Professional Documents
Culture Documents
77 Memorandum of Law
77 Memorandum of Law
Robert D. Wick
Christian J. Pistilli
Michael M. Maya
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
One CityCenter, 850 Tenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001-4956
(202) 662-6000
Michael C. Nicholson
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
The New York Times Building
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10018-1405
(212) 841-1000
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 22
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Aronov v. Mersini,
2015 WL 1780164 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2015)..........................................................................12
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................................6
Barker v. Amorini,
995 N.Y.S.2d 89 (App. Div. 2014) ..........................................................................................15
In re Chateaugay Corp.,
10 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1993).......................................................................................................14
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Finley v. Giacobbe,
79 F.3d 1285 (2d Cir. 1996).....................................................................................................17
McLaughlin v. Anderson,
962 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1992).....................................................................................................13
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Morin v. Trupin,
778 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).............................................................................................7
Reich v. Lopez,
38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)................................................................................12
Stewart v. Maitland,
835 N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div. 2007) ..........................................................................................21
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Other Authorities
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Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Chase
Home Finance, LLC (collectively, “Chase” or “Defendants”) submit this Memorandum of Law
in support of their motion to dismiss counts four through nine of the Third Amended Complaint
(“TAC” or “complaint”).1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The crux of Plaintiffs’ allegations is that Chase breached the terms of certain
contracts to sell distressed mortgage loans to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, however, improperly seek to
transform a straightforward breach of contract case into a sprawling dispute about whether Chase
violated the RICO statute and committed a series of intentional torts. The Court should dismiss
The RICO Claim. Plaintiffs allege that Chase engaged in a widespread criminal
conspiracy to evade its obligations under a pair of settlement agreements with the federal
government. According to the complaint, Chase purported to forgive certain mortgage loans that
it no longer owned in a fraudulent effort to obtain “credit” for consumer relief that it was
required to provide under the settlements. On that basis, Plaintiffs accuse Chase of violating the
RICO statute and seek treble damages for the injuries they supposedly suffered at the hands of
the alleged conspiracy. Even assuming the truth of these extraordinary allegations, this claim
Under RICO, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a criminal enterprise with both an
identifiable “structure” and a “common purpose.” Plaintiffs vaguely allege the existence of an
1
A true and correct copy of the TAC (ECF Doc. No. 67) is attached as Exhibit A to the
declaration of Michael M. Maya, submitted herewith. Solely for purposes of this motion, Chase
assumes the truth of the allegations in the TAC.
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enterprise consisting of Chase and unidentified third parties that allegedly assisted Chase by
mailing improper debt forgiveness letters and filing improper lien releases. But the complaint
fails to plead any facts regarding the supposed interactions among the unnamed members of the
purported enterprise. Nor does the complaint adequately allege that these unnamed parties
shared a common purpose with Chase. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ enterprise allegations fall far
state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege a series of related predicate acts that amount to
or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Here, Chase’s purported criminal acts consisted
of sending improper debt forgiveness letters and filing improper lien releases from late 2012
through late 2013. Under Second Circuit precedent, these allegations are far too limited in time
The Tort Claims. Separate and apart from the RICO claim, the complaint
alleges that Chase breached the terms of a February 2009 contract under which it agreed to sell
certain distressed mortgage loans to Plaintiff Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC (“MRS”).
According to Plaintiffs, the loans that Chase delivered under the contract failed to meet the
quality standards supposedly set forth in the contract. Plaintiffs also allege that Chase breached
both the February 2009 contract and a handful of similar contracts by sending improper debt
forgiveness letters and filing improper lien releases in connection with loans it had previously
sold to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs go on to allege that the very same conduct that forms the basis of their
breach of contract claims also subjects Chase to liability under a number of intentional tort
theories. Under settled law, however, Plaintiffs’ tort claims should be dismissed as duplicative
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with the breach of contract claims. The tort claims also should be dismissed on the ground that
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
The factual allegations in the complaint fall into three general categories:
(1) allegations relating to the purported February 2009 debt sale contract between Chase and
MRS, (2) allegations relating to the debt forgiveness letters and lien releases sent by Chase in
2012 and 2013, and (3) allegations relating to a purported conspiracy by Chase to evade its
obligations under settlement agreements with the government. Each of these categories is
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff MRS entered into a Mortgage Loan Purchase
Agreement (“MLPA”) with Chase to acquire certain distressed mortgage loans on or about
February 25, 2009. TAC ¶¶ 1, 38. Although the balance due on the loans purchased by MRS
exceeded $150 million, MRS paid only $200,000 for the loans – less than a penny on the dollar.
Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. Consistent with the low price it paid for the loans, MRS agreed (with certain
enumerated exceptions) to acquire the “nonperforming and/or impaired” loans “AS IS,” with
“NO RECOURSE” against Chase. Id. ¶¶ 38, 42. MRS nevertheless filed this action after
becoming dissatisfied with the loans, seeking a jaw-dropping $300 million in damages. Id. at 44.
According to Plaintiffs, Chase breached the MLPA, inter alia, by (1) providing a
“grossly deficient” schedule identifying the loans covered by the contract, (2) failing to provide
certain “information and documents” relating to the purchased loans, (3) including loans other
than “first lien mortgage loans” in the group of loans delivered to MRS, and (4) breaching a
representation that the purchased loans had been serviced in accordance with “applicable law.”
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Id. ¶ 151; see id. ¶¶ 46-79. These same allegations form the basis for MRS’s fraud and negligent
Under the April 2012 National Mortgage Settlement (“NMS”), Chase and four
other loan servicers are required to forgive or modify the terms of certain mortgage loans. Id.
¶ 97. The complaint alleges that, between September 2012 and January 2013, Chase mailed
approximately 50,000 “debt forgiveness letters” to borrowers with the “intent of fulfilling its
consumer relief obligations under the NMS.” Id. ¶ 103-04. The complaint further asserts that
Chase mistakenly sent a small number of debt forgiveness letters to borrowers whose loans
previously had been purchased by Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 105. Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, that
Chase promptly apologized for the error and offered to buy back the affected loans. Id. ¶ 109-10.
Plaintiffs also concede that Chase has already paid them more than $400,000 to buy back three
erroneously recorded releases of liens that secured a number of the loans purchased by Plaintiffs.
Id. ¶¶ 135-37, 142-44. According to the complaint, Chase released these liens to avoid purported
anti-blight responsibilities and, in its “eagerness,” signed the releases without “any knowledge as
to the relevant facts concerning each lien.” Id. ¶¶ 134, 138, 140. Although the complaint asserts
that Chase mistakenly released “hundreds” of liens that belonged to Plaintiffs, they identify only
two instances in which they purportedly were harmed by an erroneous release. Id. ¶¶ 134, 142-
43. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert breach of contract claims, as well as claims for
conversion, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and slander of title. Id.
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evade its consumer relief obligations under both the NMS and a separate settlement relating to
residential mortgage-backed securities (the “RMBS settlement”). See, e.g., TAC ¶¶ 103, 132-33,
146-48; see generally id. ¶¶ 206-20. Based on these remarkable allegations, Plaintiffs seek treble
damages and attorneys’ fees under RICO. Id. ¶¶ 201-20; see id. at p. 45.
“goal . . . was to induce the government[] . . . to believe that [Chase] had fulfilled [its] obligation
to provide $8.2 billion of consumer relief when, in fact, [it] had not done so.” Id. ¶ 210.
Plaintiffs allege that this enterprise consisted of (1) Chase, (2) unidentified “outside services”
purportedly involved in sending debt forgiveness letters, (3) employees of unspecified “entities”
that assisted Chase in releasing liens, and (4) unnamed “debt collection agencies.” Id. ¶ 204.
The complaint makes no effort to explain the role that any of these unidentified participants
allegedly played in the purported enterprise. Nor does it identify the manner in which the
The complaint also alleges that Chase engaged in “predicate acts” of criminal
mail and wire fraud in furtherance of the alleged enterprise. Id. ¶ 209. The principal predicate
acts alleged in the complaint – i.e., the sending of improper debt forgiveness letters and lien
releases – all are described as occurring between late 2012 and late 2013. Id. ¶ 212. Although
Plaintiffs also assert that Chase committed RICO predicate acts in connection with the
negotiation of the MLPA in 2008 and 2009, see id., they do not explain how conduct that
allegedly occurred in 2008 and 2009 supposedly furthered a scheme to evade Chase’s obligations
under the NMS and RMBS settlements that came into existence in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
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B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in New York State Supreme Court in
December 2014. The following month, Chase removed the action to this Court. Plaintiffs filed
the operative Third Amended Complaint in this action on August 24, 2015.
