will be
published by the CIFSS which happens to be an institution affiliated
to the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi. I agreed to this also
and the same translation is now being published by the CIFSS. I thank
Prof. Muraleemadhavan for being instrumental to get this work done
by me. Had he not requested me I donot think I would have taken up
this work so urgently. I am also thankful Dr. Dilip Kumar Rana, the
Director of the CIFSS and Dr. V. Sheeba for showing very keen interest
in publishing this work on priority basis. They extended all technical
help for the completion of this translation. I thank from the core of
my heart the entire team of the Chinmaya International Foundation
Shodha Sansthan, Veliyanad, for preparing the press copy with all
necessary improvements and seeing the book through the press.
Special thanks are due to Dr. Sheeba, Mrs. Sarala Suresh and their
colleagues for properly typing the orinal text in sanskrit along with
its transliteration with diacrtitic marks and for arranging the English
tranlation text-wise. I am glad that they have added the sanskrit
word-index also at the end of the book. I wish them all happiness and
peace in their life.
I would also like to thank Dr. K.G Paulose, the present Chairman of
the CIFSS, for his love and respect for Indian knowledge systems.
V N Jha
Introduction
The Tattvopaplavasiṁha is the work written in the style of vitaṇḍā.

The Author of the Text
At the end of the book it is written that this work called
Tattvopaplavasiṁha is composed by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa. Beyond this
nothing is known about the author.
Time of the Author
About the time of the author also nothing is certain. Looking at the
internal evidence, we do find reference to Kumārila, Prābhākara and
Dharmakīrti in this text and so the upper limit may be fixed as 750 AD.
Similarly, Tattvopaplavasiṁha along with its author’s name Jayarāśi is
quoted in the Aṣṭasāhasrī of Vidyānanda, a Jain scholar of 810 to 875
AD. On this ground Pdt. Shri Sukhalalji Sanghvi thinks that Jayarāśi
Bhaṭṭa might have flourished before 725 AD (Cf. Hindi Introduction of
Varanasi Edn.).
History of the Text
The Tattvopaplavasiṁha was published for the first time in the year
1940 in the Gaekwad Oriental Series (No.87). This was edited by Pdt.
Shri Sukhalalji Sanghvi and Prof. Rasiklal Parikh. That edition of
this work along with the Hindi introduction of Pdt. Shri Sukhalalji
Sanghvi was published separately by Swami Dwarakanatha Shastri in
the Bauddhabharati Series no. 20 from Varanasi in the year 1987.
Form of the Text
The Tattvopaplavasiṁha may be regarded as a work belonging to the
category of vitaṇḍ-grantha. In a vitaṇḍa-grantha the main aim of the
author remains to show how the others’ views are wrong and untenable
without stating the author’s own views. Here too we find that Jayarāśi
has criticised positions of all the three traditions of Vedic, Jaina and
Bauddha philosophy on the concept of pramāṇa and prameya. In the
Vedic traditions too, he has specially engaged the doctrines of Nyāya,
Sāṇkhya, Mīmaṁsā, Vedānta and Vyākaraṇa and refuted them. He
refers to the Jainas as Digambaras and refutes their stands. Among
the Buddhists he takes on Dharmakīrti and his vijñāna-vāda-followers
xi
and refutes their theories. He equally finds it difficult to agree with the
language philosopher, Bhartṛhari and ultimately refutes him also.
This simply shows the versatile scholarship of Jayarāsi. He
demonstrates equal command on all the systems of Indian Philosophy.
Ultimately he demonstrates that no doctrine is logically tenable with
regard to concept of pramāṇa (the process of knowing) and prameya
(object of a true cognition). What is considered to be Truth can
never be established through any definition. Therefore, there is nothing
called Truth (tattva) or real as proposed by philosophers of various
systems. He takes a pride even in saying that he has excelled even
Bṛhaspati, the great teacher of the Cārvāka school of thought so far the
creation of doubts is concerned. The Cārvākas seem to have accepted
only one pramāṇa called perception and the four mahābhūtas namely,
earth, water, fire, and wind. Jayarāsi demolishes this position also.
Thus, although one may get an impression initially that Jayarāśi is
the follower of the Cārvāka school, one will be disillusioned once one
completes the reading of the text carefully. This justifies the name of the
text as Tattvopaplavasiṁha (Lion who ransacks all the believed forms
of Truth of any system of thought). He says at the end of this work
that something appears to be true only as long as it is not critically
examined. In his words :
tad evam upapluteṣu eva tattveṣu avicaritaramaṇīyaḥ sarve vyavahā-
raghaṭanta eva. tathā
pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍanābhijña jñānodadhi-vivardhitaḥ,
Jayaraśerjayantīha vikalpavādijiṣnavaḥ.
Application of the Form
This text provides training as how to frame questions in such a way
with a number of alternatives (vikalpa) that it becomes difficult for
the opponents to take a particular position. Gautama mentions three
types of discourse (kathā) in his Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1. They are vāda, jalpa
and vitaṇḍā. Vāda is a form of a discourse which aims at discovering
the truth. Jalpa is that dialogue which involves twisting arguments.
Vitaṇḍā, on the other hand, is the form of discourse where the
proponent is interested only in showing how the opponents’ stand is not
tenable and hence wrong without, however, providing any alternative
view-point. Gautama defines it as follows :
xii
sva-pratipakṣa-sthāpanahīno vitaṇḍā (Nyāyasūtra 1.2.3) ‘A discourse

in which the proponent neither agrees with the view of the opponent
nor establishes his own view.’ Jayarāśi’s Tattvopaplavasiṁha belongs to
this category of discourse.
Content of the Text
The plan of work of Jayarāśi seems to be the following :
Since the reality of any thing is claimed on the basis of pramāṇa, it
is better to challenge the very concepts of pramāṇa held by different
system of philosophy. Thus when the basis or groud to claim something
real or existent is demolished, the reality of those accepted prameyas
gets automatically refuted.
Jayarāśi has challenged and refuted the general and particular
definitions of pramāṇa of Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Bauddha philosophers.
He also refuted the particular definitions of pramāṇa as offered by
Nyāya, Mīmāṁsa, Sāṅkhya, Bauddha, Pauraṇikas and the Vaiyakaraṇa
thinkers. While he refuted the definitions of all the four pramāṇas as
developed by Gautama, Jayarāśi seems to have refuted the definition
of perception of Sāṅkhya, but those of perception and inference of the
Buddhists. Jayarāśi discussed all the six pramāṇas accepted by the
Mīmāṁsā system and pointed out their limitations. The aitihya and the
sambhava pramāṇas of the Paurāṇikas have also been criticised in this
text. There is comprehensive criticism of the concept of vācaka-pada
and sādhu-pada as desired by the grammarians.
The following are some of the concepts which Jayarāśi has particularly
discussed:
1. jāti (universal or generic property)

2. samavāya (inherence relation)
3. ālambana (object of knowledge)
4. atathyatā (falsity)
5. tathyatā (validity)
6. smṛti-pramoṣa (erasing of rememberance)
7. sannikarṣa (sense-organ–object–contact)
8. viṣayadvaividhya (classifying objects into two category)
xiii
9. kalpanā (imagination)
10. aspaṣṭatā (haziness)
11. santana (series)
12. hetu-phalabhāva (cause-and-effect relationship)
13. ātman (self)
14. kaivalya (pure state without attributes)
15. anekānta (multi-dimentional perspectives)
16. avayavin (whole)
17. bāhyārtha-vilopa (denial of external world)
18. kṣaṇabhaṅga (refutation of the theory of series)
19. nirhetukavināśa (destruction without cause)
20. varṇa (phoneme)
21. pada (morpheme)
22. sphoṭa (conceptual form)
23. apauruṣeyatva ( non-human agency)
Jayarāśi has very cleaverly discussed and refuted these concepts. It is

a fact that all systems of Indian Philosophy do not accept all these
concepts and while rejecting any of these concepts each system of
thought offer a set of arguments. Jayarāśi equipped himself with these
sets of arguments for refuting a particular concept and made use of one
set of arguments at his convenience. For instance, concepts accepted
by the Naiyāyikas, like jāti, samavāya, avayavin and ātman, are not
acceptable to the Buddhists and the Buddhists developed a set of
arguments to refute them. Jayarāśi adopts these arguments of the
Buddhists to refute the Naiyāyikas and vice-a-versa.
English Translation
I have translated the text as it appears in the Varanasi edition. In
this text it appears that the editors have followed certain principle of
editing. According to which whatever is found in the manuscript has
been kept unchanged in the running text and whatever has been added
by the editors is kept in the brackets. If the addition is of the nature
of correction in the text, the corrected form of the text has been kept
in the first bracket ‘( )’. Similarly, if the editors have suggested some
missing form of the text, that has been kept in the third bracket ‘[ ]’,
and the broken text or corrupted text which does not convey any sense
has been put into the second bracket ‘{ }’. I have not disturbed this
policy of the editors.
I have arranged the text in a dialogue-form. While translating the text
I have tried to make the translation readable, without, however, losing
the content. Wherever I could not make any sense of some text I have
put question mark(?) in the brackets. At several places the sanskrit text
is broken and so while translating I had to keep it blank.
Abbreviation
जैिम. - जैिमनीयसूतर्ािण
तत्वसं. का. - तत्वसङ्गर्हका रका
न्यायिब. - न्यायिबन्दःु
न्यायसू. - न्यायसूतर्ािण
पर्माणवा. - पर्माणवाितर् कम्
वैशे. - वैशेिषकसूतर्ािण
शाबरभा. - शाबरभाष्यम्
श्लोकवा. - श्लोकवाितर् कम्
सन्मित. - सन्मिततकर्ः
Tattvopaplavasiṁha of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa
भट्शर्ीजयरािशपर्णीतः तत्वोपप्लव संहः
(Bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśipraṇītaḥ Tattvopaplavasiṁhaḥ)
Text with English Translation
0.1 गर्न्थकरणपर्ितज्ञा
Granthakaraṇapratijñā
(Introducing the Text)
Text: 1
1. ............तां यात मुन.........
..........tāṁ yāta muna.........
Translation: 1
...tāṁ yāta muna .....(The line is broken, it does not make any
sense.)
Text: 2
2. [त]त्वोपप्लव संह एष िवषमो नूनं मया [सृज्यते]..........
[ta]ttvopaplavasiṁha eṣa viṣamo nūnaṁ mayā [sṛjyate]..........
Translation: 2
This text called (Ta)ttvopaplavasiṁha which is unique, not similar
i.e. extra-ordinary, peculiar is (being composed) by me indeed. …
Text: 3
ना स्त तत्फलं वा स्वगार्िद।
nāsti tatphalaṁ vā svargādi.
Translation: 3
Or there is no result of that (good, or, bad act) viz. heaven etc.
(hell)1
1 The Cārvākas do not accept either merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) produced by
good act, or, bad act respectively nor heaven and hell produced by merit and demerit
respectively.
2 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 4
सत्यं, तावदा(दे)तस्य कमर् णः स भा..........
satyaṁ, tāvadā(de)tasya karmaṇaḥ sa bhā..........
Translation: 4
It is true but by that, of this act …………
(the sentence is broken and hence does not make full sense).
Text: 5
उक्ं च परमाथर् िविद्रिप-
uktaṁ ca paramārthavidbhirapi-
Translation: 5
Even those who know the Ultimate Reality have said the following:
Text: 6
“लौिकको मागोर्ऽनुसत्र्व्यः अ[ित?] .....। लोकव्यवहारं पर्ित सदृशौ बालप ण्डतौ॥”
इत्यािद।
“laukiko mārgo’nusarttavyaḥ a[ti?]............ lokavyavahāraṁ prati
sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau.” ityādi.
Translation: 6
“One should follow the mundane, or, ordinary path ………….. (a part
of the verse is missing). With reference to the mundane behavior,
or, inter-action both, a child and a wise man, are alike.” etc.
[2. बृहस्पतेस्तत्वचतुष्कोक्ेरिप तत्वोपप्लवपरत्वम्।]
[2. bṛhaspatestattvacatuṣkokterapi tattvopaplavaparatvam.]
Text: 7
ननु यद्ुपप्लवस्तत्वानां िकमाया....
nanu yadyupaplavastattvānāṁ kimāyā....
Translation: 7
Well, if realities are unsettled i.e. are not as they are presented by
different philosophers …… (again, the sentence is broken).
Text: 8
“अथातस्तत्वं व्याख्यास्यामः”
“athātastattvaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ”
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 3
Translation: 8
Question:
“Now, we shall explain the reality.”
Text: 9
"पृ थव्यप्ेजोवायु रित तत्वािन तत्समुदाये शरीरे न्दर्यिवषये संज्ञा"[ ] इत्यािद
“pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣaye
samjñā”[ ] ityādi
Translation: 9
“Earth, water, fire and air are the real entities. The compositions
made out of them are called body, sense organ and object.” Are
these real entities?2
Text: 10
न, अन्याथर् त्वात्।
na, anyārthatvāt.
Translation: 10
Answer:
No, because they are made for something else.
Text: 11
िकमथर् म्?
kimartham?
Translation: 11
Question:
For what?
Text: 12
पर्ितिबम्बनाथर् म्।
pratibimbanārtham.
Translation: 12
Answer:
For reflection.
2 Thislist refers to only the material aspect of the world. The Cārvākas do not want to
go beyond that. Even time and space are not acceptable because these are not perceived.
What to talk of self and mind?
Text: 13
िकं पुनरतर् पर्ितिबम्ब्यते?
kiṁ punaratra pratibimbyate?
Translation: 13
Question:
What is to be reflected upon here?
Text: 14
पृ थव्यादीिन तत्वािन लोके पर् सद्ािन, तान्यिप िवचायर् माणािन न व्यवितष्न्ते िकं
पुनरन्यािन?
pṛthivyādīni tattvāni loke prasiddhāni, tānyapi vicāryamāṇāni na
vyavatiṣṭhante kiṁ punaranyāni?
Translation: 14
Answer:
The entities such as earth etc. are well known in the mundane world.
When we enquire deep into them, even they are cannot be properly
characterized. What to talk of other entities?
Text: 15
अथ कथं तािन न स न्त?
atha kathaṁ tāni na santi?
Translation: 15
Question:
How do you say that (they cannot be characterized and hence) they
do no exist?3
Text: 16
तदच्ु यते-सल्क्षणिनबन्धनं मानव्यवस्थानम्, मानिनबन्धना च मेय स्थितः, तदभावे तयोः
सद्व्यवहारिवषयत्वं कथं [स्वयमेव]..... ताम्।
taducyate-sallakṣaṇanibandhanaṁ mānavyavasthānam, mānaniba-
ndhanā ca meyasthitiḥ, tadabhāve tayoḥ sadvyavahāraviṣayatvaṁ
kathaṁ [svayameva]..... tām.
3 Ifthe world has an existence, it has to exist independent of its knowledge. Knowledge
merely reveals the world. It is said jñānādhīna vastusattā ‘the existence of an entity
is revealed by its true knowledge, or, mānādhīna meya-siddhiḥ ‘the knowable is to be
established by its knowledge.’ But that knowledge has to be a true knowledge. But how
to determine that a knowledge is true or false? The Cārvākas hold that it cannot be.
Translation: 16
Answer:
Here is our answer. (You will agree that) settlement i.e. existence
of a proof (knowledge) is based on its proper definition. And the
existence of ‘what is to be proved’ (object of knowledge) depends
upon the proof (knowledge). In the absence of that (the proof),
how can (by itself ) both, (proof and what is to be proved), be the
objects of real reference…
Text: 17
अथ.... न ब..... व्यवहारः िकर्यते; तदात्मिन रूपा स्तत्वव्यवहारो घटादौ च
सुखा स्तत्वव्यवहारः पर्वत्र्ियतव्यः।
atha.... na ba..... vyavahāraḥ kriyate; tadātmani rūpāstitvavya-
vahāro ghaṭādau ca sukhāstitvavyavahāraḥ pravarttayitavyaḥ.
Translation: 17
Reference is made (the sentence is broken); at that time one should
make reference to the existence of form in the self and reference of
existence of happiness in pot etc.
0.2 न्यायसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा
[1. nyāyasammatasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā]
Refutation of the definition of perception as accepted by Nyāya
Text: 18
`[इ] न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषोर्त्पन्ं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यिभचा रव्यवसायात्मकं पर्त्यक्षम्" (न्यायसू.
१।१।४) इित तल्क्षणम्।
[१. अदष्ु कारकेत्यािदिवकल्पचतुष्येन अव्यिभचा रपदस्य दषू णोपकर्मः।]
“[i]ndriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri-
vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam” (Nyāyasū.1.1.4) iti tallakṣaṇam.
[1. aduṣṭakāraketyādivikalpacatuṣṭayena avyabhicāripadasya dūṣa-
ṇopakramaḥ.]
Translation: 18
The definition of perceptual knowledge as given by Nyāya Sūtra
1.1.4 is “a perceptual knowledge is that which is produced by the
contact between the sense organ and its object and which is not
verbalized, which is not erroneous, and which is determinate in
nature.”
Text: 19
तच्चाव्यिभचा[ र]....... िकमदष्ु कारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्त्वेन, आहो स्वद् बाधारिहतत्वेन,
पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न, अन्यथा वा?
taccāvyabhicā[ri]..... kimaduṣṭakārakasandohotpādyatvena, āhosvid
bādhārahitatvena, pravṛttisāmarthyena, anyathā vā?
Translation: 19
Here we would like to know such knowledge is called “not
erroneous”, is it because (a) it is produced by a number of factors
free from defects? Or, (b) because it is free from contradiction? Or,
(c) because it leads to fruitful interaction with the world? Or, (d)
because of anything else?
Text: 20
तद्द्दष्ु कारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्त्वेन अव्यिभचा रत्वम्; सैव कारणानामदष्ु ता केनावगम्यते?
tadyadyaduṣṭakārakasandohotpādyatvena avyabhicāritvam; saiva
kāraṇānāmaduṣṭatā kenāvagamyate?
Translation: 20
There, if you say that such knowledge is not erroneous because it is
produced by a set of factors which are free from defects, we would
like to ask how do you know that those factors are free from defects?
Text: 21
न पर्त्यक्षेण; नयनकुशलादेरती न्दर्यत्वात्।
na pratyakṣeṇa; nayanakuśalāderatīndriyatvāt.
Translation: 21
You cannot say you know it by perception because the defects (say
foreign particles) in the eyes are beyond the range of sense organ.
Text: 22
नाप्यनुमानेन; लङ्ान्तराऽनवगतेः।
nāpyanumānena; liṅgāntarā’navagateḥ.
Translation: 22
Nor can that be known by inference because, no other ground is
known.
Text: 23
ननु इदमेव ज्ञानं लङ्ं तदत्ु थं तस्य िविशष्तां गमयित;
nanu idameva jñānaṁ liṅgaṁ tadutthaṁ tasya viśiṣṭatāṁ gamayati;
Translation: 23
Well the same perceptual knowledge will be the ground and that
will cause the knowledge of its being special i.e. free from defects.
Text: 24
यद्ेविमतरेतराशर्यत्वं दरु
ु त्रमापनीपद्ते।
yadyevamitaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpanīpadyate.
Translation: 24
Answer:
If it is so, it leads to the unavoidable defect of mutual dependency.4
(1) A true perceptual cognition has to be produced by the contact
between a sense organ and the object.
(2) It should not be erroneous.
(3) It should not be caused by the decoding process of language
(avyapadeśya), and
(4) It should be a determinate cognition, and not a doubtful
cognition.
Jayarāśi is going to challenge all these criteria and ultimately he
is going to demonstrate that they do not characterize any true
cognition.
Text: 25
िकञ्, इ न्दर्याणां गुणदोषाशर्यत्वे तदत्ु थे िवज्ञाने दोषाशङ् का नाितवत्र्ते पुव्ं यापारो-
त्पािदतशब्दिवज्ञान इव।
kiñca, indriyāṇāṁ guṇadoṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśaṅkā
nātivarttate puṁvyāpārotpāditaśabdavijñāna iva.
Translation: 25
Moreover, if the sense organs are accepted as loci of healthiness
and defects then, the doubt regarding the defects in the knowledge
4 TheNaiyāyikas provide criteria to decide what can be called a true perceptual cognition.
The criteria are:
produced by the sense organ does not override i.e. remains as it is

like the verbal understanding from a sentence uttered by a human
being.
Text: 26
अथ बाधानुत्पत्याऽव्यिभचा रत्वं ज्ञायते; बाधानुत्प त्िवर् ज्ञानस्य िकं यथाथर् गृहीितत्वेन,
आहो स्वद् बाधकज्ञानोत्पादककारकवैकल्यािदित स न्दह्ः?
atha bādhānutpattyā’vyabhicāritvaṁ jñāyate; bādhānutpattirvijñā-
nasya kiṁ yathārthagṛhītitvena, āhosvid bādhakajñānotpādakakāra-
kavaikalyāditi sandihmaḥ?
Translation: 26
Question:
If you say that the perceptual knowledge which has arisen is not
erroneous because there has not arisen any contradiction. In that
case our question will be is it the case that there has not arisen
the contradiction because the perception has revealed the fact
or because all the factors which will produce the contradictory
knowledge are not present there? This is our doubt.
Text: 27
दृश्यते िह बाधकज्ञानोत्पादककारकवैकल्याद् बाधानुत्पादः, यथा दरू े मरीिचिनचये
जलज्ञाने जाते बाधा न सम्पद्ते, अभ्यासदेशाव स्थतस्य कारकोपिनपाते सत्युत्पद्ते।
सा चोपजायमाना संवत्सरािदकालिवकल्पेन सञ्ायते, कदािचच्च कारकवैकल्यान्ैव
सम्पद्ते। न चैतावता तस्या यथाथर् ता उपपद्ते।
dṛśyate hi bādhakajñānotpādakakārakavaikalyād bādhānutpādaḥ,
yathā dūre marīcinicaye jalajñāne jāte bādhā na sampadyate, abhyā-
sadeśāvasthitasya kārakopanipāte satyutpadyate. sā copajāyamānā
saṁvatsarādikālavikalpena sañjāyate, kadācicca kārakavaikalyā-
nnaiva sampadyate. na caitāvatā tasyā yathārthatā upapadyate.
Translation: 27
Answer:
As a matter of fact, we do see sometimes because of absence
of all factors contributing to the contradictory knowledge, the
contradiction does not take place, as for example, in the beam
of mirage at a distance, when there arises the knowledge of
water, there is no contradiction arising at that time. But, when

there is association of all factors, with the familiar place the
contradicted knowledge does arise. And sometimes for the arising of
the knowledge of contradiction it takes a year or so and sometimes
because of absence of all necessary factors, the contradicted
knowledge does not arise at all. But simply because of this i.e.
simply because the contradicted knowledge does not arise, it cannot
be justified that the perceptual cognition is true.
Text: 28
अिप च, बाधािवरह एव बाधासद्ावावेदकः तदपु लब्धत्वेन तत्सद्ावोपलब्धेः।
api ca, bādhāviraha eva bādhāsadbhāvāvedakaḥ tadupalabdhatvena
tatsadbhāvopalabdheḥ.
Translation: 28
Moreover, the absence of contradictory knowledge itself suggest
that there is contradiction, because the knowledge of absence of
contradiction will cause the knowledge of contradiction.
Text: 29
अन्यच्च, बाधािवरहः िकं सवर् पुरुषापेक्षया, आहो स्वत् पर्ितपत्तर्पेक्षया?
anyacca, bādhāvirahaḥ kiṁ sarvapuruṣāpekṣayā, āhosvit pratipattra-
pekṣayā?
Translation: 29
Still there is another point to be considered. Is it the case that
there is absence of contradictory knowledge for everybody? Or, such
absence of contradiction is only to that person who has perceived
actually?
Text: 30
तद्िद सवर् पुरुषापेक्षया... तिद्रहोप्य... [स]वर् ज्ञाः स्युः।
tadyadi sarvapuruṣāpekṣayā... tadvirahopya... [sa]rvajñāḥ syuḥ.
Translation: 30
If you say, it is with everybody……….. (the sentence is broken) then
all will become all-knowing.
Text: 31
भवन्तु नाम सवेर् सवर् ज्ञाः। को दोषः?
bhavantu nāma sarve sarvajñāḥ. ko doṣaḥ?
Translation: 31
Question:
Let everybody become all-knowing. What is the harm?
Text: 32
असवर् ज्ञव्यवहाराभावपर्सङ्ः।
asarvajñavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 32
Answer:
In that case we cannot make reference to someone as “not
all-knowing”.
Text: 33
अथ पर्ितपत्तर्पेक्षया बाधानुत्पादः-पर्ितपत्ुबार्धकं िवज्ञानं नोत्पद्ते तेन तदव्यिभचा र;
atha pratipattrapekṣayā bādhānutpādaḥ-pratipatturbādhakaṁ vijñā-
naṁ notpadyate tena tadavyabhicāri;
Translation: 33
Question:
If you say that not arising of contradiction is only with that
person who is perceiving, and therefore since the contradictory
knowledge does not arise, and therefore the perceptual knowledge
is not erroneous.
Text: 34
तदयुक्म्; पर्ितपत्ुबार्धकज्ञानाऽनुत्पादेऽिप देशान्तरगमन-मरणािदना मिणमरीच्यािद-
िवपयर् यज्ञानदशर् नात्।
tadayuktam; pratipatturbādhakajñānā’nutpāde’pi deśāntaragamana-
maraṇādinā maṇimarīcyādiviparyayajñānadarśanāt.
Translation: 34
Answer:
This is also not proper. Because, even if there does not arise the
contradictory knowledge to the perceiver, even to that person it
is seen that there arises opposite knowledge, such as knowledge of

mirage, when he goes to that place………. (?)
Text: 35
अथवा तिद्पयर् यज्ञानं तथािवधमेवोत्पन्ं स्वपर्भवस्वभावानुपर्वेशेन यद्ाधकिवज्ञानो-
त्पादपर्ितबन्धकृत् तद्शोऽिप तथाभूत एव परेष्सम्यग्ज्ञानवत्। .....एवं सित यदक्
ु म्- “यतर्
च दष्ु ं करणं यतर् च िमथ्येित पर्त्ययः स एव असमीचीनः पर्त्ययः” [शाबरभा. १।१।५]
इत्येतदेवाऽसमीचीनम्।
athavā tadviparyayajñānaṁ tathāvidhamevotpannaṁ svaprabhava-
svabhāvānupraveśena yadbādhakavijñānotpādapratibandhakṛt tadva-
śo’pi tathābhūta eva pareṣṭasamyagjñānavat. .... evaṁ sati yadu-
ktam- “yatra ca duṣṭaṁ karaṇaṁ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ sa eva
asamīcīnaḥ pratyayaḥ” [Śābarabhā. 1.1.5] ityetadevā’samīcīnam.
Translation: 35
Or, that erroneous knowledge being produced in that form because
of it own nature, obstructs the arising of its contradictory
knowledge. Even being affected by that it remains as it is like the
true cognition, intended by the opponent. …… In this context, what
Śabarasvāmin has said in his Bhāṣya on Jaimini Sūtra 1.1.5 “where
the instrument is defective and where the knowledge is erroneous,
such cognition is called a false cognition.” Is also not proper.
Text: 36
अथ पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न अव्यिभचा रतां वे त्स; पर्वृ त्सामथ्यर् फलेनाऽिभसम्बन्धः,
फलञ् सर्क्चन्दनविनतोदकािद, तेषु सत्यफलिनष्पत्ेः तेषु फलोपचारः तद्ेहसम्बन्धः
पर्वृ त्सामथ्यर् म्। पर्वृ त्ः कायस्था िकर्या तत्सामथ्यर् मव्यिभचा रतां गमयित।
atha pravṛttisāmarthyena avyabhicāritāṁ vetsi; pravṛttisāmar-
thyaṁ phalenā’bhisambandhaḥ, phalañca srakcandanavanitoda-
kādi, teṣu satyaphalaniṣpatteḥ teṣu phalopacāraḥ taddehasamba-
ndhaḥ pravṛttisāmarthyam. pravṛttiḥ kāyasthā kriyā tatsāmarthya-
mavyabhicāritāṁ gamayati.
Translation: 36
If again, you know that the perception is not erroneous on account
of its corresponding with the reality, then corresponding to the
reality or prompting to fruitful interaction with the world, means
the association with the result and result is garland of flowers,

sandal wood paste, women, water, etc. As a matter of fact, the
real result is going to be produced in them. And by extension they
are treated as result. Therefore, the association of body is in fact,
the correspondence with the reality. The inducement is the activity
in the body, the capacity of that leads to the knowledge of not being
erroneous.
Text: 37
त त्कम् अवगतम्, अनवगतं वा?
tatkim avagatam, anavagataṁ vā?
Translation: 37
Question:
Here we want to ask: whether that capacity causes the knowledge
after being known or without being known?
Text: 38
यिद नावगतम्; तद् 'अ स्त' इित कथं वे त्स? अथाऽवगतम्; तदवगतेरव्यिभचा रता
कथमवगम्यत इित पूवोर्क्मनुसत्र्व्यम्।
yadi nāvagatam; tad ‘asti’ iti kathaṁ vetsi? athā’vagatam; tadava-
gateravyabhicāritā kathamavagamyata iti pūrvoktamanusarttavyam.
Translation: 38
Anticipated Clarification:
If you say that it causes the knowledge without being known, then
how do you know that it exist. And if you say that it causes the
knowledge after being known, how does it lead to knowledge that
the perception is not erroneous? Therefore, one will have to follow
the same method of enquiry as presented before.
Text: 39
उदकपर्ाप्त्या पूवोर्त्पन्ोदकिवज्ञानस्य अव्यिभचा रता व्यवस्थाप्यते; िकं तत्पर्ितभातो-
दकपर्ाप्त्या, आहो स्वत् तज्जातीयोद[क]पर्ाप्त्या, तद्ंशजजलपर्ाप्त्या वा?
udakaprāptyā pūrvotpannodakavijñānasya avyabhicāritā vyavasthā-
pyate; kiṁ tatpratibhātodakaprāptyā, āhosvit tajjātīyoda[ka]prā-
ptyā, tadvaṁśajajalaprāptyā vā?
Translation: 39
Question:
If you say that if water is obtained after the knowledge of water, it
is concluded that the knowledge of water which arose before, is not
erroneous. There we would like to ask, is it so because one gets the
water which was revealed in the knowledge? Or, because one gets
water of that genre. Or, because one gets water of the same family?
Text: 40
तद्िद पर्ितभातोदकपर्ाप्त्या; तदयुक्म्; पर्ितभातोदकस्य अवस्थानं नोपपद्ते, झष-
मिहषप रवतर् नाऽिभघातोपजाताऽवयविकर्यान्यायेन पर्त्यस्तमयसम्भवात्।
tadyadi pratibhātodakaprāptyā; tadayuktam; pratibhātodakasya ava-
sthānaṁ nopapadyate, jhaṣamahiṣaparivartanā’bhighātopajātā’va-
yavakriyānyāyena pratyastamayasambhavāt.
Translation: 40
Anticipated Clarification:
If you say that because one gets knowledge which was reflected
in the perception, it is not proper. Because what appeared in the
knowledge, does not exist there. Because it is possible that the
water has become extinct through the action in the parts caused by
striking of water, by the changing movements of fish, buffalo etc.
Text: 41
अथ तज्जातीयोदकपर्ाप्त्या, एवं तिहर् असत्योदकज्ञानेऽिप जाते क्विचत्ोयमासादय न्त
पुमांसः तदप्यिवतथं स्यात्।
atha tajjātīyodakaprāptyā, evaṁ tarhi asatyodakajñāne’pi jāte kvacit
toyamāsādayanti pumāṁsaḥ tadapyavitathaṁ syāt.
Translation: 41
Again, if you say that the knowledge of water has led to the getting
of water belonging to the class of water which was revealed in
the knowledge of water (therefore the knowledge of water is not
erroneous), then sometimes even if an erroneous knowledge of water
arises people get a water in that case that erroneous knowledge will
also have to be declared as a true cognition.
Text: 42
अथ तद्ेशकालसंलग्मुदकं न पर्ापयित िमथ्याज्ञानम्, सम्यग्ज्ञानं तु तद्ेशकालसंलग्मुदकं
पर्ापयित तेन तदव्यिभचारीित चेत्;
atha taddeśakālasaṁlagnamudakaṁ na prāpayati mithyājñānam,
samyagjñānaṁ tu taddeśakālasaṁlagnamudakaṁ prāpayati tena
tadavyabhicārīti cet;
Translation: 42
Clarification:
Well, the erroneous knowledge of water does not lead to getting the
water connected with a particular space and particular time. But,
a true cognition of water does lead to getting the water connected
with a particular space and time and therefore such a true cognition
is called not erroneous.
Text: 43
यन् पर्ापयित तद् व्यिभचा र तिहर् मुमूषर् ुपदाथोर्त्पािदतं ज्ञानं चन्दर्ाकर्गर्हनक्षतर्तारकािद-
संवेदनं च व्यिभचा र पर्ाप्नोित।
yanna prāpayati tad vyabhicāri tarhi mumūrṣupadārthotpāditaṁ
jñānaṁ candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādisaṁvedanaṁ ca vyabhicāri
prāpnoti.
Translation: 43
Reply:
Then it implies that, that knowledge which does not lead to getting
the object revealed by it is an erroneous knowledge. In that case,
knowledge which is caused by some thing which is about to die or
vanish and also the knowledge of moon, sun, planet, constellations
and stars etc. will have to be declared as erroneous (because such
knowledges do not lead to getting the objects revealed by the
respective knowledges).
Text: 44
न च तद्ेशकालसंलग्ोदकपर्ापकत्वम स्त, देशस्यािप उदकविद्नाशसम्भवात्।
na ca taddeśakālasaṁlagnodakaprāpakatvamasti, deśasyāpi udaka-
vadvināśasambhavāt.
Translation: 44
(Moreover), it is also not true that what you consider to be a true
cognition, leads to getting the water connected with a particular
space and particular time, because as water is likely to be destroyed
the place also is also likely to be destroyed.
[२. पर्सङ्ात् जातेिनर् राकरणम्।]

[2. prasaṅgāt jāternirākaraṇam.]
Refutation of Universal
Text: 45
नच जातेः सम्भवोऽ स्त।
naca jāteḥ sambhavo’sti.
Translation: 45
There is no possibility of “universal” or generic property being a
real entity.
Text: 46
स एव कथम्?
sa eva katham?
Translation: 46
Question:
How is to so?
Text: 47
कथ्यते- सा उदकव्यिक्भ्योऽिभन्ा, िभन्ा, िभन्ाऽिभन्ा वेित?
kathyate- sā udakavyaktibhyo’bhinnā, bhinnā, bhinnā’bhinnā veti?
Translation: 47
Answer:
Here is the answer. Let me ask (a) what you call universal or a
generic property (say waterness) is it identical with waters? (b) or
different from waters? (c) or different-cum-identical with water?
Text: 48
तद्िद तादात्म्यव्यव स्थताः तदा इह तासां नानात्वेन तस्यािप (तस्या अिप) नानात्वो-
पप त्ः, तदेकत्वे च सवार्सामेकताप त्ः। एकत्वे च िनःसामान्यता तादात्म्यिवपयार्सो वा।
tadyadi tādātmyavyavasthitāḥ tadā iha tāsāṁ nānātvena tasyāpi

(tasyā api) nānātvopapattiḥ, tadekatve ca sarvāsāmekatāpattiḥ.
ekatve ca niḥsāmānyatā tādātmyaviparyāso vā.
Translation: 48
If you say, that the universal is identical with the particulars,
then since the particulars are many in number, there will arise the
contingency of universal being many in numbers (i.e. there will
be many waternesses). And if you say that the universal is only
one, then there will arise the contingency that all the particulars
becoming one. And if the particulars become one it will have no
universal. Or, it will result into error of identity.
Text: 49
अथ अथार्न्तरभूता; सा व्यावृत्ाकारा, अनुगताकारा वा?
atha arthāntarabhūtā; sā vyāvṛttākārā, anugatākārā vā?
Translation: 49
Again if you maintain the universal as a distinct entity, then the
question arises (a) whether it is of the form of being distinct from
the rest? Or (b) whether it is of the form of one of the same form
in the consecutive cognitions?
Text: 50
तद्िद व्यावृत्ाकारा; न तस्याः सामान्यरूपत्वं व्यावृत्ैकस्वभावत्वात् तोयािदवत्।
tadyadi vyāvṛttākārā; na tasyāḥ sāmānyarūpatvaṁ vyāvṛttaikasva-
bhāvatvāt toyādivat.
Translation: 50
If you say that it is of the form of being distinct from the rest
then that cannot be of the form of universal because of its being of
distinct unique character like an individual water.
Text: 51
अथ अनुस्यूतरूपा; त त्कम् आत्मरूपानुस्यूता, पररूपानुस्यूता वा?
atha anusyūtarūpā; tatkim ātmarūpānusyūtā, pararūpānusyūtā vā?
Translation: 51
But if you say that it is of the form of one of the same form. There
again the question arises (a) is it of one of the same form identical
with its self or (b) is it of one of the same consecutive form identical
with the form of something else.
Text: 52
तद्द्ात्मरूपानुस्यूता, तदयुक्म्; आत्मन्यनुगमाऽभावात्।
tadyadyātmarūpānusyūtā, tadayuktam; ātmanyanugamā’bhāvāt.
Translation: 52
If you say it is of one of the same form identical with its self, it is
not proper because there is no question of consecutiveness in one
and the same thing.
Text: 53
अथ पररूपानुस्यूता; केयं पररूपानुस्यूतता-िकं तत्ादात्म्यम्, तत्समवायो वा?
atha pararūpānusyūtā; keyaṁ pararūpānusyūtatā-kiṁ tattādāt-
myam, tatsamavāyo vā?
Translation: 53
And if you say it is of one of the same consecutive form identical
with the form of something else, then we would like to know what
is that: is it of one of the same consecutive form identical with the
form of something else: (1) Does it mean identity with that? Or (2)
does it mean inherence with that?
Text: 54
तद्िद तादात्म्यम्; सामान्यतद्तोरभेदपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi tādātmyam; sāmānyatadvatorabhedaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 54
If you say it is identity with that, then there arises the contingency
of universal becoming identical with that which possesses universal,
that is particular.
Text: 55
अथ पररूपसमवायः अनुस्यूताकारता; तदयुक्म्; सामान्यािद्न्ः समवायः। सामान्यस्य
अनुगतं रूपमालोचियतुमारब्धं न ततोऽन्यस्य।
atha pararūpasamavāyaḥ anusyūtākāratā; tadayuktam; sāmānyād-
bhinnaḥ samavāyaḥ. sāmānyasya anugataṁ rūpamālocayitumārab-
dhaṁ na tato’nyasya.
Translation: 55
If you say it is inherence with other form, is what is called the form
of being known as of one and the same form in the consecutive
cognitions, that is not proper, because (for you) inherence is
different from universal. We have initiated the discussion on the
form of consecutive character of universal and not of anything else.
Text: 56
यिद च उदकजातीयाथर् पर्ाप्त्याऽव्यिभचा रता पूवोर्िदतोदकिवज्ञानस्य व्यवस्थाप्यते;
तदा उदकजातेगर्वादाविप सम्भवोऽ स्त गवािदपर्ाप्त्याऽव्यिभच(चा) रता उदकिवज्ञानस्य
स्यात्।
yadi ca udakajātīyārthaprāptyā’vyabhicāritā pūrvoditodakavijñā-
nasya vyavasthāpyate; tadā udakajātergavādāvapi sambhavo’sti
gavādi prāptyā’vyabhica(cā)ritā udakavijñānasya syāt.
Translation: 56
If you say that the knowledge of water is not erroneous because
it leads to the obtainment of something similar to water, then the
universal of water i.e. waterness can be found also in cow etc. and
so even if one gets cow after getting the knowledge of water, the
knowledge of water can be said to be not erroneous.
Text: 57
अथ उदकत्वस्य गवादावभाव इित चेत्;
atha udakatvasya gavādāvabhāva iti cet;
Translation: 57
Clarification:
Well, there is no waterness in cow etc.
Text: 58
िकम् इतरेतराभावः, पर्ागभावः, पर्ध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावो वा?
kim itaretarābhāvaḥ, prāgabhāvaḥ, pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ, atyantā-
bhāvo vā?
Translation: 58
Reply:
Here we would like to know what kind of absence is here in the cow.
(1) Is it a mutual absence (2) Or a pre-absence (3) Or a destruction

(4) Or an absolute absence?
Text: 59
तद्दीतरेतराभावः; तदा उदकादाविप समानम् उदकत्वस्याऽभावपर्सङ्ः। उदकरूपता न
उदकत्वस्य, उदकत्वरूपता च नोदक...........
tadyadītaretarābhāvaḥ; tadā udakādāvapi samānam udakatvasyā’-
bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. udakarūpatā na udakatvasya udakatvarūpatā ca
nodaka......
Translation: 59
If you say it is a mutual absence, then it is common in water also
and as a consequence there will be absence of waterness in water
too, because neither waterness is of the form of water, nor the water
is of the form of waterness.
Text: 60
अथ पर्ागभावः; तदा उदकेऽिप उदकस्याभावपर्सङ्ः।
atha prāgabhāvaḥ; tadā udake’pi udakasyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 60
If you say there is a pre-absence of waterness in the cow, then even
in water one can say there is no water.
Text: 61
अथ पर्ध्वंसाभावः; तदा उदकेऽिप अभावपर्सङ्ः।
atha pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ; tadā udake’pi abhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 61
Similarly, if you say there is destruction of waterness in cow, then
there is such destruction in water also.
Text: 62
अथ अन्यतर्ा स्त;
atha anyatrāsti;
Translation: 62
Clarification:
Well, waterness is found in another water.
Text: 63
नैकतर् पर्त्यस्तिमतस्य अन्यतर् सम्भव उपपद्ते।
naikatra pratyastamitasya anyatra sambhava upapadyate.
Translation: 63
Reply:
It cannot be so because if something is destroyed in one place this
destruction can be possible elsewhere also.
Text: 64
अथ अत्यन्ताभावः; तदा उदकेऽिप तस्याऽभावपर्सङ्ः।
atha atyantābhāvaḥ; tadā udake’pi tasyā’bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 64
Again if you say that there is absolute absence of waterness in the
cow, then there will arise the contingency of its absence being in
water also.
Text: 65
अथ सम्बन्धाभावाद् गवादावुदकत्वाभाव इित चेत्;
atha sambandhābhāvād gavādāvudakatvābhāva iti cet;
Translation: 65
Clarification:
We say that there is no waterness in cow, because there is no relation
of waterness in the cow.
Text: 66
ततर्ािप िकम् इतरेतराभावः, पर्ध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावो वेित पूवर्वद् वक्व्यम्।
tatrāpi kim itaretarābhāvaḥ, pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ, atyantābhāvo veti
pūrvavad vaktavyam.
Translation: 66
Reply:
There also the same questions arise as before: (1) Is it the case that
there is mutual absence of relationship and the cow? (2) Or there
is destruction? (3) Or there is absolute absence? And one should
satisfactorily answer them.
Text: 67
िनिमत्ान्तराभावाद् गवादाव(वु)दकत्वाभाव इित चेत्;
nimittāntarābhāvād gavādāva(vu)dakatvābhāva iti cet;
Translation: 67
Clarification:
Since there is absence of any other ground, there is absence of
waterness in the cow.
Text: 68
सोऽतर्ािप समानः।
so’trāpi samānaḥ.
Translation: 68
Reply:
That is common here also.
Text: 69
न च उदकव्यक् नां नानात्वमुपपादियतुं पायर् ते। उदकम् अनुदकाकाराद् उदकाकारतया
व्यावत्र्ते, उदकाकारात्ु कथं व्यावत्र्ते? िकम् उदकाकारतया, आहो स्वद्
आकारान्तरेण?
na ca udakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvamupapādayituṁ pāryate. udakam
anudakākārād udakākāratayā vyāvarttate, udakākārāttu kathaṁ
vyāvarttate? kim udakākāratayā, āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?
Translation: 69
Reply:
Moreover, it is not possible to explain how individual waters
are made (one can understand that) water is distinguished from
non-waters, in the form of water. But how can one form of water
be distinguished from another form of water. If it is distinguished
then two questions come to our mind (1) Is it being distinguished
in the form of water? (2) In the form of something else?
Text: 70
तद्द्ुदकाकारतया व्यावत्र्ते, तदा अन्यासामुदकव्यक् नाम् अनुदकाकारता पर्ाप्नोित
रसादे रव। अथ अनुदकाकारतया उदकाकारािन्वत्र्ते; ततो दहनादे रव अनुदकत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadyudakākāratayā vyāvarttate, tadā anyāsāmudakavyaktīnām

anudakākāratā prāpnoti rasāderiva. atha anudakākāratayā udakā-
kārānnivarttate; tato dahanāderiva anudakatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 70
If you say that it is distinguished in the form of water then the
other water individuals become non-water like taste etc. and if one
individual water is being distinguished from other water individuals
in the form of non-water, then, as fire is non water so also other
water individuals will become non-water.
Text: 71
अथ उदकाकाररूपताऽिवशेषेऽिप अवान्तरगिणकाकारभेदप रक्लृिप् रित चेत्;
atha udakākārarūpatā’viśeṣe’pi avāntaragaṇikākārabhedapariklṛpti-
riti cet;
Translation: 71
Clarification:
Well, although there is no difference in the forms of water
individuals, still one gets the knowledge of difference of the form
of other entities like jasmine flower.
Text: 72
सत्यम्, अवान्तरगिणकाकारः तोयतादात्म्यव्यव स्थतः, अतादात्म्यव्यव स्थतो वा?
satyam, avāntaragaṇikākāraḥ toyatādātmyavyavasthitaḥ, atādā-
tmyavyavasthito vā?
Translation: 72
Reply:
What you say is true. But we would like to know (a) whether that
form of entity like jasmine flower is decided on the basis of the
identity with water? Or (b) whether it is decided on the basis of
non-identity with water?
Text: 73
तद्िद तादात्म्यव्यव स्थतः, तदा उदकाकारतया उदकान्तरािद्द्ते। एवं चान्यासाम्
उदकव्यक् नामनुदकरूपता पर्ाप्नोित, पूवोर्िदतमेव दषू णम्।
tadyadi tādātmyavyavasthitaḥ, tadā udakākāratayā udakāntarād-
bhidyate. evaṁ cānyāsām udakavyaktīnāmanudakarūpatā prāpnoti,
pūrvoditameva dūṣaṇam.
Translation: 73
If you say that it is decided on the basis of identity then it amounts
to saying that one water is distinguished from another water as
water. In that case, it will amount to saying that other water
individuals are not water and in this way, all the defects raised
above can also be raised here.
Text: 74
अथातादात्म्यव्यव स्थतः; तिहर् अनुदकत्वं रसादे रव।
athātādātmyavyavasthitaḥ; tarhi anudakatvaṁ rasāderiva.
Translation: 74
If you say that it is settled on the basis of non-identity, then
obviously the other individuals will not be called water as taste
is not called water.
Text: 75
अथ उदकत्वव्यावृत्या अनुदकाकाराद् व्यावत्र्ते;
atha udakatvavyāvṛttyā anudakākārād vyāvarttate;
Translation: 75
Clarification:
Well, by distinguishing in terms of waterness water is distinguished
from non-water.
Text: 76
ण्वन्तु अमी बाललिपतं िवप श्चतः! यद्ुदकत्वव्यावृत्याऽनुदकाद् व्यावत्र्ते तोयम्,
उदकत्वञ् उदकादनुदकाच्च कथं व्यावत्र्ते?
śṛṇvantu amī bālalapitaṁ vipaścitaḥ! yadyudakatvavyāvṛttyā’nu-
dakād vyāvarttate toyam, udakatvañca udakādanudakācca kathaṁ
vyāvarttate?
Translation: 76
Reply:
Let these so-called intelligent people listen to your tale of children,
if you are saying that water is distinguished from non-water by
distinguishing waterness, then we will also how are you going to
distinguish from water and non-water.
Text: 77
न जात्यन्तरं व्यावत्र्कम स्त। अभ्युपगमे वा अिनष्ोपप्लवाऽनुबन्धः स्यात्। तस्मात्
स्वेनव
ै रूपेण इतरेतरात्मना व्यावत्र्ते न जात्यािदना व्यावत्र्ते, जात्यादेरव्यावृ त्पर्सङ्ात्।
na jātyantaraṁ vyāvarttakamasti. abhyupagame vā aniṣṭhopaplavā’-
nubandhaḥ syāt. tasmāt svenaivarūpeṇa itaretarātmanā vyāvarttate
na jātyādinā vyāvarttate, jātyāderavyāvṛttiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 77
You do not have any other universal which can distinguish them.
And if you accept another universal, you will be caught in
the undesired chaos. Therefore, it is better to accept that each
individual water is distinguished from others by its own form and
not by any entity called universal. Because, in that case there will
be a contingency of an impossibility to distinguish universal from
the rest.
Text: 78
तस्मात् स्थतमेतत् नोदकव्यक् नां नानात्वोपप त्ः तदनुपपत्ौ नोदकत्वं नाम सामान्य-
म स्त स्वत्ववत्।
tasmāt sthitametat nodakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvopapattiḥ tadanupa-
pattau nodakatvaṁ nāma sāmānyamasti svatvavat.
Translation: 78
Thus, we have come to this conclusion that it is not possible to
explain the plurality of water individuals and when that cannot be
explained we can say that there is nothing called universal such as
waterness as you too do not accept individuality as universal.
Text: 79
इतोऽिप न िवद्ते सामान्यम्, िनत्यस्य सतो िवज्ञानजनकत्वायोगात्।
ito’pi na vidyate sāmānyam, nityasya sato vijñānajanakatvāyogāt.
Translation: 79
For the following reason too (we hold that), there is no universal.
Because, if a positive entity is eternal it cannot produce knowledge.
Text: 80
तदेव कथम्?
tadeva katham?
Translation: 80
Question:
How do you say so?
Text: 81
व्युत्पाद्ते-िवज्ञानजनकावस्थायां यदेव स्वरूप(पं) सामान्यात्मकं शिक्मच्छिक्रूपं
च कारकान्तरानपेक्षयाऽजनकावस्थायां तदेव रूपम्, अतः पूवर्मिप कायोर्त्पादपर्सङ्ः।
अनुत्पादे वा पर्ागे(िग)व इदानीमिप [न] जनयेत्।
vyutpādyate - vijñānajanakāvasthāyāṁ yadeva svarūpa(paṁ) sāmā-
nyātmakaṁ śaktimacchaktirūpaṁ ca kārakāntarānapekṣayā’janakā-
vasthāyāṁ tadeva rūpam, ataḥ pūrvamapi kāryotpādaprasaṅgaḥ.
anutpāde vā prāge(gi)va idānīmapi [na] janayet.
Translation: 81
Answer:
Let me explain. At the time of producing the knowledge whatever
form, of the nature of universal, possessed of capacity, and of the
nature of capacity it had without depending upon any other causal
factor the same form it has at the time of not producing knowledge.
Therefore, there arises the contingency that it should produce effect
viz. its knowledge even before and if it does not produce effect it
should not produce even now as before.
Text: 82
अथ कारकान्तरमपेक्षय उत्पादयित कायर् म्,
atha kārakāntaramapekṣya utpādayati kāryam,
Translation: 82
Clarification:
Well, it will produce effect taking help of some other causal factor.
Text: 83
िकं तेन कारकान्तरेण तस्य िकर्यते कारकत्वम्, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
kiṁ tena kārakāntareṇa tasya kriyate kārakatvam, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 83
Answer:
We would like to know what does other causal factor do to this
universal? Do you want to say that the causal factor makes this
universal also a causal factor? Or, do the causal factors reveal

universal?
Text: 84
तद् व्यु(तद् यद्ु)त्पाद्ते; सु स्थतं िनत्यत्वम्!
tad vyu(tad yadyu)tpādyate; susthitaṁ nityatvam!
Translation: 84
If you say the causal factors convert universal into a causal factor
then its nature of being eternal is gone.
Text: 85
उत ज्ञाप्यते; सद्ं तिहर् कारकत्वम्, तदभावेऽिप िवद्मानस्याऽवद्ोतनात्।
uta jñāpyate; siddhaṁ tarhi kārakatvam, tadabhāve’pi vidyamāna-
syā’vadyotanāt.
Translation: 85
Again if you say that the causal factors reveal universal, then it
is proved that the universal itself is a causal factor. Because, even
without the causal factor, something existent is being revealed.
Text: 86
भवतु नाम कारकत्वं को दोषः?
bhavatu nāma kārakatvaṁ ko doṣaḥ?
Translation: 86
Question:
Let the universal be a causal factor, what is the harm?
Text: 87
कायोर्त्प त्पर्सङ्ः।
kāryotpattiprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 87
Reply:
There will arise the contingency of its producing the effect.
Text: 88
अथ कारकत्वेऽिप कायर् न जनयेत्;
atha kārakatve’pi kāryaṁ na janayet;
Translation: 88
Clarification:
(It is not necessary) even if it is a factor, there is no need that it
should produce any effect.
Text: 89
अहो राजाज्ञा गरीयसी नैयाियकपशोः! इतोऽिप ना स्त सामान्यम्; तदपु पादकमान-
व्यितरेकात्।
aho rājājñā garīyasī naiyāyikapaśoḥ! ito’pi nāsti sāmānyam; tadupa-
pādakamānavyatirekāt.
Translation: 89
Answer:
Oh, what a prevailing order of the king, of the animal logician.
Also for the following reason, we think that there is no universal.
Because, there is no proof which can explain it.
Text: 90
ननु अ स्त पर्माणम्- 'अनयोः सादृश्यम्' 'एषां सारूप्यम्' 'तेन सदृशोऽयम्' 'असौ वा तेन
सदृशः' इत्यािदज्ञानं सामान्यसत्ावबोधक(कं) अपर्ितपन्सामान्यस्य नोपपद्ते। अ स्त
त्वदं िवज्ञानं बाधािवकलं जािततनुव्यवस्थापकम्;
nanu asti pramāṇam- ‘anayoḥ sādṛśyam’ ‘eṣāṁ sārūpyam’ ‘tena
sadṛśo’yam’ ‘asau vā tena sadṛśaḥ’ ityādijñānaṁ sāmānyasattā-
vabodhaka(kaṁ) apratipannasāmānyasya nopapadyate. asti tvidaṁ
vijñānaṁ bādhāvikalaṁ jātitanuvyavasthāpakam;
Translation: 90
Objection:
Well, there is proof for instance there are cognitions like, “there is a
similarity between the two,” “these have similar forms,” “it is similar
to that,” “that is similar to this,” and the like. These knowledges
convey the existence of universal. And unless one accepts universal,
these knowledges are not possible. This is a knowledge which is not
contradicted and therefore it establishes the form of universal.
Text: 91
तदेतदयुक्म्; िकं िनिमत्भूतेन तेन एवंिवधं ज्ञानमुत्पाद्ते, कमर् तापन्ेन वा? तद्िद
िनिमत्भूतेन उत्पाद्ते; तदा न सामान्यं कल्पनीयम्, असामान्यात्मकमेव िनिमत्िमत्थ-
म्भूतसामान्यज्ञानोत्पादनाय, अलं सामान्यकल्पनया। अथ कमर् तापन्ेन उत्पाद्ते;

तदसत्; नैवाऽवभाित िवज्ञाने सामान्यं धूतैर्रिवपयार् सतसंिवदाम्।
tadetadayuktam; kiṁ nimittabhūtena tena evaṁvidhaṁ jñānamu-
tpādyate, karmatāpannena vā? tadyadi nimittabhūtena utpādyate;
tadā na sāmānyaṁ kalpanīyam, asāmānyātmakameva nimittami-
tthambhūtasāmānyajñānotpādanāya, alaṁ sāmānyakalpanayā. atha
karmatāpannena utpādyate; tadasat; naivā’vabhāti vijñāne sāmā-
nyaṁ dhūrtairaviparyāsitasaṁvidām.
Translation: 91
Reply:
This is improper. Is it the case that universal is an efficient cause
because of which such knowledge is produced? Or is it the case that
universal causes knowledge by becoming object of that knowledge?
If you say being an efficient cause it produces knowledge, then there
is no necessity of postulating any universal. For the production of
such knowledge of universal the efficient cause of the nature of
non-universal itself, is sufficient. There is no need of postulating
any universal. If you say that universal produces knowledge, by
becoming the object of that knowledge that is also not true. No
universal appears in the knowledge of those who have not been
brain-washed by the cunning logicians.
Text: 92
ननु सादृश्यमवभाित;
nanu sādṛśyamavabhāti;
Translation: 92
Objection:
Well, as a matter of fact, similarity does appear in the knowledge.
Text: 93
सत्यम्, अवभाित, नापह्ूयते अिप तु-दर्व्यगुणकमार्त्मकं सत् पाचकािदभेदेषु-यथा एषां
पाचकत्वम्, एते पाचकाः, तत्पाचकसदृशोऽयम्, असौ अनेन सदृश इित िवशेषादाविप
दर्ष्व्यम्।
satyam, avabhāti, nāpahnūyate api tu-dravyaguṇakarmātmakaṁ
sat pācakādibhedeṣuyathā eṣāṁ pācakatvam, ete pācakāḥ, tatpāca-
kasadṛśo’yam, asau anena sadṛśa iti viśeṣādāvapi draṣṭavyam.
Translation: 93
Reply:
It is true. It appears. We are not denying that. But it is of the nature
of either substance or quality or action, as we find in different cooks,
as we find cookness in them and we say they are cooks or “he is like
that cook” or “that cook is like this cook” in the same way such
references can be made to particulars also.
Text: 94
अतर्ािप सामान्यप रज्ञिप् रित चेत्;
atrāpi sāmānyaparijñaptiriti cet;
Translation: 94
Objection:
In these cases also, there is knowledge of universal.
Text: 95
न; सूतर्व्याघातात् सामान्यिवशेषेषु सामान्यिवशेषाऽभावात् तत एव ज्ञानम् [वै. सू. ८।१।५]
na; sūtravyāghātāt sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣā’bhāvāt tata eva
jñānam [Vai. sū. 8.1.5.],
Translation: 95
Reply:
No, it is not so. If you interpret like that, it will go against
the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 8.1.5 “there is no universal and particular in
universal and particular.” Knowledges arise from them directly.
Text: 96
अिनष्ा च- िवशेषेषु सामान्ये प रकल्प्यमाने सित सन्देहः, सित सन्देहे तेषु िवशेषान्तरं
प रकल्पनीयम्, पुनः सामान्यम् इत्यिनष्ा इत्यलम् असद्गर्हाऽिभिनवेशेन।
aniṣṭhā ca- viśeṣeṣu sāmānye parikalpyamāne sati sandehaḥ, sati
sandehe teṣu viśeṣāntaraṁ parikalpanīyam, punaḥ sāmānyam itya-
niṣṭhā ityalam asadgrahā’bhiniveśena.
Translation: 96
This is also not desirable. If we postulate universal in particulars
there will be doubt. And when there will be doubt, one will have
to postulate another particular. Again, in those particulars some
universal and in this way (it will lead to infinite regress) and
therefore this is not desirable and hence enough of this unsound
insistence!
Text: 97
अथ िभन्ािभन्ा सामान्यं भविद्ः पर्ितपाद्ते-आकारभेदेन व्यिक्भ्य उपलभ्यते
इत्यथार्न्तरम्, देशभेदेन तु नैव उपलभ्यते इत्यव्यित रक्े(क्म्);
atha bhinnābhinnā sāmānyaṁ bhavadbhiḥ pratipādyate-ākārabhe-
dena vyaktibhya upalabhyate ityarthāntaram, deśabhedena tu naiva
upalabhyate ityavyatirikte(ktam);
Translation: 97
Objection:
Well, you are explaining universal which is different-cum-identical.
You are telling that it is distinct because it is obtained from
particulars due to the difference in form. But it is not obtained
as distinct on the basis of the difference in space.
Text: 98
तदेतन्महासुभािषतम्,
tadetanmahāsubhāṣitam,
Translation: 98
Reply:
Oh, this is indeed a great and beautiful saying!
Text: 99
न देशभेदेनव
ै वस्तूनां भेदः अिप तु आकारभेदेनव
ै भावा भेदमुपया न्त। यथा च आकारभेदो
ना स्त तथाऽनन्तरमेव िनवेिदतम्।
na deśabhedenaiva vastūnāṁ bhedaḥ api tu ākārabhedenaiva bhāvā
bhedamupayānti. yathā ca ākārabhedo nāsti tathā’nantarameva nive-
ditam.
Translation: 99
It is not true that things become different only because of the
difference in space. But the positive entities are distinguished on
the basis of difference in their form. And we have just explained
how there is no difference in form.
[३. पर्सङ्ात् समवायस्य िनरसनम्।]

[3. prasaṅgāt samavāyasya nirasanam.]
Text: 100
सामान्यं समवायवृत्या व्यिक्षु वत्र्ते इित। न चासौ िवद्ते।
sāmānyaṁ samavāyavṛttyā vyaktiṣu varttate iti. na cāsau vidyate.
Translation: 100
Universal (according to you) exists in the individuals by the relation
of inherence. But the fact is there is nothing called inherence.
Text: 101
समवायो िह- व्यावृत्ैकस्वभावः, अनुगतैकस्वभावो वा?
samavāyo hi- vyāvṛttaikasvabhāvaḥ, anugataikasvabhāvo vā?
Translation: 101
We would like to know (1) whether it is of unique and distinct
nature or (2) whether it is consecutively of unique nature.
Text: 102
तद्िद व्यावृत्ैकस्वभावः, कस्यासौ समवायः, सवर् तो व्यावृत्ेः नीलािदवत्।
tadyadi vyāvṛttaikasvabhāvaḥ, kasyāsau samavāyaḥ, sarvato vyā-
vṛtteḥ nīlādivat.
Translation: 102
If you say that it is of unique and distinct nature we would like
to know, whose inherence it is, because it is distinguished from
everything like a blue object.
Text: 103
अथ अनुगतैकस्वभावः; सामान्यं तिहर् , न समवायः, िनत्यस्य सतोऽनेकतर् वृत्ेगोर्त्वािदवत्,
atha anugataikasvabhāvaḥ; sāmānyam tarhi, na samavāyaḥ, nitya-
sya sato’nekatra vṛttergotvādivat,
Translation: 103
Again if you say it is consecutively of unique nature, then it becomes
universal and it is not inherence, because it is a positive entity, it
is eternal, and it exists in many individuals like cowness.
Text: 104
उपपादकपर्माणाभावाच्च।
upapādakapramāṇābhāvācca.
Translation: 104
And also there is no proof which can explain inherence.
Text: 105
ननु पर्त्यक्षबुद्ध्यवसेयोऽसौ;
nanu pratyakṣabuddhyavaseyo’sau;
Translation: 105
Objection:
Well, it can be definitely known by perceptual cognition.
Text: 106
तदयुक्म्; िकं सम्बन्धबुद्ध्याऽध्यवसीयते, आहो स्वद् इहबुद्ध्या, समवायबुद्ध्या वा
उच्यते?
tadayuktam; kiṁ sambandhabuddhyā’dhyavasīyate, āhosvid ihabu-
ddhyā, samavāyabuddhyā vā ucyate?
Translation: 106
Reply:
This is not correct. Is it known as a relation, or is it known as the
locus or is it known as inherence. What do you want to say?
Text: 107
तद्िद सम्बन्धबुद्ध्या; कोऽयं सम्बन्धः? िकं सम्बन्धजाितयुक्ः सम्बन्धः, आहो स्वद्
अनेकोपादानजिनतः, अनेका शर्तो वा, सम्बन्धबुिद्िवशेषो वा, सम्बन्धबुद्ध्युत्पादको वा,
सम्बद्ा(न्धा)कारो वा?
tadyadi sambandhabuddhyā; ko’yaṁ sambandhaḥ? kiṁ sambandha-
jātiyuktaḥ sambandhaḥ, āhosvid anekopādānajanitaḥ, anekāśrito vā,
sambandhabuddhiviśeṣo vā, sambandhabuddhyutpādako vā, samba-
ddhā(ndhā)kāro vā?
Translation: 107
If you say, it is known as a relation, we would like to know what
is that relation? (1) Is it a relation associated with the genre of
relation? (2) Or is it known as something caused by many evidence.
(3) Or is it known as located in many? (4) Or is it known as a
particular knowledge of relation? (5) Or is it known as the generator
of knowledge of relation? (6) Or is it known as something which a
form is associated?
Text: 108
तद्िद सम्बन्धजाितयुक्स्ते सम्बन्धः; सोऽनुपपन्ः; समवायाऽसम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi sambandhajātiyuktaste sambandhaḥ; so’nupapannaḥ; sama-
vāyā’sambandhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 108
If you say that your relation is that which is associated with the
genre of a relation that is not proper, because it will lead to the
contingency of un-related inherence.
Text: 109
अथ अनेकोपादानजिनतः सम्बन्धः; तदा कुम्भादेरिप सम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha anekopādānajanitaḥ sambandhaḥ; tadā kumbhāderapi samba-
ndhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 109
If you say it is that relation which is caused by many factors, then
even a pot will have to be treated as the relation of inherence.
Text: 110
अथ अनेका शर्तः सम्बन्धः तदा घटजात्यादेः सम्बन्धत्वं पर्सज्यते।
atha anekāśritaḥ sambandhaḥ tadā ghaṭajātyādeḥ sambandhatvaṁ
prasajyate.
Translation: 110
If you say it is a relation which is located in many, then the universal
of pot, viz. potness will have to be treated as a relation of inherence.
Text: 111
अथ सम्बन्धबुद्ध्युत्पादकस्ते सम्बन्धः उच्यते; तदा लोचनादेरिप सम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha sambandhabuddhyutpādakaste sambandhaḥ ucyate; tadā locanā-
derapi sambandhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 111
If you say that your relation is that which produces the knowledge
of relation, then there will arise a contingency of treating eyes etc.
as a relation of inherence.
Text: 112
अथ सम्बन्धबुद्ध्यवसेयः सम्बन्धोऽिभधीयते; तदा कौलेयकक रकुमारािदष्विप सम्बन्ध-
शब्दव्युत्पादने सम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha sambandhabuddhyavaseyaḥ sambandho’bhidhīyate; tadā kaule-

yakakarikumārādiṣvapi sambandhaśabdavyutpādane sambandhatva-
prasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 112
Similarly, if you say that, that is relation of inherence which is
definitely known from the knowledge of relation, then when one
derives the knowledge of relation from the relational terms like
“someone born in a noble family,” “the baby of an elephant” etc.
there will arise the contingency of such relations becoming the
relation of inherence.
Text: 113
सम्बन्धेतरयोः एकिवज्ञानिवषयत्वे इतरस्य सम्बन्धरूपता पर्ाप्ा।
sambandhetarayoḥ ekavijñānaviṣayatve itarasya sambandharūpatā
prāptā.
Translation: 113
If relation and non-relation becomes object of one knowledge, the
non-knowledge becomes relation.
Text: 114
अथ सम्बन्धाकारः सम्बन्ध:; संयोगाऽभेदपर्सङ्ः।
atha sambandhākāraḥ sambandhaḥ; saṁyogā’bhedaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 114
Again if you say that the form of a relation is a relation of inherence,
then it will become identical with the relation of contact.
Text: 115
अवान्तरगिणकाकारस्तु यथा न भेदकः तथा पुरस्तादक्
ु मेव दषू णम्।
avāntaragaṇikākārastu yathā na bhedakaḥ tathā purastāduktameva
dūṣaṇam.
Translation: 115
As the form of another jasmine flower is not the distinguisher, we
have already stated it before along with the objections which could
be raised in that case.
Text: 116
अथ 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' इित इहबुद्ध्याध्यवसीयते;
atha iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ’ iti ihabuddhyādhyavasīyate;
Translation: 116
Objection:
Well, (the knowledge of inherence) is obtained for certain on the
basis of the knowledge “there is cloth here in these threads.”
Text: 117
न। इहबुद्ेर धकरणसंिवदर्ूपत्वात्। न चा स्मन्ा(न चान्य स्मन्ा)कारे पर्तीयमाने अन्यत्
प रकल्पियतुं न्याय्यम्, अितपर्सङ्ात्।
na. ihabuddheradhikaraṇasaṁvidrūpatvāt. na cāsminnā(na cānyasmi-
nnā)kāre pratīyamāne anyat parikalpayituṁ nyāyyam, atiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 117
Reply:
It is not proper, because, the word here stands for the knowledge
of locus. It is not proper to postulate something else, when such a
form of locus is revealed in the knowledge. Or else it will lead to
undesirable contingencies.
Text: 118
अथ समवायबुद्ध्याऽऽत्मसा त्कर्यते;
atha samavāyabuddhyā”tmasātkriyate;
Translation: 118
Objection:
Well, this we had decided on the basis of knowledge of inherence.
Text: 119
सोप्यनुपपन् एव, समवायबुद्ेरनुपपत्ेः, 'अयं तन्तुः, अयं पटः, अयमनयोः समवायः'
इित न जातु जानते जनाः।
sopyanupapanna eva, samavāyabuddheranupapatteḥ, ’ayaṁ tantuḥ,
ayaṁ paṭaḥ, ayamanayoḥ samavāyaḥ’ iti na jātu jānate janāḥ.
Translation: 119
Reply:
That is also not proper, because, there is nothing called knowledge
of inherence. This is a thread, this is cloth, and here is the

relationship of inherence ‘between the two’ people do not know this.
Text: 120
अथ अनुमानेन अनुमीयते;
atha anumānena anumīyate;
Translation: 120
Objection:
The inherence can be inferred.
Text: 121
द्े अनुमाने-दृष्म्, सामान्यतो दृष्ं च।
dve anumāne-dṛṣṭam, sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṁ ca.
Translation: 121
Reply:
You have two forms of inference (1) dṛṣṭa (2) sāmānyato dṛṣṭa.
Text: 122
न दृष्म्; पर्त्यक्षव्यितरेकात्।
na dṛṣṭam; pratyakṣavyatirekāt.
Translation: 122
The first type of inference will not apply here, because inherence is
not perceived.
Text: 123
सामान्यतो दृष्मिप ना स्त; तत्पर्भवकायार्ऽनुपलब्धेः।
sāmānyato dṛṣṭamapi nāsti; tatprabhavakāryā’nupalabdheḥ.
Translation: 123
The second type of inference will also not apply, because one does
not see any effect produced by inherence.
Text: 124
न न्वहबुिद्रेव समवायज्ञािपका-'इह तन्तुषु पटः इित पर्त्ययः सम्बन्धिनिमत्ः,
अबा धत-इहपर्त्ययत्वात्, 'इह कुण्डे द ध' इित पर्त्ययवत्।
nanvihabuddhireva samavāyajñāpikā-‘iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ iti pratya-
yaḥ sambandhanimittaḥ, abādhita-ihapratyayatvāt, ‘iha kuṇḍe
dadhi’ iti pratyayavat.
Translation: 124
Objection:
Well, the very knowledge “here in the threads there is cloth” will
cause the knowledge of inherence by the following inference: (1)The
knowledge “here in the threads there is cloth” is caused by a
relationship. (2)Because, it is an uncontradicted knowledge “here
in the threads there is cloth”. (3)Like the knowledge “here in the
pot there is curd”.
Text: 125
िकमनेन अनुमीयते-
kimanena anumīyate-
Translation: 125
Reply:
What is being inferred by this inference?:
Text: 126
िकं िनिमत्मातर्म्, उत सम्बन्धः?
kiṁ nimittamātram, uta sambandhaḥ?
Translation: 126
(a)The very causal factor which cause the inferential cognition of
inherence? Or (b) The relation of inherence?
Text: 127
यिद िनिमत्मातर्म्, ततः सद्साध्यतया सम्बोधियतव्यः।
yadi nimittamātram, tataḥ siddhasādhyatayā sambodhayitavyaḥ.
Translation: 127
If you say mere causal factor is being inferred then it is required to
be satisfied because it is going to cause knowledge of that which is
already known.
Text: 128
अथ सम्बन्धः; संयोगः, समवायो वा?
atha sambandhaḥ; saṁyogaḥ, samavāyo vā?
Translation: 128
And if you say that relation is going to be inferred then I ask you,
is it (a) contact or (b) inherence?
Text: 129
संयोगानुमाने उपगमहािनः।
saṁyogānumāne upagamahāniḥ.
Translation: 129
If you say that it is a contact which is being inferred it will go
against your conclusion.
Text: 130
समवायानुमाने सम्बन्धव्यितरेकः।
samavāyānumāne sambandhavyatirekaḥ.
Translation: 130
And if you say that inherence is being inferred then there is absence
of relationship.
Text: 131
न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धः अन्यस्य गमकत्वम्, अितपर्सङ्ात्। न जातु देवदत्नयनकुटसम्बन्धे
यज्ञदत्े न्दर्यं रूपािदकमथर् करणत्वसाम्यात् पर्काशयद् दृष्म्।
na cānyasya sambandhaḥ anyasya gamakatvam, atiprasaṅgāt. na
jātu devadattanayanakuṭasambandhe yajñadattendriyaṁ rūpādika-
marthaṁ karaṇatvasāmyāt prakāśayad dṛṣṭam.
Translation: 131
It cannot be the case that the relation is with something else and
it causes the knowledge of something else, because, it will lead
to undesirable consequences i.e. the defect of over-application. It
is never the case that when something is related to the eyes of
Devadatta the sense organ of Yajñadatta reveals the object such as
color because of the similarity between the sense organ of Devadatta
and Yajñadatta. It is never seen like this.
Text: 132
एवं सित सामान्यसमवायिवरहे कथं दर्व्यािद व्यवस्था इित िचन्त्यते।
evaṁ sati sāmānyasamavāyavirahe kathaṁ dravyādi vyavasthā iti
cintyate.
Translation: 132
Thus, when there is neither universal nor inherence how can one
decide or know or settle that something is a substance (i.e. how can
there be something called substance.)?
Text: 133
अथ तद्त् सत्य(अथ तद्ंशज)जलपर्ाप्त्या अव्यिभचा रता ज्ञायते; तदयुक्म्;
अन्त्यावयिवदर्व्याणां जनकत्वव्यितरेकात्। न च उदकव्यक् नां नानात्वम स्त, यथा च न
िवद्ते तथा िनवेिदतं पुरस्तात्।
atha tadvat satya(atha tadvaṁśaja)jalaprāptyā avyabhicāritā
jñāyate; tadayuktam; antyāvayavidravyāṇāṁ janakatvavyatirekāt.
na ca udakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvamasti, yathā ca na vidyate tathā
niveditaṁ purastāt.
Translation: 133
Like that, if you say, since one gets water belonging to the same
family of water, the knowledge of water will not be proper, because,
the substances in the form of final wholes cannot be the cause of
anything (i.e. of any other whole) and there are no other water
individuals and that there are no plural individuals of water, has
already been explained before.
Text: 134
िकञ्, पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न अव्यिभचा रता पूवोर्िदतज्ञानस्य ज्ञाप्यते-िकं लङ्भूतेन, आहो
अध्यक्षात्मकेन?
kiñca, pravṛttisāmarthyena avyabhicāritā pūrvoditajñānasya jñāpyate-
kiṁ liṅgabhūtena, āho adhyakṣātmakena?
Translation: 134
Moreover, you have said that on the strength of consistent
inter-action the knowledge which arose before i.e. the knowledge
which prompted the interaction is not erroneous. There questions
are (a) is it because that is treated as a ground for inference or (b)
is it because it is of the nature of perception?
Text: 135
तद्िद लङ्भूतेन; तदयुक्म्; तेन साकं सम्बन्धानवगतेः।
tadyadi liṅgabhūtena; tadayuktam; tena sākaṁ sambandhānava-
gateḥ.
Translation: 135
If you say it causes the knowledge as a ground that is not proper,
because, one cannot know the invariable concomitance with that.
Text: 136
अवगतौ वाऽलं पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न।
avagatau vā’laṁ pravṛttisāmarthyena.
Translation: 136
If you say it can be known, then there is no need of capacity of
resulting into fruitful interaction.
Text: 137
अथाध्यक्षात्मकेन; तदयुक्म्; पूवोर्िदतपर्त्यस्तिमतेन साकं सिन्कषार्ऽभावात्। तिद्षय-
िवज्ञानं न पर्त्यक्षफलं िनरालम्बनत्वात् केशोण्डु कािदसंवेदनवत्। न िवज्ञानस्या-
भावोऽवभाित, न भावः तदभावात्।
athādhyakṣātmakena; tadayuktam; pūrvoditapratyastamitena sākaṁ
sannikarṣā’bhāvāt. tadviṣayavijñānaṁ na pratyakṣaphalaṁ nirāla-
mbanatvāt keśoṇḍukādisaṁvedanavat. na vijñānasyābhāvo’vabhāti,
na bhāvaḥ tadabhāvāt.
Translation: 137
If you say it will cause the knowledge being in the form of perception
that is also not proper, because, there cannot be any contact with
the knowledge which arose before and vanished. The knowledge of
that object cannot be the result of perception, because, it will be
contentless, like the knowledge of thread-like things which appear
in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open
our eyes.
Text: 138
अिवद्मानस्य िवषयाथोर् वक्व्यः-िकम् आकारापर् कत्वेन वा, महत्वािदधमोर्पेतत्वेन वा,
सत्ामातर्ेण वा, सहोत्पादेन वा? सवर् स्य पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वात् कथमसौ िवषयः? तिद्षयत्वे
केशोण्डु कािदिवज्ञानस्येव िमथ्यात्वे बीजमन्वेषणीयम्।
avidyamānasya viṣayārtho vaktavyaḥ-kim ākārārpakatvena vā,
mahattvādidharmopetatvena vā, sattāmātreṇa vā, sahotpādena vā?
sarvasya pratyastamitatvāt kathamasau viṣayaḥ? tadviṣayatve keśo-
ṇḍukādivijñānasyeva mithyātve bījamanveṣaṇīyam.
Translation: 138
There does not appear either absence of knowledge or presence
because it does not exist there. You should tell us the meaning
of content which does not exist. (a) Is it content because it offers

itself to the knowledge? or (b) Is it content because it is associated
with the property viz. “grossness”? or (c) Is it content because of
mere existence or (d) Is it content because it arises together? As
a matter of fact when all of them have vanished, how can that be
called content?
And in spite of that if you say that it is content of knowledge,
then like the knowledge of thread-like things which appear in the
knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes,
that should be considered as erroneous or illusory and in that case
one should enquire into the reason for this illusion.
Text: 139
आत्मसत्ामातर्ेण िमथ्यात्वे सवर् स्य िमथ्यात्वमापद्ते ततः तत्वोपप्लवः स्यात्।
ātmasattāmātreṇa mithyātve sarvasya mithyātvamāpadyate tataḥ
tattvopaplavaḥ syāt.
Translation: 139
If by mere existence of itself it is considered as illusory, then
everything has to be accepted as illusory and thereby one will have
to accept that there is nothing called real and everything is a flux.
Text: 140
अथ अन्यथाऽव्यिभचा रत्वं गृह्ते-आत्मान्तःकरणसम्बन्धेन उत्पन्ं िवज्ञानमव्यिभ-
चा रतािविशष्ं पर्द्ोत्यते; तदयुक्म्; तदव्यिभचा रत्वं तद्मोर् वा, तत्स्वरूपं वा?
atha anyathā’vyabhicāritvaṁ gṛhyate-ātmāntaḥkaraṇasambandhena
utpannaṁ vijñānam avyabhicāritāviśiṣṭaṁ pradyotyate; tadayu-
ktam; tadavyabhicāritvaṁ taddharmo vā, tatsvarūpaṁ vā?
Translation: 140
If you say that there is another way by which one will know that
perceptual knowledge is not erroneous viz. when the knowledge
produced by the relationship of inner sense organ i.e. mind and the
soul is revealed qualified by the property of not being erroneous.
This is also not proper, because, this give rise to two questions (a)
whether the property of not being erroneous is the property of that
knowledge or (b) is it the nature of that knowledge?
Text: 141
तद्िद तद्मर् ः-स िनत्यः, अिनत्यो वा?
tadyadi taddharmaḥ-sa nityaḥ, anityo vā?
Translation: 141
If you say that it is property of that knowledge there again the
question arises (a) whether that property is permanent? Or (b)
whether non-eternal property?
Text: 142
यिद िनत्यः, तदा जाितदोषेणापोपोिद(णापोिद)तो वेिदतव्यः।
yadi nityaḥ, tadā jātidoṣeṇāpopodi(ṇāpodi)to veditavyaḥ.
Translation: 142
If you say that it is eternal property then it will be rejected on the
basis of the same defect which were raised in connection with the
universal.
Text: 143
अथाऽिनत्यः-स पूवोर्त्पन्ः, सह, पश्चाद्ा जातः?
athā’nityaḥ-sa pūrvotpannaḥ, saha, paścādvā jātaḥ?
Translation: 143
Again if you say that it is non-eternal, then also one can ask
(i) whether it was produced before (ii) whether it is produced
simultaneously or (iii) whether it is produced later.
Text: 144
तद्िद पूवोर्त्पन्ः; तदा कस्यासौ धमर् ः? न िह धिमर् णमन्तरेण धमोर् भिवतुमहर् ित, सवर् तो
व्यावृत्रूपत्वात् कः कस्येित वक्व्यम्।
tadyadi pūrvotpannaḥ; tadā kasyāsau dharmaḥ? na hi dharmiṇama-
ntareṇa dharmo bhavitumarhati, sarvato vyāvṛttarūpatvāt kaḥ
kasyeti vaktavyam.
Translation: 144
If you say it is produced before, then one may ask whose property it
is? Because, without a locus no property can exist. When everything
is discrete, which is property of what? You should tell.
Text: 145
अथ सहोत्पन्ः; कस्तयोः सम्बन्ध इित वक्व्यम्।
atha sahotpannaḥ; kastayoḥ sambandha iti vaktavyam.
Translation: 145
If you say it is produced together then you should state what is the
relation between the two?
Text: 146
तादात्म्यतदत्ु प त्समवायसम्बन्धाभावे सित षष्ठ्थोर् वक्व्यः 'तस्य अव्यिभचा रत्वम्'
इित।
tādātmyatadutpattisamavāyasambandhābhāve sati ṣaṣṭhyartho vakta-
vyaḥ ‘tasya avyabhicāritvam’ iti.
Translation: 146
If the relationship is not identity or cause-and-effect relationship or
inherence then what will be the meaning of the genitive suffix, you
should state, because, the expression is “the property of not being
erroneous of that”.
Text: 147
अथ पृष्ोत्पन्स्तिहर् पूवर् व्यिभचा रता िवज्ञानस्य पर्ाप्नोित। न च आध्या त्मकोऽव्यिभ-
चा ररूपो धमोर् स्त सुखािदव्यित रक्ः, तत्पर्तीत्यसम्भवेन स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्।
atha pṛṣṭhotpannastarhi pūrvaṁ vyabhicāritā vijñānasya prāpnoti.
na ca ādhyātmiko’vyabhicārirūpo dharmosti sukhādivyatiriktaḥ,
tatpratītyasambhavena svayamanabhyupagamāt.
Translation: 147
If you say that it is produced later then it implies that the knowledge
was erroneous before. It is not also the case that there is a property
viz. the state of not being erroneous in the self other than happiness
etc. because, that can never be known and you yourself have not
accepted it.
Text: 148
यिद च अव्यिभचारादयो धमार् अथार्न्तरभूताः अभ्युपगम्यन्ते तैरव च्छन्ं िवज्ञानं
सामग्र्या अवस्थापकमुद्ष्ु यते; तच्चानुपपन्म्; पर्त्येकमनेकिवशेषणाव च्छन्िवज्ञान-
पर्ितप त्कालावस्थानायोगात्, ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकयोरभावे कत्ृर्मातर्पर्ब न्ध ज्ञानं स्यात्।
yadi ca avyabhicārādayo dharmā arthāntarabhūtāḥ abhyupaga-

myante tairavacchinnaṁ vijñānaṁ sāmagryā avasthāpakamud-
ghuṣyate; taccānupapannam; pratyekamanekaviśeṣaṇāvacchinna-
vijñānapratipattikālāvasthānāyogāt, jñāpyajñāpakayorabhāve karttṛ-
mātraprabandhi jñānaṁ syāt.
Translation: 148
If you declare that the properties like not being erroneous are
accepted as another type of entities, and therefore the knowledge
qualified by those properties will account for the factors which have
produced it, this is also not proper, because, each knowledge will not
exist up to the awareness of the knowledge qualified by a number
of qualifications and where there will be absence of both the revealer
and the revealed, the knowledge will be restricted to only the knower.
Text: 149
अथ तत्स्वरूपमव्यिभचा रत्वम्-त त्कं स्वसत्ामातर्ाऽनुरोधेन, अथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन वा?
atha tatsvarūpamavyabhicāritvam-tatkiṁ svasattāmātrā’nurodhena,
arthāntarasattānurodhena vā?
Translation: 149
If you say the very nature of the perceptual knowledge is that it is
not erroneous, there the question arises, is it on account of its mere
existence? Or is it on account of the existence of another object?
Text: 150
तद्िद ज्ञानसत्ामातर्तैवाऽव्यिभचा रत्वमुच्यते, तदा केशोण्डु कसंिवदोऽिप अव्यिभचा रता
स्यात्। न च ज्ञानसत्ामातर्ानुरोधेन ज्ञानं व्यिभचायर् व्यिभचा र वा उद्गीयते।
tadyadi jñānasattāmātrataivā’vyabhicāritvamucyate, tadā keśoṇḍu-
kasaṁvido’pi avyabhicāritā syāt. na ca jñānasattāmātrānurodhena
jñānaṁ vyabhicāryavyabhicāri vā udgīyate.
Translation: 150
If you say the mere existence of the knowledge is what is called
the state of not being erroneous, then the knowledge of thread-like
things which appear in the knowledge when we come from the
Sun and suddenly open our eyes, should also be considered as not
erroneous. It is not proper to say that some knowledge is erroneous
or not erroneous only on the basis of its existence.
Text: 151
अथाथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेनाव्यिभचा रत्वम्-िकमनुपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन,
आहो स्वद् उपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन?
athārthāntarasattānurodhenāvyabhicāritvam-kim anupakārakā’rthā-
ntarasattānurodhena, āhosvid upakārakā’rthāntarasattānurodhena?
Translation: 151
If you say that it is not erroneous, because there is existence of
another knowledge, there again the question arises (i) is it because
of existence of another knowledge which is not involved in the
production of the knowledge? Or (ii) is it because of the existence
of another knowledge in the production of knowledge?
Text: 152
तद्िद तावद् अनुपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन, तदा केशोण्डु क-इन्दद्ु यसंिवदोप्यव्य-
िभचा रतापर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi tāvad anupakārakā’rthāntarasattānurodhena, tadā keśo-
ṇḍukaindudvayasaṁvidopyavyabhicāritāprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 152
If you say that it is on account of existence of another knowledge,
not involved in the production of knowledge, then there will arise
the contingency of accepting the knowledge of thread-like things
which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and
suddenly open our eyes and the perception of two moons when you
press your eyes in a particular way, as not erroneous.
Text: 153
अथ उपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन अव्यिभचा रता-िकं पर्तीयमानाऽथार्न्तरोपकारक-
सत्ानुरोधेन, तिद्परीताथार्न्तरोपकारकसत्ानुरोधेन वा?
atha upakārakā’rthāntarasattānurodhena avyabhicāritā-kiṁ pratīya-
mānā’rthāntaropakārakasattānurodhena, tadviparītārthāntaropakā-
rakasattānurodhena vā?
Translation: 153
If again you say that it is on account of the existence of another
object which is involved in the production of knowledge, the
knowledge is known as not erroneous, then again the question arises
(i) is it because of the existence which is involved in production of

knowledge of something else “being known” or (ii) is it because
of the existence which is involved in the production of another
knowledge “not being known”.
Text: 154
तद्िद पूवर्पक्षाभ्युपगमः, तदा अतीताऽनागतानुमानिवज्ञानस्य योिगपर्त्यक्षस्य च चोदना-
वचनजिनतिवज्ञानस्य वाऽव्यिभचा रता न भवेत् तदवगतोपकारकाथार्भावात्।
tadyadi pūrvapakṣābhyupagamaḥ, tadā atītā’nāgatānumānavijñā-
nasya yogipratyakṣasya ca codanāvacanajanitavijñānasya vā’vyabhi-
cāritā na bhavet tadavagatopakārakārthābhāvāt.
Translation: 154
If you accept the first alternative, then, the inferential knowledge of
the past, inferential knowledge of the future, the perception by the
Yogins, or even the knowledge caused by Vedic injunction, cannot
be considered as not erroneous, because, there is no object which is
known as the helping factor towards that.
Text: 155
भावे वा िवतानिकर्यालोपपर्सङ्ः। अथ उत्रो मतः; तदा केशोण्डु क-इन्द-
ु द्यसंिव-
दोऽव्यिभचा रत्वं पर्सज्यते इत्यसद्गृहीतम्।
bhāve vā vitānakriyālopaprasaṅgaḥ. atha uttaro mataḥ; tadā keśoṇḍu-
kaindudvayasaṁvido’vyabhicāritvaṁ prasajyate ityasadgṛhītam.
Translation: 155
Accepting that, that is there, there will arise the contingency of
vanishing all activities. Again if you accept the second alternative,
there will arise the contingency of accepting the knowledge of
thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come
from the Sun and suddenly open our eyes and the perception of
two moons when you press your eyes in a particular way, as not
erroneous. Therefore this is not a proper understanding.
Text: 156
िकञ्, तिद्ज्ञानम् अव्यिभचायर् वगतं सामग्र्या ज्ञापकम्, अनवगतं वा?
kiñca, tadvijñānam avyabhicāryavagataṁ sāmagryā jñāpakam,
anavagataṁ vā?
Translation: 156
Moreover, that perceptual knowledge is not erroneous you have said.
Is it the case that, that knowledge is not erroneous which is known
through a collection of factors or which is not known?
Text: 157
यद्वगतम्; तस्यावगितः आत्मसंिवदर्ूपा वा, ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ा वा?
yadyavagatam; tasyāvagatiḥ ātmasaṁvidrūpā vā, jñānāntaravedyā
vā?
Translation: 157
If you say that only when it is known, it causes the knowledge, then
is that knowledge of knowledge self-illuminating or it is to be known
by another knowledge?
Text: 158
तद्द्ात्मसंवेदनरूपावगितः; तदयुक्म्; द्(स्व)यमनभ्युपगमात्। अभ्युपगमे वा उपगम-
िवरोधः।
tadyadyātmasaṁvedanarūpāvagatiḥ; tadayuktam; dva(sva)yamana-
bhyupagamāt. abhyupagame vā upagamavirodhaḥ.
Translation: 158
If you say it is self-illuminating and therefore it causes its own
knowledge, it is not proper because in your System (in the System
of Nyāya) you would not accept any knowledge as self-illuminating.
And if you accept there will be contradiction with your doctrine.
Text: 159
अथ ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ं वे त्स; िवज्ञानयोभेर्दे बीजमन्वेष्व्यम्।
atha jñānāntaravedyaṁ vetsi; vijñānayorbhede bījamanveṣṭavyam.
Translation: 159
If you say that, that perception is not erroneous is known by another
knowledge, one will have to enquire the ground to explain the
difference between those two knowledges.
Text: 160
ज्ञानमज्ञानाकारात् ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावत्र्ते ज्ञानान्तरात्ु कथं व्यावत्र्ते?- िकं ज्ञानात्मतया
व्यावत्र्ते आहो स्वद् आकारान्तरेण?
jñānamajñānākārāt jñānātmatayā vyāvarttate jñānāntarāttu

kathaṁ vyāvarttate?- kiṁ jñānātmatayā vyāvarttate āhosvid ākārā-
ntareṇa?
Translation: 160
Knowledge is distinguished from the form of knowledge as
knowledge but how can knowledge be distinguished from another
knowledge? Is it distinguished as knowledge? Or, in terms of another
form?
Text: 161
तद्िद ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावत्र्ते; तदा अन्यस्य ज्ञानात्मता िनवत्र्ते तोयादेयर्था।
tadyadi jñānātmatayā vyāvarttate; tadā anyasya jñānātmatā nivar-
ttate toyāderyathā.
Translation: 161
If you say it is distinguished as knowledge, then the other (i.e.
the non-knowledge i.e. the form or object) is not of the nature of
knowledge as water is not knowledge.
Text: 162
अथ आकारान्तरेण; आकारान्तरस्वीकरणे ज्ञानाकारिवरहः स्यात्, आकारयोस्तादा-
त्म्याऽयोगात्।
atha ākārāntareṇa; ākārāntarasvīkaraṇe jñānākāravirahaḥ syāt, ākā-
rayostādātmyā’yogāt.
Translation: 162
And if you say that it is distinguished on the basis from another
form, then if you accept another form, it amounts to saying that
there is no form in knowledge, because the two forms cannot be
identical and if they are identical that object is only one.
Text: 163
तादात्म्ये वा एकं तद्स्तु ज्ञातं(नं) अज्ञातं(नं) वा? यिद ज्ञातं(नम्); न तिहर् आकारान्तरेण
व्यावत्र्ते िकन्तु ज्ञानात्मतयैव, अन्यस्य अज्ञानात्मकत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tādātmye vā ekaṁ tadvastu jñātaṁ(naṁ) ajñātaṁ(naṁ) vā? yadi
jñātaṁ(nam); na tarhi ākārāntareṇa vyāvarttate kintu jñānātma-
tayaiva, anyasya ajñānātmakatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 163
Is that single object knowledge or non-knowledge? If it is knowledge,
then it cannot be distinguished with the help of another form, but
only in the form of knowledge. Since, the other will become of the
nature of non-knowledge?
Text: 164
अथ अज्ञातं(नं); सद्ं नः समीिहतम्।
atha ajñātaṁ(naṁ); siddhaṁ naḥ samīhitam.
Translation: 164
If again you say that single object is non-knowledge, then what we
are intending to prove, is already proved.
Text: 165
अथ ज्ञानत्वं व्यावत्र्कम्, तत्केन व्यावत्र्ते इित पूवोर्क्मनुसत्र्व्यम्।
atha jñānatvaṁ vyāvarttakam, tatkena vyāvarttate iti pūrvokta-
manusarttavyam.
Translation: 165
If you say the property of being knowledge is distinguishing factor,
here again we would like to know by what it distinguishes? And
thus, we will have to follow the same method of raising doubts as
shown by us before.
Text: 166
िवज्ञानान्तरवेद्मिप न सम्भवित। अथ न वेद्ते; तदस्तीित कथं पुनवेर् त्स?
vijñānāntaravedyamapi na sambhavati. atha na vedyate; tadastīti
kathaṁ punarvetsi?
Translation: 166
That the knowledge is not erroneous cannot be known by any other
knowledge also. If you say that it is not known, then we will ask
you how do you know that it exists.
Text: 167
अनेनव
ै वत्मर् ना सत्येतरिवज्ञानयोिवर् भागाभावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः।
anenaiva vartmanā satyetaravijñānayorvibhāgābhāvo’bhyupagantavyaḥ.
Translation: 167
In this way, we can show there is nothing called a true cognition or
a false cognition. This is what you should note.
Text: 168
अतोऽव्यिभचा रपदमपाथर् कम्।
ato’vyabhicāripadamapārthakam.
Translation: 168
And therefore, we say that the term “not erroneous” is meaningless.
[४. पर्कारान्तरेण अव्यिभचा रपदस्य िनरासः।]
[4. prakārāntareṇa avyabhicāripadasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 169
इतोप्यपाथर् कम्-
itopyapārthakam-
Translation: 169
For the following reason also the clause “which is not erroneous”
(in the definition of perception as given by Gautama 1.1.4) is
purposeless:
Text: 170
इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् पदेन अपोिद(िह)तत्वात्।
indriyārthasannikarṣapadena apodi(hi)tatvāt.
Translation: 170
Because, the intended true perception can be excluded from the
false perception by the word “contact between sense organ and
object”.
Text: 171
निह केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्य नयनाथर् सिन्कषोर्द्िू तर स्त।
nahi keśoṇḍukavijñānasya nayanārthasannikarṣodbhūtirasti.
Translation: 171
It is not the case that the perception of the thread-like things which
appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly
open our eyes is produced by the contact between eyes and the
object.
Text: 172
नन्व स्त मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानस्य, तदपनोदाय अव्यिभचा रपदम्;
nanvasti marīcyudakavijñānasya, tadapanodāya avyabhicāripadam;
Translation: 172
Objection:
Well, the clause “which is not erroneous” is required to exclude the
perception of water in the mirage.
Text: 173
तन्; यत उदकं पर्ितभाित, न च तेन सह सम्बन्धोऽ स्त। िवद्मानेन साकं सम्बध्यते
नाऽिवद्मानेन। तत्सम्बन्धे वा, न तिद्षयो(ये) िमथ्यात्विमहोपपद्ते सत्योदकसंवेदनवत्।
tanna; yata udakaṁ pratibhāti, na ca tena saha sambandho’sti. vidya-
mānena sākaṁ sambadhyate nā’vidyamānena. tatsambandhe vā, na
tadviṣayo(ye) mithyātvamihopapadyate satyodakasaṁvedanavat.
Translation: 173
Reply:
It is not true, because, in that knowledge of water, water does
appear, but there is no relationship of sense organ with that water.
The relationship of the sense organ is possible only with that which
exists there and not with that which does not exist there and if you
say there is a relationship with water there, then the knowledge of
water arising from the mirage, cannot be said to be erroneous like
the knowledge of water where there is real water.
Text: 174
ननु यद्िप पर्तीयमानोदकेन सह सम्बन्धो ना स्त चक्षुषः, तथापाप्या(थाप्या)लम्ब्य
मरीिचिनचयेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽ स्त, तस्यैव आलम्बनत्वात् तद्ेशं पर्ित पर्वृत्ेः, अत एव
िमथ्यात्वम्, अन्यदालम्बनम् अन्यच्च पर्ितभाित।
nanu yadyapi pratīyamānodakena saha sambandho nāsti cakṣuṣaḥ,
tathāpāpyā(thāpyā)lambya marīcinicayena sākaṁ sambandho’sti,
tasyaiva ālambanatvāt taddeśaṁ prati pravṛtteḥ, ata eva mithyātvam
anyadālambanam anyacca pratibhāti.
Translation: 174
Objection:
Although there is no contact of eyes with the water which has
appeared in the perception of water in the mirage, still, there is

relationship with the mirage after getting water as its object. Water
alone has to be the object of that knowledge because the person in
need of water goes towards that direction of mirage and that is
why such knowledge of water is called erroneous, because the basis
of that knowledge is different and what appears in the knowledge
is different.
[५. पर्सङ्ादालम्बनपदाथर् स्य परीक्षणम्]
[5. prasaṅgādālambanapadārthasya parīkṣaṇam.]
Text: 175
कोऽयमालम्बनाथोर् नाम येनेदमुद्ष्ु यते - अन्यदालम्बनं चान्यत् पर्ितभातीित?-िकं
िवज्ञानजनकत्वम्, आकारापर् कत्वम्, िवज्ञाना धकरणत्वम्, िवज्ञानावभा सतता वा?
ko’yamālambanārtho nāma yenedamudghuṣyate - anyadālambanaṁ
cānyat pratibhātīti?-kiṁ vijñānajanakatvam, ākārārpakatvam, vijñā-
nādhikaraṇatvam, vijñānāvabhāsitatā vā?
Translation: 175
Reply:
Please tell us the meaning of the word ālambana on the basis of
which you are making the statement, on which the perception of
water depends is different and what appears in the perception is
different. Does it mean (i) “the property of being the producer of
that knowledge”? or (ii) does it mean “the property of offering a
form in that knowledge?” or (iii) does it mean “being the locus of
that knowledge”? or (iv) does it mean “the state of being a revealer
of knowledge?”
Text: 176
तद्िद िवज्ञानजनकत्वमालम्बनाथर् ः; तदा नयनालोकादेरिप आलम्बनत्वं पर्सज्यते।
tadyadi vijñānajanakatvamālambanārthaḥ; tadā nayanālokāderapi
ālambanatvaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 176
If you say that the meaning of the term ’ālambana’ is being the
property of being the producer of that knowledge, then eyes, light,
etc. should also be called ālambana.
Text: 177
अथ आकारापर् कत्वमालम्बनत्वम्; तदयुक्म्, नैयाियकसमयेऽनभ्युपगमात्। यथा च
िवषयाकारो िवज्ञाने न युज्यते तथोप रष्ात् पर्ितपादियष्यामः।
atha ākārārpakatvamālambanatvam; tadayuktam, naiyāyikasama-
ye’nabhyupagamāt. yathā ca viṣayākāro vijñāne na yujyate tatho-
pariṣṭāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ.
Translation: 177
If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is being the
property of offering a form in that knowledge, that is also not
proper, because, such a position is not acceptable in the doctrine of
Nyāya. We are going to explain later in what way the form of the
content of knowledge, will fit into that perception.
Text: 178
अथ िवज्ञाना धकरणत्वमालम्बनत्वम्, [न;] न मरीिचचकर्ोत्क लतमुदीयते ज्ञानम् अिप तु
आत्मसमवेतमात्मानमासादयते।
atha vijñānādhikaraṇatvamālambanatvam, [na;] na marīcicakrot-
kalitamudīyate jñānam api tu ātmasamavetamātmānamāsādayate.
Translation: 178
If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is being the locus
of that knowledge, it is also not correct, because, it is not the case
that knowledge arises by way of blossoming as it were, from the
circle of the mirage. But what happens is it obtains its own form in
the self through the relationship of inherence.
Text: 179
अथ िवज्ञानावभा सतता आलम्बनत्वम्; तदा उदकिवज्ञाने उदकं पर्तीयते न मरीचयः।
atha vijñānāvabhāsitatā ālambanatvam; tadā udakavijñāne udakaṁ
pratīyate na marīcayaḥ.
Translation: 179
If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is the state of
being a revealer of knowledge, then in the knowledge of water, water
alone should appear and not the mirage (as it happens later).
Text: 180
अथ उदकाकारतया मरीचय एव पर्तीयन्ते; स उदकाकारो मरीिचभ्यो व्यित र-
क्ोऽव्यित रक्ो वा?
atha udakākāratayā marīcaya eva pratīyante; sa udakākāro
marīcibhyo vyatirikto’vyatirikto vā?
Translation: 180
If you say that yes, mirage alone appears in that knowledge, in the
form of water, then we will ask you whether that form of water is
different from mirage or not different.
Text: 181
तद्द्व्यित रक्:; स ता त्वकोऽता त्वको वा?
tadyadyavyatiriktaḥ; sa tāttviko’tāttviko vā?
Translation: 181
If you say it is not different, then we will like to know whether it is
real or unreal?
Text: 182
यिद ता त्वकः; कथं तदवगतेिमर् थ्यात्वम्?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; kathaṁ tadavagatermithyātvam?
Translation: 182
If you say it is real, then how the knowledge of it can be unreal?
Text: 183
अथाऽता त्वकः; तदा मरीचीनामिप अता त्वकत्वं पर्सज्यते।
athā’tāttvikaḥ; tadā marīcīnāmapi atāttvikatvaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 184
Again if you say it is not real, then the mirage also will become
unreal?
Text: 185
अता त्वकोदकतादात्म्ये सित तददु कज्ञानमतथ्यम्। िकमुक्ं भवित? मरीिचिवज्ञान-
मतथ्यम्।
atāttvikodakatādātmye sati tadudakajñānamatathyam. kimuktaṁ
bhavati? marīcivijñānamatathyam.
Translation: 184
If the mirage becomes identical with the unreal water, then the
knowledge of that water is not real. What does it mean? It means
the knowledge of mirage is unreal.
Text: 185
एक स्मंश्चोदकाकारे पर्तीयमाने केन एतदाख्यातम्-मरीचयः पर्ितभा न्त देवाना म्पर्यस्य!
ekasmiṁścodakākāre pratīyamāne kena etadākhyātam-marīcayaḥ
pratibhānti devānāmpriyasya!
Translation: 185
When it is the case that only one form viz. the form of water appears
in the knowledge, then who has told you, Oh fool! that in this
knowledge the mirage appears?
Text: 186
अथ अथार्न्तरभूत:; तिहर् न वक्व्यम् - मरीचय उदकाकारतया पर्तीयन्ते उदकाकारा-
न्त रता मरीचयः।
atha arthāntarabhūtaḥ; tarhi na vaktavyam-marīcaya udakākāratayā
pratīyante udakākārāntaritā marīcayaḥ.
Translation: 186
If you say that the form of water is different from the mirage, then
you should not say that the mirage appears in the form of water. It
is not the case that the mirage is covered by the form of water.
Text: 187
अथ केशोण्डु किवज्ञाने िकमवभाित? िकमालम्बते?
atha keśoṇḍukavijñāne kimavabhāti? kimālambate?
Translation: 187
Objection:
Well, I can also ask you what does appear in the knowledge of
thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from
the Sun and suddenly open our eyes, and what is the ālambana there?
Text: 188
केशोण्डु कस्यैवालम्बनत्वं पर्तीयमानत्वं च तथा उदकस्यैव आलम्बनत्वं पर्तीयमानत्वञ्,
नालम्बनान्तरं प रकल्प्यम्।
keśoṇḍukasyaivālambanatvaṁ pratīyamānatvaṁ ca tathā udaka-

syaiva ālambanatvaṁ pratīyamānatvañca, nālambanāntaraṁ pari-
kalpyam.
Translation: 188
Reply:
The same thread-like things are called ālambana and the same
appear in the knowledge. In the same way, in the knowledge of
water in the mirage, we think that water alone is ālambana and
water alone appears in the knowledge. You need not postulate any
other ālambana in that case.
Text: 189
न चोदकज्ञानस्य पर्तीयमानोदकाऽन्यालम्ब(न)त्वेन िमथ्यात्वम्, अिप तु अभावात्
ता त्वकत्वेन, अन्यथा केशोण्डु कसंिवदोऽिप िमथ्यात्वं न पर्ाप्नोित, अन्यालम्बन-
व्यितरेकात्।
na codakajñānasya pratīyamānodakā’nyālamba(na)tvena mithyā-
tvam, api tu abhāvāt tāttvikatvena, anyathā keśoṇḍukasaṁvido’pi
mithyātvaṁ na prāpnoti, anyālambanavyatirekāt.
Translation: 189
It is not the case that the knowledge of water in the mirage is called
erroneous knowledge because it has an ālambana which is different
from water which appears in the knowledge of water. But, it is called
a false knowledge because in reality there is no water. Otherwise,
the knowledge of thread-like things also will not be called false
because it is not based upon any thing other than what appears in
the knowledge.
Text: 190
यदप्युक्म्-मरीिचदेशं पर्ित गमनात् मरीचीनामालम्बनत्वम्; यद्ेवं देशस्यािप आलम्बन-
त्वमनया रीत्या उपपद्ते।
yadapyuktam-marīcideśaṁ prati gamanāt marīcīnāmālamba-
natvam; yadyevaṁ deśasyāpi ālambanatvamanayā rītyā upapadyate.
Translation: 190
You said that the mirage is the ālambana of this knowledge of water
in the mirage, because, after knowing water the person in need
of water goes towards the mirage. If it is so, then in this way it

is possible to say that place should also be the ālambana of that
knowledge.
Text: 191
न चावभातोदकिभन्ाथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वम् उदकिवज्ञानस्योपपद्ते, सत्योदकज्ञानेऽदृष्त्वात्,
अन्यथा अनुमेयदहनज्ञानस्यािप इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वमापनीपद्ेत आत्ममनःसिन्कषर् -
जत्वात्।
na cāvabhātodakabhinnārthasannikarṣajatvam udakavijñānasyopa-
padyate, satyodakajñāne’dṛṣṭatvāt, anyathā anumeyadahanajñāna-
syāpi indriyārthasannikarṣajatvamāpanīpadyeta ātmamanaḥsanni-
karṣajatvāt.
Translation: 191
It is not possible to justify that the knowledge of water is caused by
the contact of the sense organ with something different from water
which has appeared in the knowledge of water, because, this is not
seen in the knowledge of real water. Otherwise, even the inferential
knowledge of fire, can be said to be produced by the contact of sense
organ with the object, because, it is in any case it is produced by
the contact of soul and the mind.
Text: 192
अथ पर्तीयमानदहनेन सह मनसो ना स्त सम्बन्धः;
atha pratīyamānadahanena saha manaso nāsti sambandhaḥ;
Translation: 192
Objection:
Well, in the case of inferential knowledge of fire, the mind is not
connected with the fire, which appears in the inferential knowledge.
Text: 193
तिदहािप पर्तीयमानेन अम्भसा सह ना स्त सम्बन्ध: चक्षुषः।
tadihāpi pratīyamānena ambhasā saha nāsti sambandhaḥ cakṣuṣaḥ.
Translation: 193
Reply:
Similarly, here also there is no relationship of the eyes with the
water, which appears in the knowledge of water.
Text: 194
तस्मादव्यिभचा रपदं न युक्म् इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् पदेनापोिदतत्वात्।
tasmādavyabhicāripadaṁ na yuktam indriyārthasannikarṣapadenāpodi-
tatvāt.
Translation: 194
Therefore, the clause “which is not erroneous” is not required in the
definition of perception, because, the clause the contact between the
sense organ and object can exclude erroneous perceptions.
[६. पुनः पर्कारान्तरेण अव्यिभचा रपदस्यापाकरणम्।]

