G.

RECONCILIATION

 How Done – Art. 65, FC

 Effects – Arts. 66-67, FC

VII. DE FACTO SEPARATION

 Arts. 100, 127, 211, 239, 242, 246, 247, FC
A. Effects on Personal Relations

114. Arroyo v Vasquez Arroyo

G.R. No. L-17014 // August 11, 1921 // MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee. // STREET, J.:
Facts:
Mariano and Dolores were married 1910. They lived together with a few short intervals of
separation. In 1920, Dolores left their common home and decided to live separately from
Mariano. Mariano induced Dolores to return home but the latter refused. Hence, Mariano
filed a petition for permanent mandatory injunction requiring the Dolores to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as a wife under pain of contempt. By way of defense,
Dolores claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part
Mariano. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal
partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The
trial court ruled in favor of Dolores.
On appeal, the SC ruled that Mariano has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital
society of Dolores and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the
common home and cohabit with Mariano. The only question is whether it is within the
province of the courts to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other.
Issue:
May the court order Dolores to return to the conjugal home under pain of contempt?
Held:
No. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of
the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Cohabitation is a
purely personal obligation - an obligation to do. To compel the wife to comply with such
obligation would be an infringement of her personal liberty.

ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)

FACTS: Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo
City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920,

1
defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately
from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment
on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of
their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate
maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also
other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his
wife.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or
permanent mandatory injunction

HELD:
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to
defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy
towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties.
Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be
necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the
domicile.
“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good
husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it
imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts
to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In
the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would
have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as
England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without
sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

115. Lacson v San Jose

G.R. No. L-23482, L-23767, G.R. No. L-24259 // August 30, 1968 // ALFONSO
LACSON, petitioner,vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. // CASTRO, J.:
2
Background:
Alfonso and Carmen were married on February 14, 1953. They had four children. On
January 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and resided in Manila. On
March 12, 1963 she filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
(JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself. However,
through the assistance of their respective lawyers, the spouses reached an amicable
settlement as to custody of the kids, support, and separation of property. On April 27, 1963,
they filed a joint petition with the CFI of Negros Occidental, submitting that they had
mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. The terms included a)
separation of property, b) all earnings of each spouse shall belong to that spouse
exclusively, c) the custody of the two elder children shall be awarded to Alfonso and the
two younger children to Carmen, d) Alfonso shall pay Carmen a monthly allowance of
P200.00 for the support of the children, and e) each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights
of visitation and every summer the former spouses shall swap [my word] kids. For that
particular year, however, Carmen was allowed custody of all four children until June of
1963, when she was supposed to return the two older children to Alfonso's custody.
Finding the foregoing joint petition as conformable to the law, the CFI issued an order
approving their compromise agreement on the very same day. On May 7, however, Carmen
filed a motion with the JDRC alleging that the compromise agreement was the only way
she could get custody of all the children and praying that she be relieved of the agreement
pertaining to the custody and visitation of the children and that she now be awarded full
custody. Naturally, Alfonso opposed the motion and the JDRC ruled in his favor. Carmen
went to the Court of Appeals and the CA certified the case to the Supreme Court. Carmen
went to the CFI and filed a motion for reconsideration, basically claiming the same thing.
Alfonso opposed. The CFI favored Alfonso and ordered Carmen to return the two older
children by June, on pain of contempt. It is from this decision that the instant case springs.
Carmen instituted certiorari proceedings with the CA against the CFI, saying the CFl
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate execution of the compromise agreement. The CA declared void the portion of
the agreement pertaining to the custody of children.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
Was the assailed compromise agreement-and the judgment of the CFl grounded on said
agreement conformable to law?
YES -but only as far as the separation of property of spouses and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, in accordance with Article 191 of the Civil Code. The spouses did not
appear to have any creditors who would have been prejudiced by their arrangement. At the
time of the decision the spouses had been separated five years and so the propriety of
severing their financial and proprietary interests was manifest. (However, the Court
maintained that approving the separation of property and dissolution of conjugal
partnership did not amount to recognition or legalization of de facto separation.) As to the
custody of the children, they were all below 7 years of age at the time of the agreement and
so the CA was correct in awarding the custody to the mother. The Court was also "loath to
uphold the couple's agreement regarding the custody of the children", citing rights of the