Earlier, on May 22, 2015, Chase moved to transfer this action to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. On October 28, 2015, Magistrate Judge Francis denied that
motion. Judge Francis denied the motion largely because the MLPA contract contains a New
York forum selection clause and because “[i]n one way or another, the plaintiffs’ claims all stem
from” mortgage purchase contracts. ECF Doc. No. 75, at 2; see also id. at 9 (“As a factual
matter,” Plaintiffs’ tort claims “all arise from the business relationship created by the MPLA”).2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Claims grounded in fraud also must satisfy the heightened pleading standards of
Rule 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Allegations of fraud thus must specify the fraudulent
statement, the time, place, speaker and content of the alleged misrepresentations, and factual
2
A true and correct copy of the Court’s Memorandum and Order (ECF Doc. No. 75) is
attached as Exhibit B to the declaration of Michael M. Maya, submitted herewith.
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circumstances giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant had the requisite fraudulent
intent.” Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
Rule 9(b)’s requirement to plead with particularity has “even greater urgency in civil RICO
ARGUMENT
A civil RICO action “is an unusually potent weapon – the litigation equivalent of
a thermonuclear device.” Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir. 1997).
For this reason, “courts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage of
the litigation.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’ RICO claim should
be dismissed because Plaintiffs (1) have not adequately alleged a valid RICO enterprise, and
Plaintiffs’ RICO claim should be dismissed because they fail to allege “facts
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2015). In their original complaint, Plaintiffs alleged the existence of an
enterprise consisting solely of Chase and its corporate affiliates.3 As Chase pointed out in a pre-
motion letter, however, a RICO plaintiff must allege an “enterprise” that is distinct from the
RICO “person” named as the defendant, and this distinctness requirement cannot be satisfied by
3
Compl. ¶ 122. A true and correct copy of Plaintiffs’ original complaint in this case is
attached as Exhibit C to the declaration of Michael M. Maya, submitted herewith.
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alleging an enterprise consisting solely of a corporation and its corporate affiliates. See, e.g.,
distinctness requirement by alleging an enterprise consisting of (1) Chase, (2) unnamed “debt
collection agencies,” (3) unnamed “outside services” that Chase allegedly used to help send debt
forgiveness letters, and (4) unnamed third-party vendors who allegedly assisted Chase “in
releasing liens on collateral that had been transferred to the Plaintiffs.” TAC ¶ 204. Under
settled authority, however, Plaintiffs’ “veiled attempt to bypass the distinctness requirement”
fails as a matter of law. Manhattan Telecommc’ns Corp. v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 156 F.
purpose.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). To plead an informal
association-in-fact enterprise – as Plaintiffs attempt to do here – the complaint must allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate the “hierarchy, organization, and activities” of the enterprise and that
“its members functioned as a unit.” First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d
159, 174 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The mere “naming of a string of
entities does not adequately allege an enterprise.” Id. at 175 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Plaintiffs’ complaint is entirely devoid of any factual allegations that Chase and
its unidentified third-party service providers “have united together to ‘function as a continuing
unit’ that has an actual existence, organization, and structure.” Manhattan Telecommc’ns Corp.,
156 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). For example, the complaint “fail[s] to
make any concrete factual assertions as to the mechanics of the interactions among” Chase and
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the third parties with whom it allegedly partnered in a criminal enterprise. Cont’l Petroleum
Corp. v. Corp. Funding Partners, LLC, 2012 WL 1231775, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2012).
Indeed, the complaint does not even identify the members of the purported enterprise by name.
