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Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśibha A
Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśibha A
तोपविसंहः
आङ्ग्लानुवादः
वी. एन. ् झा
Chinmaya Research Series: 6
Tattvopaplavasiṁha
of
Jayarāśibhaṭṭa
English Translation
by
V N Jha
c Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan
Benediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
0.1 गर्न्थकरणपर्ितज्ञा . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0.2 न्यायसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
0.3 मीमांसकसम्मतस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
0.4 ताथागतसम्मतस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
0.5 सौगतसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
0.6 मीमांसकािभमतस्य पर्त्यक्षस्य िनरासः . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
0.7 सांख्यसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य िनरसनम्। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
0.8 नैयाियकािभमतस्यानुमानस्य िनरसनम् . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
0.9 आत्मानुमानस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
0.10 ताथागतसम्मतस्यानुमानस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
0.11 ष ड्वधाथार्प त्पर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
0.12 उपमानपर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
0.13 अभावपर्माणस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
0.14 सम्भवैितह्पर्माणयोिनर् रासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
0.15 शब्दपर्ामाण्यस्य िनरासः। . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
0.16 गर्न्थोपसंहारः . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
पदसूची . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
तत्वोपप्लव संहगतािन िवशेषनामािन . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
तत्वोपप्लव संहगतािन अवतरणािन . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Benediction
The Tattvopaplavasiṁha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is a rare work on
skepticism of Indian thought of eighth century A.D. The author has
boldly criticized the means of valid knowledge stated by the various
systems of Indian philosophy, i.e. Cārvāka, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṁsā,
Vedānta, Buddhist and Jain respectively by declaring the obliteration
of all the principles. Although the tradition links it with the Cārvāka
systems of thought, its study leads a reader towards a skeptical
critique of all major systems of Indian philosophy. It is indeed a
unique work depicting Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa as a great dialectician. Also the
study of the text helps us understand the Pūrvapakṣa for without the
understanding and negation of the Pūrvapakṣa, the Siddhānta cannot
be truly established.
Prof. V. N. Jha, a renowned scholar of Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and
Vyākaraṇa has translated the text into lucid English on the basis of
Bauddhabhārati, Varanasi edition, 1987. The present book consists of
an introduction, detailed analysis, and English translation. All these
will be useful to readers. I hope that the publication of the text will
stimulate further discussion and research. I am extremely happy that
the Chinmaya International Foundation Shodha Sansthan has brought
out such a text on the system of Indian thought for future generations
of scholars to edit and translate the text.
We are very grateful to Prof. V.N Jha for his unstinted support for
all the research activities at Chinmaya International Foundation and
its Shodha Sansthan. May God’s grace and Pujya Gurudev’s blessings
be ever with him.
V N Jha
Introduction
and refutes their theories. He equally finds it difficult to agree with the
language philosopher, Bhartṛhari and ultimately refutes him also.
This simply shows the versatile scholarship of Jayarāsi. He
demonstrates equal command on all the systems of Indian Philosophy.
Ultimately he demonstrates that no doctrine is logically tenable with
regard to concept of pramāṇa (the process of knowing) and prameya
(object of a true cognition). What is considered to be Truth can
never be established through any definition. Therefore, there is nothing
called Truth (tattva) or real as proposed by philosophers of various
systems. He takes a pride even in saying that he has excelled even
Bṛhaspati, the great teacher of the Cārvāka school of thought so far the
creation of doubts is concerned. The Cārvākas seem to have accepted
only one pramāṇa called perception and the four mahābhūtas namely,
earth, water, fire, and wind. Jayarāsi demolishes this position also.
Thus, although one may get an impression initially that Jayarāśi is
the follower of the Cārvāka school, one will be disillusioned once one
completes the reading of the text carefully. This justifies the name of the
text as Tattvopaplavasiṁha (Lion who ransacks all the believed forms
of Truth of any system of thought). He says at the end of this work
that something appears to be true only as long as it is not critically
examined. In his words :
tad evam upapluteṣu eva tattveṣu avicaritaramaṇīyaḥ sarve vyavahā-
raghaṭanta eva. tathā
pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍanābhijña jñānodadhi-vivardhitaḥ,
Jayaraśerjayantīha vikalpavādijiṣnavaḥ.
Application of the Form
This text provides training as how to frame questions in such a way
with a number of alternatives (vikalpa) that it becomes difficult for
the opponents to take a particular position. Gautama mentions three
types of discourse (kathā) in his Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1. They are vāda, jalpa
and vitaṇḍā. Vāda is a form of a discourse which aims at discovering
the truth. Jalpa is that dialogue which involves twisting arguments.
Vitaṇḍā, on the other hand, is the form of discourse where the
proponent is interested only in showing how the opponents’ stand is not
tenable and hence wrong without, however, providing any alternative
view-point. Gautama defines it as follows :
xii
9. kalpanā (imagination)
10. aspaṣṭatā (haziness)
11. santana (series)
12. hetu-phalabhāva (cause-and-effect relationship)
13. ātman (self)
14. kaivalya (pure state without attributes)
15. anekānta (multi-dimentional perspectives)
16. avayavin (whole)
17. bāhyārtha-vilopa (denial of external world)
18. kṣaṇabhaṅga (refutation of the theory of series)
19. nirhetukavināśa (destruction without cause)
20. varṇa (phoneme)
21. pada (morpheme)
22. sphoṭa (conceptual form)
23. apauruṣeyatva ( non-human agency)
जैिम. - जैिमनीयसूतर्ािण
तत्वसं. का. - तत्वसङ्गर्हका रका
न्यायिब. - न्यायिबन्दःु
न्यायसू. - न्यायसूतर्ािण
पर्माणवा. - पर्माणवाितर् कम्
वैशे. - वैशेिषकसूतर्ािण
शाबरभा. - शाबरभाष्यम्
श्लोकवा. - श्लोकवाितर् कम्
सन्मित. - सन्मिततकर्ः
Tattvopaplavasiṁha of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa
भट्शर्ीजयरािशपर्णीतः तत्वोपप्लव संहः
(Bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśipraṇītaḥ Tattvopaplavasiṁhaḥ)
Text with English Translation
0.1 गर्न्थकरणपर्ितज्ञा
Granthakaraṇapratijñā
(Introducing the Text)
Text: 1
1. ............तां यात मुन.........
..........tāṁ yāta muna.........
Translation: 1
...tāṁ yāta muna .....(The line is broken, it does not make any
sense.)
Text: 2
2. [त]त्वोपप्लव संह एष िवषमो नूनं मया [सृज्यते]..........
[ta]ttvopaplavasiṁha eṣa viṣamo nūnaṁ mayā [sṛjyate]..........
Translation: 2
This text called (Ta)ttvopaplavasiṁha which is unique, not similar
i.e. extra-ordinary, peculiar is (being composed) by me indeed. …
Text: 3
ना स्त तत्फलं वा स्वगार्िद।
nāsti tatphalaṁ vā svargādi.
Translation: 3
Or there is no result of that (good, or, bad act) viz. heaven etc.
(hell)1
1 The Cārvākas do not accept either merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa) produced by
good act, or, bad act respectively nor heaven and hell produced by merit and demerit
respectively.
2 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 4
सत्यं, तावदा(दे)तस्य कमर् णः स भा..........
satyaṁ, tāvadā(de)tasya karmaṇaḥ sa bhā..........
Translation: 4
It is true but by that, of this act …………
(the sentence is broken and hence does not make full sense).
Text: 5
उक्ं च परमाथर् िविद्रिप-
uktaṁ ca paramārthavidbhirapi-
Translation: 5
Even those who know the Ultimate Reality have said the following:
Text: 6
“लौिकको मागोर्ऽनुसत्र्व्यः अ[ित?] .....। लोकव्यवहारं पर्ित सदृशौ बालप ण्डतौ॥”
इत्यािद।
“laukiko mārgo’nusarttavyaḥ a[ti?]............ lokavyavahāraṁ prati
sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau.” ityādi.
Translation: 6
“One should follow the mundane, or, ordinary path ………….. (a part
of the verse is missing). With reference to the mundane behavior,
or, inter-action both, a child and a wise man, are alike.” etc.
[2. बृहस्पतेस्तत्वचतुष्कोक्ेरिप तत्वोपप्लवपरत्वम्।]
[2. bṛhaspatestattvacatuṣkokterapi tattvopaplavaparatvam.]
Text: 7
ननु यद्ुपप्लवस्तत्वानां िकमाया....
nanu yadyupaplavastattvānāṁ kimāyā....
Translation: 7
Well, if realities are unsettled i.e. are not as they are presented by
different philosophers …… (again, the sentence is broken).
Text: 8
“अथातस्तत्वं व्याख्यास्यामः”
“athātastattvaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ”
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 3
Translation: 8
Question:
“Now, we shall explain the reality.”
Text: 9
"पृ थव्यप्ेजोवायु रित तत्वािन तत्समुदाये शरीरे न्दर्यिवषये संज्ञा"[ ] इत्यािद
“pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣaye
samjñā”[ ] ityādi
Translation: 9
“Earth, water, fire and air are the real entities. The compositions
made out of them are called body, sense organ and object.” Are
these real entities?2
Text: 10
न, अन्याथर् त्वात्।
na, anyārthatvāt.
Translation: 10
Answer:
No, because they are made for something else.
Text: 11
िकमथर् म्?
kimartham?
Translation: 11
Question:
For what?
Text: 12
पर्ितिबम्बनाथर् म्।
pratibimbanārtham.
Translation: 12
Answer:
For reflection.
2 Thislist refers to only the material aspect of the world. The Cārvākas do not want to
go beyond that. Even time and space are not acceptable because these are not perceived.
What to talk of self and mind?
4 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 13
िकं पुनरतर् पर्ितिबम्ब्यते?
kiṁ punaratra pratibimbyate?
Translation: 13
Question:
What is to be reflected upon here?
Text: 14
पृ थव्यादीिन तत्वािन लोके पर् सद्ािन, तान्यिप िवचायर् माणािन न व्यवितष्न्ते िकं
पुनरन्यािन?
pṛthivyādīni tattvāni loke prasiddhāni, tānyapi vicāryamāṇāni na
vyavatiṣṭhante kiṁ punaranyāni?
Translation: 14
Answer:
The entities such as earth etc. are well known in the mundane world.
When we enquire deep into them, even they are cannot be properly
characterized. What to talk of other entities?
Text: 15
अथ कथं तािन न स न्त?
atha kathaṁ tāni na santi?
Translation: 15
Question:
How do you say that (they cannot be characterized and hence) they
do no exist?3
Text: 16
तदच्ु यते-सल्क्षणिनबन्धनं मानव्यवस्थानम्, मानिनबन्धना च मेय स्थितः, तदभावे तयोः
सद्व्यवहारिवषयत्वं कथं [स्वयमेव]..... ताम्।
taducyate-sallakṣaṇanibandhanaṁ mānavyavasthānam, mānaniba-
ndhanā ca meyasthitiḥ, tadabhāve tayoḥ sadvyavahāraviṣayatvaṁ
kathaṁ [svayameva]..... tām.
3 Ifthe world has an existence, it has to exist independent of its knowledge. Knowledge
merely reveals the world. It is said jñānādhīna vastusattā ‘the existence of an entity
is revealed by its true knowledge, or, mānādhīna meya-siddhiḥ ‘the knowable is to be
established by its knowledge.’ But that knowledge has to be a true knowledge. But how
to determine that a knowledge is true or false? The Cārvākas hold that it cannot be.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 5
Translation: 16
Answer:
Here is our answer. (You will agree that) settlement i.e. existence
of a proof (knowledge) is based on its proper definition. And the
existence of ‘what is to be proved’ (object of knowledge) depends
upon the proof (knowledge). In the absence of that (the proof),
how can (by itself ) both, (proof and what is to be proved), be the
objects of real reference…
Text: 17
अथ.... न ब..... व्यवहारः िकर्यते; तदात्मिन रूपा स्तत्वव्यवहारो घटादौ च
सुखा स्तत्वव्यवहारः पर्वत्र्ियतव्यः।
atha.... na ba..... vyavahāraḥ kriyate; tadātmani rūpāstitvavya-
vahāro ghaṭādau ca sukhāstitvavyavahāraḥ pravarttayitavyaḥ.
Translation: 17
Reference is made (the sentence is broken); at that time one should
make reference to the existence of form in the self and reference of
existence of happiness in pot etc.
0.2 न्यायसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य परीक्षा
[1. nyāyasammatasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā]
Refutation of the definition of perception as accepted by Nyāya
Text: 18
`[इ] न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषोर्त्पन्ं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यिभचा रव्यवसायात्मकं पर्त्यक्षम्" (न्यायसू.
१।१।४) इित तल्क्षणम्।
[१. अदष्ु कारकेत्यािदिवकल्पचतुष्येन अव्यिभचा रपदस्य दषू णोपकर्मः।]
“[i]ndriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri-
vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam” (Nyāyasū.1.1.4) iti tallakṣaṇam.
[1. aduṣṭakāraketyādivikalpacatuṣṭayena avyabhicāripadasya dūṣa-
ṇopakramaḥ.]
Translation: 18
The definition of perceptual knowledge as given by Nyāya Sūtra
1.1.4 is “a perceptual knowledge is that which is produced by the
contact between the sense organ and its object and which is not
verbalized, which is not erroneous, and which is determinate in
nature.”
6 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 19
तच्चाव्यिभचा[ र]....... िकमदष्ु कारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्त्वेन, आहो स्वद् बाधारिहतत्वेन,
पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न, अन्यथा वा?
taccāvyabhicā[ri]..... kimaduṣṭakārakasandohotpādyatvena, āhosvid
bādhārahitatvena, pravṛttisāmarthyena, anyathā vā?
Translation: 19
Here we would like to know such knowledge is called “not
erroneous”, is it because (a) it is produced by a number of factors
free from defects? Or, (b) because it is free from contradiction? Or,
(c) because it leads to fruitful interaction with the world? Or, (d)
because of anything else?
Text: 20
तद्द्दष्ु कारकसन्दोहोत्पाद्त्वेन अव्यिभचा रत्वम्; सैव कारणानामदष्ु ता केनावगम्यते?
tadyadyaduṣṭakārakasandohotpādyatvena avyabhicāritvam; saiva
kāraṇānāmaduṣṭatā kenāvagamyate?
Translation: 20
There, if you say that such knowledge is not erroneous because it is
produced by a set of factors which are free from defects, we would
like to ask how do you know that those factors are free from defects?
Text: 21
न पर्त्यक्षेण; नयनकुशलादेरती न्दर्यत्वात्।
na pratyakṣeṇa; nayanakuśalāderatīndriyatvāt.
Translation: 21
You cannot say you know it by perception because the defects (say
foreign particles) in the eyes are beyond the range of sense organ.
Text: 22
नाप्यनुमानेन; लङ्ान्तराऽनवगतेः।
nāpyanumānena; liṅgāntarā’navagateḥ.
Translation: 22
Nor can that be known by inference because, no other ground is
known.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 7
Text: 23
ननु इदमेव ज्ञानं लङ्ं तदत्ु थं तस्य िविशष्तां गमयित;
nanu idameva jñānaṁ liṅgaṁ tadutthaṁ tasya viśiṣṭatāṁ gamayati;
Translation: 23
Well the same perceptual knowledge will be the ground and that
will cause the knowledge of its being special i.e. free from defects.
Text: 24
यद्ेविमतरेतराशर्यत्वं दरु
ु त्रमापनीपद्ते।
yadyevamitaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpanīpadyate.
Translation: 24
Answer:
If it is so, it leads to the unavoidable defect of mutual dependency.4
(1) A true perceptual cognition has to be produced by the contact
between a sense organ and the object.
(2) It should not be erroneous.
(3) It should not be caused by the decoding process of language
(avyapadeśya), and
(4) It should be a determinate cognition, and not a doubtful
cognition.
Jayarāśi is going to challenge all these criteria and ultimately he
is going to demonstrate that they do not characterize any true
cognition.
Text: 25
िकञ्, इ न्दर्याणां गुणदोषाशर्यत्वे तदत्ु थे िवज्ञाने दोषाशङ् का नाितवत्र्ते पुव्ं यापारो-
त्पािदतशब्दिवज्ञान इव।
kiñca, indriyāṇāṁ guṇadoṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśaṅkā
nātivarttate puṁvyāpārotpāditaśabdavijñāna iva.
Translation: 25
Moreover, if the sense organs are accepted as loci of healthiness
and defects then, the doubt regarding the defects in the knowledge
4 TheNaiyāyikas provide criteria to decide what can be called a true perceptual cognition.
The criteria are:
8 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 31
भवन्तु नाम सवेर् सवर् ज्ञाः। को दोषः?
bhavantu nāma sarve sarvajñāḥ. ko doṣaḥ?
Translation: 31
Question:
Let everybody become all-knowing. What is the harm?
Text: 32
असवर् ज्ञव्यवहाराभावपर्सङ्ः।
asarvajñavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 32
Answer:
In that case we cannot make reference to someone as “not
all-knowing”.
Text: 33
अथ पर्ितपत्तर्पेक्षया बाधानुत्पादः-पर्ितपत्ुबार्धकं िवज्ञानं नोत्पद्ते तेन तदव्यिभचा र;
atha pratipattrapekṣayā bādhānutpādaḥ-pratipatturbādhakaṁ vijñā-
naṁ notpadyate tena tadavyabhicāri;
Translation: 33
Question:
If you say that not arising of contradiction is only with that
person who is perceiving, and therefore since the contradictory
knowledge does not arise, and therefore the perceptual knowledge
is not erroneous.
Text: 34
तदयुक्म्; पर्ितपत्ुबार्धकज्ञानाऽनुत्पादेऽिप देशान्तरगमन-मरणािदना मिणमरीच्यािद-
िवपयर् यज्ञानदशर् नात्।
tadayuktam; pratipatturbādhakajñānā’nutpāde’pi deśāntaragamana-
maraṇādinā maṇimarīcyādiviparyayajñānadarśanāt.
Translation: 34
Answer:
This is also not proper. Because, even if there does not arise the
contradictory knowledge to the perceiver, even to that person it
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 11
Translation: 39
Question:
If you say that if water is obtained after the knowledge of water, it
is concluded that the knowledge of water which arose before, is not
erroneous. There we would like to ask, is it so because one gets the
water which was revealed in the knowledge? Or, because one gets
water of that genre. Or, because one gets water of the same family?
Text: 40
तद्िद पर्ितभातोदकपर्ाप्त्या; तदयुक्म्; पर्ितभातोदकस्य अवस्थानं नोपपद्ते, झष-
मिहषप रवतर् नाऽिभघातोपजाताऽवयविकर्यान्यायेन पर्त्यस्तमयसम्भवात्।
tadyadi pratibhātodakaprāptyā; tadayuktam; pratibhātodakasya ava-
sthānaṁ nopapadyate, jhaṣamahiṣaparivartanā’bhighātopajātā’va-
yavakriyānyāyena pratyastamayasambhavāt.
Translation: 40
Anticipated Clarification:
If you say that because one gets knowledge which was reflected
in the perception, it is not proper. Because what appeared in the
knowledge, does not exist there. Because it is possible that the
water has become extinct through the action in the parts caused by
striking of water, by the changing movements of fish, buffalo etc.
Text: 41
अथ तज्जातीयोदकपर्ाप्त्या, एवं तिहर् असत्योदकज्ञानेऽिप जाते क्विचत्ोयमासादय न्त
पुमांसः तदप्यिवतथं स्यात्।
atha tajjātīyodakaprāptyā, evaṁ tarhi asatyodakajñāne’pi jāte kvacit
toyamāsādayanti pumāṁsaḥ tadapyavitathaṁ syāt.
Translation: 41
Again, if you say that the knowledge of water has led to the getting
of water belonging to the class of water which was revealed in
the knowledge of water (therefore the knowledge of water is not
erroneous), then sometimes even if an erroneous knowledge of water
arises people get a water in that case that erroneous knowledge will
also have to be declared as a true cognition.
14 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 42
अथ तद्ेशकालसंलग्मुदकं न पर्ापयित िमथ्याज्ञानम्, सम्यग्ज्ञानं तु तद्ेशकालसंलग्मुदकं
पर्ापयित तेन तदव्यिभचारीित चेत्;
atha taddeśakālasaṁlagnamudakaṁ na prāpayati mithyājñānam,
samyagjñānaṁ tu taddeśakālasaṁlagnamudakaṁ prāpayati tena
tadavyabhicārīti cet;
Translation: 42
Clarification:
Well, the erroneous knowledge of water does not lead to getting the
water connected with a particular space and particular time. But,
a true cognition of water does lead to getting the water connected
with a particular space and time and therefore such a true cognition
is called not erroneous.
Text: 43
यन् पर्ापयित तद् व्यिभचा र तिहर् मुमूषर् ुपदाथोर्त्पािदतं ज्ञानं चन्दर्ाकर्गर्हनक्षतर्तारकािद-
संवेदनं च व्यिभचा र पर्ाप्नोित।
yanna prāpayati tad vyabhicāri tarhi mumūrṣupadārthotpāditaṁ
jñānaṁ candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādisaṁvedanaṁ ca vyabhicāri
prāpnoti.
Translation: 43
Reply:
Then it implies that, that knowledge which does not lead to getting
the object revealed by it is an erroneous knowledge. In that case,
knowledge which is caused by some thing which is about to die or
vanish and also the knowledge of moon, sun, planet, constellations
and stars etc. will have to be declared as erroneous (because such
knowledges do not lead to getting the objects revealed by the
respective knowledges).
Text: 44
न च तद्ेशकालसंलग्ोदकपर्ापकत्वम स्त, देशस्यािप उदकविद्नाशसम्भवात्।
na ca taddeśakālasaṁlagnodakaprāpakatvamasti, deśasyāpi udaka-
vadvināśasambhavāt.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 15
Translation: 44
(Moreover), it is also not true that what you consider to be a true
cognition, leads to getting the water connected with a particular
space and particular time, because as water is likely to be destroyed
the place also is also likely to be destroyed.
with its self or (b) is it of one of the same consecutive form identical
with the form of something else.
Text: 52
तद्द्ात्मरूपानुस्यूता, तदयुक्म्; आत्मन्यनुगमाऽभावात्।
tadyadyātmarūpānusyūtā, tadayuktam; ātmanyanugamā’bhāvāt.
Translation: 52
If you say it is of one of the same form identical with its self, it is
not proper because there is no question of consecutiveness in one
and the same thing.
Text: 53
अथ पररूपानुस्यूता; केयं पररूपानुस्यूतता-िकं तत्ादात्म्यम्, तत्समवायो वा?
atha pararūpānusyūtā; keyaṁ pararūpānusyūtatā-kiṁ tattādāt-
myam, tatsamavāyo vā?
Translation: 53
And if you say it is of one of the same consecutive form identical
with the form of something else, then we would like to know what
is that: is it of one of the same consecutive form identical with the
form of something else: (1) Does it mean identity with that? Or (2)
does it mean inherence with that?
Text: 54
तद्िद तादात्म्यम्; सामान्यतद्तोरभेदपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi tādātmyam; sāmānyatadvatorabhedaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 54
If you say it is identity with that, then there arises the contingency
of universal becoming identical with that which possesses universal,
that is particular.
Text: 55
अथ पररूपसमवायः अनुस्यूताकारता; तदयुक्म्; सामान्यािद्न्ः समवायः। सामान्यस्य
अनुगतं रूपमालोचियतुमारब्धं न ततोऽन्यस्य।
atha pararūpasamavāyaḥ anusyūtākāratā; tadayuktam; sāmānyād-
bhinnaḥ samavāyaḥ. sāmānyasya anugataṁ rūpamālocayitumārab-
dhaṁ na tato’nyasya.
18 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 55
If you say it is inherence with other form, is what is called the form
of being known as of one and the same form in the consecutive
cognitions, that is not proper, because (for you) inherence is
different from universal. We have initiated the discussion on the
form of consecutive character of universal and not of anything else.
Text: 56
यिद च उदकजातीयाथर् पर्ाप्त्याऽव्यिभचा रता पूवोर्िदतोदकिवज्ञानस्य व्यवस्थाप्यते;
तदा उदकजातेगर्वादाविप सम्भवोऽ स्त गवािदपर्ाप्त्याऽव्यिभच(चा) रता उदकिवज्ञानस्य
स्यात्।
yadi ca udakajātīyārthaprāptyā’vyabhicāritā pūrvoditodakavijñā-
nasya vyavasthāpyate; tadā udakajātergavādāvapi sambhavo’sti
gavādi prāptyā’vyabhica(cā)ritā udakavijñānasya syāt.
Translation: 56
If you say that the knowledge of water is not erroneous because
it leads to the obtainment of something similar to water, then the
universal of water i.e. waterness can be found also in cow etc. and
so even if one gets cow after getting the knowledge of water, the
knowledge of water can be said to be not erroneous.
Text: 57
अथ उदकत्वस्य गवादावभाव इित चेत्;
atha udakatvasya gavādāvabhāva iti cet;
Translation: 57
Clarification:
Well, there is no waterness in cow etc.
Text: 58
िकम् इतरेतराभावः, पर्ागभावः, पर्ध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावो वा?
kim itaretarābhāvaḥ, prāgabhāvaḥ, pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ, atyantā-
bhāvo vā?
Translation: 58
Reply:
Here we would like to know what kind of absence is here in the cow.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 19
Text: 63
नैकतर् पर्त्यस्तिमतस्य अन्यतर् सम्भव उपपद्ते।
naikatra pratyastamitasya anyatra sambhava upapadyate.
Translation: 63
Reply:
It cannot be so because if something is destroyed in one place this
destruction can be possible elsewhere also.
Text: 64
अथ अत्यन्ताभावः; तदा उदकेऽिप तस्याऽभावपर्सङ्ः।
atha atyantābhāvaḥ; tadā udake’pi tasyā’bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 64
Again if you say that there is absolute absence of waterness in the
cow, then there will arise the contingency of its absence being in
water also.
Text: 65
अथ सम्बन्धाभावाद् गवादावुदकत्वाभाव इित चेत्;
atha sambandhābhāvād gavādāvudakatvābhāva iti cet;
Translation: 65
Clarification:
We say that there is no waterness in cow, because there is no relation
of waterness in the cow.
Text: 66
ततर्ािप िकम् इतरेतराभावः, पर्ध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावो वेित पूवर्वद् वक्व्यम्।
tatrāpi kim itaretarābhāvaḥ, pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ, atyantābhāvo veti
pūrvavad vaktavyam.
Translation: 66
Reply:
There also the same questions arise as before: (1) Is it the case that
there is mutual absence of relationship and the cow? (2) Or there
is destruction? (3) Or there is absolute absence? And one should
satisfactorily answer them.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 21
Text: 67
िनिमत्ान्तराभावाद् गवादाव(वु)दकत्वाभाव इित चेत्;
nimittāntarābhāvād gavādāva(vu)dakatvābhāva iti cet;
Translation: 67
Clarification:
Since there is absence of any other ground, there is absence of
waterness in the cow.
Text: 68
सोऽतर्ािप समानः।
so’trāpi samānaḥ.
Translation: 68
Reply:
That is common here also.
Text: 69
न च उदकव्यक् नां नानात्वमुपपादियतुं पायर् ते। उदकम् अनुदकाकाराद् उदकाकारतया
व्यावत्र्ते, उदकाकारात्ु कथं व्यावत्र्ते? िकम् उदकाकारतया, आहो स्वद्
आकारान्तरेण?
na ca udakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvamupapādayituṁ pāryate. udakam
anudakākārād udakākāratayā vyāvarttate, udakākārāttu kathaṁ
vyāvarttate? kim udakākāratayā, āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?
Translation: 69
Reply:
Moreover, it is not possible to explain how individual waters
are made (one can understand that) water is distinguished from
non-waters, in the form of water. But how can one form of water
be distinguished from another form of water. If it is distinguished
then two questions come to our mind (1) Is it being distinguished
in the form of water? (2) In the form of something else?
Text: 70
तद्द्ुदकाकारतया व्यावत्र्ते, तदा अन्यासामुदकव्यक् नाम् अनुदकाकारता पर्ाप्नोित
रसादे रव। अथ अनुदकाकारतया उदकाकारािन्वत्र्ते; ततो दहनादे रव अनुदकत्वपर्सङ्ः।
22 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 73
If you say that it is decided on the basis of identity then it amounts
to saying that one water is distinguished from another water as
water. In that case, it will amount to saying that other water
individuals are not water and in this way, all the defects raised
above can also be raised here.
Text: 74
अथातादात्म्यव्यव स्थतः; तिहर् अनुदकत्वं रसादे रव।
athātādātmyavyavasthitaḥ; tarhi anudakatvaṁ rasāderiva.
Translation: 74
If you say that it is settled on the basis of non-identity, then
obviously the other individuals will not be called water as taste
is not called water.
Text: 75
अथ उदकत्वव्यावृत्या अनुदकाकाराद् व्यावत्र्ते;
atha udakatvavyāvṛttyā anudakākārād vyāvarttate;
Translation: 75
Clarification:
Well, by distinguishing in terms of waterness water is distinguished
from non-water.
Text: 76
ण्वन्तु अमी बाललिपतं िवप श्चतः! यद्ुदकत्वव्यावृत्याऽनुदकाद् व्यावत्र्ते तोयम्,
उदकत्वञ् उदकादनुदकाच्च कथं व्यावत्र्ते?
śṛṇvantu amī bālalapitaṁ vipaścitaḥ! yadyudakatvavyāvṛttyā’nu-
dakād vyāvarttate toyam, udakatvañca udakādanudakācca kathaṁ
vyāvarttate?
Translation: 76
Reply:
Let these so-called intelligent people listen to your tale of children,
if you are saying that water is distinguished from non-water by
distinguishing waterness, then we will also how are you going to
distinguish from water and non-water.
24 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 77
न जात्यन्तरं व्यावत्र्कम स्त। अभ्युपगमे वा अिनष्ोपप्लवाऽनुबन्धः स्यात्। तस्मात्
स्वेनव
ै रूपेण इतरेतरात्मना व्यावत्र्ते न जात्यािदना व्यावत्र्ते, जात्यादेरव्यावृ त्पर्सङ्ात्।
na jātyantaraṁ vyāvarttakamasti. abhyupagame vā aniṣṭhopaplavā’-
nubandhaḥ syāt. tasmāt svenaivarūpeṇa itaretarātmanā vyāvarttate
na jātyādinā vyāvarttate, jātyāderavyāvṛttiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 77
You do not have any other universal which can distinguish them.
And if you accept another universal, you will be caught in
the undesired chaos. Therefore, it is better to accept that each
individual water is distinguished from others by its own form and
not by any entity called universal. Because, in that case there will
be a contingency of an impossibility to distinguish universal from
the rest.
Text: 78
तस्मात् स्थतमेतत् नोदकव्यक् नां नानात्वोपप त्ः तदनुपपत्ौ नोदकत्वं नाम सामान्य-
म स्त स्वत्ववत्।
tasmāt sthitametat nodakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvopapattiḥ tadanupa-
pattau nodakatvaṁ nāma sāmānyamasti svatvavat.
Translation: 78
Thus, we have come to this conclusion that it is not possible to
explain the plurality of water individuals and when that cannot be
explained we can say that there is nothing called universal such as
waterness as you too do not accept individuality as universal.
Text: 79
इतोऽिप न िवद्ते सामान्यम्, िनत्यस्य सतो िवज्ञानजनकत्वायोगात्।
ito’pi na vidyate sāmānyam, nityasya sato vijñānajanakatvāyogāt.
Translation: 79
For the following reason too (we hold that), there is no universal.
Because, if a positive entity is eternal it cannot produce knowledge.
Text: 80
तदेव कथम्?
tadeva katham?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 25
Translation: 80
Question:
How do you say so?
Text: 81
व्युत्पाद्ते-िवज्ञानजनकावस्थायां यदेव स्वरूप(पं) सामान्यात्मकं शिक्मच्छिक्रूपं
च कारकान्तरानपेक्षयाऽजनकावस्थायां तदेव रूपम्, अतः पूवर्मिप कायोर्त्पादपर्सङ्ः।
अनुत्पादे वा पर्ागे(िग)व इदानीमिप [न] जनयेत्।
vyutpādyate - vijñānajanakāvasthāyāṁ yadeva svarūpa(paṁ) sāmā-
nyātmakaṁ śaktimacchaktirūpaṁ ca kārakāntarānapekṣayā’janakā-
vasthāyāṁ tadeva rūpam, ataḥ pūrvamapi kāryotpādaprasaṅgaḥ.
anutpāde vā prāge(gi)va idānīmapi [na] janayet.
Translation: 81
Answer:
Let me explain. At the time of producing the knowledge whatever
form, of the nature of universal, possessed of capacity, and of the
nature of capacity it had without depending upon any other causal
factor the same form it has at the time of not producing knowledge.
Therefore, there arises the contingency that it should produce effect
viz. its knowledge even before and if it does not produce effect it
should not produce even now as before.
Text: 82
अथ कारकान्तरमपेक्षय उत्पादयित कायर् म्,
atha kārakāntaramapekṣya utpādayati kāryam,
Translation: 82
Clarification:
Well, it will produce effect taking help of some other causal factor.
Text: 83
िकं तेन कारकान्तरेण तस्य िकर्यते कारकत्वम्, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
kiṁ tena kārakāntareṇa tasya kriyate kārakatvam, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 83
Answer:
We would like to know what does other causal factor do to this
universal? Do you want to say that the causal factor makes this
26 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 88
Clarification:
(It is not necessary) even if it is a factor, there is no need that it
should produce any effect.
Text: 89
अहो राजाज्ञा गरीयसी नैयाियकपशोः! इतोऽिप ना स्त सामान्यम्; तदपु पादकमान-
व्यितरेकात्।
aho rājājñā garīyasī naiyāyikapaśoḥ! ito’pi nāsti sāmānyam; tadupa-
pādakamānavyatirekāt.
Translation: 89
Answer:
Oh, what a prevailing order of the king, of the animal logician.
Also for the following reason, we think that there is no universal.
Because, there is no proof which can explain it.
Text: 90
ननु अ स्त पर्माणम्- 'अनयोः सादृश्यम्' 'एषां सारूप्यम्' 'तेन सदृशोऽयम्' 'असौ वा तेन
सदृशः' इत्यािदज्ञानं सामान्यसत्ावबोधक(कं) अपर्ितपन्सामान्यस्य नोपपद्ते। अ स्त
त्वदं िवज्ञानं बाधािवकलं जािततनुव्यवस्थापकम्;
nanu asti pramāṇam- ‘anayoḥ sādṛśyam’ ‘eṣāṁ sārūpyam’ ‘tena
sadṛśo’yam’ ‘asau vā tena sadṛśaḥ’ ityādijñānaṁ sāmānyasattā-
vabodhaka(kaṁ) apratipannasāmānyasya nopapadyate. asti tvidaṁ
vijñānaṁ bādhāvikalaṁ jātitanuvyavasthāpakam;
Translation: 90
Objection:
Well, there is proof for instance there are cognitions like, “there is a
similarity between the two,” “these have similar forms,” “it is similar
to that,” “that is similar to this,” and the like. These knowledges
convey the existence of universal. And unless one accepts universal,
these knowledges are not possible. This is a knowledge which is not
contradicted and therefore it establishes the form of universal.
Text: 91
तदेतदयुक्म्; िकं िनिमत्भूतेन तेन एवंिवधं ज्ञानमुत्पाद्ते, कमर् तापन्ेन वा? तद्िद
िनिमत्भूतेन उत्पाद्ते; तदा न सामान्यं कल्पनीयम्, असामान्यात्मकमेव िनिमत्िमत्थ-
28 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 93
Reply:
It is true. It appears. We are not denying that. But it is of the nature
of either substance or quality or action, as we find in different cooks,
as we find cookness in them and we say they are cooks or “he is like
that cook” or “that cook is like this cook” in the same way such
references can be made to particulars also.
Text: 94
अतर्ािप सामान्यप रज्ञिप् रित चेत्;
atrāpi sāmānyaparijñaptiriti cet;
Translation: 94
Objection:
In these cases also, there is knowledge of universal.
Text: 95
न; सूतर्व्याघातात् सामान्यिवशेषेषु सामान्यिवशेषाऽभावात् तत एव ज्ञानम् [वै. सू. ८।१।५]
na; sūtravyāghātāt sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣā’bhāvāt tata eva
jñānam [Vai. sū. 8.1.5.],
Translation: 95
Reply:
No, it is not so. If you interpret like that, it will go against
the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 8.1.5 “there is no universal and particular in
universal and particular.” Knowledges arise from them directly.
Text: 96
अिनष्ा च- िवशेषेषु सामान्ये प रकल्प्यमाने सित सन्देहः, सित सन्देहे तेषु िवशेषान्तरं
प रकल्पनीयम्, पुनः सामान्यम् इत्यिनष्ा इत्यलम् असद्गर्हाऽिभिनवेशेन।
aniṣṭhā ca- viśeṣeṣu sāmānye parikalpyamāne sati sandehaḥ, sati
sandehe teṣu viśeṣāntaraṁ parikalpanīyam, punaḥ sāmānyam itya-
niṣṭhā ityalam asadgrahā’bhiniveśena.
Translation: 96
This is also not desirable. If we postulate universal in particulars
there will be doubt. And when there will be doubt, one will have
to postulate another particular. Again, in those particulars some
30 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
universal and in this way (it will lead to infinite regress) and
therefore this is not desirable and hence enough of this unsound
insistence!
Text: 97
अथ िभन्ािभन्ा सामान्यं भविद्ः पर्ितपाद्ते-आकारभेदेन व्यिक्भ्य उपलभ्यते
इत्यथार्न्तरम्, देशभेदेन तु नैव उपलभ्यते इत्यव्यित रक्े(क्म्);
atha bhinnābhinnā sāmānyaṁ bhavadbhiḥ pratipādyate-ākārabhe-
dena vyaktibhya upalabhyate ityarthāntaram, deśabhedena tu naiva
upalabhyate ityavyatirikte(ktam);
Translation: 97
Objection:
Well, you are explaining universal which is different-cum-identical.
You are telling that it is distinct because it is obtained from
particulars due to the difference in form. But it is not obtained
as distinct on the basis of the difference in space.
Text: 98
तदेतन्महासुभािषतम्,
tadetanmahāsubhāṣitam,
Translation: 98
Reply:
Oh, this is indeed a great and beautiful saying!
Text: 99
न देशभेदेनव
ै वस्तूनां भेदः अिप तु आकारभेदेनव
ै भावा भेदमुपया न्त। यथा च आकारभेदो
ना स्त तथाऽनन्तरमेव िनवेिदतम्।
na deśabhedenaiva vastūnāṁ bhedaḥ api tu ākārabhedenaiva bhāvā
bhedamupayānti. yathā ca ākārabhedo nāsti tathā’nantarameva nive-
ditam.
Translation: 99
It is not true that things become different only because of the
difference in space. But the positive entities are distinguished on
the basis of difference in their form. And we have just explained
how there is no difference in form.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 31
Translation: 104
And also there is no proof which can explain inherence.
Text: 105
ननु पर्त्यक्षबुद्ध्यवसेयोऽसौ;
nanu pratyakṣabuddhyavaseyo’sau;
Translation: 105
Objection:
Well, it can be definitely known by perceptual cognition.
Text: 106
तदयुक्म्; िकं सम्बन्धबुद्ध्याऽध्यवसीयते, आहो स्वद् इहबुद्ध्या, समवायबुद्ध्या वा
उच्यते?
tadayuktam; kiṁ sambandhabuddhyā’dhyavasīyate, āhosvid ihabu-
ddhyā, samavāyabuddhyā vā ucyate?
Translation: 106
Reply:
This is not correct. Is it known as a relation, or is it known as the
locus or is it known as inherence. What do you want to say?
Text: 107
तद्िद सम्बन्धबुद्ध्या; कोऽयं सम्बन्धः? िकं सम्बन्धजाितयुक्ः सम्बन्धः, आहो स्वद्
अनेकोपादानजिनतः, अनेका शर्तो वा, सम्बन्धबुिद्िवशेषो वा, सम्बन्धबुद्ध्युत्पादको वा,
सम्बद्ा(न्धा)कारो वा?
tadyadi sambandhabuddhyā; ko’yaṁ sambandhaḥ? kiṁ sambandha-
jātiyuktaḥ sambandhaḥ, āhosvid anekopādānajanitaḥ, anekāśrito vā,
sambandhabuddhiviśeṣo vā, sambandhabuddhyutpādako vā, samba-
ddhā(ndhā)kāro vā?
Translation: 107
If you say, it is known as a relation, we would like to know what
is that relation? (1) Is it a relation associated with the genre of
relation? (2) Or is it known as something caused by many evidence.
(3) Or is it known as located in many? (4) Or is it known as a
particular knowledge of relation? (5) Or is it known as the generator
of knowledge of relation? (6) Or is it known as something which a
form is associated?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 33
Text: 108
तद्िद सम्बन्धजाितयुक्स्ते सम्बन्धः; सोऽनुपपन्ः; समवायाऽसम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi sambandhajātiyuktaste sambandhaḥ; so’nupapannaḥ; sama-
vāyā’sambandhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 108
If you say that your relation is that which is associated with the
genre of a relation that is not proper, because it will lead to the
contingency of un-related inherence.
Text: 109
अथ अनेकोपादानजिनतः सम्बन्धः; तदा कुम्भादेरिप सम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha anekopādānajanitaḥ sambandhaḥ; tadā kumbhāderapi samba-
ndhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 109
If you say it is that relation which is caused by many factors, then
even a pot will have to be treated as the relation of inherence.
Text: 110
अथ अनेका शर्तः सम्बन्धः तदा घटजात्यादेः सम्बन्धत्वं पर्सज्यते।
atha anekāśritaḥ sambandhaḥ tadā ghaṭajātyādeḥ sambandhatvaṁ
prasajyate.
Translation: 110
If you say it is a relation which is located in many, then the universal
of pot, viz. potness will have to be treated as a relation of inherence.
Text: 111
अथ सम्बन्धबुद्ध्युत्पादकस्ते सम्बन्धः उच्यते; तदा लोचनादेरिप सम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha sambandhabuddhyutpādakaste sambandhaḥ ucyate; tadā locanā-
derapi sambandhatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 111
If you say that your relation is that which produces the knowledge
of relation, then there will arise a contingency of treating eyes etc.
as a relation of inherence.
Text: 112
अथ सम्बन्धबुद्ध्यवसेयः सम्बन्धोऽिभधीयते; तदा कौलेयकक रकुमारािदष्विप सम्बन्ध-
शब्दव्युत्पादने सम्बन्धत्वपर्सङ्ः।
34 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 116
अथ 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' इित इहबुद्ध्याध्यवसीयते;
atha iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ’ iti ihabuddhyādhyavasīyate;
Translation: 116
Objection:
Well, (the knowledge of inherence) is obtained for certain on the
basis of the knowledge “there is cloth here in these threads.”
Text: 117
न। इहबुद्ेर धकरणसंिवदर्ूपत्वात्। न चा स्मन्ा(न चान्य स्मन्ा)कारे पर्तीयमाने अन्यत्
प रकल्पियतुं न्याय्यम्, अितपर्सङ्ात्।
na. ihabuddheradhikaraṇasaṁvidrūpatvāt. na cāsminnā(na cānyasmi-
nnā)kāre pratīyamāne anyat parikalpayituṁ nyāyyam, atiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 117
Reply:
It is not proper, because, the word here stands for the knowledge
of locus. It is not proper to postulate something else, when such a
form of locus is revealed in the knowledge. Or else it will lead to
undesirable contingencies.
Text: 118
अथ समवायबुद्ध्याऽऽत्मसा त्कर्यते;
atha samavāyabuddhyā”tmasātkriyate;
Translation: 118
Objection:
Well, this we had decided on the basis of knowledge of inherence.
Text: 119
सोप्यनुपपन् एव, समवायबुद्ेरनुपपत्ेः, 'अयं तन्तुः, अयं पटः, अयमनयोः समवायः'
इित न जातु जानते जनाः।
sopyanupapanna eva, samavāyabuddheranupapatteḥ, ’ayaṁ tantuḥ,
ayaṁ paṭaḥ, ayamanayoḥ samavāyaḥ’ iti na jātu jānate janāḥ.
Translation: 119
Reply:
That is also not proper, because, there is nothing called knowledge
36 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 124
Objection:
Well, the very knowledge “here in the threads there is cloth” will
cause the knowledge of inherence by the following inference: (1)The
knowledge “here in the threads there is cloth” is caused by a
relationship. (2)Because, it is an uncontradicted knowledge “here
in the threads there is cloth”. (3)Like the knowledge “here in the
pot there is curd”.
Text: 125
िकमनेन अनुमीयते-
kimanena anumīyate-
Translation: 125
Reply:
What is being inferred by this inference?:
Text: 126
िकं िनिमत्मातर्म्, उत सम्बन्धः?
kiṁ nimittamātram, uta sambandhaḥ?
Translation: 126
(a)The very causal factor which cause the inferential cognition of
inherence? Or (b) The relation of inherence?
Text: 127
यिद िनिमत्मातर्म्, ततः सद्साध्यतया सम्बोधियतव्यः।
yadi nimittamātram, tataḥ siddhasādhyatayā sambodhayitavyaḥ.
Translation: 127
If you say mere causal factor is being inferred then it is required to
be satisfied because it is going to cause knowledge of that which is
already known.
Text: 128
अथ सम्बन्धः; संयोगः, समवायो वा?
atha sambandhaḥ; saṁyogaḥ, samavāyo vā?
Translation: 128
And if you say that relation is going to be inferred then I ask you,
is it (a) contact or (b) inherence?
38 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 129
संयोगानुमाने उपगमहािनः।
saṁyogānumāne upagamahāniḥ.
Translation: 129
If you say that it is a contact which is being inferred it will go
against your conclusion.
Text: 130
समवायानुमाने सम्बन्धव्यितरेकः।
samavāyānumāne sambandhavyatirekaḥ.
Translation: 130
And if you say that inherence is being inferred then there is absence
of relationship.
Text: 131
न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धः अन्यस्य गमकत्वम्, अितपर्सङ्ात्। न जातु देवदत्नयनकुटसम्बन्धे
यज्ञदत्े न्दर्यं रूपािदकमथर् करणत्वसाम्यात् पर्काशयद् दृष्म्।
na cānyasya sambandhaḥ anyasya gamakatvam, atiprasaṅgāt. na
jātu devadattanayanakuṭasambandhe yajñadattendriyaṁ rūpādika-
marthaṁ karaṇatvasāmyāt prakāśayad dṛṣṭam.
Translation: 131
It cannot be the case that the relation is with something else and
it causes the knowledge of something else, because, it will lead
to undesirable consequences i.e. the defect of over-application. It
is never the case that when something is related to the eyes of
Devadatta the sense organ of Yajñadatta reveals the object such as
color because of the similarity between the sense organ of Devadatta
and Yajñadatta. It is never seen like this.
Text: 132
एवं सित सामान्यसमवायिवरहे कथं दर्व्यािद व्यवस्था इित िचन्त्यते।
evaṁ sati sāmānyasamavāyavirahe kathaṁ dravyādi vyavasthā iti
cintyate.
Translation: 132
Thus, when there is neither universal nor inherence how can one
decide or know or settle that something is a substance (i.e. how can
there be something called substance.)?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 39
Text: 133
अथ तद्त् सत्य(अथ तद्ंशज)जलपर्ाप्त्या अव्यिभचा रता ज्ञायते; तदयुक्म्;
अन्त्यावयिवदर्व्याणां जनकत्वव्यितरेकात्। न च उदकव्यक् नां नानात्वम स्त, यथा च न
िवद्ते तथा िनवेिदतं पुरस्तात्।
atha tadvat satya(atha tadvaṁśaja)jalaprāptyā avyabhicāritā
jñāyate; tadayuktam; antyāvayavidravyāṇāṁ janakatvavyatirekāt.
na ca udakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvamasti, yathā ca na vidyate tathā
niveditaṁ purastāt.
Translation: 133
Like that, if you say, since one gets water belonging to the same
family of water, the knowledge of water will not be proper, because,
the substances in the form of final wholes cannot be the cause of
anything (i.e. of any other whole) and there are no other water
individuals and that there are no plural individuals of water, has
already been explained before.
Text: 134
िकञ्, पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न अव्यिभचा रता पूवोर्िदतज्ञानस्य ज्ञाप्यते-िकं लङ्भूतेन, आहो
अध्यक्षात्मकेन?
kiñca, pravṛttisāmarthyena avyabhicāritā pūrvoditajñānasya jñāpyate-
kiṁ liṅgabhūtena, āho adhyakṣātmakena?
Translation: 134
Moreover, you have said that on the strength of consistent
inter-action the knowledge which arose before i.e. the knowledge
which prompted the interaction is not erroneous. There questions
are (a) is it because that is treated as a ground for inference or (b)
is it because it is of the nature of perception?
Text: 135
तद्िद लङ्भूतेन; तदयुक्म्; तेन साकं सम्बन्धानवगतेः।
tadyadi liṅgabhūtena; tadayuktam; tena sākaṁ sambandhānava-
gateḥ.
Translation: 135
If you say it causes the knowledge as a ground that is not proper,
because, one cannot know the invariable concomitance with that.
40 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 136
अवगतौ वाऽलं पर्वृ त्सामथ्येर्न।
avagatau vā’laṁ pravṛttisāmarthyena.
Translation: 136
If you say it can be known, then there is no need of capacity of
resulting into fruitful interaction.
Text: 137
अथाध्यक्षात्मकेन; तदयुक्म्; पूवोर्िदतपर्त्यस्तिमतेन साकं सिन्कषार्ऽभावात्। तिद्षय-
िवज्ञानं न पर्त्यक्षफलं िनरालम्बनत्वात् केशोण्डु कािदसंवेदनवत्। न िवज्ञानस्या-
भावोऽवभाित, न भावः तदभावात्।
athādhyakṣātmakena; tadayuktam; pūrvoditapratyastamitena sākaṁ
sannikarṣā’bhāvāt. tadviṣayavijñānaṁ na pratyakṣaphalaṁ nirāla-
mbanatvāt keśoṇḍukādisaṁvedanavat. na vijñānasyābhāvo’vabhāti,
na bhāvaḥ tadabhāvāt.
Translation: 137
If you say it will cause the knowledge being in the form of perception
that is also not proper, because, there cannot be any contact with
the knowledge which arose before and vanished. The knowledge of
that object cannot be the result of perception, because, it will be
contentless, like the knowledge of thread-like things which appear
in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly open
our eyes.
Text: 138
अिवद्मानस्य िवषयाथोर् वक्व्यः-िकम् आकारापर् कत्वेन वा, महत्वािदधमोर्पेतत्वेन वा,
सत्ामातर्ेण वा, सहोत्पादेन वा? सवर् स्य पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वात् कथमसौ िवषयः? तिद्षयत्वे
केशोण्डु कािदिवज्ञानस्येव िमथ्यात्वे बीजमन्वेषणीयम्।
avidyamānasya viṣayārtho vaktavyaḥ-kim ākārārpakatvena vā,
mahattvādidharmopetatvena vā, sattāmātreṇa vā, sahotpādena vā?
sarvasya pratyastamitatvāt kathamasau viṣayaḥ? tadviṣayatve keśo-
ṇḍukādivijñānasyeva mithyātve bījamanveṣaṇīyam.
Translation: 138
There does not appear either absence of knowledge or presence
because it does not exist there. You should tell us the meaning
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 41
Text: 141
तद्िद तद्मर् ः-स िनत्यः, अिनत्यो वा?
tadyadi taddharmaḥ-sa nityaḥ, anityo vā?
Translation: 141
If you say that it is property of that knowledge there again the
question arises (a) whether that property is permanent? Or (b)
whether non-eternal property?
Text: 142
यिद िनत्यः, तदा जाितदोषेणापोपोिद(णापोिद)तो वेिदतव्यः।
yadi nityaḥ, tadā jātidoṣeṇāpopodi(ṇāpodi)to veditavyaḥ.
Translation: 142
If you say that it is eternal property then it will be rejected on the
basis of the same defect which were raised in connection with the
universal.
Text: 143
अथाऽिनत्यः-स पूवोर्त्पन्ः, सह, पश्चाद्ा जातः?
athā’nityaḥ-sa pūrvotpannaḥ, saha, paścādvā jātaḥ?
Translation: 143
Again if you say that it is non-eternal, then also one can ask
(i) whether it was produced before (ii) whether it is produced
simultaneously or (iii) whether it is produced later.
Text: 144
तद्िद पूवोर्त्पन्ः; तदा कस्यासौ धमर् ः? न िह धिमर् णमन्तरेण धमोर् भिवतुमहर् ित, सवर् तो
व्यावृत्रूपत्वात् कः कस्येित वक्व्यम्।
tadyadi pūrvotpannaḥ; tadā kasyāsau dharmaḥ? na hi dharmiṇama-
ntareṇa dharmo bhavitumarhati, sarvato vyāvṛttarūpatvāt kaḥ
kasyeti vaktavyam.
Translation: 144
If you say it is produced before, then one may ask whose property it
is? Because, without a locus no property can exist. When everything
is discrete, which is property of what? You should tell.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 43
Text: 145
अथ सहोत्पन्ः; कस्तयोः सम्बन्ध इित वक्व्यम्।
atha sahotpannaḥ; kastayoḥ sambandha iti vaktavyam.
Translation: 145
If you say it is produced together then you should state what is the
relation between the two?
Text: 146
तादात्म्यतदत्ु प त्समवायसम्बन्धाभावे सित षष्ठ्थोर् वक्व्यः 'तस्य अव्यिभचा रत्वम्'
इित।
tādātmyatadutpattisamavāyasambandhābhāve sati ṣaṣṭhyartho vakta-
vyaḥ ‘tasya avyabhicāritvam’ iti.
Translation: 146
If the relationship is not identity or cause-and-effect relationship or
inherence then what will be the meaning of the genitive suffix, you
should state, because, the expression is “the property of not being
erroneous of that”.
Text: 147
अथ पृष्ोत्पन्स्तिहर् पूवर् व्यिभचा रता िवज्ञानस्य पर्ाप्नोित। न च आध्या त्मकोऽव्यिभ-
चा ररूपो धमोर् स्त सुखािदव्यित रक्ः, तत्पर्तीत्यसम्भवेन स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्।
atha pṛṣṭhotpannastarhi pūrvaṁ vyabhicāritā vijñānasya prāpnoti.
na ca ādhyātmiko’vyabhicārirūpo dharmosti sukhādivyatiriktaḥ,
tatpratītyasambhavena svayamanabhyupagamāt.
Translation: 147
If you say that it is produced later then it implies that the knowledge
was erroneous before. It is not also the case that there is a property
viz. the state of not being erroneous in the self other than happiness
etc. because, that can never be known and you yourself have not
accepted it.
Text: 148
यिद च अव्यिभचारादयो धमार् अथार्न्तरभूताः अभ्युपगम्यन्ते तैरव च्छन्ं िवज्ञानं
सामग्र्या अवस्थापकमुद्ष्ु यते; तच्चानुपपन्म्; पर्त्येकमनेकिवशेषणाव च्छन्िवज्ञान-
पर्ितप त्कालावस्थानायोगात्, ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकयोरभावे कत्ृर्मातर्पर्ब न्ध ज्ञानं स्यात्।
44 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 151
अथाथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेनाव्यिभचा रत्वम्-िकमनुपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन,
आहो स्वद् उपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन?
athārthāntarasattānurodhenāvyabhicāritvam-kim anupakārakā’rthā-
ntarasattānurodhena, āhosvid upakārakā’rthāntarasattānurodhena?
Translation: 151
If you say that it is not erroneous, because there is existence of
another knowledge, there again the question arises (i) is it because
of existence of another knowledge which is not involved in the
production of the knowledge? Or (ii) is it because of the existence
of another knowledge in the production of knowledge?
Text: 152
तद्िद तावद् अनुपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन, तदा केशोण्डु क-इन्दद्ु यसंिवदोप्यव्य-
िभचा रतापर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi tāvad anupakārakā’rthāntarasattānurodhena, tadā keśo-
ṇḍukaindudvayasaṁvidopyavyabhicāritāprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 152
If you say that it is on account of existence of another knowledge,
not involved in the production of knowledge, then there will arise
the contingency of accepting the knowledge of thread-like things
which appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and
suddenly open our eyes and the perception of two moons when you
press your eyes in a particular way, as not erroneous.
Text: 153
अथ उपकारकाऽथार्न्तरसत्ानुरोधेन अव्यिभचा रता-िकं पर्तीयमानाऽथार्न्तरोपकारक-
सत्ानुरोधेन, तिद्परीताथार्न्तरोपकारकसत्ानुरोधेन वा?
atha upakārakā’rthāntarasattānurodhena avyabhicāritā-kiṁ pratīya-
mānā’rthāntaropakārakasattānurodhena, tadviparītārthāntaropakā-
rakasattānurodhena vā?
Translation: 153
If again you say that it is on account of the existence of another
object which is involved in the production of knowledge, the
knowledge is known as not erroneous, then again the question arises
46 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 156
Moreover, that perceptual knowledge is not erroneous you have said.
Is it the case that, that knowledge is not erroneous which is known
through a collection of factors or which is not known?
Text: 157
यद्वगतम्; तस्यावगितः आत्मसंिवदर्ूपा वा, ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ा वा?
yadyavagatam; tasyāvagatiḥ ātmasaṁvidrūpā vā, jñānāntaravedyā
vā?
Translation: 157
If you say that only when it is known, it causes the knowledge, then
is that knowledge of knowledge self-illuminating or it is to be known
by another knowledge?
Text: 158
तद्द्ात्मसंवेदनरूपावगितः; तदयुक्म्; द्(स्व)यमनभ्युपगमात्। अभ्युपगमे वा उपगम-
िवरोधः।
tadyadyātmasaṁvedanarūpāvagatiḥ; tadayuktam; dva(sva)yamana-
bhyupagamāt. abhyupagame vā upagamavirodhaḥ.
Translation: 158
If you say it is self-illuminating and therefore it causes its own
knowledge, it is not proper because in your System (in the System
of Nyāya) you would not accept any knowledge as self-illuminating.
And if you accept there will be contradiction with your doctrine.
Text: 159
अथ ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ं वे त्स; िवज्ञानयोभेर्दे बीजमन्वेष्व्यम्।
atha jñānāntaravedyaṁ vetsi; vijñānayorbhede bījamanveṣṭavyam.
Translation: 159
If you say that, that perception is not erroneous is known by another
knowledge, one will have to enquire the ground to explain the
difference between those two knowledges.
Text: 160
ज्ञानमज्ञानाकारात् ज्ञानात्मतया व्यावत्र्ते ज्ञानान्तरात्ु कथं व्यावत्र्ते?- िकं ज्ञानात्मतया
व्यावत्र्ते आहो स्वद् आकारान्तरेण?
48 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 163
Is that single object knowledge or non-knowledge? If it is knowledge,
then it cannot be distinguished with the help of another form, but
only in the form of knowledge. Since, the other will become of the
nature of non-knowledge?
Text: 164
अथ अज्ञातं(नं); सद्ं नः समीिहतम्।
atha ajñātaṁ(naṁ); siddhaṁ naḥ samīhitam.
Translation: 164
If again you say that single object is non-knowledge, then what we
are intending to prove, is already proved.
Text: 165
अथ ज्ञानत्वं व्यावत्र्कम्, तत्केन व्यावत्र्ते इित पूवोर्क्मनुसत्र्व्यम्।
atha jñānatvaṁ vyāvarttakam, tatkena vyāvarttate iti pūrvokta-
manusarttavyam.
Translation: 165
If you say the property of being knowledge is distinguishing factor,
here again we would like to know by what it distinguishes? And
thus, we will have to follow the same method of raising doubts as
shown by us before.
Text: 166
िवज्ञानान्तरवेद्मिप न सम्भवित। अथ न वेद्ते; तदस्तीित कथं पुनवेर् त्स?
vijñānāntaravedyamapi na sambhavati. atha na vedyate; tadastīti
kathaṁ punarvetsi?
Translation: 166
That the knowledge is not erroneous cannot be known by any other
knowledge also. If you say that it is not known, then we will ask
you how do you know that it exists.
Text: 167
अनेनव
ै वत्मर् ना सत्येतरिवज्ञानयोिवर् भागाभावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः।
anenaiva vartmanā satyetaravijñānayorvibhāgābhāvo’bhyupagantavyaḥ.
50 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 167
In this way, we can show there is nothing called a true cognition or
a false cognition. This is what you should note.
Text: 168
अतोऽव्यिभचा रपदमपाथर् कम्।
ato’vyabhicāripadamapārthakam.
Translation: 168
And therefore, we say that the term “not erroneous” is meaningless.
[४. पर्कारान्तरेण अव्यिभचा रपदस्य िनरासः।]
[4. prakārāntareṇa avyabhicāripadasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 169
इतोप्यपाथर् कम्-
itopyapārthakam-
Translation: 169
For the following reason also the clause “which is not erroneous”
(in the definition of perception as given by Gautama 1.1.4) is
purposeless:
Text: 170
इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् पदेन अपोिद(िह)तत्वात्।
indriyārthasannikarṣapadena apodi(hi)tatvāt.
Translation: 170
Because, the intended true perception can be excluded from the
false perception by the word “contact between sense organ and
object”.
Text: 171
निह केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्य नयनाथर् सिन्कषोर्द्िू तर स्त।
nahi keśoṇḍukavijñānasya nayanārthasannikarṣodbhūtirasti.
Translation: 171
It is not the case that the perception of the thread-like things which
appear in the knowledge when we come from the Sun and suddenly
open our eyes is produced by the contact between eyes and the
object.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 51
Text: 172
नन्व स्त मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानस्य, तदपनोदाय अव्यिभचा रपदम्;
nanvasti marīcyudakavijñānasya, tadapanodāya avyabhicāripadam;
Translation: 172
Objection:
Well, the clause “which is not erroneous” is required to exclude the
perception of water in the mirage.
Text: 173
तन्; यत उदकं पर्ितभाित, न च तेन सह सम्बन्धोऽ स्त। िवद्मानेन साकं सम्बध्यते
नाऽिवद्मानेन। तत्सम्बन्धे वा, न तिद्षयो(ये) िमथ्यात्विमहोपपद्ते सत्योदकसंवेदनवत्।
tanna; yata udakaṁ pratibhāti, na ca tena saha sambandho’sti. vidya-
mānena sākaṁ sambadhyate nā’vidyamānena. tatsambandhe vā, na
tadviṣayo(ye) mithyātvamihopapadyate satyodakasaṁvedanavat.
Translation: 173
Reply:
It is not true, because, in that knowledge of water, water does
appear, but there is no relationship of sense organ with that water.
The relationship of the sense organ is possible only with that which
exists there and not with that which does not exist there and if you
say there is a relationship with water there, then the knowledge of
water arising from the mirage, cannot be said to be erroneous like
the knowledge of water where there is real water.
Text: 174
ननु यद्िप पर्तीयमानोदकेन सह सम्बन्धो ना स्त चक्षुषः, तथापाप्या(थाप्या)लम्ब्य
मरीिचिनचयेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽ स्त, तस्यैव आलम्बनत्वात् तद्ेशं पर्ित पर्वृत्ेः, अत एव
िमथ्यात्वम्, अन्यदालम्बनम् अन्यच्च पर्ितभाित।
nanu yadyapi pratīyamānodakena saha sambandho nāsti cakṣuṣaḥ,
tathāpāpyā(thāpyā)lambya marīcinicayena sākaṁ sambandho’sti,
tasyaiva ālambanatvāt taddeśaṁ prati pravṛtteḥ, ata eva mithyātvam
anyadālambanam anyacca pratibhāti.
Translation: 174
Objection:
Although there is no contact of eyes with the water which has
52 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 177
अथ आकारापर् कत्वमालम्बनत्वम्; तदयुक्म्, नैयाियकसमयेऽनभ्युपगमात्। यथा च
िवषयाकारो िवज्ञाने न युज्यते तथोप रष्ात् पर्ितपादियष्यामः।
atha ākārārpakatvamālambanatvam; tadayuktam, naiyāyikasama-
ye’nabhyupagamāt. yathā ca viṣayākāro vijñāne na yujyate tatho-
pariṣṭāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ.
Translation: 177
If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is being the
property of offering a form in that knowledge, that is also not
proper, because, such a position is not acceptable in the doctrine of
Nyāya. We are going to explain later in what way the form of the
content of knowledge, will fit into that perception.
Text: 178
अथ िवज्ञाना धकरणत्वमालम्बनत्वम्, [न;] न मरीिचचकर्ोत्क लतमुदीयते ज्ञानम् अिप तु
आत्मसमवेतमात्मानमासादयते।
atha vijñānādhikaraṇatvamālambanatvam, [na;] na marīcicakrot-
kalitamudīyate jñānam api tu ātmasamavetamātmānamāsādayate.
Translation: 178
If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is being the locus
of that knowledge, it is also not correct, because, it is not the case
that knowledge arises by way of blossoming as it were, from the
circle of the mirage. But what happens is it obtains its own form in
the self through the relationship of inherence.
Text: 179
अथ िवज्ञानावभा सतता आलम्बनत्वम्; तदा उदकिवज्ञाने उदकं पर्तीयते न मरीचयः।
atha vijñānāvabhāsitatā ālambanatvam; tadā udakavijñāne udakaṁ
pratīyate na marīcayaḥ.
Translation: 179
If you say that the meaning of the term ālambana is the state of
being a revealer of knowledge, then in the knowledge of water, water
alone should appear and not the mirage (as it happens later).
54 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 180
अथ उदकाकारतया मरीचय एव पर्तीयन्ते; स उदकाकारो मरीिचभ्यो व्यित र-
क्ोऽव्यित रक्ो वा?
atha udakākāratayā marīcaya eva pratīyante; sa udakākāro
marīcibhyo vyatirikto’vyatirikto vā?
Translation: 180
If you say that yes, mirage alone appears in that knowledge, in the
form of water, then we will ask you whether that form of water is
different from mirage or not different.
Text: 181
तद्द्व्यित रक्:; स ता त्वकोऽता त्वको वा?
tadyadyavyatiriktaḥ; sa tāttviko’tāttviko vā?
Translation: 181
If you say it is not different, then we will like to know whether it is
real or unreal?
Text: 182
यिद ता त्वकः; कथं तदवगतेिमर् थ्यात्वम्?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; kathaṁ tadavagatermithyātvam?
Translation: 182
If you say it is real, then how the knowledge of it can be unreal?
Text: 183
अथाऽता त्वकः; तदा मरीचीनामिप अता त्वकत्वं पर्सज्यते।
athā’tāttvikaḥ; tadā marīcīnāmapi atāttvikatvaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 184
Again if you say it is not real, then the mirage also will become
unreal?
Text: 185
अता त्वकोदकतादात्म्ये सित तददु कज्ञानमतथ्यम्। िकमुक्ं भवित? मरीिचिवज्ञान-
मतथ्यम्।
atāttvikodakatādātmye sati tadudakajñānamatathyam. kimuktaṁ
bhavati? marīcivijñānamatathyam.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 55
Translation: 184
If the mirage becomes identical with the unreal water, then the
knowledge of that water is not real. What does it mean? It means
the knowledge of mirage is unreal.
Text: 185
एक स्मंश्चोदकाकारे पर्तीयमाने केन एतदाख्यातम्-मरीचयः पर्ितभा न्त देवाना म्पर्यस्य!
ekasmiṁścodakākāre pratīyamāne kena etadākhyātam-marīcayaḥ
pratibhānti devānāmpriyasya!
Translation: 185
When it is the case that only one form viz. the form of water appears
in the knowledge, then who has told you, Oh fool! that in this
knowledge the mirage appears?
Text: 186
अथ अथार्न्तरभूत:; तिहर् न वक्व्यम् - मरीचय उदकाकारतया पर्तीयन्ते उदकाकारा-
न्त रता मरीचयः।
atha arthāntarabhūtaḥ; tarhi na vaktavyam-marīcaya udakākāratayā
pratīyante udakākārāntaritā marīcayaḥ.
Translation: 186
If you say that the form of water is different from the mirage, then
you should not say that the mirage appears in the form of water. It
is not the case that the mirage is covered by the form of water.
Text: 187
अथ केशोण्डु किवज्ञाने िकमवभाित? िकमालम्बते?
atha keśoṇḍukavijñāne kimavabhāti? kimālambate?
Translation: 187
Objection:
Well, I can also ask you what does appear in the knowledge of
thread-like things which appear in the knowledge when we come from
the Sun and suddenly open our eyes, and what is the ālambana there?
Text: 188
केशोण्डु कस्यैवालम्बनत्वं पर्तीयमानत्वं च तथा उदकस्यैव आलम्बनत्वं पर्तीयमानत्वञ्,
नालम्बनान्तरं प रकल्प्यम्।
56 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 194
तस्मादव्यिभचा रपदं न युक्म् इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् पदेनापोिदतत्वात्।
tasmādavyabhicāripadaṁ na yuktam indriyārthasannikarṣapadenāpodi-
tatvāt.
Translation: 194
Therefore, the clause “which is not erroneous” is not required in the
definition of perception, because, the clause the contact between the
sense organ and object can exclude erroneous perceptions.
Text: 195
इतोप्यनुपपन्म्, अपोह्ज्ञानाऽसम्भवात्।
itopyanupapannam, apohyajñānā’sambhavāt.
Translation: 195
Similarly, for the following reason also the clause which is not
erroneous is not required, because, there is no knowledge which
needs to be excluded.
Text: 196
अथ मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानाय(प)िननीर्(नी)षया उपादीयते; तत्कथमपनीयते? अिवद्मानो-
दकिवषयत्वात्।
atha marīcyudakavijñānāya(pa)nirnī(nī)ṣayā upādīyate; tatkatha-
mapanīyate? avidyamānodakaviṣayatvāt.
