1 - Pambansang Koalisyong NG Mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa Sa Niyugan vs. Executive

9/5/22, 11:00 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 669
G.R. Nos. 147036-37. April 10, 2012.*

Petitioner-Organizations, namely: PAMBANSANG
KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT
MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT
INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR), BUKLOD NG
MALAYANG MAGBUBUKID, PAMBANSANG KILUSAN
NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA (PAKISAMA),
CENTER FOR AGRARIAN REFORM, EMPOWERMENT
AND TRANSFORMATION (CARET), PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN
(PKSK); Petitioner-
_______________
* EN BANC.
50
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at
Manggagawa sa Niyugan (PKSMMN) vs. Executive
Secretary
Legislator: REPRESENTATIVE LORETA ANN ROSALES;

and Petitioner-Individuals, namely: VIRGILIO V. DAVID,
JOSE MARIE FAUSTINO, JOSE CONCEPCION, ROMEO
ROYANDOYAN, JOSE V. ROMERO, JR., ATTY. CAMILO
L. SABIO, and ATTY. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, petitioners,
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
INC. (COCOFED), and UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK (UCPB), respondents.
G.R. No. 147811. April 10, 2012.*

TEODORO J. AMOR, representing the Peasant Alliance of
Samar and Leyte (PASALEY), DOMINGO C.
ENCALLADO, representing Aniban ng Magsasaka at
Manggagawa sa Niyugan (AMMANI), and VIDAL M.
PILIIN, representing the Laguna Coalition, petitioners, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, respondents.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Where the issues raised

are of paramount importance to the public, the Court has the
discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.—Where there
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001830e2b8eed0d3dbc3b000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/23
are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution,

it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into
such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of
the Constitution. Moreover, where the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has
the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.
Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayer’s suit is based on the theory that
expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.—The
individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as
taxpayers. The Court
51
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 51

Manggagawa sa Niyugan (PKSMMN) vs. Executive Secretary
recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public

funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
This so-called taxpayer’s suit is based on the theory that
expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds. Besides,
the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater
participation in the affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for
people’s initiative, the right to information on matters of public
concern (including the right to know the state of health of their
President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the
factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law. These provisions enlarge the
people’s right in the political as well as the judicial field. It grants
them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and
challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest.
Taxation; Coconut Levy Funds; The coco-levy funds are in the
nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.—The
Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant
to law to support a proper governmental purpose. They were
raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for
the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The
COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) treated them as public funds and the very laws
governing coconut levies recognize their public character. The
Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in
the nature ofj taxes and can only be used for public purpose.
Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and
property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the
support of the government and for all its public needs. Here, the
coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260
and P.D. 276. The funds were collected and managed by the PCA,
an independent government corporation directly under the
President. And, as the respondent public officials pointed out, the
pertinent laws used the term levy, which means to tax, in
describing the exaction.
Same; Same; Since taxes could be exacted only for a public
purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals
although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.
—Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and

Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that
coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation. And
since taxes
52

could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be

declared private properties of individuals although such
individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.
Statutes; Where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced.—The general rule is that where part of a statute is void
as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the
valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced. When the parts of a statute, however,
are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of
one part will vitiate the rest. In which case, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the other provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must consequently fall with
them.
PETITIONS to declare unconstitutional certain

presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial
law era relating to the raising and use of coco-levy
funds.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mario E. Ongkiko for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 147036-
37.
Dennis Funa for petitioners in G.R. No. 147811.
UCPB Office of the Corporate Secretary & Legal
Services Group for United Coconut Planters Bank.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
COCOFED.
ABAD, J.:
These are consolidated petitions to declare
unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive
orders of the martial law era relating to the raising and use
of coco-levy funds.
53
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 53

Secretary
The Facts and the Case
On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.)

