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G.R. No. L-23386 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PAMFILO ARTUZ
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SECOND DIVISION
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G.R. No. L-23386 May 26, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

PAMFILO
ARTUZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jose A. Ambrosio and Patrio C. Avendano for

appellant. chanrobles virtual law library

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, First Assistant Solicitor General

Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

It is a sad fate that every once in a while a person, peace-loving and law-
abiding, contrary to his wishes but unable to control events or to anticipate
what pugnacious and bellicose troublemakers may have in mind, is
 ChanRobles Special Lecture Series
compelled to resort to force in self-defense, in the course of which the

aggressor may suffer physical injuries or even death. So it did happen in
this case, resulting in a prosecution for murder of the accused Pamfilo Artuz,
now appellant. The lower court, mindful of the circumstances to be hereafter
narrated, did find that there was indeed an unlawful aggression and that
there was no provocation on his part. In view of its belief, however, that
there was lack of reasonable necessity for the means employed, it held that
there was incomplete self-defense. Accordingly, appellant was sentenced to
two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to
six years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. Nonetheless, fully
cognizant as it was that the fatal incident could not be ascribed to a criminal
intent on the part of appellant, it did allow his provisional release on liberty
while his appeal was being prosecuted. A vigorous case for the reversal of

the decision for acquittal was filed by his counsel, Attorney Estanislao A.

Fernandez, later appointed to this Court, but now retired. 1 The brief for the
People of the Philippines submitted by the then Solicitor General, now
Justice, Felix V. Makasiar, joined the plea for his acquittal. After a careful
examination of the evidence of record, we are Persuaded that self-defense
had indeed been shown as there was more than reasonable necessity for
the means employed. The conviction is set aside, and the appellant is
acquitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The facts of record were presented and appraised in the able brief for
appellant in their most favorable light from his standpoint, as was to be
expected. The cause of objectivity and impartiality may be better served by
setting forth the facts according to the brief of appellee, the People of the
Philippines. Thus: "Since appellant raises only a legal issue, he is deemed to
have accepted the finding of facts made by the trial court. The facts of the
case and the conclusions of the Court therefrom are as follows: `These facts
are proven: Leoncio Panganiban was the object of an assault perpetrated by
Dominador Rallonza and companions; Panganiban informed Artuz about the
incident and the latter immediately went down the house to report the
matter to the authorities. Panganiban and Rallonza met Pat. Amorosa and
while the three were walking they met Rallonza's group. A fight again
ensued between Panganiban and Dominador Rallonza. Artuz separated
Rallonza from Panganiban after which Rallonza rushed at Artuz with a
weapon in his hand. Rallonza and Artuz grappled for the weapon until Artuz
succeeded in grabbing it. After Artuz was in possession of the weapon * * *
and when Rallonza continued to rush at him, Artuz stabbed Rallonza first in
the lower chest and later twice at the back. Under the above facts, it cannot
be said that there was reasonable means employed by accused Artuz in
repelling the aggression of Rallonza. After Artuz had taken possession of the
weapon and Rallonza had nothing more in his hand, the menace or danger
to the life of the accused ceased or was greatly minimized. * * * Although
the claim of self-defense is not established by clear and convincing
evidence, the facts show that accused is at least entitled to an incomplete
self-defense which minimizes to a certain extent his criminal responsibility.
The Court does not give much weight and credit to the testimony of the
prosecuting witnesses tending to show that the stabbing of Rallonza was
done with treachery. As found by the Court it was the deceased who
commenced the unlawful aggression first against Leoncio Panganiban and
then to the herein accused and that accused did not give any provocation
for such aggression for undoubtedly it was Rallonza, who at that time was
under the influence of liquor, who gave the provocation for the incident.
These circumstances disprove the charge of murder; instead they show that
Artuz fought back to defend himself against Rallonza, but the means
employed by him were not reasonable and commensurate to the danger in
which he was placed at the time he became master of the situation. * * * .
2 chanrobles virtual law library