Translation: 196
If you say that this clause is required, in order to exclude the
knowledge of water in the mirage, we would like to know, how you
are going to exclude it. Is it because this knowledge has water which
is not there as its object?
Text: 197
यद्िवद्मान(नं); कोऽयं िवषयाथर् ः? पूवोर्िदतमनुसरणीयम्।
yadyavidyamāna(naṁ); ko’yaṁ viṣayārthaḥ? pūrvoditamanusa-
raṇīyam.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 59
Translation: 197
If you say there is no water (then it means there is absence of
water) and then the question arises, what should we understand by
the word ‘viṣaya’ or ‘content’? All objections raised in such context
are to be referred to once again here.
Text: 198
यिद ततर्ोदकं पर्ितभाित कथम् अ स्त?
yadi tatrodakaṁ pratibhāti katham asti?
Translation: 198
Objection:
If you say water appears there then how is it, that water is not
there?
Text: 199
सत्यम्, पर्ितभाित, िकन्तु अतथ्यं पर्ितभाित। अतथ्यता का?- िकं पर्तीयमानस्याऽभावः,
उत पर्तीयमान एव अभावः?
satyam, pratibhāti, kintu atathyaṁ pratibhāti. atathyatā kā?- kiṁ
pratīyamānasyā’bhāvaḥ, uta pratīyamāna eva abhāvaḥ?
Translation: 199
Reply:
True, water appears but what appears is false. Then we would like
to know what is this falsity of knowledge? Does it mean (a) absence
of what has appeared in the knowledge? Or (b) what has appeared
that itself is absence?
Text: 200
तद्िद पर्तीयमानस्य अभावः-स िकं तदैव, आहो स्वत् कालान्तरेण?
tadyadi pratīyamānasya abhāvaḥ-sa kiṁ tadaiva, āhosvit kālā-
ntareṇa?
Translation: 200
If you say “absence of what has appeared”, the next question that
arises is that absence at that time only? Or at a later time?
Text: 201
यिद तदैव; स िकम्व(िकमव)गतः, अनवगतो वा?
yadi tadaiva; sa kimva(kimava)gataḥ, anavagato vā?
60 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 201
If you say at that time only, then the question will arise is it known
or unknown?
Text: 202
यद्वगतः; स केनावगम्यते िकमुदकिवज्ञानेन, ज्ञानान्तरेण वा?
yadyavagataḥ; sa kenāvagamyate kimudakavijñānena, jñānāntareṇa
vā?
Translation: 202
If it is known, by what it is known? Is it known by knowledge of
water? Or by some other knowledge?
Text: 203
तद्द्ुदकज्ञानेन; तन्; तस्य उदकिवषयत्वात्।
tadyadyudakajñānena; tanna; tasya udakaviṣayatvāt.
Translation: 203
If you say that it is known by knowledge of water, it is not correct,
because that has water as its object.
Text: 204
तिद्षयत्वे वा, न तिहर् 'उदकज्ञानं भर्ान्तम्' इत्युपपद्ते अभाविवषयस्य परमाथर् सत्वात्।
tadviṣayatve vā, na tarhi ‘udakajñānaṁ bhrāntam’ ityupapadyate
abhāvaviṣayasya paramārthasattvāt.
Translation: 204
In that case it cannot be said that knowledge of water is false. Since,
in that knowledge, water alone is the object, because, the object of
absence is a fact.
Text: 205
न च उदकाकारावगािहिन िवज्ञाने तोयिविनवृत्योऽवभा न्त अितपर्सङ्ात्।
na ca udakākārāvagāhini vijñāne toyavinivṛttayo’vabhānti atipra-
saṅgāt.
Translation: 205
It cannot be said that in the knowledge where the form of water is an
object, absence of water appears, because, it will lead to unwanted
consequence.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 61
Text: 206
अथ ज्ञानान्तरेण; न; ज्ञानयौगपद्ासम्भवात्।
atha jñānāntareṇa; na; jñānayaugapadyāsambhavāt.
Translation: 206
If you say that absence is known by knowledge, this is also not
correct, because, no two knowledges can occur simultaneously.
Text: 207
यिद च अभावज्ञानेन अभावव्यवस्था िकर्यते भावज्ञानेन च भावव्यवस्था, तदा उदकस्य
भावाभावौ एककालौ स्याताम्।
yadi ca abhāvajñānena abhāvavyavasthā kriyate bhāvajñānena ca
bhāvavyavasthā, tadā udakasya bhāvābhāvau ekakālau syātām.
Translation: 207
If you are settling absence on the basis of the knowledge of absence
and presence by the knowledge of presence, then there will be
presence and absence of water at one and the same time.
Text: 208
अथ भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थां न करोित अभावज्ञानं च अभावव्यवस्थां करोित। अहो राजाज्ञा
नैयाियकपशोः।
atha bhāvajñānaṁ bhāvavyavasthāṁ na karoti abhāvajñānaṁ ca
abhāvavyavasthāṁ karoti. aho rājājñā naiyāyikapaśoḥ.
Translation: 208
If you say that the knowledge of presence of an entity does not settle
the presence, but the knowledge of absence settles the absence of
an entity. What a king’s order of the animal called logician!
Text: 209
यिद च भावज्ञानं भावव्यवस्थां न करोित तदा सवर् भावेषु अनाश्वासपर्सङ्ः। तत्पर्सक्ौ
अभावस्याप्यनव स्थितः, तदनव स्थतौ च तत्वोपप्लवः स्यात्।
yadi ca bhāvajñānaṁ bhāvavyavasthāṁ na karoti tadā sarvabhāveṣu
anāśvāsaprasaṅgaḥ. tatprasaktau abhāvasyāpyanavasthitiḥ, tadana-
vasthitau ca tattvopaplavaḥ syāt.
Translation: 209
If the knowledge of presence does not settle the presence, then
there will be uncertainty with regard to all positive entities and if
62 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 213
It is not proper to postulate absence when the positive form is
known, because it will lead to over-application, otherwise, when
color is known, one should postulate taste, but nobody does so. In
the same way, here also, water is known.
Text: 214
ननु पर्तीयते िकन्तु अतथ्यम्;
nanu pratīyate kintu atathyam;
Translation: 214
Objection:
It is true that water is known, but it is false.
Text: 215
यद्ेवम् उदकपर्पञ्ोऽयं दीघोर्दकं मधुरोदकिमित यथा।
yadyevam udakaprapañco’yaṁ dīrghodakaṁ madhurodakamiti yathā.
Translation: 215
Reply:
If it is so, this is family of water, as we say ‘huge water’ ‘sweet
water’.
Text: 216
नन्वतर् सवार्सु अवस्थासु उदकं पर्तीयते तेन तासु अम्भः पर्कल्प्यते।
nanvatra sarvāsu avasthāsu udakaṁ pratīyate tena tāsu ambhaḥ
prakalpyate.
Translation: 216
Objection:
Well, here in all conditions or forms, water is known and therefore
by that water is postulated in all of them.
Text: 217
यद्ेवं तिदहािप अवस्थाद्येऽिप उदकं पर्तीयते सत्योदकमसत्योदकं च। सत्योदकज्ञाने
सत्योदकमवभाित नाऽसत्योदकमनुदकं वा। तथा असत्योदकज्ञानेऽसत्योदकं पर्ितभाित न
सत्योदकमनुदकं वा, स्विवषयपयर् वसाियन्यो िह बुद्यः।।
yadyevaṁ tadihāpi avasthādvaye’pi udakaṁ pratīyate satyodaka-
masatyodakaṁ ca. satyodakajñāne satyodakamavabhāti nā’satyoda-
64 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 221
If you say it is contradicted by itself, then does it mean it performs
contradiction or does it mean that it reveals contradiction?
Text: 222
यिद िकर्यते; अव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
yadi kriyate; avyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 222
If you say it does cause contradiction, and then question arises is it
identical or is it different?
Text: 223
यद्व्यित रक्ा; तदा बाधा िकर्यते इित आत्मा अनेनोत्पाद्ते। तच्च न जाघटीित स्वात्मिन
िकर्यािवरोधात्।
yadyavyatiriktā; tadā bādhā kriyate iti ātmā anenotpādyate. tacca
na jāghaṭīti svātmani kriyāvirodhāt.
Translation: 223
If you say it is identical, then when you say contradiction is caused,
it will mean by this its form is produced. But that does not fit in,
because, no action can be directed towards one’s own self.
Text: 224
अथ व्यित रक्ा िकर्यते; तथािप िवद्मानस्य कत्ृर्त्वं न पर्तीयमानस्याऽपलापः।
atha vyatiriktā kriyate; tathāpi vidyamānasya karttṛtvaṁ na
pratīyamānasyā’palāpaḥ.
Translation: 224
If you say that it does something different, even then the agency
should be ascribed to that which exists and one should not deny
the existence of that which is cognized.
Text: 225
अथ बाधा ज्ञाप्यते; साप्यिभन्ा, िभन्ा वा?
atha bādhā jñāpyate; sāpyabhinnā, bhinnā vā?
Translation: 225
If you say that contradiction is indicated, there also question arises,
contradiction is identical or different?
66 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 226
यद्िभन्ा; तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते। िकमुक्ं भवित? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते।
yadyabhinnā; tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate. kimuktaṁ bhavati? udakaṁ
jñāpyate.
Translation: 226
If you say that it is identical, then it will mean that the contradiction
is indicated by that. What does it amount to? It amounts to saying
that water is revealed.
Text: 227
अथ िभन्ा; तदा िवद्मानस्य ज्ञापकत्वं सद्ं, पर्तीयमानस्य चाऽ स्तत्वम्।
atha bhinnā; tadā vidyamānasya jñāpakatvaṁ siddhaṁ, pratīya-
mānasya cā’stitvam.
Translation: 227
If you say that contradiction is different, then it gets established
that whatever exists that implies and whatever is cognized exists.
Text: 228
अथ अथार्न्तरेण बाध्यते; तथािप िवद्मानयोबार्ध्यबाधकभावो भूपालयो रव, न चैकस्य
बाध्यबाधकभाव उपपद्ते।
atha arthāntareṇa bādhyate; tathāpi vidyamānayorbādhyabādha-
kabhāvo bhūpālayoriva, na caikasya bādhyabādhakabhāva upa-
padyate.
Translation: 228
Again, if you say that it is contradicted by something else, still,
the relationship of contradicting and contradicted, of two existent
things will be like the same relation between two kings. It is
not proper to say that such relationship of contradicting and
contradicted, is there with reference to only one thing.
Text: 229
बाधािप तेन पर्तीयमानस्य-िकं िकर्यते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
bādhāpi tena pratīyamānasya-kiṁ kriyate, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 229
What is the fact: is the contradiction of that which is cognized is
created by that? Or is it indicated?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 67
Text: 230
यिद िकर्यते; अव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
yadi kriyate; avyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 230
If you say it is created, the same question may be asked whether is
it identical or different?
Text: 231
यद्व्यित रक्ा; तदा अव्यित रक्ा बाधा उत्पाद्ते। िकमुक्ं भवेत्? उदकमुत्पाद्ते।
तदत्ु पादने च तत्संिवदोऽिमथ्यात्वम्।
yadyavyatiriktā; tadā avyatiriktā bādhā utpādyate. kimuktaṁ
bhavet? udakamutpādyate. tadutpādane ca tatsaṁvido’mithyātvam.
Translation: 231
If you say it is identical, then it will mean identical contradiction
is produced. What does it mean? It means water is produced and
with reference to production of that, the knowledge of that water
cannot be said to be false.
Text: 232
अथ व्यित रक्ोत्पाद्ते; तथािप तोयसम्ब न्धतयोपलब्धेरम्भस उपप त्नर् जातु देवदत्-
स्याऽसत्वे तन्यनव्यवहार सिद्ः।
atha vyatiriktotpādyate; tathāpi toyasambandhitayopalabdherambhasa
upapattirna jātu devadattasyā’sattve tannayanavyavahārasiddhiḥ.
Translation: 232
Again if you say, that it is different and it is produced, still, since it
is being known as related with water, it is possible to justify water.
It cannot be the case that if Devadatta is not there, the function of
his eyes (is there).
Text: 233
अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तदा साऽव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
atha jñāpyate; tadā sā’vyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 233
If you say it is indicated, there also the question arises, whether
that contradiction is identical or different.
68 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 234
यद्व्यित रक्ा ज्ञाप्यते; तदा बाधा तेन ज्ञाप्यते। िकमुक्ं भवित? उदकं ज्ञाप्यते।
yadyavyatiriktā jñāpyate; tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate. kimuktaṁ
bhavati? udakaṁ jñāpyate.
Translation: 234
If it indicated as identical, then the contradiction is indeed indicated
by that. What does it mean? The water is revealed.
Text: 235
अथ व्यित रक्ा सती ज्ञाप्यते; तथाप्युदकस्येयं बाधेित अन्यतन्तर्तया पर्ितभासनात्
नात्यन्ताभावोपप त्ः।
atha vyatiriktā satī jñāpyate; tathāpyudakasyeyaṁ bādheti anyata-
ntratayā pratibhāsanāt nātyantābhāvopapattiḥ.
Translation: 235
If you say that it indicates by being different, still this contradiction
is of water and therefore one cannot say that there is absolute
absence of water because it appears with the help of something else.
Text: 236
तस्मादथार्न्तरेणािप न बाधोपप त्ः।
tasmādarthāntareṇāpi na bādhopapattiḥ.
Translation: 236
Therefore, even if it is treated as a different entity, still,
contradiction cannot be explained.
Text: 237
अथ ज्ञानेन बाध्यते; िकं तिद्षयेण अन्यिवषयेण िनिवर् षयेण वा?
atha jñānena bādhyate; kiṁ tadviṣayeṇa anyaviṣayeṇa nirviṣayeṇa vā?
Translation: 237
If you say that it contradicted by knowledge, there the question
arises, is it contradicted by content of knowledge or by the content
of some other knowledge or by knowledge without content?
Text: 238
यिद तिद्षयेण; तदा तत् स्वरूपं िवधत्े न तु िवपयार्सयित तदाकारपयर् व सतरूपत्वात्।
yadi tadviṣayeṇa; tadā tat svarūpaṁ vidhatte na tu viparyāsayati
tadākāraparyavasitarūpatvāt.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 69
Translation: 238
If you say that it is contradicted by the content of that knowledge,
then it justifies its form and does not make it otherwise, because, it
is of the form which is contributed by the form of that knowledge.
Text: 239
अथ अन्यिवषयं बाधकम्; तदिप न युज्यते, यद् यिद्षयं तत्स्यैव सत्ां िवधत्े नत्वन्यस्य
िवधायकं पर्ितषेधकं वा। स्विवषयपयर् वसाियन्यो िह बुद्यः।
atha anyaviṣayaṁ bādhakam; tadapi na yujyate, yad yadviṣayaṁ
tattasyaiva sattāṁ vidhatte natvanyasya vidhāyakaṁ pratiṣedhakaṁ
vā. svaviṣayaparyavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ.
Translation: 239
If you say that object of some other knowledge is the contradicting
factor, that also is not proper, because, if X is the object of the
knowledge Y, then that X justifies the existence of Y. It cannot be
either the justifier or the prohibiter, because, the knowledges result
into referring to their own objects.
Text: 240
अथ िनिवर् षयेण बाध्यते; न िकिञ्द् िवदधाित पर्ितषेधित वा िनिवर् षयत्वादेव।
atha nirviṣayeṇa bādhyate; na kiñcid vidadhāti pratiṣedhati vā
nirviṣayatvādeva.
Translation: 240
If you say that it is contradicted by knowledge without content, then
it will mean that it neither enjoins anything nor negates anything,
because it does not have any content.
Text: 241
अथ ज्ञानं बाध्यते; तस्यािप बाधा का? - िकं स्वरूपव्यावृ त्रूपा, स्वरूपापह्वरूपा वा,
िवषयापहारलक्षणा वा?
atha jñānaṁ bādhyate; tasyāpi bādhā kā? - kiṁ svarūpavyāvṛttirūpā,
svarūpāpahnavarūpā vā, viṣayāpahāralakṣaṇā vā?
Translation: 241
You are saying that knowledge is contradicted, what is that
contradiction with reference to that knowledge? Is it of the form of
70 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
exclusion of its own form from the rest or is it of the form of denial
of its own form or is it of the form of snatching away its content?
Text: 242
तद्िद स्वरूपव्यावृ त्रूपा बाधा, तदा सवर् बा धतं स्यात् िवज्ञानस्य िवज्ञानान्तरेण
िनवर् (िनव)त्यर् मानत्वात्।
tadyadi svarūpavyāvṛttirūpā bādhā, tadā sarvaṁ bādhitaṁ syāt
vijñānasya vijñānāntareṇa nirva(niva)rtyamānatvāt.
Translation: 242
If you say that it is of nature of exclusion of its own form from
the rest and that is what you call contradiction, then everything
will become contradicted, because, one knowledge is contradicted
by another knowledge.
Text: 243
अथ स्वरूपापह्वरूपं(पा); तदयुक्म्; िमथ्योदकिवज्ञानस्यािप अनुभूयमानत्वात्।
atha svarūpāpahnavarūpaṁ(pā); tadayuktam; mithyodakavijñā-
nasyāpi anubhūyamānatvāt.
Translation: 243
If you say that it is of the form of denial of its own form, that
is not proper, because, even the knowledge of false water is being
experienced.
Text: 244
अथ िवषयापहारलक्षणा बाधा उच्यते; सािप न युक्ा। यथा च िवषयापहारो न शक्यते कत्ुर्
तथाऽनन्तरमेव िनवेिदतम्।
atha viṣayāpahāralakṣaṇā bādhā ucyate; sāpi na yuktā. yathā ca
viṣayāpahāro na śakyate karttuṁ tathā’nantarameva niveditam.
Translation: 244
If you say that it is of the form of snatching away its content and
that is what is called contradiction, that also is not proper. That it
is not possible to snatch away the content, which is being explained
later.
Text: 245
यिद न बाध्यते िकिमत्यसौ अथर् िकर्यां न करोित भावः?
yadi na bādhyate kimityasau arthakriyāṁ na karoti bhāvaḥ?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 71
Translation: 245
If you say that it is not contradicted, then does it mean that a
positive entity does not perform consistent interaction?
Text: 246
केयम् अथर् िकर्या या तेन न सम्पाद्ते पुस
ं ाम्-िकं िवज्ञानरूपा, पर्वृ त्रूपा, पर्ािप्रूपा,
सुखदःु खोत्पादभोगरूपा वा?
keyam arthakriyā yā tena na sampādyate puṁsām-kiṁ vijñānarūpā,
pravṛttirūpā, prāptirūpā, sukhaduḥkhotpādabhogarūpā vā?
Translation: 246
What is this consistency of behavior which is not brought about to
the people by that positive entity? (i) Is it of the form of knowledge?
(ii) Is it of the form of action (iii) Is it of the form of getting what
was shown by the knowledge? Or (iv) Is it of the form of experience
leading to happiness or unhappiness?
Text: 247
तद्िद िवज्ञानलक्षणां न करोित; तदयुक्म्; िवज्ञानलक्षणामथर् िकर्यां करोत्येव तोयम्।
tadyadi vijñānalakṣaṇāṁ na karoti; tadayuktam; vijñānalakṣaṇā-
marthakriyāṁ karotyeva toyam.
Translation: 247
If you say it does not produce knowledge that is not proper,
because, water does produce the consistent behavior in the form
of knowledge.
Text: 248
अथ पर्वृ त्रूपां न करोित; तदयुक्म्; पर्वृ त्िहर् पुरुषेच्छानुिवधाियनी नाथर् स्वरूप-
भावाभावावनुगमयित। पुरुषो िह कामतः पर्वत्र्ते वा न वा, नह्ेतावता तदभाव सिद्ः।
atha pravṛttirūpāṁ na karoti; tadayuktam; pravṛttirhi puruṣecchānu-
vidhāyinī nārthasvarūpabhāvābhāvāvanugamayati. puruṣo hi
kāmataḥ pravarttate vā na vā, nahyetāvatā tadabhāvasiddhiḥ.
Translation: 248
Again if you say, that it does not produce consistency in the form of
action, that also is not proper, because, an activity takes place as per
the desire of the person and does not cause the knowledge of either
72 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 255
अथ सवर् पर्ितपत्ॄणामथर् िकर्यां न करोित तेनाऽसत्वम्; एवं तिहर् सवर् भावानामसत्वपर्सङ्ः।
निह सवेर् भावाः सवर् पुरुषाथर् हेतवः।
atha sarvapratipattṝṇāmarthakriyāṁ na karoti tenā’sattvam; evaṁ
tarhi sarvabhāvānāmasattvaprasaṅgaḥ. nahi sarve bhāvāḥ sarva
puruṣārthahetavaḥ.
Translation: 255
If you say that it does not produce fruitful behavior of all those who
know it and therefore it does not exist, in that case, it will lead to
the contingency of non-existence of all positive entities. It is not the
case that all positive entities are the cause of desired goals of all
human beings.
Text: 256
न च सवर् पुरुषाथर् िकर्यािवहीनमेतिदत्यवगन्तुं पायर् ते अवार् ग्वदा।
na ca sarvapuruṣārthakriyāvihīnametadityavagantuṁ pāryate
arvāgvidā.
Translation: 256
It is also not possible to know that this is devoid of fruitful action
of all human beings by a person who knows before.
Text: 257
तस्मात् स्थतमेतद् अव्यिभचा रपदमनथर् कम्।
tasmāt sthitametad avyabhicāripadamanarthakam.
Translation: 257
Therefore, one can conclude that the clause “not erroneous” is
purposeless.
[७. भर्मस्य स्मृितत्वं स्वीकुवर् तां पर्ाभाकराणां मतस्य िवकल्प्य िनरसनम्।]
[7. bhramasya smṛtitvaṁ svīkurvatāṁ prābhākarāṇāṁ matasya
vikalpya nirasanam.]
Text: 258
अन्ये तु मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानस्य स्मृितत्वं पर्ितपद्न्ते न भर्ा न्तरूपताम्।
anye tu marīcyudakavijñānasya smṛtitvaṁ pratipadyante na
bhrāntirūpatām.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 75
Translation: 258
Others (Prābhākaras) however believe that the knowledge of water
in the mirage which he remembers of water is not an illusion.
Text: 259
तस्य कथं स्मृितत्वं-िकमुदकगृहीितत्वेन गृहीतोदकगृहीितत्वेन वा उदकगर्हणानन्तर-
कालभािवत्वेन वा िनिवर् षयत्वेन वा 'यमहमदर्ाक्षम्' इत्यनेनाऽऽकारेण उपजायमानत्वेन वा?
tasya kathaṁ smṛtitvam-kimudakagṛhītitvena, gṛhītodakagṛhītitvena
vā udakagrahaṇānantarakālabhāvitvena vā nirviṣayatvena vā ‘yam
ahamadrākṣam’ ityanenā’kāreṇa upajāyamānatvena vā?
Translation: 259
There we can ask how is it called remembrance? (a) Is it a
remembrance which reveals water or (b) is it a remembrance which
reveals water which was known before or (c) is it a remembrance
because it occurs after the knowledge of water or (d) is it
remembrance having no content or (e) is it a remembrance which
arises in the form such as “this is what I saw before”.
Text: 260
तद्िद उदकगृहीितत्वेन; तदा सवोर्दकिवज्ञानानां स्मृितत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi udakagṛhītitvena; tadā sarvodakavijñānānāṁ smṛtitva-
prasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 260
If it is a remembrance “as knowledge of water” then, all knowledges
of water will become remembrance.
Text: 261
अथ गृहीतोदकगृहीितत्वेन स्मृितत्वम्; तदाऽऽद्स्यािप गृहीतोदकगृहीितत्वे स्मृितत्वं
पर्सज्यते, गृहीतोदकगर्ािहत्वािवशेषात्।
atha gṛhītodakagṛhītitvena smṛtitvam; tadā’dyasyāpi gṛhītodaka-
gṛhītitve smṛtitvaṁ prasajyate, gṛhītodakagrāhitvāviśeṣāt.
Translation: 261
If it is a remembrance which reveals water which was known before,
then, if the first knowledge is also the knowledge of water which was
known before and so that knowledge also will become remembrance,
76 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 269
तथा आनुमािनकमिप िवज्ञान(नं) गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन स्मृितत्वमापद्ते।
tathā ānumānikamapi vijñāna(naṁ) gṛhītārthagrāhitvena smṛti-
tvamāpadyate.
Translation: 269
Likewise, the inferential cognition also will become remembrance
since it reveals something which was already known.
Text: 270
अथ उदकगर्हणोत्रकालभािवत्वेन स्मृितत्वम्;
atha udakagrahaṇottarakālabhāvitvena smṛtitvam;
Translation: 270
Well, remembrance is that knowledge, which occurs after the
knowledge of water.
Text: 271
तदा संस्कारस्य स्मरणरूपता पर्ाप्नोित, उदकगर्हणोत्रकालभािवत्वेन, रससंवेदनस्य च।
tadā saṁskārasya smaraṇarūpatā prāpnoti, udakagrahaṇottarakāla-
bhāvitvena, rasasaṁvedanasya ca.
Translation: 271
Reply:
Then, the impression “produced by experience” will become
remembrance because, impression also occurs only after experience.
Also, the experience of taste, will become remembrance.
Text: 272
अथ िनिवर् षयत्वेन स्मृितरूपता उच्यते; तदयुक्म्; पूवोर्िदतानुभवावेिदताथर् कारावेदकत्वेन
उदीयमानायाः कथं िनिवर् षयत्वम्?
atha nirviṣayatvena smṛtirūpatā ucyate; tadayuktam; pūrvoditā-
nubhavāveditārthakārāvedakatvena udīyamānāyāḥ kathaṁ nirviṣa-
yatvam?
Translation: 272
If you say that the knowledge of water in the mirage is remembrance
because it is contentless, it will be improper, because, as this
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 79
Translation: 275
Clarification:
Knowledge which arises in the form viz. “I saw” will be a
remembrance.
Text: 276
तदयुक्म्; 'इहोदकिम'त्यनेनाकारेणोपजायमानायाः कथम् 'अदर्ाक्षिम'त्येवंरूपतोपपद्ते?
tadayuktam; ‘ihodakami’tyanenākāreṇopajāyamānāyāḥ katham
‘adrākṣami’ityevaṁrūpatopapadyate?
Translation: 276
Reply:
It is also not proper, because, when knowledge of water in the
mirage has arisen in the form “here there is water”, how can it
be explained having the form viz. I saw?
Text: 277
अथ िवपर्मुिष[त]ता अनया भङ्ग्या उपजायते।
atha vipramuṣi[ta]tā anayā bhaṅgyā upajāyate.
Translation: 277
The erasing of that knowledge can be explained as follows:
[८. पर्सङ्ात् िवपर्मोषपरीक्षा। ]
[8. prasaṅgāt vipramoṣaparīkṣā. ]
Text: 277a
कोऽयं िवपर्मोषो नाम? िकमनुभवाकारस्वीकरणम्, स्मरणाकारपर्ध्वंसो वा,
अपूवार्थर्गृहीितत्वं वा, इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वं वा, इ न्दर्याथार्ऽसिन्कषर् जत्वं वा?
ko’yaṁ vipramoṣo nāma? kimanubhavākārasvīkaraṇam, smaraṇā-
kārapradhvaṁso vā, apūrvārthagṛhītitvaṁ vā, indriyārthasanni-
karṣajatvaṁ vā, indriyārthā’sannikarṣajatvaṁ vā?
Translation: 277a
If you say, such knowledge arises in the form in which some part
is erased; we would like to ask you, what is this erasing? (a) Does
it mean acceptance of the form of experience? (b) Does it mean
destruction of the form of remembrance? Or (c) Does it mean
revealing something new? Or (d) Does it mean the state of being
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 81
Translation: 284
Therefore, as we go on analyzing erasing of remembrance, deeper
and deeper, it does not withstand logic.
Text: 285
तस्मात् मरीच्युदकिवज्ञानस्य न स्मृितिवपर्मोषरूपता अिप तु िवपरीतख्याितत्वं
सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वं वा।
tasmāt marīcyudakavijñānasya na smṛtivipramoṣarūpatā api tu
viparītakhyātitvaṁ samyagjñānatvaṁ vā.
Translation: 285
Therefore, the knowledge of water in the mirage is not of the form
of erasing of remembrance, but either of the form of knowledge of
the contrary or the form of a true cognition.
Translation: 296
If you say that property which appears is of the nature of manhood,
the same question can be asked, whether that manness is real or
unreal.
Text: 297
यिद ता त्वकः; कथं तद्द्
ु े: सन्देहरूपता?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; kathaṁ tadbuddheḥ sandeharūpatā?
Translation: 297
If you say real, then how can that knowledge be called doubtful?
Text: 298
अथ अता त्वकः तदा अव्यिभचा रपदेन अपोिदतत्वाद् व्यवसायात्मकपदं न साधीयः।
atha atāttvikaḥ tadā avyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt vyavasāyātma-
kapadaṁ na sādhīyaḥ.
Translation: 298
If you say unreal, then this has already been excluded by the clause
“that which is erroneous” and therefore the presence of the clause
which is of nature of determinate cognition cannot be justified.
Text: 299
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदा उभयोस्ता त्वकत्वम्, अता त्वकत्वं वा,
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā ubhayostāttvikatvam, atāttvikatvaṁ vā,
Translation: 299
If you say, that what appears in the knowledge is of nature of both
real and unreal, then, either both are true, or both are false?
Text: 300
अथ एकस्य ता त्वकत्वम्, अन्यस्याता त्वकत्वम्? तद्िद उभयोस्ता त्वकत्वम्; तदा
तिद्ज्ञानस्य ता त्वकत्वमेव, न सन्देहात्मता।
atha ekasya tāttvikatvam, anyasyātāttvikatvam? tadyadi ubhayostā-
ttvikatvam; tadā tadvijñānasya tāttvikatvameva, na sandehātmatā.
Translation: 300
If you say if one is real, and other is unreal, there if both are true,
then the knowledge of both will be true and that knowledge cannot
be said to be of nature of doubt.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 87
Text: 301
अथ उभावप्यता त्वकौ; तदा तिद्ज्ञानस्य िवपयर् यरूपता, न सन्देहात्मता।
atha ubhāvapyatāttvikau; tadā tadvijñānasya viparyayarūpatā, na
sandehātmatā.
Translation: 301
If you say both are unreal, then the knowledge of that will be of
knowledge of nature of contrary or nature of opposite, but not a
doubtful knowledge.
Text: 302
अथ एकस्य ता त्वकत्वमन्यस्याऽता त्वकत्वम्; तदा तदेव ज्ञानं व्यिभचा र तदेवाऽव्य-
िभचा र अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वाद् व्यिभचा र, ता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वादव्यिभचा र।
atha ekasya tāttvikatvamanyasyā’tāttvikatvam; tadā tadeva jñānaṁ
vyabhicāri tadevā’vyabhicāri atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpatvād vyabhicāri,
tāttvikārthagṛhītirūpatvādavyabhicāri.
Translation: 302
If you say one is real, and the other one is unreal, then that very
knowledge becomes erroneous and that very knowledge become
non-erroneous, since one reveals the unreal object, and therefore
is erroneous, and the other reveals the real object and therefore it
is not erroneous.
Text: 303
एतेन िद्चन्दर्ज्ञानमुद्ािटतम्। ततर् िह दर्व्याकारः पर्ितभाित न गुणाकारः।
etena dvicandrajñānamudghāṭitam. tatra hi dravyākāraḥ pratibhāti
na guṇākāraḥ.
Translation: 303
By the same argument, the knowledge of two moons is also
explained. In that knowledge what appears is a form of substance
and not of the form of quality.
Text: 304
अथ स न्दग्धाथार्कारपर्ितभा स सन्देहज्ञानिमित चेत्;
atha sandigdhārthākārapratibhāsi sandehajñānamiti cet;
88 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 304
Clarification:
Well, the knowledge which reveals doubtful form of an object is
called a doubtful knowledge.
Text: 305
स स न्दग्धोऽथोर् िवद्ते वा न वा?
sa sandigdho’rtho vidyate vā na vā?
Translation: 305
Reply:
We would like to know, whether that doubtful knowledge exists or
not.
Text: 306
तद्िद िवद्ते; कथं तत्संवेदनस्य सन्देहरूपता अबा धताथर् गृहीितरूपत्वात् सत्योदक-
संवेदनवत्?
tadyadi vidyate; kathaṁ tatsaṁvedanasya sandeharūpatā abādhi-
tārthagṛhītirūpatvāt satyodakasaṁvedanavat?
Translation: 306
If that exists, then how can the knowledge of that would be form
of doubt, because, that knowledge, reveals an object which is not
contradicted like the perception of real water?
Text: 307
अथ न िवद्ते; तदाऽव्यिभचा रपदेन अपोिदतत्वाद् व्यवसायात्मकपदमपाथर् कम्।
atha na vidyate; tadā’vyabhicāripadena apoditatvāt vyavasāyātma-
kapadamapārthakam.
Translation: 307
If you say that it does not exist, then, by the clause “which is not
erroneous” itself that has been excluded, and therefore again, the
clause “which is of the nature of a determinate cognition” becomes
purposeless.
Text: 308
अ[थ न िकं]िचदिप पर्ितभाित; न तिहर् तस्य इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् ज[त्वम्], भर्ान्तोदक-
िवज्ञानवत्। तस्माद् व्यवसायात्मकपदमिप अनुपादेयम्।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 89
Text: 309
अव्यपदेश्यपदञ् यथा न साधीयः तथा लक्षणसारे दर्ष्व्यम्।
avyapadeśyapadañca yathā na sādhīyaḥ tathā lakṣaṇasāre
draṣṭavyam.
Translation: 309
We have discussed (in detail) how the clause “that which is not
named or verbalized” is not justifiable in the definition of perception.
For that one should see the text Lakṣaṇasāra (composed by me).
Text: 310
तथा, इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जत्वमिप नोपपद्ते तद्गत्यभावात्। इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषोर् िह
व्यविहताथार्नुपल ब्ध लङ्ो वा, आ[वरण लङ्ो वा], तदत्ु पािदतघटािदज्ञानावसेयो वा?
tathā, indriyārthasannikarṣajatvamapi nopapadyate tadgatyabhāvāt.
indriyārthasannikarṣo hi vyavahitārthānupalabdhiliṅgo vā, ā[vara-
ṇaliṅgo vā], tadutpāditaghaṭādijñānāvaseyo vā?
Translation: 310
Similarly, the clause “which is produced by the contact between the
sense organ and object” also is not justified, because, there is no way
by which it can be known. Is the contact between the sense organ
90 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 317
If you say that the form produced by the contact between the sense
organ and object is different from knowledge, then that should
cause the knowledge and not the form of knowledge. Even that
cannot be called producer of knowledge, because it cannot cause
that knowledge.
Text: 318
िकञ्, तदत्ु पन्म् इ न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषार्द ् िवज्ञानं स्वरूपेणावगाहनीयम्, ततो व्यािप्स्मरणम्,
तदनु परामशर् ज्ञानम्, ततोऽनुमेयावगित रित। न च एतावन्तं कालं िवज्ञानं स्थितपदं
बध्नाित, आशुभािवत्वेन पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वात् ।
kiñca, tadutpannam indriyārthasannikarṣād vijñānaṁ svarūpeṇā-
vagāhanīyam, tato vyāptismaraṇam, tadanu parāmarśajñānam,
tato’numeyāvagatiriti. na ca etāvantaṁ kālaṁ vijñānaṁ sthitipadaṁ
badhnāti, āśubhāvitvena pratyastamitatvāt.
Translation: 318
Moreover, first of all, that knowledge produced from the contact
between the sense organ and object, should be known in its
own form. Then, there should be remembrance of invariable
concomitance. That will be followed by a confirmatory knowledge
and then the inferential knowledge of that contact can arise. The
initial knowledge however, cannot continue to exist for such a longer
duration, because, as the knowledge comes quickly, it goes quickly.
Text: 319
अथ बुद्ध्यारूढेन धमर् धिमर् न्यायेन प रकल्प्यते अनुमानम्;
atha buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharminyāyena parikalpyate anumānam;
Translation: 319
Clarification:
Well, we can postulate a mental process of inference, as we do on
the basis of the principle of locus and located.
Text: 320
तदा अवास्तवं पर्ाप्नोित सुगतानुमानवत्।
tadā avāstavaṁ prāpnoti sugatānumānavat.
94 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 320
Reply:
Then the whole thing will become unreal like the inference of the
Buddhists.
Text: 321
तथा, इ न्दर्योत्पाद्त्वमिप नोपपद्ते, इ न्दर्योत्पाद्त्वाितरेकानवगतेः।
tathā, indriyotpādyatvamapi nopapadyate, indriyotpādyatvātirekā-
navagateḥ.
Translation: 321
In the same way, even this cannot be justified that perceptual
knowledge is produced by the sense-organ, because, we do not know
whether the perceptual knowledge is also produced by something
other than the sense-organ.
Text: 322
िवज्ञानं स्वभावतयैव वेद्ते, नाकारान्तरेण, तज्ज्ञप्ौ वा ज्ञानाकारिवरहपर्सङ्ः।
vijñānaṁ svabhāvatayaiva vedyate, nākārāntareṇa, tajjñaptau vā
jñānākāravirahaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 322
Knowledge is known by its own nature and not by any other form
and if it is known by any other form then it will result into loosing
the form of knowledge.
Text: 323
न च ज्ञानम् इ न्दर्यसम्बद्ं दृष्ं, येन तदपु लभ्यमानम् इ न्दर्यं गमयित।
na ca jñānam indriyasambaddhaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ, yena tadupalabhya-
mānam indriyaṁ gamayati.
Translation: 323
We have not come across any knowledge connected with the sense
organ, had it been so, it would have caused the knowledge of the
sense organ in the form of being known.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 95
Text: 324
अथ िकर्या अन्यतर् करणसाध्या दृष्ा। सैव गिमकाऽस्तु यस्याः करणसम्बन्धोऽवगतः।
atha kriyā anyatra karaṇasādhyā dṛṣṭā. saiva gamikā’stu yasyāḥ
karaṇasambandho’vagataḥ.
Translation: 324
Objection:
Well, we do find action somewhere else i.e. in another locus produced
by an instrument, let that action be the causer of the knowledge
with which relationship of instrument is understood.
Text: 325
न चान्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्य गमकत्वं िकिञ्त्साम्यादपु पद्ते। न जातु देवदत्नयननील-
सम्बन्धे सित यज्ञदत्े न्दर्यं घटािदकमथर् म् असित सम्बन्धे करणत्वसाम्यात् पर्काशयद् दृष्म्।
na cānyasya sambandhe anyasya gamakatvaṁ kiñcitsāmyādupapa-
dyate. na jātu devadattanayananīlasambandhe sati yajñadattend-
riyaṁ ghaṭādikamartham asati sambandhe karaṇatvasāmyāt prakā-
śayad dṛṣṭam.
Translation: 325
Reply:
It will not be proper to say that on the basis of some similarity,
X has the relationship and Y can cause the knowledge. No one
has seen that, if there is a relationship of something blue with the
eyes of Devadatta, then the sense organ of Yajñadatta causes the
perception of pot etc. even if there is no relationship simply on the
basis of similarity of an instrument.
Text: 326
ै पर्कारेण पयुर्दस्तो वेिदतव्यः।
तथा, अथर् जन्याकारोऽिप िवज्ञाने अनेनव
tathā, arthajanyākāro’pi vijñāne anenaiva prakāreṇa paryudasto
veditavyaḥ.
Translation: 326
In the same way, the argument of knowledge having a form produced
by the object, should be known as rejected on the basis of this very
logic.
96 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 329
In the same way, it cannot produce knowledge with some additional
feature being born in it, which is not different from itself, because,
its form of not being a causal factor still continues. If you say it
does not continue, then, the additional feature is not different from
the object.
Text: 330
अथ व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन जन्यते तथािप नो[पपद्]ते, अकारकाकारानितवृत्ेः।
अितवृत्ौ वा आयातं क्षिणकत्वम्।
atha vyatiriktopajātātiśayena janyate tathāpi no[papadya]te, akāra-
kākārānativṛtteḥ. ativṛttau vā āyātaṁ kṣaṇikatvam.
Translation: 330
If you say that knowledge is produced by the object, which has
additional feature which is born at the same time which is different
from itself, even then, it is not justifiable, because, the form of not
being a causal factor has not ceased to exist and if you say that it has
over-extended the one cannot stop it from becoming momentary.
Text: 331
ततश्च ने न्दर्याथर् सिन्कषर् जं िवज्ञानं पर्त्यक्षलक्षणम्।
tataśca nendriyārthasannikarṣajaṁ vijñānaṁ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam.
Translation: 331
From all this we conclude that a cognition which is produced by
the contact of the sense organ with the object, it cannot be called
the definition of a perceptual cognition.
0.3 मीमांसकसम्मतस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्य परीक्षा।
[mīmāṁsakasammatasya pramāṇalakṣaṇasya parīkṣā.]
(Refutation of the definition of pramāṇa as accepted by the
Mīmāṁsakas)
Text: 332
अन्ये तु अन धगताथर् गन्तृत्वेन पर्माणलक्षणमिभदधित। ते त्वयुक्वािदनो दर्ष्व्याः।
anye tu anadhigatārthagantṛtvena pramāṇalakṣaṇamabhidadhati. te
tvayuktavādino draṣṭavyāḥ.
98 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 332
Others (Mīmāṁsakas) say that the general definition of pramāṇa
is that knowledge which reveals an object, which was not known
before. They should be looked upon as such scholars, who do not
talk rationally.
Text: 333
कथमयुक्वािदता तेषािमित चेत्;
kathamayuktavāditā teṣāmiti cet;
Translation: 333
Objection:
How do you say that they do not talk logically?
Text: 334
उच्यते-िविभन्कारकोत्पािदतैकाथर् िवज्ञानानां यथाव्यव स्थतैकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वाऽिवशेषेऽिप
पूवोर्त्पन्िवज्ञानस्य पर्ामाण्यं नोत्रस्य इत्यतर् िनयामकं वक्व्यम्।
ucyate-vibhinnakārakotpāditaikārthavijñānānāṁ yathāvyavasthitai-
kārthagṛhītirūpatvā’viśeṣe’pi pūrvotpannavijñānasya prāmāṇyam
nottarasya ityatra niyāmakaṁ vaktavyam.
Translation: 334
Reply:
We say so due to the following: When, the knowledges of an object
produced by different causal factors do not show any difference,
in their form viz. being the revealer of that single object as it is,
they say that the knowledge that has arisen before, is authentic,
whereas the knowledge that has arisen later, is not. What should
be the deciding factor? They should spell out.
Text: 335
अथ यथाव्यव स्थताथर् गृहीितरूपत्वािवशेषेऽिप पूवोर्त्पन्िवज्ञानस्य पर्ामाण्यमुपपद्ते न
पर्थमोत्रिवज्ञानस्य;
atha yathāvyavasthitārthagṛhītirūpatvāviśeṣe’pi pūrvotpannavijñā-
nasya prāmāṇyamupapadyate na prathamottaravijñānasya;
Translation: 335
Clarification:
Well, when there is no difference in the form viz. being the revealer
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 99
of one and the same object, as it is and still it is proper to hold that
the knowledge that was produced before is alone dependable, and
not the knowledge that followed the first knowledge.
Text: 336
तदा अनेनव ै न्यायेन पर्थमस्याप्यपर्ामाण्यं पर्सक्ं गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वाऽिवशेषात्। यथा
एकनीलस्वलक्षणावभा सतयुगपदत्ु पन्ानेकनीलिवज्ञानानां नीलैकाथर् गृहीितरूपता न
िभद्ते, तथा पूवार्परोत्पन्िवज्ञानानामिप गृहीताथर् गृहीितरूपता न िनवत्स्यर् ित।
tadā anenaiva nyāyena prathamasyāpyaprāmāṇyaṁ prasaktaṁ
gṛhītārthagrāhitvā’viśeṣāt. yathā ekanīlasvalakṣaṇāvabhāsitayugapa-
dutpannānekanīlavijñānānāṁ nīlaikārthagṛhītirūpatā na bhidyate,
tathā pūrvāparotpannavijñānānāmapi gṛhītārthagṛhītirūpatā na
nivartsyati.
Translation: 336
Reply:
Then on the same logic the first logic should also be declared as
non-dependable, because, that is also not different from having the
nature of being the revealer of the object which was known. As the
knowledges of a blue thing simultaneously occurring at the time of
the knowledge which reveals one blue thing, do not show difference
of their form of being the revealer of the same one blue thing. In
the same way, the knowledges occurring the earlier knowledge will
not give up their form of being the revealer of something which was
known.
Text: 337
अथा(थ) िनयतिवषयत्वं पूवोर्त्रिवज्ञानयोः-पूवोर्त्पन्िवज्ञानम् अन धगताथार्कार-
स्वीकरणमुखेन उपादीयते, उत्रं तु अ धगताथार्कारिवषयमुपजायते।
athā(tha) niyataviṣayatvaṁ pūrvottaravijñānayoḥ-pūrvotpannavijñā-
nam anadhigatārthākārasvīkaraṇamukhena upādīyate, uttaraṁ tu
adhigatārthākāraviṣayamupajāyate.
Translation: 337
Clarification:
Let us accept that the one and the same object appears in the
earlier knowledge and also in the subsequent knowledge. In that
case, we accept the knowledge which was produced earlier, as having
100 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
the form which was not known before. Whereas, the subsequent
knowledge, reveals the form which was already known.
Text: 338
यिद गृहीताथर् िवषयत्वम्; कथं पर्ितिनयतिवषयत्वम्? अथ पर्ितिनयतिवषयत्वम्; कथं
गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वम्, िनयतिवषयत्वगृहीतगर्ािहत्वयोिवर् रोधात्?
yadi gṛhītārthaviṣayatvam; kathaṁ pratiniyataviṣayatvam? atha
pratiniyataviṣayatvam; kathaṁ gṛhītārthagrāhitvam, niyataviṣaya-
tvagṛhītagrāhitvayorvirodhāt?
Translation: 338
Reply:
Here, we would like to know if the knowledge is called knowledge in
which object is known, then how we can say that each knowledge
has the same object? And if each knowledge has the same object,
then how can the knowledge be called a revealer of an object which
was known? Because, there is a contradiction between the property
of being a specific object of knowledge and the property of being a
revealer of something which was already known.
Text: 339
यिद च िनयतिवषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरिप पर्ामाण्यम् अन धगताथर् गन्तृत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
yadi ca niyataviṣayatvam; tadā ubhayorapi prāmāṇyam anadhigatā-
rthagantṛtvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 339
If it is accepted that knowledges have specific object then both
the knowledges should be treated as authentic, because both
the knowledges share the characteristics of being the revealer of
something which is not known.
Text: 340
अथ एकिवषयत्वम्; तदा उभयोरिप पर्ामाण्यमपर्ामाण्यं वा गृहीतगर्ािहत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
atha ekaviṣayatvam; tadā ubhayorapi prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṁ vā
gṛhītagrāhitvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 340
If you say both the knowledges are of one and the same object, then
both the knowledges should be either authentic or non-authentic,
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 101
Translation: 343
There if you say that the remembrance has the same form, which
was revealed in the earlier experience, then that should be treated
as a result of the authentic knowledge and that cannot be avoided
because, the remembrance also shares the same property of being the
revealer of the object which was known. Therefore, it is not proper.
Text: 344
एवं च स्मृितसंज्ञकं सप्मं पर्माणं पर्सक्ं मीमांसकानाम्।
evañca smṛtisaṁjñakaṁ saptamaṁ pramāṇaṁ prasaktaṁ mīmā-
ṁsakānām.
Translation: 344
In that case, the Mīmāṁsakas should accept the seventh pramāṇa
called remembrance.
Text: 345
अथ पूवर्िवज्ञानानवधा रताथर् िवषया; यद्ेवं कथं तस्याः पर्माणफलत्वमपनेतुं पायर् ते?
आद्ानुभवस्यै(स्ये)व स्मृितरूपता च न पर्ाप्नोित। दृष्शर्ुताथर् िवषया िह स्मृितनार्गृहीता-
थर् िवषया।
atha pūrvavijñānānavadhāritārthaviṣayā; yadyevaṁ kathaṁ tasyāḥ
pramāṇaphalatvamapanetuṁ pāryate? ādyānubhavasyai(sye)va
smṛtirūpatā ca na prāpnoti. dṛṣṭaśrutārthaviṣayā hi smṛtirnāgṛhītā-
rthaviṣayā.
Translation: 345
If you say that the remembrance has its object which is not known
by the earlier knowledge, if you say so, how can its property of being
the result of a dependable knowledge are removed. One cannot say
that the first experience is of the form of a remembrance, because
remembrance is that in which either something seen appears as
its content or something heard appears as its content and never
something which is not known.
Text: 346
अथ िनिवर् षया इष्यते; तदा न गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन स्मृतेरपर्ामाण्यम् अिप तु केशोण्डु क-
संवेदनविन्िवर् षयत्वेन।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 103
have five servants” which reflect the forms of the objects, which were
experienced before. Knowledge called remembrance always reflects,
the form of an object, which was experienced before.
Text: 350
अथ स्मृितिवज्ञानकाले पूवर्पर्बोधिवषयीकृताथर् स्य पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वान् तिद्षयत्वम्। एवं च
िनिवर् षयत्वेन स्मृतेरपर्ामाण्यं न गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन इत्युक्म्।
atha smṛtivijñānakāle pūrvaprabodhaviṣayīkṛtārthasya pratyasta-
mitatvānna tadviṣayatvam. evaṁ ca nirviṣayatvena smṛteraprāmā-
ṇyaṁ na gṛhītārthagrāhitvena ityuktam.
Translation: 350
If you say, at the time of the knowledge viz. remembrance the
object which was the content of the earlier knowledge is no more,
and therefore we say that, that is not the content of remembrance.
If it is so, then remembrance is not dependable not because it is
contentless, but not on the ground of its being the revealer of that
object which was known.
Text: 351
यिद च अवधा रताथर् िवषयं पर्माणमपर्माणमुपपाद्ते तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य अपर्ामाण्यमा-
पनीपद्ेत।
yadi ca avadhāritārthaviṣayaṁ pramāṇamapramāṇamupapādyate
tadā’numānajñānasya aprāmāṇyamāpanīpadyeta.
Translation: 351
If you say, a dependable knowledge which has a definite object as
its content is being presented as not dependable, then an inferential
knowledge also will not become dependable.
Text: 352
तदेव कथम्?
tadeva katham?
Translation: 352
How can it be so?
Text: 353
कथ्यते-यदेव अिवनाभावसम्बन्धगर्हणकालावधा रतमिग्त्वसामान्यं लङ्ाजहद्ृ त्त्वेन
पर्त्यक्षेण तदेव अनुमानादवगच्छित, आहो स्वत् पावकस्वरूपम्, मत्वथर् वा, लङ्व्यापार-
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 105
viz. arthāpatti and that will result into all human behaviors such
as “there is fire there” “please bring fire” etc.
Text: 355
अथ मा भूदेतद्व्यवहारहािन रित चेत् पूवार्वधा रतेप्यथेर् अनुमानस्या(स्य) पर्ामाण्य-
मभ्युपेयते;
atha mā bhūdetadvyavahārahāniriti cet pūrvāvadhāritepyarthe anu-
mānasyā(sya) prāmāṇyamabhyupeyate;
Translation: 355
Clarification:
Well, let us not lose such a behavior and we do accept the
authenticity of an inferential knowledge which reveals an object
which was already known.
Text: 356
तदा अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणमपाथर् कं शर्ोितर्याणािमित।
tadā anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇamapārthakaṁ śrotriyāṇāmiti.
Translation: 356
Reply:
In that case, the clause “that which reveals an object which was not
known before” becomes purposeless for the Mīmāṁsakas.
Text: 357
अथ पावकस्वरूपमनुिममीषे; तत् लङ्ाजहद्ृ त्त्वेन पूवर्मवधा रतं वा, न वा?
atha pāvakasvarūpamanumimīṣe; tat liṅgājahadvṛttitvena pūrvama-
vadhāritaṁ vā, na vā?
Translation: 357
If you say that you will infer the nature of fire by the inference there
the question will arise, will that fire be known before through the
relation of invariable concomitance with the ground viz. the smoke
or not?
Text: 358
यिद पूवोर्पलब्धम्; अ धगताथर् िवषयत्वमायातमनुमानस्य।
yadi pūrvopalabdham; adhigatārthaviṣayatvamāyātamanumānasya.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 107
Translation: 358
If you say the known fire will be inferred, then obviously the content
of inferential cognition becomes something which is already known.
Text: 359
अथ न पूवोर्पलब्धम्; अव्यापकोऽिग्ः अनुमानात्िहर् पर्तीयते, तदभ्युपगमे तृणजलािद-
िवषयमप्यनुमानं पर्सज्यते।
atha na pūrvopalabdham; avyāpako’gniḥ anumānāttarhi pratīyate,
tadabhyupagame tṛṇajalādiviṣayamapyanumānaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 359
If you say that such fire that was known before will be inferred, it
will mean, in that case, that such fire is being inferred by inference
which is not the pervader of ground viz. the smoke and if that is
accepted then one can have inferential knowledge of grass, water
etc. from the knowledge of smoke (which is absurd).
Text: 360
अथ मत्वथोर्ऽनुमीयते स पूवार्वधा रतो वा, न वा?
atha matvartho’numīyate sa pūrvāvadhārito vā, na vā?
Translation: 360
If you say a qualified thing (the subject qualified by the thing to be
inferred) there again the question arises, whether that is known or not?
Text: 361
यद्वधा रत: कथम् अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणम् अनुमाने सम्भवित?
yadyavadhāritaḥ katham anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇam anumāne
sambhavati?
Translation: 361
If you say it is known, then how can the qualifying clause “which
reveals something which is not known before” will fit into the
inferential cognition?
Text: 362
अथ नैवावगतः; तदानीं जलतृणािदिवषयमप्यनुमानं पर्सज्येत इत्युक्म्।
atha naivāvagataḥ; tadānīṁ jalatṛṇādiviṣayamapyanumānaṁ prasa-
jyeta ityuktam.
108 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 362
If you say it is not known, then we have already said that from
anything there will arise the cognition of water, grass etc. etc.
Text: 363
अथ लङ्व्यापारसमानकालीना स्तत्वम् अिग्सामान्यस्य अनुमीयते; तदनुमानव्यापार-
समानकालीना स्तत्वम् अिग्त्वसामान्याद् व्यित रक्म्, अव्यित रक्ं वा?
atha liṅgavyāpārasamānakālīnāstitvam agnisāmānyasya anumīyate;
tadanumānavyāpārasamānakālīnāstitvam agnitvasāmānyād vyati-
riktam, avyatiriktaṁ vā?
Translation: 363
If you say through inference, what is inferred is the existence of
fire universal occurring at the same time of the function of the
ground i.e. the smoke, there we may ask, whether the existence
of the universal of fire existing at the time of the function of the
ground is different from the universal of fireness or identical.
Text: 364
तद्िद अव्यित रक्म्; तदानीं पूवोर्पलब्धा स्तत्विवषयमेवानुमानम्, कथमन धगताथर् गन्तृ-
िवशेषणमपाथर् कं न भवेत्?
tadyadi avyatiriktam; tadānīṁ pūrvopalabdhāstitvaviṣayamevānumā-
nam, kathamanadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇamapārthakaṁ na bhavet?
Translation: 364
If you say it is identical, then it is the inferential knowledge of the
same object viz. the existence which was known before and in that
case, how are you going to say that the qualification “which reveals
the object which was not known before” is not meaningless?
Text: 365
अथ व्यित रक्म्; त त्कं पूवोर्पलब्धम्, अनुपलब्धं वा?
atha vyatiriktam; tatkiṁ pūrvopalabdham, anupalabdhaṁ vā?
Translation: 365
If you say it is different, there also the question will arise, whether
it was known before or not known at all.
Text: 366
यिद पूवोर्पलब्धम्; तिद्षयत्वेऽनुमानस्य नाऽन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणमुपपद्ते।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 109
before and in that case how such a cognition will be called authentic
according to you?
Text: 371
अथ िभन्म्; तद् अिवनाभािवसम्बन्धगर्हणकाले लङ्व्यापकत्वेन अवधा रतं वा,
atha bhinnam; tad avinābhāvisambandhagrahaṇakāle liṅgavyāpa-
katvena avadhāritaṁ vā,
Translation: 371
If however, if you say it is different, then at the time of knowledge
of invariable concomitance, whether it was known at pervader of
the ground or not?
Text: 372
न वा? यद्वधा रतम्; कथमन धगताथर् िवषयमनुमानम्?
na vā? yadyavadhāritam; kathamanadhigatārthaviṣayamanumānam?
Translation: 372
If you say it was known, then how can inferential knowledge of
something which was not known before?
Text: 373
अथ लङ्व्यापकत्वेना[न]वगतम्; तदा तिद्षयत्वेऽनुमानस्य प रकल्प्यमाने
ितर्भुवनावेदकत्वं धूमस्य िकन् प रकल्प्यते, सम्बन्धाभावाऽिवशेषात्?
atha liṅgavyāpakatvenā[na]vagatam; tadā tadviṣayatve’numānasya
parikalpyamāne tribhuvanāvedakatvaṁ dhūmasya kinna parikal-
pyate, sambandhābhāvā’viśeṣāt?
Translation: 373
Again if you say that, it was not known, as the pervader of the
ground, then if that is the object of inferential knowledge postulated
by you, then why don’t you postulate that the knowledge of any
probans will cause inferential knowledge of anything in the three
worlds (the heaven, the earth, and the pātāla) because there is
absence of the relationship of invariable concomitance common in
all such cases.
Text: 374
अथ अिग्व्यिक्पारतन्त्यमनुमीयते धूमेन अिग्त्वसामान्यस्य इित चेत्; तत्पारतन्त्यम्
अिग्त्वसामान्यस्य धूमव्यापकत्वेन अवधा रतं वा, न वा?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 111
Translation: 377
Through this method of argumentation, it was shown that the word
cow is not authentic, because, it causes the knowledge of cowness
which was already known.
Text: 378
तदेव कथम्?
tadeva katham?
Translation: 378
Objection:
How is that possible?
Text: 379
कथ्यते-िकं सङ्े तगर्हणकालावगतगोत्वाथर् वाचकत्वं तद्व्यित रक्ाथर् वाचकत्वं वा
पर्ितपाद्ते गोशब्दस्य?
kathyate-kiṁ saṅketagrahaṇakālāvagatagotvārthavācakatvaṁ tad-
vyatiriktārthavācakatvaṁ vā pratipādyate gośabdasya?
Translation: 379
Reply: Let me explain. Do you say that the word cow expresses
cowness as its meaning which was already known at the time of
knowing the relation between the word cow and the meaning of
that word or do you say that the word cow expresses its meaning
other than that cowness?
Text: 380
तद्िद सङ्े तगर्हणकाला धकरणगोत्वस्वरूपावेदकत्वं जेगीयते गोशब्दस्य; तदा िविदता-
थार्कारावेदकत्वेन न मानत्वमासादयित गोशब्दः।
tadyadi saṅketagrahaṇakālādhikaraṇagotvasvarūpāvedakatvaṁ jegī-
yate gośabdasya; tadā viditārthākārāvedakatvena na mānatvamāsā-
dayati gośabdaḥ.
Translation: 380
If you say that you are narrating the fact that the word cow
expresses the nature of cowness existent at the time of the existence
of relation between the word cow and its meaning, then the word
‘go’ does not acquire authenticity, because, it expresses the form of
object which was already known.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 113
Text: 381
अथ वेिदताथार्कारावेदकत्वेऽिप पर्ामाण्यमावहित; तदा अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणस्य िवषयो
वक्व्य:।
atha veditārthākārāvedakatve’pi prāmāṇyamāvahati; tadā anadhiga-
tārthagantṛviśeṣaṇasya viṣayo vaktavyaḥ.
Translation: 381
If you say that even if the word ’go’ causes the knowledge of the form
of object, which was already known, still it is authentic, then, you
should tell us what is that which is referred to by the qualification,
“which causes the knowledge of that, which was not known before”.
Text: 382
अथ तद्व्यित रक्ाथर् वाचकत्वम्; तदानीमसङ्े त(ित)त एवाथर् ः पर्तीयते गोशब्दात्, ततश्च
स्व सद्ान्तपर्तीितिवरोधो दिु नर् वारः।
atha tadvyatiriktārthavācakatvam; tadānīmasaṅketa(ti)ta evārthaḥ
pratīyate gośabdāt, tataśca svasiddhāntapratītivirodho durnivāraḥ.
Translation: 382
If you say that the word expresses its meaning, different from that,
then it amounts to saying that from the word cow one understands a
meaning, with which there is no relation of the word cow and in that
case you cannot avoid the contradiction with the understanding of
your own doctrine.
Text: 383
अथ गोत्वमेवाऽवगम्यते गोशब्देन इित चेत्; ततर्ािप पर्पिञ्तमेव अपर्ामाण्यकारण(णं)
गृहीतगर्ािहत्वम्। तदपर्ामाण्ये न गोत्वव्यव स्थितः। तदनव स्थतो नाथार्पत्या धकरण-
व्यव स्थितः।
atha gotvamevā’vagamyate gośabdena iti cet; tatrāpi prapañci-
tameva aprāmāṇyakāraṇa(ṇaṁ) gṛhītagrāhitvam. tadaprāmāṇye
na gotvavyavasthitiḥ. tadanavasthito nārthāpattyādhikaraṇavyava-
sthitiḥ.
Translation: 383
If you say that one understands cowness from the word cow, there
also we have already pointed out how the word cow becomes
inauthentic, because it will cause the knowledge of something
114 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 386
If you say, it causes the knowledge of the individual which was
not known before, then if cowness does not fit into that, one may
postulate horse or elephant also.
Text: 387
अथ पूवार्वधा रतस्य इदानीन्तनम स्तत्वम् अथार्पत्याऽवसीयते इित चेत्; तत्
इदानीन्तनम स्तत्वं पूवार्धा रताद् व्यित रक्म्, अव्यित रक्ं वा?
atha pūrvāvadhāritasya idānīntanamastitvam arthāpattyā’vasīyate
iti cet; tat idānīntanamastitvaṁ pūrvādhāritād vyatiriktam, avyati-
riktaṁ vā?
Translation: 387
If you say, the process called arthāpatti helps in concluding the
present existence of something which was known before, then
question may arise, whether the present existence is different from
the existence which was known before or identical?
Text: 388
तद्द्व्यित रक्म्; तदा पूवार्वधा रताथर् पर्ितपादकत्वेन कथमथार्पत्ेः पर्ामाण्यं वेदिवदो
वद न्त?
tadyadi avyatiriktam; tadā pūrvāvadhāritārthapratipādakatvena
katham arthāpatteḥ prāmāṇyaṁ vedavido vadanti?
Translation: 388
If you say, it is identical then how can the scholars of the Vedas
(Mīmāṁsakas) say that arthāpatti is an independent process of
knowing because, it causes the knowledge of something, which was
already known?
Text: 389
अथ अथार्न्तरम्; कथं गोत्वान्यथानुपपत्या पर्तीयते? तत्पर्तीत्यभ्युपगमे वा गजवा ज-
िवषयािप पर्ितप त्ः स्यात् इत्यसकृत् पर्ितपािदतम्। एवं च सित यदक्ु म्-
atha arthāntaram; kathaṁ gotvānyathānupapattyā pratīyate? tatpra-
tītyabhyupagame vā gajavājiviṣayāpi pratipattiḥ syāt ityasakṛt prati-
pāditam. evaṁ ca sati yaduktam-
Translation: 389
If you say, it is different then how is it known by the process of
implication without which the knowledge of cowness cannot be
116 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
explained and in spite of that you accept that knowledge, why not
there should be knowledge of horse, elephant etc. from the word
cow? We have repeatedly explained this before.
Text: 390
“इदानीन्तनम स्तत्वं निह पूवर् धया गतम्।” [श्लोकवा०४.२३४] इित तद् बालव ल्गतम्।
“idānīntanamastitvam nahi pūrvadhiyā gatam.” [ślokavā.4.234] iti
tad bālavalgitam.
Translation: 390
In the light of this, when we look at the following statement (of the
Ślokavārttika, sūtra 4, verse No. 234): “the present existence was
not known by the earlier knowledge” is nothing more than a child’s
quibbling.
Translation: 392
In the same way, the qualifying clause, “which reveals something
which is not known before” in the general definition of pramāṇa as
offered by the Buddhists, is also purposeless because it is impossible
to show something which can be excluded.
Text: 393
निह पूवार्परकालभािविन िवज्ञाने एकिवषये स्तः, न स्वलक्षणैकिवषये, न सामान्यैकिवषये,
स्वलक्षणस्य अिभन्ैकस्वभावस्य कर्मवृत्यनेकिवज्ञानजननशिक्व्यितरेकात्।
nahi pūrvāparakālabhāvini vijñāne ekaviṣaye staḥ, na svalakṣaṇaika-
viṣaye, na sāmānyaikaviṣaye, svalakṣaṇasya abhinnaikasvabhāvasya
kramavṛttyanekavijñānajananaśaktivyatirekāt.
Translation: 393
It is not the case that two cognitions arising in a sequence (the
later being caused by the former) have one and the same object,
as their content. It is also not the case that both the knowledges
have only svalakṣaṇa (a particular free from all characterizations)
as their content.
Nor is it the case, that both the knowledges have sāmānyalakṣaṇa
(a series of particulars) as their content, because, a svalakṣaṇa does
not have the capacity to generate many cognitions in a sequence,
being totally identical in nature.
Text: 394
अथ युगपदेकिवषयोत्पन्ाऽनेकिवज्ञानापनोदाथर् म्;
atha yugapadekaviṣayotpannā’nekavijñānāpanodārtham;
Translation: 394
Clarification:
We are saying so, in order to exclude the possibility of arising of
many cognitions simultaneously, caused by one and the same object.
Text: 395
तदप्ययुक्म्; एकिवषयोत्पन्ानेकपुरुषसंवेदनस्य अपर्ामाण्यमापनीपद्ेत।
tadapyayuktam; eka-viṣayotpannānekapuruṣasaṁvedanasya aprā-
māṇyamāpanīpadyeta.
118 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 395
Reply:
This is also not proper, because, this position will lead to
inauthenticity of experiences of many people, caused by one and
the same object.
Text: 396
अथ सामान्यैकिवषयानेकिवज्ञानापनोदाथर् िवशेषणमुपादीयते; तदप्ययुक्म्; न सामान्ये
एकं िवज्ञानम स्त, नाप्यनेकं िवज्ञानं तस्य स्वयमसम्भवात्।
atha sāmānyaikaviṣayānekavijñānāpanodārthaṁ viśeṣaṇamupādī-
yate; tadapyayuktam; na sāmānye ekaṁ vijñānamasti, nāpyane-
kaṁ vijñānaṁ tasya svayamasambhavāt.
Translation: 396
If you say that the qualifying clause “which causes the knowledge of
that which is not known before” is added in the definition in order
to exclude the possibility of many knowledges in which the sāmānya
alone is the content. This is also improper, because, in your series
of particulars, it is not the case that there is only one knowledge.
Nor it is the case that there are many knowledges because by itself
it is impossible.
Text: 397
तदाकारिवरहे 'सामान्यिवषयं िवज्ञानम्' इित पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थाहेतुवर्क्व्यः।
tadākāravirahe ‘sāmānyaviṣayaṁ vijñānam’ iti pratikarmavyavas-
thāheturvaktavyaḥ.
Translation: 397
If there is no form, in that then when we say this knowledge in
“which series of particulars is the content” you should point out
how to establish one-is-to-one relationship.
Text: 398
तदाकारे वा सामान्यस्य सदात्मता, अता त्वकाकारातादात्म्ये वा ज्ञानाता त्वकत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadākāre vā sāmānyasya sadātmatā, atāttvikākārātādātmye vā jñā-
nātāttvikatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 119
Translation: 398
If you say there is a form, then the series of particulars (which is
unreal according to you) will become real or if you say that there is
identity with the false form then it will make the knowledge itself
as unreal.
Text: 399
िकञ्, एकिवषये पर्वत्र्मानयोः एकस्याऽपर्ामाण्यम्, पर्माणान्तरत्वाभावो वा?
kiñca, ekaviṣaye pravarttamānayoḥ ekasyā’prāmāṇyam, pramāṇā-
ntaratvābhāvo vā?
Translation: 399
Moreover, out of the two knowledges referring to one object, one is
not authentic or do you want to say, that it cannot be the object of
another knowledge.
Text: 400
तद्िद अपर्ामाण्यम्; तदयुक्म्; अिविशष्ैकाथर् गृहीितरूपत्वे उभयो: पर्ामाण्यमपर्ामाण्यं वा
िवकल्पानुपपत्ेः, िवकल्पे बाधकिवषयोत्पन्ाऽनेकपुरुषिवज्ञानभेदपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi aprāmāṇyam; tadayuktam; aviśiṣṭaikārthagṛhītirūpatve
ubhayoḥ prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṁ vā vikalpānupapatteḥ, vikalpe
bādhakaviṣayotpannā’nekapuruṣavijñānabhedaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 400
If you say it is not authentic, it is not proper, because, if both
have revealed one and the same object and not distinct ones, then
either both are authentic or both are false. There is no other
alternative and if you say that there is alternative, there will arise
the contingency of distinguishing knowledges of different persons
caused by contradictory objects.