Nor does the complaint allege that the purported enterprise has any “organizational pattern or
system of authority other than that embedded in the organization of [Chase].” Manhattan
Telecommcn’s Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations fall far short of establishing the structure and organization
required of a RICO enterprise. See id. (dismissing alleged enterprise consisting of a vendor and
its customers as “a fiction created by plaintiff to circumvent the distinctness requirement”); see
also In re Trilegiant Corp., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 3d 82, 98-99 (D. Conn. 2014) (holding that “a
classic ‘hub-and-spoke’ formation in which the spokes are separate, distinct and unassociated
and whose actions are uncoordinated does not possess the requisite structure to constitute a
RICO enterprise”); Bonadio v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 2014 WL 522784, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2014) (dismissing RICO claim where the “only factual allegations relating to the enterprise are
Plaintiffs likewise fail to allege that the members of the purported enterprise
shared a “common purpose.” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. According to Plaintiffs, the purpose of
the alleged enterprise was to induce the government “to believe that [Chase] had fulfilled [its]
obligation to provide $8.2 billion of consumer relief” under the NMS and RMBS settlement
“when, in fact, [Chase] had not done so.” TAC ¶ 210. But Plaintiffs do not allege any facts even
remotely suggesting that this alleged purpose was a common purpose shared by the various third-
party vendors that allegedly participated in the enterprise. To the contrary, the only plausible
inference from the facts asserted in the complaint is that any such vendors assisted Chase with
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the mailing of debt forgiveness letters and the filing of lien releases for a fee, pursuant to arm’s-
length commercial transactions for the provision of mundane administrative support services.4
Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that Chase and its third-party vendors shared a common purpose
therefore fails as a matter of law. Manhattan Telecommc’ns Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 382-83
(collecting cases holding that vendors and customers do not share a common purpose); see
Cont’l Petroleum Corp., 2012 WL 1231775, at *6 (dismissing RICO claim where there were no
“concrete factual assertions as to the nature of the [enterprise members’] common interests”); see
also Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (liability under RICO
“depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the
‘enterprise’s affairs,’ not just their own affairs” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
In short, “no amount of artful pleading can create an enterprise out of such a loose
connection of separate and independent business entities” as those alleged in the complaint.
Manhattan Telecommcn’s Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 383. Plaintiffs’ RICO claim should
Plaintiffs’ RICO claim also fails because it does not satisfy RICO’s continuity
requirement. The RICO statute requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant engaged in a
plaintiff must show that the predicate acts constituting the pattern “are related, and that they
4
Plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to unnamed debt collection agencies fall especially far
from the mark because Plaintiffs do not allege any facts suggesting that those agencies played
any role in the purported scheme to evade Chase’s obligations under the government settlements.
See First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc., 385 F.3d at 174 (“This Court . . . requires that a nexus exist
between the enterprise and the racketeering activity that is being conducted.”); see also Barnes v.
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 2007 WL 2405010, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2007) (holding that the
use of third-party debt collectors to collect a debt “does not constitute a RICO ‘enterprise’”).
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amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492
U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (second emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Chase
“open-ended.” See id. at 239, 241. In order to establish closed-ended continuity, a plaintiff must
allege “a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.” Id. at 242. To
establish open-ended continuity, the plaintiff must allege facts suggesting “a threat of continuing
criminal activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed.”
Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., 187 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 1999). Here,
continuity because Chase’s purported efforts to evade its settlement obligations necessarily ends
along with its settlement obligations. Where, as here, the defendants’ business is not “primarily
or inherently unlawful,” a plaintiff seeking to establish open-ended continuity must allege either
(1) “that the predicate acts were the regular way of operating that business” or (2) that “the
nature of the predicate acts themselves implies a threat of continued criminal activity.” Spool v.
World Child Int’l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2008). No such allegations exist
here. To the contrary, the complaint alleges that the sole purpose of the purported RICO
enterprise was to evade Chase’s obligations under the NMS and RMBS settlement. TAC ¶ 206.
Any such scheme would, by definition, conclude when Chase’s settlement obligations terminate.
Under established precedent, such “an ‘inherently terminable’ scheme does not imply a threat of
continued racketeering activity.” Cofacredit, S.A., 187 F.3d at 244; GICC Capital Corp. v. Tech.
Fin. Grp., Inc., 67 F.3d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It defies logic to suggest that a threat of
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continued looting activity exists when . . . there is nothing left to loot.”); see also Spool, 520 F.3d
at 186 (no open-ended continuity where complaint “alleges only ‘a serious, but discrete and
Here, moreover, the operative complaint – which was filed in August 2015 – fails
to allege any predicate acts occurring after 2013. As the Second Circuit has recognized, the
failure to plead any recent predicate acts is fatal to the assertion that a defendant’s alleged
conduct poses an ongoing threat of criminal activity. See First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc., 385
F.3d at 181 (no threat of continued criminal activity where the last predicate act allegedly
occurred approximately two years before the filing of the amended complaint). Accordingly,
continuity, i.e., “a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.” H.J.,
Inc., 492 U.S. at 242. Since the Supreme Court decided H.J., Inc., the Second Circuit has “never
held a period of less than two years to constitute a ‘substantial period of time’” for purposes of
this requirement. Reich v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); accord Aronov v.
