Table of Contents

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................................3
STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................4
STATEMENT OF ISSUES......................................................................................................5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...............................................................................................6
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................8
1. THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION & WRIT PETITION FILED BY SILENT
FOUNDATION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE..................................................................................................................... 8
2. WHETHER LOUD SPEAKERS OR A PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM SHOULD BE
PERMITTED IN SILENCE ZONES?.....................................................................................10
2.1 Whether the authorities must designate and map silence zones and identify boundaries and put-
up silence zone boards in areas falling within the said definition?.............................................11
2.2 Whether use of public address system or loud speakers be permitted, if such necessary licenses /
permissions are issued by the State Government, and can such permissions / licenses be extended to
use of public address systems or loud speakers in silence zones?..............................................11
3. WHETHER THE NOISE POLLUTION (MANAGEMENT & CONTROL) AMENDMENT
RULES, 2015 IS FULFILLING THE TEST OF MEASURING THE VALIDITY?....................12
3.1 Test of Measuring the Validity of the Amendment Rules, 2015:..........................................12
3.2 Scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority framing the rule......................13
3.3. Conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed.......................................14
4. PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF INDIANA....................17
4.1 Wide definitions for significant terms which would result in Manifest
arbitrariness/unreasonableness:.............................................................................................17
4.2 Unreasonable restrictions violating Fundamental Rights of the people:.................................17
5. ABSENCE OF GROUNDS TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE AMENDMENT
RULES, 2015:...................................................................................................................... 20
5.1 Presence of legislative competence:.................................................................................20
5.2 Absence of violation of Fundamental rights or Constitutional provision:..............................21
5.3 Absence of Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of
authority conferred by the enabling Act:................................................................................23
5.4 Non applicability of Repugnancy to the laws of the land:....................................................23
5.5 Absence of Manifest arbitrariness / unreasonableness:........................................................23
PRAYER.............................................................................................................................. 25
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
1. Union for Democratic Rights & Others v. Union of India & Others (1982) 3 SCC

235.

2. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, AIR 1950 SC 163

3. H.B. Gandhi v. Gopinath & Sons, 1992 (Supp.-2) SCC 312.

4. Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279.

5. Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872.

6. Union of India v Verma

7. Raghid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana

8. R. v. Panel of Takeover and Mergers Exp. Guinness Plc., (1989) 2 WLR 863.

9. Hariprasad Vs S.I.of Police. 1996(2) KLT 153 = ILR 1996(3) Ker 501.

10. Suresh Chandran vs District Collector. 2005 (3) KLT 538.

11. Hariprasad Vs S.I.of Police. 1996(2) KLT 153 = ILR 1996(3) Ker 501.

12. Ajitnath Co-opertaive Housing Soceity Ltd v State of Maharashatra 2016 SCC Bom 11501

13. General Officer Commanding-In-Chief & Anr. V. Subhash Chandra Yadav & Anr, 1988 AIR

876.

14. Neelakandan Namboodiri vs State Of Kerala (2001) IILLJ 520 KER

15. Environmental Protection Act 1986 (Act no.29 of 1986), s.25.

16. State of Tamilnadu and another v P Krishnamoorthy and others (2006) 4 SCC 517

17. State of U.P v Renusagar Power Co. 1985 ALL LJ 250.

18. State of Karnataka v H. Ganesh Kamath (1983) 2 SCC 402.

19. Environmental Protection Act (Act no. 29 of 1986), s.3 (2).

20. Environmental Protection Act (Act no. 29 of 1986),s.23.

21. Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules 2017, Rule.3(2).

22. Hindu National School Management Trust Society v Deputy Director of Education
 1980, All LJ 736

23. Chandrika Prasad Yadav v State of Bihar 2004 6 SCC 331

24. Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Assam & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC, 709.

25. Forum Envn. & Sound Pollution vs. Union of India & Anr 2003 SCC OnLine Ker 543

26. Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules 2017, Rule 5(3).

27. Jacob vs. Superintendent of Police. 1992(2) KLT 238

28. H.S. Vankani & Ors vs State Of Gujarat (2010) 4 SCC 301

29. Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules 2017, Rule 5(1)

30. Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., 1959 SCR 279

31. State of Tamil Nadu and another v. P. Krishnamurthy and others, (2006) 4 SCC 5017

32. K. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., (1985) 1 SCC 523

33. Manohar Lal Sharma vs Union Of India (2014) 16 SCC 811

34. Naga People's Movement of Human Rights (supra)

35. H.S. Vankani and Others v. State of Gujarat and Other, AIR 2010 SC 1714

36. M.C.Chagla Revised Moot Proposition

37. M.C.Chagla Revised Moot Proposition

38. Mehmood Alam Tariq & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 241

LEGAL DATABASES

(1) Manupatra

(2) SCC Online

LEGISLATIONS

(1) The Constitution of India, 1950

(2) Environment Protection Act, 1986

(3) Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000

 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS, THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF
DHAURASHTRA, HEREBY HUMBLY SUBMIT TO THIS HON’BLE COURT’S
JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

(1)  Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories
directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose

(2)  The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within those territories

(3)  Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or
in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause
(1), without

(a)  furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea
for such interim order; and

