25 SUPREME COURT

0 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
20
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE
C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and
IRMA L. VELOSO, respondents.
Civil Law; Adoption; Nature and concept of adoption; Kind of adoption recognized in the
Philippines; Adoption is never presumed but must be affirmatively proved.—Adoption is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem, which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural
law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be
strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed,
but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public
building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a
presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed.
On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-
existence. Where, under the provisions of the state, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of
such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.
Same; Same; Evidence; Proof required to establish adoption of child is thru judicial decree of
adoption; Absence of proof of order of adoption by the court cannot be substituted by parol evidence.—
The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be
substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a
child to establish such adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that
he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided
with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient
to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed,
_______________

*
 FIRST DIVISION

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VOL. 92, JULY 30,

1979 51
Lazatin vs. Campos
educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish
adoption of the child. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of
deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of
petitioner’s evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child
—which statuts of an admitted illegitimate child was the very basis of his petition for intervention in the
estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception to the Rule; Secondary evidence admissible
where records of adoption proceedings actually lost or destroyed; Order of proof for introduction of
secondary evidence to prove adoption.—Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records
of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof

Page 1 of 13
is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged
lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular
case. As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and
its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first been established
that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable. Petitioner’s supposed adoption
was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to by a brother of the deceased Mariano H.
Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceases spouses treated petitioner as their child. If
adoption was really made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at the hearing
or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case,
adduced. Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not
justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it
constitute admissible proof of adoption.
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Pedigree; Pedigree testimony not admissible to prove adoption of
child.—We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted
on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree testimony
is admitted because it is
252

2 SUPREME
52 COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of
such proof than from its admission. But, in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it
should be produced. The whereabouts of the child’s family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which
they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely produce an
adoption order, if indeed there was an order. Besides, since the point in favor of receiving hearsay
evidence upon matters of family history or pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition
upon which such evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the family. Pursuant to this
view, before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the
relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof,
must ordinarily be established by competent evidence. Section 33 of Rule 130 states: “The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration * * * *.”
Same; Same; Same; Intervention; A person cannot intervene in an estate proceeding for failure to
prove his adoption by the deceased; Requirements for intervention in estate proceeding; Burden of proof
to establish adoption is laid upon the person claiming relationship thru adoption.—As a necessary
consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement
of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as an adopted child because of lack of proof
thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate,
either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.
A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done
in strict accord with the statute. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the
supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. The burden of proof in establishing
adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes
relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. A fortiori, if no hereditary interest in

Page 2 of 13
the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated or
not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary
253

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1979 53
Lazatin vs. Campos
complication. To succeed, a child must be legitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged
illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child.
Same; Same; Evidence; Courts are liberal in accepting proferred evidence; Trial court rulings on
procedural questions and admissibility of evidence during the trial interlocutory; Recourse of a party
when his proferred evidence was rejected, by the trial court is to make a formal offer of evidence in the
appellate court; How formal offer of evidence done in appellate courts; case at bar.—The Court’s
resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses was but in application of the Court’s
longstanding admonition to trial courts as reaffirmed in Lamagan vs. De la Cruz, “to be liberal in
accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to accept the evidence, the affected party
will nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal.” The
Court therein once again stressed the established rule that “it is beyond question that rulings of the trial
court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court
on the merits of the case,” and that a party’s recourse when his proferred evidence is rejected by the trial
court is to make a formal offer stating on the record what a party or witness would have testified to were
his testimony not exclusded, as well as to attach to the record any rejected exhibits.

PETITION for certiorari from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay branch)

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for petitioner.
     Jose W. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons.
     Arturo E. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge’s orders declaring that
petitioner has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an
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25 SUPREME COURT
4 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this Court “declaring as
established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in
their estates as such.” Respondent judge correctly ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who
had filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de
Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a
motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her pre-deceased husband as his admitted
illegitimate [not natural] son), over the opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence

Page 3 of 13
that he had “enjoyed . . . the status of an adopted child of the said spouses” without his first
producing competent and documentary proof that there had been judicial proceedings for his
legal adoption by the said spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court
decreeing his adoption.
On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his
wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to
respondent Bernardo de Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano’s death, his widow, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate
proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P.
Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children
of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also
intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a
holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to
Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of
petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People’s Bank and
Trust Company, Roxas
255
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 255
1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after
Margarita’s death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband, respondent
Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock;
(b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry
belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the
safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased
mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other small
items deposited therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her
that she needed an authority from the court to do so, in view of her mothers death and so, she
removed everything from the box.
On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita
de Asis, before docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of respondent Court. Days after having learned
that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner’s son, Ramon Sta.
Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will
subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for
the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened the
box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara, the safety
deposit box was opened on November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty, because
prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr, Mariano M.
Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P), as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.

