TEAM CODE:

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

COURT OF SESSIONS

DURG

CASE NUMBER: _____/2014

STATE OF XANADU

(PROSECUTION)

VS.

MANOHAR & RAHUL

(DEFENCE)

FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER THE SECTIONS 302, 465 r/w 34, 120B and 109 OF
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 & SECTIONS 66 & 66C OF THE INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 ( AS AMENDED BY THE IT AMENDMENT ACT, 2008)

MEMORIAL FOR THE PROSECUTION

Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................................5
BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED..............................................................................5

CASES CITED..................................................................................................................................7

ACT, RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS..............................................................................................9

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION....................................................................................................10
STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................................................................11
STATEMENT OF CHARGES............................................................................................................12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.........................................................................................................13
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.............................................................................................................15
ISSUE.1. MANOHAR AND RAHUL ARE CULPABLE UNDER SECTION 66 AND
SECTION 66C OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.......................................15

ISSUE.2. WHETHER MANOHAR IS GUILTY OF THE MURDER OF KARAN?.................19

ISSUE.3. WHETHER MANOHAR IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY?...........................................21

ISSUE.4. WHETHER MANOHAR AND RAHUL ARE GUILTY OF CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY?..............................................................................................................................23

ISSUE.5. WHETHER THE ACTS OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL WERE IN FURTHERANCE

OF THEIR COMMON INTENTION DEFINED UNDER S. 34 OF THE IPC...............................25

ISSUE.6. WHETHER RAHUL IS LIABLE FOR ABETMENT.................................................27

PRAYER.............................................................................................................................................29
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

A.P. Andhra Pradesh

AIR All India Reporter

All. Allahabad

Art. Article

Bom. Bombay

Cal. Calcutta

Co. Company

Corp. Corporation

Cri. Criminal

Cri. L.J./ Cr L.J. Criminal Law Journal

Cri. Criminal

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure

Del. Delhi

Dr. Doctor

Ed. / Edn. Edition

Etc. Et cetera

Evidence Act Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Guj. Gujarat

HC High Court

Hon’ble Honorable

IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860

Kar. Karnataka
 Ker Kerala

Ltd. Limited

M. P. Madhya Pradesh

Mad. Madras

No. Number

NOC Notes on cases

Ors. Others

p. Page

pp. Pages

Punj. Punjab

Pvt. Private

Raj. Rajasthan

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

Sec. Section

T.N Tamil Nadu

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

US/USA United States of America

v Versus

Vol. Volume
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED

1. Dr. Umadethan, Principles and practice of forensic medicine, 1st Edn. 2008, Swamy

Law House, Kochi.

2. Bernard Knight, Lawyer’s Guide to Forensic Medicine, 2nd Edn. 1998, Cavendish

Publishing Ltd., London.

3. C J Vyas, Determination of Death, 1993, Macmillan India Ltd.

4. B S Nabar, Forensic Science in Crime Investigation, 3rd Edn. Reprint 2008, Asia Law

House, Hyderabad.

5. Parikh’s Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 6th Edn. Reprint 2004,

Medical Publications, Bombay.

6. Jaspal Singh J., Indian Penal Code, 1st Edn. 1998, AIR Publication, Nagpur.

7. B R Sharma, Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation and Trials, 4th Edn. 2003,

Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.

8. Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 23rd Edn., LexisNexis Butterworths.

9. Textbook of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, 14th Edn. Reprint 2007, Paras

Publishing, Hyderabad.

10. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Vol I, 25th Edn. Reprint 2004, Bharat Law

House, New Delhi.

11. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes, Vol II, 25th Edn. Reprint 2004, Bharat Law

House, New Delhi.

12. Basu’s Code of Criminal procedure, Vol I, 10th Edn. 2007, Ashoka Law House, New

Delhi.

13. C D Field, Expert Evidence, 4th Edn. Reprint 2009, Delhi Law House.
14. R A Nelson’s Indian Penal Code, 9th Edn. 2003, LexisNexis Butterworths.

15. Forensic Science in Investigation of a crime, Padmashri Dr. S Subramanian, 1st Edn.

2007, S Gogia and Company, Hyderabad.

16. Justice V V Raghavan, Law of Crimes, 5th Edn. Reprint 2001, India Law House, New

Delhi.

17. S M A Qadri, Ahmad Siddique’s Criminology, 5th Edn. Reprint 2007, Eastern book

Company.

18. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal , The Indian Penal Code, 29th Edn. 2002, Wadhwa Nagpur.

19. B R Sharma, Scientific Criminal Investigation, 2006 Edn., Universal Law Publishing

Company.

20. Sarkar on Criminal Procedure, 8th Edn. Reprint 2004, India Law House.

21. S V Joga Rao, Law of Evidence, 17th Edn. 2001, Butterworths, New Delhi.

22. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Law of Evidence, 21st Edn. Reprint 2005, Wadhwa and

Company, Nagpur.

23. P S A Pillai, Criminal Law, 9th Edn. 2000, Butterworths, New Delhi.

24. Rodney D Ryder, Guide to Cyber Laws, 2nd Edn. 2003, Wadhwa Nagpur.

25. Justice Yatindra Singh, Cyber Laws, 3rd Edn. Reprint 2008, Universal Law Publishing

Company.

26. Cyber Law – Text and Cases, 2nd Edn. 2004, Thomson South-Western West.

27. R P Kathuria, Supreme Court on Criminal Law, 3rd Edn. 1984, Kathuria’s Publication.

28. Dr. Gupta and Agarwal, Information Technology – Law and Practice, 1st Edn. 2009,

Premier Publishing Company .

29. Dr. (Sir) Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, 11th Edn. in 4 volumes Reprint 2004,

Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd.