3
children to proper care not anchored on the solely on the whims of his or her parents.
Courts must decide fitness of parents for custody.
--
DOCTRINE: The law allows the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand.
CASE SUMMARY: Mrs. Lacson left the conjugal abode and fled a complaint for custody
of her children as well as support for them and herself. Both spouses reached an amicable
settlement separating their property, custody of 2 of the children to the husband and 2 to
the wife, and that the husband will provide support for the children and the wife. CFI
approved such agreement. The CA reversed. The SC ruled that the separation of property
was valid as it was made with the requirement of a judicial proceeding. However, the SC
ruled that the awarding of custody of the 2 children to the father was invalid since both are
below7 years old and the law provides that they shall be in the custody of the mother,
unless the latter was found unfit.
FACTS:
- Alfonso Lacson (husband) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson (wife) were married on February
14, 1953. To them were born four children, all alive.
- On January 9, 1963 the wife left the conjugal home and commenced to reside in Manila.
She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
(JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.
- The spouses reached an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support,
and separation of property:
 There will be separation of property o each of them shall own, dispose of,
possess, administer and enjoy such separate estate as • they may acquire without
the consent of the other and all earnings.
 The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be
awarded to petitioner Alfonso Lacson and the custody of the younger children
named Gerrard and Ramon shall be awarded to petitioner Carmen San Jose-
Lacson.
 Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a
monthly allowance of P300.00 for the support of the children in her custody.
 Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the
custody.
The CFI rendered judgement approving and incorporating in toto their compromise
agreement. The wife filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that she "entered into
and signed the ...Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have immediate
custody of the ... minor children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that
she "be considered relieved of the ... agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of
her minor children ... and that since all the children are now in her custody, the said
custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite." CA reversed the CFI ruling on the
custody and support of children •
ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of
the CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law. - YES on the separation
of property but NO on the custody and support of the children.
4
RULING:
On Separation of Property
The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand.

116. Estrada v Escritor

A.M. No. P-02-1651 // June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) //
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs.SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR,Respondent. //
PUNO, J.:
Facts:
Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an
investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a child
with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged
gross immoral conduct for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s
Witness and Watch Tower Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in
conformity with her religious beliefs. She further alleged that they executed a “Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness” in accordance with her religion which allows members of
Jehovah’s Witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital
relations. The Declaration makes the union moral and binding within the congregation
throughout the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
Issue:

 Is Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship?

 Does her religious belief justify such act?
Ruling:
Yes the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government
employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for
which he/she may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there was not one dissent
to the majority's ruling that their conduct was immoral. The respondents themselves did not
foist the defense that their conduct was not immoral, but instead sought to prove that they
did not commit the alleged act or have abated from committing the act.
No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality, and she cannot be penalized for her freedom
of religion justifies her conjugal arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the
realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education is
instructive on the matter, viz:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination
and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without
5
bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre, and unreasonable the
same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there
is quite a stretch of road to travel.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including
religious freedom, may be enjoyed
--
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a
son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the
judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly
have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to
legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or
bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to
the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between
public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the
OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has
6
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom
of religion.

117. Banaag v Espeleta

A.M. No. P-11-3011 // December 16, 2011 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-3143-P) //
EVELINA C. BANAAG, Complainant, vs. OLIVIA C. ESPELETA, Interpreter III,
Branch 82, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Respondent. // PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Subject: extra-marital cohabitation as a ground for immoral conduct FACTS: This is an
administrative complaint filed by Evelina Banaag (wife) before the Office of the Court
Administrator (0CA) charging respondent Olivia Espeleta (mistress) with Gross
Immorality and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for engaging in an
illicit and immoral relationship with her husband, Avelino C. Banaag. Evelina (wife) and
Olivia (mistress) met through a mutual friend. Olivia introduced herself as a court
interpreter in the RTC of Quezon City. Believing that Olivia could assist her and her
husband in their pending cases before the court, Evelina introduced Olivia to her husband
Avelino. This meeting would eventually blossom into an illicit affair between Olivia and
Avelino. Evelina found out about the afair a year later. Avelino asked to withdraw P180K
from their joint bank account for him to lend to his brother who was confined in the
hospital. Evelina then found out from her husband's brother's wife that Avelino gave his
brother only P8OK. Evelina also discovered that for the past three years, her husband,
using their conjugal funds had been depositing money (allegedly more than P3M) not only
to Olivia's bank account, but also to that of her (Olivia's) daughter, and co-cmployees. Her
husband had also been giving Olivia money from the rentals of the family-owned JB
Crystal Building (which is their conjugal property). Olivia was given a chance by the OCA
to be heard and to refute the claims against her. Instead, she filed a letter of resignation and
fled to the United States.
ISSUE: WON respondent Olivia Espeleta is guilty of immoral conduct.
RULING: The Court finds respondent GUILTY of disgraceful and immoral conduct which
pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 is defined in a resolution by the Civil Service
Commission as: • "an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum
abhorred and condemned by the society" and "conduct which is willful, flagrant or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and
respectable members of the community.
Respondent's act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man comes within the
purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified as a grave offense
punishable with suspension (first offense) or dismissal (second offense). The Court cited
several other cases •
 Sealana-Abbu vs. Laurenciana-Hurano
7
  Elape vs. Elape
 Regir vs. Regir
 Babante-Caples vs. Caples
wherein respondents where cither suspended or made to pay fines for engaging in illicit
relationships with people that were not their spouses. Resignation should not be used as a
means to escape administrative liability. Respondent's resignation is to be taken as a strong
indication of her guilt. Because of this, instead of mere suspension, she should be fined.
CONCLUSION: Respondent guilty. Fine of P50K.