62601 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI
Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through
capital financing.2 Coconut farmers were to capitalize and
administer the Fund through the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC)3 whose objective was, among others, to
advance the coconut farmers’ interests. For this purpose,
the law imposed a levy of P0.55 on the coconut farmer’s
first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its
equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt
convertible into CIC shares of stock.4
About a year following his proclamation of martial law
in the country or on August 20, 1973 President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) 276,5 which
established a Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCS
Fund), to address the crisis at that time in the domestic
market for coconut-based consumer goods. The CCS Fund
was to be built up through the imposition of a P15.00-levy
for every first sale of 100 kilograms of copra resecada.6 The
levy was to cease after a year or earlier provided the crisis
was over. Any remaining balance of the Fund was to revert
to the CI Fund established under R.A. 6260.7
A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos
issued P.D. 582,8 creating a permanent fund called the
Coconut
_______________
1 Entitled An Act Instituting a Coconut Investment Fund and Creating
a Coconut Investment Company for the Administration Thereof.
2 Id., Section 2.
3 Id.
4 Id., Section 8.
5 Entitled Establishing A Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund.
6 Id., Section 1(a).
7 Id., Section 2.
8 Entitled Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 232, As
Amended.
54

Secretary
Industry Development Fund (CID Fund) to channel for the

ultimate direct benefit of coconut farmers part of the levies
that they were already paying. The Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) was to provide P100 million as initial
capital of the CID Fund and, thereafter, give the Fund at
least P0.20 per kilogram of copra resecada out of the PCA’s
collection of coconut consumers stabilization levy. In case of
the lifting of this levy, the PCA was then to impose a
permanent levy of P0.20 on the first sale of every kilogram
of copra to form part of the CID Fund.9 Also, under P.D.
582, the Philippine National Bank (PNB), then owned by
the Government, was to receive on deposit, administer, and
10
use the CID Fund. P.D. 582 authorized the PNB to invest
the unused portion of the CID Fund in easily convertible
investments, the earnings of which were to form part of the
Fund.11
In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 75512 which
approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the
benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank to
promptly and efficiently realize the industry’s credit
policy.13 Thus, the PCA bought 72.2% of the shares of stock
of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.14 Due to
changes in its corporate identity and purpose, the bank’s
articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975,
resulting in a change in the bank’s name from First United
Bank to United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).15
_______________
9 Id., Section 3-B(c).
10 Id., Section 3-B.
11 Supra note 9.
12 Entitled Approving the Credit Policy for the Coconut Industry as
Recommended by the Philippine Coconut Authority and Providing Funds

Therefor.
13 Id., Section 1.
14 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118661,
January 22, 2007, 512 SCRA 25.
15 Id.
55
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 55

Secretary
On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,16

the Coconut Industry Code, which consolidated and
codified existing laws relating to the coconut industry. The
Code provided that surpluses from the CCS Fund and the
CID Fund collections, not used for replanting and other
authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring
shares of stock of corporations, including the San Miguel
Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings related to the
coconut and palm oil industries.17 UCPB was to make such
investments and equitably distribute these for free to
coconut farmers.18 These investments constituted the
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961 also
provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall
be owned by the coconut farmers in their private
capacities.19 This was reiterated in the PD 146820
amendment of June 11, 1978.
In 1980, President Marcos issued P.D. 1699,21
suspending the collections of the CCS Fund and the CID
Fund. But in 1981 he issued P.D. 184122 which revived the
collection of coconut levies. P.D. 1841 renamed the CCS
Fund into the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund (CIS
Fund).23 This Fund was to be earmarked proportionately
among several develop-
_______________
16 Entitled An Act to Codify the Laws Dealing with the Development
of the Coconut and Other Palm Oil Industry and for Other Purposes.
17 Id., Article III, Section 9.
20 Entitled Revising Presidential Decree Numbered Nine Hundred
Sixty One.
21 Entitled An Act Suspending the Collection of the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy and Similar Levies and Providing in
Connection therewith Appropriate Measures to Cushion the Adverse

Effects thereof on the Coconut Farmers.
22 Entitled Prescribing a System of Financing the Socio-Economic and
Developmental Program for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers and
Accordingly Amending the Laws Thereon.

23 Id., Section 5.
56

Secretary
ment programs, such as coconut hybrid replanting

program, insurance coverage for the coconut farmers, and
scholarship program for their children.24
In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada
issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312,25 establishing a Sagip
Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate
income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the
creation of a sustainable local market demand for coconut
oil and other coconut products.26 The Executive Order
sought to establish a P1-billion fund by disposing of assets
acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities
supported by those funds.27 A committee was created to
manage the fund under this program.28 A majority vote of
its members could engage the services of a reputable
auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.29
At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O.
313,30 which created an irrevocable trust fund known as
the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund). This aimed to
provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the
coconut industry, and to other agri-related programs.31 The
shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Fund’s
initial capital.32 These shares were acquired with CII
Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the
outstanding capital stock of SMC.
_______________
24 Id., Section 1.
25 Entitled Establishing the Erap’s Sagip Niyugan Program as an
Emergency Measure to Alleviate the Plight of Coconut Farmers