[6. punaḥ prakārāntareṇa avyabhicāripadasyāpākaraṇam.]
Text: 195
इतोप्यनुपपन्म्, अपोह्ज्ञानाऽसम्भवात्।
itopyanupapannam, apohyajñānā’sambhavāt.
Translation: 195
Similarly, for the following reason also the clause which is not
erroneous is not required, because, there is no knowledge which
needs to be excluded.
Text: 196
अथ मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानाय(प)िननीर्(नी)षया उपादीयते; तत्कथमपनीयते? अिवद्मानो-
दकिवषयत्वात्।
atha marīcyudakavijñānāya(pa)nirnī(nī)ṣayā upādīyate; tatkatha-
mapanīyate? avidyamānodakaviṣayatvāt.
Translation: 196
If you say that this clause is required, in order to exclude the
knowledge of water in the mirage, we would like to know, how you
are going to exclude it. Is it because this knowledge has water which
is not there as its object?
Text: 197
यद्िवद्मान(नं); कोऽयं िवषयाथर् ः? पूवोर्िदतमनुसरणीयम्।
yadyavidyamāna(naṁ); ko’yaṁ viṣayārthaḥ? pūrvoditamanusa-
raṇīyam.
Translation: 197
If you say there is no water (then it means there is absence of
water) and then the question arises, what should we understand by
the word ‘viṣaya’ or ‘content’? All objections raised in such context
are to be referred to once again here.
Text: 198
यिद ततर्ोदकं पर्ितभाित कथम् अ स्त?
yadi tatrodakaṁ pratibhāti katham asti?
Translation: 198
Objection:
If you say water appears there then how is it, that water is not
there?
Text: 199
सत्यम्, पर्ितभाित, िकन्तु अतथ्यं पर्ितभाित। अतथ्यता का?- िकं पर्तीयमानस्याऽभावः,
उत पर्तीयमान एव अभावः?
satyam, pratibhāti, kintu atathyaṁ pratibhāti. atathyatā kā?- kiṁ
pratīyamānasyā’bhāvaḥ, uta pratīyamāna eva abhāvaḥ?
Translation: 199
Reply:
True, water appears but what appears is false. Then we would like
to know what is this falsity of knowledge? Does it mean (a) absence
of what has appeared in the knowledge? Or (b) what has appeared
that itself is absence?
Text: 200
तद्िद पर्तीयमानस्य अभावः-स िकं तदैव, आहो स्वत् कालान्तरेण?
tadyadi pratīyamānasya abhāvaḥ-sa kiṁ tadaiva, āhosvit kālā-
ntareṇa?
Translation: 200
If you say “absence of what has appeared”, the next question that
arises is that absence at that time only? Or at a later time?
Text: 201
यिद तदैव; स िकम्व(िकमव)गतः, अनवगतो वा?
yadi tadaiva; sa kimva(kimava)gataḥ, anavagato vā?
Translation: 201
If you say at that time only, then the question will arise is it known
or unknown?
Text: 202
यद्वगतः; स केनावगम्यते िकमुदकिवज्ञानेन, ज्ञानान्तरेण वा?
yadyavagataḥ; sa kenāvagamyate kimudakavijñānena, jñānāntareṇa
vā?
Translation: 202
If it is known, by what it is known? Is it known by knowledge of
water? Or by some other knowledge?
Text: 203
तद्द्ुदकज्ञानेन; तन्; तस्य उदकिवषयत्वात्।
tadyadyudakajñānena; tanna; tasya udakaviṣayatvāt.
Translation: 203
If you say that it is known by knowledge of water, it is not correct,
because that has water as its object.
Text: 204
तिद्षयत्वे वा, न तिहर् 'उदकज्ञानं भर्ान्तम्' इत्युपपद्ते अभाविवषयस्य परमाथर् सत्वात्।
tadviṣayatve vā, na tarhi ‘udakajñānaṁ bhrāntam’ ityupapadyate
abhāvaviṣayasya paramārthasattvāt.
Translation: 204
In that case it cannot be said that knowledge of water is false. Since,
in that knowledge, water alone is the object, because, the object of
absence is a fact.
Text: 205
न च उदकाकारावगािहिन िवज्ञाने तोयिविनवृत्योऽवभा न्त अितपर्सङ्ात्।
na ca udakākārāvagāhini vijñāne toyavinivṛttayo’vabhānti atipra-
saṅgāt.
Translation: 205
It cannot be said that in the knowledge where the form of water is an
object, absence of water appears, because, it will lead to unwanted
consequence.
Text: 206
अथ ज्ञानान्तरेण; न; ज्ञानयौगपद्ासम्भवात्।
atha jñānāntareṇa; na; jñānayaugapadyāsambhavāt.
Translation: 206
If you say that absence is known by knowledge, this is also not
correct, because, no two knowledges can occur simultaneously.
Text: 207
यिद च अभावज्ञानेन अभावव्यवस्था िकर्यते भावज्ञानेन च भावव्यवस्था, तदा उदकस्य
भावाभावौ एककालौ स्याताम्।
yadi ca abhāvajñānena abhāvavyavasthā kriyate bhāvajñānena ca
bhāvavyavasthā, tadā udakasya bhāvābhāvau ekakālau syātām.
Translation: 207
If you are settling absence on the basis of the knowledge of absence
and presence by the knowledge of presence, then there will be
presence and absence of water at one and the same time.
Text: 208
अथ भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थां न करोित अभावज्ञानं च अभावव्यवस्थां करोित। अहो राजाज्ञा
नैयाियकपशोः।
atha bhāvajñānaṁ bhāvavyavasthāṁ na karoti abhāvajñānaṁ ca
abhāvavyavasthāṁ karoti. aho rājājñā naiyāyikapaśoḥ.
Translation: 208
If you say that the knowledge of presence of an entity does not settle
the presence, but the knowledge of absence settles the absence of
an entity. What a king’s order of the animal called logician!
Text: 209
यिद च भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थां न करोित तदा सवर् भावेषु अनाश्वासपर्सङ्ः। तत्पर्सक्ौ
अभावस्याप्यनव स्थितः, तदनव स्थतौ च तत्वोपप्लवः स्यात्।
yadi ca bhāvajñānaṁ bhāvavyavasthāṁ na karoti tadā sarvabhāveṣu
anāśvāsaprasaṅgaḥ. tatprasaktau abhāvasyāpyanavasthitiḥ, tadana-
vasthitau ca tattvopaplavaḥ syāt.
Translation: 209
If the knowledge of presence does not settle the presence, then
there will be uncertainty with regard to all positive entities and if
there is uncertainty, there will absence of settlement of absence also

and where there will be no settlement, it will result into certainty
regarding the reality itself.
Text: 210
अथाऽनवगतः; सोऽस्तीित कथं पुनवेर् त्स?
athā’navagataḥ; so’stīti kathaṁ punarvetsi?
Translation: 210
If you say that it is not known, then how do you know that it exists?
Text: 211
अथ कालान्तरे; तदा न िकिञ्द् बाध्यते सत्योदकस्यािप कालान्तरेऽभावोपपत्ेः।
atha kālāntare; tadā na kiñcid bādhyate satyodakasyāpi kālānta-
re’bhāvopapatteḥ.
Translation: 211
If you say that it will be known later, then nothing is contradicted,
because, even then; it is possible to explain that there is going to
be absence of even real water, sometime later.
Text: 212
अथ पर्तीयमान एव अभावः; कथं तिद्षयज्ञानस्य िमथ्यात्वमुपपद्ते, पर्तीयमानस्यैव
अभावस्योपपत्ेः?
atha pratīyamāna eva abhāvaḥ; kathaṁ tadviṣayajñānasya mithyā-
tvamupapadyate, pratīyamānasyaiva abhāvasyopapatteḥ?
Translation: 212
If you say that absence is indeed known, then how the knowledge
of that absence can be possible to be false? Because, this absence
is that which is known.
Text: 213
न च भावाकारे पर्तीयमाने अभावकल्पना न्याय्या, अितपर्सङ्ात्, अन्यथा रूपादौ
पर्तीयमाने रसािदकल्पना कत्र्व्या। न च िकर्यते, तथेहािप उदकं पर्तीयते।
na ca bhāvākāre pratīyamāne abhāvakalpanā nyāyyā, atiprasaṅgāt,
anyathā rūpādau pratīyamāne rasādikalpanā karttavyā. na ca
kriyate, tathehāpi udakaṁ pratīyate.
Translation: 213
It is not proper to postulate absence when the positive form is
known, because it will lead to over-application, otherwise, when
color is known, one should postulate taste, but nobody does so. In
the same way, here also, water is known.
Text: 214
ननु पर्तीयते िकन्तु अतथ्यम्;
nanu pratīyate kintu atathyam;
Translation: 214
Objection:
It is true that water is known, but it is false.
Text: 215
यद्ेवम् उदकपर्पञ्ोऽयं दीघोर्दकं मधुरोदकिमित यथा।
yadyevam udakaprapañco’yaṁ dīrghodakaṁ madhurodakamiti yathā.
Translation: 215
Reply:
If it is so, this is family of water, as we say ‘huge water’ ‘sweet
water’.
Text: 216
नन्वतर् सवार्सु अवस्थासु उदकं पर्तीयते तेन तासु अम्भः पर्कल्प्यते।
nanvatra sarvāsu avasthāsu udakaṁ pratīyate tena tāsu ambhaḥ
prakalpyate.
Translation: 216
Objection:
Well, here in all conditions or forms, water is known and therefore
by that water is postulated in all of them.
Text: 217
यद्ेवं तिदहािप अवस्थाद्येऽिप उदकं पर्तीयते सत्योदकमसत्योदकं च। सत्योदकज्ञाने
सत्योदकमवभाित नाऽसत्योदकमनुदकं वा। तथा असत्योदकज्ञानेऽसत्योदकं पर्ितभाित न
सत्योदकमनुदकं वा, स्विवषयपयर् वसाियन्यो िह बुद्यः।।
yadyevaṁ tadihāpi avasthādvaye’pi udakaṁ pratīyate satyodaka-
masatyodakaṁ ca. satyodakajñāne satyodakamavabhāti nā’satyoda-
kamanudakaṁ vā. tathā asatyodakajñāne’satyodakaṁ pratibhāti na

satyodakamanudakaṁ vā, svaviṣayaparyavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ.
Translation: 217
Reply:
If it is so, then here also in both the states, water is known such
as real water and unreal water. In the knowledge of water, real
water appears and not unreal water or something which is not
water. Similarly, in the knowledge of unreal water, the unreal water
appears, not the real water and anything but unreal water, because,
the knowledges result into determining their objects.
Text: 218
अथ बाध्यमानत्वेन िमथ्यात्विमित चेत्;
atha bādhyamānatvena mithyātvamiti cet;
Translation: 218
Objection:
Well, we say some knowledge as false, only because it gets
contradicted.
Text: 219
िकं बाध्यते-अथर् ः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा?
kiṁ bādhyate-arthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 219
Reply:
What is contradicted? Is it the object, or the knowledge or both?
Text: 220
यद्थर् स्य बाधा; स केन बाध्यते? िकं स्वयमेवात्मानं बाधते, आहो अथार्न्तरेण ज्ञानेन वा?
yadyarthasya bādhā; sa kena bādhyate? kiṁ svayamevātmānaṁ
bādhate, āho arthāntareṇa jñānena vā?
Translation: 220
Is it the case that, it contradicts its own form? Or is it contradicted
by something else or by knowledge?
Text: 221
यिद स्वयमेवात्मानं बाधते, तदा बाधा तेन िकर्यते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
yadi svayamevātmānaṁ bādhate, tadā bādhā tena kriyate, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 221
If you say it is contradicted by itself, then does it mean it performs
contradiction or does it mean that it reveals contradiction?
Text: 222
यिद िकर्यते; अव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
yadi kriyate; avyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 222
If you say it does cause contradiction, and then question arises is it
identical or is it different?
Text: 223
यद्व्यित रक्ा; तदा बाधा िकर्यते इित आत्मा अनेनोत्पाद्ते। तच्च न जाघटीित स्वात्मिन
िकर्यािवरोधात्।
yadyavyatiriktā; tadā bādhā kriyate iti ātmā anenotpādyate. tacca
na jāghaṭīti svātmani kriyāvirodhāt.
Translation: 223
If you say it is identical, then when you say contradiction is caused,
it will mean by this its form is produced. But that does not fit in,
because, no action can be directed towards one’s own self.
Text: 224
अथ व्यित रक्ा िकर्यते; तथािप िवद्मानस्य कत्ृर्त्वं न पर्तीयमानस्याऽपलापः।
atha vyatiriktā kriyate; tathāpi vidyamānasya karttṛtvaṁ na
pratīyamānasyā’palāpaḥ.
Translation: 224
If you say that it does something different, even then the agency
should be ascribed to that which exists and one should not deny
the existence of that which is cognized.
Text: 225
अथ बाधा ज्ञाप्यते; साप्यिभन्ा, िभन्ा वा?
atha bādhā jñāpyate; sāpyabhinnā, bhinnā vā?
Translation: 225
If you say that contradiction is indicated, there also question arises,
contradiction is identical or different?
Text: 226
यद्िभन्ा; तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते। िकमुक्ं भवित? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते।
yadyabhinnā; tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate. kimuktaṁ bhavati? udakaṁ
jñāpyate.
Translation: 226
If you say that it is identical, then it will mean that the contradiction
is indicated by that. What does it amount to? It amounts to saying
that water is revealed.
Text: 227
अथ िभन्ा; तदा िवद्मानस्य ज्ञापकत्वं सद्ं, पर्तीयमानस्य चाऽ स्तत्वम्।
atha bhinnā; tadā vidyamānasya jñāpakatvaṁ siddhaṁ, pratīya-
mānasya cā’stitvam.
Translation: 227
If you say that contradiction is different, then it gets established
that whatever exists that implies and whatever is cognized exists.
Text: 228
अथ अथार्न्तरेण बाध्यते; तथािप िवद्मानयोबार्ध्यबाधकभावो भूपालयो रव, न चैकस्य
बाध्यबाधकभाव उपपद्ते।
atha arthāntareṇa bādhyate; tathāpi vidyamānayorbādhyabādha-
kabhāvo bhūpālayoriva, na caikasya bādhyabādhakabhāva upa-
padyate.
Translation: 228
Again, if you say that it is contradicted by something else, still,
the relationship of contradicting and contradicted, of two existent
things will be like the same relation between two kings. It is
not proper to say that such relationship of contradicting and
contradicted, is there with reference to only one thing.
Text: 229
बाधािप तेन पर्तीयमानस्य-िकं िकर्यते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
bādhāpi tena pratīyamānasya-kiṁ kriyate, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 229
What is the fact: is the contradiction of that which is cognized is
created by that? Or is it indicated?
Text: 230
यिद िकर्यते; अव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
yadi kriyate; avyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 230
If you say it is created, the same question may be asked whether is
it identical or different?
Text: 231
यद्व्यित रक्ा; तदा अव्यित रक्ा बाधा उत्पाद्ते। िकमुक्ं भवेत्? उदकमुत्पाद्ते।
तदत्ु पादने च तत्संिवदोऽिमथ्यात्वम्।
yadyavyatiriktā; tadā avyatiriktā bādhā utpādyate. kimuktaṁ
bhavet? udakamutpādyate. tadutpādane ca tatsaṁvido’mithyātvam.
Translation: 231
If you say it is identical, then it will mean identical contradiction
is produced. What does it mean? It means water is produced and
with reference to production of that, the knowledge of that water
cannot be said to be false.
Text: 232
अथ व्यित रक्ोत्पाद्ते; तथािप तोयसम्ब न्धतयोपलब्धेरम्भस उपप त्नर् जातु देवदत्-
स्याऽसत्वे तन्यनव्यवहार सिद्ः।
atha vyatiriktotpādyate; tathāpi toyasambandhitayopalabdherambhasa
upapattirna jātu devadattasyā’sattve tannayanavyavahārasiddhiḥ.
Translation: 232
Again if you say, that it is different and it is produced, still, since it
is being known as related with water, it is possible to justify water.
It cannot be the case that if Devadatta is not there, the function of
his eyes (is there).
Text: 233
अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तदा साऽव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
atha jñāpyate; tadā sā’vyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 233
If you say it is indicated, there also the question arises, whether
that contradiction is identical or different.
Text: 234
यद्व्यित रक्ा ज्ञाप्यते; तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते। िकमुक्ं भवित? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते।
yadyavyatiriktā jñāpyate; tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate. kimuktaṁ
bhavati? udakaṁ jñāpyate.
Translation: 234
If it indicated as identical, then the contradiction is indeed indicated
by that. What does it mean? The water is revealed.
Text: 235
अथ व्यित रक्ा सती ज्ञाप्यते; तथाप्युदकस्येयं बाधेित अन्यतन्तर्तया पर्ितभासनात्
नात्यन्ताभावोपप त्ः।
atha vyatiriktā satī jñāpyate; tathāpyudakasyeyaṁ bādheti anyata-
ntratayā pratibhāsanāt nātyantābhāvopapattiḥ.
Translation: 235
If you say that it indicates by being different, still this contradiction
is of water and therefore one cannot say that there is absolute
absence of water because it appears with the help of something else.
Text: 236
तस्मादथार्न्तरेणािप न बाधोपप त्ः।
tasmādarthāntareṇāpi na bādhopapattiḥ.
Translation: 236
Therefore, even if it is treated as a different entity, still,
contradiction cannot be explained.
Text: 237
अथ ज्ञानेन बाध्यते; िकं तिद्षयेण अन्यिवषयेण िनिवर् षयेण वा?
atha jñānena bādhyate; kiṁ tadviṣayeṇa anyaviṣayeṇa nirviṣayeṇa vā?
Translation: 237
If you say that it contradicted by knowledge, there the question
arises, is it contradicted by content of knowledge or by the content
of some other knowledge or by knowledge without content?
Text: 238
यिद तिद्षयेण; तदा तत् स्वरूपं िवधत्े न तु िवपयार्सयित तदाकारपयर् व सतरूपत्वात्।
yadi tadviṣayeṇa; tadā tat svarūpaṁ vidhatte na tu viparyāsayati
tadākāraparyavasitarūpatvāt.
Translation: 238
If you say that it is contradicted by the content of that knowledge,
then it justifies its form and does not make it otherwise, because, it
is of the form which is contributed by the form of that knowledge.
Text: 239
अथ अन्यिवषयं बाधकम्; तदिप न युज्यते, यद् यिद्षयं तत्स्यैव सत्ां िवधत्े नत्वन्यस्य
िवधायकं पर्ितषेधकं वा। स्विवषयपयर् वसाियन्यो िह बुद्यः।
atha anyaviṣayaṁ bādhakam; tadapi na yujyate, yad yadviṣayaṁ
tattasyaiva sattāṁ vidhatte natvanyasya vidhāyakaṁ pratiṣedhakaṁ
vā. svaviṣayaparyavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ.
Translation: 239
If you say that object of some other knowledge is the contradicting
factor, that also is not proper, because, if X is the object of the
knowledge Y, then that X justifies the existence of Y. It cannot be
either the justifier or the prohibiter, because, the knowledges result
into referring to their own objects.
Text: 240
अथ िनिवर् षयेण बाध्यते; न िकिञ्द् िवदधाित पर्ितषेधित वा िनिवर् षयत्वादेव।
atha nirviṣayeṇa bādhyate; na kiñcid vidadhāti pratiṣedhati vā
nirviṣayatvādeva.
Translation: 240
If you say that it is contradicted by knowledge without content, then
it will mean that it neither enjoins anything nor negates anything,
because it does not have any content.
Text: 241
अथ ज्ञानं बाध्यते; तस्यािप बाधा का? - िकं स्वरूपव्यावृ त्रूपा, स्वरूपापह्वरूपा वा,
िवषयापहारलक्षणा वा?
atha jñānaṁ bādhyate; tasyāpi bādhā kā? - kiṁ svarūpavyāvṛttirūpā,
svarūpāpahnavarūpā vā, viṣayāpahāralakṣaṇā vā?
Translation: 241
You are saying that knowledge is contradicted, what is that
contradiction with reference to that knowledge? Is it of the form of
exclusion of its own form from the rest or is it of the form of denial
of its own form or is it of the form of snatching away its content?
Text: 242
तद्िद स्वरूपव्यावृ त्रूपा बाधा, तदा सवर् बा धतं स्यात् िवज्ञानस्य िवज्ञानान्तरेण
िनवर् (िनव)त्यर् मानत्वात्।
tadyadi svarūpavyāvṛttirūpā bādhā, tadā sarvaṁ bādhitaṁ syāt
vijñānasya vijñānāntareṇa nirva(niva)rtyamānatvāt.
Translation: 242
If you say that it is of nature of exclusion of its own form from
the rest and that is what you call contradiction, then everything
will become contradicted, because, one knowledge is contradicted
by another knowledge.
Text: 243
अथ स्वरूपापह्वरूपं(पा); तदयुक्म्; िमथ्योदकिवज्ञानस्यािप अनुभूयमानत्वात्।
atha svarūpāpahnavarūpaṁ(pā); tadayuktam; mithyodakavijñā-
nasyāpi anubhūyamānatvāt.
Translation: 243
If you say that it is of the form of denial of its own form, that
is not proper, because, even the knowledge of false water is being
experienced.
Text: 244
अथ िवषयापहारलक्षणा बाधा उच्यते; सािप न युक्ा। यथा च िवषयापहारो न शक्यते कत्ुर्
तथाऽनन्तरमेव िनवेिदतम्।
atha viṣayāpahāralakṣaṇā bādhā ucyate; sāpi na yuktā. yathā ca
viṣayāpahāro na śakyate karttuṁ tathā’nantarameva niveditam.
Translation: 244
If you say that it is of the form of snatching away its content and
that is what is called contradiction, that also is not proper. That it
is not possible to snatch away the content, which is being explained
later.
Text: 245
यिद न बाध्यते िकिमत्यसौ अथर् िकर्यां न करोित भावः?
yadi na bādhyate kimityasau arthakriyāṁ na karoti bhāvaḥ?
Translation: 245
If you say that it is not contradicted, then does it mean that a
positive entity does not perform consistent interaction?
Text: 246
केयम् अथर् िकर्या या तेन न सम्पाद्ते पुस
ं ाम्-िकं िवज्ञानरूपा, पर्वृ त्रूपा, पर्ािप्रूपा,
सुखदःु खोत्पादभोगरूपा वा?
keyam arthakriyā yā tena na sampādyate puṁsām-kiṁ vijñānarūpā,
pravṛttirūpā, prāptirūpā, sukhaduḥkhotpādabhogarūpā vā?
Translation: 246
What is this consistency of behavior which is not brought about to
the people by that positive entity? (i) Is it of the form of knowledge?
(ii) Is it of the form of action (iii) Is it of the form of getting what
was shown by the knowledge? Or (iv) Is it of the form of experience
leading to happiness or unhappiness?
Text: 247
तद्िद िवज्ञानलक्षणां न करोित; तदयुक्म्; िवज्ञानलक्षणामथर् िकर्यां करोत्येव तोयम्।
tadyadi vijñānalakṣaṇāṁ na karoti; tadayuktam; vijñānalakṣaṇā-
marthakriyāṁ karotyeva toyam.
Translation: 247
If you say it does not produce knowledge that is not proper,
because, water does produce the consistent behavior in the form
of knowledge.
Text: 248
अथ पर्वृ त्रूपां न करोित; तदयुक्म्; पर्वृ त्िहर् पुरुषेच्छानुिवधाियनी नाथर् स्वरूप-
भावाभावावनुगमयित। पुरुषो िह कामतः पर्वत्र्ते वा न वा, नह्ेतावता तदभाव सिद्ः।
atha pravṛttirūpāṁ na karoti; tadayuktam; pravṛttirhi puruṣecchānu-
vidhāyinī nārthasvarūpabhāvābhāvāvanugamayati. puruṣo hi
kāmataḥ pravarttate vā na vā, nahyetāvatā tadabhāvasiddhiḥ.
Translation: 248
Again if you say, that it does not produce consistency in the form of
action, that also is not proper, because, an activity takes place as per
the desire of the person and does not cause the knowledge of either
positive or negative entity. A human being’s activity is prompted

by desire or not, till today its contrary has not been proved.
Text: 249
अथ पर्ािप्रूपामथर् िकर्यां न करोित तेनाऽसत्वम्; तदप्ययुक्म्; चन्दर्ाकर्गर्हनक्षतर्तारकादेः
पर्ाप्त्यभावेऽिप सत्वसम्भवात्।
atha prāptirūpāmarthakriyāṁ na karoti tenā’sattvam; tadapya-
yuktam; candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādeḥ prāptyabhāve’pi sattva-
sambhavāt.
Translation: 249
If you say that the positive entity does not produce consistent
behavior in the form of obtainment of what has been shown, and
therefore it does not exist. It is also not proper, because, in spite of
the fact that entities like moon, sun, planet, constellation and stars
etc. have not been obtained by anybody and still they exist.
Text: 250
अथ सुखदःु खरूपामथर् िकर्यां न करोित-िकं दशर् नजं सुखं न करोित आहो देहसम्बन्धजम्?
atha sukhaduḥkharūpāmarthakriyāṁ na karoti-kiṁ darśanajaṁ
sukhaṁ na karoti āho dehasambandhajam?
Translation: 250
If you say it does not produce the consistency in the form of pleasure
and pain, there one may ask, does it mean that, it does not produce
pleasure produced by seeing the object or produced by relationship
with body?
Text: 251
तद्िद दशर् नजं न करोित; तदयुक्म्; करोत्येव।
tadyadi darśanajaṁ na karoti; tadayuktam; karotyeva.
Translation: 251
If you say it does not produce pleasure caused by perception, it is
not proper, because it does produce pleasure.
Text: 252
अथ देहसम्बन्धजं न करोित; तदा चन्दर्ाकर्गर्हनक्षतर्ादौ व्यिभचारः तेषां देहसम्बन्धज-
सुखजनकत्वं ना स्त, अथ च सत्वम्। न च अथर् िकर्याऽकत्ृर्त्वेन वस्तूनामसत्वं स्वहेतोरेव
िवज्ञानजननमातर्स्योत्पत्ेः, सहका रिवरहाद्ा न करोित।
atha dehasambandhajaṁ na karoti; tadā candrārkagrahanakṣatrādau

vyabhicāraḥ teṣāṁ dehasambandhajasukhajanakatvaṁ nāsti, atha
ca sattvam. na ca arthakriyā’karttṛtvena vastūnāmasattvaṁ svahe-
toreva vijñānajananamātrasyotpatteḥ, sahakārivirahādvā na karoti.
Translation: 252
If you say it does not produce pleasure caused by the association
with body, and then it will violate the fact in the case of moon, sun,
planet, constellations etc. because, they do not produce pleasure
being associated with body and in spite of that they exist. It is
not the case that things do not exist simply because they do not
produce consistent behavior, because, by their own ground they
simply facilitate the production of their knowledge or if they are no
auxiliary causes they will not produce that.
Text: 253
िकञ्, अथर् िकर्यां न करोित-िकमेकस्य पर्ितपत्ुः, सवर् पर्ितपत्ॄणां वा?
kiñca, arthakriyāṁ na karoti-kimekasya pratipattuḥ, sarvaprati-
pattṝṇāṁ vā?
Translation: 253
Moreover, you say that a positive entity does not produce fruitful
behavior, do you want to say that it does not produce fruitful
behavior of some specific person or all persons who know it?
Text: 254
तद्िद एकस्य पर्ितपत्ुरथर् िकर्यां न करोित तेनाऽसत्वम्; तदा चन्दर्ाकर्गर्हनक्षतर्तारकादौ
व्यिभचारः मुमूष्वर् थेर् च।
tadyadi ekasya pratipatturarthakriyāṁ na karoti tenā’sattvam; tadā
candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādau vyabhicāraḥ mumūrṣvarthe ca.
Translation: 254
If you say that it does not produce fruitful behavior of a specific
person who knows it and therefore it does not exist, if it is so, it
will violate the fact with regard moon, sun, planet, constellations
etc. and also something (like a bubble) which is about to vanish.
Text: 255
अथ सवर् पर्ितपत्ॄणामथर् िकर्यां न करोित तेनाऽसत्वम्; एवं तिहर् सवर् भावानामसत्वपर्सङ्ः।
निह सवेर् भावाः सवर् पुरुषाथर् हेतवः।
atha sarvapratipattṝṇāmarthakriyāṁ na karoti tenā’sattvam; evaṁ
tarhi sarvabhāvānāmasattvaprasaṅgaḥ. nahi sarve bhāvāḥ sarva
puruṣārthahetavaḥ.
Translation: 255
If you say that it does not produce fruitful behavior of all those who
know it and therefore it does not exist, in that case, it will lead to
the contingency of non-existence of all positive entities. It is not the
case that all positive entities are the cause of desired goals of all
human beings.
Text: 256
न च सवर् पुरुषाथर् िकर्यािवहीनमेतिदत्यवगन्तुं पायर् ते अवार् ग्वदा।
na ca sarvapuruṣārthakriyāvihīnametadityavagantuṁ pāryate
arvāgvidā.
Translation: 256
It is also not possible to know that this is devoid of fruitful action
of all human beings by a person who knows before.
Text: 257
तस्मात् स्थतमेतद् अव्यिभचा रपदमनथर् कम्।
tasmāt sthitametad avyabhicāripadamanarthakam.
Translation: 257
Therefore, one can conclude that the clause “not erroneous” is
purposeless.
[७. भर्मस्य स्मृितत्वं स्वीकुवर् तां पर्ाभाकराणां मतस्य िवकल्प्य िनरसनम्।]
[7. bhramasya smṛtitvaṁ svīkurvatāṁ prābhākarāṇāṁ matasya
vikalpya nirasanam.]
Text: 258
अन्ये तु मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानस्य स्मृितत्वं पर्ितपद्न्ते न भर्ा न्तरूपताम्।
anye tu marīcyudakavijñānasya smṛtitvaṁ pratipadyante na
bhrāntirūpatām.
Translation: 258
Others (Prābhākaras) however believe that the knowledge of water
in the mirage which he remembers of water is not an illusion.
Text: 259
तस्य कथं स्मृितत्वं-िकमुदकगृहीितत्वेन गृहीतोदकगृहीितत्वेन वा उदकगर्हणानन्तर-
कालभािवत्वेन वा िनिवर् षयत्वेन वा 'यमहमदर्ाक्षम्' इत्यनेनाऽऽकारेण उपजायमानत्वेन वा?
tasya kathaṁ smṛtitvam-kimudakagṛhītitvena, gṛhītodakagṛhītitvena
vā udakagrahaṇānantarakālabhāvitvena vā nirviṣayatvena vā ‘yam
ahamadrākṣam’ ityanenā’kāreṇa upajāyamānatvena vā?
Translation: 259
There we can ask how is it called remembrance? (a) Is it a
remembrance which reveals water or (b) is it a remembrance which
reveals water which was known before or (c) is it a remembrance
because it occurs after the knowledge of water or (d) is it
remembrance having no content or (e) is it a remembrance which
arises in the form such as “this is what I saw before”.
Text: 260
तद्िद उदकगृहीितत्वेन; तदा सवोर्दकिवज्ञानानां स्मृितत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi udakagṛhītitvena; tadā sarvodakavijñānānāṁ smṛtitva-
prasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 260
If it is a remembrance “as knowledge of water” then, all knowledges
of water will become remembrance.
Text: 261
अथ गृहीतोदकगृहीितत्वेन स्मृितत्वम्; तदाऽऽद्स्यािप गृहीतोदकगृहीितत्वे स्मृितत्वं
पर्सज्यते, गृहीतोदकगर्ािहत्वािवशेषात्।
atha gṛhītodakagṛhītitvena smṛtitvam; tadā’dyasyāpi gṛhītodaka-
gṛhītitve smṛtitvaṁ prasajyate, gṛhītodakagrāhitvāviśeṣāt.
Translation: 261
If it is a remembrance which reveals water which was known before,
then, if the first knowledge is also the knowledge of water which was
known before and so that knowledge also will become remembrance,
because the first knowledge also is equally the revealer of water

which was known before.
Text: 262
आद्स्य गृहीतोदकगर्ािहत्वं ना स्त;
ādyasya gṛhītodakagrāhitvaṁ nāsti;
Translation: 262
Clarification:
The first knowledge of water cannot be called the revealer of water
which was already known.
Text: 263
तदानीं िभन्िवषयत्वम्, िभन्िवषयत्वे च िद्तीयस्यािप गृहीतगर्ािहत्वं िवहायते।
tadānīṁ bhinnaviṣayatvam, bhinnaviṣayatve ca dvitīyasyāpi gṛhīta-
grāhitvaṁ vihāyate.
Translation: 263
Reply:
That means, at that time i.e. at the first time, the object was
different, then the second knowledge of water, cannot be said to
be revealer of water which was already known (in that case the
second knowledge cannot be called remembrance).
Text: 264
अथ एकिवषयत्वम्; आयातं तिहर् पर्थमस्यािप गृहीतगर्ािहत्वम्, अिविशष्ाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वात्,
पर्थमोत्रिवज्ञानवत्। यथा एकनीलस्वलक्षणगर्ाहकयुगपदत्ु पन्ानेकिवज्ञानात् नीलज्ञान-
रूपता न िभद्ते, तथेहािप।
atha ekaviṣayatvam; āyātaṁ tarhi prathamasyāpi gṛhītagrāhitvam,
aviśiṣṭārthagṛhītirūpatvāt, prathamottaravijñānavat. yathā ekanīla-
svalakṣaṇagrāhakayugapadutpannānekavijñānāt nīlajñānarūpatā na
bhidyate, tathehāpi.
Translation: 264
If you say the object is one and the same, then the first knowledge
has to be revealer of that which is already known, because, the
first knowledge is the knowledge which reveals an object which was
not specific, like the knowledge which followed thereafter as the
form of knowledge of a blue thing, is not distinguished from many

knowledges of blue things simultaneously occurring, at the time of
the knowledge which reveals one blue thing. The same is the case
here.
Text: 265
तथा, धारावािहिवज्ञानानां स्मृितरूपता पर्ाप्नोित।
tathā, dhārāvāhivijñānānāṁ smṛtirūpatā prāpnoti.
Translation: 265
Similarly, the perceptions occurring in a sequence, when someone
is looking at one and the same thing, will become remembrance.
Text: 266
तथा, पर्त्यिभज्ञानस्य च गृहीतगर्ािहत्वेन स्मृितत्वं पर्सज्यते।
tathā, pratyabhijñānasya ca gṛhītagrāhitvena smṛtitvaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 266
In the same way, the knowledge called recollection (which is
produced by sense organ and impressions together) will become
remembrance.
Text: 267
अथ पर्त्यिभज्ञानस्य गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वं न िवद्ते;
atha pratyabhijñānasya gṛhītarthagrāhitvaṁ na vidyate;
Translation: 267
Clarification:
Well, in that case it is different and hence it cannot be called
recollection.
Text: 268
तदा पर्त्यिभज्ञानत्वं िनवत्र्ते, नह्ाद्ं दशर् नं 'स एवायम्' इत्युपजायते।
tadā pratyabhijñānatvaṁ nivarttate, nahyādyaṁ darśanaṁ ‘sa
evāyam’ ityupajāyate.
Translation: 268
Reply:
In that case, it cannot be called recollection. It is not the case that
the first observation arises in the form viz. “he is the same person”.
Text: 269
तथा आनुमािनकमिप िवज्ञान(नं) गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन स्मृितत्वमापद्ते।
tathā ānumānikamapi vijñāna(naṁ) gṛhītārthagrāhitvena smṛti-
tvamāpadyate.
Translation: 269
Likewise, the inferential cognition also will become remembrance
since it reveals something which was already known.
Text: 270
अथ उदकगर्हणोत्रकालभािवत्वेन स्मृितत्वम्;
atha udakagrahaṇottarakālabhāvitvena smṛtitvam;
Translation: 270
Well, remembrance is that knowledge, which occurs after the
knowledge of water.
Text: 271
तदा संस्कारस्य स्मरणरूपता पर्ाप्नोित, उदकगर्हणोत्रकालभािवत्वेन, रससंवेदनस्य च।
tadā saṁskārasya smaraṇarūpatā prāpnoti, udakagrahaṇottarakāla-
bhāvitvena, rasasaṁvedanasya ca.
Translation: 271
Reply:
Then, the impression “produced by experience” will become
remembrance because, impression also occurs only after experience.
Also, the experience of taste, will become remembrance.
Text: 272
अथ िनिवर् षयत्वेन स्मृितरूपता उच्यते; तदयुक्म्; पूवोर्िदतानुभवावेिदताथर् कारावेदकत्वेन
उदीयमानायाः कथं िनिवर् षयत्वम्?
atha nirviṣayatvena smṛtirūpatā ucyate; tadayuktam; pūrvoditā-
nubhavāveditārthakārāvedakatvena udīyamānāyāḥ kathaṁ nirviṣa-
yatvam?
Translation: 272
If you say that the knowledge of water in the mirage is remembrance
because it is contentless, it will be improper, because, as this
knowledge has arisen as the revealer of the form of water, prompted

by the earlier experience of water, how can this knowledge be called
contentless?
Text: 273
अथ पूवार्नुभूताथर् पर्त्यस्तमये सित समानकालाथार्भावािन्िवर् षयता; तदा चोदनाजिनत-
िवज्ञानस्य िनिवर् षयत्वेन स्मृितत्वमापनीपद्ते, कत्र्व्यतारूपाथर् स्य तदाऽभावात्। भावे वा
कत्र्व्यरूपता नोपपद्ते। तदनुपपत्ौ सप्तन्तुिकर्याया िवलोपपर्सङ्ः।
atha pūrvānubhūtārthapratyastamaye sati samānakālārthābhāvānni-
rviṣayatā; tadā codanājanitavijñānasya nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvamā-
panīpadyate, karttavyatārūpārthasya tadā’bhāvāt. bhāve vā kartta-
vyarūpatā nopapadyate. tadanupapattau saptatantukriyāyā vilopa-
prasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 273
If you say by contentless what we mean is the absence of object
or at the same time when the object is of the earlier experience is
no longer there, then, the knowledge caused by an injunction will
become contentless and thereby will become remembrance, because,
at that time there is no object which is worth-performing. If you say
it is there, it cannot be explained how it should be worth-performing
and if that cannot be explained then all the activities related to the
sacrifice called sapta-tantu will vanish.
Text: 274
यिद च िनिवर् षयत्वेन स्मृितत्वम्; तदा िवद्मानघट-जात्यादेः स्मरणस्यास्मृितत्वपर्सङ्ः।
yadi ca nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvam; tadā vidyamānaghaṭa-jātyādeḥ
smaraṇasyāsmṛtitvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 274
If you say that the knowledge is contentless and therefore it is a
remembrance, the remembrance of universal like potness which is
existent cannot be considered as remembrance.
Text: 275
अथ 'अदर्ाक्षम्' इत्यनेनाकारेणोपजायमानत्वेन स्मृितत्वम्;
atha ’adrākṣam’ ityanenākāreṇopajāyamānatvena smṛtitvam;
Translation: 275
Clarification:
Knowledge which arises in the form viz. “I saw” will be a
remembrance.
Text: 276
तदयुक्म्; 'इहोदकिम'त्यनेनाकारेणोपजायमानायाः कथम् 'अदर्ाक्षिम'त्येवंरूपतोपपद्ते?
tadayuktam; ‘ihodakami’tyanenākāreṇopajāyamānāyāḥ katham
‘adrākṣami’ityevaṁrūpatopapadyate?
Translation: 276
Reply:
It is also not proper, because, when knowledge of water in the
mirage has arisen in the form “here there is water”, how can it
be explained having the form viz. I saw?
Text: 277
अथ िवपर्मुिष[त]ता अनया भङ्ग्या उपजायते।
atha vipramuṣi[ta]tā anayā bhaṅgyā upajāyate.
Translation: 277
The erasing of that knowledge can be explained as follows:
[८. पर्सङ्ात् िवपर्मोषपरीक्षा। ]
[8. prasaṅgāt vipramoṣaparīkṣā. ]
Text: 277a
कोऽयं िवपर्मोषो नाम? िकमनुभवाकारस्वीकरणम्, स्मरणाकारपर्ध्वंसो वा,
अपूवार्थर्गृहीितत्वं वा, इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वं वा, इ न्दर्याथार्ऽसिन्कषर् जत्वं वा?
ko’yaṁ vipramoṣo nāma? kimanubhavākārasvīkaraṇam, smaraṇā-
kārapradhvaṁso vā, apūrvārthagṛhītitvaṁ vā, indriyārthasanni-
karṣajatvaṁ vā, indriyārthā’sannikarṣajatvaṁ vā?
Translation: 277a
If you say, such knowledge arises in the form in which some part
is erased; we would like to ask you, what is this erasing? (a) Does
it mean acceptance of the form of experience? (b) Does it mean
destruction of the form of remembrance? Or (c) Does it mean
revealing something new? Or (d) Does it mean the state of being
produced by the contact between the sense organ and object? Or

(e) Does it mean the state of not being produced by the contact
between the sense organ and object?
Text: 278
तद्िद अनुभवाकारस्वीकरणम्; तदा स्मृितरूपता नोपपद्ते।
tadyadi anubhavākārasvīkaraṇam; tadā smṛtirūpatā nopapadyate.
Translation: 278
If you say, does it mean acceptance of the form of experience? Then,
that cannot be treated as remembrance.
Text: 279
अथ स्मृितरूपता; तदाऽनुभवाकारस्वीकरणं नोपपद्ते, स्मृत्यनुभवाकारयो: इतरेतर-
प रहार स्थितलक्षणत्वात्।
atha smṛtirūpatā; tadā’nubhavākārasvīkaraṇaṁ nopapadyate, smṛtya-
nubhavākārayoḥ itaretaraparihārasthitilakṣaṇatvāt.
Translation: 279
If you treat it to be a form of remembrance, then you cannot treat it
as the form of an experience, because remembrance and experience
are mutually exclusive.
Text: 280
अथ स्मरणाकारपर्ध्वंसः; तदयुक्म्; िवज्ञानस्य स्वयं स्मृितत्वेनाभ्युपगमात्। पर्ध्वंसो िह
अिवज्ञानात्मकः कथं स्मृितरूपतां िवधत्े?
atha smaraṇākārapradhvaṁsaḥ; tadayuktam; vijñānasya svayaṁ
smṛtitvenābhyupagamāt. pradhvaṁso hi avijñānātmakaḥ kathaṁ
smṛtirūpatāṁ vidhatte?
Translation: 280
If you say, does it mean destruction of the form of remembrance?
That is not correct, because, knowledge by itself is not accepted as
remembrance. Destruction is not of the form of knowledge, and so
how do you call it a remembrance?
Text: 281
अथ अपूवार्थर्िवषयगृ(oथर् गृ)हीितत्वं स्मृितपर्मोष उच्यते; तदा अत्यन्ताऽननुभूतकनक-
पनसािदसंिवत्ीनां स्मृितिवपर्मोषत्वम् आपद्ते।
atha apūrvārthaviṣayagṛ(rthagṛ)hītitvaṁ smṛtipramoṣa ucyate;

tadā atyantā’nanubhūtakanakapanasādisaṁvittīnāṁ smṛtivipramo-
ṣatvam āpadyate.
Translation: 281
If you say that erasing of remembrance means revealing something
new, then the perception of golden jackfruit and the like which
is never experienced by anybody, will become erasing of that
remembrance.
Text: 282
अथ इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वं स्मृितिवपर्मोष उच्यते; तदा संिवत्ीना(नां) स्मृितिवपर्मोष-
त्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha indriyārthasannikarṣajatvaṁ smṛtivipramoṣa ucyate; tadā
saṁvittīnā(nāṁ) smṛtivipramoṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 282
If you say that, does it mean the state of being produced by the
contact between the sense organ and object? Then there will arise
the contingency of erasing of remembrance of all perceptions.
Text: 283
अथ इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वं स्मृितिवपर्मोष उच्यते; तदा चोदनाजिनतिवज्ञानस्य
अनुमानोपमानिवज्ञानस्य च स्मृितिवपर्मोषत्वमापद्ते।
atha indriyārthasannikarṣajatvaṁ smṛtivipramoṣa ucyate; tadā
codanājanitavijñānasya anumānopamānavijñānasya ca smṛtivipra-
moṣatvamāpadyate.
Translation: 283
If you say that, does it mean the state of not being produced by the
contact between the sense organ and object? Then, the knowledge
caused by injunction and the inferential knowledge as well as
analogical knowledge, will also become the erasing of remembrance.
Text: 284
तस्माद् यथा यथा िवचायर् ते स्मृितिवपर्मोषः, तथा तथा न्यायं न िवषहत इित।
tasmād yathā yathā vicāryate smṛtivipramoṣaḥ, tathā tathā nyāyaṁ
na viṣahata iti.
Translation: 284
Therefore, as we go on analyzing erasing of remembrance, deeper
and deeper, it does not withstand logic.
Text: 285
तस्मात् मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानस्य न स्मृितिवपर्मोषरूपता अिप तु िवपरीतख्याितत्वं
सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वं वा।
tasmāt marīcyudakavijñānasya na smṛtivipramoṣarūpatā api tu
viparītakhyātitvaṁ samyagjñānatvaṁ vā.
Translation: 285
Therefore, the knowledge of water in the mirage is not of the form
of erasing of remembrance, but either of the form of knowledge of
the contrary or the form of a true cognition.
[९. व्यवसायात्मकपदस्य समालोचनम्।]

[9. vyavasāyātmakapadasya samālocanam.]
Text: 286
तथा, व्यवसायात्मकपदमिप नोपादेयमपर्मे(मपने)याभावात्।
tathā, vyavasāyātmakapadamapi nopādeyamaprame(mapane)yābhāvāt.
Translation: 286
In the same way, the clause “which is of the nature of determinate
cognition” is not required in the definition of perception, because,
there is nothing which can be excluded by this clause.
Text: 287
ननु स्थाण्वािदकेऽथेर् इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषार्त् सामान्यमातर्दशर् नािद्शेषानुपलब्धौ सन्देहज्ञान-
मुपजायते तदपनीयते; त स्मन् सन्देहज्ञाने जाते िकिञ्त् पर्ितभाित आहो न पर्ितभाित?
nanu sthāṇvādike’rthe indriyārthasannikarṣāt sāmānyamātra-
darśanāt viśeṣānupalabdhau sandehajñānamupajāyate tadapanīyate;
tasmin sandehajñāne jāte kiñcit pratibhāti āho na pratibhāti?
Translation: 287
Objection:
Well, when our eyes come in contact with a post, we observe certain
common features there and we also do not observe certain specific
features and after sometimes, a doubtful knowledge arises. Now the
question is, in that doubtful knowledge whether something appears

or does not appear?
Text: 288
तद्िद पर्ितभाित; स िकं धमीर्, धमोर् वा?
tadyadi pratibhāti; sa kiṁ dharmī, dharmo vā?
Translation: 288
Reply:
We would like to know what appears in the knowledge, is it a locus
of the properties or the property itself?
Text: 289
तद्िद धमीर् पर्ितभाित; स ता त्वकः, अता त्वको वा?
tadyadi dharmī pratibhāti; sa tāttvikaḥ, atāttviko vā?
Translation: 289
If you say that the locus appears, then our question is, whether that
locus is real or unreal?
Text: 290
यिद ता त्वकः; नापनेयता तिद्षयिवज्ञानस्य।
yadi tāttvikaḥ; nāpaneyatā tadviṣayavijñānasya.
Translation: 290
If you say that it is real, then obviously, the knowledge of that
cannot be excluded.
Text: 291
अथ अता त्वकः; तदा अव्यिभचा रपदेन अपनीतत्वात् न व्यवसायात्मकपदमुपादेयम्।
atha atāttvikaḥ; tadā avyabhicāripadena apanītatvāt na vyavasā-
yātmakapadamupādeyam.
Translation: 291
If you say that it is real, then it has already been excluded by the
clause “which is not erroneous” and so the clause “which is of the
form of determinate cognition” need not be added to that definition.
Text: 292
अथ धमर् ः पर्ितभाित; स स्थाणुत्वलक्षणः पुरुषत्वलक्षणः, उभयं वा?
atha dharmaḥ pratibhāti; sa sthāṇutvalakṣaṇaḥ puruṣatvalakṣaṇaḥ,

ubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 292
If you say what appears there is a property, we would like to know,
is that property of the form of postness or of the form of manhood
or both.
Text: 293
तद्िद स्थाणुत्वलक्षणो धमर् ः पर्ितभाित स ता त्वकोऽता त्वको वा?
tadyadi sthāṇutvalakṣaṇo dharmaḥ pratibhāti sa tāttviko’tāttviko vā?
Translation: 293
If you say that property which appears there, is of the form of
postness, we will again ask you, whether that is real or unreal?
Text: 294
यिद ता त्वकः; कथं तद्द्
ु े: सन्देहरूपता, ता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वेन सत्योदकसंवेदनवत्?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; kathaṁ tadbuddheḥ sandeharūpatā, tāttvikārthagṛhī-
tirūpatvena satyodakasaṁvedanavat?
Translation: 294
If you say it is real, how can that knowledge be doubtful like the
perception of real water which reveals the real object?
Text: 295
अथ अता त्वकः; तदा अव्यिभचा रपदेन अपोिदतत्वात् न व्यवसायात्मकपदमुपादेयम्।
atha atāttvikaḥ; tadā avyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt na vyavasā-
yātmakapadamupādeyam.
Translation: 295
If you say it is unreal, then this has been already excluded by
the clause “that which is erroneous” and therefore the clause “that
which is of the form of a determinate cognition” need not be added
in the definition.
Text: 296
अथ पुरुषत्वलक्षणो धमर् ः पर्ितभाित; असाविप ता त्वकोऽता त्वको वा?
atha puruṣatvalakṣaṇo dharmaḥ pratibhāti; asāvapi tāttviko’tāttviko
vā?
Translation: 296
If you say that property which appears is of the nature of manhood,
the same question can be asked, whether that manness is real or
unreal.
Text: 297
यिद ता त्वकः; कथं तद्द्
ु े: सन्देहरूपता?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; kathaṁ tadbuddheḥ sandeharūpatā?
Translation: 297
If you say real, then how can that knowledge be called doubtful?
Text: 298
अथ अता त्वकः तदा अव्यिभचा रपदेन अपोिदतत्वाद् व्यवसायात्मकपदं न साधीयः।
atha atāttvikaḥ tadā avyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt vyavasāyātma-
kapadaṁ na sādhīyaḥ.
Translation: 298
If you say unreal, then this has already been excluded by the clause
“that which is erroneous” and therefore the presence of the clause
which is of nature of determinate cognition cannot be justified.
Text: 299
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदा उभयोस्ता त्वकत्वम्, अता त्वकत्वं वा,
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā ubhayostāttvikatvam, atāttvikatvaṁ vā,
Translation: 299
If you say, that what appears in the knowledge is of nature of both
real and unreal, then, either both are true, or both are false?
Text: 300
अथ एकस्य ता त्वकत्वम्, अन्यस्याता त्वकत्वम्? तद्िद उभयोस्ता त्वकत्वम्; तदा
तिद्ज्ञानस्य ता त्वकत्वमेव, न सन्देहात्मता।
atha ekasya tāttvikatvam, anyasyātāttvikatvam? tadyadi ubhayostā-
ttvikatvam; tadā tadvijñānasya tāttvikatvameva, na sandehātmatā.
Translation: 300
If you say if one is real, and other is unreal, there if both are true,
then the knowledge of both will be true and that knowledge cannot
be said to be of nature of doubt.
Text: 301
अथ उभावप्यता त्वकौ; तदा तिद्ज्ञानस्य िवपयर् यरूपता, न सन्देहात्मता।
atha ubhāvapyatāttvikau; tadā tadvijñānasya viparyayarūpatā, na
sandehātmatā.
Translation: 301
If you say both are unreal, then the knowledge of that will be of
knowledge of nature of contrary or nature of opposite, but not a
doubtful knowledge.
Text: 302
अथ एकस्य ता त्वकत्वमन्यस्याऽता त्वकत्वम्; तदा तदेव ज्ञानं व्यिभचा र तदेवाऽव्य-
िभचा र अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वाद् व्यिभचा र, ता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वादव्यिभचा र।
atha ekasya tāttvikatvamanyasyā’tāttvikatvam; tadā tadeva jñānaṁ
vyabhicāri tadevā’vyabhicāri atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpatvād vyabhicāri,
tāttvikārthagṛhītirūpatvādavyabhicāri.
Translation: 302
If you say one is real, and the other one is unreal, then that very
knowledge becomes erroneous and that very knowledge become
non-erroneous, since one reveals the unreal object, and therefore
is erroneous, and the other reveals the real object and therefore it
is not erroneous.
Text: 303
एतेन िद्चन्दर्ज्ञानमुद्ािटतम्। ततर् िह दर्व्याकारः पर्ितभाित न गुणाकारः।
etena dvicandrajñānamudghāṭitam. tatra hi dravyākāraḥ pratibhāti
na guṇākāraḥ.
Translation: 303
By the same argument, the knowledge of two moons is also
explained. In that knowledge what appears is a form of substance
and not of the form of quality.
Text: 304
अथ स न्दग्धाथार्कारपर्ितभा स सन्देहज्ञानिमित चेत्;
atha sandigdhārthākārapratibhāsi sandehajñānamiti cet;
Translation: 304
Clarification:
Well, the knowledge which reveals doubtful form of an object is
called a doubtful knowledge.
Text: 305
स स न्दग्धोऽथोर् िवद्ते वा न वा?
sa sandigdho’rtho vidyate vā na vā?
Translation: 305
Reply:
We would like to know, whether that doubtful knowledge exists or
not.
Text: 306
तद्िद िवद्ते; कथं तत्संवेदनस्य सन्देहरूपता अबा धताथर् गृहीितरूपत्वात् सत्योदक-
संवेदनवत्?
tadyadi vidyate; kathaṁ tatsaṁvedanasya sandeharūpatā abādhi-
tārthagṛhītirūpatvāt satyodakasaṁvedanavat?
Translation: 306
If that exists, then how can the knowledge of that would be form
of doubt, because, that knowledge, reveals an object which is not
contradicted like the perception of real water?
Text: 307
अथ न िवद्ते; तदाऽव्यिभचा रपदेन अपोिदतत्वाद् व्यवसायात्मकपदमपाथर् कम्।
atha na vidyate; tadā’vyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt vyavasāyātma-
kapadamapārthakam.
Translation: 307
If you say that it does not exist, then, by the clause “which is not
erroneous” itself that has been excluded, and therefore again, the
clause “which is of the nature of a determinate cognition” becomes
purposeless.
Text: 308
अ[थ न िकं]िचदिप पर्ितभाित; न तिहर् तस्य इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् ज[त्वम्], भर्ान्तोदक-
िवज्ञानवत्। तस्माद् व्यवसायात्मकपदमिप अनुपादेयम्।
a[tha na kiṁ]cidapi pratibhāti; na tarhi tasya indriyārthasanni-

karṣaja[tvam], bhrāntodakavijñānavat. tasmād vyavasāyātmaka-
padam api anupādeyam.
Translation: 308
If you say nothing appears in that knowledge, then that cannot be
treated as knowledge caused by contact of sense organ and object
as in the case of illusion of water. Therefore, the clause “which is of
the nature of a definite cognition” is also not required to be added
in the definition of perception.
[१०. अव्यपदेश्यपदस्यासाधुत्वे लक्षणसारगर्न्थस्योल्ेखः।]

[10. avyapadeśyapadasyāsādhutve lakṣaṇasāragranthasyollekhaḥ.]
Text: 309
अव्यपदेश्यपदञ् यथा न साधीयः तथा लक्षणसारे दर्ष्व्यम्।
avyapadeśyapadañca yathā na sādhīyaḥ tathā lakṣaṇasāre
draṣṭavyam.
Translation: 309
We have discussed (in detail) how the clause “that which is not
named or verbalized” is not justifiable in the definition of perception.
For that one should see the text Lakṣaṇasāra (composed by me).
[११. इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषोर्त्पन्पदस्य समीक्षा।]

[11. indriyārthasannikarṣotpannapadasya samīkṣā.]
Text: 310
तथा, इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वमिप नोपपद्ते तद्गत्यभावात्। इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषोर् िह
व्यविहताथार्नुपल ब्ध लङ्ो वा, आ[वरण लङ्ो वा], तदत्ु पािदतघटािदज्ञानावसेयो वा?
tathā, indriyārthasannikarṣajatvamapi nopapadyate tadgatyabhāvāt.
indriyārthasannikarṣo hi vyavahitārthānupalabdhiliṅgo vā, ā[vara-
ṇaliṅgo vā], tadutpāditaghaṭādijñānāvaseyo vā?
Translation: 310
Similarly, the clause “which is produced by the contact between the
sense organ and object” also is not justified, because, there is no way
by which it can be known. Is the contact between the sense organ
and object known on the basis of not arising of the knowledge of a

thing at a distance or is it known on the basis of the ground viz.
cover or ignorance or is it concluded on the basis of the knowledge
of pot etc. produced by that contact.
Text: 311
तद्िद व्यविहताथार्नुपल ब्ध लङ्ः; तदयुक्म्; तेन सह सम्बन्धाऽनुपपत्ेः, तदभावेप्य-
नुपलम्भसद्ावदशर् नात्। यदभावेऽिप यस्य सद्ावः स कथं तत्सद्ावावेदकः?
tadyadi vyavahitārthānupalabdhiliṅgaḥ; tadayuktam; tena saha
sambandhā’nupapatteḥ, tadabhāvepyanupalambhasadbhāvadarśanāt.
yadabhāve’pi yasya sadbhāvaḥ sa kathaṁ tatsadbhāvāvedakaḥ?
Translation: 311
If you say it is known on the basis of not arising of the knowledge of
a thing at a distance, it is not proper, because, there is no invariable
relationship with that, because, it is observed that even in the absence
of that the non-knowledge exist. If X can exist, even without Y, how
can Y be the producer of knowledge of existence of X.
Text: 312
अथ आवरण लङ्ः; तदयुक्म्; तेन सह सम्मितग(सङ्)तेरभावात्, तदभावेऽिप सद्ाव-
दशर् नात्, तद्ावे वा आवरणानथर् ज्य(क्य)म्। तदभावे तद्गितः कथम्?
atha āvaraṇaliṅgaḥ; tadayuktam; tena saha sammatiga(saṅga)tera-
bhāvāt, tadabhāve’pi sadbhāvadarśanāt, tadbhāve vā āvaraṇānartha-
jya(kya)m. tadabhāve tadgatiḥ katham?
Translation: 312
If you say it is known on the basis of the ground viz. cover or
ignorance, which also is not proper, because, this also does not have
a relationship with that contact. Since, even in the absence of that
it is observed to exist and if it exists the cover becomes meaningless
and if it does not exist, how can it be known?
Text: 313
अथ तद्वकुम्भािदज्ञानेन अवगम्यते; तदयुक्म्; तदनवगतौ तदद् ु वत्वस्यानवगतेः।
िपशाचपरमाणुमहेश्वरकल्पोऽसौ सिन्कषर् ः। कथं तदायत्ता वेद्ते ज्ञाने?
atha tadbhavakumbhādijñānena avagamyate; tadayuktam; tadana-

vagatau tadudbhavatvasyānavagateḥ. piśācaparamāṇumaheśvara-
kalpo’sau sannikarṣaḥ. kathaṁ tadāyattatā vedyate jñāne?
Translation: 313
If you say it is known by the knowledge which is produced by the
contact, it is again improper, because if it is not known, it cannot
also be known that the contact has produced the knowledge of pot.
That contact between sense organ and object is something like a
ghost or an atom or what you say God which is never known. How
can it be known that knowledge depends upon that?
Text: 314
कथं च तद् इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् मावेदयित ज्ञानम्-िकं िवज्ञानाकारतया, आहो कायार्-
कारतया, इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जन्याकारतया वा?
kathaṁ ca tad indriyārthasannikarṣamāvedayati jñānam-kiṁ vijñānā-
kāratayā, āho kāryākāratayā, indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākāratayā vā?
Translation: 314
We would like to ask: How does that knowledge cause the knowledge
between sense organ and object? Is it (i) As knowledge? (ii) As an
effect? (iii) As a form produced by the contact produced by sense
organ and object?
Text: 314
तद्िद ज्ञानस्वभावतया; तदयुक्म्; तदभावेऽिप ज्ञानाकारस्य सम्भव उपमानािदज्ञाने।
tadyadi jñānasvabhāvatayā; tadayuktam; tadabhāve’pi jñānākārasya
sambhava upamānādijñāne.
Translation: 314
If you say it causes the knowledge as nature of knowledge, it is not
proper, because, even without this there is possibility of a form of
knowledge as in the case of analogical knowledge.
Text: 315
अथ कायार्त्मतया गमयित तदप्ययुक्म्; उपमानानुमानज्ञान-मरीिचनीलजलादौ तस्य
सद्ावोपपत्ेः। यो येन िवना भवित स कथं तस्य ज्ञापको नाम? अन्यथा सत्वादेरिप
गमकत्वं स्यात्।
atha kāryātmatayā gamayati tadapyayuktam; upamānānumānajñā-

namarīcinīlajalādau tasya sadbhāvopapatteḥ. yo yena vinā bhavati sa
kathaṁ tasya jñāpako nāma? anyathā sattvāderapi gamakatvaṁ syāt.
Translation: 315
If you say it causes the knowledge in the form of an effect, it is also
not proper, because, in the case of analogical knowledge, inferential
knowledge, and the knowledge of water in the mirage, also effectness
is present. If X comes into being without Y how can Y be called
the producer of knowledge of X? Otherwise, mere existence can also
become the producer of knowledge.
Text: 316
अथ इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जन्याकारतया संशू(सू)चयतीित चेत्; असौ इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् -
जन्याकारः ज्ञानाकारादव्यित रक्ः व्यित रक्ो वा? यद्व्यित रक्ः; तदा ज्ञानात्मतामातर्ं,
नाऽऽकाराितरेकोऽन्योऽ स्त िवभाव्यमानोऽनुमानािदज्ञानेषु यथा। आकारान्तराितरेके वा
ज्ञानारूपता हर्ीयते।
atha indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākāratayā saṁśū(sū)cayatīti cet;
asau indriyārthasannikarṣajanyākāraḥ jñānākārādavyatiriktaḥ, vya-
tirikto vā? yadyavyatiriktaḥ; tadā jñānātmatāmātram, nā”kārāti-
reko’nyo’sti vibhāvyamāno’numānādijñāneṣu yathā. ākārāntarāti-
reke vā jñānārūpatā hrīyate.
Translation: 316
If you say that it causes the knowledge as a form produced by the
contact between the sense organ and object. We would like to know
whether that form produced between the contact between the sense
organ and object, is identical with the knowledge or different from
it. If it is identical, then it is mere knowledge. There is no different
form which we can imagine there as in the case of an inferential
cognition and the like and if we posit another form it will seize to
be knowledge.
Text: 317
अथ व्यित रक्ः; तस्यैव तिहर् गमकत्वं न ज्ञानाकारस्य। तस्याप्यगमकत्वं तदवेदनात्।
atha vyatiriktaḥ; tasyaiva tarhi gamakatvaṁ na jñānākārasya.
tasyāpyagamakatvaṁ tadavedanāt.
Translation: 317
If you say that the form produced by the contact between the sense
organ and object is different from knowledge, then that should
cause the knowledge and not the form of knowledge. Even that
cannot be called producer of knowledge, because it cannot cause
that knowledge.
Text: 318
िकञ्, तदत्ु पन्म् इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषार्द ् िवज्ञानं स्वरूपेणावगाहनीयम्, ततो व्यािप्स्मरणम्,
तदनु परामशर् ज्ञानम्, ततोऽनुमेयावगित रित। न च एतावन्तं कालं िवज्ञानं स्थितपदं
बध्नाित, आशुभािवत्वेन पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वात् ।
kiñca, tadutpannam indriyārthasannikarṣād vijñānaṁ svarūpeṇā-
vagāhanīyam, tato vyāptismaraṇam, tadanu parāmarśajñānam,
tato’numeyāvagatiriti. na ca etāvantaṁ kālaṁ vijñānaṁ sthitipadaṁ
badhnāti, āśubhāvitvena pratyastamitatvāt.
Translation: 318
Moreover, first of all, that knowledge produced from the contact
between the sense organ and object, should be known in its
own form. Then, there should be remembrance of invariable
concomitance. That will be followed by a confirmatory knowledge
and then the inferential knowledge of that contact can arise. The
initial knowledge however, cannot continue to exist for such a longer
duration, because, as the knowledge comes quickly, it goes quickly.
Text: 319
अथ बुद्ध्यारूढेन धमर् धिमर् न्यायेन प रकल्प्यते अनुमानम्;
atha buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharminyāyena parikalpyate anumānam;
Translation: 319
Clarification:
Well, we can postulate a mental process of inference, as we do on
the basis of the principle of locus and located.
Text: 320
तदा अवास्तवं पर्ाप्नोित सुगतानुमानवत्।
tadā avāstavaṁ prāpnoti sugatānumānavat.
Translation: 320
Reply:
Then the whole thing will become unreal like the inference of the
Buddhists.
[१२. इ न्दर्यजन्यत्वस्य पर्त्यक्षेऽसम्भवपर्कटनम्।]

[12. indriyajanyatvasya pratyakṣe’sambhavaprakaṭanam.]
Text: 321
तथा, इ न्दर्योत्पाद्त्वमिप नोपपद्ते, इ न्दर्योत्पाद्त्वाितरेकानवगतेः।
tathā, indriyotpādyatvamapi nopapadyate, indriyotpādyatvātirekā-
navagateḥ.
Translation: 321
In the same way, even this cannot be justified that perceptual
knowledge is produced by the sense-organ, because, we do not know
whether the perceptual knowledge is also produced by something
other than the sense-organ.
Text: 322
िवज्ञानं स्वभावतयैव वेद्ते, नाकारान्तरेण, तज्ज्ञप्ौ वा ज्ञानाकारिवरहपर्सङ्ः।
vijñānaṁ svabhāvatayaiva vedyate, nākārāntareṇa, tajjñaptau vā
jñānākāravirahaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 322
Knowledge is known by its own nature and not by any other form
and if it is known by any other form then it will result into loosing
the form of knowledge.
Text: 323
न च ज्ञानम् इ न्दर्यसम्बद्ं दृष्ं, येन तदपु लभ्यमानम् इ न्दर्यं गमयित।
na ca jñānam indriyasambaddhaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ, yena tadupalabhya-
mānam indriyaṁ gamayati.
Translation: 323
We have not come across any knowledge connected with the sense
organ, had it been so, it would have caused the knowledge of the
sense organ in the form of being known.
Text: 324
अथ िकर्या अन्यतर् करणसाध्या दृष्ा। सैव गिमकाऽस्तु यस्याः करणसम्बन्धोऽवगतः।
atha kriyā anyatra karaṇasādhyā dṛṣṭā. saiva gamikā’stu yasyāḥ
karaṇasambandho’vagataḥ.
Translation: 324
Objection:
Well, we do find action somewhere else i.e. in another locus produced
by an instrument, let that action be the causer of the knowledge
with which relationship of instrument is understood.
Text: 325
न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्य गमकत्वं िकिञ्त्साम्यादपु पद्ते। न जातु देवदत्नयननील-
सम्बन्धे सित यज्ञदत्े न्दर्यं घटािदकमथर् म् असित सम्बन्धे करणत्वसाम्यात् पर्काशयद् दृष्म्।
na cānyasya sambandhe anyasya gamakatvaṁ kiñcitsāmyādupapa-
dyate. na jātu devadattanayananīlasambandhe sati yajñadattend-
riyaṁ ghaṭādikamartham asati sambandhe karaṇatvasāmyāt prakā-
śayad dṛṣṭam.
Translation: 325
Reply:
It will not be proper to say that on the basis of some similarity,
X has the relationship and Y can cause the knowledge. No one
has seen that, if there is a relationship of something blue with the
eyes of Devadatta, then the sense organ of Yajñadatta causes the
perception of pot etc. even if there is no relationship simply on the
basis of similarity of an instrument.
Text: 326
ै पर्कारेण पयुर्दस्तो वेिदतव्यः।
तथा, अथर् जन्याकारोऽिप िवज्ञाने अनेनव
tathā, arthajanyākāro’pi vijñāne anenaiva prakāreṇa paryudasto
veditavyaḥ.
Translation: 326
In the same way, the argument of knowledge having a form produced
by the object, should be known as rejected on the basis of this very
logic.
[१३. अथर् स्यािप पर्त्यक्षजनकत्वखण्डनम्।]

[13. arthasyāpi pratyakṣajanakatvakhaṇḍanam.]
Text: 327
तथा, अथोर्ऽिप िवज्ञानमुत्पादयित-अनुपजाताऽितशयः, उपजाताितशयो वा, अव्यित-
रक्ोपजाताितशयो वा, व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयो वा?
tathā, artho’pi vijñānamutpādayati-anupajātā’tiśayaḥ, upajātāti-
śayo vā, avyatiriktopajātātiśayo vā, vyatiriktopajātātiśayo vā?
Translation: 327
Similarly, you say that object produces knowledge; there we would
like to ask, (i) whether the object produces knowledge without
any additional property produced in the object? Or (ii) whether
it produces knowledge with something extra property produced in
it?
Or (iii) does it produce knowledge with something additional
property produced in it and at the same time not being different
from it? Or (iv) does it produce cognition with some extra feature
produced in it which is different from it?
Text: 328
तद्ित अनुपजाताितशयः करोित; तदा सवर् दा कुयार्द ् न वा करणम् अकरणं वा नोपिव-
(प)द्ेत तत्स्वरूपानितवृत्ेः।
tadyati anupajātātiśayaḥ karoti; tadā sarvadā kuryād na vā karaṇam
akaraṇaṁ vā nopavi(pa)dyeta tatsvarūpānativṛtteḥ.
Translation: 328
If you say, it produces knowledge with something extra property
produced in it, then it should always produce knowledge or it cannot
be characterized either as an instrument or non-instrument because
its nature remains unaffected.
Text: 329
तथा, अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयोऽिप न करोित, अकारकाकारस्यानुगतेः। अननुगतौ वा न
तिहर् तदव्यित रक्ोऽितशयः।
tathā, avyatiriktopajātātiśayo’pi na karoti, akārakākārasyānugateḥ.
ananugatau vā na tarhi tadavyatirikto’tiśayaḥ.
Translation: 329
In the same way, it cannot produce knowledge with some additional
feature being born in it, which is not different from itself, because,
its form of not being a causal factor still continues. If you say it
does not continue, then, the additional feature is not different from
the object.
Text: 330
अथ व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन जन्यते तथािप नो[पपद्]ते, अकारकाकारानितवृत्ेः।
अितवृत्ौ वा आयातं क्षिणकत्वम्।
atha vyatiriktopajātātiśayena janyate tathāpi no[papadya]te, akāra-
kākārānativṛtteḥ. ativṛttau vā āyātaṁ kṣaṇikatvam.
Translation: 330
If you say that knowledge is produced by the object, which has
additional feature which is born at the same time which is different
from itself, even then, it is not justifiable, because, the form of not
being a causal factor has not ceased to exist and if you say that it has
over-extended the one cannot stop it from becoming momentary.
Text: 331
ततश्च ने न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जं िवज्ञानं पर्त्यक्षलक्षणम्।
tataśca nendriyārthasannikarṣajaṁ vijñānaṁ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam.
Translation: 331
From all this we conclude that a cognition which is produced by
the contact of the sense organ with the object, it cannot be called
the definition of a perceptual cognition.
0.3 मीमांसकसम्मतस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा।
[mīmāṁsakasammatasya pramāṇalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā.]
(Refutation of the definition of pramāṇa as accepted by the
Mīmāṁsakas)
Text: 332
अन्ये तु अन धगताथर् गन्तृत्वेन पर्माणलक्षणमिभदधित। ते त्वयुक्वािदनो दर्ष्व्याः।
anye tu anadhigatārthagantṛtvena pramāṇalakṣaṇamabhidadhati. te
tvayuktavādino draṣṭavyāḥ.
Translation: 332
Others (Mīmāṁsakas) say that the general definition of pramāṇa
is that knowledge which reveals an object, which was not known
before. They should be looked upon as such scholars, who do not
talk rationally.
Text: 333
कथमयुक्वािदता तेषािमित चेत्;
kathamayuktavāditā teṣāmiti cet;
Translation: 333
Objection:
How do you say that they do not talk logically?
Text: 334
उच्यते-िविभन्कारकोत्पािदतैकाथर् िवज्ञानानां यथाव्यव स्थतैकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वाऽिवशेषेऽिप
पूवोर्त्पन्िवज्ञानस्य पर्ामाण्यं नोत्रस्य इत्यतर् िनयामकं वक्व्यम्।
ucyate-vibhinnakārakotpāditaikārthavijñānānāṁ yathāvyavasthitai-
kārthagṛhītirūpatvā’viśeṣe’pi pūrvotpannavijñānasya prāmāṇyam
nottarasya ityatra niyāmakaṁ vaktavyam.
Translation: 334
Reply:
We say so due to the following: When, the knowledges of an object
produced by different causal factors do not show any difference,
in their form viz. being the revealer of that single object as it is,
they say that the knowledge that has arisen before, is authentic,
whereas the knowledge that has arisen later, is not. What should
be the deciding factor? They should spell out.
Text: 335
अथ यथाव्यव स्थताथर् गृहीितरूपत्वािवशेषेऽिप पूवोर्त्पन्िवज्ञानस्य पर्ामाण्यमुपपद्ते न
पर्थमोत्रिवज्ञानस्य;
atha yathāvyavasthitārthagṛhītirūpatvāviśeṣe’pi pūrvotpannavijñā-
nasya prāmāṇyamupapadyate na prathamottaravijñānasya;
Translation: 335
Clarification:
Well, when there is no difference in the form viz. being the revealer
of one and the same object, as it is and still it is proper to hold that
the knowledge that was produced before is alone dependable, and
not the knowledge that followed the first knowledge.
Text: 336
तदा अनेनव ै न्यायेन पर्थमस्याप्यपर्ामाण्यं पर्सक्ं गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वाऽिवशेषात्। यथा
एकनीलस्वलक्षणावभा सतयुगपदत्ु पन्ानेकनीलिवज्ञानानां नीलैकाथर् गृहीितरूपता न
िभद्ते, तथा पूवार्परोत्पन्िवज्ञानानामिप गृहीताथर् गृहीितरूपता न िनवत्स्यर् ित।
tadā anenaiva nyāyena prathamasyāpyaprāmāṇyaṁ prasaktaṁ
gṛhītārthagrāhitvā’viśeṣāt. yathā ekanīlasvalakṣaṇāvabhāsitayugapa-
dutpannānekanīlavijñānānāṁ nīlaikārthagṛhītirūpatā na bhidyate,
tathā pūrvāparotpannavijñānānāmapi gṛhītārthagṛhītirūpatā na
nivartsyati.
Translation: 336
Reply:
Then on the same logic the first logic should also be declared as
non-dependable, because, that is also not different from having the
nature of being the revealer of the object which was known. As the
knowledges of a blue thing simultaneously occurring at the time of
the knowledge which reveals one blue thing, do not show difference
of their form of being the revealer of the same one blue thing. In
the same way, the knowledges occurring the earlier knowledge will
not give up their form of being the revealer of something which was
known.
Text: 337
अथा(थ) िनयतिवषयत्वं पूवोर्त्रिवज्ञानयोः-पूवोर्त्पन्िवज्ञानम् अन धगताथार्कार-
स्वीकरणमुखेन उपादीयते, उत्रं तु अ धगताथार्कारिवषयमुपजायते।
athā(tha) niyataviṣayatvaṁ pūrvottaravijñānayoḥ-pūrvotpannavijñā-
nam anadhigatārthākārasvīkaraṇamukhena upādīyate, uttaraṁ tu
adhigatārthākāraviṣayamupajāyate.
Translation: 337
Clarification:
Let us accept that the one and the same object appears in the
earlier knowledge and also in the subsequent knowledge. In that
case, we accept the knowledge which was produced earlier, as having
the form which was not known before. Whereas, the subsequent
knowledge, reveals the form which was already known.
Text: 338
यिद गृहीताथर् िवषयत्वम्; कथं पर्ितिनयतिवषयत्वम्? अथ पर्ितिनयतिवषयत्वम्; कथं
गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वम्, िनयतिवषयत्वगृहीतगर्ािहत्वयोिवर् रोधात्?
yadi gṛhītārthaviṣayatvam; kathaṁ pratiniyataviṣayatvam? atha
pratiniyataviṣayatvam; kathaṁ gṛhītārthagrāhitvam, niyataviṣaya-
tvagṛhītagrāhitvayorvirodhāt?
Translation: 338
Reply:
Here, we would like to know if the knowledge is called knowledge in
which object is known, then how we can say that each knowledge
has the same object? And if each knowledge has the same object,
then how can the knowledge be called a revealer of an object which
was known? Because, there is a contradiction between the property
of being a specific object of knowledge and the property of being a
revealer of something which was already known.
Text: 339
यिद च िनयतिवषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरिप पर्ामाण्यम् अन धगताथर् गन्तृत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
yadi ca niyataviṣayatvam; tadā ubhayorapi prāmāṇyam anadhigatā-
rthagantṛtvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 339
If it is accepted that knowledges have specific object then both
the knowledges should be treated as authentic, because both
the knowledges share the characteristics of being the revealer of
something which is not known.
Text: 340
अथ एकिवषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरिप पर्ामाण्यमपर्ामाण्यं वा गृहीतगर्ािहत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
atha ekaviṣayatvam; tadā ubhayorapi prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṁ vā
gṛhītagrāhitvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 340
If you say both the knowledges are of one and the same object, then
both the knowledges should be either authentic or non-authentic,
because both share the characteristics of being the revealer of some

unknown object.
Text: 341
सोऽयं गडु पर्वेशािक्षतारकिविनगर् मन्यायोपिनपातः शर्ुितलालसानां दरु ु त्रः। नन्व धगत-
िवषयत्वे सत्यिप पर्ामाण्याभ्युपगमे स्मृतेरिप पर्ामाण्यमनुषज्यते, पर्माणफलता वा। कोऽतर्
िनवारियता?
so’yaṁ gaḍupraveśākṣitārakavinirgamanyāyopanipātaḥ śrutilālasā-
nāṁ duruttaraḥ. nanvadhigataviṣayatve satyapi prāmāṇyābhyupa-
game smṛterapi prāmāṇyamanuṣajyate, pramāṇaphalatā vā. ko’tra
nivārayitā?
Translation: 341
Objection:
Well, if knowledge reveals something which was already known and
in spite of that if it is treated as authentic, then even a remembrance
will have to be treated as authentic or it will have to be treated as a
result of a dependable knowledge. Who can prevent this unwanted
consequence?
Text: 342
स्मृित रहोपजायमाना-आद्ानुभवावेिदताथार्कारिवषया वा, अन्यिवषया वा, िनिवर् षया वा?
smṛtirihopajāyamānā-ādyānubhavāveditārthākāraviṣayā vā, anya-
viṣayā vā, nirviṣayā vā?
Translation: 342
Reply:
In that context, we would like to ask whether the remembrance
which is caused here, has the same form which was revealed by the
first experience or having different object or having no object?
Text: 343
तद्िद पूवोर्िदतानुभवावेिदताथार्कारिवषया; तथा तस्याः पर्माणफलता नैव िनवारियतुं
पायर् ते गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वािवशेषािदत्युक्म्।
tadyadi pūrvoditānubhavāveditārthākāraviṣayā; tathā tasyāḥ pramā-
ṇaphalatā naiva nivārayituṁ pāryate gṛhītārthagrāhitvāviśeṣādi-
tyuktam.
Translation: 343
There if you say that the remembrance has the same form, which
was revealed in the earlier experience, then that should be treated
as a result of the authentic knowledge and that cannot be avoided
because, the remembrance also shares the same property of being the
revealer of the object which was known. Therefore, it is not proper.
Text: 344
एवं च स्मृितसंज्ञकं सप्मं पर्माणं पर्सक्ं मीमांसकानाम्।
evañca smṛtisaṁjñakaṁ saptamaṁ pramāṇaṁ prasaktaṁ mīmā-
ṁsakānām.
Translation: 344
In that case, the Mīmāṁsakas should accept the seventh pramāṇa
called remembrance.
Text: 345
अथ पूवर्िवज्ञानानवधा रताथर् िवषया; यद्ेवं कथं तस्याः पर्माणफलत्वमपनेतुं पायर् ते?
आद्ानुभवस्यै(स्ये)व स्मृितरूपता च न पर्ाप्नोित। दृष्शर्ुताथर् िवषया िह स्मृितनार्गृहीता-
थर् िवषया।
atha pūrvavijñānānavadhāritārthaviṣayā; yadyevaṁ kathaṁ tasyāḥ
pramāṇaphalatvamapanetuṁ pāryate? ādyānubhavasyai(sye)va
smṛtirūpatā ca na prāpnoti. dṛṣṭaśrutārthaviṣayā hi smṛtirnāgṛhītā-
rthaviṣayā.
Translation: 345
If you say that the remembrance has its object which is not known
by the earlier knowledge, if you say so, how can its property of being
the result of a dependable knowledge are removed. One cannot say
that the first experience is of the form of a remembrance, because
remembrance is that in which either something seen appears as
its content or something heard appears as its content and never
something which is not known.
Text: 346
अथ िनिवर् षया इष्यते; तदा न गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन स्मृतेरपर्ामाण्यम् अिप तु केशोण्डु क-
संवेदनविन्िवर् षयत्वेन।
atha nirviṣayā iṣyate; tadā na gṛhītārthagrāhitvena smṛteraprā-

māṇyam api tu keśoṇḍukasaṁvedanavannirviṣayatvena.
Translation: 346
Now if you say that it is without content, in that case, the
remembrance cannot be declared as non-dependable on the ground
of its revealing something already known. But, only like a perception
of thread-like thing which one sees in the cognition when one returns
from the scorching sun in a shade.
Text: 347
अिप च, यिद िनिवर् षया; तदा गृहीताथर् गर्ािहणी कथम्?
api ca, yadi nirviṣayā; tadā gṛhītārthagrāhiṇī katham?
Translation: 347
Moreover, if you say that it is without content, then how can you
call it a revealer of something which was known?
Text: 348
गृहीताथर् गर्ािहणीित चेत्;
gṛhītārthagrāhiṇīti cet;
Translation: 348
Clarification:
By that we mean, revealer of that object which is known.
Text: 349
'िनिवर् षया' इित न वक्व्यम्। न च िनिवर् षया-`मातरं िपतरं शुशर्ूिषतवानहम्' `स न्त
मे पञ्भृत्याः' इित पूवार्नुभवावेिदताथार्कारपयर् वसाियन्यो िह स्मृतयः, स्मृितज्ञानेन
पूवार्नुभवावेिदताथार्कारस्य पर्ितभासनात्।
‘nirviṣayā’ iti na vaktavyam. na ca nirviṣayā- ‘mātaraṁ pitaraṁ
śuśrūṣitavānaham’ ‘santi me pañcabhṛtyāḥ’ iti pūrvānubhavāve-
ditārthākāraparyavasāyinyo hi smṛtayaḥ, smṛtijñānena pūrvānubha-
vāveditārthākārasya pratibhāsanāt.
Translation: 349
Reply:
In that case you should not say it is contentless. As a matter
of fact, remembrance cannot be without content. We do have
remembrances such as “I had served my father and mother.” “I
have five servants” which reflect the forms of the objects, which were
experienced before. Knowledge called remembrance always reflects,
the form of an object, which was experienced before.
Text: 350
अथ स्मृितिवज्ञानकाले पूवर्पर्बोधिवषयीकृताथर् स्य पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वान् तिद्षयत्वम्। एवं च
िनिवर् षयत्वेन स्मृतेरपर्ामाण्यं न गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन इत्युक्म्।
atha smṛtivijñānakāle pūrvaprabodhaviṣayīkṛtārthasya pratyasta-
mitatvānna tadviṣayatvam. evaṁ ca nirviṣayatvena smṛteraprāmā-
ṇyaṁ na gṛhītārthagrāhitvena ityuktam.
Translation: 350
If you say, at the time of the knowledge viz. remembrance the
object which was the content of the earlier knowledge is no more,
and therefore we say that, that is not the content of remembrance.
If it is so, then remembrance is not dependable not because it is
contentless, but not on the ground of its being the revealer of that
object which was known.
Text: 351
यिद च अवधा रताथर् िवषयं पर्माणमपर्माणमुपपाद्ते तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य अपर्ामाण्यमा-
पनीपद्ेत।
yadi ca avadhāritārthaviṣayaṁ pramāṇamapramāṇamupapādyate
tadā’numānajñānasya aprāmāṇyamāpanīpadyeta.
Translation: 351
If you say, a dependable knowledge which has a definite object as
its content is being presented as not dependable, then an inferential
knowledge also will not become dependable.
Text: 352
tadeva katham?
Translation: 352
How can it be so?
Text: 353
कथ्यते-यदेव अिवनाभावसम्बन्धगर्हणकालावधा रतमिग्त्वसामान्यं लङ्ाजहद्ृ त्त्वेन
पर्त्यक्षेण तदेव अनुमानादवगच्छित, आहो स्वत् पावकस्वरूपम्, मत्वथर् वा, लङ्व्यापार-
समानकालीनता(लीना) स्तत्वं वा, लङ्ोपसजर् नत्वं वा, अिग्व्यिक्पारतन्त्यं वा

अिग्त्वसामान्यस्य?
kathyate-yadeva avinābhāvasambandhagrahaṇakālāvadhāritamagni-
tvasāmānyaṁ liṅgājahadvṛttitvena pratyakṣeṇa tadeva anumānā-
davagacchati, āhosvit pāvakasvarūpam, matvarthaṁ vā, liṅgavyā-
pārasamānakālīnatā(līnā)stitvaṁ vā, liṅgopasarjanatvaṁ vā, agni-
vyaktipāratantryaṁ vā agnitvasāmānyasya?
Translation: 353
Here, is the answer. At the time of the knowledge of invariable
concomitance between smoke and fire, whatever was decided such as
the class of fire, the same is being known by inference, on the basis
of perception of the ground, viz. the smoke through the method
of inclusive relationship, is it this or mere the form of fire or the
meaning of the possessive suffix or the existence concurrent with
the function of the ground or what was indicated by the ground or
any dependency on a particular fire individual.
Text: 354
तद्िद पूवार्वधा रतसामान्यिवषयमभ्युपेयते; तदा पर्ामाण्यं नैव समासादयित गृहीताथर् -
गर्ािहत्वेन स्मृितवदेव। तदपर्ामाण्ये नािग्मत्वव्यवस्थोपप त्ः तदनुपपत्ौ वा अथार्पत्या
अिग्व्यिक्सं स्थितः। ततश्च 'अमुतर्ािग्ः' 'अिग्रानीयताम्' इित सकललोकव्यवहारिवरहः
tadyadi pūrvāvadhāritasāmānyaviṣayamabhyupeyate; tadā prāmā-
ṇyaṁ naiva samāsādayati gṛhītārthagrāhitvena smṛtivadeva.
tadaprāmāṇye nāgnimattvavyavasthopapattiḥ tadanupapattau vā
arthāpattyā agnivyaktisaṁsthitiḥ. tataśca ‘amutrāgniḥ’ ‘agnirānīya-
tām’ iti sakalalokavyavahāravirahaḥ syāt.
Translation: 354
If you accept that knowledge has having the universal which was
decided before, then it cannot be said to be authentic, because like
remembrance, it reveals something which was already known and if
that becomes unauthentic on the basis of that the subject cannot
be concluded as having fire and when that is not explained, there
will be existence of individual fire through another way of knowing
viz. arthāpatti and that will result into all human behaviors such
as “there is fire there” “please bring fire” etc.
Text: 355
अथ मा भूदेतद्व्यवहारहािन रित चेत् पूवार्वधा रतेप्यथेर् अनुमानस्या(स्य) पर्ामाण्य-
मभ्युपेयते;
atha mā bhūdetadvyavahārahāniriti cet pūrvāvadhāritepyarthe anu-
mānasyā(sya) prāmāṇyamabhyupeyate;
Translation: 355
Clarification:
Well, let us not lose such a behavior and we do accept the
authenticity of an inferential knowledge which reveals an object
Text: 356
तदा अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणमपाथर् कं शर्ोितर्याणािमित।
tadā anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇamapārthakaṁ śrotriyāṇāmiti.
Translation: 356
Reply:
In that case, the clause “that which reveals an object which was not
known before” becomes purposeless for the Mīmāṁsakas.
Text: 357
अथ पावकस्वरूपमनुिममीषे; तत् लङ्ाजहद्ृ त्त्वेन पूवर्मवधा रतं वा, न वा?
atha pāvakasvarūpamanumimīṣe; tat liṅgājahadvṛttitvena pūrvama-
vadhāritaṁ vā, na vā?
Translation: 357
If you say that you will infer the nature of fire by the inference there
the question will arise, will that fire be known before through the
relation of invariable concomitance with the ground viz. the smoke
or not?
Text: 358
यिद पूवोर्पलब्धम्; अ धगताथर् िवषयत्वमायातमनुमानस्य।
yadi pūrvopalabdham; adhigatārthaviṣayatvamāyātamanumānasya.
Translation: 358
If you say the known fire will be inferred, then obviously the content
of inferential cognition becomes something which is already known.
Text: 359
अथ न पूवोर्पलब्धम्; अव्यापकोऽिग्ः अनुमानात्िहर् पर्तीयते, तदभ्युपगमे तृणजलािद-
िवषयमप्यनुमानं पर्सज्यते।
atha na pūrvopalabdham; avyāpako’gniḥ anumānāttarhi pratīyate,
tadabhyupagame tṛṇajalādiviṣayamapyanumānaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 359
If you say that such fire that was known before will be inferred, it
will mean, in that case, that such fire is being inferred by inference
which is not the pervader of ground viz. the smoke and if that is
accepted then one can have inferential knowledge of grass, water
etc. from the knowledge of smoke (which is absurd).
Text: 360
अथ मत्वथोर्ऽनुमीयते स पूवार्वधा रतो वा, न वा?
atha matvartho’numīyate sa pūrvāvadhārito vā, na vā?
Translation: 360
If you say a qualified thing (the subject qualified by the thing to be
inferred) there again the question arises, whether that is known or not?
Text: 361
यद्वधा रत: कथम् अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणम् अनुमाने सम्भवित?
yadyavadhāritaḥ katham anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇam anumāne
sambhavati?
Translation: 361
If you say it is known, then how can the qualifying clause “which
reveals something which is not known before” will fit into the
inferential cognition?
Text: 362
अथ नैवावगतः; तदानीं जलतृणािदिवषयमप्यनुमानं पर्सज्येत इत्युक्म्।
atha naivāvagataḥ; tadānīṁ jalatṛṇādiviṣayamapyanumānaṁ prasa-
jyeta ityuktam.
Translation: 362
If you say it is not known, then we have already said that from
anything there will arise the cognition of water, grass etc. etc.
Text: 363
अथ लङ्व्यापारसमानकालीना स्तत्वम् अिग्सामान्यस्य अनुमीयते; तदनुमानव्यापार-
समानकालीना स्तत्वम् अिग्त्वसामान्याद् व्यित रक्म्, अव्यित रक्ं वा?
atha liṅgavyāpārasamānakālīnāstitvam agnisāmānyasya anumīyate;
tadanumānavyāpārasamānakālīnāstitvam agnitvasāmānyād vyati-
riktam, avyatiriktaṁ vā?
Translation: 363
If you say through inference, what is inferred is the existence of
fire universal occurring at the same time of the function of the
ground i.e. the smoke, there we may ask, whether the existence
of the universal of fire existing at the time of the function of the
ground is different from the universal of fireness or identical.
Text: 364
तद्िद अव्यित रक्म्; तदानीं पूवोर्पलब्धा स्तत्विवषयमेवानुमानम्, कथमन धगताथर् गन्तृ-
िवशेषणमपाथर् कं न भवेत्?
tadyadi avyatiriktam; tadānīṁ pūrvopalabdhāstitvaviṣayamevānumā-
nam, kathamanadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇamapārthakaṁ na bhavet?
Translation: 364
If you say it is identical, then it is the inferential knowledge of the
same object viz. the existence which was known before and in that
case, how are you going to say that the qualification “which reveals
the object which was not known before” is not meaningless?
Text: 365
अथ व्यित रक्म्; त त्कं पूवोर्पलब्धम्, अनुपलब्धं वा?
atha vyatiriktam; tatkiṁ pūrvopalabdham, anupalabdhaṁ vā?
Translation: 365
If you say it is different, there also the question will arise, whether
it was known before or not known at all.
Text: 366
यिद पूवोर्पलब्धम्; तिद्षयत्वेऽनुमानस्य नाऽन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणमुपपद्ते।
yadi pūrvopalabdham; tadviṣayatve’numānasya nā’nadhigatārtha-

gantṛviśeṣaṇamupapadyate.
Translation: 366
If you hold that, it is known before, then to that inferential
knowledge the qualification “which does not reveal the object which
is known before” will not fit in.
Text: 367
अथ नोपलब्धम्; तत्कथमनुमीयते जलािदकल्पं धूमेन?
atha nopalabdham; tatkathamanumīyate jalādikalpaṁ dhūmena?
Translation: 367
Again if you say it is not known at all, and then the question will
arise, how will you infer something like water on the basis of smoke?
Text: 368
अथ लङ्ोपसजर् नत्वमिग्त्वसामान्यस्य अनुमानात् पर्तीयते;
atha liṅgopasarjanatvamagnitvasāmānyasya anumānāt pratīyate;
Translation: 368
Clarification:
What is inferred by the process of inference is the dependence of
the universal of fireness on the ground viz. smoke.
Text: 369
तिल्ङ्ोपसजर् नत्वम् अिग्त्वसामान्याद् िभन्म्, अिभन्ं वा?
talliṅgopasarjanatvam agnitvasāmānyād bhinnam, abhinnaṁ vā?
Translation: 369
Reply:
Here also the question may be asked, whether that dependency on
the ground is different from the universal of fireness or identical?
Text: 370
यद्िभन्म्; पूवोर्पलब्धाऽिग्त्वसामान्यिवषयमेव अनुमानं कथं पर्ामाण्यभाग् भवित?
yadyabhinnam; pūrvopalabdhā’gnitvasāmānyaviṣayameva anumā-
naṁ kathaṁ prāmāṇyabhāg bhavati?
Translation: 370
If you say it is identical, then the inferential knowledge will have
the same content viz. the universal called fireness, which was known
before and in that case how such a cognition will be called authentic
according to you?
Text: 371
अथ िभन्म्; तद् अिवनाभािवसम्बन्धगर्हणकाले लङ्व्यापकत्वेन अवधा रतं वा,
atha bhinnam; tad avinābhāvisambandhagrahaṇakāle liṅgavyāpa-
katvena avadhāritaṁ vā,
Translation: 371
If however, if you say it is different, then at the time of knowledge
of invariable concomitance, whether it was known at pervader of
the ground or not?
Text: 372
न वा? यद्वधा रतम्; कथमन धगताथर् िवषयमनुमानम्?
na vā? yadyavadhāritam; kathamanadhigatārthaviṣayamanumānam?
Translation: 372
If you say it was known, then how can inferential knowledge of
something which was not known before?
Text: 373
अथ लङ्व्यापकत्वेना[न]वगतम्; तदा तिद्षयत्वेऽनुमानस्य प रकल्प्यमाने
ितर्भुवनावेदकत्वं धूमस्य िकन् प रकल्प्यते, सम्बन्धाभावाऽिवशेषात्?
atha liṅgavyāpakatvenā[na]vagatam; tadā tadviṣayatve’numānasya
parikalpyamāne tribhuvanāvedakatvaṁ dhūmasya kinna parikal-
pyate, sambandhābhāvā’viśeṣāt?
Translation: 373
Again if you say that, it was not known, as the pervader of the
ground, then if that is the object of inferential knowledge postulated
by you, then why don’t you postulate that the knowledge of any
probans will cause inferential knowledge of anything in the three
worlds (the heaven, the earth, and the pātāla) because there is
absence of the relationship of invariable concomitance common in
all such cases.
Text: 374
अथ अिग्व्यिक्पारतन्त्यमनुमीयते धूमेन अिग्त्वसामान्यस्य इित चेत्; तत्पारतन्त्यम्
अिग्त्वसामान्यस्य धूमव्यापकत्वेन अवधा रतं वा, न वा?
atha agnivyaktipāratantryamanumīyate dhūmena agnitvasāmānya-

sya iti cet; tatpāratantryam agnitvasāmānyasya dhūmavyāpaka-
tvena avadhāritaṁ vā, na vā?
Translation: 374
If you say that dependence of the fire individual is being inferred
on the basis of smoke of the universal called fireness, there also the
question can be asked, whether the dependency of the universal
called fireness, is already known as the pervader of the ground viz.
the smoke or not.
Text: 375
यद्वधा रतम्; पुनरिप गृहीतगर्ािहत्वं नाितवत्र्तेऽनुमानम्।
yadyavadhāritam; punarapi gṛhītagrāhitvaṁ nātivarttate’numānam.
Translation: 375
If you say it is already known, then again it cannot be avoided
that an inferential knowledge is the revealer of something already
known.
Text: 376
अथ नावधा रतं धूमव्यापकत्वेन पारतन्त्यम् अिग्सामान्यस्य इित चेत्; कथमनुमीयते
इत्युक्ं पुरस्तात्।
atha nāvadhāritaṁ dhūmavyāpakatvena pāratantryam agnisāmā-
nyasya iti cet; kathamanumīyate ityuktaṁ purastāt.
Translation: 376
If you say that the dependency of the universal viz. fireness is
not known as the pervader of smoke, then how can it cause the
knowledge of fire as it has already said above?
[१. गोत्वािदपर्ितपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादीनामपर्ामाण्योद्ाटनम्।]

[1. gotvādipratipādakatvena gośabdādīnāmaprāmāṇyodghāṭanam.]
Text: 377
एतेन पूवोर्पलब्धगोत्वािदपर्ितपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादेरपर्ामाण्यमुद्ािटतम्।
etena pūrvopalabdagotvādipratipādakatvena gośabdāderaprāmāṇya-
mudghāṭitam.
Translation: 377
Through this method of argumentation, it was shown that the word
cow is not authentic, because, it causes the knowledge of cowness
Text: 378
tadeva katham?
Translation: 378
Objection:
How is that possible?
Text: 379
कथ्यते-िकं सङ्े तगर्हणकालावगतगोत्वाथर् वाचकत्वं तद्व्यित रक्ाथर् वाचकत्वं वा
पर्ितपाद्ते गोशब्दस्य?
kathyate-kiṁ saṅketagrahaṇakālāvagatagotvārthavācakatvaṁ tad-
vyatiriktārthavācakatvaṁ vā pratipādyate gośabdasya?
Translation: 379
Reply: Let me explain. Do you say that the word cow expresses
cowness as its meaning which was already known at the time of
knowing the relation between the word cow and the meaning of
that word or do you say that the word cow expresses its meaning
other than that cowness?
Text: 380
तद्िद सङ्े तगर्हणकाला धकरणगोत्वस्वरूपावेदकत्वं जेगीयते गोशब्दस्य; तदा िविदता-
थार्कारावेदकत्वेन न मानत्वमासादयित गोशब्दः।
tadyadi saṅketagrahaṇakālādhikaraṇagotvasvarūpāvedakatvaṁ jegī-
yate gośabdasya; tadā viditārthākārāvedakatvena na mānatvamāsā-
dayati gośabdaḥ.
Translation: 380
If you say that you are narrating the fact that the word cow
expresses the nature of cowness existent at the time of the existence
of relation between the word cow and its meaning, then the word
‘go’ does not acquire authenticity, because, it expresses the form of
object which was already known.
Text: 381
अथ वेिदताथार्कारावेदकत्वेऽिप पर्ामाण्यमावहित; तदा अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणस्य िवषयो
वक्व्य:।
atha veditārthākārāvedakatve’pi prāmāṇyamāvahati; tadā anadhiga-
tārthagantṛviśeṣaṇasya viṣayo vaktavyaḥ.
Translation: 381
If you say that even if the word ’go’ causes the knowledge of the form
of object, which was already known, still it is authentic, then, you
should tell us what is that which is referred to by the qualification,
“which causes the knowledge of that, which was not known before”.
Text: 382
अथ तद्व्यित रक्ाथर् वाचकत्वम्; तदानीमसङ्े त(ित)त एवाथर् ः पर्तीयते गोशब्दात्, ततश्च
स्व सद्ान्तपर्तीितिवरोधो दिु नर् वारः।
atha tadvyatiriktārthavācakatvam; tadānīmasaṅketa(ti)ta evārthaḥ
pratīyate gośabdāt, tataśca svasiddhāntapratītivirodho durnivāraḥ.
Translation: 382
If you say that the word expresses its meaning, different from that,
then it amounts to saying that from the word cow one understands a
meaning, with which there is no relation of the word cow and in that
case you cannot avoid the contradiction with the understanding of
your own doctrine.
Text: 383
अथ गोत्वमेवाऽवगम्यते गोशब्देन इित चेत्; ततर्ािप पर्पिञ्तमेव अपर्ामाण्यकारण(णं)
गृहीतगर्ािहत्वम्। तदपर्ामाण्ये न गोत्वव्यव स्थितः। तदनव स्थतो नाथार्पत्या धकरण-
व्यव स्थितः।
atha gotvamevā’vagamyate gośabdena iti cet; tatrāpi prapañci-
tameva aprāmāṇyakāraṇa(ṇaṁ) gṛhītagrāhitvam. tadaprāmāṇye
na gotvavyavasthitiḥ. tadanavasthito nārthāpattyādhikaraṇavyava-
sthitiḥ.
Translation: 383
If you say that one understands cowness from the word cow, there
also we have already pointed out how the word cow becomes
inauthentic, because it will cause the knowledge of something
which is already known and if the word cow become inauthentic

the cowness cannot be established and once that cowness is not
established, the section of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā Darśana dealing with
arthāpatti (pre-supposition or implication) cannot be said to be
meaningful.
[२. अथार्पत्ेर धकरणव्यव स्थत्युपपादकत्वस्य िनषेधः।]
[2. arthāpatteradhikaraṇavyavasthityupapādakatvasya niṣedhaḥ.]
Text: 384
इतोऽिप नाथार्पत्य धकरणव्यव स्थितरुपपद्ते-िकम् अथार्पत्या पूवार्वधा रता धकरण-
पर्त्यायनं िकर्यते, आहो स्वत् अपूवार् धकरणपर्त्यायनम्?
ito’pi nārthāpattyadhikaraṇavyavasthitirupapadyate-kim arthāpa-
ttyā pūrvāvadhāritādhikaraṇapratyāyanaṁ kriyate, āhosvit apūrvā-
dhikaraṇapratyāyanam?
Translation: 384
Also, on the basis of the following ground, the section dealing with
the pre-supposition or implication cannot be settled: - Is it the case
that, by the process of arthāpatti one creates the understanding of
the section which is already known or it causes the knowledge of
the section which was not before?
Text: 385
तद्िद पूवार्वधा रता धकरणपयर् व सताऽथार्प त्ः; तदा पर्ितपािदताथर् पर्ितपादकत्वेन न
पर्माणम्।
tadyadi pūrvāvadhāritādhikaraṇaparyavasitā’rthāpattiḥ; tadā prati-
pāditārthapratipādakatvena na pramāṇam.
Translation: 385
If you say, that arthāpatti terminates in the section which was
known before, then it cannot be said to be authentic process,
because, it causes the knowledge of that which is already known.
Text: 386
अथ अदृष्िपण्डावेदकत्वम्; तदा गोत्वान्यथानुपपत्या गजवा जकल्पनािप कायार्।
atha adṛṣṭapiṇḍāvedakatvam; tadā gotvānyathānupapattyā gajavāji-
kalpanāpi kāryā.
Translation: 386
If you say, it causes the knowledge of the individual which was
not known before, then if cowness does not fit into that, one may
postulate horse or elephant also.
Text: 387
अथ पूवार्वधा रतस्य इदानीन्तनम स्तत्वम् अथार्पत्याऽवसीयते इित चेत्; तत्
इदानीन्तनम स्तत्वं पूवार्धा रताद् व्यित रक्म्, अव्यित रक्ं वा?
atha pūrvāvadhāritasya idānīntanamastitvam arthāpattyā’vasīyate
iti cet; tat idānīntanamastitvaṁ pūrvādhāritād vyatiriktam, avyati-
riktaṁ vā?
Translation: 387
If you say, the process called arthāpatti helps in concluding the
present existence of something which was known before, then
question may arise, whether the present existence is different from
the existence which was known before or identical?
Text: 388
तद्द्व्यित रक्म्; तदा पूवार्वधा रताथर् पर्ितपादकत्वेन कथमथार्पत्ेः पर्ामाण्यं वेदिवदो
वद न्त?
tadyadi avyatiriktam; tadā pūrvāvadhāritārthapratipādakatvena
katham arthāpatteḥ prāmāṇyaṁ vedavido vadanti?
Translation: 388
If you say, it is identical then how can the scholars of the Vedas
(Mīmāṁsakas) say that arthāpatti is an independent process of
knowing because, it causes the knowledge of something, which was
already known?
Text: 389
अथ अथार्न्तरम्; कथं गोत्वान्यथानुपपत्या पर्तीयते? तत्पर्तीत्यभ्युपगमे वा गजवा ज-
िवषयािप पर्ितप त्ः स्यात् इत्यसकृत् पर्ितपािदतम्। एवं च सित यदक्ु म्-
atha arthāntaram; kathaṁ gotvānyathānupapattyā pratīyate? tatpra-
tītyabhyupagame vā gajavājiviṣayāpi pratipattiḥ syāt ityasakṛt prati-
pāditam. evaṁ ca sati yaduktam-
Translation: 389
If you say, it is different then how is it known by the process of
implication without which the knowledge of cowness cannot be
explained and in spite of that you accept that knowledge, why not
there should be knowledge of horse, elephant etc. from the word
cow? We have repeatedly explained this before.
Text: 390
“इदानीन्तनम स्तत्वं निह पूवर् धया गतम्।” [श्लोकवा०४.२३४] इित तद् बालव ल्गतम्।
“idānīntanamastitvam nahi pūrvadhiyā gatam.” [ślokavā.4.234] iti
tad bālavalgitam.
Translation: 390
In the light of this, when we look at the following statement (of the
Ślokavārttika, sūtra 4, verse No. 234): “the present existence was
not known by the earlier knowledge” is nothing more than a child’s
quibbling.
[३. पर्त्यिभज्ञानपर्ामाण्यखण्डनस्य सूचनम्।]

[pratyabhijñānaprāmāṇyakhaṇḍanasya sūcanam.]
Text: 391
एतेन पर्त्यिभज्ञानस्यािप पर्ामाण्यं पर्त्युक्ं वेिदतव्यम्।
etena pratyabhijñānasyāpi prāmāṇyaṁ pratyuktaṁ veditavyam.
Translation: 391
By this very argument, the authenticity of “recollection” is to be
noted as rejected.
0.4 ताथागतसम्मतस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा।

[tāthāgatasammatasya pramāṇalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā.]
(Refutation of the definition of pramāṇa as accepted by the
Buddhists)
[१. अन धगताथार् धगन्तृत्वेित िवशेषणस्यापाथर् कत्वपर्दशर् नम्।]
[1. anadhigatārthādhigantṛtveti viśeṣaṇasyāpārthakatvapradarśanam.]
Text: 392
तथा, ताथागतानामिप अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणमपाथर् कम् अपोह्ज्ञानासम्भवात्।
tathā, tāthāgatānāmapi anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇamapārthakam
apohyajñānāsambhavāt.
Translation: 392
In the same way, the qualifying clause, “which reveals something
which is not known before” in the general definition of pramāṇa as
offered by the Buddhists, is also purposeless because it is impossible
to show something which can be excluded.
Text: 393
निह पूवार्परकालभािविन िवज्ञाने एकिवषये स्तः, न स्वलक्षणैकिवषये, न सामान्यैकिवषये,
स्वलक्षणस्य अिभन्ैकस्वभावस्य कर्मवृत्यनेकिवज्ञानजननशिक्व्यितरेकात्।
nahi pūrvāparakālabhāvini vijñāne ekaviṣaye staḥ, na svalakṣaṇaika-
viṣaye, na sāmānyaikaviṣaye, svalakṣaṇasya abhinnaikasvabhāvasya
kramavṛttyanekavijñānajananaśaktivyatirekāt.
Translation: 393
It is not the case that two cognitions arising in a sequence (the
later being caused by the former) have one and the same object,
as their content. It is also not the case that both the knowledges
have only svalakṣaṇa (a particular free from all characterizations)
as their content.
Nor is it the case, that both the knowledges have sāmānyalakṣaṇa
(a series of particulars) as their content, because, a svalakṣaṇa does
not have the capacity to generate many cognitions in a sequence,
being totally identical in nature.
Text: 394
अथ युगपदेकिवषयोत्पन्ाऽनेकिवज्ञानापनोदाथर् म्;
atha yugapadekaviṣayotpannā’nekavijñānāpanodārtham;
Translation: 394
Clarification:
We are saying so, in order to exclude the possibility of arising of
many cognitions simultaneously, caused by one and the same object.
Text: 395
तदप्ययुक्म्; एकिवषयोत्पन्ानेकपुरुषसंवेदनस्य अपर्ामाण्यमापनीपद्ेत।
tadapyayuktam; eka-viṣayotpannānekapuruṣasaṁvedanasya aprā-
māṇyamāpanīpadyeta.
Translation: 395
Reply:
This is also not proper, because, this position will lead to
inauthenticity of experiences of many people, caused by one and
the same object.
Text: 396
अथ सामान्यैकिवषयानेकिवज्ञानापनोदाथर् िवशेषणमुपादीयते; तदप्ययुक्म्; न सामान्ये
एकं िवज्ञानम स्त, नाप्यनेकं िवज्ञानं तस्य स्वयमसम्भवात्।
atha sāmānyaikaviṣayānekavijñānāpanodārthaṁ viśeṣaṇamupādī-
yate; tadapyayuktam; na sāmānye ekaṁ vijñānamasti, nāpyane-
kaṁ vijñānaṁ tasya svayamasambhavāt.
Translation: 396
If you say that the qualifying clause “which causes the knowledge of
that which is not known before” is added in the definition in order
to exclude the possibility of many knowledges in which the sāmānya
alone is the content. This is also improper, because, in your series
of particulars, it is not the case that there is only one knowledge.
Nor it is the case that there are many knowledges because by itself
it is impossible.
Text: 397
तदाकारिवरहे 'सामान्यिवषयं िवज्ञानम्' इित पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थाहेतुवर्क्व्यः।
tadākāravirahe ‘sāmānyaviṣayaṁ vijñānam’ iti pratikarmavyavas-
thāheturvaktavyaḥ.
Translation: 397
If there is no form, in that then when we say this knowledge in
“which series of particulars is the content” you should point out
how to establish one-is-to-one relationship.
Text: 398
तदाकारे वा सामान्यस्य सदात्मता, अता त्वकाकारातादात्म्ये वा ज्ञानाता त्वकत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadākāre vā sāmānyasya sadātmatā, atāttvikākārātādātmye vā jñā-
nātāttvikatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 398
If you say there is a form, then the series of particulars (which is
unreal according to you) will become real or if you say that there is
identity with the false form then it will make the knowledge itself
as unreal.
Text: 399
िकञ्, एकिवषये पर्वत्र्मानयोः एकस्याऽपर्ामाण्यम्, पर्माणान्तरत्वाभावो वा?
kiñca, ekaviṣaye pravarttamānayoḥ ekasyā’prāmāṇyam, pramāṇā-
ntaratvābhāvo vā?
Translation: 399
Moreover, out of the two knowledges referring to one object, one is
not authentic or do you want to say, that it cannot be the object of
another knowledge.
Text: 400
तद्िद अपर्ामाण्यम्; तदयुक्म्; अिविशष्ैकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वे उभयो: पर्ामाण्यमपर्ामाण्यं वा
िवकल्पानुपपत्ेः, िवकल्पे बाधकिवषयोत्पन्ाऽनेकपुरुषिवज्ञानभेदपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi aprāmāṇyam; tadayuktam; aviśiṣṭaikārthagṛhītirūpatve
ubhayoḥ prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṁ vā vikalpānupapatteḥ, vikalpe
bādhakaviṣayotpannā’nekapuruṣavijñānabhedaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 400
If you say it is not authentic, it is not proper, because, if both
have revealed one and the same object and not distinct ones, then
either both are authentic or both are false. There is no other
alternative and if you say that there is alternative, there will arise
the contingency of distinguishing knowledges of different persons
caused by contradictory objects.
Text: 401
अथाऽपर्माणान्तरत्वं; तदप्यनुपपन्म्; िकमेकिवषयोत्पािदतानेकपर्त्यक्षािदज्ञानानां व्यिक्-
नानात्वं नोपपद्ते, आहो आकारनानात्वम्?
athā’pramāṇāntaratvam; tadapyanupapannam; kimekaviṣayotpādi-
tānekapratyakṣādijñānānāṁ vyaktinānātvaṁ nopapadyate, āho ākā-
ranānātvam?
Translation: 401
If you say it will be a different knowledge that also is not proper.
There the question arises, is it the fact that the knowledges such
as perception, caused by one object, cannot be treated as different
knowledges or one will have to treat plurality of forms in those
knowledges?
Text: 402
तद्िद व्यिक्नानात्वं न जाघटीित; तदसत्; एकनीलोत्पािदतानेकनीलालोकिवज्ञानानां
व्यिक्नानात्वदशर् नात्।
tadyadi vyaktinānātvaṁ na jāghaṭīti; tadasat; ekanīlotpāditāne-
kanīlālokavijñānānāṁ vyaktinānātvadarśanāt.
Translation: 402
If you say the plurality of knowledges is not possible, it is not true,
because it is our experience that many knowledges of light of blue
thing produced by one blue thing are many in number.
Text: 403
अथ अनेकाकारता नोपपद्ते; तदयुक्म्; नीलालोकिवज्ञानानाम् अनेकाकारकत्वदशर् नात्।
athānekākāratā nopapadyate; tadayuktam; nīlālokavijñānānām
anekākārakatvadarśanāt.
Translation: 403
If you say, multiformedness of knowledges is not justifiable, that also
is not proper, because we do find many forms in the knowledges of
light of a blue thing.
Text: 404
न च तदत्ु पादको नीलपर्पञ्ो स्त, एकात्मतया स्वयमनुपगमात्।
na ca tadutpādako nīlaprapañcaḥ asti, ekātmatayā svayamanupagamāt.
Translation: 404
There are not many blue things which would have produced those
knowledges because, blue thing being one cannot be said to be
present consecutively in all knowledges.
Text: 405
अथ एकिवषयत्वे पर्त्यक्षानुमानव्यपदेशानुपप त्;
atha ekaviṣayatve pratyakṣānumānavyapadeśānupapatti;
Translation: 405
Objection:
Well, if the object is only one, how can we refer to the knowledges
of the object as perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge etc.?
Text: 406
तदेतदयुक्म्; िभन्कारणकायर् त्वेन व्यपदेश्योप(देशोप)पत्ेः। यथा एकनीलोत्पन्ानेकदेव-
दत्ज्ञानानां िभन्कारणकायर् त्वेन [देवदत्िवज्ञानानां] िभन्कत्ृर्कायर् त्वेन देवदत्ािदज्ञान-
व्यपदेशः तथेहािप।
tadetadayuktam; bhinnakāraṇakāryatvena vyapadeśyopa(deśopa)-
patteḥ. yathā ekanīlotpannānekadevadattajñānānāṁ bhinnakāraṇa-
kāryatvena [devadattavijñānānāṁ] bhinnakarttṛkāryatvena devada-
ttādijñānavyapadeśaḥ tathehāpi.
Translation: 406
Reply:
This is not correct, because it is possible to justify the reference of
knowledges of one object, by different names on the basis of different
sets of cause-and-effect relationship as knowledges produced by one
blue thing to many persons called Devadatta are referred to as
knowledges of Devadatta, on the basis of effects being produced by
different agents, in terms of different cause-and-effect relationships,
in the same way here also, references to different knowledges of the
object can be made.
[२.अिवसंवािदज्ञानिमत्यस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्यािप िनरासः।]
[2.avisaṁvādijñānamityasya pramāṇalakṣaṇasyāpi nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 407
अन्ये तु "अिवसंवािद ज्ञानम्” [पर्माणवा० २.१] पर्माणमिभदधित।
anye tu “avisaṁvādi jñānam” [pramāṇavā.2.1] pramāṇamabhidadhati.
Translation: 407
Other (Dharmakīrti etc.) however say that knowledge which
corroborates its content is called pramāṇa.
Text: 408
कोऽयमिवसंवादाथर् ः - िकं यथाव्यव स्थताथर् गृहीितत्वम्, बाधारिहतत्वं वा पर्तीयमानाथर् -
जन्यता वा, पर्तीयमानाथर् पर्ित पर्वत्र्कत्वं वा, अथर् पर्ापकत्वं वा?
ko’yamavisaṁvādārthaḥ - kiṁ yathāvyavasthitārthagṛhītitvam,

bādhā- rahitatvaṁ vā pratīyamānārthajanyatā vā,
pratīyamānārthaṁ prati pravarttakatvaṁ vā, arthaprāpakatvaṁ vā?
Translation: 408
Here we would like to raise the following questions with regard to
the meaning of the term “which corroborates”. (i) Does it mean
revealing the object as it is? (ii) Or does it mean being devoid of
contradiction? (iii) Or does it mean the state of being produced by
the object which appears in the knowledge? (iv) Or does it mean
the state of inducing the knower towards the object which has been
known? (v) Or does it mean the state of causing the knower to get
the object which was shown by the knowledge?
Text: 409
तद्िद यथाव्यव स्थताथर् गृहीितत्वम्; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानं(ने) नोपपद्ते।
tadyadi yathāvyavasthitārthagṛhītitvam; tadā’numānajñānaṁ(ne)
nopapadyate.
Translation: 409
If you say does it mean revealing the object as it is? Then, it is not
possible in the inferential knowledge.
Text: 410
अथ बाधारिहतत्वम्; तदप्यनुमानज्ञाने नोपपद्ते।
atha bādhārahitatvam; tadapyanumānajñāne nopapadyate.
Translation: 410
If you say does it mean being devoid of contradiction? That also is
not possible in the inferential knowledge.
Text: 411
अथ पर्तीयमानाथोर्त्पाद्त्वम्; तदप्यनुमानज्ञानस्य नोपपद्ते, सामान्याकारस्य जनकत्व-
व्यावृत्ेः। तथा, रागािदसंवेदनस्याप्यवभाताथोर्त्पाद्त्वं नोपपद्ते, स्वात्मोत्पादने
सामथ्यर् व्यितरेकात्। तथा, योिगपर्त्यक्षस्य च पर्तीयमानाथर् जन्यता न सम्भवित
व्यतीताऽनागतयोरजनकत्वात्, जनकत्वे वा अतीताऽनागतता हीयते।
atha pratīyamānārthotpādyatvam; tadapyanumānajñānasya nopa-
padyate, sāmānyākārasya janakatvavyāvṛtteḥ. tathā, rāgādisaṁve-
danasyāpyavabhātārthotpādyatvaṁ nopapadyate, svātmotpādane

sāmarthyavyatirekāt. tathā, yogipratyakṣasya ca pratīyamānārtha-
janyatā na sambhavati vyatītā’nāgatayorajanakatvāt, janakatve vā
atītā’nāgatatā hīyate.
Translation: 411
If you say, does it mean the state of being produced by the object
which appears in the knowledge? Then this also is not possible
in the case of inferential knowledge, because, a universal form is
excluded from the producer, in the same way it is not possible to
explain how the knowledge of attachment etc. is not produced by
the object which appeared in the knowledge, because, they do not
have the capacity to produce itself. In the same way, the perception
of a yogin is not produced by the object which appeared in the
knowledge, because, a past object and a future object cannot be
the producer of knowledge and if you consider them as producer of
knowledge, then those objects cannot be called as past and future
objects.
Text: 412
अथ पर्तीयमानाथर् पर्ित पर्वतर् कत्वमिवसंवादाथर् :; तद् िवपयर् यज्ञानस्यािप पर्वत्र्कत्वं
िवद्ते। िवपरीतोत्पन्ोदकबुिद्ः पर्वत्र्ते, न च तस्य अिवसंवादोऽ स्त। सत्योदकज्ञानेऽिप
जाते न पर्वत्र्ते केनािप हेतुना, तदिप िवसंवािद स्यात्।
atha pratīyamānārthaṁ prati pravartakatvamavisaṁvādārthaḥ; tad
viparyayajñānasyāpi pravarttakatvaṁ vidyate. viparītotpannodaka-
buddhiḥ pravarttate, na ca tasya avisaṁvādo’sti. satyodakajñāne’pi
jāte na pravarttate kenāpi hetunā, tadapi visaṁvādi syāt.
Translation: 412
If you say, does it mean the state of inducing the knower towards
the object which has been known? Then as a matter of fact, a
false knowledge also produces inducement. A person who got the
false knowledge of water does take up activity of going forward at
that time his knowledge cannot be called false and sometimes even
if there is knowledge of true water, still he doesn’t take activity
of going forward because of some reason. But according to your

definition of pramāṇa, even this knowledge will become false.
Text: 413
अथ अथर् पर्ापकत्विवसंवादः, ततर् िकम्-अथर् मातर्पर्ापकत्वम्, आहो अवभाताथर् पर्ापकत्वम्,
तज्जातीयोदकपर्पाकत्वं वा, स्वोत्पादकऽथर् पर्ापकत्वं वा, अथ स्वोत्पादककारकाणां
धर्ुवभािवत्वमिवसंवादः?
atha arthaprāpakatvavisaṁvādaḥ, tatra kim-arthamātraprāpaka-
tvam, āho avabhātārthaprāpakatvam, tajjātīyodakaprapākatvaṁ vā,
svotpādaka’rthaprāpakatvaṁ vā, atha svotpādakakārakāṇāṁ dhruva-
bhāvitvamavisaṁvādaḥ?
Translation: 413
If you say, does it mean the state of causing the knower to get
the object which was shown by the knowledge? There we would
like to ask, does it mean the state of causing the obtainment of
mere object? Or does it mean the state of causing the obtainment
of object which appeared in the knowledge? Or does it mean the
state of causing the obtainment of water belonging to that class?
Or does it mean the state of causing the obtainment of object which
causes the knowledge? Or does the corroboration mean occurrence
of definite number of causal factors which produce the knowledge?
Text: 414
यिद अथर् मातर्पर्ापकत्वम्; केशोण्डु केन्दद्ु यसंवेदनस्यािप अिवसंवािदत्वम् आपद्ते।
yadi arthamātraprāpakatvam; keśoṇḍukendudvayasaṁvedanasyāpi
avisaṁvāditvam āpadyate.
Translation: 414
If you say, does it mean revealing the object as it is? Then, the
knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a
person who comes into the shade from the sun, and the knowledge
of two moons, should also be called two cognitions.
Text: 415
अथ अवभाताथर् पर्ापकत्वम्; तदा अनुमानज्ञानस्य अिवसंवािदत्वं न लभ्यते अवभाता-
थार्ऽपर्ापकत्वात्। अनुमानज्ञाने िह सामान्याकारोऽवभाित, न चासौ पर्ाप्यते स्वयमसत्वात्।
तथा, योिगज्ञानस्य अतीतानागताथेर् समुत्पन्स्य अथर् पर्ापकत्वं न िवद्ते।
atha avabhātārthaprāpakatvam; tadā anumānajñānasya avisaṁvādi-

tvaṁ na labhyate avabhātārthā’prāpakatvāt. anumānajñāne hi sāmā-
nyākāro’vabhāti, na cāsau prāpyate svayamasattvāt. tathā, yogijñā-
nasya atītānāgatārthe samutpannasya arthaprāpakatvaṁ na vidyate.
Translation: 415
If you say, does it mean being devoid of contradiction? Then even
the inferential knowledge, cannot be said to be a valid knowledge,
because, it does not cause the obtainment of object, which appeared
in the knowledge, because in the inferential knowledge, what
appears is the universal form and that is never obtained because
it itself has no existence. In the same way, the knowledge of past
and future objects of a yogin cannot be said to be causing the
obtainment of its object.
Text: 416
तथा, रागािदसंवेदनेऽिप जाते न अवभातरागािदपर्ािप्र स्त। तथा, पर्त्यक्षेऽिप िवज्ञाने
नाऽवभाताथर् पर्ािप्र स्त, क्षिणकत्वेन अस्तिमतत्वात्।
tathā, rāgādisaṁvedane’pi jāte na avabhātarāgādiprāptirasti. tathā,
pratyakṣe’pi vijñāne nā’vabhātārthaprāptirasti, kṣaṇikatvena āsta-
mitatvāt.
Translation: 416
Likewise, even after the awareness of attachment, there is no
obtainment of attachment which appeared in the knowledge. In the
same way, even in a perceptual cognition, there is no obtainment of
object which appeared in the cognition, because, that object being
momentary, is no more present in the next moment.
Text: 417
अथ तज्जातीयोदकपर्ापकत्वेन अिवसंवािदत्वमुच्यते; तदयुक्म्; उदकत्वजातेरभावात्।
atha tajjātīyodakaprāpakatvena avisaṁvāditvamucyate; tadayuktam;
udakatvajāterabhāvāt.
Translation: 417
If you say that knowledge is called corroborative, because it causes
the obtainment of water belonging to the same class, it is not proper,
because there is nothing called a generic property called waterness.
Text: 418
अथ अनुदकत्वव्यावृ त्जार्ित रत्युच्यते;
atha anudakatvavyāvṛttirjātirityucyate;
Translation: 418
Clarification:
Well, the generic property viz. waterness according to us is the
exclusion of that which is not water.
Text: 419
सा उदकव्यिक्भ्योऽव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
sā udakavyaktibhyo’vyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 419
Reply:
There we may raise the following questions: Is that universal
or generic property identical with the water individual? Or is it
different from that?
Text: 420
यद्व्यित रक्ा; तदा व्यिक्रेव न जाितः।
yadyavyatiriktā; tadā vyaktireva na jātiḥ.
Translation: 420
If you say that it is identical, then there is only individual and there
is no universal or generic property.
Text: 421
अथ व्यित रक्ा; सा वस्तुभूता, अवस्तुभूता वा?
atha vyatiriktā; sā vastubhūtā, avastubhūtā vā?
Translation: 421
If you say that it is different, then the question arises, whether it is
real or unreal?
Text: 422
यिद वस्तुभूता; अभ्युपेतहािनः।
yadi vastubhūtā; abhyupetahāniḥ.
Translation: 422
If you say it is real, then it goes against the accepted position of
your doctrine.
Text: 422
अथ अवस्तुभूता; तद्गितः कथम्?
atha avastubhūtā; tadgatiḥ katham?
Translation: 422
If you say it is not unreal, then how do you know it?
Text: 423
न च उदकव्यक् नां नानात्वमुपपद्ते। यथा च नोपपद्ते तथा िनवेिदतं नैयाियकपर्त्यक्ष-
लक्षणा धकारे।
na ca udakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvamupapadyate. yathā ca nopapadyate
tathā niveditaṁ naiyāyikapratyakṣalakṣaṇādhikāre.
Translation: 423
It cannot be justified that water individuals are many in number.
We have already demonstrated in the section discussing the
definition of perception as proposed by the Naiyāyikas how the
plurality of water individuals is not possible.
Text: 424
अथ स्वोत्पादकाथर् पर्ापकत्वमिवसंवादकत्वम्; तदयुक्म्; नयनालोकमनस्कारादेः
पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वात्।
atha svotpādakārthaprāpakatvamavisaṁvādakatvam; tadayuktam;
nayanālokamanaskārādeḥ pratyastamitatvāt.
Translation: 424
If you say, a true cognition is that which causes the obtainment of
an object which is produced by that object, it will not be correct,
because the factors like eyes, light, mind etc. are no longer there (in
function).
Text: 425
अथ स्वोत्पादककारकाणां धर्ुवभािवत्वम् अिवसंवादस्तदभावे तदभावपर्सङ्ात्; यद्ेवं
केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप धर्ुवभािवकारणािवसंवादोऽ स्त, अन्यथा आक स्मकत्वपर्सङ्ात्।
atha svotpādakakārakāṇāṁ dhruvabhāvitvam avisaṁvādastadabhāve

tadabhāvaprasaṅgāt; yadyevaṁ keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi dhruva-
bhāvikāraṇāvisaṁvādo’sti, anyathā ākasmikatvaprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 425
If you say, that the correctness of a cognition is nothing but the
causal factors which produce the cognition being constant, because
otherwise in the absence of that there will absence of the cognition.
If you say so then, the factors which produce the knowledge of
thread-like things which a person sees when he comes from the
Sun, are also constant and therefore such a knowledge will also
be called veridical, otherwise, such a cognition will be treated as
without cause.
Text: 426
एवं चाव्यव स्थते यदक्
ु म्- “न ह्ाभ्यामथर् प र च्छद् पर्वत्र्मानोऽथर् िकर्यायां िवसंवाद्ते”
इित तद्ालिवल सतम्।
evaṁ cāvyavasthite yaduktam - “na hyābhyāmarthaṁ paricchidya
pravarttamāno’rthakriyāyāṁ visaṁvādyate” iti tadbālavilasitam.
Translation: 426
When the fact is like this, your statement viz. “after determining the
object by these two when a person takes up an action to obtain it
his behaviour is frustrated” is nothing but fanciful ideas of children.
३. सौगतसम्मताया मानमेयसंख्याया िनरसनम्।
[3. saugatasammatāyā mānameyasaṁkhyāyā nirasanam.]
Text: 427
तथा, मानमेयसंख्यािप सौगतमते नोपपद्ते।
tathā, mānameyasaṁkhyāpi saugatamate nopapadyate.
Translation: 427
In the same way, the number of pramāṇas (processes of knowing)
and prameya (objects of knowing knowledge) as accepted by the
Buddhists cannot be justified.
Text: 428
तदेव कथम्? कथ्यते-द्े एव पर्माणे न मानान्तरम स्त। त द्द्त्वं िकं व्यिक्भेदेन,
आकारभेदेन, िवषयभेदेन वा?
tadeva katham? kathyate-dve eva pramāṇe na mānāntaramasti.

