SESSION 4

SESSION 4
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Chapter II: The Lawyer and the Legal Profession
CANON 7 - Uphold the Dignity and Integrity of the Profession
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6397
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively.
Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out
of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out
the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: September 17, 1971
Rule 139-A, Sections 9-10
RULE 139-A
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12

of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In Re: Edilion
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board
of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case
No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial
A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the
IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted
the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to
the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February
23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint
reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show

that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are
in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of
Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance
with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court
the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in
par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of
the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule,
which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions

of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in

these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body

to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons
whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of

the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void
and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name
from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case
before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the
Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al.,
Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must

belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment
of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding

considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon
the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of
the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an
officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the
holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through
Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York,
291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its
Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines
in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential
Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations
of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing
public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim
goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of
Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power
to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act
(Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the
Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice
of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were
(and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish
to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal

with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power
to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence,
Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that
the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a

member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such
as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation
of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that
the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of
Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment
ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The
power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend
upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this
court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of
justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating
to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the
duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant
task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as
here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and
to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is
itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration
of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly
vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that

the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion,

Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Adopted in the Supreme Court's Resolution, promulgated on January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration
of the Bar of the Philippines.
2 114 A.L.R. 101.
3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar Integration, cited in the Report of the
Commission Bar Integration on the Integration of the Philippine Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see also Supreme Court
Resolution of January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.
4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114; Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d
902; Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280: In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P.
665; Commonwealth ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d 53; Ayres vs. Hadaway 303 Mich.
589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195; Petition for Integration of
Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of
Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 291;
Baker vs. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla, 505, 95
P. 2d 113; State ex rel. Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs. Third District Committee
of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, approved on September 17,1971.
6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop
vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S.
Ct. 1826; Railways Employes' Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76 S. Ct. 714.
7 Diokno, Jose W., "Bar Integration — A Sword and a Shield for Justice" (Manor Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.
8 Fellers James, "Integration of the Bar — Aloha!", Journal of the Am. Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 11
(1964) p. 256. 9 Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820,
6 L, ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
9. Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis., 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6L. ed. 2d
1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs. State Bar of California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543;
Carpenter vs. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 SO. 2d 398; In re
Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858, In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d
643; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P. 623.
11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In re Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887;
Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P.
291; In re Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State
Bar of Oklahoma vs. McGhnee 148 Okla, 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282,
298 P. 623; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
The following words of Justice Harlan are opposite: "The objection would make every Governmental
exaction the material of a 'free speech' issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would
carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to
thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by
his conscience as irreligious or immoral The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government." (Concurring opinion of Harlan, J, joined by
Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367
U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 21191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J. with Branders and Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton
vs. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)
13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.
14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.

A.C. No. 4749 January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a letter-complaint dated February 8, 1997 to this Court.
He alleged that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for a number of years had not indicated the proper Professional
Tax Receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Official Receipt Numbers and data (date and
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated "IBP Rizal 259060," but he had been using this
for at least three years already. This matter was being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies a that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law." In his comment, Atty. Llamas claimed that since 1992, he publicly made it clear in his Income
Tax Return that he had only a limited practice of law and his principal occupation is farming. And being a
senior citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 in the payment of
taxes. Thus, he honestly believed in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption.
Nonetheless, despite such honest belief, he was ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.
The Court ruled that respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4, grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues. Respondent's failure
to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merited the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and
plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court believed that the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, was appropriate.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP); MEMBERSHIP DUES; PAYMENT IS
REQUIRED TO LIMITED PRACTICE. — Respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying
his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7432; SENIOR CITIZENS EXEMPTION
FROM PAYMENT OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION
DUES ARE NOT INCLUDED THEREIN. — While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable
income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY;

VIOLATED BY MISREPRESENTATION OF LAWYER TO PUBLIC AND COURTS THAT HE HAS PAID HIS
IBP DUES. — By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10 — A LAWYER
OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY; MITIGATED BY LAWYER'S ADVANCED AGE, EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO PAY
HIS IBP DUES AND PLEA FOR MORE TEMPERATE APPLICATION OF LAW. — Respondent's failure
to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to
pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one
year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership

dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman

M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate

sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years
now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" but he has been using this for at least
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings
in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case
No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B
— "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc.
No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of

Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-
G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law." There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10
which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate

action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar
Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes,
he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of
an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy
furnishing some of these courts). cdtai
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas,

as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court

Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October
28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying
the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,

November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at
the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name,
address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of
the order, 2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the
then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R.
Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees
up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten
days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his commentmemorandum, dated
June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995,
1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is
automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an

admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled
to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in

good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of
Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787
was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been

delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In
fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which
he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan,
Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment
by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In
fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted
upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the

exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at
any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and
surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as
an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such
dues despite his candor and honest belief in all good faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting

and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent
moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the
Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering
respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's nonindication of
the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B"
and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal
259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment
of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by

respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In
fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he
alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice
of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP
O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his
actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number
for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is
only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as
a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While
it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment
of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby

misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view
of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for
a more temperate application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever
is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 4-9.

2. Id., p. 11.
3. Id., p. 13.
4. Records, pp. 35-42.
5. Id., pp. 39-40.
6. Records, p. 57.
7. Rollo, p. 38.
8. Comment-Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 40-41.
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION

FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment
of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the
years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961,
he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then
migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the
year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he
was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits
the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of
annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules
of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld
as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy
of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in
defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent,
that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership.
It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also
alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals
for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the
Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from
payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is

questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they
are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also
posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status
and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal
from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of
law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the
inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from
payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law
that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working
abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,

as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially
a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his
shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of

the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar8 - which power
required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the
Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean
that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while

tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose
a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law
is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The
public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the
slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of
the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in

the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have
informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before
he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and
his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors
is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and
the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner
is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on
one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not
here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power
of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right
but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
fresponsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is

DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will
merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 1.
2
Rollo, p. 5.
3
Rollo, pp. 12-16.
4
Rollo, pp. 18-25.
5
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554, 562.
6
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 25.
7
Ibid., citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S.
820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
8
Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution.
9
Appendix D, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Martin, Ruperto G., p. 440.
10
Supra, note 5, pp. 567-568.
11
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. M.A. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 19
December 1980, 101 SCRA 612, 617.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar.
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian

Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14
February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted

marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro
of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had
finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in
1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for
them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband
and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the
Bar. In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the
examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting
Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out
his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good
moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he
became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the
Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7
June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p.
6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October
1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he
could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar
examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having
indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to
my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with
the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that
he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
"Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was
Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose
out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining
from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No.
78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this

time praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with
me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our
marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married

in his application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted
to the Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing
of the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the
comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for
he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family,
friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw
my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated

and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent
after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was
grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not
love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was
actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the
celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer,
and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were
not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant
not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him,
he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing
you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According
to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on
the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it
is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant
had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his
studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from
the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that
the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the
same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He
could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as
husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly
believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General
submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated
from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and
to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent
and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the
latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his
marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant,
we find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently
established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar
Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact
made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule
7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission
to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified
him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of
good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring

his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to
keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the
Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts
absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his
marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the
requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character
under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's
official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various

pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and
deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an
"Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally
married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he
denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21)
contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that
he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of
Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this
Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars.
3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to

Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage
and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the
marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to
be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this
case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was
"not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned

letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides
with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from
the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the
Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent
had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish
to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he
would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-
pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001
thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No.
2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been
lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as
an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not

only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda,
Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr.
Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers
of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and

unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who
shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of
any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or
other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
A.C. No. 10179 March 4, 2014

(Formerly CBD 11-2985)
BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of

his oath to obey the laws. To accord with the canon of professional
responsibility that requires him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes, he thereby becomes
administratively liable for gross misconduct.
Antecedents
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty.

William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila. After several calls and personal interactions between them, Ong
and Atty. Delos Santos became friends.1 In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos
Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need
of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty.
Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients.
Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos
Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s
Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.2 However, the check
was dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account was
closed.3 Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and
demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him.4 When efforts to
collect remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos.5 Ong also brought
this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.
Findings and Recommendation

of the IBP Bar Commissioner
In his Commissioner’s Report,6 IBP Bar Commissioner Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated
that Ong had sufficiently established the existence of the dishonored check; and
that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer despite notice, and did not also
present contrary evidence.7 He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos be held
liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two years, plus the return of the amount of P100,000.00 to the
complainant,8 be meted on Atty. Delos Santos in view of an earlier disbarment case
brought against him (Lucman v. Atty. Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253).
Resolution No. XX-2013-253
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-
253 adopting and approving the findings of IBP Commissioner Dela Rama, Jr.,9 to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent
violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. William F. Delos Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years and ORDERED to RETURN the amount of One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant with legal interest within
thirty days from receipt of notice.
Issue
By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Ruling
We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the recommended penalty.
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to
maintain his good moral character. In this regard, good moral character is not only
a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a
continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the
Philippine Bar.10 The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent,
honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose
confidence.11 Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.12
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the
banking system and the legitimate public checking account users.13 The gravamen
of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, according to
Lozano v. Martinez,14 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any
check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious
and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit,
because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to
be abated. The Court has observed in Lozano v. Martinez:
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.15 xxx
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and
coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed
to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of
the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to
public interest and public order.16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that
enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for
granted the express commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer
an enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus:
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness
expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his
personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety,
and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as
officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times
in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear
to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private
capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court. 18
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His
being a lawyer invested him – whether he was acting as such or in a
non- professional capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good
faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others. There is no
question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his
profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional
capacity.19 His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of
the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with
others.20
Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious
question not only his personal integrity but also the integrity of the entire
Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos Santos’ request
for encashment of the check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of the
Legal Profession. The following excerpts from Ong’s testimony bear this out, to
wit:
COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you were issued a bounced check
by the respondent?
MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him money because actually he was
not even my friend. He was just referred to me. The reason why I felt at ease to
loan him money was because the sheriff told me that abogado eto. It is his license
that would be at stake that’s why I lent him the money.21
x x x xCOMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are saying is that you felt
betrayed when the lawyer issued a bounced check in your favor.
MR. ONG
Yes, Commissioner.
COMM. DELA RAMA:
Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?
MR. ONG
They uphold the law, they know the law. He should not have issued the check if
you know it cannot be funded because actually I have many lawyer friend[s] and
I have always high regard for lawyers.22
Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the
law and to be circumspect in all his dealings with the public. Any
transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the
Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that he was in good
financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the
contrary was true manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving
a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless post-dated check.
Such actuation did not speak well of him as a member of the Bar.
Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting

appropriate administrative sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging
him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was already dismissed, and that
he already repaid to Ong the full amount of P100,000.00,23 both of which are
treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for a period
of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to suspension from the practice
of law to six months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.24
ACCORDINGLY, the Court PRONOUNCES respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F.
DELOS SANTOS GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and,
accordingly, SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD
OF SIX MONTHS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a stern warning that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Delos Santos' personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
* Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1644 dated February 25, 2014.
1 Rollo, pp. 2-3.
2 Id. at 3.
3 Id. at 6.
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id. at 4.
6 Id. at 55-60.
7 Id. at 56.
8 Id. at 55-56.
9 Id. at 54.
10 Manaois v. Deciembre, Adm. Case No. 5364, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 359, 363-364; Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla,
Adm. Case No. 3637, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 138, 145; Narag v. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451,
463.
11 Sebastian v. Bajar, A.C. No. 3731, September 7, 2007, 532 SCRA 435, 448.
12 Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 32, 45;
Grande v. De Silva, A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003, 407 SCRA 310, 313.
13 Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA 471, 478.
14 G.R. No. L-63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323, 338.
15 Id. at 340.
16 Santos-Tan v. Robiso, A.C. No. 6383, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 556, 564.
17 A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 1.
18 Id. at 17-18
19 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang, A.C. No. 5700, January 30, 2006, 480 SCRA 512, 518.
20 Fernandez v. Cabrera III, A.C. No. 5623, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 1, 5.
21 Rollo, p. 45.
22 Id. at 47.
23 Id. at 39-43.
profession.
A.C. No. 5179 May 31, 2016
DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against

respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on December 10, 1999.2
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle
sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent
alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped
at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?")
Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then left.4
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of
respondent's car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was Atty.
Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del Norte.6
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and

humiliated." Respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of
7
office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross

misconduct. 8
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's

Affidavit, 10 and a letter11 dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita E.
Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte
Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped complainant
and caused him great humiliation. 12 Thus, respondent should be administratively
penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in
Surigao City, committed by Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a
tricycle driver, causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that such
conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official. Considering the nature and
purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted that appropriate action be taken
on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse
of authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the
Municipal Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures
of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.14 In his
Comment, 15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the
incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to school. 16 He
further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle
to bump the fender of respondent's car.17 When respondent alighted from his car
to check the damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly
manner. 18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself. 19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against his
son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage
and if they should wait for a traffic officer.20 Both parties agreed that they were
both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch. 21 No traffic
officer was present during the incident.22
Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the
subject of attacks on radio programs by the Provincial Governor's
allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver.23 He alleged that
complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial
Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was
unknown to complainant.24 Respondent was identified with those who
politically opposed the Provincial Governor.25
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might
have arisen out of the incident during the conciliation proceedings before the
Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao City. 26 During
the proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed complainant because of fear
that complainant was carrying a weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On
the other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent to check if
there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part of the settlement, respondent
agreed to no longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle
to his car.29
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification30 dated October 27, 2006
of the Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that the case had already been
mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the
parties.31
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.32
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the
Certification from Barangay Washington, Surigao City attesting that the case
between the parties had already been settled. 34
Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason

why the complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory
Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.36
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent

appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case exparte.38
In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the

penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for
misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for

the suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of law for a period of
sixty ( 60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner
that tends to discredit the legal profession. 40 (Emphasis in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was

indeed a slapping incident.41 The slapping incident was witnessed by one
Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit
attached to complainant's complaint;42 and (2) the signatures on the League of
Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed that
respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be
held administratively liable.43
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
issued the Resolution 44 adopting and approving with modification Commissioner
De La Rama's recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A
"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of
Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous
manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty
(30) days.45 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August 14,

2008 Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Board of
Governors in the Resolution47 dated March 22, 2014.
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held
administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.
Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident

happened.48 He stresses complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack of
participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is
politically motivated.49
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of
disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with baseless
allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers
only if allegations of misconduct are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to be
innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption that
his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath.51 Thus, the burden of proof still
rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.52
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of

proof is preponderance of evidence, 53 or evidence that is superior,
more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."54
In this case, complainant discharged this burden.
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors also adopted/found that the
slapping incident actually occurred. 55
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed
and notarized Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the
signed and notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide present during the incident. It was
even the traffic aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate number.58
In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De La

Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the
people's faith in the legal profession eroded"60 because of respondent's act of
slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened

complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the
political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility and
motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature
of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of
arrogance.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the

public is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the
profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance
of and harassment committed by its officers.
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the
face hints of a character that disregards the human dignity of
another. Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?" ("Do you
not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession
as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by

perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As
officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the
public, not to bully them to submission.
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has the
power to impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct
in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain
officers of the court. 63
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against

lawyers are sui generis. 64 They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not
a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of public
interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the
privileges of being a court officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:65
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 66
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are

mere witnesses. They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the
investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that are important
in disciplinary proceedings. 67
Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are
ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have
violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as

attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Footnotes
* On official business.
**
On official business.
*** On official leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 1-7.
2 Id. at 121.
3
Id.
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id. at 121.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 5.
9 Id. at 9.
10
Id. at 10.
11 Id. at 21-23.
12 Id.at 21.
13
Id. Complainant's name is spelled in his Affidavit is "Dionnie" (Id. at 7).
14 Id. at 22-23.
15 Id. at 43-45.
16 Id.
17
Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20
Id.
21 Id. at 43-44.
22 Id. at 44.
23 Id.
24
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28
Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 49.
31
Id. at 44 and 49.
32 Id. at 52.
33 Id. at 97, Order dated July 20, 2007.
34 Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37 Id. at 101, Integrated Bar of the Philippines Order.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 121-128.
40
Id. at 128.
41 Id. at 124.
42
Id.
43 Id. at 125.
44 Id. at 120.
45 Id.
46
Id. at 139-142, Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2008.
47
Id. at 153.
48 Id. at 43, Comment.
49 Id. at 44.
50 See Ferancullo v. Atty. Ferancullo, Jr., 538 Phil. 501, 511 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
51 Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., 678 Phil. 5 88, 599-600 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; In Re: Atty. Felizardo M De Guzman, 154 Phil.
127, 133 (1974) [Per J. Munoz Palma, First Division]; In Re: De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554, 554-555 and 558-559 (1939) [Per J.
Laurel, En Banc,]; In Re: Atty. Eusebio Tionko, 43 Phil. 191, 191 and 194 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc,]; Acosta v. Serrano, 166 Phil.
257, 262 (1977) [Per J. Bernardo, Second Division].
52 Atty. Solidon v. Atty. Macalalad, 627 Phil. 284, 289 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
53 Id.
54 Guevarra v. Eala, 555 Phil. 713, 725 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
55 Rollo, p. 124, Commissioner's Report.
56 Id. at 9.
57 Id. at 20.
58 Id. at 4.
59 Id. at 126.
60 Id. at 127.
61 Id.
62 Rural Bank ofSilay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
63 Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr., 392 Phil. 394, 402 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
64 Ylaya v. Gacott, 702 Phil. 390, 406 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
65 Ylaya v. Gacott, 702 Phil. 390 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
66
Id. at 407.
67 Id.
profession.
A.C. 59000, April 10, 2019
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO

P. CO UNTIAN, JR.
RESOLUTION
J. REYES, JR., J.:
Subject of this Resolution is an Anonymous Complaint[1] dated May 14, 2002

against Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. (respondent) for his alleged sexual
harassment of students of Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City (Xavier).
The May 14, 2002 Complaint requested the Court to investigate the alleged sexual
harassments that respondent had committed against students of Xavier,
particularly Antoinette Toyco (Toyco), Christina Sagarbarria (Sagarbarria) and Lea
Dal (Dal). The complaint was written in the local dialect and made by an
individual identifying himself or herself only as "law practitioner." In a September
26, 2002 Letter,[2] the "law practitioner" sent copies of the complaint-affidavits[3] of
the victims of sexual harassment and the Resolution of the Committee on Decorum
and Investigation (Committee on Decorum).
Toyco claimed that respondent initially expressed amorous interest when he sent
her flowers anonymously through another law student. She stated that thereafter,
respondent would often text her through the phone of another law student. Toyco
noted eventually that respondent texted her through his own phone where he
would send romantic messages, poems, love notes and sweet nothings. She said
that respondent also invited her to go to Camiguin with another law student but
she turned it down. Toyco explained that while she was never sexually assaulted,
respondent's unwelcome advances made her feel degraded as she could not easily
ignore respondent for fear of reprisal.
On the other hand, Sagarbarria narrated that respondent showed her a

photograph revealing only the face of a woman and asked her if she knew who
the woman in the picture was. After she realized that the woman in the picture
looked like her, respondent revealed the entire photograph revealing a naked
woman and teased her within hearing distance of other law students. Sagarbarria
denied that she was the woman because she had a distinctive mark on her back
for the past six years. She averred that the incident caused her depression, fearing
what other law students may think of her. Sagarbarria highlighted that she was
unable to participate in a scheduled moot court competition because she broke
down in the middle of practice and cried uncontrollably.
Meanwhile, Dal recounted that in one of her recitations during respondent's class,
she clarified a question propounded to her saying "Sir, come again?" Respondent
retorted "What? You want me to come again? I have not come the first time and
don't you know that it took me five minutes to come, and you want me to come
again?" She later learned that respondent would narrate the said incident to almost
all of his classes. Dal felt offended that she was subjected to such sexually charged
language and the fact that her embarrassment was retold in other classes.
In its September 5, 2002 Resolution,[4] the Committee on Decorum recommended

that respondent's teaching contract not be renewed on account of the accusations
of sexual harassment against him. It explained that respondent was guilty of
violating Xavier's anti-sexual harassment guidelines. The Committee on Decorum
noted that respondent's unwanted sexual advances or innuendos caused distress
to the complaining students as it created a hostile or offensive environment.
Respondent's Position
Respondent lamented that the complaints for sexual harassment was made by
disgruntled students who failed their classes for the 2001-2002 school year as
manifested by the fact that the incidents happened years apart but the complaints
were made all at the same time.
Respondent denied sending flowers and text messages with romantic undertones
to Toyco. He highlighted that it was in fact her who gave him gifts during
Valentine's Day in 2002. Respondent added that he texting "luv u" and "miss u" are
friendly text messages sent without malice especially considering that they were
misspelled.
As to Sagarbarria's allegations, respondent countered that he confiscated the

photograph from another student and jokingly showed it to her in the spirit of
their open and uninhibited relationship. He noted that Sagarbarria is his niece and
they were previously close as they would oftentimes exchange discussions on
sensitive and mature matters as adults without any malice. Respondent claimed
that she was never humiliated when he showed her the photograph because she
even gamely lowered down her pants to prove that it was not her in the
photograph because unlike her, the naked woman did not have any tattoo.
On the other hand, respondent explained that Dal answered disrespectfully when
she was called for recitation uttering "Come again?" He posited that to inject
humor during class, he responded "Never use slang language in my class because
you might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again?' It takes me
several minutes before I come again." Respondent expounded that the joke was
directed at himself and that Dal never showed any resentment or showed any sign
of humiliation as she even laughed at the joke and continued to sit in front of the
class.
IBP Proceedings
In his Report and Recommendation[5] dated January 19, 2009, Commissioner

Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two years. He observed that respondent
was given all the opportunity to explain his side in the investigation that Xavier
had conducted. Commissioner Hababag reminded that lawyers must be of good
moral character and must continue to possess it so long as he is part of the legal
profession.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2010-289[6] dated April 16, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) affirmed with modification the
recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. It resolved to disbar respondent on
the ground of gross immoral conduct.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. In its Resolution No. XXII-2017-

804[7] dated January 27, 2017, the IBP-BOG partially granted his motion for
reconsideration. It reduced the penalty to two years suspension and directed the
Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline to prepare an extended resolution
explaining its actions.
In his June 9, 2017 Extended Resolution,[8] Director Ramon S. Esguerra (Director