Page 4 of 13
 Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner’s son, Ramon, filed a petition in the
estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the
256
25 SUPREME COURT
6 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
safety deposit box. Whereupon, on January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora
L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court.
Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P,
Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora L.
de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety
deposit box and to deliver the same to the custody of the court within one week. Within the
period ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items
themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened upon order of
the court.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to
intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an adopted child, on the
basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin, that petitioner was an “illegitimate son” of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him.
This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both
Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent Nora L. de Leon guilty of contempt
of court for not complying with the orders of January 31, 1975 and May 29, 1975, requiring her
to produce and deliver to the court all the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box.
Her former counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and
suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp.
Proc No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis), on her testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon, acted upon his
advice.
Respondent court heard petitioner’s motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of
adoption in his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents’
objections, that he had recognized
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VOL. 92, JULY 30, 257
1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he
was known as “Renato Lazatin” but was compelled to change his surname to “Sta. Clara” when
the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he
and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few monts
later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased
spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be
presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of

Page 5 of 13
petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy;
document showing that petitioner’s real name is “Renato Lazatin.” 1

Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents’ objections to the admission
of petitioner’s evidence, but on November 14, 1975, when petitioner could not present evidence
on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the
parties time to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be
introduced by petitoner. On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of
petitioner’s evidence because:
“All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara through their counsel do not prove or have
no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above
named were taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of
a proceeding in court where the adoption of the above named persons was held.  The evidence, however,
tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for which
Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into consideration
the evidence heretofore presented by the petitioners, any further introduction of similar evidence,
documentary or oral, would not prove or tend to prove the fact of their adoption but rather of a recognized
natural child.”
________________

 Annex 25, p. 1, Comment of respondents de Leon.

1

258
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8 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the fact
of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon’s refusal to comply with the orders of
respondent court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita
de Asis. As authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, since according to him, the order of the court for the production of the items in the
safety deposit box can be considered as an order for production and inspection of documents
under Rule 27.
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court denied
petitioner’s motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent
court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by
respondent court, with notice to the parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of
jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3, 1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioner’s motion for definite resolution on his
previous motion to declare as established the fact of adoption, issued the following order:
“As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is concerned and his Petition to establish his status as an adopted
child, the Court has ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The Court denies any motion for
reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof.”

Hence, the petition at bar.

We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence.
1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem,  which creates between two persons a
2

relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.  Only an
3

Page 6 of 13
________________

 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1974 ed., at 657; Ellis v. Republic, L-16922, 7 SCRA 962; Van
2

Matre v. Sankey, 36 NE 628.

 Valverde 473; See Annotation in Hofileña v. Republic, L-26476, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 550.
3

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VOL. 92, JULY 30, 259
1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction.  It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and
4

entirely artificial.  To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried
5

out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity.  The fact of adoption is never presumed, but
6

must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a
public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise
to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be
presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence.  Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is
7

effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such
adoption may be established. 8

2. Petitioner’s flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial
adoption. We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court
decree of adoption in his favor. Petitioner’s proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time
or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated
by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of
such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely
proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and
1932. By what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition heard,
petitioner does not even manifest, much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption
proceeding or to the adoption decree. Apparent-
_______________

 In re: Adoption of Resaba Santos Yñigo v. Republic, 94 Phil. 244 (1954).

4

 Succession of Pizzari, 75 So. 498.

5

 Succession of D’Asaro, 167 So. 2d 391; Appeal of Ritchie, 53 NW 2d 753.

6

 2 CJS 444.
7

 Quinn v. Quinn, 58 NW 808; 2 CJS 444.

8

260
26 SUPREME COURT
0 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
ly on the assumption that the adoption was commenced in Manila, petitioner’s counsel secured a
certification from the Court of First Instance of Manila which, however, negatively reported
“(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this Office, there has not been found, after
a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.
Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin

Page 7 of 13
and Margarita de Asis de Lazatin.” The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
“(T)hat our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were either
destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila,” does not furnish any legal basis
for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that
petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was
rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was really such adoption, petitioner could have
conveniently secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the adoption as required under
Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of the
publishing house to that effect. Petitioner’s failure on this point is another strong indication of
the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also observed that the identity of the one who gave
the written consent to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court), whether the parents or
orphanage, does not appear in the trend of petitioner’s evidence. The collation of proof on this
point is not so difficult and such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the
adoption. And of course, if the adoption records were indeed destroyed or burned during the war,
the clear right and duty of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute,
cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and
has been treated as a child to establish such adoption.  Even evidence of declaration of the
9

deceased, made in his

________________

 Coombs v. Cook, 129 P. 698.