taddvitvaṁ kiṁ vyaktibhedena, ākārabhedena, viṣayabhedena vā?
Translation: 428
How is that? The following is the answer:
They say there are only two types of pramāṇa and there is no other
type. There we would like to ask, you say there are two, does it
mean there are two different individuals or there are two because
their forms are different or they are two because their objects are
different?
Text: 429
यिद व्यिक्भेदेन; तदा अप रसंख्येयत्वं ज्ञानव्यक् नामानन्त्याद् - िद्त्वानुपप त्ः।
yadi vyaktibhedena; tadā aparisaṁkhyeyatvaṁ jñānavyaktīnāmāna-
ntyād - dvitvānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 429
If you say, there are two different individuals, then they should
be innumerable in number, because there are infinite number of
knowledge individuals and therefore you cannot maintain that they
are only two.
Text: 430
न च ज्ञानानां भेदोऽ स्त;
na ca jñānānāṁ bhedo’sti;
Translation: 430
Clarification:
There is no difference amongst knowledges.
Text: 431
अज्ञानािद्(िद्)ज्ञानं ज्ञानात्मतया िभद्ते, ज्ञानान्तरात्ु कथं िनवतर् ते-िकं ज्ञानात्मतया
आकारान्तरेण वा? यिद ज्ञानाकारतया िभद्ते; तदान्येषामज्ञानात्मकत्वपर्सङ्ः,
रसादे रव।
ajñānādvi(ddhi)jñānaṁ jñānātmatayā bhidyate, jñānāntarāttu
kathaṁ nivartate-kiṁ jñānātmatayā ākārāntareṇa vā? yadi
jñānākāratayā bhidyate; tadā anyeṣām ajñānātmakatvaprasaṅgaḥ,
rasāderiva.
Translation: 431
Reply:
Knowledge is distinguished from non-knowledge as knowledge but
how one knowledge can be distinguished from another knowledge?
Is it distinguished as knowledge or as some other form?
Text: 432
अथ आकारान्तरेण व्यावत्र्ते; तदा अज्ञानात्मता तस्य उत्पद्ते, रसादे रव।
atha ākārāntareṇa vyāvarttate; tadā ajñānātmatā tasya utpadyate,
rasāderiva.
Translation: 432
If you say it is distinguished by another form of knowledge, then
knowledges will become non-knowledge, like taste etc.
Text: 433
अथ आकारभेदे ज्ञानयोभेर्दः; सोऽप्यनुपपन् एव;
atha ākārabhede jñānayorbhedaḥ; so’pyanupapanna eva;
Translation: 433
If you say the two knowledges become different, because they have
two different forms, it is also not justifiable.
Text: 434
ज्ञानाकारव्यितरेकेण पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोनार्कारान्तरम स्त। तदपु गमे वा ज्ञानाकारिवरहः
स्यात्। न च आकारसमूहात्मकं ज्ञानम्, तस्यािभन्ात्मकत्वात्।
jñānākāravyatirekeṇa pratyakṣānumānayornākārāntaramasti. tadu-
pagame vā jñānākāravirahaḥ syāt. na ca ākārasamūhātmakaṁ
jñānam, tasyābhinnātmakatvāt.
Translation: 434
Because perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge do not
have any other form, other than the form of knowledge and if you
accept that, it means that there is no form. It is not the case that
the knowledge is of the form of collection of forms, because in that
case it will become identical.
Text: 434a
अथ िवषयभेदेन द्ैिवध्यमुपपाद्ते; तथाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य िवषयाथोर् वक्व्यः -
atha viṣayabhedena dvaividhyamupapādyate; tathā’numānajñānasya

viṣayārtho vaktavyaḥ -
Translation: 434a
If you explain two knowledges viz. perceptual knowledge and
inferential knowledge on the basis of the difference between their
objects, then you should tell us what could be the object of an
inferential knowledge.
Text: 435
िकम् अग्न्यािदस्वलक्षणिवषयम्, िवद्मानसामान्यिवषयम्, अपारमा थर् कसामान्यिवषयं वा,
िनिवर् षयं वा, स्वांशिवषयं वा?
kim agnyādisvalakṣaṇaviṣayam, vidyamānasāmānyaviṣayam, apāra-
mārthikasāmānyaviṣayaṁ vā, nirviṣayaṁ vā, svāṁśaviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 435
Is inferential knowledge, knowledge of svalakṣaṇa (mere
particular), or of fire, or is it a knowledge of existent series
of particulars or is it a knowledge of unreal universal, or is it a
knowledge without content or is it a knowledge in which part of
itself is the object?
Text: 436
यिद अग्न्यािदस्वलक्षणिवषयम्; तदा पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोः भेदानुपप त्ः, अिभन्िवषयत्वात्।
yadi agnyādisvalakṣaṇaviṣayam; tadā pratyakṣānumānayoḥ bhedā-
nupapattiḥ, abhinnaviṣayatvāt.
Translation: 436
If you say inferential knowledge, is knowledge of svalakṣaṇa (mere
particular) of fire, then there will be no difference in perceptual
knowledge and inferential knowledge, because in both the cases the
object will be the same.
Text: 437
अथ आनुमािनके ज्ञाने अिग्मातर्ं पर्तीयते, पर्त्यक्षे तु ताणार्िदिवशेषात्मतया पर्तीयते;
atha ānumānike jñāne agnimātraṁ pratīyate, pratyakṣe tu tārṇādi-
viśeṣātmatayā pratīyate;
Translation: 437
Clarification:
In the inferential knowledge, mere fire is known, whereas, in the
perceptual knowledge the specific fire produced from specific things,
such as grass etc. is known.
Text: 438
यद्ेवं स्वलक्षणिवषयत्वं नाितवत्र्ते अनुमानस्य यिद नाम वह्े रव
े पर्पञ्ता।
yadyevaṁ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvaṁ nātivarttate anumānasya yadi
nāma vahnereva prapañcatā.
Translation: 438
Reply: If it is so, still the inferential knowledge cannot be said to
be the knowledge of svalakṣaṇa, if you are talking about fire alone.
Text: 439
अथ सत्सामान्यिवषयत्वम् तथािप पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोनर् भेदोऽ स्त, सामान्यस्य स्वलक्षण-
रूपत्वात्। न च सत्सामान्यस्य िवज्ञानिवषयतोपपद्ते, िनत्यत्वेन जनकत्वाकारापर् क-
त्वानुपपत्ेः। न च सत्सामान्यिवषयत्वे भर्ान्ततोपपद्ते। “भर्ा न्तरप्यथर् सम्बन्धतः पर्मा"
इित न वक्व्यम्।
atha satsāmānyaviṣayatvam tathāpi pratyakṣānumānayorna bhedo’-
sti, sāmānyasya svalakṣaṇarūpatvāt. na ca satsāmānyasya vijñāna-
viṣayatopapadyate, nityatvena janakatvākārārpakatvānupapatteḥ. na
ca satsāmānyaviṣayatve bhrāntatopapadyate. “bhrāntirapyartha-
sambandhataḥ pramā” iti na vaktavyam.
Translation: 439
If you say that it is knowledge of existent series of particulars of fire,
still there will be no difference between a perceptual knowledge
and inferential knowledge, because universal according to you, is
nothing but a series of particulars. (Moreover) if that universal is
real, then also it cannot be said to be the object of knowledge,
because since universal is accepted as permanent, it cannot have
the capacity to offer the form of being a producer of that knowledge
(in other words a permanent cannot cause its knowledge). Again,
if that universal is real, the knowledge cannot be treated as unreal.
You should also not say “it is illusory at the same time veridical
because of its relationship with an object”.
Text: 440
अथ असत्सामान्यिवषयम्; न तिहर् तस्य भर्ान्तता असतः स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात्। न
च असद् िवषयभावं पर्ितपद्ते, जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वव्यितरेकात्।
atha asatsāmānyaviṣayam; na tarhi tasya bhrāntatā asataḥ svena
rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt. na ca asad viṣayabhāvaṁ pratipadyate,
janakatvā”kārārpakatvavyatirekāt.
Translation: 440
If you say that, the inferential knowledge has unreal universal as its
content, then it cannot be called a false knowledge, because, in that
knowledge a false entity appears in its own form, viz. a false entity.
Nor it is the case, that one understands absence of content in that
knowledge, because, in that case, it cannot be said that, that object
has produced that inferential knowledge.
Text: 441
अव्यितरेके वा वस्तुत्वपर्सङ्ः, तत्पर्सक्ौ च पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दानुपप त्ः।
avyatireke vā vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ, tatprasaktau ca pratyakṣānumā-
nayorbhedānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 441
If you say it is identical, then the content will become real and if
that becomes real, there will be no difference between a perceptual
knowledge and inferential knowledge.
Text: 442
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् मानयोभेर्दोऽ स्त, अनुमानज्ञानस्य िवषयाऽसम्भवात्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi mānayorbhedo’sti, anumānajñānasya
viṣayā’sambhavāt.
Translation: 442
If you maintain that inferential knowledge is without content,
then there is no difference between the two knowledges viz. the
perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge, because, there is
no object left for the inferential knowledge.
Text: 443
नािप भर्ान्तता िनिवर् षयत्वादेव। न च ज्ञानस्य स्वसत्ामातर्ेण भर्ान्तता अभर्ान्तता च
उपपद्ते, िकन्तु परोपधानवशात्।
nāpi bhrāntatā nirviṣayatvādeva. na ca jñānasya svasattāmātreṇa
bhrāntatā abhrāntatā ca upapadyate, kintu paropadhānavaśāt.
Translation: 443
Nor can such inferential knowledge be called a false knowledge,
because there is no content in that. It is not the case that by mere
being into existence, knowledge can be called false or true. But, it
is to be decided on the basis of something else.
Text: 444
अथ स्वांशिवषयम्; तथािप पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोनर् नानात्वम्, उभयोः स्वलक्षणिवषयत्वात्। न
चानुमानज्ञानस्य भर्ान्तता स्वांशस्याऽवञ्नात्।
atha svāṁśaviṣayam; tathāpi pratyakṣānumānayorna nānātvam,
ubhayoḥ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt. na cānumānajñānasya bhrāntatā
svāṁśasyā’vañcanāt.
Translation: 444
If you say that, the inferential knowledge has a part of knowledge as
its content, still, the perceptual knowledge cannot be distinguished
from inferential knowledge, because, both have svalakṣaṇa (mere
particulars) as their content. It cannot be said that an inferential
knowledge is false knowledge, because it cannot betray its own part.
Text: 445
तथा पर्त्यक्षस्यािप िवषयो वक्व्यः - िकं रूपािदस्वलक्षणिवषयमात्मिवषयमुभयिवषयं वा?
tathā pratyakṣasyāpi viṣayo vaktavyaḥ - kiṁ rūpādisvalakṣaṇa-
viṣayam, ātmaviṣayam, ubhayaviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 445
In the same way, you should also tell us what can be the object of
perceptual cognition? Is that object mere particular like color etc.
or is that content the cognition itself or both?
Text: 446
तद्िद रूपािदमातर्ालोचकम्; तदयुक्म्; तदनवगतौ एतद्गत्यभावात्। अथ ज्ञानमातर्-
कायावगाहकम्; तदिप नोपपद्ते, िवषयभावस्य जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन व्यव स्थतेः।
tadyadi rūpādimātrālocakaṁ; tadayuktam; tadanavagatau etad-

gatyabhāvāt. atha jñānamātrakāyāvagāhakam; tadapi nopapadyate,
viṣayabhāvasya janakatvā”kārārpakatvena vyavasthiteḥ.
Translation: 446
If you say, it is the indeterminate perception in which mere color etc.
appear it will not be proper, because, in an indeterminate cognition
the content cannot be known, and if that is not known, that will
not be the knowledge of color etc.
Text: 447
न च स्वात्मिन जनकत्वमाकारापर् कत्वं चोपपद्ते-िवषियणमपेक्षय िवषयो भवित,
यथा कारणमपेक्षय कायर्, कायर् ञ्ापेक्षय कारणं तथेहािप। यिद च पर्त्यक्षज्ञानेन
आत्ममातर्मात्मसात् िकर्यते; तदाऽनुमानेप्येतद स्त पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दानुपप त्ः।
na ca svātmani janakatvamākārārpakatvaṁ copapadyate-viṣayiṇa-
mapekṣya viṣayo bhavati, yathā kāraṇamapekṣya kāryaṁ, kārya-
ñcāpekṣya kāraṇaṁ tathehāpi. yadi ca pratyakṣajñānena ātmamātra-
mātmasāt kriyate; tadā’numānepyetadasti pratyakṣānumāna-
yorbhedānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 447
If you say, perceptual cognition reveals merely its own form viz. the
perceptual cognition then it is also not satisfactory, because, the
presence of the content of cognition is decided as that which offers
the form of being the producer. If the content is its own form, this
idea of offering the form of being the cause or producer, does not fit
in, because something is called content only in terms of the container
i.e. the cognition. As something is called effect in terms of its cause,
so also something is called in relation to its effect. The same logic is
applicable here also. If you say that by a perceptual cognition mere
perceptual cognition is included then this is possible also in the case
of an inferential cognition and in that case there will no difference
between a perceptual cognition and inferential cognition.
Text: 448
अथोभयं िवषयीिकर्यते; तदप्ययुक्म्; एकोपलम्भस्य िद्तीयाकारप रहारेण व्यव स्थ-
तत्वात्।
atha ubhayaṁ viṣayīkriyate; tadapyayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitī-

yākāraparihāreṇa vyavasthitatvāt.
Translation: 448
If you say both i.e. the content as well as its own form are made the
content of a perceptual cognition, that would also not be proper,
because, knowledge of one is decided (in your doctrine) by excluding
the other form.
Text: 449
यिद च रूपगृहीितरेव ज्ञानगृहीितः; तदा रूपस्य ज्ञानरूपता, ज्ञानस्य वा रूपरूपता,
रूपगृहीतेवार् रूपाऽव्यवस्थापकत्वम्। न च एकस्य आकारद्यं पश्यामः।
yadi ca rūpagṛhītireva jñānagṛhītiḥ; tadā rūpasya jñānarūpatā,
jñānasya vā rūparūpatā, rūpagṛhītervā rūpā’vyavasthāpakatvam. na
ca ekasya ākāradvayaṁ paśyāmaḥ.
Translation: 449
If you say that the perception of color etc. itself is perception of
cognition, then one will have to decide whether the color is of
the form of cognition, or the cognition is of the form of color, or
cognition of color cannot decide color. This is not our experience
that one object has two forms.
Text: 450
न च िद्त्वावधारणा(ण)िमहोपपद्ते। पर्त्यक्षं ज्ञानम् आत्मानं गृह्दपु जायते नानुमानं
िवषययित। तथा, अनुमानमिप आत्मानमात्मसात्कुवर् दपु जायते, न पर्त्यक्षं ज्ञानमव-
द्ोतयित। एवं िद्त्वसंख्याव्यवहारानुपप त्ः।
na ca dvitvāvadhāraṇā(ṇa)mihopapadyate. pratyakṣaṁ jñānam
ātmānaṁ gṛhṇadupajāyate nānumānaṁ viṣayayati. tathā, anumā-
namapi ātmānamātmasātkurvadupajāyate, na pratyakṣaṁ jñānama-
vadyotayati. evaṁ dvitvasaṁkhyāvyavahārānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 450
(Moreover), it is not possible to know this duality. The perceptual
cognition arises through revealing its own form, but it cannot make
inferential cognition as its content. Similarly, inferential cognition
also arises by making its own form as its content, but not the
perceptual cognition as its content and therefore referring to them

as “two” cannot be justified.
Text: 451
अथ िवकल्पेन द्यावधारणिमित चेत्;
atha vikalpena dvayāvadhāraṇamiti cet;
Translation: 451
Clarification:
They are called two alternatively and not “simultaneously”.
Text: 452
तदयुक्म्; असाविप आत्मसंवेदनपयर् व सतत्वान् द्यं गृह्ाित। गर्हणे वा अभ्युपेतहानम्।
तदनुपपत्ौ च द्े एवेित जडचेिष्तम्।
tadayuktam; asāvapi ātmasaṁvedanaparyavasitatvānna dvayaṁ
gṛhṇāti. grahaṇe vā abhyupetahānam. tadanupapattau ca dve eveti
jaḍaceṣṭitam.
Translation: 452
Reply:
This is also not proper, because, that two is accepted (by you) as
revealing one’s own form and hence cause the knowledge of duality.
Granting that it causes the knowledge of duality, it will amount in
giving up something which was already accepted and once that is
demonstrated as impossible then to claim that the pramāṇas are
two only, will be nothing more than an attempt of any insentient
object.
0.5 सौगतसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा।

saugatasammatasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā
Critical examination of the definition of perception of the
Buddhists.
Text: 453
तथा, “पर्त्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढमभर्ान्तम्” [न्यायिब.१.४] इित न वक्व्यम्, कल्पनापोढ-
पदस्य अपोह्ाथार्सम्भवात्।
tathā, “pratyakṣaṁ kalpanā’poḍhamabhrāntam” [Nyāyabi.1.4] iti na
vaktavyam, kalpanāpoḍhapadasya apohyārthāsambhavāt.
Translation: 453
Moreover, you should not define a perceptual cognition such as “a
perceptual cognition is that which is non-illusory and which is free
from mental construction” (Nyāyabindu 1.4) because which is free
from mental construction, has nothing to exclude.
Text: 454
ननु कल्पनैव अपोह्ा;
nanu kalpanaiva apohyā;
Translation: 454
Objection:
If we say, the mental construction itself is to be excluded then?
Text: 455
केयं कल्पना - िकं गुणचलनजात्यािदिवशेषणोत्पािदतं िवज्ञानं कल्पना, आहो स्मृत्यु-
त्पादकं िवज्ञानं कल्पना, स्मृितरूपं वा, स्मृत्युत्पाद्ं वा, अिभलापसंसगर् िनभार्सो वा,
अिभलापवती पर्तीितवार् कल्पना, अस्पष्ाकारा वा, अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपा वा, स्वयं
वाऽता त्वक , ितर्रूपािल्ङ्तोऽथर् दृग्वा, अतीताऽनागताथर् िनभार्सा वा?
keyaṁ kalpanā - kiṁ guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpāditaṁ vijñānaṁ
kalpanā, āho smṛtyutpādakaṁ vijñānaṁ kalpanā, smṛtirūpaṁ vā,
smṛtyutpādyaṁ vā, abhilāpasaṁsarganirbhāso vā, abhilāpavatī pratī-
tirvā kalpanā, aspaṣṭākārā vā, atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpā vā, svayaṁ
vā’tāttvikī, trirūpālliṅgato’rthadṛgvā, atītā’nāgatārthanirbhāsā vā?
Translation: 455
Reply:
We would like to know what this mental construction is. Is a mental
construction, a cognition which is caused by the qualifications
viz. quality, action, universal, etc.? Or a mental construction is
a cognition which produces remembrance or is it of the form of
remembrance or is it something produced by remembrance? Or is
it an appearance of relationship with language? Or is a mental
construction a cognition which can be verbalized in language? Or is
it something unreal? Or is it a cognition of an object, produced from
a ground or reason having three features or aspects or forms ((i)
being in the subject (ii) not being in that which is not a subject and
(iii) being in an example or instance.) Or is it a mental construction

which reveals an object of the past and the future?
Text: 456
तद्िद गुणचलनजात्यािदिवशेषणोत्पािदतं िवज्ञानं कल्पना; त त्कम् अिवद्मानगुणचलन-
जात्यािदिवशेषणोत्पाद्त्वेन कल्पना, उत िवद्मानोत्पाद्त्वेन?
tadyadi guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpāditaṁ vijñānaṁ kalpanā;
tatkim avidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpādyatvena kalpanā,
uta vidyamānotpādyatvena?
Translation: 456
If it is a mental construction, a cognition which is caused by the
qualifications quality, action, universal, etc. then again the question
arises whether it is a mental construction because it is produced by
the qualifications such as quality, action and universal etc. which
are non-existent? Or is it a mental construction, which is produced
by those existing qualifications?
Text: 457
तद्िद अिवद्मानगुणचलनजात्यािदिवशेषणोत्पाद्त्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदयुक्म्; अिवद्-
मानस्य जनकत्वाभावादेव अकल्पनात्वम्।
tadyadi avidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpādyatvena kalpanā-
tvam; tadayuktam; avidyamānasya janakatvābhāvādeva akalpa-
nātvam
Translation: 457
If you say it is produced by the qualifications such as quality, action
and universal etc. which are non-existent? Then it is not proper,
because, if something is non-existent, it cannot be a cause and if
something is not a cause, obviously, it cannot be called a mental
construction.
Text: 458
अथ िवद्मानगुणचलनजात्यािदिवशेषणोत्पाद्त्वेन कल्पना; त त्कं सिवषयं कल्पनाज्ञानं
िनिवर् षयं वा?
atha vidyamānaguṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpādyatvena kalpanā;
tatkiṁ saviṣayaṁ kalpanājñānam, nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 458
If you say it is a mental construction caused by the qualifications viz.
quality, action and universal which are existent, then, the question
arises: Is that cognition called mental construction, contentful or
contentless?
Text: 459
तद्िद सिवषयं सत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्; तदयुक्म्; गुणचलनजात्यािदजन्यत्वेऽिप न
कल्पनात्वम् अथर् सामाथ्यर् समुद्वत्वस्याऽनितवृत्ेः।
tadyadi saviṣayaṁ sat kalpanājñānam; tadayuktam; guṇacalana-
jātyādijanyatve’pi na kalpanātvam arthasāmārthyasamudbhavatva-
syā’nativṛtteḥ.
Translation: 459
If you say it is contentful and still it is a mental construction it
is not correct, because, if it has been produced by quality, action
and universal etc. then it cannot be called a mental construction,
because, you cannot override the property of being produced from
something which is an object of a fruitful behaviour.
Text: 460
अथ िनिवर् षयं सत् कल्पना; तदा िनिवर् षयत्वमेव कल्पनात्वे कारणं न गुणचलन-
जात्यािदिवशेषणजन्यत्वम्।
atha nirviṣayaṁ sat kalpanā; tadā nirviṣayatvameva kalpanātve
kāraṇaṁ na guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇajanyatvam.
Translation: 460
If you say it is a mental construction, because it is contentless,
then the ground for calling it a mental construction should be its
being contentless and not being produced by the qualifications like
quality, action and universal etc.
Text: 461
यिद च तिन्िवर् षयम्; तदा न कल्पनाज्ञानम्, नाप्यकल्पनाज्ञानम्, ज्ञानमातर्ता स्यात्।
ज्ञानात्मतया च कल्पनात्वे सवर् ज्ञानं कल्पनाज्ञानं स्यात्।
yadi ca tannirviṣayam; tadā na kalpanājñānam, nāpyakalpa-
nājñānam, jñānamātratā syāt. jñānātmatayā ca kalpanātve sarvaṁ
jñānaṁ kalpanājñānaṁ syāt.
Translation: 461
Again if it is contentless, then it cannot be called mental
construction, nor can it be called non-mental construction. It will
be reduced to mere cognition and if it is called mental construction,
only because it is mere cognition then all knowledges will be called
mental construction.
Text: 462
अथ स्मृत्युत्पादकं ज्ञानं कल्पना; तदयुक्म्; रूपािददशर् नादिप स्मृितरुत्पद्ते, न च
कल्पनात्वम्। “यत्सिन्धाने यो दृष्ः तद्ष्ृ ेस्ततौ [तद्ध्वनौ] स्मृितः” इित वचनात्।
atha smṛtyutpādakaṁ jñānaṁ kalpanā; tadayuktam; rūpādida-
rśanādapi smṛtirutpadyate, na ca kalpanātvam. “yatsannidhāne yo
dṛṣṭaḥ taddṛṣṭestatau [taddhvanau] smṛtiḥ” iti vacanāt.
Translation: 462
If you say, the cognition which produces remembrance is called
mental construction, that will not be proper, because, by seeing
a color also i.e. from the knowledge of color, remembrance
is produced. But color etc. is not considered to be a mental
construction. This is in accordance with the statement viz. “if in the
proximity of X, Y is perceived, then by seeing X, Y is remembered.”
Text: 463
अथ स्मृितरूपत्वेन कल्पना; ततर्ािप िकं गृहीतगर्ािहत्वेन, िनिवर् षयत्वेन, अपूवार्थर्-
गृहीितरूपत्वेन वा?
atha smṛtirūpatvena kalpanā; tatrāpi kiṁ gṛhītagrāhitvena, nirviṣa-
yatvena, apūrvārthagṛhītirūpatvena vā?
Translation: 463
If you say, a cognition is a mental construction in the form of
remembrance, there also a question arises, is it a mental construction
as the revealer of something which is already known or because it
is contentless or because it is the revealer of something new?
Text: 464
तद्िद गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा पर्थमानुभवस्यािप कल्पनात्वमापद्ते
गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वािवशेषात् इत्युक्ं पुरस्तात्।
tadyadi gṛhītārthagrāhitvena kalpanātvam; tadā prathamānubha-

vasyāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate gṛhītārthagrāhitvāviśeṣāt ityuktaṁ
purastāt.
Translation: 464
If you say, it is a mental construction in the form of revealer of
something which is already known, then the first experience should
also be called a mental construction, because, that also is a cognition
which has revealed something which was known before. This we
have already discussed before.
Text: 465
अथ िनिवर् षयत्वेन; तदा न कल्पनाकारता नाप्यकल्पनाकारता ज्ञानाकारव्यितरेकेण।
atha nirviṣayatvena; tadā na kalpanākāratā nāpyakalpa- nākāratā
jñānākāravyatirekeṇa.
Translation: 465
If you say, it is a mental construction because it is contentless, then
it has neither the form of a mental construction, nor the form of
non-mental construction, apart from the form of the cognition.
Text: 466
अथापूवार्थर्गृहीितत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदयुक्म्; न स्मृतेरपूवार्थर्गृहीितत्वम स्त तदभावान्
कल्पनात्वम्।
athāpūrvārthagṛhītitvena kalpanātvam; tadayuktam; na smṛterapūr-
vārthagṛhītitvamasti tadabhāvānna kalpanātvam.
Translation: 466
Again if you say, it is a mental construction because it reveals
something new, that will not be correct, because, there is nothing
new in the remembrance and in the absence of that it will not be
called a mental construction, according to your definition.
Text: 467
यिद च अपूवार्थर्गृहीितत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; रूपािदज्ञानानां कल्पनात्वमापद्ते।
yadi ca apūrvārthagṛhītitvena kalpanātvam; rūpādijñānānāṁ kalpa-
nātvamāpadyate.
Translation: 467
Moreover, if you say that a cognition is a mental construction, if it
reveals something new, then the knowledges of color etc. will have
to be treated a mental construction.
Text: 468
अथ स्मृत्युत्पाद्त्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा रूपािदज्ञानस्यािप िनिवर् कल्पकत्वेनािभमतस्य
स्मृत्युत्पाद्त्वम स्त, तदस्तु कल्पनाज्ञानम्।
atha smṛtyutpādyatvena kalpanātvam; tadā rūpādijñānasyāpi nirvikal-
pakatvenābhimatasya smṛtyutpādyatvamasti, tadastu kalpanājñānam.
Translation: 468
If you say that a cognition which is caused by remembrance is a
mental construction, then even the knowledge of color etc. which is
intended as indeterminate in character is caused by remembrance
and so let that cognition be called mental construction.
Text: 469
अथ न भवित तत् कल्पनाज्ञानं, स्मृत्या बोधस्वभावतयोत्पािदतं कल्पनाज्ञानं न स्मरणा-
कारतयोत्पाद्ते;
atha na bhavati tat kalpanājñānaṁ, smṛtyā bodhasvabhāvatayot-
pāditaṁ kalpanājñānaṁ na smaraṇākāratayotpādyate;
Translation: 469
Clarification:
Well that cannot be called a mental construction, because, the
mental construction is produced by remembrance in the form of
an understanding and not in the form of remembrance.
Text: 470
तिददं मिद्कल्पान्दो लतबुद्े: िनरुपप त्काऽिभधानम्। न ह्ेकस्य स्वभावद्यमुत्पश्यामः।
tadidaṁ madvikalpāndolitabuddheḥ nirupapattikā’bhidhānam. na
hyekasya svabhāvadvayamutpaśyāmaḥ.
Translation: 470
Reply:
This illogical statement of yours is an outcome of your confused
mind due to raising odd questions by us. One entity cannot have
two natures.
Text: 471
अथ अिभलापसंसगर् पर्ितभासा पर्तीितः कल्पना; स संसगर् ः पारमा थर् कः, अपारमा थर् को
वा?
atha abhilāpasaṁsargapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā; sa saṁsargaḥ
pāramārthikaḥ, apāramārthiko vā?
Translation: 471
If you say, that a mental construction is a cognition which reveals
association with language, there also we can ask whether that
relation is real or unreal?
Text: 472
यिद पारमा थर् कः; न तदा तस्य कल्पनात्वं रूपािदज्ञानस्येव।
yadi pāramārthikaḥ; na tadā tasya kalpanātvaṁ rūpādijñānasyeva.
Translation: 472
If you say it is real, then it cannot be said to be a mental
construction, like the cognition of color.
Text: 473
अथ अपारमा थर् कः; कथं तदाभं िवज्ञानम्, नैरात्म्यपर्सङ्ात्। न चाऽता त्वके िवषयाथर् ः
क श्चल्भ्यते, जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वसहोत्पादसत्ामातर्व्यितरेकात्।
atha apāramārthikaḥ; kathaṁ tadābhaṁ vijñānam, nairātmyapra-
saṅgāt. na cā’tāttvike viṣayārthaḥ kaścillabhyate, janakatvākārār-
pakatvasahotpādasattāmātravyatirekāt.
Translation: 473
And if you say it is unreal, then how can it be called a cognition
reflecting that nature, because in that case, it will be devoid of its
nature. In a false cognition, what has appeared as its content, is not
formed, because, it doesn’t have the state of producing the effect or
the state of offering a form, or mere existence of being a product
together.
Text: 474
यिद च अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपम्; तदा िवपयर् यज्ञानम्। तच्च अव्यिभचा रपदेन अपोिदतम्,
न कल्पनापोढपदमुपादेयम्।
yadi ca atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpam; tadā viparyayajñānam. tacca
avyabhicāripadena apoditam, na kalpanāpoḍhapadamupādeyam.
Translation: 474
If again a mental construction is taken as a cognition that reveals
an unreal object, then that cognition will be called a false cognition
and that can be excluded by a clause which is not false or which is
not illusory and so there is no need to add the clause “which is free
from mental construction in the definition of perception.”
Text: 475
अथ अिभलापवती पर्तीितः कल्पना, िकम्-अिभलापा त्मका, आहो अिभलापोत्पाद्ा,
अिभलापगृहीितवार्?
atha abhilāpavatī pratītiḥ kalpanā, kim-abhilāpātmikā, āho abhilāpot-
pādyā, abhilāpagṛhītirvā?
Translation: 475
If you say a mental construction is a cognition which is verbalizable,
then the question arises, is it identical with the language? Or is it
produced by language or is it the cognition of the language?
Text: 476
तद्िद अिभलापा त्मका; पर्तीितः कथम्? पर्तीितश्चेत्; 'अिभलापा त्मका' इित न
वक्व्यम्। िवरुद्ाकारयोस्तादात्म्यव्यितरेकात्।
tadyadi abhilāpātmikā; pratītiḥ katham? pratītiścet; ’abhilāpātmikā’
iti na vaktavyam. viruddhākārayostādātmyavyatirekāt.
Translation: 476
If you say it is of the form of language, then how can it be called
cognition? And if it is a cognition then you should not call it
of the form of language, because, two entities having opposite
characteristics, cannot be identical.
Text: 477
अथ अिभलापोत्पाद्ा; तदा शब्दज्ञानानां कल्पनात्वमापद्ते। तेषां च कल्पनात्वे
शब्दव्यवस्थानऽनुपप त्ः स्यात्।
atha abhilāpotpādyā; tadā śabdajñānānāṁ kalpanātvamāpadyate.
teṣāṁ ca kalpanātve śabdavyavasthāna’nupapattiḥ syāt.
Translation: 477
If you say it is caused by language, then the knowledge of language
will have to be treated as mental construction and if that becomes
mental construction, then nothing can be decided on the basis of

language.
Text: 478
अिभलापगृहीितत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा सवार्सामिभलापगृहीतीनां कल्पनात्वमापद्ते,
तत्कल्पनात्वे शब्दव्यवस्थानुपप त्ः।
abhilāpagṛhītitvena kalpanātvam; tadā sarvāsāmabhilāpagṛhītīnāṁ
kalpanātvamāpadyate, tatkalpanātve śabdavyavasthānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 478
If you say a cognition is a mental construction, because it reveals
language, then all cognitions of language will have to be treated as
mental construction, and if they are treated as mental constructions
then nothing can be settled on the basis of language.
[१. पर्सङ्ायाताया अस्पष्ताया िवकल्प्य दषू णम्।]
[1. prasaṅgāyātāyā aspaṣṭatāyā vikalpya dūṣaṇam.]
Text: 479
अथ अस्पष्ाकारा पर्तीितः कल्पना; अस्पष्ता का?
atha aspaṣṭākārā pratītiḥ kalpanā; aspaṣṭatā kā?
Translation: 479
If you say a cognition the form of which is not clear or blur, is a
mental construction, we would like to know what is that blurness?
Text: 480
िकम् अिवज्ञानात्मकत्वम्, आहो स्वलक्षणाजन्यत्वम्, अथ पर्तीयमानाथार्जन्यत्वम्,
पर्तीयमानासत्यता वा, स्वलक्षणापर्ितभा सता वा?
kim avijñānātmakatvam, āho svalakṣaṇājanyatvam, atha pratīyamā-
nārthājanyatvam, pratīyamānāsatyatā vā, svalakṣaṇāpratibhāsitā vā?
Translation: 480
Does it mean “being of the nature of non-cognition?” or does
it mean the “state of not being produced by svalakṣaṇa (mere
particular).” If you say, it is the state of not being produced by
the object which is known; in that case does it mean that whatever
is known is false? Or does it mean a cognition in which svalakṣaṇa
(mere particular) is not revealed?
Text: 481
तद्िद अिवज्ञानात्मकत्वमस्पष्ता; तदयुक्म्; पर्तीित रह अस्पष्ाकारा गीयते, सा कथं
िवज्ञाना त्मका भिवतुमहर् ित?
tadyadi avijñānātmakatvamaspaṣṭatā; tadayuktam; pratītiriha aspa-
ṣṭākārā gīyate, sā kathaṁ vijñānātmikā bhavitumarhati?
Translation: 481
If you say, blurness means being of the nature of non-cognition that
will not be proper, because, here on one hand you are telling that
the cognition is blur then how can that be called of the form of
cogniton?
Text: 482
अथ स्वलक्षणाजन्यता अस्पष्ता; तदा ज्ञानाक स्मकत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha svalakṣaṇājanyatā aspaṣṭatā; tadā jñānākasmikatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 482
If you say, that not being produced by svalakṣaṇa is blurness, then
one will have to accept that cognition arises without any cause.
Text: 483
अथ पर्तीयमानाथार्जन्यत्वम्; तदा रागािदसंवेदनस्य अस्पष्ता पर्ाप्नोित, रागादीनां
स्वात्मसंवेदनोत्पादकत्वाऽयोगात्, स्वात्मोत्पादकत्वं वस्तूनां न दृष्पूवर्म्। तथा केशोण्डु -
किवज्ञानस्या(स्य) पर्तीयमानकेशोण्डु कोत्पाद्त्वं न िवद्ते, तदप्य(िप) स्पष्ाभ-
मुपजायते न तु अस्पष्ाभम्, “न िवकल्पानुबद्स्य स्पष्ाथर् पर्ितभा सता” [पर्माणवा०
३.२८३] इित वचनात्।
atha pratīyamānārthājanyatvam; tadā rāgādisaṁvedanasya aspa-
ṣṭatā prāpnoti, rāgādīnāṁ svātmasaṁvedanotpādakatvā’yogāt, svāt-
motpādakatvaṁ vastūnāṁ na dṛṣṭapūrvam. tathā keśoṇḍukavijñā-
nasyā(sya) pratīyamānakeśoṇḍukotpādyatvaṁ na vidyate, tada-
pya(pi) spaṣṭābhamupajāyate na tu aspaṣṭābham, “na vikalpānuba-
ddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsitā” [Pramāṇavā� 3.283] iti vacanāt.
Translation: 483
Again if you say that it is the state of not being produced by the
object which is known, then the feeling of attachment etc. should
be accepted as blur, because, attachment etc. do not take part in
causing the feeling of attachment. So far we have not experienced
before that things produce themselves. It is true that the cognitions

of thread-like things which appear to a person who comes from
outside the Sun, is not caused by its content viz. thread-like things.
Still, the cognition that appears is quite clear and not blurred. This
is in support of the statement (in the Pramāṇavārttika 3.283) viz. “a
cognition if affected by imagination is not a cognition which reflects
its object clearly.”
Text: 484
अथ स्वलक्षणापर्ितभा सत्वमस्पष्ता; तदा िनिवर् कल्पािभमतकेशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्य अस्प-
ष्ता पर्ाप्नोित, ततर् स्वलक्षणस्यापर्ितभासनात् स्पष्ाभं च तद्गीयते। न च ताथागते दशर् ने
तथाभूतं ज्ञानम स्त यत् स्वलक्षणापर्ितभा स, सवर् स्मन् ज्ञाने ज्ञानकायर् पर्ितभासनात्।
atha svalakṣaṇāpratibhāsitvamaspaṣṭatā; tadā nirvikalpābhimata-
keśoṇḍukavijñānasya aspaṣṭatā prāpnoti, tatra svalakṣaṇasyāprati-
bhāsanāt spaṣṭābhaṁ ca tadgīyate. na ca tāthāgate darśane
tathābhūtaṁ jñānamasti yat svalakṣaṇāpratibhāsi, sarvasmin jñāne
jñānakāryapratibhāsanāt.
Translation: 484
If you say being blurred is not reflecting svalakṣaṇā, then the
cognitions of thread-like things which appear to a person who comes
from outside the Sun, which is considered to an indeterminate
cognition by you will become blurred, because there the svalakṣaṇā is
not reflected clearly but still you accept it to be clear. There is no such
knowledge in the Buddhist doctrine which does not reflect svalakṣaṇā,
because in every knowledge effect of knowledge is reflected.
Text: 485
अथ पर्तीयमाना सत्यता अस्पष्ता; तदा केशोण्डु केन्दद्ु यिवज्ञानस्य अस्पष्ता पर्ाप्नोित।
नच पर्तीयमानस्यासत्यता, िवज्ञानकायर् स्य पर्तीयमानत्वात्। न च तस्य िवसंवादोऽ स्त।
atha pratīyamānā satyatā aspaṣṭatā; tadā keśoṇḍukendudvaya-
vijñānasya aspaṣṭatā prāpnoti. naca pratīyamānasyāsatyatā, vijñā-
nakāryasya pratīyamānatvāt. na ca tasya visaṁvādo’sti.
Translation: 485
If you say, the blurness is the truthfulness of what has appeared
in a knowledge, then in the knowledge of thread-like things which
appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, and the
knowledge of two moons, will be considered as blurred, because
in those knowledges whatever has appeared is not false, because,
the form of knowledge has definitely appeared there and it is not
the case that those forms do not match with the reality.
Text: 486
अथ अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपा कल्पना; तदा केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप कल्पनात्वमापद्ते।
atha atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpā kalpanā; tadā keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi
kalpanātvamāpadyate.
Translation: 486
If you say, that mental construction is the cognition which reveals
an unreal thing, then the cognition of the knowledge of thread-like
things which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun,
should also be treated as mental construction.
Text: 487
अथ स्वयमता त्वक ; तदा पर्तीितः कथम्? पर्तीितश्चेद;् अता त्वक कथम्?
atha svayamatāttvikī; tadā pratītiḥ katham? pratītiśced; atāttvikī
katham?
Translation: 487
If you say, mental construction is itself unreal, then how can it be
called cognition? And if it is cognition how can it be called false?
Text: 488
अथ ितर्रूपािल्ङ्तोऽथर् दृक् कल्पना इित चेत्; सािप िकं लङ्जन्यत्वेन कल्पना, आहो
िनिवर् षयत्वेन?
atha trirūpālliṅgato’rthadṛk kalpanā iti cet; sāpi kiṁ liṅgajanyatvena
kalpanā, āho nirviṣayatvena?
Translation: 488
Clarification:
If you say, mental construction or imagination is cognition of a
thing, produced from a ground having three aspects: (i) being in
the subject (ii) not being in that which is not a subject and (iii)
being in an example or instance.
Text: 489
तद्िद लङ्जन्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्;
tadyadi liṅgajanyatvena kalpanātvam;
Translation: 489
Reply:
There also the question arises, whether such cognition is to be
treated as mental construction because it is produced by ground.
Text: 490
तदा लङ्ावगाहकिनिवर् कल्पकिवज्ञानस्यािप कल्पनात्वमापद्ते। न च अनुमेयज्ञान-
स्याव्यवधानेन लङ्ोत्पाद्त्वम स्त।
tadā liṅgāvagāhakanirvikalpakavijñānasyāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate.
na ca anumeyajñānasyāvyavadhānena liṅgotpādyatvamasti.
Translation: 490
If you say it is mental construction because it is produced by ground,
then the indeterminate cognition which reveals the ground will also
have to be treated as mental construction, it is not the case that
inferential knowledge of a thing is produced by the ground without
gap.
Text: 491
अथ िनिवर् षयत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदिप न योयुज्यते; स्वांशिवषयत्वादनुमानज्ञानस्य।
atha nirviṣayatvena kalpanātvam; tadapi na yoyujyate; svāṁśa-
viṣayatvādanumānajñānasya.
Translation: 491
If you say it is a mental construction because it is contentless, that
also does in fit in, because an inferential knowledge has some of its
own part as its object.
Text: 492
अथ स्वांशिवषयव्यित रक्िवषयो ना स्त, िनिवर् षयत्वेन कल्पनात्वमपिदश्यते;
atha svāṁśaviṣayavyatiriktaviṣayo nāsti, nirviṣayatvena kalpanā-
tvamapadiśyate;
Translation: 492
Clarification:
There is no content without involving some of its own part.
Therefore, a cognition is called a mental construction, if it is

contentless.
Text: 493
तदा केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप कल्पनात्वमापद्ते।
tadā keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate.
Translation: 493
Reply :
In that case the cognition of the knowledge of thread-like things
which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, should
also be treated as mental construction.
Text: 494
अथ यत् िनिवर् कल्पकं तत् िवस्पष्तयोपजायते। आनुमािनकं तु अस्पष्ाभं तेन तत्
कल्पनाज्ञानम्;
atha yat nirvikalpakaṁ tat vispaṣṭatayopajāyate. ānumānikaṁ tu
aspaṣṭābhaṁ tena tat kalpanājñānam;
Translation: 494
Clarification:
Well, that is an indeterminate cognition, which arises as a clear
cognition. An inferential cognition however, is not a clear cognition
and therefore that cognition is called a mental construction.
Text: 495
तदयुक्म्; अस्पष्ता च यथा न सम्भवित तथा पर्ागेवोक्ा।
tadayuktam; aspaṣṭatā ca yathā na saṁbhavati tathā prāgevoktā.
Translation: 495
Reply:
It is not correct. We have already told how an inferential cognition
is blurred.
[२. पर्सङ्ायातायाः पर्त्यक्षीयस्पष्ताया िवकल्प्य िवडम्बनम्।]
[2. prasaṅgāyātāyāḥ pratyakṣīyaspaṣṭatāyā vikalpya viḍambanam.]
Text: 496
पर्त्यक्षज्ञानस्य च स्पष्ता का? िकं स्वलक्षणजन्यता, आहो स्वलक्षणपर्ितभा सता?
pratyakṣajñānasya ca spaṣṭatā kā? kiṁ svalakṣaṇajanyatā, āho

svalakṣaṇapratibhāsitā?
Translation: 496
By the way, what do you mean by the clarity of a perceptual
cognition? Does it mean the state of being caused by svalakṣaṇa?
Or does it mean the state of revealing svalakṣaṇa?
Text: 497
तद्िद स्वलक्षणजन्यता; िकं पर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता, तिद्परीतस्वलक्षणजन्यता वा?
tadyadi svalakṣaṇajanyatā; kiṁ pratīyamānasvalakṣaṇajanyatā,
tadviparītasvalakṣaṇajanyatā vā?
Translation: 497
If you say it is the state of being produced by svalakṣaṇa, there
also the question arises, is it the state of being produced by the
svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition? Or does it mean the
state of being produced by the svalakṣaṇa which is opposite than
what appears in the cognition?
Text: 498
तद्िद पर्तीत्यारूढस्वलक्षणजन्यता; पर्तीतौ िकमवभाित - िकमथर् ः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा?
tadyadi pratītyārūḍhasvalakṣaṇajanyatā; pratītau kimavabhāti -
kimarthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 498
If you say it is the state of being produced by svalakṣaṇa which
appears in the cognition, then we would like to know what is that
appears in the cognition? Is it an object or the cognition or both?
Text: 499
तद्िद अथर् ः; तदयुक्म्; अपर्तीतायां पर्तीतौ तदनवभासनात्।
tadyadi arthaḥ; tadayuktam; apratītāyāṁ pratītau tadanava-
bhāsanāt.
Translation: 499
If you say it is the object that appears in the cognition, it is
not proper, because, unless the cognition is cognized, that cannot
appear in the cognition.
Text: 500
अथ ज्ञानम्; न तिहर् तद् आत्मानमुत्पादयित, स्वात्मिन िकर्याव्यितरेकात्।
atha jñānam; na tarhi tad ātmānamutpādayati, svātmani kriyā-
vyatirekāt.
Translation: 500
If you say it is the cognition that appears in the cognition, it implies
that it does not produce itself, because there cannot be any activity
aimed at producing its own form.
Text: 501
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्; एकोपलम्भस्य िद्तीयाकारप रहार स्थितधमर् त्वात्।
यिद चोभयं पर्ितभाित; तदा अथर् वत् ज्ञानेनािप ज्ञानमुत्पाद्ते इत्यापद्ते। तच्चायुक्म्,
स्वात्मिन िकर्यािवरोधात्।
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitīyākāra-
parihārasthitidharmatvāt. yadi cobhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā arthavat
jñānenāpi jñānamutpādyate ityāpadyate. taccāyuktam, svātmani
kriyāvirodhāt.
Translation: 501
If you say both appear in the cognition that also is not proper,
because at a time when one form is revealed, the other form is
excluded and this is the property of cognition. Moreover, if you still
hold that both appear in the cognition, then, as object produces
the cognition, the cognition should also produce the cognition, and
that cannot be justified, because the activity of producing cannot
be directed towards one’s own self.
Text: 502
अथ अपर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता; व(त)द्गितः कथम्?
atha apratīyamānasvalakṣaṇajanyatā; va(ta)dgatiḥ katham?
Translation: 502
If you say clarity of perception means being produced by svalakṣaṇa
which does not appear in the cognition, then, the question arises
how do you know it?
Text: 503
न पर्त्यक्षेण; अपर्तीयमानत्वादेव।
na pratyakṣeṇa; apratīyamānatvādeva.
Translation: 503
You cannot say that you know it by perception, because you have
said that it does not appear in the cognition.
Text: 504
नाप्यनुमानेन, स्वभाव-कायर् लङ्ानवगतेः।
nāpyanumānena, svabhāva-kāryaliṅgānavagateḥ.
Translation: 504
Nor can you say that it is known by inference, because there is
no ground reflecting the invariable concomitance of the type of
“own nature”, or the invariable concomitance of the nature of
cause-and-effect relationship.
Text: 505
न स्वभावानुमानं तत्कायर् तादात्म्ये, तदनवगतौ तस्याऽनवगतेः।
na svabhāvānumānaṁ tatkāryatādātmye, tadanavagatau tasyā’na-
vagateḥ.
Translation: 505
It cannot be the inference of its nature, if it is identical with its
effect, because, if that is not understood, its own nature also will
not be understood.
Text: 506
नािप कायार्नुमानम्; तद्त
ू कायार्नुपलब्धेः, िपशाचपरमाणुमहेश्वरकल्पाथोर्त्पािदतं कायर्
नेहोपलभ्यते।
nāpi kāryānumānam; tadbhūtakāryānupalabdheḥ, piśācaparamāṇu-
maheśvarakalpārthotpāditaṁ kāryaṁ nehopalabhyate.
Translation: 506
Nor can it be the inference of the effect, because no effect produced
by that is known. No effect produced by an object like ghost, atom,
or God is found here.
Text: 507
अथ ज्ञानमेव तस्य लङ्म्; तदयुक्म्; तेन सह तस्य सम्बन्धानवगते श्चन्मातर्तयैव न
त्वन्योऽथर् ः, न च िचदात्मानं जनयित।
atha jñānameva tasya liṅgam; tadayuktam; tena saha tasya
sambandhānavagateścinmātratayaiva na tvanyo’rthaḥ, na ca
cidātmānaṁ janayati.
Translation: 507
If you say that, the very cognition or knowledge can be the ground
to infer that, that will not be proper, because no relationship is
known with that knowledge of that “clarity” because what is there
is mere consciousness and there is no other object and it is not the
case that consciousness produces consciousness.
Text: 508
समनन्तरज्ञानं तस्य हेतुः इित चेत्;
samanantarajñānaṁ tasya hetuḥ iti cet;
Translation: 508
Clarification:
The cognition which immediately follows is the cause of that
“clarity”.
Text: 509
तदयुक्म्; तदवगतौ न मानम स्त, परसन्तानज्ञानाथर् कल्पं तदिप न स्वसंवेद्ं
तत्कायर् ज्ञानस्य ततो िभन्त्वात् परसन्तानज्ञानाथर् वत्।
tadayuktam; tadavagatau na mānamasti, parasantānajñānārtha-
kalpaṁ tadapi na svasaṁvedyaṁ tatkāryajñānasya tato bhinnatvāt
parasantānajñānārthavat.
Translation: 509
Reply:
It is not correct, because, there is no proof or process by which we
can know it. Even it cannot be like the series of cognitions which
follow, since it cannot be self revealed, because the knowledge of
its effect will be different from it, like the object of the series of
cognitions.
Text: 510
नाप्यनुमानेन; तदायत्ताया अनवगते श्चन्मातर्तयैव आत्मानमवगाहयित नान्यायत्तया
ततोऽन्यस्य िपशाचेश्वरे(र)तुल्यत्वात् ।
nāpyanumānena; tadāyattatāyā anavagateścinmātratayaiva ātmā-
namavagāhayati nānyāyattatayā tato’nyasya piśāceśvare(ra)tu-
lyatvāt.
Translation: 510
Neither can it be known by inference, because, the scope of inference
to know that is not known. At the most it can cause the knowledge
of itself as mere consciousness and not through the capacity of some
thing else, because anything except that will be like a ghost or God.
Text: 511
यिद च समनन्तरिवज्ञानोत्पाद्त्वेन स्पष्ता; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्यािप समनन्तरज्ञानो-
त्पाद्त्वेन िनिवर् कल्पकत्वमनुषक्म्।
yadi ca samanantaravijñānotpādyatvena spaṣṭatā; tadā’numānajñā-
nasyāpi samanantarajñānotpādyatvena nirvikalpakatvamanuṣaktam.
Translation: 511
Moreover, if you say that there is clarity in the perceptual cognition,
because it is produced by the consecutive cognition, then, even
the inferential knowledge should be accepted as an indeterminate
knowledge because it is produced by the subsequent knowledge.
Text: 512
अथ स्वलक्षणपर्ितभा सता स्पष्ता; ततर् िकं पर्ितभाित - िकमथर् ः, ज्ञानम् , उभयं वा?
atha svalakṣaṇapratibhāsitā spaṣṭatā; tatra kiṁ pratibhāti -
kimarthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 512
If you say that, the clarity of perception means the revealing of the
svalakṣaṇa then, also the question arises what does appear there?
Is it the object or the knowledge or both?
Text: 513
तद्िद अथर् ः; तदयुक्म्; अपर् सद्ायाः(यां) पर् सद्ौ तत्पर् सद्ध्यभावात् ।
tadyadi arthaḥ; tadayuktam; aprasiddhāyāḥ(yāṁ) prasiddhau tat-
prasiddhyabhāvāt.
Translation: 513
If you say it is the object, it will not be proper, because if there is
no awareness of the knowledge, there cannot be knowledge of that.
Text: 514
अथ ज्ञानम्; तदनुमानेऽिप पर्ितभाित तदप्यस्तु िनिवर् कल्पकम्। तिन्िवर् कल्पकत्वे तिहर्
अपोह्ो मृग्योऽधुना कल्पनापोढपदस्य।
atha jñānam; tadanumāne’pi pratibhāti tadapyastu nirvikalpakam.
tannirvikalpakatve tarhi apohyo mṛgyo’dhunā kalpanāpoḍhapadasya.
Translation: 514
And if you say that it is the cognition which appears there, then,
that happens in the case of inferential knowledge also and so let
inferential knowledge be treated as an indeterminate cognition and
if that becomes an indeterminate cognition, then, now you will have
to find out what is to be excluded by the word “which is free from
mental construction or imagination.”
Text: 515
अथोभयं पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्; एकोपलम्भस्य िद्तीयाकारप रहार स्थितधमर् त्वाभ्युपगमात्।
athobhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitīyākāra-
parihārasthitidharmatvābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 515
Again if you say that both appear in that knowledge, that is not
correct, because what is accepted is the knowledge of one excludes
the other form and this is the characteristics of knowledge.
Text: 516
अथ अतीतानागताथर् गृहीितरूपा कल्पना; ततर् िकमवभाित-अथर् ः, तदभावो वा, न िकिञ्द्ा?
atha atītānāgatārthagṛhītirūpā kalpanā; tatra kimavabhāti-arthaḥ,
tadabhāvo vā, na kiñcidvā?
Translation: 516
If you say that, the mental construction is of the form of a cognition
which reveals past and future object, there also question arises,
what does appear there? Is it an object or absence of an object or
nothing?
Text: 517
यद्तीतोऽथर् ः पर्ितभाित; न तिहर् तस्य कल्पनात्वम् वत्र्माननीलज्ञानवत्। नाप्यथर् स्य
अतीतता पर्तीयमानत्वेन नीलजलािदवत्। निह पर्तीयमानस्य अतीतता नाम। यिद च
पर्तीयमानस्यािप अतीतता उच्यते तदा सवर् स्य बुद्ध्युपलिक्षतस्य अतीतता भवेत्। ततश्च
वत्र्मानव्यवहारिवरहः स्यात्।
yadyatīto’rthaḥ pratibhāti; na tarhi tasya kalpanātvam varttamāna-
nīlajñānavat. nāpyarthasya atītatā pratīyamānatvena nīlajalādivat.
nahi pratīyamānasya atītatā nāma. yadi ca pratīyamānasyāpi atītatā
ucyate tadā sarvasya buddhyupalakṣitasya atītatā bhavet. tataśca
varttamānavyavahāravirahaḥ syāt.
Translation: 517
If you say a past object appears there, then, that cannot called a
mental construction like the knowledge of present blue object. Nor
can it decide that, that object is a past object, because, that is
being known at the present time, like the objects like blue object or
water etc. As a matter of fact, what is being known at the present
time cannot be said to belong to the past. And if you say that even
that which is known at the present time belongs to the past, then,
each and every thing which is known will have to be considered as
belonging to the past. And in that case, nobody can refer to the
present events.
Text: 518
अथ तदभावः पर्ितभाित; तस्याप्यतीतता ना स्त, स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात्। नािप
तिद्षयिवज्ञानस्य कल्पनात्वमुपपद्ते अभावाथर् सामथ्येर्न समुद्वात्। असामथ्येर् वा
िवषयाथर् श्चन्त्यः।
atha tadabhāvaḥ pratibhāti; tasyāpyatītatā nāsti svena rūpeṇa
vidyamānatvāt. nāpi tadviṣayavijñānasya kalpanātvamupapadyate
abhāvārthasāmarthyena samudbhavāt. asāmarthye vā viṣayā-
rthaścintyaḥ.
Translation: 518
If you say that, what appears there is absence of object even that
cannot be said to belong to the past, because in its own form i.e.
in the form of absence, it exists in the present and it is not proper
to say that the cognition of that absence is a mental construction,

because such a cognition has arisen due to the object called absence.
And if you say that absence does not have the capacity to call
knowledge, then, it should specify the object of that knowledge.
Text: 519
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् तदतीतानागताथर् िवज्ञानम् अतीतानागताथोर्पकाररिहतमपिदश्यते।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi tadatītānāgatārthavijñānam atītānāga-
tārthopakārarahitamapadiśyate.
Translation: 519
If you say that, knowledge is contentless, then, you cannot say that
such knowledge is of the past or of the future object. It cannot be
referred to as cognition without being caused by past and future
object.
Text: 520
न च िनिवर् षयत्वे सित सिवकल्पकत्वं िनिवर् कल्पकत्वं वा, अिप तु ज्ञानात्मतयैव
तस्याऽव्यव स्थितः। न च ज्ञानमातर्तया तस्य सिवकल्पकत्विमष्यते सवर् ज्ञानानां
सिवकल्पकत्वपर्सङ्ात्।
na ca nirviṣayatve sati savikalpakatvaṁ nirvikalpakatvaṁ vā, api
tu jñānātmatayaiva tasyā’vyavasthitiḥ. na ca jñānamātratayā tasya
savikalpakatvamiṣyate sarvajñānānāṁ savikalpakatvaprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 520
It is not the case that cognition is called determinate or
indeterminate on the ground of it being contentless; rather it is
not decided on the basis of the very nature of cognition. It cannot
be the case that merely on the basis of its being cognition, it can be
called a determinate cognition, because in that case all knowledges
will become determinate knowledges.
Text: 521
यिद च िनिवर् षयत्वेन अतीतानागताथर् िवज्ञानस्य सिवकल्पकत्वमभ्युपेयते, िनिवर् कल्प-
कािभमतकेशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप सिवकल्पकत्वमापद्ते। न च अतीतानागतिवज्ञानस्य
िनिवर् षयत्वम स्त स्वांशपयर् व सतत्वात्। नािप स्वांशव्यित रक्ोऽथोर्ऽन्यो स्त एकोपलस्ते
(०लम्भे)न अपोिहतत्वात्। न च स्वांशस्य वञ्नोपपद्ते, तदभावात् सवर् िवज्ञानं
सिवकल्पकं िनिवर् कल्पकं वा वक्व्यं भेदानुपपत्ेः।
yadi ca nirviṣayatvena atītānāgatārthavijñānasya savikalpakatvama-

bhyupeyate, nirvikalpakābhimatakeśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi savikalpa-
katvamāpadyate. na ca atītānāgatavijñānasya nirviṣayatvamasti
svāṁśaparyavasitatvāt. nāpi svāṁśavyatirikto’rtho’nyosti eko-
palaste (�lambhe)na apohitatvāt. na ca svāṁśasya vañcanopapa-
dyate, tadabhāvāt sarvaṁ vijñānaṁ savikalpakaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ vā
vaktavyaṁ bhedānupapatteḥ.
Translation: 521
If you say the knowledge of past and future object is accepted
as determinate knowledge on the ground of its being contentless
then, there will arise the contingency of accepting knowledge of
thread-like things which appear to a person who comes from outside
the Sun, which is intended by you as indeterminate cognition as
a determinate cognition. It is not the case that cognition of past
and future object is contentless, because it amounts to be a part
of itself. As a matter of fact, there is no other object other than
its own part, because by knowing one, others are excluded. It is
not proper to deny its own part because if that is not there, each
and every cognition or knowledge can become either determinate
or indeterminate, because it will be difficult to distinguish them.
Text: 522
यदप्युक्म्- “कल्पनापोढं पर्त्यक्षम् अथर् सामथ्येर्न समुद्वात् रूपािदस्वलक्षणवत्” इित;
ततर् िकं पर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्वत्वं िवविक्षतम्, आहो अथर् मातर्ोद्वत्वम्?
yadapyuktam- “kalpanāpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣam arthasāmarthyena
samudbhavāt rūpādisvalakṣaṇavat” iti; tatra kiṁ pratīyamāna-
svalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ vivakṣitam, āho arthamātrodbhavatvam?
Translation: 522
You made a statement viz. “a perceptual cognition is that which
is free from mental construction or imagination” because it is
produced on the basis of the capacity of its object like the svalakṣaṇa
viz. color etc. There we would like to ask, whether you want to say
that such cognition is caused by the svalakṣaṇa which appears in
the cognition or which is caused by mere object.
Text: 523
तद्िद पर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्वत्वं िवविक्षतम् तदा रागािदसंवेदनस्य योिगपर्त्यक्षस्य च
पर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्वत्वं न लभ्यते।
tadyadi pratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ vivakṣitam tadā rāgā-
disaṁvedanasya yogipratyakṣasya ca pratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbha-
vatvaṁ na labhyate.
Translation: 523
If you say, the state of being produced by the svalakṣaṇa which
appears in the cognition, is intended by you, then, one does not see
that the feeling of attachment and the perception of a yogin are
produced by the svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition.
Text: 524
अथ इ न्दर्यजपर्त्यक्षिववक्षया इदमपिदश्यते अथर् सामथ्येर्न समुद्त
ू त्वािदित साधनम्;
atha indriyajapratyakṣavivakṣayā idamapadiśyate arthasāmar-
thyena samudbhūtatvāditi sādhanam;
Translation: 524
Clarification:
Well, what is being stated here is that perceptual cognition which
is caused by (the contact between) sense organ (an object) and the
ground for such an assertion is the state of being caused by the
capacity of its object.
Text: 525
ततर्ािप [पर्तीयमानाथर् समुद्व?]-स्य बाह्ाथर् िनराकरणपरत्वात्।
tatrāpi [pratīyamānārthasamudbhava?]-sya bāhyārthanirākaraṇa-
paratvāt.
Translation: 525
Reply:
There also (according to your doctrine, what appears in the
cognition cannot be an object outside) because you deny the
existence of external object.
Text: 526
अस्तु वा बाह्ोऽथर् ः; तथािप िकं तेन िनिमत्ात्मकेन उत्पाद्ते, आहो उपादानात्मकेन?
astu vā bāhyo’rthaḥ; tathāpi kiṁ tena nimittātmakena utpādyate,

āho upādānātmakena?
Translation: 526
Granting that there is an external object, we would like to know
whether that object is an efficient cause of its knowledge or a
material cause of its knowledge.
Text: 527
तद्िद िनिमत्भूतेन उत्पाद्ते तदा तदत्ु पािदतरूपस्य रूपरूपता न पर्ाप्नोित
िनिमत्भूतरूपोत्पािदतज्ञानवत्।
tadyadi nimittabhūtena utpādyate tadā tadutpāditarūpasya
rūparūpatā na prāpnoti nimittabhūtarūpotpāditajñānavat.
Translation: 527
If you say being an efficient cause it produces the knowledge, then,
the form of that cognition cannot be the form of color, like a
cognition produced by the color which is the efficient cause of that
cognition.
Text: 528
अथ उपादानात्मकेन उत्पाद्ते; तदा अनया रीत्या रूपरूपता आपद्ते ज्ञानस्य
रूपोत्पािदतरूपस्येव। ततः सवर् मिवज्ञानात्मकं जगत् स्यात्। अिवज्ञानात्मके च जगित
मानमेयव्यवहाराभावपर्सङ्ः। तत्पर्सक्ौ च कस्येदं लक्षणं पर्स्तूयते?
atha upādānātmakena utpādyate; tadā anayā rītyā rūparūpatā
āpadyate jñānasya rūpotpāditarūpasyeva. tataḥ sarvamavijñānā-
tmakaṁ jagat syāt. avijñānātmake ca jagati mānameyavyavahārā-
bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. tatprasaktau ca kasyedaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ prastūyate?
Translation: 528
If you say that, the external object produces its knowledge as its
material cause, then, by this method a cognition becomes color. Like
a color produced by color. And in that case, the entire universe will
become of the nature of non-cognition. And once it becomes of the
nature of non-cognition, in this world there will be no reference to
knowledge and knowable. And once that is the consequence, then,
definitions of what are you presenting here?
Text: 529
अथ उपादानभूतेन रूपेण रूपमुत्पाद्ते िनिमत्ात्मकेन तु ज्ञानिमित चेत्;
atha upādānabhūtena rūpeṇa rūpamutpādyate nimittātmakena tu
jñānamiti cet;
Translation: 529
Clarification:
As a matter of fact, color produces color as a material cause, but it
produces knowledge as an efficient cause.
Text: 530
तिददं महानुभावस्य दशर् नम्। न ह्बा लश एवं वक्ुमुत्सहेत, न ह्ेकस्य अनेकाकारता नाम।
न चानेकनामकरणे मेयाद्न्यत्वम स्त। अन्यत्वे वा न तहीर्दं वक्व्यम्- “स्विवषयानन्तर-
िवषयसहका रणे न्दर्यज्ञानेन मनोिवज्ञानं िनष्पाद्ते।”
tadidaṁ mahānubhāvasya darśanam. na hyabāliśa evaṁ vaktumut-
saheta, na hyekasya anekākāratā nāma. na cānekanāmakaraṇe
meyādyanyatvamasti. anyatve vā na tarhīdaṁ vaktavyam-
“svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena manovijñānaṁ
niṣpādyate”.
Translation: 530
Reply:
This is indeed a philosophy of a great philosopher like you! As a
matter of fact, unless one is a child, one will not be prompted to
say like this. It is nobody’s experience that one entity can have many
forms. Even if you call one thing by many names, it is not different
from what is called “knowable”. And if you treat it to be different,
then, you should not say the following “a mental perception is
caused by the sense perception, which is the auxiliary cause of the
object arising after its own content.”
Text: 531
तदेविम न्दर्यज्ञानस्य पर्तीयमानाथर् समुद्वत्वाभावः। दृष्ान्तश्च साधनिवकलः-न
रूपािदस्वलक्षणस्य रूपरूपावभाताथोर्द्वत्वम स्त।
tadevamindriyajñānasya pratīyamānārthasamudbhavatvābhāvaḥ.
dṛṣṭāntaśca sādhanavikalaḥ-na rūpādisvalakṣaṇasya rūparūpāva-
bhātārthodbhavatvamasti.
Translation: 531
Thus, a sense perception is not caused by the object which appears
in the perception and the example which you have provided in
support of your theses, is suffering from the defect of absence of the
ground in the example, because it is not the case that svalakṣaṇa
like color etc. is produced by the object which has appeared in the
perception viz. the color.
Text: 532
अथ अपर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्वत्वं मे िवविक्षतम्;
atha apratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ me vivakṣitam;
Translation: 532
Clarification:
Well, what I intend is the perceptual cognition is produced by the
svalakṣaṇa which is not being cognized.
Text: 533
तदाऽतीतानागतानुमानिवकल्पानाम् अपर्तीयमानाथोर्द्वत्वेन िनिवर् कल्पकत्वमापद्ते।
tadā’tītānāgatānumānavikalpānām apratīyamānārthodbhavatvena
nirvikalpakatvamāpadyate.
Translation: 533
Reply:
In that case, then, since inferential cognition of past and future
object is produced by an object which is not being cognized at
present, should become indeterminate cognition.
[३.एकोपलम्भसामथ्यार्त् िवक ल्पकायाः समुद्व इत्याद्ुक्ेिनर् रसनम्।]
[3.ekopalambhasāmarthyāt vikalpikāyāḥ samudbhava ityādyukter-
nirasanam.]
Text: 534
यदप्यन्यदक्
ु म्-“एकोपलम्भसामथ्यार्द ् िवक ल्पकायाः समुद्वः-'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभे'
इित िकल एकभूतलोपलम्भे सित िवक ल्पका बुिद्रुत्पद्ते-'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभ्यते'
इत्यािदका” एतदिप न युक्म्। यथा रूपस्वलक्षणस्य सिवकल्पकिवज्ञानजनकत्वं ना स्त
अिवकल्पकत्वात्, तथा िवज्ञानस्वलक्षणमिप सिवकल्पकिवज्ञानोत्पादकत्वमितवतर् ते
अिवचारकत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
yadapyanyaduktam-ekopalambhasāmarthyād vikalpikāyāḥ samud-

bhavaḥ- ‘idamupalabhe idaṁ nopalabhe’ iti kila ekabhūtalopala-
mbhe sati vikalpikā buddhirutpadyate-‘idamupalabhe idaṁ nopa-
labhyate’ ityādikā etadapi na yuktam. yathā rūpasvalakṣaṇasya
savikalpakavijñānajanakatvaṁ nāsti avikalpakatvāt, tathā vijñāna-
svalakṣaṇamapi savikalpakavijñānotpādakatvamativartate avicāra-
katvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 534
You also made another statement viz. “an imaginary cognition
arises on the basis of cognition of one thing.” When we see one
ground we say, “I perceive this” “I do not perceive this”, and after
such constructed perception arises, we say “I see this”, “this is
not seen” etc. This is also not correct. As a svalakṣaṇa of color
is not capable of generating a determinate cognition, because it is
not of a determinate nature, in the same way, the svalakṣaṇa of
cognition also cannot transgress the character of being the producer
of a determinate cognition, because it is also indeterminate in
character.
Text: 535
अथ अिवचारकत्वाऽिवशेषेऽिप िनिवर् कल्पकिवज्ञानस्य सिवकल्पकिवज्ञानोदयदानसामथ्यर्
जेगीयते;
atha avicārakatvā’viśeṣe’pi nirvikalpakavijñānasya savikalpakavijñā-
nodayadānasāmarthyaṁ jegīyate;
Translation: 535
Clarification:
Well, even if it is common to the indeterminate cognition, still
an indeterminate cognition is considered as having the capacity of
producing a determinate cognition. This is what we hold.
Text: 536
तदा रूपािदस्वलक्षणस्याप्येतदस्तु, ततश्च पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दानुपप त्ः।
tadā rūpādisvalakṣaṇasyāpyetadastu, tataśca pratyakṣānumānayor-
bhedānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 536
Reply:
In that case, then, let the same capacity be ascribed to a svalakṣaṇa
like color etc. also and in that case, one cannot justify the difference
between a perceptual cognition and an inferential cognition.
[४. पर्त्यक्षसाधन एवेत्यादेबौर्द्ोक्स्य खण्डनम्।]
[4. pratyakṣasādhana evetyāderbauddhoktasya khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 537
ु म्-“पर्त्यक्षसाधन एव इ न्दर्य धयः कल्पनािवरहः।” अथ कोऽयं कल्पनािवरहो
नाम? िकं ज्ञानकायतादात्म्यव्यव स्थतदेहः तिद्परीतो वा?
yadapyanyaduktam-“pratyakṣasādhana eva indriyadhiyaḥ
kalpanā- virahaḥ.” atha ko’yaṁ kalpanāviraho nāma? kiṁ
jñānakāyatādātmya- vyavasthitadehaḥ, tadviparīto vā?
Translation: 537
You also made another statement, “the absence of mental
construction of a sense perception is caused by perception only”
there we would like to ask, what is this absence of mental
construction? Does it mean the body settled by the identity of the
form of knowledge or opposite of that?
Text: 538
तद्िद ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यव स्थतः; तदा पर्त्यक्षसाधनः कल्पनािवरहः इित। िकमुक्ं
भवित? पर्त्यक्षसाधनो िवज्ञानाकारः पर्त्यक्ष धयः। न केवलं पर्त्यक्षकल्पनािवरहः
पर्त्यक्षसाधन (नोऽ)नुमान धयोऽिप पर्त्यक्षसाधन एव, ज्ञानाकारस्य अनुमानज्ञानेऽिप
भावात्।
tadyadi jñānatādātmyena vyavasthitaḥ; tadā pratyakṣasādhanaḥ kal-
panāvirahaḥ iti. kimuktaṁ bhavati? pratyakṣasādhano vijñānākāraḥ
pratyakṣadhiyaḥ. na kevalaṁ pratyakṣakalpanāvirahaḥ pratyakṣa-
sādhana(no’)numānadhiyo’pi pratyakṣasādhana eva, jñānākārasya
anumānajñāne’pi bhāvāt.
Translation: 538
If you say that, it is settled by the identity of the knowledge
then, it means absence of mental construction, which is caused
by perception. What does it imply? It implies that the form of

knowledge of a perceptual cognition is caused by perception. It is
not the case that the absence of mental construction of a perception
is caused by perception, but that of an inferential cognition is caused
by perception only, because, the form of knowledge is also found in
an inferential cognition.
Text: 539
अथ अनुमानज्ञानस्यािप आत्मसंिवत्ौ कल्पनारिहतत्वं बाह्ाथार्पेक्षया कल्पनात्मक-
त्विमित चेत्;
atha anumānajñānasyāpi ātmasaṁvittau kalpanārahitatvaṁ bāhyār-
thāpekṣayā kalpanātmakatvamiti cet;
Translation: 539
Clarification:
For the self awareness of even inferential cognition, there is absence
of mental construction which stands for cognition of the form of
mental construction, in terms of external object.
Text: 540
तदेतन्मुग्धािभधान(नं) दन
ु ोित मानसम्- “कथं स्युिवर् िवधाकाराः तदेकस्य वस्तुनः।”
tadetanmugdhābhidhāna(naṁ) dunoti mānasam- “kathaṁ syurvivi-
dhākārāḥ tadekasya vastunaḥ.”
Translation: 540
Reply:
This foolish reply disturbs our mind. The following statement comes
to our mind, “how can one thing have various forms?”
Text: 541
अथ भेदेन व्यव स्थतः; तद्गितः कथम्? न स्वसंवेद्ोऽसौ, ज्ञानाकारव्यितरेकात्। नािप
जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन गृह्ते, िवरहस्य सामथ्यर् व्यितरेकात्। एवं च सित यदक्
ु म्-
“पर्त्यक्षसाधन एव इ न्दर्य धयः कल्पनािवरहः” इित तद्ालव ल्गतम्।
atha bhedena vyavasthitaḥ; tadgatiḥ katham? na svasaṁvedyo’sau,
jñānākāravyatirekāt. nāpi janakatvā”kārārpakatvena gṛhyate,
virahasya sāmarthyavyatirekāt. evaṁ ca sati yaduktam- “pratyakṣa-
sādhana eva indriyadhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ” iti tadbālavalgitam.
Translation: 541
If you say it is settled on the basis of difference, how to understand
it? It cannot be self-illuminating, because it is different from the
form of cognition. Nor is it known as an entity, which offers its
form of being a producer, because, an absence does not have such
a capacity. Under these circumstances, your statement viz. “The
absence of mental construction of a sense perception is caused by
perception only” is nothing more than babbling of a child.
Text: 542
अथ 'गौः' इत्यािद ज्ञानं कल्पना। कथमस्य कल्पनात्वम्, अथेर्नाऽजिनतत्वात्?
यिद गवादेरथर् स्य गौ रत्यािदज्ञानोत्पादनसामथ्यर् स्यात् तदा पर्थमाक्षसिन्पातवेलायामिप
कुयार्त् तदाऽत्मनोऽिवशेषात्। तदक्ु म्-
यः पर्ागजनको बुद्ेरुपयोगािवशेषतः।
स पश्चादिप तेन स्यादथार्पायेऽिप नेतर्धीः।।
atha ‘gauḥ’ ityādi jñānaṁ kalpanā. kathamasya kalpanātvam,
arthenā’janitatvāt? yadi gavāderarthasya gaurityādijñānotpādana-
sāmarthyaṁ syāt tadā prathamākṣasannipātavelāyāmapi kuryāt
tadā’tmano’viśeṣāt. taduktam-
yaḥ prāgajanako buddherupayogāviśeṣataḥ,
sa paścādapi tena syādarthāpāye’pi netradhīḥ.
Translation: 542
If you say cognition “this is a cow” is a mental construction, how
do you say it is a mental construction? Is it because it is not
produced by the object? If the object like cow etc. has the capacity
of producing the cognition “this is a cow” then, it must produce at
the time when our eyes fall on it, because at that time the form
is not different, as it has been said “if a thing is not the cause of
its knowledge, because it is not different from the point of view of
utility, even if that object is not there, the visual perception will
still occur.”
Text: 543
अथ शब्दस्मरणमपेक्षय उत्पादयित; तदेवास्तु तद्ेहानन्तरफलत्वाद् गौः इत्यािदज्ञानस्य।
तदक्
ु म्-
अथोर्पयोगेऽिप पुनः स्मात्र् शब्दानुयोजनम्।

अक्षधीयर् द्पेक्षेत सोऽथोर् व्यविहतो भवेत्।।
तदेतदयुक्म्। पर्ाथिमकज्ञानं 'गौः' इित ज्ञानम्, गोिपण्डावगािहिन िवज्ञाने 'गौः'

इितज्ञानसंज्ञा। ततश्च पर्थमाक्षसिन्पातजमिप भवित। एवं च पूवार्परिवज्ञानयोः
एकिवषयत्वे उभयोः 'गौः' इितज्ञानसंज्ञािवषयत्वम्।
atha śabdasmaraṇamapekṣya utpādayati; tadevāstu taddehānantara-
phalatvād gauḥ ityādijñānasya. taduktam-
arthopayoge’pi punaḥ smārttaṁ śabdānuyojanam,

akṣadhīryadyapekṣeta so’rtho vyavahito bhavet.
tadetadayuktam. prāthamikajñānaṁ ‘gauḥ’ iti jñānam, gopiṇḍā-

vagāhini vijñāne ‘gauḥ’ itijñānasaṁjñā. tataśca prathamākṣa-
sannipātajamapi bhavati. evaṁ ca pūrvāparavijñānayoḥ ekavi-
ṣayatve ubhayoḥ ‘gauḥ’ itijñānasaṁjñāviṣayatvam.
Translation: 543
If you say such a perception is produced with the help of
remembrance of the word then, let the same be the case with the
knowledge viz. this is a cow, because it will be treated as result
following the previous body of knowledge as it has been said, “even
if an object is involved in producing knowledge associating it with
the word, is a mental activity.” If mental perception is required
there, then, that object will have to be at a distance. All this is
not proper. The first cognition that arises is “this is a cow”, its
knowledge of an object which is given the name of cow. Thereafter
it can also be a perception, caused by the first contact with the
eyes. Thus, if the two consecutive cognitions have one and the same
object, then, both the cognitions will refer to by the word ‘cow’.
Text: 544
नन्वेकस्य कर्मभािविवज्ञानजनकत्वम् िकम्- एकेन स्वरूपेण, स्वरूपान्तरेण वा? एकेनैव
स्वभावेन जनयित इित बर्ूमः।
nanvekasya kramabhāvivijñānajanakatvam kim- ekena svarūpeṇa,
svarūpāntareṇa vā? ekenaiva svabhāvena janayati iti brūmaḥ.
Translation: 544
Well, you say that one object produces consecutive knowledges there
we would like to ask, does it produce in one form or in different
form? Our answer to this question is, it produces in one form.
Text: 545
नन्वेककालीनता पूवार्परिवज्ञानयोः एकस्वभावायत्त्वे सित आपद्ते;
nanvekakālīnatā pūrvāparavijñānayoḥ ekasvabhāvāyattatve sati āpa-
dyate
Translation: 545
Objection:
Well, in that case two consecutive knowledges will be treated as
belonging to one and the same time, if they are said to be sharing
one and the same nature.
Text: 546
यद्ेवम् एकनीलोत्पािदतनयनालोकिवज्ञानानाम् एकदेशसम्ब न्धत्वम् एकाकारता
एकव्यिक्त्वमापद्ते एकनीलोत्पाद्त्वाऽिवशेषात्।
yadyevam ekanīlotpāditanayanālokavijñānānām ekadeśasambandhi-
tvam ekākāratā ekavyaktitvamāpadyate ekanīlotpādyatvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 546
Reply:
If it is so, then, the perceptual knowledges caused by one blue thing,
will be treated as related to one place, having one form and being
unitary in character, because of its being produced by one blue
thing.
Text: 547
अथ एवंभूतं तत् तस्य स्वरूपं यत् िचतर्कायर् करणात्मकम्;
atha evaṁbhūtaṁ tat tasya svarūpaṁ yat citrakāryakaraṇātmakam;
Translation: 547
Clarification:
Well, that is the nature of that thing, which is of the nature of
producing a number of effects.
Text: 548
यद्ेवं मामकेऽिप पक्षे कर्मभाव्यनेककायर् करणात्मकमेव स्वरूपं स्वहेतुसामथ्यर् िनयिमत-
स्योत्पत्ेः। अथवा, यथा त्वदीये पक्षे मनोज्ञानं स्वलक्षणिवषयं न च पर्थमाक्षसिन्पातजम्,
अिप तु इ न्दर्यज्ञानेन स्विवषयानन्तरिवषयसहका रणा उत्पाद्ते तथा 'गौः' इत्यािदकमिप
ज्ञानं पर्थमाक्षजेन िवज्ञानेन स्विवषयानन्तरिवषयसहका रणा स्मरणाद्ुपिहतेन चोत्पाद्ते
इित िनिवर् षयत्वाभावः, िवषयान्तर[स्य] स्वकारणसामथ्यार्नुरोधेन 'गौः' इत्यािद
ज्ञानजननयोग्यस्योत्पत्ेः; स्मरणमिप समथर् मुत्पन्ं सत् गौः इत्युत्पादयित। एवं सित
यदक्ु म्-यः पर्ागजनको बुद्ेः इत्यािद, तत् स्वपरमतमनालोच्यैव जेगीयते।
yadyevaṁ māmake’pi pakṣe kramabhāvyanekakāryakaraṇātmakameva
svarūpaṁ svahetusāmarthyaniyamitasyotpatteḥ. athavā, yathā
tvadīye pakṣe manojñānaṁ svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṁ na ca prathamā-
kṣasannipātajam, api tu indriyajñānena svaviṣayānantaraviṣaya-
sahakāriṇā utpādyate tathā ‘gauḥ’ ityādikamapi jñānaṁ
prathamākṣajena vijñānena svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇā
smaraṇādyupahitena cotpādyate iti nirviṣayatvābhāvaḥ, viṣayā-
ntara[sya] svakāraṇasāmarthyānurodhena ‘gauḥ’ ityādi jñānajana-
nayogyasyotpatteḥ; smaraṇamapi samarthamutpannaṁ sat gauḥ
ityutpādayati. evaṁ sati yaduktam-yaḥ prāgajanako buddheḥ ityādi,
tat svaparamatamanālocyaiva jegīyate.
Translation: 548
Reply:
If this is so, then, in our view also the nature of a thing can be of
the nature of producing many consecutive effects, because an effect
is invariably controlled by the capacity of its cause or as in your
view a mental perception is considered as a cognition of perception
and as it is not considered as caused by the first contact with the
eyes, but it is considered as being produced by the sense perception,
which helps another object then, its own object, in the same way
the cognition such as this is a cow, is caused by the perception
caused by the first contact with the eyes, which helps the object
other than its own object, with the help of remembrance and hence
it cannot be called contentless. The object other than its own object
is capable of producing the knowledge such as this is a cow on the
basis of the capacity of its own cause. Even remembrance which
occurs is capable of producing the knowledge such as this is a cow.

When this is a fact, your statement viz. as it has been said “if a
thing is not the cause of its knowledge, because it is not different
from the point of view of utility, even if that object is not there,
the visual perception will still occur” is being stated without due
consideration of others as well your own views.
Text: 549
न च ज्ञानाकारव्यितरेकेण वै(िव)कल्पाकारोऽन्योऽ स्त। कल्पनाकारो िह ज्ञानतादात्म्येन
व्यव स्थतः। ततश्च कल्पनापोढं पर्त्यक्षम्। िकमुक्ं भवित। ज्ञानापोढं पर्त्यक्षम्। यो यत्स्व-
भावोपिनबद्ः स िनवत्र्मानः तमादाय िनवत्र्ते। ततश्चाज्ञानात्मकं पर्त्यक्षं िभक्षूणां पर्सक्म्।
na ca jñānākāravyatirekeṇa vai(vi)kalpākāro’nyo’sti. kalpanākāro hi
jñānatādātmyena vyavasthitaḥ. tataśca kalpanāpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣam.
kimuktaṁ bhavati? jñānāpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣam. yo yatsvabhāvopani-
baddhaḥ sa nivarttamānaḥ tamādāya nivarttate. tataśca ajñānā-
tmakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ bhikṣūṇāṁ prasaktam.
Translation: 549
As a matter of fact, there is no other form of verbalizable knowledge
other than the form of knowledge. The form of imagination is settled
as identical to the knowledge and thereafter a perception free from
imagination arises. What does it mean? It will mean a perception
which is devoid of knowledge. If something is associated with its
own nature, when that is excluded it goes along with its nature.
This leads to the contingency that for the Buddhists a perception
becomes of the nature of the non-knowledge.
[५. पर्त्यक्षलक्षणगतस्य अव्यिभचा रपदस्य िनरसनम्।]
[5. pratyakṣalakṣaṇagatasya avyabhicāripadasya nirasanam.]
Text: 550
तथा अव्यिभचा रपदमिप नोपादेयम् अपोह्ज्ञानाऽसम्भवात्।
tathā avyabhicāripadamapi nopādeyam apohyajñānā’sambhavāt.
Translation: 550
In the same way, the clause “which is not erroneous” should also
not be added to the definition of perception, because there is no
possibility of any cognition which will be excluded by this clause.
Text: 551
ननु मात्र्ण्डपादसङ्ातोत्पािदतं िवज्ञानमपोह्म स्त।
nanu mārttaṇḍapādasaṅghātotpāditaṁ vijñānamapohyamasti.
Translation: 551
Clarification:
Well, cognition (of water) produced by a group of rays of the Sun,
will be excluded by that clause.
Text: 552
कथं तदपोह्म्? अतथ्योदकिवषयत्वात्।
kathaṁ tadapohyam? atathyodakaviṣayatvāt.
Translation: 552
How can that be excluded? Is it because it has a content viz. false
water or unreal water?
Text: 553
यद्तथ्योदकिवषयम्; कथं तदपनीयते, अतथ्योदकाकारस्य स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात्
मधुरोदकदीघोर्दकाकारवत्?
yadyatathyodakaviṣayam; kathaṁ tadapanīyate, atathyodakākārasya
svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt madhurodakadīrghodakākāravat?
Translation: 553
If you say the content of that water is unreal, then, how do you
exclude it? Because, there is water in its unreal form, like that form
of sweet water and the form of huge water.
Text: 554
अथ ततर् मधुरोदकं िवद्ते, स्वेन रूपेण पर्तीयमानत्वात्; तिदहाप्युदकं पर्तीयते 'उदकं
गृह्ािम' इित व्यवहारदशर् नात्।
atha tatra madhurodakaṁ vidyate, svena rūpeṇa pratīyamānatvāt;
tadihāpyudakaṁ pratīyate ‘udakaṁ gṛhṇāmi’ iti vyavahāradarśanāt.
Translation: 554
Clarification:
If you say there is sweet water because it appears there in the
knowledge in its own form then, here also there is appearance of

water, because we do say “I take water”. Reply
Text: 555
सत्यम्, पर्ितभाित, अतथ्यं तु पर्ितभाित।
satyam, pratibhāti, atathyaṁ tu pratibhāti.
Translation: 555
It is true that water appears, but what appears is false.
[६. पर्सङ्ायाताया अतथ्यताया िवकल्प्य दषू णम्।]
[6. prasaṅgāyātāyā atathyatāyā vikalpya dūṣaṇam.]
Text: 556
अतथ्यता का? िकं पर्तीयमानस्याभावः, अथ पर्तीयमान एवाऽभावः?
atathyatā kā? kiṁ pratīyamānasyābhāvaḥ, atha pratīyamāna evā-
’bhāvaḥ?
Translation: 556
What do you mean by falsity? Does it mean absence of what has
appeared? Or does it mean the absence which has appeared?
Text: 557
यिद पर्तीयमानस्याभावः; सोऽतर् नावभाित, उदकाकार एवाऽवभाित।
yadi pratīyamānasyābhāvaḥ; so’tra nāvabhāti, udakākāra evā’va-
bhāti.
Translation: 557
If you say it is the absence of what has appeared, that has not
appeared here, because what has appeared here is the form of water.
Text: 558
अथ पर्तीयमान एवाऽभावः; सोऽप्यनुपपन् एव; न िह भावाकारे पर्तीयमाने अभावकल्पना
युक्ा, अन्यथा रसाकारे पर्तीयमाने रूपाकारः प रकल्पियतव्यः। ततश्चालूनिवशीणर् जगत्
स्यात्। यिद च अभावः पर्ितभाित; कथं तददु कज्ञानं, िमथ्याज्ञानं चोच्यते अभाविवषयस्य
स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात्?
atha pratīyamāna evā’bhāvaḥ; so’pyanupapanna eva; na hi bhāvā-
kāre pratīyamāne abhāvakalpanā yuktā, anyathā rasākāre pratī-
yamāne rūpākāraḥ parikalpayitavyaḥ. tataścālūnaviśīrṇaṁ jagat
syāt. yadi ca abhāvaḥ pratibhāti; kathaṁ tadudakajñānaṁ, mithyā-

jñānaṁ cocyate abhāvaviṣayasya svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt?
Translation: 558
If you say that, it is the absence which has appeared, that also
is not proper, because if the form of absence has appeared, it is
not proper to postulate absence there, otherwise, when in a case
the form of taste has appeared, one can also postulate the form of
color and if this is accepted, the entire world will become scattered
without its being cut into pieces. Moreover, absence has appeared
then, how would you call it the knowledge of water and also a false
knowledge? Because, the object viz. absence does appear there in
its own form.
Text: 559
तदेतददु कज्ञानम् उदकं िवषययित, उदकाभावं, आत्मानं, न िकिञ्द् वा?
tadetadudakajñānam udakaṁ viṣayayati, udakābhāvaṁ, ātmānaṁ,
na kiñcid vā?
Translation: 559
There, we would like to know whether this knowledge of water
has water as its content or absence of water as its content or the
knowledge itself as its content, or no content at all?
Text: 560
तद्िद उदकं िवषययित; तदा न तस्य िमथ्यात्वं मधुरोदकसंवेदनस्येव।
tadyadi udakaṁ viṣayayati; tadā na tasya mithyātvaṁ madhuroda-
kasaṁvedanasyeva.
Translation: 560
If you say water is the content, then, it cannot be called erroneous
knowledge, like the knowledge of sweet water.
Text: 561
ततर् तथ्योदकं पर्ितभाित;
tatra tathyodakaṁ pratibhāti;
Translation: 561
Clarification:
But there real water appears.
Text: 562
िकं यत् पर्ितभाित तत् तथ्योदकं, आहो यत् तथ्यं तत् पर्ितभाित?
kiṁ yat pratibhāti tat tathyodakaṁ, āho yat tathyaṁ tat pratibhāti?
Translation: 562
Reply:
Here the question arises, whether the water that appears in the
knowledge of water, is real water or is it the real water that appears
in the knowledge?
Text: 563
तद्िद यत् पर्ितभाित तत् तथ्यम्; इहाप्युदकं पर्ितभाित, पर्ाप्ा तस्यािप तथ्यता।
tadyadi yat pratibhāti tat tathyam; ihāpyudakaṁ pratibhāti, prāptā
tasyāpi tathyatā.
Translation: 563
If you say what appears is real, then, in this case also, water appears
in the knowledge and therefore, water will become real.
Text: 564
अथ यत् तथ्यं तत् पर्ितभाित; तस्य तथ्यता कथं ज्ञायते - िकं पर्तीत्या, अन्यथा वा?
atha yat tathyaṁ tat pratibhāti; tasya tathyatā kathaṁ jñāyate - kiṁ
pratītyā, anyathā vā?
Translation: 564
If you say what is real that appears in the knowledge, there the
question arises how is the reality of water known? Is it through
knowledge or by some other way?
Text: 565
यिद पर्तीत्या; इहािप पर्तीितरुत्पद्ते, अस्तु तथ्यता।
yadi pratītyā; ihāpi pratītirutpadyate, astu tathyatā.
Translation: 565
If you say it is by knowledge, and then, here also there is knowledge
of water, then, let the water be true.
Text: 566
अथ पर्तीितमन्तरेण तथ्यता उपपाद्ते; तथा सु स्थतािन वस्तूिन! सवर् वाद सिद्ः स्यात्।
atha pratītimantareṇa tathyatā upapādyate; tathā susthitāni vastūni!

sarvavādasiddhiḥ syāt.
Translation: 566
If you say that, without knowledge, reality is explained, and then,
all the things are settled as they are and it will lead to establishment
of all theories.
Text: 567
अथ पर्तीयते-यिद नाम बाध्यते; 'पर्तीयते बाध्यते च' इित िचतर्म्। पर्तीयमानत्वं च
जनकत्वऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन व्याप्ं, यच्च न जनयित नाकारमपर् यित य(त)न्ावभाित, यथा
रूपज्ञाने रसः। पर्तीयते चातर् उदकं, जनकत्वऽऽकारापर् कत्वोपप त्ः, तदपु पत्ौ च न
बाधोपप त्ः, जनकत्वऽऽकारापर् कत्वस्य सत्विनबन्धनत्वात्।
atha pratīyate-yadi nāma bādhyate; ‘pratīyate bādhyate ca’ iti
citram. pratīyamānatvaṁ ca janakatva”kārārpakatvena vyāptaṁ,
yacca na janayati nākāramarpayati ya(ta)nnāvabhāti, yathā rūpa-
jñāne rasaḥ. pratīyate cātra udakaṁ, janakatva’kārārpakatvo-
papattiḥ, tadupapattau ca na bādhopapattiḥ, janakatva”kārārpaka-
tvasya sattvanibandhanatvāt.
Translation: 567
If you say it is known and at the same time it is contradicted,
then, it is funny because how is it that it is known and at the same
time it is contradicted? The state of being known is pervaded by
the state of offering the form being the producer of that cognition
and if something does not produce, it does not offer the form and
obviously it does not appear in the knowledge. For example, in the
knowledge of color, the taste does not appear. Here, however the
water does appear and therefore it satisfies the character of offering
the form being the producer of the knowledge and once that is
justifiable, how can there arise a contradiction? Because, the state
of offering the form being the producer depends upon existence.
Text: 568
अथ अभावं िवषययित; न तिहर् उदकज्ञानरूपता अभावगृहीितरूपत्वात्। नािप तस्य
िमथ्यात्वम्, अभाविवषयत्वस्योपपत्ेः। न च सौगतमते अभावे क श्चद् िवषयाथर्
उपपद्ते जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वव्यितरेकात्। उदकाकारो िह पर्तीत्युत्क लतः, तदभावश्च
अपर्ातीितक इहोपपाद्ते मुग्धबौद्ैः।
atha abhāvaṁ viṣayayati; na tarhi udakajñānarūpatā abhāvagṛhī-

tirūpatvāt. nāpi tasya mithyātvam, abhāvaviṣayatvasyopapatteḥ.
na ca saugatamate abhāve kaścid viṣayārtha upapadyate janaka-
tvā”kārārpakatvavyatirekāt. udakākāro hi pratītyutkalitaḥ, tadabhā-
vaśca aprātītika ihopapādyate mugdhabauddhaiḥ.
Translation: 568
If you say absence is the content of the knowledge of water, then,
it cannot be knowledge of water, because this knowledge will reveal
only absence of water and according to the doctrine of Buddhists,
there cannot be an object like absence, because it does not have the
character of offering the form being the producer of the knowledge.
What the Buddhist scholars foolishly doing is the form of water, is
taken from the cognition of water and the absence of water which
has not appeared in the cognition is being explained here.
Text: 569
अथ आत्मिवषयम्; तथािप व्यिभचा रता नोपपद्ते स्वांशस्याऽवञ्नात्, निह ज्ञानमात्मानं
िवसंवदित। नािप तद् उदकज्ञानत्वेन व्यपदेश्यं रागािदसंवेदनवत्। निह नीलाभं संवेदनं
रसिवज्ञानात्मकत्वेन व्यपिदश्यमानं दृष्म्।
atha ātmaviṣayam; tathāpi vyabhicāritā nopapadyate svāṁśasyā’-
vañcanāt, nahi jñānamātmānaṁ visaṁvadati. nāpi tad udakajñāna-
tvena vyapadeśyaṁ rāgādisaṁvedanavat. nahi nīlābhaṁ saṁve-
danaṁ rasavijñānātmakatvena vyapadiśyamānaṁ dṛṣṭam.
Translation: 569
If you say that, this cognition itself takes as object, then, this
cognition cannot be said to be erroneous, because cognition cannot
betray its own part, cognition cannot be contradictory to its own
form. Nor cannot be said to be cognition of water, like the cognition
of attachment. Nobody has seen that cognition of blue object is
being referred to as cognition of taste.
Text: 570
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् तददु कज्ञानं, उदकज्ञानतया तु पर्ितभाित, तेन जानीमो न
िनिवर् षयम्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi tadudakajñānaṁ, udakajñānatayā tu

pratibhāti, tena jānīmo na nirviṣayam.
Translation: 570
If you say it is contentless, then, again it is not cognition of water.
But, as a matter of fact, the cognition appears as cognition of water.
By that we come to know that it is not without content.
Text: 571
यिद च िनिवर् षयं; कथं त न्मथ्याज्ञानम्? ज्ञानमातर्ानुरोधेन न िमथ्याज्ञानं नािप
सम्यग्ज्ञानम्। न च भवतां पक्षे ज्ञानं िनरालम्बनम स्त स्वांशपयर् व सतत्वात्।
yadi ca nirviṣayaṁ; kathaṁ tanmithyājñānam? jñānamātrā-
nurodhena na mithyājñānaṁ nāpi samyagjñānam. na ca bhavatāṁ
pakṣe jñānaṁ nirālambanamasti svāṁśaparyavasitatvāt.
Translation: 571
Moreover, if it is without content, how is it called an erroneous
cognition? Merely as cognition, no cognition is false or true.
According to your doctrine, there is no cognition without content,
because every cognition reveals its own part as its content.
[७. व्यिभचा रत्वस्य िवकल्प्य खण्डनम्।]
[7. vyabhicāritvasya vikalpya khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 572
िवज्ञानस्य व्यिभचा रता िकं - स्वसत्ामातर्ानुरोधेन, आहो परसत्ानुरोधेन?
vijñānasya vyabhicāritā kiṁ - svasattāmātrānurodhena, āho parasa-
ttānurodhena?
Translation: 572
(By the by) we would like to know what do you mean falsity of a
cognition? Is it in terms of mere existence of itself or is it in terms
of existence of something else.
Text: 573
तद्िद स्वसत्ानुरोधेन; तथा सवर् िवज्ञानानां व्यिभचा रता पर्ाप्नोित, ज्ञानरूपतायाः सवर् तर्
भावात्, न िकिञ्िद्ज्ञानमव्यिभचा र स्यात्।
tadyadi svasattānurodhena; tathā sarvavijñānānāṁ vyabhicāritā
prāpnoti, jñānarūpatāyāḥ sarvatra bhāvāt, na kiñcidvijñānamavya-
bhicāri syāt.
Translation: 573
If you say it is in terms of its own existence, then, all knowledges
should be declared as false knowledges, because in every knowledge,
there is the form of knowledge and as a result and no cognition will
be left as a true cognition.
Text: 574
अथ परसत्ानुरोधेन व्यिभचा रता उच्यते िकम् - अनुपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन, आहो
उपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन?
atha parasattānurodhena vyabhicāritā ucyate kiṁ - anupakāra-
kaparasattānurodhena, āho upakārakaparasattānurodhena?
Translation: 574
If you say that, a cognition is a false cognition in terms of something
else, is it due to existence of something else which does not provide
any help or is it due to the existence of something else which offers
some help?
Text: 575
तद्िद अनुपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन व्यिभचा रता; तदा सवर् संिवत्ीनां व्यिभचा रता
पर्ाप्नोित, अनुपकारकपरसत्ाऽिवशेषात्।
tadyadi anupakārakaparasattānurodhena vyabhicāritā; tadā sarva-
saṁvittīnāṁ vyabhicāritā prāpnoti, anupakārakaparasattā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 575
If you say falsity is accounted for in terms of existence of something
else which does not offer any help, then, all cognitions should be
declared as false, because all share the same existence of something
else, which does not offer any help.
Text: 576
अथ उपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन व्यिभचा र अिभधीयते िकं - करणभूतपरोपकारक-
परसत्ानुरोधेन, आहो कमर् तापन्ोपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन?
atha upakārakaparasattānurodhena vyabhicāri abhidhīyate kiṁ-
karaṇabhūtaparopakārakaparasattānurodhena, āho karmatāpanno-
pakārakaparasattānurodhena?
Translation: 576
Again if you say that cognition is called false because of the
existence of something else, which offers some help, there also the
question arises, is it due to the existence of something else which

offer some help being an instrument of it or due to the existence of
something else, which offers some help of the nature of being object
of the cognition.
Text: 577
तद्िद करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ानुवेधेन तदा सवार्सां संिवत्ीनां िमथ्यात्वमापद्ते
करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ाऽिवशेषात्।
tadyadi karaṇabhūtaparopakārakasattānuvedhena tadā sarvāsāṁ
saṁvittīnāṁ mithyātvamāpadyate karaṇabhūtaparopakārakasattā’-
viśeṣāt.
Translation: 577
If you say that, it is due to the existence of something else which
offers some help of being an instrument, then, all cognitions should
be declared as false, because, they all will have same character of
having existence of something else which offers some help being an
instrument.
Text: 578
अथ कमर् कारकोपकारकपरसत्ानुवेधेन िमथ्यात्वं; तदयुक्म्; न तस्य िमथ्यात्वं
सत्योदक- ज्ञानस्येव कमर् कारकेण उपिकर्यमाणत्वात्।
atha karmakārakopakārakaparasattānuvedhena mithyātvaṁ; tada-
yuktam; na tasya mithyātvaṁ satyodakajñānasyeva karmakārakeṇa
upakriyamāṇatvāt.
Translation: 578
Again if you say that the cognition is false, due to the existence of
something else, that is, the content of the cognition, which offers
some help, being the content of the cognition that also will not be
proper, because, that cognition of water cannot be said to be false,
like the cognition of actual water which is being helped by water as
its content.
[८. ज्ञानगतस्य सम्यक्त्वस्यािप िवकल्प्य िवदलनम्।]
[8. jñānagatasya samyaktvasyāpi vikalpya vidalanam.]
Text: 579
तथा सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वमिप कथम्? िकं ज्ञानसत्ामातर्ानुरोधेन, आहो परसत्ानुरोधेन?
tathā samyagjñānatvamapi katham? kiṁ jñānasattāmātrānuro-

dhena, āho parasattānurodhena?
Translation: 579
Similarly, how, i.e., on what ground do you say that cognition is
true cognition? Is it due to mere existence of cognition, or due to
existence of something else, i.e. its content?
Text: 580
तद्िद ज्ञानसत्ामातर्ानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वम्; तदा सवर् संिवत्ीनां सम्यक्त्वं पर्ाप्नोित
ज्ञानाकारस्योपपत्ेः।
tadyadi jñānasattāmātrānurodhena samyaktvam; tadā sarvasaṁ-
vittīnāṁ samyaktvaṁ prāpnoti jñānākārasyopapatteḥ.
Translation: 580
If you say, it is true because of mere existence of the cognition,
then, all cognitions will have to be true cognitions, because each
cognition exists only as cognition.
Text: 581
अथ परसत्ानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वं, तदा िकमनुपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन, िकं वा उपकारक-
परसत्ानुरोधेन?
atha parasattānurodhena samyaktvaṁ, tadā kimanupakārakapara-
sattānurodhena, kiṁ vā upakārakaparasattānurodhena?
Translation: 581
If again you say that, a cognition is true because of existence
of something else, there also the question arises, is it due to the
existence of something else, which does not offer any help, or due
to the existence of something else which offers some help?
Text: 582
तद्िद अनुपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन सम्यक्त्वं, तदा सवार्सां संिवत्ीनां सम्यक्त्वमापद्ते,
अनुपकारकपरसत्ाऽिवशेषात्।
tadyadi anupakārakaparasattānurodhena samyaktvaṁ, tadā sarvāsāṁ
saṁvittīnāṁ samyaktvamāpadyate, anupakārakaparasattā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 582
If you say it is true due to the existence of something else, which
does not offer any help, then, all cognitions should become true,
because this feature of existence of something else which does not

offer any help is common to all.
Text: 583
अथ उपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन िकम् - करणभूतपरोपकारकपरसत्ानुवेधेन, आहो
कमर् ता- पन्ोपकारकसत्ानुवेधेन?
atha upakārakaparasattānurodhena kim - karaṇabhūtaparopakāraka-
parasattānuvedhena, āho karmatāpannopakārakasattānuvedhena?
Translation: 583
If you say it is due to the existence of something else, which offers
some help, then, is it due to the existence of something else, which
offers some help, being an instrument or due to the existence of
something else which offers some help, being its content?
Text: 584
तद्िद करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ानुवेधेन, तदा सवार्सां संिवत्ीनां सम्यक्त्वमापद्ते,
करणभूतपरोपकारकसत्ािवशेषात्।
tadyadi karaṇabhūtaparopakārakasattānuvedhena, tadā sarvāsāṁ
saṁvittīnāṁ samyaktvamāpadyate, karaṇabhūtaparopakārakasattā-
viśeṣāt.
Translation: 584
If you say it is due to the existence of something else, which offers
some help being an instrument, then, all cognitions will become
true cognitions, because, all have existence, which causes some help
being an instrument.
Text: 585
अथ कमर् तापन्परसत्ानुवेधेन सम्यक्त्वमिभधीयते, तदा रागािदसंवेदनस्य सम्यक्त्वं न
पर्ाप्नोित अतीतानागताथर् िवषयत्वे योिगज्ञानस्य च।
atha karmatāpannaparasattānuvedhena samyaktvamabhidhīyate,
tadā rāgādisaṁvedanasya samyaktvaṁ na prāpnoti atītānā-
gatārthaviṣayatve yogijñānasya ca.
Translation: 585
And if you say cognition is called true due to the existence
of something else, being the content of the cognition, then, the
cognition of attachment etc. will not be called a true cognition.

And the same will be the case with cognition of an ascetic in which
the past and future objects will be the content.
Text: 586
यत् तत् व्यिभचा र ज्ञानं तत् िकम् - व्यिभचा रभूतेन उपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते, आहो
अव्यिभचा रभूतेनोपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते?
yat tat vyabhicāri jñānaṁ tat kim - vyabhicāribhūtena upādāna-
jñānena janyate, āho avyabhicāribhūtenopādānajñānena janyate?
Translation: 586
Whatever you consider as a false cognition, is it produced by the
knowledge of its material cause, which is false or is it produced by
the knowledge of its material cause, which is not false?
Text: 587
तद्िद व्यिभचा रभूतेन उपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते, तदिप व्यिभचा रभूतेन पर्ाप्ा व्यिभचा र-
परम्परा। सङ्गर्ाह्मव्यिभचा र न लभ्यते।
tadyadi vyabhicāribhūtena upādānajñānena janyate, tadapi vyabhi-
cāribhūtena prāptā vyabhicāriparamparā. saṅgrāhyamavyabhicāri na
labhyate.
Translation: 587
If you say, it is produced by the knowledge of its material cause,
which is false, then, it will generate an unending series of false
cognitions and in that case one can never know what a false
cognition is.
Text: 588
अथ अव्यिभचा रभूतेनोपादानज्ञानेन जन्यते; तद् उपादानकारणमनुकुवर् द्ा उपजायते,
अननुकुवर् द्ा?
atha avyabhicāribhūtenopādānajñānena janyate; tad upādānakāra-
ṇamanukurvadvā upajāyate, ananukurvadvā?
Translation: 588
If you say, it is produced by the knowledge of its material cause,
which is true, then, the question arises, is it produced by following
the material cause or without following the material cause?
Text: 589
तद्िद उपादानकारणानुकारेणोत्पाद्ते; तदा िकमाप्नोित? अव्यिभचा र स्वरूपानुकारेण
उत्पाद्ते। कथम्? अव्यिभचारस्य ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यव स्थतेः।
tadyadi upādānakāraṇānukāreṇotpādyate; tadā kimāpnoti? avya-
bhicāri svarūpānukāreṇa utpādyate. katham? avyabhicārasya jñāna-
tādātmyena vyavasthiteḥ.
Translation: 589
If you say, it is produced by following the material cause, then, what
is the outcome? Does it mean it produces the cognition following
its own nature which is not false? But how can it happen? Because,
the absence of falsity is settled by its identity with the cognition.
Text: 590
न च एकदेशानुका रत्वम स्त उपादानकारणस्य िनरवयवत्वात्। एवं सवर् िवज्ञानमव्यिभचा र
पर्सक्म् - अपोह्ज्ञानानुपप त्ः।
na ca ekadeśānukāritvamasti upādānakāraṇasya niravayavatvāt. evaṁ
sarvaṁ vijñānamavyabhicāri prasaktam - apohyajñānānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 590
You cannot say that, it follows only a part of the material cause,
because the material cause has no parts. Thus, every knowledge
will become true and there will be no false cognition which can be
excluded by the clause “which is not erroneous.”
Text: 591
न च व्यिभचाराव्यिभचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यित रक्ौ स्तः। यथा रसाकारो रूपाकारो
वा ज्ञानाकाराद् िभन्ः न तथा व्यिभचाराऽव्यिभचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यित रक्ौ। ततश्च
व्यिभचाराकारो अतर् िनरािकर्यते। िकमुक्ं भवित? ज्ञानाकारोऽतर् िनरािकर्यते। ततश्च
अज्ञानात्मकं पर्त्यक्षं पर्सक्ं सौगतानाम्।
na ca vyabhicārāvyabhicārau jñānād vyatiriktau staḥ. yathā rasā-
kāro rūpākāro vā jñānākārād bhinnaḥ na tathā vyabhicārā’vya-
bhicārau jñānād vyatiriktau. tataśca vyabhicārākāro atra nirākri-
yate. kimuktaṁ bhavati? jñānākāro’tra nirākriyate. tataśca ajñānāt-
makaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prasaktaṁ saugatānām.
Translation: 591
It is not the case that falsity and truthfulness are different from
cognitions, as the form of taste and form of color are different from
their knowledges; the falsity and the truthfulness, are not different
from their knowledges and what is happening here is the form of
falsity is being excluded. What does it mean? As a matter of fact,
the form of knowledge is itself being excluded and this will lead
the Buddhist philosophers to accept perception which is not of the
nature of cognition.
Text: 592
अिप च यथा रूपेण उपादानभूतेन जन्यते रूपम् तथा ज्ञानमिप उपादानभूतेनव ै जन्यते।
य एव तस्य रूपोत्पादने आत्मा स एव तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादनेऽिप। न िह तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादने
आत्मान्यत्वम्।
api ca yathā rūpeṇa upādānabhūtena janyate rūpam tathā jñānamapi
upādānabhūtenaiva janyate. ya eva tasya rūpotpādane ātmā sa eva
tasya jñānotpādane’pi. na hi tasya jñānotpādane ātmānyatvam.
Translation: 592
Moreover, as color is produced from the material viz. color, in
the same way, cognition also is produced from something which
is its material. Whatever, is the form of that with reference to
the production of color, the same is the form with reference to
the production of cognition. It does not have any other form with
reference to the production of cognition.
Text: 593
अथ िनिमत्भूतेन ज्ञानमुत्पाद्ते, उपादानभूतेन रूपिमित चेत्;
atha nimittabhūtena jñānamutpādyate, upādānabhūtena rūpamiti
cet;
Translation: 593
Clarification:
Cognition is produced from what is called efficient cause, but a color
is produced from the material cause.
Text: 594
तत्कथमेकस्य अनेकाकारयोिगतोपपद्ते? न च संज्ञान्यत्वे मेयान्यत्वमुपपद्ते, रूपवद्
िवज्ञानस्यािप रूपरूपता पर्ाप्नोित। तत्पर्ाप्ौ च न परलोक आत्मा, तदभावान् परलोकः।
इदमेवं चेत स समारोप्याह भगवान् बृहस्पितः-“परलोिकनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः।”
tatkathamekasya anekākārayogitopapadyate? na ca saṁjñānyatve

meyā- nyatvamupapadyate, rūpavad vijñānasyāpi rūparūpatā prāp-
noti. tatprāptau ca na paralokī ātmā, tadabhāvānna paralokaḥ.
idamevaṁ cetasi samāropyāha bhagavān bṛhaspatiḥ-“paralokino-
’bhāvāt paralokābhāvaḥ.”
Translation: 594
Reply:
Then how will you explain one thing having many forms? It is not
the case that by calling by different names, the objects will become
different as in the case of color, so also in the case of cognition,
there is the nature of form and if that is obtained then, one cannot
maintain that a self goes to another world and if that is not there,
it follows that there is no world beyond this world of experience.
Having kept this very idea in mind, the Lord Bṛhaspati has said,
“since there are no persons who go to any other world, other than
this, there is no other world, beyond this world.”
Text: 595
अथ रूपोपादानजन्यत्वेिप ज्ञानरूपतैव;
atha rūpopādānajanyatvepi jñānarūpataiva;
Translation: 595
Clarification:
Well, even if the cognition is produced from the material cause viz.
color, it is nothing but cognition.
Text: 596
रूपस्यािप ज्ञानरूपता पर्ाप्ा रूपोपादानजन्यत्वात् ज्ञानरूपवत्।
rūpasyāpi jñānarūpatā prāptā rūpopādānajanyatvāt jñānarūpavat.
Translation: 596
Reply:
Then, a color becomes cognition because it is produced by the
material called color, like the form of cognition.
Text: 597
अथ ज्ञा[नं ज्ञानेन उपादानभूतेन जन्य]ते;
atha jñā[naṁ jñānena upādānabhūtena janya]te;
Translation: 597
Clarification:
Cognition is produced by cognition, as its material cause.
Text: 598
रूपमिप तेनव
ै जन्यते, निह तस्य रूपोपादाने आत्माऽन्यत्वम्। एवं च-
तदतदर्ूिपणोभावाः तदतदर्ूपहेतुजाः।
तदर्ूपािद िकमज्ञानं िवज्ञानािभन्हेतुजम्।। (पर्माणवा.३.२५१)
rūpamapi tenaiva janyate, nahi tasya rūpopādāne ātmā’nyatvam.
evaṁ ca-
tadatadrūpiṇobhāvāḥ tadatadrūpahetujāḥ,
tadrūpādi kimajñānaṁ vijñānābhinnahetujam.(pramāṇa.vā.3.251)
Translation: 598
Reply:
Then the form is also produced by form, we do not say anything
else other than itself, with reference to production of form. Thus,
it has been said in the (Pramāṇavārttika 3.251) viz. “the similar
and dissimilar, positive entities are caused by similar and dissimilar
causes respectively.” And therefore, is it the case an entity other
than cognition is caused by a cause identical with the cognition?
Text: 599
अथ रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे िवज्ञानस्य न रूपात्मता तथा ज्ञानोत्पादन(ज्ञानोपादान)-
जन्यत्वेऽिप िवज्ञानस्य न ज्ञानरूपता,
atha rūpopādānajanyatve vijñānasya na rūpātmatā tathā jñānot-
pādana(jñānopādāna)janyatve’pi vijñānasya na jñānarūpatā,
Translation: 599
Clarification:
Well, even if cognition is produced by color, cognition is not
identical with color. Similarly, even if cognition is generated by
the factors of cognition, cognition cannot identical with cognition.
Text: 600
ततश्च नैरात्म्यपर्सङ्ः।
tataśca nairātmyaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 600
Reply:
Thus there will arise the contingency of absence of self.
Text: 601
अथ ज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वे ज्ञानाकारप रकल्पना तथा रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे रूपाकारता,
आलोकोपादानजन्यत्वेन आलोकाकारता पर्ाप्नोित; ततश्च आकारकदम्बात्मकं ज्ञानं
पर्सक्म्। अिनष्ं चैतत्, अद्यरूपत्वेनाऽभ्युपगमात्।
atha jñānopādānajanyatve jñānākāraparikalpanā tathā rūpopādāna-
janyatve rūpākāratā, ālokopādānajanyatvena ālokākāratā prāpnoti;
tataśca ākārakadambātmakaṁ jñānaṁ prasaktam. aniṣṭaṁ caitat,
advayarūpatvenā’bhyupagamāt.
Translation: 601
If you say that, since a cognition is caused by the factor of cognition,
we postulate the form of cognition. Similarly, when color is produced
from the color, it gets the form of color. Likewise, when something is
produced from the material of light it gets the form of light, then, it
leads to a cognition having multiple forms. But this is not desirable,
because, it is accepted as non-dual entity.
Text: 602
यत् तदर्ूपोत्पाद्ं िवज्ञानं त त्कम् - एकदेशेन रूपोत्पाद्त्वेन स्थतम्, सवार्त्मना वा
उत्पाद्त्वेन पयर् व सतम्?
yat tadrūpotpādyaṁ vijñānaṁ tatkim - ekadeśena rūpotpādyatvena
sthitam, sarvātmanā vā utpādyatvena paryavasitam?
Translation: 602
You said that cognition is produced by that form. There, we would
like to know (i) whether it is accepted as produced by the form
partially? or (ii) whether it results in being produced totally?
Text: 603
तद्िद एकदेशेन स्थतम्; तदयुक्म्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशिवरहात्।
tadyadi ekadeśena sthitam; tadayuktam; akhaṇḍasya ekadeśavirahāt.
Translation: 603
If you say it is produced by the form partially, that will not be
proper because, that which is indivisible cannot have parts.
Text: 604
अथ सवार्त्मना रूपोत्पाद्त्वेन पयर् व सतम्; तदा िवज्ञानोत्पाद्ं न पर्ाप्नोित यथा
एककारकसमूहोत्पाद्त्वेन पयर् व सतस्य कारकसङ्ातस्य सङ्ातान्तरोत्पाद्त्वं न दृष्म्,
ततश्च िवज्ञानसङ्ातानुपप त्ः।
atha sarvātmanā rūpotpādyatvena paryavasitam; tadā vijñānot-
pādyaṁ na prāpnoti yathā ekakārakasamūhotpādyatvena paryavasi-
tasya kārakasaṅghātasya saṅghātāntarotpādyatvaṁ na dṛṣṭam,
tataśca vijñānasaṅghātānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 604
If you say, it results in being produced totally, then, it cannot be
said that it is produced by cognition, as a collection of factors which
is seen to be produced by one group of factors is not seen to have
been produced by another group of factors. Therefore, the theory
of chain of cognitions cannot be justified.
Text: 605
तथा रूपमिप ज्ञानमेकदेशेन कुयार्त्, सवार्त्मना करणपयर् व सतं वा?
tathā rūpamapi jñānamekadeśena kuryāt, sarvātmanā karaṇaparya-
vasitaṁ vā?
Translation: 605
In the same way, a color will produce its knowledge, is it by part or
in totality?
Text: 606
तद्िद एकदेशेन करोित; तदयुक्म्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशाऽयोगात्।
tadyadi ekadeśena karoti; tadayuktam; akhaṇḍasya ekadeśā’yogāt.
Translation: 606
If you say it will produce in part, it will not be proper, because,
that which is indivisible cannot have parts.
Text: 607
अथ सवार्त्मना करोित; तदा रूपं सवार्त्मना िवज्ञानकरणे पयर् व सतं न रूपान्तरकरणे
पर्वत्र्ते, यथा एककारकसामगर्ी एककायोर्त्पादनपयर् व सता कायार्न्तरसिवतर्ी न भवित,
तथा रूपमिप रूपान्तरोत्पादकं न भवित, ततश्च रूपान्तरस्य आक स्मकत्वम् कथं
तदा(०कत्वम्, तदाऽऽ)क स्मकत्वे कायार्नुमानं िवलुप्यते सौगतानाम्।
atha sarvātmanā karoti; tadā rūpaṁ sarvātmanā vijñānakaraṇe

paryavasitaṁ na rūpāntarakaraṇe pravarttate, yathā ekakārakasā-
magrī ekakāryotpādanaparyavasitā kāryāntarasavitrī na bhavati,
tathā rūpamapi rūpāntarotpādakaṁ na bhavati, tataśca rūpāntarasya
ākasmikatvam kathaṁ tadā(0katvam, tadā”)kasmikatve kāryānu-
mānaṁ vilupyate saugatānām.
Translation: 607
If you say it will produce in totality, then, when color is said to
produce its cognition in totality, it is not engaged in producing
another color, as a collection of one type of factors when engaged in
producing one effect is not engaged in producing another effect.
Similarly, a color also does not produce another color. Thus,
(the Buddhists must explain) how another color is produced. Is
it without a cause? If you accept it without a cause, then, the
Buddhists will have to forgo the inference of effect on the basis of
the cause.
Text: 608
अथ अनेककायोर्त्पादकत्वेन पयर् व सतं रूपस्वरूपम्; तदा घट-संख्या-सामान्यादेरिप
अनेका धकरणा शर्तात्मकं रूपम्, वृ त्िवकल्पदोषानुपप त्ः।
atha anekakāryotpādakatvena paryavasitaṁ rūpasvarūpam; tadā
ghaṭa-saṁkhyā-sāmānyāderapi anekādhikaraṇāśritātmakaṁ rūpam,
vṛttivikalpadoṣānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 608
Well, if you say, the form of a color terminates in producing many
effects, then, entities like pot, number, universal etc. will have to be
accepted as having many loci and this will lead to the impossibility
of showing the fault of conjecturing relations.
[९. जाितं पर्ितविदतुं बौद्ैदर्त्ानां दषू णानामेकैकशो िनरासः।]
[9. jātiṁ prativadituṁ bauddhairdattānāṁ dūṣaṇānāmekaikaśo
nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 609
इतोऽिप वृ त्िवकल्पदोषानुपप त्ः - वृ त्िवकल्पदोषेण वृत्ेरव
े िनराकरणं कृतम्,
न घट-संख्या-सामान्यादेः, ततोऽन्यत्वात्। निह अन्यस्याऽभावे अन्यस्याभावोऽ स्त,
असम्बन्धात्। निह अनुदकः कमण्डलुः इत्युक्े कमण्डलोरभावः पर्तीयते, कपालानां