(b)  giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court
for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose
favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose
of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from
the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where
the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day
afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the
interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid
next day, stand vacated

(4)  The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the
power conferred on the Supreme court by clause (2) of Article 32.
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
 The State Government of Dhaurashtra organizes processions for idols (gods) during the
festivals. They issue license to various mandals to carry out such activities (processions,
erecting pandals, announcement, etc).
 Silent foundation, an NGO aims and works towards curbing noise pollution and works
for the benefit of natural resources by safeguarding them. During the procession in the
2012, it was identified that there is violation of the noise Pollution (Management &
Control) Rules, 1999. The data collected depicted the use of noise emanating instruments
which was played near the St. Berth Hospital & Medical Institute of cancer.
 Despite submitting the records of noise readings to the concerned authority, no actions
were taken. In furtherance, a letter was forwarded to the Ministry of Environment &
Forest on request of immediate actions. On being aggrieved by the inaction by the
concerned authorities, a PIL was filed before the High Court seeking implementation of
Noise Pollution Rules (Management & Control) Rules, 1999.
 The State Government, in its affidavit furnished the detailed action plan prepared in 2002
and argued to have not received any complaint from the Silent Foundation. On
recommendation of various measures by the Silent Foundation, the High Court issued
notice to the State Government to issue public notices/ advertisement & call upon the
citizen/ interested parties to provide solutions.
 There were 15 intervention application which sought for identical relief. On the direction
of High Court, a committee was set up comprising the Environmentalist, activities and
other experts to formulate the steps to be undertaken by the State Government. On taking
cognizance of the report prepared by the committee after extensive research, the matter
was set for final hearing by listing the issues in concern.
 In the interregnum, the Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules, 1999 was
amended and one of the significant amendments was inserting a proviso to sub-rule (5)
of Rule 3 of the Rules, which reads thus: “Provided that, an area shall not fall under
silence area or zone category, unless notified by the State Government in accordance
with sub-rule (2)”.
 Being aggrieved by the amendment, the Silent Foundations & other interveners filed a
Writ petition challenging the amendment.
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1:

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION & WRIT PETITION

FILED BY SILENT FOUNDATION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA IS MAINTAINABLE.

ISSUE 2:

2. WHETHER THE MECHANISM TO BE SET UP BY THE STATE

GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE NOISE POLLUTION RULES IS
VALID OR NOT.

ISSUE 3:

3. WHETHER THE NOISE POLLUTION (MANAGEMENT & CONTROL)

AMENDMENT RULES, 2015 IS FULFILLING THE TEST OF MEASURING
THE VALIDITY?

ISSUE 4:

4. WHETHER THE IMPUGNED RULES PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF INDIANA.

ISSUE 5:

5. WHETHER THE GROUNDS OF CHALLENGING THE IMPUGNED RULES

IS VALID BEFORE THE EYES OF LAW.
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1:

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION & WRIT PETITION

FILED BY SILENT FOUNDATION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA IS MAINTAINABLE.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Present PIL and Writ
Petition challenging the impugned Rules is evidently not maintainable against the
State of Dhaurashtra under section 226 of Indiana Constitution. It is further submitted
that the petitioner’s have not exhausted the alternative remedies efficiently and also
the Impugned Rules is in furtherance of Article 19 and 25 of the Indian Constitution
and there is no merits in the case filed by the Petitioners for challenging the impugned
rules.

ISSUE 2:

2. WHETHER THE MECHANISM TO BE SET UP BY THE STATE

GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE NOISE POLLUTION RULES IS
VALID OR NOT.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that A loudspeaker is a lively symbol
through which vibrates the robust as well as virulent notes emanating from Art.19(1)
(a) of the Constitution. the loud speakers can never be permitted for usage within the
silence zones and the State Government cannot be provided with the sole discretion of
issuing license for such usage within the silence zones. Hence the Mechanism which
was set up by the State to implement the Noise Pollution Rules is not valid.
ISSUE 3:

3. WHETHER THE NOISE POLLUTION (MANAGEMENT & CONTROL)

AMENDMENT RULES, 2015 IS FULFILLING THE TEST OF MEASURING
THE VALIDITY?

The impugned Rules which had been enacted is evidently confirming to the
provisions of the Statute under which it is framed. Further it also comes within the
scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority framing the rule. Hence
the Hon’ble court shall consider the merits of the case and declare the impugned
Rules to be Valid in light of the principle of law.

ISSUE 4:

4. WHETHER THE IMPUGNED RULES PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF INDIANA.

The impugned Rules have been enacted in furtherance of protecting the fundamental
rights of the people under Article 14 and 21 of Constitution of Indiana. In absence of
the impugned Rules the Fundamental Right to religion and freedom of speech and
expression will be severely infringed on account of abuse of the ambiguity present in
the principal rules

ISSUE 5:

5. WHETHER THE GROUNDS OF CHALLENGING THE IMPUGNED RULES

IS VALID BEFORE THE EYES OF LAW.