There was a manifestation of fealty to the creed that should animate the
prosecuting arm of the government when the then Solicitor General Felix V.
Makasiar, now a member of this Court as previously noted, after appraising
the above facts concluded that appellant had demonstrated that he was
entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. His acquittal is
therefore in order. As set forth at the outset, this Court is of the same
mind. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1. Appellee's brief analyzed both the contention of counsel for appellant and
the reasoning followed by the lower court in rejecting the claim of self-
defense. Thus: "It is the contention of appellant's counsel that after
appellant had wrested the weapon (tres cantos) from the deceased, the
struggle had not ceased, for the danger to the appellant still existed
because it was not impossible that the deceased could recover the weapon
and thereafter used it against appellant. It is argued that even after the
appellant had wrested the weapon from the deceased, the latter continued
to advance toward him despite the fact that he was swinging the weapon
from left to right and warning the deceased not to approach him. The
deceased must have been unreasonably emboldened by the alcohol he had
taken that, unheeding of the warnings given by the appellant, he rushed at
the latter, in the course of which he was hit by the weapon on the chest. In
the continuing struggle, the deceased was also hit twice at the back. With
such as a background, the trial court concluded that, even assuming that
the first wound on the chest was inflicted in self- defense, the wounds
subsequently inflicted at the back of the deceased was not reasonably
demanded by the circumstances 'since the menace or danger to the life of

the accused ceased or was greatly minimized." 3 Appellee's brief then

referred to what it characterized as revealing incidents: "1. That the
deceased and his gang mauled up Leoncio Panganiban for no reason at all
than the apparent thrill they get from such unwarranted assaults (p. 3,
t.s.n., Dec. 12, 1962); 2. That the deceased and his gang were notorious for
these sadistic activities in that vicinity (p. 2, t.s.n., Aug. 26, 1963); 3. That
the deceased and his gang defied police authority, in the person of
policeman Urbano Amorosa, who tried to stop them from assaulting Leoncio
Panganiban when they, instead, rushed at the latter evidently because they
were irked when Leoncio Panganiban pointed them to the policeman as his
assailants (pp. 6-7, t.s.n.. Feb. 5, 1963; p. 21. t.s.n., Feb. 28, 1962); 4.
That in the ensuing free-for-all, the deceased first wounded the appellant on
the knee with the death weapon and when the latter wrested possession
thereof, the deceased still pressed the attack until he was stabbed on the
chest (p. 7, t.s.n., Feb. 5, 1963; p. 10, t.s.n., Sept. 2, 1963); 5. That the
struggle continued on without let-up for about a minute longer when the
deceased still [persisting in his efforts to] recover the death weapon, was
stabbed on the back and thereafter he fell down to the ground (p. 16, t.s.n.,

Feb. 28, 1962) * * *." 4 Its conclusion, with which we are in agreement, is

that "appellant is entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. 5 chanrobles virtual law

library

2. The brief for the appellee relied on People v. Pancho. 6 It was shown in
that case that a controversy having arisen between the accused and the
deceased who was at fault, the latter seized his bolo and attacked the
former. There was a struggle, with the accused having succeeded in getting
the weapon away from his assailant who, however, tried to recover the
weapon. Thereupon, the accused retreated a little, freed his right hand from
the grasp of his opponent, and inflicted the wounds, from the effects of
 which the deceased died four days later. This Court, speaking through
Justice Street, holding that the means employed was reasonable, pointed
out: "Under these circumstances it is but natural that the appellant should
have used the same weapon to defend himself, and more properly so
because his antagonist was larger and stronger than himself. In dealing with
situations of this kind some allowance must be made for the excitement
naturally incident to the physical contest; and it cannot fairly be said that in
using the bolo as he did, the appellant passed beyond what was reasonably
necessary for his own defense. It might very well have happened that the
deceased would have recovered the bolo, and, enraged as he then was, the
most probable thing is that he himself would have struck the appellant with
the weapon, inflicting perhaps a fatal injury, or injuries, upon him. In the
light of these considerations, we are of the opinion that the appellant should

