Article XI - In the present case, Mapue’s admission, in her

sworn statement, of misappropriating court funds

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers shows her blatant disregard of the principles of
and employees must at all times be accountable to the public office she had sworn to uphold. As found by
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, the OCA, her restitution of the total amount did
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and not exonerate or mitigate her liability, as this was
lead modest lives. done after the discovery of the misappropriation.
Furthermore, Mapue already deprived the Court
1. Hipolito v. Mergas (A.M. No. P-90-412, 11 March 1991) of the interest otherwise earned had the
- The investigating judge submitted that the acts of confiscated bonds been deposited in the GF or JDF.
respondent deputy sheriff are improper and not In Office of the Court Administrator v. Besa,18 the
conducive to the best interest of the service. Court found respondent therein liable for
Respondent was held to have committed acts dishonesty and dismissed her from the service due
which may be called "moonlighting" and which are to her own admission that she misappropriated
contrary to civil service rules and regulations. He the fiduciary funds for her personal use. Gross
observed that respondent is not supposed to be dishonesty is a grave offense and merits the
following up extraneous matters outside Manila, penalty of dismissal even for the first offense.
in other government offices and for private
individuals, to the prejudice of his work in the 3. Belgica v. Ochoa (GR 208566, 19 November 2013)
judiciary as a deputy sheriff of the Regional Trial - The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of
Court of Manila. the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public
- Respondent failed to refute the fact that he was office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder
indeed involved in the work and processes that every instrumentality of government should
involved in the application for the small scale exercise their official functions only in accordance
mining permit for complainant Marisol C. Hipolito. with the principles of the Constitution which
This clearly shows that respondent failed to embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust.
observe and maintain that degree of dedication to The notion of a public trust connotes
the duties and responsibilities required of him as a accountability, hence, the various mechanisms in
deputy sheriff. Thus, it bears mention at this the Constitution which are designed to exact
juncture that although he appears to have been accountability from public officers.
exonerated by the prosecutor of the criminal - Among others, an accountability mechanism with
charges proffered against him, such absolution is which the proper expenditure of public funds may
not per se a bar to administrative sanctions where be checked is the power of congressional
called for by the malfeasance, misfeasance or oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,
nonfeasance of a public officer. congressional oversight may be performed either
- While "moonlighting" is not normally considered through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘
as a serious misconduct, nonetheless, by the very power of appropriation and the budget hearings
nature of the position held by respondent, it conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
obviously amounts to a malfeasance in office. In heads of departments to appear before and be
sum, he is bound, virtute officii, to bring to the heard by either of its Houses on any matter
discharge of his duties that prudence, caution and pertaining to their departments and its power of
attention which careful men usually exercise in confirmation; or (b) investigation and monitoring
the management of their own affairs. Finally, of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
public service requires utmost integrity and power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit legislation.
at all times the highest sense of honesty and - The Court agrees with petitioners that certain
integrity features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013
2. OCA v. Buencamino (AM P-05-2051, 21 January 2014) PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional
- The Constitution mandates that a public office is a oversight. The fact that individual legislators
public trust and that all public officers must be are given post-enactment roles in the
accountable to the people, and serve them with implementation of the budget makes it difficult
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.15 for them to become disinterested "observers"
The demand for moral uprightness is more when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
pronounced for members and personnel of the the implementation of the appropriation law.
judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would
justice.16 As front liners in the administration of be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with
justice, court personnel should live up to the post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the checking on activities in which they themselves
public service. participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this
 very same concept of post-enactment with disbarment during the incumbency of such
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI public office
- Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the - Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into
various phases of project implementation – a account the commentaries of the leading legal
matter before another office of government – luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion
renders them susceptible to taking undue on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is
advantage of their own office. impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the
impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2,
4. Salumbides v. OMB (GR 180917, 23 April 2010) Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In
- Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his
give proper attention to a task expected from an deputies, is impeachable.
employee resulting from either carelessness or - The impeachable officers are the President of the
indifference.37 In the present case, petitioners fell Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of
short of the reasonable diligence required of them, the Supreme Court, the members of the
for failing to exercise due care and prudence in Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may
soundness of the projects before stamping their not be increased or reduced by legislative
imprimatur and giving their advice to their enactment. The power to impeach is essentially a
superior. non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised
- When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or by the Congress only within the limits of the
she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform authority conferred upon it by the Constitution.
the duties of the office and use reasonable skill This authority may not be expanded by the
and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to
of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a strengthen the security of tenure of other officials
public officer is to use that prudence, caution, and of the government.
attention which careful persons use in the
management of their affairs.43Public service SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
public servants must exhibit at all times the (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
By the very nature of their duties and citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
responsibilities, public officers and employees thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render within ten session days, and referred to the proper
inviolate the constitutional principle that a public Committee within three session days thereafter. The
office is a public trust; and must at all times be Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the session days from receipt thereof.
