CEHTIF~f 'j~~y

~~~
~
"c- ~

\VlLFlUl'.1)0 \~~rt/:\~
3aepublic of tbe ~bilippines Clerk of Con 1·1
~upreme QI:ourt Third Di\ ision1

;!OOanila JUL 2 4 2018

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 223566

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., J.,

Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - LEONEN,
MARTIRES, and
GESMUNDO, JJ

JUNIE (OR DIONEY) SALVADOR, Promulgated:

SR. YMASAYANG,
Accused-Appellant. June 27, 2018

x. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~~- ~- - x.
DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

Accused-appellant Junie (or Dioney) Salvador, Sr., y Masayang

assails through this appeal the 27 January 2016 Decision' of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Twenty-Third Division, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01195-MIN
affirming, with modification as to the award of damages, the 12 July 2013
Joint Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Tagum City,
Davao del Norte, in Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 17628, 17629, 17630,
17631, and 17632.M

CA rollo, pp. 70-81; penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.
Records, pp. 141-147. Penned by Judge Ma. Susana T. Baua.
 Decision 2 G.R. No. 223566

' ,

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant was charged with five counts of murder under the

following Informations:

Crim. Case No. 17628

That on or about February 11, 2011, in the Municipality of

Kapalong, Province of Davao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, armed with bolos, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and hack Junie M. Salvador, Jr., his son, a two
year old minor, which caused his death, and further causing actual, moral,
and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 3

Crim. Case No. 17629

That on or about February 11, 2011, in the Municipality of

Kapalong, Province of Davao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with bolos, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and hack one Rossana B. Realo, a twelve (12) year old minor, daughter of
his live-in partner, thereby inflicting upon her wounds which caused her
death, and further causing actual, moral, and compensatory damages to the
heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Crim. Case No. 17630

That on or about February 11, 2011, in the Municipality of

Kapalong, Province of Davao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with bolos, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and hack one Miraflor B. Realo, his live-in partner, thereby inflicting upon
her wounds which caused her death, and further causing actual, moral, and
compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 5

Crim. Case No. 17631

That on or about February 11, 2011, in the Municipality of

Kapalong, Province of Davao de! Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed

Records (Criminal Case No. 17628), p. 3.

Records (Criminal Case No. 17629), p. I.
PAI
Records (Criminal Case No. 17630), p. I.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 223566

with bolos, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and hack one Mariz R. Masayang, a three (3) year old minor, his niece,
thereby inflicting upon her wounds which caused her death, and further
causing actual, moral, and compensatory damages to the heirs of the
victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Crim. Case No. 17632

That on or about February 11, 2011, in the Municipality of

Kapalong, Province of Davao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with bolos, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and hack one Jonessa R. Masayang, a one ( 1) year and two months old
minor, his niece, thereby inflicting upon her wounds which caused her
death, and further causing actual, moral, and compensatory damages to the
heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

To prove its cases against accused-appellant, Joy Masayang (Joy),

Melissa Masayang (Melissa), Felixchito Salaysay (Felixchito), Santos
Masayang (Santos), and Police Officer I (POI) Kim Aguspina (Aguspina)
took the witness stand.

For the defense, Dr. Reagan 8 Joseph Villanueva (Dr. Villanueva) and
accused-appellant testified.

Version of the Prosecution

On 11 February 2011, at around 6:00 a.m., accused-appellant and his

live-in partner Miraflor Realo (Miraflor), together with Miraflor's daughter
Melissa, and Melissa's husband Santos, were walking on their way to the
barangay hall to attend the Pamilya Pantawid program (program). Accused-
appellant, who appeared then to be very sweet to Miraflor, was happily
cracking jokes. When they reached the hall, accused-appellant told Miraflor

the program's list.

9 .
fH"4
and Melissa that he would go home already since his name did not appear in

Records (Criminal Case No. 17631), p. I

Records (Criminal Case No. 17631 ), p. I.
Also referred to as "Regan" in the records. The name "Reagan" appears in the medical certificate;
records, p. 127.