तददु कस्य वा, अिप तु कमण्डलुना साकम् उदकस्य िवश्लेषमातर्ं पर्तीयते।
ito’pi vṛttivikalpadoṣānupapattiḥ - vṛttivikalpadoṣeṇa vṛttereva nirā-
karaṇaṁ kṛtam, na ghaṭa-saṁkhyā-sāmānyādeḥ, tato’nyatvāt. nahi
anyasyā’bhāve anyasyābhāvo’sti, asambandhāt. nahi anudakaḥ
kamaṇḍaluḥ ityukte kamaṇḍalorabhāvaḥ pratīyate, kapālānāṁ
tadudakasya vā, api tu kamaṇḍalunā sākam udakasya viśleṣamātraṁ
pratīyate.
Translation: 609
For the following reasons also the fault of conjecturing relations is
not possible to be raised – by the fault of conjecturing the relation,
the very relationship is denied and not the whole such as pot,
number and universal, because they are different from that. It is
not the case that if there is absence of something else (say X) there
will be absence of something else (say Y), because they are not
related. When someone says there is no water in the vessel, one
understands that there is no vessel or one understands that or the
absence of the parts of the vessel or of the water of the vessel but
what is understood is, the mere disassociation of water with the
vessel.
Text: 610
ननु नैयाियकैः वृ त्मद्-घट-सामान्यमभ्युपेयते, तदभावे कथं तस्य सं स्थितः?
nanu naiyāyikaiḥ vṛttimad-ghaṭa-sāmānyamabhyupeyate, tadabhāve
kathaṁ tasya saṁsthitiḥ?
Translation: 610
Objection:
Well, the logicians do accept universal of pot having existence and
so if that is not there, how can that exist?
Text: 611
यद्ेवं रूपरसिवज्ञानानामिप वृ त्रभ्युपेयते नैयाियकैः, तदभावेऽिप सद्ावोऽभ्युपगम्यते
तेषां भविद्ः।
yadyevaṁ rūparasavijñānānāmapi vṛttirabhyupeyate naiyāyikaiḥ,
tadabhāve’pi sadbhāvo’bhyupagamyate teṣāṁ bhavadbhiḥ.
Translation: 611
Reply:
If it is so, the Naiyāyikas also accept cognitions of color and taste,
but, in spite of their absence you accept their presence.
Text: 612
अथ तािन पर्ितभा न्त वृत्यभावेऽिप, तेन तेषामभ्युपगमः िकर्यते;
atha tāni pratibhānti vṛttyabhāve’pi, tena teṣāmabhyupagamaḥ
kriyate;
Translation: 612
Clarification:
Well, even if they do not exist, they appear and therefore we accept
them.
Text: 613
यद्ेवं घट-संख्या-सामान्यादेरिप स्वरूपं पर्ितभाित अिभन्ानुगतात्मतया। न
चानुभूयमानस्य िनह्वो युक्ः सवार्पलापपर्सङ्ात्। अनुपलब्धौ वा सैव समथार्, अलं
वृ त्िवकल्पदोषेण। यद्ुपलभ्यते; तदा वृ त्िवकल्पदोषो न वक्व्यः।
yadyevaṁ ghaṭa-saṁkhyā-sāmānyāderapi svarūpaṁ pratibhāti abhi-
nnānugatātmatayā. na cānubhūyamānasya nihnavo yuktaḥ sarvāpa-
lāpaprasaṅgāt. anupalabdhau vā saiva samarthā, alaṁ vṛttivikalpa-
doṣeṇa. yadyupalabhyate; tadā vṛttivikalpadoṣo na vaktavyaḥ.
Translation: 613
Reply:
If it is so, then, the form of pot, number and universal etc. also
appears as identical and consecutively present in all subsequent
cases. It is not proper to deny something which is being experienced,
because, if it is so, then, there will arise the contingency of denying
everything and something is not experienced that alone is capable
of causing such an experience and so, there is no need of the fault
of conjecturing relationship.
Text: 614
अथ नोपलभ्यते; तथािप न वक्व्यः।
atha nopalabhyate; tathāpi na vaktavyaḥ.
Translation: 614
If you say it is not experienced, even then, you should not make
such an argument.
[१०. देशभेदेनाऽगर्हणात् इत्यादेः समालोच्य पर्ितिवधानम्]
[10. deśabhedenā’grahaṇāt ityādeḥ samālocya pratividhānam.]
Text: 615
यदप्युक्म्- “देशभेदेनाऽगर्हणाद् घट-सामान्यानुपप त्ः”; तदप्ययुक्म्; न देशभेदेन
वस्तूनां भेदोऽिप तु आकारभेदेन, अिभन्ानुगतात्मतया तयोः स्वरूपमनुभूयते। न
देशभेदागर्हणेन स्वावयवा धकरणेन सह तयोस्तादात्म्यं सद्ध्यित असत्वं वा।
yadapyuktam-“deśabhedenā’grahaṇād ghaṭasāmānyānupapattiḥ”;tada-
pyayuktam; na deśabhedena vastūnāṁ bhedo’pi tu ākārabhedena,
abhinnānugatātmatayā tayoḥ svarūpamanubhūyate. na deśabhedā-
grahaṇena svāvayavādhikaraṇena saha tayostādātmyaṁ siddhyati
asattvaṁ vā.
Translation: 615
You had said that there is nothing called universal of pot because
it is not known through the differentiation of space, this is also
not proper, because, things are not distinguished on account of
difference of space. They are distinguished on the account of the
difference in their shapes. Both, pot and universal are experienced
as ’uniform and consecutively present’ in subsequent instances.
Unless the difference of space is grasped, their identity with their
parts and the locus is not established nor is the absence established.
Text: 616
यद्ाकारभेदेन गर्हणम्; तदा देशभेदेनागर्हणस्य अपर्योजकत्वम् (अपर्योजनकत्वम्),
आकारभेदगर्हणेन स्वरूपान्यत्वस्य पर्बो धतत्वात्।
yadyākārabhedena grahaṇam; tadā deśabhedenāgrahaṇasya aprayo-
jakatvam, ākārabhedagrahaṇena svarūpānyatvasya prabodhitatvāt.
Translation: 616
If knowledge arises due to the difference in shapes, then, not
knowing due to the difference in space cannot be the prompting
factor, because, by the knowledge of the difference of shapes, the
knowledge of another form is caused.
Text: 617
अथ आकारान्यत्वेन नावबोधोऽ स्त;
atha ākārānyatvena nāvabodho’sti;
Translation: 617
Clarification:
Well, there is no knowledge as having different shapes.
Text: 618
स एवास्तु, असद्व्यवहारसमथर् त्वात्, िकं देशभेदागर्हणेन? स्वहेतोरेव िनयतदेशकाल-
िनयिमतस्योत्पत्ेनर् देशान्तरादौ गर्हणम्, अन्यथा रूपादेरसत्वं स्यािदतरदेशलग्-
स्याऽगर्हणात्।
sa evāstu, asadvyavahārasamarthatvāt, kiṁ deśabhedāgrahaṇena?
svahetoreva niyatadeśakālaniyamitasyotpatterna deśāntarādau gra-
haṇam, anyathā rūpāderasattvaṁ syāditaradeśalagnasyā’grahaṇāt.
Translation: 618
Reply:
Then let it be the same. When it is capable of causing the use of
its non-existence, what is the need of not knowing the difference of
space? When it is possible to explain that, it is regularly produced
in a particular space and time out of its own cause, there is no
knowledge of it a different place. Otherwise, one will have to accept
that there is no color because one does not know that it is associated
with another place.
[११. ना स्त घटसामान्यम्, तदगर्हेऽगर्हात् इत्यस्य िवभञ्नम्।]
[11. nāsti ghaṭasāmānyam, tadagrahe’grahāt ityasya vibhañjanam.]
Text: 619
यदप्युक्म्- “ना स्त घटसामान्यम्, तदगर्हेऽगर्हात्” िकमनेन िकर्यते? िकम् अवयवा ध-
करणाऽव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनम्, आहो असत्वपर्ितपादनम्?
yadapyuktam- “nāsti ghaṭasāmānyam, tadagrahe’grahāt” kimanena
kriyate? kim avayavādhikaraṇā’vyatirekapratipādanam, āho asattva-
pratipādanam?
Translation: 619
You had also said “there is nothing called universal of a pot” because
when the pot is not known, this is also not known. There the
question arises, what do you want to say by this? Do you want

to say that there is nothing over and above the locus of thoughts?
Or do you want to say that there is nothing called universal?
Text: 620
तद्िद अव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं िकर्यते; कस्यातर् पक्षीकरणम्? िकं घटसामान्यस्य, आहो
तदवयवा धकरणस्य?
tadyadi avyatirekapratipādanaṁ kriyate; kasyātra pakṣīkaraṇam?
kiṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya, āho tadavayavādhikaraṇasya?
Translation: 620
If you say that, you are saying that there is nothing other than locus
of parts, then, what do you want to state as the subject (pakṣa) of
this inference? Is it universal of pot? Or is it the locus of its parts?
Text: 621
तद्िद घटसामान्यस्य पक्षीकरणम्, त त्कम् - अवगतस्य, अनवगतस्य वा?
tadyadi ghaṭasāmānyasya pakṣīkaraṇam tatkim - avagatasya, anava-
gatasya vā?
Translation: 621
If you are making the universal of pot, as the subject, there again
the question arises is this subject known? Or is it unknown?
Text: 622
तद्िद अनवगतस्य; तदयुक्म्; नह्नवगते धिमर् िण हेतोरुत्थानम स्त। न
चाशर्यवैकल्य(ये) गमकत्वम्।
tadyadi anavagatasya; tadayuktam; nahyanavagate dharmiṇi heto-
rutthānamasti. na cāśrayavaikalya(ye) gamakatvam.
Translation: 622
If you say, it is not known, it will not be proper, because unless the
subject is known, no ground or reason (hetu) can be pointed out
there. And if there is no locus, it cannot lead to the inference of the
probandum.
Text: 623
अथ अवगतस्य; तदा तेनव
ै िभन्ाकारावगमेन अव्यितरेकपर्त्यायकसाधनं बाध्यते।
atha avagatasya; tadā tenaiva bhinnākārāvagamena avyatireka-
pratyāyakasādhanaṁ bādhyate.
Translation: 623
If you say that, the subject is known, then, by that only different
form is known and therefore the ground which will cause the
knowledge of non-difference will be contradicted.
Text: 624
अथ तदवयवा धकरणस्य पक्षीकरणम्; ततर्ािप िकम् - स्वस्मात् स्वरूपाद् अव्यितरेकः
साध्यते, [आहो परस्मात्] इित?
atha tadavayavādhikaraṇasya pakṣīkaraṇam; tatrāpi kim - svasmāt
svarūpād avyatirekaḥ sādhyate, [āho parasmāt] iti?
Translation: 624
If again you say that the locus of its parts is presented as the
subject, there also one can ask, is it the fact that something is
being established which is not different from its own form or (from
other form)?
Text: 625
[यिद स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यितरेकः साध्यते;] सद्साध्यतया सम्बोधियतव्याः।
[yadi svasmāt svarūpādavyatirekaḥ sādhyate;] siddhasādhyatayā
sambodhayitavyāḥ.
Translation: 625
(If you say that, non-difference from its own part is established)
then, it should be addressed as something to be established which
is already known.
Text: 626
अथ परस्मादव्यितरेकः साध्यते; स परात्मा पर्ितपन्ः, अपर्ितपन्ो वा?
atha parasmādavyatirekaḥ sādhyate; sa parātmā pratipannaḥ,
apratipanno vā?
Translation: 626
If you say the non-difference from something else is being
established, there also the question arises, that something else is
known or not known.
Text: 627
यिद पर्ितपन्ः स िकम् - िभन्ाकारतया अवगतः, अिभन्ाकारतया वा?
yadi pratipannaḥ sa kim - bhinnākāratayā avagataḥ, abhinnākā-

ratayā vā?
Translation: 627
If you say it is known, there also the question arises, whether it is
known in another form or is it known in identical form?
Text: 628
तद्िद िभन्ाकारतयोपलब्धः; तदाऽनेनव
ै िभन्ाकारावगमेन अभेदपर्त्यायकं साधनं बाध्यते।
tadyadi bhinnākāratayopalabdhaḥ; tadā’nenaiva bhinnākārāvaga-
mena abhedapratyāyakaṁ sādhanaṁ bādhyate.
Translation: 628
If you say it is known as another form, then, by this very fact when
another form is known, the ground to generate the identity would
be contradicted.
Text: 629
अथािभन्ाकारतयाऽवगतः; न तिहर् परात्मा, इदानीं स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यितरेकः साध्यत
इित सद्साध्यतया सम्बोधियतव्याः।
athābhinnākāratayā’vagataḥ; na tarhi parātmā, idānīṁ svasmāt sva-
rūpādavyatirekaḥ sādhyata iti siddhasādhyatayā sambodhayitavyāḥ.
Translation: 629
If you say, it is known in identical form, then, it is not of the
form of anything else and therefore now, we will be establishing
non-difference from its own form, and in that case, you should call
it something which is being established that is already known.
Text: 630
अथ अनवगतः; न तिहर् एकत्वं रथतुरगिवषाणयो रव।
atha anavagataḥ; na tarhi ekatvaṁ rathaturagaviṣāṇayoriva.
Translation: 630
Again if you say, it is not known, then, it cannot be said to be one
like horns of horse of a chariot which are fictitious.
Text: 631
अथ अभावः साध्यः; ततर्ािप कस्य पक्षीकरणम्- िकं घटसामान्यस्य, आहो
तदवयवा धकरणस्य?
atha abhāvaḥ sādhyaḥ; tatrāpi kasya pakṣīkaraṇam - kiṁ ghaṭasāmā-

nyasya, āho tadavayavādhikaraṇasya?
Translation: 631
Again if you say, you want to establish absence, there also, the
question arises what will be the subject of that absence? Will it be
the universal of pot or will it be the locus of the parts of pot?
Text: 632
तद्िद घटसामान्यस्य पक्षीकरणम्; त त्कम् - अवगतस्य, अनवगतस्य वा?
tadyadi ghaṭasāmānyasya pakṣīkaraṇam; tatkim - avagatasya, ana-
vagatasya vā?
Translation: 632
If you say, the pot in general will be the subject, there too, the
question arises, whether it will be the subject being known or
unknown?
Text: 633
यद्वगतस्य; तदा तेनव
ै सद्ावावगमेन अभावहेतोबार्ध्यमानत्वादगमकत्वम्।
yadyavagatasya; tadā tenaiva sadbhāvāvagamena abhāvahetorbā-
dhyamānatvādagamakatvam.
Translation: 633
If you say it will be the subject being known, then, by that itself
existence will be known and therefore, the ground to establish
absence will become contradicted and as such it cannot be a ground
to establish the probandum.
Text: 634
अथ नावगतम्; कथं तस्य पक्षीकरणम्, स्वयमनवगतस्य पक्षीकरणायोगात्?
atha nāvagatam; kathaṁ tasya pakṣīkaraṇam, svayamanavagatasya
pakṣīkaraṇāyogāt?
Translation: 634
If you say, it will be the subject without being known, then, how
can it be the subject? because, anything if it is not known cannot
be accepted as subject in an inference.
Text: 635
अथ अवयवा धकरणस्य पक्षीकरणम्, घटसामान्यं नास्तीित पर्ितज्ञा; तदगर्हेऽगर्हािदत्यस्य
हेतोः तदभावेन सह सम्बन्धो ना स्त। तादात्म्यतदत्ु प त्सम्बन्धाभावे सित कथं
गमकत्वम्?
atha avayavādhikaraṇasya pakṣīkaraṇam, ghaṭasāmānyaṁ nāstīti
pratijñā; tadagrahe’grahādityasya hetoḥ tadabhāvena saha
sambandho nāsti. tādātmyatadutpattisambandhābhāve sati kathaṁ
gamakatvam?
Translation: 635
If you say the locus of its parts will be made the subject, then,
your proposition is “there is nothing called universal of pot?”
because, unless it is known, it can never be known and as such
this ground will not have the relation of invariable concomitance
with the absence of universal of absence of pot. As a matter of
fact, if the invariable concomitance, either in the form of identity
or causing effect relationship is not there, how can something be
called a ground?
Text: 636
तदगर्हेऽगर्हािदत्यस्य कोऽथर् ः? िकम् - अवयवा धकरणगर्हणमेव घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणम्,
आहो अवयवा धकरणगर्हणानन्तरं घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणम्, िकं वा घटसामान्यस्यागर्हणमेव
िवविक्षतम्?
tadagrahe’grahādityasya ko’rthaḥ? kim - avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇa-
meva ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam, āho avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇā-
nantaraṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam, kiṁ vā ghaṭasāmānyasyā-
grahaṇameva vivakṣitam?
Translation: 636
When you say, unless it is known, it cannot be known, what do you
mean by it? Do you mean the knowledge of the locus of the part
itself is the knowledge of universal of pot or after the knowledge
of the locus of parts the knowledge of potness is the knowledge of
universal of pot? Or do you want to say that there is no knowledge
of universal of pot?
Text: 637
तद्िद अवयवा धकरणगर्हणमेव घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणम् िवविक्षतम्; तदा नानेनाव्यितरेकः
अन्यतरासत्वं वा पर्ितपाद्ते, यथा नीलतिद्योः एकोपलम्भेऽिप नान्यतराभावः,
अव्यितरेको वा, तथा नीललोिहतयोः एकोपलम्भेऽिप नान्यतराभावः, अव्यितरेको वा।
tadyadi avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇameva ghaṭasāmānyasya graha-
ṇam vivakṣitam; tadā nānenāvyatirekaḥ anyatarāsattvaṁ vā pratipā-
dyate, yathā nīlataddhiyoḥ ekopalambhe’pi nānyatarābhāvaḥ, avyati-
reko vā, tathā nīlalohitayoḥ ekopalambhe’pi nānyatarābhāvaḥ, avya-
tireko vā.
Translation: 637
If you intend that, the knowledge of the locus of parts itself is the
knowledge of universal of pot, then, you are not explaining either
difference from many or absence of either of the two. For example,
out of the two viz. a blue object and its knowledge, even if one is
known, there cannot be absence of the other or non-difference. In
the same way, out of the two viz. a blue and a red thing, even if
there is presence of one, one cannot say there is absence of other or
there is no absence.
Text: 638
अथ अवयवा धकरणगर्हणानन्तरं घटसामान्यगर्हणं िवविक्षतम्; तदा नानेनाव्यितरेकः
साध्यते अन्यतरासत्वं वा, यथा रूपगर्हणानन्तरं रससंवेदनं न तयोरेकतां गमयित
अन्यतरासत्वं वा।
atha avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ ghaṭasāmānyagrahaṇaṁ
vivakṣitam; tadā nānenāvyatirekaḥ sādhyate anyatarāsattvaṁ vā,
yathā rūpagrahaṇānantaraṁ rasasaṁvedanaṁ na tayorekatāṁ
gamayati anyatarāsattvaṁ vā.
Translation: 638
If you intend to say that, after the knowledge of locus of parts, there
is knowledge of universal of pot, then, you are not establishing either
the absence of absence of many, i.e. identity or absence of other. For
example, after the knowledge of color, if there is knowledge of taste,
neither it causes the knowledge of identity nor absence of other.
Text: 639
अथ अगर्हणमेव िवविक्षतं घटसामान्यस्य; तदा 'तदगर्हेऽगर्हात्' इत्येतन् वक्व्यम्,
'अगर्हात्' इत्येतावदस्तु। निह अन्यस्याऽगर्हे तदनुपलम्भ सिद्ः, तत्स्वभाविविन-
वृ त्िनबन्धनत्वात् तदनुपलम्भस्य।
atha agrahaṇameva vivakṣitaṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya; tadā ‘tadagrahe’-
grahāt’ ityetanna vaktavyam, ‘agrahāt’ ityetāvadastu. nahi anya-
syā’grahe tadanupalambhasiddhiḥ, tatsvabhāvavinivṛttinibandhana-
tvāt tadanupalambhasya.
Translation: 639
If you say that, what is intended is the absence of knowledge
of universal of pot, then, you should not say, in the absence of
knowledge of that, there is absence of knowledge of universal.
You should simply say, “Because there is absence of knowledge
of universal.” It is not the case that, if there is no knowledge of
something else, it is established that, there is absence of knowledge
of that, because; the absence of knowledge of X depends upon the
absence of nature of X.
Text: 640
न चायं व्यितरेकाथोर् लभ्यते, 'तदगर्हेऽगर्हात्' इत्यस्य हेतोः घटसामान्यस्यागर्हणमेव,
अिप तु अवयवा धकरणगर्हणानन्तरं घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणं लभ्यते ततश्च िवपरीतसाधनाद्
िवरुद्ो भवित।
na cāyaṁ vyatirekārtho labhyate, ‘tadagrahe’grahāt’ ityasya hetoḥ
ghaṭasāmānyasyāgrahaṇameva, api tu avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇāna-
ntaraṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇaṁ labhyate tataśca viparītasā-
dhanād viruddho bhavati.
Translation: 640
Neither the following meaning is understood from the expression,
“In the absence of knowledge of that, there is absence of knowledge.”
Because of this ground, there will indeed be absence of knowledge of
universal of pot. But what follows from this expression is: after the
knowledge of locus of its parts, there will be knowledge of universal
of pot. And if that is so, this ground will become a contradictory
ground, because, it will establish just opposite of what is intended
by you to be established.
[१२. एकिपण्डगर्हणकाले उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्येत्यादेः समीक्षय पर्ितवचनम्।]

[12. ekapiṇḍagrahaṇakāle upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyetyādeḥ samī-
kṣya prativacanam.]
Text: 641
यदप्यभ्यधािय- “एकिपण्डगर्हणकाले उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्यानुपलब्धेनार् स्त सामान्यम्।”
क एवमाह नोपलब्धं सामान्यम्। अिप तु उपलब्धमेव। कथं ज्ञायते? िद्तीयािद-
िपण्डदशर् ने सित पूवेर् िपण्डे स्मृितदशर् नात् 'अनेन सदृशोऽसौ' एवमनुस्मरित। अथवा
एकिपण्डगर्हणकाले तदपु ल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्ं न भवित, तेन नोपलभ्यते। उपल ब्धलक्षण-
पर्ािप् रह अनेकसहका रिपण्डोपिनपातः। यिद चोपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्म्, कथं नोपलभ्यते?
yadapyabhyadhāyi - “ekapiṇḍagrahaṇakāle upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta-
syānupalabdhernāsti sāmānyam.” ka evamāha nopalabdhaṁ sāmā-
nyam. api tu upalabdhameva. kathaṁ jñāyate? dvitīyādipiṇḍa-
darśane sati pūrve piṇḍe smṛtidarśanāt ‘anena sadṛśo’sau’
evamanusmarati. athavā ekapiṇḍagrahaṇakāle tadupalabdhilakṣaṇa-
prāptaṁ na bhavati, tena nopalabhyate. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptiriha
anekasahakāripiṇḍopanipātaḥ. yadi copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam,
kathaṁ nopalabhyate?
Translation: 641
You said, “since, at the time of knowledge of one individual, there
is no non-knowledge of something which could have been known,
had it been present there.” In this connection, we would like to
ask, “Who said universal is not known?” As a matter of fact, it is
known. Now the question is how is it known? After seeing the second
individual, there is remembrance of the first individual in the form
such as, “this is similar to that”. Or at the time of knowing one
individual, since that which would have been known, had it been
there, is not found here and so it is not known. The knowledge of
something which is fit to be known, incorporates many auxiliary
factors. If something is fit to be known, how is it not known?
Text: 642
अथ नोपलभ्यते; न तिहर् उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्म्। उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ािप् रह पर्त्ययान्तर-
साकल्य(ल्यं) स्वभाविवशेषस्स(श्च)। एतच्चेद ् िवद्ते; कथमनुपल ब्धः? एवंभूतस्या-
प्यनुपलम्भे प रकल्प्यमाने सवर् वस्तूनामनुपलम्भपर्सङ्ः। उपलब्घौ वा अन्यत् कारणम्
अन्वेष्व्यम्।
atha nopalabhyate; na tarhi upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam. upalabdhi-

lakṣaṇaprāptiriha pratyayāntarasākalya(lyaṁ) svabhāvaviśeṣassa
(śca). etacced vidyate; kathamanupalabdhiḥ? evaṁbhūtasyāpyanu-
palambhe parikalpyamāne sarvavastūnāmanupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ.
upalabdhau vā anyat kāraṇam anveṣṭavyam.
Translation: 642
If you say, because it is not seen, then, how do you call it something
which is fit to be seen? Here, the knowledge of something which is
fit to be known means, a bundle of defining features arising after
the knowledge of that thing. And if that is there, how can it be
said that it is not known? If one postulates absence of knowledge
of such a thing, then, there will arise the contingency of absence of
everything in this universe. And when it is known, one will have to
find out what could be the cause of such knowledge.
Text: 643
अथ पर्त्ययान्तरसाकल्यमातर्ं िवविक्षतम्, न तत्स्वभाविवशेषः;
atha pratyayāntarasākalyamātraṁ vivakṣitam, na tatsvabhāva-
viśeṣaḥ;
Translation: 643
Clarification:
Well, what is intended here is mere collection of features arising
out of the knowledge of that thing and not particular nature of
that thing.
Text: 644
यद्ेवम् अदृश्यस्यैव अनुपल ब्धः, न दृश्यानुपल ब्धर स्त। यिद च अन्यकारकसाकल्यम्
उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ािप्रिभधीयते, तदाप्युपलब्ध्या भिवतव्यं नानुपलब्ध्या। इतरकारक-
साकल्यं िह उपलम्भजननसामथ्यर् म्। तच्चेद ् िवद्ते; कथमनुपल ब्धः? तस्मादनुप-
ल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्यैव अनुपलब्धेः( ब्धः), नोपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्य।
yadyevam adṛśyasyaiva anupalabdhiḥ, na dṛśyānupalabdhirasti.
yadi ca anyakārakasākalyam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptirabhidhīyate,
tadāpyupalabdhyā bhavitavyaṁ nānupalabdhyā. itarakārakasāka-
lyaṁ hi upalambhajananasāmarthyam. tacced vidyate; kathamanu-
palabdhiḥ? tasmādanupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyaiva anupalabdheḥ

(bdhiḥ), nopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya.
Translation: 644
Reply:
If it is so, it will mean absence of something which is not seen,
but not absence of something which is fit to be seen. At that time
also, there has to be presence and not absence. The collection of
other factors is nothing but the capacity to produce the knowledge
of a thing and if it is there, how can one say that it is not known?
Therefore, the knowledge of absence of only that which is not fit to
be known, and never of that which is fit to be known.
[१३. क्षीरोदकविद्वेकेनागर्हणान्ा स्त सामान्यिमत्युक्ेः खण्डनम्।]

[13. kṣīrodakavadvivekenāgrahaṇānnāsti sāmānyamityukteḥ khaṇḍa-
nam.]
Text: 645
यदप्युवाच-“क्षीरोदकवद् िववेकेनाऽगर्हणात् ना स्त सामान्यम्;” तदप्ययुक्म्; िववेको िह
आकारान्यत्वं व्यक् नामननुगमरूपता, सामान्यं तु अनुगताकारम्, अनयोः सारूप्यम्। तैः
सह सारूप्यमस्य इित िविवक्ाकारावगमदशर् नात् तथा, क्षीरोदकयोरिप िविवक्मेव गर्हणम्।
yadapyuvāca-“kṣīrodakavad vivekenā’grahaṇāt nāsti sāmānyam;”
tadapyayuktam; viveko hi ākārānyatvaṁ vyaktīnāmananugamarū-
patā, sāmānyaṁ tu anugatākāram, anayoḥ sārūpyam. taiḥ saha
sārūpyamasya iti viviktākārāvagamadarśanāt tathā, kṣīrodaka-
yorapi viviktameva grahaṇam.
Translation: 645
You also said “since individual and universal are not known
distinctly as water and milk and therefore there is nothing called
universal.” That also is not proper, because, difference means ‘being
of different form’ which cannot be a common property of the
individuals, universals on the other hand, is a common consecutive
form; there is similarity between the two. Since, there is similarity
in them, there is knowledge of distinct form. In the same way, water
and milk are also known distinctly.
Text: 646
ततर् क्षीरोदकयोः एकभाजनिनक्षेपे सित िकं - केवलं क्षीरं पर्ितभाित आहो उदकमुभयं वा?
tatra kṣīrodakayoḥ ekabhājananikṣepe sati kim - kevalaṁ kṣīraṁ
pratibhāti āho udakamubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 646
When one pours water and milk in a vessel, what do you find? Is it
milk or water or both.
Text: 647
तद्िद क्षीरमेव पर्ितभाित; कथं तददु काकारान् िविवक्ं भवित?
tadyadi kṣīrameva pratibhāti; kathaṁ tadudakākārānna viviktaṁ
bhavati?
Translation: 647
If you say only milk appears, then, how is it that, it is not distinct
from the form of water?
Text: 648
अथ उदकं केवलं पर्ितभाित; तदिप कथं क्षीरान् िविवक्ं भवित?
atha udakaṁ kevalaṁ pratibhāti; tadapi kathaṁ kṣīrānna viviktaṁ
bhavati?
Translation: 648
If you say only water appears, then, also, how is it not distinct from
milk?
Text: 649
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदा उभयो रतरेतराकारिविवक्योगर्र्हणं तादात्म्यव्यितरेकात्।
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā ubhayoritaretarākāraviviktayorgrahaṇaṁ
tādātmyavyatirekāt.
Translation: 649
If you say, both appear, then, the knowledge of both, distinct from
each other occurs, without identity.
[१४. एकतर् दृष्ो भेदो िह- इत्यादेः का रकायाः पर्ितवदनम्।]
[14. ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi- ityādeḥ kārikāyāḥ prativadanam.]
Text: 650
ु म्-
एकतर् दृष्ो भेदो िह क्विचन्ान्यतर् दृश्यते।

न तस्माद् िभन्मस्त्यन्यत् सामान्यं बुद्ध्यभेदतः। (पर्माणवा.३.१२६)
इत्येतदप्ययुक्म्। एकतर् दृष्े(ष्)स्य भेदस्य अन्यतर् दशर् नमस्त्येव, यथा घटवस्ादेः
एकावयवोप रदृष्स्य अवयवान्तरलग्स्य उपलम्भात्, तथा सामान्यमिप िभन्म स्त,
अनुगताकारस्य बुिद्भेदेनाध्यवसीयमानत्वात्।
yadapyanyaduktam-
ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi kvacinnānyatra dṛśyate.
na tasmād bhinnamastyanyat sāmānyaṁ buddhyabhe
dataḥ. (Pramāṇavā.3.126)
ityetadapyayuktam. ekatra dṛṣṭe(ṣṭa)sya bhedasya anyatra darśa-
namastyeva, yathā ghaṭavastrādeḥ ekāvayavoparidṛṣṭasya avayavā-
ntaralagnasya upalambhāt, tathā sāmānyamapi bhinnamasti, anuga-
tākārasya buddhibhedenādhyavasīyamānatvāt.
Translation: 650
You had also said the following: “the difference seen in one place is
not seen elsewhere.” Therefore, a universal is not different, because;
it does cause identical knowledge. This statement is also wrong,
because it is a fact that difference seen in one place, is also seen
elsewhere. For example, pot and cloth seen associated with one
type of parts and another type of parts, in the same way, a universal
is also different, because by different determinate cognitions, it is
determined as of uniform nature.
[१५.िनत्यस्य कर्मेतराभ्यािमत्यादेः पर्ितसमाधानम्।]

[15.nityasya krametarābhyāmityādeḥ pratisamādhānam.]
Text: 651
ु म्-“िनत्यस्य कर्मेतराभ्यामथर् िकर्याकरणसामथ्यर् नास्तीत्यसत् सामान्यम्”;
तदेतदयुक्म्; उभयथाप्यथर् िकर्यासम्पादनमुपपद्ते युगपत्, कर्मेण च।
yadapyanyaduktam-“nityasya krametarābhyāmarthakriyākaraṇasā-
marthyaṁ nāstītyasat sāmānyam”; tadetadayuktam; ubhayathāpya-
rthakriyāsampādanamupapadyate yugapat, krameṇa ca.
Translation: 651
You had also said the following: “since an eternal entity does not
have the capacity to contribute to fruitful behavior, either in a
sequence or without a sequence, the concept of universal is not true.”

This is also not proper, because; in both ways, one can explain that,
it contributes to fruitful behavior either together or in a sequence.
Text: 652
ननु कर्मकतृर्त्वमिभन्स्य नोपपद्ते, कायर् स्यैककालीनता पर्ाप्नोित; एतञ्ाऽसमीचीनम्;
यथा भवतां पक्षे एकं नीलस्वलक्षणमनेकाकारकायर् िनयतदेशसम्ब न्ध जनयित नयना-
लोकमनस्कारािदरूपम्, न च कायार्णामेकाकारता एकदेशसम्ब न्धता वा िवद्ते एक-
स्वभावसमुद्वत्वेऽिप, तथा इहािप एवंभूतं तत्सामान्यं यत् कर्मेतराभ्यां कायोर्त्पा-
दात्मकम्।
nanu kramakartṛtvamabhinnasya nopapadyate, kāryasyaikakālīnatā
prāpnoti; etañcā’samīcīnam; yathā bhavatāṁ pakṣe ekaṁ nīlasva-
lakṣaṇamanekākārakāryaṁ niyatadeśasambandhi janayati nayanā-
lokamanaskārādirūpam, na ca kāryāṇāmekākāratā ekadeśasam-
bandhitā vā vidyate ekasvabhāvasamudbhavatve’pi, tathā ihāpi
evaṁbhūtaṁ tatsāmānyaṁ yat krametarābhyāṁ kāryotpādātmakam.
Translation: 652
Objection:
Well, that which is identical, that is one and without a second,
cannot be said to be an agent, because it leads to occurrence of an
effect, at one and the same time, which is not proper. For example,
according to your doctrine, one blue particular, causes an effect of
different form with reference to a specific place in the form of light
of eyes, impression etc. Even if there produced by single character,
the effects do not have one form or they are not related to one space.
In the same way, here also, the universal under discussion, is of the
form which can contribute effects either together or jointly.
Text: 653
ननु यिद कर्मेण कायर् करोित तदा तदेव जनकम्, तदेव चाऽजनकम्;
nanu yadi krameṇa kāryaṁ karoti tadā tadeva janakam, tadeva
cā’janakam;
Translation: 653
Objection:
Well, if it produces an effect in a sequence, then, the same is to be
treated as the producer and the same can be non-producer of an

effect.
Text: 654
सत्यम्, तदेव जनकं तदेव चाऽजनकम्।
satyam, tadeva janakaṁ tadeva cā’janakam.
Translation: 654
Reply:
What you say is correct. The same is the producer and the same is
not the producer.
Text: 655
ननु जनकाऽजनकयोभेर्दपर्सङ्ः;
nanu janakā’janakayorbhedaprasaṅgaḥ;
Translation: 655
Objection:
Well, in that case, there will arise the contingency of producer
becoming different from non-producer.
Text: 656
न पर्सङ्ो स्त, यथा त्वदीये पक्षे एकं नीलस्वलक्षणं स्वकायार्पेक्षया जनकम्,
स्वकारणात्मापेक्षया तु अजनकम्, न तस्य स्वरूपभेदोऽ स्त।
na prasaṅgosti, yathā tvadīye pakṣe ekaṁ nīlasvalakṣaṇaṁ svakāryā-
pekṣayā janakam, svakāraṇātmāpekṣayā tu ajanakam, na tasya
svarūpabhedo’sti.
Translation: 656
Reply:
That cannot be a contingency, because, as according to you one
and the same blue particular is said to be producer, in terms of its
effect and the same is said to be a non-producer in the form of its
cause and in spite of that, there is no difference in its form.
Text: 657
अथ स्वकारणमात्मानं च जनयित; तदयुक्म्; तदात्मानं कुवर् दत्ु पन्ं वा कुयार्त्, अनुत्पन्ं
वा?
atha svakāraṇamātmānaṁ ca janayati; tadayuktam; tadātmānaṁ
kurvadutpannaṁ vā kuryāt, anutpannaṁ vā?
Translation: 657
If you say its own cause does not produce itself, it will not be
correct. There the question arises, whether while producing itself it
will produce something which is already produced or it will produce
something which is not yet produced.
Text: 658
तद्िद उत्पन्ं करोित; तदयुक्म्; कृतस्य करणायोगात्।
tadyadi utpannaṁ karoti; tadayuktam; kṛtasya karaṇāyogāt.
Translation: 658
If you say it produces something which is already produced. It is
not proper, if something is produced, it cannot be produced again.
Text: 659
अथाऽनुत्पन्ं करोित; असतः कः कारकाथर् ः? तथा स्वकारणमिप न जनयित इतरेतरा-
शर्यत्वदोषपर्सङ्ात्। अतः तदेव कारकं तदेव च अकारकिमित, तथा सामान्यमिप
जनकम- जनकं च।
athā’nutpannaṁ karoti; asataḥ kaḥ kārakārthaḥ? tathā svakāraṇa-
mapi na janayati itaretarāśrayatvadoṣaprasaṅgāt. ataḥ tadeva
kārakaṁ tadeva ca akārakamiti, tathā sāmānyamapi janakamaja-
nakaṁ ca.
Translation: 659
And if you say that, it will produce something which is not yet
produced, there the question arises, what is the meaning of the
producer, in the case of something not produced. Moreover, in that
way it also does not produce its own cause, because it will lead to
the defect of mutual dependency. Therefore, whatever is a producing
factor, the same is also a non-producing factor. In the same way,
universal also is a producer and also a non-producer.
Text: 660
न चाथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वाभावेऽसत्वं सद्ध्यित, यथा वह्े ः अयोगोलकाङ्ारावस्थायां
धूमोत्पादकत्वाभावेऽिप न िनवतर् ते विह्रूपता, स्वहेतोरेव तथाभूतस्योत्पत्ेवर्िह्स्वभावस्य
धूमजनकात्मकस्य च, तथा अन्यदिप कायर् स्वहेतुनोत्पािदतं यत् वस्तुस्वभावं
कायार्ऽजनकात्मकं च, तथा सामान्यमिप वस्तुभूतं न च कायर् मुत्पादयित।
na cārthakriyākartṛtvābhāve’satvaṁ siddhyati, yathā vahneḥ ayogo-

lakāṅgārāvasthāyāṁ dhūmotpādakatvābhāve’pi na nivartate vahni-
rūpatā, svahetoreva tathābhūtasyotpattervahnisvabhāvasya dhūma-
janakātmakasya ca, tathā anyadapi kāryaṁ svahetunotpāditaṁ yat
vastusvabhāvaṁ kāryā’janakātmakaṁ ca, tathā sāmānyamapi vastu-
bhūtaṁ na ca kāryamutpādayati.
Translation: 660
It cannot be said that, if it is accepted that there is absence of
producerness of any fruitful behavior, then, it will mean that, it
does not exist. For example, when the fire is in the form of a red
hot iron ball, even if it does not produce smoke, it does not lose its
character of being a fire. The nature of fire, of that type i.e. of the
form of being the producer of smoke is produced from its own cause.
In the same way, another effect also is produced by its own cause
viz. the nature of a thing i.e. being of the form of not producer of
an effect. Similarly, universal is an entity which does not produce
an effect.
Text: 661
ननु यिद कायर् नोत्पादयित, तदस्तीित कथं वे त्स?
nanu yadi kāryaṁ notpādayati, tadastīti kathaṁ vetsi?
Translation: 661
Objection:
Well, if does not produce an effect, how do you know that it exists?
Text: 662
तदपु लब्ध्या।
tadupalabdhyā.
Translation: 662
Reply:
Through its knowledge.
Text: 663
ननु तदनुत्पाद्ा कथं तद्गृहीितभर् वित? स्वहेतुसामथ्यर् िनयिमतायाः तद्गृहीत्यात्मतयो-
त्पत्ेः।
nanu tadanutpādyā kathaṁ tadgṛhītirbhavati? svahetusāmarthya-

niyamitāyāḥ tadgṛhītyātmatayotpatteḥ.
Translation: 663
Objection:
Well, how is it that, its knowledge is not produced by that? That
is produced in the form of knowledge of that universal which is
determined by the capacity of its cause.
Text: 664
नच तदत्ु पाद्त्वेन तद्गृहीितत्वम्; चक्षुरादेरिप संवेद्त्वपर्सङ्ात्। न च िवषयाकारयोिगत्वेन
तद्गृहीितत्व(त्वं) िवज्ञानात्मना व्यितरेकेण िवषयाकारसमावेशायोगात्। योऽसौ आकारो
िवषयािपर् तः स िकं ज्ञानाकाराद् िभन्ः, अिभन्ो वा?
naca tadutpādyatvena tadgṛhītitvam; cakṣurāderapi saṁvedyatvapra-
saṅgāt. na ca viṣayākārayogitvena tadgṛhītitva(tvaṁ) vijñānātmanā
vyatirekeṇa viṣayākārasamāveśāyogāt. yo’sau ākāro viṣayārpitaḥ sa
kiṁ jñānākārād bhinnaḥ, abhinno vā?
Translation: 664
Reply:
It is not the case that the knowledge of universal is called knowledge,
because, it is produced by that universal. Had it been so, there will
arise the contingency of eyes etc. revealing themselves. It is also
not the case that, because, the universal contributes to the form of
knowledge of universal, therefore it is called knowledge of universal,
because, without the form of knowledge, the association of form of
object in the knowledge is not possible. There also the question
arises, is the form in the knowledge contributed in the object is
different from the form of knowledge or identical with that?
Text: 665
यिद िभन्ः; स ता त्वकः; अता त्वको वा?
yadi bhinnaḥ; sa tātvikaḥ; atātviko vā?
Translation: 665
If you say, it is different, then, again the question arises, whether it
is real or unreal?
Text: 666
यिद ता त्वकः; तद्गितः कथम्?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; tadgatiḥ katham?
Translation: 666
If you say, it is real, then, how is it known?
Text: 667
िकं स्वसंवेद्त्वेन; आहो जनकत्वाकारापर् कत्वेन?
kiṁ svasaṁvedyatvena; āho janakatvākārārpakatvena?
Translation: 667
Is it known as being self revealed or as contributed the form of being
the producer?
Text: 668
तद्ित स्वसंवेद्त्वेन; तदयुक्म्; अज्ञानात्मतया स्वसंवेद्त्वायोगात्।
tadyati svasaṁvedyatvena; tadayuktam; ajñānātmatayā svasaṁve-
dyatvāyogāt.
Translation: 668
If you say, it is known as something to be known by itself, it will
not be proper, because since it is of the nature of non-knowledge,
it cannot reveal itself.
Text: 669
अथ जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन; तदा पर्ाप्ा आकारपरम्परा।
atha janakatvā”kārārpakatvena; tadā prāptā ākāraparamparā.
Translation: 669
If you say, it is known as contributed the form as a producer, then,
one will have to postulate an endless series of forms (i.e. it will lead
to infinite regress).
Text: 670
अता त्वकः; तद्गितनोर्पपद्ते; स्वसंवेद्त्वजनकत्वव्यितरेकात्।
atāttvikaḥ; tadgatirnopapadyate; svasaṁvedyatvajanakatvavyatirekāt.
Translation: 670
If you say, it is unreal, then, its knowledge cannot be explained,
because it will be neither self-illuminating nor producer of anything.
Text: 671
अथ अव्यित रक्ः; स ता त्वकः, अता त्वको वा?
atha avyatiriktaḥ; sa tāttvikaḥ, atāttviko vā?
Translation: 671
If you say, it is identical with the form of knowledge, there again
the question arises whether it is a fact or it is a fiction?
Text: 672
यिद ता त्वकः; स जडात्मा, तिद्परीतो वा?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; sa jaḍātmā, tadviparīto vā?
Translation: 672
If you say, it is a fact, again question arises, is it non-sentient matter
or opposite of it?
Text: 673
यिद जडात्मा; न तिहर् िचता सह तादात्म्यम्-िचदिचतोः तादात्म्यानुपप त्ः।
yadi jaḍātmā; na tarhi citā saha tādātmyam-cidacitoḥ tādātmyā-
nupapattiḥ.
Translation: 673
If it is a non-sentient matter, then, it cannot be identical with
anything sentient (i.e. one who has consciousness) because, identity
between conscious and unconscious is not possible.
Text: 674
अथ तिद्परीतः; तदा ज्ञानमातर्ता स्यात्। ज्ञानरूपता च सवर् ज्ञानावधारणा-
(०ज्ञानसाधारणा)पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थानुपप त्ः।
atha tadviparītaḥ; tadā jñānamātratā syāt. jñānarūpatā ca sarvajñā-
nāvadhāraṇā(0jñānasādhāraṇā)pratikarmavyavasthānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 674
If you say, it is conscious, then, it will be mere knowledge and the
form of knowledge is common to all knowledges and in that case, it
will be difficult to explain any individual object or action.
Text: 675
अथ अता त्वकः; तदा ज्ञानस्यािप अता त्वकत्वं पर्ाप्नोित।
atha atāttvikaḥ; tadā jñānasyāpi atāttvikatvaṁ prāpnoti.
Translation: 675
If you say it is a fiction, then, knowledge also will become fictitious.
Text: 676
यिद च िवज्ञानतादात्म्येन आकारोत्प त्भर् वित; िवज्ञानं सवर् कारकिनष्पाद्ेन साधारणम् -
पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थानुपप त्ः। एवं च सित यदक्
ु म्-
अथेर्न घटयत्येनां निह मुक्त्वाथर् रूपताम्।
तस्मादथार् धगतेः पर्माणं मेयरूपता॥
तन्मुग्धिवल सतं सौगतानाम्।
yadi ca vijñānatādātmyena ākārotpattirbhavati; vijñānaṁ sarvakā-
rakaniṣpādyena sādhāraṇam pratikarmavyavasthānupapattiḥ. evaṁ
ca sati yaduktam-
arthena ghaṭayatyenāṁ nahi muktvārtharūpatām,
tasmādarthādhigateḥ pramāṇaṁ meyarūpatā.
tanmugdhavilasitaṁ saugatānām.
Translation: 676
If you say, the form is produced as identical with the knowledge,
then, since knowledge is common to all as being produced by all
factors, it will be difficult to explain each and every object and
action. When such is the case, your statement viz. “the form of
the content of knowledge, is caused by the content without giving
up the form of content, therefore, the proof for the knowledge of
content is the very form of the content,” is nothing but a fanciful
imagination of the Buddhists.
Text: 677
तदेवं वृ त्िवकल्पािददषू णं सामान्यादौ न सम्भवित यथा एकं रूपम् अनेककायोर्त्पादकत्वेन
साधारणम्, तथा एकं सामान्यम् अनेकाधारसाधारणम्।
tadevaṁ vṛttivikalpādidūṣaṇaṁ sāmānyādau na sambhavati yathā
ekaṁ rūpam anekakāryotpādakatvena sādhāraṇam, tathā ekaṁ
sāmānyam anekādhārasādhāraṇam.
Translation: 677
In this way, the criticism of relation and imagination is not possible
with reference to a universal. As one color is common as producer
of many effects, similarly, one universal is common in many loci.
Text: 678
अथ एकरूपं नानेकं कायर् जनयित अिप तु एकमेव; ततर्ािप िकं रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयित,
उत ज्ञानमेव?
atha ekarūpaṁ nānekaṁ kāryaṁ janayati api tu ekameva; tatrāpi
kiṁ rūpameva kevalamutpādayati, uta jñānameva?
Translation: 678
If you say that, one color does not produce many effects, but only
one effect, there also a question arises, is it the fact that it produces
only color or only knowledge?
Text: 679
तद्िद रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयित; तदा रूपस्याऽगर्हणं पर्ाप्नोित िवज्ञानाऽजननात्।
tadyadi rūpameva kevalamutpādayati; tadā rūpasyā’grahaṇaṁ prā-
pnoti vijñānā’jananāt.
Translation: 679
If you say, it produces only color, then, it means that it is not
known, because it does not produce knowledge.
Text: 680
अथ ज्ञानमेव केवलमुत्पादयित तथािप मानसं पर्त्यक्षं न पर्ाप्नोित। स्विवषयानन्तरिवषय-
सहका रणे न्दर्यज्ञानेन यज्जन्यते तत् मानसं पर्त्यक्षम्। न च स्विवषयानन्तरभावी
िवषयोऽ स्त रूपान्तराजनकात्। तस्मादेकमेव रूपं िवज्ञाननीलािदकायर् साधारणं
पर्ितपत्व्यम्। चक्षुरूपालोकादीिन कारणािन िवज्ञानमुत्पादय न्त, तािन िकमेकस्वभाव-
युक्ािन, आहो िनयतस्वभावयुक्ािन?
atha jñānameva kevalamutpādayati tathāpi mānasaṁ pratyakṣaṁ na
prāpnoti. svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena yajja-
nyate tat mānasaṁ pratyakṣam. na ca svaviṣayānantarabhāvī viṣa-
yo’sti rūpāntarājanakāt. tasmādekameva rūpaṁ vijñānanīlādikā-
ryasādhāraṇaṁ pratipattavyam. cakṣurūpālokādīni kāraṇāni vijñā-
namutpādayanti, tāni kimekasvabhāvayuktāni, āho niyatasva-
bhāvayuktāni?
Translation: 680
If you say, it produces only knowledge, even then, there cannot
arise any mental perception. A mental perception is that perception,
which is produced by the knowledge of senses, which is the auxiliary
cause of the content which comes after its own content. And here
there is no content which arises after its own content, because it
does not produce another color. Therefore, one has to accept single
color, which is common to knowledge blue color etc. We say that
the factors such as eyes, color, light etc. produce knowledge. Here
the question arises, whether they produce knowledge having one
and the same nature or having specific individual nature?
Text: 681
तद्िद एकस्वभावतया उत्पादयित( न्त); तदा कारकैकत्वं पर्ाप्नोित अिभन्स्वभाव-
योिगत्वात्।
tadyadi ekasvabhāvatayā utpādayati(nti); tadā kārakaikatvaṁ prā-
pnoti abhinnasvabhāvayogitvāt.
Translation: 681
If you say that, they produce having one and the same nature, then,
one should say, there is only one factor, because all factors possess
identical nature.
Text: 682
अथ िनयतस्वभावयुक्ािन ज्ञानरूपं कायर् जनय न्त, तदा िवज्ञानस्य अभेदरूपता िनवतर् ते,
िनयतस्वभावकारकजन्यत्वाद् रूपशब्दािदवत्।
atha niyatasvabhāvayuktāni jñānarūpaṁ kāryaṁ janayanti, tadā
vijñānasya abhedarūpatā nivartate, niyatasvabhāvakārakajanyatvād
rūpaśabdādivat.
Translation: 682
If you say, they produce knowledge possessing individual specific
nature, and then, it cannot be maintained, that the knowledge
is identical, as color, sound, etc. are different because they are
produced by factors having specific individual character.
Text: 683
अथ िविवधादिप कारणादख ण्डतरूपं कायर् भवित; एवं च कायर् भेदात् िभन्कारणानुमानं
िनवतर् ते - एकस्वभावादिप िवज्ञानादनेकं नयनालोकािदकायर् मुत्पद्ते, अनेकस्मादिप एकं
भवित। एवं च सित िनयतकायर् दशर् ने िनयतकारणानुमानं िनवतर् ते।
atha vividhādapi kāraṇādakhaṇḍitarūpaṁ kāryaṁ bhavati; evaṁ
ca kāryabhedād bhinnakāraṇānumānaṁ nivartate - ekasvabhāvā-
dapi vijñānādanekaṁ nayanālokādikāryamutpadyate, anekasmādapi

ekaṁ bhavati. evaṁ ca sati niyatakāryadarśane niyatakāraṇānu-
mānaṁ nivartate.
Translation: 683
If you say, from various types of causes an indivisible or uniform
effect is produced, then, there cannot be inference of different
causes on the basis of different effects. As a matter of fact, from a
single knowledge having a single characteristic, many effects of eyes,
light etc. are produced. Similarly, from many causes, one effect is
produced. When such is the case, the inference of specific cause on
the basis of specific effect will not remain valid.
Text: 684
अथ एकस्मादेव कारणादेकं कायर् भवित न बहनां सङ् लतानाम् एकफलोत्पादकत्वम्।
ततश्च िनयतकायर् दशर् ने िनयतकारणानुमानं केन िनवायर् ते?
atha ekasmādeva kāraṇādekaṁ kāryaṁ bhavati na bahūnāṁ saṅka-
litānām ekaphalotpādakatvam. tataśca niyatakāryadarśane niyata-
kāraṇānumānaṁ kena nivāryate?
Translation: 684
Likewise, from a single cause, a single effect will arise. Many causes
together cannot be said to be producer of one effect and so who
can debar the operation of inference of specific cause on seeing the
specific effect.
Text: 685
तदेतदसमीचीनम्; यद्ेकं कारणम् एकं कायर् जनयित तदाऽभ्युपगमिवरोधः- “चतुभ्यर् -
श्चत्चैत्ा भव न्त, बोधाद्ोधरूपता िवषयाकारता” इत्यािद। एकमेव जनयित िकम्-
समानजातीयत्वेन, आहो तदाकारत्वेन, िकं वा पूवार्परकालभािवत्वेन?
tadetadasamīcīnam; yadyekaṁ kāraṇam ekaṁ kāryaṁ janayati
tadā’bhyupagamavirodhaḥ-“caturbhyaścittacaittā bhavanti, bodhād-
bodharūpatā viṣayākāratā” ityādi. ekameva janayati kim- samāna-
jātīyatvena, āho tadākāratvena, kiṁ vā pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena?
Translation: 685
This is not at all proper. If you maintain that, one cause will
generate one effect, then, it will go against what you have already
accepted. For instance, you have said, “the mental states arise from
four things, the conscious state, from the consciousness’ and also
the form of the content etc.” Moreover, when you say one cause
produces one effect, the question arises, is it in the form of the
same class or in the form of that or in the form of something arising
in a sequence?
Text: 686
तद्िद समानजातीयत्वेन जनकत्वम्; तदा समानकालीनं पश्चादत्ु पन्मिप जनयेत्।
tadyadi samānajātīyatvena janakatvam; tadā samānakālīnaṁ
paścādutpannamapi janayet.
Translation: 686
If you say it produces things of the same class, then, it can also
produce something which comes later but belonging to the same
kind.
Text: 687
अथ तदाकारानुका रत्वेन जनकम्, ततर्ाप्येतदेव दषू णम्।
atha tadākārānukāritvena janakam, tatrāpyetadeva dūṣaṇam.
Translation: 687
If you say, it is a producer imitating the form of that, there also the
same objection can be raised.
Text: 688
अथ पूवार्परकालभािवत्वेन जनकम्; न तहीर्दं वक्व्यम् 'एकमेव जनकम्' चक्षूरूपालोक-
मनस्काराणां पूवर्कालभािवत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
atha pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena janakam; na tarhīdaṁ vaktavya-
m‘ekam eva janakam’ cakṣūrūpālokamanaskārāṇāṁ pūrvakālabhā-
vitvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 688
If you say, it is a producer coming in sequence then, you should not
say one and only one is the producer, because the factors such as
eyes, color, light and mind all belong to the earlier time.
Text: 689
एवञ् अनेकोपादानोत्पाद्त्वेन आकारकदम्बकस्वरूपं िवज्ञानं पर्सक्म्। रूपाद्ाकार-
प रहारे वा िवज्ञानाकारस्याप्यनुपप त्ः। तदनुपपत्ौ नैरात्म्यपर्सङ्ः।
evañca anekopādānotpādyatvena ākārakadambakasvarūpaṁ vijñā-

naṁ prasaktam. rūpādyākāraparihāre vā vijñānākārasyāpyanupapa-
ttiḥ. tadanupapattau nairātmyaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 689
Thus, since it is produced by many factors, knowledge appears to
be of the form of many forms and if you try to exclude the form
of color, the form of knowledge will remain unexplained and if that
remains unexplained, it will lead to the contingency of voidness of
characteristics.
Text: 690
िकञ्, ज्ञानं कायैर्कस्वभावम्, कारणैकस्वभावम्, उभयस्वभावं वा?
kiñca, jñānaṁ kāryaikasvabhāvam, kāraṇaikasvabhāvam, ubhaya-
svabhāvaṁ vā?
Translation: 690
Moreover, what is the fact is knowledge always of the form of an
effect or is it of the form of cause or is it of the form of both?
Text: 691
तद्िद कारणैकस्वभावम्; तदा कायर् रूपता न सम्भवित, तदभावे न वस्तुत्वम्, संस्कृतानां
वस्तुत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
tadyadi kāraṇaikasvabhāvam; tadā kāryarūpatā na sambhavati,
tadabhāve na vastutvam, saṁskṛtānāṁ vastutvābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 691
If you say, it is of the form of cause, then, it cannot have the form
of effect and if it does not have the form of effect, then, it cannot
be an entity at all, because, according to you, only that which is
produced is accepted as an entity.
Text: 692
नािप कारणरूपता उपपद्ते; अनाधीयमानाऽितशयत्येन जनकत्वाऽयोगात्।
nāpi kāraṇarūpatā upapadyate; anādhīyamānā’tiśayatyena janaka-
tvā’yogāt.
Translation: 692
It cannot be of the form of cause also, because, unless something
additional is super-imposed, it cannot be called the cause.
Text: 693
अथ कायैर्कस्वभावम्; तथािप न सदात्मकम्, अथर् िकर्याऽकरणे वस्तुत्विवरहात् ।
atha kāryaikasvabhāvam; tathāpi na sadātmakam, arthakriyā’karaṇe
vastutvavirahāt.
Translation: 693
If you say that, knowledge is always of the form of effect, still, it is
not eternal, because, if it does not contribute to a fruitful behavior,
it cannot be considered to be an entity.
Text: 694
अथ उभयात्मकम्; एकमनेकात्मकं भवित? केन त्वं िवपर्ल म्भतः? निह एकस्य अनेक-
नामकरणे नानातोपपद्ते। न चानेकनामका(क)रणमुपपद्ते, िनिमत्स्यािविचतर्त्वात्।
atha ubhayātmakam; ekamanekātmakaṁ bhavati? kena tvaṁ
vipralambhitaḥ? nahi ekasya anekanāmakaraṇe nānātopapadyate.
na cānekanāmakā(ka)raṇamupapadyate, nimittasyāvicitratvāt.
Translation: 694
If you say knowledge is of the nature of both a cause and an effect,
it means one and the same thing can be of many natures. Who has
confused you? Even if one thing is given many names, it does not
become many. Moreover, it is not possible even to name it by many
names, because the ground for application of the term knowledge
is not many.
Text: 695
एवं िवज्ञानस्याऽसम्भवे सित सन्तानानुपप त्ः; अभर्ान्तभर्ान्तद्ैतस्याऽनुपप त्श्च।
evaṁ vijñānasyā’sambhave sati santānānupapattiḥ; abhrāntabhrā-
ntadvaitasyā’nupapattiśca.
Translation: 695
Thus, when knowledge itself remains impossible to explain, there
can be no justification for a series of knowledges. Also, there is no
justification in holding the duality of non-erroneous and erroneous.
[१६. पर्सङ्ात् बौद्ािभमतस्य सन्तानस्य अ सद्त्वपर्दशर् नम्।]
[16. prasaṅgāt boddhābhimatasya santānasya asiddhatvapradarśanam.]
Text: 696
इतोऽिप सन्तानस्याऽ सिद्ः िवज्ञानस्य एकत्वात्। तदेकत्वं च आकारान्तरस्यानुपपत्ेः;
उपपत्ौ वा ज्ञानाकारिवरहपर्सङ्ः। तत्पर्सक्ौ च सन्तानाऽनुपप त्ः।
ito’pi santānasyā’siddhiḥ vijñānasya ekatvāt. tadekatvaṁ ca ākā-

rāntarasyānupapatteḥ; upapattau vā jñānākāravirahaprasaṅgaḥ. tat-
prasaktau ca santānā’nupapattiḥ.
Translation: 696
For this reason also viz. because knowledge is one, the series of
knowledges cannot be established. Knowledge is one means, there
is no form other than the form of knowledge possible and even if
it is possible there will arise the contingency of knowledge having
no form and once that is the fact, there cannot be a series of
knowledges.
Text: 697
इतोऽिप िवज्ञानसन्तानानुपप त्ः- िवज्ञानम् असद्मार्त् सदात्मतया िनवतर् ते,
स्वरूपान्तरात्ु कथं व्यावत्र्ते? िकं सदात्मतया, आहो आकारान्तरेण?
ito’pi vijñānasantānānupapattiḥ- vijñānam asaddharmāt sadāt-
matayā nivartate, svarūpāntarāttu kathaṁ vyāvarttate? kiṁ
sadātmatayā, āho ākārāntareṇa?
Translation: 697
For the following reason also, there is no possibility of a series of
knowledges viz. a knowledge is excluded as being existent from that
which is non-existent. But how can it be excluded from its other
form? There the question arises, is it excluded as being existent or
in terms of another form?
Text: 698
तद्िद सदात्मतया व्यावत्र्ते; तदा रूपादेः असदाकारता पर्ाप्नोित, वा जिवषाणयो रव।
tadyadi sadātmatayā vyāvarttate; tadā rūpādeḥ asadākāratā
prāpnoti, vājiviṣāṇayoriva.
Translation: 698
If you say that, it is excluded as being existent, then, entities like
color will have to be accepted as non-existent like horns of horse.
Text: 699
अथ आकारान्तरेण िनवतर् ते; तदा ज्ञानस्य असत्स्वभावता पर्ाप्नोित, तुरगिवषाणविदित।
atha ākārāntareṇa nivartate; tadā jñānasya asatsvabhāvatā
prāpnoti, turagaviṣāṇavaditi.
Translation: 699
If you say that, it is excluded in terms of other form, then, it means
that the knowledge is fictitious like horns of horse.
Text: 700
अथ िवज्ञानाकारतया िनवतर् ते रूपािदभ्यो िवज्ञानम्; सा िवज्ञानाकारता सत्स्वभावा,
असत्स्वभावा[वा]?
atha vijñānākāratayā nivartate rūpādibhyo vijñānam; sā vijñānā-
kāratā satsvabhāvā, asatsvabhāvā[vā]?
Translation: 700
If you say that, knowledge is excluded in the form of knowledge,
like knowledge of color etc. is excluded from color etc. there the
question arises, is that form of knowledge real or unreal?
Text: 701
तद्िद सत्स्वभावा; तदा ज्ञानाकारतया िनवत्र्त इित िकमुक्ं भवित?
tadyadi satsvabhāvā; tadā jñānākāratayā nivarttata iti kimuktaṁ
bhavati?
Translation: 701
If you say that, it is real, then, what do you mean by saying “it is
excluded in the form of knowledge?”
Text: 702
सदात्मतया िनवतर् ते, िवज्ञानसदाकारयोरव्यितरेकात्। ततश्च रूपादेरसदाकारता पर्ाप्नोित
तुरगिवषाणविदित पूवोर्िदतमेव दषू णमापद्ते।
sadātmatayā nivartate, vijñānasadākārayoravyatirekāt. tataśca
rūpāderasadākāratā prāpnoti turagaviṣāṇavaditi pūrvoditameva
dūṣaṇamāpadyate.
Translation: 702
If you say that, it is excluded as real and existent, because
knowledge and existence of knowledge cannot be separated. Then,
again the entities like color etc. will become non-existent, like the
horns of horse, which is the same objection raised before.
Text: 703
अथ असत्स्वभावा; तदा खरिवषाणवद् िवज्ञानरूपतां प रत्यजित, त्यागे िवज्ञान-
सन्तानानुपप त्ः, तदनुपपत्ौ चैत्यवन्दनािदिकर्याऽनथर् क्यम्।
atha asatsvabhāvā; tadā kharaviṣāṇavad vijñānarūpatāṁ parityajati,

tyāge vijñānasantānānupapattiḥ, tadanupapattau caityavandanādi-
kriyā’narthakyam.
Translation: 703
If you say, it is unreal then, its character of being knowledge will
vanish, like rabbits horn and once it is not knowledge that cannot
be a series of knowledge and when there is no series of knowledge,
the activities viz. the praying of ‘caitya’ will become meaningless.
Text: 704
इतोऽिप िवज्ञानसन्तानानुपप त्ः, तदत्ु पादकिवज्ञानस्य पूवार्परसहोत्पन्िवज्ञानं पर्ित
स्वरूपािवशेषाद् यदेव पूवर्सहोत्पन्िवज्ञानापेक्षया स्वरूपं तदेव अपरिवज्ञानापेक्षयािप
स्वरूपं, िवज्ञानस्य िनरवय[व]त्वेन, ततश्च यथा पूवर्सहोत्पन्िवज्ञानस्य हेतुनर् भवित,
एवमपरिवज्ञानस्यािप हेतुनर् भवित, तत्स्वरूपव्यित रक्व्यापाराितशयस्यानुपलब्धेः।
ito’pi vijñānasantānānupapattiḥ, tadutpādakavijñānasya pūrvāpara-
sahotpannavijñānaṁ prati svarūpāviśeṣād yadeva pūrvasahotpanna-
vijñānāpekṣayā svarūpaṁ tadeva aparavijñānāpekṣayāpi svarūpaṁ,
vijñānasya niravaya[va]tvena, tataśca yathā pūrvasahotpanna-
vijñānasya heturna bhavati, evamaparavijñānasyāpi heturna
bhavati, tatsvarūpavyatiriktavyāpārātiśayasyānupalabdheḥ.
Translation: 704
For the following reason also, there cannot be a series of knowledges
viz. the nature of the knowledge which is suppose to produce the
series remains the same with reference to the prior and the later
knowledges. In other words, whatever is the form of knowledge, prior
to the series with reference to the knowledge which arises before
the same is the form of knowledge with reference to the knowledge
which follows. Since, knowledge does not have parts; therefore, as
it does not become the cause of previous knowledge, so also it is
not the cause of the following knowledge, because there is no extra
function other than its own form.
Text: 705
अथ पूवर्कालभाव एवाितशयः तेन तस्य हेतुत्वमुपपाद्ते;
atha pūrvakālabhāva evātiśayaḥ tena tasya hetutvamupapādyate;
Translation: 705
Clarification:
Being at the previous moment, may be treated as the extra function
and that is why that can be called as the cause of following
knowledge.
Text: 706
यद्ेवं यथा देवदत्ज्ञानपूवर्कालभािव देवदत्ज्ञानकारणं तथा सवर् पुरुषज्ञानानां देवदत्-
ज्ञानकालोत्पन्ानां देवदत्ज्ञानं पर्ित हेतुत्वं पर्सक्म्; तत्पर्सक्ौ अनेकद्ीपदेशान्त रत-
पुरुषानुस्यू(नुभू) ताथार्नुस्मरणं स्यात्। तथा, स्वजनभुजङ्मादौऽ(मादावन) नुभूतेप्य-
थेर्ऽनुस्मरणं स्यात्। तथा, तथागतावदातज्ञानजन्यत्वे देवदत्ज्ञानानामवदातता स्यात्।
ततश्च सवेर् सवर् ज्ञाः स्युः।
yadyevaṁ yathā devadattajñānapūrvakālabhāvi devadattajñāna-
kāraṇaṁ tathā sarvapuruṣajñānānāṁ devadattajñānakālotpannā-
nāṁ devadattajñānaṁ prati hetutvaṁ prasaktam; tatprasaktau
anekadvīpadeśāntaritapuruṣānusyū(nubhū)tārthānusmaraṇaṁ syāt.
tathā, svajanabhujaṅgamādau’(mādāvana)nubhūtepyarthe’nusma-
raṇaṁ syāt. tathā, tathāgatāvadātajñānajanyatve devadattajñānā-
nāmavadātatā syāt. tataśca sarve sarvajñāḥ syuḥ.
Translation: 706
Reply:
If it is so, then, suppose as the knowledge of Devadatta of previous
moment, is the cause of the subsequent knowledge of Devadatta,
in the same way, all knowledges of all people produced at the
time of knowledge of Devadatta should be treated as the cause
of the knowledge of Devadatta and if that is accepted, then, there
should be remembrance of all things experienced by people living
in many islands and places. Similarly, there will be remembrance
with reference to things which were experienced by own people and
serpents. Likewise, since knowledges of Devadatta are produced by
pure knowledge of Buddha, the knowledges of Devadatta should
also become pure and as a consequence of it all should become
all-knowing.
Text: 707
अथ नैव अवदातता देवदत्ािदज्ञानानाम्, तथागतावदातज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वेऽिप देवदत्ा-
िदज्ञानेनािप जिनतत्वात्; तज्जन्यत्वेनव
ै तथागतज्ञानस्याप्यवदातरूपता न पर्ाप्नोित।
atha naiva avadātatā devadattādijñānānām, tathāgatāvadāta-
jñānopādānajanyatve’pi devadattādijñānenāpi janitatvāt; tajjanya-
tvenaiva tathāgatajñānasyāpyavadātarūpatā na prāpnoti.
Translation: 707
Clarification:
Well, the knowledges of Devadatta will not be pure knowledges,
because, although these knowledges of Devadatta etc. are produced
by the pure knowledges of the Buddha, still these knowledges of
Devadatta are also produced by the knowledges of Devadatta etc.
Text: 708
ततश्चासाविप अवीतरागः स्यादसवर् ज्ञश्च। इतश्च सन्तानानुपप त्ः, िवज्ञानयोः सहोत्पादे
हेतुफलभावानुपपत्ेः। यदैव कारणज्ञानं िवनश्यित तदैव कायर् ज्ञानं जायत इित वः
सद्ान्तः।
tataścāsāvapi avītarāgaḥ syādasarvajñaśca. itaśca santānā-
nupapattiḥ, vijñānayoḥ sahotpāde hetuphalabhāvānupapatteḥ.
yadaiva kāraṇajñānaṁ vinaśyati tadaiva kāryajñānaṁ jāyata iti
vaḥ siddhāntaḥ.
Translation: 708
Reply:
Then, the knowledge of the Buddha also cannot be said to be pure,
because, it is also produced by the knowledge of the Buddha and in
that case, the Buddha also cannot be said to be free from defects
like desire etc. and as a consequence he too cannot be considered
as all-knowing.
Text: 709
कारणज्ञानस्य च िवनाशः तदत्ु पाद एव। ततश्च कारणज्ञानिवनाशकाले कायर् ज्ञानं
भवित। िकमुक्ं भवित? कारणज्ञानोत्पादकाल एव भवित। ततश्च सहोत्पन्योः
हेतुफलभावानुपप त्ः एककालोद्गतयोः गोिवषाणयो रव। कारणज्ञानस्य च
अनुपप(नुत्प)न्स्योत्प त्वद् अनुत्पन्स्य िवनाशपर्सङ्ः। ततश्च क्षणमिप नोपलभ्येत,
उपलब्धौ वा सततोपलम्भपर्सङ्ः, तदात्मभूतिवनाशस्य उपलम्भिवघाताकत्ृर्त्वात्।
िवघातकत्ृर्त्वे वा एकक्षणोपलम्भस्यािप अनुपप त्पर्सङ्ः।
kāraṇajñānasya ca vināśaḥ tadutpāda eva. tataśca kāraṇajñāna-

vināśakāle kāryajñānaṁ bhavati. kimuktaṁ bhavati? kāraṇajñā-
notpādakāla eva bhavati. tataśca sahotpannayoḥ hetuphalabhā-
vānupapattiḥ ekakālodgatayoḥ goviṣāṇayoriva. kāraṇajñānasya ca
anupapa(nutpa)nnasyotpattivad anutpannasya vināśaprasaṅgaḥ.
tataśca kṣaṇamapi nopalabhyeta, upalabdhau vā satatopalambha-
prasaṅgaḥ, tadātmabhūtavināśasya upalambhavighātākarttṛtvāt.
vighātakarttṛtve vā ekakṣaṇopalambhasyāpi anupapattiprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 709
For this reason also, there cannot be series of knowledges viz. two
knowledges are produced together, i.e. it cannot be decided, which
one is the cause and which one is the effect. According to your
doctrine, the moment the knowledge which is treated as cause is
destroyed, at the same time, the knowledge which is treated as effect
is produced. The destruction of the knowledge which is the cause, is
itself is the effect of that cause. Thus, at the time of the destruction
of the knowledge which is the cause, there arises the knowledge of
effect. What do you mean by this? It means the knowledge which
is an effect, arises at the time of knowledge, which is the cause
and that is why it cannot be decided which of the two knowledges,
which have arisen simultaneously, is the cause and which one is the
effect, like two horns of a cow which have grown simultaneously
and there will arise the contingency viz. like the production of the
knowledge which is the cause, which is not yet produced there will
be destruction of that which is not yet born and it will take to a
situation that, it cannot be known even for a moment and if it is
known, then, it will continue to be known for ever, because it being
of the nature of destruction it does not have the capacity either
to know or to destroy or if we accept that it has the capacity to
destroy, then, there will arise the contingency that, it can never be
known even for a moment.
Text: 710
अथ एकक्षणोपलभ्यस्वभावकं सञ्ातं तेन (न) सततोपल ब्धः अनुपल ब्धवार्;
atha ekakṣaṇopalabhyasvabhāvakaṁ sañjātaṁ tena (na) satatopa-

labdhiḥ anupalabdhirvā;
Translation: 710
Clarification:
In that case, it has become an entity which has the nature of being
for a moment and therefore there can be neither its knowledge for
ever nor non-knowledge for ever.
Text: 711
यद्ेवं द्ादशाष्क्षणोपलभ्यस्वभावकं सञ्ातं िकन् कल्प्यते? िकञ्, उत्पादिवनाशयोरभेदे
सित कायर् कारणयोः समं िवनाशः स्यात्।
yadyevaṁ dvādaśāṣṭakṣaṇopalabhyasvabhāvakaṁ sañjātaṁ kinna
kalpyate? kiñca, utpādavināśayorabhede sati kāryakāraṇayoḥ samaṁ
vināśaḥ syāt.
Translation: 711
Reply:
If it is so, then, why don’t you postulate it as having the nature of
being known for twelve or eight moments? Moreover, if production
and destruction are made identical then, there will be destruction
of cause and effect simultaneously.
Text: 712
यदप्यन्यदक् ु म्-“मातुरुदरिनःकर्म(िनष्कर्म)णानन्तरं यदाद्ं ज्ञानं तज्झानान्तरपूवर्कं
ज्ञानत्वाद् िद्तीयज्ञानवत्।” न, अ सद्त्वाद् दृष्ान्तस्य, िद्तीयािदज्ञानस्यािप यथा
ज्ञानपूवर्कत्वं नावगाहियतुं पायर् ते तथा पर्ागेव आवेिदतम्। िकञ्, यिद (िद्)ज्ञानत्वात्
ज्ञानपूवर्कत्वानुमानम्, न िकलाऽवबोधात्मककारणमन्तरेण बोधात्मकं कायर् मुपपद्ते।
yadapyanyaduktam-“māturudaraniḥkrama(niṣkrama)ṇānantaraṁ
yadādyaṁ jñānaṁ tajjhānāntarapūrvakaṁ jñānatvād dvitīya-
jñānavat.” na, asiddhatvād dṛṣṭāntasya, dvitīyādijñānasyāpi yathā
jñānapūrvakatvaṁ nāvagāhayituṁ pāryate tathā prāgeva āveditam.
kiñca, yadi (ddhi)jñānatvāt jñānapūrvakatvānumānam, na kilā’va-
bodhātmakakāraṇamantareṇa bodhātmakaṁ kāryamupapadyate.
Translation: 712
You had also said the following: “the first knowledge after coming
out of mother’s womb is also preceded by another knowledge,
because it is a knowledge, like the second knowledge.” This inference

also is not correct because, here the example is not established yet.
It is not possible to know that, the second knowledge is preceded
by the previous knowledge (since the second knowledge is not yet
born) and in spite of that you have mentioned it as an example.
Moreover, your inference says that, this knowledge is preceded by
another knowledge, because it is knowledge. But, it is not the case
that, without the cause of the form of knowledge there can be an
effect in the form of knowledge.
Text: 713
एतच्चावद्म्- अबोधात्मकादिप नीलालोकलोचनािदकारणादपु जायते;
etaccāvadyam - abodhātmakādapi nīlālokalocanādikāraṇādupa-
jāyate;
Translation: 713
Objection:
But this is not proper, because, knowledge does arise from the cause
which is not of the form of knowledge viz. from the blue thing, light,
eyes, etc.
Text: 714
तदा गभार्दौ यदाद्ं िवज्ञानं तद्त ू संवातादेव भिवष्यित न ज्ञानान्तरं प रकल्पनीयम्।
यस्यानन्तरं यद्वित तत्स्य कारणं नाप रदृष्सामथ्यर्, िवज्ञानाभावे िवज्ञानजन्याकारता
िनवृत्ा न तु ज्ञानाकारता, यथा इ न्दर्यव्यापारमन्तरेणोपजायमाने मनोिवज्ञाने इ न्दर्य-
जन्याकारता िनवत्र्ते न तु ज्ञानाकारता।
tadā garbhādau yadādyaṁ vijñānaṁ tadbhūtasaṁvātādeva bhavi-
ṣyati na jñānāntaraṁ parikalpanīyam. yasyānantaraṁ yadbha-
vati tattasya kāraṇaṁ nāparidṛṣṭasāmarthyam, vijñānābhāve
vijñānajanyākāratā nivṛttā na tu jñānākāratā, yathā indriyavyā-
pāramantareṇopajāyamāne manovijñāne indriyajanyākāratā nivar-
ttate na tu jñānākāratā.
Translation: 714
Reply:
Then, the first knowledge in the womb can be from collection
of matters and in that case, you should not postulate another
knowledge, as the cause of the first knowledge. It is everybody’s

knowledge that, if X follows Y, then, Y is the cause of X. In the
absence of knowledge, the form caused by the knowledge will not
be there but, not the form of knowledge as in the case of knowledge
caused by mind without the function of sense organs, the form
produced by the sense organ is not found, no doubt, but not the
form of knowledge.
Text: 715
यिद च सदृशात् सदृशस्योत्प त्िनर् यम्यते तदा धूमेन दहनानुमानं न पर्ाप्नोित, दहनस्य
धूमसारूप्यमन्तरेण उपादानकारणत्वायोगात्।
yadi ca sadṛśāt sadṛśasyotpattirniyamyate tadā dhūmena dahanā-
numānaṁ na prāpnoti, dahanasya dhūmasārūpyamantareṇa upādā-
nakāraṇatvāyogāt.
Translation: 715
If you restrict similar effect from similar cause, then, you cannot
explain inference of fire from smoke, because, in that case unless
smoke is treated as similar to fire, fire cannot be the cause of smoke.
Text: 716
अथ रूपरूपता सारूप्यमुभयो रित चेत्; तिदहािप स्वलक्षणरूपता सारूप्यं भूतिवज्ञानयोः,
अलं परलोकिवज्ञानकल्पनया।
atha rūparūpatā sārūpyamubhayoriti cet; tadihāpi svalakṣaṇarūpatā
sārūpyaṁ bhūtavijñānayoḥ, alaṁ paralokavijñānakalpanayā.
Translation: 716
If you say, there is similarity of both, in terms of similarity in form,
then, here also there is similarity between matter and knowledge in
terms of their being unique particulars and therefore, there is no
need of postulating knowledge of previous birth.
Text: 717
अथ िवज्ञानरूपता भूतानां न िवद्ते तेन तेषामुपादानकारणत्वं ना स्त िवज्ञानं
पर्तीितश्चे(पर्तीित चे)त्;
atha vijñānarūpatā bhūtānāṁ na vidyate tena teṣāmupādāna-
kāraṇatvaṁ nāsti vijñānaṁ pratītiśce(pratīti ce)t;
Translation: 717
Clarification:
Well, matters are not of the form of knowledge and therefore, they
cannot be the material cause of knowledge. Since, knowledge is
nothing but awareness.
Text: 718
इहािप धूमरूपता ना स्त दहनस्य, नोपादानकारणत्वं, तदभावे न दहनानुमानम्। तथा,
अनुभवज्ञानादनुभवज्ञानस्यैव िनष्प त्रभ्युपेया उपादानकारणानुका रत्वेन कायर् स्य
िनष्पत्यभ्युपगमात्। न च एकदेशानुका रत्वम स्त तद्ीजस्यऽिविचतर्त्वात्। अनुभवा-
काराननुका रत्वे च ज्ञानाकारतािवरहः स्यात्, अनुकरोित च िवज्ञानरूपतां, तेन कथं
नानुभवात्मकम्? तदपु पत्ौ च पर्ाप्ा अनुभवपरम्परा इत्यतः स्मरणानुपप त्ः, तदनुपपत्ौ
च अनुमानज्ञानस्याप्यनुपप त्ः, ततश्च सवर् व्यवहारिवलोपपर्सङ्श्च। एवं (पर्सङ्ः। एवञ्)
न सन्तान सिद्ः,
ihāpi dhūmarūpatā nāsti dahanasya, nopādānakāraṇatvam,
tadabhāve na dahanānumānam. tathā, anubhavajñānādanu-
bhavajñānasyaiva niṣpattirabhyupeyā upādānakāraṇānukāritvena
kāryasya niṣpatyabhyupagamāt. na ca ekadeśānukāritvamasti
tadbījasya’vicitratvāt. anubhavākārānanukāritve ca jñānākāra-
tāvirahaḥ syāt, anukaroti ca vijñānarūpatām, tena kathaṁ
nānubhavātmakam? tadupapattau ca prāptā anubhavaparamparā
ityataḥ smaraṇānupapattiḥ, tadanupapattau ca anumānajñāna-
syāpyanupapattiḥ, tataśca sarvavyavahāravilopaprasaṅgaśca. evaṁ
(prasaṅgaḥ. evaṁ ca) na santānasiddhiḥ,
Translation: 718
Reply:
Then, here also fire is not of the form of smoke. Therefore, fire
cannot be the material cause of smoke and if it is not the cause of
smoke, then, there cannot be inference of fire on the basis of smoke.
Similarly, you should accept arising of experience from experience
only, because, you have accepted that, an effect arises in accordance
with its material cause. It is also not true that, an effect imitates
its cause partially, because, the cause of an effect does not allow
variation. If the effect viz. knowledge does not follow the form
of experience, it will lose its knowledgehood. Therefore, it does
follow the form of knowledge. Therefore, how can you say, it is

not of the form of experience and once that is explained, a chain
of experiences is unavoidable and therefore, one can never explain
any remembrance.
Text: 719
नािप सिवकल्पकिनिवर् कल्पकज्ञानद्ैराश्यम स्त, नािप व्यिभचाराव्यिभचारद्ैिवध्यमुपपद्ते
सौगते मते।
nāpi savikalpakanirvikalpakajñānadvairāśyamasti, nāpi vyabhicārā-
vyabhicāradvaividhyamupapadyate saugate mate.
Translation: 719
Neither there can be the dichotomy of determinate and
indeterminate knowledge. Nor can there be the dichotomy of
erroneous and non-erroneous knowledge according to the doctrine
of Buddhists.
0.6 मीमांसकािभमतस्य पर्त्यक्षस्य िनरासः
[mīmāṁsakābhimatasya pratyakṣasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the definition of Perception as accepted by the
Mīmāṁsakas)
Text: 720
तथा, “सत्सम्पर्योगे पुरुषस्ये न्दर्याणां बुिद्जन्म तत् पर्त्यक्षम्” [जैिम.१.१.४]; तदिप
पर्त्युक्म्। कथम्? एतत्सूतर्ं कदािचत् लक्षणपरम्, कदािचच्च कारकसंख्यापर्ितपादनपरम्,
कदािचच्चानुवादपरम्।
tathā, “satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṁ buddhijanma tat
pratyakṣam” [Jaimi.1.1.4]; tadapi pratyuktam. katham? etatsūtraṁ
kadācit lakṣaṇaparam, kadācicca kārakasaṁkhyāpratipādanaparam,
kadāciccānuvādaparam.
Translation: 720
In the same way, the definition of perception as given by the
Pūrvamīmaṁsā system viz. “when there is proper contact with the
sense organs (with the object) of a person there arises a perceptual
knowledge” (Jaimini 1.1.4) can also not be justified. How is it
so? Because, this aphorism of Jaimini is sometimes treated as a
statement of definition, sometimes as providing the number of cases

and again sometimes as a restatement.
Text: 721
तद्िद लक्षणपरम्; तदावबोधस्याव्यिभचा रत्वं नावगन्तुं पायर् ते-नादष्ु कारणजन्यत्वेन,
नािप पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न, नािप बाधारिहतत्वेन, नान्यथा वा-सवर् पूवोर्िदतमनुस्मृत्य
वक्व्यम्।
tadyadi lakṣaṇaparam; tadāvabodhasyāvyabhicāritvaṁ nāvagantuṁ
pāryate- nāduṣṭakāraṇajanyatvena, nāpi pravṛttisāmarthyena, nāpi
bādhārahitatvena, nānyathā vā-sarvaṁ pūrvoditamanusmṛtya vakta-
vyam.
Translation: 721
If it is treated as a definition, then, the fact that such a perceptual
knowledge has to be non-erroneous, cannot be understood. It cannot
be understood as non-erroneous either on account of its being
produced by defectless causes, nor can it be said to be non-erroneous
on the ground of its capacity to produce fruitful behavior, nor it can
be non-erroneous because, it is not contradicted, nor by any other
way or by any other ground. All these objections should be raised
recollecting what we discussed before.
Text: 722
नािप इ न्दर्याथर् सम्पर्योगजत्वं िवज्ञानस्यावबोधस्य चावार्ग्भागिवदावगम्यते, तदती न्दर्यत्वेन
तदायत्ताऽन धगतेः। नािप इ न्दर्यजन्यत्वमवगन्तुं पायर् ते, इ न्दर्याणामती न्दर्यत्वादेव।
nāpi indriyārthasamprayogajatvaṁ vijñānasyāvabodhasya cārvāg-
bhāgavidāvagamyate, tadatīndriyatvena tadāyattatā’nadhigateḥ.
nāpi indriyajanyatvamavagantuṁ pāryate, indriyāṇāmatīndriya-
tvādeva.
Translation: 722
A person who is observing a thing from one side does not know
whether the contact of his sense organ is proper with the entire
object. Since the contact is beyond the grasping capacity of a sense
organ, he cannot know the extent of such a contact. Nor can he
know that such a knowledge has been produced by the sense organ,
because, he cannot see the sense-organ.
Text: 723
अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्या सिन्कषर् प रकल्पना िकर्यते; अवबोधस्य अन्यथानुपप त्नर्
भवित काऽनुमा?
atha avabodhānyathānupapattyā sannikarṣaparikalpanā kriyate;
avabodhasya anyathānupapattirna bhavati kā’numā?
Translation: 723
If you say that, he will infer such a contact with his sense organ
considering that without such a contact such knowledge cannot
arise. It is not correct, because, it is not the case that such a
knowledge cannot be explained otherwise and therefore, where is
the question of resorting to inference?
Text: 724
अथ कारकसंख्याथर् म्; िकं तेन प रसंख्यातेन पर्योजनम्? आलोकादीनामिप कारकत्वात्
तान्यिप प रसंख्येयािन भव न्त।
atha kārakasaṁkhyārtham; kiṁ tena parisaṁkhyātena prayojanam?
ālokādīnāmapi kārakatvāt tānyapi parisaṁkhyeyāni bhavanti.
Translation: 724
If you see this statement of Jaimini mentioned above informs about
the number of cases or producing factors we would like to know
what is the purpose of counting such factors, because, there are
other factors like light, etc. they should also have been counted in
the statement.
Text: 725
अथ अनुवादपरता; पर् सद्स्यानुवादो नाऽपर् सद्स्य। नच अध्यक्षं क्विचिद्िदतम्।
atha anuvādaparatā; prasiddhasyānuvādo nā’prasiddhasya. naca
adhyakṣaṁ kvacidviditam.
Translation: 725
If you say that, the statement of Jaimini is a restatement. There, I
must remind you that, a restatement is possible of only that which
is already known and not of that which is not known. In the present
case, perceptual knowledge is nowhere known.
Text: 726
ननु लोके िविदतम्;
nanu loke viditam;
Translation: 726
Clarification:
Well it is known to the world.
Text: 727
'न िविदतम्' इित बर्ूमः, अव्यिभचा रतयाऽनवगतेः। नािप सत्संपर्योगजत्वं िविदतम्, ततश्च
पर्त्यक्षान धगितः, तदनवगतौ चानुवादानुपप त्ः।
‘na viditam’ iti brūmaḥ, avyabhicāritayā’navagateḥ. nāpi satsa-
ṁprayogajatvaṁ viditam, tataśca pratyakṣānadhigatiḥ, tadana-
vagatau cānuvādānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 727
Reply:
Well, we are not saying that, it is not known, what we are saying
that, it is not known as non-erroneous. Nor is it known that, it is
produced by a proper contact with the sense organs, that is why, we
say that, perceptual knowledge is not known and if it is not known,
there cannot be any restatement of that.
Text: 728
इतोप्यनुवादानुपप त्ः पर्योजनाभावात्। निह पर्योजनं िवना अनुवादः पर्वतर् ते, अनूद्
क्विचत् िकिञ्िद्धीयते पर्ितिषध्यते वा।
itopyanuvādānupapattiḥ prayojanābhāvāt. nahi prayojanaṁ vinā
anuvādaḥ pravartate, anūdya kvacit kiñcidvidhīyate pratiṣidhyate
vā.
Translation: 728
Also, restatement is not possible, because, there is no purpose
behind it. You know very well that, without a purpose, no
restatement occurs. It is our experience that, after restating either
something is enjoined or something is prohibited.
Text: 729
नन्वतर्ािप धमर् पर्ित िनिमत्त्वं पर्ितिषध्यते। तदक्
ु म्-“धमर् पर्त्यिनिमत्ं पर्त्यक्षं िवद्मानो-
पलम्भनत्वात् सम्पर्योगजत्वाच्च।”
nanvatrāpi dharmaṁ prati nimittatvaṁ pratiṣidhyate. taduktam-
“dharmaṁ pratyanimittaṁ pratyakṣaṁ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt
samprayogajatvācca.”
Translation: 729
Clarification:
Well, here also the cause or the ground for Dharma is prohibited or
negated and it has been stated “a perceptual knowledge cannot be
the ground for the knowledge of Dharma because, it can only reveal
that which exists in the present time, since it is caused by proper
contact with the sense organs.”
Text: 730
ततर् िकम् अन्यपदाथार्वभासोत्पन्ं पर्त्यक्षं धमर् पर्ित िनिमत्त्वेन पर्ितिषध्यते, िकं वा
धमार्वभासोत्पन्म्, अनुत्पन्ं वा?
tatra kim anyapadārthāvabhāsotpannaṁ pratyakṣaṁ dharmaṁ
prati nimittatvena pratiṣidhyate, kiṁ vā dharmāvabhāsotpannam,
anutpannaṁ vā?
Translation: 730
Here we have some questions: Is that perception which is produced
in the form of appearance of something else is prohibited as the
ground to know Dharma, or, is it because pseudo-dharma reflects
in it, or, is it not produced at all?
Text: 731
तद्िद अन्यपदाथार्वभासोत्पन्पर्त्यक्षव्यावृ त्ः िकर्यते; तदाऽिवपर्ितपत्या सम्बोधियतव्या
जडमतयः।
tadyadi anyapadārthāvabhāsotpannapratyakṣavyāvṛttiḥ kriyate; tadā’-
vipratipattyā sambodhayitavyā jaḍamatayaḥ.
Translation: 731
If you say, the statement of Jaimini excludes perception in which
something else appears, then, those dull-headed should be addressed
without any problem.
Text: 732
अथ धम्यर् (मार्)वबोधकोत्पन्पर्त्यक्षव्यावृ त्ः िकर्यते; तदा िवरोधेन पर्त्यवस्थेयो भवित-
धमार्वबोधकोत्पन्ं पर्त्यक्षम्, न च धमर् िनिमत्िमित व्याहतमपिदश्यते, अन्यथा चोदना-
वचनजिनतिवज्ञानस्यािप धमार्वबोधकत्वेन उत्पन्स्यातिन्िमत्त्वं स्यात्।
atha dharmya(rmā)vabodhakotpannapratyakṣavyāvṛttiḥ kriyate;
tadā virodhena pratyavastheyo bhavati-dharmāvabodhakotpannaṁ
pratyakṣam, na ca dharmanimittamiti vyāhatamapadiśyate, anyathā

codanāvacanajanitavijñānasyāpi dharmāvabodhakatvena utpanna-
syātannimittatvaṁ syāt.
Translation: 732
If you say that, the perception which has arisen to reveal Dharma is
being excluded by the statement, then, it should be counter-acted
with opposition: it means a perceptual knowledge is produced to
reveal Dharma and at the same time, you say, it is not the ground for
Dharma. These are contradictory. Otherwise, even the knowledge
arising from the statement of injunction, will not be a ground, since
it has arisen to convey Dharma.
Text: 733
अथानुत्पन्स्य धमार्वबोधकत्वं ना स्त; केनातर् पर्ितपद्ते-यन्ोत्पन्ं तद् धमार्वबोधकम्?
नािप कमलदलावबोधकं स्वयमसत्वात्।
athānutpannasya dharmāvabodhakatvaṁ nāsti; kenātra pratipa-
dyate- yannotpannaṁ taddharmāvabodhakam? nāpi kamaladalāva-
bodhakaṁ svayamasatvāt.
Translation: 733
If you say that, unless it is produced, how can it cause knowledge of
Dharma? Then, who understands here “whatever is not produced
causes the knowledge of Dharma? It cannot be the case that, a lotus
is not born and still it causes the knowledge of petals of lotus.
Text: 734
यदप्युक्म्-'सत्सम्पर्योगजत्वात्' इित, तदप्ययुक्म्; सत्सम्पर्योगजत्वं यथा न भवित तथा
पर्ागेवोक्म्।
yadapyuktam-’satsamprayogajatvāt’ iti, tadapyayuktam; satsampra-
yogajatvaṁ yathā na bhavati tathā prāgevoktam.
Translation: 734
You have given the ground that, it is a perceptual knowledge
because it is produced by proper contact of the sense organ with
the object. That is also not proper and we have already shown it
before, how a perception cannot be said to be produced by proper
contact.
Text: 735
ु म्-“िवद्मानोपलम्भनत्वात् िकल पर्त्यक्षं िवज्ञानं िवद्मानमवबोधयित”;
यद्ेवं न केवलं पर्त्यक्षम् अिप तु सवर् पर्माणोत्पािदतं िवज्ञानं िवद्मानावबोधकम्।
yadapyanyaduktam-“vidyamānopalambhanatvāt kila pratyakṣaṁ
vijñānaṁ vidyamānamavabodhayati”; yadyevaṁ na kevalaṁ pratya-
kṣam api tu sarvapramāṇotpāditaṁ vijñānaṁ vidyamānāvabodha-
kam.
Translation: 735
You have given another ground such as “since a perception reveals
that which exists in present time, it is knowledge which causes the
knowledge of existent thing.” In this connection we would like to
say that, if it is so, then, it is not only perception, but knowledges
produced by all process of knowing, cause the knowledge of existent
thing.
Text: 736
अथ चोदनाजिनतं िवज्ञानमिवद्मानकतर् व्याथार्वबोधकम्; यद्िवद्मानम्; कथमवबोध्यते?
atha codanājanitaṁ vijñānamavidyamānakartavyārthāvabodhakam;
yadyavidyamānam; kathamavabodhyate?
Translation: 736
Clarification:
Well, the knowledge produced by a Vedic injunction conveys that
meaning which does not exist at the present time and which is
required to be performed i.e. the vedic sacrifice.
Text: 737
अथ अवबोध्यते; कथमिवद्मानता? अवबोध्यमानत्वेनव ै िवद्मानता पर्त्यक्षपर्माणाव-
बो धताथर् विदित। नाप्यवबोधनमवबोध्यमन्तरेण उपजायते पर्त्यक्षावबोधनवत्।
atha avabodhyate; kathamavidyamānatā? avabodhyamānatvenaiva
vidyamānatā pratyakṣapramāṇāvabodhitārthavaditi. nāpyavabodha-
namavabodhyamantareṇa upajāyate pratyakṣāvabodhanavat.
Translation: 737
Reply:
If you say, which does not exist in the present time, then, how is its
knowledge caused? And if the knowledge is caused by injunction,
then, how can it be said that it does not exist? Something it is said
to exist when it is presented as being known like an object which is
revealed by the means of perception. No act of knowing is possible
without the object which is being known, like the act of perceptual
knowledge.
Text: 738
अिप च चोदनावचनजिनतिवज्ञानस्य िमथ्यात्वमुपपद्ते, अिवद्मानिवषयत्वात् केशोण्डु -
कज्ञानवत्। केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप पर्तीयमानोपकारकाथार्भावे िमथ्यात्वम्, तिदहािप
पर्तीयमानोपकारकाथोर्[ना]स्त्येव, कथं न िमथ्यात्वम्? तदन्वये वा कतर् व्याथर् िवषयत्वं
पर्ितहीयेत चोदनावचसः। िकञ्, चोदनाजिनतं िवज्ञानं कतर् व्यताथर् िवषयं वा तदभाविवषयं
api ca codanāvacanajanitavijñānasya mithyātvamupapadyate,
avidyamānaviṣayatvāt keśoṇḍukajñānavat. keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi
pratīyamānopakārakārthābhāve mithyātvam, tadihāpi pratīyamā-
nopakārakārtho[nā]styeva, kathaṁ na mithyātvam? tadanvaye
vā kartavyārthaviṣayatvaṁ pratihīyeta codanāvacasaḥ. kiñca,
codanājanitaṁ vijñānaṁ kartavyatārthaviṣayaṁ vā tadabhāva-
viṣayaṁ nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 738
Moreover, if what you say is accepted, then, the knowledge arising
from the Vedic injunction will become a false knowledge, because,
it reflects an object which does not exist, like the knowledge of
thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who
comes into the shade from the sun. As a matter of fact, even the
knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a
person who comes into the shade from the sun, will become false
if there is no element which causes such perception. And here also,
there is nothing which prompts the knowledge of Dharma to arise
and so how is the knowledge arising from a Vedic injunction not
false? If this is the way we are construing the Vedic injunction,
then, the Vedic injunction will lose its content which is presented
as some activity to be performed. Moreover, we would like to ask
whether the content of the knowledge which arises from a Vedic
injunction is an activity which is to be performed or is the content

absence of that or there is no content at all?
Text: 739
तद्िद कतर् व्यताथर् िवषयम्; तदा तस्य वतर् मानतैव पर्तीत्युत्क लतत्वाद् िवद्मान-
तोयािदवत्।
tadyadi kartavyatārthaviṣayam; tadā tasya vartamānataiva pratītyu-
tkalitatvād vidyamānatoyādivat.
Translation: 739
If you say, it has a content which is presented as an activity to be
performed, then, that activity is known to exist in the present time
from that understanding, like water in the present time (presented
by the erroneous perception of water in the mirage).
Text: 740
तोयादेरपर्तीयमानत्वं स्वसत्ाधूमादग्ौ सित जनकत्वािदना िनिमत्ेन
toyāderapratīyamānatvaṁ svasattādhūmādagnau sati janakatvādinā
nimittena
Translation: 740
(The sentence is defective, hence not translated.)
Text: 741
एतच्चेद ् िवद्ते; कथमिवद्मानता?
etacced vidyate; kathamavidyamānatā?
Translation: 741
And if it is there, how can it be said that it does not exist?
Text: 742
अथ तदभाविवषयम्; तस्यािप स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात् न कतर् व्यता।
atha tadabhāvaviṣayam; tasyāpi svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt na
kartavyatā.
Translation: 742
If you say that, the content arising from the Vedic injunction, is
absence of that, then, that also i.e. absence also exists in present
time in its own form, but it cannot be an object for performance.
Text: 743
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् चोदना कत्र्व्यावबो धका अिप तु िनिवर् षया इत्येवं वक्व्यम्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi codanā karttavyāvabodhikā api tu
nirviṣayā ityevaṁ vaktavyam.
Translation: 743
If you say that, the understanding of the Vedic injunction has no
content at all, then, you should say that the Vedic injunction does
not convey any act to be performed. But it is contentless.
Text: 744
एवं स्थते यथा पर्त्यक्षं िवद्मानोपलम्भकं तथा अन्यान्यिप पर्माणािन।
evaṁsthite yathā pratyakṣaṁ vidyamānopalambhakaṁ tathā anyā-
nyapi pramāṇāni.
Translation: 744
When this is the situation, it is proper to say that, as a perceptual
knowledge reveals something existent, in the same way, the other
knowledges arising from other processes of knowing also reveal
something which is existent.
Text: 745
बुिद्जन्म पर्त्यक्षम्, नच बुद्ध्यवगमे पर्माणम स्त। पर्त्यक्षावसेया सा न भवित,
स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। अनुमानगम्यािप न भवित, तया पर्ितबद् लङ्ानवगतेः।
buddhijanma pratyakṣam, naca buddhyavagame pramāṇamasti.
pratyakṣāvaseyā sā na bhavati, svayamanabhyupagamāt. anumāna-
gamyāpi na bhavati, tayā pratibaddhaliṅgānavagateḥ.
Translation: 745
You have said that perception is knowledge that arises, but you
do not find any proof for the knowledge of such perception.
That knowledge cannot be determined by perception, because,
you too hold the same view (according to the Bhāṭṭa school of
Pūrvamīmāṁsā - knowledge is not perceived but it is inferred.)
This cannot be known by inference either, because we do not know
any ground which has invariable concomitance with the object of
inference viz. knowledge.
Text: 746
अथ अथार्पत्या पर्तीयते; िकम्-घटाथार्न्यथानुपपत्या, आहो तदपु ादानप रत्यागान्यथा-
नुपपत्या, घटावबोधान्यथानुपपत्या वा?
atha arthāpattyā pratīyate; kim-ghaṭārthānyathānupapattyā, āho tadu-
pādānaparityāgānyathānupapattyā ghaṭāvabodhānyathānupapatyā vā?
Translation: 746
If you say that, perception can be known by process of implication,
there we would like to know whether without postulating the
knowledge of pot, the pot cannot be explained or whether without
postulating knowledge giving up of the material cause of the
pot cannot be explained or without postulating knowledge the
knowledge of the pot cannot be explained?
Text: 747
तद्िद घटाथार्न्यथानुपपत्या; तदयुक्म्, न बुिद्कायोर् घटः, अिप तु बुिद् रह तत्कायार्।
tadyadi ghaṭārthānyathānupapattyā; tadayuktam, na buddhikāryo
ghaṭaḥ, api tu buddhiriha tatkāryā.
Translation: 747
If you say without postulating the knowledge of pot, the pot cannot
be explained, that is not proper, because, pot is not effect of
knowledge. Rather, the knowledge of pot is produced by the pot.
Text: 748
अथ घटोपादानप रत्यागान्यथानुपपत्या बुिद्प रकल्पना िकर्यते; तदयुक्ं, बुिद्स्व-
रूपस्यानेककालान्तरावस्थानायोगादथार्पत्ेिनर् िवर् षयत्वम्। केनािप बलवता पर्े रतो
बुिद्मन्तरेण वा तदपु प्लवाद्ा घटोपादानाप रत्यागाय घटते तेन स न्दग्धाऽथार्प त्ः।
नच सम्बन्धगर्हणमन्तरेण िनयतायां बुद्ौ पर्ितप त्रुपपद्ते। अथार्प त्तस्तु तदनुपपत्ौ
ु र् टा।
इ न्दर्यकल्पनािप दघ
atha ghaṭopādānaparityāgānyathānupapattyā buddhiparikalpanā
kriyate; tadayuktam, buddhisvarūpasyānekakālāntarāvasthānāyogāt
arthāpatternirviṣayatvam. kenāpi balavatā prerito buddhimantareṇa
vā tadupaplavādvā ghaṭopādānāparityāgāya ghaṭate tena sandi-
gdhā’rthāpattiḥ. naca sambandhagrahaṇamantareṇa niyatāyāṁ
buddhau pratipattirupapadyate. arthāpattitastu tadanupapattau
indriyakalpanāpi durghaṭā.
Translation: 748
If you say, without postulating knowledge giving up of the material
cause of the pot cannot be explained, that also is not proper,
because, the form of the knowledge cannot continue to exist for a
longer time and as such the knowledge by implication will become
contentless. Without the knowledge being prompted by some strong
factor or because of confusion, there occurs the elimination of the
material cause of a pot and therefore, this may lead to a doubtful
pre-supposition. It is not the case that without the knowledge of
relationship, there can be awareness of a specific knowledge and if
that does not happen through the process of pre-supposition then,
even the postulation of sense organ will be a difficult task.
Text: 749
अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्या बुिद्प रकल्पना िकर्यते; तस्यािप बुद्ध्या सह सम्बन्धो
ना स्त, कथमवबोधयित? अवबोधे चावगते पर्त्यक्षावगतैव बुिद्ः नावबोधगम्या,
अवबोधबुिद्िवज्ञानशब्दानां पयार्यत्वादवबुध्यते ज्ञायत इत्येकोऽथर् ः।
atha avabodhānyathānupapatyā buddhiparikalpanā kriyate;
tasyāpi buddhyā saha sambandho nāsti, kathamavabodhayati?
avabodhe cāvagate pratyakṣāvagataiva buddhiḥ nāvabodhagamyā,
avabodha- buddhivijñānaśabdānāṁ paryāyatvādavabudhyate jñāyata
ityeko’rthaḥ.
Translation: 749
If you say, without postulating knowledge, the knowledge of the pot
cannot be explained, that also is not proper, because, even that does
not have relationship with the knowledge. Then, how can it cause
the knowledge of that. Once the knowledge is understood, it means
that knowledge is directly perceived and not by the knowledge
of pre-supposition. The terms avabodha, buddhi and vijñāna are
synonymous and all the three have one meaning viz. knowledge.
0.7 सांख्यसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य िनरसनम्।
[sāṁkhyasammatasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya nirasanam.]
(Refutation of the definition of Perception as accepted by the
Sāṅkhyas)
Text: 750
तथा “शर्ोतर्ािदवृ त्रिवक ल्पका" एतदिप पर्त्युक्म्; शर्ोतर्ािदका(क)रणानां शब्दािद-
िवषयाकारतया िवप रणामो वृ त्शब्देनािभधीयते। सा चानेकपर्कारा भवित-सम्यग्-
ज्ञानरूपा िवपयर् यज्ञानसन्देहरूपा च। तदक् ु म्- "तमो मोहो महामोहस्तािमसर्ोऽन्ध-
तािमसर्ः।” (भवसं. उ. ३.१०) इत्यािद। तद्िद शर्ोतर्ािदवृत्ेः पर्त्यक्षत्वम्; तदा
िवपयर् यािदवृत्ेरिप पर्त्यक्षत्वं पर्ाप्नोित।
tathā “śrotrādivṛttiravikalpikā” etadapi pratyuktam; śrotrādikā(ka)-
raṇānāṁ śabdādiviṣayākāratayā vipariṇāmo vṛttiśabdenābhidhī-
yate. sā cānekaprakārā bhavati-samyagjñānarūpā viparyayajñā-
nasandeharūpā ca. taduktam- “tamo moho mahāmohastāmisro’n-
dhatāmisraḥ” (Bhavasaṁ. u. 3.10) ityādi. tadyadi śrotrādivṛtteḥ
pratyakṣatvam; tadā viparyayādivṛtterapi pratyakṣatvaṁ prāpnoti.
Translation: 750
In the same way, the statement of the Sāṁkhya philosophers
viz. “an indeterminate knowledge is the modification of the mind
through the sense organs viz. ears etc.” is also refuted. The term
vṛtti stands for the modification of the instruments such as ears
etc. in the form of their content viz. sound etc. Such modifications
are of various types viz. of the form of true cognition, in the form
of erroneous cognition, in the form of doubt. It has been said in the
same system-“ignorance, delusion, great delusion, confusion, great
confusion, etc.” Now, if the modification of the senses such as ears
etc. is called perception, then, the modification such as illusion etc.
should also be called perception.
Text: 751
अथ अबा धतपदोपादानं िकर्यते; तत् सूतर्े न शर्ूयते। भवतु वा तस्य कल्पना, तथािप
अव्यिभचा रत्वं ज्ञातुं न शक्यते। तच्च नैयाियकपर्त्यक्षलक्षणा धकारे पर्पिञ्तम्।
atha abādhitapadopādānaṁ kriyate; tat sūtre na śrūyate. bhavatu
vā tasya kalpanā, tathāpi avyabhicāritvaṁ jñātuṁ na śakyate. tacca
naiyāyikapratyakṣalakṣaṇādhikāre prapañcitam.
Translation: 751
If you add a clause viz. that which is not “contradicted” that is not
found in the original aphorism in the original text of the system.
Or, granting that you add the clause, still how can you know that
the perceptual cognition is non-erroneous? We have elaborately
discussed this in the section discussing the definition of perception
as given by the Naiyāyikas.
Text: 752
यिद चाव्यिभचा रपदेन िवपयर् यरूपा वृ त्रपोद्ते तत्दात्मतया व्यव स्थता सम्यगर्ूपािप
वृ त्रपोिदता भवित। ततश्च संगर्ाह्ा न लभ्यते वृ त्ः।
yadi cāvyabhicāripadena viparyayarūpā vṛttirapodyate
tattadātmatayā vyavasthitā samyagrūpāpi vṛttirapoditā bhavati.
tataśca saṁgrāhyā na labhyate vṛttiḥ.
Translation: 752
If by the word “non-erroneous” an illusory perception is excluded,
then, in that form even the established true cognition, will become
excluded and in that case, no cognition will be left to be included
in the category of perception.
Text: 753
अथ सम्यगर्ूपा वृ त् रह संगर्ाह्ा; तदाऽपोह्ा न लभ्यते, वृत्ीनां स्वरूपैकताभ्युपगमात्।
भेदानभ्युपगमे चाभ्युपेतहानम्। निह भवतां पक्षे इ न्दर्याद् िभद्न्ते वृत्यः। तच्चेदिभन्म्,
कथं वृत्ीनां भेदः? भेदाभ्युपगमे इ न्दर्यैकत्वं हीयते। इ न्दर्याव्यितरेिकत्वं न
वक्व्यम्। इ न्दर्याव्यितरेिकत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने नीललोिहतघटादीनां सवर् दा उपलम्भः
स्यात्, इ न्दर्यावस्थाने तदव्यित रक्ाया वृत्ेः अवस्थानसम्भवात्, तत्सम्भवे च
घटाद्नुपलम्भानुपप त्ः।
atha samyagrūpā vṛttiriha saṁgrāhyā; tadā’pohyā na labhyate,
vṛttīnāṁ svarūpaikatābhyupagamāt. bhedānabhyupagame cābhyu-
petahānam. nahi bhavatāṁ pakṣe indriyād bhidyante vṛttayaḥ.
taccedabhinnam, kathaṁ vṛttīnāṁ bhedaḥ? bhedābhyupagame
indriyaikatvaṁ hīyate. indriyāvyatirekitvaṁ na vaktavyam. indri-
yāvyatirekitve’bhyupagamyamāne nīlalohitaghaṭādīnāṁ sarvadā
upalambhaḥ syāt, indriyāvasthāne tadavyatiriktāyā vṛtteḥ avasthā-
nasambhavāt, tatsambhave ca ghaṭādyanupalambhānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 753
If you say that, by perception you should include a true cognition
then, nothing remains to be excluded because, cognitions are
accepted as having uniform form and if you do not accept difference

in cognitions, then, you will lose your accepted position. According
to your doctrine the cognitions are not differentiated from the senses
and therefore, if this is identical, how can there be difference in
cognitions? and if you accept difference, that the sense organ is
one, will be lost. You should not say that, it is not different from
the senses, because, if you accept that, it is not different from the
senses, one will always find objects like blue pot, red pot etc. If
the sense organ exists, the cognition which is not different from its
modification, will also be there and when that is there, you cannot
establish the absence of pot etc.
Text: 754
अथ वृ त्सद्ावेिप अनुपल ब्धः; न कदािचदपु ल ब्धः स्यात्, निह भवतां पक्षे िकिञ्दपूवर्
जायते पूवर् वा िनरुद्ध्यते। ततश्च सवर् स्याऽ स्तत्वे उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी िकंकृते?
सदोपल ब्धरनु[प]ल ब्धवार्। नह्ेवं वािदनो िद्तीया गितर स्त।
atha vṛttisadbhāvepi anupalabdhiḥ; na kadācidupalabdhiḥ
syāt, nahi bhavatāṁ pakṣe kiñcidapūrvaṁ jāyate pūrvaṁ vā
niruddhyate. tataśca sarvasyā’stitve upalabdhyanupalabdhī kiṁkṛte?
sadopalabdhiranu[pa]labdhirvā. nahyevaṁ vādino dvitīyā gatirasti.
Translation: 754
If you say, in spite of there is modification of the senses, there
can be absence of knowledge of a pot. In that case, the occasional
knowledge of a thing cannot be explained. Because, according to
your doctrine, there is nothing which is produced new. Or, there is
anything which is stopped. Therefore, when everything is there, how
to explain knowledge and absence of knowledge of a thing, or this
may lead to constant knowledge of presence or constant knowledge
of absence. There is no way out for those who hold such a view.
Text: 755
िकञ्, शब्दादय उपलभ्यन्ते िकमनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते, आहो स्वदपु लभ्य-
स्वभावा(वाः)?
kiñca, śabdādaya upalabhyante kimanupalabhyasvabhāvā upala-
bhyante āhosvidupalabhyasvabhāvā(vāḥ)?
Translation: 755
Moreover, we hear sound, there the question arises, is it the fact that
we hear sound which is of the nature of something which cannot be
known? or we hear sound which has the nature of being something
which can be known?
Text: 756
तद्िद अनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; तदा उपल ब्धः कथम्? यिद अनुपलभ्यस्वभावाः
कथम् उपलभ्येरन्? अन्यथा आत्मादेरप्युपल ब्धः स्यात्।
tadyadi anupalabhyasvabhāvā upalabhyante; tadā upalabdhiḥ
katham? yadi anupalabhyasvabhāvāḥ katham upalabhyeran? anyathā
ātmāderapyupalabdhiḥ syāt.
Translation: 756
There, if you say the sounds which are of the nature of not being
known, are heard, then, how is it heard? Because, if it is of the
nature of that which can be known, then, how can they be heard?
Otherwise, entities like soul etc. can also be known.
Text: 757
अथ उपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; अनुपल ब्धः कथम्? िकं तेनव
ै ाकारेण, आहो स्वद्
atha upalabhyasvabhāvā upalabhyante; anupalabdhiḥ katham? kiṁ
tenaivākāreṇa, āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?
Translation: 757
If you say, they are heard because they are of the nature of being
known, then, how to explain the knowledge of its absence? There
also the question arises, whether it is not known in the same form
or in some other form?
Text: 758
यिद तेनवै आकारेण अनुपल ब्धः; आत्मादेरिप अनुपल ब्धनर् पर्ाप्नोित, उपलब्धौ वा
बीजान्तरं वचनीयम्।
yadi tenaiva ākāreṇa anupalabdhiḥ; ātmāderapi anupalabdhirna
prāpnoti, upalabdhau vā bījāntaraṁ vacanīyam.
Translation: 758
If you say, it is not known in the same form, then, even entities like
soul etc. cannot be said to be not known and if it is known, then,
it should state some other reason or ground for that.
Text: 759
अथाकारान्तरेण नोपलभ्यन्ते; तथाप्युपलभ्यमानाऽनुपलभ्यमानयोः नैकत्वम्, शब्दा-
त्माकारयो रव, निह उपलभ्यस्वभावाच्छब्दादनुपलभ्यस्वभाव आत्माऽव्यित रक्ो दृष्ः।
atha ākārāntareṇa nopalabhyante; tathāpi upalabhyamānā’nupa-
labhyamānayoḥ naikatvam, śabdātmākārayoriva, nahi upalabhya-
svabhāvācchabdādanupalabhyasvabhāva ātmā’vyatirikto dṛṣṭaḥ.
Translation: 759
If you say that, in other form it is not known, even then, that which
is being known and that which is not known, cannot be identical,
like the forms of sound and soul. It is not the case that, the soul
which is of the nature of not being known is identical with the sound
which is of the nature of being known.
Text: 760
अथ तस्यैवाऽिभव्यक्स्योपल ब्धः; तत्स्वरूपवदिभव्यक्ेः सवर् दानव(दाव)स्थानात्
सततोपल ब्धपर्सङ्ः।
atha tasyaivā’bhivyaktasyopalabdhiḥ; tatsvarūpavadabhivyakteḥ sar-
vadānava(dāva)sthānāt satatopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 760
If you say, the same thing when manifest is known, then, it means
that like its own form the manifestation is not present always and
in that case it will lead to the contingency of knowing always at all
time.
Text: 761
अथ ितरोधाने सित अनुपल ब्धः; तदा तत्स्वरूपतादात्म्यात् सततानुपलम्भपर्सङ्ः,
उभयोवार्ऽवस्थाने सममुपलम्भाऽनुपलम्भौ स्याताम्। ततश्च-'इदानीमुपलभे पूवर्
नोप(पा)लभे' इित व्यवहारिवरहः स्यात्। तथा, 'पूवर्मुप(पा)लभे इदानीं नोपलभे'
इत्येतदिप न पर्ाप्नोित।
atha tirodhāne sati anupalabdhiḥ; tadā tatsvarūpatādātmyāt sata-
tānupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ, ubhayorvā’vasthāne samamupalambhā’nu-
palambhau syātām. tataśca- ‘idānīmupalabhe pūrvaṁ nopa(pā)labhe’

iti vyavahāravirahaḥ syāt. tathā, ‘pūrvamupa(pā)labhe idānīṁ nopa-
labhe’ ityetadapi na prāpnoti.
Translation: 761
If you say that, when there is disappearance, there will be knowledge
of absence then, because of its identity with its form there will arise
the contingency of the knowledge of its absence always. Again, if
both exist at one and the same time, then, there will be knowledge
of presence and knowledge of absence simultaneously. Thereby, it
will lead to the denial of our experiential behavior viz. “I did not
see it before, but I see it now.” Similarly, we cannot say, “I saw it
before and I do not see it now.”
Text: 762
अथ अवयवोपचये सित उपलम्भः; तस्य सवर् दा भावात् सवर् दोपलम्भपर्सङ्ः।
atha avayavopacaye sati upalambhaḥ; tasya sarvadā bhāvāt
sarvadopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 762
If you say, when there is growth in the form, there will be the
knowledge of presence. Then, it will lead to its knowledge always
because it will continue to exist always.
Text: 763
अथ स्वलक्षणपुष्ौ सत्यामुपलम्भः; तस्याः सवर् दा सत्वात् सततोपलम्भपर्सङ्ः।
atha svalakṣaṇapuṣṭau satyāmupalambhaḥ; tasyāḥ sarvadā satvāt
satatopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 763
If you say, when own characteristics are present, there will
knowledge of presence, then, since it always be there, there will
be always knowledge of presence.
Text: 764
अथ संस्थानोत्कषेर् सत्युपलम्भः; तस्यािप सवर् दा िवद्मानत्वात् सततोपल ब्धः
स्यात्। तस्माद् येन येन िनिमत्ेन उपलम्भप रकल्पना, तस्य तस्य सवर् दा भावात्
सततोपलम्भपर्सङ्ः।
atha saṁsthānotkarṣe satyupalambhaḥ; tasyāpi sarvadā vidyamāna-