Text: 401
अथाऽपर्माणान्तरत्वं; तदप्यनुपपन्म्; िकमेकिवषयोत्पािदतानेकपर्त्यक्षािदज्ञानानां व्यिक्-
नानात्वं नोपपद्ते, आहो आकारनानात्वम्?
athā’pramāṇāntaratvam; tadapyanupapannam; kimekaviṣayotpādi-
tānekapratyakṣādijñānānāṁ vyaktinānātvaṁ nopapadyate, āho ākā-
ranānātvam?
120 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 401
If you say it will be a different knowledge that also is not proper.
There the question arises, is it the fact that the knowledges such
as perception, caused by one object, cannot be treated as different
knowledges or one will have to treat plurality of forms in those
knowledges?
Text: 402
तद्िद व्यिक्नानात्वं न जाघटीित; तदसत्; एकनीलोत्पािदतानेकनीलालोकिवज्ञानानां
व्यिक्नानात्वदशर् नात्।
tadyadi vyaktinānātvaṁ na jāghaṭīti; tadasat; ekanīlotpāditāne-
kanīlālokavijñānānāṁ vyaktinānātvadarśanāt.
Translation: 402
If you say the plurality of knowledges is not possible, it is not true,
because it is our experience that many knowledges of light of blue
thing produced by one blue thing are many in number.
Text: 403
अथ अनेकाकारता नोपपद्ते; तदयुक्म्; नीलालोकिवज्ञानानाम् अनेकाकारकत्वदशर् नात्।
athānekākāratā nopapadyate; tadayuktam; nīlālokavijñānānām
anekākārakatvadarśanāt.
Translation: 403
If you say, multiformedness of knowledges is not justifiable, that also
is not proper, because we do find many forms in the knowledges of
light of a blue thing.
Text: 404
न च तदत्ु पादको नीलपर्पञ्ो स्त, एकात्मतया स्वयमनुपगमात्।
na ca tadutpādako nīlaprapañcaḥ asti, ekātmatayā svayamanupagamāt.
Translation: 404
There are not many blue things which would have produced those
knowledges because, blue thing being one cannot be said to be
present consecutively in all knowledges.
Text: 405
अथ एकिवषयत्वे पर्त्यक्षानुमानव्यपदेशानुपप त्;
atha ekaviṣayatve pratyakṣānumānavyapadeśānupapatti;
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 121
Translation: 405
Objection:
Well, if the object is only one, how can we refer to the knowledges
of the object as perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge etc.?
Text: 406
तदेतदयुक्म्; िभन्कारणकायर् त्वेन व्यपदेश्योप(देशोप)पत्ेः। यथा एकनीलोत्पन्ानेकदेव-
दत्ज्ञानानां िभन्कारणकायर् त्वेन [देवदत्िवज्ञानानां] िभन्कत्ृर्कायर् त्वेन देवदत्ािदज्ञान-
व्यपदेशः तथेहािप।
tadetadayuktam; bhinnakāraṇakāryatvena vyapadeśyopa(deśopa)-
patteḥ. yathā ekanīlotpannānekadevadattajñānānāṁ bhinnakāraṇa-
kāryatvena [devadattavijñānānāṁ] bhinnakarttṛkāryatvena devada-
ttādijñānavyapadeśaḥ tathehāpi.
Translation: 406
Reply:
This is not correct, because it is possible to justify the reference of
knowledges of one object, by different names on the basis of different
sets of cause-and-effect relationship as knowledges produced by one
blue thing to many persons called Devadatta are referred to as
knowledges of Devadatta, on the basis of effects being produced by
different agents, in terms of different cause-and-effect relationships,
in the same way here also, references to different knowledges of the
object can be made.
[२.अिवसंवािदज्ञानिमत्यस्य पर्माणलक्षणस्यािप िनरासः।]
[2.avisaṁvādijñānamityasya pramāṇalakṣaṇasyāpi nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 407
अन्ये तु "अिवसंवािद ज्ञानम्” [पर्माणवा० २.१] पर्माणमिभदधित।
anye tu “avisaṁvādi jñānam” [pramāṇavā.2.1] pramāṇamabhidadhati.
Translation: 407
Other (Dharmakīrti etc.) however say that knowledge which
corroborates its content is called pramāṇa.
Text: 408
कोऽयमिवसंवादाथर् ः - िकं यथाव्यव स्थताथर् गृहीितत्वम्, बाधारिहतत्वं वा पर्तीयमानाथर् -
जन्यता वा, पर्तीयमानाथर् पर्ित पर्वत्र्कत्वं वा, अथर् पर्ापकत्वं वा?
122 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 418
अथ अनुदकत्वव्यावृ त्जार्ित रत्युच्यते;
atha anudakatvavyāvṛttirjātirityucyate;
Translation: 418
Clarification:
Well, the generic property viz. waterness according to us is the
exclusion of that which is not water.
Text: 419
सा उदकव्यिक्भ्योऽव्यित रक्ा, व्यित रक्ा वा?
sā udakavyaktibhyo’vyatiriktā, vyatiriktā vā?
Translation: 419
Reply:
There we may raise the following questions: Is that universal
or generic property identical with the water individual? Or is it
different from that?
Text: 420
यद्व्यित रक्ा; तदा व्यिक्रेव न जाितः।
yadyavyatiriktā; tadā vyaktireva na jātiḥ.
Translation: 420
If you say that it is identical, then there is only individual and there
is no universal or generic property.
Text: 421
अथ व्यित रक्ा; सा वस्तुभूता, अवस्तुभूता वा?
atha vyatiriktā; sā vastubhūtā, avastubhūtā vā?
Translation: 421
If you say that it is different, then the question arises, whether it is
real or unreal?
Text: 422
यिद वस्तुभूता; अभ्युपेतहािनः।
yadi vastubhūtā; abhyupetahāniḥ.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 127
Translation: 422
If you say it is real, then it goes against the accepted position of
your doctrine.
Text: 422
अथ अवस्तुभूता; तद्गितः कथम्?
atha avastubhūtā; tadgatiḥ katham?
Translation: 422
If you say it is not unreal, then how do you know it?
Text: 423
न च उदकव्यक् नां नानात्वमुपपद्ते। यथा च नोपपद्ते तथा िनवेिदतं नैयाियकपर्त्यक्ष-
लक्षणा धकारे।
na ca udakavyaktīnāṁ nānātvamupapadyate. yathā ca nopapadyate
tathā niveditaṁ naiyāyikapratyakṣalakṣaṇādhikāre.
Translation: 423
It cannot be justified that water individuals are many in number.
We have already demonstrated in the section discussing the
definition of perception as proposed by the Naiyāyikas how the
plurality of water individuals is not possible.
Text: 424
अथ स्वोत्पादकाथर् पर्ापकत्वमिवसंवादकत्वम्; तदयुक्म्; नयनालोकमनस्कारादेः
पर्त्यस्तिमतत्वात्।
atha svotpādakārthaprāpakatvamavisaṁvādakatvam; tadayuktam;
nayanālokamanaskārādeḥ pratyastamitatvāt.
Translation: 424
If you say, a true cognition is that which causes the obtainment of
an object which is produced by that object, it will not be correct,
because the factors like eyes, light, mind etc. are no longer there (in
function).
Text: 425
अथ स्वोत्पादककारकाणां धर्ुवभािवत्वम् अिवसंवादस्तदभावे तदभावपर्सङ्ात्; यद्ेवं
केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप धर्ुवभािवकारणािवसंवादोऽ स्त, अन्यथा आक स्मकत्वपर्सङ्ात्।
128 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 431
Reply:
Knowledge is distinguished from non-knowledge as knowledge but
how one knowledge can be distinguished from another knowledge?
Is it distinguished as knowledge or as some other form?
Text: 432
अथ आकारान्तरेण व्यावत्र्ते; तदा अज्ञानात्मता तस्य उत्पद्ते, रसादे रव।
atha ākārāntareṇa vyāvarttate; tadā ajñānātmatā tasya utpadyate,
rasāderiva.
Translation: 432
If you say it is distinguished by another form of knowledge, then
knowledges will become non-knowledge, like taste etc.
Text: 433
अथ आकारभेदे ज्ञानयोभेर्दः; सोऽप्यनुपपन् एव;
atha ākārabhede jñānayorbhedaḥ; so’pyanupapanna eva;
Translation: 433
If you say the two knowledges become different, because they have
two different forms, it is also not justifiable.
Text: 434
ज्ञानाकारव्यितरेकेण पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोनार्कारान्तरम स्त। तदपु गमे वा ज्ञानाकारिवरहः
स्यात्। न च आकारसमूहात्मकं ज्ञानम्, तस्यािभन्ात्मकत्वात्।
jñānākāravyatirekeṇa pratyakṣānumānayornākārāntaramasti. tadu-
pagame vā jñānākāravirahaḥ syāt. na ca ākārasamūhātmakaṁ
jñānam, tasyābhinnātmakatvāt.
Translation: 434
Because perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge do not
have any other form, other than the form of knowledge and if you
accept that, it means that there is no form. It is not the case that
the knowledge is of the form of collection of forms, because in that
case it will become identical.
Text: 434a
अथ िवषयभेदेन द्ैिवध्यमुपपाद्ते; तथाऽनुमानज्ञानस्य िवषयाथोर् वक्व्यः -
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 131
Translation: 437
Clarification:
In the inferential knowledge, mere fire is known, whereas, in the
perceptual knowledge the specific fire produced from specific things,
such as grass etc. is known.
Text: 438
यद्ेवं स्वलक्षणिवषयत्वं नाितवत्र्ते अनुमानस्य यिद नाम वह्े रव
े पर्पञ्ता।
yadyevaṁ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvaṁ nātivarttate anumānasya yadi
nāma vahnereva prapañcatā.
Translation: 438
Reply: If it is so, still the inferential knowledge cannot be said to
be the knowledge of svalakṣaṇa, if you are talking about fire alone.
Text: 439
अथ सत्सामान्यिवषयत्वम् तथािप पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोनर् भेदोऽ स्त, सामान्यस्य स्वलक्षण-
रूपत्वात्। न च सत्सामान्यस्य िवज्ञानिवषयतोपपद्ते, िनत्यत्वेन जनकत्वाकारापर् क-
त्वानुपपत्ेः। न च सत्सामान्यिवषयत्वे भर्ान्ततोपपद्ते। “भर्ा न्तरप्यथर् सम्बन्धतः पर्मा"
इित न वक्व्यम्।
atha satsāmānyaviṣayatvam tathāpi pratyakṣānumānayorna bhedo’-
sti, sāmānyasya svalakṣaṇarūpatvāt. na ca satsāmānyasya vijñāna-
viṣayatopapadyate, nityatvena janakatvākārārpakatvānupapatteḥ. na
ca satsāmānyaviṣayatve bhrāntatopapadyate. “bhrāntirapyartha-
sambandhataḥ pramā” iti na vaktavyam.
Translation: 439
If you say that it is knowledge of existent series of particulars of fire,
still there will be no difference between a perceptual knowledge
and inferential knowledge, because universal according to you, is
nothing but a series of particulars. (Moreover) if that universal is
real, then also it cannot be said to be the object of knowledge,
because since universal is accepted as permanent, it cannot have
the capacity to offer the form of being a producer of that knowledge
(in other words a permanent cannot cause its knowledge). Again,
if that universal is real, the knowledge cannot be treated as unreal.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 133
You should also not say “it is illusory at the same time veridical
because of its relationship with an object”.
Text: 440
अथ असत्सामान्यिवषयम्; न तिहर् तस्य भर्ान्तता असतः स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात्। न
च असद् िवषयभावं पर्ितपद्ते, जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वव्यितरेकात्।
atha asatsāmānyaviṣayam; na tarhi tasya bhrāntatā asataḥ svena
rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt. na ca asad viṣayabhāvaṁ pratipadyate,
janakatvā”kārārpakatvavyatirekāt.
Translation: 440
If you say that, the inferential knowledge has unreal universal as its
content, then it cannot be called a false knowledge, because, in that
knowledge a false entity appears in its own form, viz. a false entity.
Nor it is the case, that one understands absence of content in that
knowledge, because, in that case, it cannot be said that, that object
has produced that inferential knowledge.
Text: 441
अव्यितरेके वा वस्तुत्वपर्सङ्ः, तत्पर्सक्ौ च पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दानुपप त्ः।
avyatireke vā vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ, tatprasaktau ca pratyakṣānumā-
nayorbhedānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 441
If you say it is identical, then the content will become real and if
that becomes real, there will be no difference between a perceptual
knowledge and inferential knowledge.
Text: 442
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् मानयोभेर्दोऽ स्त, अनुमानज्ञानस्य िवषयाऽसम्भवात्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi mānayorbhedo’sti, anumānajñānasya
viṣayā’sambhavāt.
Translation: 442
If you maintain that inferential knowledge is without content,
then there is no difference between the two knowledges viz. the
perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge, because, there is
no object left for the inferential knowledge.
134 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 443
नािप भर्ान्तता िनिवर् षयत्वादेव। न च ज्ञानस्य स्वसत्ामातर्ेण भर्ान्तता अभर्ान्तता च
उपपद्ते, िकन्तु परोपधानवशात्।
nāpi bhrāntatā nirviṣayatvādeva. na ca jñānasya svasattāmātreṇa
bhrāntatā abhrāntatā ca upapadyate, kintu paropadhānavaśāt.
Translation: 443
Nor can such inferential knowledge be called a false knowledge,
because there is no content in that. It is not the case that by mere
being into existence, knowledge can be called false or true. But, it
is to be decided on the basis of something else.
Text: 444
अथ स्वांशिवषयम्; तथािप पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोनर् नानात्वम्, उभयोः स्वलक्षणिवषयत्वात्। न
चानुमानज्ञानस्य भर्ान्तता स्वांशस्याऽवञ्नात्।
atha svāṁśaviṣayam; tathāpi pratyakṣānumānayorna nānātvam,
ubhayoḥ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt. na cānumānajñānasya bhrāntatā
svāṁśasyā’vañcanāt.
Translation: 444
If you say that, the inferential knowledge has a part of knowledge as
its content, still, the perceptual knowledge cannot be distinguished
from inferential knowledge, because, both have svalakṣaṇa (mere
particulars) as their content. It cannot be said that an inferential
knowledge is false knowledge, because it cannot betray its own part.
Text: 445
तथा पर्त्यक्षस्यािप िवषयो वक्व्यः - िकं रूपािदस्वलक्षणिवषयमात्मिवषयमुभयिवषयं वा?
tathā pratyakṣasyāpi viṣayo vaktavyaḥ - kiṁ rūpādisvalakṣaṇa-
viṣayam, ātmaviṣayam, ubhayaviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 445
In the same way, you should also tell us what can be the object of
perceptual cognition? Is that object mere particular like color etc.
or is that content the cognition itself or both?
Text: 446
तद्िद रूपािदमातर्ालोचकम्; तदयुक्म्; तदनवगतौ एतद्गत्यभावात्। अथ ज्ञानमातर्-
कायावगाहकम्; तदिप नोपपद्ते, िवषयभावस्य जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन व्यव स्थतेः।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 135
Translation: 453
Moreover, you should not define a perceptual cognition such as “a
perceptual cognition is that which is non-illusory and which is free
from mental construction” (Nyāyabindu 1.4) because which is free
from mental construction, has nothing to exclude.
Text: 454
ननु कल्पनैव अपोह्ा;
nanu kalpanaiva apohyā;
Translation: 454
Objection:
If we say, the mental construction itself is to be excluded then?
Text: 455
केयं कल्पना - िकं गुणचलनजात्यािदिवशेषणोत्पािदतं िवज्ञानं कल्पना, आहो स्मृत्यु-
त्पादकं िवज्ञानं कल्पना, स्मृितरूपं वा, स्मृत्युत्पाद्ं वा, अिभलापसंसगर् िनभार्सो वा,
अिभलापवती पर्तीितवार् कल्पना, अस्पष्ाकारा वा, अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपा वा, स्वयं
वाऽता त्वक , ितर्रूपािल्ङ्तोऽथर् दृग्वा, अतीताऽनागताथर् िनभार्सा वा?
keyaṁ kalpanā - kiṁ guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇotpāditaṁ vijñānaṁ
kalpanā, āho smṛtyutpādakaṁ vijñānaṁ kalpanā, smṛtirūpaṁ vā,
smṛtyutpādyaṁ vā, abhilāpasaṁsarganirbhāso vā, abhilāpavatī pratī-
tirvā kalpanā, aspaṣṭākārā vā, atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpā vā, svayaṁ
vā’tāttvikī, trirūpālliṅgato’rthadṛgvā, atītā’nāgatārthanirbhāsā vā?
Translation: 455
Reply:
We would like to know what this mental construction is. Is a mental
construction, a cognition which is caused by the qualifications
viz. quality, action, universal, etc.? Or a mental construction is
a cognition which produces remembrance or is it of the form of
remembrance or is it something produced by remembrance? Or is
it an appearance of relationship with language? Or is a mental
construction a cognition which can be verbalized in language? Or is
it something unreal? Or is it a cognition of an object, produced from
a ground or reason having three features or aspects or forms ((i)
being in the subject (ii) not being in that which is not a subject and
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 139
Translation: 458
If you say it is a mental construction caused by the qualifications viz.
quality, action and universal which are existent, then, the question
arises: Is that cognition called mental construction, contentful or
contentless?
Text: 459
तद्िद सिवषयं सत् कल्पनाज्ञानम्; तदयुक्म्; गुणचलनजात्यािदजन्यत्वेऽिप न
कल्पनात्वम् अथर् सामाथ्यर् समुद्वत्वस्याऽनितवृत्ेः।
tadyadi saviṣayaṁ sat kalpanājñānam; tadayuktam; guṇacalana-
jātyādijanyatve’pi na kalpanātvam arthasāmārthyasamudbhavatva-
syā’nativṛtteḥ.
Translation: 459
If you say it is contentful and still it is a mental construction it
is not correct, because, if it has been produced by quality, action
and universal etc. then it cannot be called a mental construction,
because, you cannot override the property of being produced from
something which is an object of a fruitful behaviour.
Text: 460
अथ िनिवर् षयं सत् कल्पना; तदा िनिवर् षयत्वमेव कल्पनात्वे कारणं न गुणचलन-
जात्यािदिवशेषणजन्यत्वम्।
atha nirviṣayaṁ sat kalpanā; tadā nirviṣayatvameva kalpanātve
kāraṇaṁ na guṇacalanajātyādiviśeṣaṇajanyatvam.
Translation: 460
If you say it is a mental construction, because it is contentless,
then the ground for calling it a mental construction should be its
being contentless and not being produced by the qualifications like
quality, action and universal etc.
Text: 461
यिद च तिन्िवर् षयम्; तदा न कल्पनाज्ञानम्, नाप्यकल्पनाज्ञानम्, ज्ञानमातर्ता स्यात्।
ज्ञानात्मतया च कल्पनात्वे सवर् ज्ञानं कल्पनाज्ञानं स्यात्।
yadi ca tannirviṣayam; tadā na kalpanājñānam, nāpyakalpa-
nājñānam, jñānamātratā syāt. jñānātmatayā ca kalpanātve sarvaṁ
jñānaṁ kalpanājñānaṁ syāt.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 141
Translation: 461
Again if it is contentless, then it cannot be called mental
construction, nor can it be called non-mental construction. It will
be reduced to mere cognition and if it is called mental construction,
only because it is mere cognition then all knowledges will be called
mental construction.
Text: 462
अथ स्मृत्युत्पादकं ज्ञानं कल्पना; तदयुक्म्; रूपािददशर् नादिप स्मृितरुत्पद्ते, न च
कल्पनात्वम्। “यत्सिन्धाने यो दृष्ः तद्ष्ृ ेस्ततौ [तद्ध्वनौ] स्मृितः” इित वचनात्।
atha smṛtyutpādakaṁ jñānaṁ kalpanā; tadayuktam; rūpādida-
rśanādapi smṛtirutpadyate, na ca kalpanātvam. “yatsannidhāne yo
dṛṣṭaḥ taddṛṣṭestatau [taddhvanau] smṛtiḥ” iti vacanāt.
Translation: 462
If you say, the cognition which produces remembrance is called
mental construction, that will not be proper, because, by seeing
a color also i.e. from the knowledge of color, remembrance
is produced. But color etc. is not considered to be a mental
construction. This is in accordance with the statement viz. “if in the
proximity of X, Y is perceived, then by seeing X, Y is remembered.”
Text: 463
अथ स्मृितरूपत्वेन कल्पना; ततर्ािप िकं गृहीतगर्ािहत्वेन, िनिवर् षयत्वेन, अपूवार्थर्-
गृहीितरूपत्वेन वा?
atha smṛtirūpatvena kalpanā; tatrāpi kiṁ gṛhītagrāhitvena, nirviṣa-
yatvena, apūrvārthagṛhītirūpatvena vā?
Translation: 463
If you say, a cognition is a mental construction in the form of
remembrance, there also a question arises, is it a mental construction
as the revealer of something which is already known or because it
is contentless or because it is the revealer of something new?
Text: 464
तद्िद गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा पर्थमानुभवस्यािप कल्पनात्वमापद्ते
गृहीताथर् गर्ािहत्वािवशेषात् इत्युक्ं पुरस्तात्।
142 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 467
Moreover, if you say that a cognition is a mental construction, if it
reveals something new, then the knowledges of color etc. will have
to be treated a mental construction.
Text: 468
अथ स्मृत्युत्पाद्त्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदा रूपािदज्ञानस्यािप िनिवर् कल्पकत्वेनािभमतस्य
स्मृत्युत्पाद्त्वम स्त, तदस्तु कल्पनाज्ञानम्।
atha smṛtyutpādyatvena kalpanātvam; tadā rūpādijñānasyāpi nirvikal-
pakatvenābhimatasya smṛtyutpādyatvamasti, tadastu kalpanājñānam.
Translation: 468
If you say that a cognition which is caused by remembrance is a
mental construction, then even the knowledge of color etc. which is
intended as indeterminate in character is caused by remembrance
and so let that cognition be called mental construction.
Text: 469
अथ न भवित तत् कल्पनाज्ञानं, स्मृत्या बोधस्वभावतयोत्पािदतं कल्पनाज्ञानं न स्मरणा-
कारतयोत्पाद्ते;
atha na bhavati tat kalpanājñānaṁ, smṛtyā bodhasvabhāvatayot-
pāditaṁ kalpanājñānaṁ na smaraṇākāratayotpādyate;
Translation: 469
Clarification:
Well that cannot be called a mental construction, because, the
mental construction is produced by remembrance in the form of
an understanding and not in the form of remembrance.
Text: 470
तिददं मिद्कल्पान्दो लतबुद्े: िनरुपप त्काऽिभधानम्। न ह्ेकस्य स्वभावद्यमुत्पश्यामः।
tadidaṁ madvikalpāndolitabuddheḥ nirupapattikā’bhidhānam. na
hyekasya svabhāvadvayamutpaśyāmaḥ.
Translation: 470
Reply:
This illogical statement of yours is an outcome of your confused
mind due to raising odd questions by us. One entity cannot have
two natures.
144 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 471
अथ अिभलापसंसगर् पर्ितभासा पर्तीितः कल्पना; स संसगर् ः पारमा थर् कः, अपारमा थर् को
वा?
atha abhilāpasaṁsargapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā; sa saṁsargaḥ
pāramārthikaḥ, apāramārthiko vā?
Translation: 471
If you say, that a mental construction is a cognition which reveals
association with language, there also we can ask whether that
relation is real or unreal?
Text: 472
यिद पारमा थर् कः; न तदा तस्य कल्पनात्वं रूपािदज्ञानस्येव।
yadi pāramārthikaḥ; na tadā tasya kalpanātvaṁ rūpādijñānasyeva.
Translation: 472
If you say it is real, then it cannot be said to be a mental
construction, like the cognition of color.
Text: 473
अथ अपारमा थर् कः; कथं तदाभं िवज्ञानम्, नैरात्म्यपर्सङ्ात्। न चाऽता त्वके िवषयाथर् ः
क श्चल्भ्यते, जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वसहोत्पादसत्ामातर्व्यितरेकात्।
atha apāramārthikaḥ; kathaṁ tadābhaṁ vijñānam, nairātmyapra-
saṅgāt. na cā’tāttvike viṣayārthaḥ kaścillabhyate, janakatvākārār-
pakatvasahotpādasattāmātravyatirekāt.
Translation: 473
And if you say it is unreal, then how can it be called a cognition
reflecting that nature, because in that case, it will be devoid of its
nature. In a false cognition, what has appeared as its content, is not
formed, because, it doesn’t have the state of producing the effect or
the state of offering a form, or mere existence of being a product
together.
Text: 474
यिद च अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपम्; तदा िवपयर् यज्ञानम्। तच्च अव्यिभचा रपदेन अपोिदतम्,
न कल्पनापोढपदमुपादेयम्।
yadi ca atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpam; tadā viparyayajñānam. tacca
avyabhicāripadena apoditam, na kalpanāpoḍhapadamupādeyam.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 145
Translation: 474
If again a mental construction is taken as a cognition that reveals
an unreal object, then that cognition will be called a false cognition
and that can be excluded by a clause which is not false or which is
not illusory and so there is no need to add the clause “which is free
from mental construction in the definition of perception.”
Text: 475
अथ अिभलापवती पर्तीितः कल्पना, िकम्-अिभलापा त्मका, आहो अिभलापोत्पाद्ा,
अिभलापगृहीितवार्?
atha abhilāpavatī pratītiḥ kalpanā, kim-abhilāpātmikā, āho abhilāpot-
pādyā, abhilāpagṛhītirvā?
Translation: 475
If you say a mental construction is a cognition which is verbalizable,
then the question arises, is it identical with the language? Or is it
produced by language or is it the cognition of the language?
Text: 476
तद्िद अिभलापा त्मका; पर्तीितः कथम्? पर्तीितश्चेत्; 'अिभलापा त्मका' इित न
वक्व्यम्। िवरुद्ाकारयोस्तादात्म्यव्यितरेकात्।
tadyadi abhilāpātmikā; pratītiḥ katham? pratītiścet; ’abhilāpātmikā’
iti na vaktavyam. viruddhākārayostādātmyavyatirekāt.
Translation: 476
If you say it is of the form of language, then how can it be called
cognition? And if it is a cognition then you should not call it
of the form of language, because, two entities having opposite
characteristics, cannot be identical.
Text: 477
अथ अिभलापोत्पाद्ा; तदा शब्दज्ञानानां कल्पनात्वमापद्ते। तेषां च कल्पनात्वे
शब्दव्यवस्थानऽनुपप त्ः स्यात्।
atha abhilāpotpādyā; tadā śabdajñānānāṁ kalpanātvamāpadyate.
teṣāṁ ca kalpanātve śabdavyavasthāna’nupapattiḥ syāt.
Translation: 477
If you say it is caused by language, then the knowledge of language
will have to be treated as mental construction and if that becomes
146 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 481
तद्िद अिवज्ञानात्मकत्वमस्पष्ता; तदयुक्म्; पर्तीित रह अस्पष्ाकारा गीयते, सा कथं
िवज्ञाना त्मका भिवतुमहर् ित?
tadyadi avijñānātmakatvamaspaṣṭatā; tadayuktam; pratītiriha aspa-
ṣṭākārā gīyate, sā kathaṁ vijñānātmikā bhavitumarhati?
Translation: 481
If you say, blurness means being of the nature of non-cognition that
will not be proper, because, here on one hand you are telling that
the cognition is blur then how can that be called of the form of
cogniton?
Text: 482
अथ स्वलक्षणाजन्यता अस्पष्ता; तदा ज्ञानाक स्मकत्वपर्सङ्ः।
atha svalakṣaṇājanyatā aspaṣṭatā; tadā jñānākasmikatvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 482
If you say, that not being produced by svalakṣaṇa is blurness, then
one will have to accept that cognition arises without any cause.
Text: 483
अथ पर्तीयमानाथार्जन्यत्वम्; तदा रागािदसंवेदनस्य अस्पष्ता पर्ाप्नोित, रागादीनां
स्वात्मसंवेदनोत्पादकत्वाऽयोगात्, स्वात्मोत्पादकत्वं वस्तूनां न दृष्पूवर्म्। तथा केशोण्डु -
किवज्ञानस्या(स्य) पर्तीयमानकेशोण्डु कोत्पाद्त्वं न िवद्ते, तदप्य(िप) स्पष्ाभ-
मुपजायते न तु अस्पष्ाभम्, “न िवकल्पानुबद्स्य स्पष्ाथर् पर्ितभा सता” [पर्माणवा०
३.२८३] इित वचनात्।
atha pratīyamānārthājanyatvam; tadā rāgādisaṁvedanasya aspa-
ṣṭatā prāpnoti, rāgādīnāṁ svātmasaṁvedanotpādakatvā’yogāt, svāt-
motpādakatvaṁ vastūnāṁ na dṛṣṭapūrvam. tathā keśoṇḍukavijñā-
nasyā(sya) pratīyamānakeśoṇḍukotpādyatvaṁ na vidyate, tada-
pya(pi) spaṣṭābhamupajāyate na tu aspaṣṭābham, “na vikalpānuba-
ddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsitā” [Pramāṇavā� 3.283] iti vacanāt.
Translation: 483
Again if you say that it is the state of not being produced by the
object which is known, then the feeling of attachment etc. should
be accepted as blur, because, attachment etc. do not take part in
causing the feeling of attachment. So far we have not experienced
148 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun, and the
knowledge of two moons, will be considered as blurred, because
in those knowledges whatever has appeared is not false, because,
the form of knowledge has definitely appeared there and it is not
the case that those forms do not match with the reality.
Text: 486
अथ अता त्वकाथर् गृहीितरूपा कल्पना; तदा केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप कल्पनात्वमापद्ते।
atha atāttvikārthagṛhītirūpā kalpanā; tadā keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi
kalpanātvamāpadyate.
Translation: 486
If you say, that mental construction is the cognition which reveals
an unreal thing, then the cognition of the knowledge of thread-like
things which appear to a person who comes from outside the Sun,
should also be treated as mental construction.
Text: 487
अथ स्वयमता त्वक ; तदा पर्तीितः कथम्? पर्तीितश्चेद;् अता त्वक कथम्?
atha svayamatāttvikī; tadā pratītiḥ katham? pratītiśced; atāttvikī
katham?
Translation: 487
If you say, mental construction is itself unreal, then how can it be
called cognition? And if it is cognition how can it be called false?
Text: 488
अथ ितर्रूपािल्ङ्तोऽथर् दृक् कल्पना इित चेत्; सािप िकं लङ्जन्यत्वेन कल्पना, आहो
िनिवर् षयत्वेन?
atha trirūpālliṅgato’rthadṛk kalpanā iti cet; sāpi kiṁ liṅgajanyatvena
kalpanā, āho nirviṣayatvena?
Translation: 488
Clarification:
If you say, mental construction or imagination is cognition of a
thing, produced from a ground having three aspects: (i) being in
the subject (ii) not being in that which is not a subject and (iii)
being in an example or instance.
150 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 489
तद्िद लङ्जन्यत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्;
tadyadi liṅgajanyatvena kalpanātvam;
Translation: 489
Reply:
There also the question arises, whether such cognition is to be
treated as mental construction because it is produced by ground.
Text: 490
तदा लङ्ावगाहकिनिवर् कल्पकिवज्ञानस्यािप कल्पनात्वमापद्ते। न च अनुमेयज्ञान-
स्याव्यवधानेन लङ्ोत्पाद्त्वम स्त।
tadā liṅgāvagāhakanirvikalpakavijñānasyāpi kalpanātvamāpadyate.
na ca anumeyajñānasyāvyavadhānena liṅgotpādyatvamasti.
Translation: 490
If you say it is mental construction because it is produced by ground,
then the indeterminate cognition which reveals the ground will also
have to be treated as mental construction, it is not the case that
inferential knowledge of a thing is produced by the ground without
gap.
Text: 491
अथ िनिवर् षयत्वेन कल्पनात्वम्; तदिप न योयुज्यते; स्वांशिवषयत्वादनुमानज्ञानस्य।
atha nirviṣayatvena kalpanātvam; tadapi na yoyujyate; svāṁśa-
viṣayatvādanumānajñānasya.
Translation: 491
If you say it is a mental construction because it is contentless, that
also does in fit in, because an inferential knowledge has some of its
own part as its object.
Text: 492
अथ स्वांशिवषयव्यित रक्िवषयो ना स्त, िनिवर् षयत्वेन कल्पनात्वमपिदश्यते;
atha svāṁśaviṣayavyatiriktaviṣayo nāsti, nirviṣayatvena kalpanā-
tvamapadiśyate;
Translation: 492
Clarification:
There is no content without involving some of its own part.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 151
Text: 500
अथ ज्ञानम्; न तिहर् तद् आत्मानमुत्पादयित, स्वात्मिन िकर्याव्यितरेकात्।
atha jñānam; na tarhi tad ātmānamutpādayati, svātmani kriyā-
vyatirekāt.
Translation: 500
If you say it is the cognition that appears in the cognition, it implies
that it does not produce itself, because there cannot be any activity
aimed at producing its own form.
Text: 501
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्; एकोपलम्भस्य िद्तीयाकारप रहार स्थितधमर् त्वात्।
यिद चोभयं पर्ितभाित; तदा अथर् वत् ज्ञानेनािप ज्ञानमुत्पाद्ते इत्यापद्ते। तच्चायुक्म्,
स्वात्मिन िकर्यािवरोधात्।
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitīyākāra-
parihārasthitidharmatvāt. yadi cobhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā arthavat
jñānenāpi jñānamutpādyate ityāpadyate. taccāyuktam, svātmani
kriyāvirodhāt.
Translation: 501
If you say both appear in the cognition that also is not proper,
because at a time when one form is revealed, the other form is
excluded and this is the property of cognition. Moreover, if you still
hold that both appear in the cognition, then, as object produces
the cognition, the cognition should also produce the cognition, and
that cannot be justified, because the activity of producing cannot
be directed towards one’s own self.
Text: 502
अथ अपर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणजन्यता; व(त)द्गितः कथम्?
atha apratīyamānasvalakṣaṇajanyatā; va(ta)dgatiḥ katham?
Translation: 502
If you say clarity of perception means being produced by svalakṣaṇa
which does not appear in the cognition, then, the question arises
how do you know it?
154 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 503
न पर्त्यक्षेण; अपर्तीयमानत्वादेव।
na pratyakṣeṇa; apratīyamānatvādeva.
Translation: 503
You cannot say that you know it by perception, because you have
said that it does not appear in the cognition.
Text: 504
नाप्यनुमानेन, स्वभाव-कायर् लङ्ानवगतेः।
nāpyanumānena, svabhāva-kāryaliṅgānavagateḥ.
Translation: 504
Nor can you say that it is known by inference, because there is
no ground reflecting the invariable concomitance of the type of
“own nature”, or the invariable concomitance of the nature of
cause-and-effect relationship.
Text: 505
न स्वभावानुमानं तत्कायर् तादात्म्ये, तदनवगतौ तस्याऽनवगतेः।
na svabhāvānumānaṁ tatkāryatādātmye, tadanavagatau tasyā’na-
vagateḥ.
Translation: 505
It cannot be the inference of its nature, if it is identical with its
effect, because, if that is not understood, its own nature also will
not be understood.
Text: 506
नािप कायार्नुमानम्; तद्त
ू कायार्नुपलब्धेः, िपशाचपरमाणुमहेश्वरकल्पाथोर्त्पािदतं कायर्
नेहोपलभ्यते।
nāpi kāryānumānam; tadbhūtakāryānupalabdheḥ, piśācaparamāṇu-
maheśvarakalpārthotpāditaṁ kāryaṁ nehopalabhyate.
Translation: 506
Nor can it be the inference of the effect, because no effect produced
by that is known. No effect produced by an object like ghost, atom,
or God is found here.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 155
Text: 507
अथ ज्ञानमेव तस्य लङ्म्; तदयुक्म्; तेन सह तस्य सम्बन्धानवगते श्चन्मातर्तयैव न
त्वन्योऽथर् ः, न च िचदात्मानं जनयित।
atha jñānameva tasya liṅgam; tadayuktam; tena saha tasya
sambandhānavagateścinmātratayaiva na tvanyo’rthaḥ, na ca
cidātmānaṁ janayati.
Translation: 507
If you say that, the very cognition or knowledge can be the ground
to infer that, that will not be proper, because no relationship is
known with that knowledge of that “clarity” because what is there
is mere consciousness and there is no other object and it is not the
case that consciousness produces consciousness.
Text: 508
समनन्तरज्ञानं तस्य हेतुः इित चेत्;
samanantarajñānaṁ tasya hetuḥ iti cet;
Translation: 508
Clarification:
The cognition which immediately follows is the cause of that
“clarity”.
Text: 509
तदयुक्म्; तदवगतौ न मानम स्त, परसन्तानज्ञानाथर् कल्पं तदिप न स्वसंवेद्ं
तत्कायर् ज्ञानस्य ततो िभन्त्वात् परसन्तानज्ञानाथर् वत्।
tadayuktam; tadavagatau na mānamasti, parasantānajñānārtha-
kalpaṁ tadapi na svasaṁvedyaṁ tatkāryajñānasya tato bhinnatvāt
parasantānajñānārthavat.
Translation: 509
Reply:
It is not correct, because, there is no proof or process by which we
can know it. Even it cannot be like the series of cognitions which
follow, since it cannot be self revealed, because the knowledge of
its effect will be different from it, like the object of the series of
cognitions.
156 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 510
नाप्यनुमानेन; तदायत्ताया अनवगते श्चन्मातर्तयैव आत्मानमवगाहयित नान्यायत्तया
ततोऽन्यस्य िपशाचेश्वरे(र)तुल्यत्वात् ।
nāpyanumānena; tadāyattatāyā anavagateścinmātratayaiva ātmā-
namavagāhayati nānyāyattatayā tato’nyasya piśāceśvare(ra)tu-
lyatvāt.
Translation: 510
Neither can it be known by inference, because, the scope of inference
to know that is not known. At the most it can cause the knowledge
of itself as mere consciousness and not through the capacity of some
thing else, because anything except that will be like a ghost or God.
Text: 511
यिद च समनन्तरिवज्ञानोत्पाद्त्वेन स्पष्ता; तदाऽनुमानज्ञानस्यािप समनन्तरज्ञानो-
त्पाद्त्वेन िनिवर् कल्पकत्वमनुषक्म्।
yadi ca samanantaravijñānotpādyatvena spaṣṭatā; tadā’numānajñā-
nasyāpi samanantarajñānotpādyatvena nirvikalpakatvamanuṣaktam.
Translation: 511
Moreover, if you say that there is clarity in the perceptual cognition,
because it is produced by the consecutive cognition, then, even
the inferential knowledge should be accepted as an indeterminate
knowledge because it is produced by the subsequent knowledge.
Text: 512
अथ स्वलक्षणपर्ितभा सता स्पष्ता; ततर् िकं पर्ितभाित - िकमथर् ः, ज्ञानम् , उभयं वा?
atha svalakṣaṇapratibhāsitā spaṣṭatā; tatra kiṁ pratibhāti -
kimarthaḥ, jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 512
If you say that, the clarity of perception means the revealing of the
svalakṣaṇa then, also the question arises what does appear there?
Is it the object or the knowledge or both?
Text: 513
तद्िद अथर् ः; तदयुक्म्; अपर् सद्ायाः(यां) पर् सद्ौ तत्पर् सद्ध्यभावात् ।
tadyadi arthaḥ; tadayuktam; aprasiddhāyāḥ(yāṁ) prasiddhau tat-
prasiddhyabhāvāt.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 157
Translation: 513
If you say it is the object, it will not be proper, because if there is
no awareness of the knowledge, there cannot be knowledge of that.
Text: 514
अथ ज्ञानम्; तदनुमानेऽिप पर्ितभाित तदप्यस्तु िनिवर् कल्पकम्। तिन्िवर् कल्पकत्वे तिहर्
अपोह्ो मृग्योऽधुना कल्पनापोढपदस्य।
atha jñānam; tadanumāne’pi pratibhāti tadapyastu nirvikalpakam.
tannirvikalpakatve tarhi apohyo mṛgyo’dhunā kalpanāpoḍhapadasya.
Translation: 514
And if you say that it is the cognition which appears there, then,
that happens in the case of inferential knowledge also and so let
inferential knowledge be treated as an indeterminate cognition and
if that becomes an indeterminate cognition, then, now you will have
to find out what is to be excluded by the word “which is free from
mental construction or imagination.”
Text: 515
अथोभयं पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्; एकोपलम्भस्य िद्तीयाकारप रहार स्थितधमर् त्वाभ्युपगमात्।
athobhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadayuktam; ekopalambhasya dvitīyākāra-
parihārasthitidharmatvābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 515
Again if you say that both appear in that knowledge, that is not
correct, because what is accepted is the knowledge of one excludes
the other form and this is the characteristics of knowledge.
Text: 516
अथ अतीतानागताथर् गृहीितरूपा कल्पना; ततर् िकमवभाित-अथर् ः, तदभावो वा, न िकिञ्द्ा?
atha atītānāgatārthagṛhītirūpā kalpanā; tatra kimavabhāti-arthaḥ,
tadabhāvo vā, na kiñcidvā?
Translation: 516
If you say that, the mental construction is of the form of a cognition
which reveals past and future object, there also question arises,
what does appear there? Is it an object or absence of an object or
nothing?
158 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 517
यद्तीतोऽथर् ः पर्ितभाित; न तिहर् तस्य कल्पनात्वम् वत्र्माननीलज्ञानवत्। नाप्यथर् स्य
अतीतता पर्तीयमानत्वेन नीलजलािदवत्। निह पर्तीयमानस्य अतीतता नाम। यिद च
पर्तीयमानस्यािप अतीतता उच्यते तदा सवर् स्य बुद्ध्युपलिक्षतस्य अतीतता भवेत्। ततश्च
वत्र्मानव्यवहारिवरहः स्यात्।
yadyatīto’rthaḥ pratibhāti; na tarhi tasya kalpanātvam varttamāna-
nīlajñānavat. nāpyarthasya atītatā pratīyamānatvena nīlajalādivat.
nahi pratīyamānasya atītatā nāma. yadi ca pratīyamānasyāpi atītatā
ucyate tadā sarvasya buddhyupalakṣitasya atītatā bhavet. tataśca
varttamānavyavahāravirahaḥ syāt.
Translation: 517
If you say a past object appears there, then, that cannot called a
mental construction like the knowledge of present blue object. Nor
can it decide that, that object is a past object, because, that is
being known at the present time, like the objects like blue object or
water etc. As a matter of fact, what is being known at the present
time cannot be said to belong to the past. And if you say that even
that which is known at the present time belongs to the past, then,
each and every thing which is known will have to be considered as
belonging to the past. And in that case, nobody can refer to the
present events.
Text: 518
अथ तदभावः पर्ितभाित; तस्याप्यतीतता ना स्त, स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात्। नािप
तिद्षयिवज्ञानस्य कल्पनात्वमुपपद्ते अभावाथर् सामथ्येर्न समुद्वात्। असामथ्येर् वा
िवषयाथर् श्चन्त्यः।
atha tadabhāvaḥ pratibhāti; tasyāpyatītatā nāsti svena rūpeṇa
vidyamānatvāt. nāpi tadviṣayavijñānasya kalpanātvamupapadyate
abhāvārthasāmarthyena samudbhavāt. asāmarthye vā viṣayā-
rthaścintyaḥ.
Translation: 518
If you say that, what appears there is absence of object even that
cannot be said to belong to the past, because in its own form i.e.
in the form of absence, it exists in the present and it is not proper
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 159
Text: 523
तद्िद पर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्वत्वं िवविक्षतम् तदा रागािदसंवेदनस्य योिगपर्त्यक्षस्य च
पर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्वत्वं न लभ्यते।
tadyadi pratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ vivakṣitam tadā rāgā-
disaṁvedanasya yogipratyakṣasya ca pratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbha-
vatvaṁ na labhyate.
Translation: 523
If you say, the state of being produced by the svalakṣaṇa which
appears in the cognition, is intended by you, then, one does not see
that the feeling of attachment and the perception of a yogin are
produced by the svalakṣaṇa which appears in the cognition.
Text: 524
अथ इ न्दर्यजपर्त्यक्षिववक्षया इदमपिदश्यते अथर् सामथ्येर्न समुद्त
ू त्वािदित साधनम्;
atha indriyajapratyakṣavivakṣayā idamapadiśyate arthasāmar-
thyena samudbhūtatvāditi sādhanam;
Translation: 524
Clarification:
Well, what is being stated here is that perceptual cognition which
is caused by (the contact between) sense organ (an object) and the
ground for such an assertion is the state of being caused by the
capacity of its object.
Text: 525
ततर्ािप [पर्तीयमानाथर् समुद्व?]-स्य बाह्ाथर् िनराकरणपरत्वात्।
tatrāpi [pratīyamānārthasamudbhava?]-sya bāhyārthanirākaraṇa-
paratvāt.
Translation: 525
Reply:
There also (according to your doctrine, what appears in the
cognition cannot be an object outside) because you deny the
existence of external object.
Text: 526
अस्तु वा बाह्ोऽथर् ः; तथािप िकं तेन िनिमत्ात्मकेन उत्पाद्ते, आहो उपादानात्मकेन?
162 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 529
अथ उपादानभूतेन रूपेण रूपमुत्पाद्ते िनिमत्ात्मकेन तु ज्ञानिमित चेत्;
atha upādānabhūtena rūpeṇa rūpamutpādyate nimittātmakena tu
jñānamiti cet;
Translation: 529
Clarification:
As a matter of fact, color produces color as a material cause, but it
produces knowledge as an efficient cause.
Text: 530
तिददं महानुभावस्य दशर् नम्। न ह्बा लश एवं वक्ुमुत्सहेत, न ह्ेकस्य अनेकाकारता नाम।
न चानेकनामकरणे मेयाद्न्यत्वम स्त। अन्यत्वे वा न तहीर्दं वक्व्यम्- “स्विवषयानन्तर-
िवषयसहका रणे न्दर्यज्ञानेन मनोिवज्ञानं िनष्पाद्ते।”
tadidaṁ mahānubhāvasya darśanam. na hyabāliśa evaṁ vaktumut-
saheta, na hyekasya anekākāratā nāma. na cānekanāmakaraṇe
meyādyanyatvamasti. anyatve vā na tarhīdaṁ vaktavyam-
“svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena manovijñānaṁ
niṣpādyate”.
Translation: 530
Reply:
This is indeed a philosophy of a great philosopher like you! As a
matter of fact, unless one is a child, one will not be prompted to
say like this. It is nobody’s experience that one entity can have many
forms. Even if you call one thing by many names, it is not different
from what is called “knowable”. And if you treat it to be different,
then, you should not say the following “a mental perception is
caused by the sense perception, which is the auxiliary cause of the
object arising after its own content.”
Text: 531
तदेविम न्दर्यज्ञानस्य पर्तीयमानाथर् समुद्वत्वाभावः। दृष्ान्तश्च साधनिवकलः-न
रूपािदस्वलक्षणस्य रूपरूपावभाताथोर्द्वत्वम स्त।
tadevamindriyajñānasya pratīyamānārthasamudbhavatvābhāvaḥ.
dṛṣṭāntaśca sādhanavikalaḥ-na rūpādisvalakṣaṇasya rūparūpāva-
bhātārthodbhavatvamasti.
164 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 531
Thus, a sense perception is not caused by the object which appears
in the perception and the example which you have provided in
support of your theses, is suffering from the defect of absence of the
ground in the example, because it is not the case that svalakṣaṇa
like color etc. is produced by the object which has appeared in the
perception viz. the color.
Text: 532
अथ अपर्तीयमानस्वलक्षणोद्वत्वं मे िवविक्षतम्;
atha apratīyamānasvalakṣaṇodbhavatvaṁ me vivakṣitam;
Translation: 532
Clarification:
Well, what I intend is the perceptual cognition is produced by the
svalakṣaṇa which is not being cognized.
Text: 533
तदाऽतीतानागतानुमानिवकल्पानाम् अपर्तीयमानाथोर्द्वत्वेन िनिवर् कल्पकत्वमापद्ते।
tadā’tītānāgatānumānavikalpānām apratīyamānārthodbhavatvena
nirvikalpakatvamāpadyate.
Translation: 533
Reply:
In that case, then, since inferential cognition of past and future
object is produced by an object which is not being cognized at
present, should become indeterminate cognition.
[३.एकोपलम्भसामथ्यार्त् िवक ल्पकायाः समुद्व इत्याद्ुक्ेिनर् रसनम्।]
[3.ekopalambhasāmarthyāt vikalpikāyāḥ samudbhava ityādyukter-
nirasanam.]
Text: 534
यदप्यन्यदक्
ु म्-“एकोपलम्भसामथ्यार्द ् िवक ल्पकायाः समुद्वः-'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभे'
इित िकल एकभूतलोपलम्भे सित िवक ल्पका बुिद्रुत्पद्ते-'इदमुपलभे इदं नोपलभ्यते'
इत्यािदका” एतदिप न युक्म्। यथा रूपस्वलक्षणस्य सिवकल्पकिवज्ञानजनकत्वं ना स्त
अिवकल्पकत्वात्, तथा िवज्ञानस्वलक्षणमिप सिवकल्पकिवज्ञानोत्पादकत्वमितवतर् ते
अिवचारकत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 165
Translation: 536
Reply:
In that case, then, let the same capacity be ascribed to a svalakṣaṇa
like color etc. also and in that case, one cannot justify the difference
between a perceptual cognition and an inferential cognition.
[४. पर्त्यक्षसाधन एवेत्यादेबौर्द्ोक्स्य खण्डनम्।]
[4. pratyakṣasādhana evetyāderbauddhoktasya khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 537
यदप्यन्यदक्
ु म्-“पर्त्यक्षसाधन एव इ न्दर्य धयः कल्पनािवरहः।” अथ कोऽयं कल्पनािवरहो
नाम? िकं ज्ञानकायतादात्म्यव्यव स्थतदेहः तिद्परीतो वा?
yadapyanyaduktam-“pratyakṣasādhana eva indriyadhiyaḥ
kalpanā- virahaḥ.” atha ko’yaṁ kalpanāviraho nāma? kiṁ
jñānakāyatādātmya- vyavasthitadehaḥ, tadviparīto vā?
Translation: 537
You also made another statement, “the absence of mental
construction of a sense perception is caused by perception only”
there we would like to ask, what is this absence of mental
construction? Does it mean the body settled by the identity of the
form of knowledge or opposite of that?
Text: 538
तद्िद ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यव स्थतः; तदा पर्त्यक्षसाधनः कल्पनािवरहः इित। िकमुक्ं
भवित? पर्त्यक्षसाधनो िवज्ञानाकारः पर्त्यक्ष धयः। न केवलं पर्त्यक्षकल्पनािवरहः
पर्त्यक्षसाधन (नोऽ)नुमान धयोऽिप पर्त्यक्षसाधन एव, ज्ञानाकारस्य अनुमानज्ञानेऽिप
भावात्।
tadyadi jñānatādātmyena vyavasthitaḥ; tadā pratyakṣasādhanaḥ kal-
panāvirahaḥ iti. kimuktaṁ bhavati? pratyakṣasādhano vijñānākāraḥ
pratyakṣadhiyaḥ. na kevalaṁ pratyakṣakalpanāvirahaḥ pratyakṣa-
sādhana(no’)numānadhiyo’pi pratyakṣasādhana eva, jñānākārasya
anumānajñāne’pi bhāvāt.
Translation: 538
If you say that, it is settled by the identity of the knowledge
then, it means absence of mental construction, which is caused
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 167
Translation: 541
If you say it is settled on the basis of difference, how to understand
it? It cannot be self-illuminating, because it is different from the
form of cognition. Nor is it known as an entity, which offers its
form of being a producer, because, an absence does not have such
a capacity. Under these circumstances, your statement viz. “The
absence of mental construction of a sense perception is caused by
perception only” is nothing more than babbling of a child.
Text: 542
अथ 'गौः' इत्यािद ज्ञानं कल्पना। कथमस्य कल्पनात्वम्, अथेर्नाऽजिनतत्वात्?
यिद गवादेरथर् स्य गौ रत्यािदज्ञानोत्पादनसामथ्यर् स्यात् तदा पर्थमाक्षसिन्पातवेलायामिप
कुयार्त् तदाऽत्मनोऽिवशेषात्। तदक्ु म्-
यः पर्ागजनको बुद्ेरुपयोगािवशेषतः।
स पश्चादिप तेन स्यादथार्पायेऽिप नेतर्धीः।।
atha ‘gauḥ’ ityādi jñānaṁ kalpanā. kathamasya kalpanātvam,
arthenā’janitatvāt? yadi gavāderarthasya gaurityādijñānotpādana-
sāmarthyaṁ syāt tadā prathamākṣasannipātavelāyāmapi kuryāt
tadā’tmano’viśeṣāt. taduktam-
yaḥ prāgajanako buddherupayogāviśeṣataḥ,
sa paścādapi tena syādarthāpāye’pi netradhīḥ.
Translation: 542
If you say cognition “this is a cow” is a mental construction, how
do you say it is a mental construction? Is it because it is not
produced by the object? If the object like cow etc. has the capacity
of producing the cognition “this is a cow” then, it must produce at
the time when our eyes fall on it, because at that time the form
is not different, as it has been said “if a thing is not the cause of
its knowledge, because it is not different from the point of view of
utility, even if that object is not there, the visual perception will
still occur.”
Text: 543
अथ शब्दस्मरणमपेक्षय उत्पादयित; तदेवास्तु तद्ेहानन्तरफलत्वाद् गौः इत्यािदज्ञानस्य।
तदक्
ु म्-
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 169
Translation: 544
Well, you say that one object produces consecutive knowledges there
we would like to ask, does it produce in one form or in different
form? Our answer to this question is, it produces in one form.
Text: 545
नन्वेककालीनता पूवार्परिवज्ञानयोः एकस्वभावायत्त्वे सित आपद्ते;
nanvekakālīnatā pūrvāparavijñānayoḥ ekasvabhāvāyattatve sati āpa-
dyate
Translation: 545
Objection:
Well, in that case two consecutive knowledges will be treated as
belonging to one and the same time, if they are said to be sharing
one and the same nature.
Text: 546
यद्ेवम् एकनीलोत्पािदतनयनालोकिवज्ञानानाम् एकदेशसम्ब न्धत्वम् एकाकारता
एकव्यिक्त्वमापद्ते एकनीलोत्पाद्त्वाऽिवशेषात्।
yadyevam ekanīlotpāditanayanālokavijñānānām ekadeśasambandhi-
tvam ekākāratā ekavyaktitvamāpadyate ekanīlotpādyatvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 546
Reply:
If it is so, then, the perceptual knowledges caused by one blue thing,
will be treated as related to one place, having one form and being
unitary in character, because of its being produced by one blue
thing.
Text: 547
अथ एवंभूतं तत् तस्य स्वरूपं यत् िचतर्कायर् करणात्मकम्;
atha evaṁbhūtaṁ tat tasya svarūpaṁ yat citrakāryakaraṇātmakam;
Translation: 547
Clarification:
Well, that is the nature of that thing, which is of the nature of
producing a number of effects.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 171
Text: 548
यद्ेवं मामकेऽिप पक्षे कर्मभाव्यनेककायर् करणात्मकमेव स्वरूपं स्वहेतुसामथ्यर् िनयिमत-
स्योत्पत्ेः। अथवा, यथा त्वदीये पक्षे मनोज्ञानं स्वलक्षणिवषयं न च पर्थमाक्षसिन्पातजम्,
अिप तु इ न्दर्यज्ञानेन स्विवषयानन्तरिवषयसहका रणा उत्पाद्ते तथा 'गौः' इत्यािदकमिप
ज्ञानं पर्थमाक्षजेन िवज्ञानेन स्विवषयानन्तरिवषयसहका रणा स्मरणाद्ुपिहतेन चोत्पाद्ते
इित िनिवर् षयत्वाभावः, िवषयान्तर[स्य] स्वकारणसामथ्यार्नुरोधेन 'गौः' इत्यािद
ज्ञानजननयोग्यस्योत्पत्ेः; स्मरणमिप समथर् मुत्पन्ं सत् गौः इत्युत्पादयित। एवं सित
यदक्ु म्-यः पर्ागजनको बुद्ेः इत्यािद, तत् स्वपरमतमनालोच्यैव जेगीयते।
yadyevaṁ māmake’pi pakṣe kramabhāvyanekakāryakaraṇātmakameva
svarūpaṁ svahetusāmarthyaniyamitasyotpatteḥ. athavā, yathā
tvadīye pakṣe manojñānaṁ svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṁ na ca prathamā-
kṣasannipātajam, api tu indriyajñānena svaviṣayānantaraviṣaya-
sahakāriṇā utpādyate tathā ‘gauḥ’ ityādikamapi jñānaṁ
prathamākṣajena vijñānena svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇā
smaraṇādyupahitena cotpādyate iti nirviṣayatvābhāvaḥ, viṣayā-
ntara[sya] svakāraṇasāmarthyānurodhena ‘gauḥ’ ityādi jñānajana-
nayogyasyotpatteḥ; smaraṇamapi samarthamutpannaṁ sat gauḥ
ityutpādayati. evaṁ sati yaduktam-yaḥ prāgajanako buddheḥ ityādi,
tat svaparamatamanālocyaiva jegīyate.
Translation: 548
Reply:
If this is so, then, in our view also the nature of a thing can be of
the nature of producing many consecutive effects, because an effect
is invariably controlled by the capacity of its cause or as in your
view a mental perception is considered as a cognition of perception
and as it is not considered as caused by the first contact with the
eyes, but it is considered as being produced by the sense perception,
which helps another object then, its own object, in the same way
the cognition such as this is a cow, is caused by the perception
caused by the first contact with the eyes, which helps the object
other than its own object, with the help of remembrance and hence
it cannot be called contentless. The object other than its own object
is capable of producing the knowledge such as this is a cow on the
basis of the capacity of its own cause. Even remembrance which
172 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 551
ननु मात्र्ण्डपादसङ्ातोत्पािदतं िवज्ञानमपोह्म स्त।
nanu mārttaṇḍapādasaṅghātotpāditaṁ vijñānamapohyamasti.
Translation: 551
Clarification:
Well, cognition (of water) produced by a group of rays of the Sun,
will be excluded by that clause.
Text: 552
कथं तदपोह्म्? अतथ्योदकिवषयत्वात्।
kathaṁ tadapohyam? atathyodakaviṣayatvāt.
Translation: 552
How can that be excluded? Is it because it has a content viz. false
water or unreal water?
Text: 553
यद्तथ्योदकिवषयम्; कथं तदपनीयते, अतथ्योदकाकारस्य स्वेन रूपेण िवद्मानत्वात्
मधुरोदकदीघोर्दकाकारवत्?
yadyatathyodakaviṣayam; kathaṁ tadapanīyate, atathyodakākārasya
svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatvāt madhurodakadīrghodakākāravat?
Translation: 553
If you say the content of that water is unreal, then, how do you
exclude it? Because, there is water in its unreal form, like that form
of sweet water and the form of huge water.
Text: 554
अथ ततर् मधुरोदकं िवद्ते, स्वेन रूपेण पर्तीयमानत्वात्; तिदहाप्युदकं पर्तीयते 'उदकं
गृह्ािम' इित व्यवहारदशर् नात्।
atha tatra madhurodakaṁ vidyate, svena rūpeṇa pratīyamānatvāt;
tadihāpyudakaṁ pratīyate ‘udakaṁ gṛhṇāmi’ iti vyavahāradarśanāt.
Translation: 554
Clarification:
If you say there is sweet water because it appears there in the
174 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 562
िकं यत् पर्ितभाित तत् तथ्योदकं, आहो यत् तथ्यं तत् पर्ितभाित?
kiṁ yat pratibhāti tat tathyodakaṁ, āho yat tathyaṁ tat pratibhāti?
Translation: 562
Reply:
Here the question arises, whether the water that appears in the
knowledge of water, is real water or is it the real water that appears
in the knowledge?
Text: 563
तद्िद यत् पर्ितभाित तत् तथ्यम्; इहाप्युदकं पर्ितभाित, पर्ाप्ा तस्यािप तथ्यता।
tadyadi yat pratibhāti tat tathyam; ihāpyudakaṁ pratibhāti, prāptā
tasyāpi tathyatā.
Translation: 563
If you say what appears is real, then, in this case also, water appears
in the knowledge and therefore, water will become real.
Text: 564
अथ यत् तथ्यं तत् पर्ितभाित; तस्य तथ्यता कथं ज्ञायते - िकं पर्तीत्या, अन्यथा वा?
atha yat tathyaṁ tat pratibhāti; tasya tathyatā kathaṁ jñāyate - kiṁ
pratītyā, anyathā vā?
Translation: 564
If you say what is real that appears in the knowledge, there the
question arises how is the reality of water known? Is it through
knowledge or by some other way?
Text: 565
यिद पर्तीत्या; इहािप पर्तीितरुत्पद्ते, अस्तु तथ्यता।
yadi pratītyā; ihāpi pratītirutpadyate, astu tathyatā.
Translation: 565
If you say it is by knowledge, and then, here also there is knowledge
of water, then, let the water be true.
Text: 566
अथ पर्तीितमन्तरेण तथ्यता उपपाद्ते; तथा सु स्थतािन वस्तूिन! सवर् वाद सिद्ः स्यात्।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 177
Translation: 573
If you say it is in terms of its own existence, then, all knowledges
should be declared as false knowledges, because in every knowledge,
there is the form of knowledge and as a result and no cognition will
be left as a true cognition.
Text: 574
अथ परसत्ानुरोधेन व्यिभचा रता उच्यते िकम् - अनुपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन, आहो
उपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन?
atha parasattānurodhena vyabhicāritā ucyate kiṁ - anupakāra-
kaparasattānurodhena, āho upakārakaparasattānurodhena?
Translation: 574
If you say that, a cognition is a false cognition in terms of something
else, is it due to existence of something else which does not provide
any help or is it due to the existence of something else which offers
some help?
Text: 575
तद्िद अनुपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन व्यिभचा रता; तदा सवर् संिवत्ीनां व्यिभचा रता
पर्ाप्नोित, अनुपकारकपरसत्ाऽिवशेषात्।
tadyadi anupakārakaparasattānurodhena vyabhicāritā; tadā sarva-
saṁvittīnāṁ vyabhicāritā prāpnoti, anupakārakaparasattā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 575
If you say falsity is accounted for in terms of existence of something
else which does not offer any help, then, all cognitions should be
declared as false, because all share the same existence of something
else, which does not offer any help.
Text: 576
अथ उपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन व्यिभचा र अिभधीयते िकं - करणभूतपरोपकारक-
परसत्ानुरोधेन, आहो कमर् तापन्ोपकारकपरसत्ानुरोधेन?
atha upakārakaparasattānurodhena vyabhicāri abhidhīyate kiṁ-
karaṇabhūtaparopakārakaparasattānurodhena, āho karmatāpanno-
pakārakaparasattānurodhena?
Translation: 576
Again if you say that cognition is called false because of the
existence of something else, which offers some help, there also the
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 181
Text: 589
तद्िद उपादानकारणानुकारेणोत्पाद्ते; तदा िकमाप्नोित? अव्यिभचा र स्वरूपानुकारेण
उत्पाद्ते। कथम्? अव्यिभचारस्य ज्ञानतादात्म्येन व्यव स्थतेः।
tadyadi upādānakāraṇānukāreṇotpādyate; tadā kimāpnoti? avya-
bhicāri svarūpānukāreṇa utpādyate. katham? avyabhicārasya jñāna-
tādātmyena vyavasthiteḥ.
Translation: 589
If you say, it is produced by following the material cause, then, what
is the outcome? Does it mean it produces the cognition following
its own nature which is not false? But how can it happen? Because,
the absence of falsity is settled by its identity with the cognition.
Text: 590
न च एकदेशानुका रत्वम स्त उपादानकारणस्य िनरवयवत्वात्। एवं सवर् िवज्ञानमव्यिभचा र
पर्सक्म् - अपोह्ज्ञानानुपप त्ः।
na ca ekadeśānukāritvamasti upādānakāraṇasya niravayavatvāt. evaṁ
sarvaṁ vijñānamavyabhicāri prasaktam - apohyajñānānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 590
You cannot say that, it follows only a part of the material cause,
because the material cause has no parts. Thus, every knowledge
will become true and there will be no false cognition which can be
excluded by the clause “which is not erroneous.”
Text: 591
न च व्यिभचाराव्यिभचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यित रक्ौ स्तः। यथा रसाकारो रूपाकारो
वा ज्ञानाकाराद् िभन्ः न तथा व्यिभचाराऽव्यिभचारौ ज्ञानाद् व्यित रक्ौ। ततश्च
व्यिभचाराकारो अतर् िनरािकर्यते। िकमुक्ं भवित? ज्ञानाकारोऽतर् िनरािकर्यते। ततश्च
अज्ञानात्मकं पर्त्यक्षं पर्सक्ं सौगतानाम्।
na ca vyabhicārāvyabhicārau jñānād vyatiriktau staḥ. yathā rasā-
kāro rūpākāro vā jñānākārād bhinnaḥ na tathā vyabhicārā’vya-
bhicārau jñānād vyatiriktau. tataśca vyabhicārākāro atra nirākri-
yate. kimuktaṁ bhavati? jñānākāro’tra nirākriyate. tataśca ajñānāt-
makaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prasaktaṁ saugatānām.
Translation: 591
It is not the case that falsity and truthfulness are different from
cognitions, as the form of taste and form of color are different from
186 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
their knowledges; the falsity and the truthfulness, are not different
from their knowledges and what is happening here is the form of
falsity is being excluded. What does it mean? As a matter of fact,
the form of knowledge is itself being excluded and this will lead
the Buddhist philosophers to accept perception which is not of the
nature of cognition.
Text: 592
अिप च यथा रूपेण उपादानभूतेन जन्यते रूपम् तथा ज्ञानमिप उपादानभूतेनव ै जन्यते।
य एव तस्य रूपोत्पादने आत्मा स एव तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादनेऽिप। न िह तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादने
आत्मान्यत्वम्।
api ca yathā rūpeṇa upādānabhūtena janyate rūpam tathā jñānamapi
upādānabhūtenaiva janyate. ya eva tasya rūpotpādane ātmā sa eva
tasya jñānotpādane’pi. na hi tasya jñānotpādane ātmānyatvam.
Translation: 592
Moreover, as color is produced from the material viz. color, in
the same way, cognition also is produced from something which
is its material. Whatever, is the form of that with reference to
the production of color, the same is the form with reference to
the production of cognition. It does not have any other form with
reference to the production of cognition.
Text: 593
अथ िनिमत्भूतेन ज्ञानमुत्पाद्ते, उपादानभूतेन रूपिमित चेत्;
atha nimittabhūtena jñānamutpādyate, upādānabhūtena rūpamiti
cet;
Translation: 593
Clarification:
Cognition is produced from what is called efficient cause, but a color
is produced from the material cause.
Text: 594
तत्कथमेकस्य अनेकाकारयोिगतोपपद्ते? न च संज्ञान्यत्वे मेयान्यत्वमुपपद्ते, रूपवद्
िवज्ञानस्यािप रूपरूपता पर्ाप्नोित। तत्पर्ाप्ौ च न परलोक आत्मा, तदभावान् परलोकः।
इदमेवं चेत स समारोप्याह भगवान् बृहस्पितः-“परलोिकनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः।”
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 187
Translation: 597
Clarification:
Cognition is produced by cognition, as its material cause.
Text: 598
रूपमिप तेनव
ै जन्यते, निह तस्य रूपोपादाने आत्माऽन्यत्वम्। एवं च-
तदतदर्ूिपणोभावाः तदतदर्ूपहेतुजाः।
तदर्ूपािद िकमज्ञानं िवज्ञानािभन्हेतुजम्।। (पर्माणवा.३.२५१)
rūpamapi tenaiva janyate, nahi tasya rūpopādāne ātmā’nyatvam.
evaṁ ca-
tadatadrūpiṇobhāvāḥ tadatadrūpahetujāḥ,
tadrūpādi kimajñānaṁ vijñānābhinnahetujam.(pramāṇa.vā.3.251)
Translation: 598
Reply:
Then the form is also produced by form, we do not say anything
else other than itself, with reference to production of form. Thus,
it has been said in the (Pramāṇavārttika 3.251) viz. “the similar
and dissimilar, positive entities are caused by similar and dissimilar
causes respectively.” And therefore, is it the case an entity other
than cognition is caused by a cause identical with the cognition?
Text: 599
अथ रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे िवज्ञानस्य न रूपात्मता तथा ज्ञानोत्पादन(ज्ञानोपादान)-
जन्यत्वेऽिप िवज्ञानस्य न ज्ञानरूपता,
atha rūpopādānajanyatve vijñānasya na rūpātmatā tathā jñānot-
pādana(jñānopādāna)janyatve’pi vijñānasya na jñānarūpatā,
Translation: 599
Clarification:
Well, even if cognition is produced by color, cognition is not
identical with color. Similarly, even if cognition is generated by
the factors of cognition, cognition cannot identical with cognition.
Text: 600
ततश्च नैरात्म्यपर्सङ्ः।
tataśca nairātmyaprasaṅgaḥ.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 189
Translation: 600
Reply:
Thus there will arise the contingency of absence of self.
Text: 601
अथ ज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वे ज्ञानाकारप रकल्पना तथा रूपोपादानजन्यत्वे रूपाकारता,
आलोकोपादानजन्यत्वेन आलोकाकारता पर्ाप्नोित; ततश्च आकारकदम्बात्मकं ज्ञानं
पर्सक्म्। अिनष्ं चैतत्, अद्यरूपत्वेनाऽभ्युपगमात्।
atha jñānopādānajanyatve jñānākāraparikalpanā tathā rūpopādāna-
janyatve rūpākāratā, ālokopādānajanyatvena ālokākāratā prāpnoti;
tataśca ākārakadambātmakaṁ jñānaṁ prasaktam. aniṣṭaṁ caitat,
advayarūpatvenā’bhyupagamāt.