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of each Member shall be recorded.
public trust. All other public officers and employees may (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
impeachment. Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
5. OMB v. CA, 452 SCRA 714 (2005) forthwith proceed.
- Barely two months later, we issued another (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
Resolution in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales,[22] the same official more than once within a period of one
concerning the same charges for disbarment year.
brought against Justice Fernan, wherein we cited (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
the above ruling to underscore the principle all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose,
involved in the case, that [a] public officer who the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
under the Constitution is required to be a member President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
office held by him and who may be removed from person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
office only by impeachment, cannot be charged thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend established (Sec. 6). All of said actions of the
further than removal from office and disqualification to Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but for impeachment initiated by at least one-fifth of
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject all the members of the Batasan. Their purpose is
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. to determine whether or not a complaint for
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment initiated by the required number of
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this members of the Batasan warrants being referred
section. to the Batasan for trial. They are not properly part
of the "initiation phase" of the impeachment
7. Romulo V. Yñ iguez, 141 SCRA 263 (1986) proceeding but of the "trial phase", or more
- In any event, We find no basis for the contention accurately the "preparatory to trial" phase. Such
of petitioners that Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the actions are liken to actions taken by this Court in
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment are violative determining whether a petition duly filed should
of the provisions of the Constitution on be given due course or should be dismissed
Impeachment. As We said in Arturo de Castro vs. outright.
Committee on Justice, et at (G.R. No. L-71688),
"beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate 8. In Re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)
impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all - It is important to underscore the rule of
its members and that no official shall be convicted constitution law here involved. This principle may
without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of be succinctly formulated in the following terms. A
all the members thereof, the Constitution says no public officer who under the Constitution is
more." The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
rules of its proceedings (Article VIII, Sec. 8[31, qualification for the office held by him and who
may adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of may be removed from office only by impeachment,
procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. cannot be charged with disbarment during the
The rules it adopted providing for dismissal of a incumbency of such public officer. Further, such
complaint for impeachment which is not sufficient public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
in form or substance, or when sufficient grounds charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or
for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause any other court with any offence which carries
has not been established, or requiring a majority with it the penalty of removal from office, or any
vote of all members of the Batasan for the penalty service of which would amount to removal
approval of the resolution setting forth the from office.
Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with - It is important to make clear that the Court is not
the provision of Section 3 of Article XIII of the here saying that it Members or the other
1973 Constitution. constitutional officers we referred to above are
- More specifically, the provision requiring entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
concurrence of at least two-thirds votes of all criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons
members of the Batasan for conviction is not of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior.
violated by any provision of the Rules which What the Court is saying is that there is a
authorizes dismissal of a petition by a majority fundamental procedural requirements that must
vote of the Batasan since with such number of be observed before such liability may be
votes it is obvious that the two-thirds vote of all determined and enforced. A Member of the
members necessary for conviction can no longer Supreme Court must first be removed from office
be obtained. Such being the case, the Batasan can via the constitutional route of impeachment under
specify in its rules how and when the Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
impeachment proceedings can be terminated or Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme
dismissed for Section 3, Article XIII merely Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment,
provides for how a judgment of conviction can be he may then be held to answer either criminally or
sustained but is respondent on how a complaint administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for
for impeachment can be dismissed when it any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven
becomes apparent that a judgment of conviction against him in appropriate proceedings.
by the required number of votes is not possible.
- Neither is the Constitutional provision to the effect 9. Marcoleta v. Brawner, 582 SCRA 474 (2009)
that impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at - At the outset, the Court, guided by its
least one-fifth of the members violated by the pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman,17 In
provision of the Rules authorizing the Committee Re: Raul M. Gonzales18 and Cuenco v. Fernan,19
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to has laid down the rule that an impeachable
dismiss the complaint for impeachment which it officer20 who is a member of the Bar cannot be
finds not sufficient in form and substance (Sec. 4), disbarred without first being impeached.
does not have sufficient grounds for impeachment Complainant’s availment of Section 1 (1) of Article
(Sec. 5), or where probable cause has not been
 IX-C of the Constitution to skirt this rule is criminal or administrative proceedings against
specious. him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement
- At the time the present complaint was filed, to avoid prosecution.
respondents and three other commissioners21 - There is another reason why petitioners
were all lawyers. As an impeachable officer who is contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar,
at the same time a member of the Bar, respondent the records show that when petitioner resigned on
Borra must first be removed from office via the January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him
constitutional route of impeachment before he before the Ombudsman. While these cases have
may be held to answer administratively for his been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained
supposed errant resolutions and actions. from conducting the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
10. Francisco et al. v. House Speaker (GR160261, 10 President then, petitioner was immune from suit.
November 2003) Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
- Father Bernas further explains: The as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction
"impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot
the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
because that is the end of the House proceeding contemplates of cases whose investigation or
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable
the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
initiated when the House deliberates on the sitting President.
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, - Petitioner contends that the impeachment
because something prior to that has already been proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
done. The action of the House is already a further under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and even assuming arguendo that it is an
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. administrative proceeding, it can not be
This is the initiating step which triggers the considered pending at the time petitioner
series of steps that follow. resigned because the process already broke down
- Having concluded that the initiation takes place by when a majority of the senator-judges voted
the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the against the opening of the second envelope, the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee public and private prosecutors walked out, the
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of
the members of the House of Representatives with Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings
the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect,
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an no impeachment case pending against petitioner
impeachment complaint has been initiated, when he resigned.