tvāt satatopalabdhiḥ syāt. tasmād yena yena nimittena upalambha-
parikalpanā, tasya tasya sarvadā bhāvāt satatopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 764
If you say, if there is growth in the structure of a thing there will be
knowledge of the thing, then, since it will always be there, there will
always be knowledge of the thing. Therefore, on whatever ground
you postulate the knowledge of presence, since that ground exists
always, there will always be the knowledge of the thing.
Text: 765
अथ देशकालकारकापबन्धादनुपलम्भः; तदा तस्यापबन्धस्य सवर् दा भावादनुपलम्भाऽनु-
परमः स्यात्।
atha deśakālakārakāpabandhādanupalambhaḥ; tadā tasyāpaban-
dhasya sarvadā bhāvādanupalambhā’nuparamaḥ syāt.
Translation: 765
If you say that, when there is disassociation of space, time
and factor, there will be knowledge of absence. Then, such a
disassociation will always be there and the knowledge of absence
in that case will never cease.
Text: 766
तथा, इ न्दर्याणामिप करणरूपता नोपलभ्यते फलवैकल्यात्।
tathā, indriyāṇāmapi karaṇarūpatā nopalabhyate phalavaikalyāt.
Translation: 766
Similarly, we do not see the instrumentality of the sense organs
because they do not produce any results.
Text: 767
ननु अ स्त िवज्ञानं फलम्;
nanu asti vijñānaṁ phalam;
Translation: 767
Clarification:
Well, there is result viz. the cognition.
Text: 768
न, तस्य सवर् दा िवद्मानत्वात्। सवर् दा िवद्मानयोः हेतुफलभावो नोपपद्ते, यथा गुणानां
परस्परमात्मभेदानां वा। निह आत्मा आत्मान्तरस्य हेतुभर्वित तत्फलं वा, तथा इहािप
अनाद्न्ता सत्ा न फलं हेतुवार् उच्यते। िकञ्, भूजलािद अनेकं कायर्-त त्कं गुणतर्याद्
व्यित रक्म्, अव्यित रक्ं वा?
na, tasya sarvadā vidyamānatvāt. sarvadā vidyamānayoḥ hetu-
phalabhāvo nopapadyate, yathā guṇānāṁ parasparamātmabhedānāṁ
vā. nahi ātmā ātmāntarasya heturbhavati tatphalaṁ vā, tathā ihāpi
anādyantā sattā na phalaṁ heturvā ucyate. kiñca, bhūjalādi anekaṁ
kāryaṁ-tatkiṁ guṇatrayād vyatiriktam, avyatiriktaṁ vā?
Translation: 768
Reply:
It is not true, because, that result is always there. When two things
always exist one cannot be the cause of the other or the effect of
the other e.g. the qualities or the mutual differences of the selves.
It is not the case that one self is the cause of another self or one self
is the effect of another self. In the same way, here also the existence
without a beginning and an end cannot be said to be either effect
or cause. Moreover, there are many effects such as earth, water etc.
Are these effects different from the three ingredients or constituents
of nature or identical with them?
Text: 769
तद्िद व्यित रक्म्; त त्कं ता त्वकम्, अता त्वकं वा?
tadyadi vyatiriktam; tatkiṁ tāttvikam, atāttvikaṁ vā?
Translation: 769
If you say, they are different, there the question arises, whether it
is real or unreal?
Text: 770
तद्िद ता त्वकम्; न तिहर् गुणतर्योपादानपूवर्कम्, ततो िभन्त्वाद् आत्मस्वरूपवत्। न च
गुणतर्येण सह अन्यतमोऽिप सम्बन्ध उपपद्ते तिद्न्कायर् स्य। न मातर्ामाितर्कसम्बन्धः,
नािप सहचरसहच र[त]भावः, नािप िनिमत्-िन(नै)िम त्कभावः, उपकायोर्पकारकभावो
वा।
tadyadi tāttvikam; na tarhi guṇatrayopādānapūrvakam, tato bhinna-
tvād ātmasvarūpavat. na ca guṇatrayeṇa saha anyatamo’pi samba-
ndha upapadyate tadbhinnakāryasya. na mātrāmātrikasambandhaḥ,
nāpi sahacarasahacari[ta]bhāvaḥ, nāpi nimittani(nai)mittikabhāvaḥ,
upakāryopakārakabhāvo vā.
Translation: 770
If you say, it is real, then, it is not the fact that, it is preceded
by the material cause viz. the three ingredients, because it is
different from them like the nature of the self. Not even a single
relationship is tenable with an effect which is different from those
three ingredients. Such a relation can neither be relation of part
and whole, nor associate and associated, nor cause and effect, nor
helper and helped.
Text: 771
अथ अता त्वकम्; कथं तेन गुणतर्यं पर्तीयते, गुणतर्येण सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्ेः?
न च सदसतोः सम्बन्ध उपपद्ते आत्मखरिवषाणयो रव। तदभावात् नानुमानाद्
गुणतर्यपर्ितप त्ः। नािप पर्त्यक्षेण गुणावधारणम्, स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। तदक्
ु म्-
गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृिष्पथमृच्छित।
यत्ु दृिष्पथपर्ाप्ं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्॥
तदनवगमे च न भोग्येन भोक्ुरनुमानम्। ततश्च नात्मा, न गुणतर्यम्।
atha atāttvikam; kathaṁ tena guṇatrayaṁ pratīyate, guṇatrayeṇa
saha sambandhānupapatteḥ? na ca sadasatoḥ sambandha upapadyate
ātmakhalaviṣāṇayoriva. tadabhāvāt nānumānād guṇatrayaprati-
pattiḥ. nāpi pratyakṣeṇa guṇāvadhāraṇam, svayamanabhyupagamāt.
taduktam-
guṇānāṁ paramaṁ rūpaṁ na dṛṣṭipathamṛcchati,
yattu dṛṣṭipathaprāptaṁ tanmāyeva sutucchakam.
tadanavagame ca na bhogyena bhokturanumānam. tataśca nātmā,
na guṇatrayam.
Translation: 771
And if you say that, it is unreal, then, how is it that the
three ingredients are known there? Because, there cannot be a
relationship with the three ingredients and the effect. It is not
the case that there can be a relationship between existent and
non-existent, like the self and the horns of a rabbit and once that
is not there through inference also the three ingredients can be
justified. The three ingredients cannot be known by perception,
because you yourself do not accept this. As the statement goes
- “the real form of the three ingredients is not visible by eyes and
what is visible to the eyes is the insignificant illusive object (māyā).”
And once those three ingredients are not known, that cannot be
the inference of the enjoyer on the basis of the object of enjoyment.
This amount to saying that, there is no self and there are no three
ingredients (guṇas).
Text: 772
अथ अव्यित रक्म्; त त्कम्-ता त्वकम्, अता त्वकम् वा?
atha avyatiriktam; tatkim-tāttvikam, atāttvikam vā?
Translation: 772
If you say, it is identical, then, question arises whether it is real or
unreal?
Text: 773
यिद ता त्वकम्; तदा कायार्णामप रसंख्येयत्वे गुणानामप्यप रसंख्येयता। ततश्च 'तर्यो
गुणाः' इित न वक्व्यम्।
yadi tāttvikam; tadā kāryāṇāmaparisaṁkhyeyatve guṇānāma-
pyaparisaṅkhyeyatā. tataśca ’trayo guṇāḥ’ iti na vaktavyam.
Translation: 773
If you say, it is real, then, since the effects are innumerable the
ingredients are also to be postulated as innumerable. And in that
case, you should not say that there are three ingredients.
Text: 774
अथ गुणानां ितर्त्वम्; तदा कायर् स्यािप ितर्त्वं पर्ाप्नोित, आनन्त्यं हीयते।
atha guṇānāṁ tritvam; tadā kāryasyāpi tritvaṁ prāpnoti, ānantyaṁ
hīyate.
Translation: 774
If you say, ingredients are only three, then, effects also should
be only three. And in that case, the effects cannot be said to be
innumerable.
Text: 775
तथा, कायर् स्य पर्त्यक्षत्वे गुणानामिप पर्त्यक्षत्वम्।
tathā, kāryasya pratyakṣatve guṇānāmapi pratyakṣatvam.
Translation: 775
Similarly, if an effect is perceivable, the ingredients also should be
perceivable.
Text: 776
िकं िवषयं पर्धानानुमानम्? गुणतर्यं पर्धानम्, तच्च उपलब्धम् अलम् अन्वयशिक्प रमाण-
वैश्वरूप्योपकायोर्पकारकािदसाधनेन।
kiṁ viṣayaṁ pradhānānumānam? guṇatrayaṁ pradhānam,
tacca upalabdham alam anvayaśaktiparimāṇavaiśvarūpyopakāryo-
pakārakādisādhanena.
Translation: 776
What is the object of inference of the gross matter? You say the
gross matter has three ingredients. These ingredients are known,
then, enough of the factors such as, relation, potentiality, measure,
universality, helping factors and those which are helped!
Text: 777
अथ नोपलभ्यते पर्धानम्; तदव्यित रक्ं कायर् मिप नोपलभ्येत, तदभावान् पुरुष सिद्-
रुपपद्ते।
atha nopalabhyate pradhānam; tadavyatiriktaṁ kāryamapi nopala-
bhyeta, tadabhāvānna puruṣasiddhirupapadyate.
Translation: 777
If you say, pradhāna is not known, then, one should not find an
effect identical with that. And in the absence of pradhāna, it is not
possible to establish the self.
Text: 778
अथ अता त्वकम्; तदा गुणतर्यस्यािप अता त्वकत्वम्। तदभावात् न िच त्सद्ौ पर्माणम स्त।
तद सद्ौ परलोिकनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः।
atha atāttvikam; tadā guṇatrayasyāpi atāttvikatvam. tadabhāvāt na
citsiddhau pramāṇamasti. tadasiddhau paralokino’bhāvāt paralokā-
bhāvaḥ.
Translation: 778
If you say, it is unreal, then, the three ingredients also will become
unreal. In the absence of that, there will be no proof to establish
consciousness. And if consciousness is not established, then, there
will be no people going to the next world and once they are not
there, there will not be even the next world.
Text: 779
तदेवं पर्त्यक्षं नोपपद्ते।
tadevaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nopapadyate.
Translation: 779
This is how; one cannot establish any perceptual cognition.
0.8 नैयाियकािभमतस्यानुमानस्य िनरसनम्
[naiyāyikābhimatasyānumānasya nirasanam]
(Refutation of the definition of inference as accepted by the
Naiyāyikas)
Text: 780
अथ इदानीमनुमानं िवचायर् ते-िकं पुनरनुमानम्? “तत्पूवर्कमनुमानम्” [न्यायसू.१.१.५]
कथम्? कथ्यते- रसवतीपर्देशे नयनािदव्यापारेण दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं िकर्यते,
तेन च संस्कारः, तदत् ु रकालं िद्तीय लङ्दशर् नम्; तदनन्तरं व्यािप्स्मरणम्, व्यािप्-
स्मरणानन्तरं परामशर् ज्ञानमनुमानं लङ्सिचवम्। तदभावे तस्याभावः तत्पूवर्कत्वात्। निह
कारणं िवना कायर् लोके भवद्ष्ृ म्, पर्त्यक्षं च कारणं गीयते तदभावात् कथमनुमानक्लृिप्ः,
क्लृप्ौ वा कायार्ऽक स्मकत्वपर्सङ्ः। पर्त्यक्षाभावमङ्ीकृत्य उक्म्- “अिवनाभावसम्बन्धस्य
गर्हीतुमशक्यत्वात्।”
atha idānīmanumānaṁ vicāryate-kiṁ punaranumānam? “tatpūrva-
kamanumānam” [Nyāyasū.1.1.5] katham? kathyate- rasavatīpra-
deśe nayanādivyāpāreṇa dahanadhūmayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ
kriyate, tena ca saṁskāraḥ, taduttarakālaṁ dvitīyaliṅgadarśanam;
tadanantaraṁ vyāptismaraṇam, vyāptismaraṇānantaraṁ parāmar-
śajñānamanumānaṁ liṅgasacivam. tadabhāve tasyābhāvaḥ tatpūr-
vakatvāt. nahi kāraṇaṁ vinā kāryaṁ loke bhavaddṛṣṭam, pratya-
kṣaṁ ca kāraṇaṁ gīyate tadabhāvāt kathamanumānaklṛptiḥ, klṛptau
vā kāryā’kasmikatvaprasaṅgaḥ. pratyakṣābhāvamaṅgīkṛtya uktam-
“avinābhāvasambandhasya grahītumaśakyatvāt.”
Translation: 780
Let us now discuss; inference. What is an inference? The Nyāya
Sūtra defines inference as “that which is preceded by perception.”
How can this definition work? Let us elaborate. In a kitchen
one comes to know the relationship between fire and smoke

through the function of eyes. That knowledge produces impression.
At a subsequent time, the person observes the smoke second
time. Thereafter, there arises the remembrance of the relationship
of invariable concomitance (between smoke and fire). After the
remembrance of this invariable concomitance, there arises the
confirmatory knowledge along with the ground smoke and this is
called inference. (In the definition mentioned above), it has been
said that inference is preceded by perception. It means that in the
absence of the perception, there will be absence of inference. No one
has seen in the world, that, there arises an effect without a cause. In
this context of inference, you say that perception is the cause. And
so in the absence of the perception, how can inference be known?
And if it is known, it implies that an effect can arise without a
cause. Having accepted the absence of perception it has been said
“it is impossible to know the relation of invariable concomitance.”
Text: 781
इतोप्यिवनाभावसम्बन्धगर्हणानुपप त्ः-िकं सामान्ययोस्सम्बन्धावधारणम्, आहो स्वल-
क्षणयोः, सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोवार्?
itopyavinābhāvasambandhagrahaṇānupapattiḥ-kiṁ sāmānyayossa-
mbandhāvadhāraṇam āho svalakṣaṇayoḥ sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayorvā?
Translation: 781
For the following reason also, it is not possible to know the
invariable concomitance relationship. Because the question arises,
is it the knowledge of relationship between two universals? Or, is it
the knowledge of relationship between two particulars? Or, is it a
relationship between a universal and a particular?
Text: 782
तद्िद सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तदयुक्म्; सामान्यानुपपत्ेः। तदनुपप त्श्च
पर्ागेवोपपािदता। नािप सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः, सामान्यासम्भवादेव। नािप स्वलक्षणयोः,
दहनधूमव्यक् नामानन्त्यात्, अिभन्ानेकानुगािमिनिमत्ाऽसम्भवाच्च। तद्ावेऽिप आन-
न्त्यस्याऽनितवृत्ेः, अितवृत्ौ वा भावाभावपर्सङ्ः, तत्पर्सक्ौ च वद इदानीं कस्य सम्ब-
न्धावधारणम्?
tadyadi sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; tadayuktam; sāmā-

nyānupapatteḥ. tadanupapattiśca prāgevopapāditā. nāpi sāmānya-
svalakṣaṇayoḥ, sāmānyāsambhavādeva. nāpi svalakṣaṇayoḥ, daha-
nadhūmavyaktīnāmānantyāt, abhinnānekānugāminimittā’sambha-
vācca. tadbhāve’pi ānantyasyā’nativṛtteḥ, ativṛttau vā bhāvā-
bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, tatprasaktau ca vada idānīṁ kasya sambandhā-
vadhāraṇam?
Translation: 782
There, if you say that, here the relationship between two universals
is decided, that will not be proper. Because, there is nothing
called universal and we already demonstrated before how it is
difficult to establish an entity called universal. Nor can there be
relationship between universal and a particular on the same ground
of impossibility to establish an entity called universal. Nor can
there be relationship between two particulars, because there are
innumerable fire individuals and innumerable smoke individuals
and there is no possibility of an entity which can be the ground by
which the identical individuals can be brought together. Accepting
that, that is there, the fault of endless regress cannot be prevented
and if it is prevented, still there will arise the contingency of that
entity being positive and negative at one and the same time and
if that is the consequence, tell us whose relationship are you going
to know?
Text: 783
देशकालस्वभाविवपर्कषार्च्च न व्यक् नां सम्बन्धावधारणायालं पर्त्यक्षम्। न च
सम्ब न्धगर्हणमन्तरेण सम्बन्धबुद्ेरुपप त्ः तद धकरणत्वात् सम्बन्धतद्द्ु ध्योः। न च
सम्बन्धगर्हणसमये सवेर् सम्ब न्धनोऽवभा न्त, अपर्ितभासनात्। न चापर्तीयमानस्य
पर्तीयमानत्वं कल्पियतुं न्याय्यमितपर्सङ्ात्। अन्यथा िह रासने िवज्ञाने रसे पर्तीयमाने
रूपमिप कल्प्यं स्यात्।
deśakālasvabhāvaviprakarṣācca na vyaktīnāṁ sambandhāvadhāra-
ṇāya alaṁ pratyakṣam. na ca sambandhigrahaṇamantareṇa samba-
ndhabuddherupapattiḥ tadadhikaraṇatvāt sambandhatadbuddhyoḥ.
na ca sambandhagrahaṇasamaye sarve sambandhino’vabhānti,
apratibhāsanāt. na cāpratīyamānasya pratīyamānatvaṁ kalpayituṁ

nyāyyam, atiprasaṅgāt. anyathā hi rāsane vijñāne rase pratīyamāne
rūpamapi kalpyaṁ syāt.
Translation: 783
Because of the distance in space, time and nature, the perception
is not capable of deciding the relationship of individuals. Moreover,
unless the relata are known, the relationship cannot be known,
because, the relation and its knowledge are based on them. It is
also not the case that at the time of knowing the relationship, all
the relata are known because they do not appear before us. It is
also not proper to postulate something as being known when it is
not being known because, it will lead to unwanted consequence.
Otherwise, in the perception of taste, when the taste is known, one
will have to postulate there color also.
Text: 784
अथ अिवनाभावसम्बन्धगर्हणकालोपलिक्षतकितपयव्यक् नां सम्बन्धावधारणम्, न सवार्-
सािमित चेत्;
atha avinābhāvasambandhagrahaṇakālopalakṣitakatipayavyaktīnāṁ
sambandhāvadhāraṇam, na sarvāsāmiti cet;
Translation: 784
Clarification:
If we say that at the time of knowledge of the invariable
concomitance, the relationship of only few individuals is known,
not of all individuals.
Text: 785
यद्ेवं तासामेव गमकत्वं नान्यासाम्। निह अन्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्य गमकत्वम स्त,
अितपर्सङ्ात्। न जातु देवदत्नयनघटसम्बन्धे जाते जलादौ ज्ञानमुत्पद्ते िनयत-
देशकालस्वभावाऽयोिगत्वात्।
yadyevaṁ tāsāmeva gamakatvaṁ nānyāsām. nahi anyasya samba-
ndhe anyasya gamakatvamasti, atiprasaṅgāt. na jātu devadatta-
nayanaghaṭasambandhe jāte jalādau jñānamutpadyate niyatadeśa-
kālasvabhāvā’yogitvāt.
Translation: 785
Reply:
If you say so, then, only those individuals can become the ground
for inferential knowledge and not the other individuals. It is not a
fact that, if the relationship is known with something that can be
the ground for knowing something else, because this will lead to
the fault of over-application. It is not the case that when the eyes of
Devadatta are connected with a pot, he gets the knowledge of water.
Text: 786
स्वभाव ........... स्यात्।
svabhāva .......... syāt.
Translation: 786
(………….The text is broken and hence does not make any sense……..)
Text: 787
आत्मान्यत्वे च अन्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्याऽगमकत्वं तदाकारव्यितरेकात्। अव्यितरेके वा
पवर् ते नैकबलकृ ........ धूमाकारानुपर्वेशपर्सङ्ः स्यात्। तदनुपर्वेशे च न तत्संिवत्यानुमेया
अिग्संिव त्रुपपद्ते, ना लकेरद्ीपवा सन इव तयोः सम्बन्धानवगतेः। तदनवगितश्च
अनुमेयदहनस्य िपशाचेश्वरतुल्यत्वात्। पावकसम्ब न्धसंिवत्ौ सम्बन्धबुद्ेरुपप त्रित-
पर्सङ्ात्। तस्माद् धूमा ....... लङ्ावगम इवा ............ ता त्वक्या दृष्ट्ा न
केनाप्युत्पाद्ते इित िकन् कल्प्यते धूमबलेन .......... धूमधूमस्वरूपं िकमधुनोत्पन्म्,
िचरोत्पन्म्, कारणाद्ा जातम्, आक स्मकम् ......... मातर्ावद्ोतकत्वेन पयर् व सते
आक स्मकमिप स्वरूपमुपपद्ते जगतो वैश्वरूप्यदशर् नात्।
ātmānyatve ca anyasya sambandhe anyasyā’gamakatvaṁ tadākāra-
vyatirekāt. avyatireke vā parvate naikabalakṛ .... dhūmākārānuprave-
śaprasaṅgaḥ syāt. tadanupraveśe ca na tatsaṁvittyānumeyā
agnisaṁvittirupapadyate, nālikeradvīpavāsina iva tayoḥ samba-
ndhānavagateḥ. tadanavagatiśca anumeyadahanasya piśāce-
śvaratulyatvāt. pāvakasambandhisaṁvittau sambandhabuddheru-
papattiratiprasaṅgāt. tasmād dhūmā ...... liṅgāvagama ivā .....
tāttvikyā dṛṣṭyā na kenāpyutpādyate iti kinna kalpyate dhūmabalena
...... dhūmadhūma- svarūpaṁ kimadhu- notpannam, cirotpannam,
kāraṇādvā jātam, ākasmikam ...... mātrāvadyotakatvena paryavasite
ākasmikamapi svarūpamupapadyate jagato vaiśvarūpyadarśanāt.
Translation: 787
If the relatum is different from itself, then, something having
relationship with something cannot be the ground for inferring
something else, because, it will not have that form and if the form
is not different, on the mountain .... (the text is broken..) there will
arise the contingency of taking the form of smoke and once that form
is taken, on the basis of the knowledge of smoke, there will not arise
the knowledge of fire, because like the people living in the island
of coconut trees they will not have the relation between smoke and
fire. There will be knowledge of relation in the knowledge of that
which is related to fire and this will be an unwanted consequence.
Therefore, .... (the text is broken.) .... like the knowledge of the
ground or reason .... (text is broken) .... As a matter of fact, by
nobody it cannot be produced and therefore, why not is it being
postulated on the strength of smoke .... (the text is broken)? Is the
nature of smoke produced now? Or, already produced for a long
time? Or, is it produced with its cause? .... (the text is broken) ....
(the text is broken) When it terminates in revealing the quantity,
sometimes a sudden form is also justifiable, because, the universe is
of all forms.
Text: 788
अथ आक स्मकत्वे िनयतदेशकालसम्ब न्धत्वं न लभ्यते; तन् युक्ं, तत्स्वभावस्य
तस्योत्पत्ेराक स्मकिनयतदेशकालसम्बन्धाभावानवगतेः। एवंभूतं तत् कारणं िवनोत्पन्ं
यिन्यतदेशकालपर्ितिष्तदेहम्। एवञ् स्थते धूमोपलम्भे सित नानुमेयािग्पर्ितप त्ः,
अनुपलम्भात्।
atha ākasmikatve niyatadeśakālasambandhitvaṁ na labhyate; tanna
yuktam, tatsvabhāvasya tasyotpatterākasmikaniyatadeśakālasamba-
ndhābhāvānavagateḥ. evaṁbhūtaṁ tat kāraṇaṁ vinotpannaṁ yanni-
yatadeśakālapratiṣṭhitadeham. evañca sthite dhūmopalambhe sati
nānumeyāgnipratipattiḥ, anupalambhāt.
Translation: 788
If you say, it is without a cause, then, it cannot be said to be
related with a particular space and time. It is not proper. Since,
it is produced because, it is of the nature of that, one cannot
know the absence of the relationship with a particular space and

particular time, with reference to something which has come into
being without a cause. Such is the thing which is produced without
a cause and which occupies a particular, time and particular place.
When this is the case, on the knowledge of smoke, there cannot be
inferential knowledge of fire, because, it is not there.
[१. कायर् हेतुकानुमानिनरासाय कायर् त्वस्य खण्डनम्।]
[1. kāryahetukānumānanirāsāya kāryatvasya khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 789
इतोऽिप नानुमेयपर्ितप त्ः, धूमस्य कायर् रूपत्वाऽसम्भवात्। तदनुपप त्श्च सत्ािवच्छे द-
स्यानवगतेः।
ito’pi nānumeyapratipattiḥ, dhūmasya kāryarūpatvā’sambhavāt.
tadanupapattiśca sattāvicchedasyānavagateḥ.
Translation: 789
For the following reason also, the knowledge of object of an
inferential cognition is not possible. Because, the smoke cannot
be called an effect. Its impossibility is due to not knowing its
disassociation with the existence.
Text: 790
ननु पर्त्यक्षेणव
ै अवगम्यते;
nanu pratyakṣeṇaiva avagamyate;
Translation: 790
Clarification:
Well it can be known by perception itself.
Text: 791
िकं तत् पर्त्यक्षं िव धमुखेन उपजायते, आहो पर्ितषेधमुखेन?
kiṁ tat pratyakṣaṁ vidhimukhena upajāyate, āho pratiṣedha-
mukhena?
Translation: 791
Reply:
There the question arises, does this perceptual cognition arise in a
positive way or in a negative way?
Text: 792
तद्िद िव धमुखेन उपादीयते; त त्कं धूमिवषयम्, आहो अन्यिवषयम्, िनिवर् षयं वा?
tadyadi vidhimukhena upādīyate; tatkiṁ dhūmaviṣayam, āho
anyaviṣayam, nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 792
If you say, it arises in a positive way, then, one can ask, is it a
perception which the object being smoke, or, is it a perception of
something else, or, is it a perception having no content at all?
Text: 793
तद्िद धूमिवषयम्; तदा तत्स्वरूपावगािहना तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्वं िवधीयते न
तत्स्वरूपखण्डना।
tadyadi dhūmaviṣayam; tadā tatsvarūpāvagāhinā tatsvarūpāstitvaṁ
vidhīyate na tatsvarūpakhaṇḍanā.
Translation: 793
If you say it is perception of smoke, then, its existence is enjoined by
the knowledge in which there is form of smoke and not by knowledge
which destroys its form.
Text: 794
अथ अन्यिवषयम्; न तिहर् तेन तस्य खण्डना िवधीयते तत्स्वरूपवत्, अिप तु यद् यिद्षयं
तत् तस्यैवाऽ स्तत्वं िवदधाित।
atha anyaviṣayam; na tarhi tena tasya khaṇḍanā vidhīyate
tatsvarūpavat, api tu yad yadviṣayaṁ tat tasyaivā’stitvaṁ vidadhāti.
Translation: 794
If you say, it is a perception of something else, then, by that its
rejection is not possible, like its form. Rather it will enjoin the
existence of that which appeared as the object of the knowledge.
Text: 795
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् तत् िकंिचद् िवदधाित नािप पर्ितषेधित मूकान्धब धरतुल्यत्वात्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi tat kiṁcid vidadhāti nāpi pratiṣedhati
mūkāndhabadhiratulyatvāt.
Translation: 795
If you say it is perception without content, then, it means that, it
does not enjoin anything, nor does it negate anything, because it
will be similar to someone who is deaf and dumb.
Text: 796
अथ पर्ितषेधमुखेन उपादीयते; तदिप िकं धूमिवषयम्, आहो अन्यिवषयम्, िनिवर् षयं वा?
atha pratiṣedhamukhena upādīyate; tadapi kiṁ dhūmaviṣayam, āho
anyaviṣayam, nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 796
If you say, it is taken in a negative way, is that also knowledge of
which smoke is the object or something else is the object, or it has
no object at all?
Text: 797
तद्िद धूमिवषयम्; तदा तत्सत्ोपिनबद्ं तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्विवधायकं न तु व्यावत्र्कम्।
tadyadi dhūmaviṣayam; tadā tatsattopanibaddhaṁ tatsvarūpāsti-
tvavidhāyakaṁ na tu vyāvarttakam.
Translation: 797
If you say, the object is smoke, then, whatever is associated with
its existence, will enjoin the existence of its form or nature and it
will not exclude it.
Text: 798
अथ अन्यिवषयम्; अन्यिवषयपयर् वसाियना न तत्सत्ाखण्डना अवद्ोत्यते तत्सत्ावत्।
atha anyaviṣayam; anyaviṣayaparyavasāyinā na tatsattākhaṇḍanā
avadyotyate tatsattāvat.
Translation: 798
If it is a perception of something else, then, it does not imply
the rejection of its existence by that which culminates in having
something as its object, because it exists there like the existence.
Text: 799
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तत् िकिञ्िद्दधाित नािप पर्ितषेधित मूढात्मतयोत्पत्ेः।
atha nirviṣayam; na tat kiñcidvidadhāti nāpi pratiṣedhati mūḍhā-
tmatayotpatteḥ.
Translation: 799
If you say, it is without object, then, it does not enjoin anything,
nor does it reject anything, because it emerges without any
consciousness.
Text: 800
अथ सत्ािवच्छे दो िह पर्ध्वंसः, सोऽनेन आत्मसात् िकर्यते;
atha sattāvicchedo hi pradhvaṁsaḥ, so’nena ātmasāt kriyate;
Translation: 800
Clarification:
Well, the destruction means disassociation with existence and that
is being adopted by it.
Text: 801
नेदं चतुरसर्ं वचः। पर्ध्वंसो िह िवषयान्तरम्, ततर्ोत्पन्ं िवज्ञानं तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्विवधायकं
न तु कस्यिचत् पर्ितषेधकम्। त स्मंश्च संवेद्माने न कस्यिचत् खण्डनाऽवगम्यते
स्विवषयपयर् वसायीिन िवज्ञानािन स्विवषया स्तत्विवधानपरािण। का कस्य खण्डना?
nedaṁ caturasraṁ vacaḥ. pradhvaṁso hi viṣayāntaram,
tatrotpannaṁ vijñānaṁ tatsvarūpāstitvavidhāyakaṁ na tu
kasyacit pratiṣedhakam. tasmiṁśca saṁvedyamāne na kasyacit
khaṇḍanā’vagamyate svaviṣayaparyavasāyīni vijñānāni svaviṣa-
yāstitvavidhānaparāṇi. kā kasya khaṇḍanā?
Translation: 801
Reply:
This will not have intermittent answer. Destruction is something
else. The knowledge of it enjoins existence of its nature. It does
not reject anything, when that is known, rejection of nothing is
understood. The knowledges which terminate in their own content
they convey enjoining of existence of its own. Who rejects whose
existence?
Text: 802
अथ पर्ध्वंसज्ञाने धूमस्वरूपं न पर्ितभाित, तेनासौ तस्य खण्डना इित चेत्;
atha pradhvaṁsajñāne dhūmasvarūpaṁ na pratibhāti, tenāsau tasya
khaṇḍanā iti cet;
Translation: 802
Objection:
Well in the knowledge of destruction, the nature of smoke does not
appear and therefore, it is said that it is rejection of that.
Text: 803
यद्ेवं तर्ैलोक्यस्य खण्डना, त स्मन् धूमध्वंसज्ञाने तर्ैलोक्यं नावभाित, तर्ैलोक्यात्मको वा
न भवित ध्वंसः।
yadyevaṁ trailokyasya khaṇḍanā, tasmin dhūmadhvaṁsajñāne
trailokyaṁ nāvabhāti, trailokyātmako vā na bhavati dhvaṁsaḥ.
Translation: 803
Reply:
If it is so, there can be rejection of the three worlds, because when
that knowledge of destruction of smoke arises, the three worlds do
not appear, or in other words, the destruction does not take the
form of the three worlds.
[२. पर्सङ्ात् िवरोधपदाथर् स्य िवकल्प्य दषू णम्। ]
[2. prasaṅgāt virodhapadārthasya vikalpya dūṣaṇam. ]
Text: 804
अथ धूमिवरो धत्वेन असौ धूमस्य खण्डना इित चेत्;
atha dhūmavirodhitvena asau dhūmasya khaṇḍanā iti cet;
Translation: 804
Clarification:
Well, that is called rejection of smoke, because it opposes smoke.
Text: 805
कः पुनरसौ िवरोधाथर् ः? िकम्-अतदाकारता, आहो असमानकालीनता तत्सद्ावे
तस्यानुपलम्भो वा, तज्जन्यता वा, तज्जनकत्वं वा, िभन्िकर्याकतृर्त्वं वा, िभन्हेतू-
त्पाद्त्वं वा, आ शर्ताना शर्तत्वं वा?
kaḥ punarasau virodhārthaḥ? kim-atadākāratā, āho asamānakā-
līnatā, tatsadbhāve tasyānupalambho vā, tajjanyatā vā, tajjanaka-
tvaṁ vā, bhinnakriyākartṛtvaṁ vā, bhinnahetūtpādyatvaṁ vā, āśri-
tānāśritatvaṁ vā?
Translation: 805
Reply:
What is the meaning of opposition? Does it mean not having the
form of that? Or does it mean not being of the same time? Or, does
it mean in the presence of X, in the presence of Y? or, does it mean
being caused by that? or, does it mean it is produced by that? or,

does it mean being an agent of different actions? Does it mean the
state of being produced by different causes? or, does it mean the
state of not being located in that which is located?
Text: 806
तद्िद तावद् अतदाकारता िवरोधः; तदा तर्ैलोक्यस्य सा खण्डना, न केवलं धूमस्य,
तर्ैलक्याकारप रहारेण त त्स्थतेः।
tadyadi tāvad atadākāratā virodhaḥ; tadā trailokyasya sā khaṇḍanā,
na kevalaṁ dhūmasya, trailakyākāraparihāreṇa tatsthiteḥ.
Translation: 806
If you say by opposition, of having the form of that, that will mean
rejection of three worlds, because that exists devoid of the form of
the three worlds and not only of the smoke.
Text: 807
अथ असमानकालीनता िवरोधाथर् ः; तदा अतीतानागतवतर् मानकालानामन्योन्यिवरो धत्व-
पर्सङ्ः। न चासना-(चासमान)कालीनता स स्वभावेन उभयोः स्वभावोपपत्ेः।
atha asamānakālīnatā virodhārthaḥ; tadā atītānāgatavartamāna-
kālānāmanyonyavirodhitvaprasaṅgaḥ. na cāsanā-(cāsamāna)kālī-
natā sa svabhāvena ubhayoḥ svabhāvopapatteḥ.
Translation: 807
If you say, the meaning of opposition is not belonging to one and
the same time, then, the things of past, present and future will
contradict one another. That cannot be said to be belonging to
different time, because individual nature can be justified by their
own nature.
Text: 808
अथ तत्सद्ावे तस्यानुपल ब्धः िवरोधाथर् ः; तदा अितदरू ािदिनिमत्ोपिनपाते सित
तदनुपल ब्धदृर्ष्ा, नच तेषां तत्खण्डनात्मता। तथा, दीपाभावे घटधूमादेरनुपल ब्धदृर्ष्ा,
न च सा घटधूमादेः सत्ा ख ण्डता।
atha tatsadbhāve tasyānupalabdhiḥ virodhārthaḥ; tadā atidūrādi-
nimittopanipāte sati tadanupalabdhirdṛṣṭā, naca teṣāṁ tatkhaṇḍa-
nātmatā. tathā, dīpābhāve ghaṭadhūmāderanupalabdhirdṛṣṭā, na ca
sā ghaṭadhūmādeḥ sattā khaṇḍitā.
Translation: 808
If you say, in the presence of X, absence of Y, is the meaning of the
term opposition, then, it is a fact that when something is at a far
distance, due to the ground of distance, that thing is not visible.
But that does not amount to rejection of that thing; in the same
way, when there is no land we do have experience of absence of
pot, smoke etc. But that does not amount to the rejection of the
existence of pot, smoke etc.
Text: 809
अथ दरू ािदिनिमत्ोपिनपाते यतर्ानुपल ब्धदृर्ष्ा ततर्ोपल ब्धरिप पुनदृर्ष्ा, इह तु पुनः ध्वंसे
सञ्ाते न जातु धूमकुम्भादेरुपल ब्धर स्त।
atha dūrādinimittopanipāte yatrānupalabdhirdṛṣṭā tatropalabdhirapi
punardṛṣṭā, iha tu punaḥ dhvaṁse sañjāte na jātu dhūmakumbhā-
derupalabdhirasti.
Translation: 809
Clarification:
However, in a situation where the circumstances such as longer
distance etc. crop up, and because of that, there is no knowledge, in
that case, we do find that, there is perception again. Here, however,
once the destruction has taken place there is no knowledge of smoke,
pot etc.
Text: 810
केन नोपलभ्यते? िकं केनािप, आहो सवर् ज्ञातृिभः?
kena nopalabhyate? kiṁ kenāpi, āho sarvajñātṛbhiḥ?
Translation: 810
Reply:
By whom it is not perceived? Is it by anybody? Or by one who
knows everything?
Text: 811
तद्िद केनािप नोपलभ्यते, तेन तदा तस्य स्वरूपखण्डना; तदयुक्म्, दरू ा[व]रणािद-
िनिमत्ोपिनपाते सित यथैके तमथर् न पश्य न्त अपरे पश्य न्त, एवं सित सञ्ाते ध्वंसे
तमथर् म् एके नोपलभन्ते अन्ये तु उपलप्स्यन्त इित।
tadyadi kenāpi nopalabhyate, tena tadā tasya svarūpakhaṇḍanā;

tadayuktam, dūrā[va]raṇādinimittopanipāte sati yathaike tamar-
thaṁ na paśyanti apare paśyanti, evaṁ sati sañjāte dhvaṁse tamar-
tham eke nopalabhante anye tu upalapsyanta iti.
Translation: 811
If you say, it is not known by anybody and therefore its form is
denied, it will not be proper, because, as due to the factors such as
distance, cover, etc. people do not see a particular thing, but others
can see it, in the same way, when destruction occurs, some people
do not see it but others will.
Text: 812
अथ सवर् ज्ञातृिभनोर्पलभ्यते; कानुमा? 'एतदनुभविवकलाः सवेर् ज्ञातारः'; न मानम स्त,
परिचत्वृत्ीनां दरु न्वयत्वाद् बुिद्वैिचत्यस्य च उपपत्ेः।
atha sarvajñātṛbhirnopalabhyate; kānumā? ‘etadanubhavavikalāḥ
sarve jñātāraḥ’; na mānamasti, paracittavṛttīnāṁ duranvayatvāt
buddhivaicitryasya ca upapatteḥ.
Translation: 812
If you say that, it is not known by those who are all-knowing, what
will be the inferential knowledge there? Will it be like “all knowers
are devoid of experience of this?” There is no proof for this, because,
the mental states of others are inaccessible and it is also a fact that,
different people have different knowledges.
Text: 813
ध्वंसे सित अनुपल ब्धः िकं-िनयतदेशकाले, सवर् दा वा?
dhvaṁse sati anupalabdhiḥ kiṁ-niyatadeśakāle, sarvadā vā?
Translation: 813
After the destruction, does the knowledge of absence take place at
a particular space and a particular time? Or does it occur always?
Text: 814
तद्िद िनयतदेशकाले अनुपल ब्धः; तदा न सत्ापगमोऽवगम्यते, सद्साध्यतया च
बोद्व्याः।
tadyadi niyatadeśakāle anupalabdhiḥ; tadā na sattāpagamo’va-
gamyate, siddhasādhyatayā ca boddhavyāḥ.
Translation: 814
If you say that, such knowledge of absence occurs at a particular
space and time, then, it means that, the absence of existence is
not understood. They should be understood as something which is
going to be established that which is already known.
Text: 815
अथ सवर् देशकाले नोपलभ्यते; तदयुक्म्, न िनयामकं िकिञ्द् बीजम स्त, न च बीजमन्त-
रेणाभ्युपगमो युक्ः।
atha sarvadeśakāle nopalabhyate; tadayuktam, na niyāmakaṁ kiñcid
bījamasti, na ca bījamantareṇābhyupagamo yuktaḥ.
Translation: 815
If you say that, it is not known in all space and time, it will not be
proper, because there is no ground to specify it. It is not proper to
accept anything without a ground.
Text: 816
अथ ध्वंसे सित सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वे कथं वस्तुत्वसं स्थितः?
atha dhvaṁse sati sarvopākhyārahitatve kathaṁ vastutvasaṁsthitiḥ?
Translation: 816
Objection:
Well, after the destruction a thing loses all its reference and so how
can that be called an entity?
Text: 817
कदा सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वम्? िकम् उपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्, आहो अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्?
kadā sarvopākhyārahitatvam? kim upalabdhyavasthāyām, āho anu-
palabdhyavasthāyām?
Translation: 817
Reply:
There we would like to ask, when did it lose its reference? Is at the
time when it is known or at the time when it is not known?
Text: 818
तद्िद उपल ब्धम धकृत्योच्यते; उपलभ्यते च सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वं च इित िचतर्म्।
tadyadi upalabdhimadhikṛtyocyate; upalabhyate ca sarvopākhyā-
rahitatvaṁ ca iti citram.
Translation: 818
If you say that, we are referring to the time when it is known, this
is not understandable, because, it is funny to say that, it is known
and at the same time, it has lost all its reference.
Text: 819
अथ अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थामङ्ीकृत्योच्यते सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वम्; तदयुक्म्, दरू ावरणािद-
िनिमत्ोपिनपाते सित अनुपलब्धौ सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वं सत्वं च इत्यनेकान्तः। यिद च ध्वंसे
सित अत्यन्तानुपलम्भः; अनुपलम्भपर्पञ्ोऽयं न तत्स्वरूपस्यातावद(तादव)स्थ्यम्,
आवराणािदकृतानुपलम्भे यथा।
atha anupalabdhyavasthāmaṅgīkṛtyocyate sarvopākhyārahitatvam;
tadayuktam, dūrāvaraṇādinimittopanipāte sati anupalabdhau
sarvopā- khyārahitatvaṁ sattvaṁ ca ityanekāntaḥ. yadi ca dhvaṁse
sati atyantānupalambhaḥ; anupalambhaprapañco’yaṁ na tatsvarū-
pasyātāvada(tādava)sthyam, āvarāṇādikṛtānupalambhe yathā.
Translation: 819
If you say that, we are saying so accepting the state of its
non-knowledge and because of that, the state of its being devoid
of all references, it will not be proper, because, when there is no
knowledge after the presence of the grounds such as longer distance,
cover etc. there is lack of all references and at the same time,
there is existence. This is inconsistent. If after the destruction,
there is absolute absence of knowledge, then, this description of
non-knowledge of its form remains as it is, as we can see in the case
of non-knowledge caused by covering a thing.
Text: 820
तज्जन्यता िवरोधाथर् ः; तदा दण्डािदनािप जिनतत्वात् तिद्रो धत्वपर्सङ्ः। न च
व्यापाराितशयोऽ स्त, तं पर्ित िकर्याितरेकस्य अनुपल ब्धः(ब्धेः)।
tajjanyatā virodhārthaḥ; tadā daṇḍādināpi janitatvāt tadviro-
dhitvaprasaṅgaḥ. na ca vyāpārātiśayo’sti, taṁ prati kriyātirekasya
anupalabdhiḥ(bdheḥ).
Translation: 820
If you say that, the state of being produced by that, is the meaning
of opposition, then, since a pot is produced by the stick, it will be
considered in opposition with that. You cannot say that, there is

an additional factor viz. function, because with reference to that,
the additional function is not seen.
Text: 821
अथ तज्जनकत्वं िवरोधाथर् ः; तदयुक्म्, न घटधूमात्मा तद् ध्वंसोत्पाद्ः तैरव
े अनभ्यु-
पगमात्। यिद च तज्जनकत्वेन िवरो धत्वम्; तदा अभावज्ञानस्य अभावो िवरोधी स्यात्।
atha tajjanakatvaṁ virodhārthaḥ; tadayuktam, na ghaṭadhūmātmā
tad dhvaṁsotpādyaḥ taireva anabhyupagamāt. yadi ca tajjana-
katvena virodhitvam; tadā abhāvajñānasya abhāvo virodhī syāt.
Translation: 821
If you say, the state of producing that is the meaning of opposition
then, that will also not be proper, because, the form of pot
and smoke is not produced by their destruction, because, they
themselves do not accept it. If something is taken as “opposing”
because, it is produced by something, then, absence should be called
opposing the knowledge of absence.
Text: 822
अथ िभन्ाथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वम्; तदा सवेर् सवर् स्य िवरो धनः पर्ाप्नुव न्त।
atha bhinnārthakriyākartṛtvam; tadā sarve sarvasya virodhinaḥ
prāpnuvanti.
Translation: 822
If you say, the state of being the agent of different fruitful activities
is the meaning of opposition, then, everything will be opposing
everything.
Text: 823
अथ िभन्हेतूत्पाद्त्वं िवरोधाथर् ः; तदयुक्म्, एकेन देवदत्ेन कुम्भतिद्च्छे दयोरुत्पद्-
मानत्वात्।
atha bhinnahetūtpādyatvaṁ virodhārthaḥ; tadayuktam, ekena
devadattena kumbha-tadvicchedayorutpadyamānatvāt.
Translation: 823
If you say that, the state of being produced by different causes is
the meaning of opposition, that will not be proper because by single
Devadatta both the pot and its destruction can be produced.
Text: 824
यिद च िनयतहेतूत्पाद्त्वेन िवरुद्त्वं जेगीयते सदसतोः; तदा सवेर् भावा िनयतसामग्र्या
उत्पाद्ा अन्योन्यिवरो धनो भवेयःु । िनत्यािनत्याकारयोिवर् रोधपर्सङ्ः, िनत्याकारस्य
िनबीर्जत्वात्, बीजवत्वे वा िनत्यतैव न स्यात्।
yadi ca niyatahetūtpādyatvena viruddhatvaṁ jegīyate sadasatoḥ;
tadā sarve bhāvā niyatasāmagryā utpādyā anyonyavirodhino bhave-
yuḥ. nityānityākārayorvirodhaprasaṅgaḥ, nityākārasya nirbījatvāt,
bījavatve vā nityataiva na syāt.
Translation: 824
If you say that, a positive and a negative entities are produced
by specific causes and this is what you mean opposition, then,
all positive entities will be opposing one another, since they are
produced by specific set of causes. There will arise contingency of
opposition between eternal form and non-eternal form, because the
eternal form is without a cause and if that is produced by a cause,
then, that will lose its character of being eternal.
Text: 825
अथ आ शर्ताना शर्तत्वं िवरोधाथर् ः; तदा आत्मज्ञानयोः िवरो धत्वमापनीपद्ते,
atha āśritānāśritatvaṁ virodhārthaḥ; tadā ātmajñānayoḥ virodhi-
tvamāpanīpadyate,
Translation: 825
If you say that, the state of being dependent (located) and not
dependent (not located) is the meaning of opposition, then, there
will be opposition of self and knowledge of self.
Text: 826
कुम्भापगमस्य सवर् िवरो धत्वं पर्ाप्नोित, आ शर्ताना शर्तत्वस्याऽिवशेषात्।
kumbhāpagamasya sarvavirodhitvaṁ prāpnoti, āśritānāśritatvasyā’-
viśeṣāt.
Translation: 826
(Similarly), the removal of a pot will oppose everything because, it
is all the same viz. located and not located.
Text: 827
न च सम्बन्धमन्तरेण षष्ी सम्पद्ते, अिप तु सम्बन्धे सित देवदत्नयनतुरगव्यपदेशो यथा।
na ca sambandhamantareṇa ṣaṣṭhī sampadyate, api tu sambandhe

sati devadattanayanaturagavyapadeśo yathā.
Translation: 827
Without a relation there cannot be a genitive case-ending. Rather,
where there is a relation, there can be reference to eyes of Devadatta
or horse of Devadatta.
Text: 828
अथ सम्बन्धमन्तरेण कुम्भाभावव्यपदेशोऽभ्युपगम्यते; तदास्तं गतं िवश्वं स्यात्,
सम्बन्धाभावस्याऽिवशेषात्।
atha sambandhamantareṇa kumbhābhāvavyapadeśo’bhyupagamyate;
tadāstaṁ gataṁ viśvaṁ syāt, sambandhābhāvasyā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 828
If you say, you accept the reference of absence of pot without
revelation, then, the entire universe is lost, because, there is no
difference in the absence of relation.
[३. हेतुफलसम्बन्धावधारणस्यानुपप त्पर्कटनम्।]

[3. hetuphalasambandhāvadhāraṇasyānupapattiprakaṭanam.]
Text: 829
इतोऽिप हेतुफलसम्बन्धावधारणं नोपपद्ते-िकं िनरुपच रतकारणगर्हणानन्तरं गृह्ते
कायर् म्, आहो स्वद् उपच रतकारणगर्हणानन्तरम्?
ito’pi hetuphalasambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ nopapadyate-kiṁ nirupa-
caritakāraṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ gṛhyate kāryam, āhosvid upacarita-
kāraṇagrahaṇānantaram?
Translation: 829
For the following reason also it is not possible to determine the
relationship between cause and effect: Is it the case that an effect
is known after the knowledge of unimagined cause or after the
knowledge of imagined cause?
Text: 830
यिद िनरुपच रतकारणगर्हणानन्तरं गृह्ते; तदयुक्म्, सामग्र्या अती न्दर्यत्वेन संवेदना-
योगात्।
yadi nirupacaritakāraṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ gṛhyate; tadayuktam,

sāmagryā atīndriyatvena saṁvedanāyogāt.
Translation: 830
If you say that, an effect is known after the knowledge of unimagined
cause, that will not be proper, because, as the collection of factors
is beyond the range of sense organs, there cannot be any knowledge.
Text: 831
अथ उपच रतकारणानन्तरीयकत्वेन तद् गृह्ते तेन तस्य तत् फलम्; तदयुक्म्,
उपच रतस्य कारणत्वमेव न िवद्ते कथं तत् फलतां याित। अन्यच्च, तन्तूनां कायर्
वस्तू(ं स्ं) िकम्-पूवार्परकालभािवत्वेन, आहो पूवार्परगर्हणेन?
atha upacaritakāraṇānantarīyakatvena tad gṛhyate tena tasya
tat phalam; tadayuktam, upacaritasya kāraṇatvameva na vidyate
kathaṁ tat phalatāṁ yāti. anyacca, tantūnāṁ kāryaṁ vastūṁ
(straṁ)kim-pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena, āho pūrvāparagrahaṇena?
Translation: 831
If you say that, the effect is known because of a set of imagined
causes and therefore, this is an effect of that, that will not be proper
because that which is imagined cannot be called the cause at all,
how can anything be called an effect of that? Moreover, you say
that, the cloth is an effect of its threads, there the question arises,
is it because there is temporal sequence between them? Or, because
their sequence is known?
Text: 832
तद्िद पूवार्परकालभािवत्वेन; तदा िनयतकारणकायर् त्वं न लभ्यते अम्बरफलस्य,
तत्समानकालीनाऽनेककायोर्त्पादकानां तत्पूवार्परकालभािवत्वािवशेषात्।
tadyadi pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena; tadā niyatakāraṇakāryatvaṁ na
labhyate ambaraphalasya, tatsamānakālīnā’nekakāryotpādakānāṁ
tatpūrvāparakālabhāvitvāviśeṣāt.
Translation: 832
If you say that, there is temporal sequence between them, then, we
cannot specify that, such-and-such effect is caused by such-and-such
cause. Under the sky, there are many effects coming into being in a
sequence of time and at one and the same time, out of many causes
of the same time and there is no difference in that [therefore how

to decide, what the cause is and what the effect is?]
Text: 833
अथ अन्वयव्यितरेकयुक्स्य यस्य पूवर्कालभािवत्वं तत्कारणं तद स्त, धर्ुवभािव-
कायर् दशर् नात्।
atha anvayavyatirekayuktasya yasya pūrvakālabhāvitvaṁ tatkāra-
ṇaṁ tadasti, dhruvabhāvikāryadarśanāt.
Translation: 833
Clarification:
Well, by the application of the principle of positive and negative
concomitance, between X and Y, one can decide that if X invariably
precedes Y, then, X is the cause of Y.
Text: 834
अन्वयव्यितरेकशब्देन िकमिभधीयते? िकम्-कारणम्, अन्यद्ा?
anvayavyatirekaśabdena kimabhidhīyate? kim-kāraṇam, anyadvā?
Translation: 834
Reply:
What do you mean by the term positive and negative concomitance?
Does it mean a cause or something else?
Text: 835
तद्िद कारणम्; तदा न िकिञ्द् बाध्यते कारणात्मतया तत्कारणम्।
tadyadi kāraṇam; tadā na kiñcid bādhyate kāraṇātmatayā
tatkāraṇam.
Translation: 835
If you say, it means a cause, then, nothing is obstructing and
therefore, in the form of cause, it is a cause.
Text: 836
अथ अन्यत् तत्; न जानीमः िकं तद् इित? न च पूवार्परभावः सद्ोऽतर् ज्ञानमन्तरेण।
ज्ञानं िवना न जाने िकं सहोत्पन्ौ, पूवार्परभावोत्पन्ौ वा, अनुत्पन्ौ वा?
atha anyat tat; na jānīmaḥ kiṁ tad iti? na ca pūrvāparabhāvaḥ
siddho’tra jñānamantareṇa. jñānaṁ vinā na jāne kiṁ sahotpannau,
pūrvāparabhāvotpannau vā, anutpannau vā?
Translation: 836
If you say, it is something else, we do not know what is that
something else. The sequence cannot be decided without the
knowledge. Without the knowledge we do not know whether they
are produced together or produced in a sequence, or they are not
produced at all.
Text: 837
अथ पूवार्परगर्हणकर्मेण पूवार्परोत्पाद-तदभावव्यवस्था इित चेत्;
atha pūrvāparagrahaṇakrameṇa pūrvāparotpāda-tadabhāvavyavasthā
iti cet;
Translation: 837
Clarification:
We can decide effect’s coming into being in a sequence or not coming
into being in a sequence, by the sequence of knowledge of what
precedes and what follows.
Text: 838
तदेतदिप गर्हणेऽिप तुल्यम्। सती सत्ा संवेद्ते नाऽसती। सहोत्पन्योरिप कर्मेण गर्हणं
दृष्ं गोिवषाणयोः। अनुत्पन्योश्च गोत्वाऽ स्तत्वयोः। तथा, पटगर्हणानन्तरं तन्तूनां गर्हणं
दृष्म्। तथा, एकमेव गर्हणं दृष्म्, न च तयोभेर्दोऽ स्त, नच तयोहेर्तुफलभावः। यथा च भेदो
ना स्त तथापर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्।
tadetadapi grahaṇe’pi tulyam. satī sattā saṁvedyate nā’satī. saho-
tpannayorapi krameṇa grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ goviṣāṇayoḥ anutpanna-
yośca gotvā’stitvayoḥ. tathā, paṭagrahaṇānantaraṁ tantūnāṁ graha-
ṇaṁ dṛṣṭam. tathā, ekameva grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭam, na ca tayorbhe-
do’sti, naca tayorhetuphalabhāvaḥ. yathā ca bhedo nāsti tathā-
prāgeva prapañcitam.
Translation: 838
Reply:
Even this remains the same, even when it is known. If something
exists, its existence is known and not otherwise. One can have
knowledge of two things in a sequence, in spite of the fact that,
the two things are produced simultaneously as it can be seen, as
it is known of the two horns of a cow. We have also seen that the
two things, which are not produced, that are eternal, also can be
known in a sequence e.g. the universal of universal of “cowness” and
“existence”. In the same way after the knowledge of cloth, knowledge
of threads is also seen. Thus, there is only one knowledge and there
is no difference between the two. There is no relationship between
the two called cause and effect. That there is no difference has
already been discussed before.
Text: 839
एवं संवेदनमिप संवेद्ात् न िभद्ते सदाकारतया, न च तयोराकारान्तरम स्त, एकं िह वस्तु।
evaṁ saṁvedanamapi saṁvedyāt na bhidyate sadākāratayā, na ca
tayorākārāntaramasti, ekaṁ hi vastu.
Translation: 839
Similarly, knowledge is also not different from what is known in the
form of a positive entity. It is also not the case that the two have
two different forms. In reality, there is only one entity.
Text: 840
इतोऽिप हेतुफलयोिवर् ज्ञानं न वेदनम्, यथा उत्पन्ं िवज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनं न भवित,
िवज्ञानाकाराित रक्ाकारान्तरिवरहात्।
ito’pi hetuphalayorvijñānaṁ na vedanam, yathā utpannaṁ vijñānaṁ
svasaṁvedanaṁ na bhavati, vijñānākārātiriktākārāntaravirahāt.
Translation: 840
Because of the following ground also the knowledge of cause and
effect is not an experience: As a knowledge when produced, is not
said to be revealer of itself, because there is no form other than the
form of knowledge.
Text: 841
अथ िकर्याितरेकापायेऽिप स्वसंवेदनमपिदश्यते;
atha kriyātirekāpāye’pi svasaṁvedanamapadiśyate;
Translation: 841
Clarification:
Well, even if there is no additional activity, there is reference to
self-illumination.
Text: 842
अस्वसंवेदनं िकं न व्यपिदश्यते, िकर्याितरेकाभावस्याऽिवशेषात्?
asvasaṁvedanaṁ kiṁ na vyapadiśyate, kriyātirekābhāvasyā’viśeṣāt?
Translation: 842
Reply:
Then what is the reason that absence of self-illumination is not
referred to. Because, even there, there is absence of additional
activity?
Text: 843
तथा, अथर् स्यािप न तद्ेदनम्।
tathā, arthasyāpi na tadvedanam.
Translation: 843
In the same way, there cannot be knowledge of even the object.
Text: 844
अथ कथं तत् अथर् स्य वेदनं न भवित?
atha kathaṁ tat arthasya vedanaṁ na bhavati?
Translation: 844
Objection:
Then how will you call it the knowledge of the object?
Text: 845
कथ्यते-तत् सत्ामातर्ेण अथर् स्य वेदनम्, तज्जन्यतया वा?
kathyate-tat sattāmātreṇa arthasya vedanam, tajjanyatayā vā?
Translation: 845
Reply:
Is it the case that there is knowledge of object by mere existence,
or is it because it is caused by that?
Text: 846
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण अथर् स्य वेदनम्; तदा िवश्वस्य तद्ेदनं स्यात् तद्ेहािवशेषात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa arthasya vedanam; tadā viśvasya tadvedanaṁ
syāt taddehāviśeṣāt.
Translation: 846
If you say that, there is knowledge of object by mere existence, then,
there should be knowledge of the whole world? Because there is no
difference in the body of the universe.
Text: 847
अथ तज्जन्यतया तत्संवेदनमुद्गीयते; तदा नयनालोकेश्वरादेरिप तत् संवेदनमापद्ते,
तैजर्न्यमानत्वोपपत्ेः। न चाथर् स्य व्यापाराितरेकोऽ स्त, िकर्याितरेकस्यान धगतेः। व्यापा-
राितरेके िह िनयतफलोऽथर् ः स्यात्।
atha tajjanyatayā tatsaṁvedanamudgīyate; tadā nayanāloke-
śvarāderapi tat saṁvedanamāpadyate, tairjanyamānatvopapatteḥ.
na cārthasya vyāpārātireko’sti, kriyātirekasyānadhigateḥ. vyāpārā-
tireke hi niyataphalo’rthaḥ syāt.
Translation: 847
If you say that, some knowledge is called knowledge of that object,
because, it is produced by that, then, since a knowledge is produced
by eyes, light, God etc. it should be called knowledge of eyes, light
and God. Because, one can easily justify that, it is produced by
them. There is no additional function of an object, because, one
does not know that additional activity. Had there been additional
function, an object could have been accepted as the result of a
specific object.
Text: 848
भवतु;
bhavatu;
Translation: 848
Objection:
Let it be, what is the harm?
Text: 849
न, अदृष्त्वात्, एकं िह इदं फलं कारककदम्बसम्पाद्म्। ततश्चाथर् संवेदनवत् तत्सवर् -
कारकसंवेदनवत्वपर्सङ्ः।
na, adṛṣṭatvāt, ekaṁ hi idaṁ phalaṁ kārakakadambasam-
pādyam. tataścārthasaṁvedanavat tatsarvakārakasaṁvedanavattva-
prasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 849
Reply:
No, it cannot be, because, it is not experienced by anybody. This is a
single effect, which is accomplished by a collection of factors. Thus,
like the knowledge of an object, there will arise the contingency of

knowledge of all the factors of that collection.
Text: 850
अथ कारकान्तरस्य न तत् वेदनम्; अथर् स्यािप न तत् वेदनम्। तदभावान्
हेतुफलभावावगमः। तदनवगतौ च न कायर् दृष्ट्ा कारणं पर्त्येित।
atha kārakāntarasya na tat vedanam; arthasyāpi na tat vedanam.
tadabhāvānna hetuphalabhāvāvagamaḥ� tadanavagatau ca na
kāryaṁ dṛṣṭvā kāraṇaṁ pratyeti.
Translation: 850
If you say that, it is not the knowledge of other factors, we say
that, it is also not the knowledge of that object and in the absence
of that, there is no knowledge of cause and effect relationship. And
once the cause and effect relationship is not known, no one can have
the knowledge of its cause by seeing an effect.
Text: 851
अिप च, कायर् दृष्ट्ा िकमयमनुमाता कारणं स्मरित, आहो पर्त्येित?
api ca, kāryaṁ dṛṣṭvā kimayamanumātā kāraṇaṁ smarati, āho
pratyeti?
Translation: 851
Moreover, after seeing the effect, is it the fact that the inferer
remembers the cause or deduces it?
Text: 852
तद्िद स्मरित; तन्ाननुभूतं स्मत्ुर्मीशः।
tadyadi smarati; tannānanubhūtaṁ smarttumīśaḥ.
Translation: 852
If you say that, he remembers he is not capable of remembering
because, he has not experienced it before.
Text: 853
अथ पर्त्येित; ततर्ािप िकमुपच रतं पर्त्येित, आहो िनरुपच रतम्?
atha pratyeti; tatrāpi kimupacaritaṁ pratyeti, āho nirupacaritam?
Translation: 853
If you say that, he deduces it, there also the question arises whether
he deduces something which is imagined or unimagined?
Text: 854
तद्िद उपच रतं पर्त्येित; तदयुक्म्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्ेः, अकारकत्वेन
गमकत्वानुपप त्ः।
tadyadi upacaritaṁ pratyeti; tadayuktam, tena saha samba-
ndhānupapatteḥ, akārakatvena gamakatvānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 854
If you say, he deduces something which is imagined, that will not be
proper, because, with that, there cannot be the relation of invariable
concomitance, since it will not be a causal factor, it cannot be
treated as the ground for deduction.
Text: 855
अथ िनरुपच रतं पर्त्येित; ततर्ािप िकम्-िवद्मानमिवद्मानं वा?
atha nirupacaritaṁ pratyeti; tatrāpi kim-vidyamānamavidyamānaṁ
vā?
Translation: 855
If you say, he deduces something which is unimagined, there also the
question comes to our mind, whether he deduces something which
is existent or non-existent.
Text: 856
तद्िद िवद्मानम्; तदयुक्म्, जनकत्वयोगेन जनकमपिदश्यते, यथा दण्डयोगेन दण्डी,
दर्व्यत्वयोगेन दर्व्यम्। न भवतां पक्षे जनकत्वयुक्स्य अनेककालाऽन्तरावस्थानम स्त,
कायार्नेकत्वपर्सङ्ात्।
tadyadi vidyamānam; tadayuktam, janakatvayogena janakamapa-
diśyate, yathā daṇḍayogena daṇḍī, dravyatvayogena dravyam. na
bhavatāṁ pakṣe janakatvayuktasya anekakālā’ntarāvasthānamasti,
kāryānekatvaprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 856
If you say, he deduces something which is existent, it will not
be proper, because, on account of something being the producer,
something is called as the producer e.g. someone is called ‘man
with a stick’ only when he has association with the stick. Similarly,
something is called a substance only when it has association with
substanceness. According to your doctrine, however, nothing which
is associated with the property of being a producer or cause is

accepted as existent in different times, because, in that case, it will
lead to the contingency of accepting many effects.
Text: 857
ै ाऽहेतुः स्यात्।
अथ जनकत्वे सत्यिप न जनयित; सवर् दव
atha janakatve satyapi na janayati; sarvadaivā’hetuḥ syāt.
Translation: 857
If you say that, in spite of the fact i.e. it is a cause and still it does
not produce, then, that should always be non-cause.
Text: 858
अथ अिवद्मानं पर्त्येित; अिवद्मानम्, पर्त्येित च इित िचतर्म्।
atha avidyamānaṁ pratyeti; avidyamānam, pratyeti ca iti citram.
Translation: 858
If you say that, he deduces something non-existent, then, it is very
funny to say that, something is non-existent and still he comes to
know through inference.
Text: 859
िकञ्, कायर् दृष्ट्ा कारणं पर्त्येित, आहो कारणपूवर्कत्वम्, कारणपूवर्कं वा कायर् म्।
kiñca, kāryaṁ dṛṣṭvā kāraṇaṁ pratyeti, āho kāraṇapūrvakatvam,
kāraṇapūrvakaṁ vā kāryam.
Translation: 859
Moreover, is it the fact that, after seeing the effect, he comes to
know the state of its being preceded by the cause or the effect is
preceded by the cause?
Text: 860
तद्िद कारणं पर्त्येित; तदा एतदापद्ते-अ स्त कारणं कायार्त्, यथा अ स्त आत्मा
काकस्य काष्ण्यार्त्।
tadyadi kāraṇaṁ pratyeti; tadā etadāpadyate-asti kāraṇaṁ kāryāt,
yathā asti ātmā kākasya kārṣṇyāt.
Translation: 860
If you say that, he comes to know the cause, then, the following
is the consequence: One will deduce i.e. “cause, because there is
effect” “as there is self, because, there is black color of a crow.”
Text: 861
अथ तत्कारणपूवर्कत्वं कायर् स्यानुमीयते; तत्कारणपूवर्कत्वम्-स्वकारणसत्ासम्बन्धः,
सत्ा वा, धमार्न्तरं वा?
atha tatkāraṇapūrvakatvaṁ kāryasyānumīyate; tatkāraṇapūrva-
katvam-svakāraṇasattāsambandhaḥ, sattā vā, dharmāntaraṁ vā?
Translation: 861
If you say the state of occurring prior to the effect is inferred of
the effect, what is the meaning of the state of occurring prior to
the effect? Does it mean a relation of the existence of its cause or
simply existence or any other property?
Text: 862
तद्िद स्वकारणसत्ासम्बन्धोऽनुमीयते; तदयुक्म्, तस्य पर्त्यक्षिवषयत्वात्। न च
पर्त्यक्षेण अवगम्यमाने अनुमानं न्याय्यम्, हेतावप्यनुमानपर्सङ्ात्। तदक्ु म्-“सामान्ये
सद्साध्यताम्(ता), सामान्यं समानता पर्त्यक्षानुमानिवषयत्वेन अथर् स्य।”
tadyadi svakāraṇasattāsambandho’numīyate; tadayuktam, tasya
pratyakṣaviṣayatvāt. na ca pratyakṣeṇa avagamyamāne anumānaṁ
nyāyyam, hetāvapyanumānaprasaṅgāt. taduktam- “sāmānye siddha-
sādhyatām(tā), sāmānyaṁ samānatā pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvena
arthasya.”
Translation: 862
If you say, the relation of the existence of its own cause, which
is inferred, it will not be proper, because, that is the object of
perception. When something is known by perception, it is not
proper to know it by inference. In that case, even with reference to
the ground of the inference, one will have to know it by inference.
That is why, it is said “if it is universal, then, it is proving something
which is already proved.” Universal means sameness. It means
sameness of a thing through perception and inference.
Text: 863
अथ सत्ाऽनुमीयते; साऽिप पर्त्यक्षेणावगम्यते अलमनुमानेन। इहाप्येतद् दर्ष्व्यम्-
'सामान्ये सद्साध्यता'। अथवा सद्स्य िवद्मानस्य साधनम् सद्साधनम्। यथा च
न तौ स्तः तथा पर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्।
atha sattā’numīyate; sā’pi pratyakṣeṇāvagamyate alamanumānena.
ihāpyetad draṣṭavyam-‘sāmānye siddhasādhyatā’. athavā siddhasya

vidyamānasya sādhanam siddhasādhanam. yathā ca na tau staḥ
tathā prāgeva prapañcitam.
Translation: 863
If you say that, existence is inferred and that too is known by
perception, then, there is no need of inference. Here also, it should
be noted “when there is universal, it is establishing something which
is already established.” Or, the word siddha-sādhana means proving
something existent which is already known. Both these states are
not possible here which we have already discussed before.
Text: 864
अथ कारणपूवर्कत्वं धमार्न्तरं तदनुमीयते; तदिप उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्ा धकरणस्थं
पर्त्यक्षावसेयम्, न मानान्तरमाकाङ्ित। न च अनुपल ब्धकारणम् आवरणदरू ािद
िकिञ्द स्त। अनुपलब्धौ वा घटादावप्यनुपलम्भपर्सङ्ः। तदक् ु म्-“िवशेषेऽनुगमाभावः।”
िवशेषो िह अनुमानैकगर्ाह्ोऽथर् ः तेन सह सम्बन्धो नावगतः। तदनवगतौ न
लङ्ात् लङ्ा( लिङ्)गितः। नच षट्पदाथर् व्यित रक्ं धमार्न्तरम स्त स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्,
अभ्युपगमे वा अभ्युपेतहानम्। यिद च कारणपूवर्कत्वं धमार्न्तरं तदनुमीयते लङ्ात्; न तिहर्
कारणमवगतं िदगीश्वरािद।
atha kāraṇapūrvakatvaṁ dharmāntaraṁ tadanumīyate; tadapi upa-
labdhilakṣaṇaprāptādhikaraṇasthaṁ pratyakṣāvaseyam, na mānā-
ntaramākāṅkṣati. na ca anupalabdhikāraṇam āvaraṇadūrādi kiñci-
dasti. anupalabdhau vā ghaṭādāvapyanupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ. tadu-
ktam- “viśeṣe’nugamābhāvaḥ”. viśeṣo hi anumānaikagrāhyo’rthaḥ
tena saha sambandho nāvagataḥ. tadanavagatau na liṅgāt liṅgā-
(liṅgi)gatiḥ. naca ṣaṭpadārthavyatiriktaṁ dharmāntaramasti svaya-
manabhyupagamāt, abhyupagame vā abhyupetahānam. yadi ca
kāraṇapūrvakatvaṁ dharmāntaraṁ tadanumīyate liṅgāt; na tarhi
kāraṇamavagataṁ digīśvarādi.
Translation: 864
If you say that, some other property in the form of the state of being
preceded by a cause is inferred, then, that also which is present in
the locus of something which can be known by perception is to
be determined by perception and that does not require any other
means to know it and there is no ground for non-knowledge such

as cover, distance etc. and in spite of that, it is not known, then,
even pot etc. will not be known as it has been said- “if there is a
particular thing, then, there is no common characteristic in it.” A
particular thing is that which can be determined only by inference.
But with that the relationship is not known and if the relationship
is not known, on the basis of the ground the thing to be inferred
cannot be inferred. There is no additional entity over and above the
six categories of entities and you yourself have not accepted it and
if you accept it now then, it will result into the fault of denying
something which has already been accepted. If another property in
the form of the state of being preceded by cause is inferred, on the
basis of some ground then, it means that what is actual cause viz.
space, God etc. is not known.
Text: 865
अथ कारणपूवर्कं कायर् मेव पर्तीयते; तदेतत् पर्ज्ञामान्द्िवचेिष्तम्। कथम्? तत्स्वरूपस्य
पर्त्यक्षावगािहतदेहस्य िकमनुमानेन? अतर्ािप तदेव उपनतम्-'सामान्ये सद्साधनम्'
समानं पर्त्यक्षानुमानिवषयत्वे सामान्यिमत्यपिदश्यते, त स्मन् सामान्ये साध्यमाने
साधनवैफल्यमापद्ते। िकंच, यद्नुमानादिप कायर् पर्त्येित; कारणं न केनाप्यवद्ोिततं
स्यात्। तदनवद्ोतने कालािदव्यवहारिवरहः स्यात्।
atha kāraṇapūrvakaṁ kāryameva pratīyate; tadetat prajñāmā-
ndyaviceṣṭitam. katham? tatsvarūpasya pratyakṣāvagāhitadehasya
kimanumānena? atrāpi tadeva upanatam-‘sāmānye siddhasādha-
nam’samānaṁ pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatve sāmānyamityapadiśyate,
tasmin sāmānye sādhyamāne sādhanavaiphalyamāpadyate. kiṁca,
yadyanumānādapi kāryaṁ pratyeti; kāraṇaṁ na kenāpyavadyotitaṁ
syāt. tadanavadyotane kālādivyavahāravirahaḥ syāt.
Translation: 865
If you say that, what is known as something preceded by the cause,
is nothing but the effect, then, it is a reflection of lack of intelligence.
If you ask me how, I would say what is the need of an inference to
know something, which can be known by perception. Here also, the
same logic has cropped up viz. “when there is universal, it is the case
of proving something which is already proved.” Something is called
universal, when both universal and perception become operative to

it and so if someone wants to establish that universal, it will amount
to a fruitless act of proving. Moreover, if you say that from inference
effect can be known, then, nothing can point to its cause and once
the cause is not indicated, it will lead to absence of reference to
time etc.
Text: 866
तथा, कारणदशर् नेन कायार्नुमानमिप न सम्भवित। भवतां पक्षे कारकाणां सामग्र्यं जनकम्।
तच्चेन् पर्त्यक्षं न च साधनान्तरं िवद्ते तत्स्वरूपावेदकम्। अिप च, लङ्गर्हणानन्तरं
व्यािप्स्मरणम्, तदनु परामशर् ज्ञानम्, ततोऽनुमेयपर्ितप त्ः। न च एतावन्तं कालं
सामग्र्यवस्थानम स्त।
tathā, kāraṇadarśanena kāryānumānamapi na sambhavati.
bhavatāṁ pakṣe kārakāṇāṁ sāmagryaṁ janakam.taccenna
pratyakṣaṁ na ca sādhanāntaraṁ vidyate tatsvarūpāvedakam.
api ca, liṅgagrahaṇānantaraṁ vyāptismaraṇam, tadanu parāmarśa-
jñānam, tato’numeyapratipattiḥ. na ca etāvantaṁ kālaṁ sāmagrya-
vasthānamasti.
Translation: 866
Similarly, by seeing the cause, the inference of the effect is also
not possible. According to your doctrine, the collection of factors
is considered to be the cause. If that is not perceivable, then,
there is no other ground which can reveal its form. Moreover,
after knowing the ground, there should be the remembrance of the
invariable concomitance between the inferences on the basis of the
ground, followed by confirmatory knowledge, followed by inferential
knowledge. For such a long duration of time, the collection of factors
cannot continue to exist.
Text: 867
अथ कारकैकदेशगर्हणे सित कायर् मनुिममीषे; तदयुक्म्, कारकैकदेशरूप(शस्या)-
जनकत्वात्। जनकत्वयोगे सित जनकम् इत्यपिदश्यते। नच जनकत्वयुक्स्य
अनुमेयपर्ितप त्काले अवस्थानम स्त। न चाकारकं कायर् गमयित अितपर्सङ्ात्।
atha kārakaikadeśagrahaṇe sati kāryamanumimīṣe; tadayuktam,
kārakaikadeśarūpa(śasyā)janakatvāt. janakatvayoge sati janakam
ityapadiśyate. naca janakatvayuktasya anumeyapratipattikāle ava-

sthānamasti. na cākārakaṁ kāryaṁ gamayati atiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 867
If you say, by knowing a part of that collection of factors, you will
infer the effect that is not proper. Because, the part of the collection
of factors, is not capable of generating the inferential knowledge.
(We all know that) when something possesses the property of being
a cause, it is called cause and what is associated with being the
cause does not exist at the time of the knowledge of the thing to
be inferred i.e. the effect. If something is not an instrumental case,
it cannot be the cause of the knowledge of the effect. Otherwise, it
will lead to unwanted consequences.
[४. कृतकत्वहेतुकस्यािनत्यत्वानुमानस्याप्यघटमानत्वपर्दशर् नम्।]

[4. kṛtakatvahetukasyānityatvānumānasyāpyaghaṭamānatvapradar-
śanam.]
Text: 868
तथा, कृतकत्वेन अिनत्यत्वानुमानमिप नोपपद्ते, अिनत्यत्वं िह स्वकारणसत्ासम्बन्धः,
सत्ा वा, धमार्न्तरं वा, शब्दध्वंसो वा, शब्दस्वरूपं वेित। ततर् तावत् स्वकारणसत्ा-
सम्बन्ध-सत्ा-धमार्न्तरस्वरूपपक्षे उक्मेव दषू णम्।
tathā, kṛtakatvena anityatvānumānamapi nopapadyate, anityatvaṁ
hi svakāraṇasattāsambandhaḥ, sattā vā, dharmāntaraṁ vā, śabda-
dhvaṁso vā, śabdasvarūpaṁ veti. tatra tāvat svakāraṇa-sattāsamba-
ndha-sattā-dharmāntarasvarūpapakṣe uktameva dūṣaṇam.
Translation: 868
In the same way, on the basis of the property of being an effect
one cannot infer that something is not eternal. What will be the
meaning of the term anityatva? Does it mean the relation with the
existence of its own cause or mere existence or any other property
or the destruction of sound or the nature of sound? If you say that,
it is the relationship of the existence of its own cause or mere
existence or some other property or its own form, then, we have
already presented to you our criticisms.
Text: 869
अथ ध्वंसोऽनुमीयते; तदयुक्म्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानवगतेः। न शब्दसत्ाकाले तद्ध्वं-
सोऽ स्त, तदभावान् सम्बन्धाऽवगितः, एकस्य सम्बन्धानुपपत्ेः। न चाभावस्य िवषय-
भावोऽ स्त, भावे वा शब्द लङ्ं न भवेत्। शब्द लङ्सद्ावे वा िवज्ञानस्य अभावो न िवषयः,
तदभावात्। एतेन तपनोदयास्तिमत्योगर् म्यगमकभावः पयुर्दस्तो वेिदतव्यः।
atha dhvaṁso’numīyate; tadayuktam, tena saha sambandhānava-
gateḥ. na śabdasattākāle taddhvaṁso’sti, tadabhāvānna samba-
ndhā’vagatiḥ, ekasya sambandhānupapatteḥ. na cābhāvasya viṣaya-
bhāvo’sti, bhāve vā śabdaliṅgaṁ na bhavet. śabdaliṅgasadbhāve
vā vijñānasya abhāvo na viṣayaḥ, tadabhāvāt. etena tapanoda-
yāstamityorgamyagamakabhāvaḥ paryudasto veditavyaḥ.
Translation: 869
If you say, what is inferred is destruction, which is also not proper,
because, with that no relationship is known, because, when there is
existence of sound there is no destruction of sound and when that
is not there, the knowledge of relationship is not possible, because,
a single entity cannot have a relationship. An absence cannot be
treated as an object. If it is treated, then, the sound cannot be
the ground. If the sound is taken as a ground, then, absence of
knowledge cannot be the object, because it is not there. By this
argument between the rising of the sun and the setting of the sun,
one being the ground for the knowledge of the other, stands rejected.
0.9 आत्मानुमानस्य िनरासः।
[ātmānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the definition of Inference of the Self)
[१. नैयाियकािदसम्मतस्यात्मानुमानस्य िनरासः।]
[1. naiyāyikādisammatasyātmānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 870
तथा, [आत्मा]नुमान(नं) सुखद्ेषा(ष)ज्ञानािदना न सम्भवित, तेन सह सम्बन्धान-
वगमात्, तदनवगतौ च अनुमानानथर् क्यम्। िकं चातर् साध्यते? िकम्-ज्ञान-सुखादीनाम्
आ शर्तत्वम्, आहो स्वद् आशर्या शर्तं वा ज्ञानस्वरूपम्?
tathā, [ātmā]numāna(naṁ) sukhadveṣā(ṣa)jñānādinā na sambha-
vati, tena saha sambandhānavagamāt, tadanavagatau ca anumānā-
narthakyam. kiṁ cātra sādhyate? kim-jñānasukhādīnām āśritatvam,

āhosvid āśrayāśritaṁ vā jñānasvarūpam?
Translation: 870
Similarly, it is not possible to infer the self, on the basis of happiness,
hatred, knowledge etc. because, the relationship between them
cannot be known. And if the relationship between them is not
known, the inference will become inoperative. (As a matter of fact),
what is being inferred here? Is it known that knowledge, happiness
etc. are located somewhere? Or is it known that the nature of
knowledge is such that it is located in a locus?
Text: 871
त(अ)था शर्तत्वं साध्यते; तदा आत्म(त्मा) नैवाऽवबो धतः, ततोऽन्यत्वाद् आ शर्त-
त्वस्य।
ta(a)thāśritatvaṁ sādhyate; tadā ātma(tmā) naivā’vabodhitaḥ, tato-
’nyatvād āśritatvasya.
Translation: 871
If you say, what is being established is the state of its being located,
then, it means that, the self is not known, because the state of being
located is different from that.
Text: 872
अथ आत्मा साध्यते; तदेवं भवित-अ स्त आत्मा िवज्ञानात्, नच व्य धकरणस्य गमकत्वं
िवद्ते।
atha ātmā sādhyate; tadevaṁ bhavati-asti ātmā vijñānāt, naca
vyadhikaraṇasya gamakatvaṁ vidyate.
Translation: 872
If you say that, the self is being established, then, that may be
something like this viz. there is self, because, there is knowledge. If
the ground exists in some other locus, it cannot be the ground to
know the object of inference.
Text: 873
अथ आ शर्तं ज्ञानस्वरूपं साध्यते; तच्च पर्त्यक्षेणावगतम्। अन्योऽनुमानस्य िवषयो
वक्व्यः। कथं ज्ञानसुखािद आत्मसम्ब न्धत्वेन व्यपिदश्यते-िकं सत्ामातर्ेण, आहो
तज्जन्यतया, तज्जनकत्वेन वा, तत्समवाियत्वेन वा, तत्स्वरूपतादात्म्याद्ा?
atha āśritaṁ jñānasvarūpaṁ sādhyate; tacca pratyakṣeṇāvagatam.

anyo’numānasya viṣayo vaktavyaḥ. kathaṁ jñānasukhādi ātma-
sambandhitvena vyapadiśyate-kiṁ sattāmātreṇa, āho tajjanyatayā,
tajjanakatvena vā, tatsamavāyitvena vā, tatsvarūpatādātmyādvā?
Translation: 873
If you say that, the nature of knowledge is that, it is located and that
is what is being established, then, it is known by perception. As a
matter of fact, the object of inference has to be different from that of
perception. (Moreover, how do you say that knowledge, happiness is
related with the self?) Is it related just as an existence or being or as
something produced by that? Or, as being producer of something?
Or, as something being present by the relation of inherence? Or, as
being of identical in nature?
Text: 874
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण सुखं िवज्ञानं वा आत्मनोऽपिदश्यते; तदा आत्मवत् सवेर् भावाश्चेतनाः
स्युः िवज्ञानसत्ाऽिवशेषात्। तथा, सवेर् सु खनो भवेयःु , आनन्दसत्ाऽिवशेषात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa sukhaṁ vijñānaṁ vā ātmano’padiśyate; tadā
ātmavat sarve bhāvāścetanāḥ syuḥ vijñānasattā’viśeṣāt. tathā, sarve
sukhino bhaveyuḥ, ānandasattā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 874
If you say that, by mere existence happiness or knowledge is said to
be of the self, then, like the self, all the positive entities should be
taken as conscious, because they are not different from the existence
of knowledge. Similarly, all will become happy because they are not
different from the existence of joy.
Text: 875
अथ तज्जन्यतया िवज्ञानमात्मनोऽपिदश्यते; तदा नयनालोकपटाः चेतनाः स्युः,
तैजर्न्यमानत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
atha tajjanyatayā vijñānamātmano’padiśyate; tadā nayanālokapaṭāḥ
cetanāḥ syuḥ, tairjanyamānatvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 875
If you say that, since knowledge is produced by that, knowledge
is said to be of the self, then, eyes, light, cloth etc. should also
be conscious, because they too produce the knowledge and as such

there is no difference with them.
Text: 876
अथ तज्जनकत्वेन तस्य इित चेत्; तदयुक्म्, न िवज्ञानेन आत्मा उत्पाद्ते भवतां पक्षे,
उत्पादने वा स्मरणानुपप त्ः।
atha tajjanakatvena tasya iti cet; tadayuktam, na vijñānena ātmā
utpādyate bhavatāṁ pakṣe, utpādane vā smaraṇānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 876
If you say, as the producer of the self, the self is called like that, that
will not be proper, because according to you, knowledge does not
produce self and if you say that, it produces self, then, one cannot
explain remembrance.
Text: 877
अथ आत्मसमवाियत्वेन िवज्ञानम् आत्मनोऽपिदश्यते; न, तदभावात्। भवतु वा,
समवाये(यो) िह अख ण्डतात्मा सवार्त्मवस्ािदसाधारणः। ततः सवेर् चेतनाः स्युः।
atha ātmasamavāyitvena vijñānam ātmano’padiśyate; na,
tadabhāvāt. bhavatu vā, samavāye(yo) hi akhaṇḍitātmā sarvātmava-
strādisādhāraṇaḥ. tataḥ sarve cetanāḥ syuḥ.
Translation: 877
If you say, since the knowledge exists in the self by inherence, it
is said to be of the self, it is not correct, because, that is not the
case. Or granting that it is the relation of inherence, being one
without any part, is common to all self, cloth, etc. and as such all
will become conscious.
Text: 878
अथ िवज्ञानोपलिक्षतस्य नान्यतर् सम्भवोऽ स्त; तदयुक्म्, तद् उपलिक्षतस्य अन्यतर्
सम्भवात्, तत्सम्भवश्च तस्य एकत्वात्। असम्भवे वा समवायानेकत्वपर्सङ्ः,
असमवाियत्वं वाऽन्येषाम्।
atha vijñānopalakṣitasya nānyatra sambhavo’sti; tadayuktam,
tad upalakṣitasya anyatra sambhavāt, tatsambhavaśca tasya
ekatvāt. asambhave vā samavāyānekatvaprasaṅgaḥ, asamavāyitvaṁ
vā’nyeṣām.
Translation: 878
If you say, nothing else can be indicated by knowledge, it is also
not true. Because, what is indicated by that is possible to exist
somewhere else and it is possible because it is one. If you say, it
is not possible then, you should accept many inherences or other
entities not existing by the relationship of inherence.
Text: 879
तथा, िवज्ञानसमवाय आत्मनः समवायः िकम् - सत्ामातर्ेण, आहो स्वद् आत्मजनकत्वेन,
तज्जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवाियत्वेन, आत्मस्वरूपतादात्म्याद्ा?
tathā, vijñānasamavāya ātmanaḥ samavāyaḥ kim - sattāmātreṇa,
āhosvid ātmajanakatvena, tajjanyatvena, tatsamavāyitvena, ātma-
svarūpatādātmyādvā?
Translation: 879
Similarly, if you say, inherence of knowledge is inherence of the self;
there, we would like to ask, is it so by mere existence, or, as the
producer of the self, or, as being produced by the self, or, being
existent in the self by relationship of inherence, or, on account of
being identical with the nature of the self?
Text: 880
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण आत्मनः समवायोऽपिदश्यते; तदा ज्ञानसमवायसत्ाऽिवशेषात् सवेर्षां
ज्ञानसमवाियत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa ātmanaḥ samavāyo’padiśyate; tadā jñāna-
samavāyasattā’viśeṣāt sarveṣāṁ jñānasamavāyitvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 880
If you say, as mere existence, the inherence of the self is referred to
as such, then, there is no difference in the inherence of knowledge
and existence, everything will be treated as being in the self by the
relationship of inherence.
Text: 881
अथ तज्जन्यत्वेन; तदयुक्म्, निह आत्मना समवायोत्पादनं िकर्यते, िनत्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
atha tajjanyatvena; tadayuktam, nahi ātmanā samavāyotpādanaṁ
kriyate, nityatvābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 881
If you say, as being produced by the self, that also is not proper,
because, it is not the case that inherence is produced by the self,
because, according to you inherence is eternal.
Text: 882
अथ तज्जनकत्वेन आत्मनः समवायः; तदनुपपन्म्, आत्मनो िनत्यत्वात्।
atha tajjanakatvena ātmanaḥ samavāyaḥ; tadanupapannam, ātmano
nityatvāt.
Translation: 882
If you say that, as producer of the self, there is inherence of the self,
it will not be proper, because self is eternal.
Text: 883
अथ आत्मिन समवेतः तेन आत्मसमवायोऽिभधीयते; तदयुक्म्, समवायान्तरानभ्यु-
पगमात्।
atha ātmani samavetaḥ tena ātmasamavāyo’bhidhīyate; tadayu-
ktam, samavāyāntarānabhyupagamāt.
Translation: 883
If you say, because it is present in the self by the relation of
inherence, we say inherence of the self, it will not be proper, because,
you have not accepted any other inherence.
Text: 884
अथ आत्मतादात्म्येन वतर् त इित आत्मसमवायः उच्यते; तदा आत्मा िवद्ते
नान्यः समवायोऽ स्त तत्स्वभावानुपर्वेशात्। एवं िवज्ञानानन्दादीनां समवायसम्बन्धेन न
िनयतात्मव्यपदेश उपपद्ते।
atha ātmatādātmyena vartata iti ātmasamavāyaḥ ucyate; tadā
ātmā vidyate nānyaḥ samavāyo’sti tatsvabhāvānupraveśāt. evaṁ
vijñānānandādīnāṁ samavāyasambandhena na niyatātmavyapadeśa
upapadyate.
Translation: 884
If you say, because it exists as identical with the self, we say that,
there is inherence with the self. In that case, it means that, there
is self and there is nothing else as inherence, because, it is included
in the nature of the self. In this way, one cannot refer to the self
as something where knowledge, joy etc. exists by the relation of
inherence.
Text: 885
अथ आत्मतादात्म्येनोपजायमानं िवज्ञानानन्दािदकम् आत्मनोऽपिदश्यते;
atha ātmatādātmyenopajāyamānaṁ vijñānānandādikam ātmano’pa-
diśyate;
Translation: 885
Clarification:
Well, since knowledge, joy etc. arise as identical with the self, they
are said to be of the self.
Text: 886
तदा िवकारी पर्ाप्नोित अनया भङ्ग्या आत्मा। ततश्च स्मरणानुमानपर्त्यिभज्ञानानुप त्ः।
tadā vikārī prāpnoti anayā bhaṅgyā ātmā. tataśca smaraṇānumāna-
pratyabhijñānānupattiḥ.
Translation: 886
Reply:
In that case, by this argument the self becomes an entity which
undergoes a change and as a consequence of this, remembrance,
inference and recollection cannot be explained.
Text: 887
इतोिप आत्मा सुखािदकायार् धकरणोऽवगन्तुं न पायर् ते;
itopi ātmā sukhādikāryādhikaraṇo’vagantuṁ na pāryate.
Translation: 887
For the following reason also the self cannot be understood as a
locus of the effect viz. happiness etc.
Text: 887a
िकं तेनात्मना अनुपजाताितशयेन तापािद कायर् िकर्यते, आहो स्वद् उपजाताितशयेनािप,
िकं व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेनाव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन वा?
kiṁ tenātmanānupajātātiśayena tāpādi kāryaṁ kriyate, āhosvi-
dupajātātiśayenāpi kiṁ vyatiriktopajātātiśayenāvyatiriktopajātāti-
śayena vā?
Translation: 887a
Here the question arises, is it the case that the self produces the
effect in it viz. unhappiness etc. without being affected by any
additional change or being affected by additional change or by
possessing distinct additional change or by possessing additional
change not different from itself.
Text: 888
तद्िद अनुपजाताितशयेन उत्पाद्ते तापािद कायर् म्; तदा सवर् दा कुयार्त्, अनुपजातबलस्य
कायर् कारणाभ्युपगमात्, न तापािदिवकलः स्यात्, समं सुखािदकायर् पर्सज्यते।
tadyadi anupajātātiśayena utpādyate tāpādi kāryam; tadā
sarvadā kuryāt, anupajātabalasya kāryakāraṇābhyupagamāt, na
tāpādivikalaḥ syāt, samaṁ sukhādi kāryaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 888
If you say, the effect such as unhappiness etc. produced without
being affected by any additional change, then, the self should always
produce such effects, because the cause and effect relationship is
accepted of that whose strength is not disturbed and in that case,
the self can never be free from unhappiness or the self will keep on
producing happiness simultaneously.
Text: 889
अथ अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन उत्पाद्ते तापािदकायर्; तदा अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशय
इित िकं भिणतं भवित? आत्मा उपजायते। ततश्च स्मरणानुमानपर्त्यिभज्ञानानुपप त्ः।
atha avyatiriktopajātātiśayena utpādyate tāpādikāryaṁ; tadā
avyatiriktopajātātiśaya iti kiṁ bhaṇitaṁ bhavati? ātmā upajāyate.
tataśca smaraṇānumānapratyabhijñānānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 889
If you say that, the self produces effect such as unhappiness etc. on
account of its being associated with additional change not different
from itself, then, what is to be understood by the expression “being
associated with additional change, not different from itself?” Does
it mean self is produced, if it is so, then, one cannot explain
remembrance, inference and recollection.
Text: 890
अथ व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन जन्यते तापािदकायर् म्; स तेनात्मना सह सम्बद्ो वा, न
वा?
atha vyatiriktopajātātiśayena janyate tāpādikāryam; sa tenātmanā
saha sambaddho vā, na vā?
Translation: 890
If you say, the effects such as unhappiness is produced because of the
additional change different from the self, then, the question arises
whether that change is associated with the self or not.
Text: 891
यिद न सम्बद्ः; स तस्याितशयः कथम्?
yadi na sambaddhaḥ; sa tasyātiśayaḥ katham?
Translation: 891
If you say, it is not associated, then, how can that be called
additional change of the self?
Text: 892
अथ सम्बद्ः िकम् - जनकत्वेन, अथ जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवाियत्वेन वा?
atha sambaddhaḥ kim - janakatvena, atha janyatvena, tatsamavā-
yitvena vā?
Translation: 892
If you say that, it is associated, then, also the question arises
whether it is associated as a producer, or, as produced, or, as that
in which the additional change resides by the relation of inherence.
Text: 893
तद्िद जनकत्वेन सम्बद्ः; तदा आत्मा तेनाितशयेन उत्पद्ते इित स्मरणानुपप त्ः।
tadyadi janakatvena sambaddhaḥ; tadā ātmā tenātiśayena utpadyate
iti smaraṇānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 893
If you say that, it is related as the producer, then, it will mean that
the self is produced by that additional factor and in that case, it
will not be possible to explain remembrance.
Text: 894
अथ जन्यत्वेन; सोऽिप तेन कथमुत्पाद्ते? िकम्-अनुपजाताितशयेन, व्यित रक्ोप-
जाताितशयेन वा - इित पर्ाप्ा पर्श्नपरम्परा।
atha janyatvena; so’pi tena kathamutpādyate? kim-anupajātāti-
śayena, vyatiriktopajātātiśayena vā - iti prāptā praśnaparamparā.
Translation: 894
If you say, it is associated as being produced by that self there also
the question arises, how is it produced by the self? Is it as unaffected
change, or, as an additional change distinct from itself and in this
way one can go on asking a series of questions.
Text: 895
अथ तत्समवाियत्वेन; न, तस्य सवर् साधारणत्वात्, तदभावाच्च।
atha tatsamavāyitvena; na, tasya sarvasādhāraṇatvāt, tadabhāvācca.
Translation: 895
If you say, it is associated as inherent cause, it is not correct,
because, it is common to all and also because, it is not there.
Text: 896
अथ एककायर् जनकत्वेन सम्बद्ः; तदेवेदं िचन्तियतुमारब्धम्-िकिमदं जनकत्वं नामेित?
िकञ्, यदेव अनुपजातेऽितशये आत्मनो रूपं तदेव जातेऽिप, तत् कथं कायर् कुयार्त?्
atha ekakāryajanakatvena sambaddhaḥ; tadevedaṁ cintayitumāra-
bdham-kimidaṁ janakatvaṁ nāmeti? kiñca, yadeva anupajāte’tiśaye
ātmano rūpaṁ tadeva jāte’pi, tat kathaṁ kāryaṁ kuryāt?
Translation: 896
If you say that, it associated as a producer of one effect, then, the
same we have started thinking about and the question comes to our
mind is: what is the meaning of producer? Moreover, whatever is
the form of the self at the state of its not being affected by any
change, the same is its character after it is affected by a change.
Therefore, how can it be a producer of an effect?
Text: 897
अथ पूवर्रूपस्यातादवस्थ्यम्; सु स्थतं िनत्यत्वम्! अथ तादवस्थ्यम्; तथािप न करोित
कायर् म्।
atha pūrvarūpasyātādavasthyam; susthitaṁ nityatvam! atha tāda-

vasthyam; tathāpi na karoti kāryam.
Translation: 897
If you say, its earlier form does not remain the same, then, it is clear
that the self is eternal and if you say that, it remains the same, even
then, it cannot produce an effect.
Text: 898
एवं नैयाियकािदमतेनात्मन उपभोगस्मरणािदकं न जाघटीित।
evaṁ naiyāyikādimatenātmana upabhogasmaraṇādikaṁ na
jāghaṭīti.
Translation: 898
In this way, according to the doctrine of Naiyāyika etc. it cannot
be explained that the self enjoys, the self remembers etc.
[२. जैनमते उपभोगाद्नुपप त्पर्कटनेन आत्मानुमानिनराससूचना।]

[2. jainamate upabhogādyanupapattiprakaṭanena ātmānumāna-
nirāsasūcanā.]
Text: 899
यस्यािप देहप रमाणमातर् आत्मा, तस्यािप सुखदःु खोपभोगानुभवस्मरणानुपप त्ः। कथम्?
उपपाद्ते - सुखािदकायर् म् आत्मनो िभन्म्, अिभन्म्, िभन्ािभन्ं वा?
yasyāpi dehaparimāṇamātra ātmā, tasyāpi sukhaduḥkhopabhogā-
nubhavasmaraṇānupapattiḥ. katham? upapādyate - sukhādikāryam
ātmano bhinnam, abhinnam, bhinnābhinnaṁ vā?
Translation: 899
The Jainas think that, self is of the size of a body. For them also, it
is not possible to explain how such a self can have an experience of
happiness, unhappiness etc. and how can self remember anything.
If you ask me how the following is the explanation: One may ask
whether the effect viz. happiness etc. is different from the self or
identical with the self or different-cum-identical with the self.
Text: 900
तद्िद िभन्म्; त त्कम् - सत्ामातर्ेण, तज्जन्यत्वेन, तज्जनकत्वेन, तत्समवाियत्वेन वा
- इित पूवोर्क्ं दषू णमनुसृत्य वक्व्यम्।
tadyadi bhinnam; tatkim - sattāmātreṇa, tajjanyatvena, tajjana-

katvena, tatsamavāyitvena vā - iti pūrvoktaṁ dūṣaṇamanusṛtya
vaktavyam.
Translation: 900
If you say, it is different, there also the question arises, is it different
by mere existence or as being produced by that, or, as producer of
that, or, as an inherent cause of that? All these questions are to be
answered in the same way as discussed before.
Text: 901
अथ अिभन्ं सुखदःु खोपभोगस्मरणािदकायर् मुत्पद्ते; एवं तिहर् आत्मा उत्पद्ते। तदत्ु पत्ौ
स्मरणानुमानानुपप त्ः, सुखािदवद् आत्मनो नानात्वोपपत्ेः।
atha abhinnaṁ sukhaduḥkhopabhogasmaraṇādikāryamutpadyate;
evaṁ tarhi ātmā utpadyate. tadutpattau smaraṇānumānānupapattiḥ,
sukhādivad ātmano nānātvopapatteḥ.
Translation: 901
If you say that, the effect viz. the experience of happiness and
unhappiness and remembrance etc. are produced as identical with
the self, then, it will mean that, the self is produced and if you
accept that self is produced, you cannot explain remembrance and
inference because as happiness etc. are many selves also are many.
Text: 902
अथ एक एव आत्मा; सुखादेरप्येकता पर्ाप्ा। ततश्च एकत्वे अनुभवस्यैवावस्थानाद्
अनुमानस्मरणानुपप त्ः।
atha eka eva ātmā; sukhāderapyekatā prāptā. tataśca ekatve
anubhavasyaivāvasthānād anumānasmaraṇānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 902
If you say, the self is only one, then, happiness should also be one
and if that is one, experience will have to be taken as one and in that
case it will not be possible to explain inference and remembrance.
Text: 903
अथ नानात्वं सुखादीनाम्; आत्मनोऽिप तदेवापद्ते, तदव्यितरेकात्।
atha nānātvaṁ sukhādīnām; ātmano’pi tadevāpadyate, tadavya-
tirekāt.
Translation: 903
If you say that, happiness etc. are many, then, self should also be
many, because, they are not different from them.
Text: 904
अथ सुखािदभेदेऽिप आत्मा नैव िभद्ते; तदा सुखािदतादात्म्यं न लभ्यते। अथ
सुखािदतादात्म्यम्;
atha sukhādibhede’pi ātmā naiva bhidyate; tadā sukhāditādātmyaṁ
na labhyate. atha sukhāditādātmyam;
Translation: 904
If you say that, even if happiness etc. are different, still, the self
remains one and the same. Then, self cannot be considered to be
identical to happiness etc.
Text: 905
तदा एकता नोपपद्ते, सुखािदवत् नानात्मोपपत्ेः।
tadā ekatā nopapadyate, sukhādivat nānātmopapatteḥ.
Translation: 905
If you say that, happiness is identical to self etc. then, you cannot
maintain that, self is one, because, like happiness etc. the self will
become many.
Text: 906
अथ िभन्ािभन्ं सुखािदकायर् तेन नोिदतं दषू णिमित चेत्;
atha bhinnābhinnaṁ sukhādikāryaṁ tena noditaṁ dūṣaṇamiti cet;
Translation: 906
Objection:
Well, the effect viz. happiness etc. is different-cum-identical and
therefore, such a question cannot be raised.
Text: 907
कथम्? िकम् आकारान्यत्वेन, आहो स्वत् कायार्न्यत्वेन, कारणान्यत्वेन वा?
katham? kim ākārānyatvena, āhosvit kāryānyatvena, kāraṇānyatvena
vā?
Translation: 907
Reply:
How? As being of different form? Or, because of different effect or
being different from cause?
Text: 908
तद्द्ाकारान्यत्वेन आत्मनो िभद्ते सुखािदकायर् म्; तदयुक्म्, आकारान्यत्वं िह अन्यो-
न्याकारप रहारेण स्वात्मना व्यव स्थतम्, अभेदपयुर्दासेन िभन्बुिद्िवषयत्वेनाव स्थतेर-
े
कत्वानुपप त्ः। एकत्वं िह एकस्वभावता, एकस्वाभाव्ये िह नानास्वभावता नोपपद्ते,
नानास्वाभाव्ये िह एकस्वभावतो(ता)नोपपद्ते - अन्योन्याकारप रहारेण एतावाकारौ
व्यव स्थतौ।
tadyadyākārānyatvena ātmano bhidyate sukhādikāryam; tadayu-
ktam, ākārānyatvaṁ hi anyonyākāraparihāreṇa svātmanā vyava-
sthitam, abhedaparyudāsena bhinnabuddhiviṣayatvenāvasthitereka-
tvānupapattiḥ. ekatvaṁ hi ekasvabhāvatā, ekasvābhāvye hi nānā-
svabhāvatā nopapadyate, nānāsvābhāvye hi ekasvabhāvato(tā) -
nopapadyate- anyonyākāraparihāreṇa etāvākārau vyavasthitau.
Translation: 908
If you say that, the effect viz. happiness etc. is different from the self,
because, it is of different form, which will not be proper, because,
being different from a form means, being in ones own form, by
giving up mutual form and since, it will be different from identity, it
will become object of different knowledges and as such, one cannot
justify that it is one. Being one means, having one nature and if
something has one nature, there cannot be many natures in it and
if something has many natures, it cannot have one nature and this
is how by giving up mutual form, these two forms will remain as
they are.
Text: 909
अथ कारणान्यत्वेन भेदप रकल्पना;
atha kāraṇānyatvena bhedaparikalpanā;
Translation: 909
Clarification:
Well, we are postulating difference because of its being different
from the cause.
Text: 910
तदयुक्म्, िभन्ादिप कारणादिभन्ं कायर् दृष्म्। मृ त्पण्डदण्डाद्नेकं कारणमख ण्डतं कायर्
जनयित। तथा एकेनािप कारणेनानेकं कायर् जन्यमानं दृष्ं घटािद। तेन न कारणभेदेन
वस्तूनां भेदः, नािप कायर् भेदेन, अिप तु आकारभेदेनव

ै भेदः। स च आकारभेदः अ स्त
सुखात्मनोः, कथमभेदः?
tadayuktam, bhinnādapi kāraṇādabhinnaṁ kāryaṁ dṛṣṭam. mṛt-
piṇḍadaṇḍādyanekaṁ kāraṇamakhaṇḍitaṁ kāryaṁ janayati. tathā
ekenāpi kāraṇenānekaṁ kāryaṁ janyamānaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ ghaṭādi. tena
na kāraṇabhedena vastūnāṁ bhedaḥ, nāpi kāryabhedena, api tu
ākārabhedenaiva bhedaḥ. sa ca ākārabhedaḥ asti sukhātmanoḥ,
kathamabhedaḥ?
Translation: 910
Reply:
It is not proper. Because, we do find that, even out of different
causes, identical effect is produced e.g. a set of factors such as ball
of mud, stick, etc. produces one undivided effect. In the same way,
by a single cause many effects are produced and we see them in the
form of pot etc. Therefore, there is no difference of things because of
the difference in cause. Nor there is difference because of difference
in effects. As a matter of fact, the difference is caused only due to
the difference in form and that difference in the form is certainly
found in happiness and self and therefore how can there be identity
between the two?
Text: 911
िकंच, येनव
ै आकारेण सुखम् आत्मनो िभद्ते तेनव
ै आकारेण अिभन्म्, आहो स्वद्
kiṁca, yenaiva ākāreṇa sukham ātmano bhidyate tenaiva ākāreṇa
abhinnam, āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?
Translation: 911
Moreover, is it the fact that the very form, by which happiness is
distinguished from the self, by the same form, it is identical? Or by
some other form?
Text: 912
तद्िद तेनव
ै ाकारेण अिभन्म्; तस्य तावदेकान्ताऽभेदः पर्ितपन्ो भवित भवता।
tadyadi tenaivākāreṇa abhinnam; tasya tāvadekāntā’bhedaḥ prati-
panno bhavati bhavatā.
Translation: 912
If you say, it is identical by the same form, then, you have accepted
absolute identity with that.
Text: 913
अथ आकारान्तरेण अिभन्म्; आकारान्तरं सुखं न भवित, तदभेदेऽिप सुखस्य भेदात्।
atha ākārāntareṇa abhinnam; ākārāntaraṁ sukhaṁ na bhavati,
tadabhede’pi sukhasya bhedāt.
Translation: 913
If you say, it is identical by another form, then, it means that,
another form is not happiness and even if it is identical, the self will
be different from happiness.
[३. पर्सङ्ात् जैनािभमतस्यानेकान्तवादस्य िनरसनम्।]

[3. prasaṅgāt jainābhimatasyānekāntavādasya nirasanam.]
Text: 914
एवं च स्थते-“तदेव िनत्यम् तदेव चािनत्यम्” इत्येतन्ोपपद्ते, सुखात्मनोभेर्दात्।
अनाद्न्ता सत्ा िनत्या, आद्न्तवती चाऽिनत्या।
evaṁ ca sthite-“tadeva nityam tadeva cānityam” ityetanno-
papadyate, sukhātmanorbhedāt. anādyantā sattā nityā, ādyantavatī
cā’nityā.
Translation: 914
Thus, your statement “the same is eternal and the same is
non-eternal,” is not proper, because, happiness and the self are
different. An existence which has no beginning and no end is eternal
and an existence which has a beginning and an end is non-eternal.
Text: 915
तथा-“पररूपतयाऽसत्वं स्वरूपेण सत्वम्” इत्येतदिप न सम्भवित। पररूपेण न
भावः नाप्यभावः, अिप तु स्वेन रूपेण भाव एकात्मकः-एकं हीदं वस्तूपलभ्यते,
तच्चेदभावः िकिमदानीं भावो भिवष्यित? तद्िद पररूपतयाऽभावः; तदा घटस्य
घ(प)टरूपता पर्ाप्नोित, यथा पररूपतया भावत्वेऽङ्ीिकर्यमाणे पररूपानुपर्वेशः, तथा
अभावत्वेप्यङ्ीिकर्यमाणे पररूपानुपर्वेश एव। ततश्च सवर् सवार्त्मकं स्यात्।
tathā-“pararūpatayā’satvaṁ svarūpeṇa sattvam” ityetadapi na
sambhavati. pararūpeṇa na bhāvaḥ nāpyabhāvaḥ, api tu svena
rūpeṇa bhāva ekātmakaḥ-ekaṁ hīdaṁ vastūpalabhyate, tacceda-

bhāvaḥ kimidānīṁ bhāvo bhaviṣyati? tadyadi pararūpatayā’bhāvaḥ;
tadā ghaṭasya gha(pa)ṭarūpatā prāpnoti, yathā pararūpatayā bhāva-
tve’ṅgīkriyamāṇe pararūpānupraveśaḥ, tathā abhāvatvepyaṅgīkriya-
māṇe pararūpānupraveśa eva. tataśca sarvaṁ sarvātmakaṁ syāt.
Translation: 915
Similarly, your another statement, “in another form it is
non-existent, and in its own form it is existent is also is an
impossibility.” In another form, neither a positive entity nor a
negative entity exists, rather in ones own form, a positive entity
is considered to be of a single form and as such one finds one entity
and if that entity is absence, then, what will be the positive entity?
Therefore, if you say that, in another form, there is absence, then,
one can also say, there is no pot in the form of a cloth. As, if a
positive entity is accepted having another form, then, that will be
included in another form. In the same way, if it is accepted as an
absence, it will be included in another form and as a consequence,
everything will become identical with everything.
Text: 916
अथ पररूपस्याभावः; तदिवरो ध त्वैकत्वं तस्याऽभावः। निह त स्मन् सित भवान्
तस्यानुपलब्धेदर्र्ष्ा, अन्यथा िह आत्मनोप्यभावो भवेत्।
atha pararūpasyābhāvaḥ; tadavirodhi tvaikatvaṁ tasyā’bhāvaḥ. nahi
tasmin sati bhavān tasyānupalabdherdraṣṭā, anyathā hi ātmanopya-
bhāvo bhavet.
Translation: 916
If you say, it is absence of another form, then, one and the same will
not be opposing that other and absence of that will be the absence
of that other. It is also not the fact that when that is there, you are
the experiencer of that absence of experience. Otherwise, there will
be absence of self also.
Text: 917
अथ आत्मसत्ाऽिवरो धत्वेन स्वात्मनोऽभावो न भवत्येव;
atha ātmasattā’virodhitvena svātmano’bhāvo na bhavatyeva;
Translation: 917
Clarification:
Well, there will be no absence of ones own self, because it will not
be contradictory to the existence of the self.
Text: 918
परसत्ािवरो धत्वात् परस्याप्यभावो न भवित।
parasattāvirodhitvāt parasyāpyabhāvo na bhavati.
Translation: 918
Reply:
In that case, because of the non-contradiction of existence of
something else, there will be no absence, of that something else.
Text: 919
अथापराकारतया नोपलभ्यते तेन परस्य भावो न भवित;
athāparākāratayā nopalabhyate tena parasya bhāvo na bhavati;
Translation: 919
Clarification:
Since, that is not experienced as having another form, therefore,
there will not be absence of another form.
Text: 920
अभावाकारतया च अनुपलब्धेः परस्याभावोऽिप न भवेत्।
abhāvākāratayā ca anupalabdheḥ parasyābhāvo’pi na bhavet.
Translation: 920
Reply:
Then, since it will not be known as having the form of absence,
there will no absence of other form.
Text: 921
अथ अभावाकारतया उपलभ्यते; तदा भावोऽन्यो ना स्त, अभावाकारान्त रतत्वात्-
अभावस्वभावावगािहनावबोधेन अभाव एव द्ोिततो न भावः। यथा सुखावगाहकेन िवज्ञानेन
सुखमेवाऽवद्ोिततं न दःु खम्।
atha abhāvākāratayā upalabhyate; tadā bhāvo’nyo nāsti, abhāvākā-
rāntaritatvāt abhāvasvabhāvāvagāhināvabodhena abhāva eva dyotito
na bhāvaḥ. yathā sukhāvagāhakena vijñānena sukhamevā’va-
dyotitaṁ na duḥkham.
Translation: 921
If you say, it is known as having the form of an absence, then, it
means that, there is no other positive entity. Since, it includes the
form of an absence, the knowledge in which the nature of absence
will appear as its content, will reveal only absence and not any
positive entity as the knowledge of happiness, reveals happiness
and not unhappiness.
Text: 922
अथ सुखज्ञानेन दःु खमिप गृह्ते;
atha sukhajñānena duḥkhamapi gṛhyate;
Translation: 922
Objection:
Well, by knowledge of happiness, unhappiness is also known.
Text: 923
तिददानीं सुखदःु खयोरेकता पर्ाप्नोित। ततश्च पयार्यरूपतया भेदाभ्युपगमो हीयते-
अिभन्ात्मकं जगत् स्यात्। एवञ् स्थते यदक् ु ं - “भागे संहो नरो भागे योऽथोर्
भागद्यात्मकः। तमभागं िवभागेन नर संहं पर्चक्षते॥” इित,
tadidānīṁ sukhaduḥkhayorekatā prāpnoti. tataśca paryāyarūpatayā
bhedābhyupagamo hīyate-abhinnātmakaṁ jagat syāt. evañca sthite
yaduktam- “bhāge siṁho naro bhāge yo’rtho bhāgadvayātmakaḥ,
tamabhāgaṁ vibhāgena narasiṁhaṁ pracakṣate.” iti,
Translation: 923
Reply:
In that case happiness, unhappiness will become one and the same
and as a consequence they will become synonymous and there will
be no knowledge of difference between them and consequently, the
whole world will become one and the same. When such is our
analysis, your statement “a thing having two parts, one part of
which is a lion and the other man, is called nṛsiṁha- man-lion” is
not proper. Because, the whole universe becomes indivisible.
Text: 924
तन् पर्ाप्नोित िवश्वस्याऽखण्डरूपत्वात्। एतदिप न वक्व्यम्- ‘`एको भावः सवर् भावस्वभावः,
सवेर् भावा एकभावस्वभावाः, एको भावस्तत्वतो येन दृष्ः सवेर्भावास्तत्वतस्तेन दृष्ाः॥”
tanna prāpnoti viśvasyā’khaṇḍarūpatvāt. etadapi na vaktavyam-

“eko bhāvaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ, sarve bhāvā ekabhāvasvabhāvāḥ,
eko bhāvastatvato yena dṛṣṭaḥ sarvebhāvāstattvatastena dṛṣṭāḥ.”
Translation: 924
You should also not say the following “one positive entity is of the
nature of all positive entities; all entities are of the nature of one
positive entity and therefore, one who has realized even one positive
entity, in its real form, one can conclude that, he has seen all positive
entities in their real forms.”
Text: 925
अथ पयार्या इतरेतरात्मना िभद्न्ते सवर् भावानाम्;
atha paryāyā itaretarātmanā bhidyante sarvabhāvānām;
Translation: 925
Clarification:
Well, the knowledges of all positive entities are distinguished on the
basis of mutual form.
Text: 926
एवं तिहर् भावाऽभावपयार्ययोरिप भेदोऽस्तु। इमामेव मूखर्तां िदगम्बराणामङ्ीकृत्य उक्ं
सूतर्कारेण यथा-
“नग्! शर्व(म)णक! दबु र् द्

ु े! कायक्लेशपरायण!
जीिवकाथेर्ऽिप चारम्भे केन त्वम स िशिक्षतः॥”
evaṁ tarhi bhāvā’bhāvaparyāyayorapi bhedo’stu. imāmeva mūrkha-
tāṁ digambarāṇāmaṅgīkṛtya uktaṁ sūtrakāreṇa yathā-
“nagna! śrava(ma)ṇaka! durbuddhe! kāyakleśaparāyaṇa!
jīvikārthe’pi cārambhe kena tvamasi śikṣitaḥ.”
Translation: 926
Reply:
In that case, let there be difference of the pairs of positive and
negative entities also. Taking this way, illogical argument of the
Jainas the author of the sūtras has said the following: “Oh nude
ascetic, Oh foolish one, Oh engaged in giving torture to the body,
who has taught you in the beginning even for your livelihood?”
[४. सांख्यमतेऽिप भोगानुपप त्पर्दशर् नेनात्मानुमानिनरासः।]

[4. sāṁkhyamate’pi bhogānupapattipradarśanenātmānumānanirāsaḥ.]
Text: 927
तथा सांख्यमतेनाप्यात्मनो भोगो नैव सम्पद्ते भोगस्यात्मिन अवृत्ेः। भोगशब्देन सुख-
मिभधीयते, तत्संवेदनं वा? तदभ ु यं बुद्ौ वतर् ते नात्मिन, एवञ् व्यव स्थते बुद्ेभोर्क्ृत्वं
नात्मनः।
tathā sāṁkhyamatenāpi ātmano bhogo naiva sampadyate bhogasya
ātmani avṛtteḥ. bhogaśabdena sukhamabhidhīyate, tatsaṁvedanaṁ
vā? tadubhayaṁ buddhau vartate nātmani, evañca vyavasthite
buddherbhoktṛtvaṁ nātmanaḥ.
Translation: 927
In the same way, even according to the doctrine of Sāṁkhya, it is
not possible to explain how the self enjoys, because the enjoyment
does not exist in the self. By the word enjoyment, what do you
mean? Do you mean happiness or awareness of happiness? Both
occur only in the intellect and not in the self. When such is the
fact, according to you, the intellect can be said to be an enjoyer
and not the self.
Text: 928
अथ बुिद्गतेनािप भोगेनव ै आत्मनो भोक्ृत्वमिभधीयते; तदा बुिद्गतेन कतृर्त्वेन आत्मनः
कतृर्त्वं पर्सज्यते। ततश्च “कतार् न भवित” इत्येतन् वक्व्यम्।
atha buddhigatenāpi bhogenaiva ātmano bhoktṛtvamabhidhīyate;
tadā buddhigatena kartṛtvena ātmanaḥ kartṛtvaṁ prasajyate.
tataśca “kartā na bhavati” ityetanna vaktavyam.
Translation: 928
If you say that, even if the enjoyment resides in the intellect, still,
the self can be said to be the enjoyer, then, since doerness exists in
the intellect, let the self be called the doer and if it is acceptable to
you, you should not say “the self is not the doer.”
Text: 929
अथ आत्मिन कतृर्त्वस्याऽवृत्ेः अकतार् इत्यपिदश्यते; भोगस्याप्यतद्ृत्ेः सम्भुग् न
भवत्यात्मा।
atha ātmani kartṛtvasyā’vṛtteḥ akartā ityapadiśyate; bhogasyāpya-

tadvṛtteḥ sambhug na bhavatyātmā.
Translation: 929
Since, the doerness does not exist in the self, self is called “not a
doer” then, since, the enjoyment also does not exist in the self, the
self cannot be called the enjoyer.
Text: 930
अथ अ स्त कतृर्त्वं यिद नाम औपचा रकम्, यथा भृत्ये जयपराजयौ वतर् मानौ स्वािमिन
उपचयेर्ते तथा बुद्ौ वतर् मानं कतृर्त्वं पुं स उपचयर् ते; यद्ेवम् भोगोऽिप बुद्ौ वतर् मानः
पुरुषस्यौपचा रकः पर्ाप्ः।
atha asti kartṛtvaṁ yadi nāma aupacārikam, yathā bhṛtye
jayaparājayau vartamānau svāmini upacaryete tathā buddhau
vartamānaṁ kartṛtvaṁ puṁsi upacaryate; yadyevam bhogo’pi
buddhau vartamānaḥ puruṣasyaupacārikaḥ prāptaḥ.
Translation: 930
Clarification:
Well, in a secondary sense, the self is called a doer as when a servant
becomes the winner or becomes defeated, as the master of that
servant is secondarily called the winner or defeated, in the same
way, although the doerness exists in the intellect, still secondarily
self is called the doer.
Text: 931
औपचा रकोऽिप आत्मिन न सम्भवित; अन्यतर् मुख्यतयानभ्युपगमात्। भोगाऽभावे च
आत्मनो मोक्षिचन्ता न कतर् व्या। बन्धनवान् मुच्यते। न चात्मिन बन्धनम स्त। भोगो िह
बन्धनम्। स चात्मिन नैव िवद्ते, तदभावात् मोक्षोऽिप िनरुपप त्कः।
aupacāriko’pi ātmani na sambhavati; anyatra mukhyatayānabhyu-
pagamāt. bhogā’bhāve ca ātmano mokṣacintā na kartavyā. bandha-
navān mucyate. na cātmani bandhanamasti. bhogo hi bandhanam.
sa cātmani naiva vidyate, tadabhāvāt mokṣo’pi nirupapattikaḥ.
Translation: 931
Reply:
If it is so, then, the real locus of the enjoyment is the intellect and
in a secondary way, the self is called the enjoyer. As a matter of
fact, even secondarily the self cannot be called the enjoyer, because,
enjoyment is not accepted as existing primarily somewhere else i.e.
in the intellect and when the enjoyment is not there, the self need
not worry about salvation or liberation or freedom from bondage.
One who is bound, can be liberated. There is no bondage in the self.
Enjoyment could have been the bondage, but that does not exist in
the self and since that is not there, one cannot explain liberation
also.
Text: 932
तथा, आत्मनोऽ स्तत्वं न सद्ध्यित भोक्ृत्वस्याभावे। भोग्येन भोक्ुरनुमानम्।
tathā, ātmano’stitvaṁ na siddhyati bhoktṛtvasyābhāve. bhogyena
bhokturanumānam.
Translation: 932
Similarly, since there is nothing called enjoyerness, one cannot prove
the existence of the self. One can infer the enjoyer on the basis of
the object of enjoyment.
Text: 933
यथा सूपािदमातर्ं भोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्, तथा पर्धानं सिवकारं भोग्यं तेन भोक्ाऽनुमीयते;
yathā sūpādimātraṁ bhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam, tathā pradhānaṁ
savikāraṁ bhogyaṁ tena bhoktā’numīyate;
Translation: 933
Clarification:
As the things like soup etc. is always seen related with the enjoyer,
in the same way, the object of enjoyment viz. on the basis of the
changing pradhāna the enjoyer can be inferred.
Text: 934
एतच्चायुक्म्; आत्मनो भोक्ृत्वाभावे कथं भोग्येन आत्माऽनुमीयते, आत्मना सह
भोग्यस्य सम्बन्धानवगतेः? तदनवगितश्च आत्मनः पर्त्यक्षािवषयत्वात्। तदिवषयत्वं च
'िवशेषेऽनुगमाभावः' इत्युक्म्।
etaccāyuktam; ātmano bhoktṛtvābhāve kathaṁ bhogyena ātmā’nu-
mīyate, ātmanā saha bhogyasya sambandhānavagateḥ? tadanava-
gatiśca ātmanaḥ pratyakṣāviṣayatvāt. tadaviṣayatvaṁ ca ‘viśeṣe’nu-
gamābhāvaḥ’ ityuktam.
Translation: 934
Reply:
This is not proper, because, when the self cannot be the enjoyer, how
can be the self be inferred on the basis of the object of enjoyment?
We do not know the relationship between the self and the object of
enjoyment. We do not know because the self cannot be the object
of perception. To explain that the self cannot be the object of
perception, it has been said, “There is no consecutive character
to specify it.”
Text: 935
अथ पर्त्यक्षेण आत्मा अवधायर् ते; तदा पर्त्यक्षिवषयत्वेन आत्मनः समानता पर्त्यक्षानु-
मानिवषयत्वेन, ततश्च सद्साध्यता।
atha pratyakṣeṇa ātmā avadhāryate; tadā pratyakṣaviṣayatvena
ātmanaḥ samānatā pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvena, tataśca siddha-
sādhyatā.
Translation: 935
If you say, the self is determined on the basis of perception, then,
the self becomes the object of perception and also object of inference
and thus becomes object of both, perception and inference and this
leads to the fault of knowing something which is already known.
Text: 936
सूपािदभोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्; त त्कम्-देहािदव्यित रक्भोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्, आहो स्वद्
देहमातर्भोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्?
sūpādibhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam; tatkim-dehādivyatiriktabhoktravinā-
bhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam, āhosvid dehamātrabhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam?
Translation: 936
You have said that, the object of enjoyment like soup is invariably
related to the enjoyer. There we would like to ask, “Is it seen
invariably related with the enjoyer who is different from body etc?”
Or, is it seen invariably related with the enjoyer who is nothing else
but the body?
Text: 937
तद्िद देहािदव्यित रक्भोक्तर्ािवनाभूतं दृष्म्; तदा दृष्ान्तोऽिप दाष्ार् न्तकपर्िततुल्यः,
आत्मनोऽती न्दर्यत्वेन।
tadyadi dehādivyatiriktabhoktrāvinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam; tadā dṛṣṭānto’pi

dārṣṭāntikapratitulyaḥ, ātmano’tīndriyatvena.
Translation: 937
If you say, it is seen invariably related with the enjoyer, different
from the body, then, the example becomes comparable to that for
which, this is an example, because, the self is beyond the range of
sense organs.
Text: 938
अथ पर्त्यक्षेणावधा रत आत्मा; तदा सद् आत्मा, िकमनुमानेन?
atha pratyakṣeṇāvadhārita ātmā; tadā siddha ātmā, kimanu-
mānena?
Translation: 938
If you say that, self is determined by perception, then, the self is
already established, in that case what is the need of inference?
Text: 939
अथ देहमातर्भोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्; तदा देहिवकाराणां भोगयोगेन नात्मनः सिद्ः।
atha dehamātrabhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam; tadā dehavikārāṇāṁ
bhogayogena nātmanaḥ siddhiḥ.
Translation: 939
If you say, it is seen invariably related with the enjoyer, who is
nothing but the body, then, the enjoyment gets associated with the
changes of the body and therefore, the self cannot be established.
Text: 940
भवतु वा आत्मनो भोगः, तथािप अकृत-कृताभ्यागमनाशदोषपर्सङ्ः-अकृतस्य कमर् णः
फलमभ्येित आत्मनः, कृतस्य च कमर् णः फलं न सम्पद्ते बुिद्ः। यिद च अकृतस्य
कमर् णः फलमभ्येित; तदा मुक्ात्मनामिप तत्फलं स्यात्, आत्मवृ त्िनयमहेतोरभावात्।
ततश्चाकैवल्यपर्सङ्ः।
bhavatu vā ātmano bhogaḥ, tathāpi akṛta-kṛtābhyāgamanāśado-
ṣaprasaṅgaḥ-akṛtasya karmaṇaḥ phalamabhyeti ātmanaḥ, kṛtasya
ca karmaṇaḥ phalaṁ na sampadyate buddhiḥ. yadi ca akṛtasya
karmaṇaḥ phalamabhyeti; tadā muktātmanāmapi tatphalaṁ syāt,
ātmavṛttiniyamahetorabhāvāt. tataścākaivalyaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 940
Or, let us accept that, the self has enjoyment, still, this will lead
to the defect of getting the effect of an act, which the self has not
performed and not getting the result of an act, which the self has
performed. The self will get the result of an act, which the self has
not performed, and the intellect will not get the result in spite of the
fact that, the intellect has performed the act and if it is allowed that,
one gets the result of an act which he has not performed, then, even
those selves who have not performed the acts, will get the result,
because, there will be nothing in the self which can control this
situation and as a consequence of this there can never be liberation.
[५. सांख्यसम्मतस्य कैवल्यस्यानुपप त्कत्वोपपादनम्।]
[5. sāṁkhyasammatasya kaivalyasyānupapattikatvopapādanam.]
Text: 941
इतश्च कैवल्यं नोपपद्ते, भोग्यभोजकयोरवस्थानात्। निह भवतां पक्षे सदात्मानं
प रत्यजित भोग्यम्। येनाकारेण आत्मनो भोग्यत्वेनाव स्थतम्, निह तदाकारमितवतर् ते,
आत्मनो भोक्ृत्वाकारस्य अनितवृत्ेः। अितवृत्ौ च आत्मोच्छे दपर्सङ्ः।
itaśca kaivalyaṁ nopapadyate, bhogyabhojakayoravasthānāt. nahi
bhavatāṁ pakṣe sadātmānaṁ parityajati bhogyam. yenākāreṇa
ātmano bhogyatvenāvasthitam, nahi tadākāramativartate, ātmano
bhoktṛtvākārasya anativṛtteḥ. ativṛttau ca ātmocchedaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 941
For the following reason also, no liberation is possible according
to the Sāṁkhya school of thought, because, there is nothing called
object of enjoyment and the enjoyer. According to your doctrine, it
is not the case that, the object of enjoyment leaves the self. The self
does not leave its form by which form it is said to be the enjoyer
of the object of enjoyment, because, the self does not or cannot
over-ride the form of its being the enjoyer and if it over-rides, then,
there will be no self left in this universe.
[६. वेदान्तसम्मतस्यानन्दरूपकैवल्यस्यायुिक्कतापर्दशर् नम्।]
[6. vedāntasammatasyānandarūpakaivalyasyāyuktikatāpradarśanam.]
Text: 942
येऽिप आनन्दरूपमात्मनः कैवल्यमिभदधाित तेऽिप युिक्वािदनो न भव न्त। कथम्?
यद्ात्मनः आनन्दरूपं स्वसंवेद्ं च; तदा संसारावस्थायामिप तत् वेद्ं पर्सक्म्। ततश्च
मोक्षाथर् पर्यासो िनष्फलः।
ye’pi ānandarūpamātmanaḥ kaivalyamabhidadhāti te’pi yuktivādino
na bhavanti. katham? yadyātmanaḥ ānandarūpaṁ svasaṁvedyaṁ
ca; tadā saṁsārāvasthāyāmapi tat vedyaṁ prasaktam. tataśca
mokṣārthaprayāso niṣphalaḥ.
Translation: 942
Even those philosophers (the Advaitins) who talk of liberation of
the form of Bliss, do not seem to be rational. If you ask me how,
we wonder, if the self is of the nature of bliss and at the same
time, self-illuminating, then, at the time of bondage also it should
be self-illuminating and in that case the very effort for liberation is
purposeless.
Text: 943
अथ संसारावस्थायां न वेद्ते अनािदमलावगु ण्ठतमात्मनः स्वरूपम्, यथा पटान्त रते घटे
घटबुिद्नर् भवित, एवं मल लप्े आत्मिन आत्मबुिद्नर् भवित;
atha saṁsārāvasthāyāṁ na vedyate anādimalāvaguṇṭhitamātmanaḥ
svarūpam, yathā paṭāntarite ghaṭe ghaṭabuddhirna bhavati, evaṁ
malalipte ātmani ātmabuddhirna bhavati;
Translation: 943
Clarification:
Well, at the stage of bondage, the nature of the self is not revealed,
because, it is covered with dirt from time without a beginning. As
a pot is not known, if the pot is covered with a cloth, in the same
way, if the self is covered with dirt, the awareness of the self does
not arise.
Text: 944
तदेतदयुक्म्, दृष्ान्तदाष्ार् न्तकयोः वैषम्यात्-पटान्त रते घटे घटबुिद्नर् भवित
पटान्तधार्ने सित इ न्दर्येण साकं सम्बन्धो ना स्त तदभावाद् घटे ने न्दर्यजं िवज्ञानं
सम्पद्ते। इह तु पुनः मलावगुण्ठनेन कस्य व्यवधानं िकर्यते? न वेद्वेदकयोव्यर् वधानं
िकर्यते। वेद्ं वेदकं च आत्मस्वरूपमेव-यथा बौद्ानां स्वसंवेद्ं िवज्ञानम्, तच्च
िवषयसद्ावेऽिप वेद्ते तदभावेऽिप वेद्ते, य(त)थात्मनः स्वसंवेद्ं स्वरूपं मलसद्ावेऽिप