Adversely Affected by Low Prices of Copra and Other Coconut Products,
and Providing Funds Therefor.
26 Id., Section 1.
27 Id., Section 4.
28 Id.
29 Id., Section 5.
30 Entitled Rationalizing the Use of the Coconut Levy Funds by
Constituting a “Fund For Assistance to Coconut Farmers” as an
Irrevocable Trust Fund and Creating a Coconut Trust Fund Committee

for the Management Thereof.
31 Id., Section 2.
32 Id., Section 3.
57
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 57

Secretary
E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department,

as the Trust Fund’s trustee bank. The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the
operations of the Trust Fund.33 The Committee would
designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as
often as needed but it may also request the Commission on
Audit (COA) to intervene.34
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, the Office
of the Solicitor General, and other government agencies to
exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033,
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr., et al., which was then pending before the
Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those
shares.35
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and
313.36 This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner
organizations and individuals brought the present action in
G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional. On
April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations
and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2
of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468
also for being unconstitutional.
The Issues Presented
The parties submit the following issues for adjudication:
_______________
33 Id., Section 6.
34 Id., Section 13.
35 Id., Section 14.
36 http://www.afrim.org.ph/Archives/2001/BusinessWorld/September/17/Estrada%20s%20EOs%20creating%20coco%20levy%20
trust%20fund%20challenged.txt (last accessed July 8, 2011).
58


Secretary
Procedurally –
1. Whether or not petitioners’ special civil actions of
certiorari under Rule 65 constituted the proper remedy for
their actions; and
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to
bring the same to court.
On the substance –
3. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds;
and
4. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article
III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d)
E.O. 313 are unconstitutional.
The Rulings of the Court
First. UCPB questions the propriety of the present

petitions for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on
the ground that there are no ongoing proceedings in any
tribunal or board or before a government official exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.37 UCPB
insists that the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with
respect to issues of constitutionality or validity of laws and
presidential orders.38
_______________
37 Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, 453 Phil. 586, 625; 405
SCRA 614, 626 (2003).
38 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement,
59
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 59

Secretary
But, as the Court previously held, where there are

serious allegations that a law has infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of
the Court to look into such allegations and, when
warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.39
Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has the
discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.40
Second. The Court has to uphold petitioners’ right to

institute these petitions. The petitioner organizations in
these cases represent coconut farmers on whom the burden
of the coco-levies attaches. It is also primarily for their
benefit that the levies were imposed.
The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the
petitions as taxpayers. The Court recognizes their right to
restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.41 This so-called
taxpayer’s suit is based on the theory that expenditure of
public funds for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.42
Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a
greater participation in the affairs of government. Indeed,
it provides for people's initiative, the right to information
on matters of public concern (including the right to know
the
_______________
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. x x x
(Emphasis ours)
39 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574; 272 SCRA 18, 47 (1997).
40 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 634; 338
SCRA 81, 101 (2000).
41 Phil. Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Mathay, 124 Phil. 890, 898; 18 SCRA
300, 306 (1966).
42 Tan v. Macapagal, 150 Phil. 778, 783; 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).
60

Secretary
state of health of their President), as well as the right to

file cases questioning the factual bases for the suspension
of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law. These provisions enlarge the people’s right in
the political as well as the judicial field. It grants them the
right to interfere in the affairs of government and
challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest.
Third. For some time, different and conflicting notions
had been formed as to the nature and ownership of the
coco-levy funds. The Court, however, finally put an end to
the dispute when it categorically ruled in Republic of the
Philippines v. COCOFED43 that these funds are not only
affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie
public funds. Prima facie means a fact presumed to be true
unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary.44
The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were
raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental
purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and
taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut
industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the

use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
treated them as public funds and the very laws governing
coconut levies recognize their public character.45
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy
funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for
public purpose.46 Taxes are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and property, levied by the
State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the
government and for all its
_______________
43 423 Phil. 735; 372 SCRA 462 (2001).
44 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1979), p. 1071.
45 Supra note 43, at p. 772; p. 488.
46 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193, January 24,
2012, 663 SCRA 514.
61
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 61