9

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VOL. 92, JULY 30, 261
1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
lifetime, that he intendead to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the
fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he
attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption.  Nor does the fact that the
10

deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitoner as an
adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child.  Withal, the attempts of petitioner to
11

prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner’s evidence is rather to
establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child—which status of an
admitted illegitimate child was the very basis of his petition for intervention in the estate
proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the
truth.  Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and
12

because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.  But, in
13

proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be produced. The whereabouts
of the child’s family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in
those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if
indeed there was an order.  Besides, since the point in favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon
14

matters of family history or pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon

Page 8 of 13
which such evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the family. Pursuant to this
view, before a
________________

 Haworth v. Haworth, 100 SW 531.

10

 Wohlgemuth v. Browning, 384 SW 2d. 820.

11

 See Sec. 33, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court.

12

 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1420.

13

 In re: Estate of Helen M. Biggs, 328 NYS 2d. 138; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, 1970 ed., at
14

332, et seq.

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26 SUPREME COURT
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ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship
of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question; or a branch thereof, must
ordinarily be established by competent evidence.  Section 33 of Rule 130 states: “The act or
15

declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to

the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration * * * * *.”
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings
were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as
follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in
the discretion of the court.  The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission
16

of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case.  As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the
17

former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof
may only be introduced if it has first been established that such adoption paper really existed and
was lost. This is indispensable.  Petitioner’s supposed adoption was only testified to by him and
18

is allegedly to be testified to by a brother of the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have
witnessed that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made,
the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent
thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced. 19

________________

 29 Am Jur 2d 565.

15

 Jones on Evidence, Vol. 1, 5th ed., at 458, et seq.

16

 Burns v. Goodrich, 382 SW 2d 501.

17

 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Evidence, 107.

18

 See Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 167 (1955).

19

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Page 9 of 13
Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify
the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it
constitute admissible proof of adoption.
We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to
consider as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de Leon
to produce the document of adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of petitioner’s
adoption had not been established; second, there is no proof that such document of adoption is in
the possession of respondent Nora L. de Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora
de Leon to produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as a mode
of discovery of production and inspection of documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the items
deposited in the safety deposit box have already been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de
Leon on April 26; 1976 and no document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in
the safety deposit box.
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot
properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as
an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it
is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.  A child by adoption cannot inherit from
20

the parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue.
Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or
adopted child could be bound thereby.  The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
21

person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating
________________

 Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, L-17091, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 116; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23135, Dec. 26,
20

1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Teotico v. del Val, L-18753, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 410.
 In re Estate of Schick, 274 NE 2d 291, quoting McCollister v. Yard, 57 NW 447.
21

264
26 SUPREME COURT
4 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos
to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred.  A fortiori, if no hereditary interest in
22

the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is
probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary
complication.  To succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged
23

illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 24

In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which show
that petitioner sought to intervene on November 22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged
adoptive father Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child,  while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate of Margarita de Asis,
25

widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc, No. 2341-P) was as her adopted child on the basis
of the affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed on August
19, 1975 (which affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed to
state by “oversight” that Dr. Lazatin and his wife had “jointly adopted” petitioner, but stated that
affiant knew petitioner to be “an illegitimate son” of Dr. Lazatin who later “legally adopted

Page 10 of 13
(him) as a son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928 and
1931”) and prescinding from the question of whether a natural or spurious child may be legally
adopted by the putative father, we hold
________________

 In re Estate of Helen M. Riggs, 328 NYS 2d 138.

22

 Cache v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 697.

23

 See Cid v. Burnaman, L-24414, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 438-39.

24

 Supra, at page 3 hereof. In these cases involving both estates of the deceased spouses, petitioner asserts his claim of
25

being an adopted child, on the ground that respondent court had “definitively ruled” that he “failed to establish such status
(adoption).” Petitioner’s Reply, Rollo, p. 241. In his Reply to other respondents, petitioner asserts that “there is actually no
issue in the estate of Mariano Lazatin that your petitioner was an acknowledged illegitimate son of Mariano M. Lazatin”
and “the only issue really is . . . whether (he) is also an adopted son of the deceased spouses.” Rollo, pp. 248-249.