Translation: 601
If you say that, since a cognition is caused by the factor of cognition,
we postulate the form of cognition. Similarly, when color is produced
from the color, it gets the form of color. Likewise, when something is
produced from the material of light it gets the form of light, then, it
leads to a cognition having multiple forms. But this is not desirable,
because, it is accepted as non-dual entity.
Text: 602
यत् तदर्ूपोत्पाद्ं िवज्ञानं त त्कम् - एकदेशेन रूपोत्पाद्त्वेन स्थतम्, सवार्त्मना वा
उत्पाद्त्वेन पयर् व सतम्?
yat tadrūpotpādyaṁ vijñānaṁ tatkim - ekadeśena rūpotpādyatvena
sthitam, sarvātmanā vā utpādyatvena paryavasitam?
Translation: 602
You said that cognition is produced by that form. There, we would
like to know (i) whether it is accepted as produced by the form
partially? or (ii) whether it results in being produced totally?
Text: 603
तद्िद एकदेशेन स्थतम्; तदयुक्म्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशिवरहात्।
tadyadi ekadeśena sthitam; tadayuktam; akhaṇḍasya ekadeśavirahāt.
Translation: 603
If you say it is produced by the form partially, that will not be
proper because, that which is indivisible cannot have parts.
190 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 604
अथ सवार्त्मना रूपोत्पाद्त्वेन पयर् व सतम्; तदा िवज्ञानोत्पाद्ं न पर्ाप्नोित यथा
एककारकसमूहोत्पाद्त्वेन पयर् व सतस्य कारकसङ्ातस्य सङ्ातान्तरोत्पाद्त्वं न दृष्म्,
ततश्च िवज्ञानसङ्ातानुपप त्ः।
atha sarvātmanā rūpotpādyatvena paryavasitam; tadā vijñānot-
pādyaṁ na prāpnoti yathā ekakārakasamūhotpādyatvena paryavasi-
tasya kārakasaṅghātasya saṅghātāntarotpādyatvaṁ na dṛṣṭam,
tataśca vijñānasaṅghātānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 604
If you say, it results in being produced totally, then, it cannot be
said that it is produced by cognition, as a collection of factors which
is seen to be produced by one group of factors is not seen to have
been produced by another group of factors. Therefore, the theory
of chain of cognitions cannot be justified.
Text: 605
तथा रूपमिप ज्ञानमेकदेशेन कुयार्त्, सवार्त्मना करणपयर् व सतं वा?
tathā rūpamapi jñānamekadeśena kuryāt, sarvātmanā karaṇaparya-
vasitaṁ vā?
Translation: 605
In the same way, a color will produce its knowledge, is it by part or
in totality?
Text: 606
तद्िद एकदेशेन करोित; तदयुक्म्; अखण्डस्य एकदेशाऽयोगात्।
tadyadi ekadeśena karoti; tadayuktam; akhaṇḍasya ekadeśā’yogāt.
Translation: 606
If you say it will produce in part, it will not be proper, because,
that which is indivisible cannot have parts.
Text: 607
अथ सवार्त्मना करोित; तदा रूपं सवार्त्मना िवज्ञानकरणे पयर् व सतं न रूपान्तरकरणे
पर्वत्र्ते, यथा एककारकसामगर्ी एककायोर्त्पादनपयर् व सता कायार्न्तरसिवतर्ी न भवित,
तथा रूपमिप रूपान्तरोत्पादकं न भवित, ततश्च रूपान्तरस्य आक स्मकत्वम् कथं
तदा(०कत्वम्, तदाऽऽ)क स्मकत्वे कायार्नुमानं िवलुप्यते सौगतानाम्।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 191
Translation: 611
Reply:
If it is so, the Naiyāyikas also accept cognitions of color and taste,
but, in spite of their absence you accept their presence.
Text: 612
अथ तािन पर्ितभा न्त वृत्यभावेऽिप, तेन तेषामभ्युपगमः िकर्यते;
atha tāni pratibhānti vṛttyabhāve’pi, tena teṣāmabhyupagamaḥ
kriyate;
Translation: 612
Clarification:
Well, even if they do not exist, they appear and therefore we accept
them.
Text: 613
यद्ेवं घट-संख्या-सामान्यादेरिप स्वरूपं पर्ितभाित अिभन्ानुगतात्मतया। न
चानुभूयमानस्य िनह्वो युक्ः सवार्पलापपर्सङ्ात्। अनुपलब्धौ वा सैव समथार्, अलं
वृ त्िवकल्पदोषेण। यद्ुपलभ्यते; तदा वृ त्िवकल्पदोषो न वक्व्यः।
yadyevaṁ ghaṭa-saṁkhyā-sāmānyāderapi svarūpaṁ pratibhāti abhi-
nnānugatātmatayā. na cānubhūyamānasya nihnavo yuktaḥ sarvāpa-
lāpaprasaṅgāt. anupalabdhau vā saiva samarthā, alaṁ vṛttivikalpa-
doṣeṇa. yadyupalabhyate; tadā vṛttivikalpadoṣo na vaktavyaḥ.
Translation: 613
Reply:
If it is so, then, the form of pot, number and universal etc. also
appears as identical and consecutively present in all subsequent
cases. It is not proper to deny something which is being experienced,
because, if it is so, then, there will arise the contingency of denying
everything and something is not experienced that alone is capable
of causing such an experience and so, there is no need of the fault
of conjecturing relationship.
Text: 614
अथ नोपलभ्यते; तथािप न वक्व्यः।
atha nopalabhyate; tathāpi na vaktavyaḥ.
194 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 614
If you say it is not experienced, even then, you should not make
such an argument.
[१०. देशभेदेनाऽगर्हणात् इत्यादेः समालोच्य पर्ितिवधानम्]
[10. deśabhedenā’grahaṇāt ityādeḥ samālocya pratividhānam.]
Text: 615
यदप्युक्म्- “देशभेदेनाऽगर्हणाद् घट-सामान्यानुपप त्ः”; तदप्ययुक्म्; न देशभेदेन
वस्तूनां भेदोऽिप तु आकारभेदेन, अिभन्ानुगतात्मतया तयोः स्वरूपमनुभूयते। न
देशभेदागर्हणेन स्वावयवा धकरणेन सह तयोस्तादात्म्यं सद्ध्यित असत्वं वा।
yadapyuktam-“deśabhedenā’grahaṇād ghaṭasāmānyānupapattiḥ”;tada-
pyayuktam; na deśabhedena vastūnāṁ bhedo’pi tu ākārabhedena,
abhinnānugatātmatayā tayoḥ svarūpamanubhūyate. na deśabhedā-
grahaṇena svāvayavādhikaraṇena saha tayostādātmyaṁ siddhyati
asattvaṁ vā.
Translation: 615
You had said that there is nothing called universal of pot because
it is not known through the differentiation of space, this is also
not proper, because, things are not distinguished on account of
difference of space. They are distinguished on the account of the
difference in their shapes. Both, pot and universal are experienced
as ’uniform and consecutively present’ in subsequent instances.
Unless the difference of space is grasped, their identity with their
parts and the locus is not established nor is the absence established.
Text: 616
यद्ाकारभेदेन गर्हणम्; तदा देशभेदेनागर्हणस्य अपर्योजकत्वम् (अपर्योजनकत्वम्),
आकारभेदगर्हणेन स्वरूपान्यत्वस्य पर्बो धतत्वात्।
yadyākārabhedena grahaṇam; tadā deśabhedenāgrahaṇasya aprayo-
jakatvam, ākārabhedagrahaṇena svarūpānyatvasya prabodhitatvāt.
Translation: 616
If knowledge arises due to the difference in shapes, then, not
knowing due to the difference in space cannot be the prompting
factor, because, by the knowledge of the difference of shapes, the
knowledge of another form is caused.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 195
Text: 617
अथ आकारान्यत्वेन नावबोधोऽ स्त;
atha ākārānyatvena nāvabodho’sti;
Translation: 617
Clarification:
Well, there is no knowledge as having different shapes.
Text: 618
स एवास्तु, असद्व्यवहारसमथर् त्वात्, िकं देशभेदागर्हणेन? स्वहेतोरेव िनयतदेशकाल-
िनयिमतस्योत्पत्ेनर् देशान्तरादौ गर्हणम्, अन्यथा रूपादेरसत्वं स्यािदतरदेशलग्-
स्याऽगर्हणात्।
sa evāstu, asadvyavahārasamarthatvāt, kiṁ deśabhedāgrahaṇena?
svahetoreva niyatadeśakālaniyamitasyotpatterna deśāntarādau gra-
haṇam, anyathā rūpāderasattvaṁ syāditaradeśalagnasyā’grahaṇāt.
Translation: 618
Reply:
Then let it be the same. When it is capable of causing the use of
its non-existence, what is the need of not knowing the difference of
space? When it is possible to explain that, it is regularly produced
in a particular space and time out of its own cause, there is no
knowledge of it a different place. Otherwise, one will have to accept
that there is no color because one does not know that it is associated
with another place.
[११. ना स्त घटसामान्यम्, तदगर्हेऽगर्हात् इत्यस्य िवभञ्नम्।]
[11. nāsti ghaṭasāmānyam, tadagrahe’grahāt ityasya vibhañjanam.]
Text: 619
यदप्युक्म्- “ना स्त घटसामान्यम्, तदगर्हेऽगर्हात्” िकमनेन िकर्यते? िकम् अवयवा ध-
करणाऽव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनम्, आहो असत्वपर्ितपादनम्?
yadapyuktam- “nāsti ghaṭasāmānyam, tadagrahe’grahāt” kimanena
kriyate? kim avayavādhikaraṇā’vyatirekapratipādanam, āho asattva-
pratipādanam?
Translation: 619
You had also said “there is nothing called universal of a pot” because
when the pot is not known, this is also not known. There the
196 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 623
If you say that, the subject is known, then, by that only different
form is known and therefore the ground which will cause the
knowledge of non-difference will be contradicted.
Text: 624
अथ तदवयवा धकरणस्य पक्षीकरणम्; ततर्ािप िकम् - स्वस्मात् स्वरूपाद् अव्यितरेकः
साध्यते, [आहो परस्मात्] इित?
atha tadavayavādhikaraṇasya pakṣīkaraṇam; tatrāpi kim - svasmāt
svarūpād avyatirekaḥ sādhyate, [āho parasmāt] iti?
Translation: 624
If again you say that the locus of its parts is presented as the
subject, there also one can ask, is it the fact that something is
being established which is not different from its own form or (from
other form)?
Text: 625
[यिद स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यितरेकः साध्यते;] सद्साध्यतया सम्बोधियतव्याः।
[yadi svasmāt svarūpādavyatirekaḥ sādhyate;] siddhasādhyatayā
sambodhayitavyāḥ.
Translation: 625
(If you say that, non-difference from its own part is established)
then, it should be addressed as something to be established which
is already known.
Text: 626
अथ परस्मादव्यितरेकः साध्यते; स परात्मा पर्ितपन्ः, अपर्ितपन्ो वा?
atha parasmādavyatirekaḥ sādhyate; sa parātmā pratipannaḥ,
apratipanno vā?
Translation: 626
If you say the non-difference from something else is being
established, there also the question arises, that something else is
known or not known.
Text: 627
यिद पर्ितपन्ः स िकम् - िभन्ाकारतया अवगतः, अिभन्ाकारतया वा?
198 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 635
अथ अवयवा धकरणस्य पक्षीकरणम्, घटसामान्यं नास्तीित पर्ितज्ञा; तदगर्हेऽगर्हािदत्यस्य
हेतोः तदभावेन सह सम्बन्धो ना स्त। तादात्म्यतदत्ु प त्सम्बन्धाभावे सित कथं
गमकत्वम्?
atha avayavādhikaraṇasya pakṣīkaraṇam, ghaṭasāmānyaṁ nāstīti
pratijñā; tadagrahe’grahādityasya hetoḥ tadabhāvena saha
sambandho nāsti. tādātmyatadutpattisambandhābhāve sati kathaṁ
gamakatvam?
Translation: 635
If you say the locus of its parts will be made the subject, then,
your proposition is “there is nothing called universal of pot?”
because, unless it is known, it can never be known and as such
this ground will not have the relation of invariable concomitance
with the absence of universal of absence of pot. As a matter of
fact, if the invariable concomitance, either in the form of identity
or causing effect relationship is not there, how can something be
called a ground?
Text: 636
तदगर्हेऽगर्हािदत्यस्य कोऽथर् ः? िकम् - अवयवा धकरणगर्हणमेव घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणम्,
आहो अवयवा धकरणगर्हणानन्तरं घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणम्, िकं वा घटसामान्यस्यागर्हणमेव
िवविक्षतम्?
tadagrahe’grahādityasya ko’rthaḥ? kim - avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇa-
meva ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam, āho avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇā-
nantaraṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇam, kiṁ vā ghaṭasāmānyasyā-
grahaṇameva vivakṣitam?
Translation: 636
When you say, unless it is known, it cannot be known, what do you
mean by it? Do you mean the knowledge of the locus of the part
itself is the knowledge of universal of pot or after the knowledge
of the locus of parts the knowledge of potness is the knowledge of
universal of pot? Or do you want to say that there is no knowledge
of universal of pot?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 201
Text: 637
तद्िद अवयवा धकरणगर्हणमेव घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणम् िवविक्षतम्; तदा नानेनाव्यितरेकः
अन्यतरासत्वं वा पर्ितपाद्ते, यथा नीलतिद्योः एकोपलम्भेऽिप नान्यतराभावः,
अव्यितरेको वा, तथा नीललोिहतयोः एकोपलम्भेऽिप नान्यतराभावः, अव्यितरेको वा।
tadyadi avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇameva ghaṭasāmānyasya graha-
ṇam vivakṣitam; tadā nānenāvyatirekaḥ anyatarāsattvaṁ vā pratipā-
dyate, yathā nīlataddhiyoḥ ekopalambhe’pi nānyatarābhāvaḥ, avyati-
reko vā, tathā nīlalohitayoḥ ekopalambhe’pi nānyatarābhāvaḥ, avya-
tireko vā.
Translation: 637
If you intend that, the knowledge of the locus of parts itself is the
knowledge of universal of pot, then, you are not explaining either
difference from many or absence of either of the two. For example,
out of the two viz. a blue object and its knowledge, even if one is
known, there cannot be absence of the other or non-difference. In
the same way, out of the two viz. a blue and a red thing, even if
there is presence of one, one cannot say there is absence of other or
there is no absence.
Text: 638
अथ अवयवा धकरणगर्हणानन्तरं घटसामान्यगर्हणं िवविक्षतम्; तदा नानेनाव्यितरेकः
साध्यते अन्यतरासत्वं वा, यथा रूपगर्हणानन्तरं रससंवेदनं न तयोरेकतां गमयित
अन्यतरासत्वं वा।
atha avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ ghaṭasāmānyagrahaṇaṁ
vivakṣitam; tadā nānenāvyatirekaḥ sādhyate anyatarāsattvaṁ vā,
yathā rūpagrahaṇānantaraṁ rasasaṁvedanaṁ na tayorekatāṁ
gamayati anyatarāsattvaṁ vā.
Translation: 638
If you intend to say that, after the knowledge of locus of parts, there
is knowledge of universal of pot, then, you are not establishing either
the absence of absence of many, i.e. identity or absence of other. For
example, after the knowledge of color, if there is knowledge of taste,
neither it causes the knowledge of identity nor absence of other.
202 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 639
अथ अगर्हणमेव िवविक्षतं घटसामान्यस्य; तदा 'तदगर्हेऽगर्हात्' इत्येतन् वक्व्यम्,
'अगर्हात्' इत्येतावदस्तु। निह अन्यस्याऽगर्हे तदनुपलम्भ सिद्ः, तत्स्वभाविविन-
वृ त्िनबन्धनत्वात् तदनुपलम्भस्य।
atha agrahaṇameva vivakṣitaṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya; tadā ‘tadagrahe’-
grahāt’ ityetanna vaktavyam, ‘agrahāt’ ityetāvadastu. nahi anya-
syā’grahe tadanupalambhasiddhiḥ, tatsvabhāvavinivṛttinibandhana-
tvāt tadanupalambhasya.
Translation: 639
If you say that, what is intended is the absence of knowledge
of universal of pot, then, you should not say, in the absence of
knowledge of that, there is absence of knowledge of universal.
You should simply say, “Because there is absence of knowledge
of universal.” It is not the case that, if there is no knowledge of
something else, it is established that, there is absence of knowledge
of that, because; the absence of knowledge of X depends upon the
absence of nature of X.
Text: 640
न चायं व्यितरेकाथोर् लभ्यते, 'तदगर्हेऽगर्हात्' इत्यस्य हेतोः घटसामान्यस्यागर्हणमेव,
अिप तु अवयवा धकरणगर्हणानन्तरं घटसामान्यस्य गर्हणं लभ्यते ततश्च िवपरीतसाधनाद्
िवरुद्ो भवित।
na cāyaṁ vyatirekārtho labhyate, ‘tadagrahe’grahāt’ ityasya hetoḥ
ghaṭasāmānyasyāgrahaṇameva, api tu avayavādhikaraṇagrahaṇāna-
ntaraṁ ghaṭasāmānyasya grahaṇaṁ labhyate tataśca viparītasā-
dhanād viruddho bhavati.
Translation: 640
Neither the following meaning is understood from the expression,
“In the absence of knowledge of that, there is absence of knowledge.”
Because of this ground, there will indeed be absence of knowledge of
universal of pot. But what follows from this expression is: after the
knowledge of locus of its parts, there will be knowledge of universal
of pot. And if that is so, this ground will become a contradictory
ground, because, it will establish just opposite of what is intended
by you to be established.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 203
Text: 646
ततर् क्षीरोदकयोः एकभाजनिनक्षेपे सित िकं - केवलं क्षीरं पर्ितभाित आहो उदकमुभयं वा?
tatra kṣīrodakayoḥ ekabhājananikṣepe sati kim - kevalaṁ kṣīraṁ
pratibhāti āho udakamubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 646
When one pours water and milk in a vessel, what do you find? Is it
milk or water or both.
Text: 647
तद्िद क्षीरमेव पर्ितभाित; कथं तददु काकारान् िविवक्ं भवित?
tadyadi kṣīrameva pratibhāti; kathaṁ tadudakākārānna viviktaṁ
bhavati?
Translation: 647
If you say only milk appears, then, how is it that, it is not distinct
from the form of water?
Text: 648
अथ उदकं केवलं पर्ितभाित; तदिप कथं क्षीरान् िविवक्ं भवित?
atha udakaṁ kevalaṁ pratibhāti; tadapi kathaṁ kṣīrānna viviktaṁ
bhavati?
Translation: 648
If you say only water appears, then, also, how is it not distinct from
milk?
Text: 649
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदा उभयो रतरेतराकारिविवक्योगर्र्हणं तादात्म्यव्यितरेकात्।
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā ubhayoritaretarākāraviviktayorgrahaṇaṁ
tādātmyavyatirekāt.
Translation: 649
If you say, both appear, then, the knowledge of both, distinct from
each other occurs, without identity.
[१४. एकतर् दृष्ो भेदो िह- इत्यादेः का रकायाः पर्ितवदनम्।]
[14. ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi- ityādeḥ kārikāyāḥ prativadanam.]
Text: 650
यदप्यन्यदक्
ु म्-
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 207
Translation: 657
If you say its own cause does not produce itself, it will not be
correct. There the question arises, whether while producing itself it
will produce something which is already produced or it will produce
something which is not yet produced.
Text: 658
तद्िद उत्पन्ं करोित; तदयुक्म्; कृतस्य करणायोगात्।
tadyadi utpannaṁ karoti; tadayuktam; kṛtasya karaṇāyogāt.
Translation: 658
If you say it produces something which is already produced. It is
not proper, if something is produced, it cannot be produced again.
Text: 659
अथाऽनुत्पन्ं करोित; असतः कः कारकाथर् ः? तथा स्वकारणमिप न जनयित इतरेतरा-
शर्यत्वदोषपर्सङ्ात्। अतः तदेव कारकं तदेव च अकारकिमित, तथा सामान्यमिप
जनकम- जनकं च।
athā’nutpannaṁ karoti; asataḥ kaḥ kārakārthaḥ? tathā svakāraṇa-
mapi na janayati itaretarāśrayatvadoṣaprasaṅgāt. ataḥ tadeva
kārakaṁ tadeva ca akārakamiti, tathā sāmānyamapi janakamaja-
nakaṁ ca.
Translation: 659
And if you say that, it will produce something which is not yet
produced, there the question arises, what is the meaning of the
producer, in the case of something not produced. Moreover, in that
way it also does not produce its own cause, because it will lead to
the defect of mutual dependency. Therefore, whatever is a producing
factor, the same is also a non-producing factor. In the same way,
universal also is a producer and also a non-producer.
Text: 660
न चाथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वाभावेऽसत्वं सद्ध्यित, यथा वह्े ः अयोगोलकाङ्ारावस्थायां
धूमोत्पादकत्वाभावेऽिप न िनवतर् ते विह्रूपता, स्वहेतोरेव तथाभूतस्योत्पत्ेवर्िह्स्वभावस्य
धूमजनकात्मकस्य च, तथा अन्यदिप कायर् स्वहेतुनोत्पािदतं यत् वस्तुस्वभावं
कायार्ऽजनकात्मकं च, तथा सामान्यमिप वस्तुभूतं न च कायर् मुत्पादयित।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 211
Text: 666
यिद ता त्वकः; तद्गितः कथम्?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; tadgatiḥ katham?
Translation: 666
If you say, it is real, then, how is it known?
Text: 667
िकं स्वसंवेद्त्वेन; आहो जनकत्वाकारापर् कत्वेन?
kiṁ svasaṁvedyatvena; āho janakatvākārārpakatvena?
Translation: 667
Is it known as being self revealed or as contributed the form of being
the producer?
Text: 668
तद्ित स्वसंवेद्त्वेन; तदयुक्म्; अज्ञानात्मतया स्वसंवेद्त्वायोगात्।
tadyati svasaṁvedyatvena; tadayuktam; ajñānātmatayā svasaṁve-
dyatvāyogāt.
Translation: 668
If you say, it is known as something to be known by itself, it will
not be proper, because since it is of the nature of non-knowledge,
it cannot reveal itself.
Text: 669
अथ जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन; तदा पर्ाप्ा आकारपरम्परा।
atha janakatvā”kārārpakatvena; tadā prāptā ākāraparamparā.
Translation: 669
If you say, it is known as contributed the form as a producer, then,
one will have to postulate an endless series of forms (i.e. it will lead
to infinite regress).
Text: 670
अता त्वकः; तद्गितनोर्पपद्ते; स्वसंवेद्त्वजनकत्वव्यितरेकात्।
atāttvikaḥ; tadgatirnopapadyate; svasaṁvedyatvajanakatvavyatirekāt.
Translation: 670
If you say, it is unreal, then, its knowledge cannot be explained,
because it will be neither self-illuminating nor producer of anything.
214 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 671
अथ अव्यित रक्ः; स ता त्वकः, अता त्वको वा?
atha avyatiriktaḥ; sa tāttvikaḥ, atāttviko vā?
Translation: 671
If you say, it is identical with the form of knowledge, there again
the question arises whether it is a fact or it is a fiction?
Text: 672
यिद ता त्वकः; स जडात्मा, तिद्परीतो वा?
yadi tāttvikaḥ; sa jaḍātmā, tadviparīto vā?
Translation: 672
If you say, it is a fact, again question arises, is it non-sentient matter
or opposite of it?
Text: 673
यिद जडात्मा; न तिहर् िचता सह तादात्म्यम्-िचदिचतोः तादात्म्यानुपप त्ः।
yadi jaḍātmā; na tarhi citā saha tādātmyam-cidacitoḥ tādātmyā-
nupapattiḥ.
Translation: 673
If it is a non-sentient matter, then, it cannot be identical with
anything sentient (i.e. one who has consciousness) because, identity
between conscious and unconscious is not possible.
Text: 674
अथ तिद्परीतः; तदा ज्ञानमातर्ता स्यात्। ज्ञानरूपता च सवर् ज्ञानावधारणा-
(०ज्ञानसाधारणा)पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थानुपप त्ः।
atha tadviparītaḥ; tadā jñānamātratā syāt. jñānarūpatā ca sarvajñā-
nāvadhāraṇā(0jñānasādhāraṇā)pratikarmavyavasthānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 674
If you say, it is conscious, then, it will be mere knowledge and the
form of knowledge is common to all knowledges and in that case, it
will be difficult to explain any individual object or action.
Text: 675
अथ अता त्वकः; तदा ज्ञानस्यािप अता त्वकत्वं पर्ाप्नोित।
atha atāttvikaḥ; tadā jñānasyāpi atāttvikatvaṁ prāpnoti.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 215
Translation: 675
If you say it is a fiction, then, knowledge also will become fictitious.
Text: 676
यिद च िवज्ञानतादात्म्येन आकारोत्प त्भर् वित; िवज्ञानं सवर् कारकिनष्पाद्ेन साधारणम् -
पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्थानुपप त्ः। एवं च सित यदक्
ु म्-
अथेर्न घटयत्येनां निह मुक्त्वाथर् रूपताम्।
तस्मादथार् धगतेः पर्माणं मेयरूपता॥
तन्मुग्धिवल सतं सौगतानाम्।
yadi ca vijñānatādātmyena ākārotpattirbhavati; vijñānaṁ sarvakā-
rakaniṣpādyena sādhāraṇam pratikarmavyavasthānupapattiḥ. evaṁ
ca sati yaduktam-
arthena ghaṭayatyenāṁ nahi muktvārtharūpatām,
tasmādarthādhigateḥ pramāṇaṁ meyarūpatā.
tanmugdhavilasitaṁ saugatānām.
Translation: 676
If you say, the form is produced as identical with the knowledge,
then, since knowledge is common to all as being produced by all
factors, it will be difficult to explain each and every object and
action. When such is the case, your statement viz. “the form of
the content of knowledge, is caused by the content without giving
up the form of content, therefore, the proof for the knowledge of
content is the very form of the content,” is nothing but a fanciful
imagination of the Buddhists.
Text: 677
तदेवं वृ त्िवकल्पािददषू णं सामान्यादौ न सम्भवित यथा एकं रूपम् अनेककायोर्त्पादकत्वेन
साधारणम्, तथा एकं सामान्यम् अनेकाधारसाधारणम्।
tadevaṁ vṛttivikalpādidūṣaṇaṁ sāmānyādau na sambhavati yathā
ekaṁ rūpam anekakāryotpādakatvena sādhāraṇam, tathā ekaṁ
sāmānyam anekādhārasādhāraṇam.
Translation: 677
In this way, the criticism of relation and imagination is not possible
with reference to a universal. As one color is common as producer
of many effects, similarly, one universal is common in many loci.
216 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 678
अथ एकरूपं नानेकं कायर् जनयित अिप तु एकमेव; ततर्ािप िकं रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयित,
उत ज्ञानमेव?
atha ekarūpaṁ nānekaṁ kāryaṁ janayati api tu ekameva; tatrāpi
kiṁ rūpameva kevalamutpādayati, uta jñānameva?
Translation: 678
If you say that, one color does not produce many effects, but only
one effect, there also a question arises, is it the fact that it produces
only color or only knowledge?
Text: 679
तद्िद रूपमेव केवलमुत्पादयित; तदा रूपस्याऽगर्हणं पर्ाप्नोित िवज्ञानाऽजननात्।
tadyadi rūpameva kevalamutpādayati; tadā rūpasyā’grahaṇaṁ prā-
pnoti vijñānā’jananāt.
Translation: 679
If you say, it produces only color, then, it means that it is not
known, because it does not produce knowledge.
Text: 680
अथ ज्ञानमेव केवलमुत्पादयित तथािप मानसं पर्त्यक्षं न पर्ाप्नोित। स्विवषयानन्तरिवषय-
सहका रणे न्दर्यज्ञानेन यज्जन्यते तत् मानसं पर्त्यक्षम्। न च स्विवषयानन्तरभावी
िवषयोऽ स्त रूपान्तराजनकात्। तस्मादेकमेव रूपं िवज्ञाननीलािदकायर् साधारणं
पर्ितपत्व्यम्। चक्षुरूपालोकादीिन कारणािन िवज्ञानमुत्पादय न्त, तािन िकमेकस्वभाव-
युक्ािन, आहो िनयतस्वभावयुक्ािन?
atha jñānameva kevalamutpādayati tathāpi mānasaṁ pratyakṣaṁ na
prāpnoti. svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena yajja-
nyate tat mānasaṁ pratyakṣam. na ca svaviṣayānantarabhāvī viṣa-
yo’sti rūpāntarājanakāt. tasmādekameva rūpaṁ vijñānanīlādikā-
ryasādhāraṇaṁ pratipattavyam. cakṣurūpālokādīni kāraṇāni vijñā-
namutpādayanti, tāni kimekasvabhāvayuktāni, āho niyatasva-
bhāvayuktāni?
Translation: 680
If you say, it produces only knowledge, even then, there cannot
arise any mental perception. A mental perception is that perception,
which is produced by the knowledge of senses, which is the auxiliary
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 217
cause of the content which comes after its own content. And here
there is no content which arises after its own content, because it
does not produce another color. Therefore, one has to accept single
color, which is common to knowledge blue color etc. We say that
the factors such as eyes, color, light etc. produce knowledge. Here
the question arises, whether they produce knowledge having one
and the same nature or having specific individual nature?
Text: 681
तद्िद एकस्वभावतया उत्पादयित( न्त); तदा कारकैकत्वं पर्ाप्नोित अिभन्स्वभाव-
योिगत्वात्।
tadyadi ekasvabhāvatayā utpādayati(nti); tadā kārakaikatvaṁ prā-
pnoti abhinnasvabhāvayogitvāt.
Translation: 681
If you say that, they produce having one and the same nature, then,
one should say, there is only one factor, because all factors possess
identical nature.
Text: 682
अथ िनयतस्वभावयुक्ािन ज्ञानरूपं कायर् जनय न्त, तदा िवज्ञानस्य अभेदरूपता िनवतर् ते,
िनयतस्वभावकारकजन्यत्वाद् रूपशब्दािदवत्।
atha niyatasvabhāvayuktāni jñānarūpaṁ kāryaṁ janayanti, tadā
vijñānasya abhedarūpatā nivartate, niyatasvabhāvakārakajanyatvād
rūpaśabdādivat.
Translation: 682
If you say, they produce knowledge possessing individual specific
nature, and then, it cannot be maintained, that the knowledge
is identical, as color, sound, etc. are different because they are
produced by factors having specific individual character.
Text: 683
अथ िविवधादिप कारणादख ण्डतरूपं कायर् भवित; एवं च कायर् भेदात् िभन्कारणानुमानं
िनवतर् ते - एकस्वभावादिप िवज्ञानादनेकं नयनालोकािदकायर् मुत्पद्ते, अनेकस्मादिप एकं
भवित। एवं च सित िनयतकायर् दशर् ने िनयतकारणानुमानं िनवतर् ते।
atha vividhādapi kāraṇādakhaṇḍitarūpaṁ kāryaṁ bhavati; evaṁ
ca kāryabhedād bhinnakāraṇānumānaṁ nivartate - ekasvabhāvā-
218 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
accepted. For instance, you have said, “the mental states arise from
four things, the conscious state, from the consciousness’ and also
the form of the content etc.” Moreover, when you say one cause
produces one effect, the question arises, is it in the form of the
same class or in the form of that or in the form of something arising
in a sequence?
Text: 686
तद्िद समानजातीयत्वेन जनकत्वम्; तदा समानकालीनं पश्चादत्ु पन्मिप जनयेत्।
tadyadi samānajātīyatvena janakatvam; tadā samānakālīnaṁ
paścādutpannamapi janayet.
Translation: 686
If you say it produces things of the same class, then, it can also
produce something which comes later but belonging to the same
kind.
Text: 687
अथ तदाकारानुका रत्वेन जनकम्, ततर्ाप्येतदेव दषू णम्।
atha tadākārānukāritvena janakam, tatrāpyetadeva dūṣaṇam.
Translation: 687
If you say, it is a producer imitating the form of that, there also the
same objection can be raised.
Text: 688
अथ पूवार्परकालभािवत्वेन जनकम्; न तहीर्दं वक्व्यम् 'एकमेव जनकम्' चक्षूरूपालोक-
मनस्काराणां पूवर्कालभािवत्वाऽिवशेषात्।
atha pūrvāparakālabhāvitvena janakam; na tarhīdaṁ vaktavya-
m‘ekam eva janakam’ cakṣūrūpālokamanaskārāṇāṁ pūrvakālabhā-
vitvā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 688
If you say, it is a producer coming in sequence then, you should not
say one and only one is the producer, because the factors such as
eyes, color, light and mind all belong to the earlier time.
Text: 689
एवञ् अनेकोपादानोत्पाद्त्वेन आकारकदम्बकस्वरूपं िवज्ञानं पर्सक्म्। रूपाद्ाकार-
प रहारे वा िवज्ञानाकारस्याप्यनुपप त्ः। तदनुपपत्ौ नैरात्म्यपर्सङ्ः।
220 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 693
अथ कायैर्कस्वभावम्; तथािप न सदात्मकम्, अथर् िकर्याऽकरणे वस्तुत्विवरहात् ।
atha kāryaikasvabhāvam; tathāpi na sadātmakam, arthakriyā’karaṇe
vastutvavirahāt.
Translation: 693
If you say that, knowledge is always of the form of effect, still, it is
not eternal, because, if it does not contribute to a fruitful behavior,
it cannot be considered to be an entity.
Text: 694
अथ उभयात्मकम्; एकमनेकात्मकं भवित? केन त्वं िवपर्ल म्भतः? निह एकस्य अनेक-
नामकरणे नानातोपपद्ते। न चानेकनामका(क)रणमुपपद्ते, िनिमत्स्यािविचतर्त्वात्।
atha ubhayātmakam; ekamanekātmakaṁ bhavati? kena tvaṁ
vipralambhitaḥ? nahi ekasya anekanāmakaraṇe nānātopapadyate.
na cānekanāmakā(ka)raṇamupapadyate, nimittasyāvicitratvāt.
Translation: 694
If you say knowledge is of the nature of both a cause and an effect,
it means one and the same thing can be of many natures. Who has
confused you? Even if one thing is given many names, it does not
become many. Moreover, it is not possible even to name it by many
names, because the ground for application of the term knowledge
is not many.
Text: 695
एवं िवज्ञानस्याऽसम्भवे सित सन्तानानुपप त्ः; अभर्ान्तभर्ान्तद्ैतस्याऽनुपप त्श्च।
evaṁ vijñānasyā’sambhave sati santānānupapattiḥ; abhrāntabhrā-
ntadvaitasyā’nupapattiśca.
Translation: 695
Thus, when knowledge itself remains impossible to explain, there
can be no justification for a series of knowledges. Also, there is no
justification in holding the duality of non-erroneous and erroneous.
[१६. पर्सङ्ात् बौद्ािभमतस्य सन्तानस्य अ सद्त्वपर्दशर् नम्।]
[16. prasaṅgāt boddhābhimatasya santānasya asiddhatvapradarśanam.]
Text: 696
इतोऽिप सन्तानस्याऽ सिद्ः िवज्ञानस्य एकत्वात्। तदेकत्वं च आकारान्तरस्यानुपपत्ेः;
उपपत्ौ वा ज्ञानाकारिवरहपर्सङ्ः। तत्पर्सक्ौ च सन्तानाऽनुपप त्ः।
222 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 699
If you say that, it is excluded in terms of other form, then, it means
that the knowledge is fictitious like horns of horse.
Text: 700
अथ िवज्ञानाकारतया िनवतर् ते रूपािदभ्यो िवज्ञानम्; सा िवज्ञानाकारता सत्स्वभावा,
असत्स्वभावा[वा]?
atha vijñānākāratayā nivartate rūpādibhyo vijñānam; sā vijñānā-
kāratā satsvabhāvā, asatsvabhāvā[vā]?
Translation: 700
If you say that, knowledge is excluded in the form of knowledge,
like knowledge of color etc. is excluded from color etc. there the
question arises, is that form of knowledge real or unreal?
Text: 701
तद्िद सत्स्वभावा; तदा ज्ञानाकारतया िनवत्र्त इित िकमुक्ं भवित?
tadyadi satsvabhāvā; tadā jñānākāratayā nivarttata iti kimuktaṁ
bhavati?
Translation: 701
If you say that, it is real, then, what do you mean by saying “it is
excluded in the form of knowledge?”
Text: 702
सदात्मतया िनवतर् ते, िवज्ञानसदाकारयोरव्यितरेकात्। ततश्च रूपादेरसदाकारता पर्ाप्नोित
तुरगिवषाणविदित पूवोर्िदतमेव दषू णमापद्ते।
sadātmatayā nivartate, vijñānasadākārayoravyatirekāt. tataśca
rūpāderasadākāratā prāpnoti turagaviṣāṇavaditi pūrvoditameva
dūṣaṇamāpadyate.
Translation: 702
If you say that, it is excluded as real and existent, because
knowledge and existence of knowledge cannot be separated. Then,
again the entities like color etc. will become non-existent, like the
horns of horse, which is the same objection raised before.
Text: 703
अथ असत्स्वभावा; तदा खरिवषाणवद् िवज्ञानरूपतां प रत्यजित, त्यागे िवज्ञान-
सन्तानानुपप त्ः, तदनुपपत्ौ चैत्यवन्दनािदिकर्याऽनथर् क्यम्।
224 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 705
अथ पूवर्कालभाव एवाितशयः तेन तस्य हेतुत्वमुपपाद्ते;
atha pūrvakālabhāva evātiśayaḥ tena tasya hetutvamupapādyate;
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 225
Translation: 705
Clarification:
Being at the previous moment, may be treated as the extra function
and that is why that can be called as the cause of following
knowledge.
Text: 706
यद्ेवं यथा देवदत्ज्ञानपूवर्कालभािव देवदत्ज्ञानकारणं तथा सवर् पुरुषज्ञानानां देवदत्-
ज्ञानकालोत्पन्ानां देवदत्ज्ञानं पर्ित हेतुत्वं पर्सक्म्; तत्पर्सक्ौ अनेकद्ीपदेशान्त रत-
पुरुषानुस्यू(नुभू) ताथार्नुस्मरणं स्यात्। तथा, स्वजनभुजङ्मादौऽ(मादावन) नुभूतेप्य-
थेर्ऽनुस्मरणं स्यात्। तथा, तथागतावदातज्ञानजन्यत्वे देवदत्ज्ञानानामवदातता स्यात्।
ततश्च सवेर् सवर् ज्ञाः स्युः।
yadyevaṁ yathā devadattajñānapūrvakālabhāvi devadattajñāna-
kāraṇaṁ tathā sarvapuruṣajñānānāṁ devadattajñānakālotpannā-
nāṁ devadattajñānaṁ prati hetutvaṁ prasaktam; tatprasaktau
anekadvīpadeśāntaritapuruṣānusyū(nubhū)tārthānusmaraṇaṁ syāt.
tathā, svajanabhujaṅgamādau’(mādāvana)nubhūtepyarthe’nusma-
raṇaṁ syāt. tathā, tathāgatāvadātajñānajanyatve devadattajñānā-
nāmavadātatā syāt. tataśca sarve sarvajñāḥ syuḥ.
Translation: 706
Reply:
If it is so, then, suppose as the knowledge of Devadatta of previous
moment, is the cause of the subsequent knowledge of Devadatta,
in the same way, all knowledges of all people produced at the
time of knowledge of Devadatta should be treated as the cause
of the knowledge of Devadatta and if that is accepted, then, there
should be remembrance of all things experienced by people living
in many islands and places. Similarly, there will be remembrance
with reference to things which were experienced by own people and
serpents. Likewise, since knowledges of Devadatta are produced by
pure knowledge of Buddha, the knowledges of Devadatta should
also become pure and as a consequence of it all should become
all-knowing.
226 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 707
अथ नैव अवदातता देवदत्ािदज्ञानानाम्, तथागतावदातज्ञानोपादानजन्यत्वेऽिप देवदत्ा-
िदज्ञानेनािप जिनतत्वात्; तज्जन्यत्वेनव
ै तथागतज्ञानस्याप्यवदातरूपता न पर्ाप्नोित।
atha naiva avadātatā devadattādijñānānām, tathāgatāvadāta-
jñānopādānajanyatve’pi devadattādijñānenāpi janitatvāt; tajjanya-
tvenaiva tathāgatajñānasyāpyavadātarūpatā na prāpnoti.
Translation: 707
Clarification:
Well, the knowledges of Devadatta will not be pure knowledges,
because, although these knowledges of Devadatta etc. are produced
by the pure knowledges of the Buddha, still these knowledges of
Devadatta are also produced by the knowledges of Devadatta etc.
Text: 708
ततश्चासाविप अवीतरागः स्यादसवर् ज्ञश्च। इतश्च सन्तानानुपप त्ः, िवज्ञानयोः सहोत्पादे
हेतुफलभावानुपपत्ेः। यदैव कारणज्ञानं िवनश्यित तदैव कायर् ज्ञानं जायत इित वः
सद्ान्तः।
tataścāsāvapi avītarāgaḥ syādasarvajñaśca. itaśca santānā-
nupapattiḥ, vijñānayoḥ sahotpāde hetuphalabhāvānupapatteḥ.
yadaiva kāraṇajñānaṁ vinaśyati tadaiva kāryajñānaṁ jāyata iti
vaḥ siddhāntaḥ.
Translation: 708
Reply:
Then, the knowledge of the Buddha also cannot be said to be pure,
because, it is also produced by the knowledge of the Buddha and in
that case, the Buddha also cannot be said to be free from defects
like desire etc. and as a consequence he too cannot be considered
as all-knowing.
Text: 709
कारणज्ञानस्य च िवनाशः तदत्ु पाद एव। ततश्च कारणज्ञानिवनाशकाले कायर् ज्ञानं
भवित। िकमुक्ं भवित? कारणज्ञानोत्पादकाल एव भवित। ततश्च सहोत्पन्योः
हेतुफलभावानुपप त्ः एककालोद्गतयोः गोिवषाणयो रव। कारणज्ञानस्य च
अनुपप(नुत्प)न्स्योत्प त्वद् अनुत्पन्स्य िवनाशपर्सङ्ः। ततश्च क्षणमिप नोपलभ्येत,
उपलब्धौ वा सततोपलम्भपर्सङ्ः, तदात्मभूतिवनाशस्य उपलम्भिवघाताकत्ृर्त्वात्।
िवघातकत्ृर्त्वे वा एकक्षणोपलम्भस्यािप अनुपप त्पर्सङ्ः।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 227
Translation: 717
Clarification:
Well, matters are not of the form of knowledge and therefore, they
cannot be the material cause of knowledge. Since, knowledge is
nothing but awareness.
Text: 718
इहािप धूमरूपता ना स्त दहनस्य, नोपादानकारणत्वं, तदभावे न दहनानुमानम्। तथा,
अनुभवज्ञानादनुभवज्ञानस्यैव िनष्प त्रभ्युपेया उपादानकारणानुका रत्वेन कायर् स्य
िनष्पत्यभ्युपगमात्। न च एकदेशानुका रत्वम स्त तद्ीजस्यऽिविचतर्त्वात्। अनुभवा-
काराननुका रत्वे च ज्ञानाकारतािवरहः स्यात्, अनुकरोित च िवज्ञानरूपतां, तेन कथं
नानुभवात्मकम्? तदपु पत्ौ च पर्ाप्ा अनुभवपरम्परा इत्यतः स्मरणानुपप त्ः, तदनुपपत्ौ
च अनुमानज्ञानस्याप्यनुपप त्ः, ततश्च सवर् व्यवहारिवलोपपर्सङ्श्च। एवं (पर्सङ्ः। एवञ्)
न सन्तान सिद्ः,
ihāpi dhūmarūpatā nāsti dahanasya, nopādānakāraṇatvam,
tadabhāve na dahanānumānam. tathā, anubhavajñānādanu-
bhavajñānasyaiva niṣpattirabhyupeyā upādānakāraṇānukāritvena
kāryasya niṣpatyabhyupagamāt. na ca ekadeśānukāritvamasti
tadbījasya’vicitratvāt. anubhavākārānanukāritve ca jñānākāra-
tāvirahaḥ syāt, anukaroti ca vijñānarūpatām, tena kathaṁ
nānubhavātmakam? tadupapattau ca prāptā anubhavaparamparā
ityataḥ smaraṇānupapattiḥ, tadanupapattau ca anumānajñāna-
syāpyanupapattiḥ, tataśca sarvavyavahāravilopaprasaṅgaśca. evaṁ
(prasaṅgaḥ. evaṁ ca) na santānasiddhiḥ,
Translation: 718
Reply:
Then, here also fire is not of the form of smoke. Therefore, fire
cannot be the material cause of smoke and if it is not the cause of
smoke, then, there cannot be inference of fire on the basis of smoke.
Similarly, you should accept arising of experience from experience
only, because, you have accepted that, an effect arises in accordance
with its material cause. It is also not true that, an effect imitates
its cause partially, because, the cause of an effect does not allow
variation. If the effect viz. knowledge does not follow the form
of experience, it will lose its knowledgehood. Therefore, it does
232 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 723
अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्या सिन्कषर् प रकल्पना िकर्यते; अवबोधस्य अन्यथानुपप त्नर्
भवित काऽनुमा?
atha avabodhānyathānupapattyā sannikarṣaparikalpanā kriyate;
avabodhasya anyathānupapattirna bhavati kā’numā?
Translation: 723
If you say that, he will infer such a contact with his sense organ
considering that without such a contact such knowledge cannot
arise. It is not correct, because, it is not the case that such a
knowledge cannot be explained otherwise and therefore, where is
the question of resorting to inference?
Text: 724
अथ कारकसंख्याथर् म्; िकं तेन प रसंख्यातेन पर्योजनम्? आलोकादीनामिप कारकत्वात्
तान्यिप प रसंख्येयािन भव न्त।
atha kārakasaṁkhyārtham; kiṁ tena parisaṁkhyātena prayojanam?
ālokādīnāmapi kārakatvāt tānyapi parisaṁkhyeyāni bhavanti.
Translation: 724
If you see this statement of Jaimini mentioned above informs about
the number of cases or producing factors we would like to know
what is the purpose of counting such factors, because, there are
other factors like light, etc. they should also have been counted in
the statement.
Text: 725
अथ अनुवादपरता; पर् सद्स्यानुवादो नाऽपर् सद्स्य। नच अध्यक्षं क्विचिद्िदतम्।
atha anuvādaparatā; prasiddhasyānuvādo nā’prasiddhasya. naca
adhyakṣaṁ kvacidviditam.
Translation: 725
If you say that, the statement of Jaimini is a restatement. There, I
must remind you that, a restatement is possible of only that which
is already known and not of that which is not known. In the present
case, perceptual knowledge is nowhere known.
Text: 726
ननु लोके िविदतम्;
nanu loke viditam;
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 235
Translation: 726
Clarification:
Well it is known to the world.
Text: 727
'न िविदतम्' इित बर्ूमः, अव्यिभचा रतयाऽनवगतेः। नािप सत्संपर्योगजत्वं िविदतम्, ततश्च
पर्त्यक्षान धगितः, तदनवगतौ चानुवादानुपप त्ः।
‘na viditam’ iti brūmaḥ, avyabhicāritayā’navagateḥ. nāpi satsa-
ṁprayogajatvaṁ viditam, tataśca pratyakṣānadhigatiḥ, tadana-
vagatau cānuvādānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 727
Reply:
Well, we are not saying that, it is not known, what we are saying
that, it is not known as non-erroneous. Nor is it known that, it is
produced by a proper contact with the sense organs, that is why, we
say that, perceptual knowledge is not known and if it is not known,
there cannot be any restatement of that.
Text: 728
इतोप्यनुवादानुपप त्ः पर्योजनाभावात्। निह पर्योजनं िवना अनुवादः पर्वतर् ते, अनूद्
क्विचत् िकिञ्िद्धीयते पर्ितिषध्यते वा।
itopyanuvādānupapattiḥ prayojanābhāvāt. nahi prayojanaṁ vinā
anuvādaḥ pravartate, anūdya kvacit kiñcidvidhīyate pratiṣidhyate
vā.
Translation: 728
Also, restatement is not possible, because, there is no purpose
behind it. You know very well that, without a purpose, no
restatement occurs. It is our experience that, after restating either
something is enjoined or something is prohibited.
Text: 729
नन्वतर्ािप धमर् पर्ित िनिमत्त्वं पर्ितिषध्यते। तदक्
ु म्-“धमर् पर्त्यिनिमत्ं पर्त्यक्षं िवद्मानो-
पलम्भनत्वात् सम्पर्योगजत्वाच्च।”
nanvatrāpi dharmaṁ prati nimittatvaṁ pratiṣidhyate. taduktam-
“dharmaṁ pratyanimittaṁ pratyakṣaṁ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt
samprayogajatvācca.”
236 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 729
Clarification:
Well, here also the cause or the ground for Dharma is prohibited or
negated and it has been stated “a perceptual knowledge cannot be
the ground for the knowledge of Dharma because, it can only reveal
that which exists in the present time, since it is caused by proper
contact with the sense organs.”
Text: 730
ततर् िकम् अन्यपदाथार्वभासोत्पन्ं पर्त्यक्षं धमर् पर्ित िनिमत्त्वेन पर्ितिषध्यते, िकं वा
धमार्वभासोत्पन्म्, अनुत्पन्ं वा?
tatra kim anyapadārthāvabhāsotpannaṁ pratyakṣaṁ dharmaṁ
prati nimittatvena pratiṣidhyate, kiṁ vā dharmāvabhāsotpannam,
anutpannaṁ vā?
Translation: 730
Here we have some questions: Is that perception which is produced
in the form of appearance of something else is prohibited as the
ground to know Dharma, or, is it because pseudo-dharma reflects
in it, or, is it not produced at all?
Text: 731
तद्िद अन्यपदाथार्वभासोत्पन्पर्त्यक्षव्यावृ त्ः िकर्यते; तदाऽिवपर्ितपत्या सम्बोधियतव्या
जडमतयः।
tadyadi anyapadārthāvabhāsotpannapratyakṣavyāvṛttiḥ kriyate; tadā’-
vipratipattyā sambodhayitavyā jaḍamatayaḥ.
Translation: 731
If you say, the statement of Jaimini excludes perception in which
something else appears, then, those dull-headed should be addressed
without any problem.
Text: 732
अथ धम्यर् (मार्)वबोधकोत्पन्पर्त्यक्षव्यावृ त्ः िकर्यते; तदा िवरोधेन पर्त्यवस्थेयो भवित-
धमार्वबोधकोत्पन्ं पर्त्यक्षम्, न च धमर् िनिमत्िमित व्याहतमपिदश्यते, अन्यथा चोदना-
वचनजिनतिवज्ञानस्यािप धमार्वबोधकत्वेन उत्पन्स्यातिन्िमत्त्वं स्यात्।
atha dharmya(rmā)vabodhakotpannapratyakṣavyāvṛttiḥ kriyate;
tadā virodhena pratyavastheyo bhavati-dharmāvabodhakotpannaṁ
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 237
Text: 735
यदप्यन्यदक्
ु म्-“िवद्मानोपलम्भनत्वात् िकल पर्त्यक्षं िवज्ञानं िवद्मानमवबोधयित”;
यद्ेवं न केवलं पर्त्यक्षम् अिप तु सवर् पर्माणोत्पािदतं िवज्ञानं िवद्मानावबोधकम्।
yadapyanyaduktam-“vidyamānopalambhanatvāt kila pratyakṣaṁ
vijñānaṁ vidyamānamavabodhayati”; yadyevaṁ na kevalaṁ pratya-
kṣam api tu sarvapramāṇotpāditaṁ vijñānaṁ vidyamānāvabodha-
kam.
Translation: 735
You have given another ground such as “since a perception reveals
that which exists in present time, it is knowledge which causes the
knowledge of existent thing.” In this connection we would like to
say that, if it is so, then, it is not only perception, but knowledges
produced by all process of knowing, cause the knowledge of existent
thing.
Text: 736
अथ चोदनाजिनतं िवज्ञानमिवद्मानकतर् व्याथार्वबोधकम्; यद्िवद्मानम्; कथमवबोध्यते?
atha codanājanitaṁ vijñānamavidyamānakartavyārthāvabodhakam;
yadyavidyamānam; kathamavabodhyate?
Translation: 736
Clarification:
Well, the knowledge produced by a Vedic injunction conveys that
meaning which does not exist at the present time and which is
required to be performed i.e. the vedic sacrifice.
Text: 737
अथ अवबोध्यते; कथमिवद्मानता? अवबोध्यमानत्वेनव ै िवद्मानता पर्त्यक्षपर्माणाव-
बो धताथर् विदित। नाप्यवबोधनमवबोध्यमन्तरेण उपजायते पर्त्यक्षावबोधनवत्।
atha avabodhyate; kathamavidyamānatā? avabodhyamānatvenaiva
vidyamānatā pratyakṣapramāṇāvabodhitārthavaditi. nāpyavabodha-
namavabodhyamantareṇa upajāyate pratyakṣāvabodhanavat.
Translation: 737
Reply:
If you say, which does not exist in the present time, then, how is its
knowledge caused? And if the knowledge is caused by injunction,
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 239
then, how can it be said that it does not exist? Something it is said
to exist when it is presented as being known like an object which is
revealed by the means of perception. No act of knowing is possible
without the object which is being known, like the act of perceptual
knowledge.
Text: 738
अिप च चोदनावचनजिनतिवज्ञानस्य िमथ्यात्वमुपपद्ते, अिवद्मानिवषयत्वात् केशोण्डु -
कज्ञानवत्। केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्यािप पर्तीयमानोपकारकाथार्भावे िमथ्यात्वम्, तिदहािप
पर्तीयमानोपकारकाथोर्[ना]स्त्येव, कथं न िमथ्यात्वम्? तदन्वये वा कतर् व्याथर् िवषयत्वं
पर्ितहीयेत चोदनावचसः। िकञ्, चोदनाजिनतं िवज्ञानं कतर् व्यताथर् िवषयं वा तदभाविवषयं
िनिवर् षयं वा?
api ca codanāvacanajanitavijñānasya mithyātvamupapadyate,
avidyamānaviṣayatvāt keśoṇḍukajñānavat. keśoṇḍukavijñānasyāpi
pratīyamānopakārakārthābhāve mithyātvam, tadihāpi pratīyamā-
nopakārakārtho[nā]styeva, kathaṁ na mithyātvam? tadanvaye
vā kartavyārthaviṣayatvaṁ pratihīyeta codanāvacasaḥ. kiñca,
codanājanitaṁ vijñānaṁ kartavyatārthaviṣayaṁ vā tadabhāva-
viṣayaṁ nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 738
Moreover, if what you say is accepted, then, the knowledge arising
from the Vedic injunction will become a false knowledge, because,
it reflects an object which does not exist, like the knowledge of
thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a person who
comes into the shade from the sun. As a matter of fact, even the
knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for a
person who comes into the shade from the sun, will become false
if there is no element which causes such perception. And here also,
there is nothing which prompts the knowledge of Dharma to arise
and so how is the knowledge arising from a Vedic injunction not
false? If this is the way we are construing the Vedic injunction,
then, the Vedic injunction will lose its content which is presented
as some activity to be performed. Moreover, we would like to ask
whether the content of the knowledge which arises from a Vedic
240 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 743
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् चोदना कत्र्व्यावबो धका अिप तु िनिवर् षया इत्येवं वक्व्यम्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi codanā karttavyāvabodhikā api tu
nirviṣayā ityevaṁ vaktavyam.
Translation: 743
If you say that, the understanding of the Vedic injunction has no
content at all, then, you should say that the Vedic injunction does
not convey any act to be performed. But it is contentless.
Text: 744
एवं स्थते यथा पर्त्यक्षं िवद्मानोपलम्भकं तथा अन्यान्यिप पर्माणािन।
evaṁsthite yathā pratyakṣaṁ vidyamānopalambhakaṁ tathā anyā-
nyapi pramāṇāni.
Translation: 744
When this is the situation, it is proper to say that, as a perceptual
knowledge reveals something existent, in the same way, the other
knowledges arising from other processes of knowing also reveal
something which is existent.
Text: 745
बुिद्जन्म पर्त्यक्षम्, नच बुद्ध्यवगमे पर्माणम स्त। पर्त्यक्षावसेया सा न भवित,
स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। अनुमानगम्यािप न भवित, तया पर्ितबद् लङ्ानवगतेः।
buddhijanma pratyakṣam, naca buddhyavagame pramāṇamasti.
pratyakṣāvaseyā sā na bhavati, svayamanabhyupagamāt. anumāna-
gamyāpi na bhavati, tayā pratibaddhaliṅgānavagateḥ.
Translation: 745
You have said that perception is knowledge that arises, but you
do not find any proof for the knowledge of such perception.
That knowledge cannot be determined by perception, because,
you too hold the same view (according to the Bhāṭṭa school of
Pūrvamīmāṁsā - knowledge is not perceived but it is inferred.)
This cannot be known by inference either, because we do not know
any ground which has invariable concomitance with the object of
inference viz. knowledge.
242 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 746
अथ अथार्पत्या पर्तीयते; िकम्-घटाथार्न्यथानुपपत्या, आहो तदपु ादानप रत्यागान्यथा-
नुपपत्या, घटावबोधान्यथानुपपत्या वा?
atha arthāpattyā pratīyate; kim-ghaṭārthānyathānupapattyā, āho tadu-
pādānaparityāgānyathānupapattyā ghaṭāvabodhānyathānupapatyā vā?
Translation: 746
If you say that, perception can be known by process of implication,
there we would like to know whether without postulating the
knowledge of pot, the pot cannot be explained or whether without
postulating knowledge giving up of the material cause of the
pot cannot be explained or without postulating knowledge the
knowledge of the pot cannot be explained?
Text: 747
तद्िद घटाथार्न्यथानुपपत्या; तदयुक्म्, न बुिद्कायोर् घटः, अिप तु बुिद् रह तत्कायार्।
tadyadi ghaṭārthānyathānupapattyā; tadayuktam, na buddhikāryo
ghaṭaḥ, api tu buddhiriha tatkāryā.
Translation: 747
If you say without postulating the knowledge of pot, the pot cannot
be explained, that is not proper, because, pot is not effect of
knowledge. Rather, the knowledge of pot is produced by the pot.
Text: 748
अथ घटोपादानप रत्यागान्यथानुपपत्या बुिद्प रकल्पना िकर्यते; तदयुक्ं, बुिद्स्व-
रूपस्यानेककालान्तरावस्थानायोगादथार्पत्ेिनर् िवर् षयत्वम्। केनािप बलवता पर्े रतो
बुिद्मन्तरेण वा तदपु प्लवाद्ा घटोपादानाप रत्यागाय घटते तेन स न्दग्धाऽथार्प त्ः।
नच सम्बन्धगर्हणमन्तरेण िनयतायां बुद्ौ पर्ितप त्रुपपद्ते। अथार्प त्तस्तु तदनुपपत्ौ
ु र् टा।
इ न्दर्यकल्पनािप दघ
atha ghaṭopādānaparityāgānyathānupapattyā buddhiparikalpanā
kriyate; tadayuktam, buddhisvarūpasyānekakālāntarāvasthānāyogāt
arthāpatternirviṣayatvam. kenāpi balavatā prerito buddhimantareṇa
vā tadupaplavādvā ghaṭopādānāparityāgāya ghaṭate tena sandi-
gdhā’rthāpattiḥ. naca sambandhagrahaṇamantareṇa niyatāyāṁ
buddhau pratipattirupapadyate. arthāpattitastu tadanupapattau
indriyakalpanāpi durghaṭā.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 243
Translation: 748
If you say, without postulating knowledge giving up of the material
cause of the pot cannot be explained, that also is not proper,
because, the form of the knowledge cannot continue to exist for a
longer time and as such the knowledge by implication will become
contentless. Without the knowledge being prompted by some strong
factor or because of confusion, there occurs the elimination of the
material cause of a pot and therefore, this may lead to a doubtful
pre-supposition. It is not the case that without the knowledge of
relationship, there can be awareness of a specific knowledge and if
that does not happen through the process of pre-supposition then,
even the postulation of sense organ will be a difficult task.
Text: 749
अथ अवबोधान्यथानुपपत्या बुिद्प रकल्पना िकर्यते; तस्यािप बुद्ध्या सह सम्बन्धो
ना स्त, कथमवबोधयित? अवबोधे चावगते पर्त्यक्षावगतैव बुिद्ः नावबोधगम्या,
अवबोधबुिद्िवज्ञानशब्दानां पयार्यत्वादवबुध्यते ज्ञायत इत्येकोऽथर् ः।
atha avabodhānyathānupapatyā buddhiparikalpanā kriyate;
tasyāpi buddhyā saha sambandho nāsti, kathamavabodhayati?
avabodhe cāvagate pratyakṣāvagataiva buddhiḥ nāvabodhagamyā,
avabodha- buddhivijñānaśabdānāṁ paryāyatvādavabudhyate jñāyata
ityeko’rthaḥ.
Translation: 749
If you say, without postulating knowledge, the knowledge of the pot
cannot be explained, that also is not proper, because, even that does
not have relationship with the knowledge. Then, how can it cause
the knowledge of that. Once the knowledge is understood, it means
that knowledge is directly perceived and not by the knowledge
of pre-supposition. The terms avabodha, buddhi and vijñāna are
synonymous and all the three have one meaning viz. knowledge.
0.7 सांख्यसम्मतस्य पर्त्यक्षलक्षणस्य िनरसनम्।
[sāṁkhyasammatasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya nirasanam.]
(Refutation of the definition of Perception as accepted by the
Sāṅkhyas)
244 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 750
तथा “शर्ोतर्ािदवृ त्रिवक ल्पका" एतदिप पर्त्युक्म्; शर्ोतर्ािदका(क)रणानां शब्दािद-
िवषयाकारतया िवप रणामो वृ त्शब्देनािभधीयते। सा चानेकपर्कारा भवित-सम्यग्-
ज्ञानरूपा िवपयर् यज्ञानसन्देहरूपा च। तदक् ु म्- "तमो मोहो महामोहस्तािमसर्ोऽन्ध-
तािमसर्ः।” (भवसं. उ. ३.१०) इत्यािद। तद्िद शर्ोतर्ािदवृत्ेः पर्त्यक्षत्वम्; तदा
िवपयर् यािदवृत्ेरिप पर्त्यक्षत्वं पर्ाप्नोित।
tathā “śrotrādivṛttiravikalpikā” etadapi pratyuktam; śrotrādikā(ka)-
raṇānāṁ śabdādiviṣayākāratayā vipariṇāmo vṛttiśabdenābhidhī-
yate. sā cānekaprakārā bhavati-samyagjñānarūpā viparyayajñā-
nasandeharūpā ca. taduktam- “tamo moho mahāmohastāmisro’n-
dhatāmisraḥ” (Bhavasaṁ. u. 3.10) ityādi. tadyadi śrotrādivṛtteḥ
pratyakṣatvam; tadā viparyayādivṛtterapi pratyakṣatvaṁ prāpnoti.
Translation: 750
In the same way, the statement of the Sāṁkhya philosophers
viz. “an indeterminate knowledge is the modification of the mind
through the sense organs viz. ears etc.” is also refuted. The term
vṛtti stands for the modification of the instruments such as ears
etc. in the form of their content viz. sound etc. Such modifications
are of various types viz. of the form of true cognition, in the form
of erroneous cognition, in the form of doubt. It has been said in the
same system-“ignorance, delusion, great delusion, confusion, great
confusion, etc.” Now, if the modification of the senses such as ears
etc. is called perception, then, the modification such as illusion etc.
should also be called perception.
Text: 751
अथ अबा धतपदोपादानं िकर्यते; तत् सूतर्े न शर्ूयते। भवतु वा तस्य कल्पना, तथािप
अव्यिभचा रत्वं ज्ञातुं न शक्यते। तच्च नैयाियकपर्त्यक्षलक्षणा धकारे पर्पिञ्तम्।
atha abādhitapadopādānaṁ kriyate; tat sūtre na śrūyate. bhavatu
vā tasya kalpanā, tathāpi avyabhicāritvaṁ jñātuṁ na śakyate. tacca
naiyāyikapratyakṣalakṣaṇādhikāre prapañcitam.
Translation: 751
If you add a clause viz. that which is not “contradicted” that is not
found in the original aphorism in the original text of the system.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 245
Or, granting that you add the clause, still how can you know that
the perceptual cognition is non-erroneous? We have elaborately
discussed this in the section discussing the definition of perception
as given by the Naiyāyikas.
Text: 752
यिद चाव्यिभचा रपदेन िवपयर् यरूपा वृ त्रपोद्ते तत्दात्मतया व्यव स्थता सम्यगर्ूपािप
वृ त्रपोिदता भवित। ततश्च संगर्ाह्ा न लभ्यते वृ त्ः।
yadi cāvyabhicāripadena viparyayarūpā vṛttirapodyate
tattadātmatayā vyavasthitā samyagrūpāpi vṛttirapoditā bhavati.
tataśca saṁgrāhyā na labhyate vṛttiḥ.
Translation: 752
If by the word “non-erroneous” an illusory perception is excluded,
then, in that form even the established true cognition, will become
excluded and in that case, no cognition will be left to be included
in the category of perception.
Text: 753
अथ सम्यगर्ूपा वृ त् रह संगर्ाह्ा; तदाऽपोह्ा न लभ्यते, वृत्ीनां स्वरूपैकताभ्युपगमात्।
भेदानभ्युपगमे चाभ्युपेतहानम्। निह भवतां पक्षे इ न्दर्याद् िभद्न्ते वृत्यः। तच्चेदिभन्म्,
कथं वृत्ीनां भेदः? भेदाभ्युपगमे इ न्दर्यैकत्वं हीयते। इ न्दर्याव्यितरेिकत्वं न
वक्व्यम्। इ न्दर्याव्यितरेिकत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने नीललोिहतघटादीनां सवर् दा उपलम्भः
स्यात्, इ न्दर्यावस्थाने तदव्यित रक्ाया वृत्ेः अवस्थानसम्भवात्, तत्सम्भवे च
घटाद्नुपलम्भानुपप त्ः।
atha samyagrūpā vṛttiriha saṁgrāhyā; tadā’pohyā na labhyate,
vṛttīnāṁ svarūpaikatābhyupagamāt. bhedānabhyupagame cābhyu-
petahānam. nahi bhavatāṁ pakṣe indriyād bhidyante vṛttayaḥ.
taccedabhinnam, kathaṁ vṛttīnāṁ bhedaḥ? bhedābhyupagame
indriyaikatvaṁ hīyate. indriyāvyatirekitvaṁ na vaktavyam. indri-
yāvyatirekitve’bhyupagamyamāne nīlalohitaghaṭādīnāṁ sarvadā
upalambhaḥ syāt, indriyāvasthāne tadavyatiriktāyā vṛtteḥ avasthā-
nasambhavāt, tatsambhave ca ghaṭādyanupalambhānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 753
If you say that, by perception you should include a true cognition
then, nothing remains to be excluded because, cognitions are
246 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 755
िकञ्, शब्दादय उपलभ्यन्ते िकमनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते, आहो स्वदपु लभ्य-
स्वभावा(वाः)?
kiñca, śabdādaya upalabhyante kimanupalabhyasvabhāvā upala-
bhyante āhosvidupalabhyasvabhāvā(vāḥ)?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 247
Translation: 755
Moreover, we hear sound, there the question arises, is it the fact that
we hear sound which is of the nature of something which cannot be
known? or we hear sound which has the nature of being something
which can be known?
Text: 756
तद्िद अनुपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; तदा उपल ब्धः कथम्? यिद अनुपलभ्यस्वभावाः
कथम् उपलभ्येरन्? अन्यथा आत्मादेरप्युपल ब्धः स्यात्।
tadyadi anupalabhyasvabhāvā upalabhyante; tadā upalabdhiḥ
katham? yadi anupalabhyasvabhāvāḥ katham upalabhyeran? anyathā
ātmāderapyupalabdhiḥ syāt.
Translation: 756
There, if you say the sounds which are of the nature of not being
known, are heard, then, how is it heard? Because, if it is of the
nature of that which can be known, then, how can they be heard?
Otherwise, entities like soul etc. can also be known.
Text: 757
अथ उपलभ्यस्वभावा उपलभ्यन्ते; अनुपल ब्धः कथम्? िकं तेनव
ै ाकारेण, आहो स्वद्
आकारान्तरेण?
atha upalabhyasvabhāvā upalabhyante; anupalabdhiḥ katham? kiṁ
tenaivākāreṇa, āhosvid ākārāntareṇa?
Translation: 757
If you say, they are heard because they are of the nature of being
known, then, how to explain the knowledge of its absence? There
also the question arises, whether it is not known in the same form
or in some other form?
Text: 758
यिद तेनवै आकारेण अनुपल ब्धः; आत्मादेरिप अनुपल ब्धनर् पर्ाप्नोित, उपलब्धौ वा
बीजान्तरं वचनीयम्।
yadi tenaiva ākāreṇa anupalabdhiḥ; ātmāderapi anupalabdhirna
prāpnoti, upalabdhau vā bījāntaraṁ vacanīyam.
248 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 758
If you say, it is not known in the same form, then, even entities like
soul etc. cannot be said to be not known and if it is known, then,
it should state some other reason or ground for that.