Secretary
public needs.47 Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed

pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276. The
funds were collected and managed by the PCA, an
independent government corporation directly under the
President.48 And, as the respondent public officials pointed
out, the pertinent laws used the term levy,49 which means
to tax,50 in describing the exaction.
_______________
47 Tax Principles and Remedies, Japar B. Dimaampao, (2nd ed., 2005),
p. 1; citing 1 Cooley 62.
48 Supra note 20, Article II, Section 1.
49 R.A. 6260 –
Section 8. The Coconut Investment Fund. There shall be
levied on the coconut farmer a sum equivalent to fifty-five
centavos (P0.55) on the first domestic sale of every one hundred
kilograms of copra, or its equivalent in terms of other coconut
products, for which he shall be issued a receipt which shall be
converted into shares of stock of the Company upon its
incorporation as a private entity in accordance with Section seven
hereof. x x x (Emphasis ours)
P.D. 276 –
1. x x x
(a) A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra
resecada or its equivalent in other coconut products, shall be
imposed on every first sale, in accordance with the mechanics
established under R.A. 6260, effective at the start of business hours
on August 10, 1973.
The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the
Philippine National Bank or any other government bank to the
account of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a
separate trust fund which shall not form part of the general fund of
the government. (Emphasis ours)
P.D. 582 –
Section 3-B. Coconut Industry Development Fund. x x x
c) x x x As the initial funds of the Coconut Industry Development
Fund, the Authority is hereby directed to pay to the Coconut Industry
Development Fund the amount of One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00) out of its collections of the coconut consumers
stabilization levy and thereafter the Authority shall pay to the said Fund
an amount equal to at least twenty centavos (P0.20) per
62

Secretary
Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and

P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the government’s
general funds but to provide means for the rehabilitation
and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut
industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be
within the police power of the State.51 The funds sought to
support the coconut industry, one of the main economic
backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits
for the coconut farmers and farm workers. The subject laws
are akin to the sugar liens imposed by Sec. 7(b) of P.D.
388,52 and the oil price stabilization funds under P.D.
1956,53 as amended by E.O. 137.54
Respondent UCPB suggests that the coco-levy funds are
closely similar to the Social Security System (SSS) funds,
which have been declared to be not public funds but
properties of the SSS members and held merely in trust by
the government.55 But the SSS Law56 collects premium
contributions.
_______________
kilogram of copra resecada or its equivalent out of its current
collections of the coconut consumers stabilization levy. In the event that
the coconut consumers stabilization levy is lifted, a permanent levy of
twenty centavos (P0.20) is thereafter automatically imposed on the first
sale of every kilogram of copra or its equivalent in terms of other coconut
products x x x. (Emphasis ours)
50 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1979), p. 816.
51 Republic of the Philippines v. COCOFED, supra note 43, at p. 765; p.
484, citing Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
92585, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 726, 756 and Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No.
99886, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703, 711.
52 Entitled Creating the Philippine Sugar Commission.
53 Entitled Imposing an Ad Valorem Tax on Certain Manufactured Oils
and Other Fuels; Bunker Fuel Oil and Diesel Fuel Oil; Revising the
Rates of Specific Tax thereon; Abolishing the Oil Industry Special Fund;
and for Other Purposes.
54 Entitled Expanding the Sources and Utilization of the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) by Amending Presidential Decree No. 1956.
55 Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission, 110

Phil. 616, 622; 1 SCRA 10, 16(1961).
56 Republic Act 1161.
63
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 63

Secretary
It does not collect taxes from members for a specific public

purpose. They pay contributions in exchange for insurance
protection and benefits like loans, medical or health
services, and retirement packages. The benefits accrue to
every SSS member, not to the public, in general.57
Furthermore, SSS members do not lose ownership of
their contributions. The government merely holds these in
trust, together with his employer’s contribution, to answer
for his future benefits.58 The coco-levy funds, on the other
hand, belong to the government and are subject to its
administration and disposition. Thus, these funds,
including its incomes, interests, proceeds, or profits, as well
as all its assets, properties, and shares of stocks procured
with such funds must be treated, used, administered, and
managed as public funds.59
Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds.
In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,60 the Court held that
the State collected stabilization fees from sugar millers,
planters, and producers for a special purpose: to finance
the growth and development of the sugar industry and all
its components. The fees were levied for a special purpose
and, therefore, constituted special fund when collected. Its
character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they
were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned
government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury. In
Osmeña v. Orbos,61 the Court held that the oil price
stabilization fund was a special fund mainly
_______________
57 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 147036-37), p. 362, Public Respondents’ Reply to
CommenT of UCPB.
58 Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, Samson S. Alcantara and
Samson B. Alcantara, Jr., (2004 ed., with 2007 Supplement), p. 982.
59 Republic of the Philippines v. COCOFED, supra note 43, at p. 776; p.
490, citing Executive Order 277, Directing the Mode of Treatment
Utilization, Administration and Management of the Coconut Levy Funds,
September 24, 1995.
60 242 Phil. 377; 158 SCRA 626 (1988).
61 Osmeña v. Orbos, supra note 51.
64

