32 INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V CHED

INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY
vs.
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
G.R. NO. 139371, 04 APRIL 2001
FACTS:
In October 1996, Dr. Reynaldo B. Vera, Chairman, Technical Panel for Engineering,
Architecture, and Maritime Education (TPRAM) of CHED, received a letter from Douglas R.
Macias, Chairman, Board of Aeronautical Engineering, Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC) and Chairman, Technical Committee for Aeronautical Engineering (TPRAME) inquiring
whether petitioner had already acquired University status in view of the latter's advertisement
in the Manila Bulletin.
Dr. Vera formally referred the aforesaid letter to Chairman Alcala with a request that
CHED conduct appropriate investigation on the alleged misrepresentation by petitioner. CHED
requested the Regional Director in Cebu City to investigate and report. The Report stated that
there was a violation committed by his institution when it used the term university unless the
school had complied with the basic requirement of being a university as prescribed in CHED
Memorandum Order No. 48, s. 1996.'
The report stated that, in May 1996, Petitioner Indiana Aerospace University, used the
term “University” in their name in an advertisement of a local newspaper in Cebu City after the
IAU President was advised by Director Gaduyon to do so. This was a violation as the school had
yet to meet the requirements under CHED to earn the title of University.
CHED’s Legal Affairs directed the petitioner to stop using University in its name. The
Petitioner asked for a reconsideration but was denied by the CHED; hence, petitioners filed a
Complaint for Damages with prayer for Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against. In response, CHED filed a motion to dismiss.
The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of IAE and denied the CHED’s motion to dismiss but CA
reversed the ruling, stating that petitioner had no cause of action against Respondent as
petitioner failed to show any evidence that it had been granted university status by respondent
as required under existing law and CHED rules and regulations and that a certificate of
incorporation under an unauthorized name does not confer upon petitioner the right to use the
word "university" in its name.
ISSUE:
May the Petitioner be stopped from using “University”?
RULING:
YES. The petitioners may be stopped from using the word University
The court concurred with CA that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Respondent. Petitioner failed to establish a
clear right to continue representing itself to the public as a university. Indeed, it has no vested
right to misrepresent itself. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that
(1) there must be a right in esse be protected, and

(2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed must have violated such right.
The establishment and the operation of schools are subject to prior authorization from the
government. No school may claim to be a university unless it has first complied with the
prerequisites provided in Section 34 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Section 3,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, limits the grant of preliminary injunction to cases in which the
plaintiff is clearly entitled to the relief prayed for.
We also agree with the finding of the CA that the act sought to be enjoined by petitioner
is not violative of the latter’s rights. Respondent’s Cease and Desist Order merely restrained
petitioner from using the term "university" in its name. It was not ordered to close, but merely
to revert to its authorized name; hence, its proprietary rights were not violated.
NOTE: There are multiple parts of the decision; ultimately, even though the CA was correct in
ruling that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was proper due to the reasons above, the Motion
to Dismiss by the respondents should not have been permitted as when a motion to dismiss is
grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the
facts alleged in the complaint. The court must pass upon this issue based solely on such
allegations, assuming them to be true. For it to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a
denial of the plaintiff's right to due process. In this case, the CA went beyond its limited
jurisdiction under Rule 65 when it reversed the trial court and dismissed the Complaint on the
ground that petitioner had failed to state a cause of action. The RTC had yet to conduct a trial,
but the CA already determined the factual issue regarding petitioner’s acquisition of university
status, a determination that is not permitted in certiorari proceedings.

32 INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V CHED

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32 INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V CHED

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INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY

May the Petitioner be stopped from using “University”?

(1) there must be a right in esse be protected, and

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