Esguerra) explained that respondent was not guilty of sexual harassment as
defined under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 or the "Anti-Sexual Harassment Law
of 1995." He noted that there was no evidence to show that respondent demanded
or requested sexual favors from Toyco, Sagarbarria and Dal. Nevertheless,
Director Esguerra expounded that while respondent's actions do not constitute
sexual harassment as defined by law, the way he interacted with his students were
unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. He stressed that being a law
professor, respondent should be worthy of emulation and should not have used
his position and stature to make offensive sexual insults on his students. Director
Esguerra postulated that the penalty of two years suspension is a sufficient
sanction to protect the public and the legal profession.
The Court's Ruling
The Court modifies the recommended penalty of the IBP-BOG.
In the case at bench, some of respondent's students accused him of sexual

harassment claiming that his actions were sexual in nature and had offended or
humiliated them.
R.A. No. 7877 defines education related sexual harassment as sexual harassment
committed by a teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainer or any other person
who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in an
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor
from the other, regardless of whether the same is accepted by the object of the
act.[9] In particular, it is committed:
1. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the

offender;
2. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is

entrusted to the offender;
3. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing

grade, or the granting of honors and scholarships or the payment of a
stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges or considerations; or
4. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive

environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.[10]
The IBP-BOG opined that respondent was not guilty of violating R.A. No. 7877
because there was no evidence to show that he demanded or requested sexual
favors from the complainants. Nevertheless, it found respondent's action
unacceptable and conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
R.A. No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to the sexual desires of
the abuser. Further, it is not necessary that a demand or request for sexual favor is
articulated in a categorical manner as it may be discerned from the acts of the
offender.[11] In addition, sexual harassment is also committed in an educational
environment when the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment.[12] In short, it is not necessary that there was an offer for
sex for there to be sexual harassment as a superior's conduct with sexual
underpinnings, which offends the victim or creates a hostile environment would
suffice.
In Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission,[13] the Court explained that the essence of sexual harassment is not the
violation of the victim's sexuality but the abuse of power by the offender. In other
words, what the law aims to punish is the undue exercise of power and authority
manifested through sexually charged conduct or one filled with sexual
undertones. In Domingo v. Rayala,[14], the Court clarified that R.A. No. 7877 speaks
of the criminal infraction of sexual harassment and without prejudice to any
administrative charge which may be filed against one who sexually harasses
another.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) in CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 defined the
administrative offense of sexual harassment in an educational environment as
existing when:
SEC. 3 x x x
(b) x x x
(1) submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any
decision affecting the complainant, including, but not limited to, the giving of
a grade the granting of honors or a scholarship, the payment of a stipend or
allowance, or the giving of any benefit, privilege or consideration.
(2) the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the
performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive academic
environment of the complainant; or
(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination,
insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a
trainee, apprentice, intern, tutee or ward of the person complained of.[15]
In addition, CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 provides examples of sexual harassment,
to wit:
SEC. 5. The following are illustrative forms of sexual harassment:
(a) Physical
i. Malicious Touching
ii. Overt sexual advances
iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation
(b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and
lurid remarks
(c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or [written] notes with sexual
underpinnings
(d) Other forms analogous to the [foregoing].[16]

Respondent's actions towards the students concerned definitely constitute sexual
harassment as defined by R.A. No. 7877 and the pertinent rules and regulation.
A reading of respondent's Answer would show that he substantially

admitted the accusations against him, although providing a
justification for them. He stated that he showed a picture of a naked woman
to Sagarbarria only as a joke and after he had confiscated it from another student
to prevent further circulation in the school. Respondent narrated that he would
text Toyco with "luv u" and "miss u" but claimed that it was a common everyday
text devoid of any romantic overtones as evidenced by its informality. Meanwhile,
he clarified that the statement he made to Dal was meant to inject humor in the
classroom and to teach her not to use slang language in class. Respondent assailed
that these accusations were due to them failing in his class and that none of the
purported victims exhibited embarrassment or discomfort during the incidents in
question.
Respondent's conduct towards Sagarbarria, Dal and Toyco created a hostile and
offensive environment which has no place in a learning institution. He publicly
showed a lewd picture to Sagarbarria in the presence of other students. The
incident deeply distressed her to the extent that she was unable to continue with
her Moot Court practice because she became emotional and cried uncontrollably.
The fact that Sagarbarria was bothered and humiliated was even supported by one
of respondent's witnesses who stated that respondent demanded that the
photograph be surrendered to him because Sagarbarria was disturbed by it.
In addition, respondent's action was reprehensible regardless of Sagarbarria's

reaction. He had the audacity to show lewd images to one of his students in the
hallway where other students were present. Respondent's alleged close
relationship with Sagarbarria is not an excuse as it does not detract from the fact
that he exhibited the indecent picture in a public place. It would have been
different had he shown the photograph privately to Sagarbarria especially since
he claims that as uncle and niece, they could talk about mature and sensitive topics
without malice. Respondent could have saved Sagarbarria from embarrassment in
having to identify the naked woman as herself in public.
On the other hand, respondent should not brush aside his text messages to Toyco
and his joke to Dal as innocent remarks devoid of any impropriety. He readily
admits that he would text "luv u" and "miss u" but explains that these are sweet
nothings and used in everyday ordinary text messages. These are not harmless
text messages especially since it appears that these were unwelcome flirtations
which made Toyco uncomfortable. In addition, they cast a cloud of impropriety
considering that respondent was Toyco's teacher when he sent them.
Meanwhile, respondent's statement to Dal during her recitation in class cannot be
categorized as an innocent joke only meant to lighten the mood of the class. When
she was unable to comprehend the question propounded to her, she asked him "to
come again." In response, respondent said, "Never use slang language in my class
because you might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again'? It takes
me several minutes before I come again."
It is readily apparent that the remark is tasteless, vulgar and crude and has no
place in any academic setting. It is not a clever word play or a mere statement with
sexual innuendos as its intended meaning is obviously discernable. Respondent's
attempt at humor miserably fails as his words clearly refer to him needing five
minutes to ejaculate again. Respondent's statements made Dal uncomfortable and
embarrassed in front of her classmates as it went beyond an innocent joke and was
instead a gross, graphic and an insensitive remark.
Clearly, respondent abused the power and authority he possessed over the
complainants. His sexually laced conduct had created a hostile and offensive
environment which deeply prejudiced his students. In what was supposed to be a
safe place for them to learn and develop, they were instead subjected to
unwarranted sexual advances.
What makes respondent's act of sexual harassment even more reprehensible is the
fact that he is both a professor and a member of the legal profession.
Lawyers carry the burden of living up to the ethical standards of the

legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility because public confidence in law and in lawyers may
be tainted by the irresponsible and improper conduct of members of
the Bar.[17] Those privileged to practice the legal profession are
expected to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality considering that they are always under the watchful
public eye scrutinizing them both in their public and private lives. [18]
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. On the
other hand, Canon 7 mandates that lawyers shall, at all times, uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. Further, Rule 7.03 of the CPR commands
lawyers not to engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, or behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,[19] the Court emphasized on the primacy of maintaining
a high sense of morality and decorum among lawyers, to wit:
As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain
intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because
"vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all."
xxxx
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of
the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral
standards. (Emphases supplied)
Much is expected of lawyers in that it does not suffice that they are persons of
integrity and values, but must also appear to be so in the eyes of the people, and
of God. Notwithstanding the relativity of morality, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility — they must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution.[20] In other words, members of the bar
are measured in a more demanding light because their actions or inactions not
only affect themselves, but also the legal profession and the public's trust and
respect for the law. As such, any errant behavior on the part of the lawyer, whether
in a public or private capacity, which tends to show deficiency in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.[21]
It must be remembered that lawyers are both preachers and stewards of law,
justice, morals and fairness in that they are duty-bound to propagate observance
and deference thereto. It is not enough that they know right from wrong, just from
unjust, moral or immoral, because they must not only speak of such ideals, but
must also live by them. Lawyers, aside from being competent and adept in dealing
with the intricacies of the law, must also be individuals of honor and virtue. Legal
knowledge and ability, without the guidance of morals and justice, is a dangerous
tool, which may harm, instead of uplift others.
Respondent's responsibilities and expectations are even more heightened because

he is a law professor. He should be a beacon of righteous and conscientious
conduct. Respondent, as a molder of minds of soon-to-be lawyers, should guide
his students to behave and act in a manner consistent with the lofty standards of
the legal profession. Instead, he abused his position of authority creating an
offensive and uncomfortable atmosphere in school. Again, what should be a place
of learning and growth had become a place of fear and distrust for the affected
students.
Further, it is even more disappointing that respondent fails to acknowledge the

consequences of his actions and disregard the hurt Sagarbarria, Toyco and Dal
may have felt. He generally claimed that they did not express any distress,
embarrassment, or humiliation during the incidents complained of. It must be
stressed that as their law professor, respondent exercised moral ascendancy over
them. Thus, it is within reason that the concerned students could not have readily
expressed disgust or annoyance over a person in authority. It takes courage and
strength to stand up and speak against any form of sexual harassment. This is
especially true considering that in most cases, the offender wields power,
authority, or influence over the victim.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for five (5) years and ten (10) years from teaching law in any
school effective upon the finality of this Resolution, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
reflected on the records of respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Hernando,
Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., concur. See separate opinion.
Del Castillo and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 5-9.

[2] Id. at 4.
[3] Id. at 116-128.
[4] Id. at 130-150.
[5] Id. at 323-347.
[6] Id. at 322.
[7] Id. at 452.
[8] Id. at 454-462.
[9] Republic Act No. 7877, Sec. 3.
[10] Id. at Sec. 3(b).
[11] Bacsin v. Wahiman, 576 Phil. 138, 143 (2008).
[12] Id. at 144.
[13] 387 Phil. 250, 264 (2000).
[14] Domingo v. Rayala, 569 Phil. 423, 449-450 (2008).
[15] CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Rule III, Sec. 3(b).
[16] Id. at Rule IV, Sec. 5.
[17] Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, 611 Phil. 179, 192 (2009).
[18] Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 362 (2010).
[19] 590 Phil. 270, 276 (2008).
[20] Valdez v. Atty. Dabon, Jr., 773 Phil. 109, 126 (2015).
[21] Abella v. Barrios, Jr., 7711 Phil. 363, 371 (2013).
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:
Respondent Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. committed sexual harassment. He

abused his position of authority. He degraded and embarrassed his students with
selfish and sexually charged acts. His actions created a hostile, uncomfortable, and
offensive school environment. For these, he deserves the penalty meted upon him.
If he repeats the same or similar acts, he should be disbarred.
I concur in reaffirming Bacsin v. Wahiman,[1] reiterating Domingo v. Rayala,[2] that

sexual harassment may be committed even without a categorical demand for a
sexual favor. In an educational setting, sexual harassment may be committed
when the acts of the offender create an "intimidating, hostile[,] or offensive
environment for the student, trainee[,] or apprentice:"
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be
explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, "It is true that this provision
calls for a 'demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.' But it is not necessary
that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude,
from the acts of the offender" ... Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual
harassment in an education or training environment is committed "(w )hen the sexual
advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee
or apprentice."[3] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The Extended Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on