Secretary
because this was segregated from the general fund and

placed in what the law referred to as a trust account. Yet it
remained subject to COA scrutiny and review. The Court
finds no substantial distinction between these funds and
the coco-levy funds, except as to the industry they each
support.
Fourth. Petitioners in G.R. 147811 assert that Section
2 of P.D. 755 above is void and unconstitutional for
disregarding the public character of coco-levy funds. The
subject section provides:
“Section 2. Financial Assistance.—x x x and since the

operations, and activities of the Philippine Coconut Authority are
all in accord with the present social economic plans and programs
of the Government, all collections and levies which the Philippine
Coconut Authority is authorized to levy and collect such as but
not limited to the Coconut Consumers’ Stabilization Levy, and the
Coconut Industry Development Fund as prescribed by
Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not be considered or
construed, under any law or regulation, special and/or
fiduciary funds and do not form part of the general funds
of the national government within the contemplation of
Presidential Decree No. 711.” (Emphasis ours)
The Court has, however, already passed upon this

question in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines.62 It held as
unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for “effectively
authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of the CCS Fund to
pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire
UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with
UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS
Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized to
collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds
to be transferred to the general fund of the Government,
meaning they shall be deemed private funds.”
Identical provisions of subsequent presidential decrees
likewise declared coco-levy funds private properties of
coconut farmers. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961 reads:
_______________
62 Supra note 46.
65
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 65

Secretary
“Section 5. Exemptions.—The Coconut Consumers

Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund
as well as all disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the
coconut farmers as herein authorized shall not be construed or
interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or
fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the
national government within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711;
nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded

investment, or government share within the
contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized
for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by
them in their own private capacities.” (Emphasis ours)
Section 5 of P.D. 1468 basically reproduces the above

provision, thus—
“Section 5. Exemption.—The Coconut Consumers

Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund,
as well as all disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be
construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general
funds of the national government within the contemplation of
P.D. 711; nor as subsidy, donation, levy government funded
investment, or government share within the
contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized
for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by
them in their private capacities: Provided, however, That the
President may at any time authorize the Commission on Audit or
any other officer of the government to audit the business affairs,
administration, and condition of persons and entities who receive
subsidy for coconut-based consumer products x x x.” (Emphasis
ours)
Notably, the raising of money by levy on coconut farm

production, a form of taxation as already stated, began in
1971 for the purpose of developing the coconut industry
and promoting the interest of coconut farmers. The use of
the fund was expanded in 1973 to include the stabilization
of the domestic market for coconut-based consumer goods
and in 1974
66

Secretary
to divert part of the funds for obtaining direct benefit to

coconut farmers. After five years or in 1976, however, P.D.
961 declared the coco-levy funds private property of the
farmers. P.D. 1468 reiterated this declaration in 1978. But
neither presidential decree actually turned over possession
or control of the funds to the farmers in their private
capacity. The government continued to wield undiminished
authority over the management and disposition of those
funds.
In any event, such declaration is void. There is
ownership when a thing pertaining to a person is
completely subjected to his will in everything that is not
prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of
another.63 An owner is free to exercise all attributes of
ownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and
enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose or alienate the thing

owned.64 The owner is of course free to waive all or some of
these rights in favor of others. But in the case of the
coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively,
waive what have not been and could not be legally
imparted to them.
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961,
and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the
fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through
taxation. And since taxes could be exacted only for a public
purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of
individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct
group of persons.65
The Court of course grants that there is no hard-and-
fast rule for determining what constitutes public purpose.
It is an elastic concept that could be made to fit into
modern stan-
_______________
63 Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 183278, April 24, 2009, 586
SCRA 790, 796.
64 Id., at p. 797.
65 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006,
March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 510, citing Constitutional Law, Isagani
Cruz, (1998 ed.), p. 90.
67
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 67

