CASES 7-9

Sps. Estares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.144755, June 8, 2005 

To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. In the present case, the
Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are
indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof.

FACTS:

Petitioner Spouses Eliseo F. Estares and Rosenda P. Estares (Estares spouses for brevity) obtained a loan
from Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) for ₱800,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage.
For failure to pay the obligation despite repeated demands, PLCC filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure. Estares spouses filed a complaint for "Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction"
against private respondent PLCC seeking to declare as null and void the promissory note and the real
estate mortgage for not reflecting their true agreement. In the interim, they prayed for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of
the mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale The trial court issued a TRO in favor
of the Estares spouses. At the hearing on the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, Rosenda P. Estares (Rosenda for brevity) testified that: they did not question PLCC in writing
why they only received ₱637,000.00; when they received the Statement of Account, they did not
question the figures appearing therein; when they received PLCC’s demand letter, they went to the
former’s office not to question the loan’s terms and conditions but merely to request for extension of
three months to pay their obligation. n opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
PLCC presented its manager, Rey Arambulo, who testified that the Estares spouses were duly apprised
of the terms and conditions of the loan, including the rate of interest, penalties and other charges, in
accordance with the Truth in Lending Act or Republic Act No. 3765. The trial court denied the application
for writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the denial of the application of writ of preliminary injunction is correct. (YES)

RULING: Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or
interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.
The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may
thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there
is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation. The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a
special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for
granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it
appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal
rights of plaintiff pending the litigation. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show,
inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation. In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief.
They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof. Their property
is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which
was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
Rosenda’s testimony sealed the fate of the necessity of the writ of preliminary injunction. She
acknowledged that they only raised the alleged discrepancy of the amount loaned and the amount
received, as well as the blank documents which they allegedly signed, after PLCC initiated the
foreclosure proceedings.

FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST ENTERPRISES, INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. 158141 July 11, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots in the Tali Beach Subdivision and also two parcels
of land adjacent to the subdivision. The subdivision was owned by respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc.
To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass through private respondent's subdivision.
Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but private respondent refused it for being
grossly inadequate. Hence, the latter barricaded the front gate of petitioner's property to prevent
petitioner and his family from using the subdivision roads to access said parcels. Petitioner then filed
with the RTC a Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary prohibitive injunction against
private respondent. The trial court issued an Order for private respondent to remove the barricade and
refrain from hindering petitioner’s entry and exit from the subject properties and for the free passage of
petitioner in the subdivision of private respondent pending the litigation. Sometime thereafter,
petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment and construction materials to
develop his property. Consequently, private respondent moved to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful possession and occupation of Tali
Beach Subdivision when petitioner brought in heavy equipment and construction materials. On the
other hand, petitioner prayed that his contractors, visitors, and other representatives be allowed access
and persons he has authorized be allowed to install power lines over private respondent's property. The
trial court amended the writ granting petitioner’s prayer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the
amended writ and reinstated the original writ.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right of passage allowed in the uncontested original writ applies not only to
the petitioner and his household, but also to his visitors, contractors, construction workers, authorized
persons, heavy equipment machinery, and construction materials as well as the installation of power
lines.
HELD:

The Court partially granted the petition. It held that the writ issued by the trial court is to preserve
status quo. Necessarily, it does not cover the use of the subdivision roads for ingress and egress of
construction workers, heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation of power
lines since there were no improvements introduced then. But under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if
the right of way is indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification
of a building, a temporary easement is granted after payment of indemnity for the damage caused to
the servient estate. In the present case, the trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner
used in gaining access to his property, he has to pass private respondent's subdivision. Thus, petitioner
may be granted a temporary easement after the payment of the proper indemnity. Hence, the court
ordered private respondent to allow the right of passage thru the subdivision by the petitioner's visitors
and guests, contractors, construction workers, heavy equipment vehicles, and delivery construction
materials. But the Court did not allow the installation of electric power lines because it is a permanent
easement which is not covered by Article 656.

Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324, January 07, 2013

Facts:

Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) imposes a partial ban on the importation of used motor vehicles.

Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the importation of
used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri, Cagayan and San Fernando, La Union, sued the government
in the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan (trial court) to declare... invalid EO 156, impleading
petitioner public officials as respondents.

Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the... enforcement of EO 156.

The trial court granted relief, initially by issuing a temporary restraining order followed by a writ of
preliminary injunction

On petitioners' motion, trial court lifted the injunctive writ grounded its ruling on Southwing which it
considered as negating any "clear and unmistakable legal right" on the part of respondent to receive the
"protection of a writ of preliminary injunction."

The Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's Order. The trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in lifting the preliminary injunctive writ it earlier issued. The appellate court held that the
implementation of EO 156 "would put petitioner in a financial crisis."

Petitioners are now before this Court charging the Court of Appeals with having committed an error of
law in reinstating the preliminary injunctive writ for respondent.

As prayed for by petitioners, we issued a temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals'
ruling.

Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting preliminary injunctive relief to respondent to enjoin
enforcement of EO 156.

Ruling:

We hold that it was error for the Court of Appeals to grant preliminary injunctive relief to respondent.

It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule
58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant's "clear legal right" being violated or under threat of
violation by the... defendant. "Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right
"clearly founded in or granted by law." Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes
the grant of preliminary injunctive... relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the
force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of
overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances.

Respondent sought preliminary injunctive relief as ancillary to its principal cause of action to invalidate
EO 156. Respondent's attack on EO 156, however, comes on the heels of Southwing where we passed
upon and found EO 156 legally sound, albeit overextended in... application. We found EO 156 a valid
police power measure addressing an "urgent national concern"

Nevertheless, we have no hesitation in holding that whatever legal right respondent may possess vis à
vis the... operation of EO 156, we find such legal right to be doubtful by force of the Southwing
precedent. Until reversed or modified by this Court, Southwing makes conclusive the presumption of EO
156's validity.

Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for injunctive relief against self-
inflicted losses which are in the nature of... damnum absque injuria. Injunction will not issue on the
mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the
litigant to protection.