Bar Discipline is evidently wrong. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines explained
that since respondent did not demand sexual favors from his students, no sexual
harassment was committed.[4] The official organization of lawyers should have
known better.
This Court has capably discussed respondent's actions as being sexually charged
and having created an uncomfortable, hostile, and offensive school environment
for his students. Likewise, it correctly found that the essence of sexual harassment
is one's abuse of power over another.[5] In Garcia v. Judge Drilon,[6] I had the honor
to restate that "violence in the context of intimate relationships should not be seen
and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue."[7]
In sexual harassment cases, the offender's acts amount to an exertion of power
over the victim, rather than a violation of the victim's sexuality. [8] Here,
respondent subjected his students to sexually charged words and actions,
cowardly justifying his acts with the platform of power provided to him as a
professor and a lawyer. His students had to endure these advances despite the
emotional and psychological toll on them.
Among these advances was respondent's inappropriate sending of love letters,

text messages, and invitations to a female student. It was an unwelcome gesture
that made her feel degraded. She was forced to respond to his messages only out
of fear of reprisal.[9]
Respondent also publicly ridiculed another female student by showing her a

naked picture of a woman that seemingly resembled her. Respondent teased her
with the picture within earshot of other students, causing her severe distress. She
suffered from depression, and was unable to participate in a moot court
competition.[10]
Finally, respondent embarrassed yet another female student when he infused her
class recitation with sexual innuendo. The student asked respondent to repeat a
question by saying "come again," which respondent took as an opportunity to
badger her with unnecessary information about his virility. Respondent would
repeat this anecdote to most of his classes, callous to her feelings and her
dignity.[11] He was the type of person who thrived on his ability to ridicule women.
Moreover, in answering the allegations against him, respondent was quick to
dismiss his victims' suffering. Ignorant of his duties as a teacher, he failed to
acknowledge the professionalism and moral integrity required of him as a member
of the Bar. This Court has held:
"[A]s officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently,
any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to
show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment.[12] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Our ruling today acknowledges the persistence of patriarchy in our society. The
historical and cultural expression of male privilege—or simply, the privilege of
males qua males over females qua females—till exists. It is a powerful, dominant,
molding attitude that is nefariously manifested when demeaning and distressing
representations of any woman, especially when clearly identified, are disguised as
jokes. While normally entertaining for most men, this is generally callous to
women, whose dignity may suffer.
When respondent replied to his students' innocent comments by crudely and

unnecessarily analogizing them with blatant sexual overtones, he took liberties on
what should be the most private part of his student's life. How we choose to be
intimate with each other forms the core of our autonomy as social beings. This
includes how and with whom we communicate our intimacy, with the kinds of
sexualized language of our own choosing.
Respondent breached his professional relationship with his students when he took
liberties with, trivialized, and then embarrassed them. By engaging in talk with
undisguised sexual overtones, he forced himself on his students. He created an
unnecessary burden on his students, who had to find ways to avoid both the
unwanted advance and the embarrassment that they, to begin with, wanted no
part of.
That respondent coded his advances through jokes is aggravating. Not only were
they means to trivialize, he also wanted to entertain others at the expense of
women. He hoped to create an environment that normalized his act. Those who
laughed were complicit. The more they laughed, the more his act appeared
normal; the more, too, that his act directly caused unsolicited suffering upon his
victims.
Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The more it

pervades our culture, the more its chances to infect this and future generations.
Respondent not only exceeded his male privilege, he was also a law professor.
Embedded in his role was his power and influence over his students. This should
have been used to teach. All professors have their own idiosyncrasies, which
students either grow fondly of or simply become annoyed at. Certainly, however,
any unsolicited sexual act that causes a hostile environment goes beyond what is
acceptable. Not only is this uncivilized, it is also insulting to the entire legal
profession.
It was my understanding that the deliberations on this matter would have resulted
in my colleagues voting unanimously in favor of disbarring respondent. Had this
not been the first time that this Court was required to penalize a law professor for
sexually harassing his students, I would have maintained that respondent be
disbarred to uphold the profession's standards of moral integrity.
Nonetheless, respondent should, without a doubt, be disciplined. His failure to

appreciate the gravity of his actions evinces a lack of moral character to serve as
an officer of the court, let alone serve as an example for aspiring lawyers. Should
he or any other law professor repeat any of these acts, the penalty should be
graver.
ACCORDINGLY, in light of the circumstances, I concur.
[1] 576 Phil. 138 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
[2] 569 Phil. 423 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
[3] Bacsin v. Wahiman, 576 Phil. 138, 143-144 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second
Division].
[4] Ponencia, p. 4.
[5] Id. at 6.
[6] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[7] Id. at 171.
[8] Philippine Aeolus Auto-Motive Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
387 Phil. 250, 264 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

[9] Ponencia, p. 2.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Valdez v. Atty. Dabon, Jr., 773 Phil. 109, 121-122 (2015) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
Canon 8 - Courtesy, Fairness, Candor Towards Professional
Colleagues
[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003.]
ATTY. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO T.

CHIONG, JR., respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Atty. Ramon Reyes sought the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr. for
Violation of the Lawyer's Oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Supreme Court agreed with the IBP's recommendation to
suspend Atty. Chiong, Jr. from the practice of law for two (2) years because he
filed a collection suit for damages against one Pan and Xu, impleading Atty.
Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga. The Court held that the inclusion of the
prosecutor and Atty. Reyes in the civil case had no justification since they had
never participated in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. The suit was
filed to obtain leverage against an estafa case filed against respondent's client. The
Court held that lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers
with courtesy, dignity and civility.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS;

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTORNEYS; DUTY TO USE
LEGAL PROCESS TO RENDER JUSTICE TO PARTIES, NOT TO HARASS
THEM; CASE AT BAR A VIOLATION OF. — Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Respondent's actions do not measure
up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the "collection of a sum of money,
damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It had originally
been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga. The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there
was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent took the
estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the
inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal
process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties
according to law, not to harass them. The Lawyer's Oath exhorts law practitioners
not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,

DIGNITY AND CIVILITY TOWARD PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES. —
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy,
dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the
bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal
constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect.
Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the
dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility.
The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not affect
their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and
members of the bar.
The Case
Before us is a Sworn Complaint 1 filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of
the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T.
Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyer's oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline resolved to suspend him as follows:
". . . [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him
in the obligation that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In
addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in
Civil Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground
to do so, respondent violated his oath of office as well as the above-quoted
Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years." 2
The Facts
In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services
were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, 3 a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture
that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and
seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another
Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former
discovered that the latter had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked
for his money back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek
legal assistance.
Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who
was represented by respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was
assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then issued
a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation on October 27 and 29,
1998. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted
his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint 4 for
estafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 5 On April 8,
1999, the Manila RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest 6 against Pan.
Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest. 7

He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the
collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a
business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.
When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had
decided to institute the civil action against Atty. Reyes. Respondent claimed he
would suggest to his client to drop the civil case, if complainant would move for
the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a
settlement.
In his Comment 8 dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he

had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant
in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude
that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to
exact vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded
as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had
committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically,
Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of
Pan's Motion for an Opportunity to Submit Counter-Affidavits and Evidence, 9 of
the appeal 10 to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to Defer/Suspend
Proceedings. 11
On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived

with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the former knew fully well was
baseless. According to respondent, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor
Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainant's connivance therein were
discovered only after the institution of the collection suit.
The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. 12 Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution. 13
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report and Recommendation, 14 Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to

whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, averred that
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884
on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they had filed against
respondent's client. In his Comment, respondent himself claimed that "the reason
. . . was . . . the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and
consequent damages."
Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had
been filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case, in which
respondent's client was the defendant. There was no need to implead complainant
and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the business
transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the
inclusion of the prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by
respondent on the alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to
harass complainants and Prosecutor Salanga.
Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead

Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing,
respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioner's
recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the IBP's recommendation.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to

appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. 15 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel." DaIACS
Respondent's actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was
for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered
business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later
modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
The Amended and Supplemental Complaints 16 alleged the following:
"27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and

deliberately refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law and
the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating
his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely
made a Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly
conducted and plaintiff (was) duly informed of the charges against him but
did not answer; he maliciously and . . . partially ruled that there was
probable cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff
Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally
defective and null and void; . . .;
"28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan
filed said appeal and motion to defer for the valid grounds stated therein
deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said
plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest.
"29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant
Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to harass and extort money
from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner
contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said
plaintiff and causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.]" 17
We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to
resort to the proper remedies strengthen complainant's allegation that the civil
action was intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If respondent or his
client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga's resolution, they should have used
the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone
to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for
Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga's decision to file an information for estafa.
In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that
the estafa case was filed without basis. Moreover, he could have instituted
disbarment proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he
believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent
should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing
of the civil case had no justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business

transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their
inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a personal
affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his
client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass
them. 18
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with
courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as
of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their
professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must
treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients
should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each
other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior among
lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, 19 but also
constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, the Lawyer's Oath exhorts law practitioners not to "wittingly or

willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same."
Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in

impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse
is flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of
their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery. 20 Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just
condemnation.
Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests
of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest
principles of moral law. 21
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers in the esteem of their
professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or
gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and thrives despite
conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skill
in the honorable performance of professional duty. 22
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED

for two (2) years from the practice of law, effectively immediately.
SO ORDERED. SEIDAC
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Dated October 5, 1999; rollo, pp. 1-25.
2. Notice of Resolution; rollo, p. 231.
3. Also referred to as Zongoi Xu.
4. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-171609; rollo, p. 44.
5. Presided by Judge Juan C. Nabong Jr.
6. Rollo, p. 122.
7. Id., pp. 124-126.
8. Id., pp. 52-68.

9. Id., pp. 140-141.
10. Notice of Appeal with Attached Appeal Memorandum/Motion for Reinvestigation
with Petition for Suspension of Preliminary Investigation (rollo, p. 108) and Appeal
Memorandum/Motion for Reinvestigation with Petition for Suspension of
Preliminary Investigation (rollo, pp. 109-115).
11. Rollo, pp. 120-121.
12. See Resolution dated March 22, 2000; rollo, p. 205.
13. See Notice of Resolution; id., p. 231.
14. Dated October 10, 2001, IBP.
15. Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil. 725, 729, August 31, 1964.
16. Rollo, pp. 72-81.
17. Id., pp. 79-80.
18. Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, 146 Phil. 726, 731, November 26, 1970.
19. Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293, 295, August 14, 1936; Narido v. Linsangan, 157 Phil.
87, 91, July 25, 1974.
20 Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
21. Canon 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
22. Agpalo, Legal Ethics (1989 ed.), p. 95.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
A.C. NO. 11394 December 1, 2016
MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.

ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint[1] for disbarment
filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations
of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule
19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo

Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws[2] and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery.[3] On
the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio
(Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched
surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing
infection and making her ill in 2009.[4]
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular

online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant. His
posts include the following excerpts:
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's Ass,
Belo. Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa
Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns,
No goons, No gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!
Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will go down in
Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at
11:18pm)[5]
Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in
Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna
ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to
me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm)[6]
Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko na
kung sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno
dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)[7]
Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG MAGKANONG
PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me,
ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions.... (September 15 at 3:57pm)[8]
Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news of a picket
demonstration in front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the
story when the next rallies will have the following numbers 100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran
pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July
27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm)[9]
Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation is worth that
much. Aba ako kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince
editors to pin me down with something eh alam ko na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga
sa botox si Aling Becky at may tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-
pikon laban sa akin at to protect your burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na
lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas
[ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm)[10]
Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national television to
expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that
the much needed partial restoration of her behind would cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford
Medical Hospital and she will still remain permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11 at
2:08am)[11]
Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT
VICKI BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)[12]
Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll be taking- just
pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at
12:08am)[13]
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook
account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well
as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable
cause,[14] to wit:
Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the
operations of all her clinic and seek out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good
response – 70% decrease in her July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm)[15]
Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all.
With only 2 surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries like
liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the
risk of something going wrong with the procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12
at 12:21am)[16]
Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained doctors, they
nearly killed a client of mine, medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just
recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at
10:04pm)[17]
Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in Cebu to greet
Vicki Belo with a boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is not a
certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)[18]
Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making
machines, dapat convert them into public health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those
who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16am)[19]
Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala
ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein
Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)[20]
Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a week to a
place where there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find out more
about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September 24 at 3:00pm)[21]
Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)[22]
Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!!
FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa
akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am)[23]
Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my friends and
comrades, please stay away from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have canceled
their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the Belo Medical Group until they perform their moral
and legal obligation to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)[24]
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that

allegedly threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis
and without proof,[25] as follows:
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed for
plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal
prosecution. The General Surgeon of France will have a Philippine version. By October and November,
some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry;
the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic surgery! (September 22 at 11:31pm)[26]
Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky Belo after she
gets convicted too for criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)[27]
Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for its criminal
negligence which nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He found
out that the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to Ms. Norcio, the operation was carried out by
her doctors who were not licensed by the Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive and Aesthetic
Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm)[28]
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were

sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women,[29] to wit:
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic chick there
nowadays? haven't been there for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-
and-below naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)[30]
Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket the belo clinic
there, can u tell me where that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)[31]
Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of attacks na against
me. to thwart them, being the gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like
your type? at yung preferred ko lang ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)[32]
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the
object to extort money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by
respondent on a comment on his Facebook post:[33]
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)
Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak ko lang
ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)[34]
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were
designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and
all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident
from his demand letter[35] dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant
complaint for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.
In defense,[36] respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of

his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,[37] asserting that the posts
quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on
Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of which
complainant was not a part.[38] He also averred that he wrote the posts in the
exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was filed to
derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against
complainant.[39] He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that
he made them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant.[40] He
likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he
sent the demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case
for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. [41] Finally, respondent
pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of
fair comment.[42]
After the mandatory conference had been terminated,[43] the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers.[44] Thereafter, the IBP, through
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for clarificatory
hearing.[45] Upon termination thereof, the case was deemed submitted for
report/recommendation.[46]
IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation[47] dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the
practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.[48] It held respondent liable for violation of Rule
7.03,[49] Rule 8.01,[50] and Rule 19.01[51] of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for having posted the above-quoted remarks on his Facebook account, pointing
out that respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his posts, considering
that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the
IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on
behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no
longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had
not been established.[52]
In a Resolution[53] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-
CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[54] arguing that there was no specific act
attributed to him that would warrant his suspension from the practice of law. He
also averred that the libel cases filed against him by an employee of BMGI had
already been dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.[55]
In a Resolution[56] dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially
granted respondent's motion, reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6)
months suspension.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's
findings, except as to the penalty imposed on respondent.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the
purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his
Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming
that they were "private remarks" on his "private account"[57] that can only be
viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she
violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable.
Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one
(1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users.[58] Social
media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users
to generate and share content. There are various classifications[59] of social media
platforms and one can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as
Facebook.[60]
Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit

information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share
information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one
another."[61] Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of
who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including
automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a
statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone,
depending on the user's privacy settings.[62]
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook
was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a
user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,[63] the
South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa
recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but with
the cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes
every effort to protect a user's information, these privacy settings are however
not foolproof."[64]
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online
social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said
user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.[65]
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and
insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view.
However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy
tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he
restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to
corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto,
were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.[66]
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts
were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the
same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook
profile - will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the
following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way";
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are
not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or
her own Facebook friends.[67]
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not
guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not
belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the
user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when
the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."[68] Under the circumstances,
therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.
Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written
in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression.
Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.[69] While the freedom of
expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously
protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil
Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.[70] As such, the constitutional right of freedom of
expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others,
destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.[71]
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that

they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the
reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack
doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng
Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy
respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name
and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed
criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant
disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory,"
and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these despite the pendency of the
criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even
threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which
is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and

his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant
through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation
of the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,

respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact
that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is,
respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he
used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an
aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's
reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public

personage who is exposed to criticism[72] does not justify respondent's
disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.[73] In this
case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for
which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.
"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to
the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which their license and the law invest in them."[74] Accordingly, the
Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of

violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
[1]
Dated October 25, 2009. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 2-12.
[2]
Id. at 2.
[3]
Id. at 3.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 13; emphases and italics supplied.
[6]
Id. at 5 and 14; emphasis and italics supplied.
[7]
Id. at 15; emphasis and italics supplied.
[8]
[9]
[10]
Id. at 5 and 18; emphases and italics supplied.
[11]
[12]
Id. at 6 and 20; emphases and italics supplied.
[13]
[14]
Id. at 6.
[15]
[16]
Id. at 23.
[17]
Id. at 24.
[18]
Id. at 25; emphasis and italic supplied.
[19]
[20]
Id.; emphasis and italics supplied.
[21]
Id. at 27; emphasis supplied.
[22]
[23]
Id.; emphasis and italics supplied
[24]
Id. at 29; emphases supplied.
[25]
Id. at 9.
[26]
[27]
Id. at 31; emphasis and italic supplied.
[28]
Id. at 32; emphases supplied.
[29]
Id. at 10.
[30]
Id. at 33; italics supplied.
[31]
[32]
Id. at 35; italics supplied.
[33]
See id. at 10-11.
[34]
[35]
Id. at 37-39.
[36]
See Answer dated January 4, 2010; id. at 44-57.
[37]
See id. at 44.
[38]
See id. at 45-46.
[39]
See id. at 55.
[40]
Id. at 47-48.
[41]
See id. at 49.
[42]
Id. at 54.
[43]
See Order dated January 28, 2011 issued by Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda; id. at 65-66.
[44]
See Position Paper for complainant dated February 25, 2011 (id. at 67-88) and Respondent's Position
Paper dated February 28, 2011 (id. at 176-191 ).
[45]
See Order dated April 13, 2011; id. at 213-214.
[46]
See Order dated September 3, 2012; id. at 281.
[47]
Signed by Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera. Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 329-331.
[48]
Id. at 331.
[49]
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
[50]
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
[51]
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges
to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
[52]
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 330-331.
[53]
See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXI-2014-637 issued by National Secretary Nasser A.
Marohomsalic; id. at 328, including dorsal portion.
[54]
Dated April 25, 2015. Id. at 332-343.
[55]
See id. at 338-341.
[56]
See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXII-2015-82 issued by Assistant National Secretary Maria
Angela N. Esquivel; id. at 366-367.
[57]
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 44.
[58]
Seth Fiegerman, Facebook is unstoppable, CNN Tech, July 27, 2016, available at <
money.cnn.com/2016/07/27/technology/facebook-earnings-high-expectations/ > (visited November 10,
2016).
[59]
Other classification of social media platforms are (1) blog and microblog sites (Twitter,Tumblr); (2)
content communities sites (YouTube, Instagram); (3) collaborative projects (Wikipedia); (4 Virtual social
worlds (Farmville); and (5) Virtual game-world (World of Warcraft). See Government Social Research,
Using social media for Social research: An introduction, May 2016, available at <
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524750/GSR_Social_Me
dia_Research_Guidance_-_Using_social_media_for_social_research.pdf > (visited October 28, 2016).
[60]
Id.
[61]
H v. W, Case No. 12110142, In the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa,
January 30, 2013. See also < http://www.saflii.org/za!cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/l.html > (visited October 28,
2016).
[62]
Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 117 (2014).
[63]
H v. W, supra note 61,
[64]
Id., as cited in Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, 737 SCRA 92, 114.
[65]
Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, id. at 116.
[66]
Id. at 118.
[67]
Id. at 120-121, citations omitted.
[68]
See id. at 121.
[69]
See In Re Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), per its
First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, 313 Phil 119, 163 (1995), citing Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, 248 Phil
542, 579 (1988).
[70]
Article 19 ofthe Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
[71]
See In Re Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), per its
First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, supra note 69, at 165.
[72]
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 183-185.
[73]
See Habawel v. CTA, 672 Phil. 582, 596 (2011), citing In Re Alamcen v. Yaptinchay, G.R. No. L-27654,
February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 580.
[74]
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, 613 Phil. 352, 364-365 (2009).
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
[A.C. No. 10949. August 14, 2019.]

[Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3915]
CARMELITA CANETE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO PUTI , respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 (complaint) filed by Carmelita

Canete (Canete) against Atty. Artemio Puti (Atty. Puti) with the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In her complaint, Canete claimed that her husband was a victim in a criminal case
for kidnapping for ransom with double murder filed against Atty. Puti's client.
Canete averred that Atty. Puti had, in numerous occasions, appeared in court
while he was intoxicated and made discourteous and inappropriate remarks
against the public and private prosecutors as well as the judge. 2
Canete claimed that Atty. Puti provoked her private counsel, Atty. Arturo Tan
(Atty. Tan), by calling him "bakla" in open court during the hearing on May 9,
2013:
ATTY. MALABANAN:
Objection, [Y]our Honor. Before the witness is confronted with this
question, may I ask counsel, Atty. Puti, if that copy. . . Because that is vital
and substantial and this was previously marked as our exhibit in our offer of
evidence, this June 26. My point is, where did Atty. Puti get that document.
That it is stated that it appears it was on June 26, 2008, appearing on [TSN] 3
May 13, 2009, when the prosecution and this representation have the same
copies, your Honor. I think it is more right and that document is wrong [or]
falsified.
ATTY. TAN:
May we ask the counsel to confront the witness with a correct document.
What we have is the duplicate original, your Honor.
Atty. Puti is referring to a [photocopy].
ATTY. PUTI:
All of them, [Y]our Honor, please, are my enemies?
ATTY. TAN:
No, [Y]our Honor. We [are] just [putting] everything in the proper context.
ATTY. PUTI
"Ako muna, [hijo]. Ikaw naman para kang bakla." 4 (Emphasis supplied)
Also, during the February 14, 2013 hearing, Atty. Puti again
became disrespectful towards Atty. Tan:
ATTY. TAN:
Your Honor, we take exception to that statement.
ATTY. PUTI:
I am not yet through.
ATTY. TAN:
We take exception to that allegation.
ATTY. PUTI:
Atty. Tan, you can react after my argument. My goodness!
ATTY. TAN:
Making an allegation is an exception, [Y]our Honor.
ATTY. PUTI:
That is unethical. You behave like a lawyer . 5 (Emphasis supplied).
Likewise, Atty. Puti also made inappropriate remarks against the public
prosecutor, as seen in the following exchanges during the hearing on March 14,
2013:
ATTY. TAN:
Objection, [Y]our Honor. Already answered, [Y]our Honor.
ATTY. PUTI:
No Answer! Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro bayad sa inyo.
PROS. DELOS SANTOS:
Your Honor, as lead counsel for the public and for the government, we
would like the Court to please advise counsel, Atty. Puti, to refrain from
making personal statements as it will heighten the tension and stress of
everybody here inside the courtroom. We beg. I just heard him "Malaki
siguro ang bayad sa inyo." May we put that on record. That is very
unprofessional. He used to be a public prosecutor! 6 (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, Canete also alleged that during the May 9, 2013 hearing, Atty. Puti
uttered the words "to the handsome public prosecutor" with seething sarcasm. 7
Lastly, Canete averred that during the May 22, 2013 hearing, Atty. Puti repeatedly
bullied and threatened the judge in open court:
ATTY. PUTI:
I object.
COURT:
[Okay], proceed.
ATTY. PUTI:
I object. Strongly object, [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
Let him proceed.
xxx xxx xxx ATTY. PUTI:
I would like to make of record that I have a continuous objection.
COURT:
[Okay]! You have a continuing objection but I will allow him.
ATTY. TAN:
Thank you, [Y]our Honor.
ATTY. PUTI:
That is an abuse of discretion on your part, [Y]our Honor .
COURT:
But let him proceed.
ATTY. PUTI:
[Okay]!
COURT:
Let him proceed. If you do not like my ruling, you can file a certiorari, if
you want.
Your Honor, this time, I am [half] objecting. Because there was no
testimony from this witness. This is why I was insisting a while ago that the
witness be confronted with such testimony. Otherwise, if the Court will allow
the cross-examiner to ask that question, I will withdraw from appearing in
this case because I would not like to participate in this kind of trial, partial
trial. This is an abuse of discretion.
ATTY. TAN:
Well, [Y]our Honor, first, is Atty. Puti talking about the statement made
by this witness during his direct testimony as witness for Mariano de Leon?
We will not have that because the transcript [is] not ready. It is impossible for
me to confront him with the transcript of the last hearing. It is not here with
us.
ATTY. PUTI:
That is the reason why the Prosecutor is guessing, making false question.
Because the question is improper as there was no testimony to that effect. If
he will not be confront[ed] with such testimony and then the Court will allow
that, please, I beg of this [court], I will withdraw. I will walk out.
Why does the Honorable Judge [allow] the private prosecutor to make
some kind of arguments when he is allowed to answer for an objection on
legal ground?
Why [does] the Honorable Court [allow] him to argue? To [speak]?
COURT:
Because you are also arguing. You were the first one arguing.
ATTY. PUTI:
I do not want to stipulate but.
COURT:
You want to control the proceedings?
ATTY. PUTI:
I don't want to think the Honorable Court is bias[ed] .
COURT:
For you to argue and for him not to argue?
ATTY. PUTI:
I am going to think the Honorable Court is bias[ed] . 8 (Emphasis supplied)
For his part, Atty. Puti prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against him. 9 He
denied ever appearing intoxicated in court. 10 He also claimed that it was Atty.
Tan who provoked him when the latter made threats against him. 11 According
to him, it was his duty to call out the judge for being biased and that he was only
discharging his duties to his client by representing him with zeal. 12
A mandatory conference was held and both parties were subsequently ordered to
submit their position papers.
Findings of the IBP