वेद्ते तदसद्ावेऽिप वेद्ते, मलस्याऽिकिञ्त्करत्वाद् आत्मनोऽथार्न्तरत्वेनाऽवस्थानात्।
tadetadayuktam, dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayoḥ vaiṣamyāt-paṭāntarite
ghaṭe ghaṭabuddhirna bhavati paṭāntardhāne sati indriyeṇa sākaṁ
sambandho nāsti tadabhāvād ghaṭe nendriyajaṁ vijñānaṁ sampa-
dyate. iha tu punaḥ malāvaguṇṭhanena kasya vyavadhānaṁ
kriyate? na vedyavedakayorvyavadhānaṁ kriyate. vedyaṁ vedakaṁ
ca ātmasvarūpameva-yathā bauddhānāṁ svasaṁvedyaṁ vijñānam,
tacca viṣayasadbhāve’pi vedyate tadabhāve’pi vedyate, ya(ta)thā-
tmanaḥ svasaṁvedyaṁ svarūpaṁ malasadbhāve’pi vedyate
tadasadbhāve’pi vedyate, malasyā’kiñcitkaratvād ātmano’rthā-
ntaratvenā’vasthānāt.
Translation: 944
Reply:
This is not proper, because, there is no similarity between example
and the thing for which this is an example. When a pot is covered
by a cloth, there does not arise the perception of the pot, because
the pot is not connected with the sense organ and in the absence of
the relationship with the sense organ, the perceptual knowledge
of pot does not arise. In the present case, however i.e. in the
case of awareness of the self, what is covered by the cover of
dirt? Nothing intervenes between the knower and the object of
knowledge, because, both, the object of knowledge and the knower,
are nothing but the self. According to the Buddhists, as the
knowledge is self-illumined and the awareness of that knowledge,
continues with or without the presence of the object of knowledge.
In the same way, the nature of the self viz. self awareness exists even
when there is presence of dirt or when there is no dirt. The dirt is
insignificant to this phenomenon, because the self exists irrespective
of all this.
Text: 945
अथ तादात्म्येन स्थतािन मलािन; तदा 'मलािन अपनीयन्ते' िकमुक्ं भवित? आत्माऽप-
नीयते। ततश्च मोक्षाभावपर्सङ्ः।
atha tādātmyena sthitāni malāni; tadā ‘malāni apanīyante’ kimu-

ktaṁ bhavati? ātmā’panīyate. tataśca mokṣābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 945
If you say, the dirt appears as identical as the self, then, when you
say the dirts are being removed, what does it mean? Does it mean
the self is removed? This will lead to the absence of liberation.
[७. मीमांसकमतेनािप आत्मानुमानस्यासम्भिवत्वपर्कटनम्।]

[7. mīmāṁsakamatenāpi ātmānumānasyāsambhavitvaprakaṭanam.]
Text: 946
तथा मीमांसकमतेनािप आत्मानुमानं न पर्वतर् ते, पर्माणान्तरानवधा रताथर् िवषय-
त्वाभ्युपगमात् पर्माणानाम्। िनयतिवषयािण िह पर्माणािन पर्ितपद्न्ते-पर्त्यक्षावसेये
नानुमानं पर्वतर् ते, अनुमानावसेये च पर्त्यक्षं न पर्वतर् ते। ततश्च इतरेतरव्यावृ त्िवशेष-
िवषयािण। तदयु(तद)ु क्म्- “िवशेषेऽनुगमाभावः” िवशेषो िनयतपर्माणगर्ाह्ोऽथर् ः, तथाभू-
तेऽथेर्ऽङ्ीिकर्यमाणे अनुमानस्याऽनुगमाभावः। अनुगमः सम्बन्धः, तद्गर्हणानुपप त्ः।
tathā mīmāṁsakamatenāpi ātmānumānaṁ na pravartate, pramāṇā-
ntarānavadhāritārthaviṣayatvābhyupagamāt pramāṇānām. niyata-
viṣayāṇi hi pramāṇāni pratipadyante-pratyakṣāvaseye nānumānaṁ
pravartate, anumānāvaseye ca pratyakṣaṁ na pravartate. tataśca
itaretaravyāvṛttiviśeṣaviṣayāṇi. tadayu(tadu)ktam- “viśeṣe’nugamā-
bhāvaḥ” viśeṣo niyatapramāṇagrāhyo’rthaḥ, tathābhūte’rthe’ṅgī-
kriyamāṇe anumānasyā’nugamābhāvaḥ. anugamaḥ sambandhaḥ,
tadgrahaṇānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 946
Similarly, according to the doctrine of Mīmāṁsakas, inference has
no scope to establish self, because, according to them, the processes
of knowing i.e. the pramāṇas are accepted as operative towards such
object which is not known by another process of knowing. They also
accept the processes of knowing having one is to one relationship,
between one kind of process of knowing and its object. If something
is determined by perception, inference has no scope to reveal it
and when something is concluded by the process of inference, the
process of perception has no scope to reveal it. Thus, the objects
are mutually exclusive and they are the objects of specific process
of knowing as it has been said, “There is absence of consecutive
property with reference to a specific object.” Here, specific means
an object which is known by a specific process of knowing and when
an object is accepted as of that form, an inference is left with no
consecutive scope of operation. The word anugam means, relation
and such a relation cannot be known.
Text: 947
अथेर्(थ) पर्त्यक्षाद्वधा रतेप्यथेर् अनुमानं पर्वतर् ते;
arthe(tha) pratyakṣādyavadhāritepyarthe anumānaṁ pravartate;
Translation: 947
Clarification:
Inference can operate with reference to the object, even if it is
determined by the process of perception.
Text: 948
नन्वेवं पर्त्यक्षानुमानसाधारणोऽथर् ः पर्सक्ः। साधारणता समानता। “सामान्ये सद्-
साध्यता" पर्त्यक्षावगतत्वात् । अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणं च अपाथर् कम्।
nanvevaṁ pratyakṣānumānasādhāraṇo’rthaḥ prasaktaḥ. sādhāra-
ṇatā samānatā. “sāmānye siddhasādhyatā” pratyakṣāvagatatvāt.
anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇaṁ ca apārthakam.
Translation: 948
Reply:
If it is so, then, an object becomes that, which is commonly accessed
by perception and inference. Commonality means sameness and
if there is sameness, there is knowledge of that which is already
known, because, it is already known by perception and in that case,
the adjective (in the definition of pramāṇa) “that which causes the
knowledge of a thing which is not already known, becomes empty.”
Text: 949
अथवा, सामान्ये सद्े साधनम् इत्यन्योऽथर् ः। सामान्ययोः गम्यगमकभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते
मीमांसकेन। नच तत् सामान्यं िवद्ते, यथा च न िवद्ते तथा पर्ागेवोिदतम्। ततश्च
सद्स्य साधनम्-िवद्मानस्य साधनम्। नच अिग्त्वम स्त। तदभावे कस्येदं ज्ञापकम्?
athavā sāmānye siddhe sādhanam ityanyo’rthaḥ. sāmānyayoḥ

gamyagamakabhāvo’bhyupagamyate mīmāṁsakena. naca tat
sāmānyaṁ vidyate, yathā ca na vidyate tathā prāgevoditam. tataśca
siddhasya sādhanam-vidyamānasya sādhanam. naca agnitvamasti.
tadabhāve kasyedaṁ jñāpakam?
Translation: 949
Or, this can be explained in another way, “When the universal
is established, the thing is established.” The Mīmāṁsakas accept
implication between two universals. That, there is nothing called
universal, has already been established by us before. Thus, proving
that which is established, means, establishing that which is
established. There is nothing called fireness and when there is no
fireness, what can be the ground to imply that?
Text: 950
अथवा, सद्ं साधनं सद्साधनम् इत्यन्योऽथर् ः। िवद्मानं साधनम्। नच धूमत्व-
सामान्यम स्त। तच्च(त्व)िवद्मानं सामान्यम्। कथं सामान्यं साधनं भिवतुमहर् ित?
athavā, siddhaṁ sādhanaṁ siddhasādhanam ityanyo’rthaḥ. vidya-
mānaṁ sādhanam� naca dhūmatvasāmānyamasti. tacca(tva)vidya-
mānaṁ sāmānyam. kathaṁ sāmānyaṁ sādhanaṁ bhavitumarhati?
Translation: 950
Or, the expression, “siddha-sādhana” can mean the “ground which
is known”. It will imply the ground which exists. But there is nothing
called smokeness. Such universal does not exist and therefore how
can universal be the ground for inferring something?
Text: 951
अथवा, सद्साधनम्-ज्ञातमनुमानं साधनं भवित, न च धूमत्वं ज्ञातं स्वयमसत्वात्,
अथवा गर्हणोपायाभावात् तस्य अनुस्यूतं रूपम्। नच तत् आत्मन्यनुस्यूतम्। नािप
एकस्यां व्यक्ौ अिप तु बह्ीषु व्यिक्षु। नच बह्यो व्यक्स्य उपलभ्यन्ते, अिप तु
एकैव धूमव्यिक्रुपलभ्यते। नच एकस्यां व्यक्ौ अनुगतात्मतया सामान्यसंिव त्र स्त।
नचाकारान्तरसामान्यम्।
athavā, siddhasādhanam-jñātamanumānaṁ sādhanaṁ bhavati, na
ca dhūmatvaṁ jñātaṁ svayamasattvāt, athavā grahaṇopāyābhāvāt
tasya anusyūtaṁ rūpam. naca tat ātmanyanusyūtam. nāpi
ekasyāṁ vyaktau api tu bahvīṣu vyaktiṣu. naca bahvayo vyaktasya

upalabhyante, api tu ekaiva dhūmavyaktirupalabhyate. naca
ekasyāṁ vyaktau anugatātmatayā sāmānyasaṁvittirasti. nacākārā-
ntarasāmānyam.
Translation: 951
Or, the word siddha-sādhanā can also be explained as follows:
“once the ground is known, it can be the ground for the knowing
the object of inference.” Smokeness cannot be said to be known,
because, it itself does not exist. Or, there is no method of knowing
its common form and there is no common form with reference to
its own form. It is also not the case that, it should be only one
individual, but it should be in many individuals, but we do not find
many individuals, rather we find only one smoke individual. There
cannot be the knowledge of universal “as common characteristics”
in single individual and there is no other form of universal possible.
0.10 ताथागतसम्मतस्यानुमानस्य िनरासः।

[tāthāgatasammatasyānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the definition of Inference as accepted by the
Buddhists)
Text: 952
तथा, ताथागतानामिप अनुमानं न पर्वतर् ते सम्बन्धानवगतेः। तदवगितश्च-िकं सामान्ययोः
सम्बन्धावधारणम्, आहो स्वत् सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः, स्वलक्षणयोवार्?
tathā, tāthāgatānāmapi anumānaṁ na pravartate sambandhā-
navagateḥ. tadavagatiśca-kiṁ sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam,
āhosvit sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayoḥ, svalakṣaṇayorvā?
Translation: 952
Similarly, the process of inference as proposed by the Buddhists
also cannot operate because, one cannot have the knowledge
of invariable concomitance. So far the knowledge of invariable
concomitance is concerned, the question arises, is it the conclusive
knowledge of relation between two universals? Or, between a
universal and a particular? Or, between two particulars?
Text: 953
तद्िद सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणं िकर्यते; तदयुक्म्, सामान्यस्याऽसम्भवान् तयोः
सम्बन्धः।
tadyadi sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate; tadayuktam,
sāmānyasyā’sambhavānna tayoḥ sambandhaḥ.
Translation: 953
If you say, the knowledge of relationship between two universals is
determined, that will not be proper, because, since the universal is
impossible, the question of their relationship does not arise.
Text: 954
नािप सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं िकर्यते, सामान्यस्याऽसत्वात्।
nāpi sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate, sāmā-
nyasyā’satvāt.
Translation: 954
Nor, it is the case that, the knowledge between a universal and a
particular is decided, because, the universal itself is non-existent.
Text: 955
अथ स्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; ततर्ािप िकम् अथर् योः, ज्ञानयोः, ज्ञानाथर् योवार्?
atha svalakṣaṇayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; tatrāpi kim arthayoḥ,
jñānayoḥ, jñānārthayorvā?
Translation: 955
If you say, the knowledge of concomitance between two individuals
is ascertained, there also the question arises, whether such relation
is ascertained between two objects or between two knowledges or
between knowledge and object.
Text: 956
तद्िद अथर् योः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तद्हनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावज्ञानं िकं सत्ामातर्ेण,
आहो स्वत् तदाकारयोिगत्वेन, तज्जन्यत्वेन वा, सामस्त्येन वा?
tadyadi arthayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; taddahanadhūmayorhetu-
phalabhāvajñānaṁ kiṁ sattāmātreṇa, āhosvit tadākārayogitvena,
tajjanyatvena vā, sāmastyena vā?
Translation: 956
If you say, such relationship is known between two objects, there
also the question arises, is it the case that the knowledge of ground
viz. the smoke, and the knowledge of result viz. the fire, arises by
their mere existence, or, because of association of their forms, or,
as been produced by that or collectively?
Text: 957
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण दहनधूमसंवेदनमपिदश्यते; न केवलं तद्हनस्य तत् संवेदनम्,
तर्ैलोक्यस्य तत्संवेदनं पर्सक्म्, उपकारिविनमुर्क्स्य सत्ाऽिवशेषात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa dahanadhūmasaṁvedanamapadiśyate; na
kevalaṁ taddahanasya tat saṁvedanam, trailokyasya tatsaṁve-
danaṁ prasaktam, upakāravinirmuktasya sattā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 957
If you say, by mere existence, the knowledge of fire and smoke is
referred to, then, that knowledge cannot said to be that fire rather
it will become the knowledge of all the three worlds, because, the
existence devoid of any change or effect is common to all of them.
[१. पर्सङ्ात् ज्ञानस्य िवषयाकारत्वं िवचायर् तत्खण्डनम्।]
[1. prasaṅgāt jñānasya viṣayākāratvaṁ vicārya tatkhaṇḍanam.]
Text: 958
अथ तद्हनाकारयोिगत्वेन तस्य संवेदनमिभधीयते; यथा दहनेन स्विनभार्समुत्पािदतम्।
तथा गन्धाकारोपरक्गन्धािदज्ञानेनािप स्विनभार्समुत्पािदतम्। ततश्च ज्ञानाकारं तदत्ु पद्ते
इित युक्ं भवित गन्धाद्ाकारम्, ततश्च अनेकाकारयोिगत्वे सित पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्था न
लभ्यते।
atha taddahanākārayogitvena tasya saṁvedanamabhidhīyate; yathā
dahanena svanirbhāsamutpāditam. tathā gandhākāroparaktagandhā-
dijñānenāpi svanirbhāsamutpāditam. tataśca jñānākāraṁ tadutpa-
dyate iti yuktaṁ bhavati gandhādyākāram, tataśca anekākārayogitve
sati pratikarmavyavasthā na labhyate.
Translation: 958
If you say that, ts knowledge is referred to as being associated
with the form of that fire, then, as by the fire, its own cognition
is generated, in the same way, by the knowledge of smell etc.
associated with the form of smell also, its own cognition is

generated. Therefore, it is proper to hold that, the form of the
knowledge is produced which reflects the form of the smell etc. In
this way, there will be association of many forms and as such, one
is to one correspondence between knowledge and its object, will
become impossible.
Text: 959
अथ गन्धािदज्ञानं न गन्धाद्ाकारमपर् यित दहनज्ञाने; तदानीं ज्ञानाकारापर् कत्वमिप न
लभ्यते, ज्ञानतादात्म्यव्यव स्थतोऽसौ गन्धाकारः तदनपर् कत्वे ज्ञानाकारोऽिप नािपर् तः
स्यात्। ततश्च दहनिवज्ञानम् अिवज्ञानम्। िनरवयवं च गन्धािदज्ञानम्, नैकदेशेन
आकारापर् कत्वम्।
atha gandhādijñānaṁ na gandhādyākāramarpayati dahanajñāne;
tadānīṁ jñānākārārpakatvamapi na labhyate, jñānatādātmyavyava-
sthito’sau gandhākāraḥ tadanarpakatve jñānākāro’pi nārpitaḥ syāt.
tataśca dahanavijñānam avijñānam. niravayavaṁ ca gandhādi-
jñānam, naikadeśena ākārārpakatvam.
Translation: 959
If you say that, the knowledge of smell etc. does not offer the form
of smell etc. in the knowledge of fire, then, you should also accept
that a thing does not offer its form to its knowledge and if it does
not offer its own form, then, the form of the smell will have to be
treated as identical with its knowledge and in that case, it amounts
saying that, it does not offer any form to its knowledge also. Thus,
knowledge of fire will not be called knowledge. The knowledge of
the smell etc. is without any part. Therefore, it cannot also be said
that, partially it can offer its form.
Text: 960
अथ िनराकारं गन्धािदज्ञानम्; पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्था तिहर् न लभ्यते, तस्य दहनज्ञानस्यािप
िनराकारताऽस्तु।
atha nirākāraṁ gandhādijñānam; pratikarmavyavasthā tarhi na
labhyate, tasya dahanajñānasyāpi nirākāratā’stu.
Translation: 960
If you hold that, the knowledge of smell is without a form, then, you
cannot explain that, such-and-such knowledge is of such-and-such
object. Not only that, then, one may say, let the knowledge of fire
also be treated as knowledge without a form.
Text: 961
िकंच, दहनाकारयोिगत्वेन यिद दहनसंवेदनम्; तदा पूवर्िवज्ञानाकारयोिगत्वेन पूवर्िवज्ञान-
स्यािप तद्ेदनं पर्ाप्म्, तदाकारयोिगत्वात् तदत्ु पाद्त्वाच्च।
kiṁca, dahanākārayogitvena yadi dahanasaṁvedanam; tadā pūrva-
vijñānākārayogitvena pūrvavijñānasyāpi tadvedanaṁ prāptam,
tadākārayogitvāt tadutpādyatvācca.
Translation: 961
Moreover, if you think that, knowledge of fire is associated with the
form of fire, then, since it is associated with the form of the previous
knowledge, the earlier knowledge should also be knowledge of the
fire, because, that is associated with that form and also because, it
is produced by that earlier knowledge.
Text: 962
अथ तथा(दा)कारयोिगत्वे तदत्ु पाद्त्वे च तस्य तद्ेदनं न भवित;
atha tathā(dā)kārayogitve tadutpādyatve ca tasya tadvedanaṁ na
bhavati;
Translation: 962
Clarification:
If, simply because, it is associated with that form and it is produced
by that pervious knowledge, the previous knowledge cannot be said
to be the knowledge of fire.
Text: 963
िवषयस्यािप तिहर् तद्ेदनं िकम्, इह द्यस्य िवसंवादात्?
viṣayasyāpi tarhi tadvedanaṁ kim, iha dvayasya visaṁvādāt?
Translation: 963
Reply:
In that case, what will be the knowledge of that object, because,
here both become contradictory.
Text: 964
अथ तिद्ज्ञानं िविदतम् इित कृत्वा न वेद्ते ज्ञानान्तरेण;
atha tadvijñānaṁ viditam iti kṛtvā na vedyate jñānāntareṇa;
Translation: 964
Clarification:
Well, since there is awareness of that knowledge, it cannot be known
by another knowledge.
Text: 965
एवं िवषयस्यािप तद्ेदनं न पर्ाप्नोित पुरुषान्तरावधायर् माणस्य।
evaṁ viṣayasyāpi tadvedanaṁ na prāpnoti puruṣāntarāvadhā-
ryamāṇasya.
Translation: 965
Reply:
In that case, it cannot be said to be the knowledge of that object,
if it is being known by another knower.
Text: 966
अिप च, यिद दहनाकारयोिगत्वेन दहनस्य तद्ेदनम्; वस्तुत्वाकारयोिगत्वेन नयनादेरिप
तत्संवेदनं पर्सक्म्।
api ca, yadi dahanākārayogitvena dahanasya tadvedanam; vastu-
tvākārayogitvena nayanāderapi tatsaṁvedanaṁ prasaktam.
Translation: 966
Moreover, if you say that, since there is association of the form of
fire, therefore, this knowledge is the knowledge of fire, on the same
analogy, since eyes etc. are associated with the property of being
an entity, let that knowledge also be called knowledge of eyes etc.
Text: 967
अथ नयनादेरसाधारणाकारापर् कत्वं न िवद्ते; तेन तेषां तत्संवेदनं न भवित,
नीलस्य स्वभवनदेशकालस्वभावानपर् कत्वात् स्वकारणकलापोत्पाद्स्वभावानपर् कत्वाच्च।
तदपर् कत्वे च नीलाकारयोिगता स्यात् तत्कारणजन्यत्वञ्। एककालीनत्वे एककारणजन्यत्वे
च हेतुफलभावानुपप त्ः सहोत्पन्योगोर्िवषाणयो रव।
atha nayanāderasādhāraṇākārārpakatvaṁ na vidyate; tena teṣāṁ
tatsaṁvedanaṁ na bhavati, nīlasya svabhavanadeśakālasvabhāvā-
narpakatvāt svakāraṇakalāpotpādyasvabhāvānarpakatvācca. tadar-
pakatve ca nīlākārayogitā syāt tatkāraṇajanyatvañca. ekakālīnatve
ekakāraṇajanyatve ca hetuphalabhāvānupapattiḥ sahotpannayorgovi-
ṣāṇayoriva.
Translation: 967
Well, it is not the case that, eyes etc. offer uncommon form,
therefore, it cannot be said that, it is the knowledge of the eyes,
because, a blue object does not offer the nature of its born at
a particular space and at a particular time and also because, it
does not offer the nature of being produced by its own collection
of factors and if it is accepted that, it offers, then, it should have
association with the blue form and also the state of being produced
by its cause and if it becomes contemporary and being produced by
the same collection of factors, then, it is difficult to explain cause
and effect relationship, like two horns of a cow which have grown
simultaneously.
Text: 968
अथ असाधारणाकारतया नोपजायते अिप तु नीलमातर् पर्ितच्छायतयैव उपजायते; यद्ेवं
नयनािदस्वलक्षणाकारतया उपजायमानं नयनादेः तद्गर्हणं भवेत्।
atha asādhāraṇākāratayā nopajāyate api tu nīlamātra praticchā-
yatayaiva upajāyate; yadyevaṁ nayanādisvalakṣaṇākāratayā upajā-
yamānaṁ nayanādeḥ tadgrahaṇaṁ bhavet.
Translation: 968
If you say that, it is not produced as uncommon cause, but it is
produced merely as a copy of the blue object, then, that should be
called the knowledge of the eyes etc. because it is produced in the
form of the particular viz. eyes etc.
Text: 969
अिप च, दहनाकारता दहनिवज्ञानात् िकं िभन्ा, अिभन्ा वा?
api ca, dahanākāratā dahanavijñānāt kiṁ bhinnā, abhinnā vā?
Translation: 969
Moreover, is the form of fire different from knowledge of fire or
identical?
Text: 970
यिद िभन्ा; सा िकं ता त्वक , आहो स्वदता त्वक ?
yadi bhinnā; sā kiṁ tāttvikī, āhosvidatāttvikī?
Translation: 970
If you say, it is different, then, also the question arises, whether it
is real or unreal?
Text: 971
तद्िद ता त्वक ; तद्गितः कथम्? न स्वसंवेद्त्वेन नािप जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन।
स्वसंवेद्ा न भवित िवज्ञानकायर् (काय)व्यितरेकात्। नािप जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन गृह्ते।
अथोर् िह आकारमपर् यित न िवषयाकारता। तदाकारापर् कत्वे वा पर्ाप्ा आकारपरम्परा।
tadyadi tāttvikī; tadgatiḥ katham? na svasaṁvedyatvena nāpi
janakatvā”kārārpakatvena. svasaṁvedyā na bhavati vijñānakārya-
(kāya)vyatirekāt. nāpi janakatvā”kārārpakatvena gṛhyate. artho hi
ākāramarpayati na viṣayākāratā. tadākārārpakatve vā prāptā ākāra-
paramparā.
Translation: 971
If you say, it is real, then, how can it be known? It cannot be known
by the process of self-illumination, nor, in the form of offering the
form of a producer i.e. a cause. It cannot be said to be known by
itself, because it is different from knowledge. Nor can it be said to
be known as offering the form of its cause because an object offering
its own form and not the form of its being object of knowledge and
if you accept that, it offers the form of its being object of knowledge,
then, you will have to postulate an infinite chain of forms.
Text: 972
अथ अता त्वक िवषयाकारता; सा अता त्वकत्वेन असंिविदतदेहा कथं पर्ितकमर् िनयािमका
भवित?
atha atāttvikī viṣayākāratā; sā atāttvikatvena asaṁviditadehā
kathaṁ pratikarmaniyāmikā bhavati?
Translation: 972
If you say that, the form of being the object of knowledge is unreal,
then, being unknown, because of its being unreal, how can it account
for one is to one relation between knowledge and its object.
Text: 973
अथ अव्यित रक्ाः; सा िकं ता त्वक , आहो स्वद् अता त्वक ?
atha avyatiriktāḥ; sā kiṁ tāttvikī, āhosvid atātvikī?
Translation: 973
If you say, it is identical, there also the question arises, whether it
is real or unreal?
Text: 974
यिद ता त्वक ; सा िकं जडा त्मका; आहो स्वत् िचत्स्वभावा?
yadi tāttvikī; sā kiṁ jaḍātmikā; āhosvit citsvabhāvā?
Translation: 974
If you say, it is real, then, the question arises, whether it is animate
or inanimate?
Text: 975
तद्िद जडा त्मका; तदा ज्ञानाऽव्यितरेिकत्वं न सम्भवित िचदिचदोरेकत्वायोगा-
दन्योन्यप रहार स्थितधमर् त्वेन।
tadyadi jaḍātmikā; tadā jñānā’vyatirekitvaṁ na sambhavati cidaci-
dorekatvāyogādanyonyaparihārasthitidharmatvena.
Translation: 975
If you say, it is inanimate, then, it cannot be said to be not
different from knowledge, because, animate and inanimate cannot
be identical, since they are found possessing mutually exclusive
properties.
Text: 976
अथ िचदा त्मका; तदा प रभाषामातर्ं िभद्ते-ज्ञानं िवषयाकार इित।
atha cidātmikā; tadā paribhāṣāmātraṁ bhidyate-jñānaṁ viṣayākāra iti.
Translation: 976
If you say, it is animate, then, it differs only in nomenclature i.e.
knowledge which has the form of its knowledge.
Text: 977
अथ अता त्वक ; तदा ज्ञानस्याप्यता त्वकत्वम्। न च ज्ञानव्यित रक्ा िवषयाकारता
ना स्त, अिप तु ज्ञानस्वरूपमेव िवषयाकारतात्मकमपिदश्यते। तच्च नयनाथार्लोकसाधारण
उत्पाद्त्वेन समं संवेदनं पर्सक्ं सवर् कारकाणाम्।
atha atāttvikī; tadā jñānasyāpyatāttvikatvam. na ca jñānavyati-
riktā viṣayākāratā nāsti, api tu jñānasvarūpameva viṣayākāra-
tātmakamapadiśyate. tacca nayanārthālokasādhāraṇa utpādyatvena
samaṁ saṁvedanaṁ prasaktaṁ sarvakārakāṇām.
Translation: 977
If you hold that, it is unreal, then, knowledge also becomes unreal.
It is not the case that, the form of being an object of knowledge is
different from knowledge; rather, it is referred as identical with the
form of being the object of knowledge, which is nothing but nature
of knowledge, which amounts to knowledge of all causal factors,
because of its being produced, which is common to eyes, object and
light.
[२. दृष्ान्तीभूतस्यादशर् स्य मुखरूपतास्वीकाराथर् स्य िवकल्प्य िनरसनम्।]
[2. dṛṣṭāntībhūtasyādarśasya mukharūpatāsvīkārārthasya vikalpya
nirasanam.]
Text: 978
यदप्युक्ं केनािप-“आदशर् मण्डलं मुखरूपतां स्वीकरोित नच आदशर् रूपतां प रत्यजित तथा
ज्ञानमिप िवषयरूपतां स्वीकुवर् न् िवज्ञानरूपतां त्यजित” तदप्ययुक्म्, आदशर् मण्डलस्य
मुखरूपतास्वीकरणाथोर् वक्व्यः-िकं मुखतादात्म्यम्, आहो स्वद् अिवरलदेशोत्पादः?
yadapyuktaṁ kenāpi-“ādarśamaṇḍalaṁ mukharūpatāṁ svīkaroti
naca ādarśarūpatāṁ parityajati tathā jñānamapi viṣayarūpatāṁ
svīkurvanna vijñānarūpatāṁ tyajati” tadapyayuktam, ādarśa-
maṇḍalasya mukharūpatāsvīkaraṇārtho vaktavyaḥ-kiṁ mukhatādā-
tmyam, āhosvid aviraladeśotpādaḥ?
Translation: 978
You have made the following statement: “the circular mirror reflects
the form of the face, but does not give up its being the form of the
mirror. In the same way, knowledge, reflects the form of being its
content, but does not give up its own form of being knowledge.”
This statement is also not proper. You should explain what is the
meaning of saying that, the circular mirror receives the form of the
face. Does it mean identity with the face or does it mean producing
a close place?
Text: 979
तद्िद तादात्म्यम्; कथं नादशर् रूपतां जहाित? एकं हीदं वस्तु-तत्ादात्म्ये मुखमादशोर् वा।
tadyadi tādātmyam; kathaṁ na ādarśarūpatāṁ jahāti? ekaṁ hīdaṁ
vastu-tattādātmye mukhamādarśo vā.
Translation: 979
If you say, it is identity, then, how is it that, it does not give up
the form of a mirror? The entity called face is a single thing, if it is
identical with the face, then, either it is face or mirror.
Text: 980
अथ अिवरलदेशोत्पादो मुखस्य स्वीकरणम्; तदानीम् आकारस्यािप स्वीकरणम्
अिवरलदेशोत्पाद एव पर्ाप्ः, ततश्च नाकारेण पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्था िकर्यते। अनवगतरूपेणव
ै
च स्थतेः। दहनज्ञानं यिद साकारं तथािप दहनगर्हणं न भवित।
atha aviraladeśotpādo mukhasya svīkaraṇam; tadānīm ākārasyāpi
svīkaraṇam aviraladeśotpāda eva prāptaḥ, tataśca nākāreṇa
pratikarmavyavasthā kriyate. anavagatarūpeṇaiva ca sthiteḥ.
dahanajñānaṁ yadi sākāraṁ tathāpi dahanagrahaṇaṁ na bhavati.
Translation: 980
If you say, it means producing a close place of the face, then, you
should accept the production of a close place of the form and in
that case again it cannot explain one is to one relationship between
knowledge and its object, because it will remain without being
known. Even if you accept the knowledge of fire, as having the
form, still, you cannot say that, it is the knowledge of fire.
Text: 981
इतोऽिप दहनगर्हणं न भवित। िकं तदवगतमनवगतम्, त त्कं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ं, स्वसंिविदतं
वा?
ito’pi dahanagrahaṇaṁ na bhavati. kiṁ tadavagatamanavagatam,
tatkiṁ jñānāntaravedyam, svasaṁviditaṁ vā?
Translation: 981
For the following reason also, there cannot be knowledge of fire,
because, the following questions arise: Is the knowledge of fire known
or unknown or it can be known by knowledge or it can be known
by itself?
Text: 982
यिद ज्ञानान्तरवेद्म्; तदयुक्म्, न ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ं भवत्पक्षे।
yadi jñānāntaravedyam; tadayuktam, na jñānaṁ jñānāntaravedyaṁ
bhavatpakṣe.
Translation: 982
If you say, it can be known by another knowledge, it is not proper,
because, according to your view, a knowledge cannot be known by
another knowledge.
Text: 983
अथ स्वसंवेद्म्; तदयुक्म्, िवषयदृष्ान्तबलेन िनराकृतं नैयाियकैः।
atha svasaṁvedyam; tadayuktam, viṣayadṛṣṭāntabalena nirākṛtaṁ
naiyāyikaiḥ.
Translation: 983
If you say, it is self-illuminating, that also is not proper, because
the logicians have already refuted it on the strength of example of
content.
Text: 984
अथ अनवगतम्, न तिहर् तद् दहनस्य गर्हणम्। “अपर्त्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नाथर् दृिष्ः
पर् सद्ध्यित” इित न्यायात्।
atha anavagatam, na tarhi tad dahanasya grahaṇam. “apratyakṣopa-
lambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati” iti nyāyāt.
Translation: 984
If you say, it is unknown, then, it cannot be said to be knowledge
of fire on the basis of the maxim “if knowledge is not known, then,
its content is also not known.”
Text: 985
अिप च, यत् तत् दहनगर्हणम्-ततर् िकमवभाित-िकम् अथर् ः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा?
api ca, yat tat dahanagrahaṇam-tatra kimavabhāti-kim arthaḥ,
jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 985
Moreover, whatever you consider to be the knowledge of fire, we
would like to ask, what does appear there? Is it the object or the
knowledge or both?
Text: 986
यिद अथर् ः पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्, असंिविदतायां संिवत्ो तत्संिवत्ययोगात्।
yadi arthaḥ pratibhāti; tadayuktam, asaṁviditāyāṁ saṁvitto
tatsaṁvityayogāt.
Translation: 986
If you say that, it is the object that appears, that is not proper,
because, if the knowledge is not known, its object cannot be known.
Text: 987
अथ ज्ञानम्; [न] तिहर् दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धोऽवगतः तत्संिव त्पूवर्कत्वात् सम्बन्धबुद्ेः।
atha jñānam; [na] tarhi dahanadhūmayoḥ sambandho’vagataḥ
tatsaṁvittipūrvakatvāt sambandhabuddheḥ.
Translation: 987
If you say that, it is the knowledge that is known, then, it amounts
to saying that, the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke
is not known, because, knowledge of that relation has to be preceded
by knowledge of the relata.
Text: 988
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्, एकोपलम्भस्या(स्य) िद्तीयाकारप रहार स्थित-
धमर् त्वात्। न च दहनज्ञाने ज्ञानाथर् कारौ पर्तीयेते अिप तु दहनस्यैव पर्ितभासनात्।
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadayuktam, ekopalambhasyā(sya)
dvitīyākāraparihārasthitidharmatvāt. na ca dahanajñāne jñānār-
thakārau pratīyete api tu dahanasyaiva pratibhāsanāt.
Translation: 988
If you say that, both appear there, it is improper, because, once
one is known, it will lose the property of being present in the other
form. It is not the case that, in the knowledge of fire, two forms viz.
the form of knowledge and the knowledge of object appear. But,
what appears is only fire.
Text: 989
अथ दहनोत्पाद्त्वेन तद्हनस्य संवेदनम्; कथं तद्हनेनोत्पाद्ते? िकम्
अतज्जननस्वभावेन तज्जननस्वभावेन वा?
atha dahanotpādyatvena taddahanasya saṁvedanam; kathaṁ
taddahanenotpādyate? kim atajjananasvabhāvena tajjananasvabhā-
vena vā?
Translation: 989
If you say that, it is the knowledge of fire, because it is produced by
fire, then, we would like to know, how it is produced by fire? Is it
produced as having the nature of not producing that, or, as having

the nature of producing that?
Text: 990
यद्तज्जननस्वभावेन; अतज्जननस्वभावः कथमसौ तज्जनयेत्?
yadyatajjananasvabhāvena; atajjananasvabhāvaḥ kathamasau tajja-
nayet?
Translation: 990
If you say, as having the nature of not producing that, then, if it has
the nature of not producing that, then, how can it produce that?
Text: 991
अथ तज्जननस्वभावः; न तिहर् दहनाद् धूमस्योत्प त्ः, दहनस्य दहनज्ञानोत्पा-
दकस्वाभाव्येन धूमोत्पादकत्वायोगात्।
atha tajjananasvabhāvaḥ; na tarhi dahanād dhūmasyotpattiḥ, daha-
nasya dahanajñānotpādakasvābhāvyena dhūmotpādakatvāyogāt.
Translation: 991
If you say, it has the nature of producing that, then, you should
accept that fire does not produce smoke, because, the fire has the
nature of producing its knowledge, it cannot have the nature of
producing smoke.
Text: 992
अथ तेनव ै स्वभावेन धूममुत्पादयित; पर्ाप्ा िवज्ञानस्यािप धूमरूपता, धूमस्य वा
िवज्ञानरूपता, अिभन्ात्मोत्पाद्ते, भेदकं च न बीजम स्त।
atha tenaiva svabhāvena dhūmamutpādayati; prāptā vijñānasyāpi
dhūmarūpatā, dhūmasya vā vijñānarūpatā, abhinnātmotpādyate,
bhedakaṁ ca na bījamasti.
Translation: 992
If you say that, fire produces smoke, because, it has the nature
of producing smoke, then, it amounts to saying that, knowledge is
smoke or smoke is knowledge. Both are produced in the identical
form and there is no ground left to distinguish them.
Text: 993
अथ स्वभावान्तरेण जनयित; [न] एकस्य स्वभावद्याभावात्-स्वभावद्ये च
एकतानुपपन्ा। ततश्च दहनेन धूमोत्पादनं िकर्यते न तदा स्वज्ञानमुत्पादयित। ज्ञानं
िवना केन हेतुफलावधारणं िकर्यते?
atha svabhāvāntareṇa janayati; [na] ekasya svabhāvadvayābhāvāt-

svabhāvadvaye ca ekatānupapannā. tataśca dahanena dhūmot-
pādanaṁ kriyate na tadā svajñānamutpādayati. jñānaṁ vinā kena
hetuphalāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate?
Translation: 993
If you say that, it produces by help of some other nature, it cannot
be accepted, because, one thing cannot have two natures. And if you
accept two natures, you cannot justify it to be one. Therefore, when
fire is producing smoke, then, it cannot produce its own knowledge.
Without knowledge, how can any one decide what is the cause and
what is the effect?
Text: 994
अथ दहनो दहनज्ञानमुत्पादयित; न तिहर् दहनस्य धूमोत्पादकत्वम्, तदभावात् न
बाह्ाथर् योहेर्तुफलभावावधारणं दहनािदज्ञानेन शक्यते कतुर्म्।
atha dahano dahanajñānamutpādayati; na tarhi dahanasya
dhūmotpādakatvam, tadabhāvāt na bāhyārthayorhetuphalabhāvā-
vadhāraṇaṁ dahanādijñānena śakyate kartum.
Translation: 994
If you say, fire produces knowledge of fire, then, it means that, fire
does not produce smoke. In the absence of that it is not possible
to decide the cause and effect relationship between two external
objects by the knowledge of fire etc.
[३. कायार्नुमानिनरासाय दहनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावानुपपत्ेः पुनरुपकर्मः।]

[3. kāryānumānanirāsāya dahanadhūmayorhetuphalabhāvānupapatteḥ
punarupakramaḥ.]
Text: 995
इतोऽिप दहनधूमयोः हेतुफलभावानुपप त्ः। यथा अिवच लतदहनस्वरूपस्य पूवार्परानेक-
कायार्िवभार्वकत्वं न पर्ितपद्ते भविद्ः तथा अनायत्िवकारस्य युगपदत्ु पन्ानेक-
कायार्िवभार्वकत्वमिप न पर्त्येतव्यम्।
ito’pi dahanadhūmayoḥ hetuphalabhāvānupapattiḥ. yathā avicalita-
dahanasvarūpasya pūrvāparānekakāryāvirbhāvakatvaṁ na prati-
padyate bhavadbhiḥ tathā anāyattavikārasya yugapadutpannāneka-
kāryāvirbhāvakatvamapi na pratyetavyam.
Translation: 995
For the following reason also one cannot explain the cause and
effect relationship between fire and smoke. As you do not accept
manifestation of many earlier and later effects of fire possessing
invariable nature, in the same way, you should not accept a
thing which does not undergo any change having the property of
manifesting many simultaneous effects.
Text: 996
अथ अभ्युपगम्यते युगपदनेककायोर्त्पादकत्वं युगपदनेककायोर्त्पादनशिक्युक्स्योत्पत्ेः;
atha abhyupagamyate yugapadanekakāryotpādakatvaṁ yugapada-
nekakāryotpādanaśaktiyuktasyotpatteḥ;
Translation: 996
Clarification:
Well, we accept simultaneous production of many effects, because, it
possesses power or capacity to produce many effects simultaneously.
Text: 997
यद्ेवं - कर्मभाव्यनेककायार्िवभार्वकत्वस्योत्पत्ेः अयुगपदेकं कायर् िवदध्यात्।
yadyevaṁ - kramabhāvyanekakāryāvirbhāvakatvasyotpatteḥ ayuga-
padekaṁ kāryaṁ vidadhyāt.
Translation: 997
Reply:
If it is so, then, since it is accepted as having the capacity to manifest
many effects in a sequence, then, at a time it will produce only one
effect.
Text: 998
िवदधात्येव इित चेत्;
vidadhātyeva iti cet;
Translation: 998
Clarification:
If we say, it does produce, then?
Text: 999
इदमापेिक्षकत्वं यत्कर्मभाव्यनेककायर् जनकात्मकं स्वरूपम्। एतदभ्युपगमेऽभ्युपेतहान-
मापद्ते।
idamāpekṣikatvaṁ yatkramabhāvyanekakāryajanakātmakaṁ svarū-
pam. etadabhyupagame’bhyupetahānamāpadyate.
Translation: 999
Reply:
It is a relative phenomenon that, it has the nature of producing
many effects in a sequence and if you accept this, it will lead to the
fault of giving up a position which was earlier taken.
Text: 1000
अथ अिवच लतरूपेण पूवार्परकायर् न जन्यते; तदा युगपदिप न कुयार्त् अनायत्िवकारः।
ततश्च न दहनाद् धूमस्योत्प त्ः।
atha avicalitarūpeṇa pūrvāparakāryaṁ na janyate; tadā yugapadapi
na kuryāt anāyattavikāraḥ. tataśca na dahanād dhūmasyotpattiḥ.
Translation: 1000
If you say that, it does not produce earlier and later effects,
without getting affected by any variation, then, simultaneously also
it cannot produce, because, it is not affected by any variation and
as a consequence, there will be no smoke from fire.
Text: 1001
अथ एकमेव तेन ज्वलनेन जन्यते;
atha ekameva tena jvalanena janyate;
Translation: 1001
Clarification:
Well, only one effect is generated by fire.
Text: 1002
िकं तदेकम्-िवज्ञानम्, धूमो वा?
kiṁ tadekam-vijñānam, dhūmo vā?
Translation: 1002
Reply:
What is that one effect? Is it knowledge or smoke?
Text: 1003
तद्िद िवज्ञानमेव जन्यते; न तिहर् धूमं दृष्ट्ा अिग्ं(िग्ः) पर्तीय[तेऽ]तद्व्यापारलब्ध-
जन्मवत्वात्।
tadyadi vijñānameva janyate; na tarhi dhūmaṁ dṛṣṭvā agniṁ(gniḥ)
pratīya[te’]tadvyāpāralabdhajanmavatvāt.
Translation: 1003
If you say that, knowledge alone is produced, then, after seeing
the smoke, one will not come to know fire, because it will not be
produced by its function.
Text: 1004
अथ धूम एव उत्पाद्ते; तदा तिद्ज्ञानं िवना केन हेतुफलभावोऽवगम्यते?
atha dhūma eva utpādyate; tadā tadvijñānaṁ vinā kena hetupha-
labhāvo’vagamyate?
Translation: 1004
If you say that, only smoke is produced by fire, then, without its
knowledge, who will come to know the cause and effect relationship
between them?
Text: 1005
इतोऽिप दहनस्य धूमािवभार्वकत्वं न जाघटीित - िकं िनिमत्भूतेन धूमोत्पादनं िकर्यते,
िकं वा उपादानभूतेन?
ito’pi dahanasya dhūmāvirbhāvakatvaṁ na jāghaṭīti - kiṁ nimitta-
bhūtena dhūmotpādanaṁ kriyate, kiṁ vā upādānabhūtena?
Translation: 1005
For the following reason also, fire cannot be said to be the producer
of smoke. Is it the case that fire produces smoke as its auxiliary
cause, or, it produces smoke as its material cause?
Text: 1006
तद्िद िनिमत्भूतेनोत्पाद्ते; तदा धूमरूपता न पर्ाप्नोित उपादानं िवना।
tadyadi nimittabhūtenotpādyate; tadā dhūmarūpatā na prāpnoti
upādānaṁ vinā.
Translation: 1006
If you say, as an auxiliary cause it produces smoke, then, the effect
called smoke, because, it has come into being without its material
cause.
Text: 1007
अथ उपादानभूतेनोत्पादनं िकर्यते; ननु असमानजातीयं कथमुपादानकारणं भवेत्?
अभ्युपगमे वा देहे न्दर्यसङ्ातादेव गभार्दौ िवज्ञानं भिवष्यित अलं परलोकिवज्ञानकल्पनया।
atha upādānabhūtenotpādanaṁ kriyate; nanu asamānajātīyaṁ
kathamupādānakāraṇaṁ bhavet? abhyupagame vā dehendriya-
saṅghātādeva garbhādau vijñānaṁ bhaviṣyati alaṁ paralokavijñā-
nakalpanayā.
Translation: 1007
Again if you say that, it produces smoke as its material cause, then,
the question arises, how can an entity belonging to a different class
be the material cause of an entity belonging to a different class? If
in spite of that you accept it, then, there will be knowledge in the
womb of mother from the collection of factors such as body, sense
organ etc.etc. and in that case, what is the need of postulating
knowledge of world hereafter?
Text: 1008
अथ समानजातीयेन िवज्ञानेन िवना न िवज्ञानस्य उद्गितः इित चेत्;
atha samānajātīyena vijñānena vinā na vijñānasya udgatiḥ iti cet;
Translation: 1008
Clarification:
Well, knowledge cannot arise without the knowledge belonging to
the same class.
Text: 1009
एवं तिहर् धूमस्यािप असमानजातीयात् दहनात् कथमुत्प त्?
evaṁ tarhi dhūmasyāpi asamānajātīyāt dahanāt kathamutpatti?
Translation: 1009
Reply:
In that case, how can smoke be produced from fire, which does not
belong to the class of smoke?
Text: 1010
अथ रूपरूपतया वह्े ः समानजातीयत्वम्;
atha rūparūpatayā vahneḥ samānajātīyatvam;
Translation: 1010
Clarification:
Well, fire can be treated as belonging to the same class i.e. of the
class of smoke as possessing a form.
Text: 1011
एवं देहादेरिप समानजातीयत्वं स्वलक्षणरूपतया। इदमेव चेत स समारोप्य
उक्म्-“शरीरादेव इित बृहस्पितः।”
evaṁ dehāderapi samānajātīyatvaṁ svalakṣaṇarūpatayā. idameva
cetasi samāropya uktam-“śarīrādeva iti bṛhaspatiḥ.”
Translation: 1011
Reply:
Then, factors like body etc. can also be treated as belonging to
the same class i.e. the class of knowledge as having the form of a
particular. Having kept this very idea in mind, it has been said,
“From the body alone (knowledge arises), says Bṛhaspati”.
Text: 1012
अथ ज्ञानरूपतया न समानजातीयत्वं देहस्य; दहनस्यािप धूमरूपतयाऽसमानजातीयत्वम्।
िनयतकारणजन्याकारतया िनयतदेशकालस्वभावतया च सवेर् भावाः अन्योन्यव्या-
वृत्तनवः। न च तेषाम् अन्योन्याकारानुगमोऽ स्त, नाप्येकजात्यनुगमः। तदक्
ु म्-
सवेर् भावाः स्वभावेन स्वस्वभावव्यव स्थतेः।
स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां यस्माद् व्यावृ त्भािगनः॥
atha jñānarūpatayā na samānajātīyatvaṁ dehasya; dahanasyāpi
dhūmarūpatayā’samānajātīyatvam. niyatakāraṇajanyākāratayā
niyatadeśakālasvabhāvatayā ca sarve bhāvāḥ anyonyavyāvṛttatana-
vaḥ. na ca teṣām anyonyākārānugamo’sti, nāpyekajātyanugamaḥ.
taduktam-
sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ,
svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṁ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginaḥ.
Translation: 1012
If you say that, body cannot be treated as belonging to the same
class as knowledge, then, fire also cannot be treated as belonging
to the same class as smoke. All positive entities are distinct from
one another, as possessing the form produced by specific cause and
as having the nature of being in a particular place and particular

time. There is no common form by which they can be connected
with one another. Nor there is any universal property by which
they can form the class. This is what has been said in the following
statement, “All positive entities are existent in their own form by
nature, because, they are distinguished on the basis of their own
nature and from the nature of others.”
Text: 1013
ततश्च िभन्जातीयात् सवर् जायमानं दृष्म्, न समानजातीयाद्वत् िकिञ्द् दृष्पूवर्म्। एवञ्
िभन्जातीयं देहािदकं गभार्दौ िवज्ञानमुत्पादियष्यित। ततश्च न परलोकः पर् सद्ध्यित।
tataśca bhinnajātīyāt sarvaṁ jāyamānaṁ dṛṣṭam, na samānajātī-
yādbhavat kiñcid dṛṣṭapūrvam. evañca bhinnajātīyaṁ dehādikaṁ
garbhādau vijñānamutpādayiṣyati. tataśca na paralokaḥ prasi-
ddhyati.
Translation: 1013
Therefore, everything is seen as being produced from something
belonging to different class. Nothing has been seen before which is
produced from something belonging to the same class. Thus, the
factors like body etc. would produce knowledge in the womb of
the mother and therefore, the world “after this world” i.e. re-birth
cannot be established.
Text: 1014
अथ समानजातीयं िवज्ञानं िवना िवज्ञानं नोत्पद्ते;
atha samānajātīyaṁ vijñānaṁ vinā vijñānaṁ notpadyate;
Translation: 1014
Objection:
Well, no knowledge can be produced without the knowledge
belonging to the same class.
Text: 1015
तदा न कस्यिचदत्ु प त्ः स्यात्, समानजातीयकारणासम्भवात्। ततश्च कायार्नुमानं हीयते।
tadā na kasyacidutpattiḥ syāt, samānajātīyakāraṇāsambhavāt.
tataśca kāryānumānaṁ hīyate.
Translation: 1015
Reply:
In that case, nothing can be produced, because, there is no cause
which belongs to the same class. This leads to the conclusion that,
there cannot be inference of any effect (on the basis of the cause).
Text: 1016
इतोऽिप दहनधूमयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणं कतुर् नैव शक्यते-िकम् एकेन ज्ञानेन
दहनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावावधारणं िकर्यते, आहो स्वद् पर्ितिनयतेन ज्ञानेन?
ito’pi dahanadhūmayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇaṁ kartuṁ naiva
śakyate-kim ekena jñānena dahanadhūmayorhetuphalabhāvāva-
dhāraṇaṁ kriyate, āhosvid pratiniyatena jñānena?
Translation: 1016
For the following reason also, it is not at all possible to decide
the cause and effect relationship between fire and smoke, because,
here the question arises, is it the fact that the cause and effect
relationship is decided between fire and smoke on the basis of one
knowledge, or, on the basis of each knowledge i.e. knowledge of
smoke and knowledge of fire?
Text: 1017
तद्िद एकं ज्ञानम् उभयावगाहकं गीयते; तदा ज्ञानस्य अक्षिणकत्वमापद्ते धमर् हेतोवार्।
tadyadi ekaṁ jñānam ubhayāvagāhakaṁ gīyate; tadā jñānasya
akṣaṇikatvamāpadyate dharmahetorvā.
Translation: 1017
If you say, by one knowledge which is the knowledge of both fire
and smoke, then, the knowledge cannot be said to be momentary
or the cause of the smoke cannot be said to be momentary.
Text: 1018
अथ पर्ितिनयतेन ज्ञानेन पूवार्परावधारणं िकर्यते; तदयुक्म्, धूमावगाहकेन िवज्ञानेन
तत्सत्ामातर्ं पर्द्ोत्यते। तत्स्वरूपमातर्पयर् वसाियना तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्वं िवधीयते तदक्
ु म्-
“सामान्ये सद्साध्यता” सामान्ये धूमा स्तत्वमातर्े धूमज्ञानस्य पर्ामाण्यम स्त।
atha pratiniyatena jñānena pūrvāparāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate; tadayu-
ktam, dhūmāvagāhakena vijñānena tatsattāmātraṁ pradyotyate.
tatsvarūpamātraparyavasāyinā tatsvarūpāstitvaṁ vidhīyate tadu-
ktam- “sāmānye siddhasādhyatā”. sāmānye dhūmāstitvamātre dhū-

majñānasya prāmāṇyamasti.
Translation: 1018
If you say that, by each knowledge the precedence of the cause
and the following of the effect thereafter is decided, that will not
be proper, because knowledge of smoke reveals mere existence of
smoke. That which concludes in mere exhibiting its form enjoins
the existence of that form. As it has been made in the following
statement, for an “entity in general” there is existence of its form.
It means, in smoke in general i.e. in mere existence of smoke, the
knowledge of smoke can be treated as true.
Text: 1019
"िवशेषेऽनुगमाभावः"। िवशेषे भेदे दहनेन सह पूवार्परिवकल्पो(ल्पे) अनुगमाभावः
व्यापाराभावः। न शक्नोित धूमज्ञानमवगन्तुम्-'िकमेतद् धूमस्वरूपं दहनात् पूवर् सह
पश्चाद्ा जातम्?' धूमज्ञानस्य दहनात्मा िपशाचतुल्यतया व्यव स्थतः - यथा धूमज्ञानं
िपशाचािदस्वरूपं न िवषययित तेन सह पूवार्परसहभावं न शक्नोित स्थापियतुं धूमस्य;
दहनस्यािप धूमज्ञानेन स्वरूपं नाव सतम्, तेन सह पूवार्परसहभावेन धूमज्ञानं धूमस्वरूपं
नावगन्तुं शक्नोित।
“viśeṣe’nugamābhāvaḥ”. viśeṣe bhede dahanena saha pūrvāparavikal-
po(lpe) anugamābhāvaḥ vyāpārābhāvaḥ. na śaknoti dhūmajñānama-
vagantum- ‘kimetad dhūmasvarūpaṁ dahanāt pūrvaṁ saha paścādvā
jātam?’ dhūmajñānasya dahanātmā piśācatulyatayā vyavasthitaḥ-
yathā dhūmajñānaṁ piśācādisvarūpaṁ na viṣayayati tena saha pūr-
vāparasahabhāvaṁ na śaknoti sthāpayituṁ dhūmasya; dahanasyāpi
dhūmajñānena svarūpaṁ nāvasitam, tena saha pūrvāparasahabhā-
vena dhūmajñānaṁ dhūmasvarūpaṁ nāvagantuṁ śaknoti.
Translation: 1019
There is other statement, “in the particular form of an entity, there
is no common characteristic.” It means in each distinct particular,
there is no common characteristic which can invite the preceding
and the following with the fire i.e. there is no function here. It
cannot create awareness of knowledge of smoke viz. “whether the
nature of the smoke is produced before fire or along with fire or
after fire?” If the knowledge of smoke is treated as knowledge of

fire, it will be similar to existence of a ghost. In other words, as the
knowledge of smoke cannot reveal the form of a ghost in it, and
cannot establish co-existence of the smoke with fire, in the same
way, the knowledge of fire, cannot be treated as knowledge of smoke,
because, the knowledge of smoke cannot cause the knowledge of the
nature of smoke either preceded by fire or coming into being in a
sequence.
Text: 1020
अथ यद्िप धूमज्ञानं दहनस्य स्वरूपं न िवषययित तथािप स्वज्ञानेन दहनस्वरूपं िवषयी-
िकर्यते, िपशाचादेस्तु स्वरूपं न केनाप्यव सतम्, तेन सह पूवार्परभावो नावगम्यते धूमस्य;
atha yadyapi dhūmajñānaṁ dahanasya svarūpaṁ na viṣayayati
tathāpi svajñānena dahanasvarūpaṁ viṣayīkriyate, piśācādestu
svarūpaṁ na kenāpyavasitam, tena saha pūrvāparabhāvo nāvaga-
myate dhūmasya;
Translation: 1020
Clarification:
Well, although the knowledge of smoke does not contain the nature
of fire, still by its own knowledge, it does take the form of fire as
its content. The form of ghost however, is not known to anybody.
Therefore, no one understands the sequence of smoke with the
ghost.
Text: 1021
तदेतदयुक्म्, दहनज्ञानेनािप दहना स्तत्वमातर्मव सतम्, न तु धूमेन सह पूवार्पर-
सहिवकल्पः। सती सत्ा दहनज्ञानेन पर्द्ोत्यते। सा तु धूमात् िकम् - पूवर् सह
पश्चाद्ा िचरोत्पन्ा पर्त्ययोत्पन्ा अनुत्पन्ा वा? नायं दहनज्ञानव्यापारस्य िवषयः अिप
तु तत्सत्ामातर्पर्ितबद्ं तद स्तत्वं िवदधाित। िपशाचोऽिप स्वज्ञानेनावगतः।
tadetadayuktam, dahanajñānenāpi dahanāstitvamātramavasitam,
na tu dhūmena saha pūrvāparasahavikalpaḥ. satī sattā dahana-
jñānena pradyotyate. sā tu dhūmāt kim - pūrvaṁ saha paścādvā
cirotpannā pratyayotpannā anutpannā vā? nāyaṁ dahanajñāna-
vyāpārasya viṣayaḥ api tu tatsattāmātrapratibaddhaṁ tadastitvaṁ
vidadhāti. piśāco’pi svajñānenāvagataḥ.
Translation: 1021
Reply:
This is not proper. By the knowledge of fire also mere existence
of fire is known and not its sequence with the smoke. If there is
existence (of fire) the knowledge of fire simply reveals it. Whether,
that existence of fire is before smoke or after smoke or produced
at a later time, or produced by knowledge, or not produced at all,
is not the subject matter of the function of knowledge of fire. The
knowledge of fire simply enjoins the existence, which is invariably
related to the mere existence of fire. Even the ghost is understood
from the knowledge of ghost.
Text: 1022
कथं?
kathaṁ?
Translation: 1022
Objection:
How do you say so?
Text: 1023
ज्ञायते, सोऽिप स्वज्ञानावगािहतदेहोऽस्तु - यिद नाम तेन सह धूमज्ञानं पूवार्परसहभावं न
शक्नोित पर्काशियतुं धूमस्य।
jñāyate, so’pi svajñānāvagāhitadeho’stu - yadi nāma tena saha
dhūmajñānaṁ pūrvāparasahabhāvaṁ na śaknoti prakāśayituṁ
dhūmasya.
Translation: 1023
Reply:
Because, it is known and so let that ghost also exist, whose existence
depends upon its knowledge itself, even if, it is not capable of
revealing the sequential existence of smoke.
Text: 1024
इतोऽिप दहनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कतुर्म्। धूमज्ञानसत्ाकाले धूमसत्ा न
िवद्ते ज्वलनज्ञानसत्ाकाले ज्वलनसत्ा न िवद्ते। न(ना)िवद्मानस्या(स्य) गर्हणं नाम,
अन्यथागर्ािह(थाऽगर्ाह्)केशोण्डु कस्यािप गर्हणं स्यात्।
ito’pi dahanadhūmayorhetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇaṁ na śakyate

kartum dhūmajñānasattākāle dhūmasattā na vidyate jvalanajñāna-
sattākāle jvalanasattā na vidyate. na(nā)vidyamānasyā(sya) gra-
haṇaṁ nāma, anyathāgrāhi(thā’grāhya)keśoṇḍukasyāpi grahaṇaṁ
syāt.
Translation: 1024
For the following reason also, it is not possible to decide the cause
and effect relationship between fire and smoke. When the knowledge
of smoke exists the smoke does not exist and when the knowledge of
fire exists, fire does not exist. But that which does not exist cannot
be known. Otherwise, there should be knowledge of thread-like
things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into
the shade from the sun.
Text: 1025
अथ केशोण्डु कस्य सवर् दा सत्ा न िवद्ते- न ज्ञानकाले नािप पूवर्, दहनादेस्तु पूवर् सत्ा
िवद्ते।
atha keśoṇḍukasya sarvadā sattā na vidyate- na jñānakāle nāpi
pūrvam, dahanādestu pūrvaṁ sattā vidyate.
Translation: 1025
Clarification:
Well, if you say that, thread-like things appearing in the knowledge
for a person who comes into the shade from the sun, do not exist
always neither at the time of knowledge nor before that. On the
other hand, fires etc. do exist before.
Text: 1026
यिद नाम 'ज्ञानकाले नािप पूवर् तु िवद्ते' इित; सुव्याहृतमेतत्! गृहीितकाले ना स्त गृहीतेस्तु
पूवर्म स्त, गृहीितमन्तरेण सु स्थतािन वस्तूिन!
yadi nāma ‘jñānakāle nāpi pūrvaṁ tu vidyate’ iti; suvyāhṛtametat!
gṛhītikāle nāsti gṛhītestu pūrvamasti, gṛhītimantareṇa susthitāni
vastūni!
Translation: 1026
Reply:
It is a good clarification viz. that, it does not exist at the time of
knowledge, but it does exist before knowledge. It means, at the time
of knowledge it is not there, but before knowledge it is there, and

so things can exist independent of their knowledge.
Text: 1027
अथ ज्ञानजनकत्वेन पूवर् िवद्ते;
atha jñānajanakatvena pūrvaṁ vidyate;
Translation: 1027
Clarification:
Well, it exists before as a producer of knowledge.
Text: 1028
तज्जनकत्वं केनाऽवगम्यते, िवज्ञानस्य स्वतनुद्ोतकत्वेन पयर् व सतेः? ततश्च
िपशाचकल्पौ दहनधूमाकारौ, तयोहेर्तुफलभावावधारणाय न पर्त्यक्षम्।
tajjanakatvaṁ kenā’vagamyate, vijñānasya svatanudyotakatvena
paryavasiteḥ? tataśca piśācakalpau dahanadhūmākārau, tayorhetu-
phalabhāvāvadhāraṇāya na pratyakṣam.
Translation: 1028
Reply:
Who has known that, it is the producer of knowledge, because,
knowledge terminates in revealing its own form? Therefore, the
forms of fire and smoke are like ghosts and therefore there is no
need of perception in order to know the cause and effect relationship
between them.
Text: 1029
अथ ज्ञानावलीढतदाकारान्यथानुपपत्या तयोः स्वरूपव्यवस्था िकर्यते;
atha jñānāvalīḍhatadākārānyathānupapattyā tayoḥ svarūpavyava-
sthā kriyate;
Translation: 1029
Clarification:
Well, in order to satisfactorily explain the forms which appear in
the knowledge, we require to assign forms to them.
Text: 1030
तदयुक्म्, आकारो िह पर्ागेवापोिदतः, न च आकाराथर् योः पर्ितबन्धोऽवधा रतः,
तदनवधारणे कथम् आकारोऽथर् गमयित? एवं तावदथर् जन्यत्वं न शक्यते ज्ञानस्याव-
धारियतुम्। नाप्यथर् स्य अथर् जन्यत्वम्। एवं हेतुफलभावानवधारणात् कथं धूमं दृष्ट्ा
अनुिमनोित अिग्म्।
tadayuktam, ākāro hi prāgevāpoditaḥ, na ca ākārārthayoḥ
pratibandho’vadhāritaḥ, tadanavadhāraṇe katham ākāro’rthaṁ
gamayati? evaṁ tāvadarthajanyatvaṁ na śakyate jñānasyāva-
dhārayitum. nāpyarthasya arthajanyatvam. evaṁ hetuphalabhāvā-
navadhāraṇāt kathaṁ dhūmaṁ dṛṣṭvā anuminoti agnim.
Translation: 1030
Reply:
This is not proper. We have already rejected before “form”. It has
not been decided, the invariable relationship between the form and
the thing of which this is the form, and if it is not decided, then, how
can a form cause the knowledge of a thing? Thus, it is not possible
to decide whether knowledge is produced by a thing, neither is it
decided whether a thing is produced by another thing? Therefore,
since there is no knowledge of cause and effect relationship, how
can one infer fire by seeing smoke?
[४. िवकल्प्य िवषयासम्भवदशर् नेनानुमानस्य िनरासः।]

4. vikalpya viṣayāsambhavadarśanenānumānasya nirāsaḥ]
Text: 1031
अिप च, आनुमािनकं ज्ञानं िकंिवषयं - िकं अग्न्यािदस्वलक्षणिवषयम्, आहो स्वद् वस्तुसू-
(भू)तसामान्यिवषय[म्], [अवस्तुभूतसामान्यिवषयं वा], िवकल्पिवषयं, स्वांशिवषयं,
api ca, ānumānikaṁ jñānaṁ kiṁviṣayam - kiṁ agnyādisvalakṣaṇa-
viṣayam, āhosvid vastusū(bhū)tasāmānyaviṣaya[m], [avastubhūtasā-
mānyaviṣayaṁ vā], vikalpaviṣayam, svāṁśaviṣayam, nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 1031
Moreover, what could be the object of inferential knowledge? Will
that object be a particular like fire etc. or any real entity called
universal? (or an unreal entity called universal) or some imaginary
object or a part of own form or is inferential knowledge without a
content?
Text: 1032
तद्िद स्वलक्षणिवषयम्; तदा पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दो न पर्ाप्नोित, स्वलक्षणिवषयत्वेन
स्पष्ाकारतानुमानज्ञानस्यािप पर्सज्यते, 'अस्पष्ाभम्' च भविद्ः पर्ितपद्ते न त्वन्यैः।
tadyadi svalakṣaṇaviṣayam; tadā pratyakṣānumānayorbhedo na
prāpnoti, svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvena spaṣṭākāratānumānajñānasyāpi
prasajyate, ‘aspaṣṭābham’ ca bhavadbhiḥ pratipadyate na tvanyaiḥ.
Translation: 1032
If you say that, content is a particular, then, there is no difference
between perception and inference. Since, particular will be the
object of an inferential knowledge, an inferential knowledge will
also be called knowledge in which the form of its content is very
clear. If you say, such a clarity is an appearance, then, such a view
is held only by you.
Text: 1033
अन्ये तु वद न्त - “स्वलक्षणमेव स्पष्ाकारम्।” यिद नाम पर्त्यक्षगर्ाह्ं स्वलक्षणं िवस्पष्-
मनुमानगर्ाह्म् अिवस्पष्म्, स्वलक्षणस्यैवायं भेदः। एकोऽिग्ः पर्त्यक्षजननयोग्यः अन्योऽिग्ः
अनुमानजननयोग्यः। पर्त्यक्षजननयोग्येऽग्ौ आनुमािनकं ज्ञानं यिद भवित - भवित पर्त्य-
क्षानुमानयोभेर्दः कदािचत्, यावता आनुमािनकज्ञानजननयोग्योऽिग्ः अन्य एव।
anye tu vadanti - “svalakṣaṇameva spaṣṭākāram”. yadi nāma pratya-
kṣagrāhyaṁ svalakṣaṇaṁ vispaṣṭam anumānagrāhyam avispaṣṭam,
svalakṣaṇasyaivāyaṁ bhedaḥ. eko’gniḥ pratyakṣajananayogyaḥ
anyo’gniḥ anumānajananayogyaḥ. pratyakṣajananayogye’gnau ānu-
mānikaṁ jñānaṁ yadi bhavati - bhavati pratyakṣānumānayorbhedaḥ
kadācit, yāvatā ānumānikajñānajananayogyo’gniḥ anya eva.
Translation: 1033
Others (Buddhists) however hold the view that, a particular alone
has a clear form. If the particular which is fit to be known by
perception, has clear form and the particular which is fit to be
known by inference has unclear form, then, this difference is of
particular only. One fire is fit to generate the perceptual knowledge
and another fire is fit to generate the inferential knowledge. If
we accept that, with reference to the fire which is fit to generate
perceptual knowledge, there arises the inferential knowledge, then,
somehow we can make a distinction between perception and

inference. By that, we can show that the fire which is fit to generate
inferential knowledge is indeed distinct.
Text: 1034
अथ स्वलक्षणिवषयसाम्याद् अभेदप रकल्पना पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोः;
atha svalakṣaṇaviṣayasāmyād abhedaparikalpanā pratyakṣānumā-
nayoḥ;
Translation: 1034
Clarification:
Well, because of the similarity in the particular which is the content
of the knowledge, perception and inference are postulated as one
and the same.
Text: 1035
यद्ेवम् - गन्धरसािदज्ञानानां स्वलक्षणिवषयसाम्यात् सवेर्षामभेदः पर्ाप्नोित - सवर् गन्ध-
ज्ञानं रसज्ञानं वा वक्व्यम्।
yadyevam - gandharasādijñānānāṁ svalakṣaṇaviṣayasāmyāt sarve-
ṣāmabhedaḥ prāpnoti - sarvaṁ gandhajñānaṁ rasajñānaṁ vā vakta-
vyam.
Translation: 1035
Reply:
If it is so, then, in the case of knowledges of smell, taste etc. since there
is similarity in the particular, which is the content of the knowledge,
all knowledges will have to be treated as identical i.e. all knowledges
will be either knowledges of smell or knowledges of taste.
Text: 1036
अथ स्वलक्षणिवषयत्वे सत्यिप अवान्तरभेदिववक्षया गन्धािदज्ञानमपिदश्यते;
atha svalakṣaṇaviṣayatve satyapi avāntarabhedavivakṣayā gandhādi-
jñānamapadiśyate;
Translation: 1036
Clarification:
Well, although these knowledges have particular as their content,
still, keeping in mind other differences, those knowledges are
referred to as knowledge of smell, etc.
Text: 1037
यद्ेवम् - सत्यिप अिग्िवषयत्वे पर्त्यक्षानुमानज्ञानयोः अवान्तरभेदिववक्षया पर्त्यक्षा-
नुमानज्ञानव्यपदेशः।
yadyevam - satyapi agniviṣayatve pratyakṣānumānajñānayoḥ avā-
ntarabhedavivakṣayā pratyakṣānumānajñānavyapadeśaḥ.
Translation: 1037
Reply:
If you say so, then, in spite of fire being the content of perceptual
and inferential knowledges, keeping in view other differences, they
are said to be perceptual and inferential knowledges.
Text: 1038
अथ करणभेदेन गन्धािदज्ञानािन िभद्न्ते;
atha karaṇabhedena gandhādijñānāni bhidyante;
Translation: 1038
Clarification:
Well, the knowledges of smell etc. are distinguished on the basis of
the difference of the processes through which the knowledges are
produced.
Text: 1039
तदा पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोः करणभेदोपपत्ेः भेदोऽस्तु। एवं च यदक्
ु म्-“स्वलक्षणिवषयानुमानं
भवित” तन्मूढोक्म्, अिग्पर्पञ्स्य पर्ितभासनात्।
tadā pratyakṣānumānayoḥ karaṇabhedopapatteḥ bhedo’stu. evaṁ
ca yaduktam-“svalakṣaṇaviṣayānumānaṁ bhavati” tanmūḍhoktam,
agniprapañcasya pratibhāsanāt.
Translation: 1039
Reply:
In that case, since the difference in processes of perceptual
knowledges and inferential knowledges is justified, let there be
difference between the two. Thus, your statement “inference
operates with reference to the object viz. particular” is a foolish
statement, because in that knowledge only, a series of fire
particulars appears.
Text: 1040
अथ वस्तुभूतसामान्यिवषयम्; न, तदभावाद् िवज्ञानजनकत्वासम्भवाच्च। न च
जनकत्वमन्तरेण िवषयाथर् उपलभ्यते।
atha vastubhūtasāmānyaviṣayam; na, tadabhāvād vijñānajanaka-
tvāsambhavācca. na ca janakatvamantareṇa viṣayārtha upalabhyate.
Translation: 1040
If you say that, the object of inferential knowledge is a real universal,
it will not be correct, because, there is nothing called universal
and therefore it cannot generate any knowledge. Unless, an entity
generates knowledge it cannot be said to be object of this knowledge.
Text: 1041
अथ अवस्तुभूतसामान्यिवषयम्। तदक् ु म् - “वैक ल्पकं सामान्यं बुद्ध्युपदिशर् तरूपम्”;
एतदिप न युक्म्, अिवद्मानं सामान्यं कथं बुद्ेिवर् षयभावं पर्ितपद्ते? िकम् - सत्ामातर्ेण,
सहोत्पादेन वा, जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन वा? सवर् स्यासम्भवे िवषयाथोर् भणनीयः। यिद
च जनकत्वाद्भावेऽिप बुद्ौ पर्ितभाित सामान्यम्; तदा रूपादेरिप जनकत्वं न कल्पनीयम्
- रूपं िवज्ञानमकुवर् त् पर्त्यक्षं स्यात्। यदिप “दृश्यिवकल्प्यावथार्वेक कृत्य तदध्यवसायेन
पर्वतर् ते” इत्युक्म्। दृश्यं बाह्ं रूपािदस्वलक्षणम्, िवकल्पः(प्यः) बुिद्समारोिपताकारः।
िकं पुनरनयोः एक करणम्? िकम्-अभेदेन उत्पादनम्, िकं वा अभेदेन अवधारणम् ,
आहो स्वत् सङ्टना िकर्यते?
atha avastubhūtasāmānyaviṣayam. taduktam - “vaikalpikaṁ sāmā-
nyaṁ buddhyupadarśitarūpam”; etadapi na yuktam, avidyamānaṁ
sāmānyaṁ kathaṁ buddherviṣayabhāvaṁ pratipadyate? kim -
sattāmātreṇa, sahotpādena vā, janakatvā”kārārpakatvena vā? sarva-
syāsambhave viṣayārtho bhaṇanīyaḥ. yadi ca janakatvādyabhāve’pi
buddhau pratibhāti sāmānyam; tadā rūpāderapi janakatvaṁ na
kalpanīyam - rūpaṁ vijñānamakurvat pratyakṣaṁ syāt. yadapi
“dṛśyavikalpyāvarthāvekīkṛtya tadadhyavasāyena pravartate”
ityuktam. dṛśyaṁ bāhyaṁ rūpādisvalakṣaṇam, vikalpaḥ(pyaḥ)
buddhisamāropitākāraḥ. kiṁ punaranayoḥ ekīkaraṇam? kim-abhe-
dena utpādanam, kiṁ vā abhedena avadhāraṇam, āhosvit saṅgha-
ṭanā kriyate?
Translation: 1041
If you say, the unreal universal is the content of the inferential
cognition, as expressed in your statement, “the imagined universal
is presented by the mind,” that also is not proper, because, if

the universal does not exist, how can it become the content of
knowledge? Will it become content of knowledge, by mere existence
or being produced together or by offering a form which can cause
the knowledge? All of this is impossible and therefore you should
state, what will be the object of inferential knowledge. If you say,
even if it does not generate the knowledge, the universal can appear
in the knowledge, then, you should also not postulate that, color
etc. produce knowledge and in that case color will become object of
perception, even if it does not cause that knowledge. You had said,
“by uniting both, the visible as well as imagined objects, it works
with the help of a definite knowledge of that. Here, visible is external
particular viz. color etc. and imagined is the form super-imposed by
the mind. So, what will be the meaning of their unification? Does it
mean producing as identical, or, does it mean knowing as identical,
or, does it mean it is constructed?
Text: 1042
तद्िद अभेदेन उत्पादनम्; सदसतोरभेदेन उत्पादनं हततर्ंपादृते नान्यो वक्ुमहर् ित।
अभेदेनोत्पादने च भावस्याभावपर्सङ्ः, सामान्यस्य वा वस्तुत्वं पर्ाप्नोित, तद्स्तुत्वे
स्वलक्षणिवषयमनुमानम्। पर्त्यक्षाऽनुमानयोभेर्दबीजमन्वेष्व्यम्।
tadyadi abhedena utpādanam; sadasatorabhedena utpādanaṁ
hatatraṁpādṛte nānyo vaktumarhati. abhedenotpādane ca bhāvasyā-
bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, sāmānyasya vā vastutvaṁ prāpnoti, tadvastutve
svalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānam. pratyakṣā’numānayorbhedabījama-
nveṣṭavyam.
Translation: 1042
If you say, it means producing as identical, then, no one other than
a shameless person is capable of saying that, there is a production
as identical of real and unreal entities and if there is a production as
identical, there will be an absence of a positive entity or universal
will become real and if universal becomes real, particular will
become the object of inferential knowledge and as such one will have
to find out the ground to distinguish perception from inference.
Text: 1043
अथ एक करणम् - एकत्वेन पर्तीयमानत्वं दृश्यिवकल्प्ययोः; तदक्
ु ं (तदयुक्म्), िकम् एक
एव आकारः पर्ितभाित, आहो स्वद् आकारद्यम्?
atha ekīkaraṇam - ekatvena pratīyamānatvaṁ dṛśyavikalpyayoḥ;
taduktaṁ(tadayuktam), kim eka eva ākāraḥ pratibhāti, āhosvid
ākāradvayam?
Translation: 1043
If you say, unification means knowing visible and imagined as one
that will be improper. In that case, does it mean only one form
appears in the knowledge or two forms?
Text: 1044
तद्िद एक एव आकारः पर्ितभाित; त त्कं दृश्याकारः, आहो स्वद् िवकल्पाकारः?
tadyadi eka eva ākāraḥ pratibhāti; tatkiṁ dṛśyākāraḥ, āhosvid
vikalpākāraḥ?
Translation: 1044
If you say, only one form appears in the knowledge, is that the
visible form or the imagined form?
Text: 1045
तद्िद दृश्याकारः पर्ितभाित; तदा स्वलक्षणिवषयमेव अनुमानं पर्सज्यते।
tadyadi dṛśyākāraḥ pratibhāti; tadā svalakṣaṇaviṣayameva anu-
mānaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 1045
If it is the visible form, that appears in the knowledge, then, the
content of inferential knowledge becomes nothing but a particular.
Text: 1046
अथ िवकल्पाकारः पर्ितभाित; तस्य सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वेन पर्ितभासािवषयत्वाद्ाप्येतद्
वक्व्यम्- स्वलक्षणमेष ...............काराव्यित रक्ाव्यित रक्ो वा?
atha vikalpākāraḥ pratibhāti; tasya sarvopākhyārahitatvena prati-
bhāsāviṣayatvādvāpyetad vaktavyam- svalakṣaṇameṣa ..................
kārāvyatiriktāvyatirikto vā?
Translation: 1046
If you say, imagined form appears in knowledge, then, since it is
not possible for the object to appear in the inferential knowledge
devoid of all attributes, you should say this particular (..the text is
broken) whether different from the form or identical with the form?
Text: 1047
यद्व्यित रक्ः; तदा स्वलक्षणिवषयमनुमानं पर्ाप्म्। समारोिपतं च सामान्यं पर्तीयते इित
न वक्व्यम्। ता त्वकं च सामान्यं पर्सज्यते। .........[दृश्या]ता त्वकत्वपर्सङ्ो वा।
yadyavyatiriktaḥ; tadā svalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṁ prāptam.
samāropitaṁ ca sāmānyaṁ pratīyate iti na vaktavyam. tāttvikaṁ
ca sāmānyaṁ prasajyate. .........[dṛśyā]tāttvikatvaprasaṅgo vā.
Translation: 1047
If it is identical, then, the object of an inferential knowledge becomes
the particular and then, you should not say that in that knowledge,
a super-imposed universal appears. In that case the universal will
become real….. (the text is broken or there will be contingency of
its becoming visible)
Text: 1048
अथ व्यित रक्ो िवकल्पाकारः; तिहर् न वक्व्यम् - तदारोपद्ारेण पर्तीयते स्वलक्षण-
िवकल्पाकारान्त रतत्वात्।
atha vyatirikto vikalpākāraḥ; tarhi na vaktavyam - tadāropadvāreṇa
pratīyate svalakṣaṇavikalpākārāntaritatvāt.
Translation: 1048
If you say that, the form of imagined content is different, then, you
should not say that, it appears in the knowledge as super-imposed,
because, it will be either of the form of particular, or, of the form
of imagined content.
Text: 1049
अथ घटना िकर्यते स्वलक्षणेन सामान्यस्य; तदसत्, सदसतोघर् टनाऽयोगात्। सतोघर् टना
दृष्ा यथा चक्षुघर्टयोः।
atha ghaṭanā kriyate svalakṣaṇena sāmānyasya; tadasat, sadasator-
ghaṭanā’yogāt. satorghaṭanā dṛṣṭā yathā cakṣurghaṭayoḥ.
Translation: 1049
If you say that, universal is constructed by the particular, that is not
true. No construction is possible with real and unreal. A structure
of two reals is seen as in the case of eyes and pot.
Text: 1050
अथ सामान्यस्वलक्षणाकारद्यं पर्तीयते; एवं तिहर् अन्योन्यिवलक्षणौ सामान्य-
स्वलक्षणाकारौ पर्तीयेते। ततश्च न वक्व्यम् - “दृश्यिवकल्पा(ल्प्या)वथार्वेक - कृत्य
तदध्यवसायेन पर्वतर् ते” इित। यिद च िविवक्माकारद्यं पर्ितभाित; तदा स्वलक्षण-
िवषयमनुमानं पर्सक्म्। तिद्षयत्वे मानयोभेर्दकारणं वक्व्यम्। सवोर्पाख्यािविनमुर्क्स्य च
सामान्यस्य पर्तीयमानत्वं नोपपद्ते।
atha sāmānyasvalakṣaṇākāradvayaṁ pratīyate; evaṁ tarhi anyo-
nyavilakṣaṇau sāmānyasvalakṣaṇākārau pratīyete. tataśca na
vaktavyam -“dṛśyavikalpā(lpyā)varthāvekīkṛtya tadadhyavasāyena
pravartate” iti. yadi ca viviktamākāradvayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā
svalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṁ prasaktam. tadviṣayatve mānayor-
bhedakāraṇaṁ vaktavyam. sarvopākhyāvinirmuktasya ca sāmānya-
sya pratīyamānatvaṁ nopapadyate.
Translation: 1050
If you say, two forms viz. the form of universal and form of particular
appear in knowledge, then, the two forms of universal and particular
will appear as mutually distinct and then, you should not say
“it operates by uniting visible and imagined entities through a
definite knowledge.” If two forms appear in the knowledge distinctly,
then again, there arises the contingency of accepting inferential
knowledge as having particular as its content and if that becomes
the content, you should state the reason to distinguish perception
from inference. It is impossible to explain that universal which is
devoid of all attributes appears in the knowledge.
Text: 1051
अन्यच्च, धूमोत्पािदते अिग्िवज्ञाने अनिग्व्यवच्छे दरूपं सामान्यं पर्ितभातीित व्यपिदश्यते,
अजलव्यवच्छे देन पर्ितभातीित िकं नाभ्युपगम्यते? नाऽजलव्यवच्छे देन जन्यते, नािप
अनिग्व्यवच्छे देन, तदनुत्पत्ौ पर्ितकमर् िनयमानुपप त्ः।
anyacca, dhūmotpādite agnivijñāne anagnivyavacchedarūpaṁ
sāmānyaṁ pratibhātīti vyapadiśyate, ajalavyavacchedena prati-
bhātīti kiṁ nābhyupagamyate? nā’jalavyavacchedena janyate,
nāpi anagnivyavacchedena, tadanutpattau pratikarmaniyamānupa-
pattiḥ.
Translation: 1051
Moreover, in the knowledge of fire, produced by the smoke, it is said
that, universal in the form of difference from that which is not fire
appears. If you accept this, why don’t you accept that the universal
appears in the form of being different from that which is not water?
So, you will have to accept that, such knowledge is not produced
either in the form of being different from non-water, nor in the form
of being different from non-fire and when such knowledge cannot
be recognized, it is difficult to explain to one is to one relationship
between knowledge and its content.
Text: 1052
अथ िनिवर् षयम् आनुमािनकं ज्ञानम्; तदयुक्म्, स्वांशिवषयत्वात्। निह भवतां पक्षे
िनरालम्बनं िकिञ्द् िवज्ञानम स्त, आत्मावगाहकत्वेनोत्पत्ेः। यिद च िनरालम्बनं ज्ञानम्;
क्व पर्वतेर्त िनवतेर्त वा पुरुषः? अगितः स्यात्।
atha nirviṣayam ānumānikaṁ jñānam; tadayuktam, svāṁśa-
viṣayatvāt. nahi bhavatāṁ pakṣe nirālambanaṁ kiñcid vijñāna-
masti, ātmāvagāhakatvenotpatteḥ. yadi ca nirālambanaṁ jñānam;
kva pravarteta nivarteta vā puruṣaḥ? agatiḥ syāt.
Translation: 1052
If you say that, inferential knowledge is without content, it is not
proper, because, it accepts its own form as its content. According
to your doctrine, there is no knowledge which is without a content,
because contentfulness of the knowledge can be explained by
accepting the knowledge itself as its content and if you accept
knowledge without a content, then, where will the person who has
such knowledge will be induced and from where will he withdraw?
The person will become motionless.
Text: 1053
अथ दहनेन तदत्ु पािदतम् इित कृत्वा दहना न्तकमुपसपर् ित; एवं धूमज्ञानोत्पादेऽिप यायात्।
atha dahanena tadutpāditam iti kṛtvā dahanāntikamupasarpati;
evaṁ dhūmajñānotpāde’pi yāyāt.
Translation: 1053
If you say, since the knowledge is produced by fire, the person will
go to collect fire, then, the person should also go to collect smoke,
because smoke has also produced the knowledge of fire.
Text: 1054
अथ स्वांशिवषयमनुमानम्; तदा पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दानुपप त्ः, पर्तीयमानज्ञानस्य
स्वलक्षणात्मकत्वात्।
atha svāṁśaviṣayamanumānam; tadā pratyakṣānumānayorbhe-
dānupapattiḥ, pratīyamānajñānasya svalakṣaṇātmakatvāt.
Translation: 1054
If you say, its own part can be the content of inferential
knowledge, then, one cannot explain difference between perception
and inference, because, the knowledge is the content, is nothing
more than a particular.
[५. ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणस्याशक्यत्वपर्ितपादनम्।]
[5. jñānayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇasyāśakyatvapratipādanam.]
Text: 1055
अथ ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणं िकर्यते;
atha jñānayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate;
Translation: 1055
Clarification:
Well, we come to know the cause and effect relationship between
two knowledges.
Text: 1056
तदप्ययुक्म्, ज्ञानयोरिप हेतुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कतुर्म् - कायर् ज्ञानं िह स्वसंिव-
त्पयर् व सतं न ज्ञानान्तरमात्मसात्करोित। तदकरणे 'केन िनव(वर् )ितर् तं मम स्वरूपम्'
इत्येतत् कथं वे त्, तिद्न्ज्ञानस्य िपशाचतुल्यत्वात्? ततर्(न्) ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तराद् िभद्ते।
तदभेदे कथं हेतुफलभावः, स्वात्मिन िकर्यािवरोधात्?
tadapyayuktam, jñānayorapi hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇaṁ na śakyate
kartum - kāryajñānaṁ hi svasaṁvitparyavasitaṁ na jñānāntara-
mātmasātkaroti. tadakaraṇe ’kena niva(rva)rtitaṁ mama svarūpam’
ityetat kathaṁ vetti, tadbhinnajñānasya piśācatulyatvāt? tatra(nna)
jñānaṁ jñānāntarād bhidyate. tadabhede kathaṁ hetuphalabhāvaḥ,

svātmani kriyāvirodhāt?
Translation: 1056
Reply:
That is also not correct. It is not possible to know the cause and
effect relationship between two knowledges, because, knowledge in
the form of an effect amounts to self-illumination and hence cannot
make another knowledge of its own type and once that does not
happen, how will he know who has created this form? Because, that
so called another knowledge, will be similar to a ghost. Therefore,
one knowledge does not differ from another knowledge and if they
are not different, how can they be treated as cause and effect? The
same cannot be the cause and the same cannot be the effect and
therefore, there will be contradiction in the causal function.
[६. पर्सङ्ाद् िवज्ञाननयािदकृतावयिविनराकरणस्य पर्ितवादः।]

[6. prasaṅgād vijñānanayādikṛtāvayavinirākaraṇasya prativādaḥ.]
Text: 1057
यािप युिक्रपिदष्ा - िवज्ञानमातर् स्थताववयिविनराकरणपरा वृत्यनुपपत्यािदरूपा - “न
िकल अवयवी एकदेशेन वतर् ते, नािप सवार्त्मना। एकदेशवृत्यभ्युपगमे िह अवयिवनो
भेदपर्सङ्ः। अथ सवार्त्मना वतर् ते; तिहर् अन्यतर्ावृ त्पर्सङ्ः” इत्यािदका; सािप न
युिक्युक्ा। कथम्? िकम् एकदेशशब्देन अवयवी अिभधीयते, अवयवो वा?
yāpi yuktirapadiṣṭā - vijñānamātrasthitāvavayavinirākaraṇaparā
vṛttyanupapatyādirūpā - “na kila avayavī ekadeśena vartate, nāpi
sarvātmanā. ekadeśavṛtyabhyupagame hi avayavino bhedaprasa-
ṅgaḥ. atha sarvātmanā vartate; tarhi anyatrāvṛttiprasaṅgaḥ” ityā-
dikā; sāpi na yuktiyuktā. katham? kim ekadeśaśabdena avayavī abhi-
dhīyate, avayavo vā?
Translation: 1057
You had floated the following argument to deny the concept of
“whole”: Since, knowledge is the only reality, there is nothing called
“whole”, because its existence cannot be justified. Your statement
goes like this: “the whole cannot exist partially, nor in full, because,
if one accepts that it exists partially, there will be difference in the
whole. And if it is accepted as existing totally, then, it cannot exist

elsewhere.” But such an argument is not proper. Because, we would
like to know what do you mean by partially? Do you mean the
whole by the word ekadeśa or part?
Text: 1058
यिद अवयव्यिभधीयते; तदा एकदेशेनव
ै सवर् तर् वतर् त इित बर्ूमः, स्वकारणािन्यिमतस्य
तथाभूतस्योत्पत्ेः।
yadi avayavyabhidhīyate; tadā ekadeśenaiva sarvatra vartata iti
brūmaḥ, svakāraṇānniyamitasya tathābhūtasyotpatteḥ.
Translation: 1058
If you say, whole is expressed by that word, then, we can say a whole
exists only in a part of a place everywhere, because, it is produced
like that determined by its own cause.
Text: 1059
अथ अवयवोऽिभधीयते तदेकदेशशब्देन; तदा न एकदेशेन अवयवी वतर् ते, अवय[व]स्य
अवयवे वृत्ययोगात्। भवतु वा, अवयवेषु वृत्ेरभावोऽवयिवनः, तथािप असत्वं न सद्ध्यित,
तद्ेहोपलम्भस्य तद स्तत्विवधानपरत्वात्। यथा 'अनुदकः कमण्डलुः' इत्युक्े सित
उदककमण्डलुसम्बन्धाभावः पर्तीयते, न तु कमण्डलोरभावः, तददु कस्य वा।
atha avayavo’bhidhīyate tadekadeśaśabdena; tadā na ekadeśena
avayavī vartate, avaya[va]sya avayave vṛttyayogāt. bhavatu vā, ava-
yaveṣu vṛtterabhāvo’vayavinaḥ, tathāpi asatvaṁ na siddhyati, tadde-
hopalambhasya tadastitvavidhānaparatvāt. yathā ‘anudakaḥ kama-
ṇḍaluḥ’ ityukte sati udakakamaṇḍalusambandhābhāvaḥ pratīyate, na
tu kamaṇḍalorabhāvaḥ, tadudakasya vā.
Translation: 1059
If you say that, part is meant by the word ekadeśa, then, in one
part, the whole does not exist, because a part cannot exist in a part
or let there be absence of the whole in the parts still, it is not proved
that, the whole does not exist. Because, when we say that the body
is found, it means, it exists. As when someone says, this jar does not
have water, what is understood is, the absence of relation between
water and the jar. But, not absence of either jar or of water.
[७. पर्सङ्ादनुपल ब्धपदाथर् स्य िवचारः।]

[7. prasaṅgādanupalabdhipadārthasya vicāraḥ.]
Text: 1060
अथ अवयिवन उपल ब्धरेव ना स्त;
atha avayavina upalabdhireva nāsti;
Translation: 1060
Clarification:
But there is no knowledge of the whole.
Text: 1061
सा िकं दृश्यानुपल ब्धः, आहो स्वद् अदृश्यानुपल ब्धः?
sā kiṁ dṛśyānupalabdhiḥ, āhosvid adṛśyānupalabdhiḥ?
Translation: 1061
Reply:
When you say there is no knowledge, does it mean there is no
knowledge of something which is fit to be perceived or there is no
knowledge of something which is not fit to be perceived?
Text: 1062
यिद दृश्यानुपल ब्धः; सा नोपपद्ते। दृश्यशब्देन िकमपिदश्यते? उपल ब्धलक्षण-
पर्ाप्ोऽथोर्ऽिभधीयते। उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ािप्श्च पर्त्ययान्तरसाकल्यं स्वभाविवशेषश्च।
एतच्चेद ् िवद्ते; कथमनुपलम्भः? उपल ब्धकारकसाकल्ये सित उपलब्ध्या भिवतव्यम्,
नानुपलब्ध्या, तत्स्वभाविनबन्धनत्वात्दपु लब्धेः। उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्य यिद अनुप-
लम्भः, अनुपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्य तिहर् उपलम्भः स्यात्, अिनष्ं चैतत्।
yadi dṛśyānupalabdhiḥ; sā nopapadyate. dṛśyaśabdena kima-
padiśyate? upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto’rtho’bhidhīyate. upalabdhilakṣa-
ṇaprāptiśca pratyayāntarasākalyaṁ svabhāvaviśeṣaśca. etacced
vidyate; kathamanupalambhaḥ? upalabdhikārakasākalye sati upala-
bdhyā bhavitavyam, nānupalabdhyā, tatsvabhāvanibandhanatvātta-
dupalabdheḥ. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya yadi anupalambhaḥ, anu-
palabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya tarhi upalambhaḥ syāt, aniṣṭaṁ caitat.
Translation: 1062
If you say, there is no knowledge of something which is fit to be
perceived, then, it is not correct, because by the word that which
is fit to be perceived, what do you mean? You will have to accept

that, “a thing, had it been there, it would have been perceived.”
Had the knowledge of the thing, had it been there, it would have
been known, refers to collection of factors such as other knowledge,
etc. and a particular nature of a thing. If you say, this is there,
how can it be said that it is not known? If there is collection of
factors which contribute to knowledge of the thing, there has to be
knowledge of that thing and there cannot be absence of knowledge
of that thing, because the knowledge of the thing depends upon
that nature. If it is accepted that, there is absence of knowledge of
that which possesses the property of its being known, then, there
should be knowledge of that which possesses the factors which will
cause the absence of knowledge and this is of course, not desirable.
Text: 1063
यिद च घटिविवक्भूतलोपलम्भ एव घटस्यानुपलम्भः; तदा भूतलस्याप्युपलम्भो न भवेत्,
तस्याप्युपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्त्वात्।
yadi ca ghaṭaviviktabhūtalopalambha eva ghaṭasyānupalambhaḥ;
tadā bhūtalasyāpyupalambho na bhavet, tasyāpyupalabdhilakṣaṇa-
prāptatvāt.
Translation: 1063
If by the absence of knowledge of a pot, you mean knowledge of
the ground without pot, then, there cannot be knowledge of ground
also, because, that also is something in the presence of which it is
known.
Text: 1064
अथ उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्मुपलभ्यते भूतलम्;
atha upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptamupalabhyate bhūtalam;
Translation: 1064
Clarification:
Well, the ground is known because, it is something which is
confirmed by perception.
Text: 1065
घटस्यािप उपल ब्धपर्सङ्ः।
ghaṭasyāpi upalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 1065
Reply:
Then, the pot (in the absence of pot) also should be known.
Text: 1066
अथ भूतलज्ञाने घटस्वरूपं नावभाित, तेन तस्यानुपलम्भः, घटाभावव्यवहारः िकर्यते;
तदयुक्म्; घटावष्ब्धेऽिप भूतले भूतलज्ञाने घटो नावभाित, ततर्ािप घटाभाव-
व्यवहारपर्सिक्ः। तथा ज्ञानस्यािप उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्य संवेदनं न भवेत्। ततश्च
सवर् स्यासंवेदने नानुपल ब्धः, उपलब्घेरव
े यतोऽनुपल ब्धः।
atha bhūtalajñāne ghaṭasvarūpaṁ nāvabhāti, tena tasyānupa-
lambhaḥ, ghaṭābhāvavyavahāraḥ kriyate; tadayuktam; ghaṭāvaṣṭa-
bdhe’pi bhūtale bhūtalajñāne ghaṭo nāvabhāti, tatrāpi ghaṭābhā-
vavyavahāraprasaktiḥ. tathā jñānasyāpi upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya
saṁvedanaṁ na bhavet. tataśca sarvasyāsaṁvedane nānupa-
labdhiḥ, upalabdhereva yato’nupalabdhiḥ.
Translation: 1066
If you say, in the knowledge of ground the nature of pot does not
appear, therefore, that is not known, but only reference to pot is
made. Even then, it will not be proper, because, even when the pot
is associated with the ground, in the knowledge of ground, the pot
does not appear. But there also, there will arise the contingency of
referring to absence of pot. Similarly, there will be no awareness of
knowledge which satisfies the character of something in the presence
of which it is fit to be known. Thereby, since everything will
become unknown there will be only absence of knowledge, because,
knowledge itself will become non-knowledge.
Text: 1067
यिद च भूतलाद्ुपल ब्धरेव घटानुपल ब्धः; िपशाचादेरिप सैवाऽनुपल ब्धरस्तु।
yadi ca bhūtalādyupalabdhireva ghaṭānupalabdhiḥ; piśācāderapi sai-
vā’nupalabdhirastu.
Translation: 1067
If you say, the knowledge of ground itself is the absence of knowledge
of pot, then, let the same absence of knowledge of pot be of the ghost
also.
Text: 1068
भवतु, को दोषः?
bhavatu, ko doṣaḥ?
Translation: 1068
Clarification:
Let it be so, what is the harm?
Text: 1069
िपशाचाभाविविनश्चयः स्यात्।
piśācābhāvaviniścayaḥ syāt.
Translation: 1069
Reply:
In that case, there will be definite knowledge of absence of ghost
(which is not desirable, since there is nothing called ghost.)
Text: 1070
अथ न भवित िपशाचाभाविविनश्चयः; कुम्भाभाविविनश्चयाभावपर्सङ्ः स्यात्।
atha na bhavati piśācābhāvaviniścayaḥ; kumbhābhāvaviniścayābhā-
vaprasaṅgaḥ syāt.
Translation: 1070
If you say, there will be no definite knowledge called absence of
ghost, then, there will be absence of definite knowledge of absence
of pot.
Text: 1071
अथ िनरालम्बनज्ञानं दृश्यस्याऽनुपल ब्धः; निह भवतां पक्षे िनरालम्बनज्ञानम स्त
स्वांशपयर् व सतत्वात्।
atha nirālambanajñānaṁ dṛśyasyā’nupalabdhiḥ; nahi bhavatāṁ
pakṣe nirālambanajñānamasti svāṁśaparyavasitatvāt.
Translation: 1071
If you say, knowledge without content, is the absence of knowledge
of something which is visible, it cannot be so because according to
your doctrine, there is no knowledge without a content, since, every
knowledge accepts its own part as its content.
Text: 1072
अथ अदृश्यानुपलम्भः अवयव्यनुपलम्भः; सोऽिप तत्सत्ां न व्यावत्र्यित, यथा
उपलभ्यमानत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपम्, तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमिप वस्तुस्वरूपमेव। यथा कायर् स्य
स्वकारणाजनकत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपं तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमिप वस्तुस्वरूपमेव। निह
स्वकारणाजनकत्वे वस्तुस्वरूपमितवत्र्ते। तथा अवयव्यिप कायार्जनकत्वेऽिप न स्वरूपं
हास्यित, स्वहेतोरेव कायार्जनकात्मकस्योत्पत्ेः।
atha adṛśyānupalambhaḥ avayavyanupalambhaḥ; so’pi tatsattāṁ
na vyāvarttayati, yathā upalabhyamānatvaṁ vastusvarūpam, tathā
anupalabhyamānatvamapi vastusvarūpameva. yathā kāryasya sva-
kāraṇājanakatvaṁ vastusvarūpaṁ tathā anupalabhyamānatvamapi
vastusvarūpameva. nahi svakāraṇājanakatve vastusvarūpamati-
varttate. tathā avayavyapi kāryājanakatve’pi na svarūpaṁ hāsyati,
svahetoreva kāryājanakātmakasyotpatteḥ.
Translation: 1072
If you say, non-knowledge of something which is invisible means,
absence of knowledge of the whole that too does not exclude its
existence, as the state of being known, is the nature of the thing,
similarly, the state of not being known, is also the nature of the
thing. As the state of not being the producer of its own cause, is the
nature of an effect, in the same way, the state of not being known,
also is the nature of a thing. It is not the case that, if something
is not the producer of its own cause, it loses its being nature of
a thing. In the same way, even if the whole does not produce the
effect, it does not lose its form, because, it comes into being from
its own cause which is of the nature of producing the effect.
[८. अवयिविनराकरणे पर्युक्स्य रक्ारक्त्वपर्सञ्नरूपस्य साधनस्य िनरासः।]
[8. avayavinirākaraṇe prayuktasya raktāraktatvaprasañjanarūpasya
sādhanasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1073
यदिप साधनमन्यदपु िदष्म् - रक्ारक्पर्सङ्रूपम्; तदप्यसत्, रक्ता नाम का
अवयिवनः? िकं नीलगुणात्मकत्वम्, आहो स्वत् नीलगुणा धकरणत्वम्, नीलगुणा ध-
करणदर्व्यसंयोिगत्वं वा, तदिवरलदेशोत्पादो वा?
yadapi sādhanamanyadupadiṣṭam - raktāraktaprasaṅgarūpam; tada-
pyasat, raktatā nāma kā avayavinaḥ? kiṁ nīlaguṇātmakatvam,
āhosvit nīlaguṇādhikaraṇatvam, nīlaguṇādhikaraṇadravyasaṁyo-

gitvaṁ vā, tadaviraladeśotpādo vā?
Translation: 1073
You narrated some other causal factor viz. the contingency of a
whole becoming red and non-red simultaneously. That is not proper.
We would like to know, what do you mean by redness of a whole?
Does it mean the state of being of the nature of a blue or the state
of being the locus of the blue color or the state of being connected
with the substance which is the locus of the quality called blue or
the production in the particular space without any gap?
Text: 1074
यिद तावन्ीलगुणात्मकत्वं रक्ता; तदयुक्म्, स्फिटकपटादेरनीलात्मकत्वात्।
yadi tāvannīlaguṇātmakatvaṁ raktatā; tadayuktam, sphaṭikapaṭā-
deranīlātmakatvāt.
Translation: 1074
If you say that, redness means being of the nature of the quality of
blue, that will not be proper, because, crystal, cloth etc. are not of
the nature of blue quality.
Text: 1075
अथ नीलगुणा धकरणत्वं रक्ता; साप्यनुपपन्ा, स्फिटकपटादेरवदातरूपयोिगत्वात्।
atha nīlaguṇādhikaraṇatvaṁ raktatā; sāpyanupapannā, sphaṭika-
paṭāderavadātarūpayogitvāt.
Translation: 1075
If you say, that redness means being the locus of the quality
called blue, that also is not proper, because, crystal, cloth etc. are
associated with spotless color.
Text: 1076
अथ नीलगुणा धकरणदर्व्यसंयोिगत्वं रक्ता; सा स्वयमनभ्युपगता कथमवयिवनं व्याव-
त्र्यित?
atha nīlaguṇādhikaraṇadravyasaṁyogitvaṁ raktatā; sā svayamana-
bhyupagatā kathamavayavinaṁ vyāvarttayati?
Translation: 1076
If you say that, redness means being connected with the substance
which is the locus of blue color, how can that be accepted, because,
when you yourself have not accepted it, how will exclude the
whole?
Text: 1077
अथ परेण इष्ा;
atha pareṇa iṣṭā;
Translation: 1077
Clarification:
Well, it is desired by others.
Text: 1078
यथेष्ा तथाऽिवरो धत्वेनाऽभ्युपगता, निह संयोगावयिवनोिवर् रोधोऽभ्युपगम्यते परेण
यथाकृतकत्वाऽिनत्यत्वयोः, साऽिवरुद्ा कथमवयिवनं िवपयार्सयित? 'रक्ता ध-
करणश्च, ना स्त च' इत्यसङ्तम्। यथा-ना स्त शब्दः कृतकत्वात्-तादृगेतत्।
yatheṣṭā tathā’virodhitvenā’bhyupagatā, nahi saṁyogāvayavinorvi-
rodho’bhyupagamyate pareṇa yathākṛtakatvā’nityatvayoḥ, sā’viru-
ddhā kathamavayavinaṁ viparyāsayati? ‘raktatādhikaraṇaśca, nāsti
ca’ ityasaṅgatam. yathā-nāsti śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt-tādṛgetat.
Translation: 1078
Reply:
Yes, it is desired by others, but it is accepted as not being
contradicted. It is not the case that, others accept contradiction,
between contact and the whole, as between the state of not being
produced and the state of not being eternal. And thus, without
being contradicted how can it exclude the whole? To say that,
something is locus of red color, and at the same time saying that it
does not exist, are not compatible. Like the statement “there is no
sound, because it is produced.”
Text: 1079
अथ रक्ता ना स्त घटस्य; तथािप असत्वं न सद्ध्यित। रक्ताभावे तु अभावः कथं
भवेत्? तदभावे िवज्ञानाभावपर्सङ्ः।
atha raktatā nāsti ghaṭasya; tathāpi asatvaṁ na siddhyati. rakta-
tābhāve tu abhāvaḥ kathaṁ bhavet? tadabhāve vijñānābhāvapra-
saṅgaḥ.
Translation: 1079
If you say that, there is no red color in the pot, still, it does not
prove that, the pot does not exist. If there is red color, how can
there be absence of pot? And in spite of that, if you say there is
absence, it will lead to the contingency of absence of knowledge.
Text: 1080
अथ एकस्य िवरुद्ावेतौ रक्ताऽरक्ताकारौ;
atha ekasya viruddhāvetau raktatā’raktatākārau;
Translation: 1080
Clarification:
Well, it is contradictory to say that, one thing is red and at the
same time not red.
Text: 1081
केनेष्ौ िवरुद्तया? नीलदर्व्यसंयोगो िह रक्ता, तदभावोऽरक्ता, तौ च अथार्न्तरभूतौ। न
च तयोभेर्दे अवयिवनो भेद उपपद्ते, ताभ्यां तस्य िभन्त्वात्। न च अन्यस्य भेदे अन्यस्य
भेद उपपद्ते, िवज्ञानभेदपर्सङ्ात्।
keneṣṭau viruddhatayā? nīladravyasaṁyogo hi raktatā, tadabhā-
vo’raktatā, tau ca arthāntarabhūtau. na ca tayorbhede avayavino
bheda upapadyate, tābhyāṁ tasya bhinnatvāt. na ca anyasya bhede
anyasya bheda upapadyate, vijñānabhedaprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 1081
Reply:
Who wants them to be contradictory? Being red means contact with
the blue substance and absence of that is not being red. These two
are two different things. Simply because these two are different, you
cannot say that the whole is different, because the whole is different
from both. It is not true that, if X is different from Y, X is different
from Z. If it is accepted, then, there will be difference in knowledge.
Text: 1082
यिद च रक्ारक्भेदेन अवयवी िभद्ते तदा अवयिवद्यं स्यात्, नाऽसत्वम्, िवज्ञानाऽव्य-
ितरेिकत्वं वा।
yadi ca raktāraktabhedena avayavī bhidyate tadā avayavidvayaṁ
syāt, nā’satvam, vijñānā’vyatirekitvaṁ vā.
Translation: 1082
If you say that, a whole is differentiated on the basis of its being
red and non-red, then, you should accept there are two wholes, you
should not say there is no whole or it is not different from knowledge
itself.
Text: 1083
अथ अिवरलदेशोत्पादो रक्ता नीलदर्व्यपटयोः; तथािप असत्वं न सद्ध्यित, संस्कृतानां
सत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
atha aviraladeśotpādo raktatā nīladravyapaṭayoḥ; tathāpi asatvaṁ
na siddhyati, saṁskṛtānāṁ sattvābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 1083
If you say, the redness of a blue substance and a cloth means
production in a place without any gap, even then, it does not prove
that it does not exist, because you accept existence of things which
undergo some change.
[९. अवयिविनराकरणे पर्युक्स्यावृतानावृतत्वपर्सङ्स्य खण्डनम्।]
[9. avayavinirākaraṇe prayuktasyāvṛtānāvṛtatvaprasaṅgasya kha-
ṇḍanam.]
Text: 1084
यच्चान्यत् साधनमुक्म् - आवृताऽनावृतपर्सङ्रूपम् - “एक स्मन्वयवे आवृते आवृतः,
अनावृते अनावृतः”; तदेतदयुक्म्। तद्िद अवयवावरणे अवयवी आवृतोऽनावृतो
वाऽभ्युपगम्यते परैः, तदवयवानामती न्दर्यत्वेऽिप िह उपलम्भाभ्युपगमात्। न च अवय-
वानामावृतत्वेऽनावृतत्वे वा अवयव्यावृतोऽनावृतो वा। अिप तु यदा वस्ाद्ावरणेन
देवदत्े न्दर्यघटसम्बन्धिवघातः िकर्यते तदा 'आवृतः' इत्यपिदश्यते। यस्य तु वस्ािद-
नाऽऽवरणेन देवदत्े न्दर्य-घटसम्बन्धिवघातो न िकर्यते, तदपेक्षया अनावृतव्यपदेशः। यथा
भवत्पक्षे स्वकारणानुत्पादकत्वेन अजनकत्वमिभधीयते, न च स्वरूपभेदमासादयित।
yaccānyat sādhanamuktam - āvṛtā’nāvṛtaprasaṅgarūpam - “ekasmi-
nnavayave āvṛte āvṛtaḥ, anāvṛte anāvṛtaḥ”; tadetadayuktam.
tadyadi avayavāvaraṇe avayavī āvṛto’nāvṛto vā’bhyupagamyate
paraiḥ, tadavayavānāmatīndriyatve’pi hi upalambhābhyupagamāt.
na ca avayavānāmāvṛtatve’nāvṛtatve vā avayavyāvṛto’nāvṛto
vā. api tu yadā vastrādyāvaraṇena devadattendriyaghaṭasamba-
ndhavighātaḥ kriyate tadā ‘āvṛtaḥ’ ityapadiśyate. yasya tu vastrā-
dinā”varaṇena devadattendriya-ghaṭasambandhavighāto na kriyate,

tadapekṣayā anāvṛtavyapadeśaḥ. yathā bhavatpakṣe svakāraṇānu-
tpādakatvena ajanakatvamabhidhīyate, na ca svarūpabhedamāsā-
dayati.
Translation: 1084
You had also mentioned another factor viz. the contingency of being
covered and not covered. Your statement was, “When one part is
covered, the whole is covered and when it is not covered, the whole
is not covered.” This statement is illogical, because, if a whole is
covered when a part is covered, and a whole is not covered, when
the part is not covered. If this thesis is accepted by the opponents,
then, even if their parts are beyond the range of sense organs, you
will have to accept the knowledge of that whole. It is not the case
that the whole is covered, when parts are covered and whole is
not covered, when the parts are not covered. Rather, when by a
cover viz. cloth, the relationship of pot and the sense organ viz.
the eyes of Devadatta is obstructed at that time we say that, the
whole is covered. But, for someone whose connection of the eyes
of the Devadatta with the pot, is not obstructed by a cover viz. a
cloth, with reference to such person, it is said that, the whole is not
covered. As according to your doctrine, you consider something as
non-cause, if it does not produce something which is a cause. This
does not lead to difference in the form.
[१०. अवयिविनराकरणपर्युक्स्य चलाचलत्वकृतस्य अवयिवभेदपर्सङ्स्य पर्त्यादेशः।]
[10. avayavinirākaraṇaprayuktasya calācalatvakṛtasya avayavi-
bhedaprasaṅgasya pratyādeśaḥ.]
Text: 1085
यदिप अपरमिभिहतम् - चलाचलत्वसाधनम् - “अवयवे चलित चलत्यवयवी, अवयवान्तरे
चाऽचलित न चलित - ततश्चलाचलत्वे अवयिवनो भेदपर्सङ्ः”; तदेतदयुक्म्, चलनस्य
स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। तदभावे कथं तेन अवयवी िभद्ते?
yadapi aparamabhihitam - calācalatvasādhanam - “avayave calati
calatyavayavī, avayavāntare cā’calati na calati - tataścalācalatve
avayavino bhedaprasaṅgaḥ”; tadetadayuktam, calanasya svayama-
nabhyupagamāt. tadabhāve kathaṁ tena avayavī bhidyate?
Translation: 1085
You had also made a reference to another factor viz. moving and
non-moving. You had said, “When the parts move, the whole moves
and if another part does not move, the whole does not move. And
therefore, if a whole is accepted as non-moving, then, there will
be difference in the whole.” This is also not proper, because, you
yourself have not accepted movement. And in the absence of the
movement, how can the whole be different?
Text: 1086
अथ चलनं िवद्ते; तिहर् इदं वक्व्यम्-स्विवषयलक्षणम्, चलनरूपाथर् स्य उत्पत्ेः।
atha calanaṁ vidyate; tarhi idaṁ vaktavyam-svaviṣayalakṣaṇam,
calanarūpārthasya utpatteḥ.
Translation: 1086
If you say, the movement is there, then, you should be able to define
the object of that movement, because the entity viz. the movement
is produced.
Text: 1087
अथ परेणेष्ं चलनम् इित कृत्वा व्यपिदश्यते;
atha pareṇeṣṭaṁ calanam iti kṛtvā vyapadiśyate;
Translation: 1087
Clarification:
Well, in whatever movement is desired by the opponent, you may
call the same as movement.
Text: 1088
सत्यम्, इष्ं परेण। न तु अवयवे चलित अवयिवनश्चलनिमष्म्, ततो िभन्त्वात्।
नाप्यवयवान्तरस्याचलने अवयिवनोऽचनलिमष्यते, तस्यान्यत्वात्। अिप तु चलनयुक्ः
चलतीित व्यपिदश्यते। चलनिवकलो िनष्कम्प इत्यिभधीयते।
satyam, iṣṭaṁ pareṇa. na tu avayave calati avayavinaścalanami-
ṣṭam, tato bhinnatvāt. nāpyavayavāntarasyācalane avayavino’ca-
nalamiṣyate, tasyānyatvāt. api tu calanayuktaḥ calatīti vyapadi-
śyate. calanavikalo niṣkampa ityabhidhīyate.
Translation: 1088
Reply:
It is true, it is desirable to the opponent. But, it is not desirable to
them that, if you say part moves, the whole will move. Therefore, it
is different from that. It is also not the case that, if the another part
does not move, the whole does not move, because, that is different.
Rather, that is said to move which is associated with the movement.
And that which is devoid of movement is called motionless.
Text: 1089
अथ तदेव दर्व्यमुपजातिकर्यं चलित अनुपजातिकर्यं च न चलित;
atha tadeva dravyamupajātakriyaṁ calati anupajātakriyaṁ ca na
calati;
Translation: 1089
Clarification:
Well, the same substance, when activity is produced in it, moves
and when activity is not produced in it, it does not move.
Text: 1090
सत्यम्, तदेव चलित, तदेव न चलित।
satyam, tadeva calati, tadeva na calati.
Translation: 1090
Reply:
What you say is true. It is the same whole, that moves, and the
same whole that does not move.
Text: 1091
नत्व(न्व)वयिवनो भेदः पर्सज्यते;
natva(nva)vayavino bhedaḥ prasajyate;
Translation: 1091
Objection:
Well, then, in that there will difference in the whole.
Text: 1092
न पर्सङ्ः, चलनस्य ततोऽन्यथा (न्यत्वात्)। चलाचलव्यपदेशश्च अन्योपा धकृतः। यथा
भवत्पक्षे ज्ञानं कायर् कारणं च व्यपिदश्यते - स्वकायार्पेक्षया कारणम्, स्वकारणापेक्षया
कायर् म्, न च तस्य भेदोऽ स्त, तथा अवयिवचलाचलत्वेन न भेदो दृश्यते।
na prasaṅgaḥ, calanasya tato’nyathā (nyatvāt). calācalavyapade-
śaśca anyopādhikṛtaḥ. yathā bhavatpakṣe jñānaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ
ca vyapadiśyate - svakāryāpekṣayā kāraṇam, svakāraṇāpekṣayā
kāryam, na ca tasya bhedo’sti, tathā avayavicalācalatvena na bhedo