Mersini, 2015 WL 1780164, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2015). Here, all of the relevant predicate
acts alleged in the complaint occurred over a 15-month period beginning in 2012, when Chase
allegedly mailed its first batch of debt forgiveness letters, and ending in 2013, when Chase
executed the final, allegedly improper lien release referenced in the complaint. TAC ¶ 212(g)-
(h); see also id. ¶¶ 103-04, 142-44. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the lien
releases and debt forgiveness letters are insufficient to establish closed-ended continuity as a
matter of law.
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To be sure, the complaint also alleges a different set of predicate acts relating to
the negotiation of the MLPA in 2008 and 2009. Id. ¶ 212(a)-(f). In order to constitute part of a
“pattern of racketeering activity,” however, the predicate acts must be “related.” H.J., Inc., 492
U.S. at 239; see McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1992) (disregarding
“unrelated” predicate acts for purposes of the continuity requirement). “Predicate acts are
‘related’ for RICO purposes” only “when they have the same or similar purposes, results,
characteristics and are not isolated events.” Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 119 F.3d
91, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the purported purpose of the
supposed RICO enterprise was to enable Chase to evade its obligations under settlement
agreements entered into in 2012 and 2013. Plainly, predicate acts that pre-date the settlements
by more than two years could not have been done in furtherance of a scheme to evade Chase’s
settlement obligations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs may not rely on these earlier, “unrelated predicate
acts” in order to “extend the duration of the [alleged] scheme.” Ray Larsen Assocs., Inc. v. Nikko
Am., Inc., 1996 WL 442799, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1996); see Schlaifer Nance & Co., 119 F.3d
underlying enterprise”).5
5
Nor do the 2008-09 alleged predicate acts, standing alone, give rise to a valid RICO
claim. Among other infirmities, there is absolutely no nexus between the RICO enterprise
alleged in the complaint (whose purported purpose was to evade obligations under 2012 and
2013 settlements) and the 2008-09 predicate acts (which relate entirely to a debt sale contract
between Chase and Plaintiff MRS). See, e.g., First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc., 385 F.3d at 174
(“This Court . . . requires that a nexus exist between the enterprise and the racketeering activity
that is being conducted.”).
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In addition to their RICO and breach of contract claims, Plaintiffs assert a number
of tort claims under New York law. As Magistrate Judge Francis recognized, however, these tort
claims all arise from Plaintiffs’ debt-purchase contracts with Chase.6 As a result, the tort claims
should be dismissed as duplicative of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. See, e.g., Clark-
Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 516 N.E.2d 190, 193-94 (N.Y. 1987) (dismissing tort
claims as barred by the existence of a written agreement governing the same subject matter).
The tort claims also should be dismissed for the additional reasons set forth below.
claims. Under New York law, where a conversion claim is “based on the same facts as [a] cause
of action to recover damages for breach of contract, and fail[s] to allege [a] distinct, cognizable
cause[] of action,” the claim should be dismissed. See Orok Edem v. Grandbelle Int’l, Inc., 988
N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (App. Div. 2014); see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 958 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that a claim for conversion “will not arise where plaintiff is essentially seeking
enforcement of the bargain” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That principle is dispositive
here because the grounds for Plaintiffs’ conversion claim and their breach of contract claims are
identical. The conversion claim alleges that “Chase wrote forgiveness letters to borrowers whose
loans it had sold to the Plaintiffs and released liens securing loans that Chase had sold to the
6
Maya Decl. Ex. B, at 9 (“[A]s a factual matter, MRS’ claims for conversion, tortious
interference, fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation and slander of title all arise
from the business relationship created by the MPLA.”); see also id. at 2 (“In one way or another,
the plaintiffs’ claims all stem from their purchase of mortgage loans from the defendants.”).