9
TSN, 8 November 2012, pp. 21-22.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 223566

At about 11 :30 a.m., while still at the barangay hall, Melissa told
Santos to go home so he could feed their children, Mariz and Jannes. 10 When
Santos did not find his children at home, he went out looking for them at his
neighbors' houses when he saw on the street accused-appellant with blood
on his arms and shirt and a bolo in his hand. Santos asked accused-appellant
what happened but he did not reply. Santos immediately went back to the
barangay hall and told Melissa that the children were not at home and that he
saw accused-appellant gone wild. Santos went back home to look for their
children while Melissa told Miraflor what Santos told her. 11

That same morning, Joy was on her way to the house of Miraflor to
look for Mariz and Jannes when she saw accused-appellant chasing Miraflor
in the street. Joy was about two-arm-lengths away from Miraflor when
accused-appellant, using a bolo, hacked Miraflor four times in the back and
in the nape. Joy was about to ask help from the barangay when she saw
accused-appellant drag Miraflor towards their house by pulling her hair. 12

When informed of what happened, Kagawad Salaysay and two

soldiers immediately proceeded to the house of accused-appellant, and there
saw him holding two bolos while Miraflor lay on the floor. When Salaysay
told accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily did so, saying, "I will
surrender Cons," and "If I want to kill a lot of people, I could but I only
killed my family"; and then handed his bolos to Salaysay's companion. It
was only when the policemen entered accused-appellant's house that the
bodies of the four dead children, namely: Mariz; Jannes; Rosana, 13
Miraflor's daughter; and Dioney, Jr., 14 Miraflor's son with accused-
appellant, were discovered. 15

At the Kapalong, Davao del Norte police station, PO 1 Aguspina asked

accused-appellant about his personal circumstances to which he was
• 16
responsive.

Version of the Defense

Dr. Villanueva, who has a special training in psychiatry at the

Southern Philippines Medical Center, stated that he had the chance to review
Dr. Giola Fe Dinglasan's (Dr. Dinglasan) records on accused-appellant. fa#
10
Referred to as "Jonessa" in the information in Crim. Case No. 17632. The name "Jannes" appears in
the certificate of death and the certification of the Punong Barangay; records, pp. 63 and 68.
11
TSN, 15 November 2012, pp. 16-18 and 22; TSN, 8 November 2012, p. 23.
12
TSN, 8 November2012, pp. 4-7.
11
Referred to as "Rosanna" in the information in Crim. Case No. 17629. The name "Rosana" appears in
the certificate of death and the certificate of live birth; records, pp. 61 and 65.
14
Also referred to as "Junie, Jr." in the records.
15
TSN, 8 November 2012, pp. 7-9.
16
TSN, 20 December 2012, p. 4.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 223566

Dr. Dinglasan saw accused-appellant on 6 June 2012 or sixteen months after

the 11 February 2011 incident. Initially, accused-appellant was given
medicine for depression and later for psychosis. According to
Dr. Villanueva, it was possible for accused-appellant to have a relapse if he
was not given his medicines; thus, Dr. Villanueva suggested that accused-
appellant undergo regular check-up and that he be given proper
. . 17
me d1cat10n.

Accused-appellant testified that he remembers who his victims were

but he does not recall that he killed them; the incident that took place before
their death; or where he was on 11 February 2011. It was only his sister who
informed him of the death of his family members and relatives. He had a
happy relationship with Miraflor and was very close to Dioney, Jr. He
stopped taking prohibited drugs when he started living-in with Miraflor, and
gave up smoking when he was already in prison. He claimed that he had
never been confined in a mental hospital either before the incident or after he
.
was mcarcerate d.18

The Ruling of the RTC

The R TC held that there was no question that accused-appellant was

the author of the gruesome killings of Miraflor and the four children and that
the only issue was whether accused-appellant was fully aware of the
wrongness of his acts to hold him liable. 19

The RTC ruled that accused-appellant failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that he was suffering from insanity or loss or absence
of reason before and after he killed his victims. It found that the killing of
Dioney, Jr. brings the case of accused-appellant within the ambit of Art. 246
of the RPC since Dioney was his son. Moreover, it held that the hacking by
accused-appellant of Miraflor, Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The RTC held that minors Rosana,
Mariz, and Jannes could not have suspected the attack much less defended
themselves when they were attacked as confirmed by wounds on their back,
20
torso, and skull.

The dispositive portion of the RTC joint decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JUNIE

SALVADOR y MASA YANG is hereby found GUILTY as charged for
each of the deaths of Miraflor Realo, Rosana Realo, Dioney Salvador, Jr., fiJ1
17
TSN, 7 February 2013, pp. 5-7 and 9-11.
18
TSN, 13 February 2013, pp. 4-14.
19
Recor ds, p. 144.
20
Id. at 145-146.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 223566

Mariz Masayang, and Jannes Masayang, and is hereby sentenced to suffer

the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the said deaths.