The impugned Rules has been enacted with legislative competence and is also
established to be protecting the fundamental rights of the people of Indiana. Further
the impugned Rules conforms to the statute under which it is made or exceeds the
limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act and does not lead to manifest
Arbitrariness and hence the same is liable to be declared valid before the eyes of law.
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION & WRIT PETITION

FILED BY SILENT FOUNDATION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
(¶.1) Black’s Law Dictionary defines Public Interest as: “Something in which the public, the
community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights
or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as a mere curiosity, or as the
interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest
shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, state or national Government”. 1 The word
‘litigation’ means legal action, including all legal proceedings initiated in a Court of law with
the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. 2 In People’s Union for Democratic
Rights & Others v. Union of India & Others,3 the Hon’ble court defined Public Interest
Litigation and observed that “Public interest litigation is a cooperative or collaborative effort
by the petitioner, the State of public authority and the judiciary to secure observance of
constitutional or basic human rights, benefits, and privileges upon poor, downtrodden and
vulnerable sections of the society.”

(¶.2) The existence of alternative remedies is a thing taken into consideration in the matter
governing writ4. Where statutory remedies are available or where a statutory tribunal has
been set up, a petition under Article 226 is not a proper remedy unless the remedies are ill-
suited, to meet the demand of an extraordinary situation. For example 1) where the very vires
of the statute are in question5, 2) where private or public law wrong is so inextricably mixed
up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice requires that the
recourse may be had to Article 2266, 3) in cases where the alternative remedy is not effective
or even adequate.7

(¶.3) In the present case, as per the facts, there is a designated portal set up by the state
government for lodging any complaints regarding a breach of the Noise Pollution Rules. But

1 Garner B.A., Black’s Law Dictionary, (9th ed., 2009).

2 www.jurisdictionary.com, (Last visited on 19th October, 2014).
3 Union for Democratic Rights & Others v. Union of India & Others (1982) 3 SCC 235.
4 Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, AIR 1950 SC 163
5 H.B. Gandhi v. Gopinath & Sons, 1992 (Supp.-2) SCC 312.
6 Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279.
7 Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872.
the petitioner never filed any complaint in the designated portal which is the best available
alternative remedy for them in this case, instead of filing a Public Interest Litigation.

(¶.4) The same was held in a case where it was held that it is well settled when an alternative
and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that
remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of HC to issue a prerogative writ 8 and where
such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition
under Article 226. Supreme Court observed the same in Raghid Ahmed v. Municipal Board,
Kairana9 that, “the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into
consideration in the matter of granting writs”. Whenever a statute creates any right or
liability and also prescribes a remedy or procedure for the enforcement of that right or
liability, a resort must be had to that remedy before invoking such extraordinary and
prerogative writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

(¶.5) In the present case, though there is no explicit mention of the designated portal for
lodging complaints, it is a procedural aspect developed as a mechanism to fight against noise
pollution which was initiated with Noise Pollution Rules as a base. Hence, it is a form of
remedy available for people who experience serious grievances due to noise pollution.
Having said the above, it may not be possible for the general public to know about this
designated portal for lodging complaints but a Non – Governmental Organisation like Silent
Foundation i.e., the petitioner, in this case, would have been aware of it because the petitioner
is working for the public interest by curbing noise pollution.

(¶.6) Hence it is their due negligence in lodging a complaint in the online portal which acts as
a primary – alternative remedy mechanism which the petitioner failed to do so. However,
there is a certain rationale for the exhaustion of such alternative remedies have two-fold
justifications: i) if the parliament has provided for any statutory appeal procedure, it is not for
the court to usurp the functions of the appellate body 10, and ii) the public interest dictates
judicial review should be exercised speedily and to that end, it is necessary to limit the
number of cases for which judicial review is used 11. There are no such statutory appeal
procedures incorporated either in the Parent Act or in the Noise Pollution Rules made under

8 Union of India v Verma

9 Raghid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana
10 R. v. Panel of Takeover and Mergers Exp. Guinness Plc., (1989) 2 WLR 863.
11 Ibid.
it. Therefore, this writ petition along with PIL filed by the petitioner is not maintainable
under Article 226.

2. WHETHER LOUD SPEAKERS OR A PUBLIC ADDRESS

SYSTEM SHOULD BE PERMITTED IN SILENCE ZONES?
(¶.1) A loudspeaker is a lively symbol through which vibrates the robust as well as virulent
notes emanating from Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution; both are necessary to sustain openness
in a democracy.12

Subject to public order, morality and health and subject to other fundamental rights, all
persons are entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and
propagate religion. Every religious denomination has a right to establish places of worship,
subject to public order, morality and health. Going by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution
of India, the petitioner has got a fundamental right to establish, manage and run places of
religious worship, subject to the limitations contained in those two Articles.13

(¶.2) Freedom of speech and expression protects the freedom to propagate ideas, we detest.
Popular faiths need not require any constitutional protection. Heretics and heresies need it.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his separate opinion in United States v. Schwimmer, 279
US 644, said, “If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for
attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who
agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate”.14

(¶.3) This court in the decision in Anantha Prabhu v. District Collector & Another reported in
1974 KLT 29, following the decision reported in AIR 1963 Gujrat 259 Indulal v. State held
that the right which is guaranteed by Art.19(1)(a) is not merely a right to express and
propagate one's views, but also includes in it the right to cirulate one's view to others by all
such means as are available to the citizen to make known these views. 15 In the present case
the use of speaker is a mean for circulating one’s view and expression of popular faith,