118. Santos, Sr. v CA

G.R. No. 113054 // March 16, 1995 // LEOUEL SANTOS, SR.,petitioner-appellant,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-
appellees. // ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr.,
who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia
(Spouses Bedia), who paid for all the hospital bills and subsequent support of the boy.
In May 1988, Julia left for the United States to work. Since then, Petitioner had not been
able to locate her. Spouses Bedia, however, allege that Julia had been sending financial
support for her son.
On September 2, 1990, Petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where 3-year old Leouel Jr. was staying, and took the boy back to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a “Petition for Care, Custody and
Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos, Jr.” before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
with Santos Sr. as respondent.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Bedia and awarded them custody of the child.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WHO SHOULD PROPERLY BE AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD –
HIS FATHER OR MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS?
RULING:
The father, being the natural guardian of the child, has the right to custody over the child.

8
Right of custody of parents and parental authority
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development,
as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As
regards parental authority, “there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.”
Parental authority is inalienable and purely personal; when waiver is allowed by law

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
ONLY in case of absence, death or unsuitability of both parents may substitute parental
authority of grandparents be exercised.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The child’s welfare is
always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos,
Jr. is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not
only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree
of legal separation and petitioner’s attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
Grandparents’ wealth is not a deciding factor
The Court found (the fact that the grandparents are financially well-off and that petitioner
never gave any previous financial support) insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter’s wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
9
support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son
from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without
permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child’s
custody. While petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision
against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son
and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
Petitioner’s being a soldier and employment of trickery in taking the boy is no bar to allow
him custody
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men
in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation,
are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of
authority, care and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences
of their duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner’s employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Parent’s natural love outweighs that of the grandparents
Private respondents’ attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three
years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to
outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be
unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which
has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents
should not be seen as incompatible with petitioner’s right to custody over the child as a
father. Moreover, who is to say whether the petitioner’s financial standing may improve?
--
ADDITIONAL:
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr.
who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until
sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents,
private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through
deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him
away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

10
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on
the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30,
1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under
Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper
only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to
him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in
case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may
be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would
help enhance the bond between parent and son.
The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over
the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the
service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

11
119. Sy v CA
G.R. No. 124518 // December 27, 2007 // WILSON SY, Petitioner,vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, and MERCEDES TAN UY-SY,
Respondents. // TINGA, J.:
FACTS: On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus
against Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 94- 69002. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering
Wilson to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that
after hearing, their care and custody be awarded to her as their mother. In his answer,
Wilson prayed that the custody of the minors be awarded to him instead. Petitioner
maintained that Mercedes was unfit to take custody of the minors. He adduced the
following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her family in 1992; secondly, she is
mentally unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to the children.
ISUES:
1. Whether or not the custody of the minor children be given to the mother.
2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide financial support to the minor
children not in his custody.
RULING:
1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that: "In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
take into account all relevant considerations especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds In all controversies regarding the custody of minors,
the sole and foremost consideration is the However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit
and proper person to have custody of her children compelling reasons to order otherwise."
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account
the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. so that
they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and
benefit of a mother's love and devotion for which there is no substitute. Generally, the love,
solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a
child of tender years than all other things combined.
2. Yes. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand. The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as support for the minor
children. As found by both courts, petitioner's representations regarding his family's wealth
and his capability to provide for his family more than provided a fair indication of his
financial standing even though he proved to be less than forthright on the matter. In any
event, this award of support is merely provisional as the amount may be modified or altered
in accordance with the increased or decreased needs of the needy party and with the means
of the giver.