dṛśyate.
Translation: 1092
Reply:
No, there will no such contingency, because, action is different from
that. The reference to moving and non-moving is made on the basis
of another factor. As according to your doctrine, knowledge is said
to be an effect and also a cause- with reference to its own effect, it
is a cause, with reference to its own cause, it is called an effect and
still there is no difference. In the same way, due to the movement
and non-movement of the whole, there will be no difference of the
whole.
[११. अवयिविनराकरणे पर्युक्स्य 'सवार्वयवगर्हणेन' इत्यािद िवकल्पजालस्य िनरासः।]
[11. avayavinirākaraṇe prayuktasya ‘sarvāvayavagrahaṇena’ ityādi
vikalpajālasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1093
यदप्युक्म् - िकं सवार्वयवगर्हणेन अवयवी गृह्ते, िकं वा कितपयावयवगर्हणेन गृह्ते?
यिद च सवार्वयवगर्हणेन गृह्ते; तदा मध्यभागपरभागाऽगर्हणे अवयव्यगर्हणपर्सङ्ः। अथ
कितपयाऽवयवगर्हणे अवयिवगर्हणमभ्युपगम्यते; तदा करांिहर्गर्हणे अवयविवगर्हणं स्यात् ।
अथ अवयवगर्हणमन्तरेण अवयिवगर्हणम्; तदा सवर् दा गर्हणं स्यात्। तदेतत् सवर् मयुक्म्, न
सवार्वयवगर्हणपूवर्कमवयिवगर्हणम्, नािप कितपयावयवगर्हणपूवर्कमवयिवनो गर्हणम्, अिप
तु तद्ेहे न्दर्यसिन्कषार्लोकािदसाकल्ये सित उपलम्भः। अन्यथा िह अवयवगर्हणपूवर्के
गर्हणेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने अवयव्यादेरनुपलम्भः स्यात्।
yadapyuktam - kiṁ sarvāvayavagrahaṇena avayavī gṛhyate, kiṁ vā
katipayāvayavagrahaṇena gṛhyate? yadi ca sarvāvayavagrahaṇena
gṛhyate; tadā madhyabhāgaparabhāgā’grahaṇe avayavyagrahaṇapra-
saṅgaḥ. atha katipayā’vayavagrahaṇe avayavigrahaṇamabhyupaga-
myate; tadā karāṁhrigrahaṇe avayavavigrahaṇaṁ syāt. atha avaya-
vagrahaṇamantareṇa avayavigrahaṇam; tadā sarvadā grahaṇaṁ
syāt. tadetat sarvamayuktam, na sarvāvayavagrahaṇapūrvakamava-
yavigrahaṇam, nāpi katipayāvayavagrahaṇapūrvakamavayavino gra-
haṇam, api tu taddehendriyasannikarṣālokādisākalye sati upala-
mbhaḥ. anyathā hi avayavagrahaṇapūrvake grahaṇe’bhyupagamya-
māne avayavyāderanupalambhaḥ syāt.
Translation: 1093
You had also said, “Is it the fact that when all the parts are drawn,
the whole is drawn? Or when some of the parts are drawn, the whole
is drawn? If you say, when all the parts are drawn, the whole is
drawn, then, when some one will draw the middle part, or the end
part, the whole will not be drawn. And if you say, when some parts
are drawn, then, the whole is drawn, then, if someone touches hand
and feet, it will mean that, he is touching the whole body. If you say
that, without drawing the whole, or touching the parts, there will
be touching of the whole, then, there should be always touching of
the whole.” All this is illogical. It is not the case that, to know the
whole, it is necessary to know all parts of the whole. It is also not
the case that, knowing of the whole, is preceded by knowing of some
of the parts of the whole. Rather, when the whole is connected with
the sense organ, body etc. and when there is sufficient light, there
will be knowledge of the whole. If this is not accepted, and if it is
accepted that, knowledge of the whole is preceded by knowledge of
whole. Otherwise, if it is accepted that, knowledge of the whole is
preceded by the knowledge of parts, there will be no knowledge of
the whole.
[१२. अवयिविनराकरणपरायाः 'यतर् िभन्े न तद्िु द्ः' इत्यािद युक्ेः खण्डनम्।]
[12. avayavinirākaraṇaparāyāḥ ‘yatra bhinne na tadbuddhiḥ’ ityādi
yukteḥ khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 1094
ु म्-अवयिविनराकरणपरं साधनम्- “यतर् िभन्े न तद्िु द् धर् या च न सा।
तद् घटं तु संवृितसत् परमाथर् सदन्यथा” ततर् यिद अवरुग्णे घटे घटबुिद्नर् भवित
घटस्याऽपरमाथर् सत्वम्; नीलेऽिप पर्त्यस्तिमते नीलबुिद्नर् भवित नीलस्याऽस्तिमतत्वात्
तदा नीलमिप अपरमाथर् सत् पर्ाप्म्।
yadapyanyaduktam - avayavinirākaraṇaparaṁ sādhanam - “yatra
bhinne na tadbuddhirdhiyā ca na sā. tad ghaṭaṁ tu saṁvṛ-
tisat paramārthasadanyathā” tatra yadi avarugṇe ghaṭe ghaṭa-
buddhirna bhavati ghaṭasyā’paramārthasattvam; nīle’pi pratya-
stamite nīlabuddhirna bhavati nīlasyā’stamitatvāt tadā nīlamapi
aparamārthasat prāptam.
Translation: 1094
You had also given another ground, to refute the existence of the
whole viz. “When, there is difference in the whole, there cannot
be knowledge of the whole. Nor can that knowledge be decided.
The knowledge of pot that arises is not true, because, the ultimate
reality is otherwise.” There, if the pot is covered, the knowledge
of the pot does not arise and the pot is not considered to be the
ultimate reality. If you say this, then, when the blue color is erased,
there does not arise the knowledge of blue color and so, because the
blue is not there, you should accept that the blue color is unreal.
Text: 1095
तथा, िवज्ञानमस्तमुपगतं न वेद्ते तदप्यपरमाथर् सत् पर्ाप्नोित।
tathā, vijñānamastamupagataṁ na vedyate tadapyaparamārthasat
prāpnoti.
Translation: 1095
Clarification:
Similarly, when knowledge vanishes, it is not known and therefore
on the same logic, you should say that knowledge also is unreal.
Text: 1096
अथ पर्ाक्ने िवज्ञाने नीलान्तरे पर्त्यस्तिमते ज्ञानान्तरं वेद्ते नीलान्तरं च, न तु घटेऽवरुग्णे
घटान्तरं वेद्ते; तत् िकम् - उत्पन्ं न वेद्ते, आहो स्वदनुत्पन्म्?
atha prāktane vijñāne nīlāntare pratyastamite jñānāntaraṁ vedyate
nīlāntaraṁ ca, na tu ghaṭe’varugṇe ghaṭāntaraṁ vedyate; tat kim -
utpannaṁ na vedyate, āhosvidanutpannam?
Translation: 1096
Reply:
Well, in the earlier knowledge, another blue color is destroyed and
so in the subsequent knowledge, there is awareness of knowledge
as well as another blue color. But when the pot is broken, another
pot is not known. Do you want to say that, it is produced and not
known, or, it is not produced at all?
Text: 1097
तद्िद उत्पन्ं न गृह्ते; ततर्ािप िह िवज्ञानोत्पादनसमथर् मुत्पन्ं न गृह्ेते, तिद्परीतं वा?
tadyadi utpannaṁ na gṛhyate; tatrāpi hi vijñānotpādanasamartha-

mutpannaṁ na gṛhyete, tadviparītaṁ vā?
Translation: 1097
If you say that, it is produced, but not known, there also the question
arises, that something which is capable of producing the knowledge,
is produced, but not known, or, does it mean opposite of that?
Text: 1098
तद्िद िवज्ञानोत्पादनसमथर् मुत्पन्ं न गृह्ते; तदयुक्म्, यिद िवज्ञानोत्पादनसमथर् मुत्पन्ं
घटजातम्, तदवश्यं गृह्ते अन्यथा नीलस्याप्यगर्हणं स्यात्।
tadyadi vijñānotpādanasamarthamutpannaṁ na gṛhyate; tadayu-
ktam, yadi vijñānotpādanasamarthamutpannaṁ ghaṭajātam, tada-
vaśyaṁ gṛhyate anyathā nīlasyāpyagrahaṇaṁ syāt.
Translation: 1098
If you say that, something which is capable of producing knowledge,
is produced, but not known, that will not be proper, because, if pots
are produced and are capable of producing the knowledge of the pot,
then, it must be known. Otherwise, even that cannot be knowledge
of blue color.
Text: 1099
अथ िवज्ञानजनकोत्पन्स्यागर्हणम्; तदा नीलस्याप्यनया वृत्याऽगर्हणे तस्याप्यपरमाथर् सत्वं
atha vijñānajanakotpannasyāgrahaṇam; tadā nīlasyāpyanayā vṛtyā-
’grahaṇe tasyāpyaparamārthasattvaṁ syāt.
Translation: 1099
If you say that, something is produced and it causes the knowledge,
and still it is not known, then, by the same process, when blue color
is also not known, the blue color should also be accepted as unreal.
Text: 1100
अथ अनुत्पन्घटजातं न वेद्ते तेन तस्य अपरमाथर् सत्वम्; नील-ज्ञाने अिप अनुत्पन्े न
वेद्(द्े)ते तयोरिप अपरमाथर् सत्वमापद्ते।
atha anutpannaghaṭajātaṁ na vedyate tena tasya aparamārtha-
sattvam; nīla-jñāne api anutpanne na vedya(dye)te tayorapi
aparamārthasattvamāpadyate.
Translation: 1100
If you say that, pots which are not produced are not known, and
therefore, a pot is unreal, then, when the knowledge of blue color
arises, it is not known, the knowledge of blue color should be
declared as unreal.
Text: 1101
ु र् वित िवज्ञानजनकं कपालावस्थायाम्;
अथ अवरुग्णे घटे घटान्तरं न पर्ादभ
atha avarugṇe ghaṭe ghaṭāntaraṁ na prādurbhavati vijñānajanakaṁ
kapālāvasthāyām;
Translation: 1101
Clarification:
Well, when a pot is broken, another pot does not emerge which
can generate the knowledge of pot and what continues there, is the
parts of the pot.
Text: 1102
यद्ेवं िनिवर् कल्पके रूपज्ञाने नष्े नान्यिन्िवर् कल्पकं रूपज्ञानं जायते सिवकल्पकाव-
स्थायाम्। तथा, स्थूले नीले नष्े नान्यत् स्थूलं नीलान्तरं भवित सूक्षमनीलोत्पादकाले।
yadyevaṁ nirvikalpake rūpajñāne naṣṭe nānyannirvikalpakaṁ rūpa-
jñānaṁ jāyate savikalpakāvasthāyām. tathā, sthūle nīle naṣṭe nānyat
sthūlaṁ nīlāntaraṁ bhavati sūkṣmanīlotpādakāle.
Translation: 1102
Reply:
If it is so, when an indeterminate knowledge of color, is destroyed,
no other indeterminate knowledge of color emerges during the state
of determinate knowledge. In the same way, when a gross blue color
is destroyed, no other gross blue color emerges during the time of
production of minute blue color.
Text: 1103
अथ ततर् नीलरूपताऽनुगता ज्ञानरूपता वाऽनुगता;
atha tatra nīlarūpatā’nugatā jñānarūpatā vā’nugatā;
Translation: 1103
Clarification:
Well, there the blue color continues in the subsequent moments and
also the form of the knowledge in the subsequent knowledges.
Text: 1104
यद्ेवम् इहािप कपालघटयोः स्वलक्षणरूपताऽनुगता।
yadyevam ihāpi kapālaghaṭayoḥ svalakṣaṇarūpatā’nugatā.
Translation: 1104
Reply:
If it is so, here also, the parts of the pot and the pot continue in
the form of particulars.
Text: 1105
यदप्युक्म्- “ धया च न सा - धया बुद्ध्या िववेच्यमाने न सा घटबुिद्भर् वित नीलबुिद्स्तु
भवित”; तदेतदयुक्म्, िकंभूतया बुद्ध्या िववेच्यते - िकं िनरालम्बनया, आहो स्वत्
सालम्बनया?
yadapyuktam- “dhiyā ca na sā - dhiyā buddhyā vivecyamāne na sā
ghaṭabuddhirbhavati nīlabuddhistu bhavati”; tadetadayuktam, kiṁ-
bhūtayā buddhyā vivecyate - kiṁ nirālambanayā, āhosvit sālam-
banayā?
Translation: 1105
You have said the following, “The knowledge of the pot, is also not
established i.e. when one examines critically, that knowledge is not
of pot, but it is knowledge of blue color.” This is also not proper,
because, there the question arises, by which thought do you examine
this? Is it thought without content, or, thought with content?
Text: 1106
तद्िद िनरालम्बनया िववेच्यते; तदा िववेचनीयाथोर् वक्व्यः। यिद च िनरालम्बनया
िववेच्यमानस्य असत्वम्; तदाऽनया रीत्या नीलादेरप्यसत्वमापनीपद्ते। न च
िनरालम्बनमितर स्त।
tadyadi nirālambanayā vivecyate; tadā vivecanīyārtho vaktavyaḥ.
yadi ca nirālambanayā vivecyamānasya asatvam; tadā’nayā rītyā
nīlāderapyasattvamāpanīpadyate. na ca nirālambanamatirasti.
Translation: 1106
If you say, it is examined by a thought without content, then, you
should spell out what is the object of critical examination? If you
examine it by a thought without a content, then, content does not
exist and by this logic, there will be absence of blue color also. As
a matter of fact, there cannot be a thought without a content.
Text: 1107
अथ सालम्बनया घटो िववेच्यते; सा िकमात्मालम्बना, आहो स्वत् स्वकायव्यित र-
क्ालम्बना?
atha sālambanayā ghaṭo vivecyate; sā kimātmālambanā, āhosvit
svakāyavyatiriktālambanā?
Translation: 1107
If you say that, pot is examined by the knowledge of thought, having
a content, there also the question arises, what is the content there?
Is it the thought itself, or, something other than its own form?
Text: 1108
तद्िद स्वकायालम्बना सती घटस्य िववेिचका; तदा िववेचनीयाथोर् वक्व्यः। यिद नाम
स्वकायमातर्ावभासा समुत्पन्ा; घटस्याऽसत्वे िकमायातम्?
tadyadi svakāyālambanā satī ghaṭasya vivecikā; tadā vivecanīyārtho
vaktavyaḥ. yadi nāma svakāyamātrāvabhāsā samutpannā; ghaṭa-
syā’satve kimāyātam?
Translation: 1108
If you say, the thought having thought itself as its content, examines
pot, then, you should know, what is that which is being examined?
If the thought is produced, which reveals its own form i.e. mere
thought, then, what happened that the pot does not appear in that
thought?
Text: 1109
अथ तस्यां बुद्ौ घटो [ना]वभाित तेन तस्याऽसत्वम्; अनया भङ्ग्या नीलादेरिप
असत्वमापद्ते।
atha tasyāṁ buddhau ghaṭo [nā]vabhāti tena tasyā’satvam; anayā
bhaṅgyā nīlāderapi asattvamāpadyate.
Translation: 1109
If you say that, because, in that knowledge or thought the pot does
not appear, and therefore, there is no existence of pot, then, by this
argument, there will arise the contingency of denying the existence
of blue color etc.
Text: 1110
अथ स्वकायव्यित रक्ाथार्लम्बनया घटो िववेच्यते; िकं [घटालम्बनया] घटो िववेच्यते,
घटव्यित रक्ाथार्लम्बनया वा?
atha svakāyavyatiriktārthālambanayā ghaṭo vivecyate; kiṁ [ghaṭā-
lambanayā] ghaṭo vivecyate, ghaṭavyatiriktārthālambanayā vā?
Translation: 1110
If you say that, the pot is being examined by the thought in which
the content is different from the thought then, we would like to
know whether the pot is the content of the thought, and therefore,
it is being examined, or, (the pot is being examined) by the thought
in which the content is different from the pot?
Text: 1111
तद्िद घटालम्बनया िववेच्यते, ततर्ािप िववेचनाथोर् वक्व्यः। तया िकं िकर्यते-िकं
घटस्याऽसत्वं पर्द्ोत्यते, आहो स्वत् सत्वम्, उभयं वा, न िकंिचद्ा?
tadyadi ghaṭālambanayā vivecyate, tatrāpi vivecanārtho vaktavyaḥ.
tayā kiṁ kriyate-kiṁ ghaṭasyā’sattvaṁ pradyotyate, āhosvit
sattvam, ubhayaṁ vā, na kiṁcidvā?
Translation: 1111
If you say that, by the thought, the pot having its content, the pot
is being examined, there, we would like to know, what could be the
meaning of “the act of examining”, i.e. what is going to be done by
that act of examining i.e. the act of thinking? Is the non-existence
of the pot going to be indicated, or, existence, or, both, or, neither?
Text: 1112
तद्िद असत्वम्; तदयुक्म्, निह अन्यिवषया सती एतस्य पर्बो धका भिवतुमहर् ित
अितपर्सङ्ात्, न जातु रूपिवषयिवज्ञान(नं) रसस्थापनाय अलम्।
tadyadi asatvam; tadayuktam, nahi anyaviṣayā satī etasya
prabodhikā bhavitumarhati atiprasaṅgāt, na jātu rūpaviṣayavijñā-
na(naṁ) rasasthāpanāya alam.
Translation: 1112
If you say, non-existence is going to be indicated, that will not be
proper, because, if the content of the thought is something else,
it cannot reveal that, because, otherwise it will lead to unwanted
contingency. It is not the case that, the knowledge of color is capable

of establishing the existence of taste.
Text: 1113
अथ सत्वं पर्द्ोत्यते; तथािप सत्वम्। स(सं)वृितसत्वे वा नीलादेरिप संवृितसत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha sattvaṁ pradyotyate; tathāpi sattvam. sa(saṁ)vṛtisattve vā
nīlāderapi saṁvṛtisattvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 1113
If you say, then, existence is being revealed or indicated, still there
will be existence and if that is treated as unreal, there will arise
the contingency of blue color becoming unreal i.e. not having real
existence.
Text: 1114
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; न, तदभावस्य अिवषयत्वात्। यथा िवज्ञानस्य िवषयतां न याित
तथा पर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्। िकंच, उभयं पर्द्ोतयन्त्या भावोऽिप पर्द्ोिततस्तया। तत्पर्द्ोतने च
कथं घटस्य संवृितसत्वम्?
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; na, tadabhāvasya aviṣayatvāt. yathā
vijñānasya viṣayatāṁ na yāti tathā prāgeva prapañcitam. kiṁca,
ubhayaṁ pradyotayantyā bhāvo’pi pradyotitastayā. tatpradyotane ca
kathaṁ ghaṭasya saṁvṛtisattvam?
Translation: 1114
If you say that, both appear, that is also not correct, because the
absence of the pot is not the content in the thought, as this absence
cannot be the object of the knowledge, has already been discussed
before. Moreover, by thought revealing both, the positive entity is
also revealed and if that is revealed, how can pot be called unreal?
Text: 1115
अथ न िकिञ्दिप पर्द्ोत्यते तया; कथं तिहर् घटिवषया सा अपिदश्यते?
atha na kiñcidapi pradyotyate tayā; kathaṁ tarhi ghaṭaviṣayā sā
apadiśyate?
Translation: 1115
If you say that, neither of the two is revealed by that knowledge
of thought, then, how do you call that knowledge as knowledge of
pot?
Text: 1116
अथ घटिभन्ाथर् िवषया सा; ततर् वतर् माना न कुम्भस्य अ स्तत्विवधाियका, न व्याव त्र्का।
atha ghaṭabhinnārthaviṣayā sā; tatra vartamānā na kumbhasya
astitvavidhāyikā, na vyāvarttikā.
Translation: 1116
If you say that, something other than the pot is the content of that
knowledge, then, that thought at that time can neither enjoin the
existence of pot nor can it exclude pot.
Text: 1117
अथ तस्यां बुद्ौ कुम्भो न पर्ितभाित तेन तस्य संवृितसत्वम्;
atha tasyāṁ buddhau kumbho na pratibhāti tena tasya saṁvṛti-
sattvam;
Translation: 1117
Clarification:
Well, in that knowledge, since pot does not appear, therefore, that
pot is called unreal.
Text: 1118
यद्ेवम्-बुिद्िवषयोऽिप बुद्ध्यन्तरे न पर्ितभाित, तस्याप्यायातं संवृितसत्वम्। सवर् ज्ञानािन
च इतरेतरज्ञाने न पर्ितभा न्त - सवेर्षां संवृितसत्वं पर्ाप्म्। न चैतदभ्युपगम्यते।
yadyevam-buddhiviṣayo’pi buddhyantare na pratibhāti, tasyāpyā-
yātaṁ saṁvṛtisattvam. sarvajñānāni ca itaretarajñāne na pratibhā-
nti - sarveṣāṁ saṁvṛtisattvaṁ prāptam. na caitadabhyupagamyate.
Translation: 1118
Reply:
If it is so, then, since that which appears in one knowledge does not
appear in another knowledge and so that also should be declared as
unreal. Similarly, all knowledges do not appear in other knowledges
and therefore, all knowledges should be declared as unreal. But, as
a matter of fact, this is not acceptable to you.
[१३. िवज्ञानवािदना सा धतस्य बाह्ाथर् िवलोपस्य िनरासः।]
[13. vijñānavādinā sādhitasya bāhyārthavilopasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1119
यदप्यन्यत्साधनमपिदष्ं बाह्ाथार्पह्वे - “न िकल िवज्ञानमसंिविदतम् अथर् स्य वेदनम्।
यद्िविदतमथर् वेदनं तदाऽजातेऽिप ज्ञानेऽथोर् वेद्ः स्यात्, सन्तानान्तरज्ञाने च जाते
देवदत्वेद्ः सोऽथर् ः स्यात्, न चैतदपु पद्ते। तथा स्वसन्तितपितते परोक्षज्ञाने

जातेऽथोर् न वेद्ः स्यात्। अथ ज्ञानान्तरिविदतमथर् स्य वेदनम्; तदिप ज्ञानान्तरिविदतम्
इत्यायातमान्ध्यं जगतः। अथ स्वसंिविदतं तदथर् स्य वेदनम्; ततश्च सहोपलम्भाद्
एकोपलम्भतो वा बाह्ाथर् िवलोपः पर्ाप्ः।” तदेतदयुक्म्।
yadapyanyatsādhanamapadiṣṭaṁ bāhyārthāpahnave - “na kila
vijñānamasaṁviditam arthasya vedanam. yadyaviditamarthaveda-
naṁ tadā’jāte’pi jñāne’rtho vedyaḥ syāt, santānāntarajñāne ca
jāte devadattavedyaḥ so’rthaḥ syāt, na caitadupapadyate. tathā
svasantatipatite parokṣajñāne jāte’rtho na vedyaḥ syāt. atha
jñānāntaraviditamarthasya vedanam; tadapi jñānāntaraviditam
ityāyātamāndhyaṁ jagataḥ. atha svasaṁviditaṁ tadarthasya
vedanam; tataśca sahopalambhād ekopalambhato vā bāhyārtha-
vilopaḥ prāptaḥ”. tadetadayuktam.
Translation: 1119
You had also stated another ground to deny the existence of external
object viz. “knowledge does not mean sensation of a thing which
is not known. Had it been the case that there is sensation of
even a thing which is not known, a thing would have been known
in a knowledge, even if that knowledge has not yet come into
being. When another knowledge series has arisen, that object can
be known by Devadatta. But this is not proper. Similarly, when
non-perceptual knowledge has arisen in its own knowledge series,
the object will remain unknown.
If someone says that, sensation of a thing means the perception of
something known by another knowledge, then, that knowledge also
is known by another knowledge and in this way the entire universe
will become blind. If you say that, sensation of a thing means being
known by itself, then, either because of the simultaneous knowledge
or because of knowledge, the external world will vanish.” But this
is not proper.
Text: 1120
ु म्-'ज्ञानान्तरिविदतं यिद ज्ञानम् अथर् स्य वेदनं तदा अिनष्ा पर्ाप्नोित'।
यत्ावदक्
एतदनभ्युपगमेनवै पयुर्दस्तम्। अिप तु अिविदतमेव ज्ञानम् अथर् स्य वेदनम्।
yattāvaduktam-‘jñānāntaraviditaṁ yadi jñānam arthasya vedanaṁ

tadā aniṣṭhā prāpnoti’. etadanabhyupagamenaiva paryudastam. api
tu aviditameva jñānam arthasya vedanam.
Translation: 1120
You had also said “if the knowledge of a thing is that, which is
known by another knowledge, then, it will lead to unsteadiness.”
But since such a theory is not acceptable, it is automatically refuted.
Rather, a knowledge which is not known, is the knowledge of a thing.
Text: 1121
ननु अजातेऽिप ज्ञाने अथोर् वेद्ः स्यात्;
nanu ajāte’pi jñāne artho vedyaḥ syāt;
Translation: 1121
Clarification:
Well, if when knowledge has not come into being, an object will be
known.
Text: 1122
न वेद्ः, वेदनस्याभावाद् अथोर् न वेद्ते, न तु वेदनवेदनस्याभावादथोर् न वेद्ते।
na vedyaḥ, vedanasyābhāvād artho na vedyate, na tu vedanaveda-
nasyābhāvādartho na vedyate.
Translation: 1122
Reply:
It cannot be known, since there will be no knowledge, the object
cannot be known. It is not the case that in the absence of knowledge
of knowledge, an object is not known.
Text: 1123
ु म्- 'सन्तानान्तरजाते न ज्ञाने सोऽथोर् वेद्ः स्यात्'; तदप्ययुक्म्, देवदत्-
सन्तितपितते जाते देवदत्स्य सोऽथोर्ऽपरोक्षः, न तु सन्तानान्तरपितते ज्ञाने, अन्यथा िह
सन्तानान्तरपिततं िवज्ञानं स्वसंिविदतरूपं जातम्। त स्मन् जाते सोऽथोर् देवदत्स्याऽपरोक्षः
yadapyanyaduktam- ‘santānāntarajāte na jñāne so’rtho vedyaḥ
syāt’; tadapyayuktam, devadattasantatipatite jāte devadattasya
so’rtho’parokṣaḥ, na tu santānāntarapatite jñāne, anyathā hi santā-
nāntarapatitaṁ vijñānaṁ svasaṁviditarūpaṁ jātam. tasmin jāte

so’rtho devadattasyā’parokṣaḥ syāt.
Translation: 1123
You had also said, “when knowledge is produced in another
knowledge series, that object is known.” But, this is also not
proper, because, if the knowledge comes into being in the series
of Devadatta, that object becomes invisible to Devadatta. But not
in the knowledge which is included in another knowledge series,
otherwise, a knowledge falling in another knowledge series, will
become of the form of being known by itself and when in such
a form it is born, that object will become invisible to Devadatta.
Text: 1124
अिप च, रूपज्ञानं िकं रूपगृहीत्यात्मकम्, आहो स्वद् अगृहीत्यात्मकम्?
api ca, rūpajñānaṁ kiṁ rūpagṛhītyātmakam, āhosvid agṛhītyāt-
makam?
Translation: 1124
Moreover, is it the case that knowledge of color is of the nature of
sensation of color, or, of the nature of non-sensation.
Text: 1125
तद्िद रूपगृहीत्यात्मकम्; तदा गृहीतमेव रूपं ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ं भवतु स्वसंवेद्ं वा, न
ज्ञानगर्हणपुरस्सरमथर् स्य गर्हणम्।
tadyadi rūpagṛhītyātmakam; tadā gṛhītameva rūpaṁ jñānaṁ jñānā-
ntaravedyaṁ bhavatu svasaṁvedyaṁ vā, na jñānagrahaṇapurassa-
ramarthasya grahaṇam.
Translation: 1125
If you say, it is of the nature of sensation of color, then, let the
color which is known to be the knowledge, to be known by another
knowledge, or, to be known by itself? It is not the case that, before
the object is known, the knowledge of the object is known.
Text: 1126
अथ रूपगृहीितस्वभावकं न भवित रूपज्ञानम्; एवं तिहर् स्वसंवेद्ं भवतु व्यित रक्-
संवेदकसंवेद्ं वा भवतु अवेद्ं वा, न रूपस्य पर्त्यक्षता, यथा रसज्ञानस्वसंवेद्त्वेऽिप
न रूपस्य पर्त्यक्षता तद्त् रूपज्ञानसद्ावेऽिप न रूपस्य पर्त्यक्षता रूपगृहीितस्वभावतया

अनुपपत्ेः।
atha rūpagṛhītisvabhāvakaṁ na bhavati rūpajñānam; evaṁ tarhi
svasaṁvedyaṁ bhavatu vyatiriktasaṁvedakasaṁvedyaṁ vā bhavatu
avedyaṁ vā, na rūpasya pratyakṣatā, yathā rasajñānasva-
saṁvedyatve’pi na rūpasya pratyakṣatā tadvat rūpajñānasadbhāve’pi
na rūpasya pratyakṣatā rūpagṛhītisvabhāvatayā anupapatteḥ.
Translation: 1126
If you say that, knowledge of color cannot be of the nature of
sensation of color, then, let that be known by itself, or, let that
be revealed by another revealer, or, let that not be known at all.
The color cannot be perceived. As even if the knowledge of taste is
revealed by itself, color is not revealed by that knowledge, in the
same way, it is knowledge of color, there cannot be perception of
color because, it cannot be said to be of the nature of sensation of
color.
[१४. बाह्ाथर् िवलोपायोपयुक्स्य सहोपलम्भसाधनस्य िवकल्प्य दषू णम्।]
[14. bāhyārthavilopāyopayuktasya sahopalambhasādhanasya vikalpya
dūṣaṇam.]
Text: 1127
यदप्युक्म्-'स्वसंवेद्त्वे सहोपलम्भाद् िवज्ञानाथर् योरैक्यम्' - एतदप्यपनीतं दर्ष्व्यम्;
स्वसंवेद्त्वाऽसंभवादेव। न च सहोपलम्भादथर् स्याऽभावः सद्ध्यित अव्यितरेको वा।
yadapyuktam-‘svasaṁvedyatve sahopalambhād vijñānārthayorai-
kyam’ - etadapyapanītaṁ draṣṭavyam; svasaṁvedyatvā’saṁbhavā-
deva. na ca sahopalambhādarthasyā’bhāvaḥ siddhyati avyatireko vā.
Translation: 1127
You had also said, “if it is movable by itself, because they will appear
together, there will be identity with knowledge and its content.”
This is also as good as refuted, because, it is impossible to justify
that, it is revealed by itself. It is not the case that because, they
appear together there will be absence of content or there will be
identity between the two.
Text: 1128
सहोपलम्भो िह ज्ञानैकधमर् ः, अथैर्कधमर् ः, उभयधमोर् वा?
sahopalambho hi jñānaikadharmaḥ, arthaikadharmaḥ, ubhayadha-
rmo vā?
Translation: 1128
We would like to ask, whether, knowing together is the property of
knowledge alone, or, of the object of the knowledge alone, or of the
property of the both?
Text: 1129
तद्िद ज्ञानैकधमर् ः; तदा सहशब्दाथोर् नोपपद्ते। ज्ञानैकधमर् त्वे च ज्ञानस्यैवा स्तत्वस्थापकं
नाथर् स्य व्यितरेकाभावावेदकं सहोपलम्भसाधनम् अतद्मर् त्वात्।
tadyadi jñānaikadharmaḥ; tadā sahaśabdārtho nopapadyate. jñānai-
kadharmatve ca jñānasyaivāstitvasthāpakaṁ nārthasya vyatirekā-
bhāvāvedakaṁ sahopalambhasādhanam ataddharmatvāt.
Translation: 1129
If you say that, it is the property of knowledge alone, then, you
cannot justify the meaning of the word “together”. If it is the
property of knowledge alone, then, it will not be the revealer of the
absence of difference of the object, because, the factor of causing
the perception together cannot be the property of that.
Text: 1130
अथ अथैर्कधमर् ः सहोपलम्भः; अतर्ािप सहशब्दाथोर् वक्व्यः। अथैर्कधमर् त्वे वा अथर् स्यैव
सत्ां व्यवस्थापयित, ततश्च िवपरीतसाधनाद् िवरुद्ः।
atha arthaikadharmaḥ sahopalambhaḥ; atrāpi sahaśabdārtho
vaktavyaḥ. arthaikadharmatve vā arthasyaiva sattāṁ vyavasthā-
payati, tataśca viparītasādhanād viruddhaḥ.
Translation: 1130
If you say, it is the property of object alone and that is the
meaning of knowing together, then, here also you should also spell
the meaning of the word “together”, or, else if it is the property
of knowledge alone, then, it establish the existence of object only
and consequently it will establish contrary to what you intend to
establish.
Text: 1131
अथ उभयधमर् ः; कथमुभयधमर् त्वे अन्यतरलोपः? अन्यतरलोपश्चेत्; नोभयधमर् ता
उपपद्ते। 'उभयधमर् ता च अन्यतरलोपश्च' इित व्याहतमपिदश्यते। उभयधमर् त्वे च
'अथर् स्यैव िवलोपो न ज्ञानस्य' इत्यतर् िनयामकं वक्व्यम्। तच्च ना स्त। न च
उपलम्भोऽन्यतरसद्ावं व्यावतर् यित, सद्ावेऽिप दृष्त्वात् यथा ज्ञाने।
atha ubhayadharmaḥ; kathamubhayadharmatve anyataralopaḥ?
anyataralopaścet; nobhayadharmatā upapadyate. ‘ubhayadharmatā
ca anyataralopaśca’ iti vyāhatamapadiśyate. ubhayadharmatve ca
‘arthasyaiva vilopo na jñānasya’ ityatra niyāmakaṁ vaktavyam.
tacca nāsti. na ca upalambho’nyatarasadbhāvaṁ vyāvartayati,
sadbhāve’pi dṛṣṭatvāt yathā jñāne.
Translation: 1131
If you say that, it is the property of both, then, if it is the property
of both, then, how one of the two has disappeared? If one of the
two has disappeared, then, it cannot be maintained that, it is the
property of both. It is indeed a contrary statement, if you say, “it
exists in both and there is absence of one.” If it is a property of both,
in spite of that, there is absence of the object and not of knowledge.
For such a statement, you should give explanatory ground and there
is no such controlling factor. Knowledge of a thing does not exclude
the existence of one of the two, because, even if it is there, it is
experienced by us as in the case of knowledge.
Text: 1132
अिप च कस्यातर् पक्षीकरणम् - िकं िवज्ञानस्य, उत अथर् स्य?
api ca kasyātra pakṣīkaraṇam - kiṁ vijñānasya, uta arthasya?
Translation: 1132
Moreover, what is the subject of this inference? Is it the knowledge,
or, the content of the knowledge?
Text: 1133
तद्िद ज्ञानं पक्षय स; तस्य िकं साध्यते - अभावः अव्यितरेको वा?
tadyadi jñānaṁ pakṣayasi; tasya kiṁ sādhyate-abhāvaḥ avyatireko vā?
Translation: 1133
If you are making knowledge of content as the subject, then, what
is being inferred in that? Is it the absence, or, absence of difference?
Text: 1134
तद्िद अभावः; स िकं ज्ञानस्य, उत अथर् स्येित?
tadyadi abhāvaḥ; sa kiṁ jñānasya, uta arthasyeti?
Translation: 1134
If absence is being inferred, there also we would like to know, is the
absence of knowledge, or, the absence of content of knowledge?
Text: 1135
यिद ज्ञानस्य तदा अभ्युपेतहानम्, हेतोश्च पक्षधमर् ता न लभ्यते।
yadi jñānasya tadā abhyupetahānam, hetośca pakṣadharmatā na
labhyate.
Translation: 1135
If you say, it is the absence of knowledge, then, you are giving up
something which you have already accepted. Moreover, you cannot
demonstrate that, the ground for the inference exists in the subject.
Text: 1136
अथ अथर् स्य; तदा असम्बद्त्वम् - ज्ञानं पक्षय स अथोर् नास्तीित व्याहतमपिदश्यते,
सहोपलम्भस्य च व्य धकरणत्वम्।
atha arthasya; tadā asambaddhatvam - jñānaṁ pakṣayasi artho
nāstīti vyāhatamapadiśyate, sahopalambhasya ca vyadhikaraṇatvam.
Translation: 1136
If you say, it is the absence of content of knowledge which is being
inferred, then, it is a very irrelevant statement. On one hand, you
are making knowledge as the subject, and on the other, you say
there is no content of knowledge and so it is self-contradictory. It
will mean that, the knowledge of the two exists in two different loci.
Text: 1137
अथ अव्यितरेकः साध्यते; स िकं ज्ञानस्य, आहो स्वद् अथर् स्य?
atha avyatirekaḥ sādhyate; sa kiṁ jñānasya, āhosvid arthasya?
Translation: 1137
If you say that, the absence of difference is being established by
inference, there also question arises, is it of the knowledge, or, of
the object of knowledge?
Text: 1138
तद्िद अथर् स्य; तदाऽसम्बद्ािभधातृत्वम् - ज्ञानं पक्षय स, अथर् स्य चाऽव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं
करो स इित व्याहतमपिदश्यते, अथार्व्यितरेको िह अथर् धमर् ः।
tadyadi arthasya; tadā’sambaddhābhidhātṛtvam - jñānaṁ pakṣayasi,
arthasya cā’vyatirekapratipādanaṁ karosi iti vyāhatamapadiśyate,
arthāvyatireko hi arthadharmaḥ.
Translation: 1138
If you say, it is the object of knowledge, then, again it is irrelevant
statement, because, on one hand you are making knowledge as
the subject, and on the other hand you are attempting to explain
the identity of the object of knowledge. This is self-contradictory,
because, the property of object cannot be different from the object.
Text: 1139
अथ ज्ञानस्यैव अव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं िकर्यते; त त्कं स्वस्मात्स्वरूपादव्यित रक्म्,
आहो स्वत् पररूपादव्यित रक्म्?
atha jñānasyaiva avyatirekapratipādanaṁ kriyate; tatkiṁ svasmāt
svarūpādavyatiriktam, āhosvit pararūpādavyatiriktam?
Translation: 1139
If you say that, you are explaining the non-difference of the
knowledge itself, there also the question arises, is it the case that,
it is not different from its own nature? Or, it is not different from
other’s nature?
Text: 1140
तद्िद स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यित रक्ं ज्ञानम्; तदा अिववादेन सम्बोधियतव्याः।
tadyadi svasmāt svarūpādavyatiriktaṁ jñānam; tadā avivādena
sambodhayitavyāḥ.
Translation: 1140
If you say, the knowledge is not different from its own nature, then,
there is no difference of opinion whatsoever.
Text: 1141
अथ परस्मादव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं िकर्यते; स परात्मा ता त्वकः, अता त्वको वा?
atha parasmādavyatirekapratipādanaṁ kriyate; sa parātmā tāttvi-
kaḥ, atāttviko vā?
Translation: 1141
If you say that, it is being explained as not different from other’s
nature, there also question arises whether the others nature is real
or unreal?
Text: 1142
तद्िद अता त्वकः; ततोऽव्यित रक्ं ज्ञानमिप अता त्वकं भवेत्।
tadyadi atāttvikaḥ; tato’vyatiriktaṁ jñānamapi atāttvikaṁ bhavet.
Translation: 1142
If you say, it is unreal, then, the knowledge also will be unreal
because, it is identical with that.
Text: 1143
अथ ता त्वकः; सोप्यवधा रतदेहो वा, अनवधा रतदेहो वा?
atha tāttvikaḥ; sopyavadhāritadeho vā, anavadhāritadeho vā?
Translation: 1143
If you say, it is real, then, there also question arises, whether its
own form is determined, or, its form is not determined.
Text: 1144
तद्िद अवधा रतदेहः; स िकं िभन्ाकारतया अवगतः, अिभन्ाकारतया वा?
tadyadi avadhāritadehaḥ; sa kiṁ bhinnākāratayā avagataḥ, abhinnā-
kāratayā vā?
Translation: 1144
If you say, its form is determined, there also the question arises,
whether it is known as having different form, or, as having identical
form.
Text: 1145
यिद िभन्ाकारतया अवधा रतः; तदा िभन्ाकारावगाहकिवज्ञानदिू षतपक्षत्वेन सहोपलम्भ-
हेतोर सद्ता कालात्ययापिदष्ता वा।
yadi bhinnākāratayā avadhāritaḥ; tadā bhinnākārāvagāhakavijñāna-
dūṣitapakṣatvena sahopalambhahetorasiddhatā kālātyayāpadiṣṭatā vā.
Translation: 1145
If you say, its form is determined having different form, then, the
subject of the inference becomes defective as knowledge in which
different form is the object and as such the ground viz. “knowing
together” remains unestablished, or, suffering from the defect of
kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.
Text: 1146
अथ अिभन्स्वभावतयाऽवधा रतः; न तिहर् परात्मा, 'परात्मा च अिभन्स्वभावतया
अवधा रतः' इित च व्याघातः। िकंच, अिभन्स्वभावतया यिद पर्ागेवाऽवगािहतः;
तदा िकं ततर् सहोपलम्भसाधनेन पर्योजनम्? िनष्पािदतिकर्ये कमर् िण साधनं
सा(ध?)नन्यायमितपतित।
atha abhinnasvabhāvatayā’vadhāritaḥ; na tarhi parātmā, ‘parātmā
ca abhinnasvabhāvatayā’vadhāritaḥ’ iti ca vyāghātaḥ. kiṁca,
abhinnasvabhāvatayā yadi prāgevā’vagāhitaḥ; tadā kiṁ tatra
sahopalambhasādhanena prayojanam? niṣpāditakriye karmaṇi
sādhanaṁ sā(dha?)nanyāyamatipatati.
Translation: 1146
If you say, it is determined as having identical nature, then,
this cannot be said to be of the form of others nature. It is a
contradictory statement to say that it is of others nature and at
the same time it is determined as having nature having the nature
identical with the nature of its own. Moreover, if you say that it is
already known as having identical nature then, what is the need of
establishing “knowing together”? Because, when an act has already
terminated in generating an activity, the means of that activity is
left with no scope, for a cause and effect relationship.
Text: 1147
अथ अनवधा रतदेहः; स परात्माऽस्तीित कथं जानीषे? न च अवधा रतानवधा रताकारयोः
एकत्वं बहिवदो वद न्त। अनवधा रताकारैकत्वे च ज्ञानस्याप्यसंवेदनं पर्सक्म्।
atha anavadhāritadehaḥ; sa parātmā’stīti kathaṁ jānīṣe? na ca
avadhāritānavadhāritākārayoḥ ekatvaṁ bahuvido vadanti� alavadhā-
ritākāraikatve ca jñānasyāpyasaṁvedanaṁ prasaktam.
Translation: 1147
If you say, it is not determined, then, the question arises how do
you know that, it has other’s nature? Learned people do not say
that, there is identity between a known and unknown forms. If it is
identified with the form which is not determined, then, it will lead
to lack of awareness of knowledge.
Text: 1148
अिप च सहोपलम्भः िकं ज्ञानयोः, उत अथर् योः, ज्ञानाथर् योः वा?
api ca sahopalambhaḥ kiṁ jñānayoḥ, uta arthayoḥ, jñānārthayoḥ
vā?
Translation: 1148
Moreover, by knowing both what do you mean? Is it knowing two
knowledges? Or, knowing two objects, or, knowing knowledge and
object?
Text: 1149
तद्िद ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भः; तदा न िद्तीयस्याभावोऽव्यितरेको वा सद्ध्यित, अ सद्श्च
हेतुः, दृष्ान्तश्च साधनिवकलः - िद्चन्दर्ज्ञाने[न] ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भो स्त।
tadyadi jñānayoḥ sahopalambhaḥ; tadā na dvitīyasyābhāvo’vyatireko
vā siddhyati, asiddhaśca hetuḥ, dṛṣṭāntaśca sādhanavikalaḥ - dvica-
ndrajñāne[na] jñānayoḥ sahopalambhosti.
Translation: 1149
If you say, knowing together two knowledges, then, it does not
establish as the absence of the second, or, the non-difference. Thus
the ground for the inference is not established and the example
is devoid of the ground. It is not the case that in the erroneous
knowledge of two moons there is awareness of two knowledges.
Text: 1150
अथ अथर् योः; तदाऽ सद्ो हेतुः, न चान्यतराथर् लोपः। लोपे वा अन्यतर सद्ौ बाह्ाथर् -
व्यव स्थितः।
atha arthayoḥ; tadā’siddho hetuḥ, na cānyatarārthalopaḥ. lope vā
anyatarasiddhau bāhyārthavyavasthitiḥ.
Translation: 1150
If you say, it is knowing two objects, then, also the ground is not
established. Neither of the two objects can be elided and if it is
elided, then, one of the two will be established and in that case, it
will prove that there are objects outside.
Text: 1151
अथ ज्ञानाथर् योः सहोपलम्भः; तथािप हेतोर सद्ता, दृष्ान्तश्च साधनिवकलः।
atha jñānārthayoḥ sahopalambhaḥ; tathāpi hetorasiddhatā, dṛṣṭā-
ntaśca sādhanavikalaḥ.
Translation: 1151
If you say, it is knowing together knowledge and object, even then,
the ground is not established and there is no example to establish it.
Text: 1152
अथ सहोपलम्भािदत्यस्यायमथर् ः - एकोपलम्भात्। एकोपलम्भेन ज्ञानाथर् योरेकता उप-
पाद्ते।
atha sahopalambhādityasyāyamarthaḥ - ekopalambhāt. ekopalambhena
jñānārthayorekatā upapādyate.
Translation: 1152
Clarification:
Well, by the term “knowing together” we mean the following: It
means because, there is one knowledge, we can justify the identity
between knowledge and its object.
Text: 1153
ननु एकोपलम्भािदत्यस्य कोऽथर् ः - िकं ज्ञानाथर् योः एक एवोपलम्भः, उत एकस्यै-
वोपलम्भः, आहो स्वदेकेनैव उपलम्भ इित।
nanu ekopalambhādityasya ko’rthaḥ - kiṁ jñānārthayoḥ eka eva upa-
lambhaḥ, uta ekasyaivopalambhaḥ, āhosvidekenaiva upalambha iti.
Translation: 1153
Reply
Well, we would like to know, what do you mean by, “Because it
is one knowledge”? Does it mean that there is one knowledge of
knowledge and its object?, or, does it mean knowledge of only one,
or, does it mean knowledge by only one?
Text: 1154
तद्िद ज्ञानाथर् योः एक एव उपलम्भ इित; न तिहर् अथार्भाव सिद्ः। संवेद्मानत्वेन
िवज्ञानसत्ावद् अथर् सत्ाऽिप सु स्थता। अ सद्ोप्ययं हेतुः नीलादावनेकोपलम्भसम्भवात्।
अनैका न्तकोप्ययं हेतुः यस्मादनेकनीललोिहताद्ाकाराणामेकोपलम्भेऽिप नान्यतम-
व्यावृ त्ः अभेदो वा दृष्ः।
tadyadi jñānārthayoḥ eka eva upalambha iti; na tarhi arthā-

bhāvasiddhiḥ. saṁvedyamānatvena vijñānasattāvad arthasattā’pi
susthitā. asiddhopyayaṁ hetuḥ nīlādāvanekopalambhasaṁbhavāt.
anaikāntikopyayaṁ hetuḥ yasmādanekanīlalohitādyākārāṇāmekopa-
lambhe’pi nānyatamavyāvṛttiḥ abhedo vā dṛṣṭaḥ.
Translation: 1154
If you say, only one knowledge of knowledge and the subject,
then, it will not establish that, there is no object. As, because of
awareness, the existence of knowledge is established, in the same
way, knowledge of object will be established. Moreover, this ground
of inference is unknown because, it is possible to have knowledges
of a blue color. This ground is also suffering from another defect
called “inconsistency” because, in spite of a single knowledge of
many forms such as blue, red etc., there is neither exclusion of any
of them, or, identity.
Text: 1155
अथ एकस्यैव उपलम्भः एकोपलम्भः; तदेकं िकं िवज्ञानात्मकम्, आहो स्वद् ज्ञानात्मकम्?
atha ekasyaiva upalambhaḥ ekopalambhaḥ; tadekaṁ kiṁ vijñā-
nātmakam, āhosvid jñānātmakam?
Translation: 1155
If you say, knowledge of only one is what is meant by one knowledge,
there we would like to know, whether that knowledge is of the nature
of vijñāna, or, of the nature of knowledge?
Text: 1156
तद्िद िवज्ञानात्मकम्; तदसत्, नील-मिण-कुम्भादेिवर् ज्ञानोत्पादकत्वेन स्वरूपमवधायर् ते
न तु िवज्ञानात्मतया, यस्माद् 'अनेन उत्पािदतं िवज्ञानम्' 'अतर् ममोत्पन्म्' इत्येवं
पर्वद न्त सन्तः न तु 'इदमेव ज्ञानम्' इत्येवं वक्ारो भव न्त। यथा िह वस्तुत्वेन पर्तीयमानं
नील-जलािदकम् एकोपलम्भानुरोधेन नावस्तुत्वेन पर्ितपद्ते तथा अिवज्ञानात्मकतया
अध्यवसीयमानं न िवज्ञानात्मतया व्यवस्थापियतुं पायर् ते, अन्यथा वस्तुत्वहािनपर्संगात्,
tadyadi vijñānātmakam; tadasat, nīla-maṇi-kumbhādervijñānotpāda-
katvena svarūpamavadhāryate na tu vijñānātmatayā, yasmād
‘anena utpāditaṁ vijñānam’ ‘atra mamotpannam’ ityevaṁ
pravadanti santaḥ na tu ‘idameva jñānam’ ityevaṁ vaktāro
bhavanti. yathā hi vastutvena pratīyamānaṁ nīlajalādikam ekopa-
lambhānurodhena nāvastutvena pratipadyate tathā avijñānātma-

katayā adhyavasīyamānaṁ na vijñānātmatayā vyavasthāpayituṁ
pāryate, anyathā vastutvahāniprasaṅgāt,
Translation: 1156
If you say, it is of the nature of vijñāna, then, it is not true, because,
its nature is decided on the basis of blue color, gem, pot etc., being
its producer and not as vijñāna. Since, this vijñāna is produced
by this, this is produced here for me. This is how people describe.
They do not say, this is the knowledge as blue color, water etc., is
known as an entity and in terms of a single knowledge, they are not
considered to be a non-entity, similarly, when something is decided
as non-knowledge it is not possible to establish it as the nature of
knowledge, otherwise, it will lead to absence of all entities.
Text: 1157
अथ(था)िवज्ञानात्मतया तदेकमवधायर् ते तदेष् सद्ेर सिद्ः, सद्साध्यता च स्यात्।
atha(thā)vijñānātmatayā tadekamavadhāryate tadeṣṭasiddhera-
siddhiḥ, siddhasādhyatā ca syāt.
Translation: 1157
If you say that, something is decided as of the nature of other than
vijñāna, then, there will be non-establishment of what is intended
to be established and also establishing something which is already
established.
Text: 1158
अथ एकेनैवोपलम्भः; सोप्यनुपपन् एव, जलचन्दर्ाकार्देः बिहिभरुपलभ्यमानत्वात्।
atha ekenaivopalambhaḥ; sopyanupapanna eva, jalacandrārkādeḥ
bahibhirupalabhyamānatvāt.
Translation: 1158
If you say that, knowledge by only one, that is also not proper,
because, water, moon, sun, etc., are seen by many.
[१५. अवयिविनराकरणद्ारा स्थािपतस्य क्षिणकत्वस्योत्थापनम्।]
[15. avayavinirākaraṇadvārā sthāpitasya kṣaṇikatvasyotthāpanam]
Text: 1159
यदप्युक्म् - “अवयिविनराकरणे क्षिणकत्वम् - यिद िह िकल अक्षिणको भवित भावः
तदा भवित अवयवाऽवयिवभावः, तदभावे तत्स्व(तस्याऽ)भावात्। अथ कथं तस्याभावः?
स्थाियनोऽथर् िकर्याऽकरणात्। तदेव कथम्? कथ्यते - िकं येन स्वभावेन आद्ामथर् िकर्यां
करोित िकं तेनव ै स्वभावेन उत्रोत्राण्यिप कायार्िण करोित, अथ समासािदतस्वभावान्तरः
करोित? यिद तेनव ै करोित; तदा एककालयोिगत्वं सवर् कायार्णां पर्सज्यते, कर्मकरणं
हीयते तस्य। न ह्ेकस्वभावायत्ो वस्तूनां कालिवकल्पो नाम। िवकल्पे वा
एकस्वभावायत्तामितकर्ाम न्त। अथ स्वभावान्तरापत्ौ जनयित; स्वभावान्तराप त्श्च
पूवार्कारप रहारनान्तरीयकरूपा। तदप रत्यागे न आकारान्तरानुपर्ेवेशोऽ स्त, आकारयोः
एकत्वायोगात्। अथ पूवार्कारप रहारः; तदा एतदेव क्षिणकत्वं यत् पूवार्परकायर् कारणम्।”
तदेतदयुक्म्। यिद कर्मेण कायर् न करोित युगपदिप कथं करोित? एकं नीलस्वल-
क्षणमनेकं िवज्ञाननीलािदकं कायर् करोित इित वः सद्ान्तः। तदनेकं कायर् िकम-
(िकमेके)नाकारेण करोित, आकारभेदेन वा?
yadapyuktam - “avayavinirākaraṇe kṣaṇikatvam - yadi hi kila
akṣaṇiko bhavati bhāvaḥ tadā bhavati avayavā’vayavibhāvaḥ,
tadabhāve tatsva(tasyā’)bhāvāt. atha kathaṁ tasyābhāvaḥ?
sthāyino’rthakriyā’karaṇāt. tadeva katham? kathyate - kiṁ yena
svabhāvena ādyāmarthakriyāṁ karoti kiṁ tenaiva svabhāvena
uttarottarāṇyapi kāryāṇi karoti, atha samāsāditasvabhāvāntaraḥ
karoti? yadi tenaiva karoti; tadā ekakālayogitvaṁ sarvakāryā-
ṇāṁ prasajyate, kramakaraṇaṁ hīyate tasya. na hyekasvabhā-
vāyatto vastūnāṁ kālavikalpo nāma. vikalpe vā ekasvabhāvāya-
ttatāmatikrāmanti. atha svabhāvāntarāpattau janayati; svabhāvā-
ntarāpattiśca pūrvākāraparihāranāntarīyakarūpā. tadaparityāge na
ākārāntarānupreveśo’sti, ākārayoḥ ekatvāyogāt. atha pūrvākāra-
parihāraḥ; tadā etadeva kṣaṇikatvaṁ yat pūrvāparakāryakāraṇam.”
tadetadayuktam. yadi krameṇa kāryaṁ na karoti yugapadapi
kathaṁ karoti? ekaṁ nīlasvalakṣaṇamanekaṁ vijñānanīlādikaṁ
kāryaṁ karoti iti vaḥ siddhāntaḥ. tadanekaṁ kāryaṁ kima(kime-
ke)nākāreṇa karoti, ākārabhedena vā?
Translation: 1159
You have also said the following: In the context of refuting the
concept of whole, you had raised the matter of momentariness.- If
a positive entity is taken as momentary, then, the part and whole
relationship will become possible, because, in the absence of that,
there will be absence of that. If you ask how will there be absence of
that? The answer will be “because that which is durable will not be
involved in bringing about the result. If you ask how is that? Here
is the answer: Is it the case that, a thing performs its first result
having a particular nature by the same nature, does it also produce
the subsequent effects also? If you say that, by acquiring another
nature, it produces the effect, then, let it do so by that nature, in
that case, all effects will start occurring at one and the same time
and it will lose its nature of producing an effect in a sequence. It is
not the case that, things entertain sequence of time being controlled
by one nature. Considering that, it does, it will cross the limit of its
own nature. If you say, it is involved in the production of another
nature, and assuming another nature will be of the form of being
so, without giving up its earlier form and if does not give up its
earlier form, there is no question of another form entering into it,
because, two forms cannot be said to be one. If you say that, it will
give up its earlier form, then, that itself is momentariness, which is
the cause of earlier and later effect.”
But, this is not proper. If something does not produce effect in
a sequence, how will it do so simultaneously? According to your
doctrine, one blue particular produces many cognitions of blue.
There the question can be asked, whether that produces the effect,
by the same form, or, by different form?
Text: 1160
तद् यद्ेकेन करोित; तदाऽऽयातासवर् कायार्णामेकाकाररूपता एकत्वम्, एकस्य चानेकत्व-
मापद्ते।
tad yadyekena karoti; tadā”yātāsarvakāryāṇāmekākārarūpatā eka-
tvam, ekasya cānekatvamāpadyate.
Translation: 1160
If you say that, it produces by one form, then, oneness will mean,
all effects have been only one form and this will mean, as if, one
has become many.
Text: 1161
अथ आकारभेदेनानेककायर् जनयित; आकारभेदात् तदेकत्वं व्यावत्र्ते, यद्व्यावृत्ौ
नैकमनेकं कायर् करोित।
atha ākārabhedenānekakāryaṁ janayati; ākārabhedāt tadekatvaṁ

vyāvarttate, yadvyāvṛttau naikamanekaṁ kāryaṁ karoti.
Translation: 1161
If you say that, it produces effect, by different forms, then, since
there will be difference in forms, oneness will be excluded. Once
that is excluded, it means that, one cannot produce many effects.
Text: 1162
अथ इत्थंभूतं स्वहेतुभ्यस्तदद्ु गतं यदनेकयुगपत्कायर् करणात्मकम्;
atha itthaṁbhūtaṁ svahetubhyastadudgataṁ yadanekayugapatkā-
ryakaraṇātmakam;
Translation: 1162
Clarification:
Well, what we consider to be of the nature of producing many effects
simultaneously, is that which emerges from its own cause, in this
form.
Text: 1163
यद्ेवं ममािप कर्मभाव्यनेककायर् करणात्मकं समुद्त
ू ं स्वहेतुभ्यः।
yadyevaṁ mamāpi kramabhāvyanekakāryakaraṇātmakaṁ samud-
bhūtaṁ svahetubhyaḥ.
Translation: 1163
Reply:
If it is so, then, according to me also, something can emerge from its
own cause, which may be of the nature of producing many effects
in a sequence.
[१६. क्षिणकत्वस्थापनाय पर्युक्स्य िवनाशहेत्वभावस्य िवनाशं िवकल्प्य दषू णम्।]
[16. kṣaṇikatvasthāpanāya prayuktasya vināśahetvabhāvasya vināśaṁ
vikalpya dūṣaṇam.]
Text: 1164
ु म् - “िवनाशहेत्वभावात् क्षीणको भावः” तदनुपपन्म्; कथम्? ते इदं पर्ष्व्याः
-िवनाशो स्त वा, न वा?
yadapyanyaduktam-“vināśahetvabhāvāt kṣīṇako bhāvaḥ” tadanupa-
pannam; katham? te idaṁ praṣṭavyāḥ -vināśosti vā, na vā?
Translation: 1164
You had also said the following: “Since, there is no cause of
destruction, a positive entity is momentary.” But it is not proper.
If they ask how?, they should be asked this: whether there is
something called destruction, or, not?
Text: 1165
तद्िद ना स्त; कस्य सहेतुकत्वं िनहेर्तुकत्वं वा िवचारय न्त मनीिषणः। निह वन्ध्यासुत-
स्याभावे सहेतुकत्वं िनहेर्तुकत्वं वा िवचारय न्त सन्तः।
tadyadi nāsti; kasya sahetukatvaṁ nirhetukatvaṁ vā vicārayanti
manīṣiṇaḥ. nahi vandhyāsutasyābhāve sahetukatvaṁ nirhetukatvaṁ
vā vicārayanti santaḥ.
Translation: 1165
If they say, there is no destruction, then, what is being discussed
as having cause and not having cause by the learned men? If there
is absence of son of a barren lady, wise men never discuss about its
having a cause, or, not having a cause.
Text: 1166
अथ िवद्ते िवनाशः; स वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी वा, िव च्छन्ोत्पन्ो वा?
atha vidyate vināśaḥ; sa vastusvabhāvānubandhī vā, vicchinnotpanno
vā?
Translation: 1166
If you say, there is destruction, then, the question arises whether it
is associated with nature of reality, or, is it produced without any
association with reality?
Text: 1167
तद्िद वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी; न तिहर् िनहेर्तुकत्वम्, वस्तुनो वा िनहेर्तुकत्वपर्संगः, सत्स्व-
भावानुब न्धत्वव्यितरेकपर्सङ्ो वा।
tadyadi vastusvabhāvānubandhī; na tarhi nirhetukatvam, vastuno vā
nirhetukatvaprasaṁgaḥ, satsvabhāvānubandhitvavyatirekaprasaṅgo vā.
Translation: 1167
If you say, it is associated with nature of reality, then, it cannot be
said to be without cause. Otherwise, all entities will become without
cause, or, all entities will be devoid of association with their own form.
Text: 1168
अथ व्यित रक्ः; तस्य िनहेर्तुकत्वे कोपप त्ः? सहेतुकत्वे िनयतदेशकालयोिगत्वेनो-
पल ब्धः।
atha vyatiriktaḥ; tasya nirhetukatve kopapattiḥ? sahetukatve niyata-
deśakālayogitvenopalabdhiḥ.
Translation: 1168
If you say, it is different, then, what is the justification for calling
it without a cause? And if you say, it has cause, then, there will
be its knowledge as being associated with a particular place and
particular time.
Text: 1169
यिद नाम िनहेर्तुको िवनाशः वस्तूनां क्षिणकत्वे िकमायातम्, वस्तुभ्योऽथार्न्तरत्वात्?
yadi nāma nirhetuko vināśaḥ vastūnāṁ kṣaṇikatve kimāyātam,
vastubhyo’rthāntaratvāt?
Translation: 1169
If you say, destruction is without any cause, then, what is the harm,
if things are taken as momentary because, it will be a different entity
from the real entities?
[१७. क्षिणकत्वोपयोिगनः िवनाशिनहेर्तुकत्वस्य िवकल्पपर्पञ्केन पर्ितवदनम्।]

[17. kṣaṇikatvopayoginaḥ vināśanirhetukatvasya vikalpaprapañca-
kena prativadanam.]
Text: 1170
अथ िनहेर्तुकत्वे वस्तूत्पत्यनन्तरमात्मानं समासादयित िवनाशः;
atha nirhetukatve vastūtpattyanantaramātmānaṁ samāsādayati
vināśaḥ;
Translation: 1170
Clarification:
Well, if destruction is treated as having no cause, then, destruction
will come into being after the production of a thing.
Text: 1171
तदयुक्म्। अतर् पञ् पक्षा भव न्त - वस्तूत्पत्ेः पूवर्म्, सह वा, अनन्तरं वा, कालान्तरे वा
भवनम्, न वा भवनम्?
tadayuktam. atra pañca pakṣā bhavanti - vastūtpatteḥ pūrvam, saha

vā, anantaraṁ vā, kālāntare vā bhavanam, na vā bhavanam?
Translation: 1171
Reply:
That is not proper. Here five alternatives are possible. Is it prior
to the production of a thing, or, together, or, after, or, coming into
being at another time, or, not coming into being?
Text: 1172
तद्िद पूवर्भवनम्; तदा भावोद्वानुपप त्ः।
tadyadi pūrvabhavanam; tadā bhāvodbhavānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 1172
If you say, coming into being before, then, you cannot explain
production of any positive entity.
Text: 1173
अथ सह; तदा भावानुपलम्भपर्सङ्ः। तत्सद्ावोपलम्भे वा सततोपलम्भपर्सङ्ः, अभाव-
स्याऽिकंिचत्करत्वात्। तथाऽनन्तरभूतेऽिप िवनाशे सततोपलम्भपर्सङ् एव।
atha saha; tadā bhāvānupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ. tatsadbhāvopalambhe
vā satatopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ, abhāvasyā’kiṁcitkaratvāt. tathā’na-
ntarabhūte’pi vināśe satatopalambhaprasaṅga eva.
Translation: 1173
If you say together, then, there will arise the contingency of not
knowing a positive entity and if its existence is known, then, there
will arise the contingency of knowing always, because, absence is an
insignificant entity. Similarly, even if the destruction occurs later,
it will keep on being known always.
Text: 1174
अथ कालान्तरे भवनम्; न तिहर् क्षिणकत्वं वस्तूनां िवनाशस्य िनहेर्तुकत्वे सत्यिप।
atha kālāntare bhavanam; na tarhi kṣaṇikatvaṁ vastūnāṁ vināśasya
nirhetukatve satyapi.
Translation: 1174
If you say, its coming into being at a different time, then, you cannot
hold that things are momentary, even if destruction is treated as
without a cause.
Text: 1175
अथ नैव भवनं िवनाशस्य; तदा सवर् भावानां िनत्यत्वमापद्ते, िवनाशस्याऽसंभवात्।
atha naiva bhavanaṁ vināśasya; tadā sarvabhāvānāṁ nityatva-
māpadyate, vināśasyā’saṁbhavāt.
Translation: 1175
If you say that, destruction does not occur at all, then, it will mean
that, all positive entities are eternal, because, destruction is not
possible.
Text: 1176
अथ सहेतुके िवनाशे नावश्यंभावो िवनाशस्य, वस्े रागवत् कारणव्यापारपराधीनवृ त्त्वात्,
तदभावे तस्याभावः कथं भवेत?्
atha sahetuke vināśe nāvaśyaṁbhāvo vināśasya, vastre rāgavat
kāraṇavyāpāraparādhīnavṛttitvāt, tadabhāve tasyābhāvaḥ kathaṁ
bhavet?
Translation: 1176
Clarification:
Well, if destruction is treated as having a cause, then, there can be
no definite occurrence of destruction. Like the color in the cloth, it
is dependent on the function of its cause and if that is not there,
how can there be absence of that?
Text: 1177
तदयुक्म्, स्वहेतोरेव धर्ुवभािविवनाशाहर् स्योत्पत्ेः। भवतु वाऽभावास्यानुद्गमः न क श्च-
िद्रोधः। न तु िनमोर्क्षपर्सङ्ो गुणानां िवनाशानुत्पत्ेः; नेदमस्मिद्रोधेषु राजते, मोक्षप र-
क्लृप्त्यकरणात्।
tadayuktam, svahetoreva dhruvabhāvivināśārhasyotpatteḥ. bhavatu
vā’bhāvāsyānudgamaḥ na kaścidvirodhaḥ. na tu nirmokṣaprasaṅgo
guṇānāṁ vināśānutpatteḥ; nedamasmadvirodheṣu rājate, mokṣapa-
riklṛptyakaraṇāt.
Translation: 1177
Reply:
It is not correct. A thing which is sure to be destroyed is produced
from its own cause, or, let there be no emergence of absence. There
is no conflict in it. It will also not lead to absence of freedom from
bondage, since there will be no destruction of the attributes. This

does not stand in opposition to our view, because we do not accept
the idea of salvation.
Text: 1178
अथ कृतकस्य िनत्यत्वं पर्ाप्नोित िवनाशासंभवे सित;
atha kṛtakasya nityatvaṁ prāpnoti vināśāsaṁbhave sati;
Translation: 1178
Objection:
Well, if there is no destruction, then, a thing which is produced will
become eternal.
Text: 1179
साव धका सत्ा अिनत्या, िनरव धका तु िनत्या, तत्कथं कृतकस्य िनत्यत्वं िवनाशासंभवे
सित? भवतु वा िनत्यत्वम्, न दोषोऽ स्त।
sāvadhikā sattā anityā, niravadhikā tu nityā, tatkathaṁ kṛtakasya
nityatvaṁ vināśāsaṁbhave sati? bhavatu vā nityatvam, na doṣo’sti.
Translation: 1179
Reply:
The existence which has a starting point is non-eternal and that
which has no beginning is eternal and therefore, how can there
be eternity of something which is produced in the absence of
destruction? Or, let that be eternal. It does not do harm to our
doctrine.
[१८. पर्त्यक्षगर्ाह्त्वेन उपपािदतस्य क्षिणकत्वस्य खण्डनम्।]

[18. pratyakṣagrāhyatvena upapāditasya kṣaṇikatvasya khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 1180
यदप्यपिदष्म् - “पर्त्यक्षेण क्षिणकत्वं वस्तूनां िवषयीिकर्यते, अतीतानागतकालिवकला
वस्तुसत्ा वतर् मानकाला लिङ्ता पर्त्यक्षेण आत्मसा त्कर्यते” - तदेतदयुक्म्, अतीताना-
गतवतर् मानकालानां िकं पर्तीयमानादव्यितरेिकत्वम्, व्यितरेिकत्वं वा?
yadapyapadiṣṭam - “pratyakṣeṇa kṣaṇikatvaṁ vastūnāṁ viṣayīkri-
yate, atītānāgatakālavikalā vastusattā vartamānakālāliṅgitā pratya-
kṣeṇa ātmasātkriyate” - tadetadayuktam, atītānāgatavartamānakā-
lānāṁ kiṁ pratīyamānādavyatirekitvam, vyatirekitvaṁ vā?
Translation: 1180
You had also said, “momentariness of things becomes object of
perception, the existence of a thing devoid of past and future time
and being associated with only present time, can be the object of
perception.” This is also not proper, we would like to know whether,
the times such as past, future and present are not different from
what is being known are different?
Text: 1181
तद्िद अव्यितरेिकत्वम्; तदा कालतर्यानुमतं वस्तूपलब्धम्।
tadyadi avyatirekitvam; tadā kālatrayānumataṁ vastūpalabdham.
Translation: 1181
If you say, they are not different, then, we know a thing with
reference to all the three times.
Text: 1182
अथ व्यितरेिकत्वम्; वस्त्ववगमे न अतीतानागतवतर् मानकालावगितर स्त। वस्तुमातर्ोप-
लब्धेस्तद स्तत्वं सद्म्, तदभावश्च िनष्पर्माणकः।
atha vyatirekitvam; vastvavagame na atītānāgatavartamānakālāvagati-
rasti. vastumātropalabdhestadastitvaṁ siddham, tadabhāvaśca niṣpra-
māṇakaḥ.
Translation: 1182
If you say, they are different, then, for the knowledge of them, there
is no knowledge of past, future and the present. By knowing mere
thing, its existence is established and also its absence without any
proof.
Text: 1183
अथ स एव भावोऽभावः; भावोऽन्यस्तिहर् वक्व्यः, अभावस्य सवोर्पाख्यािविनवृ त्-
लक्षणत्वात्।
atha sa eva bhāvo’bhāvaḥ; bhāvo’nyastarhi vaktavyaḥ, abhāvasya
sarvopākhyāvinivṛttilakṣaṇatvāt.
Translation: 1183
If you say, the same is positive entity is absence, then, you should
spell out the positive entity as different, because an absence is of
the nature of that which is free from all attributes.
Text: 1184
अथ कालान्तरे तस्य अन्योऽभावः; तस्यािकंिचत्करत्वात् सत्ाखण्डनं पर्ित।
atha kālāntare tasya anyo’bhāvaḥ; tasyākiṁcitkaratvāt sattākha-
ṇḍanaṁ prati.
Translation: 1184
If you say that, at other time, there will be absence, different from
that, then, it is insignificant in the context of refuting its existence.
Text: 1185
अथापरकायार्कत्ृर्त्वं कालान्तरे तदभावः; तदयुक्म्, सवार्परकायर् कत्ृर्त्वमेकस्य पर्त्यक्षात्
पर्त्यिभज्ञानेन च पूवोर्िदतानुभवावेिदता सत्ा आत्मसा त्कर्यते सैव सत्ा पर्त्यिभज्ञानेन
आत्मसा त्कर्यते।
athāparakāryākarttṛtvaṁ kālāntare tadabhāvaḥ; tadayuktam, sarvā-
parakāryakarttṛtvamekasya pratyakṣāt pratyabhijñānena ca pūrvo-
ditānubhavāveditā sattā ātmasātkriyate saiva sattā pratyabhi-
jñānena ātmasātkriyate.
Translation: 1185
If you say, the state of not producing another effect, is the absence of
that at some other time, it will not be proper, because, it is known
by perception and also by recollection that, one thing produces all
other effects and so it takes existence which is revealed by earlier
experience as its object and the same existence becomes the object
of recollection.
Text: 1186
कथं पुनवेर्त्सीित चेत;्
kathaṁ punarvetsīti cet;
Translation: 1186
Objection:
How do you know it?
Text: 1187
पर्त्यिभज्ञानादेव जानीमः। सैव सत्ा पर्ितभाित। आद्ानुभवेिप सा सत्ा पर्ितभाित।
कुतोऽवगता? एवं ज्ञानयोरिप हेतुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कतुर्म्, तदभावान्
कायार्नुमानम्।
pratyabhijñānādeva jānīmaḥ. saiva sattā pratibhāti. ādyānubhavepi

sā sattā pratibhāti. kuto’vagatā? evaṁ jñānayorapi hetuphalabhā-
vāvadhāraṇaṁ na śakyate kartum, tadabhāvānna kāryānumānam.
Translation: 1187
Reply:
We know it because of recollection only. The same existence
appears in the first experience also, the first existence also appears.
Where-from can that existence be known? In the same way, it is
not possible to know the cause and effect relationship between two
knowledges and since it is not there, there cannot be inference of an
effect.
[१९. बौद्संमतस्य स्वभावानुमानस्य िनरासः।]

[19. bauddhasaṁmatasya svabhāvānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1188
तथा स्वभावानुमानस्यािप न सम्बन्धावधारणमुपपद्ते, तदभावात्। िभन्योः सम्बन्ध-
(द्)योः सम्बन्धो दृष्ः, नह्ेकस्य सम्बन्ध उपपद्ेते।
tathā svabhāvānumānasyāpi na sambandhāvadhāraṇamupapadyate,
tadabhāvāt. bhinnayoḥ sambandha(ddha)yoḥ sambandho dṛṣṭaḥ,
nahyekasya sambandha upapadyete.
Translation: 1188
Similarly, it is not possible to know the relationship of invariable
concomitance in the case of inference of one’s nature, because, such
a relation does not exist. Relation can exist between two different
things, if the thing is only one, there can be no relation.
Text: 1189
िकंच, कृतकत्वेन अिनत्यत्वानुमानं िकर्यते - िकमवगतेन, अवनगतेन वा?
kiṁca, kṛtakatvena anityatvānumānaṁ kriyate - kimavagatena, ava-
nagatena vā?
Translation: 1189
Moreover, you are going to infer non-eternity on the basis of
something being produced. There the question arises whether that
state of being produced should be known, or, unknown.
Text: 1190
तद्िद अनवगतेन; तत्कथं स्वयमनु(मनव)गतं साधनं भिवतुमहर् ित?
tadyadi anavagatena; tatkathaṁ svayamanu(manava)gataṁ sādha-
naṁ bhavitumarhati?
Translation: 1190
If you say, it is unknown, then, how can that which is not known,
be called a ground to infer something on the basis of that.
Text: 1191
अथावगतेन; तस्यां कृतकत्वावगतौ अिनत्यत्वं पर्ितभाित वा, न वा?
athāvagatena; tasyāṁ kṛtakatvāvagatau anityatvaṁ pratibhāti vā,
na vā?
Translation: 1191
If you say that, by a known ground that can be known then, we
would like to know whether in the knowledge of the state of being
produced non-eternity appears, or, not?
Text: 1192
यिद न पर्ितभाित; कथं पर्ितभासमानाऽपर्ितभासमानयोस्तादात्म्यम्?
yadi na pratibhāti; kathaṁ pratibhāsamānā’pratibhāsamānayostādāt-
myam?
Translation: 1192
If you say, it does not appear then, how can there be identity
between that which appears and that which does not appear?
Text: 1193
अथ पर्ितभाित; िकमनुमानेन? िनष्पािदतिकर्ये कमर् िण साधनानथर् क्यम्। अन्यथा िह
कृतकत्वपर्ितपत्ाविप अनुमानमुपादेयं स्यात्।
atha pratibhāti; kimanumānena? niṣpāditakriye karmaṇi sādha-
nānarthakyam. anyathā hi kṛtakatvapratipattāvapi anumānamupā-
deyaṁ syāt.
Translation: 1193
If you say, it appears, then, what is the need of inference? With
reference to an act which has already produced the effect, a means
is of no use. Otherwise, even after the knowledge of the state of
being produced one will have to say that the inference can operate.
Text: 1194
अथ कृतकत्वं पर्ितपन्िमित कृत्वा नानुमानमुपादीयते;
atha kṛtakatvaṁ pratipannamiti kṛtvā nānumānamupādīyate;
Translation: 1194
Clarification:
Well, because the state of being produced becomes known,
therefore, inference does not operate.
Text: 1195
तत्स्वभावानुबन्ध्यिनत्यत्वमप्यवगतम्, िकमनुमानेन? अवगते चािनत्यत्वे यत्साधनमु-
पादीयते तत्कदािचदिनत्यतापर्ितपत्यथर् म्, कदािचच्च िनत्यतासमारोपव्यवच्छे दाथर् म्,
कदािचत्व(त्व)िनत्यताव्यवहाराथर् म्?
tatsvabhāvānubandhyanityatvamapyavagatam, kimanumānena?
avagate cānityatve yatsādhanamupādīyate tat kadācidanityatā-
pratipatyartham, kadācicca nityatāsamāropavyavacche- dārtham,
kadācitva(ttva)nityatāvyavahārārtham?
Translation: 1195
Reply:
In that case, then, non-eternity which follows from that nature
is also known, so, what is the need of inference? Even after
the knowledge of non-eternity, if a means is employed, will
it be for the knowledge of non-eternity sometimes, or, for
excluding super-imposition of eternity sometimes, or, for referring
to non-eternity sometimes?
Text: 1196
तद्िद अिनत्यतापर्ितपत्यथर् म्; सा ज्ञातैव, व्यथर् ः पर्यासः।
tadyadi anityatāpratipatyartham; sā jñātaiva, vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ.
Translation: 1196
If you say, for the knowledge of non-eternity, then, it is already
known and hence taking effort in that direction is futile.
Text: 1197
अथ समारोपव्यवच्छे दाथर् म्; समारोपव्यवच्छे दः अिनत्यत्वादव्यित रक्ः, व्यित रक्ो वा?
atha samāropavyavacchedārtham; samāropavyavacchedaḥ anitya-
tvādavyatiriktaḥ, vyatirikto vā?
Translation: 1197
If you say, for the sake of excluding the super-imposition, there
the question arises, whether the exclusion of super-imposition, is
identical with the non-eternity, or, different?
Text: 1198
तद्द्व्यित रक्ः; असाविप अिनत्यत्वावगमेनव
ै ावगतत्वान् साधनान्तरमपेक्षते।
tadyadyavyatiriktaḥ; asāvapi anityatvāvagamenaivāvagatatvānna
sādhanāntaramapekṣate.
Translation: 1198
If you say, it is identical, then, that also is known by knowing the
non-eternity and then also, it does not require any other means to
know it.
Text: 1199
अथ व्यित रक्ः; स िकं वस्तुभूतः, अवस्तुभूतो वा?
atha vyatiriktaḥ; sa kiṁ vastubhūtaḥ, avastubhūto vā?
Translation: 1199
If you say, it is different, we would like to know, whether it is real,
or, unreal.
Text: 1200
तद्िद वस्तुभूतः तेन सह शब्दगतकृतकत्वस्य तादात्म्यानुपप त्ः। तादात्म्ये वा
तदवगमेनव
ै ावगमात् नानुमानमपेक्षते।
tadyadi vastubhūtaḥ tena saha śabdagatakṛtakatvasya tādātmyā-
nupapattiḥ. tādātmye vā tadavagamenaivāvagamāt nānumānama-
pekṣate.
Translation: 1200
If you say, it is real, then, with that there cannot be identity of the
state of being produced which exists in the sound, and if there is
identity, then, it is known that by itself and obviously, it does not
require inference again to know it.
Text: 1201
अथ अवस्तुभूतः; स िकं िकर्यते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
atha avastubhūtaḥ; sa kiṁ kriyate, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 1201
If you say, it is unreal, then, what happens to it?
Text: 1201a
तद्िद िकर्यते; तदयुक्म्, सवोर्पाख्यािविनमुर्क्स्य करणायोगात्, करणे वा वस्तुत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi kriyate; tadayuktam, sarvopākhyāvinirmuktasya karaṇā-
yogāt, karaṇe vā vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 1201a
If you say, it does something, that will not be proper, because, if
something is devoid of all characterizations it cannot do anything
and if it does, it becomes real.
Text: 1202
अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तेन सह कृतकत्वस्य सम्बन्धव्यितरेकात्, अव्यितरेके वा तस्य वस्तुत्वं
कृतकत्वासत्वं वा।
atha jñāpyate; tena saha kṛtakatvasya sambandhavyatirekāt,
avyatireke vā tasya vastutvaṁ kṛtakatvāsattvaṁ vā.
Translation: 1202
If you say, it is known, then, it does not have relationship with
the state of being produced, or, if you say that the relationship
continues, then, the question arises whether it is real, or, a product,
or, non-existent.
Text: 1203
अथ अिनत्यताव्यवहारः िकर्यते - यो िह कृतकत्वं जानन्िप अिनत्यताव्यवहारं न करोित
स िह अतर् व्यवहायर् ते;
atha anityatāvyavahāraḥ kriyate - yo hi kṛtakatvaṁ jānannapi
anityatāvyavahāraṁ na karoti sa hi atra vyavahāryate;
Translation: 1203
Clarification:
Well, we refer to it as non-eternal and one, even after knowing it is
non-eternal, it does not refer to it as non-eternal, and that is what
is referred to here.
Text: 1204
सोऽिप व्यवहारः अिनत्यत्वादव्यित रक्ः, व्यित रक्ो वा?
so’pi vyavahāraḥ anityatvādavyatiriktaḥ, vyatirikto vā?
Translation: 1204
Reply:
Even that reference we would like to know, whether not different
from that which is non-eternal, or, different from that?
Text: 1205
यद्व्यित रक्ः; असाविप पर्ितपन् एवानुमािनकः।
yadyavyatiriktaḥ; asāvapi pratipanna evānumānikaḥ.
Translation: 1205
If you say, it is not different, then, that too is to be accepted as
inferential.
Text: 1206
अथ व्यित रक्ः; स िकं कृतकत्वेन उत्पाद्ते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
atha vyatiriktaḥ; sa kiṁ kṛtakatvena utpādyate, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 1206
If you say, it is different, then, the question arises whether it is
produced because it is non-eternal, or, is it made known?
Text: 1207
यिद उत्पाद्ते; तदा न शब्दोत्पादकहेतूनामनुमानत्वम्।
yadi utpādyate; tadā na śabdotpādakahetūnāmanumānatvam.
Translation: 1207
If you say, it is produced, then, the grounds which produce sound
need not be inferential.
Text: 1208
अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽिभधेयः। न तादात्म्यलक्षणः, ज्ञाप्याद् िभन्त्वात्।
atha jñāpyate; tena sākaṁ sambandho’bhidheyaḥ. na tādātmya-
lakṣaṇaḥ, jñāpyād bhinnatvāt.
Translation: 1208
And if you say, it is made known, then, you should state
the relationship with that. That relationship cannot be identity
because, it is different from that which makes it known.
Text: 1209
अथ तदत्ु प त्लक्षणः सोप्यनुपपन् एव - िकं व्यवहारेणोत्पाद्ते घटः, घटेन वोत्पाद्ते
व्यवहारः?
atha tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ; sopyanupapanna eva - kiṁ vyavahāreṇotpā-

dyate ghaṭaḥ, ghaṭena votpādyate vyavahāraḥ?
Translation: 1209
If you say, the relationship is of the nature of cause-and–effect, that
too is not proper because, there also the question arises, is it the
case that a pot is produced by mere linguistic reference to it, or,
the linguistic reference is produced by pot?
Text: 1210
न तावद् व्यवहारेण उत्पाद्ते घटः; आदौ घटसत्ा तदनु व्यवहारः।
na tāvad vyavahāreṇa utpādyate ghaṭaḥ; ādau ghaṭasattā tadanu
vyavahāraḥ.
Translation: 1210
It cannot be the case that a pot is produced by mere linguistic
reference, because, the first the pot should have existence and
thereafter it can be referred to by language.
Text: 1211
अथ घटेनोत्पाद्ते व्यवहारः; तदा कारणानुमानम्, न स्वभावानुमानम्। तच्च स्वयमेव
पयुर्दस्तम्।
atha ghaṭenotpādyate vyavahāraḥ; tadā kāraṇānumānam, na
svabhāvānumānam. tacca svayameva paryudastam.
Translation: 1211
If you say, the linguistic behavior is produced by pot, then, it should
infer its cause and one need not infer its nature and that has been
refuted by you, yourself.
0.11 ष ड्वधाथार्प त्पर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः
[ṣaḍvidhārthāpattiprāmāṇyasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the Authenticity of six types of Presumptions)
Text: 1212
एवमथार्पत्यादीनामप्यपर्ामाण्यम्। िकं पुनः अथार्पत्यादेः स्वरूपम्? कथं वा पर्ामाण्यम्?
ततर् दशर् नाथार्पत्ेस्तावत् स्वरूपं व्युत्पाद्ते - रूपदशर् नान्यथानुपपत्या चक्षुः-पर्ितप त्ः।
तथा, अनुमानपूिवर् कानुमानादिग्त्वपर्ितपत्यन्यथानुपपत्या अिग्व्यिक्पर्ितप त्ः। अभाव-
पूिवर् का अथार्प त्ः - जीवित देवदत्ः गेहे ना स्त - गेहाभावान्यथानुपपत्या बिहभार्वपर्ित-
प त्ः। तथा, आगमपूिवर् का अथार्प त्ः - शब्दाथर् पर्ितपत्यन्यथानुपपत्या शब्दाथर् सम्बन्ध-
िनत्यतापर्ितप त्ः। तथा अथार्प त्पूिवर् का अथार्प त्ः - शब्दाथर् सम्बन्धिनत्यतापर्ितप त्ः।
तथा, उपमानपूिवर् का अथार्प त्ः - गवयिपण्डगर्हणान्तरं गेहाव स्थतगोिपण्डे गोगवय-
सादृश्याव च्छन्े पर्ितप त्रुपमानात् िपण्डाव च्छन्े वा सादृश्ये, तस्य िपण्डस्य वाहदोह-
पर्सवसामथ्यर् म् अथार्पत्या पर्त्येित। एषा षट् पर्काराऽथार्प त्ः।
evamarthāpatyādīnāmapyaprāmāṇyam. kiṁ punaḥ arthāpattyādeḥ
svarūpam? kathaṁ vā prāmāṇyam? tatra darśanārthāpattestāvat
svarūpaṁ vyutpādyate - rūpadarśanānyathānupapatyā cakṣuḥ- prati-
pattiḥ. tathā, anumānapūrvikāanumānādagnitvapratipattyanyathā-
nupapatyā agnivyaktiprati- pattiḥ. abhāvapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - jīvati
devadattaḥ gehe nāsti - gehābhāvānyathānupapatyā bahirbhāvaprati-
pattiḥ. tathā, āgamapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - śabdārthapratipatyanya-
thānupapatyā śabdārthasambandhanityatāpratipattiḥ. tathā arthā-
pattipūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - śabdārthasambandhanityatāpratipattiḥ.
tathā, upamānapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - gavayapiṇḍagrahaṇāntaraṁ
gehāvasthitagopiṇḍe gogavayasādṛśyāvacchinne pratipattirupamā-
nāt piṇḍāvacchinne vā sādṛśye, tasya piṇḍasya vāhadohaprasava-
sāmarthyam arthāpatyā pratyeti. eṣā ṣaṭ prakārā’rthāpattiḥ.
Translation: 1212
In the same way, there is no authenticity of the processes of
knowing viz. presumption and the like. What is the nature of
presumption? How can it be called a valid means of knowing?
There the nature of presumption called darśanārthāpatti – Since
without eyes perception of color is not possible, therefore, one has to
presume eyes. Similarly, some presumption is preceded by inference,
for instance, since without fire, it is not possible to know fire through
inference and therefore, one has to presume the fire in the visual.
There can be a presumption preceded by absence, for instance, if
it is a case that Devadatta is alive and he is not found at home.
Without his existence outside the house, since his absence in the
house cannot be justified and therefore, there is presumption of
his existence outside. Similarly, there will be presumption preceded
by a sentence. Unless it is presumed that the relationship between
word and meaning is eternal, the knowledge from the meaning from
the word cannot be explained and therefore, there is a presumption
that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal. In
the same way, there will be presumption preceded by presumption.
As in the case of presumption of eternity of relationship between
word and meaning, in the same way, there is presumption preceded
by analogy. For instance, after the knowledge of a goyal individual,
there arises the knowledge of similarity of the goyal in the cow
individual, existing at home and this happens because of analogy,
or, one comes to know by presumption the capacity of carrying, or,
milking, or, giving birth to calf in the similarity qualified by the
individual. These are, thus, six types of presumptions.
Text: 1213
इयं चानुपपन्ा। यदक् ु म् - 'रूपदशर् नान्यथानुपपत्या चक्षु र न्दर्यं पर्तीयते'। तदयुक्म्।
चक्षु र न्दर्यान्वयव्यितरेकसम्बन्धावधारणमन्तरेण अन्यकारणप रहारेण िनयतकारण-
पर्ितप त्ः अथार्पत्याऽनुपपन्ा-चक्षुरािदकरणस्य िपशाचािदतुल्यत्वात् न तदवगितः,
अवगतौ वा अथार्पत्यनुपप त्ः।
iyaṁ cānupapannā. yaduktam- ‘rūpadarśanānyathānupapatyā cakṣu-
rindriyaṁ pratīyate’. tadayuktam. cakṣurindriyānvayavyatirekasa-
mbandhāvadhāraṇamantareṇa anyakāraṇaparihāreṇa niyatakāraṇa-
pratipattiḥ arthāpatyā’nupapannācakṣurādikaraṇasya piśācāditulya-
tvāt na tadavagatiḥ, avagatau vā arthāpatyanupapattiḥ.
Translation: 1213
This is not proper. You said eyes are known because without eyes
the perception of color cannot be explained. This is not proper,
because, instead of ascertaining the relationship by the method
of positive and negative concomitance with the sense organ viz.
the eyes, it is not proper to ascertain the invariable cause through
presumption by excluding other causes. The instrument viz. the
sense organs of eyes is similar to ghost and hence, that cannot be
known and if it is known, the presumption becomes futile.
Text: 1214
यदप्युक्म् - 'अन्यथोपपद्ते' इित। अतर् काऽनुमा? अथवा रूपािदज्ञानस्यैव धिमर् त्वं
करणपूवर्किमित साध्यो धमर् ः कायर् त्वात् रथािदवत्। एवं सवार्थार्प त्िवषयत्वेन पर्योगव्यु-
त्पादनं कायर् म्। पर्त्यक्षपूवर्कत्वाच्च अथार्पत्ेः तदभावे तदभावात्।
yadapyuktam - ‘anyathopapadyate’ iti. atra kā’numā? athavā rūpādi-

jñānasyaiva dharmitvaṁ karaṇapūrvakamiti sādhyo dharmaḥ kārya-
tvāt rathādivat. evaṁ sarvārthāpattiviṣayatvena prayogavyutpāda-
naṁ kāryam. pratyakṣapūrvakatvācca arthāpatteḥ tadabhāve tada-
bhāvāt.
Translation: 1214
You have said, “without that something cannot be explained.” What
is the inference here? Or, the knowledge of color etc. itself is treated
as the locus; what is to be inferred is the property “which is preceded
by an instrument”; because, it is an effect; like a chariot etc. In this
way, you should explain the form of inference in the case of all
presumptions. Since a presumption is preceded by perception and
since there is no perception accepted as a valid means of knowing
there is nothing called presumption.
0.12 उपमानपर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः।
[upamānaprāmāṇyasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the Validity of Analogy)
Text: 1215
तथा, उपमानमिप सम्भवित काननगतगवयिपण्डदशर् नानन्तरं गेहाव स्थतगोिपण्डे गवय-
सादृश्यावच्छे देन यिद्ज्ञानं तदपु मानफलम्। गोिपण्डाव च्छन्े सादृश्ये वा यिद्ज्ञानं तद्ा
उपमानफलं गवयिपण्डज्ञानमुत्पादनम्। तदेतदयुक्म्, पर्त्यक्षमूलमुपमानम्, तदपगमे
तस्याप्यपगमात्।
tathā, upamānamapi sambhavati kānanagatagavayapiṇḍadarśanāna-
ntaraṁ gehāvasthitagopiṇḍe gavayasādṛśyāvacchedena yadvijñānaṁ
tadupamānaphalam. gopiṇḍāvacchinne sādṛśye vā yadvijñānaṁ
tadvā upamānaphalaṁ gavayapiṇḍajñānamutpādanam. tadetada-
yuktam, pratyakṣamūlamupamānam, tadapagame tasyāpyapagamāt.
Translation: 1215
In the same way, analogy is also not possible as a valid means of
knowing. After seeing the animal called goyal, in the forest you
see similarity of the goyal in the cow individual at home. This
knowledge is the result of the process of analogy, or, the knowledge
of similarity qualified by the cow individual may the result of
analogy, it produces the knowledge of the individual called goyal,
but this is not proper, because, analogy is preceded by perception,

and when perception is refuted the analogy is also refuted.
Text: 1216
अथ िकिमदं गोगवयसादृश्यं यद् गोिपण्डगर्हणकाले नावगतम् उपमानादवगम्यते? िकम्
अवयवानां संस्थानम्, िकं वा िवषाणाद्वयवा वा, सामान्यं वा, अथ धमार्न्तरम्?
atha kimidaṁ gogavayasādṛśyaṁ yad gopiṇḍagrahaṇakāle nāva-
gatam upamānādavagamyate? kim avayavānāṁ saṁsthānam, kiṁ
vā viṣāṇādyavayavā vā, sāmānyaṁ vā, atha dharmāntaram?
Translation: 1216
Well, what is this similarity between the cow and goyal? Is it that
which is not known at the time of knowing the cow individual but
known by analogy? Does it mean the structure of parts, or, the
parts such as horns etc., or, a universal, or, any other property?
Text: 1217
तद्िद अवयवानां संस्थानं सादृश्यम्; तदपु ल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्ं वा, न वा?
tadyadi avayavānāṁ saṁsthānaṁ sādṛśyam; tadupalabdhilakṣaṇa-
prāptaṁ vā, na vā?
Translation: 1217
If you hold that, the structure of parts is similarity, there also one
may ask, whether it is verified by knowledge, or, not?
Text: 1218
तद्िद उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्म्; अवगतं तिहर् । अवगतपूवर् यद् भवित गवयिपण्डदशर् नानन्तरं
तत् स्मरणान्ाित रच्यते।
tadyadi upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam; avagataṁ tarhi. avagatapūrvaṁ
yad bhavati gavayapiṇḍadarśanānantaraṁ tat smaraṇānnātiricyate.
Translation: 1218
If you say, it is verified by knowledge, then, you have already known
it and whatever is already known, after the knowledge of the goyal
individual it will not be different from mere remembrance.
Text: 1219
अथ उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्मिप नोपलभ्यते; तदा गवयिपण्डेऽिप तस्य गर्हणं ना स्त। तदगर्हणे
िपण्डमातर्गर्हणे सित भवित 'मदीया गौः अनेन सदृशी' इित, तदास्व(श्व)िवषयमिप स्यात्
'मदीयोऽनेन सदृशः' इित।
atha upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptamapi nopalabhyate; tadā gavayapiṇḍe’pi

tasya grahaṇaṁ nāsti. tadagrahaṇe piṇḍamātragrahaṇe sati bhavati
‘madīyā gauḥ anena sadṛśī’ iti, tadāsva(śva)viṣayamapi syāt
‘madīyo’nena sadṛśaḥ’ iti.
Translation: 1219
If you say that, even if it is verified by knowledge, it is not known,
then, it cannot be known even in the goyal individual, and if that is
not known, by knowing mere individual, if you say, there arises the
knowledge “my cow is similar to this goyal”. If it is so, then, this
can be also said to be knowledge of horse, “my horse is similar to
this.”
Text: 1220
अथ अनुपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्म्; तिहर् तस्य क्विचदिप गर्हणम्, ततश्च मिहष्यािददशर् नेऽिप
'मदीया गौरनेन सदृशी, अश्वो वा मदीयोऽनेन सदृशः' इत्यु[प]प्लवः स्यात्।
atha anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam; tarhi tasya kvacidapi grahaṇam,
tataśca mahiṣyādidarśane’pi ‘madīyā gauranena sadṛśī, aśvo vā
madīyo’nena sadṛśaḥ’ ityu[pa]plavaḥ syāt.
Translation: 1220
If you say, it is not verified by knowledge, then, hardly it can be
known and in that case, after seeing buffalo etc. one will say, “my
cow is similar to this”, or, “my horse is similar to this” leading into
confusion.
Text: 1221
अथ िवषाणाद्वयवाः सादृश्यशब्दवाच्याः; ते च अवगता एव तेषु यद्वित उत्रकालं
िवज्ञानं तत् स्मृितरूपतामितपतित।
atha viṣāṇādyavayavāḥ sādṛśyaśabdavācyāḥ; te ca avagatā eva teṣu
yadbhavati uttarakālaṁ vijñānaṁ tat smṛtirūpatāmatipatati.
Translation: 1221
If you say, the parts viz. horns etc. are the meaning of the word
similarity, then, they are also known and at a later time, when
one will come to know them, then, that will not be different from
remembrance.
Text: 1222
अथ गोगवयसामान्यं सादृश्यशब्दवाच्यम्; तच्चानुपपन्म्, यथा च न सम्भवित तथा पर्ागेव
आवेिदतम्। भवतु नाम, िकं तदपु ल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्ं वा - पूवर्विद्भज्य दषू णं वक्व्यम्।
atha gogavayasāmānyaṁ sādṛśyaśabdavācyam; taccānupapannam,
yathā ca na sambhavati tathā prāgeva āveditam. bhavatu nāma,
kiṁ tadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ vā - pūrvavadvibhajya dūṣaṇaṁ
vaktavyam.
Translation: 1222
If you say, universal such as cowness, or, goyalness is the meaning
of the word similarity, that will not be proper. Why it will not be
proper, has already been explained before, or, let it be as you want.
Even then, you should. Answer the objections as raised above viz.
whether “that is verified by knowledge, or, not”.
Text: 1223
अथ धमार्न्तरम्; तदिप ऐ न्दर्यकम्, अती न्दर्यं वा?
atha dharmāntaram; tadapi aindriyakam, atīndriyaṁ vā?
Translation: 1223
If you say, similarity is some kind of other property, there also one
may ask whether that property can be known by senses, or, is it
beyond the range of senses.
Text: 1224
तद्िद ऐ न्दर्यकम्; तदा तस्य पूवोर्पलम्भे सित उत्रकालभािव यत् तस्य िवज्ञानं न तत्
स्मरणाकारतां प रत्यजित।
tadyadi aindriyakam; tadā tasya pūrvopalambhe sati uttarakālabhāvi
yat tasya vijñānaṁ na tat smaraṇākāratāṁ parityajati.
Translation: 1224
If you say, it can be known by senses, then, when it will be known
before, its knowledge through analogy later, will not be different
from remembrance.
Text: 1225
अथ तदपु ल ब्धलक्षण[म]पर्ाप्म्; न तिहर् तस्य क्विचदिप गर्हणम्। तदगर्हणे न गवयदशर् ने
सित 'मदीया गौरनेन सदृशी'त्यािदज्ञानेन शक्यते भिवतुम्। भवने वा गवय(या)दशर् नेऽिप
atha tadupalabdhilakṣaṇa[ma]prāptam; na tarhi tasya kvacidapi

grahaṇam. tadagrahaṇe na gavayadarśane sati ‘madīyā gauranena
sadṛśī’tyādijñānena śakyate bhavitum. bhavane vā gavaya(yā)darśa-
ne’pi syāt.
Translation: 1225
If you say, it is not verified by knowledge, then, it cannot be known
at all and once it is not known, there cannot arise the knowledge
after seeing the goyal “my cow is similar to this” and if you say
that, there will arise such knowledge, then, such knowledge can
arise without seeing the goyal.
[१. नैयाियकसम्मतस्य उपमानस्वरूपस्य खण्डनम्।]
[1. naiyāyikasammatasya upamānasvarūpasya khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 1226
अन्ये तु अन्यथा उपमानं व्याचक्षते िवप श्चतः - “गोगवयसादृश्यं स्वज्ञानिविशष्मुपमानम्।
संज्ञासं ज्ञसम्बन्धपर्ितप त्ः उपमानफलम्।” एतच्चाऽसमीचीनम्। पर्ागेव वनेचरवचनाद-
वगतं गोसदृशो गवय इित। कोऽथर् ः? गोसदृशस्य गवय इित नाम। एवं च सवर् मेव संज्ञासं ज्ञ-
सम्बन्धावधारणं कृतम्, नोपमानं कल्पनीयम्।
anye tu anyathā upamānaṁ vyācakṣate vipaścitaḥ - “gogavayasā-
dṛśyaṁ svajñānaviśiṣṭamupamānam. saṁjñāsaṁjñisambandhapra-
tipattiḥ upamānaphalam.” etaccā’samīcīnam. prāgeva vanecaravaca-
nādavagataṁ gosadṛśo gavaya iti. ko’rthaḥ? gosadṛśasya gavaya
iti nāma. evaṁ ca sarvameva saṁjñāsaṁjñisambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ
kṛtam, nopamānaṁ kalpanīyam.
Translation: 1226
Other scholars (i.e. Naiyāyikas)-explain analogy in a different way.
“The similarity between a cow and a goyal qualified by its own
knowledge, is the process of analogy and the result of this process,
is the knowledge of the relationship of word and its meaning.” This
is not proper. This has been known before from the statement of
the forester viz. “goyal is similar to cow.” What does it mean? You
will say, that which possesses similarity with the cow, is known
by the name goyal. If it is so then, the relationship between word
and its meaning is fully decided and therefore, there is no need of
postulating another process of knowing called analogy.
Text: 1227
अथ सम्प्लवन्यायेन कल्प्यते; भवतु, तथािप संज्ञी िवद्ते संज्ञा तु न िवद्ते। क्वोपमानं
प रकल्प्येत?
atha saṁplavanyāyena kalpyate; bhavatu, tathāpi saṁjñī vidyate
saṁjñā tu na vidyate. kvopamānaṁ parikalpyeta?
Translation: 1227
If you say, it is postulated on the basis of the maxim called
samplavanyāya, let it be so, still the meaning, or, referent is there,
but the word is not there and so where is the necessity of postulating
analogy?
[२. संज्ञापर्ितप त्िवषयकमतद्यस्य िनरासः।]
[2. saṁjñāpratipattiviṣayakamatadvayasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1228
एके वद न्त - “स्वयमुच्चायर् संज्ञा पर्त्येित।” तदयुक्ं, संज्ञाकाले सादृश्यज्ञानस्य अनव-
स्थतेः।
eke vadanti - “svayamuccārya saṁjñā pratyeti.” tadayuktam, saṁ-
jñākāle sādṛśyajñānasya anavasthiteḥ.
Translation: 1228
Some scholars say, “after uttering by himself one comes to know the
name of the object.” This is not proper, because, at the time of the
word, the knowledge of similarity does not exist.
Text: 1229
अन्ये तु - “बुद्ध्युपस्थािपता संज्ञा पर्त्येित” एवमामन न्त। तदयुक्म्। अिवद्मानस्य
िवषयाथर् ता न लभ्यते - 'न सत्ामातर्ेण जनकत्वेन वा' इत्यािदना पर्ागेव उपपािदतम्।
anye tu - “buddhyupasthāpitā saṁjñā pratyeti” evamāmananti. tada-
yuktam. avidyamānasya viṣayārthatā na labhyate - ‘na sattāmātreṇa
janakatvena vā’ ityādinā prāgeva upapāditam.
Translation: 1229
Still others hold that, “one comes to know the name presented by
ones intellect.” That is also not correct, because, that which does not
exist cannot be the object of knowledge. We have already discussed
before “nor by mere existence, nor by the role of producing its
knowledge, can its existence be accepted.”
Text: 1230
पर्त्यक्षपूवर्कं च उपमानमुद्गीयते। तदभावे तत्कथं भवेदव्यिभचारः येन िवज्ञानोत्पादकत्वेन
उपमानता, तच्चाव्यिभचा रत्वं न शक्यं(क्य)िवज्ञानिमित पूवर्मेवावेिदतम्।
pratyakṣapūrvakaṁ ca upamānamudgīyate. tadabhāve tatkathaṁ
bhavedavyabhicāraḥ yena vijñānotpādakatvena upamānatā, taccā-
vyabhicāritvaṁ na śakyaṁ(kya)vijñānamiti pūrvamevāveditam.
Translation: 1230
Analogy is said to be preceded by perception and when perception
is itself not there, how will it not lead to lack of inconsistency,
because of which there will be production of knowledge and thereby
the need for postulating an analogy. The fact that such absence of
inconsistency cannot be known has already been discussed before.
0.13 अभावपर्माणस्य िनरासः।

[abhāvapramāṇasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the Pramāṇa called Absence)
Text: 1231
अपरे तु अभावाख्यं पर्माणं सदपु लम्भकपर्माणपञ्कव्यावृ त्रूपं व्याहर न्त अभाविवषयम्।
त त्कमवगतमनवगतं वा?
apare tu abhāvākhyaṁ pramāṇaṁ sadupalambhakapramāṇapañcaka-
vyāvṛttirūpaṁ vyāharanti abhāvaviṣayam. tatkimavagatamanavaga-
taṁ vā?
Translation: 1231
Other thinkers (the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas) talk of an independent
process of knowing called absence which is distinct from all the
processes of knowing which reveal positive entities in order to reveal
a negative entity. There one may ask, does it cause knowledge after
it is known, or, without being known?
Text: 1232
यिद अवगतम्; तत् केनावगतम् - िकं मेयव्यावृत्या, मानव्यावृत्या वा, सदपु लम्भकेन वा?
yadi avagatam; tatkenāvagatam - kiṁ meyavyāvṛtyā, mānavyāvṛtyā
vā, sadupalambhakena vā?
Translation: 1232
If you say, it is known, then, one would like to know, how is it
known? Is it known by excluding object of knowledge, or, is it known
excluding knowledge, or, is it known by that which reveals positive
entity?
Text: 1233
तद्िद मेयव्यावृत्या; तद्गितः कथम्? अथ मानव्यावृत्या; तदा इतरेतराशर्यत्वं
दरु
ु त्रमापद्ते।
tadyadi meyavyāvṛtyā; tadgatiḥ katham? atha mānavyāvṛtyā; tadā
itaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpadyate.
Translation: 1233
If it is known by excluding object of knowledge, then, how can it
be called knowledge? And if you say it is known by excluding the
knowledge, then, it will result into mutual dependency which cannot
be answered satisfactorily.
Text: 1234
अथ समानव्यावृत्या अवधायर् ते; सैव ज्ञातुमारब्धा - कथं ज्ञािपका भवित? न च
एका ज्ञाप्या अन्या ज्ञािपका भवित सदपु लम्भकपर्माणमातर्ापगमस्य ज्ञापकत्वेनेष्त्वाद्
अिनष्ादोषपर्सङ्ाच्च-सािप ज्ञािपका कथं ज्ञाता इत्यािदना।
atha samānavyāvṛttyā avadhāryate; saiva jñātumārabdhā - kathaṁ
jñāpikā bhavati? na ca ekā jñāpyā anyā jñāpikā bhavati sadupa-
lambhakapramāṇamātrāpagamasya jñāpakatveneṣṭatvād aniṣṭhā-
doṣaprasaṅgācca-sāpi jñāpikā kathaṁ jñātā ityādinā.
Translation: 1234
If you say that, it is decided by excluding the common ones, then,
in fact that is what we have started to know, then, how can it
cause the knowledge? It is not the case that, one is known and
the other causes the knowledge. When no verifying knowledge of a
positive entity is desired to be the producer of knowledge and when
it does not lead to a contingency which is not desired and which
does not contribute to any defect, how that which is the producer
of knowledge be the object of knowledge?
Text: 1235
अथ सदपु लम्भकेन अवगम्यते; हीयते तिहर् अभावाख्यं पर्माणम्, मेयाभावावगमेऽिप
तदेवाऽस्तु।
atha sadupalambhakena avagamyate; hīyate tarhi abhāvākhyaṁ
pramāṇam, meyābhāvāvagame’pi tadevā’stu.
Translation: 1235
If you say, it is known by the verifying knowledge of existence of
positive entity, then, the process of knowing called absence should
be dropped and even in the case of knowing the absence of object
of knowledge, the same process of knowing the positive entity be
accepted.
Text: 1236
अथ अनवगतमेव मेयाभावेऽनुगमं करोित; यद्ेवं देवदत्स्य देशान्तरे िवनाशे
जाते देवदत्ोपलम्भकपर्माणपञ्कव्यावृत्ौ देवदत्ाभाविनश्चयः स्यात्, न तु भवित
पर्भुसमानस्यािप।
atha anavagatameva meyābhāve’nugamaṁ karoti; yadyevaṁ deva-
dattasya deśāntare vināśe jāte devadattopalambhakapramāṇapañca-
kavyāvṛttau devadattābhāvaniścayaḥ syāt, na tu bhavati prabhu-
samānasyāpi.
Translation: 1236
If you say that, even without being known, the process of knowing
called absence will cause the knowledge of absence of object, then,
when Devadatta has died at another place, then, there will be
determination of the absence of Devadatta only after the application
of the five processes of knowing Devadatta, such as perception etc.
Even that process of knowing which is like the monster cannot cause
such determination.
Text: 1237
अथ वस्तुभूतिनिमत्ान्तरवैकल्ये सित न भवित; तदेवास्तु तन्ान्तरीयत्वात् तद्गतेः।
atha vastubhūtanimittāntaravaikalye sati na bhavati; tadevāstu
tannāntarīyatvāt tadgateḥ.
Translation: 1237
If you say that, in the absence of another real factor, such
confirmation does not arise. Then, let that alone be accepted
because, without that, such knowledge is not possible.
Text: 1238
अभावस्य च पर्त्यक्षपर्माणगर्ाह्तां पर्ितपादय न्त नैयाियकाः। सम्बन्धश्च िवषयिवषिय-
भावलक्षणः िवशेषणिवशेष्यभावलक्षणो वा।
abhāvasya ca pratyakṣapramāṇagrāhyatāṁ pratipādayanti naiyā-
yikāḥ. sambandhaśca viṣayaviṣayibhāvalakṣaṇaḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-
bhāvalakṣaṇo vā.
Translation: 1238
The Indian logicians explain that, absence can be known by
perception. The relation is accepted of the form of “container-
and-content”, or, of the nature of “qualifier-and-qualificand”.
0.14 सम्भवैितह्पर्माणयोिनर् रासः।

[saṁbhavaitihyapramāṇayornirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the Pramāṇas called Inclusion and Popular Belief)
Text: 1239
सम्भवस्य अनुमानेऽन्तरीभावसम्बन्धैकिनिमत्मदर् ने(?) सित अथार्न्तरे पर्ितप त्रनु-
मानम्॥
sambhavasya anumāne’ntarībhāvasambandhaikanimittamardane(?)
sati arthāntare pratipattiranumānam.
Translation: 1239
The process of knowing (as accepted by the Paurāṇikas) called
Sambhava is to be included in inference. It follows the process of
inference where knowledge of one leads to the knowledge of another.
Text: 1240
ऐितह्स्य चागमे अन्तभार्वः। तस्य च पर्ामाण्यं न सम्भवित, नानुमानान्तगर् तस्य नािप
स्वतन्तर्स्य।
aitihyasya cāgame antarbhāvaḥ. tasya ca prāmāṇyaṁ na sambha-
vati, nānumānāntargatasya nāpi svatantrasya.
Translation: 1240
The process of knowing (as accepted by the Paurāṇikas) called
Aitihya is included in śabdapramāṇa. That cannot be a valid source
of knowledge. Neither as a constituent part of an inference nor
independently.
0.15 शब्दपर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः।

[śabdaprāmāṇyasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the Validity of Verbal Testimony)
[१. वाचकत्वेन शब्दपर्ामाण्यं स्वीकुवर् तां मतस्योद्लनम्।]
[1. vācakatvena śabdaprāmāṇyaṁ svīkurvatāṁ matasyodvalanam.]
Text: 1241
एके वद न्त - “वाचकत्वेन गोशब्दस्य पर्ामाण्यम्।” तच्चासमीचीनम्, शब्दाथर् गो(योः)
सम्बन्धव्यितरेकात्। न तावत्ादात्म्यलक्षणः, तयोराकारभेदात्। नािप तदत्ु प त्लक्षणः;
अथार्पायेिप शब्दोदयदशर् नात्।
eke vadanti - “vācakatvena gośabdasya prāmāṇyam.” taccāsamīcī-
nam, śabdārthago(yoḥ) sambandhavyatirekāt. na tāvattādātmyala-
kṣaṇaḥ, tayorākārabhedāt. nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ; arthāpāyepi
śabdodayadarśanāt.
Translation: 1241
Some scholars hold the following view: -
“The word cow is dependable because, it expresses its meaning”.
But this is not proper, because, there is no relationship between
word and its meaning. Such relation cannot be of the nature
of identity because, the form of word and form of meaning are
different. Nor such a relation can be of the nature of cause and
effect, because, even if the meaning, or, referent is destroyed, there
is application of word to refer to that.
Text: 1242
नािप सामियकः शब्दाथर् योः सम्बन्धः; शब्दाथर् व्यक् नामानन्त्याद् अिभन्ैकिनिमत्स्य
चाऽसम्भवात्। न च सङ्े िततशब्दस्य अथर् पर्ितप त्काले अवस्थानं िवद्ते। नचाथर् पर्त्या-
यकः(क)शब्दस्य सङ्े तोऽवगतः, समयकरणकाले तदभावात्। न च स्वकायर् सम्ब-
न्धमन्तरेण पूवर्शब्दसम्बन्धं स्वासारूप्याद्(?) वाचकम् अितपर्सङ्ात्।
nāpi sāmayikaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ; śabdārthavyaktīnāmāna-

ntyād abhinnaikanimittasya cā’saṁbhavāt. na ca saṅketitaśabdasya
arthapratipattikāle avasthānaṁ vidyate. nacārthapratyāyakaḥ(ka)-
śabdasya saṅketo’vagataḥ, samayakaraṇakāle tadabhāvāt. na ca
svakāryasambandhamantareṇa pūrvaśabdasambandhaṁ svāsārū-
pyād(?) vācakam atiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 1242
Nor can there be the relation between word and its meaning called
“conventional” because, there are endless number of words and
endless number of meanings and there is no single identical ground.
It is also not the case that the expressive word continues to exist
at the time of the knowledge of its meaning. It is also not the
case that convention, or, primary relationship of a word which
expresses a meaning is known, because, at the time of expressing
the relationship, it is not there. It is not the case that, without the
relationship with its own effect the relation with the earlier word
becomes expressive of the meaning on account of similarity because,
it will lead to unwanted consequences.
Text: 1243
नािप स्व(स्वा)भािवकः शब्दाथर् योः सम्बन्धः; तद्गत्यभावात् न पर्त्यक्षेण नािप अनुमानेन।
nāpi sva(svā)bhāvikaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ; tadgatyabhāvāt na
pratyakṣeṇa nāpi anumānena.
Translation: 1243
It is also not true to say that, there is a natural relationship between
word and its meaning, because, its knowledge is not possible, either
by perception, or, by inference.
Text: 1244
अथ अथार्पत्याऽनुमीयते; साप्यनुपपन्ा, पर्त्यक्षािदपूिवर् का िह अथार्प त्ः, पर्त्यक्षाद्भावे
तस्याप्य(तस्या अप्य)भावः। न सा अनुमानाद् िभद्ते अथार्प त्ः। न च अनुमानगर्ाह्ः
शब्दाथर् योः सम्बन्धो भविद्ः पर्ितपाद्ते। नच तदनुमानम स्त। न च िनत्यसम्बन्धस्य
िवज्ञानगमक(०नजनक)त्विमहोपपद्ते उक्न्यायात्।
atha arthāpatyā’numīyate; sāpyanupapannā, pratyakṣādipūrvikā
hi arthāpattiḥ, pratyakṣādyabhāve tasyāpya(tasyā apya)bhāvaḥ.
na sā anumānād bhidyate arthāpattiḥ. na ca anumānagrāhyaḥ

śabdārthayoḥ sambandho bhavadbhiḥ pratipādyate. naca tadanu-
mānamasti. na ca nityasambandhasya vijñānagamaka(0najanaka)-
tvamihopapadyate uktanyāyāt.
Translation: 1244
If you say, it can be inferred by the process called presumption,
it will not be correct, because, a presumption is preceded by
perception and when perception is not there as reality, there will be
nothing called presumption. Moreover, what is called presumption
is not different from inference. Moreover, the relationship between
word and meaning is not accepted by you as something which can
be known by inference. There is no inference also to that effect.
It is also not possible to hold that there is eternal relationship
between word and meaning which can cause the knowledge of verbal
understanding on the same ground.
Text: 1245
एवं च सित सम्बन्धमन्तरेण पदानां वाचकत्वं न युज्यते। तदवाचकत्वे च तत्पूवर्क-
वाक्यस्यािप वाचकत्वं न लभ्यते।
evaṁ ca sati sambandhamantareṇa padānāṁ vācakatvaṁ na yujyate.
tadavācakatve ca tatpūrvakavākyasyāpi vācakatvaṁ na labhyate.
Translation: 1245
When such is the situation, without the relationship it is not proper
to say that, words expresses meanings and when words do not
express meanings, it is obvious that the sentence also cannot express
meaning, because, to express meaning a sentence has to be preceded
by expressive words.
Text: 1246
अथ कथं न लभ्यते?
atha kathaṁ na labhyate?
Translation: 1246
Objection:
How do you say that, words and sentences do not express any
meaning?
Text: 1247
पर् सद्पदपदाथर् सम्बन्धपूवर्कं िह वाक्यं वाचकत्वेन गीयते। तदपर् सद्ौ वाक्यस्यािप
वाचकत्वं न सङ्च्छते। एवं चाऽवाचकत्वे वेदवाक्यानां कथं पर्ामाण्यम्?
prasiddhapadapadārthasambandhapūrvakaṁ hi vākyaṁ vācakatvena
gīyate.tadaprasiddhau vākyasyāpi vācakatvaṁ na saṅgacchate. evaṁ
cā’vācakatve vedavākyānāṁ kathaṁ prāmāṇyam?
Translation: 1247
Reply:
A sentence is said to express its meaning if it is preceded by
the knowledge of relationship between word and meaning. When
that itself is not known, it cannot be held that sentence expresses
meaning. Thus, when sentence does not express meaning, how can
the sentences of the Vedas be taken as authoritative?
Text: 1248
अथ अपर् सद्पदपदाथर् पूवर्कमिप वाक्यं वाचकत्वेनोद्गीयते; तदा सवर् पर्मातॄणां वेदोपलम्भे
सित वेदाथर् पर्ितप त्ः स्यात्। िकञ्, अदृष्िवषये वेदवाक्यानां पर्ामाण्यं कथं वे त्स?
atha aprasiddhapadapadārthapūrvakamapi vākyaṁ vācakatvenod-
gīyate; tadā sarvapramātṝṇāṁ vedopalambhe sati vedārthaprati-
pattiḥ syāt. kiñca, adṛṣṭaviṣaye vedavākyānāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ kathaṁ
vetsi?
Translation: 1248
If you say that, even if the knowledge of relationship between
word and its meaning is not known, a sentence can be said to be
expressive of meaning, then, after all knowers acquire the knowledge
of the Veda there will be the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda.
Moreover, how are you going to know that Vedic sentences are
authoritative with regard to an object which is beyond the range of
sense organ?
Text: 1249
वेदकै देशत्वेन इित चेत्; न, अथर् वदेववाक्येन न व्य(अथर् वादवाक्येन व्य)िभचारात्-
“गर्ावाणः प्लवन्ते, आिदत्यो वैष्णव इित चतुःषिष्वणार्नालोड् पर्जापितः पपौ”
इत्यािदना।
vedaikadeśatvena iti cet; na, arthavadevavākyena na vya(artha-

vādavakyena vya)bhicārāt - “grāvāṇaḥ plavante ādityo vaiṣṇava iti
catuḥṣaṣṭivarṇānāloḍya prajāpatiḥ papau” ityādinā.
Translation: 1249
If you say, because they are part of the Veda, it will not be proper,
because, it will not be consistent with the narrative sentences such
as “the stones are floating, the Sun is Vaishnava, and therefore, the
Creator protected after having considered sixty-four letters.”
[२. आप्ोक्त्वेन शब्दं पर्माणीकुवर् तां मतस्य िनरासः।]