The said accused is likewise ordered to pay each of the heirs of the
aforesaid deceased the sum of PS0,000.00 each for their wrongful deaths
and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

21
SO ORDERED.

Believing that the RTC erred in its decision, accused-appellant

appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA found no merit in the appeal. It held that the only issue for
resolution in these cases was whether accused-appellant was mentally insane
at the time he killed the victims which, thus, would have exempted him from
liability for the crimes he committed. It ruled that accused-appellant's
defense of insanity failed considering that no evidence was presented to
prove that he was struck with schizoaffective disorder (disorder)
immediately prior to or during the time that he hacked his victims to death. It
found that the evidence on record showed that accused-appellant was
diagnosed with the disorder more than a year after the hacking incident and
that the arguments he advanced to prove his defense was speculative and
inconclusive. It declared that the penalty imposed by the RTC in each of the
criminal cases was correct, albeit there was a need to modify the award of
damages to conform to jurisprudence. 22

The CA resolved the appeal as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this ordinary

appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 12 July 2013 Joint Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte, in
Crim. Case Nos. 17628, 17629, 17630, 17631, and 17632 convicting
JUNIE SALVADOR, SR. for Parricide and Multiple Murder is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:

Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the following amounts to the

heirs of the deceased:

1) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P.75,000.00) as civil indemnity;

2) Fifty-Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
3)
4)
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P.25,000.00) as temperate damages;
Thirty Thousand Pesos (1'30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and fol
21
Id. at 147.
22
CA rollo, pp. 75-80.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 223566

5) Legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this judgment. 23

ISSUES

I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GIVING PROBATIVE WEIGHT

TO THE TESTIMONY OF AND PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION BY
DR. REAGAN JOSEPH VILLANUEVA FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT TO BE SUFFERING FROM SCHIZOAFFECTIVE
DISORDER;

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 24

OUR RULING

The appeal is without merit.

Accused-appellant failed to
prove his defense of insanity.

It is not disputed that it was accused-appellant who killed Dioney, Jr.,

Rosana, Miraflor, Mariz, and Jannes; and that the only crux of the
controversy in these cases is whether accused-appellant, at the time of the
commission of the offenses, was insane and, thus, is exempted from criminal
liability.

Jurisprudence dictates that every individual is presumed to have acted

with a complete grasp of one's mental faculties. 25 "It is improper to assume
the contrary, i.e., that acts were done unconsciously, for the moral and legal
presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind, or that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. Thus,

is sane.'"
6
1'41
the presumption under Article (Art.) 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone

23
Id. at 80-81.
24
Id. at 19.
25
People v. Belonio, 473 Phil. 637, 653 (2004).
26
People v. Opuran, 469 Phil. 698, 711 (2004).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 223566

On the one hand, insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided

for in Art. 12, paragraph (par.) I of the Revised Penal Code (RPC):

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The

following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a

lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the
law defines as a felony (delito ), the court shall order his confinement in
one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence

while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he
acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. 27 The
legal teaching consistently maintained in our jurisprudence is that the plea of
insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. 28 Hence, if the accused
is found to be sane at the time he perpetrated the offense, a judgment of
conviction is inevitable because he had already admitted that he committed
the offense. Insanity, as an exempting circumstance that had been explained
by the Court, is as foll0ws:

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity

cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the
basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with
the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that
which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a
defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished.
No purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused
because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.

xx xx

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion

for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is
a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total

Patt
deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.

27
People v. Domingo, 599 Phil. 589, 606 (2009).
18
- Peoplev. Roa. G.R. No. 225599, 22 March 2017.
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 223566

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the

mind, not susceptible [to] the usual means of proof as no man can know
what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's
mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the
insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by
a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who
has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the
witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as
an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's
insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged. (citations omitted)2 9

He who invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its

30
existence; thus, for accused-appellant's defense of insanity to prosper, two
(2) elements must concur: (1) that defendant's insanity constitutes a
complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and (2) that
such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the
commission of the crime. 31

Accused-appellant insists that, as testified to by Dr. Villanueva, he

was suffering from the disorder which impaired his mental condition that
deprived him of reason at the time ofthe.incident. 32

The Court is not persuaded.