Secretary
dards. Public purpose, for instance, is no longer restricted

to traditional government functions like building roads and
school houses or safeguarding public health and safety.
Public purpose has been construed as including the
promotion of social justice. Thus, public funds may be used
for relocating illegal settlers, building low-cost housing for
them, and financing both urban and agrarian reforms that
benefit certain poor individuals. Still, these uses relieve
volatile iniquities in society and, therefore, impact on
public order and welfare as a whole.
But the assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy
funds from the general funds of the government and
declared them private properties of coconut farmers, do not
appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose.
The levy on copra that farmers produce appears, in the first
place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base. The
concept of farmers-businessmen is incompatible with the
idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and
so should be beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their
earnings.
It would altogether be different of course if the laws
mentioned set apart a portion of the coco-levy fund for
improving the lives of destitute coconut farm owners or
workers for their social amelioration to establish a proper
government purpose. The support for the poor is generally

recognized as a public duty and has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.66 But the declarations do not distinguish between
wealthy coconut farmers and the impoverished ones. And
even if they did, the Government cannot just embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise.67 Consequently, such declarations
are void since they appropriate public funds for
_______________
66 Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA
508, 516.
67 Id.
68

Secretary
private purpose and, therefore, violate the citizens’ right to

substantive due process.68
On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund
“shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or
regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of
the general funds of the national government,” P.D.s 961
and 1468 seek to remove such fund from COA scrutiny.
This is also the fault of President Estrada’s E.O. 312
which deals with P1 billion to be generated out of the sale
of coco-fund acquired assets. Thus—
“Section 5. Audit of Fund and Submission of Report.—The

Committee, by a majority vote, shall engage the services of a
reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits of the
fund. It shall render a quarterly report on all pertinent
transactions and availments of the fund to the Office of the
President within the first three (3) working days of the succeeding
quarter.” (Emphasis ours)
E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision

governing the management and disposition of the Coconut
Trust Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC shares of
stock that the coco-fund acquired. Thus—
“Section 13. Accounting.—x x x

The Fund shall be audited annually or as often as
necessary by an external auditor designated by the
Committee. The Committee may also request the Commission
on Audit to conduct an audit of the Fund.” (Emphasis ours)
But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of

P.D.s 755, 961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and
313 that remove such funds and the assets acquired
through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate
Article IX-D, Section
_______________
68 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipality
of Tanauan, Leyte, 161 Phil. 591, 602; 69 SCRA 460, 466 (1976).
69
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 69

Secretary
2(1)69 of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the

COA the power and authority to examine uses of
government money and property. The cited P.D.s and E.O.s
also contravene Section 270 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the
Restructuring of the Commission on Audit), which has the
force of a statute.
_______________
69 Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and
(d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy
or equity x x x. (Emphasis ours)
70 Section 2. Jurisdiction of The Commission on Audit.—The
Authority and powers of the Commission on Audit shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing and accounting procedures,
systems, and controls, including inquiry into the utilization of resources
and operating performance, the keeping of the general accounts of the
Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto, the
examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to
those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable
capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts
and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction
extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the
Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-
governmental entities subsidized by the Government, those
funded by donations through the Government, those re-
70

Secretary
And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should

be shielded from COA review and audit. The PCA, which
implements the coco-levy laws and collects the coco-levy
funds, is a government-owned and controlled corporation
subject to COA review and audit.
E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity. Its title,
“Rationalizing the Use of the Coconut Levy Funds by
Constituting a ‘Fund for Assistance to Coconut Farmers’ as
an Irrevocable Trust Fund and Creating a Coconut Trust
Fund Committee for the Management thereof” tends to
mislead. Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund out of
the coco-levy funds to provide economic assistance to the
coconut farmers and, ultimately, benefit the coconut
industry.71 But on closer look, E.O. 313 strays from the
special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in
that it permits the use of coco-levy funds for improving
productivity in other food areas. Thus:
“Section 2. Purpose of the Fund.—The Fund shall be

