EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21325. October 29, 1971.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA,
FRANCISCO BILLONA, MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO
SAVANDAL and SEVERENO SAVANDAL , defendants; PABLEO
DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN, defendants-appellants.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Arturo G.

Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for plaintiff-appellee.
Arturo E. Balbastro for defendants-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED;

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; ACCUSATION NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH
GUILT. — Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability
lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their
behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been
committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of
whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test
should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that
on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged;
that not only did he perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. — By reasonable doubt
is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any
criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required
as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. We feel
that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even
though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the
rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent.
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 3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL JUDGE; GENERALLY
RESPECTED ON APPEAL. — With the testimony of record pointing to no other
conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by appellants, the effort of
their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense of
his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to
reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected
the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and
appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this
case, circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by
him.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J : p

There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novelty in the plea made

by counsel de oficio in this appeal of the accused Pableo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecubin, who were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of
Estelito Nogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed that because the
information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with only
the two appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state
witnesses and the other three having been acquitted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence as to their culpability, the judgment of conviction
against the appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to
their guilt. To bolster such a contention, certain alleged deficiencies in the
proof offered by the prosecution were noted. A careful study of the evidence
of record would leave no other rational conclusion but that the deceased met
his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as found by the lower
court. Hence the appeal cannot prosper. We affirm.
The gory incident which was attended by a fatality started on the
morning of January 9, 1964. The two accused, now appellants, Pableo
Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito
Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del
Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on a robbery
committed in the house of the deceased five days before by being available
as witnesses. The response was decidedly in the negative as they
themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two
individuals who had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while
they were in the house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the accused
Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused Francisco
Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal, for a drinking
session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion
that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could
not satisfy in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to
ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station
themselves nearby. 1
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 Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo
with a request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of
wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation
consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate
from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of the
group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His
equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the
house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had
just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police
were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of
Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his
daughter was the cause thereof. 2
The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region,
one in the right lumbar region, and another in the left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution
that the lower court reached its decision. Its dispositive portion found the
accused, now appellants. Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty
"beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by the circumstance of
evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each
of the said accused, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, the penalty of
[reclusion perpetua]." 3 Reference was likewise made in such decision as to
why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of them, Crescencio
Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the
other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla
acquitted.
Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed
decision thus: "From the beginning the accused Modesto Ronquilla
maintained that he was not with the group but that he was fishing in the sea
during the night in question. These facts that is, that none of the prosecution
witnesses has testified that any of these three accused actually helped in the
killing of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that these three accused were
included in the case only much later after the filing of this case against
Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent Contention of the
accused Modesto Ronquilla that he was out in the sea fishing during the
night in question; and the testimonies of the accused Priolo Billona [and]
Francisco [and their witnesses,] Juan Billona, Esperanza Oposa-Billona,
Guillerma Ponce, and Anselmo Lisondra, given in a straight-forward manner,
without hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, and the fact that the
testimonies of these witnesses have not been refuted by the PC soldiers
[whom they accused of maltreatment] when they were available to the
prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a very serious doubt as to the guilt
of the said accused." 4
The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi
interposed by now appellants Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been
their lack of persuasive character that must have led to the able brief of
counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of
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 evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be
implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged," only two of the
seven accused were held culpable. To repeat, a meticulous appraisal of the
evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the offense
charged, thus calling for the affirmance of the decision.
1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of
innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. 5 That is a right
safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon
then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their
guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most
careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the
judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the
crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. 6
United States v. Lasada, 7 decided in 1910, yields this excerpt: "By
reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is
that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty
of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of
any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense."
8 To the same effect is an excerpt form the opinion of the late Justice Tuason
in People v. Esquivel. 9 Thus; "In this connection it may not be out of place to
bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of
laying before the court the pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical
and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and
loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not
escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the
court, to the accused, and to the state." 10
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable
doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion.
It cannot be denied though that the credible and competent evidence of
record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial
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 judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The force of the
controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three
accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not
present. There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state
being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal liability. The reference then
to an opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the
fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no
reasonable doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident from
the very citation in the brief of appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel in
People v. Manoji. 11 Thus: "Upon the other hand, there are certain facts
which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a
grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v.
Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the
deceased in the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that
he gave that hat . . . to Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our
minds as be the guilt of the appellant, but also seems to sustain the theory
of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that Maradani
and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin
Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is
better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he
may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his
natural life a person who may be innocent. . . . " 12 The facts of the present
case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part of
appellants on the above decision is therefore futile.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise
on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the
fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The
presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more
than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution.
What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as
established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants
would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants,
for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal
contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that
while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this
Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the
element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or
parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral
certainty having arisen as to their culpability. 13
2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their
guilty not having been sufficiently de monstrated with the contention that
the lower court over looked or did not properly consider material and
significant facts of record that ought to have substantially affected or altered
the judgment. Even the most careful reading of such brief, however, with
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 due recognition of the vigor in which this particular point is pressed, would
not destroy the credibility of the facts as testified to concerning the manner
in which the deceased was killed and the motive that prompted appellants to
put an end to his life. That such a version could not have been concocted is
shown by the undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of
robbery, with the deceased as the offended party. It was understandable
then why they would want to do away with the principal witness against
them. There was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to have
committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to no
other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of
their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense of
his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to
reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected
the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and
appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this
case, circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by
him. 14
WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 is affirmed with the
modification that the indemnification to the heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should
be in the sum of P12,000.00. With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.