The Court takes note of the fact that based on Dr. Dinglasan' s
certification, 33 she first evaluated and examined accused-appellant only on
22 March 2011, or more than a month from the 11 February 2011 incident.
The records of these cases however, are bereft of any showing as to
Dr. Dinglasan' s diagnosis of accused-appellant on 22 March 2011; hence, it
cannot be validly asserted that as of that day, or even earlier than that date,
accused-appellant already had the disorder. Additionally, the certification
merely evinces that it was on 6 June 2012 that Dr. Dinglasan diagnosed
accused-appellant to be suffering from the disorder.

Dr. Villanueva personally examined accused-appellant on

27 September 2012, 34 or one (1) year and seven (7) months from the
incident, and found him to be suffering from the disorder. However, no
documentary proof was presented by the defense to show how Dr.
Villanueva was able to arrive at his diagnosis. Indeed, the records only show
a single medical certificate from Dr. Villanueva indicating that accused- ~

29 Id.
30
People v. Belonio, supra note 25 at 653.
31
People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, 29 November 2017.
32
CA rollo, pp. 24-26.
33
Records, p. 13 I; Exh. "I."
34
Id. at 127.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 223566

appellant was diagnosed with the disorder on 27 September 2012. Moreover,

a review of Dr. Villanueva's testimony will confirm that he never stated how
he arrived at his diagnosis of accused-appellant. The probability that there
was but this single instance on 27 September 2012 that Dr. Villanueva
attended to accused-appellant was easily confirmed by his testimony before
the RTC which basically dwelt on his giving opinion as to what a person
with the disorder would normally do; or whether the disorder would cause a
person to be violent; or whether a person with the disorder would know what
he was doing; but not as to his specific observations with regard to accused-
appellant' s condition. 35 The defense never even tried to propound questions
to Dr. Villanueva that would elicit certain and categorical answers relative to
accused-appellant's demeanor or disposition in relation to the disorder he
was suffering from.

Notably, it cannot be ascertained even with Dr. Villanueva's

testimony that accused-appellant's disorder existed at the time of or
immediately preceding the commission of the crime. Dr. Villanueva
candidly admitted that Dr. Dinglasan's diagnosis that accused-appellant was
suffering from the disorder was based on the latter's observation reckoned
from accused-appellant's consultation sixteen ( 16) months after the
11 February 2011 incident and his last consultation, viz:

Q. The medical certificate which I showed to you a while ago was

dated June 6, 2012 and the incident happened February 11, 2011.
More or less sixteen months before. Tell us doctor, is it probable
that the accused at that time of the incident had been suffering a
condition worse than schizoaffective disorder?

A. The incident happened a year prior to the patient being seen by a

psychiatrist, so the diagnosis given by Dr. Dinglasan was based on
her observation from the first consultation up to the last
consultation. So we do not exactly say when the condition
started so that is why an informant, preferably a relative [is
needed], so that we can go back into history years before. 36
(emphasis supplied)

Likewise noted, Dr. Villanueva cannot state for sure that when
accused-appellant committed the crimes he was suffering from any mental
illness. It is even significant that Dr. Villanueva admitted it was possible that
accused-appellant's present condition was triggered by the massacre that he
committed and not because he already had the disorder at the time he killed
his victims. ~
37

35
TSN, 7 February 2013, pp. 8-9.
36
Id. at 9.
37
Id.atl3andl7.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 223566

To stress, an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate

to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is
committed. 38 Thus, the diagnosis on accused-appellant long after the
11 February 2011 incident, even if this was testified to by a doctor, may not
be relied upon to prove accused-appellant's mental condition at the time of
his commission of the offenses.

In the same vein, accused-appellant's testimony did not help to fortify

his defense of insanity. While accused-appellant denied having any memory
of what transpired on 11 February 2011, and claimed that he was merely
informed of what had happened that day, he admitted nonetheless that he
knew who his victims were, and that it was because of the pain that he felt
whenever he remembered what happened that made him intentionally erase
the incident from his mind. 39 Put differently, by his own admission, accused-
appellant purposely put out of his mind what he had done to his victims on
11 February 2011; not because he did not know what he did that day but
because he grieved whenever he thought about it.

For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral

oddities cannot support a finding of insanity unless the totality of such
behavior indubitably shows a total absence of reason, discernment, or free
will at the time the crime was committed. 40 In the Philippines, the courts
have established a clearer and more stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he
acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. 41
Accused-appellant's claim that he allegedly failed to remember what had
happened on 11 February 2011, neither qualifies him as insane nor negates
the truth that he was fully aware that he had killed his victims. For sure,
accused-appellant's statement right after he surrendered to Salaysay-"If I
want to kill a lot of people, I could but I only killed my family" 42-
persuasively disproves his claim of not knowingly or voluntarily killing his
victims.