12 Hariprasad Vs S.I.of Police. 1996(2) KLT 153 = ILR 1996(3) Ker 501.
13 Suresh Chandran vs District Collector. 2005 (3) KLT 538.
14 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644
15 Hariprasad Vs S.I.of Police. 1996(2) KLT 153 = ILR 1996(3) Ker 501.
2.1 Whether the authorities must designate and map silence zones and
identify boundaries and put-up silence zone boards in areas falling
within the said definition?
(¶.1) Section 3 (2) of the Principle rules provide that “The State Government [shall
categorize] the areas into industrial, commercial, residential or silence areas/zones for the
purpose of implementation of noise standards for different areas.”16

The submission is that the amended Rules will have to be interpreted in a manner so as to do
justice to all the parties and a construction of the provisions leading to confusion and
absurdity must be avoided. In that behalf, reliance was placed on the decision of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan and Another MANU/SC/0599/2011 : (2011)7
SCC 639.

(¶.2) It is pointed out that on the basis of the notification dated 21st April 2009 issued by the
State Government, the power to declare silence zones was purportedly delegated to the local
authorities. It is contended that the Mumbai Municipal Corporation had demarcated and
identified 1537 silence zones in the city of Mumbai which fact was confirmed by the
Affidavit dated 7th May 2009 filed by the State Government in P.I.L No. 85 of 2007 in which
the State Government affirmed that the power to declare silence zones has been delegated to
the local bodies. He submitted that in any event, the said silence zones which have been
identified on the basis of the authority conferred by the State Government are not affected by
the impugned Rules.

2.2 Whether use of public address system or loud speakers be

permitted, if such necessary licenses / permissions are issued by the
State Government, and can such permissions / licenses be extended to
use of public address systems or loud speakers in silence zones?
(¶.1) It is pertinent to note that in the case of Ajitnath Co-opertaive Housing Soceity Ltd v
State of Maharashatra wherein the permission for the use of loud speakers were granted for
the celebration of Navrathri festival in silence zone. On the plain reading it is interpreted as
there is no outright prohibition of the use of loudspeakers. They only lay down the
permissible limits on the sound which is generated by use of loud speaker. In the
aforementioned case, the hospitals, being within 94 meters from the place of celebration
16 Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules 2017, Rule.3(2).
declared no-objection to the use of loudspeakers, provided the conditions of the state
government are adhered to. On the pretext of ensuring adherence to the rules of the noise
pollution and the standards set, the permission to use loud speakers can be granted.

(¶.2) They must ensure that the noise level should not exceed the prescribed decibel limit,
switch off the loud speakers within the stipulated time and should not cause disturbance. 17 So,
therefore the loud speakers can be used for Ganesh Chathurthi but the officials must
immediately seize when there is a violation of the conditions promised to be adhered to. In
the silent zone, the limit is 50 decibels in the day and 40 decibels at night. The permissions
can be obtained and extended to use of public address systems or loud speakers in silence
zones.

3. WHETHER THE NOISE POLLUTION (MANAGEMENT &

CONTROL) AMENDMENT RULES, 2015 IS FULFILLING THE
TEST OF MEASURING THE VALIDITY?
(¶.1) The counsel for the Respondent humbly submit that in the present case, the Noise
Pollution (Management & Control) Amendment Rules 2015(hereinafter referred to as
Amendment Rules 2015) is constitutionally valid upon the following grounds namely:

It is also submitted that the presumption is in favor of constitutionality or validity of a

subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid.18

3.1 Test of Measuring the Validity of the Amendment Rules, 2015:

(¶.2) It is well settled that rules and the further amendment framed under the provisions of a
statute form part of the statute. In other words, the proviso to sub rule 5 of rule 3 inserted by
the Noise Pollution (Management and control) amendment rules, 2015 have statutory force.
But before it can have the effect of a statutory provision, two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely:

● it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed; and

● it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule making power of
the authority framing the rule.19
17 Ajitnath Co-opertaive Housing Soceity Ltd v State of Maharashatra 2016 SCC Bom 11501
18 Dental Council Of India vs Biyani Shikshan Samiti,  6 SCC 65.
19 General Officer Commanding-In-Chief & Anr. V. Subhash Chandra Yadav & Anr, 1988 AIR 876.
3.2 Scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority
framing the rule
(¶.3) It is humbly submitted that the proviso to sub rule 5 of rule 3 inserted by the Noise
Pollution (Management and control) amendment rules, 2015 is valid before the eyes of law.
Prior to dealing with the issue of validity of the proviso inserted to sub rule 5 of rule 3, is
valid or not, the validity of Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules, 1999
(Hereinafter referred to as Rules 1999) which were framed by the Central Government in
exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3, Sub-section
(1) and Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 and Section 25 of the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1977 (Parent Act) read with Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules,
1977.20 This evidently proves the Legislative competence of the Parent act in framing the
Subordinate Legislation.