another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period. 12. Gutierrez v. House (GR 193459, 15 February2011)
- The determination of sufficiency of form and
11. Estrada v. Desierto (GR 146740-15 and GR146738, 2 substance of an impeachment complaint is an
March 2001; and MR, 3 April2001) exponent of the express constitutional grant of
- There was hardly any debate on the prohibition rule-making powers of the House of
against the resignation or retirement of a public Representatives which committed such
official with pending criminal and administrative determinative function to public respondent. In
cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the discharge of that power and in the exercise of
the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act its discretion, the House has formulated
of resignation or retirement from being used by a determinable standards as to the form and
public official as a protective shield to stop the substance of an impeachment complaint.
investigation of a pending criminal or Prudential considerations behoove the Court to
administrative case against him and to prevent his respect the compliance by the House of its duty to
prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or effectively carry out the constitutional purpose,
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal absent any contravention of the minimum
Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to constitutional guidelines.
render service for that would be a violation of his - Since the Constitutional Commission did not
constitutional right. A public official has the right restrict promulgation to publication, the former
not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. should be understood to have been used in its
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a general sense. It is within the discretion of
public official is facing administrative or criminal Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
 promulgate a decision means to deliver the former enlarges what the latter limited. Said
decision to the clerk of court for filing and constitutional provision delegates to the
publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co- lawmaking body the determination of "such other
equal branch of government how to promulgate offenses" committed by public officers over which
when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction.
specific method of promulgation. The Court is in Accordingly, the President of the Philippines,
no position to dictate a mode of promulgation exercising his lawmaking authority and
beyond the dictates of the Constitution. prerogative vested in him by the Constitution,
- Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which
states that the term initiate means to file the mandates in Section 4(c) thereof that the
complaint and take initial action on it. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint crimes or offenses committed by public officers or
which must be accompanied with an action to set employees, including those employed in
the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the government-owned or controlled corporation, in
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress relation to their office."
taking initial action of said complaint. The initial - Thus, the provision proscribes removal from office
action taken by the House on the complaint is the of the aforementioned constitutional officers by
referral of the complaint to the Committee on any other method; otherwise, to allow a public
Justice. officer who may be removed solely by
impeachment to be charged criminally while
SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the holding his office with an offense that carries the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its penalty of removal from office, would be violative
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. of the clear mandate of the fundamental.

13. Nuñ ez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)

- It is to be made clear that the power of the then SECTION 5. There is hereby created the independent
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to
to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least
challenged in this proceeding. While such one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A
competence under the 1973 Constitution separate Deputy for the military establishment may
contemplated that such an act should come from likewise be appointed.
the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments
made clear that he as incumbent President "shall SECTION 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be
continue to exercise legislative powers until known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall
martial law shall have been lifted. " 17 Thus, there continue to function and exercise its powers as now or
is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred
Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 18 decided on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Constitution.
Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality
of such law-making authority by the President 15. Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843 (1988)
during the period of Martial Law, ... . 19 As the - Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is
opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent
authority to legislate, but a recognition of such Tanodbayan (caged Special Prosecutor under the
power as already existing in favor of the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain
incumbent President during the period of Martial powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Law. Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and to direct
14. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 (1984) the filing of criminal cases with the
- It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
provision that respondent court has Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective
jurisdictional competence not only over February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been
criminal and civil cases involving graft and divested of such authority.
corrupt practices committed by public officers - Under the present Constitution, the Special
and employees but also over other crimes Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate
committed by them in relation to their office, of the Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can
though not involving graft and corrupt practices, investigate and prosecute cases only upon the
as may be determined by law. latter's authority or orders. The Special
- There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases
Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as but can only conduct the same if instructed to do
amended, is violative of the provision of Section 5 so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to
of Article XIII of the New Constitution because the issue subpoena, which he still claims under
 Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed first furnish the respondent public officer or
transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, employee with a summary of the complaint and
however, retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor in require him to submit a written answer within
connection with the cases he is ordered to seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In
investigate. the instant case, the BIR officials concerned were
never furnished by the respondent with a
16. BIR v. Ombudsman (GR 115103, 11 April 2002) summary of the complaint and were not given the
- Petitioner BIR insists that the investigative power opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and
of the Ombudsman is not unbridled. Particularly controverting evidence. Instead, they were
on the issue of tax refunds, the BIR maintains that summarily ordered to appear before the
the Ombudsman could validly exercise its power Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of
to investigate only when there exists an the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La
appropriate case and subject to the limitations Tondea. They are aggrieved in that, from the
provided by law. Petitioner opines that the fact- point of view of the respondent, they were
finding investigation by the Ombudsman is not the already deemed probably guilty of granting
proper case as it is only a step preliminary to the anomalous tax refunds. Plainly, respondent
filing of recovery actions on the tax refunds Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford
granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea. petitioner with the basics of due process in
- This Court is not persuaded. No less than the 1987 conducting its investigation.
Constitution enjoins that the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act 17. Laurel v. Desierto (GR 145368, 12 April 2002)
promptly on complaints filed in any form or - The power to investigate and to prosecute granted
manner against public officials or employees of by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
the government, or any subdivision, agency or unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of
instrumentality thereof, including government- any public officer or employee when such act or
owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
appropriate case, notify the complainants of the inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
action taken and the result thereof. Clearly, there between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
is no requirement of a pending action before and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
the Ombudsman could wield its investigative held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of
power. The Ombudsman could resort to its any public official" is broad enough to embrace
investigative prerogative on its own or upon a any crime committed by a public officer or
complaint filed in any form or manner. Even employee.
when the complaint is verbal or written, - In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to
unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
on its own, initiate the investigation. Plainly, feasance by a public officer or employee of the
the pendency of an action is not a prerequisite government, or of any subdivision, agency or
before the Ombudsman can start its own instrumentality thereof, including government-
investigation. owned or controlled corporations.