12
120. Perez v CA
G.R. No. 118870 // March 29, 1996 // NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ, respondents. ROMERO, J.
(Special Proceedings – Custody: A child under seven years shall not be separated from his
mother)
Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse
working in the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of
their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his
mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and
awarded custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner
custody over the child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy’s
father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that “No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefore.
Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.
Held: No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec
6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven
years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the
earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the child’s age
to 5 years.
--
Facts: Ray Perez, a doctor, and Nerissa, a registered nurse were married. They had a son
named RJ. In 1998, Nerissa began working in the United States. She became a resident
alien in February 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice but unlike his wife, however,
he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
In 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and

13
that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his
sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed
to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed
her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after
winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before RJ's first birthday, the couple was no longer
on good terms. Nerissa was forced to move to her parents home. Nerissa filed a petition for
habeas corpus asking respondent Ray to surrender the custody of their son, RJ, to her.
The trial court awarded the custody of RJ to Nerissa, citing the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The CA reversed the trial court's order and awarded custody of the boy to his father.
Issue: As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child under 7
years of age?
Held: When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. It provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."

Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation decreed by a
court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are
covered within its terms.
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only
the most compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child
to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority.
In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and
being sick with a communicable disease.
The decision under review casts doubt on petitioners capability to take care of the child,
particularly since she works on twelve-hour shifts thrice weekly, at times, even at night.
There being no one to help her look after the child, it is alleged that she cannot properly
attend to him. This conclusion is as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present
14
work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a
number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still
able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Second,
many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has invited her own mother or relative to
join her abroad, providing the latter with plane tickets and liberal allowances, to look after
the child until he is able to take care of himself. Others go on leave from work until such
time as the child can be entrusted to day-care centers. Delegating child care temporarily to
qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as
long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought
up by housemaids or yayas under the eagle eyes of the mother.

121. Salientes v. Abanilla

G.R. No. 162734 // August 29, 2006 // MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES,
ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,vs. LORAN
S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents / / QUISUMBING,
J.:
Facts:
Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with
Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer
to their own house but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter
prevented from seeing his son.
Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as representative of his son, filed a petition for
habeas corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the
Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause
why the child should not be discharged from restraint.
Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that
the order of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for
the production of restrained persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full
inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied. Salienteses filed the current appeal by
certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial
court's order
2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the
father
Ruling:
1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari •Salientes: o the order is contrary
to the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise o
even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private
15
respondent was simply an action for custody but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that
habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of
custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor
by his own motheI. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the
custody of her very own child. Abani o the writ of habeas corpus is available against any
person who restrains the minor's right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the
instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the
child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors o under the
law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over
their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as
required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody
of their son and not the maternal qrandparents. • The CA was correct in holding that the
order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his
liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court's full
inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.
An interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special action under Rule 65.The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.
2. Habeas corpus is available to the father Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where
rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the
Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental
authority over their son and consequently joint custody.Further,although the couple is
separated de facto,the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the
absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the
custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent's cause of action is the
deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to him. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the
judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody
by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent's petition
for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in
the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of
age

VIII. Divorce
A. Brief History of Divorce
B. Absolute Divorce distinguished from other Remedies
C. Foreign Divorces

 Art. 15, NCC

 Art. 26, FC

122. Tenchavez v Escano

16
[G.R. No. L-19671. // July 26, 1966.] // PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. // REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly married by a military chaplain in one
of Pastor’s friend’s house. Upon learning about the secret marriage, Vicenta’s parents
arranged for them to be married properly in a church so as to validate their marriage as
advised by a priest. Vicenta opposed to a second marriage after receiving an anonymous
letter alleging that Pastor and is having an amorous relationship with matchmaker Pacita
Noel. Vicenta continued to live with her parents and Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Although still solicitous of her husband’s welfare in her letters, she was not as endearing
and becomes less and less until they became estranged.
Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for non-prosecution
because she never went to any of the set hearings. Without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single and left for the
United States. She filed for divorce (1950) against Pastor in Nevada on the ground of
“extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character” which the Nevada court granted even when
she was not yet an American citizen (1958).
Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents Mamerto
and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections. He asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
Can the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage
HELD:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party. That the
remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one party entitles the other
to recover damages;
That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in
the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

123. Van Dorn v Romillo

G.R. No. L-68470 // October 8, 1985 // ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON.
MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents. //
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
17
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972
and established their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn
be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in
Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Held:

As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise
control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
--
FACTS:
Alice Reyes, a Filipino, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong in 1972.
Following their marriage, they moved to the Philippines where they had two children. In
1982, the spouses were divorced in Nevada, US. Subsequently, Alice remarried to
Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed a case against Alice before RTC Pasay, claiming that Alice's
business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal property of the parties. In other
words, he wanted the RTC to declare that he has a right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that Richard's cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings in Nevada, where Richard acknowledged
that he and Alice had "no community property" as of 1982.