(¶.4) It is to be noted that in the said Parent Act namely Environment (Protection) Act, 1977
the term “noise” has been explicitly mentioned under Section 6 (2) (b) of the Act. “Noise” is
also considered as one of the environmental pollutants which widens the scope of this Act to
regulate not only air, water and soil but also to include noise. Hence it is evidently proved
that regulation of Noise pollution comes within the ambit of Environment Protection Act,
1977. Followingly under Section 25 (1) of the Act, the Central Government is empowered to
make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.21

(¶.5) Therefore the Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules, 1999 is enacted in
accordance with and the power granted to Central Government as per Section 25, which
makes the enactment of this subordinate legislation valid, as it is done for achieving the
purpose of the Act. The court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have
to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which
power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation
conforms to the parent statute. 22 If the exercise of power is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, the exercise must conform to the provisions of the statute. All the conditions of
the statute must be fulfilled. 23 The rule making power “cannot include within its scope the

20 Neelakandan Namboodiri vs State Of Kerala (2001) IILLJ 520 KER

21 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (Act no.29 of 1986), s.25.
22 State of Tamilnadu and another v P Krishnamoorthy and others (2006) 4 SCC 517
23 State of U.P v Renusagar Power Co. 1985 ALL LJ 250.
power to make a rule contrary to the provisions of the Act conferring the rule making
power.24

(¶.6) Under section 3 (1) it has been stated that for achieving the purpose of the Act, i.e. for
protecting and improving the quality of environment, the central government can take any
measures as it deems to be necessary. Under sub-section 2 (i) (a) of section 3 it has been
stated that those measures also include coordination of actions by State Governments, 25 either
with respect to this Act itself or any other rules made thereunder this Act. In light of the
abovementioned grounds, it is clear that actions of State Governments are necessary and shall
be coordinating in nature for achieving the purpose of this Act. Having said that, state
governments actions are necessary and shall be coordinating in nature, Section 23 of the Act
confers power upon the Central Government to delegate some of its powers and functions to
any officer or authority or State Government.26

(¶.7) However such delegation is limited with certain exceptions. Those exceptions include
power to constitute an authority conferred under sub-section 3 of section 3 of the Act and
rules making power conferred under section 25 of the Act. By ascertaining the
aforementioned sections (Section 3 sub-section 2(i)(a) and Section 23), the intent of the
legislature clearly reflects that State Government has an inevitable role of being the
Regulatory Authority with respect to pollution management and control provided that it has
to act in co-ordination with the Central Government. Hence the Proviso to Subrule (5) of
Rule 3 of the Amendment Rules 2015 is evidently proved to have come within the scope and
purview of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1977 (Parent Act) which empowers the
Central Government (Rule making Authority) to frame the rule.

3.3. Conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed

(¶.8) Now in consideration to the Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules, 1999 i.e.
before amendment as per Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3, the State Government is obligated to
categorize the areas into industrial, commercial, residential or silence areas for the purpose of
implementation of noise standards for different areas.27

24 State of Karnataka v H. Ganesh Kamath (1983) 2 SCC 402.

25 Environmental Protection Act (Act no. 29 of 1986), s.3 (2).
26 Environmental Protection Act (Act no. 29 of 1986),s.23.
27 Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules 2017, Rule.3(2).
(¶.9) Prior to the amendment, Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 3 of the Noise Pollution (Management
and Control) Amendment Rules, 2015 provided that silence zone comprises an area within
the distance of 100 meters around hospitals, educational institutions, and Courts.
Followingly, the terms educational institutions, hospitals and courts have already been
defined in Rule 2, for applicability of Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 3 of the Rules.

(¶.10) After the amendment rules 2015 through which the following proviso was inserted in
Sub-Rule (5) of Rule 3 of the Noise Pollution Rules, it read as, “An area comprising not less
than 100 metres around hospitals, educational institutions and courts may be declared as
silence area / zone for the purpose of these rules, Provided that, an area shall not fall under
silence area or zone category, unless notified by the State Government in accordance with
sub-rule(2).”

(¶.11) The validity of inserting such proviso to sub-rule 5 of rule 3 has arisen because the said
amendment mandates that for a particular area to be treated as a silence zone, it should be
declared through the State government’s notification. Analysing Sub-rule 5 in detail, the
phrase “may be declared by the state government” on a plain reading appears to be directory
in nature, i.e. it gives discretion in the hands of the State government either to declare those
mentioned areas as silence zone or not.

(¶.12) But if it is considered as directory in nature then the state government may not declare
those areas mentioned in sub-rule 5 as silence zone which in turn affects the actual purpose of
statute and legislative intent. Therefore, for the purpose of determining whether a provision
of law is either directory or mandatory, the legislative intent and nature of the statute must be
looked into. In the School Management Trust case, it has been well settled that “for judging
the scope and nature of a particular statute or rule, i.e., whether it is mandatory or directory,
the purpose for which provision has been made and its nature and the intent of the
legislature in making such provision, the serious general inconvenience or injust to person
resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, have to be taken into
account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or
directory”.28

(¶.13) The entire statute, its nature, its objective and consequences that will result if the
phrase is construed in one way or the other must be looked into. If the main object of the

28 Hindu National School Management Trust Society v Deputy Director of Education 1980,
All LJ 736
statute is defeated by holding the phrase in directory nature then it should be construed as
mandatory in nature and vice versa. In the case of Chandrika Prasad Yadav v State of Bihar 29
it was held that, the question as to whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not
depend upon the phraseology used therein. The principle as regards the nature of the statute
must be determined having regard to the purpose and the object of the statute seeks to
achieve.