The crimes committed by

accused-appellant and their
corresponding penalties

Foremost, the Court is mindful that jurisprudence instructs it to rigidly

l"I
review the records of these cases since the appeal confers upon it full
jurisdiction over the cases, viz:

38
People v. Racal, G.R. 224886, 4 September 2017.
39
TSN, 13 February 2013, pp. 6, and 10-12.
40
People v. Pantoja, supra note 31.
41
People v. Racal, supra note 38.
42
TSN, 8 November 2012, p. 8.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 223566

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws

the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the
trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
43
provision of the penal law.

In view of this legal teaching, the Court has meticulously examined

the records of this case and found that there were substantial facts that both
the RTC and the CA had overlooked and which, if considered, may affect
the outcome of these cases.

The Court notes that the RTC and the CA failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of accused-appellant's voluntary surrender, the
elements of which are as follows: (1) the accused has not been actually
arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the
latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. 44 Without the elements of
voluntary surrender, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender
are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender
is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary
surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance. 45

Salaysay stated that on 11 February 2011, two persons reported to the

barangay hall that a person had gone wild. Salaysay and two soldiers
proceeded to the scene of the crime and there saw accused-appellant holding
two bolos. When asked to surrender, accused-appellant calmly approached
Salaysay and said, "I will surrender Cons," and thereafter gave his bolos to
Salaysay's companion. Accused-appellant voluntarily went with Salaysay to
the barangay hall and thereafter to the police station. 46 Clearly, the voluntary
surrender of accused-appellant was spontaneous and with the intent to give
himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. 47 Hence, it is only
proper that this mitigating circumstance be appreciated in imposing the
correct penalties upon accused-appellant.

a) Crim. Case No. 17628

It is not disputed that Dioney, Jr. was the two year-old son of accused-
appellant; thus, qualifying the crime committed by accused-appellant as
parricide as defined and penalized under Art. 246 of the RPC, viz: f/J4(
41
Ramos v. People, G.R. No. 218466, 23 January 2017, 815 SCRA 266, 233.
44
People v. Placer, 719 Phil. 268, 281-282 (2013 ).
45
Be/his, Jr. v People, 698 Phil. 706, 724 (2012).
46
TSN, 15 November 2012, pp. 4-5. 7 and 9.
47 Id.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 223566

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

Applying Art. 63 48 of the RPC, with one mitigating circumstance of

accused-appellant's voluntary surrender and there being no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

Pursuant to the jurisprudence laid down in People v. Jugueta, 49

accused-appellant shall be held liable to pay the heirs of Dioney, Jr. the
following: civil indemnity of P75,000.00; moral damages of P75,000.00;
exemplary damages of P75,000.00; and temperate damages of PS0,000.00;
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment.

b) Crim. Case Nos. 17629, 17631,

and 17632

In Crim. Case Nos. 17629, 17631, and 17632, accused-appellant was

charged for the killing of Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes with ages twelve (12)
years and three (3) months, three (3) years and two (2) months, and (one) 1
year and (two) 2 months, respectively, at the time of the incident.

Settled is the rule that minor children, by reason of their tender years,
cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person attacks a
child, treachery exists. 50 On the one hand, jurisprudence dictates that the
elements of murder51 are as follows: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the
accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifyin~

48
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by .the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxx
49
783 Phil. 806(2016).
50
Id.at819.
51
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
I. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xx x (as amended by R.A. No. 7659 entitled "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes, amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws,
and for Other Purposes").
 Decision 14 G.R. No. 223566

circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and (d) that the killing is not parricide
or infanticide. 52 Considering that the killing of Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, accused-
appellant's conviction for murder in these cases should be sustained.

Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender and following Art. 63 of the RPC, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon accused-appellant for each of Crim. Case
Nos. 17629, 17631, and 17632.

In addition, accused-appellant shall be held liable in Crim. Case Nos.

17629, 17631, and 17632 to the heirs of Rosana B. Realo, Mariz R.
Masayang, and Jannes R. Masayang, respectively, for the following: civil
indemnity of I!75,000.00; moral damages of P75,000.00; exemplary
damages of P75,000.00; and temperate damages of PS0,000.00. Accused-
appellant shall pay interest for the civil indemnity and the moral, exemplary,
and temperate damages at the rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment.