- The power to investigate and to prosecute which - The characteristics of a public office, according to
was granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it functions, its creation by law and not by contract,
perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of of duties, and the designation of the position as an
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that office.
have been committed by any officer or employee - Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the
xxx during his tenure of office. Concededly, the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the
determination of whether to grant a tax refund law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that
falls within the exclusive expertise of the BIR. can be described as legislative or judicial. May the
Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just functions of the NCC then be described as
a tinge of impropriety in the grant of the same, the executive? We hold that the NCC performs
Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether executive functions. The executive power "is
the determination was done in accordance with generally defined as the power to enforce and
law and identify the persons who may be held administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
responsible thereto. In that sense, the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully due observance."17 The executive function,
intruding into and intervening with the BIRs therefore, concerns the implementation of the
exercise of discretion. policies as set forth by law.
- HOWEVER, The law clearly provides that if there - Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions.
is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner,
investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall as its Chair, is a public officer. That petitioner
 allegedly did not receive any compensation during continued funding was received by its officials and
his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a put to illegal use, remains.
usual but not a necessary criterion for - Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the
determining the nature of the position. Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided
18. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan (GR 116033, 26 February by law" and that because the complaint in this
1997) case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an
- The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As
the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will already stated, the Constitution expressly
have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any
when the complaint charges the private individual complaint filed "in any form or manner"
either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of concerning official acts or omissions.
a public officer or employee who has been charged
with a crime within its jurisdiction. 20. Cabalit v. COA-Region VII (GR 180236, 17January
- The Information does not charge petitioner 2012)
Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or - In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is
accessory to a public officer committing an offense given full administrative disciplinary authority.
under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, His power is not limited merely to receiving,
unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the processing complaints, or recommending
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold
crime charged hearings, summon witnesses and require
production of evidence and place respondents
SECTION 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as under preventive suspension. This includes the
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints power to impose the penalty of removal,
filed in any form or manner against public officials or suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency officer or employee
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned - The provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together
or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
thereof. administrative disciplinary authority. These
provisions cover the entire gamut of
19. Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995) administrative adjudication which entails the
- On the other hand, where the claim of authority to, inter alia, receive complaints,
confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect conduct investigations, hold hearings in
military, diplomatic or other national security accordance with its rules of procedure,
secrets but on a general public interest in the summon witnesses and require the production
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have of documents, place under preventive
declined to find in the Constitution an absolute suspension public officers and employees
privilege of the President against a subpoena pending an investigation, determine the
considered essential to the enforcement of appropriate penalty imposable on erring
criminal laws. public officers or employees as warranted by
- On the other hand, the Ombudsman is the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said
investigating a complaint that several items in the penalty.58 Thus, it is settled that the Office of
EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the the Ombudsman can directly impose
allotments for these items in 1988 were used for administrative sanctions.
illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel
records are relevant to his investigation. 21. Gonzales v. OP, 679 SCRA 614 (2012) ** OVERTURNED
- His need for the documents thus outweighs the - Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of
claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete
more, while there might have been compelling out administrative sanctions upon them, including
reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years However, it is equally without question that the
later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if President has concurrent authority with respect to
they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman
identities could not then be revealed may have and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified
ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the conditions. Considering the principles attending
covert missions to which they might have been concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the
deployed might either have been accomplished or President was the first to initiate a case against
abandoned. On the other hand, the Ombudsman's petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have
duty to investigate the complaint that there were prompted the Ombudsman to desist from
in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which proceeding separately against petitioner through
 its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
the President's assumption of authority, especially unjust, improper, or inefficient.
when the administrative charge involved (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
"demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which public official or employee of the Government, or any
constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as
both of which are grounds reserved for the of any government-owned or controlled corporation with
President's exercise of his authority to remove a original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
Deputy Ombudsman. required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse
or impropriety in the performance of duties.
22. Gonzales v. OP, (GR 196231, 28 January2014) (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
- In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting against a public official or employee at fault, and
the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
by the President, whose own alter egos and censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
officials in the Executive Department are subject (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,
to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law,
but seriously place at risk the independence of the to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts
Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the or transactions entered into by his office involving the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
includes its key officials, all of them tasked to report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
support the Ombudsman in carrying out her appropriate action.
mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the (5) Request any government agency for assistance and
constitutionally-granted independence is what information necessary in the discharge of its
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
doing, the law directly collided not only with the records and documents.
independence that the Constitution guarantees to (6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
the principle of checks and balances that the (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government
revitalize. and make recommendations for their elimination and the
- The intent of the framers of the Constitution in observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
providing that "[a]ll other public officers and (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
employees may be removed from office as other powers or perform such functions or duties as may
provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the be provided by law.
second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to
prevent Congress from extending the more 23. OMB v. Andutan (GR164679, 27 July 2011)
stringent rule of "removal only by impeachment" - Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit
to favored public officers. Understandably so, the Ombudsman from conducting an
impeachment is the most difficult and administrative investigation after the lapse of one
cumbersome mode of removing a public officer year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was
from office. It is, by its nature, a sui generis committed. Without doubt, even if the
politico-legal process that signals the need for a administrative case was filed beyond the one (1)
judicious and careful handling as shown by the year period stated in Section 20(5), the
process required to initiate the proceeding; the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to
one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the conduct the administrative investigation.
limited grounds for impeachment;58 the defined - Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by
instrumentality given the power to try Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
impeachment cases; and the number of votes investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer
required for a finding of guilt. All these argue institute an administrative case against Andutan
against the extension of this removal mechanism because the latter was not a public servant at the
beyond those mentioned in the Constitution. time the case was filed.