[2. āptoktatvena śabdaṁ pramāṇīkurvatāṁ matasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1250
अन्ये तु आप्ोक्त्वेन पर्ामाण्यमुश न्त। आप्ाः साक्षात्कृतधमार्णः। तैयर्दक्
ु ं सममाप्ं
त त्कलािवसंवादकम्। “क्षीणदोषोऽनृतं वाक्यं न बर्ूयाद् हेत्वसम्भवात्।”
anye tu āptoktatvena prāmāṇyamuśanti. āptāḥ sākṣātkṛtadhar-
māṇaḥ. tairyaduktaṁ samamāptaṁ tatkilāvisaṁvādakam. “kṣīṇa-
doṣo’nṛtaṁ vākyaṁ na brūyād hetvasaṁbhavāt.”
Translation: 1250
Other philosophers think that, a sentence is authoritative when it
is uttered by a reliable person. Reliable persons are those who have
realized the reality. Whatever they have said does not betray the
fact “a person who has no defect should not tell a lie because there
is no reason to do that.”
Text: 1251
तदेतदयुक्म्, आप्स्य अत्यन्ताऽपर्त्यक्षतया तदायत्ताया अन धगतेः। वीतरागज्ञापकं च
अनुमानं न िवद्ते तस्य अपर्माणत्वात्।
tadetadayuktam, āptasya atyantā’pratyakṣatayā tadāyattatāyā
anadhigateḥ. vītarāgajñāpakaṁ ca anumānaṁ na vidyate tasya
apramāṇatvāt.
Translation: 1251
All this is not proper, because, that is absolutely not visible and so a
reliable person cannot grasp the range of that. There is no inference
to reveal that the person is devoid of attachment etc. because, an
inference is not a valid source of knowledge.
Text: 1252
भवतु वा आप्ोक्त्वम्; पर्ामाण्ये िकमायातम्? िकं सत्ामातर्ेण पर्ामाण्य(म्), िवज्ञान-
जनकत्वेन वा?
bhavatu vā āptoktatvam; prāmāṇye kimāyātam? kiṁ sattāmātreṇa
prāmāṇya(m), vijñānajanakatvena vā?
Translation: 1252
Or, if you so wish, let the Vedic sentences be accepted as uttered
by reliable person. But what is obtained when they are treated
as authoritative? Are those Vedic sentences authoritative by their
mere existence, or, through generating knowledge?
Text: 1253
यिद सत्ामातर्ेण; तदयुक्म्; अकारकस्य पर्ामाण्यायोगात्।
yadi sattāmātreṇa; tadayuktam; akārakasya prāmāṇyāyogāt.
Translation: 1253
If you say, by mere existence, it will not be proper. If something
is not involved in function i.e. if it is not an instrumental case, it
cannot be said to be the process of knowing.
Text: 1254
अथ िवज्ञानजनकत्वेन पर्ामाण्यम्; त त्कम् एकलस्य, सहका रकारणोपच रतस्य वा?
atha vijñānajanakatvena prāmāṇyam; tatkim ekalasya, sahakāri-
kāraṇopacaritasya vā?
Translation: 1254
If you say, they are authoritative through generating knowledge,
then, we would like to know whether they themselves alone, or,
through association of auxiliary cause, they are authoritative.
Text: 1255
तद्िद एकलस्य; तदयुक्म्; स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्, कर्मयौगपद्ासम्भवाच्च।
tadyadi ekalasya; tadayuktam; svayamanabhyupagamāt, kramayau-
gapadyāsambhavācca.
Translation: 1255
If you say, they themselves, then, it will not be proper, because, you
yourself have not accepted such a position and also because nothing
like sequence, or, simultaneity will be possible.
Text: 1256
अथ सहका रक(का)रणोपच रतेन जन्यते; यद्ेवं तदा सहका रकारणं दष्ु मप्यभ्येित,
तदनुरोधेन िवपरीतमिप ज्ञानं जनयित आप्ोक्त्वे सत्यिप। यथा अिभनवकम्बलसम्ब न्धनं
माणवकं दृष्ट्ा पर्वक्ा वाक्यमुच्चारयित - नवकम्बलकोऽयं माणवकः इित; शर्ोता
तु अधमर् मनःक्षोभािदना िनिमत्ेन नवत्वसंख्यायुक्कम्बलसम्ब न्धनं पर्ितपद्ते। तथा
पर्तारणबुद्ध्या नवत्वसंख्यायुक्कम्बलसम्बन्धी माणवक इत्युक्े अवदातकमार्नुरोधेन
पर्ितपत्ा अिभनवकम्बलसम्ब न्धनं पर्त्येित, तथा वेदवाक्यानामिप अवदातेतरकमार्नुवेधेन
िवपरीताथार्वबोधोत्पादकत्वमुपपद्ते। तथा, भूतोपघातचेतोिवक(का)रमनःक्षोभािदना वा
िनिमत्ेन।
atha sahakārika(kā)raṇopacaritena janyate; yadyevaṁ tadā saha-
kārikāraṇaṁ duṣṭamapyabhyeti, tadanurodhena viparītamapi
jñānaṁ janayati āptoktatve satyapi. yathā abhinavakambala-
sambandhinaṁ māṇavakaṁ dṛṣṭvā pravaktā vākyamuccārayati -
navakambalako’yaṁ māṇavakaḥ iti; śrotā tu adharmamanaḥkṣo-
bhādinā nimittena navatvasaṁkhyāyuktakambalasambandhinaṁ
pratipadyate. tathā pratāraṇabuddhyā navatvasaṁkhyāyuktakamba-
lasambandhī māṇavaka ityukte avadātakarmānurodhena prati-
pattā abhinavakambalasambandhinaṁ pratyeti, tathā vedavākyānā-
mapi avadātetarakarmānuvedhena viparītārthāvabodhotpādakatva-
mupapadyate. tathā, bhūtopaghātacetovika(kā)ramanaḥkṣobhādinā
vā nimittena.
Translation: 1256
If you say, authoritativeness is produced in association with the
auxiliary cause, then, it is possible that the auxiliary cause is faulty
and accordingly a Vedic sentence may generate false cognition also
in spite of the fact that it is uttered by a reliable person. As after
seeing a boy associated with a new blanket, the speaker says “this
boy has new blanket” but the listener of that sentence understands
that the boy has got association with nine blankets because of the
ground such as lack of righteousness and disturbance of mind etc.
Similarly, when someone utters that this boy is associated with
nine blankets, in order to abuse him the listener of the sentence
understands the same boy having association with new blanket, in
accordance with the good work performed by that boy (the word
’nava’ in Sanskrit can be understood in two senses, (1) nine and (2)
new). In the same way, it is possible to demonstrate that the Vedic
sentences also can generate false cognition in accordance with works
other than good deeds. Similarly, such situation can arise because
of some other ground such as change in the mental state due to
physical factor, hesitation of mind and the like.
[३. अपौरुषेयत्वेन वेदस्य पर्ामाण्यं स्वीकुवर् तां मतस्य व्युदासः।]
[3. apauruṣeyatvena vedasya prāmāṇyaṁ svīkurvatāṁ matasya
vyudāsaḥ.]
Text: 1257
अन्ये तु कुमितमतानुसा रणो वद न्त - वेदस्य पर्ामाण्यमन्यथा-अपौरुषेयत्वेन।
पुरुषा िह रागािदिवपरीतचेतसो िवपरीतमुपपादय न्त, न च वेदिवधातृसम्भवोऽ स्त।
तदक्ु म्-िनत्यो वेदः अस्मयर् माणकतृर्[क]त्वात् व्योमािदवत्। वेदवेधसोऽपगमे तदायत्ा
दोषा व्यपगता भव न्त। ते िह िवधातृसत्ानुवितर् नः तदव(प)गमे कथमवितष्ेरन्। तेषामपाये
कथमपर्माणमाशङ्क्यते वेदः। यदक् ु म्-
दोषाः स न्त न सन्तीित पौरुषेयेषु युज्यते।
वेदे कतुर्रभावात्ु दोषाशङ्ै व ना स्त नः॥ (तत्वसङ्गर्हः, का रका २८९५)
चोदनाजिनता बुिद्ः पर्माणं दोषव जर् तःै ।

कारणैजर्न्यमानत्वात् लङ्ाप्ोक्ाक्षबुिद्वत्॥ (श्लोकवा.सू.२.श्लो.१८४)
नच चोदनाजिनतं िवज्ञानं स न्दग्धम्, िकं स्वत् इत्यनेनाकारेणानुपजायमानत्वात् ।
नचेदं भर्ान्तं देशान्तरादावबाध्यमानत्वात्। यत् देशान्तरादौ बाध्यते तत् िमथ्या, यथा
मरीिचिनचये अम्बुज्ञानम्, कालान्तरे च बाधा यथा आरक्पटे हाटकिवज्ञानिमत्येवमािद,
नचेदं भर्ान्तं तथा, तस्मादिवतथम्।
anye tu kumatimatānusāriṇo vadanti - vedasya prāmāṇyamanya-
thā-apauruṣeyatvena. puruṣā hi rāgādiviparītacetaso viparītamupa-
pādayanti, na ca vedavidhātṛsaṁbhavo’sti. taduktamnityo vedaḥ
asmaryamāṇakartṛ[ka]tvāt vyomādivat. vedavedhaso’pagame tadā-
yattā doṣā vyapagatā bhavanti. te hi vidhātṛsattānuvartinaḥ tadava-
(pa)game kathamavatiṣṭheran. teṣāmapāye kathamapramāṇamāśa-
ṅkyate vedaḥ. yaduktam-
doṣāḥ santi na santīti pauruṣeyeṣu yujyate,
vede karturabhāvāttu doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ.
(Tattvasaṁ.kā.2895)
codanājanitā buddhiḥ pramāṇaṁ doṣavarjitaiḥ,

kāraṇairjanyamānatvāt liṅgāptoktākṣabuddhivat.
(Ślokavā.sū.2.ślo.184)
naca codanājanitaṁ vijñānaṁ sandigdham, kiṁsvit ityanenākāreṇā-

nupajāyamānatvāt. nacedaṁ bhrāntaṁ deśāntarādāvabādhyamāna-
tvāt. yat deśāntarādau bādhyate tat mithyā, yathā marīcinicaye
ambujñānam, kālāntare ca bādhā yathā āraktapaṭe hāṭaka-
vijñānamityevamādi, nacedaṁ bhrāntaṁ tathā, tasmādavitatham.
Translation: 1257
Other philosophers who are the followers of those who are not that
intelligent say “Veda is authoritative because, it is not composed
by any human being. Human beings are indeed affected by adverse
states of mind such as attachment etc. and hence they narrate some
thing contrary to facts. They also say that, there is no possibility of
anybody creating the Veda. They extend the following inference in
support of that: Veda is eternal. Because, no one remembers author
of it. Like entities such as sky etc. If we say that, there is no creator
of the Vedas, all the defects of the Creator will be removed from
the Vedas, because, the defects of the Creator are transferred to the
sentences and when the Creator is removed how can the defects be
there? And when there are no defects how can they say that the
Vedas are un-authoritative?
It is also supported by the following statement. It may be proper
to think that, there are defects and there are no defects in the
context of sentences uttered by human beings. Since there is no
creator of the Vedas, there is no possibility of doubting any defect
in the Vedas. This is what our position is. “The knowledge which
is generated by a Vedic injunction is authoritative. Because, it
is produced by the factors which are free from defects. Like the
knowledge of the ground, knowledge of the sentence uttered by a
reliable person and perceptual knowledge. It is not the case that,
the knowledge produced by Vedic injunction is doubtful because, it
is not produced by any non-cause such as “something”.
Nor it is erroneous because, it is not going to be falsified in another

place. That which is falsified in another place is false, for example,
the knowledge of water in mirage. There can be contradiction in
another time for example, after seeing a red cloth when there arises
the knowledge of gold (i.e. when one has seen several times gold
wrapped in a red cloth sometimes when he sees something wrapped
in a red cloth he concludes that there is gold, but it may the case
that something else other than gold was wrapped in the red cloth
and hence it resulted in a erroneous cognition). This knowledge
arising from the Vedic sentence is not erroneous like that, therefore,
it is not false.”
Text: 1258
यत्ावदक्
ु म्-'िनत्यो वेदः कतर्र्स्मरणात्'; तदयुक्म्, कूपारामािदिभरनैका न्तकत्वात्। तेषां
िह कत्ार् न स्मयर् ते अथ च अिनत्यत्वम्।
yattāvaduktam-‘nityo vedaḥ kartrasmaraṇāt’; tadayuktam, kūpārāmā-
dibhiranaikāntikatvāt. teṣāṁ hi karttā na smaryate atha ca anityatvam.
Translation: 1258
You said, “Veda is eternal because, its author is not remembered”.
This is not correct, because this ground is not consistent, since one
may also say that a particular well, or, a particular garden is also
eternal because their creators are not remembered. This will happen
when their creators are not remembered. But as a matter of fact,
they are not eternal.
Text: 1259
अथ देशकालोच्छे दात् ततर् कतुर्रस्मरणम्; एवं तिहर् अिवशेषािभिहतेऽथेर् िवशेषिमच्छतो
हेत्वन्तरं नाम िनगर्हस्थानम्।
atha deśakālocchedāt tatra karturasmaraṇam; evaṁ tarhi aviśe-
ṣābhihite’rthe viśeṣamicchato hetvantaraṁ nāma nigrahasthānam.
Translation: 1259
If you say that, the same space and time are not there and therefore,
the authors are not remembered, then, this argument will lead you
to a point of defeat known as “another ground” when someone uses
a general ground with an intention to refer to a specific ground.
Text: 1260
अथवा सत्यिप िवशेषणोपादाने हेतोः िवपक्षगमनं न िनवारियतुं पायर् ते, यथा
कृतकत्विवशेषणोपादानेऽिप न पर्मेयत्वस्य व्यावृ त्र स्त।
athavā satyapi viśeṣaṇopādāne hetoḥ vipakṣagamanaṁ na nivā-
rayituṁ pāryate, yathā kṛtakatvaviśeṣaṇopādāne’pi na prameya-
tvasya vyāvṛttirasti.
Translation: 1260
Or, even if specific qualifier is added, still no one can stop occurrence
of the ground in a locus which is not the subject of the inference
i.e. the locus were the existence of the absence of probandum is
confirmed. For example, even if the qualification “the state of being
produced” is added no one can exclude the state of being object of
a true cognition being there.
Text: 1261
अथ कृतकत्वं; तदेव गमकं व्यावृत्त्वात्। न ह्ेकस्य व्यावृत्ौ अन्यस्य व्यावृ त्र स्त,
अितपर्सङ्ात्।
atha kṛtakatvaṁ; tadeva gamakaṁ vyāvṛttatvāt. na hyekasya
vyāvṛttau anyasya vyāvṛttirasti atiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 1261
If you say, it is the state of being produced, then, that itself is the
ground which is excluded from all the rest. It is not the case that,
when one is excluded, other gets also excluded, because, it will lead
to over-application of the statement.
Text: 1262
िकञ्, साध्यिवरुद्े हेतोः(तौ) िकं िवशेषणोपादनम् तिद्परीते वा?
kiñca, sādhyaviruddhe hetoḥ(tau) kiṁ viśeṣaṇopādanam tadviparīte
vā?
Translation: 1262
Moreover, what qualification can be added to a ground which
establishes just opposite of what is intended to be established, or,
do you want to say that, the qualification is to be added what is
opposite of it.
Text: 1263
तद्िद िवरुद्े; तदाऽनथर् कं िवशेषणोपादनम्।
tadyadi viruddhe; tadā’narthakaṁ viśeṣaṇopādanam.
Translation: 1263
If it is in the ground which establishes what is opposite of what is to
be established, then, the adding of the qualification is meaningless.
Text: 1264
अथ अिवरुद्ेप्येवमेव - निह िवशेषणेन िवरुद्स्वभावता, व्यावतर् ते, यथा कृतकत्व-
िवशेषणोपादानेऽिप न चाक्षुषत्वस्य शब्दे वृ त्लाभः। तथा देशकु(का)लोच्छे दाभाव-
िवशेषणोपादानेऽिप अस्मयर् माणकतृर्(क)त्वस्य न िवपक्षाद् व्यावृ त्र स्त।
atha aviruddhepyevameva - nahi viśeṣaṇena viruddhasvabhāvatā,
vyāvartate, yathā kṛtakatvaviśeṣaṇopādāne’pi na cākṣuṣatvasya
śabde kṛttilābhaḥ. tathā deśaku(kā)locchedābhāvaviśeṣaṇopādāne’pi
asmaryamāṇakartṛ(ka)tvasya na vipakṣād vyāvṛttirasti.
Translation: 1264
Again, if it is added to that which is not contradictory, the same
will be the consequence, because, just by adding a qualification the
nature of being contradictory cannot be removed. For example, even
if we add the qualification “the state of being produced” the state of
being perceived by eyes cannot occur in sound. Similarly, even if you
say we add a qualification viz. “absence of destruction of space and
time, the state of not remembering the creator cannot be excluded
from the locus where the existence of absence of probandum is
confirmed.
Text: 1265
अ सद्ोप्ययं हेतुः यस्मात्स्मर न्त एव कतार्रं काणादाः। तथा लौिकका अिप बहलं वक्ारो
भव न्त - 'बर्ह्णा वेदाः पर्णीताः' इित।
asiddhopyayaṁ hetuḥ yasmātsmaranti eva kartāraṁ kāṇādāḥ. tathā
laukikā api bahulaṁ vaktāro bhavanti - ‘brahmaṇā vedāḥ praṇītāḥ’
iti.
Translation: 1265
This ground is also not an established ground, because, the followers
of the school of Kaṇāda do remember the creator of the Veda.
Similarly, we also find many ordinary people saying that the Vedas
are created by the Brahman.
Text: 1266
अिप च िकमशेषजनस्मरणिनवृ त् रह हेतुत्वेन िवविक्षता, आहो स्वत् कितपयपुरुष-
स्मरणिविनवृ त्ः?
api ca kimaśeṣajanasmaraṇanivṛttiriha hetutvena vivakṣitā, āhosvit
katipayapuruṣasmaraṇavinivṛttiḥ?
Translation: 1266
Moreover, do you want to say that, your ground is destruction of
remembrance of all people, or, the destruction of remembrance of a
few people?
Text: 1267
तद्िद सकलजनस्मरणिविनवृ त्ः; तदाऽ सद्ा, अवधारियतुमशक्यत्वाच्च अवार्ग्भाग-
िविद्ः। अवधारणे वा त एव सवर् ज्ञाः स्युः अवार्ग्भागिवदो न भवेयःु ।
tadyadi sakalajanasmaraṇavinivṛttiḥ; tadā’siddhā, avadhārayitu-
maśakyatvācca arvāgbhāgavidbhiḥ. avadhāraṇe vā ta eva sarvajñāḥ
syuḥ arvāgbhāgavido na bhaveyuḥ.
Translation: 1267
If you say that, destruction of remembrance of all people is a ground,
then, such a ground is not established, because, it can never be
known by those who know the later part and if you say that, it can
be known, then, they will become all-knowing and not those who
know the earlier part.
Text: 1268
अथ कितपयपुरुषापेक्षया; तदानैका न्तको हेतुः, िवद्मानकतृर्केष्विप कतार् न स्मयर् ते
कै श्चत्।
atha katipayapuruṣāpekṣayā; tadānaikāntiko hetuḥ, vidyamāna-
kartṛkeṣvapi kartā na smaryate kaiścit.
Translation: 1268
If you say that, in comparison to some people it can be known, then,
such a ground will suffer from the defect of inconsistency because,
sometimes even if there is creator, the creator is not remembered.
Text: 1269
अन्यच्च, कितपयैः पुरुषैनर् स्मयर् ते - अथार्दापद्ते - पुरुषान्तरस्मयर् माणकतृर्को वेदः
िवशेषपर्ितषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुज्ञा िवषयत्वात्। न च पुरुषजन्यत्वेन वेदस्याऽपर्ामाण्यम्, अिप
तु पुरुषदोषोत्पाद्त्वेन। अतः स एव अपनेयः न पुरुषव्यापारः।
anyacca, katipayaiḥ puruṣairna smaryate - arthādāpadyate - puruṣā-
ntarasmaryamāṇakartṛko vedaḥ viśeṣapratiṣedhasya śeṣābhyanujñā
viṣayatvāt. na ca puruṣajanyatvena vedasyā’prāmāṇyam, api tu
puruṣadoṣotpādyatvena. ataḥ sa eva apaneyaḥ na puruṣavyāpāraḥ.
Translation: 1269
Not only that, if you say, some people do not remember the creators
of the Veda, it implies that the Veda is created by some other people.
This is in tune with the maxim that when a particular is negated
the remaining members become known. It is not the case that, Veda
is not authoritative because, it is produced by a human being, but
it is so because, it is produced by the defects in the human being
and therefore, that defect is to be excluded and not the function of
creation by human being.
Text: 1270
अथ पुरुषस्य दोषा धकरणत्वे तज्जन्यत्वे दोषजन्यत्वमप्याशङ्क्यत इित चेत्;
atha puruṣasya doṣādhikaraṇatve tajjanyatve doṣajanyatvamapyā-
śaṅkyata iti cet;
Translation: 1270
Clarification:
Well, if a human being is accepted as locus of defects and if such a
human being is accepted as producer of Veda, then, obviously one
can doubt that the Veda is produced by the defects of a human being.
Text: 1271
यद्ेवम् इ न्दर्याणामिप दोषा धकरणत्वेन तदत्ु पािदतिवज्ञानानामपर्ामाण्यं समाशंक्यत
इित सवर् तर् पर्ामाण्यानास्वा(श्वा)सः स्यात्। न च अस्मयर् माणकतृर्कत्वेन वेदशब्दाना-
मपौरुषेयत्वसं सिद्ः, अन्यथािप अस्मयर् माणकत्ृर्कत्वमुपपद्ते - केनािप िवदग्धमितना
वेदसन्दोहमुत्पाद् आत्मा अपह्ूयते - 'नाहं वेदानां िवधाता' इित।
yadyevam indriyāṇāmapi doṣādhikaraṇatvena tadutpāditavijñānā-
nāmaprāmāṇyaṁ samāśaṅkyata iti sarvatra prāmāṇyānāsvā(śvā)-
saḥ syāt. na ca asmaryamāṇakartṛkatvena vedaśabdānāmapauruṣe-

yatvasaṁsiddhiḥ, anyathāpyasmaryamāṇakarttṛkatvamupapadyate -
kenāpi vidagdhamatinā vedasandohamutpādya ātmā apahnūyate -
‘nāhaṁ vedānāṁ vidhātā’ iti.
Translation: 1271
Reply:
If it is so, then, since the sense organs also are locus of defects the
knowledges produced by them should also be undependable. When
such a doubt is possible, it implies that there is no authoritativeness,
or, dependability in anything. No one can establish that, the words
of the Veda are not uttered by an agent. Simply because, such
agent is not remembered, because, the fact that the agent is not
remembered can be explained in some other way also. Suppose,
some person having great genius has indeed composed the Veda but
he can conceal his own agency by saying that “I have not created
the Vedas”.
Text: 1272
भवतु वा अपौरुषेयो वेदः; पर्ामाण्ये िकमायातम्?
bhavatu vā apauruṣeyo vedaḥ; prāmāṇye kimāyātam?
Translation: 1272
Or, if you so wish, let the Veda be authorless. How to establish its
authoritativeness?
Text: 1273
अथ पुरुषव्यावृत्या तद्ोषव्यावृ त्िनबन्धनं पर्ामाण्यम्; तद्व्यावृत्या तद्गुणव्यावृ त्-
िनबन्धनमपर्ामाण्यं िकन्ेष्यते?
atha puruṣavyāvṛttyā taddoṣavyāvṛttinibandhanaṁ prāmāṇyam;
tadvyāvṛttyā tadguṇavyāvṛttinibandhanamaprāmāṇyaṁ kinneṣyate?
Translation: 1273
If you say that, by excluding an author, there will be exclusion of
defects existing in that author and on the basis of that there will an
authoritativeness in the Veda, then, by excluding the author there
will be exclusion of his qualities and on the basis of that why don’t
you welcome in-authoritativeness of the Vedas?
Text: 1274
अथ पुरुषगतगुणदोषव्यावृत्ौ िनसगर् गुणानुवेधेन पर्ामाण्यिमष्यते; पुरुषगुणदोषव्यावृत्ौ
िनसगर् दोषानुवेधेनापर्ामाण्यं िकन् गीयते?
atha puruṣagataguṇadoṣavyāvṛttau nisargaguṇānuvedhena prāmāṇya-
miṣyate; puruṣaguṇadoṣavyāvṛttau nisargadoṣānuvedhenāprāmāṇyaṁ
kinna gīyate?
Translation: 1274
If you say that, by excluding good qualities and defects of the author
on the basis of the natural qualities, the authoritativeness of the
Veda is desired, then, by excluding the virtues and defects of the
author on the basis of the natural defects, why don’t you say that
the Vedas are not authoritative?
Text: 1275
अिप च यथा अपौरुषेयत्वे सत्यिप रागािददोषसम्ब न्धता उपलभ्यते, तथा वेदेऽिप
भिवष्यित।
api ca yathā apauruṣeyatve satyapi rāgādidoṣasambandhitā upala-
bhyate, tathā vede’pi bhaviṣyati.
Translation: 1275
Moreover, in spite of the fact that, some thing is without an author,
one can find relationship with defects such as attachment. In the
same way this will happen with regard to the Veda also.
Text: 1276
िकञ्, अपौरुषेयत्वेन कत्ृर्दोषापगमः कृतः, शर्ोतृदोषास्तु केनापनीयन्ते। तथा िह -
अथर् पर्ितपत्ौ तानपेक्षय िवपरीतां पर्ितप त्मिभिनवर् तर्ियष्यित। ततश्च िनत्यानामिप
कत्ृर्कमर् णां दष्ु सहका रकारणानुवेधेन िवपयर् यािदज्ञानहेतुत्वमुपपद्ते न वाक्यानां
पर्माणपर्ितलम्भः।
kiñca, apauruṣeyatvena karttṛdoṣāpagamaḥ kṛtaḥ, śrotṛdoṣāstu
kenāpanīyante. tathā hi - arthapratipattau tānapekṣya viparītāṁ
pratipattimabhinirvartayiṣyati. tataśca nityānāmapi karttṛkarma-
ṇāṁ duṣṭasahakārikāraṇānuvedhena viparyayādijñānahetutvamupa-
padyate na vākyānāṁ pramāṇapratilambhaḥ.
Translation: 1276
Moreover, by removing the authorship of the Veda you could remove
the defects of the author. But how are you going to remove the
defects of the listener to explain while the understanding of the

Veda, a listener will acquire the knowledge of its opposite meaning
on the basis of its own defects. Thus, even the eternal actions and
agents will become the cause of erroneous knowledge on the basis of
defective auxiliary cause and thereby the Vedic sentences will not
get authoritativeness.
Text: 1277
यदप्युक्म् - 'देशान्तरादावबाध्यमानत्वात् पर्माणं चोदनाजिनता बुिद्ः' - तदयुक्म्,
स्मृतेबार्धारिहतत्वेऽिप अपर्माणत्वात्।
yadapyuktam - ‘deśāntarādāvabādhyamānatvāt pramāṇaṁ codanāja-
nitā buddhiḥ’ - tadayuktam, smṛterbādhārahitatve’pi apramāṇatvāt.
Translation: 1277
You said, “The knowledge generated by Vedic injunction is
authoritative because, they are not contradicted in another place.”
This is not proper, because, a remembrance is never authoritative
even if it is not contradicted.
Text: 1278
िकञ्, बाधाशब्देन िवपरीतिवज्ञानमपिदश्यते, तच्च नोत्पद्ते - िकं चोदनाजिनत-
िवज्ञानस्य यथाथर् त्वेन उत तदत्ु पादककारणवैकल्येन इित स न्दह्ते।
kiṁca, bādhāśabdena viparītavijñānamapadiśyate, tacca notpa-
dyate - kiṁ codanājanitavijñānasya yathārthatvena uta tadutpā-
dakakāraṇavaikalyena iti sandihyate.
Translation: 1278
Moreover, do you want to say that, by the word the contradiction
what is understood is an erroneous cognition? That does not arise,
is it because the knowledge produced by a Vedic injunction is true,
or, because there are defects in the cause which generate that? Such
a doubt is created.
Text: 1279
अिप च, बाधारिहतत्वेऽप्यपर्ामाण्यं दृष्ं - बाधकिवज्ञानोत्पत्ेः पूवर्म्। बाधाप्युपजायमाना
कालिवकल्पेन उपजायते-क्विचदधर् मासेन क्विचन्मासव्यवधानेन क्विचच्च अब्दद्यतर्य-
व्यवधानेन, अन्यतर् तु कारकवैकल्यान्ैव सम्पत्स्यते। नचैतावता पर्माणं चोदनाजिनता
बुिद्ः।
api ca, bādhārahitatve’pyaprāmāṇyaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ - bādhakavijñānot-

patteḥ pūrvam. bādhāpyupajāyamānā kālavikalpena upajāyate-
kvacidardhamāsena kvacinmāsavyavadhānena kvacicca abdadvaya-
trayavyavadhānena, anyatra tu kārakavaikalyānnaiva sampatsyate.
nacaitāvatā pramāṇaṁ codanājanitā buddhiḥ.
Translation: 1279
Moreover, it is our experience that, something is not authoritative
even if it is not contradictory before the arising of the contradicting
knowledge. Even contradiction is seen to arise with variation in
time, sometimes, in half a month, in some case after a gap of a
month, in some other case after a gap of two, or, three years, in still
some other cases it does not arise at all because of lack of necessary
factors. Therefore, on the basis of simply this, that the knowledge
that arises from Vedic injunction is authoritative.
Text: 1280
िकञ्, बाधारिहतत्वमिप िकम्-अशेषपुरुषापेक्षया, कितपयपुरुषापेक्षया वा?
kiñca, bādhārahitatvamapi kim-aśeṣapuruṣāpekṣayā, katipayapuru-
ṣāpekṣayā vā?
Translation: 1280
Moreover, is the lack of contradiction in comparison to all human
beings, or, in comparison to only a few?
Text: 1281
यद्शेषपुरुषापेक्षया; तदवगन्तुं न शक्यते, परिचत्वृत्ीनां दरु न्वयत्वात्।
yadyaśeṣapuruṣāpekṣayā; tadavagantuṁ na śakyate, paracitta-
vṛttīnāṁ duranvayatvāt.
Translation: 1281
If you say, it is in comparison to all human beings, then, it can
never be known, because, it is difficult to relate the functions of
everybody’s mind, or, intellect.
Text: 1282
अथ कितपयपुरुषापेक्षया बाधारिहतत्वम्; तदाऽनैका न्तको हेतुः - यथा असत्योदके
जातोदकबुिद्ः तस्माद्ेशात् देशान्तरं यदा पर्याित ततर्ैव दशाधर् तामुपयाित, नच तस्य
बाधकं िवज्ञानमुत्पन्म्। िकमेतावता तत् पर्माणं भवतु?
atha katipayapuruṣāpekṣayā bādhārahitatvam; tadā’naikāntiko hetuḥ

- yathā asatyodake jātodakabuddhiḥ tasmāddeśāt deśāntaraṁ yadā
prayāti tatraiva daśārdhatāmupayāti, naca tasya bādhakaṁ vijñāna-
mutpannam. kimetāvatā tat pramāṇaṁ bhavatu?
Translation: 1282
If you say, contradiction is with reference to a few, then, the ground
becomes inconsistent. For instance, when one acquires knowledge
of water where there is no water, and when he goes to another
place from that place, and suppose he dies there, no contradictory
knowledge arose in him. Is it enough to claim that knowledge is a
true knowledge?
Text: 1283
अथवा चोदनाजिनतिवज्ञानस्य िनिवर् षयत्वमेव भर्ान्तत्वं, चोदनाजिनतिवज्ञानसमानकाली-
नकत्र्व्यतारूपाथर् स्याऽसम्भवात्। सम्भवे वा चोदनावचसो वैकल्यं, िवतानिकर्यािवलोपः।
athavā codanājanitavijñānasya nirviṣayatvameva bhrāntatvam,
codanājanitavijñānasamānakālīnakarttavyatārūpārthasyā’sambhavāt.
sambhave vā codanāvacaso vaikalyam, vitānakriyāvilopaḥ.
Translation: 1283
Or, let us say the knowledge generated by a Vedic injunction has
no content and that itself is, its becoming false because, it is not
possible to show something worth doing at the time when the
knowledge is caused by the Vedic injunction and if you say it is
possible, then, the Vedic injunction will become defective and the
spreading Vedic ritual activities will disappear.
Text: 1284
अथ न िवद्ते कतर् व्यतारूपोऽथर् ः; कथं चोदनावचनोद्त
ू ं िवज्ञानं न िमथ्या? अन्यथा
केशोण्डु कसंिवदो िमथ्यात्वं न भवेत्।
atha na vidyate kartavyatārūpo’rthaḥ; kathaṁ codanāvacanodbhū-
taṁ vijñānaṁ na mithyā? anyathā keśoṇḍukasaṁvido mithyātvaṁ
na bhavet.
Translation: 1284
If you say, there is nothing which is understood as to be performed
(from the Vedic injunction) then, how is it that the knowledge
arising from the Vedic injunction is not false? If it is not false, then,
the knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for
a person who comes into the shade from the sun cannot be false?
Text: 1285
अथ तस्या[:] पर्तीयमानाथार्ऽसम्भवेन िमथ्यात्वम्; तिदहािप तदेवास्तु।
atha tasyā[ḥ] pratīyamānārthā’sambhavena mithyātvam; tadihāpi
tadevāstu.
Translation: 1285
If you say, since there is impossibility of the content in that
knowledge, that knowledge is false. The same logic is applicable
in the present case also.
Text: 1286
अथ चोदनाजिनतिवज्ञानाथर् स्य पुनः सद्ावो भवित तेन तस्य यथाथर् त्वम्। न तु
केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्य कदािचदिप सद्ावोऽ स्त।
atha codanājanitavijñānārthasya punaḥ sadbhāvo bhavati tena tasya
yathārthatvam. na tu keśoṇḍukavijñānasya kadācidapi sadbhāvo’sti.
Translation: 1286
Clarification:
Well, since the object of the knowledge arising from a Vedic
injunction emerges again and therefore, that knowledge is
considered to be true. But in the case of knowledge of thread-like
things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the
shade from the sun, never that content of that knowledge is found
to exist (therefore, the knowledge arising from the Vedic injunction
is found to be true.)
Text: 1287
सोऽयं िवषभक्षणेन परं पर्त्याययित तपस्वी। चोदनाथर् स्य पश्चाद्वनं तिद्ज्ञानानुपयोिग,
त स्मन् काले ज्ञानस्य अस्तिमतत्वात्, िवज्ञानकाले च अथर् स्य(स्या)सम्भवात्।
so’yaṁ viṣabhakṣaṇena paraṁ pratyāyayati tapasvī. codanārthasya
paścādbhavanaṁ tadvijñānānupayogi, tasmin kāle jñānasya asta-
mitatvāt, vijñānakāle ca arthasya(syā)sambhavāt.
Translation: 1287
Reply:
It is something like a saint causing the experience to another person
(the effect of poison) by consuming poison. If the object of the
knowledge arising from the Vedic sentence occurs later, it is of no
use to that knowledge, because, when that object will come into
being at the time that knowledge will no longer be there and when
there is knowledge, there is no possibility of its object being there.
Text: 1288
अथवा, इयमेव बाधा यदत ु असम्भाव्यमानाथर् स्य पर्ितपादकत्वं यथा तन्तु-तु र-
कारकोपिनपाते सित वस्ािदकायर् मुपजायमानं दृष्म्। पुनः पटा थर् ने उपदेशो दीयते-
'तन्तूनामुपादानं कुरुष्व' इित। न त्वेवं सप्तन्त्ववदातकमर् णोः साध्यसाधनसम्ब-
न्धावधारणम्, नापूवर्म्, येनातर् उपदेशस्य साफल्यं भवित। एवं तावदक्ु े न न्यायेन शब्दानां
वाचकत्वेन पर्ामाण्यं न युज्यते।
athavā, iyameva bādhā yaduta asaṁbhāvyamānārthasya pratipā-
dakatvaṁ yathā tantu-turi-kāra- kopanipāte sati vastrādikāryamupa-
jāyamānaṁ dṛṣṭam. punaḥ paṭārthine upadeśo dīyate - ‘tantūnāmu-
pādānaṁ kuruṣva’ iti. na tvevaṁ saptatantvavadātakarmaṇoḥ
sādhyasādhanasambandhāvadhāraṇam, nāpūrvam, yenātra upade-
śasya sāphalyaṁ bhavati. evaṁ tāvaduktena nyāyena śabdānāṁ
vācakatvena prāmāṇyaṁ na yujyate.
Translation: 1288
Or, this may be the meaning of contradiction that explanation of
that thing which is not going to come. For example, when there
are factors like threads, weaver’s shaft, and other factors, one finds
that the effect viz. the cloth comes into being. Thereafter, again
when some one is in need of cloth, he says go and fetch threads. It
is not the case that the relation of cause-and-effect is determined
between seven threads and the action of their fetching. Neither there
is something called apurva by which one can say that the instruction
has become fruitful. In this way, as per the above mentioned logic it
is not proper to hold that, words are dependable since they express
their meanings.
[४. िववक्षासूचकत्वेन शब्दपर्ामाण्यं स्वीकुवर् तां मतस्य खण्डनम्।]

[4. vivakṣāsūcakatvena śabdaprāmāṇyaṁ svīkurvatāṁ matasya
khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 1289
अथ िववक्षासूचकत्वेन लङ्भूतस्य पर्ामाण्यम्। तदक्
ु म्- “िववक्षापर्भवा िह शब्दाः तामेव
संसूचयेयःु ” इित।
atha vivakṣāsūcakatvena liṅgabhūtasya prāmāṇyam. taduktam-
“vivakṣāprabhavā hi śabdāḥ tāmeva saṁsūcayeyuḥ” iti.
Translation: 1289
Clarification:
Well, a sentence becomes authoritative because they become the
ground to indicate the intention of the speaker. “As it has been
said words emerge out of intention of the speaker and therefore,
they point towards those intended meanings.”
Text: 1290
तदेतदयुक्म्, यथा हेतुफलभावो ना स्त सौगते मते तथा पर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्।
tadetadayuktam, yathā hetuphalabhāvo nāsti saugate mate tathā
prāgeva prapañcitam.
Translation: 1290
Reply:
This is not proper. That it has no cause-and-effect relationship
according to the Buddhist philosophy, has already been explained
before.
[५. साधुपदादथर् पर्ितप त्ं वणर् यतां वैयाकरणानां मतस्य िनरासः।]

[5. sādhupadādarthapratipattiṁ varṇayatāṁ vaiyākaraṇānāṁ matasya
nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1291
अन्ये तु साधुपदशब्दादथर् पर्ितप त्ं वणर् य न्त। साधुत्वं च लक्षणयोिगत्वेन। लक्षणं च
सूतर्ाण्येव, लक्षयं गौ रत्यािदपदम्।
anye tu sādhupadaśabdādarthapratipattiṁ varṇayanti. sādhutvaṁ
ca lakṣaṇayogitvena. lakṣaṇaṁ ca sūtrāṇyeva, lakṣyaṁ gaurityādi-
padam.
Translation: 1291
Other philosophers say that, an understanding of the meaning
arises from a sentence containing grammatically correct words.
Grammaticality is to be tested in terms of the rules of grammar.
The word lakṣaṇa stands for grammatical rules and lakṣya refers to
the word cow etc.
Text: 1292
अथ िकिमदं नाम यल्क्षणेन परमिषर् गिदतेन सूतर्कलापेन लक्षयते? िकं गकारादयो वणार्ः,
वणेर्भ्योऽथार्न्तरं वा पदं स्फोटरूपम्?
atha kimidaṁ nāma yallakṣaṇena paramarṣigaditena sūtrakalāpena
lakṣyate? kiṁ gakārādayo varṇāḥ, varṇebhyo’rthāntaraṁ vā padaṁ
sphoṭarūpam?
Translation: 1292
Objection:
Well, what is that which is described by a set of rules uttered by
the great sage? Is it the case that the phonemes such as ‘g’ etc.
are described, or, something different from the phonemes viz. word
called sphota is described?
Text: 1293
तद्िद वणार्ः; ते िकं िनत्याः सन्तः
tadyadi varṇāḥ; te kiṁ nityāḥ santaḥ
Translation: 1293
Reply: If you say, phonemes are described, are they called a word
since they are permanent, or, since they are produced?
Text: 1294
पदसंज्ञा भव न्त, उत उपजननधमर् काः? तद्िद िनत्याः कूटस्थाः सन्तो वणार्ः पदसंज्ञा
भव न्त; ततर् िकं व्यस्ताः, समुिदता वा?
padasaṁjñā bhavanti, uta upajananadharmakāḥ? tadyadi nityāḥ
kūṭasthāḥ santo varṇāḥ padasaṁjñā bhavanti; tatra kiṁ vyastāḥ,
samuditā vā?
Translation: 1294
If you say that, they are permanent, the phonemes become words,
I would like to know, whether individually they are called so, or,
collectively?
Text: 1295
तद्िद व्यस्ताः; सनातना एते पदसंज्ञा भव न्त, तदा गवणेर्नव ै केवलेन गोऽथर् पर्ितपादनं
िकर्यते, ओकारेण वा अथर् पर्ितपादनं िकर्यते। ततश्च पूवार्परवणोर्च्चारणानथर् क्यम्। न
चातर्ैक स्मन् वणेर् िवभक्त्यन्तता अ स्त, अिप तु वणर् कदम्बके िवभक्त्युत्पादाभ्युपगमात्।
tadyadi vyastāḥ; sanātanā ete padasaṁjñā bhavanti, tadā gavarṇe-
naiva kevalena go’rthapratipādanaṁ kriyate, okāreṇa vā artha-
pratipādanaṁ kriyate. tataśca pūrvāparavarṇoccāraṇānarthakyam.
na cātraikasmin varṇe vibhaktyantatā asti, api tu varṇakadambake
vibhaktyutpādābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 1295
If you say, collectively, then, the question arises whether being
permanent they become word, or, whether by mere the phoneme ‘g’
the meaning of cow is conveyed, or, by the phoneme ‘o’ the meaning
is conveyed? If it is so, then, the utterance of the phonemes before
and after becomes purposeless. It is also not the case that individual
phonemes end in case terminations because case suffixes are added
only after the group of phonemes i.e. a word.
Text: 1296
अथ समुिदतानां पदसंज्ञा। तदयु(द)ु क्म् - “बहनां संघातशब्दवाच्यत्वम्, न ह्ेक स्मन्
संघातशब्दपर्योगोऽ स्त, अिप तु गकारौकारिवसजर् नीयेषु समुदायशब्दः पर्युज्यते।”
तदयुक्म्, वणार्नां नानाता िवद्ते। वणोर् िह अवणार्त् वणार्त्मतया व्यावत्र्ते वणार्न्तरात्ु
कथं व्यावत्र्ते? िकं वणार्कारतया अवणार्त्मतया वा?
atha samuditānāṁ padasaṁjñā. tadayu(du)ktam-“bahūnāṁ saṅghā-
taśabdavācyatvam, na hyekasmin saṁghātaśabdaprayogo’sti,
api tu gakāraukāravisarjanīyeṣu samudāyaśabdaḥ prayujyate.”
tadayuktam, varṇānāṁ nānātā vidyate. varṇo hi avarṇāt
varṇātmatayā vyāvarttate varṇāntarāttu kathaṁ vyāvarttate?
kiṁ varṇākāratayā avarṇātmatayā vā?
Translation: 1296
If you say that, the collection of phonemes will be called a word, that
will also not be proper, because, when there are many phonemes it
should be called mere a collection of phonemes. The word collection
is not used with reference to one. But the word collection can be
used only to collection of phonemes in the sequence of ’g + o +

visarga’. It is also not proper. The plurality of the phonemes exists.
One phoneme can be distinguished from something which is not a
phoneme, but how it can be distinguished from other phoneme? Is
it going to be distinguished in the form of a phoneme, or, in the
form of something which is not a phoneme?
Text: 1297
तद्िद वणार्कारतया व्यावत्र्ते; तदाऽन्येषां वणर् रूपता न पर्ाप्नोित नीरतीरादे रव।
tadyadi varṇākāratayā vyāvarttate; tadā’nyeṣāṁ varṇarūpatā na
prāpnoti nīratīrāderiva.
Translation: 1297
If you say, it is distinguished in the form of a phoneme it will mean
that other phonemes are not phonemes. Like water and bank of the
river.
Text: 1298
अथ अवणार्त्मतया व्यावत्र्ते; तदा(ऽ)वणार्त्मता व्यावतर् ते उक्ानािमव ततश्चैक एव
वणार्त्मा जगित सञ्ातः। तस्य गोऽथर् वाचकत्वं न युज्यते सुप् िवभक्त्यनुपपत्ेः।
atha avarṇātmatayā vyāvarttate; tadā(’)varṇātmatā vyāvartate
uktānāmiva tataścaika eva varṇātmā jagati sañjātaḥ. tasya go’rtha-
vācakatvaṁ na yujyate sup vibhaktyanupapatteḥ.
Translation: 1298
If you say that, they are distinguished as something other than
phoneme, then, what has been distinguished is the state of not
being a phoneme as stated above. Thereby, one will have to accept
that there is only one phoneme in this world. But that cannot be
accepted as expressive of the meaning cow, because after that no
case suffix can be added.
Text: 1299
नािप वणार्नां िनत्यत्वपर्त्यायकं पर्माणम स्त, एवं पर्त्यक्षादीनामपर्ामाण्यपर्ितपादनात्।
तीवर्मन्दात्मतया गवणर् स्य नानात्वोपलब्धेः गकारोऽिप भेदवान् न गकारे(रै)कत्वम्।
nāpi varṇānāṁ nityatvapratyāyakaṁ pramāṇamasti, evaṁ pratya-
kṣādīnāmaprāmāṇyapratipādanāt. tīvramandātmatayā gavarṇasya
nānātvopalabdheḥ gakāro’pi bhedavān na gakāre(rai)katvam.
Translation: 1299
Moreover, there is no proof which can cause the knowledge of
eternity of phonemes. It has already been explained that proofs like
perception etc. are all not dependable. Moreover, we experience
sometimes the ‘g’ sound as sharp and sometimes as soft and
therefore one will have to posit many ‘g’ sounds and therefore, it is
not true that the phoneme ‘g’ is only one.
Text: 1300
अथ व्यञ्कवशेन तीवर्मन्दािदबुद्ेरुत्प त्ः। न गवणर् स्य भेदोऽ स्त; तदयुक्म्, गवणर् एव
पर्तीयते तीवर्मन्दाद्ात्मतया न व्यञ्कािन गवणर् बुिद्वार्।
atha vyañjakavaśena tīvramandādibuddherutpattiḥ. na gavarṇasya
bhedo’sti; tadayuktam, gavarṇa eva pratīyate tīvramandādyātmatayā
na vyañjakāni gavarṇabuddhirvā.
Translation: 1300
If you say, the perception of softness, sharpness arises due to some
other revealing factor and there is no difference in the phoneme
called ‘g’, it will not be proper, because, what is realized is only the
phoneme as soft and sharp and neither the revealing factors nor the
knowledge of the sound ‘g’.
Text: 1301
यिद व्यञ्कभेदेन तीवर्मन्दािदभेदप रक्लृिप्ः िकर्यते गवणार्त्मा तु न िभद्ते; तदा
गकारािदिवभागोऽिप व्यञ्कभेदिनबन्धनोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, वणार्त्मा त्वेक एव। ततश्च
गवाथर् पर्ितप त्नर् पर्ाप्नोित एक स्मन् वणेर् सुप् िवभक्त्यनुपपत्ेः।
yadi vyañjakabhedena tīvramandādibhedapariklṛptiḥ kriyate gava-
rṇātmā tu na bhidyate; tadā gakārādivibhāgo’pi vyañjakabheda-
nibandhano’bhyupagantavyaḥ, varṇātmā tveka eva. tataśca gavār-
thapratipattirna prāpnoti ekasmin varṇe sup vibhaktyanupapatteḥ.
Translation: 1301
If you say that, due to the revealing factors, there arises the
difference viz. sharp and soft but the phoneme ‘g’ is not changed,
then, the different phonemes like ‘g’ etc. should also be accepted
due to the difference in the revealing factor. The form of phoneme
being only one. That will again result in the contingency of not
going the knowledge of meaning of cow, because, to one phoneme

it is not possible to add case-suffixes.
Text: 1302
िकञ्, िभन्ाकारतया पर्तीयमानस्य यद्ेकत्वमभ्युपगम्यते; नानेकं जगत् स्यात्,
अिभन्ात्मके च जगित मानमेयव्यवस्थैव हीयते। न च िनत्यस्य अनुपजातिवकारस्य
िवज्ञानोदयदानसामथ्यर् म स्त।
kiñca, bhinnākāratayā pratīyamānasya yadyekatvamabhyupaga-
myate; nānekaṁ jagat syāt, abhinnātmake ca jagati māname-
yavyavasthaiva hīyate. na ca nityasya anupajātavikārasya vijñā-
nodayadānasāmarthyamasti.
Translation: 1302
Moreover, if you say that, even if they appear in different form, they
are treated as one, then, the whole world should be only one and as a
consequence of it there will no provision for any distinction between
pramāṇa (process of knowing) and prameya (object of knowledge)
because, the entire world will be converted into one entity. An entity
which is eternal and which has not undergone any change, has no
capacity to generate its knowledge.
Text: 1303
अथ िकर्यते; िकमनुपजाताितशयेन वा, अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन वा, व्यित रक्ोप-
जाताितशयेन वा?
atha kriyate; kimanupajātātiśayena vā, avyatiriktopajātātiśayena vā,
vyatiriktopajātātiśayena vā?
Translation: 1303
If you hold that, it produces in spite of that knowledge, we would
like to know whether it produces without any excellence emerging
in it, or, due to emerging of excellence, not different from it, or, due
to emergence of excellence different from it.
Text: 1304
तद्िद अनुपजाताितशयेन िकर्यते; तदा सवर् दा कुयार्त् एक स्मन् वा काले कुयार्त्
तद्ेहमातर्ानुबन्धेना(न) कालिवलम्बनायोगात्।
tadyadi anupajātātiśayena kriyate; tadā sarvadā kuryāt ekasmin vā
kāle kuryāt taddehamātrānubandhenā(na) kālavilambanāyogāt.
Translation: 1304
If you say, it produces without any excellence emerging in it, then,
it should always keep on producing, or, it can produce only once
because, in that form there is no possibility of delay in time.
Text: 1305
अथ अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन िकर्यते; तथािप सनातना वणार्ः, अव्यित रक्ाितशय-
करणपक्षे स एवोपजायते, फलािनष्प त्करणस्वरूपाऽनितवृत्ेः।
atha avyatiriktopajātātiśayena kriyate; tathāpi sanātanā varṇāḥ,
avyatiriktātiśayakaraṇapakṣe sa evopajāyate, phalāniṣpattikaraṇa-
svarūpā’nativṛtteḥ.
Translation: 1305
If you say that, it produces due to emerging of excellence not
different from it, still, the phonemes will remain eternal and in
the view that there is excellence not different from itself, the same
will come into being because it will not be free from its form of not
producing the result.
Text: 1306
अथ व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन िकर्यते; तस्याितशयः कथम्? यो यस्य केनािप सम्बन्धेन
न सं(०न्धेन सं) बन्ध्यते स तस्याितशयः।
atha vyatiriktopajātātiśayena kriyate; tasyātiśayaḥ katham? yo
yasya kenāpi sambandhena na saṁ(0ndhena saṁ) bandhyate sa
tasyātiśayaḥ.
Translation: 1306
If you say, it produces due to emerging of excellence different from
itself, then, how can it be called excellence of that? Because, an
excellence has to be that which is related to that by some relation.
Text: 1307
यिद च अन्तिहर् तवणर् स्मरणिविशष्ोऽन्त्यो वणर् ः पदम्; तस्यािप स्मरणकाले ितरोिहत-
त्वादवाचकत्वम् - “तस्य व्यञ्कानां क्षिणकत्वात् क्षणोपल ब्धः” इित वचनात्।
yadi cāntarhitavarṇasmaraṇaviśiṣṭo’ntyo varṇaḥ padam; tasyāpi
smaraṇakāle tirohitatvādavācakatvam-“tasya vyañjakānāṁ kṣaṇi-
katvāt kṣaṇopalabdhiḥ” iti vacanāt.
Translation: 1307
If you say that, the last phoneme in the sequence qualified by the
remembrance of the phonemes which have disappeared, is what is
called a word, then, that also will become inexpressive of meaning
because, that also will disappear at the time of remembrance. There
is a statement to the effect viz. “since the revealing phonemes are
momentary in nature, only momentary phoneme can be known.”
Text: 1308
यिद वणार् व्यञ्कैव्यर् ज्यन्ते तदा समानदेशाव स्थतं समाने न्दर्यगर्ाह्ाणां पर्ितिनयत-
व्यञ्कत्वेनेष्म् एकान्तगर् तोदककनकादीनां वद न्त वैशेिषकाः।
yadi varṇā vyañjakairvyajyante tadā samānadeśāvasthitaṁ samā-
nendriyagrāhyāṇāṁ pratiniyatavyañjakatveneṣṭam ekāntargato-
dakakanakādīnāṁ vadanti vaiśeṣikāḥ.(?)
Translation: 1308
If you say that, the phonemes are revealed by revealing factors then,
(……….the text is not clear).
Text: 1309
अथ अिनत्या वणार्ः पदसंज्ञा भवन्तीित चेत्; ततर्ािप िकं व्यस्ताः, समस्ता वा?
atha anityā varṇāḥ padasaṁjñā bhavantīti cet; tatrāpi kiṁ vyastāḥ,
samastā vā?
Translation: 1309
If you say that, non-eternal phonemes are called a morpheme, there
also we would like to know whether individually they are called so,
or, in a collection.
Text: 1310
तद्िद व्यस्ताः; तदा गकारौकारिवसजर् नीयान्यतमे वणेर् न िवभक्त्युत्पादोऽ स्त, उत्पादे वा
एको वणर् ः वाचकः स्यात्-वणार्न्तरोच्चारणानथर् क्यम्।
tadyadi vyastāḥ; tadā gakāraukāravisarjanīyānyatame varṇe na
vibhaktyutpādo’sti, utpāde vā eko varṇaḥ vācakaḥ syāt-varṇāntaro-
ccāraṇānarthakyam.
Translation: 1310
If you say, individually they are called morpheme, then, no case
suffix is found added, or, can be added after any one phoneme viz.
either ‘g’, or, ‘au’, or, ‘visarga’. And if you say that, in spite of that it
can be added, then, you will have to accept that a single phoneme
will become the expressive of a meaning and not only that, the
utterance of other phonemes will become redundant.
Text: 1311
अथ वणर् समुदायः पदम्; पर्ितक्षणध्वं सनां समुदायाथोर् वक्व्यः, बहनामव स्थतरूपाणां
समुदायो लोके दृष्ः, न च वणार्नां भूयस्त्वम स्त उक्ान्न्यायात्। िकञ्
अन्त्यवणर् गर्हणानन्तरं पूवर्वणर् स्मरणम्, पूवर्वणर् स्मरणानन्तरम् अन्त्यवणेर् ज्ञानम्,
ततश्चास्य अथर् पर्ितप त्काले पदं [न] िवद्ते तेनाऽपिदकाऽथर् पर्ितप त्ः स्यात्।
atha varṇasamudāyaḥ padam; pratikṣaṇadhvaṁsināṁ samu-
dāyārtho vaktavyaḥ, bahūnāmavasthitarūpāṇāṁ samudāyo loke
dṛṣṭaḥ, na ca varṇānāṁ bhūyastvamasti uktānnyāyāt. kiñca
antyavarṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ pūrvavarṇasmaraṇam, pūrvavarṇa-
smaraṇānantaram antyavarṇe jñānam, tataścāsya arthaprati-
pattikāle padaṁ [na] vidyate tenā’padikā’rthapratipattiḥ syāt.
Translation: 1311
If you say that, collection of phonemes, is a morpheme, then, you
should tell us what is the meaning of collection when every moment
the phonemes gets destroyed. In the world of our experience we find
a collection of many things which continue to exist. On the basis of
the above maxim, we cannot say that there are many phonemes.
Moreover, after the hearing of the last phoneme, there will be
remembrance of the earlier phonemes and after the remembrance of
earlier phonemes, there will be the knowledge of the last phoneme.
And thus, at the time of the meaning, no morpheme will be available
and therefore, such a knowledge of meaning will become something
which is not caused by any morpheme.
Text: 1312
न च कायर् रूपता वणार्नां िवद्ते। सती सत्ा संवेद्ते। िवज्ञानोत्पत्ेः पूवर् वेद्स्य सत्ा,
पश्चािद्ज्ञानम्। तद्ेद्ं िकम्-अधुनोत्पन्ं िवषयतां याित, िचरोत्पन्म्, अनुत्पन्ं वा?
नालमालोचियतुं ज्ञानम्, तत्स्वरूपमातर्ा स्तत्विवधायकत्वेन तदत्ु पत्ेः।
na ca kāryarūpatā varṇānāṁ vidyate. satī sattā saṁvedyate.
vijñānotpatteḥ pūrvaṁ vedyasya sattā, paścādvijñānam. tadvedyaṁ
kim-adhunotpannaṁ viṣayatāṁ yāti, cirotpannam, anutpannaṁ

vā? nālamālocayituṁ jñānam, tatsvarūpamātrāstitvavidhāyakatvena
tadutpatteḥ.
Translation: 1312
It is also not the case that, the phonemes are produced. Only that
existence can be crossed which exists, before the knowledge arises
that which is to be known has to exist. And later that can be known.
There the question arises, what is that which is known? Is it the
case that what is produced just now, becomes the object of that
knowledge, or, that which was already produced becomes the object
of knowledge, or, that which is not produced becomes the object
of knowledge? We cannot discuss about the knowledge because, it
arises as merely a pointer to show the existence of that form.
Text: 1313
न च तत्कारणं िवद्ते।
na ca tatkāraṇaṁ vidyate.
Translation: 1313
We do not see any cause of its production either.
Text: 1314
ननु पर्यत्नािदकं िवद्ते;
nanu prayatnādikaṁ vidyate;
Translation: 1314
Clarification:
Well there are efforts to produce.
Text: 1315
तदयुक्म्, तेषां पर्यत्नादीनां स्वरूपं कथं गृह्ते-िकं सत्ामातर्ेण, कारकत्वेन वा?
tadayuktam, teṣāṁ prayatnādīnāṁ svarūpaṁ kathaṁ gṛhyate-kiṁ
sattāmātreṇa, kārakatvena vā?
Translation: 1315
Reply:
That is not proper. How do you come to know the nature of those
efforts? Do you know only by mere existence, or, because they take
part in producing an effect.
Text: 1316
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण; तदा जनकं रूपं न स्यात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa; tadā janakaṁ rūpaṁ na syāt.
Translation: 1316
If you say, by mere existence, then, that cannot be taken as a cause.
Text: 1317
अथ कारकत्वेन गृह्ते; िकम् आत्मजनकत्वेन, आहो स्वद् अन्यजनकत्वेन?
atha kārakatvena gṛhyate; kim ātmajanakatvena, āhosvid anyaja-
nakatvena?
Translation: 1317
If you say, as a producer of an effect, there we would like to know,
whether it produces its own form, or, does it produce something
other than itself.
Text: 1318
तद्िद आत्मजनकत्वेन गृह्ते; तदात्मा तेनोत्पाद्ते न वणर् ः।
tadyadi ātmajanakatvena gṛhyate; tadātmā tenotpādyate na varṇaḥ.
Translation: 1318
If you say, it is known as it produces itself, then, it means that, the
same is produced by that and not the phoneme.
Text: 1319
अथ अन्यजनकत्वेन अवधायर् ते; तदा अन्यस्य सत्ा सद्ा। तह्ार्(नह्ा)िक्षप्ान्यसद्ाव
एव सद्ावोऽस्याध्यवसीयते, ततः तत्समानकालीनत्वेन हेतुफलभावाऽ सिद्ः।
atha anyajanakatvena avadhāryate; tadā anyasya sattā siddhā.
tarhyā(nahyā)kṣiptānyasadbhāva eva sadbhāvo’syādhyavasīyate,
tataḥ tatsamānakālīnatvena hetuphalabhāvā’siddhiḥ.
Translation: 1319
If you say that, it is known as it produces something, then, it will
establish existence of something else. In that case, then, one will
come to know that, it exists only after one knows that something
else exists and in that case, both will be of the same time, and
hence the cause-and-effect relationship between them cannot be
established.
Text: 1320
िकञ्, पूवार्परभावेन हेतुफलभावः, िकं वा पूवार्परगर्हणेन?
kiñca, pūrvāparabhāvena hetuphalabhāvaḥ, kiṁ vā pūrvāparagra-
haṇena?
Translation: 1320
Moreover, should we decide cause and effect relationship on the
basis of a sequence of prior and later, or, on the basis of knowledge
of prior and later.
Text: 1321
तद्िद पूवार्परभावेन हेतुफलभावः; तदा ज्ञानं िवना 'अ स्त' कथं ज्ञायते? ज्ञानाभावे-
नाऽज्ञाने िकं पूवोर्त्पन्ौ सहोत्पन्ौ वा?
tadyadi pūrvāparabhāvena hetuphalabhāvaḥ; tadā jñānaṁ vinā ‘asti’
kathaṁ jñāyate? jñānābhāvenā’jñāne kiṁ pūrvotpannau sahotpa-
nnau vā?
Translation: 1321
If you say, the basis of prior and later is cause and relationship,
then, without knowledge, how can you say that it exists? Well,
the knowledge does not arise, when there is absence of knowledge,
how to say that they are produced before, or, they are produced
together.
Text: 1322
अथ पूवार्परगर्हणेन हेतुफलभावव्यवस्था इित; तदयुक्म्, अिनयतं गर्हणं दृष्म्-कायर्
दृष्ट्ा कारणं गृह्ाित, कारणं दृष्ट्ा कायर् गृह्ाित, उभयं च युगपद् गृह्ाित। एवं
च स्थते न हेतुफलभाविविनश्चयोऽ स्त। तदभावान्ाऽिनत्या वणार्ः पदं भिवतुमहर् ित।
atha pūrvāparagrahaṇena hetuphalabhāvavyavasthā iti; tadayuktam,
aniyataṁ grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭam-kāryaṁ dṛṣṭvā kāraṇaṁ gṛhṇāti,
kāraṇaṁ dṛṣṭvā kāryaṁ gṛhṇāti, ubhayaṁ ca yugapat gṛhṇāti.
evaṁ ca sthite na hetuphalabhāvaviniścayo’sti. tadabhāvānnā’nityā
varṇāḥ padaṁ bhavitumarhati.
Translation: 1322
If you say that, with knowledge of prior and later, the cause and
effect relationship can be decided, that is also not proper, because
we do not see consistent knowledge about it. Sometimes after seeing
the effect one comes to know the cause, sometimes having seen
the cause, one comes to know the effect and sometimes both are
known as cause and effect. When such is the case, one cannot decide
cause and effect relationship. And when there is no cause and effect
relationship, we cannot hold that the non-eternal phonemes can be
called a morpheme.
Text: 1323
अथ वणेर्भ्योऽथार्न्तरभूतं पदं वणर् व्यङ्ग्यस्फोटरूपमभ्युपगम्यते।
atha varṇebhyo’rthāntarabhūtaṁ padaṁ varṇavyaṅgyasphoṭarūpa-
mabhyupagamyate.
Translation: 1323
Well, a morpheme distinct from the phonemes of the nature of a
concept, suggested by the phonemes, is accepted.
Text: 1324
वणार्नां िकल अथर् पर्त्यायकत्वं व्यस्तसमस्तानां सम्भवित, अ स्त च सा अथर् पर्ितप त्ः
तेन अथार्न्तरभूतं वणेर्भ्यः पदं िवद्ः। अिभन्ाकारा च पर्ितप त्वर् णेर्ष्वनुपपन्ा तेन वणेर्भ्यो
िभन्म् अिभन्ाकारं पदमध्यवसीयते।
varṇānāṁ kila arthapratyāyakatvaṁ vyastasamastānāṁ sambha-
vati, asti ca sā arthapratipattiḥ tena arthāntarabhūtaṁ varṇebhyaḥ
padaṁ vidmaḥ. abhinnākārā ca pratipattirvarṇeṣvanupapannā tena
varṇebhyo bhinnam abhinnākāraṁ padamadhyavasīyate.
Translation: 1324
The phonemes independently, or, in a collection convey meanings
and we do have understanding of such meaning and therefore, we
understand a morpheme as distinct from the phonemes. It is not
proper to say that, there arises the knowledge of identity with the
phonemes and therefore, in a morpheme having an identical form
but different from phonemes is accepted.
Text: 1325
यत्ावदक्ु म् - “अथर् पर्ितपत्यन्यथानुपपत्या पदमवगम्यते” तदयुक्म्, अथार्पत्ेः पर्ामाण्य-
मेव ना स्त। यथा च न िवद्ते तथा पर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्।
yattāvaduktam - “arthapratipatyanyathānupapatyā padamavaga-
myate” tadayuktam, arthāpatteḥ prāmāṇyameva nāsti. yathā ca na
vidyate tathā prāgeva prapañcitam.
Translation: 1325
“You had said a morpheme is accepted because without that the
knowledge of meaning cannot be explained”. But this is not proper,
because, we had already shown that pre-supposition is not a valid
means of knowing. How it cannot be accepted as the valid means
of knowing, has already been discussed before.
Text: 1326
न च पदेन सह पर्ितबद्ा अथर् पर्ितप त्ः अवगतपूवार् येन अन्यकारणप रहारेण पदं
बोधयित। पर्त्यक्षं च पर्माणमेव न भवित। कथं तत् पदपर्ितपादनाय अलम्? न च िनत्यस्य
िवज्ञानाद्थर् िकर्याकरणसामथ्यर् म स्त। एवं लक्षयभूतं पदं न िवद्ते। तदभावािन्िवर् षयं
पारमाथर्(मषर्) लक्षणिमित।
na ca padena saha pratibaddhā arthapratipattiḥ avagatapūrvā
yena anyakāraṇaparihāreṇa padaṁ bodhayati. pratyakṣaṁ
ca pramāṇameva na bhavati. kathaṁ tat padapratipādanāya
alam? na ca nityasya vijñānādyarthakriyākaraṇasāmarthyamasti.
evaṁ lakṣyabhūtaṁ padaṁ na vidyate. tadabhāvānnirviṣayaṁ
pāramārthaṁ(marṣaṁ) lakṣaṇamiti.
Translation: 1326
It is not our experience that, the knowledge of meaning arises
invariably in association with a morpheme. Had it been so, we could
have said that, since there is no other factor responsible for such
an understanding, it is the morpheme that causes the knowledge of
the meaning. Perception cannot be the valid means in this respect
because, it is not a valid means at all. Then how is it capable of
causing the knowledge of a morpheme? It is not the case that, a
permanent entity has the capacity to generate any function such
as cognition etc. Thus, there is nothing called a morpheme which
needs to be defined and when that is not there its definition is not
left with any object.
Text: 1327
अिप च, यािन लक्षणपरािण सूतर्ािण तेषां लक्षणं िवद्ते, न वा? यिद िवद्ते; ततर्ािप अन्यद्
अतर्ािप इत्यिनष्ायां च न िकिञ्त् पदं ज्ञानं(तं) स्यात्।
api ca, yāni lakṣaṇaparāṇi sūtrāṇi teṣāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ vidyate, na vā?

yadi vidyate; tatrāpi anyad atrāpi ityaniṣṭhāyāṁ ca na kiṅcit padaṁ
jñānaṁ(taṁ) syāt.
Translation: 1327
Moreover, what you consider to be the definition-rules, whether
there is any definition of them, or, not? If you say, there is, then,
there also should be definition of that and in this way, it will lead
to endless regress and as a consequence, no pada, or, morpheme can
ever be known.
Text: 1328
अथ न िवद्ते; िकमेवं तिहर् तेषां साधुत्वं न िवद्ते?
atha na vidyate; kimevaṁ tarhi teṣāṁ sādhutvaṁ na vidyate?
Translation: 1328
If you say, there are no definitions, or, rules, then, does it mean that
they are not grammatically correct?
Text: 1329
अथ लक्षणाभावेऽिप तेषां साधुत्वं िवद्ते; एवं गावी-गोणी-गोपुत् लकेत्येवमादीनामिप
अपभर्ंसा(शा)नां लक्षणाभावेऽिप साधुत्वं भिवष्यित।
atha lakṣaṇābhāve’pi teṣāṁ sādhutvaṁ vidyate; evaṁ gāvī-goṇī-
goputtaliketyevamādīnāmapi apabhraṁsā(śā)nāṁ lakṣaṇābhāve’pi
sādhutvaṁ bhaviṣyati.
Translation: 1329
If you say that, even if there are no rules of grammar and still
they are grammatically correct, then, the ordinary dialectical forms
such as gāvī, goṇī, goputtalika and the like which are known as
apabhraṁśa words should also be declared as grammatically correct
in the absence of any rules for them.
Text: 1330
अथ लक्षणाभावान् गाव्यादीनां साधुत्वम्; तदा सूतर्पदानामिप तदभावादेव असाधुत्वम्।
atha lakṣaṇābhāvānna gāvyādīnāṁ sādhutvam; tadā sūtrapa-
dānāmapi tadabhāvādeva asādhutvam.
Translation: 1330
If you say, the words like gavi etc. are not accepted as standard
grammatical forms, because, there are no grammatical rules to
explain them, then, the words of the rules of Pāṇini should also
be declared as ungrammatical because, there are no rules for them.
Text: 1331
अिप च, यिद नाम लक्षणिवकलता शब्दस्य; तदा िकं भवित? िकमुच्चारियतुमर् ुखभङ्ः
सम्पद्ते, शब्दस्य वा अवाचकत्वम्, अथर् स्य वा रूपिवपयार्सो जायते, िकं वा अपशब्द-
पर्ितपािदताथर् स्य अथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वं हीयते, अपशब्दोच्चारणे सित अमङ्लोदयो वा भवित?
api ca, yadi nāma lakṣaṇavikalatā śabdasya; tadā kiṁ
bhavati? kimuccārayiturmukhabhaṅgaḥ sampadyate, śabdasya vā
avācakatvam, arthasya vā rūpaviparyāso jāyate, kiṁ vā apaśabda-
pratipāditārthasya arthakriyākartṛtvaṁ hīyate, apaśabdoccāraṇe
sati amaṅgalodayo vā bhavati?
Translation: 1331
Moreover, if you say, a word does not have any rule to explain
it, what happens? Does the vocal cavity of the speaker break, or,
the word becomes inexpressive, or, meaning gets distorted, or, the
meaning obtained from an ungrammatical word does not cause its
function, or, is it the case that, if someone utters ungrammatical
word, something inauspicious takes place?
Text: 1332
तद्िद तावत् पर्वक्ृमुखभङ्ो भवित गावीशब्दोच्चारणे सित; तदैते बहलं गावीशब्दोच्चारणं
कुवार्णाः समुपलभ्यन्ते पर्वक्ारः, न च तेषां मुखभङ्ः समुपलभ्यते।
tadyadi tāvat pravaktṛmukhabhaṅgo bhavati gāvīśabdoccāraṇe sati;
tadaite bahulaṁ gāvīśabdoccāraṇaṁ kurvāṇāḥ samupalabhyante
pravaktāraḥ, na ca teṣāṁ mukhabhaṅgaḥ samupalabhyate.
Translation: 1332
If you say, the vocal cavity of the speaker breaks, when he utters the
word gāvī, in the sense of cow, it is not true because, innumerable
speakers are found uttering the word gāvī, but nobody’s vocal cavity
is seen to have broken.
Text: 1333
अथ गावीशब्दस्य वाचकत्वं नोपपद्ते; तदयुक्म्, गावीशब्देन बहलं व्याहर न्त पर्मातारः।
atha gāvīśabdasya vācakatvaṁ nopapadyate; tadayuktam, gāvī-
śabdena bahulaṁ vyāharanti pramātāraḥ.
Translation: 1333
If you say that, the word gāvī is not expressive of its meaning, which
is not proper, because, innumerable knowers use the word gāvī.
Text: 1334
अथ गोऽथर् पर्ितिपत्सूनां गावीशब्दशर्वणानन्तरं गोशब्दे स्मृितरुपजायते स च गवाद्थर् वाचक
इित चेत्;
atha go’rthapratipitsūnāṁ gāvīśabdaśravaṇānantaraṁ gośabde
smṛtirupajāyate sa ca gavādyarthavācaka iti cet;
Translation: 1334
Clarification:
Well, those who want to know the meaning ‘cow’, remember the
word ‘go’ after hearing the word gāvī, because, it is the word ‘go’
which is expressive of the word ‘cow’.
Text: 1335
तदयुक्म्, म्लेच्छादीनां साधुशब्दप रज्ञानाभावात् कथं तिद्षया स्मृितः? तदभावे न
गोऽथर् पर्ितप त्ः स्यात्।
tadayuktam, mlecchādīnāṁ sādhuśabdaparijñānābhāvāt kathaṁ
tadviṣayā smṛtiḥ? tadabhāve na go’rthapratipattiḥ syāt.
Translation: 1335
Reply:
It is not proper. The tribals do not have the knowledge of standard
grammatical form and so how can they remember the word ‘go’ and
in absence of remembrance, they should not have the knowledge of
cow from the word gāvī (which is contrary to the fact)
Text: 1336
अथ अथर् स्य रूपिवपयार्सो भवित; तदयुक्म्, न गावीशब्देन अिभधीयमानस्य गोरूपता
व्यावत्र्माना दृष्ा।
atha arthasya rūpaviparyāso bhavati; tadayuktam, na gāvīśabdena
abhidhīyamānasya gorūpatā vyāvarttamānā dṛṣṭā.
Translation: 1336
If you say that, the meaning gets distorted, that is also not proper.
Nobody has seen that what is expressed by the word ‘gāvī’, is not
a cow.
Text: 1337
अथ अथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वं हीयते; तदयुक्म्, गावीशब्देन अिभधीयमानस्य वाहदोहपर्सव-
सामथ्यर् नाितवतर् ते गोिपण्डस्य।
atha arthakriyākartṛtvaṁ hīyate; tadayuktam, gāvīśabdena abhidhī-
yamānasya vāhadohaprasavasāmarthyaṁ nātivartate gopiṇḍasya.
Translation: 1337
If you say, it does not cause the function viz activities related to
the cow, it will not be proper, because, whatever is conveyed by the
word ‘gāvī’, is the animal called cow, which is not devoid of capacity
of carrying load, milking and giving birth to a calf.
Text: 1338
अथ गावीशब्दोच्चारणादमङ्लोदयो भवित, न तु वाचकत्वं िनरािकर्यते असाधुशब्दस्य।
तदक्
ु म्-
अपशब्दोऽनुमानेन वाचकः कै श्चिदष्यते।
वाचकत्वाऽिवशेषेऽिप िनयमः पुण्यपापयोः॥
atha gāvīśabdoccāraṇādamaṅgalodayo bhavati, na tu vācakatvaṁ
nirākriyate asādhuśabdasya. taduktam-
apaśabdo’numānena vācakaḥ kaiścidiṣyate,
vācakatvā’viśeṣe’pi niyamaḥ puṇyapāpayoḥ.
Translation: 1338
If you think that by uttering the word ‘gāvī’ something inauspicious
is going to take place, and you are not denying the fact that an
ungrammatical non-standard form also expresses its meaning as it
is supported by the following statement, “Some thinkers conclude by
inference that, a non-standard ungrammatical word also expresses
its meaning, although there is no difference so far as its expressive
character is concerned, a grammatical form leads to something
auspicious that is meritorious and an ungrammatical form leads
to something inauspicious, or, demeritorious.”
Text: 1339
तदयुक्म्, तेन सह पर्ितबन्धाभावात्। न चापो स्तत्वगर्ाहकं(?) पर्माणम स्त। अन्यथैव
काले च न म्ले च्च[त]व्यिमित िनयमोऽभ्युपगम्यते। न च शुद्म्, अन्यतर् प ण्डतानामिप
व्यवहारोदयदानदशर् नात्।
tadayuktam, tena saha pratibandhābhāvāt. na cāpostitvagrā-
hakaṁ(?) pramāṇamasti. anyathaiva kāle ca na mlecci[ta]vyamiti
niyamo’bhyupagamyate. na ca śuddham, anyatra paṇḍitānāmapi
vyavahārodayadānadarśanāt.
Translation: 1339
That is also not proper, because, there is no invariable relationship
with merit and demerit. There is no proof to support it. At times,
the injunction, “One should not use dialectical and non-standard
form” is interpreted differently. It is not correct, because, even the
learned people are seen to entertain such usage.
0.16 गर्न्थोपसंहारः
Granthopasaṁhāraḥ
(Conclusion)
Text: 1340
तदेवमुपप्लुतेष्वेव तत्वेषु अिवचा रतरमणीयाः सवेर् व्यवहारा घटन्त इित।
ये याता निह गोचरं सुरगुरोः बुद्ेिवर् कल्पा दृढाः,
पर्ाप्यन्ते ननु तेऽिप यतर् िवमले पाखण्डदपर् च्छिद।
भट्शर्ीजयरािशदेवगुरुिभः सृष्ो महातोर्दयः-
तत्वोपप्लव संह एष इित यः ख्याितं परां यास्यित॥
पाखण्डखण्डनािभज्ञा ज्ञानोद धिवविद्र्ताः।
जयराशेजर्यन्तीह िवकल्पा वािद जष्णवः॥
संवत् १३४९ मागर् ० विद ११ शनौ धवलकक्के महं० नरपालेन तत्वोपप्लवगर्न्थपु स्तका
लेखीित। भदर्म्॥
tadevamupapluteṣveva tattveṣu
avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti.
ye yātā nahi gocaraṁ suraguroḥ buddhervikalpā dṛḍhāḥ,
prāpyante nanu te’pi yatra vimale pākhaṇḍadarpacchidi
bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśidevagurubhiḥ sṛṣṭo mahārtodayaḥ-
tattvopaplavasiṁha eṣa iti yaḥ khyātiṁ parāṁ yāsyati.
pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍanābhijñā jñānodadhivivarddhitāḥ
jayarāśerjayantīha vikalpā vādijiṣṇavaḥ.
saṁvat1349 mārga0 vadi 11 śanau dhavalakakke mahaṁ0

narapālena tattvopaplavagranthapustikā lekhīti. bhadram.
Translation: 1340
In this way, when all that you consider to be real, cannot be proved
to be real, it is nice to say that, all our behaviors with the world are
going smoothly only until we do not reflect on them critically. Even
those doubts or critical questions which could not become the object
of knowledge of even Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the Gods, have
been raised by the teachers viz. Shri Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, for the sake of
removing the pride of the fools. This text called Tattvopaplavasiṁha
composed by them has a great future and it is going to be very
famous. These doubts, or, critical questions of Jayarāśi which know
how to refute the stubborn and which will expand the ocean of
knowledge are indeed capable of winning over the arguments of the
opponents. The manuscript of this book called Tattvopaplavasiṁha
was written by Narapal in the place called Dhavalkkaka on Saturday
the 11th day of the Kṛṣṇapakṣa in the month called Mārgaśīrṣa in
the Samvat 1349.
पदसूची
अकतार्, 317 अिनत्यत्वानुमान, 295, 417

अकारक, 216, 288, 441 अिनष्ा, 29, 392
अकृत-कृताभ्यागमनाशदोष, 321 अिनष्ोपप्लव, 24
अक्षिणक, 405 अनुगताकार, 16, 211, 212
अक्षिणकत्व, 349 अनुगतैकस्वभाव, 31
अक्षधी, 173 अनुगम, 325
अिग्संिव त्, 266 अनुगमाभाव, 350
अजनक, 215, 377 अनुपजाताितशय, 99, 302--304, 463
अज्ञान, 133 अनुपल ब्ध, 234, 254, 292, 369, 428
अतज्जननस्वभाव, 340 अनुपल ब्धकारण, 292
अतथ्यता, 60, 179 अनुपलभ्यस्वभाव, 253
अतदाकारता, 272, 273 अनुपलम्भ, 277
अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपा, 142 अनुभव, 237, 307
अता त्वक , 335 अनुभवाकारस्वीकरण, 83
अतादात्म्यव्यव स्थत, 22 अनुभवाकाराननुका रत्व, 237
अितशय, 463 अनुमातृ, 288
अतीतता, 162 अनुमान, 96, 109, 128, 136, 137, 140,
अतीतानागताथर् गृहीितरूपा, 162 171, 172, 237, 248, 307, 325,
अत्यन्ताभाव, 18, 20 356, 418, 437
अदुष्कारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्त्व, 6 अनुमानज्ञानस्य िवषयाथर् , 135
अदुष्कारणजन्यत्व, 239 अनुमानपूिवर् का, 423
अदुष्ता, 6 अनुमेयपर्ितप त्, 268, 294
अदृश्य, 210 अनुवादपर, 239
अदृश्यानुपल ब्ध, 368 अनुवादपरता, 241
अध्यक्षात्मक, 39, 40 अनुवादानुपप त्, 241, 242
अन धगताथर् गन्तृ, 100 अनेककालाऽन्तरावस्थान, 289
अनाद्न्ता, 257, 311 अनेकान्त, 277
अनावृत, 377 अनेकान्तवाद, 311
अिनत्यताव्यवहार, 421 अनेका शर्त, 32, 33
अिनत्यत्व, 445 अनेकोपादानजिनत, 32, 33
465
अनैका न्तक, 403, 445, 448, 454 अम्बरफल, 282

अन्त्यावयिव, 39 अयोगोलकाङ्ारावस्था, 216
अन्यतरासत्व, 206, 207 अथर् , 329, 355, 392, 396--398, 401,
अन्यथानुपप त्, 240, 248 402, 436, 456, 459, 465, 474
अन्योन्यिवरो धत्वपर्सङ्, 273 अथर् िकर्या, 73, 75, 227
अन्योन्याकारानुगम, 347 अथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्व, 472, 474
अन्वयव्यितरेक, 282 अथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वाभाव, 216
अपिदकाऽथर् पर्ितप त्, 465 अथर् जन्याकार, 98
अपरमाथर् सत्व, 382, 384, 385 अथर् धमर् , 398
अपशब्द, 472 अथर् वादवाक्य, 439
अपारमा थर् क, 135, 148 अथर् स्य, 285--287, 291, 395, 398, 472
अपूवार्थर्गृहीितत्व, 83, 147 अथर् स्य वेदनम्, 286, 391, 392
अपोह्ज्ञान, 59, 120, 177, 190 अथार्न्तर, 30, 323, 410, 469
अपौरुषेय, 450 अथार्न्तरभूत, 44, 56, 376, 470
अपौरुषेयत्व, 443, 449, 451 अथार्न्तरभूता, 16
अपर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता, 158 अथार्न्तरसत्ा, 45
अपर् सद्पदपदाथर् पूवर्क, 439 अथार्प त्, 108, 248, 249, 423
अपर्ामाण्य, 107 अथार्प त्पूिवर् का, 423
अपर्ामाण्यम्, 423 अथार्पत्या धकरणव्यव स्थित, 117
अबा धतपद, 251 अथैर्कधमर् , 395
अबा लश, 168 अवार्ग्भागिवद्, 240, 448
अबोधात्मक, 235 अवदातता, 232
अभाव, 18, 20, 21, 61, 63, 64, 73, 179, अवदातेतरकमार्नुवेध, 442
182, 247, 278, 435 अवबोध, 240
अभावज्ञान, 62, 278 अवबोधन, 245
अभावपूिवर् का, 423 अवबोधबुिद्, 250
अभावव्यवस्था, 62 अवयव, 367, 381
अभावस्वभाव, 314 अवयवा धकरण, 205, 206
अभावहेतु, 205 अवयवा धकरणाऽव्यितरेक, 201
अभावाकारता, 313, 314 अवयवी, 367, 376--378, 381
अिभलाप, 148, 149 अवयवोपचय, 256
अिभलापवती पर्तीितः, 142, 149 अवस्तुभूतसामान्यिवषयं, 355
अिभलापसंसगर् िनभार्स, 142 अवान्तरगिणकाकार, 22, 34
अभर्ान्त, 141 अिवज्ञानात्मक, 150, 151, 404
अभर्ान्तता, 138 अिवद्मान, 41, 60, 143, 245
अभर्ान्तभर्ान्तद्ैत, 227 अिवद्मानकतर् व्याथार्वबोधक, 245
अमङ्लोदय, 472, 475 अिवनाभावसम्बन्ध, 108, 262, 263, 265
अिवनाभािवसम्बन्धगर्हण, 113 आत्मान्तःकरणसम्बन्ध, 42

अिवसंवाद, 131 आदशर् मण्डल, 337
अिवसंवादक, 131, 440 आदशर् रूपता, 337
अिवसंवािदज्ञान, 125 आद्ानुभवावेिदताथार्कारिवषया, 104
अव्यित रक्, 55, 111, 119, 260, 399 आनन्दरूप, 322
अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशय, 99, 302, 303, 463 आनुमािनकज्ञान, 356
अव्यितरेक, 202, 204, 206, 398 आप्, 440
अव्यितरेकपर्ितपादन, 398, 399 आप्ोक्, 440, 441
अव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं, 201, 399 आलम्बनाथर् , 53
अव्यपदेश्य, 5, 92 आलूनिवशीणर् , 179
अव्यिभचा र, 10, 45, 90, 149, 177, 184, आलोकाकारता, 194
190 आलोकािद, 223, 381
अव्यिभचा रता, 12, 18, 39, 45, 46 आवरण लङ्ः, 93
अव्यिभचा रत्व, 42, 43, 45, 47 आवृत, 377
असत्वम्, 74, 75, 387 आ शर्ताना शर्तत्व, 280
असमानकालीनता, 272, 273 इतरकारकसाकल्य, 210
असाधुशब्द, 475 इतरेतरव्यावृ त्िवशेषिवषय, 325
असामान्यात्मक, 27 इतरेतराभाव, 18, 19
अ सद्, 402, 447, 448 इतरेतराशर्यत्व, 7, 216, 433
अ सद्ता, 400, 402 इ न्दर्य, 7
अस्पष्ता, 150--153, 156 इ न्दर्यज, 166, 323
अस्पष्ाकारा, 142, 150, 151 इ न्दर्यव्यापार, 236
अस्मयर् माणकतृर्कत्व, 443, 447, 449 इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् , 51, 94, 100
आक स्मकत्व, 131, 196 इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्व, 58, 92
आकार, 218, 254 इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जन्याकार, 94, 95
आकारकदम्बकस्वरूप, 226 इ न्दर्याथर् सम्पर्योगजत्व, 240
आकारभेद, 199, 200 इ न्दर्याव्यितरेिकत्व, 252
आकारभेदगर्हण, 200 इ न्दर्यैकत्व, 252
आकारान्तर, 49, 134, 228, 284, 327 इ न्दर्योत्पाद्त्व, 97
आकारापर् कत्व, 53, 54, 137, 148, 182, 331 ईश्वर, 292
आगमपूिवर् का, 423 उत्पादिवनाश, 234
आगमेऽन्तभार्वः, 435 उदकपर्पञ्, 64
आत्मन्, 253, 254, 257, 290, 299, 306, उदकव्यिक्, 15, 130
322 उपकायोर्पकारकभाव, 258
आत्ममनःसिन्कषर् , 58 उपगमिवरोध, 48, 224
आत्मसंिवदर्ूपा, 48 उपच रतकारणगर्हण, 281
आत्मसत्ा, 41, 313 उपजाताितशय, 99, 302
उपमान, 426, 430 कारक, 216

उपमानता, 431 कारककदम्बसम्पाद्, 287
उपमानपूिवर् का, 423 कारकत्व, 25, 26, 240, 467
उपमानफल, 426, 430 कारकसंख्याथर् , 240
उपल ब्ध, 368 कारकसाकल्य, 210
उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्ा धकरणस्य, 292 कारण, 290, 310
उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ािप्, 208--210, 369 कारणपूवर्क, 290
उपलभ्यस्वभाव, 254 कारणपूवर्कत्व, 290
उपादानकारणानुका रत्व, 237 कारणानुमान, 223, 224, 423
उपादानभूत, 346 कारणैकस्वभाव, 226
उभयधमर् , 395 कायार्नुमान, 159, 294, 416
उभयस्वभाव, 226 कायार्ऽक स्मकत्वपर्सङ्ः, 262
एककारकसामगर्ी, 196 कायैर्कस्वभाव, 226
एककायोर्त्पादन, 196 कायोर्त्पादात्मक, 214
एककालयोिगत्व, 406 कालिवकल्प, 8, 406, 453
एककालीनता, 175, 214 कालात्ययापिदष्ता, 400
एकता, 207, 308, 314 कूपारामािद, 445
एकत्व, 15, 204, 228, 299, 307, 361, कृतकत्व, 295, 418, 420, 445, 447
401, 407 केशोण्डु कािद, 40, 41
एकदेशानुका रत्व, 190 केशोण्डर् केन्दुद्य, 46, 47, 128, 153
एकभावस्वभावाः, 315 कैवल्य, 322
एकरूप, 222 कर्मकतृर्त्व, 214
एकाकारता, 175, 214 कर्मेतराभ्याम्, 213
एकान्ताभेद, 311 क्षिणकत्व, 100, 405, 414
एक करण, 359, 361 क्षीरोदकवद्, 211
एकोपलम्भ, 140, 157, 162, 340, 391 खण्डना, 269, 272, 273
ऐितह्, 435 खण्डनाऽवगम्यते, 271
औपचा रक, 317 खरिवषाण, 230, 259
कमलदलावबोधक, 243 गकार, 458
करणरूपता, 257 गकारा, 461
कतर् व्यताथर् िवषय, 246 गडु पर्वेशािक्षतारकिविनगर् मन्याय, 104
कतर् व्याथर् िवषयत्व, 245 गन्धाकारोपरक्गन्धािदज्ञान, 330
कतृर्त्व, 317 गम्यगमकभाव, 295, 326
कल्पना, 64, 142, 143, 145, 149, 150, गावीगोणीगोपुत् लका, 472
154, 357 गुणचलनजात्यािदिवशेषणोत्पािदतिवज्ञान, 142, 143
कल्पनापोढ, 141, 149, 161 गुणतर्य, 259, 261
कल्पनािवरह, 171, 172 गृहीतगर्ािहत्व, 78, 117
गृहीताथर् गृहीितरूपता, 102 ज्ञानाकार, 229

ज्ञानाकारता, 236, 237
गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्व, 79, 80, 102, 103, 105--108,
146 ज्ञानाकारप रकल्पना, 194
गोगवयसादृश्य, 423, 426, 430 ज्ञानाकारापर् कत्व, 330
गोिवषाण, 233, 284, 333 ज्ञानात्मता, 49, 95
गोशब्दे स्मृित, 473 ज्ञानान्तरवेद्, 338
गौः इत्यािद ज्ञान, 176 ज्ञानापोढ, 177
घट-संख्या-सामान्य, 197, 198 ज्ञानाथर् , 401
घटना, 363 ज्ञानावलीढ, 354
घटसामान्य, 201, 202, 204, 206--208 ज्ञानैकधमर् , 395
घटाद्नुपलम्भानुपप त्, 252 ज्ञापकत्व, 68, 433
चक्षुरूपालोकािद, 222 झषमिहषप रवतर् नाऽिभघातोपजाताऽवयविकर्यान्याय, 13
चक्षूरूपालोकमनस्कार, 225 तज्जनकत्व, 272
चलाचलत्वसाधन, 378 तज्जननस्वभाव, 340, 341
िचत्चैत्, 224 तज्जन्यतया, 286, 297, 298
िच त्सिद्, 261 तज्जन्यता, 272, 278
िचदिचत्, 220, 336 तत्व, 476
िचदा त्मका, 336 तत्वोपप्लव, 41
चैत्यवन्दनािदिकर्या, 230 तत्सद्ावे तस्यानुपलम्भ, 272
चोदनाजिनत, 81, 85, 452 तथ्य, 181
चोदनाजिनता बुिद्ः, 443, 452, 453 तथ्यता, 181
चोदनावचनजिनतिवज्ञान, 243, 245 तदगर्हेऽगर्हात्, 201, 205, 207, 208
जनक, 214, 215, 289 तदभाविवषय, 245
जनकत्व, 126, 139, 169, 182, 289 तदवयवा धकरण, 201, 202, 204
जनकत्वाकारापर् कत्व, 136, 219 तदाकारयोिगत्वेन, 329
जनकत्वेन, 304, 431 तद्वकुम्भािदज्ञानेन अवगम्यते, 93
जन्यत्वेन, 304 तन्तु-तुरी-कारकोपिनपात, 456
जलचन्दर्ाकार्िद, 405 तमस्, 250
जाितदोष, 42 तादात्म्यतदुत्प त्, 43
ज्ञान, 226, 401 तादात्म्यिवपयार्स, 15
ज्ञानं बाध्यते, 71 तादात्म्यव्यव स्थत, 15, 22
ज्ञानकायतादात्म्यव्यव स्थतदेह, 171 तीवर्मन्दात्मता, 461
ज्ञानतादात्म्यव्यव स्थत, 330 ितर्रूपािल्ङ्तोऽथर् दृक्, 142, 154
ज्ञानपूवर्कत्वानुमान, 235 दशर् नाथार्प त्, 423
ज्ञानरूपता, 140, 184, 193, 194, 220, 386 दहनगर्हण, 338
ज्ञानसत्ामातर्ानुरोधेन, 187 दहनज्ञान, 58, 331, 338, 342, 351
ज्ञानस्य, 330, 349, 396--398 दहनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावज्ञान, 329
दहनाकारता, 334 िनरूपच रतकारणगर्हण, 281

दहनाकारयोिगत्व, 330, 331, 333 िनिवर् कल्पक, 161, 170, 238
िदक्, 292 िनिवर् कल्पकत्व, 147, 160, 161, 164, 169
दरू ावरणािदिनिमत्, 277 िनिवर् षय, 71, 77, 81, 82, 107, 355, 454
दृश्य, 210 िनिवर् षया, 104, 106, 247
दृश्यानुपल ब्ध, 368 िनसगर् दोषानुवेध, 451
दृष्ान्त, 168, 235, 402 नीलतद्ी, 206
दृष्ान्तदाष्ार् न्तक, 323 नीललोिहतघटािद, 252
देशकालस्वभाविवपर्कषर् , 264 नीलस्वलक्षण, 214, 406
देशभेदेनाऽगर्हण, 199 नेतर्धी, 173
देहप रमाण, 306 नैरात्म्य, 148, 226
दोष, 443 पक्षीकरण, 201, 202, 204, 205, 397
दर्व्यािदव्यवस्था, 39 परमाथर् सत्, 61
धमर् , 43, 86--88, 242 पररूपानुस्यूतता, 17
धमर् धिमर् न्याय, 96 परलोक, 192
धमार्न्तर, 292, 295, 426 परलोकिवज्ञानकल्पना, 237, 346
धमार्न्तरं, 290 परलोक , 192
धमीर्, 43, 86 परसत्ानुरोध, 184
धूमािवभार्वकत्व, 345 परसत्ानुरोधेन, 185, 187
धूमोत्पादन, 341, 345 परात्मा, 203, 204, 399--401
नयनाथर् सिन्कषर् , 51 परामशर् ज्ञान, 96, 294
नयनालोकमनस्कारािद, 214 पयार्यरूपता, 314
नयनालोकेश्वरािद, 286 पाखण्डखण्डना, 476
नर संह, 314 पाखण्डदपर् च्छिद, 476
नवकम्बलक, 441 पारमा थर् क, 148
ना लकेरद्ीपवा सन्, 266 िपशाच, 350, 354, 366
िनःसामान्यता, 15 िपशाचेश्वरतुल्यत्व, 266
िनगर्हस्थान, 445 पुण्यपाप, 475
िनत्य, 31, 213 पुरुष, 317, 449
िनत्यािनत्याकार, 279 पुरुष सिद्, 261
िनिमत्नैिम त्कभाव, 258 पुरुषान्तरस्मयर् माणकतृर्क, 448
िनिमत्भूतेन, 27, 167, 192, 345 पूवर्िवज्ञानानवधा रताथर् िवषया, 105
िनयतदेशकालिनयिमत, 200 पूवर्सहोत्पन्िवज्ञान, 230
िनयतदेशकालस्वभाव, 347 पूवार्परगर्हण, 283
िनयतात्मव्यपदेश, 301 पूवार्परभाव, 283, 351, 468
िनरव धका, 413 पूवार्परसहिवकल्प, 351
िनरुपच रतकारणगर्हण, 281 पूवार्परानेककायार्िवभार्वकत्व, 342
पूवोर्िदतानुभवावेिदताथार्कारिवषया, 105 पर्ामाण्य, 101, 103, 451, 457, 470

पौरुषेय, 443 बन्धन, 318
पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्था, 330, 331, 338 बाधक, 8
पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थानुपप त्, 220, 221 बाधा, 72, 443
पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थाहेतु, 122 बाधानुत्प त्, 8
पर्ितक्षणध्वं सन्, 465 बाधानुत्पाद, 8, 10
पर्ितपत्ृ, 9, 10 बाधारिहतत्व, 126, 453, 454
पर्ितिबम्बनाथर् , 3 बाधािवरह, 9
पर्ितषेधमुख, 268, 270 बाधोपप त्, 70
पर्तीित, 181, 237 बाध्यबाधकभाव, 68
पर्तीत्यारूढस्वलक्षणजन्यता, 157 बालप ण्डत, 2
पर्तीयमान, 60, 61, 64, 264, 361, 363, बाह्ाथर् िनराकरण, 166
462 बाह्ाथर् व्यव स्थित, 402
पर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता, 156 बाह्ाथार्पह्व, 391
पर्तीयमानाथार्जन्यत्व, 150 बुिद्, 249
पर्तीयमानासत्यता, 150 बुिद्जन्म, 239, 248
पर्तीयमानोपकारकाथर् , 245 बुिद्प रकल्पना, 249, 250
पर्त्यक्ष, 262, 354, 356 बुिद्स्वरूप, 249
पर्त्यक्षम्, 222, 242, 244, 247, 248 भाव, 312
पर्त्यक्षसाधन, 170--172 भावज्ञान, 62
पर्त्यक्षसाधनः कल्पनािवरहः, 171 भावव्यवस्था, 62
पर्त्यिभज्ञान, 79, 80, 120 िभन्िकर्याकतृर्त्व, 272
पर्त्यय, 37 िभन्हेतूत्पाद्त्व, 272, 279
पर्त्ययान्तरसाकल्य, 209, 210 िभन्ािभन्, 30, 306, 308
पर्धान, 261 भूजलािद, 257
पर्ध्वंस, 272 भूत, 237
पर्ध्वंसाभाव, 18, 19 भूतिवज्ञान, 237
पर्पञ्, 136 भेद, 212
पर्माण, 107, 118 भेदप रकल्पना, 309
पर्माणफलता, 104, 105 भेदेन व्यव स्थत, 172
पर्माणान्तरानवधा रताथर् िवषयत्व, 324 भोक्ृ, 259
पर्वृ त्, 73 भोक्ृत्व, 317, 318
पर्वृ त्रूपा, 73 भोक्ृत्वाकार, 322
पर्वृ त्सामथ्यर् , 6, 11, 39, 40, 239 भोक्तर्िवनाभूत, 319--321
पर् सद्पदपदाथर् सम्बन्धपूवर्क, 438 भोग, 321
पर्ागभाव, 18, 19 भोग्य, 319, 322
पर्ािप्रूपा, 73 भर्ान्तता, 137, 138
भर्ा न्त, 77, 136 रूपज्ञान, 394

मत्वथर् , 108, 110 रूपरूपता, 140, 167, 192, 237
मनोज्ञान, 175 रूपाकारता, 194
मनोिवज्ञान, 168, 236 लक्षण, 5
मरीिच, 55, 57, 94 लक्षणपर, 239
मरीिचचकर्ोत्क लत, 54 लक्षय, 458
मरीिचिनचय, 8, 52, 443 लङ्गर्हण, 294
महत्वािदधमोर्पेतत्व, 41 लङ्ाप्ोक्ाक्षबुिद्वत्, 443
मातुरुदरिनष्कर्मण, 235 लङ्ोपसजर् नत्व, 112, 113
मातर्ामाितर्कसम्बन्ध, 258 वन्ध्यासुत, 409
मान, 4 वणर् , 458, 459
मानमेयव्यवस्था, 462 वणर् कदम्बक, 459
मानमेयसंख्या, 132 वणर् समुदाय, 465
मानव्यवस्थान, 4 वणार्त्मा, 460
मानस, 172, 222 वस्तुभूतसामान्यिवषय, 355
िमथ्या, 443, 455 वस्तुसत्ा, 414
िमथ्याज्ञान, 14, 184 वस्तुस्वभाव, 216, 409
िमथ्यात्व, 41, 52, 55, 57, 64, 65, 69, विह्रूपता, 216
182, 186, 245, 455 वाक्य, 438, 441
मुखरूपता, 337 वाचकत्वेन गो, 436
मेयरूपता, 221 वा जिवषाण, 229
मेय स्थित, 4 वािद जष्णु, 476
मोक्षिचन्ता, 318 वािदन्, 253
मोक्षाभावपर्सङ्।, 324 वाहदोहपर्सवसामथ्यर् , 423
म्लेच्छ, 474 िवकल्पिवषय, 355
म्ले च्छतव्य, 475 िवक ल्पका, 169
यत्सिन्धाने, 145 िव च्छन्ोत्पन्, 409
यथाथर् त्व, 455 िवज्ञान, 244, 323, 344--346, 348, 354,
योिगज्ञान, 128, 189 359, 364
योिगपर्त्यक्ष, 46, 126, 165 िवज्ञानजनकत्व, 53, 174
रक्ताऽरक्ताकारौ, 375 िवज्ञानजन्याकारता, 236
रथतुरगिवषाण, 204 िवज्ञानतादात्म्य, 221
रागािदसंवेदन, 126, 151, 165, 183, 189 िवज्ञाननीलािदकायर् , 222
राजाज्ञा, 27, 62 िवज्ञानरूपता, 237, 341
रूप, 138 िवज्ञानरूपा, 73
रूपगृहीितस्वभाव, 394 िवज्ञानसङ्ात, 195
रूपगृहीितस्वभावक, 394 िवज्ञानसन्तानानुपप त्, 228, 230
िवज्ञानसमवाय, 300 वेदिवद्, 119

िवज्ञानस्वलक्षण, 169 वेदिवधातृ, 443
िवज्ञाना धकरणत्व, 53, 54 वेदशब्द, 449
िवज्ञानानन्दािद, 302 वेदसन्दोह, 449
िवज्ञानाभाव, 375 वेदस्य पर्ामाण्य, 443
िवज्ञानावभा सतता, 53, 54 वैक ल्पकं सामान्य, 359
िवतानिकर्यािवलोप, 454 व्यिक्, 123, 130, 132, 133
िवद्मानोप, 247 व्यञ्क, 461
िवद्मानोपलम्भनत्व, 242, 244 व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशय, 99, 100, 302--304,
िव धमुख, 268, 269 462, 463
िवनाश, 412 व्यिभचाराव्यिभचारद्ैिवध्य, 238
िवनाशहेतु, 408 व्यिभचा र, 14
िवनाशहेत्व, 409 व्यिभचा रता, 184, 185
िवपक्षगमन, 445 व्यवसायात्मक, 5, 85, 87--89, 91
िवपरीतख्याितत्व, 85 व्यवहार, 422
िवपयर् यज्ञान, 10, 127, 149, 250 व्यवहारिवरह, 108, 162, 255, 293
िवपर्मोष, 84, 85 व्यविहताथार्नुपल ब्ध लर् ङ्ः, 92
िवरोधाथर् , 272 व्यापाराभाव, 350
िवरोधाथर् ः, 273, 274, 278 व्यािप्स्मरण, 96, 262, 294
िववक्षापर्भव, 457 व्यावत्र्क, 24, 50
िववेक, 211 व्यावृत्ाकारा, 16
िवशेष, 448 व्यावृ त्भािगन्, 347
िवशेषणिवशेष्यभावलक्षण, 435 व्यावृत्ैकस्वभाव, 16
िवश्व, 286, 315 शब्दज्ञान, 150
िवषय, 138 शब्दिवज्ञान, 7
िवषयभेद, 132, 135 शब्दािदिवषयाकारता, 250
िवषयिवषियभावलक्षण, 435 शब्दानुयोजन, 173
िवषयाकार, 218, 224 शब्दाथर् योः, 436, 437
िवषयापहारलक्षणा, 71, 72 शरीरादेव, 347
िवषयाथर् ः, 60, 148 शर्ोतर्ािदकरण, 250
िवसंवािद, 127 शर्ोितर्य, 109
वृ त्ः, 251 षट्पदाथर् , 292
वृ त्िवकल्पदोष, 197 संज्ञा, 430, 431
वृ त्िवकल्पािददषू ण, 221 संज्ञासं ज्ञसम्बन्ध, 430
वृ त्सद्ाव, 253 संज्ञी, 430
वेद, 443 संयोग, 34, 38
वेदवाक्य, 438, 439, 442 संिवत्ी, 84
संवृितसत्, 382 सम्प्लवन्याय, 430

संवृितसत्व, 389, 390 सम्बद्, 304
संवेदन, 336 सम्बन्ध, 32--34, 38, 437
संसगर् , 148 सम्बन्धः, 436
संस्कार, 80, 262 सम्बन्धगर्हण, 249, 264
सङ्े त, 436 सम्बन्धजाितयुक्, 33
सङ्े िततशब्द, 436 सम्बन्धबुिद्, 266
सततोपल ब्धपर्सङ्, 255 सम्बन्धबुिद्िवशेष, 32
सततोपलम्भपर्सङ्, 233 सम्बन्धबुद्ध्युत्पादक, 32
सती, 70, 284, 351, 387, 389, 466 सम्बन्धाकार, 34
सत्ा, 290, 413, 415, 416 सम्बन्धावधारण, 263, 265, 328, 329, 416
सत्ाखण्डना, 270 सम्ब न्धगर्हण, 264
सत्ामातर्ेण, 41, 286, 297, 298, 300, 306, सम्भव, 435
329, 359, 431, 440, 441, 467 सम्यक्त्व, 187, 189
सत्ािवच्छे द, 271 सम्यग्ज्ञान, 14, 85, 184
सत्व, 312 सम्यग्ज्ञानरूपा, 250
सत्येतरिवज्ञान, 50 सवर् ज्ञ, 9, 10, 448
सत्सम्पर्योगजत्व, 244 सवर् पर्माणोत्पािदत, 244
सदसत्, 259, 279, 360, 363 सवर् भावस्वभाव, 315
सदृश, 28, 236 सवर् व्यवहारिवलोपपर्सङ्, 237
सन्तान सिद्ः, 237 सवेर् भावाः, 76, 347
सन्तानानुपप त्, 227, 232 सिवकल्पक, 164, 170, 238
स न्दग्ध, 443 सहचरसहच रतभाव, 258
सन्देहज्ञान, 86, 90 सहोत्पन्, 43, 233, 283, 284, 468
सन्देहरूपा, 250 सहोपलम्भ, 391, 395
सिन्कषर् , 40, 93 सांख्यसम्मत, 322
सिन्कषर् प रकल्पना, 240 सादृश्य, 27, 28, 427, 428
सप्तन्त्ववदात, 456 साधनिवकल, 168
सममुपलम्भाऽनुपलम्भौ, 255 साधुपदशब्द, 458
समवाय, 17, 31, 38 साधुशब्द, 474
समवायः, 31, 35, 300, 301 साध्यिवरुद्, 446
समवायज्ञािपका, 37 सामान्य, 17, 24, 25, 27--31
समवायवृ त्, 31 सामान्यप रज्ञिप्, 29
समवाियत्वेन, 304 सामान्ययोः, 263, 326, 328
समानजातीयत्व, 347 सामान्यिवशेषेषु, 29
समारोपव्यवच्छे द, 418, 419 सामान्यसंिव त्, 327
समुदाय, 459 सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः, 329
सामान्ये सद्साध्यता, 291, 326, 350 स्वलक्षणपर्ितभा सता, 156, 161

सारूप्य, 27, 211, 237 स्वलक्षणमेव, 356
साव धका, 413 स्वलक्षणयोः, 263, 328, 329
सद्साधन, 291, 293, 327 स्वलक्षणरूपता, 237, 386
सद्साध्यता, 319, 405 स्वलक्षणिवषय, 358
सुखदुःखोत्पादभोगरूपा, 73 स्वलक्षणिवषयत्व, 136, 138, 356, 358
सुखािद, 44 स्वलक्षणाजन्यत्व, 150
सुखािदकायर् , 302, 303, 306, 308, 309 स्वलक्षणापर्ितभा सता, 150
सुप् िवभक्त्यनुपप त्, 460, 462 स्विवषयपयर् वसाियन्यो िह बुद्यः, 65, 71
सूतर्, 458 स्विवषयपयर् वसायीिन, 271
स्थाियन्, 406 स्विवषयानन्तर, 168, 222
स्पष्ता, 156, 160, 161 स्विवषयानन्तरिवषयसहका र, 175
स्पष्ाकारता, 356 स्वसंवेद्त्वे सहोपलम्भ, 395
स्फोटरूप, 458, 469 स्वसत्ानुरोधेन, 184
स्मरणाकारता, 147, 429 स्वसत्ामातर्ानुरोध, 184
स्मरणाकारपर्ध्वंस, 83, 84 स्वस्वभावव्यव स्थत, 347

स्वहेतुसामथ्यर् , 175, 217
स्मृितत्व, 77, 78, 80--82
स्वांशिवषय, 355
स्मृितपर्मोष, 84
हेतु, 202
स्मृितरूपत्वेन, 145
हेतुफलभाव, 353--355, 366, 457, 468,
स्मृत्युत्पादक, 142, 145
469
स्मृत्युत्पाद्त्वेन, 147
हेतुफलभावानुपप त्, 232, 233, 333, 342
स्वकारणकलाप, 333
हेतुफलभावावधारण, 365, 366, 416
स्वकारणसत्ासम्बन्ध, 290
हेतुफलसम्बन्धावधारण, 281
स्वत्व, 24
हेत्वन्तर, 445
स्विनभार्स, 330
स्वभवनदेशकालस्वभावानपर् कत्व, 333
स्वभाव, 174, 223
स्वभाव-कायर् लङ्, 158
स्वभावपरभाव, 347
स्वभावानुमान, 416, 423
स्वयमुच्चायर् , 431
स्वरूपखण्डना, 269, 275
स्वरूपव्यावृ त्रूपा, 71, 72
स्वरूपापह्वरूपा, 71
स्वरूपा स्तत्व, 270, 271
स्वलक्षणजन्यता, 156
स्वलक्षणपुिष्, 256
तोपविसंहगतािन िवशेषनामािन
काणाद, 426
जयरािश, 453
तत्वोपप्लव संह,1,453
तथागत, 221
ताथागत, 115, 146, 312
िदगम्बर, 301
धवलक्कक, 453
नरपाल, 453
नैयाियक, 7, 26, 52, 61, 125, 189, 239, 250, 282, 292, 322, 409, 414,
बृहस्पित, 2, 183
बौद्, 188, 308, 396
िभक्षु, 169
मीमांसक, 96, 105, 101, 114, 228, 309, 311
लक्षणसार, 88
वेदिवद्, 114,
शर्ुितलालस, 99
शर्ोितर्य, 105
सांख्य, 239, 301
सुगत, 92
सूतर्कार, 301
सौगत, 127, 135, 174, 182, 187, 211, 227, 436
तोपविसंहगतािन अवतरणािन
अथातस्तत्वम् - धया च न सा
अथेर्न घटयत्येनाम् - न िकल अवयवी
अपशब्दोनुमानेन - न िकल िवज्ञानम्
अपर्त्यक्षोपलम्भस्य - नग् शर्मणक दबु र् ुद्े
अथर् पर्ितपत्यन्यथानुपपत्या - न िवकल्पानुबद्स्य (पर्माणवा.३.२८३)
अथोर्पयोगेऽिप पुनः - न ह्ाभ्यामथर् प र च्छद्
अवयिविनराकरणे - ना स्त घटसामान्यम्
अवयवे चलित - िनत्यस्य कर्मेतराभ्याम्
अिवनाभावसम्बन्धस्य - पररूपतयाऽसत्वम्
अिवसंवािदज्ञानम् (पर्माणवा. २.१) - परलोिकनोऽभावात्
आदशर् मण्डले मुखरूपताम् - पृ थव्यापस्तेजोवायु रित
इदानीन्तनम स्तत्वम् (श्लोकवा. सू. श्लोक.२३४.) - पर्त्यक्षसाधन एव

इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषोर्त्पन्म् (न्यायसू.१.१.४) - पर्त्यक्षे कल्पनापोढम् (न्यायिब.१.४)
एकतर् दृष्ो भेदो िह (पर्माणवा.३.१२६) - पर्त्यक्षे कल्पनापोढम्
एकिपण्डगर्हणकाले - पर्त्यक्षेण क्षिणकत्वम्
एक स्मन्वयवे आवृते - बहनां संघातशब्दवाच्यत्वम्
एकोपलम्भसामथ्यार्त् - बुद्ध्युपस्थािपता संज्ञा
एको भावः सवर् भावस्वभावः - भागे संहो नरो भागे
कथं स्युिवर् िवधाकाराः - भर्ा न्तरप्यथर् सम्बन्धतः पर्मा
कत्ार् न भवित - मातुरुदरिनःकर्मणानन्तरम्
कल्पनापोढं पर्त्यक्षम् - यः पर्ागजनको बुद्ेः
िकं सवार्वयवगर्हणेन - यतर् च दष्ु ं करणम् (शाबरभाष्य १.१.५)
क्षीणदोषोऽनृतं वाक्यम् - यतर् िभन् न तद्ुिद्ः
क्षीरोदकवद् िववेकेन - यत्सिन्धाने
गुणानां परमं रूपम् - वाचकत्वेन गो.
गोगवयसादृश्यम् - िवद्मानोप.
गर्ावाणः प्लवन्ते आिदत्यो - िवनाशहेत्व
चतुभ्यर् श्चत्चैत्ा भव न्त - िववक्षापर्भवाः
चोदना जिनता बुिद्ः (श्लोकवा.सू.श्लोक.१८४) - िवशेषे अनुगमा.
तत्पूवर्कमनुमानम् (न्यायसू.१.१.५) - वेदस्य पर्ामाण्यम्
तत्समुदाये - वैक ल्पकं सामान्यम्
तदतदर्ूिपणो भावाः (पर्माणवा.३.२५१) - शरीरादेव
तदेव िनत्यं तदेव - सत्संपर्योगे (जैिम.१.१.४)
तमो मोहो महामोहः - सवेर् भावाः
तस्य व्यञ्कानां क्षिणकत्वात् - सामान्यिवशेषेषु (वैशे.८.१.५)
दृश्यिवकल्प्यादथार्वेक कृत्य - सामान्ये सद्
देशभेदेनाऽगर्हणात् - स्वयमुच्चायर्
दोषाः स न्त न सन्तीित (तत्वसं.का.२८९५) - स्वलक्षणमेव
धमेर् पर्त्यिनिमत्ं पर्त्यक्षम् - स्वलक्षणिवषया.
स्विवषयानन्तर

Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśibha A

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Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśibha A

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जयरािशभट्िवरिचतः

Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan

Published with the ﬁnancial assistance of Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan,

General Editor : Dilip Kumar Rana, Director

No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, or by any means,

First Edition: February 2013, 500 copies

In Shri Guru Smṛti

their epistemology with diﬀerent arguments in a Vaitaṇḍika style. One

Dilip Kumar Rana

The Tattvopaplavasiṁha is the work written in the style of vitaṇḍā.

sva-pratipakṣa-sthāpanahīno vitaṇḍā (Nyāyasūtra 1.2.3) ‘A discourse

1. jāti (universal or generic property)

Jayarāśi has very cleaverly discussed and refuted these concepts. It is

produced by the sense organ does not override i.e. remains as it is

water, there is no contradiction arising at that time. But, when

is seen that there arises opposite knowledge, such as knowledge of

the association with the result and result is garland of ﬂowers,

[२. पर्सङ्ात् जातेिनर् राकरणम्।]

tadyadi tādātmyavyavasthitāḥ tadā iha tāsāṁ nānātvena tasyāpi

(1) Is it a mutual absence (2) Or a pre-absence (3) Or a destruction

tadyadyudakākāratayā vyāvarttate, tadā anyāsāmudakavyaktīnām

universal also a causal factor? Or, do the causal factors reveal

म्भूतसामान्यज्ञानोत्पादनाय, अलं सामान्यकल्पनया। अथ कमर् तापन्ेन उत्पाद्ते;

[३. पर्सङ्ात् समवायस्य िनरसनम्।]

atha sambandhabuddhyavaseyaḥ sambandho’bhidhīyate; tadā kaule-

of inherence. This is a thread, this is cloth, and here is the

of content which does not exist. (a) Is it content because it oﬀers

yadi ca avyabhicārādayo dharmā arthāntarabhūtāḥ abhyupaga-

(i) is it because of the existence which is involved in production of

jñānamajñānākārāt jñānātmatayā vyāvarttate jñānāntarāttu

appeared in the perception of water in the mirage, still, there is

keśoṇḍukasyaivālambanatvaṁ pratīyamānatvaṁ ca tathā udaka-

of water goes towards the mirage. If it is so, then in this way it

[६. पुनः पर्कारान्तरेण अव्यिभचा रपदस्यापाकरणम्।]

there is uncertainty, there will absence of settlement of absence also

kamanudakaṁ vā. tathā asatyodakajñāne’satyodakaṁ pratibhāti na

positive or negative entity. A human being’s activity is prompted

atha dehasambandhajaṁ na karoti; tadā candrārkagrahanakṣatrādau

because the ﬁrst knowledge also is equally the revealer of water

form of knowledge of a blue thing, is not distinguished from many

knowledge has arisen as the revealer of the form of water, prompted

produced by the contact between the sense organ and object? Or

atha apūrvārthaviṣayagṛ(rthagṛ)hītitvaṁ smṛtipramoṣa ucyate;

[९. व्यवसायात्मकपदस्य समालोचनम्।]

question is, in that doubtful knowledge whether something appears

atha dharmaḥ pratibhāti; sa sthāṇutvalakṣaṇaḥ puruṣatvalakṣaṇaḥ,

a[tha na kiṁ]cidapi pratibhāti; na tarhi tasya indriyārthasanni-

[१०. अव्यपदेश्यपदस्यासाधुत्वे लक्षणसारगर्न्थस्योल्ेखः।]

[११. इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषोर्त्पन्पदस्य समीक्षा।]

and object known on the basis of not arising of the knowledge of a

atha tadbhavakumbhādijñānena avagamyate; tadayuktam; tadana-

atha kāryātmatayā gamayati tadapyayuktam; upamānānumānajñā-

[१२. इ न्दर्यजन्यत्वस्य पर्त्यक्षेऽसम्भवपर्कटनम्।]

[१३. अथर् स्यािप पर्त्यक्षजनकत्वखण्डनम्।]

because both share the characteristics of being the revealer of some

atha nirviṣayā iṣyate; tadā na gṛhītārthagrāhitvena smṛteraprā-

समानकालीनता(लीना) स्तत्वं वा, लङ्ोपसजर् नत्वं वा, अिग्व्यिक्पारतन्त्यं वा

yadi pūrvopalabdham; tadviṣayatve’numānasya nā’nadhigatārtha-

atha agnivyaktipāratantryamanumīyate dhūmena agnitvasāmānya-

[१. गोत्वािदपर्ितपादकत्वेन गोशब्दादीनामपर्ामाण्योद्ाटनम्।]

which is already known and if the word cow become inauthentic

[३. पर्त्यिभज्ञानपर्ामाण्यखण्डनस्य सूचनम्।]