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Plaintiffs.” TAC ¶ 168. The breach of contract claims similarly allege that Chase breached its
contracts by “forgiving loans it had previously sold to [Plaintiffs]” and “releasing mortgage liens
securing loans previously sold to [Plaintiffs].” Id. ¶¶ 157, 162; see also id. at 152 (comparable
New York law, “the mere right to payment cannot be the basis for a cause of action alleging
conversion.” Barker v. Amorini, 995 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91-92 (App. Div. 2014). Rather, a plaintiff
asserting a conversion claim “must demonstrate legal ownership or an immediate superior right
of possession to a specific identifiable thing and must show that the defendant exercised an
unauthorized dominion over the thing in question . . . to the exclusion of the plaintiff’s rights.”
Hamlet at Willow Creek Dev. Co. v. Ne. Land Dev. Co., 878 N.Y.S.2d 97, 113 (App. Div. 2009)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(conversion requires “the exercise of unauthorized dominion and control to the complete
exclusion of the rightful possessor”). Here, the complaint makes no effort to identify any
“specific thing” over which Chase exercised unauthorized dominion and control, let alone
anything over which Chase exercised dominion and control to the complete exclusion of
Third, to the extent that Plaintiffs mean to argue that Chase exercised
unauthorized dominion over certain payment obligations or liens, their conversion claim fails for
an additional reason: a conversion claim requires the taking of tangible property. See Anthracite
Capital, Inc. v. MP-555 West Fifth Mezzanine, LLC, 2005 WL 1155418, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May
17, 2005) (“[A] claim for conversion will not arise where the claim involves appropriation of
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‘intangible property.’” (quoting Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (N.Y.
1983)), aff’d, 165 F. App’x 875 (2d Cir. 2005); Star Contracting Co. v. McDonald’s Corp., 608
N.Y.S.2d 327, 327 (App. Div. 1994) (“no cause of action lies for the conversion of intangible
property”). Because payment obligations and liens are not tangible property, Plaintiffs’
conversion claim should be dismissed. See, e.g., Anthracite Capital, 2005 WL 1155418, at *9
(holding that a “security interest is intangible property” and therefore “not subject to a
conversion claim”).
should be dismissed as duplicative of their contract claims and for failure to state a claim.
claims. The gist of the claim is that Chase interfered with Plaintiffs’ prospective economic
advantage by “sending out forgiveness letters to borrowers whose loans it had sold to the
Plaintiffs, and by releasing liens securing loans it had sold to the Plaintiffs.” TAC ¶ 173. As
explained above, these very same allegations form the basis for a portion of Plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claims. Supra pp. 4, 14-15; see TAC ¶¶ 152, 157, 162. Accordingly, the tortious
interference claim should be dismissed. See, e.g., Plasticware, LLC v. Flint Hills Res., LP, 852
F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing tortious interference claim where “the crux of
Plaintiff’s allegations” was an alleged breach of contract); Diario El Pais, S.L. v. The Nielsen
Co., 2008 WL 4833012, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2008) (dismissing tortious interference claim
Plaintiffs also fail to satisfy the “extremely high pleading standard” applicable to
a claim for tortious interference. Id. at *7. “[A]n essential element of this tort is that the
complaining party would have consummated a contract but for the interference of a third party.”
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Brown v. Bethlehem Terrace Assocs., 136 A.D.2d 222, 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). Here,
Plaintiffs make no effort to identify any contract that they would have consummated “but for”
Chase’s alleged tortious interference. Accordingly, their claim for tortious interference with
prospective business advantage should be dismissed. Id.; see Diario El Pais, S.L., 2008 WL
4833012, at *7 (“Plaintiffs must provide some factual allegations that but-for Defendant’s
alleged acts, Plaintiffs would have entered into contracts with specific [people].”).
Plaintiffs also allege in passing that defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank tortiously
interfered with contracts between Plaintiffs and JPMorgan Chase Bank’s former subsidiary,
Chase Home Finance. TAC ¶ 172. Even if Plaintiffs had asserted a claim for tortious
interference with contract (and they did not), this claim would fail for several reasons. First,
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts indicating that the debt forgiveness letters and lien releases
were sent with the “malicious” intent to harm Plaintiffs, as is required to state a claim for tortious
interference with contract. See Schmidt & Schmidt, Inc. v. Town of Charlton, 103 A.D.3d 1011,
1013 (App. Div. 2013) (“merely negligent” conduct insufficient); see also infra pp. 18-19.