- Thus, under the present Constitution, there is - To recall, we have held in the past that a public
every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be officials resignation does not render moot an
at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least administrative case that was filed prior to the
insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is officials resignation. However, the facts of those
concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of cases are not entirely applicable to the present
independence under the Constitution. case. In the above-cited cases, the Court found that
the public officials subject of the administrative
SECTION 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation
following powers, functions, and duties: of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, filing of one.[43] Here, neither situation obtains.
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
 - As earlier stated, under the Ombudsmans theory, guilty and the greatest number among the accused
the administrative authorities may exercise – is involved whether the grant is secured by the
administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad public prosecutor with active court intervention,
infinitum; thus, a public official who has validly or by the Ombudsman. If there is any distinction at
severed his ties with the civil service may still be all between the public prosecutor and the
the subject of an administrative complaint up to Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in the
his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the specificity of and the higher priority given by law
public policy behind it. to the Ombudsman’s purpose and objective – to
- First, although we have held that the resignation focus on offenses committed by public officers and
of an official does not render an administrative employees to ensure accountability in the public
case moot and academic because accessory service. This accounts for the Ombudsman’s
penalties may still be imposed, this holding must unique power to grant immunity by itself and
be read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, even prior to the filing of information in court,
Jr., the Court’s justification for the continuation of a power that the public prosecutor himself
the administrative case notwithstanding Paganos generally does not enjoy.
resignation was her bad faith in filing the - The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed
certificate of candidacy, and not the the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude
availability of accessory penalties. of investigatory and prosecutory powers, freed, to
- Our position that accessory penalties are still the extent possible within our governmental
imposable thereby negating the mootness of the system and structure, from legislative, executive,
administrative complaint merely flows from the or judicial intervention, and insulated from
fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the outside pressure and improper influence.86
administrative case against her. Consistent with this purpose and subject to the
command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of
****Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun the 1987 Constitution,87 the Court reiterates its
- [W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s
offenses do not prescribe exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
- The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is powers (among them, the power to grant
directory in nature and not mandatory as immunity to witnesses88), and respects the
petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is initiative and independence inherent in the
permissive only and operates to confer discretion; Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one, acts as the
while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to champion of the people and the preserver of the
impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying integrity of the public service. Following this
Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon policy, we deem it neither appropriate nor
the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an advisable to interfere with the Ombudsman’s
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed grant of immunity to the respondents, particularly
after one year from the occurrence of the act or in this case, where the petitioner has not clearly
omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is and convincingly shown the grave abuse of
not barred by prescription. (Emphasis supplied) discretion that would call for our intervention.
-
25. Ledesma v. CA (GR 161629, 29 July 2005)
24. Quarto v. OMB (GR169042, 5 October 2011) - For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office
- The Ombudsman may grant immunity from of the Ombudsman argue that the word
criminal prosecution to any person whose recommend must be taken in conjunction with the
testimony or whose possession and production of phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The
documents or other evidence may be necessary to proper interpretation of the Courts statement in
determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the
proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman authority to determine the administrative liability
or under its authority, in the performance or in the of a public official or employee at fault, and direct
furtherance of its constitutional functions and and compel the head of the office or agency
statutory objectives. The immunity granted under concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In
this and the immediately preceding paragraph other words, it merely concerns the procedural
shall not exempt the witness from criminal aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its
prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor jurisdiction.
shall he be exempt from demotion or removal - We agree with the ratiocination of public
from office respondents. Several reasons militate against a
- RA No. 6770 recognizes that these same principles literal interpretation of the subject constitutional
should apply when the Ombudsman directly provision. Firstly, statements about the power of
grants immunity to a witness. The same the Ombudsman in Tapiador was an obiter.
consideration – to achieve the greater and higher - We note that the Section 15 of RA 6670 qualifies
purpose of securing the conviction of the most the order to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
 censure, or prosecute an officer or employee akin
to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. 27. Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, 194 SCRA 474(1991)
That the refusal, without just cause, of any - In the same case We ruled that after the
officer to comply with such an order of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution whereby the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or office of the Ombudsman was created under
employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is Article XI, the said authority of respondent PCGG
a strong indication that the Ombudsmans was maintained,
recommendation is not merely advisory in - And even upon the passage of Republic Act No.
nature but is actually mandatory within the 6770 known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as whereby under Section 15(l) the Ombudsman has
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of primary jurisdiction over the cases cognizable by
the head of office or any officer concerned. It has the Sandiganbayan, this Court held in Cojuangco
long been settled that the power of the that this authority of the Ombudsman is "not
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly
illegal act or omission of any public official is not authorized agencies of the government." 8 Thus,
an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent this Court held "that the authority of the PCGG to
authority in respect of the offense charged. By conduct preliminary investigation of ill-gotten
stating therefore that the Ombudsman wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed
recommends the action to be taken against an before February 25, 1986," is maintained.