The Investigating Commissioner of the CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation 13 finding Atty. Puti liable for misconduct for violating the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his
suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law. 14 The Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty. Puti failed to conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. 15 Further, his act of
imputing bias on the judge was without basis and uncalled for. 16 Furthermore,
his act of appearing at hearings while intoxicated was in utter disrespect to the
court.
In Resolution No. XXI-2014-785, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
with modification:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and for violation
of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 8, Rule 10.01, 10.03, Canon 10 and Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Artemio Puti is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. 17
Based on the records, 18 Atty. Puti did not file a motion for reconsideration despite
receipt of the IBP Resolution.
Ruling of the Court

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP, with modifications.
Canete filed the instant complaint against Atty. Puti for: 1) appearing in the
hearings while drunk; 2) provoking and insulting the prosecutors; and 3)
disrespecting the court. These grounds shall be discussed in seriatim.
On the allegation that Atty. Puti appeared intoxicated in court on numerous

occasions, Canete claimed that these were witnessed by several court personnel,
his co-counsels, and opposing counsels. 19 Atty. Puti denied such claim and
argued that there is no evidence on record that he appeared in court while
intoxicated. 20 The Court agrees with Atty. Puti. It was not sufficiently proven that
Atty. Puti ever appeared at a court hearing while he was intoxicated — despite
Canete's claim that the same was witnessed by several persons. Thus, Atty. Puti
cannot be held liable on this ground.
Regarding the second ground, the TSN of the hearings held at the trial court
plainly show that Atty. Puti employed impertinent and discourteous language
towards the opposing counsels.
To recall, Atty. Puti called Atty. Tan "bakla" in a condescending manner. To be

sure, the term "bakla" (gay) itself is not derogatory. It is used to describe a male
person who is attracted to the same sex. Thus, the term in itself is not a source
of offense as it is merely descriptive. However, when "bakla" is used in a
pejorative and deprecating manner, then it becomes derogatory. Such offensive
language finds no place in the courtroom or in any other place for that matter.
Atty. Puti ought to be aware that using the term "bakla" in a derogatory way is no
longer acceptable — as it should have been in the first place. Verily, in Sy v. Fineza,
21 the Court ruled that the respondent judge's act of ruling that a witness should
not be given any credence because he is a "bakla" was most unbecoming of a judge.
22
As against the public prosecutors, Atty. Puti made the following statement:
"Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro bayad sa inyo." 23 Such remark was
clearly unprofessional, especially since Atty. Puti used to be a public prosecutor.
24 By nonchalantly accusing the prosecutors of having been bribed or otherwise
acting for a valuable consideration, Atty. Puti overstepped the bounds of courtesy,
fairness, and candor which he owes to the opposing counsels.
For his statements against the private and public prosecutors, Atty. Puti violated
the following provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and

candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.
As regards the final ground, the TSN of the May 22, 2013 hearing shows that Atty.
Puti made several remarks against the judge. Specifically, Atty. Puti stated in open
court that the judge was abusing his discretion and implied that the judge was
partial and biased. Moreover, Atty. Puti threatened the judge that he would
withdraw from the case and walk out if his request was not granted. Again, such
statements were improper.
While a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the right to criticize the acts of courts
and judges, the same must be made respectfully and through legitimate channels.
In this case, Atty. Puti violated the following provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record or have no materiality to the case.
As a defense, Atty. Puti claimed that he was merely doing his duty to call out the
judge for being biased. He maintained that he was only discharging his duties to
his client by representing him with zeal. Such contention deserves scant
consideration.
While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is

desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or
enthusiasm is disfavored. 25
On the penalty to be imposed, the Court disagrees with the IBP's recommendation
that Atty. Puti be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. While
Atty. Puti is found to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
suspension from the practice of law is not a commensurate penalty. The Court has
consistently held that disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most
severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed with great caution.
They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges. 26
Thus, while Atty. Puti is guilty of using inappropriate language against the
opposing counsels and the judge, such transgression is not of a grievous character
as to merit his suspension since his misconduct is considered as simple rather than
grave.
I n Saberon v. Lorong, 27 the Court meted the penalty of fine of P2,000.00 for a
lawyer's use of intemperate language for referring to a party's pleadings as "a
series of blackmail suits." In Bacatan v. Dadula, 28 the Court fined a lawyer for
P2,000.00 for making unfounded accusations of partiality, bias, and corruption
against the prosecutor. More recently, in Quilendrino v. Icasiano, 29 a lawyer was
reprimanded for violating Canon 8, Rule 8.01, Canon 11, and Rule 11.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
As applied to this case, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for Atty. Puti's
infraction. The Court also takes into consideration that this is the first
administrative case against Atty. Puti in his more than three decades in the legal
profession.
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Artemio Puti GUILTY of violating Canons 8 and 11

and Rules 8.01, 11.03, and 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Court REPRIMANDS him with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Puti's personal records in the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
J.C. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Carpio, * J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
* On official leave.
** Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2688 dated July 30, 2019.
1. CBD Case No. 13-3915.
2. Id. at 2-5.
3. Transcript of Stenographic Notes.
4. Id. at 66-67.
5. Id. at 12.
6. Id. at 268-269.
7. Id. at 125.
8. Id. at 211-224.
9. Id. at 16-17.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 14-15.
12. Id. at 15-16.
13. Id. at 318-325. Prepared by Commissioner Erwin A. Aguilera.
14. Id. at 325.
15. Id. at 323.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 317. Italics omitted.
18. Id. at 328.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 14.
21. 459 Phil. 780 (2003).
22. Id. at 791.
23. Rollo, p. 268.
24. Id. at 269.
25. Bacatan v. Dadula, 794 Phil. 437, 444 (2016).
26. Saberon v. Larong, 574 Phil. 510, 520 (2008).
27. Id.
28. Supra note 25.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
A.C. No. 4807 March 22, 2000
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES,
CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional

Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of

controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only
deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to
avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C.
Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P.
Bustos.
Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA
Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-
97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that
respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate
occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission
Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in
effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against
AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act
of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting
either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-
respondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or
execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in
fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates Law
Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the
dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of
effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of
AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O.
Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D.
Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all
members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be
published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of
hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and
unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The body recommended the
penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V,
AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549
on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City.
While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the
expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason
Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997
with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs.
Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission
Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22
May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of
22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22 September
1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the
AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael
Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997
with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements,

a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil
case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was
furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and
DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they did not take
part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then
already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case.
Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded,
nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel
of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether
by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the
canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to
a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as
a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on
the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation1 which,
among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom
assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission
Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V
acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE
MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they
may have against the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from

Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them.1âwphi1
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the
IBP Board of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-
month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the
circumstances and the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the other
respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an

attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 21.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO -versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of

Court. Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a
manner befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a Complaint-Affidavit [1] with supporting documents [2] against respondent Atty.
Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7,
Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. [3] The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-

Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainant's office
to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps.
Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been
remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned,
Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record
of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted
since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be
presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin.
To this respondent retorted scornfully, 'Who will certify the Court of Appeals'
Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to
Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at this outburst, complainant
replied, 'Sir, it's in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you
claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, 'Then you should have notified
me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting
your office since then, but you never bothered to notify me. Complainant replied,
'It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.
Respondent then answered, 'You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the
record of the case? Complainant responded, 'No, Sir, I mean, it's not our duty to
notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals' decision.
Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, 'Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon?
Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?') He then
turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The
banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC,
Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place. [4]
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed
his finger at complainant and shouted, 'Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan
mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings
against my client, dont turn your ire on me!') Complainant was shocked at
respondent's words but still managed to reply, 'I dont even know your client, Sir.
Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainant's window, he again
shouted, 'Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!') [5]
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her

office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that
her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to
command full respect from her staff. [6]
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by
an Affidavit [7] signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who
witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by
the said employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was
filed by complainant on 25 September 2003. [8]
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order [9] requiring respondent to submit
his answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance [10] dated 18
June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et
al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil
Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of
the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the
MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the
records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on
that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident,
the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these
records were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25
September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan.
However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the
case be submitted for resolution. [11] Respondent later on filed
a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was
still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare
the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003.
He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the
same Manifestation. [12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next
hearing date in view of respondent's public apology, adding that respondent
personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted. [13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded

and warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be
dealt with more severely. [14] The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of
Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. [15]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of
record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would
have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila
to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of
Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate
original or certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were
already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record
and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them,
respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case
No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the
counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the
clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-
mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and
in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco, [16] respondent ought to have realized that
this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect for it. [17] These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon
8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 ' A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 ' A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 ' A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that

lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their
fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and
otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times. [18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not

categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy
narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondent's

uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done
the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter
having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court. [19] We,
however, cannot acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the
veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty.
Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This
is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations.
People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if
they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and
words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of
his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by
artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting
interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the
honorable performance of professional duty. [20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount

of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar
infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[1]Rollo, pp. 2-4.
[2] Id. at 5-9.