(¶.14) Here, if sub-rule 5 of rule 3 is considered as directory in nature, the areas mentioned
therein are not categorised or declared as silence zone by state government then the actual
purpose of the Act will be defeated. The consequences that will result if it is considered as
directory will not only affect an individual but it will affect society at large and thus it has to
be taken into consideration seriously. The purpose of the Act is “to provide for the protection
and improvement of environment and matters connected there with”. As these areas are in
prime requirement of silence or should be free from noise pollution, they should be
categorised as silence zone.

The Hon’ble court must strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute
to futility. The provision of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective and
operative, on the principle "ut res magis valent quam pereat".30

(¶.15) Henceforth, the phrase “maybe” in sub-rule 5 of rule 3 should be interpreted as

mandatory in nature. Having said the above, a question may arise that what the proviso has to
do with if at all sub-rule 5 of rule 3 is treated as mandatory in nature. As sub-rule 5 is treated
as mandatory rule, areas within 100 meters of educational institutions, hospitals, courts shall
defaulty be categorized as silence zone / area, and state government will issue a mandatory
notification for the same. But the proviso applied for places apart from what have been
mentioned in sub-rule 5 of rule 3.

It is submitted that for categorizing areas not less than 100 meters of places other than
educational instituions, hospitals and courts this proviso shall be applied. And for those
places state government with its full discretion shall notify the places as silence zone or not.
By doing so, the places mentioned in sub-rule 5 or rule 3 will automatically be classified as
silence zone as per central government’s mandatory direction by which important areas
which requires silence or should be free from noise pollution, are protected already.

29 Chandrika Prasad Yadav v State of Bihar 2004 6 SCC 331

30 Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Assam & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC, 709.
(¶.16) Hence in the present case it has been evidently proved that the proviso to Subrule (5)
of Rule 3 of the Amendment Rules 2015 conforms to the provisions of the Environmental
Protection Act, 1977 (Parent Act).

4. PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE

OF INDIANA.
(¶.17) Arguendo, if the Hon’ble High Court is not inclined towards the abovementioned
ground of interpretation of the Proviso inserted to sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 inserted by the Noise
Pollution (Management and Control) Amendment Rules, 2015 and considers the phrase
“Maybe” to be directory in nature which shall effect in such a manner that any area can be
treated as a silence zone only in the event of State Government declaring them through
notification. But still, it is paramount for the Hon’ble court to uphold the validity of the
Amendment Rules, 2015 to prevent violation of the Fundamental Rights of the people.

4.1 Wide definitions for significant terms which would result in

Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness:
(¶.18) It is submitted that considering the very wide definitions of the terms “Court” and
“hospital” in the Principal Rules, the provisions regarding silence zone as interpreted would
be leading to Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might
well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). These wide
definitions in the Principal Rules is subject to high probabilities of misuse. For example, a
hospital is defined as an institution for reception and care of the sick and wounded, including
private hospitals and nursing homes. But there arises ambiguity since no bed size has been
defined in the norms. Hence if the Rules as existed in relation to silence zones were to be
implemented, considering the wide definitions therein, very few areas in the State will not be
silence zones.

4.2 Unreasonable restrictions violating Fundamental Rights of the

people:
(¶.19) Correspondingly these wide definitions would be resulting in unreasonable restriction
over the People’s “freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and
propagate religion” under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution and Right Freedom of speech
and expression under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution.

(¶.20) Earlier when the Constitutionality of the principal rules was challenged before the
Supreme court in the case it was held that,”Looking at the diversity of cultures and religions
in India, we think that a limited power of exemption from the operation of the Noise Rules
granted by the Central Government in exercise of its statutory power cannot be held to be
unreasonable. The power to grant exemption is conferred on the State Government. It cannot
be further delegated. The power shall be exercised by reference to the State as a unit and not
by reference to districts, so as to specify different dates for different districts. It can be
reasonably expected that the State Government would exercise the power with due care and
caution and in public interest.”31

(¶.21) It is admitted that People have the right to Noise free environment under Article 21 of
the Indian Constitution and the Right to essential religious practice under Article 25 and
Right to freedom of speech and expression is not an absolute right. But still use of sound
emanating instruments during festivals is elemental part of Religious practice which is
reflected in Rule (5) of the Principle rules which permit use of loudspeakers or [public
address system and the like during night hours] (between 10.00 p.m to 12.00 midnight) on or
during any cultural or religious festive occasion of a limited duration not exceeding fifteen
days in all during a calendar year.32

There are amenities available outside fundamental rights. The spirit often protects what the
language does not. One may enjoy certain amenities or common law rights, independent of
fundamental rights. These would include the amenity of using a loud speaker (without
committing aural aggression), to the extent of reaching a willing audience. One may exercise
that amenity in a hall or area reasonably required to accommodate a willing audience.

Besides, use of a loud speaker cannot be arbitrarily denied, only because a fundamental right
is not involved. By reason of Article 14, the State and its agencies cannot act arbitrarily.
They must adhere to fair play in action. For instance, even when a person may not have a
fundamental right to, enter into a contract with the State, the State cannot act arbitrarily in

31 Forum Envn. & Sound Pollution vs. Union of India & Anr 2003 SCC OnLine Ker 543
32 Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules 2017, Rule 5(3).
the matter of awarding a contract. Likewise, in the matter of denying the use of a loud
speaker, Police cannot act arbitrarily. All State action is amenable to Article 14.33

(¶.22) Hence reasonable use of loudspeakers or voice emanating instrument or public address
system is recognised to be an exception under the Principle Rules which reflects that it is also
an integral part of Article 25 and Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. It is to be noted that
speakers or any other voice emanating instruments cannot be used in the silence zones even
with respect to power conferred to the State government under Subrule (3) of Rule 5.

(¶.23) But in the present case if the Amendment Rules, 2015 is not being held to be
constitutionally valid, as already mentioned the ambiguous wide scope of the definitions shall
make room for misuse which shall provide with absurd results of almost all the places in the
country to be declared as a silence zone. Hence in such a case, the purpose of the exception
provided in Subrule (3) of Rule (5) for exercising reasonable practice of fundamental rights
conferred under Article 19 and 25 would become fruitless and the true intent of the
legislature gets defeated.

(¶.24) Further, if the impugned amendment rules are not being upheld by this Hon’ble court,
there would be severe law and order problems creating unrest among different sections of the
society over violation of their fundamental rights. Hence, the Court has to avoid a
construction of an enactment that leads to an unworkable, inconsistent and impracticable
result.34 Subsequently, in the present case if this Court accepts interpretation of the Petitioner,
notwithstanding the amendment Rules 2015, the judgement to be issued in this present case
will create unworkable and inconsistent situation.

(¶.25) Further it is also to be noted that the State Government is empowered to categorize and
notify an area as silence zone35 and only because the State has not declared any area as a
silence zone in the entire State, the Amendment Rules 2015 do not become invalid.
Conclusively it is submitted that the impugned Rules have been brought on the statute book
to ensure that the operation of the provisions regarding silence zone in the Principal Rules do
not lead to absurd results.

33 Jacob vs. Superintendent of Police. 1992(2) KLT 238

34 H.S. Vankani & Ors vs State Of Gujarat (2010) 4 SCC 301
35 Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Rules 2017, Rule 5(1)
5. ABSENCE OF GROUNDS TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY
OF THE AMENDMENT RULES, 2015:
It is well settled that there is always an assumption in favour of the constitutionality of an
enactment and the onus is upon him who assaults it to show that there has been a clear
contravention of the constitutional doctrines.36

(¶.26) It is submitted that it is well settled before the eyes of law that a subordinate legislation
can be challenged under the following grounds:

 Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation.

 Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, or any

provision of the Constitution of India.

 Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of
authority conferred by the enabling Act.

 Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment

 Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say
that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules).37

It is submitted that in the present case, the proviso inserted to sub rule (5) of Rule 3 of the
Amendment Rules 2015 is evidently valid as none of the above- mentioned grounds are
applicable.

5.1 Presence of legislative competence:

(¶.27) As discussed earlier the Environmental Protection Act, 1977 enacted by the Central
Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section
3, Sub-section (1) and Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 and Section 2538 had made
this subordinate legislation, with all due power and legislative competence to do so. This sub
issue has already been made a detailed submission in Issue 1.1 of the Memorandum.

36 Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., 1959 SCR 279
37 State of Tamil Nadu and another v. P. Krishnamurthy and others, (2006) 4 SCC 5017
38 Environmental Protection Act, 1977
It is established that the State Governments were within their right to introduce legislation on
issues related to sound pollution under Entry 8, “Public Health and Sanitation of List II
provided under the Seventh Schedule”. The Court held that the States “have the right to
control loud noises when the rights of such user, in disregard to the comfort and obligations
to others, emerge as a manifest nuisance to them”. 39 Hence it cannot be said that there is lack
of legislative competence to make subordinate legislation.

The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous
purpose. Its reasons for passing a law are those that are stated in the Objects and Reasons and
if no reasons are so stated, as appear from the provisions enacted by it. Even assuming that
the executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive
cannot render the passing of the law mala fide. This kind of 'transferred malice' is unknown in
the field of legislation".40 In so far as the allegation of mala fides is concerned, it is well
settled proposition of law that if the Legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the
motives, which impelled it to act, are really irrelevant.41

The use of expression "colourable legislation" seeks to convey that by enacting the legislation
in question the Legislature is seeking to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. But
ultimately the issue boil down to the question whether the Legislature had the competence to
enact the Legislation because if the impugned Legislation falls within the competence of the
Legislature the question of doing something indirectly which cannot be done directly does
not arise.42 In the present case, it has been well established that the parent Act has legislative
competence and hence there can be no allegations with regard to grounds of Mala fide and
colorable legislation.

5.2 Absence of violation of Fundamental rights or Constitutional

provision:
(¶.28) The said amendment does not violate the fundamental right of the citizens. Conferring
such a power to the State Government is not violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Indian
Constitution. The due procedure of law established by Article 14 of the Constitution has been
abided in the implementation of this Rules.