Text: 759
अथाकारान्तरेण नोपलभ्यन्ते; तथाप्युपलभ्यमानाऽनुपलभ्यमानयोः नैकत्वम्, शब्दा-
त्माकारयो रव, निह उपलभ्यस्वभावाच्छब्दादनुपलभ्यस्वभाव आत्माऽव्यित रक्ो दृष्ः।
atha ākārāntareṇa nopalabhyante; tathāpi upalabhyamānā’nupa-
labhyamānayoḥ naikatvam, śabdātmākārayoriva, nahi upalabhya-
svabhāvācchabdādanupalabhyasvabhāva ātmā’vyatirikto dṛṣṭaḥ.
Translation: 759
If you say that, in other form it is not known, even then, that which
is being known and that which is not known, cannot be identical,
like the forms of sound and soul. It is not the case that, the soul
which is of the nature of not being known is identical with the sound
which is of the nature of being known.
Text: 760
अथ तस्यैवाऽिभव्यक्स्योपल ब्धः; तत्स्वरूपवदिभव्यक्ेः सवर् दानव(दाव)स्थानात्
सततोपल ब्धपर्सङ्ः।
atha tasyaivā’bhivyaktasyopalabdhiḥ; tatsvarūpavadabhivyakteḥ sar-
vadānava(dāva)sthānāt satatopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 760
If you say, the same thing when manifest is known, then, it means
that like its own form the manifestation is not present always and
in that case it will lead to the contingency of knowing always at all
time.
Text: 761
अथ ितरोधाने सित अनुपल ब्धः; तदा तत्स्वरूपतादात्म्यात् सततानुपलम्भपर्सङ्ः,
उभयोवार्ऽवस्थाने सममुपलम्भाऽनुपलम्भौ स्याताम्। ततश्च-'इदानीमुपलभे पूवर्
नोप(पा)लभे' इित व्यवहारिवरहः स्यात्। तथा, 'पूवर्मुप(पा)लभे इदानीं नोपलभे'
इत्येतदिप न पर्ाप्नोित।
atha tirodhāne sati anupalabdhiḥ; tadā tatsvarūpatādātmyāt sata-
tānupalambhaprasaṅgaḥ, ubhayorvā’vasthāne samamupalambhā’nu-
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 249
अनाद्न्ता सत्ा न फलं हेतुवार् उच्यते। िकञ्, भूजलािद अनेकं कायर्-त त्कं गुणतर्याद्
व्यित रक्म्, अव्यित रक्ं वा?
na, tasya sarvadā vidyamānatvāt. sarvadā vidyamānayoḥ hetu-
phalabhāvo nopapadyate, yathā guṇānāṁ parasparamātmabhedānāṁ
vā. nahi ātmā ātmāntarasya heturbhavati tatphalaṁ vā, tathā ihāpi
anādyantā sattā na phalaṁ heturvā ucyate. kiñca, bhūjalādi anekaṁ
kāryaṁ-tatkiṁ guṇatrayād vyatiriktam, avyatiriktaṁ vā?
Translation: 768
Reply:
It is not true, because, that result is always there. When two things
always exist one cannot be the cause of the other or the effect of
the other e.g. the qualities or the mutual differences of the selves.
It is not the case that one self is the cause of another self or one self
is the effect of another self. In the same way, here also the existence
without a beginning and an end cannot be said to be either effect
or cause. Moreover, there are many effects such as earth, water etc.
Are these effects different from the three ingredients or constituents
of nature or identical with them?
Text: 769
तद्िद व्यित रक्म्; त त्कं ता त्वकम्, अता त्वकं वा?
tadyadi vyatiriktam; tatkiṁ tāttvikam, atāttvikaṁ vā?
Translation: 769
If you say, they are different, there the question arises, whether it
is real or unreal?
Text: 770
तद्िद ता त्वकम्; न तिहर् गुणतर्योपादानपूवर्कम्, ततो िभन्त्वाद् आत्मस्वरूपवत्। न च
गुणतर्येण सह अन्यतमोऽिप सम्बन्ध उपपद्ते तिद्न्कायर् स्य। न मातर्ामाितर्कसम्बन्धः,
नािप सहचरसहच र[त]भावः, नािप िनिमत्-िन(नै)िम त्कभावः, उपकायोर्पकारकभावो
वा।
tadyadi tāttvikam; na tarhi guṇatrayopādānapūrvakam, tato bhinna-
tvād ātmasvarūpavat. na ca guṇatrayeṇa saha anyatamo’pi samba-
ndha upapadyate tadbhinnakāryasya. na mātrāmātrikasambandhaḥ,
nāpi sahacarasahacari[ta]bhāvaḥ, nāpi nimittani(nai)mittikabhāvaḥ,
upakāryopakārakabhāvo vā.
252 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 770
If you say, it is real, then, it is not the fact that, it is preceded
by the material cause viz. the three ingredients, because it is
different from them like the nature of the self. Not even a single
relationship is tenable with an effect which is different from those
three ingredients. Such a relation can neither be relation of part
and whole, nor associate and associated, nor cause and effect, nor
helper and helped.
Text: 771
अथ अता त्वकम्; कथं तेन गुणतर्यं पर्तीयते, गुणतर्येण सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्ेः?
न च सदसतोः सम्बन्ध उपपद्ते आत्मखरिवषाणयो रव। तदभावात् नानुमानाद्
गुणतर्यपर्ितप त्ः। नािप पर्त्यक्षेण गुणावधारणम्, स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्। तदक्
ु म्-
गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृिष्पथमृच्छित।
यत्ु दृिष्पथपर्ाप्ं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्॥
तदनवगमे च न भोग्येन भोक्ुरनुमानम्। ततश्च नात्मा, न गुणतर्यम्।
atha atāttvikam; kathaṁ tena guṇatrayaṁ pratīyate, guṇatrayeṇa
saha sambandhānupapatteḥ? na ca sadasatoḥ sambandha upapadyate
ātmakhalaviṣāṇayoriva. tadabhāvāt nānumānād guṇatrayaprati-
pattiḥ. nāpi pratyakṣeṇa guṇāvadhāraṇam, svayamanabhyupagamāt.
taduktam-
guṇānāṁ paramaṁ rūpaṁ na dṛṣṭipathamṛcchati,
yattu dṛṣṭipathaprāptaṁ tanmāyeva sutucchakam.
tadanavagame ca na bhogyena bhokturanumānam. tataśca nātmā,
na guṇatrayam.
Translation: 771
And if you say that, it is unreal, then, how is it that the
three ingredients are known there? Because, there cannot be a
relationship with the three ingredients and the effect. It is not
the case that there can be a relationship between existent and
non-existent, like the self and the horns of a rabbit and once that
is not there through inference also the three ingredients can be
justified. The three ingredients cannot be known by perception,
because you yourself do not accept this. As the statement goes
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 253
- “the real form of the three ingredients is not visible by eyes and
what is visible to the eyes is the insignificant illusive object (māyā).”
And once those three ingredients are not known, that cannot be
the inference of the enjoyer on the basis of the object of enjoyment.
This amount to saying that, there is no self and there are no three
ingredients (guṇas).
Text: 772
अथ अव्यित रक्म्; त त्कम्-ता त्वकम्, अता त्वकम् वा?
atha avyatiriktam; tatkim-tāttvikam, atāttvikam vā?
Translation: 772
If you say, it is identical, then, question arises whether it is real or
unreal?
Text: 773
यिद ता त्वकम्; तदा कायार्णामप रसंख्येयत्वे गुणानामप्यप रसंख्येयता। ततश्च 'तर्यो
गुणाः' इित न वक्व्यम्।
yadi tāttvikam; tadā kāryāṇāmaparisaṁkhyeyatve guṇānāma-
pyaparisaṅkhyeyatā. tataśca ’trayo guṇāḥ’ iti na vaktavyam.
Translation: 773
If you say, it is real, then, since the effects are innumerable the
ingredients are also to be postulated as innumerable. And in that
case, you should not say that there are three ingredients.
Text: 774
अथ गुणानां ितर्त्वम्; तदा कायर् स्यािप ितर्त्वं पर्ाप्नोित, आनन्त्यं हीयते।
atha guṇānāṁ tritvam; tadā kāryasyāpi tritvaṁ prāpnoti, ānantyaṁ
hīyate.
Translation: 774
If you say, ingredients are only three, then, effects also should
be only three. And in that case, the effects cannot be said to be
innumerable.
Text: 775
तथा, कायर् स्य पर्त्यक्षत्वे गुणानामिप पर्त्यक्षत्वम्।
tathā, kāryasya pratyakṣatve guṇānāmapi pratyakṣatvam.
254 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 775
Similarly, if an effect is perceivable, the ingredients also should be
perceivable.
Text: 776
िकं िवषयं पर्धानानुमानम्? गुणतर्यं पर्धानम्, तच्च उपलब्धम् अलम् अन्वयशिक्प रमाण-
वैश्वरूप्योपकायोर्पकारकािदसाधनेन।
kiṁ viṣayaṁ pradhānānumānam? guṇatrayaṁ pradhānam,
tacca upalabdham alam anvayaśaktiparimāṇavaiśvarūpyopakāryo-
pakārakādisādhanena.
Translation: 776
What is the object of inference of the gross matter? You say the
gross matter has three ingredients. These ingredients are known,
then, enough of the factors such as, relation, potentiality, measure,
universality, helping factors and those which are helped!
Text: 777
अथ नोपलभ्यते पर्धानम्; तदव्यित रक्ं कायर् मिप नोपलभ्येत, तदभावान् पुरुष सिद्-
रुपपद्ते।
atha nopalabhyate pradhānam; tadavyatiriktaṁ kāryamapi nopala-
bhyeta, tadabhāvānna puruṣasiddhirupapadyate.
Translation: 777
If you say, pradhāna is not known, then, one should not find an
effect identical with that. And in the absence of pradhāna, it is not
possible to establish the self.
Text: 778
अथ अता त्वकम्; तदा गुणतर्यस्यािप अता त्वकत्वम्। तदभावात् न िच त्सद्ौ पर्माणम स्त।
तद सद्ौ परलोिकनोऽभावात् परलोकाभावः।
atha atāttvikam; tadā guṇatrayasyāpi atāttvikatvam. tadabhāvāt na
citsiddhau pramāṇamasti. tadasiddhau paralokino’bhāvāt paralokā-
bhāvaḥ.
Translation: 778
If you say, it is unreal, then, the three ingredients also will become
unreal. In the absence of that, there will be no proof to establish
consciousness. And if consciousness is not established, then, there
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 255
will be no people going to the next world and once they are not
there, there will not be even the next world.
Text: 779
तदेवं पर्त्यक्षं नोपपद्ते।
tadevaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nopapadyate.
Translation: 779
This is how; one cannot establish any perceptual cognition.
0.8 नैयाियकािभमतस्यानुमानस्य िनरसनम्
[naiyāyikābhimatasyānumānasya nirasanam]
(Refutation of the definition of inference as accepted by the
Naiyāyikas)
Text: 780
अथ इदानीमनुमानं िवचायर् ते-िकं पुनरनुमानम्? “तत्पूवर्कमनुमानम्” [न्यायसू.१.१.५]
कथम्? कथ्यते- रसवतीपर्देशे नयनािदव्यापारेण दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं िकर्यते,
तेन च संस्कारः, तदत् ु रकालं िद्तीय लङ्दशर् नम्; तदनन्तरं व्यािप्स्मरणम्, व्यािप्-
स्मरणानन्तरं परामशर् ज्ञानमनुमानं लङ्सिचवम्। तदभावे तस्याभावः तत्पूवर्कत्वात्। निह
कारणं िवना कायर् लोके भवद्ष्ृ म्, पर्त्यक्षं च कारणं गीयते तदभावात् कथमनुमानक्लृिप्ः,
क्लृप्ौ वा कायार्ऽक स्मकत्वपर्सङ्ः। पर्त्यक्षाभावमङ्ीकृत्य उक्म्- “अिवनाभावसम्बन्धस्य
गर्हीतुमशक्यत्वात्।”
atha idānīmanumānaṁ vicāryate-kiṁ punaranumānam? “tatpūrva-
kamanumānam” [Nyāyasū.1.1.5] katham? kathyate- rasavatīpra-
deśe nayanādivyāpāreṇa dahanadhūmayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ
kriyate, tena ca saṁskāraḥ, taduttarakālaṁ dvitīyaliṅgadarśanam;
tadanantaraṁ vyāptismaraṇam, vyāptismaraṇānantaraṁ parāmar-
śajñānamanumānaṁ liṅgasacivam. tadabhāve tasyābhāvaḥ tatpūr-
vakatvāt. nahi kāraṇaṁ vinā kāryaṁ loke bhavaddṛṣṭam, pratya-
kṣaṁ ca kāraṇaṁ gīyate tadabhāvāt kathamanumānaklṛptiḥ, klṛptau
vā kāryā’kasmikatvaprasaṅgaḥ. pratyakṣābhāvamaṅgīkṛtya uktam-
“avinābhāvasambandhasya grahītumaśakyatvāt.”
Translation: 780
Let us now discuss; inference. What is an inference? The Nyāya
Sūtra defines inference as “that which is preceded by perception.”
How can this definition work? Let us elaborate. In a kitchen
256 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 785
Reply:
If you say so, then, only those individuals can become the ground
for inferential knowledge and not the other individuals. It is not a
fact that, if the relationship is known with something that can be
the ground for knowing something else, because this will lead to
the fault of over-application. It is not the case that when the eyes of
Devadatta are connected with a pot, he gets the knowledge of water.
Text: 786
स्वभाव ........... स्यात्।
svabhāva .......... syāt.
Translation: 786
(………….The text is broken and hence does not make any sense……..)
Text: 787
आत्मान्यत्वे च अन्यस्य सम्बन्धे अन्यस्याऽगमकत्वं तदाकारव्यितरेकात्। अव्यितरेके वा
पवर् ते नैकबलकृ ........ धूमाकारानुपर्वेशपर्सङ्ः स्यात्। तदनुपर्वेशे च न तत्संिवत्यानुमेया
अिग्संिव त्रुपपद्ते, ना लकेरद्ीपवा सन इव तयोः सम्बन्धानवगतेः। तदनवगितश्च
अनुमेयदहनस्य िपशाचेश्वरतुल्यत्वात्। पावकसम्ब न्धसंिवत्ौ सम्बन्धबुद्ेरुपप त्रित-
पर्सङ्ात्। तस्माद् धूमा ....... लङ्ावगम इवा ............ ता त्वक्या दृष्ट्ा न
केनाप्युत्पाद्ते इित िकन् कल्प्यते धूमबलेन .......... धूमधूमस्वरूपं िकमधुनोत्पन्म्,
िचरोत्पन्म्, कारणाद्ा जातम्, आक स्मकम् ......... मातर्ावद्ोतकत्वेन पयर् व सते
आक स्मकमिप स्वरूपमुपपद्ते जगतो वैश्वरूप्यदशर् नात्।
ātmānyatve ca anyasya sambandhe anyasyā’gamakatvaṁ tadākāra-
vyatirekāt. avyatireke vā parvate naikabalakṛ .... dhūmākārānuprave-
śaprasaṅgaḥ syāt. tadanupraveśe ca na tatsaṁvittyānumeyā
agnisaṁvittirupapadyate, nālikeradvīpavāsina iva tayoḥ samba-
ndhānavagateḥ. tadanavagatiśca anumeyadahanasya piśāce-
śvaratulyatvāt. pāvakasambandhisaṁvittau sambandhabuddheru-
papattiratiprasaṅgāt. tasmād dhūmā ...... liṅgāvagama ivā .....
tāttvikyā dṛṣṭyā na kenāpyutpādyate iti kinna kalpyate dhūmabalena
...... dhūmadhūma- svarūpaṁ kimadhu- notpannam, cirotpannam,
kāraṇādvā jātam, ākasmikam ...... mātrāvadyotakatvena paryavasite
ākasmikamapi svarūpamupapadyate jagato vaiśvarūpyadarśanāt.
260 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 787
If the relatum is different from itself, then, something having
relationship with something cannot be the ground for inferring
something else, because, it will not have that form and if the form
is not different, on the mountain .... (the text is broken..) there will
arise the contingency of taking the form of smoke and once that form
is taken, on the basis of the knowledge of smoke, there will not arise
the knowledge of fire, because like the people living in the island
of coconut trees they will not have the relation between smoke and
fire. There will be knowledge of relation in the knowledge of that
which is related to fire and this will be an unwanted consequence.
Therefore, .... (the text is broken.) .... like the knowledge of the
ground or reason .... (text is broken) .... As a matter of fact, by
nobody it cannot be produced and therefore, why not is it being
postulated on the strength of smoke .... (the text is broken)? Is the
nature of smoke produced now? Or, already produced for a long
time? Or, is it produced with its cause? .... (the text is broken) ....
(the text is broken) When it terminates in revealing the quantity,
sometimes a sudden form is also justifiable, because, the universe is
of all forms.
Text: 788
अथ आक स्मकत्वे िनयतदेशकालसम्ब न्धत्वं न लभ्यते; तन् युक्ं, तत्स्वभावस्य
तस्योत्पत्ेराक स्मकिनयतदेशकालसम्बन्धाभावानवगतेः। एवंभूतं तत् कारणं िवनोत्पन्ं
यिन्यतदेशकालपर्ितिष्तदेहम्। एवञ् स्थते धूमोपलम्भे सित नानुमेयािग्पर्ितप त्ः,
अनुपलम्भात्।
atha ākasmikatve niyatadeśakālasambandhitvaṁ na labhyate; tanna
yuktam, tatsvabhāvasya tasyotpatterākasmikaniyatadeśakālasamba-
ndhābhāvānavagateḥ. evaṁbhūtaṁ tat kāraṇaṁ vinotpannaṁ yanni-
yatadeśakālapratiṣṭhitadeham. evañca sthite dhūmopalambhe sati
nānumeyāgnipratipattiḥ, anupalambhāt.
Translation: 788
If you say, it is without a cause, then, it cannot be said to be
related with a particular space and time. It is not proper. Since,
it is produced because, it is of the nature of that, one cannot
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 261
Text: 792
तद्िद िव धमुखेन उपादीयते; त त्कं धूमिवषयम्, आहो अन्यिवषयम्, िनिवर् षयं वा?
tadyadi vidhimukhena upādīyate; tatkiṁ dhūmaviṣayam, āho
anyaviṣayam, nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 792
If you say, it arises in a positive way, then, one can ask, is it a
perception which the object being smoke, or, is it a perception of
something else, or, is it a perception having no content at all?
Text: 793
तद्िद धूमिवषयम्; तदा तत्स्वरूपावगािहना तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्वं िवधीयते न
तत्स्वरूपखण्डना।
tadyadi dhūmaviṣayam; tadā tatsvarūpāvagāhinā tatsvarūpāstitvaṁ
vidhīyate na tatsvarūpakhaṇḍanā.
Translation: 793
If you say it is perception of smoke, then, its existence is enjoined by
the knowledge in which there is form of smoke and not by knowledge
which destroys its form.
Text: 794
अथ अन्यिवषयम्; न तिहर् तेन तस्य खण्डना िवधीयते तत्स्वरूपवत्, अिप तु यद् यिद्षयं
तत् तस्यैवाऽ स्तत्वं िवदधाित।
atha anyaviṣayam; na tarhi tena tasya khaṇḍanā vidhīyate
tatsvarūpavat, api tu yad yadviṣayaṁ tat tasyaivā’stitvaṁ vidadhāti.
Translation: 794
If you say, it is a perception of something else, then, by that its
rejection is not possible, like its form. Rather it will enjoin the
existence of that which appeared as the object of the knowledge.
Text: 795
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तिहर् तत् िकंिचद् िवदधाित नािप पर्ितषेधित मूकान्धब धरतुल्यत्वात्।
atha nirviṣayam; na tarhi tat kiṁcid vidadhāti nāpi pratiṣedhati
mūkāndhabadhiratulyatvāt.
Translation: 795
If you say it is perception without content, then, it means that, it
does not enjoin anything, nor does it negate anything, because it
will be similar to someone who is deaf and dumb.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 263
Text: 796
अथ पर्ितषेधमुखेन उपादीयते; तदिप िकं धूमिवषयम्, आहो अन्यिवषयम्, िनिवर् षयं वा?
atha pratiṣedhamukhena upādīyate; tadapi kiṁ dhūmaviṣayam, āho
anyaviṣayam, nirviṣayaṁ vā?
Translation: 796
If you say, it is taken in a negative way, is that also knowledge of
which smoke is the object or something else is the object, or it has
no object at all?
Text: 797
तद्िद धूमिवषयम्; तदा तत्सत्ोपिनबद्ं तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्विवधायकं न तु व्यावत्र्कम्।
tadyadi dhūmaviṣayam; tadā tatsattopanibaddhaṁ tatsvarūpāsti-
tvavidhāyakaṁ na tu vyāvarttakam.
Translation: 797
If you say, the object is smoke, then, whatever is associated with
its existence, will enjoin the existence of its form or nature and it
will not exclude it.
Text: 798
अथ अन्यिवषयम्; अन्यिवषयपयर् वसाियना न तत्सत्ाखण्डना अवद्ोत्यते तत्सत्ावत्।
atha anyaviṣayam; anyaviṣayaparyavasāyinā na tatsattākhaṇḍanā
avadyotyate tatsattāvat.
Translation: 798
If it is a perception of something else, then, it does not imply
the rejection of its existence by that which culminates in having
something as its object, because it exists there like the existence.
Text: 799
अथ िनिवर् षयम्; न तत् िकिञ्िद्दधाित नािप पर्ितषेधित मूढात्मतयोत्पत्ेः।
atha nirviṣayam; na tat kiñcidvidadhāti nāpi pratiṣedhati mūḍhā-
tmatayotpatteḥ.
Translation: 799
If you say, it is without object, then, it does not enjoin anything,
nor does it reject anything, because it emerges without any
consciousness.
264 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 800
अथ सत्ािवच्छे दो िह पर्ध्वंसः, सोऽनेन आत्मसात् िकर्यते;
atha sattāvicchedo hi pradhvaṁsaḥ, so’nena ātmasāt kriyate;
Translation: 800
Clarification:
Well, the destruction means disassociation with existence and that
is being adopted by it.
Text: 801
नेदं चतुरसर्ं वचः। पर्ध्वंसो िह िवषयान्तरम्, ततर्ोत्पन्ं िवज्ञानं तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्विवधायकं
न तु कस्यिचत् पर्ितषेधकम्। त स्मंश्च संवेद्माने न कस्यिचत् खण्डनाऽवगम्यते
स्विवषयपयर् वसायीिन िवज्ञानािन स्विवषया स्तत्विवधानपरािण। का कस्य खण्डना?
nedaṁ caturasraṁ vacaḥ. pradhvaṁso hi viṣayāntaram,
tatrotpannaṁ vijñānaṁ tatsvarūpāstitvavidhāyakaṁ na tu
kasyacit pratiṣedhakam. tasmiṁśca saṁvedyamāne na kasyacit
khaṇḍanā’vagamyate svaviṣayaparyavasāyīni vijñānāni svaviṣa-
yāstitvavidhānaparāṇi. kā kasya khaṇḍanā?
Translation: 801
Reply:
This will not have intermittent answer. Destruction is something
else. The knowledge of it enjoins existence of its nature. It does
not reject anything, when that is known, rejection of nothing is
understood. The knowledges which terminate in their own content
they convey enjoining of existence of its own. Who rejects whose
existence?
Text: 802
अथ पर्ध्वंसज्ञाने धूमस्वरूपं न पर्ितभाित, तेनासौ तस्य खण्डना इित चेत्;
atha pradhvaṁsajñāne dhūmasvarūpaṁ na pratibhāti, tenāsau tasya
khaṇḍanā iti cet;
Translation: 802
Objection:
Well in the knowledge of destruction, the nature of smoke does not
appear and therefore, it is said that it is rejection of that.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 265
Text: 803
यद्ेवं तर्ैलोक्यस्य खण्डना, त स्मन् धूमध्वंसज्ञाने तर्ैलोक्यं नावभाित, तर्ैलोक्यात्मको वा
न भवित ध्वंसः।
yadyevaṁ trailokyasya khaṇḍanā, tasmin dhūmadhvaṁsajñāne
trailokyaṁ nāvabhāti, trailokyātmako vā na bhavati dhvaṁsaḥ.
Translation: 803
Reply:
If it is so, there can be rejection of the three worlds, because when
that knowledge of destruction of smoke arises, the three worlds do
not appear, or in other words, the destruction does not take the
form of the three worlds.
[२. पर्सङ्ात् िवरोधपदाथर् स्य िवकल्प्य दषू णम्। ]
[2. prasaṅgāt virodhapadārthasya vikalpya dūṣaṇam. ]
Text: 804
अथ धूमिवरो धत्वेन असौ धूमस्य खण्डना इित चेत्;
atha dhūmavirodhitvena asau dhūmasya khaṇḍanā iti cet;
Translation: 804
Clarification:
Well, that is called rejection of smoke, because it opposes smoke.
Text: 805
कः पुनरसौ िवरोधाथर् ः? िकम्-अतदाकारता, आहो असमानकालीनता तत्सद्ावे
तस्यानुपलम्भो वा, तज्जन्यता वा, तज्जनकत्वं वा, िभन्िकर्याकतृर्त्वं वा, िभन्हेतू-
त्पाद्त्वं वा, आ शर्ताना शर्तत्वं वा?
kaḥ punarasau virodhārthaḥ? kim-atadākāratā, āho asamānakā-
līnatā, tatsadbhāve tasyānupalambho vā, tajjanyatā vā, tajjanaka-
tvaṁ vā, bhinnakriyākartṛtvaṁ vā, bhinnahetūtpādyatvaṁ vā, āśri-
tānāśritatvaṁ vā?
Translation: 805
Reply:
What is the meaning of opposition? Does it mean not having the
form of that? Or does it mean not being of the same time? Or, does
it mean in the presence of X, in the presence of Y? or, does it mean
266 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 808
If you say, in the presence of X, absence of Y, is the meaning of the
term opposition, then, it is a fact that when something is at a far
distance, due to the ground of distance, that thing is not visible.
But that does not amount to rejection of that thing; in the same
way, when there is no land we do have experience of absence of
pot, smoke etc. But that does not amount to the rejection of the
existence of pot, smoke etc.
Text: 809
अथ दरू ािदिनिमत्ोपिनपाते यतर्ानुपल ब्धदृर्ष्ा ततर्ोपल ब्धरिप पुनदृर्ष्ा, इह तु पुनः ध्वंसे
सञ्ाते न जातु धूमकुम्भादेरुपल ब्धर स्त।
atha dūrādinimittopanipāte yatrānupalabdhirdṛṣṭā tatropalabdhirapi
punardṛṣṭā, iha tu punaḥ dhvaṁse sañjāte na jātu dhūmakumbhā-
derupalabdhirasti.
Translation: 809
Clarification:
However, in a situation where the circumstances such as longer
distance etc. crop up, and because of that, there is no knowledge, in
that case, we do find that, there is perception again. Here, however,
once the destruction has taken place there is no knowledge of smoke,
pot etc.
Text: 810
केन नोपलभ्यते? िकं केनािप, आहो सवर् ज्ञातृिभः?
kena nopalabhyate? kiṁ kenāpi, āho sarvajñātṛbhiḥ?
Translation: 810
Reply:
By whom it is not perceived? Is it by anybody? Or by one who
knows everything?
Text: 811
तद्िद केनािप नोपलभ्यते, तेन तदा तस्य स्वरूपखण्डना; तदयुक्म्, दरू ा[व]रणािद-
िनिमत्ोपिनपाते सित यथैके तमथर् न पश्य न्त अपरे पश्य न्त, एवं सित सञ्ाते ध्वंसे
तमथर् म् एके नोपलभन्ते अन्ये तु उपलप्स्यन्त इित।
268 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 814
If you say that, such knowledge of absence occurs at a particular
space and time, then, it means that, the absence of existence is
not understood. They should be understood as something which is
going to be established that which is already known.
Text: 815
अथ सवर् देशकाले नोपलभ्यते; तदयुक्म्, न िनयामकं िकिञ्द् बीजम स्त, न च बीजमन्त-
रेणाभ्युपगमो युक्ः।
atha sarvadeśakāle nopalabhyate; tadayuktam, na niyāmakaṁ kiñcid
bījamasti, na ca bījamantareṇābhyupagamo yuktaḥ.
Translation: 815
If you say that, it is not known in all space and time, it will not be
proper, because there is no ground to specify it. It is not proper to
accept anything without a ground.
Text: 816
अथ ध्वंसे सित सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वे कथं वस्तुत्वसं स्थितः?
atha dhvaṁse sati sarvopākhyārahitatve kathaṁ vastutvasaṁsthitiḥ?
Translation: 816
Objection:
Well, after the destruction a thing loses all its reference and so how
can that be called an entity?
Text: 817
कदा सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वम्? िकम् उपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्, आहो अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थायाम्?
kadā sarvopākhyārahitatvam? kim upalabdhyavasthāyām, āho anu-
palabdhyavasthāyām?
Translation: 817
Reply:
There we would like to ask, when did it lose its reference? Is at the
time when it is known or at the time when it is not known?
Text: 818
तद्िद उपल ब्धम धकृत्योच्यते; उपलभ्यते च सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वं च इित िचतर्म्।
tadyadi upalabdhimadhikṛtyocyate; upalabhyate ca sarvopākhyā-
rahitatvaṁ ca iti citram.
270 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 818
If you say that, we are referring to the time when it is known, this
is not understandable, because, it is funny to say that, it is known
and at the same time, it has lost all its reference.
Text: 819
अथ अनुपलब्ध्यवस्थामङ्ीकृत्योच्यते सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वम्; तदयुक्म्, दरू ावरणािद-
िनिमत्ोपिनपाते सित अनुपलब्धौ सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वं सत्वं च इत्यनेकान्तः। यिद च ध्वंसे
सित अत्यन्तानुपलम्भः; अनुपलम्भपर्पञ्ोऽयं न तत्स्वरूपस्यातावद(तादव)स्थ्यम्,
आवराणािदकृतानुपलम्भे यथा।
atha anupalabdhyavasthāmaṅgīkṛtyocyate sarvopākhyārahitatvam;
tadayuktam, dūrāvaraṇādinimittopanipāte sati anupalabdhau
sarvopā- khyārahitatvaṁ sattvaṁ ca ityanekāntaḥ. yadi ca dhvaṁse
sati atyantānupalambhaḥ; anupalambhaprapañco’yaṁ na tatsvarū-
pasyātāvada(tādava)sthyam, āvarāṇādikṛtānupalambhe yathā.
Translation: 819
If you say that, we are saying so accepting the state of its
non-knowledge and because of that, the state of its being devoid
of all references, it will not be proper, because, when there is no
knowledge after the presence of the grounds such as longer distance,
cover etc. there is lack of all references and at the same time,
there is existence. This is inconsistent. If after the destruction,
there is absolute absence of knowledge, then, this description of
non-knowledge of its form remains as it is, as we can see in the case
of non-knowledge caused by covering a thing.
Text: 820
तज्जन्यता िवरोधाथर् ः; तदा दण्डािदनािप जिनतत्वात् तिद्रो धत्वपर्सङ्ः। न च
व्यापाराितशयोऽ स्त, तं पर्ित िकर्याितरेकस्य अनुपल ब्धः(ब्धेः)।
tajjanyatā virodhārthaḥ; tadā daṇḍādināpi janitatvāt tadviro-
dhitvaprasaṅgaḥ. na ca vyāpārātiśayo’sti, taṁ prati kriyātirekasya
anupalabdhiḥ(bdheḥ).
Translation: 820
If you say that, the state of being produced by that, is the meaning
of opposition, then, since a pot is produced by the stick, it will be
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 271
Text: 824
यिद च िनयतहेतूत्पाद्त्वेन िवरुद्त्वं जेगीयते सदसतोः; तदा सवेर् भावा िनयतसामग्र्या
उत्पाद्ा अन्योन्यिवरो धनो भवेयःु । िनत्यािनत्याकारयोिवर् रोधपर्सङ्ः, िनत्याकारस्य
िनबीर्जत्वात्, बीजवत्वे वा िनत्यतैव न स्यात्।
yadi ca niyatahetūtpādyatvena viruddhatvaṁ jegīyate sadasatoḥ;
tadā sarve bhāvā niyatasāmagryā utpādyā anyonyavirodhino bhave-
yuḥ. nityānityākārayorvirodhaprasaṅgaḥ, nityākārasya nirbījatvāt,
bījavatve vā nityataiva na syāt.
Translation: 824
If you say that, a positive and a negative entities are produced
by specific causes and this is what you mean opposition, then,
all positive entities will be opposing one another, since they are
produced by specific set of causes. There will arise contingency of
opposition between eternal form and non-eternal form, because the
eternal form is without a cause and if that is produced by a cause,
then, that will lose its character of being eternal.
Text: 825
अथ आ शर्ताना शर्तत्वं िवरोधाथर् ः; तदा आत्मज्ञानयोः िवरो धत्वमापनीपद्ते,
atha āśritānāśritatvaṁ virodhārthaḥ; tadā ātmajñānayoḥ virodhi-
tvamāpanīpadyate,
Translation: 825
If you say that, the state of being dependent (located) and not
dependent (not located) is the meaning of opposition, then, there
will be opposition of self and knowledge of self.
Text: 826
कुम्भापगमस्य सवर् िवरो धत्वं पर्ाप्नोित, आ शर्ताना शर्तत्वस्याऽिवशेषात्।
kumbhāpagamasya sarvavirodhitvaṁ prāpnoti, āśritānāśritatvasyā’-
viśeṣāt.
Translation: 826
(Similarly), the removal of a pot will oppose everything because, it
is all the same viz. located and not located.
Text: 827
न च सम्बन्धमन्तरेण षष्ी सम्पद्ते, अिप तु सम्बन्धे सित देवदत्नयनतुरगव्यपदेशो यथा।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 273
Translation: 836
If you say, it is something else, we do not know what is that
something else. The sequence cannot be decided without the
knowledge. Without the knowledge we do not know whether they
are produced together or produced in a sequence, or they are not
produced at all.
Text: 837
अथ पूवार्परगर्हणकर्मेण पूवार्परोत्पाद-तदभावव्यवस्था इित चेत्;
atha pūrvāparagrahaṇakrameṇa pūrvāparotpāda-tadabhāvavyavasthā
iti cet;
Translation: 837
Clarification:
We can decide effect’s coming into being in a sequence or not coming
into being in a sequence, by the sequence of knowledge of what
precedes and what follows.
Text: 838
तदेतदिप गर्हणेऽिप तुल्यम्। सती सत्ा संवेद्ते नाऽसती। सहोत्पन्योरिप कर्मेण गर्हणं
दृष्ं गोिवषाणयोः। अनुत्पन्योश्च गोत्वाऽ स्तत्वयोः। तथा, पटगर्हणानन्तरं तन्तूनां गर्हणं
दृष्म्। तथा, एकमेव गर्हणं दृष्म्, न च तयोभेर्दोऽ स्त, नच तयोहेर्तुफलभावः। यथा च भेदो
ना स्त तथापर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्।
tadetadapi grahaṇe’pi tulyam. satī sattā saṁvedyate nā’satī. saho-
tpannayorapi krameṇa grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ goviṣāṇayoḥ anutpanna-
yośca gotvā’stitvayoḥ. tathā, paṭagrahaṇānantaraṁ tantūnāṁ graha-
ṇaṁ dṛṣṭam. tathā, ekameva grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭam, na ca tayorbhe-
do’sti, naca tayorhetuphalabhāvaḥ. yathā ca bhedo nāsti tathā-
prāgeva prapañcitam.
Translation: 838
Reply:
Even this remains the same, even when it is known. If something
exists, its existence is known and not otherwise. One can have
knowledge of two things in a sequence, in spite of the fact that,
the two things are produced simultaneously as it can be seen, as
it is known of the two horns of a cow. We have also seen that the
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 277
two things, which are not produced, that are eternal, also can be
known in a sequence e.g. the universal of universal of “cowness” and
“existence”. In the same way after the knowledge of cloth, knowledge
of threads is also seen. Thus, there is only one knowledge and there
is no difference between the two. There is no relationship between
the two called cause and effect. That there is no difference has
already been discussed before.
Text: 839
एवं संवेदनमिप संवेद्ात् न िभद्ते सदाकारतया, न च तयोराकारान्तरम स्त, एकं िह वस्तु।
evaṁ saṁvedanamapi saṁvedyāt na bhidyate sadākāratayā, na ca
tayorākārāntaramasti, ekaṁ hi vastu.
Translation: 839
Similarly, knowledge is also not different from what is known in the
form of a positive entity. It is also not the case that the two have
two different forms. In reality, there is only one entity.
Text: 840
इतोऽिप हेतुफलयोिवर् ज्ञानं न वेदनम्, यथा उत्पन्ं िवज्ञानं स्वसंवेदनं न भवित,
िवज्ञानाकाराित रक्ाकारान्तरिवरहात्।
ito’pi hetuphalayorvijñānaṁ na vedanam, yathā utpannaṁ vijñānaṁ
svasaṁvedanaṁ na bhavati, vijñānākārātiriktākārāntaravirahāt.
Translation: 840
Because of the following ground also the knowledge of cause and
effect is not an experience: As a knowledge when produced, is not
said to be revealer of itself, because there is no form other than the
form of knowledge.
Text: 841
अथ िकर्याितरेकापायेऽिप स्वसंवेदनमपिदश्यते;
atha kriyātirekāpāye’pi svasaṁvedanamapadiśyate;
Translation: 841
Clarification:
Well, even if there is no additional activity, there is reference to
self-illumination.
278 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 842
अस्वसंवेदनं िकं न व्यपिदश्यते, िकर्याितरेकाभावस्याऽिवशेषात्?
asvasaṁvedanaṁ kiṁ na vyapadiśyate, kriyātirekābhāvasyā’viśeṣāt?
Translation: 842
Reply:
Then what is the reason that absence of self-illumination is not
referred to. Because, even there, there is absence of additional
activity?
Text: 843
तथा, अथर् स्यािप न तद्ेदनम्।
tathā, arthasyāpi na tadvedanam.
Translation: 843
In the same way, there cannot be knowledge of even the object.
Text: 844
अथ कथं तत् अथर् स्य वेदनं न भवित?
atha kathaṁ tat arthasya vedanaṁ na bhavati?
Translation: 844
Objection:
Then how will you call it the knowledge of the object?
Text: 845
कथ्यते-तत् सत्ामातर्ेण अथर् स्य वेदनम्, तज्जन्यतया वा?
kathyate-tat sattāmātreṇa arthasya vedanam, tajjanyatayā vā?
Translation: 845
Reply:
Is it the case that there is knowledge of object by mere existence,
or is it because it is caused by that?
Text: 846
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण अथर् स्य वेदनम्; तदा िवश्वस्य तद्ेदनं स्यात् तद्ेहािवशेषात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa arthasya vedanam; tadā viśvasya tadvedanaṁ
syāt taddehāviśeṣāt.
Translation: 846
If you say that, there is knowledge of object by mere existence, then,
there should be knowledge of the whole world? Because there is no
difference in the body of the universe.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 279
Text: 847
अथ तज्जन्यतया तत्संवेदनमुद्गीयते; तदा नयनालोकेश्वरादेरिप तत् संवेदनमापद्ते,
तैजर्न्यमानत्वोपपत्ेः। न चाथर् स्य व्यापाराितरेकोऽ स्त, िकर्याितरेकस्यान धगतेः। व्यापा-
राितरेके िह िनयतफलोऽथर् ः स्यात्।
atha tajjanyatayā tatsaṁvedanamudgīyate; tadā nayanāloke-
śvarāderapi tat saṁvedanamāpadyate, tairjanyamānatvopapatteḥ.
na cārthasya vyāpārātireko’sti, kriyātirekasyānadhigateḥ. vyāpārā-
tireke hi niyataphalo’rthaḥ syāt.
Translation: 847
If you say that, some knowledge is called knowledge of that object,
because, it is produced by that, then, since a knowledge is produced
by eyes, light, God etc. it should be called knowledge of eyes, light
and God. Because, one can easily justify that, it is produced by
them. There is no additional function of an object, because, one
does not know that additional activity. Had there been additional
function, an object could have been accepted as the result of a
specific object.
Text: 848
भवतु;
bhavatu;
Translation: 848
Objection:
Let it be, what is the harm?
Text: 849
न, अदृष्त्वात्, एकं िह इदं फलं कारककदम्बसम्पाद्म्। ततश्चाथर् संवेदनवत् तत्सवर् -
कारकसंवेदनवत्वपर्सङ्ः।
na, adṛṣṭatvāt, ekaṁ hi idaṁ phalaṁ kārakakadambasam-
pādyam. tataścārthasaṁvedanavat tatsarvakārakasaṁvedanavattva-
prasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 849
Reply:
No, it cannot be, because, it is not experienced by anybody. This is a
single effect, which is accomplished by a collection of factors. Thus,
280 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 854
तद्िद उपच रतं पर्त्येित; तदयुक्म्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानुपपत्ेः, अकारकत्वेन
गमकत्वानुपप त्ः।
tadyadi upacaritaṁ pratyeti; tadayuktam, tena saha samba-
ndhānupapatteḥ, akārakatvena gamakatvānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 854
If you say, he deduces something which is imagined, that will not be
proper, because, with that, there cannot be the relation of invariable
concomitance, since it will not be a causal factor, it cannot be
treated as the ground for deduction.
Text: 855
अथ िनरुपच रतं पर्त्येित; ततर्ािप िकम्-िवद्मानमिवद्मानं वा?
atha nirupacaritaṁ pratyeti; tatrāpi kim-vidyamānamavidyamānaṁ
vā?
Translation: 855
If you say, he deduces something which is unimagined, there also the
question comes to our mind, whether he deduces something which
is existent or non-existent.
Text: 856
तद्िद िवद्मानम्; तदयुक्म्, जनकत्वयोगेन जनकमपिदश्यते, यथा दण्डयोगेन दण्डी,
दर्व्यत्वयोगेन दर्व्यम्। न भवतां पक्षे जनकत्वयुक्स्य अनेककालाऽन्तरावस्थानम स्त,
कायार्नेकत्वपर्सङ्ात्।
tadyadi vidyamānam; tadayuktam, janakatvayogena janakamapa-
diśyate, yathā daṇḍayogena daṇḍī, dravyatvayogena dravyam. na
bhavatāṁ pakṣe janakatvayuktasya anekakālā’ntarāvasthānamasti,
kāryānekatvaprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 856
If you say, he deduces something which is existent, it will not
be proper, because, on account of something being the producer,
something is called as the producer e.g. someone is called ‘man
with a stick’ only when he has association with the stick. Similarly,
something is called a substance only when it has association with
substanceness. According to your doctrine, however, nothing which
282 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 861
अथ तत्कारणपूवर्कत्वं कायर् स्यानुमीयते; तत्कारणपूवर्कत्वम्-स्वकारणसत्ासम्बन्धः,
सत्ा वा, धमार्न्तरं वा?
atha tatkāraṇapūrvakatvaṁ kāryasyānumīyate; tatkāraṇapūrva-
katvam-svakāraṇasattāsambandhaḥ, sattā vā, dharmāntaraṁ vā?
Translation: 861
If you say the state of occurring prior to the effect is inferred of
the effect, what is the meaning of the state of occurring prior to
the effect? Does it mean a relation of the existence of its cause or
simply existence or any other property?
Text: 862
तद्िद स्वकारणसत्ासम्बन्धोऽनुमीयते; तदयुक्म्, तस्य पर्त्यक्षिवषयत्वात्। न च
पर्त्यक्षेण अवगम्यमाने अनुमानं न्याय्यम्, हेतावप्यनुमानपर्सङ्ात्। तदक्ु म्-“सामान्ये
सद्साध्यताम्(ता), सामान्यं समानता पर्त्यक्षानुमानिवषयत्वेन अथर् स्य।”
tadyadi svakāraṇasattāsambandho’numīyate; tadayuktam, tasya
pratyakṣaviṣayatvāt. na ca pratyakṣeṇa avagamyamāne anumānaṁ
nyāyyam, hetāvapyanumānaprasaṅgāt. taduktam- “sāmānye siddha-
sādhyatām(tā), sāmānyaṁ samānatā pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvena
arthasya.”
Translation: 862
If you say, the relation of the existence of its own cause, which
is inferred, it will not be proper, because, that is the object of
perception. When something is known by perception, it is not
proper to know it by inference. In that case, even with reference to
the ground of the inference, one will have to know it by inference.
That is why, it is said “if it is universal, then, it is proving something
which is already proved.” Universal means sameness. It means
sameness of a thing through perception and inference.
Text: 863
अथ सत्ाऽनुमीयते; साऽिप पर्त्यक्षेणावगम्यते अलमनुमानेन। इहाप्येतद् दर्ष्व्यम्-
'सामान्ये सद्साध्यता'। अथवा सद्स्य िवद्मानस्य साधनम् सद्साधनम्। यथा च
न तौ स्तः तथा पर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्।
atha sattā’numīyate; sā’pi pratyakṣeṇāvagamyate alamanumānena.
284 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 869
अथ ध्वंसोऽनुमीयते; तदयुक्म्, तेन सह सम्बन्धानवगतेः। न शब्दसत्ाकाले तद्ध्वं-
सोऽ स्त, तदभावान् सम्बन्धाऽवगितः, एकस्य सम्बन्धानुपपत्ेः। न चाभावस्य िवषय-
भावोऽ स्त, भावे वा शब्द लङ्ं न भवेत्। शब्द लङ्सद्ावे वा िवज्ञानस्य अभावो न िवषयः,
तदभावात्। एतेन तपनोदयास्तिमत्योगर् म्यगमकभावः पयुर्दस्तो वेिदतव्यः।
atha dhvaṁso’numīyate; tadayuktam, tena saha sambandhānava-
gateḥ. na śabdasattākāle taddhvaṁso’sti, tadabhāvānna samba-
ndhā’vagatiḥ, ekasya sambandhānupapatteḥ. na cābhāvasya viṣaya-
bhāvo’sti, bhāve vā śabdaliṅgaṁ na bhavet. śabdaliṅgasadbhāve
vā vijñānasya abhāvo na viṣayaḥ, tadabhāvāt. etena tapanoda-
yāstamityorgamyagamakabhāvaḥ paryudasto veditavyaḥ.
Translation: 869
If you say, what is inferred is destruction, which is also not proper,
because, with that no relationship is known, because, when there is
existence of sound there is no destruction of sound and when that
is not there, the knowledge of relationship is not possible, because,
a single entity cannot have a relationship. An absence cannot be
treated as an object. If it is treated, then, the sound cannot be
the ground. If the sound is taken as a ground, then, absence of
knowledge cannot be the object, because it is not there. By this
argument between the rising of the sun and the setting of the sun,
one being the ground for the knowledge of the other, stands rejected.
0.9 आत्मानुमानस्य िनरासः।
[ātmānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]
(Refutation of the definition of Inference of the Self)
[१. नैयाियकािदसम्मतस्यात्मानुमानस्य िनरासः।]
[1. naiyāyikādisammatasyātmānumānasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 870
तथा, [आत्मा]नुमान(नं) सुखद्ेषा(ष)ज्ञानािदना न सम्भवित, तेन सह सम्बन्धान-
वगमात्, तदनवगतौ च अनुमानानथर् क्यम्। िकं चातर् साध्यते? िकम्-ज्ञान-सुखादीनाम्
आ शर्तत्वम्, आहो स्वद् आशर्या शर्तं वा ज्ञानस्वरूपम्?
tathā, [ātmā]numāna(naṁ) sukhadveṣā(ṣa)jñānādinā na sambha-
vati, tena saha sambandhānavagamāt, tadanavagatau ca anumānā-
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 289
Translation: 878
If you say, nothing else can be indicated by knowledge, it is also
not true. Because, what is indicated by that is possible to exist
somewhere else and it is possible because it is one. If you say, it
is not possible then, you should accept many inherences or other
entities not existing by the relationship of inherence.
Text: 879
तथा, िवज्ञानसमवाय आत्मनः समवायः िकम् - सत्ामातर्ेण, आहो स्वद् आत्मजनकत्वेन,
तज्जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवाियत्वेन, आत्मस्वरूपतादात्म्याद्ा?
tathā, vijñānasamavāya ātmanaḥ samavāyaḥ kim - sattāmātreṇa,
āhosvid ātmajanakatvena, tajjanyatvena, tatsamavāyitvena, ātma-
svarūpatādātmyādvā?
Translation: 879
Similarly, if you say, inherence of knowledge is inherence of the self;
there, we would like to ask, is it so by mere existence, or, as the
producer of the self, or, as being produced by the self, or, being
existent in the self by relationship of inherence, or, on account of
being identical with the nature of the self?
Text: 880
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण आत्मनः समवायोऽपिदश्यते; तदा ज्ञानसमवायसत्ाऽिवशेषात् सवेर्षां
ज्ञानसमवाियत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa ātmanaḥ samavāyo’padiśyate; tadā jñāna-
samavāyasattā’viśeṣāt sarveṣāṁ jñānasamavāyitvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 880
If you say, as mere existence, the inherence of the self is referred to
as such, then, there is no difference in the inherence of knowledge
and existence, everything will be treated as being in the self by the
relationship of inherence.
Text: 881
अथ तज्जन्यत्वेन; तदयुक्म्, निह आत्मना समवायोत्पादनं िकर्यते, िनत्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
atha tajjanyatvena; tadayuktam, nahi ātmanā samavāyotpādanaṁ
kriyate, nityatvābhyupagamāt.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 293
Translation: 881
If you say, as being produced by the self, that also is not proper,
because, it is not the case that inherence is produced by the self,
because, according to you inherence is eternal.
Text: 882
अथ तज्जनकत्वेन आत्मनः समवायः; तदनुपपन्म्, आत्मनो िनत्यत्वात्।
atha tajjanakatvena ātmanaḥ samavāyaḥ; tadanupapannam, ātmano
nityatvāt.
Translation: 882
If you say that, as producer of the self, there is inherence of the self,
it will not be proper, because self is eternal.
Text: 883
अथ आत्मिन समवेतः तेन आत्मसमवायोऽिभधीयते; तदयुक्म्, समवायान्तरानभ्यु-
पगमात्।
atha ātmani samavetaḥ tena ātmasamavāyo’bhidhīyate; tadayu-
ktam, samavāyāntarānabhyupagamāt.
Translation: 883
If you say, because it is present in the self by the relation of
inherence, we say inherence of the self, it will not be proper, because,
you have not accepted any other inherence.
Text: 884
अथ आत्मतादात्म्येन वतर् त इित आत्मसमवायः उच्यते; तदा आत्मा िवद्ते
नान्यः समवायोऽ स्त तत्स्वभावानुपर्वेशात्। एवं िवज्ञानानन्दादीनां समवायसम्बन्धेन न
िनयतात्मव्यपदेश उपपद्ते।
atha ātmatādātmyena vartata iti ātmasamavāyaḥ ucyate; tadā
ātmā vidyate nānyaḥ samavāyo’sti tatsvabhāvānupraveśāt. evaṁ
vijñānānandādīnāṁ samavāyasambandhena na niyatātmavyapadeśa
upapadyate.
Translation: 884
If you say, because it exists as identical with the self, we say that,
there is inherence with the self. In that case, it means that, there
is self and there is nothing else as inherence, because, it is included
294 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
in the nature of the self. In this way, one cannot refer to the self
as something where knowledge, joy etc. exists by the relation of
inherence.
Text: 885
अथ आत्मतादात्म्येनोपजायमानं िवज्ञानानन्दािदकम् आत्मनोऽपिदश्यते;
atha ātmatādātmyenopajāyamānaṁ vijñānānandādikam ātmano’pa-
diśyate;
Translation: 885
Clarification:
Well, since knowledge, joy etc. arise as identical with the self, they
are said to be of the self.
Text: 886
तदा िवकारी पर्ाप्नोित अनया भङ्ग्या आत्मा। ततश्च स्मरणानुमानपर्त्यिभज्ञानानुप त्ः।
tadā vikārī prāpnoti anayā bhaṅgyā ātmā. tataśca smaraṇānumāna-
pratyabhijñānānupattiḥ.
Translation: 886
Reply:
In that case, by this argument the self becomes an entity which
undergoes a change and as a consequence of this, remembrance,
inference and recollection cannot be explained.
Text: 887
इतोिप आत्मा सुखािदकायार् धकरणोऽवगन्तुं न पायर् ते;
itopi ātmā sukhādikāryādhikaraṇo’vagantuṁ na pāryate.
Translation: 887
For the following reason also the self cannot be understood as a
locus of the effect viz. happiness etc.
Text: 887a
िकं तेनात्मना अनुपजाताितशयेन तापािद कायर् िकर्यते, आहो स्वद् उपजाताितशयेनािप,
िकं व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेनाव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन वा?
kiṁ tenātmanānupajātātiśayena tāpādi kāryaṁ kriyate, āhosvi-
dupajātātiśayenāpi kiṁ vyatiriktopajātātiśayenāvyatiriktopajātāti-
śayena vā?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 295
Translation: 887a
Here the question arises, is it the case that the self produces the
effect in it viz. unhappiness etc. without being affected by any
additional change or being affected by additional change or by
possessing distinct additional change or by possessing additional
change not different from itself.
Text: 888
तद्िद अनुपजाताितशयेन उत्पाद्ते तापािद कायर् म्; तदा सवर् दा कुयार्त्, अनुपजातबलस्य
कायर् कारणाभ्युपगमात्, न तापािदिवकलः स्यात्, समं सुखािदकायर् पर्सज्यते।
tadyadi anupajātātiśayena utpādyate tāpādi kāryam; tadā
sarvadā kuryāt, anupajātabalasya kāryakāraṇābhyupagamāt, na
tāpādivikalaḥ syāt, samaṁ sukhādi kāryaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 888
If you say, the effect such as unhappiness etc. produced without
being affected by any additional change, then, the self should always
produce such effects, because the cause and effect relationship is
accepted of that whose strength is not disturbed and in that case,
the self can never be free from unhappiness or the self will keep on
producing happiness simultaneously.
Text: 889
अथ अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन उत्पाद्ते तापािदकायर्; तदा अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशय
इित िकं भिणतं भवित? आत्मा उपजायते। ततश्च स्मरणानुमानपर्त्यिभज्ञानानुपप त्ः।
atha avyatiriktopajātātiśayena utpādyate tāpādikāryaṁ; tadā
avyatiriktopajātātiśaya iti kiṁ bhaṇitaṁ bhavati? ātmā upajāyate.
tataśca smaraṇānumānapratyabhijñānānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 889
If you say that, the self produces effect such as unhappiness etc. on
account of its being associated with additional change not different
from itself, then, what is to be understood by the expression “being
associated with additional change, not different from itself?” Does
it mean self is produced, if it is so, then, one cannot explain
remembrance, inference and recollection.
296 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 890
अथ व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन जन्यते तापािदकायर् म्; स तेनात्मना सह सम्बद्ो वा, न
वा?
atha vyatiriktopajātātiśayena janyate tāpādikāryam; sa tenātmanā
saha sambaddho vā, na vā?
Translation: 890
If you say, the effects such as unhappiness is produced because of the
additional change different from the self, then, the question arises
whether that change is associated with the self or not.
Text: 891
यिद न सम्बद्ः; स तस्याितशयः कथम्?
yadi na sambaddhaḥ; sa tasyātiśayaḥ katham?
Translation: 891
If you say, it is not associated, then, how can that be called
additional change of the self?
Text: 892
अथ सम्बद्ः िकम् - जनकत्वेन, अथ जन्यत्वेन, तत्समवाियत्वेन वा?
atha sambaddhaḥ kim - janakatvena, atha janyatvena, tatsamavā-
yitvena vā?
Translation: 892
If you say that, it is associated, then, also the question arises
whether it is associated as a producer, or, as produced, or, as that
in which the additional change resides by the relation of inherence.
Text: 893
तद्िद जनकत्वेन सम्बद्ः; तदा आत्मा तेनाितशयेन उत्पद्ते इित स्मरणानुपप त्ः।
tadyadi janakatvena sambaddhaḥ; tadā ātmā tenātiśayena utpadyate
iti smaraṇānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 893
If you say that, it is related as the producer, then, it will mean that
the self is produced by that additional factor and in that case, it
will not be possible to explain remembrance.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 297
Text: 894
अथ जन्यत्वेन; सोऽिप तेन कथमुत्पाद्ते? िकम्-अनुपजाताितशयेन, व्यित रक्ोप-
जाताितशयेन वा - इित पर्ाप्ा पर्श्नपरम्परा।
atha janyatvena; so’pi tena kathamutpādyate? kim-anupajātāti-
śayena, vyatiriktopajātātiśayena vā - iti prāptā praśnaparamparā.
Translation: 894
If you say, it is associated as being produced by that self there also
the question arises, how is it produced by the self? Is it as unaffected
change, or, as an additional change distinct from itself and in this
way one can go on asking a series of questions.
Text: 895
अथ तत्समवाियत्वेन; न, तस्य सवर् साधारणत्वात्, तदभावाच्च।
atha tatsamavāyitvena; na, tasya sarvasādhāraṇatvāt, tadabhāvācca.
Translation: 895
If you say, it is associated as inherent cause, it is not correct,
because, it is common to all and also because, it is not there.
Text: 896
अथ एककायर् जनकत्वेन सम्बद्ः; तदेवेदं िचन्तियतुमारब्धम्-िकिमदं जनकत्वं नामेित?
िकञ्, यदेव अनुपजातेऽितशये आत्मनो रूपं तदेव जातेऽिप, तत् कथं कायर् कुयार्त?्
atha ekakāryajanakatvena sambaddhaḥ; tadevedaṁ cintayitumāra-
bdham-kimidaṁ janakatvaṁ nāmeti? kiñca, yadeva anupajāte’tiśaye
ātmano rūpaṁ tadeva jāte’pi, tat kathaṁ kāryaṁ kuryāt?
Translation: 896
If you say that, it associated as a producer of one effect, then, the
same we have started thinking about and the question comes to our
mind is: what is the meaning of producer? Moreover, whatever is
the form of the self at the state of its not being affected by any
change, the same is its character after it is affected by a change.
Therefore, how can it be a producer of an effect?
Text: 897
अथ पूवर्रूपस्यातादवस्थ्यम्; सु स्थतं िनत्यत्वम्! अथ तादवस्थ्यम्; तथािप न करोित
कायर् म्।
298 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 903
If you say that, happiness etc. are many, then, self should also be
many, because, they are not different from them.
Text: 904
अथ सुखािदभेदेऽिप आत्मा नैव िभद्ते; तदा सुखािदतादात्म्यं न लभ्यते। अथ
सुखािदतादात्म्यम्;
atha sukhādibhede’pi ātmā naiva bhidyate; tadā sukhāditādātmyaṁ
na labhyate. atha sukhāditādātmyam;
Translation: 904
If you say that, even if happiness etc. are different, still, the self
remains one and the same. Then, self cannot be considered to be
identical to happiness etc.
Text: 905
तदा एकता नोपपद्ते, सुखािदवत् नानात्मोपपत्ेः।
tadā ekatā nopapadyate, sukhādivat nānātmopapatteḥ.
Translation: 905
If you say that, happiness is identical to self etc. then, you cannot
maintain that, self is one, because, like happiness etc. the self will
become many.
Text: 906
अथ िभन्ािभन्ं सुखािदकायर् तेन नोिदतं दषू णिमित चेत्;
atha bhinnābhinnaṁ sukhādikāryaṁ tena noditaṁ dūṣaṇamiti cet;
Translation: 906
Objection:
Well, the effect viz. happiness etc. is different-cum-identical and
therefore, such a question cannot be raised.
Text: 907
कथम्? िकम् आकारान्यत्वेन, आहो स्वत् कायार्न्यत्वेन, कारणान्यत्वेन वा?
katham? kim ākārānyatvena, āhosvit kāryānyatvena, kāraṇānyatvena
vā?
Translation: 907
Reply:
How? As being of different form? Or, because of different effect or
being different from cause?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 301
Text: 908
तद्द्ाकारान्यत्वेन आत्मनो िभद्ते सुखािदकायर् म्; तदयुक्म्, आकारान्यत्वं िह अन्यो-
न्याकारप रहारेण स्वात्मना व्यव स्थतम्, अभेदपयुर्दासेन िभन्बुिद्िवषयत्वेनाव स्थतेर-
े
कत्वानुपप त्ः। एकत्वं िह एकस्वभावता, एकस्वाभाव्ये िह नानास्वभावता नोपपद्ते,
नानास्वाभाव्ये िह एकस्वभावतो(ता)नोपपद्ते - अन्योन्याकारप रहारेण एतावाकारौ
व्यव स्थतौ।
tadyadyākārānyatvena ātmano bhidyate sukhādikāryam; tadayu-
ktam, ākārānyatvaṁ hi anyonyākāraparihāreṇa svātmanā vyava-
sthitam, abhedaparyudāsena bhinnabuddhiviṣayatvenāvasthitereka-
tvānupapattiḥ. ekatvaṁ hi ekasvabhāvatā, ekasvābhāvye hi nānā-
svabhāvatā nopapadyate, nānāsvābhāvye hi ekasvabhāvato(tā) -
nopapadyate- anyonyākāraparihāreṇa etāvākārau vyavasthitau.
Translation: 908
If you say that, the effect viz. happiness etc. is different from the self,
because, it is of different form, which will not be proper, because,
being different from a form means, being in ones own form, by
giving up mutual form and since, it will be different from identity, it
will become object of different knowledges and as such, one cannot
justify that it is one. Being one means, having one nature and if
something has one nature, there cannot be many natures in it and
if something has many natures, it cannot have one nature and this
is how by giving up mutual form, these two forms will remain as
they are.
Text: 909
अथ कारणान्यत्वेन भेदप रकल्पना;
atha kāraṇānyatvena bhedaparikalpanā;
Translation: 909
Clarification:
Well, we are postulating difference because of its being different
from the cause.
Text: 910
तदयुक्म्, िभन्ादिप कारणादिभन्ं कायर् दृष्म्। मृ त्पण्डदण्डाद्नेकं कारणमख ण्डतं कायर्
जनयित। तथा एकेनािप कारणेनानेकं कायर् जन्यमानं दृष्ं घटािद। तेन न कारणभेदेन
302 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 912
If you say, it is identical by the same form, then, you have accepted
absolute identity with that.
Text: 913
अथ आकारान्तरेण अिभन्म्; आकारान्तरं सुखं न भवित, तदभेदेऽिप सुखस्य भेदात्।
atha ākārāntareṇa abhinnam; ākārāntaraṁ sukhaṁ na bhavati,
tadabhede’pi sukhasya bhedāt.
Translation: 913
If you say, it is identical by another form, then, it means that,
another form is not happiness and even if it is identical, the self will
be different from happiness.
Translation: 917
Clarification:
Well, there will be no absence of ones own self, because it will not
be contradictory to the existence of the self.
Text: 918
परसत्ािवरो धत्वात् परस्याप्यभावो न भवित।
parasattāvirodhitvāt parasyāpyabhāvo na bhavati.
Translation: 918
Reply:
In that case, because of the non-contradiction of existence of
something else, there will be no absence, of that something else.
Text: 919
अथापराकारतया नोपलभ्यते तेन परस्य भावो न भवित;
athāparākāratayā nopalabhyate tena parasya bhāvo na bhavati;
Translation: 919
Clarification:
Since, that is not experienced as having another form, therefore,
there will not be absence of another form.
Text: 920
अभावाकारतया च अनुपलब्धेः परस्याभावोऽिप न भवेत्।
abhāvākāratayā ca anupalabdheḥ parasyābhāvo’pi na bhavet.
Translation: 920
Reply:
Then, since it will not be known as having the form of absence,
there will no absence of other form.
Text: 921
अथ अभावाकारतया उपलभ्यते; तदा भावोऽन्यो ना स्त, अभावाकारान्त रतत्वात्-
अभावस्वभावावगािहनावबोधेन अभाव एव द्ोिततो न भावः। यथा सुखावगाहकेन िवज्ञानेन
सुखमेवाऽवद्ोिततं न दःु खम्।
atha abhāvākāratayā upalabhyate; tadā bhāvo’nyo nāsti, abhāvākā-
rāntaritatvāt abhāvasvabhāvāvagāhināvabodhena abhāva eva dyotito
na bhāvaḥ. yathā sukhāvagāhakena vijñānena sukhamevā’va-
dyotitaṁ na duḥkham.
306 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 921
If you say, it is known as having the form of an absence, then, it
means that, there is no other positive entity. Since, it includes the
form of an absence, the knowledge in which the nature of absence
will appear as its content, will reveal only absence and not any
positive entity as the knowledge of happiness, reveals happiness
and not unhappiness.
Text: 922
अथ सुखज्ञानेन दःु खमिप गृह्ते;
atha sukhajñānena duḥkhamapi gṛhyate;
Translation: 922
Objection:
Well, by knowledge of happiness, unhappiness is also known.
Text: 923
तिददानीं सुखदःु खयोरेकता पर्ाप्नोित। ततश्च पयार्यरूपतया भेदाभ्युपगमो हीयते-
अिभन्ात्मकं जगत् स्यात्। एवञ् स्थते यदक् ु ं - “भागे संहो नरो भागे योऽथोर्
भागद्यात्मकः। तमभागं िवभागेन नर संहं पर्चक्षते॥” इित,
tadidānīṁ sukhaduḥkhayorekatā prāpnoti. tataśca paryāyarūpatayā
bhedābhyupagamo hīyate-abhinnātmakaṁ jagat syāt. evañca sthite
yaduktam- “bhāge siṁho naro bhāge yo’rtho bhāgadvayātmakaḥ,
tamabhāgaṁ vibhāgena narasiṁhaṁ pracakṣate.” iti,
Translation: 923
Reply:
In that case happiness, unhappiness will become one and the same
and as a consequence they will become synonymous and there will
be no knowledge of difference between them and consequently, the
whole world will become one and the same. When such is our
analysis, your statement “a thing having two parts, one part of
which is a lion and the other man, is called nṛsiṁha- man-lion” is
not proper. Because, the whole universe becomes indivisible.
Text: 924
तन् पर्ाप्नोित िवश्वस्याऽखण्डरूपत्वात्। एतदिप न वक्व्यम्- ‘`एको भावः सवर् भावस्वभावः,
सवेर् भावा एकभावस्वभावाः, एको भावस्तत्वतो येन दृष्ः सवेर्भावास्तत्वतस्तेन दृष्ाः॥”
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 307
fact, even secondarily the self cannot be called the enjoyer, because,
enjoyment is not accepted as existing primarily somewhere else i.e.
in the intellect and when the enjoyment is not there, the self need
not worry about salvation or liberation or freedom from bondage.
One who is bound, can be liberated. There is no bondage in the self.
Enjoyment could have been the bondage, but that does not exist in
the self and since that is not there, one cannot explain liberation
also.
Text: 932
तथा, आत्मनोऽ स्तत्वं न सद्ध्यित भोक्ृत्वस्याभावे। भोग्येन भोक्ुरनुमानम्।
tathā, ātmano’stitvaṁ na siddhyati bhoktṛtvasyābhāve. bhogyena
bhokturanumānam.
Translation: 932
Similarly, since there is nothing called enjoyerness, one cannot prove
the existence of the self. One can infer the enjoyer on the basis of
the object of enjoyment.
Text: 933
यथा सूपािदमातर्ं भोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्, तथा पर्धानं सिवकारं भोग्यं तेन भोक्ाऽनुमीयते;
yathā sūpādimātraṁ bhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam, tathā pradhānaṁ
savikāraṁ bhogyaṁ tena bhoktā’numīyate;
Translation: 933
Clarification:
As the things like soup etc. is always seen related with the enjoyer,
in the same way, the object of enjoyment viz. on the basis of the
changing pradhāna the enjoyer can be inferred.
Text: 934
एतच्चायुक्म्; आत्मनो भोक्ृत्वाभावे कथं भोग्येन आत्माऽनुमीयते, आत्मना सह
भोग्यस्य सम्बन्धानवगतेः? तदनवगितश्च आत्मनः पर्त्यक्षािवषयत्वात्। तदिवषयत्वं च
'िवशेषेऽनुगमाभावः' इत्युक्म्।
etaccāyuktam; ātmano bhoktṛtvābhāve kathaṁ bhogyena ātmā’nu-
mīyate, ātmanā saha bhogyasya sambandhānavagateḥ? tadanava-
gatiśca ātmanaḥ pratyakṣāviṣayatvāt. tadaviṣayatvaṁ ca ‘viśeṣe’nu-
gamābhāvaḥ’ ityuktam.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 311
Translation: 934
Reply:
This is not proper, because, when the self cannot be the enjoyer, how
can be the self be inferred on the basis of the object of enjoyment?
We do not know the relationship between the self and the object of
enjoyment. We do not know because the self cannot be the object
of perception. To explain that the self cannot be the object of
perception, it has been said, “There is no consecutive character
to specify it.”
Text: 935
अथ पर्त्यक्षेण आत्मा अवधायर् ते; तदा पर्त्यक्षिवषयत्वेन आत्मनः समानता पर्त्यक्षानु-
मानिवषयत्वेन, ततश्च सद्साध्यता।
atha pratyakṣeṇa ātmā avadhāryate; tadā pratyakṣaviṣayatvena
ātmanaḥ samānatā pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvena, tataśca siddha-
sādhyatā.
Translation: 935
If you say, the self is determined on the basis of perception, then,
the self becomes the object of perception and also object of inference
and thus becomes object of both, perception and inference and this
leads to the fault of knowing something which is already known.
Text: 936
सूपािदभोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्; त त्कम्-देहािदव्यित रक्भोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्, आहो स्वद्
देहमातर्भोक्तर्िवनाभूतं दृष्म्?
sūpādibhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam; tatkim-dehādivyatiriktabhoktravinā-
bhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam, āhosvid dehamātrabhoktravinābhūtaṁ dṛṣṭam?