c) Crim. Case No. 17630

In this case, accused-appellant was charged with murder for the

killing of Miraflor, his live-in partner. The information provides that the
killing of Miraflor was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes

against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 53
Alevosia is characterized by a deliberate, sudden, and unexpected assault
from behind, without warning and without giving the victim a chance to
defend himself or repel the assault and without risk to the assailant. 54

For treachery to be appreciated two elements must be alleged and

proved, namely: ( 1) that the means of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted, that is, the
means, methods or forms of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon
or consciously adopted by the offender. 55 Treachery, whenever alleged in the fol
52
People v. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829, 22 January 2018.
5
' People v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, 29 March 2017.
54
People v. Raytos, G.R. No. 225623, 7 June 2017.
11
People v. Dasmarinas, G.R. No. 203986, 4 October 2017.
Decision 15 G.R. No. 223566

information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and
.
raises . tothe category o f murder. 56
it

Additionally, in murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent

to kill. 57 The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the
means used; the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim. 58

On the first element, the legal teaching consistently upheld by the

Court is that the essence of treachery is when the attack comes without
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unanned, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the
sudden blow. 59 Relative to the second element, jurisprudence imparts that
there must be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or consciously
adopted the means of execution to ensure its success 60 since unexpectedness
of the attack does not always equate to treachery. 61 The means adopted must
have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the
. 62
cnme.

Joy testified that on 11 February 2011, she saw accused-appellant

chase Miraflor out of the house, and thereafter stabbed her and hacked her in
the nape using a bolo. 63 There was no doubt that the intent of accused-
appellant was to kill Miraflor, which fact was firmly established by her
certificate of death reflecting
.
that
64
her cause of death was the "hacked wound,
neck area, (R) dorsal area." Obviously too, the means adopted by the
accused-appellant in suddenly attacking Miraflor from behind using a bolo
ensured his killing her. The presence of treachery is thus established, finding
accused-appellant guilty of murder.

Taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

/1'I
surrender and following Art. 63 of the RPC, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon ac,cused-appellant.

56
People v. Macaspac, G.R. No. 198954, 22 February 2017.
57
Cirera v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 39(2014).
58
Escamilla v. People, 705 Phil. 188, 196-197 (2013).
59
People v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, 15 March 2017.
60
People v. Oloverio, 756 Phil. 435, 449 (2015).
61
Cirera v. People, supra note 57 at 28.
62
Id. at 45.
63
TSN, 8 November 2012, p. 5.
64
Records, p. 100.
Decision 16 G.R. No. 223566

In all these cases, following Jugueta, 65 accused-appellant shall be

liable to the heirs of Miraflor B. Realo for the following: civil indemnity of
P75,000.00; moral damages of P75,000.00; exemplary damages of
P75,000.00; and temperate damages of P50,000.00; with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, judgment

is rendered as follows:

In Crim. Case No. 17628, accused-appellant JUNIE (or DI ONEY)

SALVADOR, SR. y MASA YANG is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as defined and penalized under
Art. 246 of the RPC and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to pay the heirs of
Junie (or Dioney) Salvador, Jr. the following: civil indemnity of P75,000.00;
moral damages of P75,000.00; exemplary damages of P75,000.00; and
temperate damages of P50,000.00, and shall pay interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until
their full payment.

In Crim. Case Nos. 17629, 17630, 17631, and 17632, accused-

appellant JUNIE (or DI ONEY) SALVADOR, SR. y MASA YANG is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined
and penalized pursuant to Art. 248 of the RPC and is sentenced to suffer, in
each of these cases, the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to pay in each of these cases the
heirs of Rosana B. Realo, Miraflor B. Realo, Mariz R. Masayang, and
Jannes R. Masayang, respectively, the following: civil indemnity of
P75,000.00; moral damages of P75,000.00; exemplary damages of
P75,000.00; and temperate damages of P50,000.00, with interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision
until their full payment.

SO ORDERED.

s UEL Il. ~~TIRES

Associate Justice

65
Supra note 49.
Decision 17 G.R. No. 223566

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITER1, J. VELASCO, JR.

A2?c~ate Justice
Chairperson

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

J. VELASCO, JR.
A~ociate Justice
Chainlerson, Third Division
Decision 18 G.R. No. 223566

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

CEHTIHFD j JU t <CW\

~:>ov.1~
Divhi1 Clt·rt< " " ' ""
Thi1·c1o;,1.,1,111

n ! 1~-
.J ',_•
;
L
,
4
·'i•llil'