established for the purpose of financing programs of assistance for
the benefit of the coconut farmers, the coconut industry, and
other agri-related programs intended to maximize food
productivity, develop business opportunities in the
countryside, provide livelihood alternatives, and promote
anti-poverty programs. (Emphasis ours)
xxxx
Section 9. Use and Disposition of the Trust Income.—The
Coconut Trust Fund Committee, on an annual basis, shall
determine and establish the amount comprising the Trust
Income. After such determination, the Committee shall earmark,
allocate and disburse the Trust Income for the following purposes,
namely:
xxxx
(d) Thirty percent (30%) of the Trust Income shall be
used to assist and fund agriculturally-related programs for
_______________
quired to pay levies or government share, and those partly funded by
the Government. (Emphasis ours)
71 Supra note 30, Whereas clauses.
71
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 71

the Government, as reasonably determined by the Trust Fund

Committee, implemented for the purpose of: (i) maximizing food
productivity in the agriculture areas of the country, (ii) enhancing
the upliftment and well-being of the living conditions of farmers
and agricultural workers, (iii) developing viable industries and
business opportunities in the countryside, (iv) providing
alternative means of livelihood to the direct dependents of
agriculture businesses and enterprises, and (v) providing financial
assistance and support to coconut farmers in times of economic
hardship due to extremely low prices of copra and other coconut
products, natural calamities, world market dislocation and

similar occurrences, including financial support to the ERAP’s
Sagip Niyugan Program established under Executive Order No.
312 dated November 3, 2000; x x x.” (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, E.O. 313 above runs counter to the

constitutional provision which directs that all money
collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only.72 Assisting other agriculturally-related programs is
way off the coco-fund’s objective of promoting the general
interests of the coconut industry and its farmers.
A final point, the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,73
Section 84(2),74 the first part by the previously mentioned
sections of
_______________
72 Supra note 38, Article VI, Section 29. x x x
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government. (Emphasis ours)
73 Entitled Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines.
74 Section 84. Disbursement of government funds.
xxxx
2. Trust funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or
depository except in fulfillment of the purpose for which the trust was
created or funds received, and upon authorization of the legislative body,
or head of any other agency of the government having
72

Secretary
E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and
Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313. E.O. 313 vests the power to
administer, manage, and supervise the operations and
disbursements of the Trust Fund it established (capitalized
with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a
Coconut Trust Fund Committee. Thus—
“Section 6. Creation of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee.

—A Committee is hereby created to administer, manage
and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund, chaired by
the President with ten (10) members, as follows:
(a) four (4) representatives from the government sector,
two of whom shall be the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform who shall act as Vice
Chairmen;
(b) four (4) representatives from coconut farmers’
organizations, one of whom shall come from a list of
nominees from the Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation Inc. (“COCOFED”);
(c) a representative from the CIIF; and

(d) a representative from a non-government organization
(NGO) involved in agricultural and rural development.
All decisions of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be
determined by a majority vote of all the members.
The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall perform the functions
and duties set forth in Section 7 hereof, with the skill, care,
prudence and diligence necessary under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity would
exercise.
The members of the Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall be
appointed by the President and shall hold office at his pleasure.
The Coconut Trust Fund Committee is authorized to hire
administrative, technical and/or support staff as may be required
to enable it to effectively perform its functions and
responsibilities. (Emphasis ours)
_______________
control thereof, and subject to pertinent budget law, rules and regulations.
73
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 73

Section 7. Functions and Responsibilities of the Committee.

—The Coconut Trust Fund Committee shall have the following
functions and responsibilities:
(a) set the investment policy of the Trust Fund;
(b) establish priorities for assistance giving preference to
small coconut farmers and farmworkers which shall be
reviewed periodically and revised as necessary in
accordance with changing conditions;
(c) receive, process and approve project proposals for
financing by the Trust Fund;
(d) decide on the use of the Trust Fund’s income or
net earnings including final action on applications
for assistance, grants and/or loans;
(e) avail of professional counsel and services by retaining
an investment and financial manager, if desired;
(f) formulate the rules and regulations governing
the allocation, utilization and disbursement of the
Fund; and
(g) perform such other acts and things as may be
necessary proper or conducive to attain the purposes of the
Fund.” (Emphasis ours)
Section 4 of E.O. 312 does essentially the same thing. It

vests the management and disposition of the assistance
fund generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired
assets into a Committee of five members. Thus, Section 4 of
E.O. 312 provides—
“Section 4. Funding.—Assets acquired through the coconut

levy funds or by entities financed by the coconut levy funds
identified by the President for appropriate disposal or sale, shall
be sold or disposed to generate a maximum fund of ONE
BILLION PESOS (P1,000,000,000.00) which shall be managed
by a Committee composed of a Chairman and four (4)

members to be appointed by the President whose term
shall be co-terminus with the Program. x x x” (Emphasis
ours)
74