18
RTC Pasay: Denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved
(Galeon Shop) is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the
case.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether a divorce decree validly issued by a competent court overseas is also valid in the
Philippines? -- YES.
HELD:

1. Richard cannot have his cake and eat it, too. His claim that the divorce decree applies
only in the US and not in the Philippines due to the standing policy in the Philippines that
divorce is not allowed, creates an absurd situation where Alice is validly divorced from
Richard in the US but remains married to him in the Philippines. This cannot be
countenanced as this would result in Alice being discriminated against in her own country.
2. The divorce decree issued in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to
his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. Therefore, he would have no
standing to sue in the instant case and claim that he is still the husband.
3. The SC held that the RTC's denial of the Motion to Dismiss is overturned. As such, the
Supreme Court ordered RTC Pasay to dismiss the case filed by Richard against Alice.

124. Pilapil v Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116 // June 30, 1989 // IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON.
CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila,Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARDGEILING, respondents. // REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married in Germany to private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980
and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany on January 1983.The divorce decree was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
Six months after the divorce was granted private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an

19
affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983”.
ISSUE:
Whether a person could still be prosecuted of bigamy after a divorce decree was already
issued?
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though
in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a
valid divorce in his country and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines.
In the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

125. Republic v Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380 // October 5, 2005 // REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. // QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. Related imageThey were
blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few
years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in
2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for
review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:

20
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was
still barred from remarrying.

126. Quita v Dandan

[G.R. No. 124862. // December 22, 1998.] // FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents. // BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May
18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner
obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16,
1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in
favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

21
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary
shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage
considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a
surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

127. Llorente v CA
G.R. No. 124371 // November 23, 2000 // PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. // PARDO, J.:
Facts:
Lorenzo and Paula Llorente, both Filipinos, were married in 1937. Before the outbreak of
the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States, leaving his wife in the Philippines.
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a citizen of the United States. When he came
back to the Philippines in 1945, he found out that his wife, Paula, was living with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente. The two had a child together. Lorenzo then returned to the
United States and on November 16, 1951, he filed for divorce in the State of California. On
December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente, a Filipino, in Manila. They were
married for 25 years, producing three children. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a
last will and testament, giving all his properties to Alicia and their three children. On June
11, 1985, Lorenzo died. In September 4 of the same year, Paula filed for a petition to be the
administrator of Lorenzo’s property, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.
Issue:
Is Paula Llorente correct in saying that she is the surviving spouse of Lorenzo and therefore
should have a part of the latter’s properties?
Ruling:
No. Lorenzo Llorente had become a United States citizen long before his divorce from
Paula, marriage to Alicia, the execution of his will, and his death. The divorce granted to
him in the United States is binding in the Philippines. Therefore, he is no longer bound by
marriage to Paula, as the latter contends.
--
FACTS:

22
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and
Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American
citizen.
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was
already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente, a brother of Lorenzo and the two even have a
son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support.
Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing that Lorenzo shall not criminally charge
Paula if the she will agree to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo
returned to the US.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was
represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce
became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had
three children
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia
and their children and left nothing for Paula. In 1983, Lorenzo went to the court for the
will’s probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the
probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters
of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.
RTC ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce decree granted
to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void.

The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the Philippines.
HELD:
YES. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943.
Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or
status are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad

23
must be respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine
the effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
Regarding on the issue of Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected because
he is an alien and is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was
submitted to our courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where
the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the will.

128. Garcia v Recio

[G.R. No. 138322. // October 2, 2001.] // GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, Petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, Respondent. // PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, on March
1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian
citizen. He then married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. In their application
for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. On October 22, 1995,
Grace and Rederick lived separately even without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage.

Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on March 2, 1998, on the
grounds of bigamy. She contended that Rederick’s previous marriage was still subsisting at
the time she contracted a marriage with him. She claimed that she learned of Rederick’s
marriage to Editha Samson only in November 1997. However, Rederick said that he had
told Grace about his previous marriage and the dissolution thereof. On July 7, 1998,
Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. In this case,
the Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads
A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.
Issue:
Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?
Ruling:

24
The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following
reasons. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino
spouse can be allowed to remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce
would be capacitated to remarry because of the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws
must be alleged and proved.
There are two basic types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The Court could not determine which type of divorce
Rederick had acquired in Australia because of insufficient evidence.
The Australian law provision stated in the facts led the Court to believe that Rederick’s
divorce might have been restricted. Hence, his capacity to remarry has not been proven.
Thus, the Court had to remand the case to find conclusive evidence. However, the Court
also ordered that if there is no proof shown that Rederick had the capacity to remarry, then
the court a quo may declare the nullity of the marriage on the ground of bigamy since there
are already two marriages contracted.