be acquitted." 7 The brief for the appellant relied on the first Philippine case

in point, United States v. Patala, 8 decided in 1901, and thereafter United

States v. Molina, 9 decided in 1911. The opinions in both cases came from
Justice Mapa. In United States v. Patala, it was shown that the accused,
who was a member of the crew in an inter-island vessel, was performing his
task cleaning the fish to be served the passengers when all of a sudden the
cook, believing that some fish were missing, slapped and kicked him. The
accused ran away; he was pursued and attacked with a knife. Then, as
stated by Justice Mapa, "taking advantage of some favorable chance during
the struggle, [he] succeeded in wresting the knife from the deceased and
inflicted upon him a wound in the left side, from the result of which he died

a few hours later." 10 It was then set forth: "The aggression on the part of
the deceased was in every respect unjustified, and the defendant had a
perfect right to repel the attack in the most adequate form within his power

under the critical circumstances of a sudden assault." 11 In United States v.

Molina 12 the evidence disclosed that the accused went to the house of the
deceased hoping to settle amicably a dispute that arose when his son, who
was living with the latter's daughter as his common-law wife, left her. His
mission was unsuccessful, for upon reaching that place, the accused was
insulted and then assaulted with a bolo. While he had no weapon with him,
he fought with the aggressor and was able to get hold of the bolo. With it,
he inflicted the wounds which proved fatal. In holding that the means was
reasonable and that the plea of self-defense was entitled to acceptance,
Justice Mapa emphasized: "Considering the decidedly aggressive attitude of
the deceased from the commencement of this struggle until its termination,
it can not be said that there was a cessation of the danger for the accused,
even for a single instant. If, through the various incidents of the struggle, or
any favorable accident whatever, the deceased had succeeded in recovering
the bolo or in possessing himself of the hatchet, as he attempted to do to
the last, the result of the combat would probably have been very different;
perhaps the accused, instead of being the slayer, would himself have been
killed. The accused certainly was not duty-bound to expose himself to such
a contingency, and while the Struggle continued, and, consequently, the

danger to his person or to his life subsisted, he had a perfect and

indisputable right to repel such danger by wounding his adversary, if
necessary, as from the circumstances of the case it was, and even to disable
him completely so that he could not continue the assault. In our opinion, the
means employed by the accused were rationally necessary to repel the
assault, and as the latter was in all respects unlawful and was not preceded
by any provocation of any kind on the part of the accused himself, we
declare the said accused to be exempt from criminal liability, in accordance

with the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code." 13 chanrobles virtual law library
3. It may not be amiss to point out that in addition to justice Mapa, the
other two in the illustrious group of Filipino jurists who were first appointed
to this Court, Chief Justice Arellano himself and Justice Torres, viewed the

matter similarly. In United States v. Gesmundo, 14 a 1907 decision, the

accused used a pen-knife against the deceased, who held him by the neck.
As succinctly put by Chief Justice Arellano: "Death resulted from the wounds
inflicted. The characteristic elements of self-defense are here well defined,
and anyone acting under such circumstances is relieved from criminal

responsibility." 15 In United States v. Paras, 16 promulgated that same year,

the accused used a revolver after having been assaulted and knocked down
by the deceased. With his nose bleeding and while still being kicked by the
aggressor, he fired several shots at his assailant. Again, this Court held that
that was a proper case of self-defense, the means employed being
reasonable, the essential point being "that without any known cause or
reason, Florencio Paras, in the darkness of night, was assaulted in a brutal
manner by James Reed, who knocked him down, and the assaulted party in
self-defense fired at his assailant several shots with the revolver he carried