Second, a parent company generally cannot tortiously interfere with the contracts of its
subsidiaries. See, e.g., Houbigant, Inc. v. Dev. Specialists, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 208, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[A] defendant cannot tortiously interfere with a contract if he is not a third
party unrelated to the contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Third, as the complaint
acknowledges, Chase Home Finance “merged into” JPMorgan Chase Bank in 2011. TAC ¶ 7.
Because a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract, a claim of tortious interference
against JPMorgan Chase Bank would fail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79
F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] plaintiff bringing a tortious interference claim must show
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Plaintiffs’ slander of title claim should be dismissed for each of the following
reasons.
First, the slander of title claim is duplicative of the breach of contract claims. The
basis for the slander of title claim is that Chase improperly sent debt forgiveness letters and filed
lien releases in connection with loans it had sold to Plaintiffs. TAC ¶ 194. As explained above,
the exact same assertions are among the grounds for Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. Supra
pp. 4, 14-15; see TAC ¶¶ 152, 157, 162. Accordingly, the slander of title claim should be
Second, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Chase acted with the requisite intent. To state
a claim for slander of title, a plaintiff must “allege that the defendant acted with ‘malice.’”
Pawaroo v. Countrywide Bank, 2010 WL 1048822, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010). “This
requires that the complaint allege facts with sufficient particularity so that the . . . intent to cause
harm [is] clear.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts indicating that Chase sent debt
forgiveness letters or released liens with the malicious intent to injure Plaintiffs. To the contrary,
Plaintiffs allege that Chase recorded the lien releases “to avoid liability for urban blight” and
that, in its “eagerness” to evade these purported obligations, Chase signed the releases without
“any knowledge as to the relevant facts concerning each lien.” TAC ¶¶ 138, 140. Similarly, the
complaint alleges that Chase sent the forgiveness letters with the “intent of fulfilling its
obligations” under the NMS. Id. ¶ 103. Plaintiffs, moreover, acknowledge that Chase
“apologize[d]” after it realized that it had sent the letters in error and “offered to buy back the
loans that it had forgiven.” Id. ¶¶ 109-10. Accordingly, the complaint’s specific factual
allegations belie any assertion that Chase recorded the lien releases or sent the forgiveness letters
with the specific intent of injuring Plaintiffs. The slander of title claim therefore fails as a matter
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of law. See, e.g., Fink v. Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc., 790 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (App. Div.
2005) (affirming dismissal where there was “no evidence of the malicious intent necessary to
Third, Plaintiffs fail to allege the essential element of “special damages” with the
requisite particularity. E.g., id. “Special damages consist of the loss of something having
economic or pecuniary value” and “must flow directly from the injury to reputation caused by
the defamation.” Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters., Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 179 (2d Cir. 2000). A
claim for special damages “must be fully and accurately stated, with sufficient particularity to
identify actual losses.” Thai v. Cayre Grp., Ltd., 726 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(g) (“If an item of special
damage is claimed, it must be specifically stated.”). Here, the complaint fails to plead that
Plaintiffs suffered any damages flowing directly from the alleged injury to their reputation, let
alone with sufficient particularity to identify any actual losses. Their claim for slander of title
limitations. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 215(3) (McKinney 2006). Here, Plaintiffs’ slander of title claim
is based on (1) debt forgiveness letters that Chase allegedly sent between September 2012 and
January 2013, and (2) lien releases that Chase allegedly executed in October and November of
7
Plaintiffs provide slightly more detail with respect to harm they purportedly suffered as a
result of two specific debt forgiveness letters. See TAC ¶¶ 120-31. Even if the Court concludes
that these allegations satisfy the heightened pleading standard for special damages (and it should
not), Plaintiffs’ vague and conclusory allegations regarding other purportedly slanderous
communications are plainly insufficient.
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2013. See TAC ¶¶ 103-04, 142-43, 194. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on December
Plaintiff MRS also asserts claims for fraudulent inducement, fraud, fraudulent
omission, and negligent misrepresentation in connection with the MLPA. See TAC ¶¶ 176-92.