129. Corpuz v Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571 // August 11, 2010 GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN
TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. // BRION, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization in 2000. In 2005, he married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. He went to Canada soon after the wedding. When he
returned to the Philippines four months later, he discovered that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce which was granted.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying
his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage
certificate. Despite the registration, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the
marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable,
the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition to
Gerbert's petition.
The RTC denied the petition, ruling that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law
Issues:
25
1. Does the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
2. Does the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree?
3. Does the recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate
proper?
Held:
1.) No. The provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of
the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
2.) No. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
26
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be

 accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in

the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and
 (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with
the petition.
3.) No. There is no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

130. Fujiki v Marinay

G.R. No. 196049 // June 26, 2013 // MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ
GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, ANDTHE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS. // CARPIO, J.:
--
PRINCIPLE/S:
Special Proceedings
a) Jurisdictional and procedural requirements before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry (Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court)
- Verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;
- Civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings
27
 - Time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Conflict of Laws
a) Rule on recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
- Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws
b) How foreign divorce judgment is recognized in the Philippines
- Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. (Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note
10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.)
- Foreign judgment must be ALLEGED and PROVED
c) How to ALLEGE and PROVE foreign judgment (Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court)
Proof either by:
(1) official publications OR
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents.
If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept AND
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

d) Registration of the foreign divorce decree should be done with judicial recognition of the
foreign judgment
Article 407 of the Civil Code requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status. But while
the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.

Persons and Family Relations

a) Second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code cam only be claimed by a Filipino
citizen
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

b) Two types of defective marriages recognized under the Family Code

- void marriages
- voidable marriages

c) Void and voidable marriages vs. Divorce

Void and voidable marriages - Dissolution of the lawful union is based on a cause existing
before or at the time of the marriage
Divorce- Dissolution of the lawful union is based on a cause arising after the marriage

28
d) Philippines does not recognize absolute divorce; exception
GR: Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country.
Exception: Second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code recognizes the dissolution
of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

e) Effect of 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code

- Recognition of the foreign divorce decree
- Declare that the Filipino spouse is capacitated to contract another marriage if the court
finds that the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry.

f) Intent for enactment of 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code

"to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."

FACTS: Petitioner Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He married a Filipina. He later filed a petition for
divorce for his first wife since he discovered that she was having an affair. This was
granted. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. He desired to
marry her. So he registered the Canadian divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office. But
he was informed that despite the registration of the divorce decree the marriage between
him and his first wife still subsists under Philippine law and for the divorce decree to be
enforceable, it must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Petitioner then filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage
as dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner
lacked locus standi. Thus, petitioner directly appeals to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
1) WON the 2nd paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
2) WON Civil Registry Office acted out of line in registering the foreign decree of divorce.
HELD:
1) NO. Only a Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under the 2nd paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the
Filipino spouse. Hence, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the 2nd paragraph of Art 26 of
the Family Code.
However, the unavailability of the 2nd paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian
citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce
decree with conformity to alien’s national law.
29
2) YES. Article 407 of the Civil Code requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Hence, the Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign
decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial
order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

131. Medina v Koike

G.R. No. 215723, // July 27, 2016 // DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A.
"DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner, v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent. // PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla, a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike, a
Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Doreen and
Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. Doreen filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. The RTC denied Doreen’s petition, ruling
that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that considering that
the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence
of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation
of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously
a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Nonetheless, in
the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case was referred to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla, a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23,
2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and
Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya
City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce
Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki
30
Koike. Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of
Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February
7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry. The RTC denied Doreen’s petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of
foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce
must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the
national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC
observed that the “The Civil Code of Japan 2000” and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009,”
presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by
Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the
applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was
insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to
have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on
family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises
pursuant to Section 46, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness
on the subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law. Doreen’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce – REFERRED TO THE CA
RULING AND DOCTRINE:
Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree
between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the
matter are essentially factual that calls for a re evaluation of the evidence presented before
the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond
the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not
a trier of facts. Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals, the
Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court. In the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case was referred to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

132. In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce between

Takahashi and Moraña
G.R. No. 227605, // December 05, 2019 // IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE BETWEEN MINURO* TAKAHASHI AND JULIET
31
RENDORA MORAÑA, JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. // LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

Read case

133. Republic v Manalo

G.R. No. 221029 // REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO , Respondent // PERALTA, J.
FACTS
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national. She later filed for divorce
against her husband, and a divorce decree was issued by a Japanese court.
In 2012, she sought the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila by virtue of the said divorce decree. She later amended her petition for
the judicial recognition of the divorce decree.
RTC denied Marelyn's petition, arguing that the divorce obtained by Marelyn in Japan
should not be recognized. The RTC held that based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code,
the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are
in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos
"are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."
Upon appeal, the CA overturned RTC's ruling. CA held that Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. As such, it would be height of injustice
to consider Manelyn as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her and can legally have another wife.
OSG's motion for recommendation was denied by CA. Hence, the instant petition.