erring officer or employee, the provisions in the - From the foregoing what is clear is that the PCGG,
Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the at the time it conducted the investigation and filed
implementation of the order be coursed through the information against petitioner in this case, had
the proper officer, which in this case would be the the authority to investigate and prosecute such ill-
head of the BID. gotten wealth cases of former President Ferdinand
- It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the E. Marcos, members of his family, his relatives,
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the subordinates, and close associates, and graft and
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that corrupt practices cases that may be assigned from
it can effectively carry out its mandate as time to time by the President to the PCGG to be
protector of the people against inept and corrupt filed with the Sandiganbayan.
government officers and employees. The Office - A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3, of
was granted the power to punish for contempt in Executive Order No. 1, in relation with Sections 1,
accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given 2, and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, show that what
disciplinary authority over all elective and the authority of the respondent PCGG to
appointive officials of the government and its investigate and prosecute covers. However, other
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
the exception only of impeachable officers, Practices Act not otherwise falling under the
members of Congress and the Judiciary).[25] Also, foregoing categories, require a previous
it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority of the President for the respondent
authority pending an investigation when the case PCGG to investigate and prosecute the same in
so warrants accordance with Section 2(b) of Executive Order
No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is
26. Ombudsman v. Apolonio (GR 165132, 7 March 2012) vested in the Ombudsman and other duly
- The Ombudsman has the power to impose the authorized investigating agencies as the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, provincial and city prosecutors, their
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his
employee, in the exercise of its administrative assistants, and the state prosecutors.
disciplinary authority. The challenge to the - Thus for a penal violation to fall under the
Ombudsmans power to impose these penalties, on jurisdiction of the respondent PCGG under
the allegation that the Constitution only grants it Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, the
recommendatory powers, had already been following elements must concur:(1). It must
rejected by this Court. relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth;(2). Of the
- The conclusion reached by the Court in Ledesma is late President Marcos, his immediate family
clear: the Ombudsman has been statutorily relatives, subordinates and close associates;
granted the right to impose administrative (3). Who took undue advantage of their public
penalties on erring public officials. That the office and/or used their power, authority,
Constitution merely indicated a influence, connections or relationship.
recommendatory power in the text of Section
13(3), Article XI of the Constitution did not 28. Salvador v. Mapa, 539 SCRA 34
deprive Congress of its plenary legislative - Indeed, what was filed before this Court is a
power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond petition captioned as Petition for Review on
those stated. Certiorari. We have ruled, time and again, that a
 petition for review on certiorari is not the proper - Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
mode by which resolutions of the Ombudsman in of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
preliminary investigations of criminal cases are Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical
reviewed by this Court. The remedy from the in providing that an appeal shall not stop an
adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a Ombudsman decision from being executory. This
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a rule applies to the appealable decisions of the
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty
- However, though captioned as a Petition for imposed is other than public censure or
Review on Certiorari, we will treat this petition as reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more
one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its than one month, or a fine equivalent to more than
contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave one month's salary. Hence, the dismissal of De
abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for Jesus and Parungao from the government service
dismissing the complaint. The averments in the is immediately executory pending appeal.
complaint, not the nomenclature given by the - The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in
parties, determine the nature of the action. In providing that in case the penalty is removal and
previous rulings, we have treated differently the respondent wins his appeal, he shall be
labeled actions as special civil actions for considered as having been under preventive
certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
justice, equity, and fair play. other emoluments that he did not receive by
- Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada, where the reason of the removal. As explained above, there is
petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or
Republic Act No. 6770 in his motion for an absolute right to hold office, except
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans decision, we constitutional offices with special provisions on
had occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no salary and tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the
jurisdiction to entertain questions on the Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right of
constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, De Jesus and Parungao would be violated as they
therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in would be considered under preventive
declaring unconstitutional the subject suspension, and entitled to the salary and
administrative and memorandum orders. emoluments they did not receive in the event that
they would win their appeal.
29. OMB v. Chavez (GR 172206, 3 July 2013)
- In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining 30. Ampil v. OMB (GR 192685, 31 July 2013)
body," the Office of the Ombudsman correctly - Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion,"
summed up its legal interest in the matter in based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to
controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its determine the existence of probable cause or the
role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently
the people," a disciplinary authority vested with hewed to the policy of non-interference with the
quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally
disciplinary cases against public officials. To hold mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to
otherwise would have been tantamount to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal
abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian of case can only be assailed through certiorari
public trust and accountability. proceedings before this Court on the ground that
- It is true that under our rule on intervention, the such determination is tainted with grave abuse of
allowance or disallowance of a motion to discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave
intervene is left to the sound discretion of the and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of
court after a consideration of the appropriate jurisdiction
circumstances. However, such discretion is not
without limitations. The CA should have 31. Hernandez v. OMB (GR 197307, 26 February2014)
considered the nature of the Ombudsman's - The nature of the case before the Office of the
powers as provided in the Constitution and RA Ombudsman (OMB) determines the proper
6770. remedy available to the aggrieved party and with
- The issue of whether or not an appeal of the which court it should be filed. In administrative
Ombudsman decision in an administrative case disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMB’s
carries with it the immediate suspension of the decision should be taken to the CA under Rule 43,
imposed penalty has been laid to rest in the recent unless the decision is not appealable owing to the
resolution of the case of Ombudsman v. penalty imposed.
