EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-13139. May 24, 1961. ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN CHU KENG TO BE ADMITTED AS A

CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. TAN CHU KENG, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Jesus P. Narvios and Cesar A. Kintanar for Petitioner-Appellee.

Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; DECLARATION OF INTENTION; EFFECT OF
FAILURE TO FILE. — The failure to file a declaration of intention within the prescribed
time, in accordance with the requirements of Section 5 of the Naturalization Law, is fatal to
the application (Ng Peng Sia v. Republic, G. R. No. 7780 Sept. 27, 1955).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY APPLICANT BE EXEMPT FROM FILING. — In order that
an applicant for naturalization may be exempt from filing a declaration of intention, he must
have been born in the Philippines and have received primary and secondary education in
public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality and those who have resided in the Philippines continuously for 30 years or more
and must have also given primary and secondary education to all his children.

3. ID.; ID.; DOUBTS CONCERNING GRANT OF CITIZENSHIP RESOLVED AGAINST

APPLICANT. — Doubts concerning grant of citizenship should be resolved in favor of the
Government and against the applicant (U.S. v. MacIntosh, N.Y., 1931, 51 S. Ct. 570, 283 U.
S. 605, 75 L. Ed. 1302, cited in Velayo’s Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization, p. 115).

4. ID.; ID.; APPLICANT MUST COMPLY WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS; ALL

CHILDREN OF APPLICANT MUST BE INCLUDED IN PETITION. — Applicant’s failure
to state in his petition the name, age, birthplace and residence of all his children as required
by law, is a ground for denying his petition, because an applicant must comply with all the
requirements and conditions specified by law (Hao Lian Chiu v. Republic, 87 Phil., 668; 48
Off. Gaz., p. 1780).
DECISION
PAREDES, J.:
This is an appeal by the Republic of the Philippines from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, granting Tan Chu Keng Philippine citizenship.

On September 15, 1955, Tan Chu Keng filed a petition for naturalization, with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, alleging that he emigrated to the Philippines from Amoy, China, in or
about July 1912, arriving in the islands on board the boat Susana; that he is married to Lu Lay
Tee, also a Chinese, born in Amoy, China, who came to the Philippines in 1932; that he has
three (3) children with his wife Lu Lay Tee, namely Domingo Tan, Esperanza Tan and
Bienvenido Tan, all born in Cebu, on January 28, 1940, September 30, 1942 and April 22,
1945, respectively; that his children are now studying in the Cebu Institute, a school duly
recognized by the government where Philippine history, civics and Philippine government are
taught and which school is open to children of all races; that he is a merchant, having a sari-
sari store and deals in lumber, copra and corn meal business: that he has no tax liabilities:
knows the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; can speak and write English,
Spanish and the Cebu-Visayan dialect. Petitioner claimed that he is entitled to the benefits of
Commonwealth Act No. 535, which exempts any person who has resided in the Philippines
for a period of thirty (30) years from filing a declaration of intention — to become a citizen.
The affidavits of two character witnesses, Dr. Hospicio B. Iballe, City School Dentist of Cebu
City, who claimed to have known petitioner since childhood, and Atty. Antonio T. Paulin,
who lived a stone throw from petitioner’s house, vouching for his good moral character and
irreproachable conduct, were also presented. Both witnesses are compadres of petitioner.

In the course of the proceedings, the provincial fiscal, on cross-examination was able to elicit
facts which were not contained in the petition, such as: that petitioner before he married his
present wife, was married in China sometime in 1923; that his first wife died in 1925, leaving
a son Espiritu Tan, who was living at C. Padilla street, Cebu City, at the time; that Espiritu
studied at the Silliman University and reached the 2nd year high school; that he (Espiritu)
was already 35 years old at the time of the hearing; that he did not include Espiritu in the
enumeration of his children in the petition because he was already of age. On redirect,
petitioner explained that Espiritu did not finish his studies because of the outbreak of the last
war and of his marriage after.