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VOL. 92, JULY 30, 265
1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed by respondent judge in issuing
the questioned orders of March 4, 1976, March 26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner’s
petition “to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of adoption” and denying “any
motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof.” The Court finds no basis
to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding by petitioner for a rendition of judgment
“declaring as established the fact of your petitioner’s adoption as a son of the deceased spouses
entitling him to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on
succession as to his inheritance.”
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a temporary restraining
order; which as amended on July 21, 1976, restrained respondent judge “from proceeding with
the hearing scheduled on June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of evidence to
establish heirship in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled ‘Intestate Estate of the Late
Mariano M. Lazatin’ and Special Proceedings No. 2341-P, entitled ‘Testate Estate of the late
Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,’ and from proceeding with the probate of the alleged
holographic will of the deceased Doña Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29,
1976, August 10 and 12, 1976 and on any other dates.” With the Court’s determination of the
issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any need for restraining the proceedings below and
the said restraining order shall be immediately lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner’s motion resolved to conditionally allow
respondent judge “to take the deposition of petitioner’s witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies
pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, subject to the Court’s ruling in due course
on the admissibility of such testimonies.” The Court thereby permitted in effect the advance
testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses, principally among them Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L.
Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr. Mariano L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner’s
motion of January 11, 1977:
266
26 SUPREME COURT
6 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Lazatin vs. Campos

Page 11 of 13
“Substantially, the testimony of the above-named witnesses will be on the fact that they had been
informed by the deceased spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner was their
[Mariano’s and Margarita’s] judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them the fact that your
petitioner enjoys the reputation of being their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin family.”

The Court’s resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses was but in
application of the Court’s longstanding admonition to trial courts as reaffirmed in Lamagan vs.
De la Cruz , “to be liberal in accepting preferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to
26

accept the evidence, the affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded
evidence on the record, for review on appeal.” The Court therein once again stressed the
established rule that “it is beyond question that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions
and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may
not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be assigned as errors and
reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits
of the case,”  and that a party’s recourse when his proferred evidence is rejected by the trial court
27

is to make a formal offer stating on the record what a party or witness would have testified to
were his testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the record any rejected exhibits.
At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of the
alleged holographic will of the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, petitioner who has
failed to establish his status as an alleged adopted child of Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved
to him by the court below, he can show some documentary proof) and whose intervention in the
estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child, will have to
decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the status of such admitted illegitimate
child of said deceased. Whatever be his
________________

 40 SCRA 101, 110 (1971).

26

 Idem, at pages 106-107.

27

267
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 267
1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
theory and his course of action and whether or not he may be duly allowed to intervene in the
proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in the event of an
adverse ruling against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral
and documentary, and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying petitioner’s
petition below “to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of [his] adoption” are hereby
affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21,
1976 is ordered lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
     De Castro, J., took no part.
Petition Dismissed.
Notes.—Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court may entertain them unless it has
jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also, over

Page 12 of 13
the res, which is the personal status not only of the person to be adopted, but also of the adopting
parents. (Ellis vs. Republic, 7 SCRA 962).
Adoption proceedings being in rem, constructive notice by publication is sufficient. (Santos
vs. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344).
Relatives by blood or affinity are not prohibited from adopting one another. (Santos, Jr. vs.
Republic, 21 SCRA 379).
An individual who has already adopted a child may still adopt another. (Hofileña vs.
Republic, 34 SCRA 545).
The acquisition, by the adopted person, of the adopting parents’ citizenship is not required.
(Therkelsen vs. Republic, 12 SCRA 400; Cathey vs. Republic, 18 SCRA 86).
A person may legally adopt two or more children and that if the children to be adopted are all
of age, the consent of neither of their legitimate parents is not necessary, all that is needed
268

26 SUPREME COURT
8 REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Matura vs. Laya
being their own consent. (Paulino vs. Belen, 27 SCRA 357).
Adoption, as a privilege granted by law, can be exercised by any person of age and in full
possession of his civil rights. (In re: Adoption of Minors Millindez, 39 SCRA 499).
Natural mother is expressly authorized by law to adopt her natural child, and likewise, a
stepfather is expressly authorized by law to adopt his step-child. (Malkinson vs. Agrava, 54
SCRA 66).
Adoption statutes, being humane and statutory, held the interest and welfare of the child to be
a paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter as well as the allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parental instincts. (Malkinson vs. Agrava, 54 SCRA 66).

——o0o——

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