Samaniego, where this Court held that the decision - As a consequence and in line with the regulatory
of the Ombudsman is immediately executory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. Procedure, appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
 should be taken to the CA under the provisions of tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.25 In
Rule 43.27 Barata v. Abalos, Jr.,28 Coronel v. this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman,
Desierto,29 and recently Dimagiba v. Espartero30 occupying a position corresponding to salary
have reiterated the pertinent holding in Fabian. grade 14. Under RA 7160, the sangguniang
- Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
14-A was issued, the OMB-imposed penalties in authority over any elective barangay official. Since
administrative disciplinary cases were already the complaint against the petitioner was initially
immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the
timely filed. In this case, it must be noted that the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the
complaint dated July 28, 2003 was filed on August exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose
20, 2003 or after the AO 14-A has come into effect. exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.
Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when it - The Ombudsman has the power to impose
ruled that the penalties imposed by the administrative sanctions. Section 15 of RA 677027
Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to
executory. Immediate execution argues against give the Office of the Ombudsman full
the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can administrative disciplinary authority. This
only recommend disciplinary sanctions. provision covers the entire range of
- An appeal shall not stop the decision from being administrative activities attendant to
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or administrative adjudication, including, among
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he others, the authority to receive complaints,
shall be considered as having been under conduct investigations, hold hearings in
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
and such other emoluments that he did not witnesses and require the production of
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. documents, place under preventive suspension
public officers and employees pending an
32. Alejandro v. OMB Fact-Finding Bureau, 695SCRA 35 investigation, determine the appropriate penalty
- Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for imposable on erring public officers or employees
another appeal from the decision of the Deputy as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily,
Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply impose the corresponding penalty
requires that a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for certiorari may be filed in all other 33. Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645 (1993)
cases where the penalty imposed is not one - When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman
involving public censure or reprimand, the power "to recommend the suspension" of a
suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it
fine equivalent to one (1) month salary. To our referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure.
mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all All the words associated with the word
administrative remedies when he filed his motion "suspension" in said provision referred to
for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal,
Ombudsman. There is no further need to review demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor
the case at the administrative level since the a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the
Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case same sense as the other words with which it is
and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of associated.
the Ombudsman. - Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the
- The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
investigate any act or omission of a public officer public officials and employees facing
or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the administrative charges before him, is a
Sandiganbayan, as provided by RA 6770. procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive
- The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to suspension is imposed after compliance with the
public officials occupying positions corresponding requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, as we investigation of the administrative charges.
held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any
act or omission of a public officer or employee 34. Lastimosa v. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497 (1995)
occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within - Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
of the regular courts or other investigative prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
agencies. person, any act or omission of any public officer or
- In administrative cases involving the concurrent employee, office or agency, when such act or
jurisdiction of two or more disciplining omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
authorities, the body where the complaint is filed inefficient." 14 This power has been held to
first, and which opts to take cognizance of the include the investigation and prosecution of any
case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other crime committed by a public official regardless of
 whether the acts or omissions complained of are if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the form and substance.
performance of his official duty 15 It is enough - It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the
that the act or omission was committed by a Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint
committed by a public official like a municipal outright for want of palpable merit. At that
mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to point, the Ombudsman does not have to
investigate and prosecute. conduct a preliminary investigation upon
- In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is receipt of a complaint. Should the investigating
authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he
§31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. may recommend its outright dismissal. The
6770) provides. It does not matter that the Office Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether
of the Provincial Prosecutor had already a preliminary investigation is proper. It is only
conducted the preliminary investigation and all when the Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the
that remained to be done was for the Office of the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit
Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding would the Ombudsman be expected to require the
case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation respondents to file their counter-affidavit and
had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor petitioner, its reply.
to conduct, his determination of the nature of the
offense to be charged would still be subject to the 36. Busuego v. OMB (GR 196842, 9 October2013)
approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is - The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority
because under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when in the determination of probable cause during a
a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the preliminary investigation.10 This is the reason
"supervision and control" of the Ombudsman why judicial review of the resolution of the
which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and duty
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or to investigate and prosecute felonies and/or
modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner offenses of public officers is limited to a
cannot legally act on her own and refuse to determination of whether there has been a grave
prepare and file the information as directed by the abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Ombudsman. jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to
- Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid substitute their judgment for that of the
because the order was issued without giving her Ombudsman
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the - The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit
opportunity to refute the charges against them concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
and because, at any rate, the evidence against investigation of crimes involving public officers,
them is not strong as required by §24. The without regard to its commission in relation to
contention is without merit. Prior notice and office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v.