Secretary
In effect, the above transfers the power to allocate, use,

and disburse coco-levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the
PCA and transferred the same, without legislative
authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the
Committees mentioned above. An executive order cannot
repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing
as a statute enacted by Congress.
UCPB invokes the principle of separability to save the
assailed laws from being struck down. The general rule is
that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion,
if susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may
stand and be enforced. When the parts of a statute,
however, are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other,
as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In
which case, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must consequently fall with them.75
But, given that the provisions of E.O.s 312 and 313,
which as already stated invalidly transferred powers over
the funds to two committees that President Estrada
created, the rest of their provisions became non-
operational. It is evident that President Estrada would not
have created the new funding programs if they were to be
managed by some other entity. Indeed, he made himself
Chairman of the Coconut Trust Fund and left to his
discretion the appointment of the members of the other
committee.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R.
147036-37, PARTLY GRANTS the petition in G.R. 147811,
and declares the following VOID:
_______________
75 Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, (5th ed., 2003), pp. 37-38.
75
VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 75

Secretary
a) E.O. 312, for being repugnant to Section 84(2)

of P.D. 1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the
Constitution; and
b) E.O. 313, for being in contravention of Section
84(2) of P.D. 1445, and Article IX-D, Section 2(1) and
Article VI, Section 29(3) of the Constitution.
The Court has previously declared Section 2 of P.D. 755
and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Velasco, Jr., Brion, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., No Part. I am a petitioner in G.R. 147036-
37.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., No part due to prior
participation in a related case.
Peralta, J., No Part due to prior participation in a
related case.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On Official Leave.
Petition in G.R. No. 147036-37 granted, while petition in

G.R. No. 147811 partly granted.
Notes.—For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites

must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and
in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is
committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act. In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that
contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a
party to the contract to challenge its validity. (Mamba vs.
Lara, 608 SCRA 149 [2009])
76

Secretary
The Court cannot reverse the decision of the

Sandiganbayan on the basis alone of judicial
pronouncements to the effect that the coconut levy funds
were prima facie public funds, but without any competent
evidence linking the acquisition of the block of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) shares by Cojuangco, et al. to the
coconut levy funds. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [First
Division], 648 SCRA 47 [2011])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2022 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

1 - Pambansang Koalisyong NG Mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa Sa Niyugan vs. Executive

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

1 - Pambansang Koalisyong NG Mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa Sa Niyugan vs. Executive

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9/5/22, 11:00 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 669

G.R. Nos. 147036-37. April 10, 2012.*

50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Legislator: REPRESENTATIVE LORETA ANN ROSALES;

G.R. No. 147811. April 10, 2012.*

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Where the issues raised

are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution,

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 51

Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at

recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public

—Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and

52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at

could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be

PETITIONS to declare unconstitutional certain

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 53

The Facts and the Case

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.)

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Industry Development Fund (CID Fund) to channel for the

Recommended by the Philippine Coconut Authority and Providing Funds

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 55

On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,16

Connection therewith Appropriate Measures to Cushion the Adverse

Developmental Program for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers and

Accordingly Amending the Laws Thereon.

56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ment programs, such as coconut hybrid replanting

Emergency Measure to Alleviate the Plight of Coconut Farmers

Constituting a “Fund For Assistance to Coconut Farmers” as an

Irrevocable Trust Fund and Creating a Coconut Trust Fund Committee

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 57

E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department,

The Issues Presented

The parties submit the following issues for adjudication:

58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manggagawa sa Niyugan (PKSMMN) vs. Executive

The Rulings of the Court

First. UCPB questions the propriety of the present

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 59

But, as the Court previously held, where there are

Second. The Court has to uphold petitioners’ right to

60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

state of health of their President), as well as the right to

industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 61

public needs.47 Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed

62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and

55 Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission, 110

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 63

It does not collect taxes from members for a specific public

64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

because this was segregated from the general fund and

“Section 2. Financial Assistance.—x x x and since the

The Court has, however, already passed upon this

VOL. 669, APRIL 10, 2012 65

“Section 5. Exemptions.—The Coconut Consumers

nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded

Section 5 of P.D. 1468 basically reproduces the above

“Section 5. Exemption.—The Coconut Consumers

Notably, the raising of money by levy on coconut farm

66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED