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Calalang - v. - Court - of - Appeals20210428-11-G6zqio
Calalang - v. - Court - of - Appeals20210428-11-G6zqio
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision * of the
Court of Appeals which set aside the order of dismissal issued by the lower
court, ** in Civil Case No. 36907 entitled "Filipinas Manufacturers Bank, plaintiff,
versus Hugo Arca, Conrado Calalang, Rio Arturo R. Salceda and Acropolis
Trading Corporation, defendants".
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On April 29, 1980, respondent Filipinas Manufacturers Bank filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money 1 against petitioner Conrado Calalang and 3 other
defendants namely, Hugo M. Arca, Rio Arturo Salceda and the Acropolis Trading
Corporation with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District Branch
36, Makati under Judge Segundo M. Zosa.
Petitioner, after having been served with summons on May 19, 1980, filed a
Motion to Dismiss on June 2, 1980. The other summoned defendant, Hugo M.
Arca, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars on June 5, 1980. The two other
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defendants namely, the Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda
were also summoned but only a clerk-employee of the Acropolis Trading
Corporation received the summons while Arturo R. Salceda was no longer
residing at his given address.
Over a year after, the Motion for Bill of Particulars was granted on August 24,
1981 by Judge Zosa. Meanwhile, the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner
Calalang was left unresolved. The last pleading filed regarding the Motion to
Dismiss was the reply of petitioner Calalang to the opposition to the motion to
dismiss by respondent bank which was filed on August 5, 1980.
On August 10, 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act) was passed by the Batasang Pambansa and subsequently approved by
then President Marcos on August 14, 1981.
On November 27, 1981, defendant Arca filed a Motion to Dismiss which
necessitated the filing of various pleadings in relation thereto by respondent
bank herein, and defendant Arca.
On May 25, 1983, a hearing was scheduled under Judge Florentino Dela Peña of
the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 134. But then, the case was transferred
to the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, presided over by Judge Benigno
M. Puno who, on August 8, 1985, issued an Order to wit: cdphil
On October 3, 1986, Gella Reyes Vergara Alcala and Associates entered its
appearance as counsel for respondent bank.
On October 30, 1985, defendant Arca filed his answer with compulsory
counterclaim to the complaint which was received by respondent bank's former
counsel, Emerito M. Salva and Associates on November 4, 1985.
It appears that this case has been set several times for pre-trial (November 29,
1985, January 29, 1986, May 12, 1986, November 19, 1986, January 14, 1987
and February 27, 1987). For the first two scheduled hearings, respondent
bank's counsel failed to appear causing the dismissal without prejudice of the
case which was nevertheless set aside upon respondent bank's motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal. The November 19, 1986 hearing was
transferred to January 14, 1987 upon agreement by both counsels. For the last
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two scheduled dates counsel for the defendant Hugo Arca failed to appear.
Judge Benigno M. Puno was replaced by Judge Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr. as the
presiding judge of the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 who, on March 6,
1987, issued an Order, quoted hereunder as follows:
"The records of this case show that among the defendants herein are:
(a) Rio Arturo R, Salceda; and (b) Acropolis Trading Corporation. The
Sheriff's Return, dated June 4, 1980 (Records Page 33) show the
following report on the service of summons thereto:
As to defendant Acropolis Trading Corporation: "Served
upon the defendant thru Miss BETH REYES, Clerk-employee,
employed thereat, who signed for the receipt hereof."
As to defendant Rio Arturo Salceda: "Not serve (sic),
defendant is not residing at the given address, occupant is
Leonito Acuron."
The Court hereby informs the plaintiff that it shall not consider
defendant Acropolis Trading Corporation as having been properly
brought under the jurisdiction of this Court in view of the improper
service of summons on said corporation (Sec. 13 of Rule 14, Revised
Rules of Court).
Inasmuch as it would appear that the setting of this case for pre-trial
was premature, since issues herein do not appear to have been really
joined, the pre-trial conference scheduled in this case for April 8, 1987
is cancelled until further assignment or until any of the parties herein
shall make the appropriate steps in connection therewith.
xxx xxx xxx" 3
The above Order was received by petitioner's counsel on March 13, 1987. 4
On March 17, 1987, respondent bank, in response to the Order dated March 6,
1987, filed a manifestation stating that:
Since the Court cannot let an unreasonable period pass for plaintiff to
cause service of alias summons on the aforesaid defendants, the Court
hereby resolves that if plaintiff shall still be unable to cause service of
alias summons on the said defendants within thirty (30) days from
plaintiff's receipts hereof, then this Court will dismiss the complaint as
against said defendants and proceedings herein shall be limited to the
defendants on whom summons had been served as of the lapse of said
30 days' period." 7
Thereafter, on May 8, 1987, respondent bank moved for the issuance of alias
summons on defendant Acropolis Trading Corporation through its
President/Director Conrado T. Calalang or through its director Hugo M. Arca. 8
Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles of the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, to whom
the case was assigned after Judge Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr., then issued an
Order, dated July 16, 1987, denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner for
lack of merit. The motion for alias summons was granted. Entry of appearance
of Atty. Crisostomo J. Danguilan as counsel for respondent bank was noted in
the same order. 9
On January 12, 1988, counsel for the respondent bank filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the order of dismissal citing as reason for his late arrival
"the unusually heavy traffic he encountered along Kamias Road in Quezon City,
which was caused by a stalled Jeepney along the main thoroughfare." 13 The
motion was denied on January 26, 1988. The respondent bank appealed the
dismissal to the respondent Court. On October 25, 1991, the respondent Court
promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which is quoted
hereunder: prLL
The petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the Court of
Appeals, he filed this instant petition with this Court alleging that the
respondent Court erred in:
1.) absolving respondent bank for the delay in the pursuit of the
case;
2.) declaring the January 7, 1988 pre-trial as premature;
3.) holding that respondent bank "did not entirely fall to appear";
4.) invoking the liberal application of the rules of procedure in favor
of the respondent bank;
5.) not having found abuse in the dismissal by the lower court of
the case at bar, there is no basis for the respondent court to reverse
the order of dismissal.