hearing is a not required, such suspension not The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ. To
being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an reiterate for emphasis, the power to
administrative investigation. investigate or conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against any public
35. Presidential v. Desierto, 528 SCRA 20(2007) officers or employees may be exercised by an
- In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto, investigator or by any provincial or city
the Court held that the imprescriptibility of the prosecutor or their assistants, either in their
right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill- prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in
gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under
words, the prosecution of offenses arising from, the OMB-DOJ circular is a mere superfluity. The
relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized
wealth contemplated in the above-mentioned by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
provision of the Constitution may be barred by investigation for complaints filed with it because
prescription the DOJ’s authority to act as the principal law
- This Court has consistently held that the agency of the government and investigate the
Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether commission of crimes under the Revised Penal
a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, Code is derived from the Revised Administrative
should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He Code which had been held in the Natividad case
may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he citation omitted as not being contrary to the
find it to be insufficient in form and substance or, Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to
should he find it otherwise, to continue with the delegate the conduct of the preliminary
inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation investigation to an agency which has the
jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However,
 the Ombudsman may assert its primary provides: “Section 2. Prescription shall begin to
jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation. run from the day of the commission of the
(Emphasis supplied). violation of the law, and if the same be not known
- In Honasan II, although Senator Gregorio "Gringo" at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
Honasan was a public officer who was charged institution of judicial proceedings for its
with coup d’etat for the occupation of Oakwood on investigation and punishment.”
27 July 2003, the preliminary investigation - The above-mentioned section provides two rules
therefor was conducted by the DOJ. Honasan for determining when the prescriptive period shall
questioned the jurisdiction of the DOJ to do so, begin to run: first, from the day of the commission
proferring that it was the Ombudsman which had of the violation of the law, if such commission is
jurisdiction since the imputed acts were known; and second, from its discovery, if not then
committed in relation to his public office. We known, and the institution of judicial proceedings
clarified that the DOJ and the Ombudsman have for its investigation and punishment.
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses - In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the
involving public officers or employees. Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the
Nonetheless, we pointed out that the Ombudsman, discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that
in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the government, as aggrieved party, could not
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take have known that those loans existed when they
over, at any stage, from any investigating agency were made.
of the government, the investigation of such cases. - Those circumstances do not obtain in this case.
Plainly, applying that ruling in this case, the For one thing, what is questioned here is not the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction, albeit grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could
concurrent with the DOJ, over Rosa’s complaint, be concealed from the public eye by the simple
and after choosing to exercise such jurisdiction, expedient of suppressing their documentations.
need not defer to the dictates of a respondent in a What is rather involved here is UCPBs investment
complaint, such as Alfredo. In other words, the in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned
Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the by respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos
exclusion of the DOJ. crony. That investment does not, however, appear
to have been withheld from the curious or from
SECTION 15. The right of the State to recover properties those who were minded to know like banks or
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no
them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be allegation that respondent members of the board
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. of directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to
suppress public knowledge of the investment.
37. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest - And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have
Loans v. OMB (GR 135715, 13 April 2011) the courage to question the UCPB investment into
- It has already been settled that Section 15 of UNICOM during martial law, the second element
Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery that the action could not have been instituted
of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases. during the 10-year period because of martial law
Conversely, prescription of criminal cases is does not apply to this case. The last day for filing
governed by special laws on prescription. the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990,
about four years after martial law ended.
38. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (GR 152154, 15 July 2003) Petitioner had known of the investment it now
- But even assuming for the sake of argument that questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let
laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel those four years of the remaining period of
or laches does not apply when the government prescription run its course before bringing the
sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental proper action.
rights.73 Nor can estoppel validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy.As a final point, it 40. Heirs of Licaros v. SB (GR 157438, 18 October 2004)
must be emphasized that laches is not a mere - The instant action for reconveyance, restitution,
question of time but is principally a question of and accounting impleads the Estate/Heirs of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or Gregorio Licaros for previous acts committed by
claim to be enforced or asserted. the decedent during his lifetime, more particularly
- Equity demands that petitioner Republic should for conspiring with the main defendants to
not be barred from pursuing the people's case prejudice the Republic. An action to recover ill-
against the Marcoses. gotten wealth is outside the purview of the
ordinary rules on prescription, as contained in
39. Republic v Cojuangco (GR 139930, 26 June 2012) Article 1146 of the Civil Code and Section 15 of
- Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
prescriptive period should be computed in - The intendment of the foregoing constitutional
accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, which provision -- exempting actions to recover ill-
 gotten wealth from the operation of the general resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to
rules of prescription -- presumably lies in the the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant
special attendant circumstances and the status should be as indubitable as his application
primordial state interests involved in cases of such for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an
nature. irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
- From the preceding discussion, it is clear that any surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S.
action involving the recovery of unlawfully authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in
acquired properties against Licaros or his the local elections on January 18, 1988, our
transferees, may not be deemed to have conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for
prescribed. The language of the Constitution, the said public office, hence, his election thereto was
law and the Rules of Court is clear and null and void.
unequivocal. Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed Resolutions denying, for lack of merit,
petitioners Motion to Dismiss.

SECTION 18. Public officers and employees owe the State

and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

41. Caasi v. CA, 191 SCRA 229 (1990)

- To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the
Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a
certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States. The waiver of his green card
should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to
run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus
Election Code).
- In banning from elective public office Philippine
citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public
office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that
privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot
with our country "without mental reservations or
purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those
who are resident aliens of a foreign country are
incapable of such entire devotion to the interest
and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on
their public duties here, they must keep another
eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their
status as permanent residents thereof.
- Miguel's application for immigrant status and
permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status
are conclusive proof that he is a permanent