39 India Const. Entry 8

40 K. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr., (1985) 1 SCC 523
41 Manohar Lal Sharma vs Union Of India (2014) 16 SCC 811
42 Naga People's Movement of Human Rights (supra)
"MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, FORESTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 10th August, 2017 S.O. 2555(E).-Whereas, according to
clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of rule 5 of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986, whenever it
appears to the Central Government that it is expedient to impose prohibition or restrictions on
the location of an industry or the carrying on the processes and operations in an area, it may,
by notification in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as the Central Government
may deem necessary from time to time, give notice of its intention to do so;43

And whereas, sub-rule (4) of rule 5 of the said rules provide that, notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-rule (3), whenever it appears to the Central Government that it is in public
interest to do so, it may dispense with the requirement of notice under clause (a) of sub-rule
(3) of rule 5.44

Hence for exercising the rule making power under 1986 Act, there is no requirement of prior
publication. In the present case the Principal rules were to have consequences which are
objectionable or undesirable.

The court will presume that Parliament did not intend a statute to have consequences which
are objectionable or undesirable; or absurd; or unworkable or impracticable; or merely
inconvenient; or anomalous or illogical; or futile or pointless. But the strength of these
presumptions depends on the degree to which a particular construction produces an
unreasonable result. The more unreasonable a result, the less likely it is that Parliament
intended it.45 Hence the impugned rules have been enacted in the public interest to avoid such
undesirable results and to further the original intention of the legislature.

It is further submitted that there will be gross violation of fundamental rights provided under
Article 19 and 25 of the Indian Constitution which has been made in a detailed submission in
the aforementioned Issue 1.2 of the Memorandum. It is also submitted that there is no
violation of Constitutional Provisions in the present issue and it is the burden of the petitioner
to prove otherwise.

43 Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change, Notification, S.O.25555 (5), New Delhi,
August 10, 2017.
44 Noise Pollution (Control and Management) Rules, 2000
45 H.S. Vankani and Others v. State of Gujarat and Other, AIR 2010 SC 1714
5.3 Absence of Failure to conform to the statute under which it is
made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling
Act:
(¶.29) The Parent Act is The Environmental Protection Act, 1986 and the said amendment is
in conformity with the enabling act. The amendment is in conformity with the objective and
provisions of the enabling act. The Central Government can delegate the powers to the State
Government in accordance with the section 23 of the parent act. The powers conferred does
not fall under the exception as stated in sub section 3 of section 3 of the parent act.

The powers granted are pertaining to the categorization of areas and issuing of notices. These
are the only powers conferred to the State Government and the subordinate legislation does
not confer additional powers other than specified in the parent act. This sub issue has already
been made a detailed submission in Issue 1.1.2 of the Memorandum. Therefore, this cannot be
considered as a valid ground to be challenged. The State Government reserves a huge budget
for arranging and managing these festivities every year.46

This reflects the significance of religious festivals among the people of Dhrauhastra. Further
there is a duty upon the people elected state government to arrange and manage these
festivals every year. Hence it is right for the impugned rules to have empowered the State
government with the power to issue licenses for usage of loud speakers during Festivals and
further power to declare different zones / areas under the Rules.47

5.4 Non applicability of Repugnancy to the laws of the land:

(¶.30) The amendment is in conformity with other laws in state and it is not considered as
repugnant. This is the only subordinate legislation which deals with the noise pollution.
Therein, the Repugnancy cannot be a valid ground to challenge the said amendment as
unconstitutional.

5.5 Absence of Manifest arbitrariness / unreasonableness:

(¶.31) In viewing the diversity of cultures and religions in India, the limited rules granted by
the Central Government in exercise of its statutory power cannot be held as unreasonable. It
is reasonably expected that the State Government would exercise its powers with due care

46 M.C.Chagla Revised Moot Proposition

47 M.C.Chagla Revised Moot Proposition
and caution and in the public interest. The sub-rule 5 of rule 3, the term ‘maybe’ on plain
reading can be interpreted to be directory in nature.

It is also necessary to reiterate that a mere possibility of abuse of a provision, does not, by
itself, justify its invalidation. The validity of a provision must be tested with reference to its
operation and efficiency in the generality of cases and not by the freaks or exceptions that its
application might in some rare cases possibly produce. The affairs of government cannot be
conducted on principles of distrust.”48

In the present case there has been no abuse of the provisions in the impugned rules till date
and no law-and-order situation has arisen in the society till date. Hence there is no necessity
for challenging the validity of the impugned rules and it is thus proved that Noise Pollution
Amendment Rules are valid before the eyes of law.

(¶.32) If such interpretation is made it can be considered as arbitrary. Since, the interpretation
‘maybe’ as directory would be in non-conformity with the objective of the act and intent of
the legislature, this should be interpreted to be mandatory in nature. Interpreting ‘maybe’ to
be mandatory will be considered as reasonable and non-arbitrary. This sub issue is already
dealt with and made a detailed submission in Issue 1.2.1 of the Memorandum. Henceforth, the
said amendment cannot be challenged under the ground of arbitrary and unreasonable.

48 Mehmood Alam Tariq & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 241
 PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this
Hon‘ble Court be pleased to Uphold the Validity of the proviso inserted to sub rule (5) of
Rule 3 of the Noise Pollution (Management & Control) Amendment Rules 2015

AND/OR

Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice and Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.