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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 187879               July 5, 2010

DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E.

OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated December 16, 2008 and
the Resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104683. The Decision annulled and set aside the Order dated March
13, 20084 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, in
Sp. Proc. No. B-3089; while the Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Decision.

The Antecedents

Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda

Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.)
are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who
died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M.
Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate
children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who
died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively.
Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna.
Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts.
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners
initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled "In Re: Intestate
Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado
Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo," in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna,
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089.5 The petition alleged that, upon the
death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly
controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under
such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-
third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate.
However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition
prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate
of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to
apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the
decedents.

Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7,

2004,6 contending that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial
settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. They argued that the
settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same being
dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the
settlement of his parents’ estate. In their counter-petition, respondents
prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima.

In an Order dated March 4, 2005,7 the RTC denied respondents’ opposition

to the settlement proceedings but admitted their counter-petition. The trial
court also clarified that the judicial settlement referred only to the properties
of Vicente and Maxima.

Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators dated

October 11, 2005,8 respondents reiterated their prayer for appointment as
special joint administrators of the estate, and to serve as such without
posting a bond.

In their Comment dated November 3, 2005,9 petitioners argued that, since

April 2002, they had been deprived of their fair share of the income of the
estate, and that the appointment of respondents as special joint
administrators would further cause injustice to them. Thus, they prayed that,
in order to avoid further delay, letters of administration to serve as joint
administrators of the subject estate be issued to respondents and Dalisay.

In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator dated

December 5, 2005,10 petitioners nominated the Biñan Rural Bank to serve as
special administrator pending resolution of the motion for the issuance of the
letters of administration.

In its June 15, 2006 Order,11 the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as
special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses, and
required them to post a bond of ₱200,000.00 each. 12

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 1, 2006 13 of the
Order, insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as
administrator of the estate, considering that she even failed to take care of
her husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also contended
that petitioners’ prayer for Dalisay’s appointment as special administrator was
already deemed abandoned upon their nomination of the Biñan Rural Bank
to act as special administrator of the estate.

In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, 14 respondents

asserted their priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next
of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law
of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of representation from her
late husband Leonardo.

Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a

Motion to Submit Inventory and Accounting dated November 20,
2006,15 praying that the RTC issue an order directing respondents to submit a
true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to render an
accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the income
of the estate.

Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15,

2007,16 claiming that they could not yet be compelled to submit an inventory
and render an accounting of the income and assets of the estate inasmuch
as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 15, 2006
Order appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Renato.
In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of
Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC
took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of
Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even
manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate.

On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents’ appointment as joint
special administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to
Render Account of the Estate,17 reiterating their stance that respondents, as
joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory of
the income and assets of the estate.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’

Bond18 on May 22, 2007, praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as
special administrators without the need to file an administrators’ bond due to
their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since
petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to the
appointment of respondents as special co-administrators, it would be to the
best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from incurring
unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They also assured
the RTC that they would faithfully exercise their duties as special
administrators under pain of contempt should they violate any undertaking in
the performance of the trust of their office.

In an Order dated June 29, 2007,19 the RTC directed the parties to submit
their respective comments or oppositions to the pending incidents, i.e.,
petitioners’ Motion for Inventory and to Render Account, and respondents’
Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond.

Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition, 20 stating that they have
already filed a comment on petitioners’ Motion for Inventory and to Render
Account. They asserted that the RTC should, in the meantime, hold in
abeyance the resolution of this Motion, pending the resolution of their Motion
for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond.

On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order
appointing respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a
Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to
Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator. 21 Petitioners
contended that the special administration was not necessary as the estate is
neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being identified and
undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the representation
of special administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents
had been resorting to the mode of special administration merely to delay and
prolong their deprivation of what was due them. Petitioners cited an alleged
fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for ₱2,700,000.00, which
the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for
₱1,500,000.00, and respondents’ alleged misrepresentation that petitioners
owed the estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of
Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.

Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment 22 on March 10, 2008, to
which, in turn, petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment 23 on March
17, 2008.

In its Order dated March 13, 2008,24 the RTC granted petitioners’ Motion,
revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint
special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order,
particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory
of the properties and of an income statement of the estate. The RTC also
appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond
in the amount of ₱200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the
properties and an income statement of the subject estate. The RTC likewise
found that judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed her
duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari 25 under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC in (a) declaring them to have failed to enter the office of special
administration despite lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not
entered the office because they were waiting for the resolution of their motion
for exemption from bond; (b) appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a
mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima, instead of them who, being the
surviving children of the deceased spouses, were the next of kin; and (c)
declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of hearing
and evidence against them.
Petitioners filed their Comment to the Petition and Opposition to Application
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction,26 reiterating their arguments in their Motion for the revocation of
respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators. Respondents filed
their Reply.27

On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the
petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators without
first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing
Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to
determine her competency to assume as such. According to the CA, the
posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their
duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their
submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income
statement thereon.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision. 28 The CA,

however, denied it. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the CA errors of law and
grave abuse of discretion for annulling and setting aside the RTC Order
dated March 13, 2008.