The pre-trial conference scheduled for January 8, 1987 was not premature. A
pre-trial cannot validly be held until the last pleading has been filed, which last
pleading may be the plaintiff's reply, except where the period to file the last
pleading has lapsed. 15 The period to appear and file the necessary pleading
having expired on the Acropolis Trading Corporation, the lower court can direct
that a pre-trial conference be held among the answering defendants. however,
though it is within the discretion of the trial court to declare a party non-suited
for non appearance in the pre-trial conference, such discretion must not be
abused. The precipitate haste of the lower court in declaring the respondent
bank non-suited was uncalled for and deserved a second look. Considering the
fact that the counsel for the plaintiff/respondent bank did arrive for the pre-trial
conference, though a bit late and that counsel for the defendant was himself
also late, the trial court should have called the case again. An admonition to
both counsels to be more prompt in appearing before the Court as scheduled
would have sufficed, instead of having dismissed the complaint outright.
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Unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or
dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the
courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving
the desired end. 16
"Inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a
panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets, while they
lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they
merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the
absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition
of the cases before the court." 17
"While it is true that the case had been pending for that length of time
we find that the delay is not to be attributed entirely to the plaintiff in
this case. The records show that various incidents were raised by the
defendants Calalang and Arca who filed separate pleadings and were
represented by different counsels.
Calalang filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the plaintiff had no cause of action against him. This necessitated the
filing of an opposition from the plaintiff, a reply to said opposition from
the defendant Calalang, and a rejoinder to the said reply. The
defendant Arca, on the other hand. initially sought an extension of time
to file a responsive pleading, then filed a motion for bill of particulars,
then later also a motion to dismiss the case. After his motion to dismiss
was denied Arca filed a motion for reconsideration. In all these
incidents pleadings and counter-pleadings were filed and hearings held
on the motions, which resulted in the case dragging on for a
considerable time.
The case was set for pre-trial several times when, as aforestated, the
issues were not yet joined for only Arca had initially filed his answer to
the complaint. The case was ordered dismissed at least two (2) times
when the plaintiff's counsel failed to appear at these pre-trials but the
dismissals were reconsidered and the case set anew.
Another factor that contributed to the confusion in the proceedings and
the delay in the case is the fact that the case was assigned from one
Judge to another due probably to the judicial reorganization that took
place. The records show that there were no less than four (4) judges
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who handled the case - Judges Segundo Zosa, Benigno M. Puno,
Federico Alikpala, Jr., and Zosimo Angeles.
The answer of defendant Arca to the complaint was filed only on
October 30, 985 while that of defendant Calalang was filed only on
November 10, 1987." 19
Again, petitioner's contention that the fact that respondent bank had not
caused service of summons on the two other defendants, the Acropolis Trading
Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda, for almost seven years after the complaint
was filed on April 29, 1980 indicated "abuse of judicial leniency and tolerance"
is bereft of merit. Summons is issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the
complaint. When it was informed later on by Judge Alikpala. Jr. in his Order
dated March 6, 1987 that there was an improper service on defendants
Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda, respondent bank, in
compliance therewith, filed a motion for alias summons, as permitted by the
law.
Considering the judicial reorganization which took place during the pendency of
this case and the numerous instances raised by both petitioner and respondent
bank as contributing to the delay, petitioner cannot now claim that respondent
bank's "abuse of judicial leniency and tolerance is the single greatest
component of this delay". 20
The acts of the respondent bank do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute,
in the absence of proof that it indeed abandoned or intended to abandon its
case against petitioner and the other defendants. Admittedly there was delay in
this case, but such delay, We hold, is not the delay warranting dismissal. To be
a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also
unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial processes. cdll
In Marahay vs. Melicor, 21 the Court set forth the test for dismissal of a case due
to failure to prosecute, to wit:
"While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the
real test for the exercise of such power is whether. under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a
pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton
failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part
of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense
with rather than wield their authority to dismiss."
Footnotes
16. 62A Am. Jur. 2d 602 citing Willis v. RCA Corp. (Cuyahoga Co.), 12 Ohio App.
3d 1, 12 Ohio BR 57, 465 N.E. 2d 924.
17. Ruiz vs. Estenzo, 186 SCRA 8 (1990) citing Macasa vs. Herrera, 101 Phil. 44
(1957).
18. 62A Am. Jur. 2d 602 citing Garland v. Dixie Ins. Co. (Fla App. D4) 495 So.
2d. 785, 11 FLW 1986, Aller v. Editorial Planeta. S.A. (Fla App. D3) 389 So.
2d. 321.
19. Rollo, p. 22.
20. Rollo, p. 13.
21. 181 SCRA 811 (1990), citing 1 MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF
COURT 521 (1979 Ed.), Perez, et al. v. Perez, et al., 73 SCRA 517 (197).