RULING
Does a Filipino citizen have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry? -- YES.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain

32
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad.
The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien
spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
In fact, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his
or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike.
Finally, a prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not
only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section
2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.

Although the SC held that a Filipino may initiate divorce against a foreign spouse,
Marelyn's case was still remanded to the RTC to allow Marelyn to present evidence as
proof of the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
--
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo
filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage

33
between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden
surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the
divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having
the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer
married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad
and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino
spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be
interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court
will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent
of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled
that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it
should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection
clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the
foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and
making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained
would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the
Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection
from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

34
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe
that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be
proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

134. Racho v Tanaka

G.R. No. 199515, // June 25, 2018 // RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA
RACHO TANAKA," Petitioner, v. SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents. // LEONEN, J.:
Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is
the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the
divorce becomes “validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same
status should be given to the Filipino spouse. The national law of Japan does not prohibit
the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow.
FACTS:
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro
Manila. They lived together for nine years in Japan and did not have any children. Racho
alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted.
She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama of the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated by the DFA. She was informed that by
reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philippines to
report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition
of divorce.
She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but
was refused since there was no court order recognizing it. When she went to the
Department of Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she was likewise told that she needed
the proper court order. She was also informed by the National Statistics Office that her
divorce could only be annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order
capacitating her to remarry.
She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry before
the RTC but the latter held that failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce.
Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Racho filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with the SC but the latter deferred action on her Petition pending her
35
submission of a duly authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce. On
March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance, attaching a duly authenticated
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she obtained in Japan.
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes
effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by two or more
witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating “Acceptance Certification of
Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan” is
sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by agreement and have already
effected notification of the divorce. She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner
of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fact of its
acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate. She insists that she is now
legally capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a
matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.
ISSUE:
Whether the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the
fact that a divorce was validly obtained by Tanaka according to his national law.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino
may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the
foreign spouse’s national law. The second paragraph provides that where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient. In Garcia v.
Recio, the court established the principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized
in this jurisdiction, a separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the
divorce decree and the national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like
any other fact before trial courts.
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate issued by Consul
Takayama. This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance
Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. Upon
appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce has been accepted.
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is a question
of fact that would not ordinarily be within this Court’s ambit to resolve. The court records,
however, are already sufficient to fully resolve the factual issues.
Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General neither posed any objection to the
admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce nor argued that the
Petition presented questions of fact. In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, this
Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
36
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by agreement is not the
divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code. In this particular instance, it is the
Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this narrow interpretation, which may be
unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides that State recognizes
the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant
for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a
divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes “validly obtained” and capacitates the
foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.

The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or
participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman
to be prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law may allow.
The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses initiated the proceedings
but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent was valid.
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not
state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be
no other interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is
absolute and completely terminates their marital tie. Even under our laws, the effect of the
absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry.
D. Muslim Divorces

 Code of Muslim Personal Laws

134. Yasin v Sharia District Court

G.R. No. 94986 // February 23, 1995 // HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-
in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A
DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Zamboanga City,
respondent. // BIDIN, J.:
Facts:
After the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of the
Philippines, petitioner Yasin filed a petition to resume the use of maiden name before the
Shari'a District Court. The respondent court denied the petition on the ground that the
petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule
103 Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be granted.
Issue:
1. Does petitioner seek to change her registered name?
2. In case the marriage ties no longer exist (as in the case of death, divorce, annulment),
does women need to seek judicial confirmation of the change in their civil status in order to
revert to their maiden name?