Our Ruling

The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the

decedents’ estate under the Rules of Court provide—

Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. – When there is delay in

granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed.29

Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. – Such special

administrator shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor
or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence
and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be
liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court. 30

Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. –

Before an executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust,
and letters testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a bond, in
such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:

(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a
true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or
knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him;
 (b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor,
according to the will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his
possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and
from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and
charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed by the court;

(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the

court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by
the court;

(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed. 31

Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. – A special administrator before

entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the
court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his
possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are
received by him when required by the court, and will deliver the same to the
person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as may
be authorized to receive them.32

Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as

administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a
probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators pending
the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration
may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such
disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration,
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on
June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators,
imposing upon each of them the obligation to post an administrator’s bond of
₱200,000.00. However, taking into account the arguments of respondents
that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special
administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when
petitioners nominated Biñan Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC,
on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisay’s appointment and substituted her
with Erlinda.

A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its

supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire
estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement.33 When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or
representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. 34 The principal
object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer
it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the
Rules of Court.35

While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is
not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled
that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. 36 The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that
the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness37 and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of
Rule 78,38 as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not
obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is
based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher
courts is unwarranted.39 The appointment or removal

of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may

be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.40

Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special
administrators, and for failing to first resolve the pending Motion for
Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the
administrators’ bond is a pre-requisite to respondents’ entering into the duties
and responsibilities of their designated office. This Court disagrees.

It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for
Appointment as Joint Special Administrators, respondents already prayed for
their exemption to post bond should they be assigned as joint special
administrators. However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when it
issued its June 15, 2006 Order, designating Renato and Dalisay as special
administrators and enjoining them to post bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00
each. This denial was, in effect, reiterated when the RTC rendered its
February 16, 2007 Order substituting Dalisay with Erlinda as special
administratrix.

Undeterred by the RTC’s resolve to require them to post their respective

administrators’ bonds, respondents filed anew a Motion for Exemption to File
Administrators’ Bond on May 22, 2007, positing that it would be to the best
interest of the estate of their deceased parents and all the heirs to spare the
estate from incurring the unnecessary expense of paying for their bond
premiums since they could not raise the money themselves. To note, this
Motion was filed only after petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to
Render Account of the Estate on April 23, 2007. Respondents then argued
that they could not enter into their duties and responsibilities as special
administrators in light of the pendency of their motion for exemption. In other
words, they could not yet submit an inventory and render an account of the
income of the estate since they had not yet posted their bonds.

Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special

administrators for failing to post their administrators’ bond and to submit an
inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply
with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of respondents’
plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so.

Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the
duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate
and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one
(1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to
make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of
the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the
administration of the decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to
(1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2)
truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3)
deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular
administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them.

Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs,
as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the
trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its
object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and,
therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary
expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts
constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover,
the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.41

Hence, the RTC revoked respondents’ designation as joint special

administrators, especially considering that respondents never denied that
they have been in possession, charge, and actual administration of the estate
of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to the present, despite the assumption
of Melinda as regular administratrix. In fact, respondents also admitted that,
allegedly out of good faith and sincerity to observe transparency, they had
submitted a Statement of Cash Distribution42 for the period covering April
2002 to June 2006,43 where they indicated that Renato had received
₱4,241,676.00, Erlinda ₱4,164,526.96, and petitioners ₱2,486,656.60, and
that the estate had advanced ₱2,700,000.00 for the hospital and funeral
expenses of Leonardo.44 The latter cash advance was questioned by
petitioners in their motion for revocation of special administration on account
of the demand letter45 dated June 20, 2007 of Asian Hospital and Medical
Center addressed to Dalisay, stating that there still remained unpaid hospital
bills in the amount of ₱2,087,380.49 since January 2004. Undeniably,
respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits generated
from the properties of the decedents’ estate, yet they still failed to post their
respective administrators’ bonds despite collection of the advances from their
supposed shares. This state of affairs continued even after a considerable
lapse of time from the appointment of Renato as a special administrator of
the estate on June 15, 2006 and from February 16, 2007 when the RTC
substituted Erlinda, for Dalisay, as special administratrix.