Footnotes

1. Transcript of stenographic note, pp. 21-22, 24-27, 44-47, 155-157, 207-209.

2. Ibid, pp. 24-27, 45-46.
3. Decision, Appendix to Brief for Accused-Appellants, p. 19. It was further
adjudged that the accused appellants who in the meanwhile, had already
been convicted for robbery, with the deceased as the offended party, should
serve the sentences imposed on them of from four years and two months of
prision correccional as minimum to not more than ten years of prision mayor
as maximum before commencing to serve the sentence imposed upon them
for murder. The indemnity imposed was in the sum of P10,000.00.

4. Ibid, pp. 18-19.

5. According to Section 1, paragraph 17 of Article III of the Constitution: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, . . ."
6. 3 Phil. 3 (1903). Later cases that speak to the same effect are: United States v.
Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910); People v. Lanas, 93 Phil. 147 (153); People v.
Lavarias, L-24339, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1301.
7. 18 Phil. 90.
8. Ibid, pp. 96-97.
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 9. 92 Phil. 453 (1948). Cf. United States v. Garces, 31 Phil. 637 (1915); People v.
Gallego, 44 Phil. 192 (1922); People v. Tayag, 59 Phil. 606 (1934); People v.
Abana, 76 Phil. 1 (1946); People v. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463 (1946); People v.
Somera, 83 Phil. 548 (1949); People v. Lanas, 93 Phil. 147 (1953); People v.
Sy Pio, 94 Phil. 885 (1954); People v. Palo, 101 Phil. 963 (1957); People v.
Del Rosario Murray, 105 Phil. 591 (1959); People v. Delimios, 105 Phil. 845
(1959); People v. Saik, 106 Phil. 957 (1960); People v. Corpuz, 107 Phil. 44
(1960); People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188 (1960); People v. Fraga, 109
Phil. 241 (1960); People v. Magborang, L-16937, Sept. 30, 1963, 3 SCRA 108;
People v. Argana, L-19448, Feb. 28, 1964, 10 SCRA 311; People v. Contante,
L-14639, Dec. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 653; People v. Cunanan, L-17599, April 24,
1967, 19 SCRA 769; People v. Baquiran L-20153, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA
451; Ramos v. People, L-22348, Aug. 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 1109; People v.
Parayno, L-24804, July 5, 1968, 24 SCRA 3; People v. Pagaduan, L-26948,
Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 54; People v. Gallora, L-21740, Oct. 30, 1969, 29
SCRA 780; People v. Madarang, L-22295, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 148; People
v. Gallema, L-30588-89. June 10, 1970, 33 SCRA 440.
10. Ibid, p. 459.
11. 68 Phil. 471 (1939).

12. Ibid, p. 475.

13. Cf. People v. Bernal, 91 Phil. 619 (1952); People v. Hufana, 103 Phil. 304
(1958); People v. Amajul, L-14626-27, Feb. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 682; People v.
Dueñas, L-15307, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 221, People v. Hernandez, L-6025,
May 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 223; People v. Sagario, L-18659, June 29, 1965, 14
SCRA 468; People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, L-19590, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 127;
People v. Wong, L-22130-32, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 146; People v. Provo, L-
28347, Jan. 20, 1971, SCRA 19.
14. Cf. People v. Sabandal, L-31129, Sept. 30, 1971 citing People v. Beraces, L-
25016, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 127; People v. Gumahin, L-22357, Oct. 31,
1967, 21 SCRA 729; People v. Tila-on, L-12406, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 653;
People v. Curiano, L-15256-57, Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 323; People v.
Lumayag, L-19142, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 502.

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