37
Held:
1. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register.
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the
true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. In the instant petition, petitioner does
not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to
resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage, by virtue of
a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
2. No. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to
use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by
adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art.
370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the
case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or
divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to
revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not
obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but
only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's
surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the
husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the
respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do
so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of
divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

IX. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife

 RA 10354, Secs. 2, 3, 4 (g)(h)(i)(p)(q)(s)(v), 7 and 8
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and Respect, Mutual Help and Support

 Art. 247, RPC

 Art. 68-70, FC
 Art. 34, NCC
 Sec. 2, RA 8353
 Sec. 2-6, 8, 21, 26, 28, 35, RA 9262
 Sec. 19, RA 9710
 Arts. 199-200, FC

135. Garcia v Santiago

G.R. No. L-28904 // December 29, 1928 // CIPRIANA GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
ISABELO SANTIAGO and ALEJO SANTIAGO, defendants-appellees. // OSTRAND, J.:
(read case)

38
136. Goitia v Campos Rueda
G.R. No. 11263 // November 2, 1916 // ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee. // TRENT, J.:
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They
stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs.
Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and
valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and
deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled
in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may
fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is
driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

137. People v Jumawan

G.R. No. 187495 // April 21, 2014 // PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant. // REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband,
the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her
shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

39
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and
fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged
method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush
but he would threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial
bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a
cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying
on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain
due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier.
He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the
floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the
bed.
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in
penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape
charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
Violation of equal protection clause

40
The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on
the equal protection clause.
The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone.
He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another
person in raping her.
Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.
Implied consent theory untenable
The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by
the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between
cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence,
exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No.
8353.

138. Garcia v Drilon and Jaype-Garcia

G.R. No. 179267 // June 25, 2013 // JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch
41, Bacolod City,and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor
children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPHEDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents. // PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Doctrine: R.A. No. 9262 defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child. This Act is based on a valid classification and, as such, do not
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and
abuse to whom the State extends its protection. The unequal power relationship between
women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence;
and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law.

41
Narrative:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia and Jesus Garcia were married in 2002 and begot three (3) children.
Rosalie described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband, while her husband was described as dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from her and their children. He forbade Rosalie to pray, and be with her friends.
He was often jealous that his wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point
threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.
Things worsen up when Jesus Garcia had an affair. He even admitted it to his wife and told
her that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank. His infidelity
spawned several fights where Rosalie would be left physically and emotionally wounded.
In one of their quarrels, petitioner caused bruises and hematoma to his wife. At another
time, petitioner hit Rosalie forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. He even hit
their child, Jo-Ann, on the chest and slapped her many times. Even the small boys were
aware of her sufferings. All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. She even attempted suicide by cutting her wrist.
Rosalie then filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, which was approved
and issued by the RTC.
Two days later, Jesus Garcia asked for the denial of the TPO, but was dismissed by Court
of Appeals. Hence, seeking before the Supreme Court (SC) on whether R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause, and whether the law is
violative of the policy to protect the family as a basic social institution.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws
As explained by the SC, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and
child should be affected alike by a statute. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be

42
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union)
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.
Violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power
relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence”.
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers,
providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men’s
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads
to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of controlling women to retain power.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
As held by the SC, there was no concrete evidence and convincing arguments presented by
Jesus Garcia to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an
act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As observed by Justice Puno, “the history of the women’s movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the
violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the
struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment.” Hence, the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
The SC denied the contentions of Jesus Garcia for lack of merit.

139. Go-Tan v Tan

G.R. No. 168852 // September 30, 2008 // SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents. // AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union,
two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005,
barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

43
Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may
be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA
9262.
Held:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides
that the offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as
RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
--
FACTS:
Sharica Mari Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven Tan were married and have two female
children. Barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law,
herein respondents, before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation
of R.A. No. 9262.
The RTC granted the petition and issued a TPO.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their
persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
The RTC dismissed the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law
of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents parents-in-law of petitioner, may be included in the petition for
the Issuance of a Protective Order in accordance with R.A. NO. 9262.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ”[v]iolence against women and their children” as any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in

44
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. – For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

140. Pelayo v Lauron

G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909 // ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees. J.H. Junquera, for appellant.
Filemon Sotto, for appellee. // TORRES, J.
Facts:
Dr. Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo Lauron and Juana Abellana alleging
that upon their request, he rendered medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was
about to give birth to a child. The just and equitable value of the services rendered by him
was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor.
In their Answer, Marelo and Juana alleged that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if
on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was
accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, the defendants should be
absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Issue:
Are Marelo and Juana obliged to pay petitioner for the medical assistance rendered to their
daughter-in-law?
Held:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any
kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those
expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones.
Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and
must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
45
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and
143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (Art. 1088), and
spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when
either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other was
under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order
that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is
jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all expenses,
including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. Consequently, the
person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he
rendered was the husband of the patient.

Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to
the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the
furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the
other hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the
plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to
pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they
consented to bind themselves.. (Pelayo vs. Lauron, G.R. No. L-4089, January 12, 1909)
B. Management Household

 Art. 71, FC Compared with Art. 115, NCC

C. Exercise of Profession

 Art. 73, FC compared with Art 117, NCC

 RA 7192

46