What is more, respondents’ insincerity in administering the estate was

betrayed by the Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 12,
200446 discovered by petitioners. This Deed was executed between
respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus excluding the
representing heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses Marcus Jose B. Brillantes and
Amelita Catalan-Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real
property situated in Biñan, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-332305 of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, for a total purchase
price of ₱2,700,000.00. The Deed stipulated for a payment of ₱1,500,000.00
upon the signing of the contract, and the balance of ₱1,200,000.00 to be paid
within one (1) month from the receipt of title of the vendees. The contract
also stated that the previous contract of lease between the vendors and the
vendees shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no longer
obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a
purported Deed of Absolute Sale47 over the same realty between
respondents, and including Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as vendors,
and the same spouses, as vendees, for a purchase price of only
₱1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute Sale already had the
signatures of respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners claimed that
respondents were coaxing Dalisay into signing the same, while respondents
said that Dalisay already got a share from this transaction in the amount of
₱500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of the execution of this
Deed of Absolute Sale, although not notarized as the Deed of Conditional
Sale, might not have been distant from the execution of the latter Deed,
considering the similar Community Tax Certificate Numbers of the parties
appearing in both contracts.

Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the RTC when it revoked the appointment of respondents as joint
special administrators, the removal being grounded on reason, equity,
justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already
been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer
entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and
giving no valid effect thereto.48

On the other hand, the Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as
regular administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion.

In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator,

the following provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state –

Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No

person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:

(a) Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the
trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of
understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude.

xxxx

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor

is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
 (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it

may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration,

the following provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent –

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters

of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names
 and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the

estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a petition for
letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice
thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to
any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner
provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. – Any interested person

may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the
incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the
ground of the contestant’s own right to the administration, and may pray that
letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the
opposition.

Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing of the petition,
it must first be shown that notice has been given as herein-above required,
and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of their
respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that
there is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of
letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto.1avvphi1

Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to

Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was
embodied in the motion for the termination of the special administration.
Although there was a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the
same was canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the absence of the
parties’ counsels. The February 8, 2008 hearing was again deferred to March
10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation of the Hall of Justice. Despite
the resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion dated February 29,
2008,49 reiterating their prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda
as regular administrator and for the revocation of the special administration. It
may be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents of their Opposition
and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the prayer
for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the estate was not
specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency,
and legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was not properly objected to
by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and
was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance
with the above mentioned Rules.

However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the

estate of Vicente and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles
of the heirs, we take into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC
Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of
₱200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of Administration
were issued to her the following day, and that she filed an Inventory of the
Properties of the Estate dated April 15, 2008. 50 These acts clearly manifested
her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents’ estate, but
her appointment should be converted into one of special administration,
pending the proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it
appears that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from
Leonardo’s estate, which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may
then proceed with dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated

December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Biñan, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special administration in
favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The
appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET
ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix of the estate
under the same administrator’s bond she had posted. The trial court is
directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the appointment of the
regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 Rollo, pp. 12-33.
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate
Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Magdangal M. de Leon,
concurring; id. at 34-51.
3
 Id. at 52-53.
4
 Id. at 54-55.
5
 Id. at 35-36.
6
 Id. at 36.
7
 Id. at 36-37.
8
 Id. at 37.
9
 Id.
10
 Id.
11
 Id.
12
 As admitted by respondents in their Petition for Certiorari with
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction; id. at 86.
13
 Id. at 38.
14
 Id.
15
 Id.
16
 Id. at 39.
17
 Id.
18
 Id. at 40.
19
 Id.
20
 Id. at 40-41.
21
 Id. at 56-63.
22
 Id. at 71-75.
23
 Id. at 76-80.
24
 Id. at 54-55.
25
 Id. at 81-107.
26
 Id. at 108-132.
27
 Id. at 142-145.
28
 Id. at 146-155.
29
 Rule 80.
30
 Id.
31
 Rule 81.
32
 Id.
33
 Co v. Rosario, G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA
225, 229.
34
 Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No.
162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 757; Valarao v.
Pascual, 441 Phil. 226, 238 (2002).
35
 Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008, 548
SCRA 528, 537.
36
 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228; Tan v. Gedorio, Jr.,
supra, at 536; Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-
Gabriel, supra note 34, at 760; Pijuan v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil.
1527, 1531-1532 (1966); Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410
(1948).
37
 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228; Rivera v. Hon. Santos, et
al., 124 Phil. 1557, 1561 (1966).
38
 Infra.
39
 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228; Fule v. Court of Appeals,
165 Phil. 785, 800 (1976).
40
 Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., supra note 35, at 536; Jamero v. Melicor,
498 Phil. 158, 165-166 (2005).
41
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 385
Phil. 397, 409 (2000); Moran Sison v. Teodoro, 100 Phil. 1055,
1058 (1957); Sulit v. Santos, 56 Phil. 626, 630 (1932).
42
 Annex "N" to the Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
43
 Per respondents’ Petition for Certiorari before the CA; rollo, p.
96.
44
 Per petitioners’ Comment to the petition before the CA; id. at
114.
45
 Id. at 64-65.
46
 Id. at 66-67.
47
 Id. at 68-70.
48
 Co v. Rosario, supra note 33, at 228-229.
49
 Rollo, p. 41.
 50
 As admitted by respondents in their Comment; id. at 165-166.

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