These allegations fail to state a claim for the reasons explained below.
contract claims. Under New York law, “where a fraud claim arises out of the same facts as
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, with the addition only of an allegation that defendant never
intended to perform the precise promises spelled out in the contract between the parties, the fraud
claim is redundant and plaintiff’s sole remedy is for breach of contract.” Telecom Int’l Am., Ltd.
v. AT & T Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 196 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 19 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that “intentionally-false statements by [defendant] indicating his intent to perform under
the contract” were “not sufficient to support a claim of fraud under New York law”). Thus, an
allegedly false statement may give rise to a claim for fraud between contracting parties only if
8
To the extent Plaintiffs purport to assert a slander of title claim based on communications
other than those identified with specificity in the complaint, the claim fails because slander of
title claims must be pleaded with particularity. See, e.g., Pawaroo, 2010 WL 1048822, at *6.
9
New York law also permits a plaintiff to maintain a separate claim for fraud where the
defendant owed the plaintiff “a legal duty separate from the duty to perform under the contract.”
Bridgestone/Firestone, 98 F.3d at 20. Chase, however, did not owe MRS any fiduciary or other
duty giving rise to an independent disclosure obligation. See infra pp. 21-22.
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MLPA. According to the complaint, Chase “induce[d]” MRS to enter into the MLPA by
misrepresenting that (1) Chase “would provide a complete Exhibit A to the MLPA,” (2) Chase
“would provide all original loan documentation to MRS,” (3) “the loans sold to MRS under the
MLPA consisted of first lien mortgage loans,” and (4) the loans had been “made and serviced in
full compliance with applicable law.” TAC ¶¶ 177-78. Plaintiffs allege, however, that the
MLPA contained express terms addressing each of these items. See id. ¶ 49 (alleging that Chase
had a “contractual obligation to provide a complete Exhibit A”); id. ¶ 65 (alleging that “Chase
breached the MLPA by failing to provide MRS with assignments of the notes and mortgages for
each of the loans”); id. ¶ 50 (alleging that Chase breached a contractual “obligation to sell MRS
‘closed end first lien mortgage loans’”); id. ¶ 59 (alleging that Chase breached a “warranty that
‘Each mortgage loan complies in all material respects with all applicable . . . laws’”); see also id.
duplicative of MRS’s contract claim. See, e.g., RGH Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche
LLP, 851 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32-33 (App. Div. 2008) (affirming dismissal of fraud claims as
“duplicative” where the alleged misrepresentations “related to defendants’ obligation under their
should be dismissed because Chase did not owe a duty of disclosure to MRS. See Mandarin
10
See also Stewart v. Maitland, 835 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (App. Div. 2007) (“The cause of
action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation was duplicative of plaintiff’s contract claim,
inasmuch as it alleged no factual basis for recovery other than defendants’ failure to keep
promises.”); Four Finger Art Factory, Inc. v. Dinicola, 2000 WL 145466, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
9, 2000) (dismissing fraudulent inducement claim where “the contract contain[ed] a specific
provision” relating to the subject matter of the alleged fraud).
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Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that the existence of a
“fiduciary duty” is required for a fraud claim premised on omission or concealment); id. at 1009
(holding that the “existence of a special or privity-like relationship imposing a duty on the
defendant” is required for a negligent misrepresentation claim). Here, the complaint fails to
allege the existence of anything more than an ordinary, arm’s-length business relationship
between MRS and Chase. Under well-established law, these allegations do not give rise to a
disclosure obligation on the part of Chase. See, e.g., Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d
142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993) (“A duty to speak cannot arise simply because two parties may have
been on opposite sides of a bargaining table when a deal was struck between them, for under
New York law the ancient rule of caveat emptor is still alive and well.”); Silva Fun Worldwide,
Ltd. v. Gaming Lottery Corp., 1998 WL 167330, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1998) (“Something
more than the trust and reliance between an ordinary buyer and seller must be established. An
arm’s length business transaction is insufficient.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); K.M.L. Labs., Ltd. v. Hopper, 830 F. Supp. 159, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[A]
conventional business relationship, without more, does not become a fiduciary relationship by
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, counts four through nine of the complaint should be
dismissed.
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Christian J. Pistilli
Michael M. Maya
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
One CityCenter, 850 Tenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001-4956
Telephone: (202) 662-6000
Facsimile: (202) 662-6291
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Michael C. Nicholson
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
The New York Times Building
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10018-1405
Telephone: (212) 841-1000
[email protected]
23