After the hearing, the provincial fiscal requested for fifteen (15) days within which to file a
memorandum. Before the expiration of the period, however, counsel for the petitioner filed a
motion for the re-opening of the case to present additional evidence, since he (petitioner)
failed to introduce "important material and relevant facts, through excusable negligence and
mistake." At the reopening, petitioner testified that aside from the three (3) children he
mentioned in his petition, he had two (2) others, namely Espiritu Tan and Alfonso Tan, who
were born in Amoy, China, on February 17, 1924 and January 8, 1933, respectively; that
when Espiritu was under the custody of petitioner, he attended the Cebu Little Flower School,
the Silliman University and the Balamban Institute; that in 1937 to 1938, Espiritu was
classified as a third grader and a fifth grader in 1939 to 1940; that Alfonso studied in the
Balamban Public School from Grade I to IV. Atty. Narvios, counsel for the petitioner,
testified that at the preparation of the petition, he discovered that Espiritu and Alfonso were
already 31 and 21 years old and both married in 1953 and 1955, respectively; that he believed
there was no necessity to include their names in the petition, considering that under section
15 of Act 473, only minor children are affected by the naturalization of the father.

It was also brought out at the said hearing that on February 25, 1942, petitioner filed a
petition for naturalization in the CFI of Cebu, in which petition he included the names of the
two children (Espiritu and Alfonso), who were then minors; but that said petition was
dismissed for his failure to appear during the hearing, due to illness.

The lower court on June 8, 1957, rendered the following judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines of petitioner TAN

CHU KENG is granted and the Court hereby decrees the naturalization of the said petitioner
as a citizen of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Solicitor General alleged in his appeal brief that the lower court erred in holding that: (1)
the omission in the petition of the names of two of petitioner’s children who were 31 and 22
years old, respectively, at the time of the filing of the petition is not a sufficient ground for
dismissing the petition: (2) the omission of the names of Espiritu Tan and Alfonso Tan in the
petition was not made in bad faith or due to some ulterior motive; (3) petitioner is exempt
from filing his declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen; and (4) petitioner has all
the qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.

1. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law (Comm. Act No. 473) specifically provides that the
petitioner will set forth, among others, whether he is single or married and the father of
children, "the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and each of the children."
Petitioner gave the flimsy explanation and his counsel tried to corroborate it that the failure to
state the names of the two (2) children (Espiritu and Alfonso) was due to the belief that there
was no necessity for it. It will be recalled that it was only during the cross-examination that
the existence of these children was elicited; that petitioner did not voluntarily tell the court,
during the hearings, that he had another son besides Espiritu and that it was only when the
Fiscal asked for time to file a memorandum that petitioner moved for a re-opening of the
case, alleging that he had to introduce material and relevant facts, which turned out to be the
existence of another son.

The law requires the petitioner, if he is the father of children, to state the name, age,
birthplace and residence of each of the children, without making a distinction whether the
petitioner’s children are minors or of age. Where the law does not distinguish we should not
distinguish. If it were the intention of the law to require only minor children of the petitioner
to be mentioned in the petition, it would have so stated. An applicant for naturalization must
comply with all the requirements and conditions specified by law (Halo Lian Chu v.
Republic, 48 O.G. 1780). To dispense with some requirements of the law on the shallow
excuse that petitioner’s counsel was responsible for the omission, would blaze the trial for
dangerous precedents.

2 & 3. It would seem that the omission was tinged with the color of bad faith and done for
ulterior motives, considering the fact that petitioner claims exemption to file his declaration
of intention. Commonwealth Act No. 535, amending section 6 of the Naturalization Law,
provides that, "Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary
education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any
race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of
thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to
make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To
such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary
and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality . . ." While petitioner
might have satisfied the condition of the thirty years continuous residence, he has, however,
failed to comply with the further requisite of having given all his children of school age,
primary and secondary education. Awareness of this requisite has undoubtedly motivated the
petitioner to exclude the names of Espiritu and Alfonso in the petition, contrariwise, he would
have been compelled to show that he had given said children primary and secondary
education in the proper schools, which he had admittedly failed to do. Under these facts,
petitioner is not entitled to the exemption of making a declaration of intention. The failure to
file a declaration of intention within the prescribed time, in accordance with the requirements
of Section 5 of the Naturalization Law, is fatal to his application (Ng Peng Sia v. Republic,
G.R. No. L-8378, March 23, 1956).

The requirements of the law regarding the qualifications of a petitioner for citizenship are
stringent. In view of the above findings, it is seriously doubted whether the petitioner herein
possesses the qualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Doubts concerning grant of
citizenship should be resolved in favor of the government and against the claimant (U.S. v.
Macintosh, N.Y., 1931, 51 S. Ct. 570, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L. Ed. 1302, cited in Velayo’s
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization, p. 1153).

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another entered denying the petition for
citizenship of petitioner-appellee Tan Chu Keng. Costs against the Petitioner-Appellee.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.