Translation: 936
You have said that, the object of enjoyment like soup is invariably
related to the enjoyer. There we would like to ask, “Is it seen
invariably related with the enjoyer who is different from body etc?”
Or, is it seen invariably related with the enjoyer who is nothing else
but the body?
Text: 937
तद्िद देहािदव्यित रक्भोक्तर्ािवनाभूतं दृष्म्; तदा दृष्ान्तोऽिप दाष्ार् न्तकपर्िततुल्यः,
आत्मनोऽती न्दर्यत्वेन।
312 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 940
Or, let us accept that, the self has enjoyment, still, this will lead
to the defect of getting the effect of an act, which the self has not
performed and not getting the result of an act, which the self has
performed. The self will get the result of an act, which the self has
not performed, and the intellect will not get the result in spite of the
fact that, the intellect has performed the act and if it is allowed that,
one gets the result of an act which he has not performed, then, even
those selves who have not performed the acts, will get the result,
because, there will be nothing in the self which can control this
situation and as a consequence of this there can never be liberation.
[५. सांख्यसम्मतस्य कैवल्यस्यानुपप त्कत्वोपपादनम्।]
[5. sāṁkhyasammatasya kaivalyasyānupapattikatvopapādanam.]
Text: 941
इतश्च कैवल्यं नोपपद्ते, भोग्यभोजकयोरवस्थानात्। निह भवतां पक्षे सदात्मानं
प रत्यजित भोग्यम्। येनाकारेण आत्मनो भोग्यत्वेनाव स्थतम्, निह तदाकारमितवतर् ते,
आत्मनो भोक्ृत्वाकारस्य अनितवृत्ेः। अितवृत्ौ च आत्मोच्छे दपर्सङ्ः।
itaśca kaivalyaṁ nopapadyate, bhogyabhojakayoravasthānāt. nahi
bhavatāṁ pakṣe sadātmānaṁ parityajati bhogyam. yenākāreṇa
ātmano bhogyatvenāvasthitam, nahi tadākāramativartate, ātmano
bhoktṛtvākārasya anativṛtteḥ. ativṛttau ca ātmocchedaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 941
For the following reason also, no liberation is possible according
to the Sāṁkhya school of thought, because, there is nothing called
object of enjoyment and the enjoyer. According to your doctrine, it
is not the case that, the object of enjoyment leaves the self. The self
does not leave its form by which form it is said to be the enjoyer
of the object of enjoyment, because, the self does not or cannot
over-ride the form of its being the enjoyer and if it over-rides, then,
there will be no self left in this universe.
[६. वेदान्तसम्मतस्यानन्दरूपकैवल्यस्यायुिक्कतापर्दशर् नम्।]
[6. vedāntasammatasyānandarūpakaivalyasyāyuktikatāpradarśanam.]
314 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 942
येऽिप आनन्दरूपमात्मनः कैवल्यमिभदधाित तेऽिप युिक्वािदनो न भव न्त। कथम्?
यद्ात्मनः आनन्दरूपं स्वसंवेद्ं च; तदा संसारावस्थायामिप तत् वेद्ं पर्सक्म्। ततश्च
मोक्षाथर् पर्यासो िनष्फलः।
ye’pi ānandarūpamātmanaḥ kaivalyamabhidadhāti te’pi yuktivādino
na bhavanti. katham? yadyātmanaḥ ānandarūpaṁ svasaṁvedyaṁ
ca; tadā saṁsārāvasthāyāmapi tat vedyaṁ prasaktam. tataśca
mokṣārthaprayāso niṣphalaḥ.
Translation: 942
Even those philosophers (the Advaitins) who talk of liberation of
the form of Bliss, do not seem to be rational. If you ask me how,
we wonder, if the self is of the nature of bliss and at the same
time, self-illuminating, then, at the time of bondage also it should
be self-illuminating and in that case the very effort for liberation is
purposeless.
Text: 943
अथ संसारावस्थायां न वेद्ते अनािदमलावगु ण्ठतमात्मनः स्वरूपम्, यथा पटान्त रते घटे
घटबुिद्नर् भवित, एवं मल लप्े आत्मिन आत्मबुिद्नर् भवित;
atha saṁsārāvasthāyāṁ na vedyate anādimalāvaguṇṭhitamātmanaḥ
svarūpam, yathā paṭāntarite ghaṭe ghaṭabuddhirna bhavati, evaṁ
malalipte ātmani ātmabuddhirna bhavati;
Translation: 943
Clarification:
Well, at the stage of bondage, the nature of the self is not revealed,
because, it is covered with dirt from time without a beginning. As
a pot is not known, if the pot is covered with a cloth, in the same
way, if the self is covered with dirt, the awareness of the self does
not arise.
Text: 944
तदेतदयुक्म्, दृष्ान्तदाष्ार् न्तकयोः वैषम्यात्-पटान्त रते घटे घटबुिद्नर् भवित
पटान्तधार्ने सित इ न्दर्येण साकं सम्बन्धो ना स्त तदभावाद् घटे ने न्दर्यजं िवज्ञानं
सम्पद्ते। इह तु पुनः मलावगुण्ठनेन कस्य व्यवधानं िकर्यते? न वेद्वेदकयोव्यर् वधानं
िकर्यते। वेद्ं वेदकं च आत्मस्वरूपमेव-यथा बौद्ानां स्वसंवेद्ं िवज्ञानम्, तच्च
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 315
Text: 946
तथा मीमांसकमतेनािप आत्मानुमानं न पर्वतर् ते, पर्माणान्तरानवधा रताथर् िवषय-
त्वाभ्युपगमात् पर्माणानाम्। िनयतिवषयािण िह पर्माणािन पर्ितपद्न्ते-पर्त्यक्षावसेये
नानुमानं पर्वतर् ते, अनुमानावसेये च पर्त्यक्षं न पर्वतर् ते। ततश्च इतरेतरव्यावृ त्िवशेष-
िवषयािण। तदयु(तद)ु क्म्- “िवशेषेऽनुगमाभावः” िवशेषो िनयतपर्माणगर्ाह्ोऽथर् ः, तथाभू-
तेऽथेर्ऽङ्ीिकर्यमाणे अनुमानस्याऽनुगमाभावः। अनुगमः सम्बन्धः, तद्गर्हणानुपप त्ः।
tathā mīmāṁsakamatenāpi ātmānumānaṁ na pravartate, pramāṇā-
ntarānavadhāritārthaviṣayatvābhyupagamāt pramāṇānām. niyata-
viṣayāṇi hi pramāṇāni pratipadyante-pratyakṣāvaseye nānumānaṁ
pravartate, anumānāvaseye ca pratyakṣaṁ na pravartate. tataśca
itaretaravyāvṛttiviśeṣaviṣayāṇi. tadayu(tadu)ktam- “viśeṣe’nugamā-
bhāvaḥ” viśeṣo niyatapramāṇagrāhyo’rthaḥ, tathābhūte’rthe’ṅgī-
kriyamāṇe anumānasyā’nugamābhāvaḥ. anugamaḥ sambandhaḥ,
tadgrahaṇānupapattiḥ.
Translation: 946
Similarly, according to the doctrine of Mīmāṁsakas, inference has
no scope to establish self, because, according to them, the processes
of knowing i.e. the pramāṇas are accepted as operative towards such
object which is not known by another process of knowing. They also
accept the processes of knowing having one is to one relationship,
between one kind of process of knowing and its object. If something
is determined by perception, inference has no scope to reveal it
and when something is concluded by the process of inference, the
process of perception has no scope to reveal it. Thus, the objects
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 317
are mutually exclusive and they are the objects of specific process
of knowing as it has been said, “There is absence of consecutive
property with reference to a specific object.” Here, specific means
an object which is known by a specific process of knowing and when
an object is accepted as of that form, an inference is left with no
consecutive scope of operation. The word anugam means, relation
and such a relation cannot be known.
Text: 947
अथेर्(थ) पर्त्यक्षाद्वधा रतेप्यथेर् अनुमानं पर्वतर् ते;
arthe(tha) pratyakṣādyavadhāritepyarthe anumānaṁ pravartate;
Translation: 947
Clarification:
Inference can operate with reference to the object, even if it is
determined by the process of perception.
Text: 948
नन्वेवं पर्त्यक्षानुमानसाधारणोऽथर् ः पर्सक्ः। साधारणता समानता। “सामान्ये सद्-
साध्यता" पर्त्यक्षावगतत्वात् । अन धगताथर् गन्तृिवशेषणं च अपाथर् कम्।
nanvevaṁ pratyakṣānumānasādhāraṇo’rthaḥ prasaktaḥ. sādhāra-
ṇatā samānatā. “sāmānye siddhasādhyatā” pratyakṣāvagatatvāt.
anadhigatārthagantṛviśeṣaṇaṁ ca apārthakam.
Translation: 948
Reply:
If it is so, then, an object becomes that, which is commonly accessed
by perception and inference. Commonality means sameness and
if there is sameness, there is knowledge of that which is already
known, because, it is already known by perception and in that case,
the adjective (in the definition of pramāṇa) “that which causes the
knowledge of a thing which is not already known, becomes empty.”
Text: 949
अथवा, सामान्ये सद्े साधनम् इत्यन्योऽथर् ः। सामान्ययोः गम्यगमकभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते
मीमांसकेन। नच तत् सामान्यं िवद्ते, यथा च न िवद्ते तथा पर्ागेवोिदतम्। ततश्च
सद्स्य साधनम्-िवद्मानस्य साधनम्। नच अिग्त्वम स्त। तदभावे कस्येदं ज्ञापकम्?
318 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 953
तद्िद सामान्ययोः सम्बन्धावधारणं िकर्यते; तदयुक्म्, सामान्यस्याऽसम्भवान् तयोः
सम्बन्धः।
tadyadi sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate; tadayuktam,
sāmānyasyā’sambhavānna tayoḥ sambandhaḥ.
Translation: 953
If you say, the knowledge of relationship between two universals is
determined, that will not be proper, because, since the universal is
impossible, the question of their relationship does not arise.
Text: 954
नािप सामान्यस्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणं िकर्यते, सामान्यस्याऽसत्वात्।
nāpi sāmānyasvalakṣaṇayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate, sāmā-
nyasyā’satvāt.
Translation: 954
Nor, it is the case that, the knowledge between a universal and a
particular is decided, because, the universal itself is non-existent.
Text: 955
अथ स्वलक्षणयोः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; ततर्ािप िकम् अथर् योः, ज्ञानयोः, ज्ञानाथर् योवार्?
atha svalakṣaṇayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; tatrāpi kim arthayoḥ,
jñānayoḥ, jñānārthayorvā?
Translation: 955
If you say, the knowledge of concomitance between two individuals
is ascertained, there also the question arises, whether such relation
is ascertained between two objects or between two knowledges or
between knowledge and object.
Text: 956
तद्िद अथर् योः सम्बन्धावधारणम्; तद्हनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावज्ञानं िकं सत्ामातर्ेण,
आहो स्वत् तदाकारयोिगत्वेन, तज्जन्यत्वेन वा, सामस्त्येन वा?
tadyadi arthayoḥ sambandhāvadhāraṇam; taddahanadhūmayorhetu-
phalabhāvajñānaṁ kiṁ sattāmātreṇa, āhosvit tadākārayogitvena,
tajjanyatvena vā, sāmastyena vā?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 321
Translation: 956
If you say, such relationship is known between two objects, there
also the question arises, is it the case that the knowledge of ground
viz. the smoke, and the knowledge of result viz. the fire, arises by
their mere existence, or, because of association of their forms, or,
as been produced by that or collectively?
Text: 957
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण दहनधूमसंवेदनमपिदश्यते; न केवलं तद्हनस्य तत् संवेदनम्,
तर्ैलोक्यस्य तत्संवेदनं पर्सक्म्, उपकारिविनमुर्क्स्य सत्ाऽिवशेषात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa dahanadhūmasaṁvedanamapadiśyate; na
kevalaṁ taddahanasya tat saṁvedanam, trailokyasya tatsaṁve-
danaṁ prasaktam, upakāravinirmuktasya sattā’viśeṣāt.
Translation: 957
If you say, by mere existence, the knowledge of fire and smoke is
referred to, then, that knowledge cannot said to be that fire rather
it will become the knowledge of all the three worlds, because, the
existence devoid of any change or effect is common to all of them.
[१. पर्सङ्ात् ज्ञानस्य िवषयाकारत्वं िवचायर् तत्खण्डनम्।]
[1. prasaṅgāt jñānasya viṣayākāratvaṁ vicārya tatkhaṇḍanam.]
Text: 958
अथ तद्हनाकारयोिगत्वेन तस्य संवेदनमिभधीयते; यथा दहनेन स्विनभार्समुत्पािदतम्।
तथा गन्धाकारोपरक्गन्धािदज्ञानेनािप स्विनभार्समुत्पािदतम्। ततश्च ज्ञानाकारं तदत्ु पद्ते
इित युक्ं भवित गन्धाद्ाकारम्, ततश्च अनेकाकारयोिगत्वे सित पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्था न
लभ्यते।
atha taddahanākārayogitvena tasya saṁvedanamabhidhīyate; yathā
dahanena svanirbhāsamutpāditam. tathā gandhākāroparaktagandhā-
dijñānenāpi svanirbhāsamutpāditam. tataśca jñānākāraṁ tadutpa-
dyate iti yuktaṁ bhavati gandhādyākāram, tataśca anekākārayogitve
sati pratikarmavyavasthā na labhyate.
Translation: 958
If you say that, ts knowledge is referred to as being associated
with the form of that fire, then, as by the fire, its own cognition
is generated, in the same way, by the knowledge of smell etc.
322 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
object. Not only that, then, one may say, let the knowledge of fire
also be treated as knowledge without a form.
Text: 961
िकंच, दहनाकारयोिगत्वेन यिद दहनसंवेदनम्; तदा पूवर्िवज्ञानाकारयोिगत्वेन पूवर्िवज्ञान-
स्यािप तद्ेदनं पर्ाप्म्, तदाकारयोिगत्वात् तदत्ु पाद्त्वाच्च।
kiṁca, dahanākārayogitvena yadi dahanasaṁvedanam; tadā pūrva-
vijñānākārayogitvena pūrvavijñānasyāpi tadvedanaṁ prāptam,
tadākārayogitvāt tadutpādyatvācca.
Translation: 961
Moreover, if you think that, knowledge of fire is associated with the
form of fire, then, since it is associated with the form of the previous
knowledge, the earlier knowledge should also be knowledge of the
fire, because, that is associated with that form and also because, it
is produced by that earlier knowledge.
Text: 962
अथ तथा(दा)कारयोिगत्वे तदत्ु पाद्त्वे च तस्य तद्ेदनं न भवित;
atha tathā(dā)kārayogitve tadutpādyatve ca tasya tadvedanaṁ na
bhavati;
Translation: 962
Clarification:
If, simply because, it is associated with that form and it is produced
by that pervious knowledge, the previous knowledge cannot be said
to be the knowledge of fire.
Text: 963
िवषयस्यािप तिहर् तद्ेदनं िकम्, इह द्यस्य िवसंवादात्?
viṣayasyāpi tarhi tadvedanaṁ kim, iha dvayasya visaṁvādāt?
Translation: 963
Reply:
In that case, what will be the knowledge of that object, because,
here both become contradictory.
Text: 964
अथ तिद्ज्ञानं िविदतम् इित कृत्वा न वेद्ते ज्ञानान्तरेण;
atha tadvijñānaṁ viditam iti kṛtvā na vedyate jñānāntareṇa;
324 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 964
Clarification:
Well, since there is awareness of that knowledge, it cannot be known
by another knowledge.
Text: 965
एवं िवषयस्यािप तद्ेदनं न पर्ाप्नोित पुरुषान्तरावधायर् माणस्य।
evaṁ viṣayasyāpi tadvedanaṁ na prāpnoti puruṣāntarāvadhā-
ryamāṇasya.
Translation: 965
Reply:
In that case, it cannot be said to be the knowledge of that object,
if it is being known by another knower.
Text: 966
अिप च, यिद दहनाकारयोिगत्वेन दहनस्य तद्ेदनम्; वस्तुत्वाकारयोिगत्वेन नयनादेरिप
तत्संवेदनं पर्सक्म्।
api ca, yadi dahanākārayogitvena dahanasya tadvedanam; vastu-
tvākārayogitvena nayanāderapi tatsaṁvedanaṁ prasaktam.
Translation: 966
Moreover, if you say that, since there is association of the form of
fire, therefore, this knowledge is the knowledge of fire, on the same
analogy, since eyes etc. are associated with the property of being
an entity, let that knowledge also be called knowledge of eyes etc.
Text: 967
अथ नयनादेरसाधारणाकारापर् कत्वं न िवद्ते; तेन तेषां तत्संवेदनं न भवित,
नीलस्य स्वभवनदेशकालस्वभावानपर् कत्वात् स्वकारणकलापोत्पाद्स्वभावानपर् कत्वाच्च।
तदपर् कत्वे च नीलाकारयोिगता स्यात् तत्कारणजन्यत्वञ्। एककालीनत्वे एककारणजन्यत्वे
च हेतुफलभावानुपप त्ः सहोत्पन्योगोर्िवषाणयो रव।
atha nayanāderasādhāraṇākārārpakatvaṁ na vidyate; tena teṣāṁ
tatsaṁvedanaṁ na bhavati, nīlasya svabhavanadeśakālasvabhāvā-
narpakatvāt svakāraṇakalāpotpādyasvabhāvānarpakatvācca. tadar-
pakatve ca nīlākārayogitā syāt tatkāraṇajanyatvañca. ekakālīnatve
ekakāraṇajanyatve ca hetuphalabhāvānupapattiḥ sahotpannayorgovi-
ṣāṇayoriva.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 325
Translation: 967
Well, it is not the case that, eyes etc. offer uncommon form,
therefore, it cannot be said that, it is the knowledge of the eyes,
because, a blue object does not offer the nature of its born at
a particular space and at a particular time and also because, it
does not offer the nature of being produced by its own collection
of factors and if it is accepted that, it offers, then, it should have
association with the blue form and also the state of being produced
by its cause and if it becomes contemporary and being produced by
the same collection of factors, then, it is difficult to explain cause
and effect relationship, like two horns of a cow which have grown
simultaneously.
Text: 968
अथ असाधारणाकारतया नोपजायते अिप तु नीलमातर् पर्ितच्छायतयैव उपजायते; यद्ेवं
नयनािदस्वलक्षणाकारतया उपजायमानं नयनादेः तद्गर्हणं भवेत्।
atha asādhāraṇākāratayā nopajāyate api tu nīlamātra praticchā-
yatayaiva upajāyate; yadyevaṁ nayanādisvalakṣaṇākāratayā upajā-
yamānaṁ nayanādeḥ tadgrahaṇaṁ bhavet.
Translation: 968
If you say that, it is not produced as uncommon cause, but it is
produced merely as a copy of the blue object, then, that should be
called the knowledge of the eyes etc. because it is produced in the
form of the particular viz. eyes etc.
Text: 969
अिप च, दहनाकारता दहनिवज्ञानात् िकं िभन्ा, अिभन्ा वा?
api ca, dahanākāratā dahanavijñānāt kiṁ bhinnā, abhinnā vā?
Translation: 969
Moreover, is the form of fire different from knowledge of fire or
identical?
Text: 970
यिद िभन्ा; सा िकं ता त्वक , आहो स्वदता त्वक ?
yadi bhinnā; sā kiṁ tāttvikī, āhosvidatāttvikī?
326 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 970
If you say, it is different, then, also the question arises, whether it
is real or unreal?
Text: 971
तद्िद ता त्वक ; तद्गितः कथम्? न स्वसंवेद्त्वेन नािप जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन।
स्वसंवेद्ा न भवित िवज्ञानकायर् (काय)व्यितरेकात्। नािप जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन गृह्ते।
अथोर् िह आकारमपर् यित न िवषयाकारता। तदाकारापर् कत्वे वा पर्ाप्ा आकारपरम्परा।
tadyadi tāttvikī; tadgatiḥ katham? na svasaṁvedyatvena nāpi
janakatvā”kārārpakatvena. svasaṁvedyā na bhavati vijñānakārya-
(kāya)vyatirekāt. nāpi janakatvā”kārārpakatvena gṛhyate. artho hi
ākāramarpayati na viṣayākāratā. tadākārārpakatve vā prāptā ākāra-
paramparā.
Translation: 971
If you say, it is real, then, how can it be known? It cannot be known
by the process of self-illumination, nor, in the form of offering the
form of a producer i.e. a cause. It cannot be said to be known by
itself, because it is different from knowledge. Nor can it be said to
be known as offering the form of its cause because an object offering
its own form and not the form of its being object of knowledge and
if you accept that, it offers the form of its being object of knowledge,
then, you will have to postulate an infinite chain of forms.
Text: 972
अथ अता त्वक िवषयाकारता; सा अता त्वकत्वेन असंिविदतदेहा कथं पर्ितकमर् िनयािमका
भवित?
atha atāttvikī viṣayākāratā; sā atāttvikatvena asaṁviditadehā
kathaṁ pratikarmaniyāmikā bhavati?
Translation: 972
If you say that, the form of being the object of knowledge is unreal,
then, being unknown, because of its being unreal, how can it account
for one is to one relation between knowledge and its object.
Text: 973
अथ अव्यित रक्ाः; सा िकं ता त्वक , आहो स्वद् अता त्वक ?
atha avyatiriktāḥ; sā kiṁ tāttvikī, āhosvid atātvikī?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 327
Translation: 973
If you say, it is identical, there also the question arises, whether it
is real or unreal?
Text: 974
यिद ता त्वक ; सा िकं जडा त्मका; आहो स्वत् िचत्स्वभावा?
yadi tāttvikī; sā kiṁ jaḍātmikā; āhosvit citsvabhāvā?
Translation: 974
If you say, it is real, then, the question arises, whether it is animate
or inanimate?
Text: 975
तद्िद जडा त्मका; तदा ज्ञानाऽव्यितरेिकत्वं न सम्भवित िचदिचदोरेकत्वायोगा-
दन्योन्यप रहार स्थितधमर् त्वेन।
tadyadi jaḍātmikā; tadā jñānā’vyatirekitvaṁ na sambhavati cidaci-
dorekatvāyogādanyonyaparihārasthitidharmatvena.
Translation: 975
If you say, it is inanimate, then, it cannot be said to be not
different from knowledge, because, animate and inanimate cannot
be identical, since they are found possessing mutually exclusive
properties.
Text: 976
अथ िचदा त्मका; तदा प रभाषामातर्ं िभद्ते-ज्ञानं िवषयाकार इित।
atha cidātmikā; tadā paribhāṣāmātraṁ bhidyate-jñānaṁ viṣayākāra iti.
Translation: 976
If you say, it is animate, then, it differs only in nomenclature i.e.
knowledge which has the form of its knowledge.
Text: 977
अथ अता त्वक ; तदा ज्ञानस्याप्यता त्वकत्वम्। न च ज्ञानव्यित रक्ा िवषयाकारता
ना स्त, अिप तु ज्ञानस्वरूपमेव िवषयाकारतात्मकमपिदश्यते। तच्च नयनाथार्लोकसाधारण
उत्पाद्त्वेन समं संवेदनं पर्सक्ं सवर् कारकाणाम्।
atha atāttvikī; tadā jñānasyāpyatāttvikatvam. na ca jñānavyati-
riktā viṣayākāratā nāsti, api tu jñānasvarūpameva viṣayākāra-
tātmakamapadiśyate. tacca nayanārthālokasādhāraṇa utpādyatvena
samaṁ saṁvedanaṁ prasaktaṁ sarvakārakāṇām.
328 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 977
If you hold that, it is unreal, then, knowledge also becomes unreal.
It is not the case that, the form of being an object of knowledge is
different from knowledge; rather, it is referred as identical with the
form of being the object of knowledge, which is nothing but nature
of knowledge, which amounts to knowledge of all causal factors,
because of its being produced, which is common to eyes, object and
light.
[२. दृष्ान्तीभूतस्यादशर् स्य मुखरूपतास्वीकाराथर् स्य िवकल्प्य िनरसनम्।]
[2. dṛṣṭāntībhūtasyādarśasya mukharūpatāsvīkārārthasya vikalpya
nirasanam.]
Text: 978
यदप्युक्ं केनािप-“आदशर् मण्डलं मुखरूपतां स्वीकरोित नच आदशर् रूपतां प रत्यजित तथा
ज्ञानमिप िवषयरूपतां स्वीकुवर् न् िवज्ञानरूपतां त्यजित” तदप्ययुक्म्, आदशर् मण्डलस्य
मुखरूपतास्वीकरणाथोर् वक्व्यः-िकं मुखतादात्म्यम्, आहो स्वद् अिवरलदेशोत्पादः?
yadapyuktaṁ kenāpi-“ādarśamaṇḍalaṁ mukharūpatāṁ svīkaroti
naca ādarśarūpatāṁ parityajati tathā jñānamapi viṣayarūpatāṁ
svīkurvanna vijñānarūpatāṁ tyajati” tadapyayuktam, ādarśa-
maṇḍalasya mukharūpatāsvīkaraṇārtho vaktavyaḥ-kiṁ mukhatādā-
tmyam, āhosvid aviraladeśotpādaḥ?
Translation: 978
You have made the following statement: “the circular mirror reflects
the form of the face, but does not give up its being the form of the
mirror. In the same way, knowledge, reflects the form of being its
content, but does not give up its own form of being knowledge.”
This statement is also not proper. You should explain what is the
meaning of saying that, the circular mirror receives the form of the
face. Does it mean identity with the face or does it mean producing
a close place?
Text: 979
तद्िद तादात्म्यम्; कथं नादशर् रूपतां जहाित? एकं हीदं वस्तु-तत्ादात्म्ये मुखमादशोर् वा।
tadyadi tādātmyam; kathaṁ na ādarśarūpatāṁ jahāti? ekaṁ hīdaṁ
vastu-tattādātmye mukhamādarśo vā.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 329
Translation: 979
If you say, it is identity, then, how is it that, it does not give up
the form of a mirror? The entity called face is a single thing, if it is
identical with the face, then, either it is face or mirror.
Text: 980
अथ अिवरलदेशोत्पादो मुखस्य स्वीकरणम्; तदानीम् आकारस्यािप स्वीकरणम्
अिवरलदेशोत्पाद एव पर्ाप्ः, ततश्च नाकारेण पर्ितकमर् व्यवस्था िकर्यते। अनवगतरूपेणव
ै
च स्थतेः। दहनज्ञानं यिद साकारं तथािप दहनगर्हणं न भवित।
atha aviraladeśotpādo mukhasya svīkaraṇam; tadānīm ākārasyāpi
svīkaraṇam aviraladeśotpāda eva prāptaḥ, tataśca nākāreṇa
pratikarmavyavasthā kriyate. anavagatarūpeṇaiva ca sthiteḥ.
dahanajñānaṁ yadi sākāraṁ tathāpi dahanagrahaṇaṁ na bhavati.
Translation: 980
If you say, it means producing a close place of the face, then, you
should accept the production of a close place of the form and in
that case again it cannot explain one is to one relationship between
knowledge and its object, because it will remain without being
known. Even if you accept the knowledge of fire, as having the
form, still, you cannot say that, it is the knowledge of fire.
Text: 981
इतोऽिप दहनगर्हणं न भवित। िकं तदवगतमनवगतम्, त त्कं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ं, स्वसंिविदतं
वा?
ito’pi dahanagrahaṇaṁ na bhavati. kiṁ tadavagatamanavagatam,
tatkiṁ jñānāntaravedyam, svasaṁviditaṁ vā?
Translation: 981
For the following reason also, there cannot be knowledge of fire,
because, the following questions arise: Is the knowledge of fire known
or unknown or it can be known by knowledge or it can be known
by itself?
Text: 982
यिद ज्ञानान्तरवेद्म्; तदयुक्म्, न ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्ं भवत्पक्षे।
yadi jñānāntaravedyam; tadayuktam, na jñānaṁ jñānāntaravedyaṁ
bhavatpakṣe.
330 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 982
If you say, it can be known by another knowledge, it is not proper,
because, according to your view, a knowledge cannot be known by
another knowledge.
Text: 983
अथ स्वसंवेद्म्; तदयुक्म्, िवषयदृष्ान्तबलेन िनराकृतं नैयाियकैः।
atha svasaṁvedyam; tadayuktam, viṣayadṛṣṭāntabalena nirākṛtaṁ
naiyāyikaiḥ.
Translation: 983
If you say, it is self-illuminating, that also is not proper, because
the logicians have already refuted it on the strength of example of
content.
Text: 984
अथ अनवगतम्, न तिहर् तद् दहनस्य गर्हणम्। “अपर्त्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नाथर् दृिष्ः
पर् सद्ध्यित” इित न्यायात्।
atha anavagatam, na tarhi tad dahanasya grahaṇam. “apratyakṣopa-
lambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati” iti nyāyāt.
Translation: 984
If you say, it is unknown, then, it cannot be said to be knowledge
of fire on the basis of the maxim “if knowledge is not known, then,
its content is also not known.”
Text: 985
अिप च, यत् तत् दहनगर्हणम्-ततर् िकमवभाित-िकम् अथर् ः, ज्ञानम्, उभयं वा?
api ca, yat tat dahanagrahaṇam-tatra kimavabhāti-kim arthaḥ,
jñānam, ubhayaṁ vā?
Translation: 985
Moreover, whatever you consider to be the knowledge of fire, we
would like to ask, what does appear there? Is it the object or the
knowledge or both?
Text: 986
यिद अथर् ः पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्, असंिविदतायां संिवत्ो तत्संिवत्ययोगात्।
yadi arthaḥ pratibhāti; tadayuktam, asaṁviditāyāṁ saṁvitto
tatsaṁvityayogāt.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 331
Translation: 986
If you say that, it is the object that appears, that is not proper,
because, if the knowledge is not known, its object cannot be known.
Text: 987
अथ ज्ञानम्; [न] तिहर् दहनधूमयोः सम्बन्धोऽवगतः तत्संिव त्पूवर्कत्वात् सम्बन्धबुद्ेः।
atha jñānam; [na] tarhi dahanadhūmayoḥ sambandho’vagataḥ
tatsaṁvittipūrvakatvāt sambandhabuddheḥ.
Translation: 987
If you say that, it is the knowledge that is known, then, it amounts
to saying that, the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke
is not known, because, knowledge of that relation has to be preceded
by knowledge of the relata.
Text: 988
अथ उभयं पर्ितभाित; तदयुक्म्, एकोपलम्भस्या(स्य) िद्तीयाकारप रहार स्थित-
धमर् त्वात्। न च दहनज्ञाने ज्ञानाथर् कारौ पर्तीयेते अिप तु दहनस्यैव पर्ितभासनात्।
atha ubhayaṁ pratibhāti; tadayuktam, ekopalambhasyā(sya)
dvitīyākāraparihārasthitidharmatvāt. na ca dahanajñāne jñānār-
thakārau pratīyete api tu dahanasyaiva pratibhāsanāt.
Translation: 988
If you say that, both appear there, it is improper, because, once
one is known, it will lose the property of being present in the other
form. It is not the case that, in the knowledge of fire, two forms viz.
the form of knowledge and the knowledge of object appear. But,
what appears is only fire.
Text: 989
अथ दहनोत्पाद्त्वेन तद्हनस्य संवेदनम्; कथं तद्हनेनोत्पाद्ते? िकम्
अतज्जननस्वभावेन तज्जननस्वभावेन वा?
atha dahanotpādyatvena taddahanasya saṁvedanam; kathaṁ
taddahanenotpādyate? kim atajjananasvabhāvena tajjananasvabhā-
vena vā?
Translation: 989
If you say that, it is the knowledge of fire, because it is produced by
fire, then, we would like to know, how it is produced by fire? Is it
332 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 995
For the following reason also one cannot explain the cause and
effect relationship between fire and smoke. As you do not accept
manifestation of many earlier and later effects of fire possessing
invariable nature, in the same way, you should not accept a
thing which does not undergo any change having the property of
manifesting many simultaneous effects.
Text: 996
अथ अभ्युपगम्यते युगपदनेककायोर्त्पादकत्वं युगपदनेककायोर्त्पादनशिक्युक्स्योत्पत्ेः;
atha abhyupagamyate yugapadanekakāryotpādakatvaṁ yugapada-
nekakāryotpādanaśaktiyuktasyotpatteḥ;
Translation: 996
Clarification:
Well, we accept simultaneous production of many effects, because, it
possesses power or capacity to produce many effects simultaneously.
Text: 997
यद्ेवं - कर्मभाव्यनेककायार्िवभार्वकत्वस्योत्पत्ेः अयुगपदेकं कायर् िवदध्यात्।
yadyevaṁ - kramabhāvyanekakāryāvirbhāvakatvasyotpatteḥ ayuga-
padekaṁ kāryaṁ vidadhyāt.
Translation: 997
Reply:
If it is so, then, since it is accepted as having the capacity to manifest
many effects in a sequence, then, at a time it will produce only one
effect.
Text: 998
िवदधात्येव इित चेत्;
vidadhātyeva iti cet;
Translation: 998
Clarification:
If we say, it does produce, then?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 335
Text: 999
इदमापेिक्षकत्वं यत्कर्मभाव्यनेककायर् जनकात्मकं स्वरूपम्। एतदभ्युपगमेऽभ्युपेतहान-
मापद्ते।
idamāpekṣikatvaṁ yatkramabhāvyanekakāryajanakātmakaṁ svarū-
pam. etadabhyupagame’bhyupetahānamāpadyate.
Translation: 999
Reply:
It is a relative phenomenon that, it has the nature of producing
many effects in a sequence and if you accept this, it will lead to the
fault of giving up a position which was earlier taken.
Text: 1000
अथ अिवच लतरूपेण पूवार्परकायर् न जन्यते; तदा युगपदिप न कुयार्त् अनायत्िवकारः।
ततश्च न दहनाद् धूमस्योत्प त्ः।
atha avicalitarūpeṇa pūrvāparakāryaṁ na janyate; tadā yugapadapi
na kuryāt anāyattavikāraḥ. tataśca na dahanād dhūmasyotpattiḥ.
Translation: 1000
If you say that, it does not produce earlier and later effects,
without getting affected by any variation, then, simultaneously also
it cannot produce, because, it is not affected by any variation and
as a consequence, there will be no smoke from fire.
Text: 1001
अथ एकमेव तेन ज्वलनेन जन्यते;
atha ekameva tena jvalanena janyate;
Translation: 1001
Clarification:
Well, only one effect is generated by fire.
Text: 1002
िकं तदेकम्-िवज्ञानम्, धूमो वा?
kiṁ tadekam-vijñānam, dhūmo vā?
Translation: 1002
Reply:
What is that one effect? Is it knowledge or smoke?
336 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1003
तद्िद िवज्ञानमेव जन्यते; न तिहर् धूमं दृष्ट्ा अिग्ं(िग्ः) पर्तीय[तेऽ]तद्व्यापारलब्ध-
जन्मवत्वात्।
tadyadi vijñānameva janyate; na tarhi dhūmaṁ dṛṣṭvā agniṁ(gniḥ)
pratīya[te’]tadvyāpāralabdhajanmavatvāt.
Translation: 1003
If you say that, knowledge alone is produced, then, after seeing
the smoke, one will not come to know fire, because it will not be
produced by its function.
Text: 1004
अथ धूम एव उत्पाद्ते; तदा तिद्ज्ञानं िवना केन हेतुफलभावोऽवगम्यते?
atha dhūma eva utpādyate; tadā tadvijñānaṁ vinā kena hetupha-
labhāvo’vagamyate?
Translation: 1004
If you say that, only smoke is produced by fire, then, without its
knowledge, who will come to know the cause and effect relationship
between them?
Text: 1005
इतोऽिप दहनस्य धूमािवभार्वकत्वं न जाघटीित - िकं िनिमत्भूतेन धूमोत्पादनं िकर्यते,
िकं वा उपादानभूतेन?
ito’pi dahanasya dhūmāvirbhāvakatvaṁ na jāghaṭīti - kiṁ nimitta-
bhūtena dhūmotpādanaṁ kriyate, kiṁ vā upādānabhūtena?
Translation: 1005
For the following reason also, fire cannot be said to be the producer
of smoke. Is it the case that fire produces smoke as its auxiliary
cause, or, it produces smoke as its material cause?
Text: 1006
तद्िद िनिमत्भूतेनोत्पाद्ते; तदा धूमरूपता न पर्ाप्नोित उपादानं िवना।
tadyadi nimittabhūtenotpādyate; tadā dhūmarūpatā na prāpnoti
upādānaṁ vinā.
Translation: 1006
If you say, as an auxiliary cause it produces smoke, then, the effect
called smoke, because, it has come into being without its material
cause.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 337
Text: 1007
अथ उपादानभूतेनोत्पादनं िकर्यते; ननु असमानजातीयं कथमुपादानकारणं भवेत्?
अभ्युपगमे वा देहे न्दर्यसङ्ातादेव गभार्दौ िवज्ञानं भिवष्यित अलं परलोकिवज्ञानकल्पनया।
atha upādānabhūtenotpādanaṁ kriyate; nanu asamānajātīyaṁ
kathamupādānakāraṇaṁ bhavet? abhyupagame vā dehendriya-
saṅghātādeva garbhādau vijñānaṁ bhaviṣyati alaṁ paralokavijñā-
nakalpanayā.
Translation: 1007
Again if you say that, it produces smoke as its material cause, then,
the question arises, how can an entity belonging to a different class
be the material cause of an entity belonging to a different class? If
in spite of that you accept it, then, there will be knowledge in the
womb of mother from the collection of factors such as body, sense
organ etc.etc. and in that case, what is the need of postulating
knowledge of world hereafter?
Text: 1008
अथ समानजातीयेन िवज्ञानेन िवना न िवज्ञानस्य उद्गितः इित चेत्;
atha samānajātīyena vijñānena vinā na vijñānasya udgatiḥ iti cet;
Translation: 1008
Clarification:
Well, knowledge cannot arise without the knowledge belonging to
the same class.
Text: 1009
एवं तिहर् धूमस्यािप असमानजातीयात् दहनात् कथमुत्प त्?
evaṁ tarhi dhūmasyāpi asamānajātīyāt dahanāt kathamutpatti?
Translation: 1009
Reply:
In that case, how can smoke be produced from fire, which does not
belong to the class of smoke?
Text: 1010
अथ रूपरूपतया वह्े ः समानजातीयत्वम्;
atha rūparūpatayā vahneḥ samānajātīyatvam;
338 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1010
Clarification:
Well, fire can be treated as belonging to the same class i.e. of the
class of smoke as possessing a form.
Text: 1011
एवं देहादेरिप समानजातीयत्वं स्वलक्षणरूपतया। इदमेव चेत स समारोप्य
उक्म्-“शरीरादेव इित बृहस्पितः।”
evaṁ dehāderapi samānajātīyatvaṁ svalakṣaṇarūpatayā. idameva
cetasi samāropya uktam-“śarīrādeva iti bṛhaspatiḥ.”
Translation: 1011
Reply:
Then, factors like body etc. can also be treated as belonging to
the same class i.e. the class of knowledge as having the form of a
particular. Having kept this very idea in mind, it has been said,
“From the body alone (knowledge arises), says Bṛhaspati”.
Text: 1012
अथ ज्ञानरूपतया न समानजातीयत्वं देहस्य; दहनस्यािप धूमरूपतयाऽसमानजातीयत्वम्।
िनयतकारणजन्याकारतया िनयतदेशकालस्वभावतया च सवेर् भावाः अन्योन्यव्या-
वृत्तनवः। न च तेषाम् अन्योन्याकारानुगमोऽ स्त, नाप्येकजात्यनुगमः। तदक्
ु म्-
सवेर् भावाः स्वभावेन स्वस्वभावव्यव स्थतेः।
स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां यस्माद् व्यावृ त्भािगनः॥
atha jñānarūpatayā na samānajātīyatvaṁ dehasya; dahanasyāpi
dhūmarūpatayā’samānajātīyatvam. niyatakāraṇajanyākāratayā
niyatadeśakālasvabhāvatayā ca sarve bhāvāḥ anyonyavyāvṛttatana-
vaḥ. na ca teṣām anyonyākārānugamo’sti, nāpyekajātyanugamaḥ.
taduktam-
sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ,
svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṁ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginaḥ.
Translation: 1012
If you say that, body cannot be treated as belonging to the same
class as knowledge, then, fire also cannot be treated as belonging
to the same class as smoke. All positive entities are distinct from
one another, as possessing the form produced by specific cause and
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 339
Translation: 1015
Reply:
In that case, nothing can be produced, because, there is no cause
which belongs to the same class. This leads to the conclusion that,
there cannot be inference of any effect (on the basis of the cause).
Text: 1016
इतोऽिप दहनधूमयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणं कतुर् नैव शक्यते-िकम् एकेन ज्ञानेन
दहनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावावधारणं िकर्यते, आहो स्वद् पर्ितिनयतेन ज्ञानेन?
ito’pi dahanadhūmayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇaṁ kartuṁ naiva
śakyate-kim ekena jñānena dahanadhūmayorhetuphalabhāvāva-
dhāraṇaṁ kriyate, āhosvid pratiniyatena jñānena?
Translation: 1016
For the following reason also, it is not at all possible to decide
the cause and effect relationship between fire and smoke, because,
here the question arises, is it the fact that the cause and effect
relationship is decided between fire and smoke on the basis of one
knowledge, or, on the basis of each knowledge i.e. knowledge of
smoke and knowledge of fire?
Text: 1017
तद्िद एकं ज्ञानम् उभयावगाहकं गीयते; तदा ज्ञानस्य अक्षिणकत्वमापद्ते धमर् हेतोवार्।
tadyadi ekaṁ jñānam ubhayāvagāhakaṁ gīyate; tadā jñānasya
akṣaṇikatvamāpadyate dharmahetorvā.
Translation: 1017
If you say, by one knowledge which is the knowledge of both fire
and smoke, then, the knowledge cannot be said to be momentary
or the cause of the smoke cannot be said to be momentary.
Text: 1018
अथ पर्ितिनयतेन ज्ञानेन पूवार्परावधारणं िकर्यते; तदयुक्म्, धूमावगाहकेन िवज्ञानेन
तत्सत्ामातर्ं पर्द्ोत्यते। तत्स्वरूपमातर्पयर् वसाियना तत्स्वरूपा स्तत्वं िवधीयते तदक्
ु म्-
“सामान्ये सद्साध्यता” सामान्ये धूमा स्तत्वमातर्े धूमज्ञानस्य पर्ामाण्यम स्त।
atha pratiniyatena jñānena pūrvāparāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate; tadayu-
ktam, dhūmāvagāhakena vijñānena tatsattāmātraṁ pradyotyate.
tatsvarūpamātraparyavasāyinā tatsvarūpāstitvaṁ vidhīyate tadu-
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 341
Translation: 1021
Reply:
This is not proper. By the knowledge of fire also mere existence
of fire is known and not its sequence with the smoke. If there is
existence (of fire) the knowledge of fire simply reveals it. Whether,
that existence of fire is before smoke or after smoke or produced
at a later time, or produced by knowledge, or not produced at all,
is not the subject matter of the function of knowledge of fire. The
knowledge of fire simply enjoins the existence, which is invariably
related to the mere existence of fire. Even the ghost is understood
from the knowledge of ghost.
Text: 1022
कथं?
kathaṁ?
Translation: 1022
Objection:
How do you say so?
Text: 1023
ज्ञायते, सोऽिप स्वज्ञानावगािहतदेहोऽस्तु - यिद नाम तेन सह धूमज्ञानं पूवार्परसहभावं न
शक्नोित पर्काशियतुं धूमस्य।
jñāyate, so’pi svajñānāvagāhitadeho’stu - yadi nāma tena saha
dhūmajñānaṁ pūrvāparasahabhāvaṁ na śaknoti prakāśayituṁ
dhūmasya.
Translation: 1023
Reply:
Because, it is known and so let that ghost also exist, whose existence
depends upon its knowledge itself, even if, it is not capable of
revealing the sequential existence of smoke.
Text: 1024
इतोऽिप दहनधूमयोहेर्तुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कतुर्म्। धूमज्ञानसत्ाकाले धूमसत्ा न
िवद्ते ज्वलनज्ञानसत्ाकाले ज्वलनसत्ा न िवद्ते। न(ना)िवद्मानस्या(स्य) गर्हणं नाम,
अन्यथागर्ािह(थाऽगर्ाह्)केशोण्डु कस्यािप गर्हणं स्यात्।
344 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
धारियतुम्। नाप्यथर् स्य अथर् जन्यत्वम्। एवं हेतुफलभावानवधारणात् कथं धूमं दृष्ट्ा
अनुिमनोित अिग्म्।
tadayuktam, ākāro hi prāgevāpoditaḥ, na ca ākārārthayoḥ
pratibandho’vadhāritaḥ, tadanavadhāraṇe katham ākāro’rthaṁ
gamayati? evaṁ tāvadarthajanyatvaṁ na śakyate jñānasyāva-
dhārayitum. nāpyarthasya arthajanyatvam. evaṁ hetuphalabhāvā-
navadhāraṇāt kathaṁ dhūmaṁ dṛṣṭvā anuminoti agnim.
Translation: 1030
Reply:
This is not proper. We have already rejected before “form”. It has
not been decided, the invariable relationship between the form and
the thing of which this is the form, and if it is not decided, then, how
can a form cause the knowledge of a thing? Thus, it is not possible
to decide whether knowledge is produced by a thing, neither is it
decided whether a thing is produced by another thing? Therefore,
since there is no knowledge of cause and effect relationship, how
can one infer fire by seeing smoke?
Text: 1032
तद्िद स्वलक्षणिवषयम्; तदा पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दो न पर्ाप्नोित, स्वलक्षणिवषयत्वेन
स्पष्ाकारतानुमानज्ञानस्यािप पर्सज्यते, 'अस्पष्ाभम्' च भविद्ः पर्ितपद्ते न त्वन्यैः।
tadyadi svalakṣaṇaviṣayam; tadā pratyakṣānumānayorbhedo na
prāpnoti, svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvena spaṣṭākāratānumānajñānasyāpi
prasajyate, ‘aspaṣṭābham’ ca bhavadbhiḥ pratipadyate na tvanyaiḥ.
Translation: 1032
If you say that, content is a particular, then, there is no difference
between perception and inference. Since, particular will be the
object of an inferential knowledge, an inferential knowledge will
also be called knowledge in which the form of its content is very
clear. If you say, such a clarity is an appearance, then, such a view
is held only by you.
Text: 1033
अन्ये तु वद न्त - “स्वलक्षणमेव स्पष्ाकारम्।” यिद नाम पर्त्यक्षगर्ाह्ं स्वलक्षणं िवस्पष्-
मनुमानगर्ाह्म् अिवस्पष्म्, स्वलक्षणस्यैवायं भेदः। एकोऽिग्ः पर्त्यक्षजननयोग्यः अन्योऽिग्ः
अनुमानजननयोग्यः। पर्त्यक्षजननयोग्येऽग्ौ आनुमािनकं ज्ञानं यिद भवित - भवित पर्त्य-
क्षानुमानयोभेर्दः कदािचत्, यावता आनुमािनकज्ञानजननयोग्योऽिग्ः अन्य एव।
anye tu vadanti - “svalakṣaṇameva spaṣṭākāram”. yadi nāma pratya-
kṣagrāhyaṁ svalakṣaṇaṁ vispaṣṭam anumānagrāhyam avispaṣṭam,
svalakṣaṇasyaivāyaṁ bhedaḥ. eko’gniḥ pratyakṣajananayogyaḥ
anyo’gniḥ anumānajananayogyaḥ. pratyakṣajananayogye’gnau ānu-
mānikaṁ jñānaṁ yadi bhavati - bhavati pratyakṣānumānayorbhedaḥ
kadācit, yāvatā ānumānikajñānajananayogyo’gniḥ anya eva.
Translation: 1033
Others (Buddhists) however hold the view that, a particular alone
has a clear form. If the particular which is fit to be known by
perception, has clear form and the particular which is fit to be
known by inference has unclear form, then, this difference is of
particular only. One fire is fit to generate the perceptual knowledge
and another fire is fit to generate the inferential knowledge. If
we accept that, with reference to the fire which is fit to generate
perceptual knowledge, there arises the inferential knowledge, then,
348 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1037
यद्ेवम् - सत्यिप अिग्िवषयत्वे पर्त्यक्षानुमानज्ञानयोः अवान्तरभेदिववक्षया पर्त्यक्षा-
नुमानज्ञानव्यपदेशः।
yadyevam - satyapi agniviṣayatve pratyakṣānumānajñānayoḥ avā-
ntarabhedavivakṣayā pratyakṣānumānajñānavyapadeśaḥ.
Translation: 1037
Reply:
If you say so, then, in spite of fire being the content of perceptual
and inferential knowledges, keeping in view other differences, they
are said to be perceptual and inferential knowledges.
Text: 1038
अथ करणभेदेन गन्धािदज्ञानािन िभद्न्ते;
atha karaṇabhedena gandhādijñānāni bhidyante;
Translation: 1038
Clarification:
Well, the knowledges of smell etc. are distinguished on the basis of
the difference of the processes through which the knowledges are
produced.
Text: 1039
तदा पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोः करणभेदोपपत्ेः भेदोऽस्तु। एवं च यदक्
ु म्-“स्वलक्षणिवषयानुमानं
भवित” तन्मूढोक्म्, अिग्पर्पञ्स्य पर्ितभासनात्।
tadā pratyakṣānumānayoḥ karaṇabhedopapatteḥ bhedo’stu. evaṁ
ca yaduktam-“svalakṣaṇaviṣayānumānaṁ bhavati” tanmūḍhoktam,
agniprapañcasya pratibhāsanāt.
Translation: 1039
Reply:
In that case, since the difference in processes of perceptual
knowledges and inferential knowledges is justified, let there be
difference between the two. Thus, your statement “inference
operates with reference to the object viz. particular” is a foolish
statement, because in that knowledge only, a series of fire
particulars appears.
350 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1040
अथ वस्तुभूतसामान्यिवषयम्; न, तदभावाद् िवज्ञानजनकत्वासम्भवाच्च। न च
जनकत्वमन्तरेण िवषयाथर् उपलभ्यते।
atha vastubhūtasāmānyaviṣayam; na, tadabhāvād vijñānajanaka-
tvāsambhavācca. na ca janakatvamantareṇa viṣayārtha upalabhyate.
Translation: 1040
If you say that, the object of inferential knowledge is a real universal,
it will not be correct, because, there is nothing called universal
and therefore it cannot generate any knowledge. Unless, an entity
generates knowledge it cannot be said to be object of this knowledge.
Text: 1041
अथ अवस्तुभूतसामान्यिवषयम्। तदक् ु म् - “वैक ल्पकं सामान्यं बुद्ध्युपदिशर् तरूपम्”;
एतदिप न युक्म्, अिवद्मानं सामान्यं कथं बुद्ेिवर् षयभावं पर्ितपद्ते? िकम् - सत्ामातर्ेण,
सहोत्पादेन वा, जनकत्वाऽऽकारापर् कत्वेन वा? सवर् स्यासम्भवे िवषयाथोर् भणनीयः। यिद
च जनकत्वाद्भावेऽिप बुद्ौ पर्ितभाित सामान्यम्; तदा रूपादेरिप जनकत्वं न कल्पनीयम्
- रूपं िवज्ञानमकुवर् त् पर्त्यक्षं स्यात्। यदिप “दृश्यिवकल्प्यावथार्वेक कृत्य तदध्यवसायेन
पर्वतर् ते” इत्युक्म्। दृश्यं बाह्ं रूपािदस्वलक्षणम्, िवकल्पः(प्यः) बुिद्समारोिपताकारः।
िकं पुनरनयोः एक करणम्? िकम्-अभेदेन उत्पादनम्, िकं वा अभेदेन अवधारणम् ,
आहो स्वत् सङ्टना िकर्यते?
atha avastubhūtasāmānyaviṣayam. taduktam - “vaikalpikaṁ sāmā-
nyaṁ buddhyupadarśitarūpam”; etadapi na yuktam, avidyamānaṁ
sāmānyaṁ kathaṁ buddherviṣayabhāvaṁ pratipadyate? kim -
sattāmātreṇa, sahotpādena vā, janakatvā”kārārpakatvena vā? sarva-
syāsambhave viṣayārtho bhaṇanīyaḥ. yadi ca janakatvādyabhāve’pi
buddhau pratibhāti sāmānyam; tadā rūpāderapi janakatvaṁ na
kalpanīyam - rūpaṁ vijñānamakurvat pratyakṣaṁ syāt. yadapi
“dṛśyavikalpyāvarthāvekīkṛtya tadadhyavasāyena pravartate”
ityuktam. dṛśyaṁ bāhyaṁ rūpādisvalakṣaṇam, vikalpaḥ(pyaḥ)
buddhisamāropitākāraḥ. kiṁ punaranayoḥ ekīkaraṇam? kim-abhe-
dena utpādanam, kiṁ vā abhedena avadhāraṇam, āhosvit saṅgha-
ṭanā kriyate?
Translation: 1041
If you say, the unreal universal is the content of the inferential
cognition, as expressed in your statement, “the imagined universal
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 351
Text: 1043
अथ एक करणम् - एकत्वेन पर्तीयमानत्वं दृश्यिवकल्प्ययोः; तदक्
ु ं (तदयुक्म्), िकम् एक
एव आकारः पर्ितभाित, आहो स्वद् आकारद्यम्?
atha ekīkaraṇam - ekatvena pratīyamānatvaṁ dṛśyavikalpyayoḥ;
taduktaṁ(tadayuktam), kim eka eva ākāraḥ pratibhāti, āhosvid
ākāradvayam?
Translation: 1043
If you say, unification means knowing visible and imagined as one
that will be improper. In that case, does it mean only one form
appears in the knowledge or two forms?
Text: 1044
तद्िद एक एव आकारः पर्ितभाित; त त्कं दृश्याकारः, आहो स्वद् िवकल्पाकारः?
tadyadi eka eva ākāraḥ pratibhāti; tatkiṁ dṛśyākāraḥ, āhosvid
vikalpākāraḥ?
Translation: 1044
If you say, only one form appears in the knowledge, is that the
visible form or the imagined form?
Text: 1045
तद्िद दृश्याकारः पर्ितभाित; तदा स्वलक्षणिवषयमेव अनुमानं पर्सज्यते।
tadyadi dṛśyākāraḥ pratibhāti; tadā svalakṣaṇaviṣayameva anu-
mānaṁ prasajyate.
Translation: 1045
If it is the visible form, that appears in the knowledge, then, the
content of inferential knowledge becomes nothing but a particular.
Text: 1046
अथ िवकल्पाकारः पर्ितभाित; तस्य सवोर्पाख्यारिहतत्वेन पर्ितभासािवषयत्वाद्ाप्येतद्
वक्व्यम्- स्वलक्षणमेष ...............काराव्यित रक्ाव्यित रक्ो वा?
atha vikalpākāraḥ pratibhāti; tasya sarvopākhyārahitatvena prati-
bhāsāviṣayatvādvāpyetad vaktavyam- svalakṣaṇameṣa ..................
kārāvyatiriktāvyatirikto vā?
Translation: 1046
If you say, imagined form appears in knowledge, then, since it is
not possible for the object to appear in the inferential knowledge
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 353
devoid of all attributes, you should say this particular (..the text is
broken) whether different from the form or identical with the form?
Text: 1047
यद्व्यित रक्ः; तदा स्वलक्षणिवषयमनुमानं पर्ाप्म्। समारोिपतं च सामान्यं पर्तीयते इित
न वक्व्यम्। ता त्वकं च सामान्यं पर्सज्यते। .........[दृश्या]ता त्वकत्वपर्सङ्ो वा।
yadyavyatiriktaḥ; tadā svalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṁ prāptam.
samāropitaṁ ca sāmānyaṁ pratīyate iti na vaktavyam. tāttvikaṁ
ca sāmānyaṁ prasajyate. .........[dṛśyā]tāttvikatvaprasaṅgo vā.
Translation: 1047
If it is identical, then, the object of an inferential knowledge becomes
the particular and then, you should not say that in that knowledge,
a super-imposed universal appears. In that case the universal will
become real….. (the text is broken or there will be contingency of
its becoming visible)
Text: 1048
अथ व्यित रक्ो िवकल्पाकारः; तिहर् न वक्व्यम् - तदारोपद्ारेण पर्तीयते स्वलक्षण-
िवकल्पाकारान्त रतत्वात्।
atha vyatirikto vikalpākāraḥ; tarhi na vaktavyam - tadāropadvāreṇa
pratīyate svalakṣaṇavikalpākārāntaritatvāt.
Translation: 1048
If you say that, the form of imagined content is different, then, you
should not say that, it appears in the knowledge as super-imposed,
because, it will be either of the form of particular, or, of the form
of imagined content.
Text: 1049
अथ घटना िकर्यते स्वलक्षणेन सामान्यस्य; तदसत्, सदसतोघर् टनाऽयोगात्। सतोघर् टना
दृष्ा यथा चक्षुघर्टयोः।
atha ghaṭanā kriyate svalakṣaṇena sāmānyasya; tadasat, sadasator-
ghaṭanā’yogāt. satorghaṭanā dṛṣṭā yathā cakṣurghaṭayoḥ.
Translation: 1049
If you say that, universal is constructed by the particular, that is not
true. No construction is possible with real and unreal. A structure
of two reals is seen as in the case of eyes and pot.
354 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1050
अथ सामान्यस्वलक्षणाकारद्यं पर्तीयते; एवं तिहर् अन्योन्यिवलक्षणौ सामान्य-
स्वलक्षणाकारौ पर्तीयेते। ततश्च न वक्व्यम् - “दृश्यिवकल्पा(ल्प्या)वथार्वेक - कृत्य
तदध्यवसायेन पर्वतर् ते” इित। यिद च िविवक्माकारद्यं पर्ितभाित; तदा स्वलक्षण-
िवषयमनुमानं पर्सक्म्। तिद्षयत्वे मानयोभेर्दकारणं वक्व्यम्। सवोर्पाख्यािविनमुर्क्स्य च
सामान्यस्य पर्तीयमानत्वं नोपपद्ते।
atha sāmānyasvalakṣaṇākāradvayaṁ pratīyate; evaṁ tarhi anyo-
nyavilakṣaṇau sāmānyasvalakṣaṇākārau pratīyete. tataśca na
vaktavyam -“dṛśyavikalpā(lpyā)varthāvekīkṛtya tadadhyavasāyena
pravartate” iti. yadi ca viviktamākāradvayaṁ pratibhāti; tadā
svalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṁ prasaktam. tadviṣayatve mānayor-
bhedakāraṇaṁ vaktavyam. sarvopākhyāvinirmuktasya ca sāmānya-
sya pratīyamānatvaṁ nopapadyate.
Translation: 1050
If you say, two forms viz. the form of universal and form of particular
appear in knowledge, then, the two forms of universal and particular
will appear as mutually distinct and then, you should not say
“it operates by uniting visible and imagined entities through a
definite knowledge.” If two forms appear in the knowledge distinctly,
then again, there arises the contingency of accepting inferential
knowledge as having particular as its content and if that becomes
the content, you should state the reason to distinguish perception
from inference. It is impossible to explain that universal which is
devoid of all attributes appears in the knowledge.
Text: 1051
अन्यच्च, धूमोत्पािदते अिग्िवज्ञाने अनिग्व्यवच्छे दरूपं सामान्यं पर्ितभातीित व्यपिदश्यते,
अजलव्यवच्छे देन पर्ितभातीित िकं नाभ्युपगम्यते? नाऽजलव्यवच्छे देन जन्यते, नािप
अनिग्व्यवच्छे देन, तदनुत्पत्ौ पर्ितकमर् िनयमानुपप त्ः।
anyacca, dhūmotpādite agnivijñāne anagnivyavacchedarūpaṁ
sāmānyaṁ pratibhātīti vyapadiśyate, ajalavyavacchedena prati-
bhātīti kiṁ nābhyupagamyate? nā’jalavyavacchedena janyate,
nāpi anagnivyavacchedena, tadanutpattau pratikarmaniyamānupa-
pattiḥ.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 355
Translation: 1051
Moreover, in the knowledge of fire, produced by the smoke, it is said
that, universal in the form of difference from that which is not fire
appears. If you accept this, why don’t you accept that the universal
appears in the form of being different from that which is not water?
So, you will have to accept that, such knowledge is not produced
either in the form of being different from non-water, nor in the form
of being different from non-fire and when such knowledge cannot
be recognized, it is difficult to explain to one is to one relationship
between knowledge and its content.
Text: 1052
अथ िनिवर् षयम् आनुमािनकं ज्ञानम्; तदयुक्म्, स्वांशिवषयत्वात्। निह भवतां पक्षे
िनरालम्बनं िकिञ्द् िवज्ञानम स्त, आत्मावगाहकत्वेनोत्पत्ेः। यिद च िनरालम्बनं ज्ञानम्;
क्व पर्वतेर्त िनवतेर्त वा पुरुषः? अगितः स्यात्।
atha nirviṣayam ānumānikaṁ jñānam; tadayuktam, svāṁśa-
viṣayatvāt. nahi bhavatāṁ pakṣe nirālambanaṁ kiñcid vijñāna-
masti, ātmāvagāhakatvenotpatteḥ. yadi ca nirālambanaṁ jñānam;
kva pravarteta nivarteta vā puruṣaḥ? agatiḥ syāt.
Translation: 1052
If you say that, inferential knowledge is without content, it is not
proper, because, it accepts its own form as its content. According
to your doctrine, there is no knowledge which is without a content,
because contentfulness of the knowledge can be explained by
accepting the knowledge itself as its content and if you accept
knowledge without a content, then, where will the person who has
such knowledge will be induced and from where will he withdraw?
The person will become motionless.
Text: 1053
अथ दहनेन तदत्ु पािदतम् इित कृत्वा दहना न्तकमुपसपर् ित; एवं धूमज्ञानोत्पादेऽिप यायात्।
atha dahanena tadutpāditam iti kṛtvā dahanāntikamupasarpati;
evaṁ dhūmajñānotpāde’pi yāyāt.
356 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1053
If you say, since the knowledge is produced by fire, the person will
go to collect fire, then, the person should also go to collect smoke,
because smoke has also produced the knowledge of fire.
Text: 1054
अथ स्वांशिवषयमनुमानम्; तदा पर्त्यक्षानुमानयोभेर्दानुपप त्ः, पर्तीयमानज्ञानस्य
स्वलक्षणात्मकत्वात्।
atha svāṁśaviṣayamanumānam; tadā pratyakṣānumānayorbhe-
dānupapattiḥ, pratīyamānajñānasya svalakṣaṇātmakatvāt.
Translation: 1054
If you say, its own part can be the content of inferential
knowledge, then, one cannot explain difference between perception
and inference, because, the knowledge is the content, is nothing
more than a particular.
[५. ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणस्याशक्यत्वपर्ितपादनम्।]
[5. jñānayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇasyāśakyatvapratipādanam.]
Text: 1055
अथ ज्ञानयोः हेतुफलभावावधारणं िकर्यते;
atha jñānayoḥ hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇaṁ kriyate;
Translation: 1055
Clarification:
Well, we come to know the cause and effect relationship between
two knowledges.
Text: 1056
तदप्ययुक्म्, ज्ञानयोरिप हेतुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कतुर्म् - कायर् ज्ञानं िह स्वसंिव-
त्पयर् व सतं न ज्ञानान्तरमात्मसात्करोित। तदकरणे 'केन िनव(वर् )ितर् तं मम स्वरूपम्'
इत्येतत् कथं वे त्, तिद्न्ज्ञानस्य िपशाचतुल्यत्वात्? ततर्(न्) ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तराद् िभद्ते।
तदभेदे कथं हेतुफलभावः, स्वात्मिन िकर्यािवरोधात्?
tadapyayuktam, jñānayorapi hetuphalabhāvāvadhāraṇaṁ na śakyate
kartum - kāryajñānaṁ hi svasaṁvitparyavasitaṁ na jñānāntara-
mātmasātkaroti. tadakaraṇe ’kena niva(rva)rtitaṁ mama svarūpam’
ityetat kathaṁ vetti, tadbhinnajñānasya piśācatulyatvāt? tatra(nna)
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 357
Translation: 1065
Reply:
Then, the pot (in the absence of pot) also should be known.
Text: 1066
अथ भूतलज्ञाने घटस्वरूपं नावभाित, तेन तस्यानुपलम्भः, घटाभावव्यवहारः िकर्यते;
तदयुक्म्; घटावष्ब्धेऽिप भूतले भूतलज्ञाने घटो नावभाित, ततर्ािप घटाभाव-
व्यवहारपर्सिक्ः। तथा ज्ञानस्यािप उपल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्स्य संवेदनं न भवेत्। ततश्च
सवर् स्यासंवेदने नानुपल ब्धः, उपलब्घेरव
े यतोऽनुपल ब्धः।
atha bhūtalajñāne ghaṭasvarūpaṁ nāvabhāti, tena tasyānupa-
lambhaḥ, ghaṭābhāvavyavahāraḥ kriyate; tadayuktam; ghaṭāvaṣṭa-
bdhe’pi bhūtale bhūtalajñāne ghaṭo nāvabhāti, tatrāpi ghaṭābhā-
vavyavahāraprasaktiḥ. tathā jñānasyāpi upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya
saṁvedanaṁ na bhavet. tataśca sarvasyāsaṁvedane nānupa-
labdhiḥ, upalabdhereva yato’nupalabdhiḥ.
Translation: 1066
If you say, in the knowledge of ground the nature of pot does not
appear, therefore, that is not known, but only reference to pot is
made. Even then, it will not be proper, because, even when the pot
is associated with the ground, in the knowledge of ground, the pot
does not appear. But there also, there will arise the contingency of
referring to absence of pot. Similarly, there will be no awareness of
knowledge which satisfies the character of something in the presence
of which it is fit to be known. Thereby, since everything will
become unknown there will be only absence of knowledge, because,
knowledge itself will become non-knowledge.
Text: 1067
यिद च भूतलाद्ुपल ब्धरेव घटानुपल ब्धः; िपशाचादेरिप सैवाऽनुपल ब्धरस्तु।
yadi ca bhūtalādyupalabdhireva ghaṭānupalabdhiḥ; piśācāderapi sai-
vā’nupalabdhirastu.
Translation: 1067
If you say, the knowledge of ground itself is the absence of knowledge
of pot, then, let the same absence of knowledge of pot be of the ghost
also.
362 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1068
भवतु, को दोषः?
bhavatu, ko doṣaḥ?
Translation: 1068
Clarification:
Let it be so, what is the harm?
Text: 1069
िपशाचाभाविविनश्चयः स्यात्।
piśācābhāvaviniścayaḥ syāt.
Translation: 1069
Reply:
In that case, there will be definite knowledge of absence of ghost
(which is not desirable, since there is nothing called ghost.)
Text: 1070
अथ न भवित िपशाचाभाविविनश्चयः; कुम्भाभाविविनश्चयाभावपर्सङ्ः स्यात्।
atha na bhavati piśācābhāvaviniścayaḥ; kumbhābhāvaviniścayābhā-
vaprasaṅgaḥ syāt.
Translation: 1070
If you say, there will be no definite knowledge called absence of
ghost, then, there will be absence of definite knowledge of absence
of pot.
Text: 1071
अथ िनरालम्बनज्ञानं दृश्यस्याऽनुपल ब्धः; निह भवतां पक्षे िनरालम्बनज्ञानम स्त
स्वांशपयर् व सतत्वात्।
atha nirālambanajñānaṁ dṛśyasyā’nupalabdhiḥ; nahi bhavatāṁ
pakṣe nirālambanajñānamasti svāṁśaparyavasitatvāt.
Translation: 1071
If you say, knowledge without content, is the absence of knowledge
of something which is visible, it cannot be so because according to
your doctrine, there is no knowledge without a content, since, every
knowledge accepts its own part as its content.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 363
Text: 1072
अथ अदृश्यानुपलम्भः अवयव्यनुपलम्भः; सोऽिप तत्सत्ां न व्यावत्र्यित, यथा
उपलभ्यमानत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपम्, तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमिप वस्तुस्वरूपमेव। यथा कायर् स्य
स्वकारणाजनकत्वं वस्तुस्वरूपं तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वमिप वस्तुस्वरूपमेव। निह
स्वकारणाजनकत्वे वस्तुस्वरूपमितवत्र्ते। तथा अवयव्यिप कायार्जनकत्वेऽिप न स्वरूपं
हास्यित, स्वहेतोरेव कायार्जनकात्मकस्योत्पत्ेः।
atha adṛśyānupalambhaḥ avayavyanupalambhaḥ; so’pi tatsattāṁ
na vyāvarttayati, yathā upalabhyamānatvaṁ vastusvarūpam, tathā
anupalabhyamānatvamapi vastusvarūpameva. yathā kāryasya sva-
kāraṇājanakatvaṁ vastusvarūpaṁ tathā anupalabhyamānatvamapi
vastusvarūpameva. nahi svakāraṇājanakatve vastusvarūpamati-
varttate. tathā avayavyapi kāryājanakatve’pi na svarūpaṁ hāsyati,
svahetoreva kāryājanakātmakasyotpatteḥ.
Translation: 1072
If you say, non-knowledge of something which is invisible means,
absence of knowledge of the whole that too does not exclude its
existence, as the state of being known, is the nature of the thing,
similarly, the state of not being known, is also the nature of the
thing. As the state of not being the producer of its own cause, is the
nature of an effect, in the same way, the state of not being known,
also is the nature of a thing. It is not the case that, if something
is not the producer of its own cause, it loses its being nature of
a thing. In the same way, even if the whole does not produce the
effect, it does not lose its form, because, it comes into being from
its own cause which is of the nature of producing the effect.