[3]CANON 7 ' A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the integrated bar.
Rule 7.03 ' A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
CANON 8 ' A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.02 ' A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
[4] Id. at 2 and 5.
[5] Id. at 3 and 6.
[6] Id. at 3.
[7] Id. at 5-6. It is signed by Carmelita E. Caoile, Thelma R. Moya, Nestor L. Rojo, William F. Jandoc and
Jovencio Guyod. The names of Ruben Panganiban and Eliezer Ordonez are affixed on the Affidavit but do
not bear their signatures. An attached Explanation, id. at 7, clarifies that Ruben Panganiban did not sign
the Affidavit as he did not witness the whole incident, having left the office during the height thereof.
Eliezer Ordonez, on the other hand, was able to observe the whole incident but was out of the province at
the time of filing of the complaint and was therefore unable to sign the Affidavit. '
[8] Id at 79-93.
[9] Id. at 47.
[10] Id. at 48-53.
[11]TSN, 25 September 2005, p. 11; Rollo, p. 105. See also Order dated 25 September 2003, Id at 94.
[12] Id at 107.
[13] Id at 111.
[14]The Report and Recommendation was filed with the IBP by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan. Id at 115-117.
[15] Id at 114.
[16]441 Phil. 514 (2002).
[17] Id . at 520.
[18] Id. at 519 citing De Ere v. Rubi, 320 SCRA 617 (1999).
[19] Id at 3.
[20]Atty. Reyes v. Atty. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 107 (2003) citing Agpalo, Legal Ethics (1989), p. 95.
CANON 9- Unauthorized Practice of Law
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good
standing.
B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,

vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral
integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is
of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a
privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit
cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took
the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys
up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave

misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated
19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes
in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses

respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims
that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the
lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading
as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that

he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the
same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox.
Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering
that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and

refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to
extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the
winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not
taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his

claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political
vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to
be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC
therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he
was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the

records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior
to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading
respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained"

respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed
the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC
as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-
PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as
the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath .
Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally,
to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do
so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member
of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority
to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a

privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and
even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed
the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without
a license.5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v.

Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and
signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court.7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s
oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes
one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not
allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior

to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter
dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning
"effective upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s
resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge
that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that

Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the
MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine

Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-

Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 105 Phil. 173 (1959).
2 G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210.
3 Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 211 Phil. 252 (1983).
4 In
the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
Ozaeta, Romulo, etc., 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1.
5 Ui v. Bonifacio, Administrative Case No. 3319, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 38.
6 Bar Matter No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
7 People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 310.
8 Diao v. Martinez, Administrative Case No. 244, 29 March 1963, 7 SCRA 475.
9 Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
10 Respondent’s Comment, Annex "A".
11 Ibid., Annex "B".

standing.
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator)
of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase
on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith,
a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed
a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent

to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that
my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab
initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and
quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual
rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record
that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal
action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation
of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary
deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,

rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between me and the
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of
the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting
of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real
facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to
be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already
cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996
to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and
to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his
salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner
by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming
sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's)
mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which
she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing
the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused
Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with
the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from
the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably

with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the

authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating
an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution
was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office.
He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him
for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff
and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,
even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk
of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature,
fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions
of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.7 He
declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse
of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words:
"Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an
averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment
as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use
of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with
the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into
reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a
blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document
to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his
supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised
to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims
that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment,
clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which
he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being
apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . .
prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him
by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with

Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . .
(his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely

acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights
of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More
than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from
the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized
by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect
of the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs
or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that
he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
19
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar

and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should
be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, "
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not,
is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the

use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
a Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.
b Annexes F and G, id.
c Annex C-2, id.
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also
furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, The Finance
Management and Budget Office and-the Financial Division of the Supreme Court.
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES
(or communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any
of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the signature of the
corresponding Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being
incorporated verbatim in said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id at p. 60.
9 id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.
14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.
16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with
(1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2) suspension
not exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the gravity of the offense,
after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if no
criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA
491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68: SEE also Policarpio
v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
19 Art. 19, Civil Code.
20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should
apply by analogy to Members of the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681,
entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular
courts;." SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court.
standing.
A.C. No. 6290 July 14, 2004
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-

TENORIO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana
Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-
Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct,
and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely
representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious means, the
respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage
contract,1 which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila.
Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila2 and the National Statistics Office
(NSO)3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and
place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two
children, Donnabel Tenorio4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III.5 But in the birth
certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 6 and John Cedric
Tenorio,7 another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February
1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent

caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati
City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and
sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees the alleged
immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that

the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is
not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to her own
use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3)
threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement
"Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal activities and
transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the
charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of
Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon City.8 Her
husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she
caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor
Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of
said document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are the
rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting
a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied
by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is
registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a single
proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business
Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the
same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by
Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise
denied that she threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala ka lang"
on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the
complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainant's employment after
receiving numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from
different people with the promise of processing their passports and marriages to
foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint
is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and
her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they
were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received
numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the
community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being
baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant
would submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would
submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint,
Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the respective direct
testimonies of the parties and the affiants.11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated
in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office 12 where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed
as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification
card13 signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified
as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's husband even
appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership
with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If
there was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a
representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was
a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon
cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a
lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are
named as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12
February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage
contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She
then presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous
entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her
marriage were merely an oversight.15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and
Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13
November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out
of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner

on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to
substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she
found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of
law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior
partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order
dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos.
20729 - 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel
and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private
complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus,
Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in
increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for
six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with
more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved
and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to
Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos,16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by

complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension
or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants,
the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case

should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving his case by convincing evidence.17 With respect to the estafa
case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona v. Datingaling,18 we
held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still
pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act
must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in
the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar
to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon
9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 - A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized

practice of law.
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to
the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by
acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in
court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office
for the general practice of law.19 Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as
one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized
practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D.
Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but
paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior partners
because they have investments in her law office.20 That is a blatant
misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that
the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public
that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is "Atty.
Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of
the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as

attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, 19.
2 Id., 9.
3 Id., 10.
4 Id., 5.
5 Id., 6.
6 Id., 7.
7 Id., 8.
8 Id., 36.
9 Rollo, 37.
10 Id., 38.
11 Rollo, 130.
12 Id., 104.
13 Id., 106.
14 TSN, 30 October 2000, 1-66.
15 TSN, 30 October 2000, 1-66.
16 Adm. Case No. 2884, 349 Phil. 7, 15-16 (1998).
17 Adarne v. Aldaba, Adm. Case No. 801, 27 June 1978, 83 SCRA 734.
18 Adm. Case No. 4801, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA 148.
19See Ruben E. Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 75

(1st ed. 1991) (hereafter Agpalo).
20 TSN, 30 October 2000, 52.
21 Agpalo, 69, 78.

Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
with persons not licensed to practice law, except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon
the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate
or to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased

lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement

plan even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed by complainant

Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross
misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when
he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representing attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime

in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters
Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of
said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as
LRC Case No. B-2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the
hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests
in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC
Case No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he
received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the
deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-
2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon

the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate
or to the persons specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased

lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan,

even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be

made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be
established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a
case which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers.
The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00
savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit
is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the

compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as

commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or
stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement
with a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover
after Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect
the public and the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be
suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future
will be severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating

commissioner.6
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected
to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct8 and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and
diligence.9 They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this
negligence in connection therewith shall render them liable.10
Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery
of complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s Development Bank
cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant’s
counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the
latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent
admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to
complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for
legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to
P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.11
Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the iniquitous

stipulations in the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the
validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already
expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims
against it.12 As found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed to
these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still
redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer
to safeguard his client’s interests commences from his retainer until his discharge
from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance
of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the legal profession require
that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with
zeal, care and utmost devotion.13
Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees with two
other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A
lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.15
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority.
In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held that Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a
lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes
him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once
he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care.
If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should
accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently
protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his
legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels
for his client’s cause.18
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six
months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the
amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01,

9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice,
and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice,
the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this
Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on
the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2-4.
2 Position Paper for Complainant, id. at 49.
3 Id. at 42.
4 Id. at 106-107.
5 Id, at 107.
6 Id. at 102.
7 Garcia v. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 85, 91.
8 Rule 1.01.
9 Canon 18.
10 Rule 18.03.
11 Canon 20.
12 Rollo, pp. 37-39.
13Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda, A.C. No.

5162, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 296, 303.
14 Rollo, p. 90.
15 Rule 9.02.
16 445 Phil. 1, 5 (2003).
17 A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508, 514.
18 Abiero v. Juanino A.C. No. 5302, February 18, 2005, 452 SCRA 1, 10.
19Garcia v. Bala, supra note 7 at 95-96; Ferrer v. Tebelin, A.C. No. 6590, June 27,
2005, 461 SCRA 207, 217; Macarilay v. Seriña, A.C. No. 6591, May 4, 2005, 458
SCRA 12, 26; Dalisay v. Mauricio, supra at 515-516.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon
the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate
or to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased

lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement

plan even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
A.C. 12098, March 20, 2019
MARILYN PABALAN COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ELISEO MAGNO C.

SALVA RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
CAGUIOA, J.:
On December 13, 2011, Marilyn Pabalan (Pabalan) filed before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) a Complaint for
Disbarment1 against Atty. Eliseo Magno Salva (Salva) for unprofessional and
immoral conduct, originally docketed as CBD Case No. 11-3282.
Complaint
Pabalan claimed that she and Salva were live-in partners for three years until
2008. She alleged that: 1) "with sweet words and promise of marriage," Salva
deceived her into taking him in her condo unit and induced her to advance the
funding for his proposed law office; 2) she and Salva entered into an agreement
wherein she would solicit clients for Salva and they would evenly divide the
attorney's fees paid by the clients, not knowing that a partnership between a
lawyer and non-lawyer was illegal; 3) Salva is a womanizer with children from
different women, and he faked a certificate of non-marriage (CENOMAR) in
order to enter into a marriage for convenience with a U.S. citizen in 2008; 4) Salva
was her counsel in a case before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and he failed to represent her with zeal, even withdrawing as counsel
prior to his substitution; and 5) Salva neglected to return more than P1 million
she incurred in putting up his law office, including payment of her shares in the
solicitation of clients which she endorsed to him per their agreement.
Pabalan also stated that she was a witness in another disbarment case filed by a
certain Daniel Benito (Benito) against Salva in CBD Case No. 09-2382. She
claimed that she was emboldened to file a separate case and not just be a witness
when a certain Cherry Reyes-Abastillas (Abastillas) filed another disbarment
case against Salva in CBD Case No. 11-3098.2
Answer
In his Answer3 dated March 12, 2012, Salva denied the allegations against him. He
averred that Pabalan, Benito, and Abastillas are all close friends who have an axe
to grind against him; hence, they fabricated the disbarment complaints.
As regards the instant case, Salva admitted that he and Pabalan were seeing each
other but he decided not to see her anymore when she insisted that he change his
religious affiliation and marry her abroad. Subsequently, Pabalan demanded P1
million from him, failure of which meant that she would do everything to
destroy him. Salva claimed that it was actually Pabalan who owed him money
for unpaid legal services when he represented her in an ejectment suit. He also
denied inducing Pabalan to fund his law firm as he already had a law office at
Salva Salva & Associates. Likewise, he denied entering into a partnership with
Pabalan, and even assuming such agreement validly existed, it was Pabalan who
insisted on entering the same. He averred that the agreement was never enforced
nor implemented because Pabalan never referred any client to him.
Salva also denied that he falsified his CENOMAR. He countered that it was
Pabalan and Benito who secured the CENOMAR on the basis of falsified
information. Lastly, Salva claimed that he withdrew as counsel in the NLRC case
upon instructions of Pabalan since according to her, she would just engage the
services of another counsel. He alleged that Pabalan no longer participated in the
case when he withdrew as counsel since she was not actually an employee of the
party respondent in that case so her complaint had no basis. In fact, after the
complaint was dismissed without prejudice by the NLRC due to non-attendance
of Pabalan, the latter never refiled the same.
As an affirmative defense, Salva argued that the case should be dismissed for
forum shopping because Pabalan already raised the same issues in the instant
case in her Sinumpaang Salaysay in the earlier disbarment case filed by Benito
against Salva.
Pabalan filed her Reply4 on July 10, 2012, reiterating her allegations and denying
Salva's assertions.
Motion to Dismiss
On September 17, 2012, Salva filed a Motion to Dismiss5 (MTD) on the grounds
of forum shopping, res judicata, and double jeopardy. He informed the IBP-CBD
that it had already issued a Report and Recommendation in CBD Case No. 09-
2382 which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors, wherein
he was admonished for entering into an agreement with Pabalan for the
solicitation of clients and division of attorney's fees.
Salva claimed that Pabalan is in effect a complainant in CBD Case No. 09-23 82
because her Sinumpaang Salaysay, which raised the same issues in the instant
case, was incorporated therein, with the same annexes as those attached to her
complaint in the instant case.
IBP Report and Recommendation
The records do not show any action by the IBP on the MTD. However, on
November 20, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation6 finding Salva guilty of grossly immoral conduct and of
violating his oath as a lawyer, thereby recommending that he be suspended from
the practice of law for six months. The pertinent findings of the Investigating
Commissioner are reproduced below:
We found that [c]omplainant and [respondent before July 2006 had been living
together as shown by Annex "A"[.] Respondent calls [c]omplainant [by her]
nickname "Mayie". As proof of their relationship in July 2006[,] [Respondent
wrote a letter greeting complainant happy anniversary and happy birthday,
expressing his love and praying [for] God to bless them and to be part of
everything they do[,] which letter is marked as Annex "B"[.] To show also that
there was an agreement for the partnership between [Respondent and
[c]omplainant[,] the same is marked as Annex C[.] Likewise, complainant
submitted Annex C to show that [Respondent secured a certification that the
name of [Respondent does not appear in the record of marriages in the NSO[,]
marked as Annex D.
Respondent should know that it is a violation of Canon 33 to form a

