People v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
People v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014
(2014)
Summary Cases:
Subject: An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against him to
enable him to prepare his defense; Findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
entitled to great weight and credence; The accused were sufficiently identified by the prosecution
witnesses; Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this
case; Res Gestae evidence; The belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive
identification of the accused; Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim; Accused
were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery in the commission of the crime; The
presence of conspiracy makes all of the accused liable for murder and attempted murder
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of UP Diliman, when
Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina
shouted, and he saw about ten men charging toward them. The men were armed with baseball bats and
lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts. Within a few seconds, the
men started attacking them hitting them with their lead pipes. During the attack, he recognized one of the
attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.
Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. Dennis Venturina died from his injuries.
The medico-legal concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.
An information for murder was filed against twelve members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity (Danilo
Feliciano, Jr. and others) for the attack which led to the death of Dennis Venturina. Separate
informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and the frustrated murder of Sigma
Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio and Amel Fortes.
The defense presented some UP students who witnessed the attack but who all testified that they did not
see any mask fall off. The several accused also presented their respective alibi during the alleged time of
the incident.
The trial court rendered a decision finding Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Robert Michael Alvir, Christopher Soliva,
Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted
murder. Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to the
Supreme Court on automatic appeal but was remanded to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the
conviction.
Hence, the case is not before the Supreme Court. The two principal issues are (1) Whether accused's
constitutional rights were violated when the information against them contained the aggravating
circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks
fell off? and (2) Whether the lower courts correctly ruled that the accused were sufficiently identified?
1. The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The purpose is to allow the accused
to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. (People v. Wilson Lab-ea)
2. The inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not
violate the constitutional rights of the accused. Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be
stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will
not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
3. In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes. The introduction of the
prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell
off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in
alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the
accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their
identity.
4. The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also
not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses. The information charges conspiracy among the
accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of all." This would mean all the accused
had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some
of them might not have done so.
5. In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime
have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the
offense.
Findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to great weight and
credence
6. It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of
the witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception that
makes the rule is where such findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted with
bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached without the careful study
and perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision.
7. In this case, a total of eleven witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two witnesses for the defense
were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an 83-page decision, the trial court acquitted six and
convicted five of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said that the trial court
acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without a judicious and
exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
9. The trial court correctly held that, considering the swiftness of the incident, there would be slight
inconsistencies in their statements. It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the
occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice
while the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated
and rehearsed. (People v. Adriano Cabrillas)
10. In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks. It
had been testified by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of
cloth or a handkerchief and that Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, and Feliciano had masks on at first but their
masks fell off and hung around their necks. Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco
Capilo during cross-examination who observed that some of the attackers were wearing masks and
some were not. While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind
to take a look at their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
11. It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris
members identified by Mangrobang "should not be misinterpreted to mean that the testimony of
Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication." 135 The court went on to state that they "were exonerated
merely because they were accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under
tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were not corroborated and their alibis, not refuted. There was,
therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that the evidence presented
was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
12. As a general rule, a witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception. All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible
as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of
which is when the evidence is part of res gestae.
13. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and ( c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. (People v. Rodrigo Salafranca)
14. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
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manufacture testimony.
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value in this case
15. According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were
all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
16. There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
17. The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in
time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had
their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.
18. When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the
entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of
the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less
weight than that of the victims.
The belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive identification of the
accused
19. It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the
Quezon City Police but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days
after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their testimonies.
20. It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While this
court does not condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are
certain practices that are unique to fraternal organizations. It is quite possible that at this point in time,
they knew the identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose it without first conferring with their
other fraternity brothers. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have been
prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
21. Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make
the police officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be
forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera,
and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying secondhand information.
22. The fact that they went to the NBI 4 days after the incident also does not affect their credibility since
most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first. Since a fraternity
moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them were well
enough to go to the NBI headquarters in order to give their statements. Seniority is also often the norm in
fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their legal counsel that they executed their
sworn statements before the NBI 4 days after the incident.
23. The decision to report the incident to the NBI instead of to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal
counsel who might have deemed the NBI more equipped to handle the investigation. This does not,
however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely following the legal advice of their
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counsel. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics website, the U.P. Police is employed by U.P.
primarily for campus security. They are by no means an actual police force that is equipped to handle a
full-blown murder investigation.
24. In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused merely
offered alibis and denials as their defense. It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of
the appellant by a witness destroys the defense of alibi and denial. Alibi and denial are inherently weak
and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be
concocted. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the
crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an
exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like
alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
Accused were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery in the commission of the
crime
25. According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused were correctly
charged with murder. As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed
against Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with
the aid of armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in
the commission of the offense.
26. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery
is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording
the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be
considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. (People v. Leozar Dela Cruz)
27. The appellate court ruled that although the attack was sudden and unexpected, “it was done in broad
daylight with a lot of people who could see them" and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have
fought back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the victims." This reasoning is clearly
erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they
would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The victims,
who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry
the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and outnumbered, it would be
impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute,
which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to
defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy makes all of the accused liable for murder and attempted murder
28. In the decision of the trial court, the accused were found guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and
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the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Mangrobang, Lachica, Fortes, and Gaston. The appellate
court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the accused were guilty of attempted murder only
against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston. It is the appellate
court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the attackers," then
accused "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they
did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them." It also pointed
out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill." Thus, it
concluded that the accused would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
29. This is erroneous. The trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused and the
appellate court sustained this finding. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all
of the accused, regardless of their degree of participation. Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The moment it is established
that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present
at the scene of the crime.
30. The liabilities of the accused in this case arose from a single incident wherein the accused were
armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible
to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of
their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared
by all of the accused alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to
distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective
liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that
intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be
appreciated.
31. The appellate court erred in finding the accused guilty only of slight physical injuries. It would be
illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill
only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston.
Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of
them were liable for that intent to kill.
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