[८. अवयिविनराकरणे पर्युक्स्य रक्ारक्त्वपर्सञ्नरूपस्य साधनस्य िनरासः।]
[8. avayavinirākaraṇe prayuktasya raktāraktatvaprasañjanarūpasya
sādhanasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1073
यदिप साधनमन्यदपु िदष्म् - रक्ारक्पर्सङ्रूपम्; तदप्यसत्, रक्ता नाम का
अवयिवनः? िकं नीलगुणात्मकत्वम्, आहो स्वत् नीलगुणा धकरणत्वम्, नीलगुणा ध-
करणदर्व्यसंयोिगत्वं वा, तदिवरलदेशोत्पादो वा?
yadapi sādhanamanyadupadiṣṭam - raktāraktaprasaṅgarūpam; tada-
pyasat, raktatā nāma kā avayavinaḥ? kiṁ nīlaguṇātmakatvam,
364 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
when you yourself have not accepted it, how will exclude the
whole?
Text: 1077
अथ परेण इष्ा;
atha pareṇa iṣṭā;
Translation: 1077
Clarification:
Well, it is desired by others.
Text: 1078
यथेष्ा तथाऽिवरो धत्वेनाऽभ्युपगता, निह संयोगावयिवनोिवर् रोधोऽभ्युपगम्यते परेण
यथाकृतकत्वाऽिनत्यत्वयोः, साऽिवरुद्ा कथमवयिवनं िवपयार्सयित? 'रक्ता ध-
करणश्च, ना स्त च' इत्यसङ्तम्। यथा-ना स्त शब्दः कृतकत्वात्-तादृगेतत्।
yatheṣṭā tathā’virodhitvenā’bhyupagatā, nahi saṁyogāvayavinorvi-
rodho’bhyupagamyate pareṇa yathākṛtakatvā’nityatvayoḥ, sā’viru-
ddhā kathamavayavinaṁ viparyāsayati? ‘raktatādhikaraṇaśca, nāsti
ca’ ityasaṅgatam. yathā-nāsti śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt-tādṛgetat.
Translation: 1078
Reply:
Yes, it is desired by others, but it is accepted as not being
contradicted. It is not the case that, others accept contradiction,
between contact and the whole, as between the state of not being
produced and the state of not being eternal. And thus, without
being contradicted how can it exclude the whole? To say that,
something is locus of red color, and at the same time saying that it
does not exist, are not compatible. Like the statement “there is no
sound, because it is produced.”
Text: 1079
अथ रक्ता ना स्त घटस्य; तथािप असत्वं न सद्ध्यित। रक्ताभावे तु अभावः कथं
भवेत्? तदभावे िवज्ञानाभावपर्सङ्ः।
atha raktatā nāsti ghaṭasya; tathāpi asatvaṁ na siddhyati. rakta-
tābhāve tu abhāvaḥ kathaṁ bhavet? tadabhāve vijñānābhāvapra-
saṅgaḥ.
366 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1079
If you say that, there is no red color in the pot, still, it does not
prove that, the pot does not exist. If there is red color, how can
there be absence of pot? And in spite of that, if you say there is
absence, it will lead to the contingency of absence of knowledge.
Text: 1080
अथ एकस्य िवरुद्ावेतौ रक्ताऽरक्ताकारौ;
atha ekasya viruddhāvetau raktatā’raktatākārau;
Translation: 1080
Clarification:
Well, it is contradictory to say that, one thing is red and at the
same time not red.
Text: 1081
केनेष्ौ िवरुद्तया? नीलदर्व्यसंयोगो िह रक्ता, तदभावोऽरक्ता, तौ च अथार्न्तरभूतौ। न
च तयोभेर्दे अवयिवनो भेद उपपद्ते, ताभ्यां तस्य िभन्त्वात्। न च अन्यस्य भेदे अन्यस्य
भेद उपपद्ते, िवज्ञानभेदपर्सङ्ात्।
keneṣṭau viruddhatayā? nīladravyasaṁyogo hi raktatā, tadabhā-
vo’raktatā, tau ca arthāntarabhūtau. na ca tayorbhede avayavino
bheda upapadyate, tābhyāṁ tasya bhinnatvāt. na ca anyasya bhede
anyasya bheda upapadyate, vijñānabhedaprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 1081
Reply:
Who wants them to be contradictory? Being red means contact with
the blue substance and absence of that is not being red. These two
are two different things. Simply because these two are different, you
cannot say that the whole is different, because the whole is different
from both. It is not true that, if X is different from Y, X is different
from Z. If it is accepted, then, there will be difference in knowledge.
Text: 1082
यिद च रक्ारक्भेदेन अवयवी िभद्ते तदा अवयिवद्यं स्यात्, नाऽसत्वम्, िवज्ञानाऽव्य-
ितरेिकत्वं वा।
yadi ca raktāraktabhedena avayavī bhidyate tadā avayavidvayaṁ
syāt, nā’satvam, vijñānā’vyatirekitvaṁ vā.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 367
Translation: 1082
If you say that, a whole is differentiated on the basis of its being
red and non-red, then, you should accept there are two wholes, you
should not say there is no whole or it is not different from knowledge
itself.
Text: 1083
अथ अिवरलदेशोत्पादो रक्ता नीलदर्व्यपटयोः; तथािप असत्वं न सद्ध्यित, संस्कृतानां
सत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
atha aviraladeśotpādo raktatā nīladravyapaṭayoḥ; tathāpi asatvaṁ
na siddhyati, saṁskṛtānāṁ sattvābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 1083
If you say, the redness of a blue substance and a cloth means
production in a place without any gap, even then, it does not prove
that it does not exist, because you accept existence of things which
undergo some change.
[९. अवयिविनराकरणे पर्युक्स्यावृतानावृतत्वपर्सङ्स्य खण्डनम्।]
[9. avayavinirākaraṇe prayuktasyāvṛtānāvṛtatvaprasaṅgasya kha-
ṇḍanam.]
Text: 1084
यच्चान्यत् साधनमुक्म् - आवृताऽनावृतपर्सङ्रूपम् - “एक स्मन्वयवे आवृते आवृतः,
अनावृते अनावृतः”; तदेतदयुक्म्। तद्िद अवयवावरणे अवयवी आवृतोऽनावृतो
वाऽभ्युपगम्यते परैः, तदवयवानामती न्दर्यत्वेऽिप िह उपलम्भाभ्युपगमात्। न च अवय-
वानामावृतत्वेऽनावृतत्वे वा अवयव्यावृतोऽनावृतो वा। अिप तु यदा वस्ाद्ावरणेन
देवदत्े न्दर्यघटसम्बन्धिवघातः िकर्यते तदा 'आवृतः' इत्यपिदश्यते। यस्य तु वस्ािद-
नाऽऽवरणेन देवदत्े न्दर्य-घटसम्बन्धिवघातो न िकर्यते, तदपेक्षया अनावृतव्यपदेशः। यथा
भवत्पक्षे स्वकारणानुत्पादकत्वेन अजनकत्वमिभधीयते, न च स्वरूपभेदमासादयित।
yaccānyat sādhanamuktam - āvṛtā’nāvṛtaprasaṅgarūpam - “ekasmi-
nnavayave āvṛte āvṛtaḥ, anāvṛte anāvṛtaḥ”; tadetadayuktam.
tadyadi avayavāvaraṇe avayavī āvṛto’nāvṛto vā’bhyupagamyate
paraiḥ, tadavayavānāmatīndriyatve’pi hi upalambhābhyupagamāt.
na ca avayavānāmāvṛtatve’nāvṛtatve vā avayavyāvṛto’nāvṛto
vā. api tu yadā vastrādyāvaraṇena devadattendriyaghaṭasamba-
ndhavighātaḥ kriyate tadā ‘āvṛtaḥ’ ityapadiśyate. yasya tu vastrā-
368 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1085
You had also made a reference to another factor viz. moving and
non-moving. You had said, “When the parts move, the whole moves
and if another part does not move, the whole does not move. And
therefore, if a whole is accepted as non-moving, then, there will
be difference in the whole.” This is also not proper, because, you
yourself have not accepted movement. And in the absence of the
movement, how can the whole be different?
Text: 1086
अथ चलनं िवद्ते; तिहर् इदं वक्व्यम्-स्विवषयलक्षणम्, चलनरूपाथर् स्य उत्पत्ेः।
atha calanaṁ vidyate; tarhi idaṁ vaktavyam-svaviṣayalakṣaṇam,
calanarūpārthasya utpatteḥ.
Translation: 1086
If you say, the movement is there, then, you should be able to define
the object of that movement, because the entity viz. the movement
is produced.
Text: 1087
अथ परेणेष्ं चलनम् इित कृत्वा व्यपिदश्यते;
atha pareṇeṣṭaṁ calanam iti kṛtvā vyapadiśyate;
Translation: 1087
Clarification:
Well, in whatever movement is desired by the opponent, you may
call the same as movement.
Text: 1088
सत्यम्, इष्ं परेण। न तु अवयवे चलित अवयिवनश्चलनिमष्म्, ततो िभन्त्वात्।
नाप्यवयवान्तरस्याचलने अवयिवनोऽचनलिमष्यते, तस्यान्यत्वात्। अिप तु चलनयुक्ः
चलतीित व्यपिदश्यते। चलनिवकलो िनष्कम्प इत्यिभधीयते।
satyam, iṣṭaṁ pareṇa. na tu avayave calati avayavinaścalanami-
ṣṭam, tato bhinnatvāt. nāpyavayavāntarasyācalane avayavino’ca-
nalamiṣyate, tasyānyatvāt. api tu calanayuktaḥ calatīti vyapadi-
śyate. calanavikalo niṣkampa ityabhidhīyate.
Translation: 1088
Reply:
It is true, it is desirable to the opponent. But, it is not desirable to
370 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
them that, if you say part moves, the whole will move. Therefore, it
is different from that. It is also not the case that, if the another part
does not move, the whole does not move, because, that is different.
Rather, that is said to move which is associated with the movement.
And that which is devoid of movement is called motionless.
Text: 1089
अथ तदेव दर्व्यमुपजातिकर्यं चलित अनुपजातिकर्यं च न चलित;
atha tadeva dravyamupajātakriyaṁ calati anupajātakriyaṁ ca na
calati;
Translation: 1089
Clarification:
Well, the same substance, when activity is produced in it, moves
and when activity is not produced in it, it does not move.
Text: 1090
सत्यम्, तदेव चलित, तदेव न चलित।
satyam, tadeva calati, tadeva na calati.
Translation: 1090
Reply:
What you say is true. It is the same whole, that moves, and the
same whole that does not move.
Text: 1091
नत्व(न्व)वयिवनो भेदः पर्सज्यते;
natva(nva)vayavino bhedaḥ prasajyate;
Translation: 1091
Objection:
Well, then, in that there will difference in the whole.
Text: 1092
न पर्सङ्ः, चलनस्य ततोऽन्यथा (न्यत्वात्)। चलाचलव्यपदेशश्च अन्योपा धकृतः। यथा
भवत्पक्षे ज्ञानं कायर् कारणं च व्यपिदश्यते - स्वकायार्पेक्षया कारणम्, स्वकारणापेक्षया
कायर् म्, न च तस्य भेदोऽ स्त, तथा अवयिवचलाचलत्वेन न भेदो दृश्यते।
na prasaṅgaḥ, calanasya tato’nyathā (nyatvāt). calācalavyapade-
śaśca anyopādhikṛtaḥ. yathā bhavatpakṣe jñānaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ
ca vyapadiśyate - svakāryāpekṣayā kāraṇam, svakāraṇāpekṣayā
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 371
Translation: 1093
You had also said, “Is it the fact that when all the parts are drawn,
the whole is drawn? Or when some of the parts are drawn, the whole
is drawn? If you say, when all the parts are drawn, the whole is
drawn, then, when some one will draw the middle part, or the end
part, the whole will not be drawn. And if you say, when some parts
are drawn, then, the whole is drawn, then, if someone touches hand
and feet, it will mean that, he is touching the whole body. If you say
that, without drawing the whole, or touching the parts, there will
be touching of the whole, then, there should be always touching of
the whole.” All this is illogical. It is not the case that, to know the
whole, it is necessary to know all parts of the whole. It is also not
the case that, knowing of the whole, is preceded by knowing of some
of the parts of the whole. Rather, when the whole is connected with
the sense organ, body etc. and when there is sufficient light, there
will be knowledge of the whole. If this is not accepted, and if it is
accepted that, knowledge of the whole is preceded by knowledge of
whole. Otherwise, if it is accepted that, knowledge of the whole is
preceded by the knowledge of parts, there will be no knowledge of
the whole.
[१२. अवयिविनराकरणपरायाः 'यतर् िभन्े न तद्िु द्ः' इत्यािद युक्ेः खण्डनम्।]
[12. avayavinirākaraṇaparāyāḥ ‘yatra bhinne na tadbuddhiḥ’ ityādi
yukteḥ khaṇḍanam.]
Text: 1094
यदप्यन्यदक्
ु म्-अवयिविनराकरणपरं साधनम्- “यतर् िभन्े न तद्िु द् धर् या च न सा।
तद् घटं तु संवृितसत् परमाथर् सदन्यथा” ततर् यिद अवरुग्णे घटे घटबुिद्नर् भवित
घटस्याऽपरमाथर् सत्वम्; नीलेऽिप पर्त्यस्तिमते नीलबुिद्नर् भवित नीलस्याऽस्तिमतत्वात्
तदा नीलमिप अपरमाथर् सत् पर्ाप्म्।
yadapyanyaduktam - avayavinirākaraṇaparaṁ sādhanam - “yatra
bhinne na tadbuddhirdhiyā ca na sā. tad ghaṭaṁ tu saṁvṛ-
tisat paramārthasadanyathā” tatra yadi avarugṇe ghaṭe ghaṭa-
buddhirna bhavati ghaṭasyā’paramārthasattvam; nīle’pi pratya-
stamite nīlabuddhirna bhavati nīlasyā’stamitatvāt tadā nīlamapi
aparamārthasat prāptam.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 373
Translation: 1094
You had also given another ground, to refute the existence of the
whole viz. “When, there is difference in the whole, there cannot
be knowledge of the whole. Nor can that knowledge be decided.
The knowledge of pot that arises is not true, because, the ultimate
reality is otherwise.” There, if the pot is covered, the knowledge
of the pot does not arise and the pot is not considered to be the
ultimate reality. If you say this, then, when the blue color is erased,
there does not arise the knowledge of blue color and so, because the
blue is not there, you should accept that the blue color is unreal.
Text: 1095
तथा, िवज्ञानमस्तमुपगतं न वेद्ते तदप्यपरमाथर् सत् पर्ाप्नोित।
tathā, vijñānamastamupagataṁ na vedyate tadapyaparamārthasat
prāpnoti.
Translation: 1095
Clarification:
Similarly, when knowledge vanishes, it is not known and therefore
on the same logic, you should say that knowledge also is unreal.
Text: 1096
अथ पर्ाक्ने िवज्ञाने नीलान्तरे पर्त्यस्तिमते ज्ञानान्तरं वेद्ते नीलान्तरं च, न तु घटेऽवरुग्णे
घटान्तरं वेद्ते; तत् िकम् - उत्पन्ं न वेद्ते, आहो स्वदनुत्पन्म्?
atha prāktane vijñāne nīlāntare pratyastamite jñānāntaraṁ vedyate
nīlāntaraṁ ca, na tu ghaṭe’varugṇe ghaṭāntaraṁ vedyate; tat kim -
utpannaṁ na vedyate, āhosvidanutpannam?
Translation: 1096
Reply:
Well, in the earlier knowledge, another blue color is destroyed and
so in the subsequent knowledge, there is awareness of knowledge
as well as another blue color. But when the pot is broken, another
pot is not known. Do you want to say that, it is produced and not
known, or, it is not produced at all?
Text: 1097
तद्िद उत्पन्ं न गृह्ते; ततर्ािप िह िवज्ञानोत्पादनसमथर् मुत्पन्ं न गृह्ेते, तिद्परीतं वा?
374 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1100
If you say that, pots which are not produced are not known, and
therefore, a pot is unreal, then, when the knowledge of blue color
arises, it is not known, the knowledge of blue color should be
declared as unreal.
Text: 1101
ु र् वित िवज्ञानजनकं कपालावस्थायाम्;
अथ अवरुग्णे घटे घटान्तरं न पर्ादभ
atha avarugṇe ghaṭe ghaṭāntaraṁ na prādurbhavati vijñānajanakaṁ
kapālāvasthāyām;
Translation: 1101
Clarification:
Well, when a pot is broken, another pot does not emerge which
can generate the knowledge of pot and what continues there, is the
parts of the pot.
Text: 1102
यद्ेवं िनिवर् कल्पके रूपज्ञाने नष्े नान्यिन्िवर् कल्पकं रूपज्ञानं जायते सिवकल्पकाव-
स्थायाम्। तथा, स्थूले नीले नष्े नान्यत् स्थूलं नीलान्तरं भवित सूक्षमनीलोत्पादकाले।
yadyevaṁ nirvikalpake rūpajñāne naṣṭe nānyannirvikalpakaṁ rūpa-
jñānaṁ jāyate savikalpakāvasthāyām. tathā, sthūle nīle naṣṭe nānyat
sthūlaṁ nīlāntaraṁ bhavati sūkṣmanīlotpādakāle.
Translation: 1102
Reply:
If it is so, when an indeterminate knowledge of color, is destroyed,
no other indeterminate knowledge of color emerges during the state
of determinate knowledge. In the same way, when a gross blue color
is destroyed, no other gross blue color emerges during the time of
production of minute blue color.
Text: 1103
अथ ततर् नीलरूपताऽनुगता ज्ञानरूपता वाऽनुगता;
atha tatra nīlarūpatā’nugatā jñānarūpatā vā’nugatā;
Translation: 1103
Clarification:
Well, there the blue color continues in the subsequent moments and
also the form of the knowledge in the subsequent knowledges.
376 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1104
यद्ेवम् इहािप कपालघटयोः स्वलक्षणरूपताऽनुगता।
yadyevam ihāpi kapālaghaṭayoḥ svalakṣaṇarūpatā’nugatā.
Translation: 1104
Reply:
If it is so, here also, the parts of the pot and the pot continue in
the form of particulars.
Text: 1105
यदप्युक्म्- “ धया च न सा - धया बुद्ध्या िववेच्यमाने न सा घटबुिद्भर् वित नीलबुिद्स्तु
भवित”; तदेतदयुक्म्, िकंभूतया बुद्ध्या िववेच्यते - िकं िनरालम्बनया, आहो स्वत्
सालम्बनया?
yadapyuktam- “dhiyā ca na sā - dhiyā buddhyā vivecyamāne na sā
ghaṭabuddhirbhavati nīlabuddhistu bhavati”; tadetadayuktam, kiṁ-
bhūtayā buddhyā vivecyate - kiṁ nirālambanayā, āhosvit sālam-
banayā?
Translation: 1105
You have said the following, “The knowledge of the pot, is also not
established i.e. when one examines critically, that knowledge is not
of pot, but it is knowledge of blue color.” This is also not proper,
because, there the question arises, by which thought do you examine
this? Is it thought without content, or, thought with content?
Text: 1106
तद्िद िनरालम्बनया िववेच्यते; तदा िववेचनीयाथोर् वक्व्यः। यिद च िनरालम्बनया
िववेच्यमानस्य असत्वम्; तदाऽनया रीत्या नीलादेरप्यसत्वमापनीपद्ते। न च
िनरालम्बनमितर स्त।
tadyadi nirālambanayā vivecyate; tadā vivecanīyārtho vaktavyaḥ.
yadi ca nirālambanayā vivecyamānasya asatvam; tadā’nayā rītyā
nīlāderapyasattvamāpanīpadyate. na ca nirālambanamatirasti.
Translation: 1106
If you say, it is examined by a thought without content, then, you
should spell out what is the object of critical examination? If you
examine it by a thought without a content, then, content does not
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 377
exist and by this logic, there will be absence of blue color also. As
a matter of fact, there cannot be a thought without a content.
Text: 1107
अथ सालम्बनया घटो िववेच्यते; सा िकमात्मालम्बना, आहो स्वत् स्वकायव्यित र-
क्ालम्बना?
atha sālambanayā ghaṭo vivecyate; sā kimātmālambanā, āhosvit
svakāyavyatiriktālambanā?
Translation: 1107
If you say that, pot is examined by the knowledge of thought, having
a content, there also the question arises, what is the content there?
Is it the thought itself, or, something other than its own form?
Text: 1108
तद्िद स्वकायालम्बना सती घटस्य िववेिचका; तदा िववेचनीयाथोर् वक्व्यः। यिद नाम
स्वकायमातर्ावभासा समुत्पन्ा; घटस्याऽसत्वे िकमायातम्?
tadyadi svakāyālambanā satī ghaṭasya vivecikā; tadā vivecanīyārtho
vaktavyaḥ. yadi nāma svakāyamātrāvabhāsā samutpannā; ghaṭa-
syā’satve kimāyātam?
Translation: 1108
If you say, the thought having thought itself as its content, examines
pot, then, you should know, what is that which is being examined?
If the thought is produced, which reveals its own form i.e. mere
thought, then, what happened that the pot does not appear in that
thought?
Text: 1109
अथ तस्यां बुद्ौ घटो [ना]वभाित तेन तस्याऽसत्वम्; अनया भङ्ग्या नीलादेरिप
असत्वमापद्ते।
atha tasyāṁ buddhau ghaṭo [nā]vabhāti tena tasyā’satvam; anayā
bhaṅgyā nīlāderapi asattvamāpadyate.
Translation: 1109
If you say that, because, in that knowledge or thought the pot does
not appear, and therefore, there is no existence of pot, then, by this
argument, there will arise the contingency of denying the existence
of blue color etc.
378 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1110
अथ स्वकायव्यित रक्ाथार्लम्बनया घटो िववेच्यते; िकं [घटालम्बनया] घटो िववेच्यते,
घटव्यित रक्ाथार्लम्बनया वा?
atha svakāyavyatiriktārthālambanayā ghaṭo vivecyate; kiṁ [ghaṭā-
lambanayā] ghaṭo vivecyate, ghaṭavyatiriktārthālambanayā vā?
Translation: 1110
If you say that, the pot is being examined by the thought in which
the content is different from the thought then, we would like to
know whether the pot is the content of the thought, and therefore,
it is being examined, or, (the pot is being examined) by the thought
in which the content is different from the pot?
Text: 1111
तद्िद घटालम्बनया िववेच्यते, ततर्ािप िववेचनाथोर् वक्व्यः। तया िकं िकर्यते-िकं
घटस्याऽसत्वं पर्द्ोत्यते, आहो स्वत् सत्वम्, उभयं वा, न िकंिचद्ा?
tadyadi ghaṭālambanayā vivecyate, tatrāpi vivecanārtho vaktavyaḥ.
tayā kiṁ kriyate-kiṁ ghaṭasyā’sattvaṁ pradyotyate, āhosvit
sattvam, ubhayaṁ vā, na kiṁcidvā?
Translation: 1111
If you say that, by the thought, the pot having its content, the pot
is being examined, there, we would like to know, what could be the
meaning of “the act of examining”, i.e. what is going to be done by
that act of examining i.e. the act of thinking? Is the non-existence
of the pot going to be indicated, or, existence, or, both, or, neither?
Text: 1112
तद्िद असत्वम्; तदयुक्म्, निह अन्यिवषया सती एतस्य पर्बो धका भिवतुमहर् ित
अितपर्सङ्ात्, न जातु रूपिवषयिवज्ञान(नं) रसस्थापनाय अलम्।
tadyadi asatvam; tadayuktam, nahi anyaviṣayā satī etasya
prabodhikā bhavitumarhati atiprasaṅgāt, na jātu rūpaviṣayavijñā-
na(naṁ) rasasthāpanāya alam.
Translation: 1112
If you say, non-existence is going to be indicated, that will not be
proper, because, if the content of the thought is something else,
it cannot reveal that, because, otherwise it will lead to unwanted
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 379
Text: 1116
अथ घटिभन्ाथर् िवषया सा; ततर् वतर् माना न कुम्भस्य अ स्तत्विवधाियका, न व्याव त्र्का।
atha ghaṭabhinnārthaviṣayā sā; tatra vartamānā na kumbhasya
astitvavidhāyikā, na vyāvarttikā.
Translation: 1116
If you say that, something other than the pot is the content of that
knowledge, then, that thought at that time can neither enjoin the
existence of pot nor can it exclude pot.
Text: 1117
अथ तस्यां बुद्ौ कुम्भो न पर्ितभाित तेन तस्य संवृितसत्वम्;
atha tasyāṁ buddhau kumbho na pratibhāti tena tasya saṁvṛti-
sattvam;
Translation: 1117
Clarification:
Well, in that knowledge, since pot does not appear, therefore, that
pot is called unreal.
Text: 1118
यद्ेवम्-बुिद्िवषयोऽिप बुद्ध्यन्तरे न पर्ितभाित, तस्याप्यायातं संवृितसत्वम्। सवर् ज्ञानािन
च इतरेतरज्ञाने न पर्ितभा न्त - सवेर्षां संवृितसत्वं पर्ाप्म्। न चैतदभ्युपगम्यते।
yadyevam-buddhiviṣayo’pi buddhyantare na pratibhāti, tasyāpyā-
yātaṁ saṁvṛtisattvam. sarvajñānāni ca itaretarajñāne na pratibhā-
nti - sarveṣāṁ saṁvṛtisattvaṁ prāptam. na caitadabhyupagamyate.
Translation: 1118
Reply:
If it is so, then, since that which appears in one knowledge does not
appear in another knowledge and so that also should be declared as
unreal. Similarly, all knowledges do not appear in other knowledges
and therefore, all knowledges should be declared as unreal. But, as
a matter of fact, this is not acceptable to you.
[१३. िवज्ञानवािदना सा धतस्य बाह्ाथर् िवलोपस्य िनरासः।]
[13. vijñānavādinā sādhitasya bāhyārthavilopasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1119
यदप्यन्यत्साधनमपिदष्ं बाह्ाथार्पह्वे - “न िकल िवज्ञानमसंिविदतम् अथर् स्य वेदनम्।
यद्िविदतमथर् वेदनं तदाऽजातेऽिप ज्ञानेऽथोर् वेद्ः स्यात्, सन्तानान्तरज्ञाने च जाते
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 381
Text: 1128
सहोपलम्भो िह ज्ञानैकधमर् ः, अथैर्कधमर् ः, उभयधमोर् वा?
sahopalambho hi jñānaikadharmaḥ, arthaikadharmaḥ, ubhayadha-
rmo vā?
Translation: 1128
We would like to ask, whether, knowing together is the property of
knowledge alone, or, of the object of the knowledge alone, or of the
property of the both?
Text: 1129
तद्िद ज्ञानैकधमर् ः; तदा सहशब्दाथोर् नोपपद्ते। ज्ञानैकधमर् त्वे च ज्ञानस्यैवा स्तत्वस्थापकं
नाथर् स्य व्यितरेकाभावावेदकं सहोपलम्भसाधनम् अतद्मर् त्वात्।
tadyadi jñānaikadharmaḥ; tadā sahaśabdārtho nopapadyate. jñānai-
kadharmatve ca jñānasyaivāstitvasthāpakaṁ nārthasya vyatirekā-
bhāvāvedakaṁ sahopalambhasādhanam ataddharmatvāt.
Translation: 1129
If you say that, it is the property of knowledge alone, then, you
cannot justify the meaning of the word “together”. If it is the
property of knowledge alone, then, it will not be the revealer of the
absence of difference of the object, because, the factor of causing
the perception together cannot be the property of that.
Text: 1130
अथ अथैर्कधमर् ः सहोपलम्भः; अतर्ािप सहशब्दाथोर् वक्व्यः। अथैर्कधमर् त्वे वा अथर् स्यैव
सत्ां व्यवस्थापयित, ततश्च िवपरीतसाधनाद् िवरुद्ः।
atha arthaikadharmaḥ sahopalambhaḥ; atrāpi sahaśabdārtho
vaktavyaḥ. arthaikadharmatve vā arthasyaiva sattāṁ vyavasthā-
payati, tataśca viparītasādhanād viruddhaḥ.
Translation: 1130
If you say, it is the property of object alone and that is the
meaning of knowing together, then, here also you should also spell
the meaning of the word “together”, or, else if it is the property
of knowledge alone, then, it establish the existence of object only
and consequently it will establish contrary to what you intend to
establish.
386 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1131
अथ उभयधमर् ः; कथमुभयधमर् त्वे अन्यतरलोपः? अन्यतरलोपश्चेत्; नोभयधमर् ता
उपपद्ते। 'उभयधमर् ता च अन्यतरलोपश्च' इित व्याहतमपिदश्यते। उभयधमर् त्वे च
'अथर् स्यैव िवलोपो न ज्ञानस्य' इत्यतर् िनयामकं वक्व्यम्। तच्च ना स्त। न च
उपलम्भोऽन्यतरसद्ावं व्यावतर् यित, सद्ावेऽिप दृष्त्वात् यथा ज्ञाने।
atha ubhayadharmaḥ; kathamubhayadharmatve anyataralopaḥ?
anyataralopaścet; nobhayadharmatā upapadyate. ‘ubhayadharmatā
ca anyataralopaśca’ iti vyāhatamapadiśyate. ubhayadharmatve ca
‘arthasyaiva vilopo na jñānasya’ ityatra niyāmakaṁ vaktavyam.
tacca nāsti. na ca upalambho’nyatarasadbhāvaṁ vyāvartayati,
sadbhāve’pi dṛṣṭatvāt yathā jñāne.
Translation: 1131
If you say that, it is the property of both, then, if it is the property
of both, then, how one of the two has disappeared? If one of the
two has disappeared, then, it cannot be maintained that, it is the
property of both. It is indeed a contrary statement, if you say, “it
exists in both and there is absence of one.” If it is a property of both,
in spite of that, there is absence of the object and not of knowledge.
For such a statement, you should give explanatory ground and there
is no such controlling factor. Knowledge of a thing does not exclude
the existence of one of the two, because, even if it is there, it is
experienced by us as in the case of knowledge.
Text: 1132
अिप च कस्यातर् पक्षीकरणम् - िकं िवज्ञानस्य, उत अथर् स्य?
api ca kasyātra pakṣīkaraṇam - kiṁ vijñānasya, uta arthasya?
Translation: 1132
Moreover, what is the subject of this inference? Is it the knowledge,
or, the content of the knowledge?
Text: 1133
तद्िद ज्ञानं पक्षय स; तस्य िकं साध्यते - अभावः अव्यितरेको वा?
tadyadi jñānaṁ pakṣayasi; tasya kiṁ sādhyate-abhāvaḥ avyatireko vā?
Translation: 1133
If you are making knowledge of content as the subject, then, what
is being inferred in that? Is it the absence, or, absence of difference?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 387
Text: 1134
तद्िद अभावः; स िकं ज्ञानस्य, उत अथर् स्येित?
tadyadi abhāvaḥ; sa kiṁ jñānasya, uta arthasyeti?
Translation: 1134
If absence is being inferred, there also we would like to know, is the
absence of knowledge, or, the absence of content of knowledge?
Text: 1135
यिद ज्ञानस्य तदा अभ्युपेतहानम्, हेतोश्च पक्षधमर् ता न लभ्यते।
yadi jñānasya tadā abhyupetahānam, hetośca pakṣadharmatā na
labhyate.
Translation: 1135
If you say, it is the absence of knowledge, then, you are giving up
something which you have already accepted. Moreover, you cannot
demonstrate that, the ground for the inference exists in the subject.
Text: 1136
अथ अथर् स्य; तदा असम्बद्त्वम् - ज्ञानं पक्षय स अथोर् नास्तीित व्याहतमपिदश्यते,
सहोपलम्भस्य च व्य धकरणत्वम्।
atha arthasya; tadā asambaddhatvam - jñānaṁ pakṣayasi artho
nāstīti vyāhatamapadiśyate, sahopalambhasya ca vyadhikaraṇatvam.
Translation: 1136
If you say, it is the absence of content of knowledge which is being
inferred, then, it is a very irrelevant statement. On one hand, you
are making knowledge as the subject, and on the other, you say
there is no content of knowledge and so it is self-contradictory. It
will mean that, the knowledge of the two exists in two different loci.
Text: 1137
अथ अव्यितरेकः साध्यते; स िकं ज्ञानस्य, आहो स्वद् अथर् स्य?
atha avyatirekaḥ sādhyate; sa kiṁ jñānasya, āhosvid arthasya?
Translation: 1137
If you say that, the absence of difference is being established by
inference, there also question arises, is it of the knowledge, or, of
the object of knowledge?
388 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1138
तद्िद अथर् स्य; तदाऽसम्बद्ािभधातृत्वम् - ज्ञानं पक्षय स, अथर् स्य चाऽव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं
करो स इित व्याहतमपिदश्यते, अथार्व्यितरेको िह अथर् धमर् ः।
tadyadi arthasya; tadā’sambaddhābhidhātṛtvam - jñānaṁ pakṣayasi,
arthasya cā’vyatirekapratipādanaṁ karosi iti vyāhatamapadiśyate,
arthāvyatireko hi arthadharmaḥ.
Translation: 1138
If you say, it is the object of knowledge, then, again it is irrelevant
statement, because, on one hand you are making knowledge as
the subject, and on the other hand you are attempting to explain
the identity of the object of knowledge. This is self-contradictory,
because, the property of object cannot be different from the object.
Text: 1139
अथ ज्ञानस्यैव अव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं िकर्यते; त त्कं स्वस्मात्स्वरूपादव्यित रक्म्,
आहो स्वत् पररूपादव्यित रक्म्?
atha jñānasyaiva avyatirekapratipādanaṁ kriyate; tatkiṁ svasmāt
svarūpādavyatiriktam, āhosvit pararūpādavyatiriktam?
Translation: 1139
If you say that, you are explaining the non-difference of the
knowledge itself, there also the question arises, is it the case that,
it is not different from its own nature? Or, it is not different from
other’s nature?
Text: 1140
तद्िद स्वस्मात् स्वरूपादव्यित रक्ं ज्ञानम्; तदा अिववादेन सम्बोधियतव्याः।
tadyadi svasmāt svarūpādavyatiriktaṁ jñānam; tadā avivādena
sambodhayitavyāḥ.
Translation: 1140
If you say, the knowledge is not different from its own nature, then,
there is no difference of opinion whatsoever.
Text: 1141
अथ परस्मादव्यितरेकपर्ितपादनं िकर्यते; स परात्मा ता त्वकः, अता त्वको वा?
atha parasmādavyatirekapratipādanaṁ kriyate; sa parātmā tāttvi-
kaḥ, atāttviko vā?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 389
Translation: 1141
If you say that, it is being explained as not different from other’s
nature, there also question arises whether the others nature is real
or unreal?
Text: 1142
तद्िद अता त्वकः; ततोऽव्यित रक्ं ज्ञानमिप अता त्वकं भवेत्।
tadyadi atāttvikaḥ; tato’vyatiriktaṁ jñānamapi atāttvikaṁ bhavet.
Translation: 1142
If you say, it is unreal, then, the knowledge also will be unreal
because, it is identical with that.
Text: 1143
अथ ता त्वकः; सोप्यवधा रतदेहो वा, अनवधा रतदेहो वा?
atha tāttvikaḥ; sopyavadhāritadeho vā, anavadhāritadeho vā?
Translation: 1143
If you say, it is real, then, there also question arises, whether its
own form is determined, or, its form is not determined.
Text: 1144
तद्िद अवधा रतदेहः; स िकं िभन्ाकारतया अवगतः, अिभन्ाकारतया वा?
tadyadi avadhāritadehaḥ; sa kiṁ bhinnākāratayā avagataḥ, abhinnā-
kāratayā vā?
Translation: 1144
If you say, its form is determined, there also the question arises,
whether it is known as having different form, or, as having identical
form.
Text: 1145
यिद िभन्ाकारतया अवधा रतः; तदा िभन्ाकारावगाहकिवज्ञानदिू षतपक्षत्वेन सहोपलम्भ-
हेतोर सद्ता कालात्ययापिदष्ता वा।
yadi bhinnākāratayā avadhāritaḥ; tadā bhinnākārāvagāhakavijñāna-
dūṣitapakṣatvena sahopalambhahetorasiddhatā kālātyayāpadiṣṭatā vā.
Translation: 1145
If you say, its form is determined having different form, then, the
subject of the inference becomes defective as knowledge in which
390 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
different form is the object and as such the ground viz. “knowing
together” remains unestablished, or, suffering from the defect of
kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.
Text: 1146
अथ अिभन्स्वभावतयाऽवधा रतः; न तिहर् परात्मा, 'परात्मा च अिभन्स्वभावतया
अवधा रतः' इित च व्याघातः। िकंच, अिभन्स्वभावतया यिद पर्ागेवाऽवगािहतः;
तदा िकं ततर् सहोपलम्भसाधनेन पर्योजनम्? िनष्पािदतिकर्ये कमर् िण साधनं
सा(ध?)नन्यायमितपतित।
atha abhinnasvabhāvatayā’vadhāritaḥ; na tarhi parātmā, ‘parātmā
ca abhinnasvabhāvatayā’vadhāritaḥ’ iti ca vyāghātaḥ. kiṁca,
abhinnasvabhāvatayā yadi prāgevā’vagāhitaḥ; tadā kiṁ tatra
sahopalambhasādhanena prayojanam? niṣpāditakriye karmaṇi
sādhanaṁ sā(dha?)nanyāyamatipatati.
Translation: 1146
If you say, it is determined as having identical nature, then,
this cannot be said to be of the form of others nature. It is a
contradictory statement to say that it is of others nature and at
the same time it is determined as having nature having the nature
identical with the nature of its own. Moreover, if you say that it is
already known as having identical nature then, what is the need of
establishing “knowing together”? Because, when an act has already
terminated in generating an activity, the means of that activity is
left with no scope, for a cause and effect relationship.
Text: 1147
अथ अनवधा रतदेहः; स परात्माऽस्तीित कथं जानीषे? न च अवधा रतानवधा रताकारयोः
एकत्वं बहिवदो वद न्त। अनवधा रताकारैकत्वे च ज्ञानस्याप्यसंवेदनं पर्सक्म्।
atha anavadhāritadehaḥ; sa parātmā’stīti kathaṁ jānīṣe? na ca
avadhāritānavadhāritākārayoḥ ekatvaṁ bahuvido vadanti� alavadhā-
ritākāraikatve ca jñānasyāpyasaṁvedanaṁ prasaktam.
Translation: 1147
If you say, it is not determined, then, the question arises how do
you know that, it has other’s nature? Learned people do not say
that, there is identity between a known and unknown forms. If it is
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 391
identified with the form which is not determined, then, it will lead
to lack of awareness of knowledge.
Text: 1148
अिप च सहोपलम्भः िकं ज्ञानयोः, उत अथर् योः, ज्ञानाथर् योः वा?
api ca sahopalambhaḥ kiṁ jñānayoḥ, uta arthayoḥ, jñānārthayoḥ
vā?
Translation: 1148
Moreover, by knowing both what do you mean? Is it knowing two
knowledges? Or, knowing two objects, or, knowing knowledge and
object?
Text: 1149
तद्िद ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भः; तदा न िद्तीयस्याभावोऽव्यितरेको वा सद्ध्यित, अ सद्श्च
हेतुः, दृष्ान्तश्च साधनिवकलः - िद्चन्दर्ज्ञाने[न] ज्ञानयोः सहोपलम्भो स्त।
tadyadi jñānayoḥ sahopalambhaḥ; tadā na dvitīyasyābhāvo’vyatireko
vā siddhyati, asiddhaśca hetuḥ, dṛṣṭāntaśca sādhanavikalaḥ - dvica-
ndrajñāne[na] jñānayoḥ sahopalambhosti.
Translation: 1149
If you say, knowing together two knowledges, then, it does not
establish as the absence of the second, or, the non-difference. Thus
the ground for the inference is not established and the example
is devoid of the ground. It is not the case that in the erroneous
knowledge of two moons there is awareness of two knowledges.
Text: 1150
अथ अथर् योः; तदाऽ सद्ो हेतुः, न चान्यतराथर् लोपः। लोपे वा अन्यतर सद्ौ बाह्ाथर् -
व्यव स्थितः।
atha arthayoḥ; tadā’siddho hetuḥ, na cānyatarārthalopaḥ. lope vā
anyatarasiddhau bāhyārthavyavasthitiḥ.
Translation: 1150
If you say, it is knowing two objects, then, also the ground is not
established. Neither of the two objects can be elided and if it is
elided, then, one of the two will be established and in that case, it
will prove that there are objects outside.
392 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1151
अथ ज्ञानाथर् योः सहोपलम्भः; तथािप हेतोर सद्ता, दृष्ान्तश्च साधनिवकलः।
atha jñānārthayoḥ sahopalambhaḥ; tathāpi hetorasiddhatā, dṛṣṭā-
ntaśca sādhanavikalaḥ.
Translation: 1151
If you say, it is knowing together knowledge and object, even then,
the ground is not established and there is no example to establish it.
Text: 1152
अथ सहोपलम्भािदत्यस्यायमथर् ः - एकोपलम्भात्। एकोपलम्भेन ज्ञानाथर् योरेकता उप-
पाद्ते।
atha sahopalambhādityasyāyamarthaḥ - ekopalambhāt. ekopalambhena
jñānārthayorekatā upapādyate.
Translation: 1152
Clarification:
Well, by the term “knowing together” we mean the following: It
means because, there is one knowledge, we can justify the identity
between knowledge and its object.
Text: 1153
ननु एकोपलम्भािदत्यस्य कोऽथर् ः - िकं ज्ञानाथर् योः एक एवोपलम्भः, उत एकस्यै-
वोपलम्भः, आहो स्वदेकेनैव उपलम्भ इित।
nanu ekopalambhādityasya ko’rthaḥ - kiṁ jñānārthayoḥ eka eva upa-
lambhaḥ, uta ekasyaivopalambhaḥ, āhosvidekenaiva upalambha iti.
Translation: 1153
Reply
Well, we would like to know, what do you mean by, “Because it
is one knowledge”? Does it mean that there is one knowledge of
knowledge and its object?, or, does it mean knowledge of only one,
or, does it mean knowledge by only one?
Text: 1154
तद्िद ज्ञानाथर् योः एक एव उपलम्भ इित; न तिहर् अथार्भाव सिद्ः। संवेद्मानत्वेन
िवज्ञानसत्ावद् अथर् सत्ाऽिप सु स्थता। अ सद्ोप्ययं हेतुः नीलादावनेकोपलम्भसम्भवात्।
अनैका न्तकोप्ययं हेतुः यस्मादनेकनीललोिहताद्ाकाराणामेकोपलम्भेऽिप नान्यतम-
व्यावृ त्ः अभेदो वा दृष्ः।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 393
स्थाियनोऽथर् िकर्याऽकरणात्। तदेव कथम्? कथ्यते - िकं येन स्वभावेन आद्ामथर् िकर्यां
करोित िकं तेनव ै स्वभावेन उत्रोत्राण्यिप कायार्िण करोित, अथ समासािदतस्वभावान्तरः
करोित? यिद तेनव ै करोित; तदा एककालयोिगत्वं सवर् कायार्णां पर्सज्यते, कर्मकरणं
हीयते तस्य। न ह्ेकस्वभावायत्ो वस्तूनां कालिवकल्पो नाम। िवकल्पे वा
एकस्वभावायत्तामितकर्ाम न्त। अथ स्वभावान्तरापत्ौ जनयित; स्वभावान्तराप त्श्च
पूवार्कारप रहारनान्तरीयकरूपा। तदप रत्यागे न आकारान्तरानुपर्ेवेशोऽ स्त, आकारयोः
एकत्वायोगात्। अथ पूवार्कारप रहारः; तदा एतदेव क्षिणकत्वं यत् पूवार्परकायर् कारणम्।”
तदेतदयुक्म्। यिद कर्मेण कायर् न करोित युगपदिप कथं करोित? एकं नीलस्वल-
क्षणमनेकं िवज्ञाननीलािदकं कायर् करोित इित वः सद्ान्तः। तदनेकं कायर् िकम-
(िकमेके)नाकारेण करोित, आकारभेदेन वा?
yadapyuktam - “avayavinirākaraṇe kṣaṇikatvam - yadi hi kila
akṣaṇiko bhavati bhāvaḥ tadā bhavati avayavā’vayavibhāvaḥ,
tadabhāve tatsva(tasyā’)bhāvāt. atha kathaṁ tasyābhāvaḥ?
sthāyino’rthakriyā’karaṇāt. tadeva katham? kathyate - kiṁ yena
svabhāvena ādyāmarthakriyāṁ karoti kiṁ tenaiva svabhāvena
uttarottarāṇyapi kāryāṇi karoti, atha samāsāditasvabhāvāntaraḥ
karoti? yadi tenaiva karoti; tadā ekakālayogitvaṁ sarvakāryā-
ṇāṁ prasajyate, kramakaraṇaṁ hīyate tasya. na hyekasvabhā-
vāyatto vastūnāṁ kālavikalpo nāma. vikalpe vā ekasvabhāvāya-
ttatāmatikrāmanti. atha svabhāvāntarāpattau janayati; svabhāvā-
ntarāpattiśca pūrvākāraparihāranāntarīyakarūpā. tadaparityāge na
ākārāntarānupreveśo’sti, ākārayoḥ ekatvāyogāt. atha pūrvākāra-
parihāraḥ; tadā etadeva kṣaṇikatvaṁ yat pūrvāparakāryakāraṇam.”
tadetadayuktam. yadi krameṇa kāryaṁ na karoti yugapadapi
kathaṁ karoti? ekaṁ nīlasvalakṣaṇamanekaṁ vijñānanīlādikaṁ
kāryaṁ karoti iti vaḥ siddhāntaḥ. tadanekaṁ kāryaṁ kima(kime-
ke)nākāreṇa karoti, ākārabhedena vā?
Translation: 1159
You have also said the following: In the context of refuting the
concept of whole, you had raised the matter of momentariness.- If
a positive entity is taken as momentary, then, the part and whole
relationship will become possible, because, in the absence of that,
there will be absence of that. If you ask how will there be absence of
that? The answer will be “because that which is durable will not be
396 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
involved in bringing about the result. If you ask how is that? Here
is the answer: Is it the case that, a thing performs its first result
having a particular nature by the same nature, does it also produce
the subsequent effects also? If you say that, by acquiring another
nature, it produces the effect, then, let it do so by that nature, in
that case, all effects will start occurring at one and the same time
and it will lose its nature of producing an effect in a sequence. It is
not the case that, things entertain sequence of time being controlled
by one nature. Considering that, it does, it will cross the limit of its
own nature. If you say, it is involved in the production of another
nature, and assuming another nature will be of the form of being
so, without giving up its earlier form and if does not give up its
earlier form, there is no question of another form entering into it,
because, two forms cannot be said to be one. If you say that, it will
give up its earlier form, then, that itself is momentariness, which is
the cause of earlier and later effect.”
But, this is not proper. If something does not produce effect in
a sequence, how will it do so simultaneously? According to your
doctrine, one blue particular produces many cognitions of blue.
There the question can be asked, whether that produces the effect,
by the same form, or, by different form?
Text: 1160
तद् यद्ेकेन करोित; तदाऽऽयातासवर् कायार्णामेकाकाररूपता एकत्वम्, एकस्य चानेकत्व-
मापद्ते।
tad yadyekena karoti; tadā”yātāsarvakāryāṇāmekākārarūpatā eka-
tvam, ekasya cānekatvamāpadyate.
Translation: 1160
If you say that, it produces by one form, then, oneness will mean,
all effects have been only one form and this will mean, as if, one
has become many.
Text: 1161
अथ आकारभेदेनानेककायर् जनयित; आकारभेदात् तदेकत्वं व्यावत्र्ते, यद्व्यावृत्ौ
नैकमनेकं कायर् करोित।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 397
Translation: 1164
You had also said the following: “Since, there is no cause of
destruction, a positive entity is momentary.” But it is not proper.
If they ask how?, they should be asked this: whether there is
something called destruction, or, not?
Text: 1165
तद्िद ना स्त; कस्य सहेतुकत्वं िनहेर्तुकत्वं वा िवचारय न्त मनीिषणः। निह वन्ध्यासुत-
स्याभावे सहेतुकत्वं िनहेर्तुकत्वं वा िवचारय न्त सन्तः।
tadyadi nāsti; kasya sahetukatvaṁ nirhetukatvaṁ vā vicārayanti
manīṣiṇaḥ. nahi vandhyāsutasyābhāve sahetukatvaṁ nirhetukatvaṁ
vā vicārayanti santaḥ.
Translation: 1165
If they say, there is no destruction, then, what is being discussed
as having cause and not having cause by the learned men? If there
is absence of son of a barren lady, wise men never discuss about its
having a cause, or, not having a cause.
Text: 1166
अथ िवद्ते िवनाशः; स वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी वा, िव च्छन्ोत्पन्ो वा?
atha vidyate vināśaḥ; sa vastusvabhāvānubandhī vā, vicchinnotpanno
vā?
Translation: 1166
If you say, there is destruction, then, the question arises whether it
is associated with nature of reality, or, is it produced without any
association with reality?
Text: 1167
तद्िद वस्तुस्वभावानुबन्धी; न तिहर् िनहेर्तुकत्वम्, वस्तुनो वा िनहेर्तुकत्वपर्संगः, सत्स्व-
भावानुब न्धत्वव्यितरेकपर्सङ्ो वा।
tadyadi vastusvabhāvānubandhī; na tarhi nirhetukatvam, vastuno vā
nirhetukatvaprasaṁgaḥ, satsvabhāvānubandhitvavyatirekaprasaṅgo vā.
Translation: 1167
If you say, it is associated with nature of reality, then, it cannot be
said to be without cause. Otherwise, all entities will become without
cause, or, all entities will be devoid of association with their own form.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 399
Text: 1168
अथ व्यित रक्ः; तस्य िनहेर्तुकत्वे कोपप त्ः? सहेतुकत्वे िनयतदेशकालयोिगत्वेनो-
पल ब्धः।
atha vyatiriktaḥ; tasya nirhetukatve kopapattiḥ? sahetukatve niyata-
deśakālayogitvenopalabdhiḥ.
Translation: 1168
If you say, it is different, then, what is the justification for calling
it without a cause? And if you say, it has cause, then, there will
be its knowledge as being associated with a particular place and
particular time.
Text: 1169
यिद नाम िनहेर्तुको िवनाशः वस्तूनां क्षिणकत्वे िकमायातम्, वस्तुभ्योऽथार्न्तरत्वात्?
yadi nāma nirhetuko vināśaḥ vastūnāṁ kṣaṇikatve kimāyātam,
vastubhyo’rthāntaratvāt?
Translation: 1169
If you say, destruction is without any cause, then, what is the harm,
if things are taken as momentary because, it will be a different entity
from the real entities?
Text: 1175
अथ नैव भवनं िवनाशस्य; तदा सवर् भावानां िनत्यत्वमापद्ते, िवनाशस्याऽसंभवात्।
atha naiva bhavanaṁ vināśasya; tadā sarvabhāvānāṁ nityatva-
māpadyate, vināśasyā’saṁbhavāt.
Translation: 1175
If you say that, destruction does not occur at all, then, it will mean
that, all positive entities are eternal, because, destruction is not
possible.
Text: 1176
अथ सहेतुके िवनाशे नावश्यंभावो िवनाशस्य, वस्े रागवत् कारणव्यापारपराधीनवृ त्त्वात्,
तदभावे तस्याभावः कथं भवेत?्
atha sahetuke vināśe nāvaśyaṁbhāvo vināśasya, vastre rāgavat
kāraṇavyāpāraparādhīnavṛttitvāt, tadabhāve tasyābhāvaḥ kathaṁ
bhavet?
Translation: 1176
Clarification:
Well, if destruction is treated as having a cause, then, there can be
no definite occurrence of destruction. Like the color in the cloth, it
is dependent on the function of its cause and if that is not there,
how can there be absence of that?
Text: 1177
तदयुक्म्, स्वहेतोरेव धर्ुवभािविवनाशाहर् स्योत्पत्ेः। भवतु वाऽभावास्यानुद्गमः न क श्च-
िद्रोधः। न तु िनमोर्क्षपर्सङ्ो गुणानां िवनाशानुत्पत्ेः; नेदमस्मिद्रोधेषु राजते, मोक्षप र-
क्लृप्त्यकरणात्।
tadayuktam, svahetoreva dhruvabhāvivināśārhasyotpatteḥ. bhavatu
vā’bhāvāsyānudgamaḥ na kaścidvirodhaḥ. na tu nirmokṣaprasaṅgo
guṇānāṁ vināśānutpatteḥ; nedamasmadvirodheṣu rājate, mokṣapa-
riklṛptyakaraṇāt.
Translation: 1177
Reply:
It is not correct. A thing which is sure to be destroyed is produced
from its own cause, or, let there be no emergence of absence. There
is no conflict in it. It will also not lead to absence of freedom from
402 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1180
You had also said, “momentariness of things becomes object of
perception, the existence of a thing devoid of past and future time
and being associated with only present time, can be the object of
perception.” This is also not proper, we would like to know whether,
the times such as past, future and present are not different from
what is being known are different?
Text: 1181
तद्िद अव्यितरेिकत्वम्; तदा कालतर्यानुमतं वस्तूपलब्धम्।
tadyadi avyatirekitvam; tadā kālatrayānumataṁ vastūpalabdham.
Translation: 1181
If you say, they are not different, then, we know a thing with
reference to all the three times.
Text: 1182
अथ व्यितरेिकत्वम्; वस्त्ववगमे न अतीतानागतवतर् मानकालावगितर स्त। वस्तुमातर्ोप-
लब्धेस्तद स्तत्वं सद्म्, तदभावश्च िनष्पर्माणकः।
atha vyatirekitvam; vastvavagame na atītānāgatavartamānakālāvagati-
rasti. vastumātropalabdhestadastitvaṁ siddham, tadabhāvaśca niṣpra-
māṇakaḥ.
Translation: 1182
If you say, they are different, then, for the knowledge of them, there
is no knowledge of past, future and the present. By knowing mere
thing, its existence is established and also its absence without any
proof.
Text: 1183
अथ स एव भावोऽभावः; भावोऽन्यस्तिहर् वक्व्यः, अभावस्य सवोर्पाख्यािविनवृ त्-
लक्षणत्वात्।
atha sa eva bhāvo’bhāvaḥ; bhāvo’nyastarhi vaktavyaḥ, abhāvasya
sarvopākhyāvinivṛttilakṣaṇatvāt.
Translation: 1183
If you say, the same is positive entity is absence, then, you should
spell out the positive entity as different, because an absence is of
the nature of that which is free from all attributes.
404 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1184
अथ कालान्तरे तस्य अन्योऽभावः; तस्यािकंिचत्करत्वात् सत्ाखण्डनं पर्ित।
atha kālāntare tasya anyo’bhāvaḥ; tasyākiṁcitkaratvāt sattākha-
ṇḍanaṁ prati.
Translation: 1184
If you say that, at other time, there will be absence, different from
that, then, it is insignificant in the context of refuting its existence.
Text: 1185
अथापरकायार्कत्ृर्त्वं कालान्तरे तदभावः; तदयुक्म्, सवार्परकायर् कत्ृर्त्वमेकस्य पर्त्यक्षात्
पर्त्यिभज्ञानेन च पूवोर्िदतानुभवावेिदता सत्ा आत्मसा त्कर्यते सैव सत्ा पर्त्यिभज्ञानेन
आत्मसा त्कर्यते।
athāparakāryākarttṛtvaṁ kālāntare tadabhāvaḥ; tadayuktam, sarvā-
parakāryakarttṛtvamekasya pratyakṣāt pratyabhijñānena ca pūrvo-
ditānubhavāveditā sattā ātmasātkriyate saiva sattā pratyabhi-
jñānena ātmasātkriyate.
Translation: 1185
If you say, the state of not producing another effect, is the absence of
that at some other time, it will not be proper, because, it is known
by perception and also by recollection that, one thing produces all
other effects and so it takes existence which is revealed by earlier
experience as its object and the same existence becomes the object
of recollection.
Text: 1186
कथं पुनवेर्त्सीित चेत;्
kathaṁ punarvetsīti cet;
Translation: 1186
Objection:
How do you know it?
Text: 1187
पर्त्यिभज्ञानादेव जानीमः। सैव सत्ा पर्ितभाित। आद्ानुभवेिप सा सत्ा पर्ितभाित।
कुतोऽवगता? एवं ज्ञानयोरिप हेतुफलभावावधारणं न शक्यते कतुर्म्, तदभावान्
कायार्नुमानम्।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 405
Text: 1190
तद्िद अनवगतेन; तत्कथं स्वयमनु(मनव)गतं साधनं भिवतुमहर् ित?
tadyadi anavagatena; tatkathaṁ svayamanu(manava)gataṁ sādha-
naṁ bhavitumarhati?
Translation: 1190
If you say, it is unknown, then, how can that which is not known,
be called a ground to infer something on the basis of that.
Text: 1191
अथावगतेन; तस्यां कृतकत्वावगतौ अिनत्यत्वं पर्ितभाित वा, न वा?
athāvagatena; tasyāṁ kṛtakatvāvagatau anityatvaṁ pratibhāti vā,
na vā?
Translation: 1191
If you say that, by a known ground that can be known then, we
would like to know whether in the knowledge of the state of being
produced non-eternity appears, or, not?
Text: 1192
यिद न पर्ितभाित; कथं पर्ितभासमानाऽपर्ितभासमानयोस्तादात्म्यम्?
yadi na pratibhāti; kathaṁ pratibhāsamānā’pratibhāsamānayostādāt-
myam?
Translation: 1192
If you say, it does not appear then, how can there be identity
between that which appears and that which does not appear?
Text: 1193
अथ पर्ितभाित; िकमनुमानेन? िनष्पािदतिकर्ये कमर् िण साधनानथर् क्यम्। अन्यथा िह
कृतकत्वपर्ितपत्ाविप अनुमानमुपादेयं स्यात्।
atha pratibhāti; kimanumānena? niṣpāditakriye karmaṇi sādha-
nānarthakyam. anyathā hi kṛtakatvapratipattāvapi anumānamupā-
deyaṁ syāt.
Translation: 1193
If you say, it appears, then, what is the need of inference? With
reference to an act which has already produced the effect, a means
is of no use. Otherwise, even after the knowledge of the state of
being produced one will have to say that the inference can operate.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 407
Text: 1194
अथ कृतकत्वं पर्ितपन्िमित कृत्वा नानुमानमुपादीयते;
atha kṛtakatvaṁ pratipannamiti kṛtvā nānumānamupādīyate;
Translation: 1194
Clarification:
Well, because the state of being produced becomes known,
therefore, inference does not operate.
Text: 1195
तत्स्वभावानुबन्ध्यिनत्यत्वमप्यवगतम्, िकमनुमानेन? अवगते चािनत्यत्वे यत्साधनमु-
पादीयते तत्कदािचदिनत्यतापर्ितपत्यथर् म्, कदािचच्च िनत्यतासमारोपव्यवच्छे दाथर् म्,
कदािचत्व(त्व)िनत्यताव्यवहाराथर् म्?
tatsvabhāvānubandhyanityatvamapyavagatam, kimanumānena?
avagate cānityatve yatsādhanamupādīyate tat kadācidanityatā-
pratipatyartham, kadācicca nityatāsamāropavyavacche- dārtham,
kadācitva(ttva)nityatāvyavahārārtham?
Translation: 1195
Reply:
In that case, then, non-eternity which follows from that nature
is also known, so, what is the need of inference? Even after
the knowledge of non-eternity, if a means is employed, will
it be for the knowledge of non-eternity sometimes, or, for
excluding super-imposition of eternity sometimes, or, for referring
to non-eternity sometimes?
Text: 1196
तद्िद अिनत्यतापर्ितपत्यथर् म्; सा ज्ञातैव, व्यथर् ः पर्यासः।
tadyadi anityatāpratipatyartham; sā jñātaiva, vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ.
Translation: 1196
If you say, for the knowledge of non-eternity, then, it is already
known and hence taking effort in that direction is futile.
Text: 1197
अथ समारोपव्यवच्छे दाथर् म्; समारोपव्यवच्छे दः अिनत्यत्वादव्यित रक्ः, व्यित रक्ो वा?
atha samāropavyavacchedārtham; samāropavyavacchedaḥ anitya-
tvādavyatiriktaḥ, vyatirikto vā?
408 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1197
If you say, for the sake of excluding the super-imposition, there
the question arises, whether the exclusion of super-imposition, is
identical with the non-eternity, or, different?
Text: 1198
तद्द्व्यित रक्ः; असाविप अिनत्यत्वावगमेनव
ै ावगतत्वान् साधनान्तरमपेक्षते।
tadyadyavyatiriktaḥ; asāvapi anityatvāvagamenaivāvagatatvānna
sādhanāntaramapekṣate.
Translation: 1198
If you say, it is identical, then, that also is known by knowing the
non-eternity and then also, it does not require any other means to
know it.
Text: 1199
अथ व्यित रक्ः; स िकं वस्तुभूतः, अवस्तुभूतो वा?
atha vyatiriktaḥ; sa kiṁ vastubhūtaḥ, avastubhūto vā?
Translation: 1199
If you say, it is different, we would like to know, whether it is real,
or, unreal.
Text: 1200
तद्िद वस्तुभूतः तेन सह शब्दगतकृतकत्वस्य तादात्म्यानुपप त्ः। तादात्म्ये वा
तदवगमेनव
ै ावगमात् नानुमानमपेक्षते।
tadyadi vastubhūtaḥ tena saha śabdagatakṛtakatvasya tādātmyā-
nupapattiḥ. tādātmye vā tadavagamenaivāvagamāt nānumānama-
pekṣate.
Translation: 1200
If you say, it is real, then, with that there cannot be identity of the
state of being produced which exists in the sound, and if there is
identity, then, it is known that by itself and obviously, it does not
require inference again to know it.
Text: 1201
अथ अवस्तुभूतः; स िकं िकर्यते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
atha avastubhūtaḥ; sa kiṁ kriyate, jñāpyate vā?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 409
Translation: 1201
If you say, it is unreal, then, what happens to it?
Text: 1201a
तद्िद िकर्यते; तदयुक्म्, सवोर्पाख्यािविनमुर्क्स्य करणायोगात्, करणे वा वस्तुत्वपर्सङ्ः।
tadyadi kriyate; tadayuktam, sarvopākhyāvinirmuktasya karaṇā-
yogāt, karaṇe vā vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ.
Translation: 1201a
If you say, it does something, that will not be proper, because, if
something is devoid of all characterizations it cannot do anything
and if it does, it becomes real.
Text: 1202
अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तेन सह कृतकत्वस्य सम्बन्धव्यितरेकात्, अव्यितरेके वा तस्य वस्तुत्वं
कृतकत्वासत्वं वा।
atha jñāpyate; tena saha kṛtakatvasya sambandhavyatirekāt,
avyatireke vā tasya vastutvaṁ kṛtakatvāsattvaṁ vā.
Translation: 1202
If you say, it is known, then, it does not have relationship with
the state of being produced, or, if you say that the relationship
continues, then, the question arises whether it is real, or, a product,
or, non-existent.
Text: 1203
अथ अिनत्यताव्यवहारः िकर्यते - यो िह कृतकत्वं जानन्िप अिनत्यताव्यवहारं न करोित
स िह अतर् व्यवहायर् ते;
atha anityatāvyavahāraḥ kriyate - yo hi kṛtakatvaṁ jānannapi
anityatāvyavahāraṁ na karoti sa hi atra vyavahāryate;
Translation: 1203
Clarification:
Well, we refer to it as non-eternal and one, even after knowing it is
non-eternal, it does not refer to it as non-eternal, and that is what
is referred to here.
Text: 1204
सोऽिप व्यवहारः अिनत्यत्वादव्यित रक्ः, व्यित रक्ो वा?
so’pi vyavahāraḥ anityatvādavyatiriktaḥ, vyatirikto vā?
410 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1204
Reply:
Even that reference we would like to know, whether not different
from that which is non-eternal, or, different from that?
Text: 1205
यद्व्यित रक्ः; असाविप पर्ितपन् एवानुमािनकः।
yadyavyatiriktaḥ; asāvapi pratipanna evānumānikaḥ.
Translation: 1205
If you say, it is not different, then, that too is to be accepted as
inferential.
Text: 1206
अथ व्यित रक्ः; स िकं कृतकत्वेन उत्पाद्ते, ज्ञाप्यते वा?
atha vyatiriktaḥ; sa kiṁ kṛtakatvena utpādyate, jñāpyate vā?
Translation: 1206
If you say, it is different, then, the question arises whether it is
produced because it is non-eternal, or, is it made known?
Text: 1207
यिद उत्पाद्ते; तदा न शब्दोत्पादकहेतूनामनुमानत्वम्।
yadi utpādyate; tadā na śabdotpādakahetūnāmanumānatvam.
Translation: 1207
If you say, it is produced, then, the grounds which produce sound
need not be inferential.
Text: 1208
अथ ज्ञाप्यते; तेन साकं सम्बन्धोऽिभधेयः। न तादात्म्यलक्षणः, ज्ञाप्याद् िभन्त्वात्।
atha jñāpyate; tena sākaṁ sambandho’bhidheyaḥ. na tādātmya-
lakṣaṇaḥ, jñāpyād bhinnatvāt.
Translation: 1208
And if you say, it is made known, then, you should state
the relationship with that. That relationship cannot be identity
because, it is different from that which makes it known.
Text: 1209
अथ तदत्ु प त्लक्षणः सोप्यनुपपन् एव - िकं व्यवहारेणोत्पाद्ते घटः, घटेन वोत्पाद्ते
व्यवहारः?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 411
िनत्यतापर्ितप त्ः। तथा अथार्प त्पूिवर् का अथार्प त्ः - शब्दाथर् सम्बन्धिनत्यतापर्ितप त्ः।
तथा, उपमानपूिवर् का अथार्प त्ः - गवयिपण्डगर्हणान्तरं गेहाव स्थतगोिपण्डे गोगवय-
सादृश्याव च्छन्े पर्ितप त्रुपमानात् िपण्डाव च्छन्े वा सादृश्ये, तस्य िपण्डस्य वाहदोह-
पर्सवसामथ्यर् म् अथार्पत्या पर्त्येित। एषा षट् पर्काराऽथार्प त्ः।
evamarthāpatyādīnāmapyaprāmāṇyam. kiṁ punaḥ arthāpattyādeḥ
svarūpam? kathaṁ vā prāmāṇyam? tatra darśanārthāpattestāvat
svarūpaṁ vyutpādyate - rūpadarśanānyathānupapatyā cakṣuḥ- prati-
pattiḥ. tathā, anumānapūrvikāanumānādagnitvapratipattyanyathā-
nupapatyā agnivyaktiprati- pattiḥ. abhāvapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - jīvati
devadattaḥ gehe nāsti - gehābhāvānyathānupapatyā bahirbhāvaprati-
pattiḥ. tathā, āgamapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - śabdārthapratipatyanya-
thānupapatyā śabdārthasambandhanityatāpratipattiḥ. tathā arthā-
pattipūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - śabdārthasambandhanityatāpratipattiḥ.
tathā, upamānapūrvikā arthāpattiḥ - gavayapiṇḍagrahaṇāntaraṁ
gehāvasthitagopiṇḍe gogavayasādṛśyāvacchinne pratipattirupamā-
nāt piṇḍāvacchinne vā sādṛśye, tasya piṇḍasya vāhadohaprasava-
sāmarthyam arthāpatyā pratyeti. eṣā ṣaṭ prakārā’rthāpattiḥ.
Translation: 1212
In the same way, there is no authenticity of the processes of
knowing viz. presumption and the like. What is the nature of
presumption? How can it be called a valid means of knowing?
There the nature of presumption called darśanārthāpatti – Since
without eyes perception of color is not possible, therefore, one has to
presume eyes. Similarly, some presumption is preceded by inference,
for instance, since without fire, it is not possible to know fire through
inference and therefore, one has to presume the fire in the visual.
There can be a presumption preceded by absence, for instance, if
it is a case that Devadatta is alive and he is not found at home.
Without his existence outside the house, since his absence in the
house cannot be justified and therefore, there is presumption of
his existence outside. Similarly, there will be presumption preceded
by a sentence. Unless it is presumed that the relationship between
word and meaning is eternal, the knowledge from the meaning from
the word cannot be explained and therefore, there is a presumption
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 413
that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal. In
the same way, there will be presumption preceded by presumption.
As in the case of presumption of eternity of relationship between
word and meaning, in the same way, there is presumption preceded
by analogy. For instance, after the knowledge of a goyal individual,
there arises the knowledge of similarity of the goyal in the cow
individual, existing at home and this happens because of analogy,
or, one comes to know by presumption the capacity of carrying, or,
milking, or, giving birth to calf in the similarity qualified by the
individual. These are, thus, six types of presumptions.
Text: 1213
इयं चानुपपन्ा। यदक् ु म् - 'रूपदशर् नान्यथानुपपत्या चक्षु र न्दर्यं पर्तीयते'। तदयुक्म्।
चक्षु र न्दर्यान्वयव्यितरेकसम्बन्धावधारणमन्तरेण अन्यकारणप रहारेण िनयतकारण-
पर्ितप त्ः अथार्पत्याऽनुपपन्ा-चक्षुरािदकरणस्य िपशाचािदतुल्यत्वात् न तदवगितः,
अवगतौ वा अथार्पत्यनुपप त्ः।
iyaṁ cānupapannā. yaduktam- ‘rūpadarśanānyathānupapatyā cakṣu-
rindriyaṁ pratīyate’. tadayuktam. cakṣurindriyānvayavyatirekasa-
mbandhāvadhāraṇamantareṇa anyakāraṇaparihāreṇa niyatakāraṇa-
pratipattiḥ arthāpatyā’nupapannācakṣurādikaraṇasya piśācāditulya-
tvāt na tadavagatiḥ, avagatau vā arthāpatyanupapattiḥ.
