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1990 People - v. - Uribe20220702 11 glrd4t
1990 People - v. - Uribe20220702 11 glrd4t
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J : p
On the other hand, the appellant who was connected with the PC for
eight (8) years before the incident testified that the subject .45 caliber pistol
was officially issued to him by his ". . . commanding officer and our staff
sergeant Cabanacan who was the supply officer." (TSN, p. 194, October 7,
1985)
The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
both crimes. As regards the murder charge, the appellant was sentenced to
"suffer the penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P20,000.00 but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs of this
case." (Rollo, p. 37) As regards the illegal possession of firearm charge, the
trial court after applying section 1 of Presidential Decree 1866 imposed "the
supreme penalty of death subject to an automatic and final review of the
same by our Supreme Court." (Rollo, p. 38)
The appellant now insists on his claim of self-defense.
Time and again we have stated the principles underlying self-defense
as follows:
"Having admitted the killing, Ongonion must clearly establish
that he acted in self-defense. The burden of proof is now shifted to
him. He must, therefore, rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the prosecution (People v. Sadie, 149 SCRA
240; and People v. Regulacion, 121 SCRA 40) for even if the latter's
evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the appellant
admitted the killing (People v. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48; People v.
Bauden, 77 Phil. 105; and People v. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772).
xxx xxx xxx
". . . For self-defense to prosper, the following elements should
have been proved by appellant: (a) unlawful aggression; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself (People v. Balmaceda, 148 SCRA 194 [1987]).
(People v. Abagon, 161 SCRA 255 [1988]).
In this case, the appellant insists on his version of the incident as
sustaining his claim of self-defense. He maintains: (1) that in the course of
their argument regarding guard duties, Tibay raised his T-shirt from his hip
to make it known that he had a gun and moved to draw the same; (2) that as
Tibay was going out from the canteen he said "Follow me outside and we will
shoot it out outside." (p. 190, Tsn, October 7, 1985) which amounts to an
unlawful aggression on the part of Tibay; (3) that Tibay grabbed an armalite
from a certain guard Corredo, chamberloaded it, positioned himself in the
Guard House and aimed the same at appellant prompting the appellant to
defend himself by shooting at him first which shows that the appellant was
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forced to use his .45 caliber service pistol in repelling the aggression and
that in defending his life there was a necessity and he employed reasonable
means; and that (4) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the appellant because as the incoming sergeant of the Guard that afternoon
of the incident, he had the right to confront the deceased why he was not in
uniform as required by military regulation. prLL
To bolster further his claim of self-defense, the appellant points out the
testimony of medico legal officer Capt. Angel Cordero while on cross-
examination to the effect that "both wounds nos. 1 and 2 sustained by the
deceased could have been sustained while in the act of aiming long firearm
(tsn pp. 19 to 20, Hearing of July 21, 1983). (Rollo, p. 91)
The main issue boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Do
the records sustain the trial court's finding that the evidence for the
prosecution was more credible?
Vicente Cabanacan, then staff sergeant of the PC and stationed at
Regional Command No. 8 and who was with both Uribe and Tibay at the July
22nd canteen during the incident categorically stated that the appellant hit
the victim first (Tsn p. 41, February 10, 1985). This testimony was
corroborated by Genoveva Barredo, cashier of the July 22nd Canteen who
was also present during the incident. (Tsn, p. 77, April 11, 1984). This
evidence negates the appellant's contention that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Tibay. The appellant was the aggressor. The victim
was running away from him, apparently looking for a safe sanctuary.
The appellant's contention that he was forced to shoot Tibay to defend
himself because he saw the latter armed with an armalite aimed at him is
not worthy of belief. On cross-examination, the appellant testified:
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Tibay was not able to fire his firearm?
A. No, Sir.
Q. In fact, when you saw Tibay at a distance of 8 meters, when
you shot him he was walking towards the guardhouse?
A. No, sir. When I saw him he was already in position.
Q. What do you mean 'in position'?
ATTY. TEVES:
Q. And this wound No. 2, doctor, could it be possible also that
this was inflicted while the victim was also in kneeling or
squatting position?
WITNESS:
The evidence on record shows that the deceased Tibay was also armed
with a .22 caliber gun when he was chased by the appellant. In fact, after the
fist fight between the two protagonists, Tibay went out from the canteen
ahead of the appellant. The appellant then followed him after which, at about
four (4) meters distance between the two, while Tibay was trying to hide
near a guard the appellant shot him in the arm. Under this scenario, there
was the possibility that the appellant himself could have been hit by Tibay
had the latter drawn his gun and used it before the appellant shot him. It is
evident that in committing the crime, the appellant did not take any
precautionary measures to insure no risk upon himself. Neither can it be said
that the appellant consciously adopted a mode of attack to insure the
impossibility of Tibay's retaliating. Both protagonists had firearms. It was in
an open field where the incident happened. In the case of People v.
Villanueva (161 SCRA 511 [1988]), we said:
"From the fact found by the trial court, it does not appear to us
that Acosta and his companions were completely caught off-guard
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when the accused-appellant and his companions started chasing
them. The attack against Acosta was not unexpected; in fact, he was
running away from it; and in any case, there was sufficient warning
when Villanueva's group confronted them in a menacing manner, and
with weapons. Moreover, it has not been established that Villanueva
consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the commission
of the offense without risk to himself. On the contrary, the court
believes that the shooting was done on impulse whetted by the
excitement of chase and was not the result of earlier deliberation."
With these findings, we find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and not MURDER.
As regards the illegal possession of firearm charge, the Solicitor
General recommends the acquittal of the appellant based on the testimony
given by prosecution witness then Staff Sergeant Vicente Cabanacan of
Regional Command 8. At the time of the incident, Cabanacan was the PC
Supply Officer.
On direct testimony, Cabanacan testified that the .45 caliber pistol
taken from Uribe at the scene of the crime was "a property of the service
department." (Tsn. p. 144, February 19, 1985).
On cross-examination, Cabanacan declared:
Q. "You said also a while ago that you were connected with the
military since August, 1974, and that you were assigned to
the supply headquarters, am I right?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you signed that memorandum receipt?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had it approved by Major Virgilio I. Bautista, your
commanding officer?
A. Yes. (Tsn, February 19, 1985, pp. 147-148).
FISCAL TOGONON:
We have already a certification from Camp Crame, Quezon
City, your Honor, that the firearm was unlicensed."
COURT:
The fact is that you brought out on redirect that the firearm
was his, it was surrendered to the PC and reissued to him
with a memorandum receipt. Now, where is that illegal
possession of firearm you are talking about?
FISCAL TOGONON:
That will be all, your Honor." (Tsn, February 19, 1985, pp.
149-151)