in his hand." 17It was further stated by Justice Torres: "It is reasonable to
believe that the accused, when he defended himself by shooting his
assailant, did not exceed his rights in his defense or employ unnecessary
means to repel an attack already commenced in a cruel and violent manner
or to prevent its continuation, because from the suddenness of the attack,
the end thereof, without risk to his person, could not be assured. It would
not be proper or reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a
less deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which, without any reason
whatever, He was placed, and being attacked by a person larger and
stronger than himself, there was nothing more natural than to have made
use of the weapon he held, in order to defend himself; anyone, upon being
assaulted in a similar manner, would have acted likewise. In the natural
order of things, following the instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled
to resort to a proper defense; an impossibility can not be demanded of the
injured person when it can not be affirmed that he could have done less
than he did in defending himself by shooting at his assailant who had

maltreated him and knocked him down." 18 chanrobles virtual law library

4. It would thus appear that the lower court was unduly strict in its
appreciation of the situation that confronted appellant. It was not for him a
matter that he could, with calmness and sobriety, objectively weigh. He was
attacked by an assailant intent on mayhem and possibly worse. He had
already been wounded; his life was in danger. The aggressor in addition was
further emboldened by his gang, rowdy elements unmindful of, if not taking
pride in, the injury they could inflict on peaceful citizens. It was the
assailant likewise who had the weapon. Appellant had the good fortune of
being able to take it away from him. That ought to have given pause to the
former. It did not. The peril then to appellant's life, actual and imminent,
continued. He had in his hand the only means of self-defense. He did
brandish it to warn the deceased. The response was negative. What else
was there left then for appellant except to act exactly as he did? It would be
to disregard the counsel of realism and to rely on the conjectural if on the
above facts he would be denied exculpation. The test of rationality is not
what a man should do under normal circumstances and with time for cool
reflection present. It is rather how an individual in such dire situation, with
the grim prospect of the loss of life, would react. The law wisely takes into
consideration the well-nigh irresistible force of the instinct of self-
preservation. This Court, from the previously cited case of United States v.

Patala 19 promulgated in 1901, to People v. Boholts-Caballero 20 a 1974

decision, has been steadfast and unwavering, in its adherence to such a test
of rationality. 21 There is no justification for a departure from such a norm.
The appellant is entitled to acquittal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of February 26, 1964 finding
the accused guilty of homicide with the attendant mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense is reversed and the
accused is acquitted. His bond for provisional liberty is ordered cancelled.
With costs de oficio.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1 He was assisted by Attorneys Jose A. Ambrosio and Patrio C. Avendano. chanrobles virtual law library

2 Brief for the Appellee, 24. chanrobles virtual law library

3 Ibid, 5-6. chanrobles virtual law library

4 Ibid, 6-7. chanrobles virtual law library

5 Ibid, 7.
chanrobles virtual law library

6 56 Phil. 516 (1932). chanrobles virtual law library

7 Ibid, 519. chanrobles virtual law library

8 2 Phil. 752. chanrobles virtual law library

9 19 Phil. 227. chanrobles virtual law library

10 2 Phil. 752, 756. chanrobles virtual law library

11 Ibid, 756. chanrobles virtual law library

12 19 Phil. 227. chanrobles virtual law library

13 Ibid, 232. The brief for the appellant likewise cited People v. Rabandaban (85 Phil. 636.

[1950]),a parricide case, the facts of which are similar, the wife getting hold of a bolo and

wounding the husband, who was then able to take it away from her and with it stabbed her

in the breast. He was acquitted of parricide, as it was a legitimate case of self-defense, the

means employed being necessary. chanrobles virtual law library

14 9 Phil. 160. chanrobles virtual law library

15 Ibid, 161. chanrobles virtual law library

16 9 Phil. 367. chanrobles virtual law library

17 Ibid, 369. chanrobles virtual law library

18 Ibid, 369-370. chanrobles virtual law library

19 2 Phil. 752. chanrobles virtual law library

20 L-23249, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180. chanrobles virtual law library

21 Other cases that may be cited are United States v. Laurel, 22 Phil. 252 (1912); United

States v. Patoto; 28 Phil. 535 (1914); United States v. Macasaet, 35 Phil. 226 (1916);

United states v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922); People vs. Tembrevilla, 44 Phil. 517 (1923).

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