Translation: 1213
This is not proper. You said eyes are known because without eyes
the perception of color cannot be explained. This is not proper,
because, instead of ascertaining the relationship by the method
of positive and negative concomitance with the sense organ viz.
the eyes, it is not proper to ascertain the invariable cause through
presumption by excluding other causes. The instrument viz. the
sense organs of eyes is similar to ghost and hence, that cannot be
known and if it is known, the presumption becomes futile.
Text: 1214
यदप्युक्म् - 'अन्यथोपपद्ते' इित। अतर् काऽनुमा? अथवा रूपािदज्ञानस्यैव धिमर् त्वं
करणपूवर्किमित साध्यो धमर् ः कायर् त्वात् रथािदवत्। एवं सवार्थार्प त्िवषयत्वेन पर्योगव्यु-
त्पादनं कायर् म्। पर्त्यक्षपूवर्कत्वाच्च अथार्पत्ेः तदभावे तदभावात्।
414 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1222
अथ गोगवयसामान्यं सादृश्यशब्दवाच्यम्; तच्चानुपपन्म्, यथा च न सम्भवित तथा पर्ागेव
आवेिदतम्। भवतु नाम, िकं तदपु ल ब्धलक्षणपर्ाप्ं वा - पूवर्विद्भज्य दषू णं वक्व्यम्।
atha gogavayasāmānyaṁ sādṛśyaśabdavācyam; taccānupapannam,
yathā ca na sambhavati tathā prāgeva āveditam. bhavatu nāma,
kiṁ tadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ vā - pūrvavadvibhajya dūṣaṇaṁ
vaktavyam.
Translation: 1222
If you say, universal such as cowness, or, goyalness is the meaning
of the word similarity, that will not be proper. Why it will not be
proper, has already been explained before, or, let it be as you want.
Even then, you should. Answer the objections as raised above viz.
whether “that is verified by knowledge, or, not”.
Text: 1223
अथ धमार्न्तरम्; तदिप ऐ न्दर्यकम्, अती न्दर्यं वा?
atha dharmāntaram; tadapi aindriyakam, atīndriyaṁ vā?
Translation: 1223
If you say, similarity is some kind of other property, there also one
may ask whether that property can be known by senses, or, is it
beyond the range of senses.
Text: 1224
तद्िद ऐ न्दर्यकम्; तदा तस्य पूवोर्पलम्भे सित उत्रकालभािव यत् तस्य िवज्ञानं न तत्
स्मरणाकारतां प रत्यजित।
tadyadi aindriyakam; tadā tasya pūrvopalambhe sati uttarakālabhāvi
yat tasya vijñānaṁ na tat smaraṇākāratāṁ parityajati.
Translation: 1224
If you say, it can be known by senses, then, when it will be known
before, its knowledge through analogy later, will not be different
from remembrance.
Text: 1225
अथ तदपु ल ब्धलक्षण[म]पर्ाप्म्; न तिहर् तस्य क्विचदिप गर्हणम्। तदगर्हणे न गवयदशर् ने
सित 'मदीया गौरनेन सदृशी'त्यािदज्ञानेन शक्यते भिवतुम्। भवने वा गवय(या)दशर् नेऽिप
स्यात्।
418 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1227
अथ सम्प्लवन्यायेन कल्प्यते; भवतु, तथािप संज्ञी िवद्ते संज्ञा तु न िवद्ते। क्वोपमानं
प रकल्प्येत?
atha saṁplavanyāyena kalpyate; bhavatu, tathāpi saṁjñī vidyate
saṁjñā tu na vidyate. kvopamānaṁ parikalpyeta?
Translation: 1227
If you say, it is postulated on the basis of the maxim called
samplavanyāya, let it be so, still the meaning, or, referent is there,
but the word is not there and so where is the necessity of postulating
analogy?
[२. संज्ञापर्ितप त्िवषयकमतद्यस्य िनरासः।]
[2. saṁjñāpratipattiviṣayakamatadvayasya nirāsaḥ.]
Text: 1228
एके वद न्त - “स्वयमुच्चायर् संज्ञा पर्त्येित।” तदयुक्ं, संज्ञाकाले सादृश्यज्ञानस्य अनव-
स्थतेः।
eke vadanti - “svayamuccārya saṁjñā pratyeti.” tadayuktam, saṁ-
jñākāle sādṛśyajñānasya anavasthiteḥ.
Translation: 1228
Some scholars say, “after uttering by himself one comes to know the
name of the object.” This is not proper, because, at the time of the
word, the knowledge of similarity does not exist.
Text: 1229
अन्ये तु - “बुद्ध्युपस्थािपता संज्ञा पर्त्येित” एवमामन न्त। तदयुक्म्। अिवद्मानस्य
िवषयाथर् ता न लभ्यते - 'न सत्ामातर्ेण जनकत्वेन वा' इत्यािदना पर्ागेव उपपािदतम्।
anye tu - “buddhyupasthāpitā saṁjñā pratyeti” evamāmananti. tada-
yuktam. avidyamānasya viṣayārthatā na labhyate - ‘na sattāmātreṇa
janakatvena vā’ ityādinā prāgeva upapāditam.
Translation: 1229
Still others hold that, “one comes to know the name presented by
ones intellect.” That is also not correct, because, that which does not
exist cannot be the object of knowledge. We have already discussed
before “nor by mere existence, nor by the role of producing its
knowledge, can its existence be accepted.”
420 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1230
पर्त्यक्षपूवर्कं च उपमानमुद्गीयते। तदभावे तत्कथं भवेदव्यिभचारः येन िवज्ञानोत्पादकत्वेन
उपमानता, तच्चाव्यिभचा रत्वं न शक्यं(क्य)िवज्ञानिमित पूवर्मेवावेिदतम्।
pratyakṣapūrvakaṁ ca upamānamudgīyate. tadabhāve tatkathaṁ
bhavedavyabhicāraḥ yena vijñānotpādakatvena upamānatā, taccā-
vyabhicāritvaṁ na śakyaṁ(kya)vijñānamiti pūrvamevāveditam.
Translation: 1230
Analogy is said to be preceded by perception and when perception
is itself not there, how will it not lead to lack of inconsistency,
because of which there will be production of knowledge and thereby
the need for postulating an analogy. The fact that such absence of
inconsistency cannot be known has already been discussed before.
Translation: 1232
If you say, it is known, then, one would like to know, how is it
known? Is it known by excluding object of knowledge, or, is it known
excluding knowledge, or, is it known by that which reveals positive
entity?
Text: 1233
तद्िद मेयव्यावृत्या; तद्गितः कथम्? अथ मानव्यावृत्या; तदा इतरेतराशर्यत्वं
दरु
ु त्रमापद्ते।
tadyadi meyavyāvṛtyā; tadgatiḥ katham? atha mānavyāvṛtyā; tadā
itaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpadyate.
Translation: 1233
If it is known by excluding object of knowledge, then, how can it
be called knowledge? And if you say it is known by excluding the
knowledge, then, it will result into mutual dependency which cannot
be answered satisfactorily.
Text: 1234
अथ समानव्यावृत्या अवधायर् ते; सैव ज्ञातुमारब्धा - कथं ज्ञािपका भवित? न च
एका ज्ञाप्या अन्या ज्ञािपका भवित सदपु लम्भकपर्माणमातर्ापगमस्य ज्ञापकत्वेनेष्त्वाद्
अिनष्ादोषपर्सङ्ाच्च-सािप ज्ञािपका कथं ज्ञाता इत्यािदना।
atha samānavyāvṛttyā avadhāryate; saiva jñātumārabdhā - kathaṁ
jñāpikā bhavati? na ca ekā jñāpyā anyā jñāpikā bhavati sadupa-
lambhakapramāṇamātrāpagamasya jñāpakatveneṣṭatvād aniṣṭhā-
doṣaprasaṅgācca-sāpi jñāpikā kathaṁ jñātā ityādinā.
Translation: 1234
If you say that, it is decided by excluding the common ones, then,
in fact that is what we have started to know, then, how can it
cause the knowledge? It is not the case that, one is known and
the other causes the knowledge. When no verifying knowledge of a
positive entity is desired to be the producer of knowledge and when
it does not lead to a contingency which is not desired and which
does not contribute to any defect, how that which is the producer
of knowledge be the object of knowledge?
422 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1235
अथ सदपु लम्भकेन अवगम्यते; हीयते तिहर् अभावाख्यं पर्माणम्, मेयाभावावगमेऽिप
तदेवाऽस्तु।
atha sadupalambhakena avagamyate; hīyate tarhi abhāvākhyaṁ
pramāṇam, meyābhāvāvagame’pi tadevā’stu.
Translation: 1235
If you say, it is known by the verifying knowledge of existence of
positive entity, then, the process of knowing called absence should
be dropped and even in the case of knowing the absence of object
of knowledge, the same process of knowing the positive entity be
accepted.
Text: 1236
अथ अनवगतमेव मेयाभावेऽनुगमं करोित; यद्ेवं देवदत्स्य देशान्तरे िवनाशे
जाते देवदत्ोपलम्भकपर्माणपञ्कव्यावृत्ौ देवदत्ाभाविनश्चयः स्यात्, न तु भवित
पर्भुसमानस्यािप।
atha anavagatameva meyābhāve’nugamaṁ karoti; yadyevaṁ deva-
dattasya deśāntare vināśe jāte devadattopalambhakapramāṇapañca-
kavyāvṛttau devadattābhāvaniścayaḥ syāt, na tu bhavati prabhu-
samānasyāpi.
Translation: 1236
If you say that, even without being known, the process of knowing
called absence will cause the knowledge of absence of object, then,
when Devadatta has died at another place, then, there will be
determination of the absence of Devadatta only after the application
of the five processes of knowing Devadatta, such as perception etc.
Even that process of knowing which is like the monster cannot cause
such determination.
Text: 1237
अथ वस्तुभूतिनिमत्ान्तरवैकल्ये सित न भवित; तदेवास्तु तन्ान्तरीयत्वात् तद्गतेः।
atha vastubhūtanimittāntaravaikalye sati na bhavati; tadevāstu
tannāntarīyatvāt tadgateḥ.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 423
Translation: 1237
If you say that, in the absence of another real factor, such
confirmation does not arise. Then, let that alone be accepted
because, without that, such knowledge is not possible.
Text: 1238
अभावस्य च पर्त्यक्षपर्माणगर्ाह्तां पर्ितपादय न्त नैयाियकाः। सम्बन्धश्च िवषयिवषिय-
भावलक्षणः िवशेषणिवशेष्यभावलक्षणो वा।
abhāvasya ca pratyakṣapramāṇagrāhyatāṁ pratipādayanti naiyā-
yikāḥ. sambandhaśca viṣayaviṣayibhāvalakṣaṇaḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-
bhāvalakṣaṇo vā.
Translation: 1238
The Indian logicians explain that, absence can be known by
perception. The relation is accepted of the form of “container-
and-content”, or, of the nature of “qualifier-and-qualificand”.
Translation: 1240
The process of knowing (as accepted by the Paurāṇikas) called
Aitihya is included in śabdapramāṇa. That cannot be a valid source
of knowledge. Neither as a constituent part of an inference nor
independently.
Text: 1247
पर् सद्पदपदाथर् सम्बन्धपूवर्कं िह वाक्यं वाचकत्वेन गीयते। तदपर् सद्ौ वाक्यस्यािप
वाचकत्वं न सङ्च्छते। एवं चाऽवाचकत्वे वेदवाक्यानां कथं पर्ामाण्यम्?
prasiddhapadapadārthasambandhapūrvakaṁ hi vākyaṁ vācakatvena
gīyate.tadaprasiddhau vākyasyāpi vācakatvaṁ na saṅgacchate. evaṁ
cā’vācakatve vedavākyānāṁ kathaṁ prāmāṇyam?
Translation: 1247
Reply:
A sentence is said to express its meaning if it is preceded by
the knowledge of relationship between word and meaning. When
that itself is not known, it cannot be held that sentence expresses
meaning. Thus, when sentence does not express meaning, how can
the sentences of the Vedas be taken as authoritative?
Text: 1248
अथ अपर् सद्पदपदाथर् पूवर्कमिप वाक्यं वाचकत्वेनोद्गीयते; तदा सवर् पर्मातॄणां वेदोपलम्भे
सित वेदाथर् पर्ितप त्ः स्यात्। िकञ्, अदृष्िवषये वेदवाक्यानां पर्ामाण्यं कथं वे त्स?
atha aprasiddhapadapadārthapūrvakamapi vākyaṁ vācakatvenod-
gīyate; tadā sarvapramātṝṇāṁ vedopalambhe sati vedārthaprati-
pattiḥ syāt. kiñca, adṛṣṭaviṣaye vedavākyānāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ kathaṁ
vetsi?
Translation: 1248
If you say that, even if the knowledge of relationship between
word and its meaning is not known, a sentence can be said to be
expressive of meaning, then, after all knowers acquire the knowledge
of the Veda there will be the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda.
Moreover, how are you going to know that Vedic sentences are
authoritative with regard to an object which is beyond the range of
sense organ?
Text: 1249
वेदकै देशत्वेन इित चेत्; न, अथर् वदेववाक्येन न व्य(अथर् वादवाक्येन व्य)िभचारात्-
“गर्ावाणः प्लवन्ते, आिदत्यो वैष्णव इित चतुःषिष्वणार्नालोड् पर्जापितः पपौ”
इत्यािदना।
428 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1252
भवतु वा आप्ोक्त्वम्; पर्ामाण्ये िकमायातम्? िकं सत्ामातर्ेण पर्ामाण्य(म्), िवज्ञान-
जनकत्वेन वा?
bhavatu vā āptoktatvam; prāmāṇye kimāyātam? kiṁ sattāmātreṇa
prāmāṇya(m), vijñānajanakatvena vā?
Translation: 1252
Or, if you so wish, let the Vedic sentences be accepted as uttered
by reliable person. But what is obtained when they are treated
as authoritative? Are those Vedic sentences authoritative by their
mere existence, or, through generating knowledge?
Text: 1253
यिद सत्ामातर्ेण; तदयुक्म्; अकारकस्य पर्ामाण्यायोगात्।
yadi sattāmātreṇa; tadayuktam; akārakasya prāmāṇyāyogāt.
Translation: 1253
If you say, by mere existence, it will not be proper. If something
is not involved in function i.e. if it is not an instrumental case, it
cannot be said to be the process of knowing.
Text: 1254
अथ िवज्ञानजनकत्वेन पर्ामाण्यम्; त त्कम् एकलस्य, सहका रकारणोपच रतस्य वा?
atha vijñānajanakatvena prāmāṇyam; tatkim ekalasya, sahakāri-
kāraṇopacaritasya vā?
Translation: 1254
If you say, they are authoritative through generating knowledge,
then, we would like to know whether they themselves alone, or,
through association of auxiliary cause, they are authoritative.
Text: 1255
तद्िद एकलस्य; तदयुक्म्; स्वयमनभ्युपगमात्, कर्मयौगपद्ासम्भवाच्च।
tadyadi ekalasya; tadayuktam; svayamanabhyupagamāt, kramayau-
gapadyāsambhavācca.
Translation: 1255
If you say, they themselves, then, it will not be proper, because, you
yourself have not accepted such a position and also because nothing
like sequence, or, simultaneity will be possible.
430 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1256
अथ सहका रक(का)रणोपच रतेन जन्यते; यद्ेवं तदा सहका रकारणं दष्ु मप्यभ्येित,
तदनुरोधेन िवपरीतमिप ज्ञानं जनयित आप्ोक्त्वे सत्यिप। यथा अिभनवकम्बलसम्ब न्धनं
माणवकं दृष्ट्ा पर्वक्ा वाक्यमुच्चारयित - नवकम्बलकोऽयं माणवकः इित; शर्ोता
तु अधमर् मनःक्षोभािदना िनिमत्ेन नवत्वसंख्यायुक्कम्बलसम्ब न्धनं पर्ितपद्ते। तथा
पर्तारणबुद्ध्या नवत्वसंख्यायुक्कम्बलसम्बन्धी माणवक इत्युक्े अवदातकमार्नुरोधेन
पर्ितपत्ा अिभनवकम्बलसम्ब न्धनं पर्त्येित, तथा वेदवाक्यानामिप अवदातेतरकमार्नुवेधेन
िवपरीताथार्वबोधोत्पादकत्वमुपपद्ते। तथा, भूतोपघातचेतोिवक(का)रमनःक्षोभािदना वा
िनिमत्ेन।
atha sahakārika(kā)raṇopacaritena janyate; yadyevaṁ tadā saha-
kārikāraṇaṁ duṣṭamapyabhyeti, tadanurodhena viparītamapi
jñānaṁ janayati āptoktatve satyapi. yathā abhinavakambala-
sambandhinaṁ māṇavakaṁ dṛṣṭvā pravaktā vākyamuccārayati -
navakambalako’yaṁ māṇavakaḥ iti; śrotā tu adharmamanaḥkṣo-
bhādinā nimittena navatvasaṁkhyāyuktakambalasambandhinaṁ
pratipadyate. tathā pratāraṇabuddhyā navatvasaṁkhyāyuktakamba-
lasambandhī māṇavaka ityukte avadātakarmānurodhena prati-
pattā abhinavakambalasambandhinaṁ pratyeti, tathā vedavākyānā-
mapi avadātetarakarmānuvedhena viparītārthāvabodhotpādakatva-
mupapadyate. tathā, bhūtopaghātacetovika(kā)ramanaḥkṣobhādinā
vā nimittena.
Translation: 1256
If you say, authoritativeness is produced in association with the
auxiliary cause, then, it is possible that the auxiliary cause is faulty
and accordingly a Vedic sentence may generate false cognition also
in spite of the fact that it is uttered by a reliable person. As after
seeing a boy associated with a new blanket, the speaker says “this
boy has new blanket” but the listener of that sentence understands
that the boy has got association with nine blankets because of the
ground such as lack of righteousness and disturbance of mind etc.
Similarly, when someone utters that this boy is associated with
nine blankets, in order to abuse him the listener of the sentence
understands the same boy having association with new blanket, in
accordance with the good work performed by that boy (the word
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 431
’nava’ in Sanskrit can be understood in two senses, (1) nine and (2)
new). In the same way, it is possible to demonstrate that the Vedic
sentences also can generate false cognition in accordance with works
other than good deeds. Similarly, such situation can arise because
of some other ground such as change in the mental state due to
physical factor, hesitation of mind and the like.
[३. अपौरुषेयत्वेन वेदस्य पर्ामाण्यं स्वीकुवर् तां मतस्य व्युदासः।]
[3. apauruṣeyatvena vedasya prāmāṇyaṁ svīkurvatāṁ matasya
vyudāsaḥ.]
Text: 1257
अन्ये तु कुमितमतानुसा रणो वद न्त - वेदस्य पर्ामाण्यमन्यथा-अपौरुषेयत्वेन।
पुरुषा िह रागािदिवपरीतचेतसो िवपरीतमुपपादय न्त, न च वेदिवधातृसम्भवोऽ स्त।
तदक्ु म्-िनत्यो वेदः अस्मयर् माणकतृर्[क]त्वात् व्योमािदवत्। वेदवेधसोऽपगमे तदायत्ा
दोषा व्यपगता भव न्त। ते िह िवधातृसत्ानुवितर् नः तदव(प)गमे कथमवितष्ेरन्। तेषामपाये
कथमपर्माणमाशङ्क्यते वेदः। यदक् ु म्-
दोषाः स न्त न सन्तीित पौरुषेयेषु युज्यते।
वेदे कतुर्रभावात्ु दोषाशङ्ै व ना स्त नः॥ (तत्वसङ्गर्हः, का रका २८९५)
(Ślokavā.sū.2.ślo.184)
Text: 1260
अथवा सत्यिप िवशेषणोपादाने हेतोः िवपक्षगमनं न िनवारियतुं पायर् ते, यथा
कृतकत्विवशेषणोपादानेऽिप न पर्मेयत्वस्य व्यावृ त्र स्त।
athavā satyapi viśeṣaṇopādāne hetoḥ vipakṣagamanaṁ na nivā-
rayituṁ pāryate, yathā kṛtakatvaviśeṣaṇopādāne’pi na prameya-
tvasya vyāvṛttirasti.
Translation: 1260
Or, even if specific qualifier is added, still no one can stop occurrence
of the ground in a locus which is not the subject of the inference
i.e. the locus were the existence of the absence of probandum is
confirmed. For example, even if the qualification “the state of being
produced” is added no one can exclude the state of being object of
a true cognition being there.
Text: 1261
अथ कृतकत्वं; तदेव गमकं व्यावृत्त्वात्। न ह्ेकस्य व्यावृत्ौ अन्यस्य व्यावृ त्र स्त,
अितपर्सङ्ात्।
atha kṛtakatvaṁ; tadeva gamakaṁ vyāvṛttatvāt. na hyekasya
vyāvṛttau anyasya vyāvṛttirasti atiprasaṅgāt.
Translation: 1261
If you say, it is the state of being produced, then, that itself is the
ground which is excluded from all the rest. It is not the case that,
when one is excluded, other gets also excluded, because, it will lead
to over-application of the statement.
Text: 1262
िकञ्, साध्यिवरुद्े हेतोः(तौ) िकं िवशेषणोपादनम् तिद्परीते वा?
kiñca, sādhyaviruddhe hetoḥ(tau) kiṁ viśeṣaṇopādanam tadviparīte
vā?
Translation: 1262
Moreover, what qualification can be added to a ground which
establishes just opposite of what is intended to be established, or,
do you want to say that, the qualification is to be added what is
opposite of it.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 435
Text: 1263
तद्िद िवरुद्े; तदाऽनथर् कं िवशेषणोपादनम्।
tadyadi viruddhe; tadā’narthakaṁ viśeṣaṇopādanam.
Translation: 1263
If it is in the ground which establishes what is opposite of what is to
be established, then, the adding of the qualification is meaningless.
Text: 1264
अथ अिवरुद्ेप्येवमेव - निह िवशेषणेन िवरुद्स्वभावता, व्यावतर् ते, यथा कृतकत्व-
िवशेषणोपादानेऽिप न चाक्षुषत्वस्य शब्दे वृ त्लाभः। तथा देशकु(का)लोच्छे दाभाव-
िवशेषणोपादानेऽिप अस्मयर् माणकतृर्(क)त्वस्य न िवपक्षाद् व्यावृ त्र स्त।
atha aviruddhepyevameva - nahi viśeṣaṇena viruddhasvabhāvatā,
vyāvartate, yathā kṛtakatvaviśeṣaṇopādāne’pi na cākṣuṣatvasya
śabde kṛttilābhaḥ. tathā deśaku(kā)locchedābhāvaviśeṣaṇopādāne’pi
asmaryamāṇakartṛ(ka)tvasya na vipakṣād vyāvṛttirasti.
Translation: 1264
Again, if it is added to that which is not contradictory, the same
will be the consequence, because, just by adding a qualification the
nature of being contradictory cannot be removed. For example, even
if we add the qualification “the state of being produced” the state of
being perceived by eyes cannot occur in sound. Similarly, even if you
say we add a qualification viz. “absence of destruction of space and
time, the state of not remembering the creator cannot be excluded
from the locus where the existence of absence of probandum is
confirmed.
Text: 1265
अ सद्ोप्ययं हेतुः यस्मात्स्मर न्त एव कतार्रं काणादाः। तथा लौिकका अिप बहलं वक्ारो
भव न्त - 'बर्ह्णा वेदाः पर्णीताः' इित।
asiddhopyayaṁ hetuḥ yasmātsmaranti eva kartāraṁ kāṇādāḥ. tathā
laukikā api bahulaṁ vaktāro bhavanti - ‘brahmaṇā vedāḥ praṇītāḥ’
iti.
Translation: 1265
This ground is also not an established ground, because, the followers
of the school of Kaṇāda do remember the creator of the Veda.
436 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Similarly, we also find many ordinary people saying that the Vedas
are created by the Brahman.
Text: 1266
अिप च िकमशेषजनस्मरणिनवृ त् रह हेतुत्वेन िवविक्षता, आहो स्वत् कितपयपुरुष-
स्मरणिविनवृ त्ः?
api ca kimaśeṣajanasmaraṇanivṛttiriha hetutvena vivakṣitā, āhosvit
katipayapuruṣasmaraṇavinivṛttiḥ?
Translation: 1266
Moreover, do you want to say that, your ground is destruction of
remembrance of all people, or, the destruction of remembrance of a
few people?
Text: 1267
तद्िद सकलजनस्मरणिविनवृ त्ः; तदाऽ सद्ा, अवधारियतुमशक्यत्वाच्च अवार्ग्भाग-
िविद्ः। अवधारणे वा त एव सवर् ज्ञाः स्युः अवार्ग्भागिवदो न भवेयःु ।
tadyadi sakalajanasmaraṇavinivṛttiḥ; tadā’siddhā, avadhārayitu-
maśakyatvācca arvāgbhāgavidbhiḥ. avadhāraṇe vā ta eva sarvajñāḥ
syuḥ arvāgbhāgavido na bhaveyuḥ.
Translation: 1267
If you say that, destruction of remembrance of all people is a ground,
then, such a ground is not established, because, it can never be
known by those who know the later part and if you say that, it can
be known, then, they will become all-knowing and not those who
know the earlier part.
Text: 1268
अथ कितपयपुरुषापेक्षया; तदानैका न्तको हेतुः, िवद्मानकतृर्केष्विप कतार् न स्मयर् ते
कै श्चत्।
atha katipayapuruṣāpekṣayā; tadānaikāntiko hetuḥ, vidyamāna-
kartṛkeṣvapi kartā na smaryate kaiścit.
Translation: 1268
If you say that, in comparison to some people it can be known, then,
such a ground will suffer from the defect of inconsistency because,
sometimes even if there is creator, the creator is not remembered.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 437
Text: 1269
अन्यच्च, कितपयैः पुरुषैनर् स्मयर् ते - अथार्दापद्ते - पुरुषान्तरस्मयर् माणकतृर्को वेदः
िवशेषपर्ितषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुज्ञा िवषयत्वात्। न च पुरुषजन्यत्वेन वेदस्याऽपर्ामाण्यम्, अिप
तु पुरुषदोषोत्पाद्त्वेन। अतः स एव अपनेयः न पुरुषव्यापारः।
anyacca, katipayaiḥ puruṣairna smaryate - arthādāpadyate - puruṣā-
ntarasmaryamāṇakartṛko vedaḥ viśeṣapratiṣedhasya śeṣābhyanujñā
viṣayatvāt. na ca puruṣajanyatvena vedasyā’prāmāṇyam, api tu
puruṣadoṣotpādyatvena. ataḥ sa eva apaneyaḥ na puruṣavyāpāraḥ.
Translation: 1269
Not only that, if you say, some people do not remember the creators
of the Veda, it implies that the Veda is created by some other people.
This is in tune with the maxim that when a particular is negated
the remaining members become known. It is not the case that, Veda
is not authoritative because, it is produced by a human being, but
it is so because, it is produced by the defects in the human being
and therefore, that defect is to be excluded and not the function of
creation by human being.
Text: 1270
अथ पुरुषस्य दोषा धकरणत्वे तज्जन्यत्वे दोषजन्यत्वमप्याशङ्क्यत इित चेत्;
atha puruṣasya doṣādhikaraṇatve tajjanyatve doṣajanyatvamapyā-
śaṅkyata iti cet;
Translation: 1270
Clarification:
Well, if a human being is accepted as locus of defects and if such a
human being is accepted as producer of Veda, then, obviously one
can doubt that the Veda is produced by the defects of a human being.
Text: 1271
यद्ेवम् इ न्दर्याणामिप दोषा धकरणत्वेन तदत्ु पािदतिवज्ञानानामपर्ामाण्यं समाशंक्यत
इित सवर् तर् पर्ामाण्यानास्वा(श्वा)सः स्यात्। न च अस्मयर् माणकतृर्कत्वेन वेदशब्दाना-
मपौरुषेयत्वसं सिद्ः, अन्यथािप अस्मयर् माणकत्ृर्कत्वमुपपद्ते - केनािप िवदग्धमितना
वेदसन्दोहमुत्पाद् आत्मा अपह्ूयते - 'नाहं वेदानां िवधाता' इित।
yadyevam indriyāṇāmapi doṣādhikaraṇatvena tadutpāditavijñānā-
nāmaprāmāṇyaṁ samāśaṅkyata iti sarvatra prāmāṇyānāsvā(śvā)-
438 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1274
अथ पुरुषगतगुणदोषव्यावृत्ौ िनसगर् गुणानुवेधेन पर्ामाण्यिमष्यते; पुरुषगुणदोषव्यावृत्ौ
िनसगर् दोषानुवेधेनापर्ामाण्यं िकन् गीयते?
atha puruṣagataguṇadoṣavyāvṛttau nisargaguṇānuvedhena prāmāṇya-
miṣyate; puruṣaguṇadoṣavyāvṛttau nisargadoṣānuvedhenāprāmāṇyaṁ
kinna gīyate?
Translation: 1274
If you say that, by excluding good qualities and defects of the author
on the basis of the natural qualities, the authoritativeness of the
Veda is desired, then, by excluding the virtues and defects of the
author on the basis of the natural defects, why don’t you say that
the Vedas are not authoritative?
Text: 1275
अिप च यथा अपौरुषेयत्वे सत्यिप रागािददोषसम्ब न्धता उपलभ्यते, तथा वेदेऽिप
भिवष्यित।
api ca yathā apauruṣeyatve satyapi rāgādidoṣasambandhitā upala-
bhyate, tathā vede’pi bhaviṣyati.
Translation: 1275
Moreover, in spite of the fact that, some thing is without an author,
one can find relationship with defects such as attachment. In the
same way this will happen with regard to the Veda also.
Text: 1276
िकञ्, अपौरुषेयत्वेन कत्ृर्दोषापगमः कृतः, शर्ोतृदोषास्तु केनापनीयन्ते। तथा िह -
अथर् पर्ितपत्ौ तानपेक्षय िवपरीतां पर्ितप त्मिभिनवर् तर्ियष्यित। ततश्च िनत्यानामिप
कत्ृर्कमर् णां दष्ु सहका रकारणानुवेधेन िवपयर् यािदज्ञानहेतुत्वमुपपद्ते न वाक्यानां
पर्माणपर्ितलम्भः।
kiñca, apauruṣeyatvena karttṛdoṣāpagamaḥ kṛtaḥ, śrotṛdoṣāstu
kenāpanīyante. tathā hi - arthapratipattau tānapekṣya viparītāṁ
pratipattimabhinirvartayiṣyati. tataśca nityānāmapi karttṛkarma-
ṇāṁ duṣṭasahakārikāraṇānuvedhena viparyayādijñānahetutvamupa-
padyate na vākyānāṁ pramāṇapratilambhaḥ.
Translation: 1276
Moreover, by removing the authorship of the Veda you could remove
the defects of the author. But how are you going to remove the
440 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
arising from the Vedic injunction is not false? If it is not false, then,
the knowledge of thread-like things appearing in the knowledge for
a person who comes into the shade from the sun cannot be false?
Text: 1285
अथ तस्या[:] पर्तीयमानाथार्ऽसम्भवेन िमथ्यात्वम्; तिदहािप तदेवास्तु।
atha tasyā[ḥ] pratīyamānārthā’sambhavena mithyātvam; tadihāpi
tadevāstu.
Translation: 1285
If you say, since there is impossibility of the content in that
knowledge, that knowledge is false. The same logic is applicable
in the present case also.
Text: 1286
अथ चोदनाजिनतिवज्ञानाथर् स्य पुनः सद्ावो भवित तेन तस्य यथाथर् त्वम्। न तु
केशोण्डु किवज्ञानस्य कदािचदिप सद्ावोऽ स्त।
atha codanājanitavijñānārthasya punaḥ sadbhāvo bhavati tena tasya
yathārthatvam. na tu keśoṇḍukavijñānasya kadācidapi sadbhāvo’sti.
Translation: 1286
Clarification:
Well, since the object of the knowledge arising from a Vedic
injunction emerges again and therefore, that knowledge is
considered to be true. But in the case of knowledge of thread-like
things appearing in the knowledge for a person who comes into the
shade from the sun, never that content of that knowledge is found
to exist (therefore, the knowledge arising from the Vedic injunction
is found to be true.)
Text: 1287
सोऽयं िवषभक्षणेन परं पर्त्याययित तपस्वी। चोदनाथर् स्य पश्चाद्वनं तिद्ज्ञानानुपयोिग,
त स्मन् काले ज्ञानस्य अस्तिमतत्वात्, िवज्ञानकाले च अथर् स्य(स्या)सम्भवात्।
so’yaṁ viṣabhakṣaṇena paraṁ pratyāyayati tapasvī. codanārthasya
paścādbhavanaṁ tadvijñānānupayogi, tasmin kāle jñānasya asta-
mitatvāt, vijñānakāle ca arthasya(syā)sambhavāt.
444 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1287
Reply:
It is something like a saint causing the experience to another person
(the effect of poison) by consuming poison. If the object of the
knowledge arising from the Vedic sentence occurs later, it is of no
use to that knowledge, because, when that object will come into
being at the time that knowledge will no longer be there and when
there is knowledge, there is no possibility of its object being there.
Text: 1288
अथवा, इयमेव बाधा यदत ु असम्भाव्यमानाथर् स्य पर्ितपादकत्वं यथा तन्तु-तु र-
कारकोपिनपाते सित वस्ािदकायर् मुपजायमानं दृष्म्। पुनः पटा थर् ने उपदेशो दीयते-
'तन्तूनामुपादानं कुरुष्व' इित। न त्वेवं सप्तन्त्ववदातकमर् णोः साध्यसाधनसम्ब-
न्धावधारणम्, नापूवर्म्, येनातर् उपदेशस्य साफल्यं भवित। एवं तावदक्ु े न न्यायेन शब्दानां
वाचकत्वेन पर्ामाण्यं न युज्यते।
athavā, iyameva bādhā yaduta asaṁbhāvyamānārthasya pratipā-
dakatvaṁ yathā tantu-turi-kāra- kopanipāte sati vastrādikāryamupa-
jāyamānaṁ dṛṣṭam. punaḥ paṭārthine upadeśo dīyate - ‘tantūnāmu-
pādānaṁ kuruṣva’ iti. na tvevaṁ saptatantvavadātakarmaṇoḥ
sādhyasādhanasambandhāvadhāraṇam, nāpūrvam, yenātra upade-
śasya sāphalyaṁ bhavati. evaṁ tāvaduktena nyāyena śabdānāṁ
vācakatvena prāmāṇyaṁ na yujyate.
Translation: 1288
Or, this may be the meaning of contradiction that explanation of
that thing which is not going to come. For example, when there
are factors like threads, weaver’s shaft, and other factors, one finds
that the effect viz. the cloth comes into being. Thereafter, again
when some one is in need of cloth, he says go and fetch threads. It
is not the case that the relation of cause-and-effect is determined
between seven threads and the action of their fetching. Neither there
is something called apurva by which one can say that the instruction
has become fruitful. In this way, as per the above mentioned logic it
is not proper to hold that, words are dependable since they express
their meanings.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 445
Translation: 1291
Other philosophers say that, an understanding of the meaning
arises from a sentence containing grammatically correct words.
Grammaticality is to be tested in terms of the rules of grammar.
The word lakṣaṇa stands for grammatical rules and lakṣya refers to
the word cow etc.
Text: 1292
अथ िकिमदं नाम यल्क्षणेन परमिषर् गिदतेन सूतर्कलापेन लक्षयते? िकं गकारादयो वणार्ः,
वणेर्भ्योऽथार्न्तरं वा पदं स्फोटरूपम्?
atha kimidaṁ nāma yallakṣaṇena paramarṣigaditena sūtrakalāpena
lakṣyate? kiṁ gakārādayo varṇāḥ, varṇebhyo’rthāntaraṁ vā padaṁ
sphoṭarūpam?
Translation: 1292
Objection:
Well, what is that which is described by a set of rules uttered by
the great sage? Is it the case that the phonemes such as ‘g’ etc.
are described, or, something different from the phonemes viz. word
called sphota is described?
Text: 1293
तद्िद वणार्ः; ते िकं िनत्याः सन्तः
tadyadi varṇāḥ; te kiṁ nityāḥ santaḥ
Translation: 1293
Reply: If you say, phonemes are described, are they called a word
since they are permanent, or, since they are produced?
Text: 1294
पदसंज्ञा भव न्त, उत उपजननधमर् काः? तद्िद िनत्याः कूटस्थाः सन्तो वणार्ः पदसंज्ञा
भव न्त; ततर् िकं व्यस्ताः, समुिदता वा?
padasaṁjñā bhavanti, uta upajananadharmakāḥ? tadyadi nityāḥ
kūṭasthāḥ santo varṇāḥ padasaṁjñā bhavanti; tatra kiṁ vyastāḥ,
samuditā vā?
Translation: 1294
If you say that, they are permanent, the phonemes become words,
I would like to know, whether individually they are called so, or,
collectively?
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 447
Text: 1295
तद्िद व्यस्ताः; सनातना एते पदसंज्ञा भव न्त, तदा गवणेर्नव ै केवलेन गोऽथर् पर्ितपादनं
िकर्यते, ओकारेण वा अथर् पर्ितपादनं िकर्यते। ततश्च पूवार्परवणोर्च्चारणानथर् क्यम्। न
चातर्ैक स्मन् वणेर् िवभक्त्यन्तता अ स्त, अिप तु वणर् कदम्बके िवभक्त्युत्पादाभ्युपगमात्।
tadyadi vyastāḥ; sanātanā ete padasaṁjñā bhavanti, tadā gavarṇe-
naiva kevalena go’rthapratipādanaṁ kriyate, okāreṇa vā artha-
pratipādanaṁ kriyate. tataśca pūrvāparavarṇoccāraṇānarthakyam.
na cātraikasmin varṇe vibhaktyantatā asti, api tu varṇakadambake
vibhaktyutpādābhyupagamāt.
Translation: 1295
If you say, collectively, then, the question arises whether being
permanent they become word, or, whether by mere the phoneme ‘g’
the meaning of cow is conveyed, or, by the phoneme ‘o’ the meaning
is conveyed? If it is so, then, the utterance of the phonemes before
and after becomes purposeless. It is also not the case that individual
phonemes end in case terminations because case suffixes are added
only after the group of phonemes i.e. a word.
Text: 1296
अथ समुिदतानां पदसंज्ञा। तदयु(द)ु क्म् - “बहनां संघातशब्दवाच्यत्वम्, न ह्ेक स्मन्
संघातशब्दपर्योगोऽ स्त, अिप तु गकारौकारिवसजर् नीयेषु समुदायशब्दः पर्युज्यते।”
तदयुक्म्, वणार्नां नानाता िवद्ते। वणोर् िह अवणार्त् वणार्त्मतया व्यावत्र्ते वणार्न्तरात्ु
कथं व्यावत्र्ते? िकं वणार्कारतया अवणार्त्मतया वा?
atha samuditānāṁ padasaṁjñā. tadayu(du)ktam-“bahūnāṁ saṅghā-
taśabdavācyatvam, na hyekasmin saṁghātaśabdaprayogo’sti,
api tu gakāraukāravisarjanīyeṣu samudāyaśabdaḥ prayujyate.”
tadayuktam, varṇānāṁ nānātā vidyate. varṇo hi avarṇāt
varṇātmatayā vyāvarttate varṇāntarāttu kathaṁ vyāvarttate?
kiṁ varṇākāratayā avarṇātmatayā vā?
Translation: 1296
If you say that, the collection of phonemes will be called a word, that
will also not be proper, because, when there are many phonemes it
should be called mere a collection of phonemes. The word collection
is not used with reference to one. But the word collection can be
448 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1299
Moreover, there is no proof which can cause the knowledge of
eternity of phonemes. It has already been explained that proofs like
perception etc. are all not dependable. Moreover, we experience
sometimes the ‘g’ sound as sharp and sometimes as soft and
therefore one will have to posit many ‘g’ sounds and therefore, it is
not true that the phoneme ‘g’ is only one.
Text: 1300
अथ व्यञ्कवशेन तीवर्मन्दािदबुद्ेरुत्प त्ः। न गवणर् स्य भेदोऽ स्त; तदयुक्म्, गवणर् एव
पर्तीयते तीवर्मन्दाद्ात्मतया न व्यञ्कािन गवणर् बुिद्वार्।
atha vyañjakavaśena tīvramandādibuddherutpattiḥ. na gavarṇasya
bhedo’sti; tadayuktam, gavarṇa eva pratīyate tīvramandādyātmatayā
na vyañjakāni gavarṇabuddhirvā.
Translation: 1300
If you say, the perception of softness, sharpness arises due to some
other revealing factor and there is no difference in the phoneme
called ‘g’, it will not be proper, because, what is realized is only the
phoneme as soft and sharp and neither the revealing factors nor the
knowledge of the sound ‘g’.
Text: 1301
यिद व्यञ्कभेदेन तीवर्मन्दािदभेदप रक्लृिप्ः िकर्यते गवणार्त्मा तु न िभद्ते; तदा
गकारािदिवभागोऽिप व्यञ्कभेदिनबन्धनोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, वणार्त्मा त्वेक एव। ततश्च
गवाथर् पर्ितप त्नर् पर्ाप्नोित एक स्मन् वणेर् सुप् िवभक्त्यनुपपत्ेः।
yadi vyañjakabhedena tīvramandādibhedapariklṛptiḥ kriyate gava-
rṇātmā tu na bhidyate; tadā gakārādivibhāgo’pi vyañjakabheda-
nibandhano’bhyupagantavyaḥ, varṇātmā tveka eva. tataśca gavār-
thapratipattirna prāpnoti ekasmin varṇe sup vibhaktyanupapatteḥ.
Translation: 1301
If you say that, due to the revealing factors, there arises the
difference viz. sharp and soft but the phoneme ‘g’ is not changed,
then, the different phonemes like ‘g’ etc. should also be accepted
due to the difference in the revealing factor. The form of phoneme
being only one. That will again result in the contingency of not
450 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1304
If you say, it produces without any excellence emerging in it, then,
it should always keep on producing, or, it can produce only once
because, in that form there is no possibility of delay in time.
Text: 1305
अथ अव्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन िकर्यते; तथािप सनातना वणार्ः, अव्यित रक्ाितशय-
करणपक्षे स एवोपजायते, फलािनष्प त्करणस्वरूपाऽनितवृत्ेः।
atha avyatiriktopajātātiśayena kriyate; tathāpi sanātanā varṇāḥ,
avyatiriktātiśayakaraṇapakṣe sa evopajāyate, phalāniṣpattikaraṇa-
svarūpā’nativṛtteḥ.
Translation: 1305
If you say that, it produces due to emerging of excellence not
different from it, still, the phonemes will remain eternal and in
the view that there is excellence not different from itself, the same
will come into being because it will not be free from its form of not
producing the result.
Text: 1306
अथ व्यित रक्ोपजाताितशयेन िकर्यते; तस्याितशयः कथम्? यो यस्य केनािप सम्बन्धेन
न सं(०न्धेन सं) बन्ध्यते स तस्याितशयः।
atha vyatiriktopajātātiśayena kriyate; tasyātiśayaḥ katham? yo
yasya kenāpi sambandhena na saṁ(0ndhena saṁ) bandhyate sa
tasyātiśayaḥ.
Translation: 1306
If you say, it produces due to emerging of excellence different from
itself, then, how can it be called excellence of that? Because, an
excellence has to be that which is related to that by some relation.
Text: 1307
यिद च अन्तिहर् तवणर् स्मरणिविशष्ोऽन्त्यो वणर् ः पदम्; तस्यािप स्मरणकाले ितरोिहत-
त्वादवाचकत्वम् - “तस्य व्यञ्कानां क्षिणकत्वात् क्षणोपल ब्धः” इित वचनात्।
yadi cāntarhitavarṇasmaraṇaviśiṣṭo’ntyo varṇaḥ padam; tasyāpi
smaraṇakāle tirohitatvādavācakatvam-“tasya vyañjakānāṁ kṣaṇi-
katvāt kṣaṇopalabdhiḥ” iti vacanāt.
452 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1307
If you say that, the last phoneme in the sequence qualified by the
remembrance of the phonemes which have disappeared, is what is
called a word, then, that also will become inexpressive of meaning
because, that also will disappear at the time of remembrance. There
is a statement to the effect viz. “since the revealing phonemes are
momentary in nature, only momentary phoneme can be known.”
Text: 1308
यिद वणार् व्यञ्कैव्यर् ज्यन्ते तदा समानदेशाव स्थतं समाने न्दर्यगर्ाह्ाणां पर्ितिनयत-
व्यञ्कत्वेनेष्म् एकान्तगर् तोदककनकादीनां वद न्त वैशेिषकाः।
yadi varṇā vyañjakairvyajyante tadā samānadeśāvasthitaṁ samā-
nendriyagrāhyāṇāṁ pratiniyatavyañjakatveneṣṭam ekāntargato-
dakakanakādīnāṁ vadanti vaiśeṣikāḥ.(?)
Translation: 1308
If you say that, the phonemes are revealed by revealing factors then,
(……….the text is not clear).
Text: 1309
अथ अिनत्या वणार्ः पदसंज्ञा भवन्तीित चेत्; ततर्ािप िकं व्यस्ताः, समस्ता वा?
atha anityā varṇāḥ padasaṁjñā bhavantīti cet; tatrāpi kiṁ vyastāḥ,
samastā vā?
Translation: 1309
If you say that, non-eternal phonemes are called a morpheme, there
also we would like to know whether individually they are called so,
or, in a collection.
Text: 1310
तद्िद व्यस्ताः; तदा गकारौकारिवसजर् नीयान्यतमे वणेर् न िवभक्त्युत्पादोऽ स्त, उत्पादे वा
एको वणर् ः वाचकः स्यात्-वणार्न्तरोच्चारणानथर् क्यम्।
tadyadi vyastāḥ; tadā gakāraukāravisarjanīyānyatame varṇe na
vibhaktyutpādo’sti, utpāde vā eko varṇaḥ vācakaḥ syāt-varṇāntaro-
ccāraṇānarthakyam.
Translation: 1310
If you say, individually they are called morpheme, then, no case
suffix is found added, or, can be added after any one phoneme viz.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 453
either ‘g’, or, ‘au’, or, ‘visarga’. And if you say that, in spite of that it
can be added, then, you will have to accept that a single phoneme
will become the expressive of a meaning and not only that, the
utterance of other phonemes will become redundant.
Text: 1311
अथ वणर् समुदायः पदम्; पर्ितक्षणध्वं सनां समुदायाथोर् वक्व्यः, बहनामव स्थतरूपाणां
समुदायो लोके दृष्ः, न च वणार्नां भूयस्त्वम स्त उक्ान्न्यायात्। िकञ्
अन्त्यवणर् गर्हणानन्तरं पूवर्वणर् स्मरणम्, पूवर्वणर् स्मरणानन्तरम् अन्त्यवणेर् ज्ञानम्,
ततश्चास्य अथर् पर्ितप त्काले पदं [न] िवद्ते तेनाऽपिदकाऽथर् पर्ितप त्ः स्यात्।
atha varṇasamudāyaḥ padam; pratikṣaṇadhvaṁsināṁ samu-
dāyārtho vaktavyaḥ, bahūnāmavasthitarūpāṇāṁ samudāyo loke
dṛṣṭaḥ, na ca varṇānāṁ bhūyastvamasti uktānnyāyāt. kiñca
antyavarṇagrahaṇānantaraṁ pūrvavarṇasmaraṇam, pūrvavarṇa-
smaraṇānantaram antyavarṇe jñānam, tataścāsya arthaprati-
pattikāle padaṁ [na] vidyate tenā’padikā’rthapratipattiḥ syāt.
Translation: 1311
If you say that, collection of phonemes, is a morpheme, then, you
should tell us what is the meaning of collection when every moment
the phonemes gets destroyed. In the world of our experience we find
a collection of many things which continue to exist. On the basis of
the above maxim, we cannot say that there are many phonemes.
Moreover, after the hearing of the last phoneme, there will be
remembrance of the earlier phonemes and after the remembrance of
earlier phonemes, there will be the knowledge of the last phoneme.
And thus, at the time of the meaning, no morpheme will be available
and therefore, such a knowledge of meaning will become something
which is not caused by any morpheme.
Text: 1312
न च कायर् रूपता वणार्नां िवद्ते। सती सत्ा संवेद्ते। िवज्ञानोत्पत्ेः पूवर् वेद्स्य सत्ा,
पश्चािद्ज्ञानम्। तद्ेद्ं िकम्-अधुनोत्पन्ं िवषयतां याित, िचरोत्पन्म्, अनुत्पन्ं वा?
नालमालोचियतुं ज्ञानम्, तत्स्वरूपमातर्ा स्तत्विवधायकत्वेन तदत्ु पत्ेः।
na ca kāryarūpatā varṇānāṁ vidyate. satī sattā saṁvedyate.
vijñānotpatteḥ pūrvaṁ vedyasya sattā, paścādvijñānam. tadvedyaṁ
454 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1316
तद्िद सत्ामातर्ेण; तदा जनकं रूपं न स्यात्।
tadyadi sattāmātreṇa; tadā janakaṁ rūpaṁ na syāt.
Translation: 1316
If you say, by mere existence, then, that cannot be taken as a cause.
Text: 1317
अथ कारकत्वेन गृह्ते; िकम् आत्मजनकत्वेन, आहो स्वद् अन्यजनकत्वेन?
atha kārakatvena gṛhyate; kim ātmajanakatvena, āhosvid anyaja-
nakatvena?
Translation: 1317
If you say, as a producer of an effect, there we would like to know,
whether it produces its own form, or, does it produce something
other than itself.
Text: 1318
तद्िद आत्मजनकत्वेन गृह्ते; तदात्मा तेनोत्पाद्ते न वणर् ः।
tadyadi ātmajanakatvena gṛhyate; tadātmā tenotpādyate na varṇaḥ.
Translation: 1318
If you say, it is known as it produces itself, then, it means that, the
same is produced by that and not the phoneme.
Text: 1319
अथ अन्यजनकत्वेन अवधायर् ते; तदा अन्यस्य सत्ा सद्ा। तह्ार्(नह्ा)िक्षप्ान्यसद्ाव
एव सद्ावोऽस्याध्यवसीयते, ततः तत्समानकालीनत्वेन हेतुफलभावाऽ सिद्ः।
atha anyajanakatvena avadhāryate; tadā anyasya sattā siddhā.
tarhyā(nahyā)kṣiptānyasadbhāva eva sadbhāvo’syādhyavasīyate,
tataḥ tatsamānakālīnatvena hetuphalabhāvā’siddhiḥ.
Translation: 1319
If you say that, it is known as it produces something, then, it will
establish existence of something else. In that case, then, one will
come to know that, it exists only after one knows that something
else exists and in that case, both will be of the same time, and
hence the cause-and-effect relationship between them cannot be
established.
456 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1320
िकञ्, पूवार्परभावेन हेतुफलभावः, िकं वा पूवार्परगर्हणेन?
kiñca, pūrvāparabhāvena hetuphalabhāvaḥ, kiṁ vā pūrvāparagra-
haṇena?
Translation: 1320
Moreover, should we decide cause and effect relationship on the
basis of a sequence of prior and later, or, on the basis of knowledge
of prior and later.
Text: 1321
तद्िद पूवार्परभावेन हेतुफलभावः; तदा ज्ञानं िवना 'अ स्त' कथं ज्ञायते? ज्ञानाभावे-
नाऽज्ञाने िकं पूवोर्त्पन्ौ सहोत्पन्ौ वा?
tadyadi pūrvāparabhāvena hetuphalabhāvaḥ; tadā jñānaṁ vinā ‘asti’
kathaṁ jñāyate? jñānābhāvenā’jñāne kiṁ pūrvotpannau sahotpa-
nnau vā?
Translation: 1321
If you say, the basis of prior and later is cause and relationship,
then, without knowledge, how can you say that it exists? Well,
the knowledge does not arise, when there is absence of knowledge,
how to say that they are produced before, or, they are produced
together.
Text: 1322
अथ पूवार्परगर्हणेन हेतुफलभावव्यवस्था इित; तदयुक्म्, अिनयतं गर्हणं दृष्म्-कायर्
दृष्ट्ा कारणं गृह्ाित, कारणं दृष्ट्ा कायर् गृह्ाित, उभयं च युगपद् गृह्ाित। एवं
च स्थते न हेतुफलभाविविनश्चयोऽ स्त। तदभावान्ाऽिनत्या वणार्ः पदं भिवतुमहर् ित।
atha pūrvāparagrahaṇena hetuphalabhāvavyavasthā iti; tadayuktam,
aniyataṁ grahaṇaṁ dṛṣṭam-kāryaṁ dṛṣṭvā kāraṇaṁ gṛhṇāti,
kāraṇaṁ dṛṣṭvā kāryaṁ gṛhṇāti, ubhayaṁ ca yugapat gṛhṇāti.
evaṁ ca sthite na hetuphalabhāvaviniścayo’sti. tadabhāvānnā’nityā
varṇāḥ padaṁ bhavitumarhati.
Translation: 1322
If you say that, with knowledge of prior and later, the cause and
effect relationship can be decided, that is also not proper, because
we do not see consistent knowledge about it. Sometimes after seeing
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 457
the effect one comes to know the cause, sometimes having seen
the cause, one comes to know the effect and sometimes both are
known as cause and effect. When such is the case, one cannot decide
cause and effect relationship. And when there is no cause and effect
relationship, we cannot hold that the non-eternal phonemes can be
called a morpheme.
Text: 1323
अथ वणेर्भ्योऽथार्न्तरभूतं पदं वणर् व्यङ्ग्यस्फोटरूपमभ्युपगम्यते।
atha varṇebhyo’rthāntarabhūtaṁ padaṁ varṇavyaṅgyasphoṭarūpa-
mabhyupagamyate.
Translation: 1323
Well, a morpheme distinct from the phonemes of the nature of a
concept, suggested by the phonemes, is accepted.
Text: 1324
वणार्नां िकल अथर् पर्त्यायकत्वं व्यस्तसमस्तानां सम्भवित, अ स्त च सा अथर् पर्ितप त्ः
तेन अथार्न्तरभूतं वणेर्भ्यः पदं िवद्ः। अिभन्ाकारा च पर्ितप त्वर् णेर्ष्वनुपपन्ा तेन वणेर्भ्यो
िभन्म् अिभन्ाकारं पदमध्यवसीयते।
varṇānāṁ kila arthapratyāyakatvaṁ vyastasamastānāṁ sambha-
vati, asti ca sā arthapratipattiḥ tena arthāntarabhūtaṁ varṇebhyaḥ
padaṁ vidmaḥ. abhinnākārā ca pratipattirvarṇeṣvanupapannā tena
varṇebhyo bhinnam abhinnākāraṁ padamadhyavasīyate.
Translation: 1324
The phonemes independently, or, in a collection convey meanings
and we do have understanding of such meaning and therefore, we
understand a morpheme as distinct from the phonemes. It is not
proper to say that, there arises the knowledge of identity with the
phonemes and therefore, in a morpheme having an identical form
but different from phonemes is accepted.
Text: 1325
यत्ावदक्ु म् - “अथर् पर्ितपत्यन्यथानुपपत्या पदमवगम्यते” तदयुक्म्, अथार्पत्ेः पर्ामाण्य-
मेव ना स्त। यथा च न िवद्ते तथा पर्ागेव पर्पिञ्तम्।
yattāvaduktam - “arthapratipatyanyathānupapatyā padamavaga-
myate” tadayuktam, arthāpatteḥ prāmāṇyameva nāsti. yathā ca na
vidyate tathā prāgeva prapañcitam.
458 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Translation: 1325
“You had said a morpheme is accepted because without that the
knowledge of meaning cannot be explained”. But this is not proper,
because, we had already shown that pre-supposition is not a valid
means of knowing. How it cannot be accepted as the valid means
of knowing, has already been discussed before.
Text: 1326
न च पदेन सह पर्ितबद्ा अथर् पर्ितप त्ः अवगतपूवार् येन अन्यकारणप रहारेण पदं
बोधयित। पर्त्यक्षं च पर्माणमेव न भवित। कथं तत् पदपर्ितपादनाय अलम्? न च िनत्यस्य
िवज्ञानाद्थर् िकर्याकरणसामथ्यर् म स्त। एवं लक्षयभूतं पदं न िवद्ते। तदभावािन्िवर् षयं
पारमाथर्(मषर्) लक्षणिमित।
na ca padena saha pratibaddhā arthapratipattiḥ avagatapūrvā
yena anyakāraṇaparihāreṇa padaṁ bodhayati. pratyakṣaṁ
ca pramāṇameva na bhavati. kathaṁ tat padapratipādanāya
alam? na ca nityasya vijñānādyarthakriyākaraṇasāmarthyamasti.
evaṁ lakṣyabhūtaṁ padaṁ na vidyate. tadabhāvānnirviṣayaṁ
pāramārthaṁ(marṣaṁ) lakṣaṇamiti.
Translation: 1326
It is not our experience that, the knowledge of meaning arises
invariably in association with a morpheme. Had it been so, we could
have said that, since there is no other factor responsible for such
an understanding, it is the morpheme that causes the knowledge of
the meaning. Perception cannot be the valid means in this respect
because, it is not a valid means at all. Then how is it capable of
causing the knowledge of a morpheme? It is not the case that, a
permanent entity has the capacity to generate any function such
as cognition etc. Thus, there is nothing called a morpheme which
needs to be defined and when that is not there its definition is not
left with any object.
Text: 1327
अिप च, यािन लक्षणपरािण सूतर्ािण तेषां लक्षणं िवद्ते, न वा? यिद िवद्ते; ततर्ािप अन्यद्
अतर्ािप इत्यिनष्ायां च न िकिञ्त् पदं ज्ञानं(तं) स्यात्।
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 459
explain them, then, the words of the rules of Pāṇini should also
be declared as ungrammatical because, there are no rules for them.
Text: 1331
अिप च, यिद नाम लक्षणिवकलता शब्दस्य; तदा िकं भवित? िकमुच्चारियतुमर् ुखभङ्ः
सम्पद्ते, शब्दस्य वा अवाचकत्वम्, अथर् स्य वा रूपिवपयार्सो जायते, िकं वा अपशब्द-
पर्ितपािदताथर् स्य अथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वं हीयते, अपशब्दोच्चारणे सित अमङ्लोदयो वा भवित?
api ca, yadi nāma lakṣaṇavikalatā śabdasya; tadā kiṁ
bhavati? kimuccārayiturmukhabhaṅgaḥ sampadyate, śabdasya vā
avācakatvam, arthasya vā rūpaviparyāso jāyate, kiṁ vā apaśabda-
pratipāditārthasya arthakriyākartṛtvaṁ hīyate, apaśabdoccāraṇe
sati amaṅgalodayo vā bhavati?
Translation: 1331
Moreover, if you say, a word does not have any rule to explain
it, what happens? Does the vocal cavity of the speaker break, or,
the word becomes inexpressive, or, meaning gets distorted, or, the
meaning obtained from an ungrammatical word does not cause its
function, or, is it the case that, if someone utters ungrammatical
word, something inauspicious takes place?
Text: 1332
तद्िद तावत् पर्वक्ृमुखभङ्ो भवित गावीशब्दोच्चारणे सित; तदैते बहलं गावीशब्दोच्चारणं
कुवार्णाः समुपलभ्यन्ते पर्वक्ारः, न च तेषां मुखभङ्ः समुपलभ्यते।
tadyadi tāvat pravaktṛmukhabhaṅgo bhavati gāvīśabdoccāraṇe sati;
tadaite bahulaṁ gāvīśabdoccāraṇaṁ kurvāṇāḥ samupalabhyante
pravaktāraḥ, na ca teṣāṁ mukhabhaṅgaḥ samupalabhyate.
Translation: 1332
If you say, the vocal cavity of the speaker breaks, when he utters the
word gāvī, in the sense of cow, it is not true because, innumerable
speakers are found uttering the word gāvī, but nobody’s vocal cavity
is seen to have broken.
Text: 1333
अथ गावीशब्दस्य वाचकत्वं नोपपद्ते; तदयुक्म्, गावीशब्देन बहलं व्याहर न्त पर्मातारः।
atha gāvīśabdasya vācakatvaṁ nopapadyate; tadayuktam, gāvī-
śabdena bahulaṁ vyāharanti pramātāraḥ.
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 461
Translation: 1333
If you say that, the word gāvī is not expressive of its meaning, which
is not proper, because, innumerable knowers use the word gāvī.
Text: 1334
अथ गोऽथर् पर्ितिपत्सूनां गावीशब्दशर्वणानन्तरं गोशब्दे स्मृितरुपजायते स च गवाद्थर् वाचक
इित चेत्;
atha go’rthapratipitsūnāṁ gāvīśabdaśravaṇānantaraṁ gośabde
smṛtirupajāyate sa ca gavādyarthavācaka iti cet;
Translation: 1334
Clarification:
Well, those who want to know the meaning ‘cow’, remember the
word ‘go’ after hearing the word gāvī, because, it is the word ‘go’
which is expressive of the word ‘cow’.
Text: 1335
तदयुक्म्, म्लेच्छादीनां साधुशब्दप रज्ञानाभावात् कथं तिद्षया स्मृितः? तदभावे न
गोऽथर् पर्ितप त्ः स्यात्।
tadayuktam, mlecchādīnāṁ sādhuśabdaparijñānābhāvāt kathaṁ
tadviṣayā smṛtiḥ? tadabhāve na go’rthapratipattiḥ syāt.
Translation: 1335
Reply:
It is not proper. The tribals do not have the knowledge of standard
grammatical form and so how can they remember the word ‘go’ and
in absence of remembrance, they should not have the knowledge of
cow from the word gāvī (which is contrary to the fact)
Text: 1336
अथ अथर् स्य रूपिवपयार्सो भवित; तदयुक्म्, न गावीशब्देन अिभधीयमानस्य गोरूपता
व्यावत्र्माना दृष्ा।
atha arthasya rūpaviparyāso bhavati; tadayuktam, na gāvīśabdena
abhidhīyamānasya gorūpatā vyāvarttamānā dṛṣṭā.
Translation: 1336
If you say that, the meaning gets distorted, that is also not proper.
Nobody has seen that what is expressed by the word ‘gāvī’, is not
a cow.
462 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
Text: 1337
अथ अथर् िकर्याकतृर्त्वं हीयते; तदयुक्म्, गावीशब्देन अिभधीयमानस्य वाहदोहपर्सव-
सामथ्यर् नाितवतर् ते गोिपण्डस्य।
atha arthakriyākartṛtvaṁ hīyate; tadayuktam, gāvīśabdena abhidhī-
yamānasya vāhadohaprasavasāmarthyaṁ nātivartate gopiṇḍasya.
Translation: 1337
If you say, it does not cause the function viz activities related to
the cow, it will not be proper, because, whatever is conveyed by the
word ‘gāvī’, is the animal called cow, which is not devoid of capacity
of carrying load, milking and giving birth to a calf.
Text: 1338
अथ गावीशब्दोच्चारणादमङ्लोदयो भवित, न तु वाचकत्वं िनरािकर्यते असाधुशब्दस्य।
तदक्
ु म्-
अपशब्दोऽनुमानेन वाचकः कै श्चिदष्यते।
वाचकत्वाऽिवशेषेऽिप िनयमः पुण्यपापयोः॥
atha gāvīśabdoccāraṇādamaṅgalodayo bhavati, na tu vācakatvaṁ
nirākriyate asādhuśabdasya. taduktam-
apaśabdo’numānena vācakaḥ kaiścidiṣyate,
vācakatvā’viśeṣe’pi niyamaḥ puṇyapāpayoḥ.
Translation: 1338
If you think that by uttering the word ‘gāvī’ something inauspicious
is going to take place, and you are not denying the fact that an
ungrammatical non-standard form also expresses its meaning as it
is supported by the following statement, “Some thinkers conclude by
inference that, a non-standard ungrammatical word also expresses
its meaning, although there is no difference so far as its expressive
character is concerned, a grammatical form leads to something
auspicious that is meritorious and an ungrammatical form leads
to something inauspicious, or, demeritorious.”
Text: 1339
तदयुक्म्, तेन सह पर्ितबन्धाभावात्। न चापो स्तत्वगर्ाहकं(?) पर्माणम स्त। अन्यथैव
काले च न म्ले च्च[त]व्यिमित िनयमोऽभ्युपगम्यते। न च शुद्म्, अन्यतर् प ण्डतानामिप
व्यवहारोदयदानदशर् नात्।
tadayuktam, tena saha pratibandhābhāvāt. na cāpostitvagrā-
hakaṁ(?) pramāṇamasti. anyathaiva kāle ca na mlecci[ta]vyamiti
niyamo’bhyupagamyate. na ca śuddham, anyatra paṇḍitānāmapi
vyavahārodayadānadarśanāt.
Translation: 1339
That is also not proper, because, there is no invariable relationship
with merit and demerit. There is no proof to support it. At times,
the injunction, “One should not use dialectical and non-standard
form” is interpreted differently. It is not correct, because, even the
learned people are seen to entertain such usage.
0.16 गर्न्थोपसंहारः
Granthopasaṁhāraḥ
(Conclusion)
Text: 1340
तदेवमुपप्लुतेष्वेव तत्वेषु अिवचा रतरमणीयाः सवेर् व्यवहारा घटन्त इित।
ये याता निह गोचरं सुरगुरोः बुद्ेिवर् कल्पा दृढाः,
पर्ाप्यन्ते ननु तेऽिप यतर् िवमले पाखण्डदपर् च्छिद।
भट्शर्ीजयरािशदेवगुरुिभः सृष्ो महातोर्दयः-
तत्वोपप्लव संह एष इित यः ख्याितं परां यास्यित॥
पाखण्डखण्डनािभज्ञा ज्ञानोद धिवविद्र्ताः।
जयराशेजर्यन्तीह िवकल्पा वािद जष्णवः॥
संवत् १३४९ मागर् ० विद ११ शनौ धवलकक्के महं० नरपालेन तत्वोपप्लवगर्न्थपु स्तका
लेखीित। भदर्म्॥
tadevamupapluteṣveva tattveṣu
avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti.
ye yātā nahi gocaraṁ suraguroḥ buddhervikalpā dṛḍhāḥ,
prāpyante nanu te’pi yatra vimale pākhaṇḍadarpacchidi
bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśidevagurubhiḥ sṛṣṭo mahārtodayaḥ-
tattvopaplavasiṁha eṣa iti yaḥ khyātiṁ parāṁ yāsyati.
pākhaṇḍakhaṇḍanābhijñā jñānodadhivivarddhitāḥ
jayarāśerjayantīha vikalpā vādijiṣṇavaḥ.
Translation: 1340
In this way, when all that you consider to be real, cannot be proved
to be real, it is nice to say that, all our behaviors with the world are
going smoothly only until we do not reflect on them critically. Even
those doubts or critical questions which could not become the object
of knowledge of even Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the Gods, have
been raised by the teachers viz. Shri Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, for the sake of
removing the pride of the fools. This text called Tattvopaplavasiṁha
composed by them has a great future and it is going to be very
famous. These doubts, or, critical questions of Jayarāśi which know
how to refute the stubborn and which will expand the ocean of
knowledge are indeed capable of winning over the arguments of the
opponents. The manuscript of this book called Tattvopaplavasiṁha
was written by Narapal in the place called Dhavalkkaka on Saturday
the 11th day of the Kṛṣṇapakṣa in the month called Mārgaśīrṣa in
the Samvat 1349.
पदसूची
465
466 Jayarāśibhaṭṭa’s
तोपविसंहगतािन िवशेषनामािन
काणाद, 426
जयरािश, 453
तत्वोपप्लव संह,1,453
तथागत, 221
ताथागत, 115, 146, 312
िदगम्बर, 301
धवलक्कक, 453
नरपाल, 453
नैयाियक, 7, 26, 52, 61, 125, 189, 239, 250, 282, 292, 322, 409, 414,
बृहस्पित, 2, 183
बौद्, 188, 308, 396
िभक्षु, 169
मीमांसक, 96, 105, 101, 114, 228, 309, 311
लक्षणसार, 88
वेदिवद्, 114,
शर्ुितलालस, 99
शर्ोितर्य, 105
सांख्य, 239, 301
सुगत, 92
सूतर्कार, 301
सौगत, 127, 135, 174, 182, 187, 211, 227, 436
तोपविसंहगतािन अवतरणािन
अथातस्तत्वम् - धया च न सा
अथेर्न घटयत्येनाम् - न िकल अवयवी
अपशब्दोनुमानेन - न िकल िवज्ञानम्
अपर्त्यक्षोपलम्भस्य - नग् शर्मणक दबु र् ुद्े
अथर् पर्ितपत्यन्यथानुपपत्या - न िवकल्पानुबद्स्य (पर्माणवा.३.२८३)
अथोर्पयोगेऽिप पुनः - न ह्ाभ्यामथर् प र च्छद्
अवयिविनराकरणे - ना स्त घटसामान्यम्
अवयवे चलित - िनत्यस्य कर्मेतराभ्याम्
अिवनाभावसम्बन्धस्य - पररूपतयाऽसत्वम्
अिवसंवािदज्ञानम् (पर्माणवा. २.१) - परलोिकनोऽभावात्
आदशर् मण्डले मुखरूपताम् - पृ थव्यापस्तेजोवायु रित
Tattvopaplavasiṁha 477