partnership between a lawyer and non-lawyer. As there is no clear
evidence to show how much [c]omplainant spent [for his] law office, [if] there
was such really, we cannot grant her the reimbursement claimed.7 (Emphasis
supplied)
In a Resolution8 dated June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with modification of the penalty, increasing the admonition to one-year
suspension from the practice of law.
On October 2, 2013, Salva filed a motion for reconsideration9 (MR) before the IBP,
citing among others the grounds of res judicata and double jeopardy. He cited the
earlier ruling of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 09-238210 which
already admonished him for the same acts being raised in the instant case. On
May 11, 2015, Salva filed a supplemental MR11 where he informed the IBP that its
ruling in CBD Case No. 09-2382 had already been affirmed by the Supreme
Court in a Resolution12 dated September 11, 2013 in A.C. No. 9809 (Daniel V.
Benito v. Atty. Eliseo Magno C. Salva), the dispositive portion of which is
quoted below:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eliseo Magno C. Salva is found GUILTY of

violating Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice
and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.13
In a Resolution14 dated April 20, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors denied the MR.
Hence, this case before the Court.
The Court's Ruling
The Court disagrees with the IBP. The disbarment complaint should be
dismissed in view of the ruling in A.C. No. 9809.
At the outset, the Court notes that in the instant disbarment complaint filed by
Pabalan in CBD Case No. 11-3282, she manifested that she had been a witness in
the disbarment complaint filed by Benito against Salva in CBD Case No. 09-2382:
3. When CBD Case No. 09-2382 was filed by Mr. Benito against the
Respondent herein, Complainant and her "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY" was
integrated therein as one of the witnesses (WITNESS L) and her information
therein were marked as Annex-A thru Annex-H[.] Complainant could have
remained only as a witness had it not been for Ms[.] CHERRY REYES-
ABASTILLAS who filed a Disbarment Case (CBD Case No. 11-3098) against this
same Respondent for the maltreatment and mental anguish she suffered from him;
that this Complainant had come to realize how she was gravely abused by
Respondent that it is only warranted that she file her Claims and Complaint
directly herself like her other co-victims.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court also notes that Pabalan issued an "Appointment Paper"16 where
she designated Benito as her attorney-in-fact to represent her in the cases she filed
before the IBP, RTC, and MTC against Salva, which include the instant disbarment
complaint.
In his Answer in the instant case, Salva raised forum shopping as an affirmative
defense. This, along with Pabalan's manifestation, should have been enough to
alert the IBP. Indeed, the IBP should have already dismissed the instant
disbarment complaint because the same grounds raised by Pabalan were already
contained in her Sinumpaang Salaysay17 as a witness in CBD Case No. 09-2382. The
instant complaint even contains the same annexes as those attached to
her Sinumpaang Salaysay. While Pabalan's allegations were only part of the many
other allegations raised by Benito in CBD Case No. 09-2382, Salva was able to
address Pabalan's allegations in his Answer18 therein. In fact, he even devoted the
last few pages of said Answer as a Reply to Pabalan's Sinumpaang Salaysay.19
Further, before the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and

Recommendation on November 20, 2012, Salva filed a Motion to Dismiss on
September 17, 2012 where he informed the IBP that a Report and
Recommendation20 on CBD Case No. 09-2382 was already issued on April 11, 2011,
which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors on June 28,
2012.21 The relevant portions of the IBP Report in CBD Case No. 09-2382 are quoted
below:
Complainant also accuses respondent of immoral conduct, x x x Complainant

accuses respondent of an "(a)greement with Ms. Marilyn Pabalan, a non-lawyer,
on a 50-50 scheme as indicated on her Annex-C for her to solicit clients or acting
as agent or touter" knowing that Ms. Pabalan is a non-lawyer x x x. Complainant
also accuses respondent of "withdrawal as counsel of Ms. Marilyn Pabalan x x x
out of malice and ill will" x x x.
Complainant also accuses respondent of irregularities in the entries pertaining to

respondent's marriage appearing in the records of the [NSO] x x x.
xxxx
Respondent denies committing any unprofessional conduct with respect to Marilyn Pabalan. x x
x Respondent likewise denies having an agreement with Pabalan for a 50-50 sharing scheme in
the solicitation of clients x x x and states that he withdrew as counsel of Pabalan "due to the
instructions and insistence of Pabalan." x x x
xxxx
With respect to the irregular entries pertaining to respondent's marriage as appearing in the
records of the [NSO], it is pure speculation to conclude that respondent was responsible for
tampering his records in the NSO or should be held accountable for his missing NSO records.
Indeed, respondent is not the official custodian of his marriage records. If there will be any
[irregularity] in the official records, then it is the NSO which should be made to explain. On the
other hand, if complainant is claiming that respondent was engaged in any immorality with
respect to his marriage, then complainant has to present something more than a mere certification
from the NSO that records of respondent pertaining to marriage could not be found. Again, we
are dwelling in the realm of speculation. Thus, once again, there is no factual basis for this charge.
With respect to the charge of respondent entering into a 50-50 agreement on the sharing of
attorney's fees, complainant attached as Annex "C" of his complaint a copy of said agreement.
xxxx
Hence, except for the charge of entering into an agreement with a non-lawyer for the sharing
of attorney's fees, all the charges raised against respondent are found to have no factual and
legal basis. With respect to the charge of entering into an agreement with a non-lawyer for the
sharing of attorney's fees, respondent is found guilty. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).22
As gleaned from above, the IBP had already considered the allegations of Pabalan
against Salva when it ruled on the disbarment complaint filed by Benito in CBD
Case No. 09-2382. To repeat, the allegations of Pabalan in CBD Case No. 09-2382
and in the instant case are the same. Still, the IBP adopted and approved on June
21, 2013 the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
without even acknowledging its earlier ruling in CBD Case No. 09-2382.
Furthermore, Salva cited again the IBP's ruling in CBD Case No. 09-2382 when he
filed his MR on October 2, 2013. Subsequently, he filed on May 11, 2015 a
supplemental MR, informing the IBP that the Court had already issued a
Resolution on September 11, 2013 in A.C. No. 9809 adopting its Report and
Recommendation in CBD Case No. 09-2382 but modifying the penalty from
admonition to suspension from the practice of law for six months. The Court
therein ruled:
After a careful examination of the records, this Court concurs with

and adopts the findings of the [IBP] Investigating Commissioner
and of the [IBP] Board of Governors x x x. Respondent violated Rule
9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in entering into an
agreement to divide attorney's fees with a non-lawyer. As such,
respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
There is a dearth of evidence that will justify the imposition of a grave penalty
premised on gross misconduct relating to respondent's participation in the
eviction of complainant, inordinate appearance in proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, conflict of interest, direct and personal liability for a retired judge's
supposed practice of law as well as erroneous and/or missing records in the
[NSO]. Nevertheless, the document identified by complainant as "Annex-C
(Mayie's Annexes IBP Complaint)" is clearly an agreement between respondent
and Pabalan, a non-lawyer, concerning the equal division of attorney's fees paid
by clients solicited by Pabalan.
x x x x
Given these, it is, at the very least, unclear if respondent and Pabalan actually
divided for themselves the attorney's fees paid to respondent. Nevertheless, Rule
9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits not only the actual
division of attorney's fees by a lawyer with a non-lawyer but also the mere
stipulation of such an agreement. The mere execution of the
agreement is, thus, a violation of Rule 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which it is proper to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is noteworthy that among all the allegations of Benito, it is the allegation
specific to Pabalan that became the basis for Salva's suspension.
Still, the IBP Board of Governors denied Salva's MR, "there being no new reason
and/or new argument adduced to reverse the previous findings and decision of
the Board of Governors."24 This is serious error on the part of the IBP. Upon
being informed of the Court's ruling in A.C. No. 9809, which approved and
adopted the IBP's findings in CBD Case No. 09-2382 (including Pabalan's
allegations), the IBP should have granted the MR and dismissed the complaint.
Evidently, the allegations raised by Pabalan in this case have been previously
ruled upon by the IBP and the Court in A.C. No. 9809. Having already imposed a
punishment on Salva in the said case involving the same set of facts, the Court is
thus constrained to dismiss the instant complaint.
On this note, the Court calls on the IBP to be more circumspect and prudent in
handling the cases before it.
WHEREFORE, the disbarment complaint against Atty. Eliseo Magno C. Salva

is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 2-6.
2On June 11, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution in A.C. No. 12043 titled Cherry
Reyes-Abastillas v. Atty. Eliseo Magno C. Salva wherein the Court adopted the
Recommendation of the IBP to dismiss the complaint for failure to sufficiently
establish the fact that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct as to
warrant disbarment. There being no motion for reconsideration, the Court also
considered the case as closed and terminated.
3Rollo, pp. 19-23.
4 Id. at 29-30.
5 Id. at 46-49.
6 Id. at 79-85, by Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor.
7 Id. at 83-84.
8 Id. at 78.
9Id. at 86-124. Titled "PETITION TO RECONSIDER AND SET ASIDE

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-777."
10 Mistakenly indicated in the MR as CBD Case No. 09-2383.
11Rollo, pp. 287-303.
12 Id. at 305-308, including dorsal portion.
13 Id. at 308, including dorsal portion.
14 Id. at 522-523.
15 Id. at 2.
16 Id. at 12.
17 Id. at 205-207.
18 Id. at 212-232.
19 Id. at 228-232.
20 Id. at 276-283.
21 Id. at 65.
22 Id. at 277-283.
23 Id. at 306 (dorsal portion) to 308.
24 Id. at 522.

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CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 7 - Uphold the Dignity and Integrity of the Profession

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6397

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: September 17, 1971

Rule 139-A, Sections 9-10

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion,

13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.

14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.

A.C. No. 4749 January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY;

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate

Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas,

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an

The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the

1. Rollo, pp. 4-9.

B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005