 30. J C Smith, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law – Cases and Materials, 8th Edn. 2002,

LexisNexis Butterworths.

31. Basu’s Indian Penal Code (Law of Crimes), Vol I, 9th Edn. Reprint 2004, Ashoka Law

House.

32. Cases and Materials on Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 2nd Edn. 1982, Eastern

Book Company.

33. Criminal Manual 2005, Universal Law Publishing Company.

34. Sudipto Sarkar and B R Manohar, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, Vol II, 16th Edn. Reprint

2008, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur.

35. Dr. K N Chandrasekharan Pillai, R V Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure, 5th Edn. 2008,

Eastern Book Company.

36. Sarkar’s Commentary on the Law of Evidence, Vol I, 2nd Edn. Reprint 2008, Dwivedi

Publishing Company.

37. C. Gringas, ‘To be great is to be misunderstood: the Computer Misuse Act,

1990’(1997) 3 Computer and Telecommunication Law Review.

CASES CITED

1. Amiruddin Salebhoy AIR 1923 Bom 44

2. Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260

3. Barendra Kumar Ghose AIR 1925 PC 1

4. Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emporer, (1910) 11 Cri LJ 453

5. Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682

6. Chunku AIR 1931 All 258

7. Dhansai v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 Ori 105

8. Dhunum Kazee (1882) 9 Cal 53

9. E. K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066

10. Faguna Kanta Nath AIR 1959 SC 673

11. Feda Hossein (1881) 10 CLR 184

12. George Kutly v. State of MP, 1992 Cr Lj 1663 (ker)

13. Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 209

14. Hardev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 179

15. State of Maharashtra v. Kalu Shrinivasam, AIR 1980 SC 879

16. Intel Corps v. Hamidi, 7/P3d 296[Cal 2003]

17. International Airport Centres v. Citrin, 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).

18. La Aung (1906) 12 Burma LR 70

19. Lennart Schussler v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 549

20. Lim Hoe (1894) 1 UBR (1892-1896) 279

21. Maqsoodan v. State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 218 (SC)

22. Mohan Lal Pangasa AIR 1974 SC 1144

23. Govinda Reddy Krishna AIR 1960 SC 29

24. Mohanan Kani v. State of Kerala, (1993) Cur Cri R 702 (DB) (Ker)

25. Rajurant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874

26. Nga Maung v. Emperor, (1905) 6 Cri LJ 389

27. Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216

28. Bhopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 Raj 305

29. Parimal Chatterji AIR 1932 Cal 760

30. Pauna v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 2011 SC 2545.

31. Muhammad Saeed Khan (1898) 21 All 113, 115.

32. Prem Narain AIR 1957 All 177

 33. Province of Bihar v Surendra Prasad Ojha AIR 1951 Pat 86

34. R. v. Bow Street Magistrate Court and Allison, [2000] 2 AC 216

35. RK Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821

36. Sarojini v. State of MP, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 632

37. Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188

38. Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555

39. State of HP v. Krishnan Lal, AIR 1987 SC 773

40. State of UP v. Iftikhar Khan, 1973 Cr LJ 636 (SC)

41. Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 Cr LJ 1111 (SC)

42. State of Punjab v. Mann Singh, 1983 Cr LJ 229 (SC)

43. Tukaram Ganpet Pandave v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 514

44. Vinod Kaushik v. Madhvika Joshi, MANU/ CY/0001/2011

45. Yash Pal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433

ACT, RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS

1. The Indian Penal Code, 1860

2. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

3. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

4. The Computer Misuse Act, 1998

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The prosecution, State of Xanadu hereby submits the Memorandum for the Prosecution filed

under S.26 (a) (ii) read with Schedule I & S. 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

before this Hon’ble Sessions Court charging the accused under S.302, S. 465 r/w S. 34,

S.120B & S.109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and S. 66 & S. 66C of the Information

Technology Act, 2000 (as amended by the IT Amendment Act, 2008).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

 Manohar lived with his uncle Karan, after losing his parents, he was intelligent and

got admission in TMC college in 2011. There, He befriended Rahul, who was a tech

freak, and became habitual of borrowing money from him. Rahul once decrypted

Karan’s online banking password by using a device and transferred money.

 Karan was obese and having other ailments too. On May 21, 2014 when he was ill, he

informed Manohar about 2 Crore insurance policy that was taken for his (Manohar’s)

benefit. He also gave permission to transfer money in case of emergency.

 Devika (Karan’s wife) didn’t pay Manohar’s College fee when Karan was ill, this led

to an altercation when manohar inquired about this. The next day Karan asked

Manohar to transfer some money to his account for college fee. Manohar transferred

2.5 Lakhs.

 The next day Manohar visited Karan, Suddenly Karan started coughing heavily and

complained of chest pain. Dr. Choudhry was not in town and unreachable. Manohar

wrote name of medicine ‘Angispan’ in liquid form and asked Raghav to get it and he

administered it. Karan was quite for about half an hour. Suddenly he developed fits

and seizers and regardless of Manohar’s attempt to retrieve him, he passed away.

 Dr. Chaudhary said though the medicine as such was harmless, but the its

combination with other medicines could be fatal. if proper care wasn’t taken.

 While arranging belongings of karan, Devika found the insurance policy of 2 Crores

in Manohar’s name and got awfully suspicious of Manohar’s actions. She

immediately called the police and informed about her suspicion of the circumstances

leading to Karan’s death. The police filed the final report before the Magistrate’s
Court who took cognizance of the report and therefore committed the case to the

Court of sessions in Durg, Xanadu.

STATEMENT OF CHARGES

Manohar and Rahul Gulati has been charged under Section 302, 120B, 465 r/w 34, 109 of

Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 66 and 66C of IT Act, 2000 for the crime of Murder,

Conspiracy, Forgery, Abetment and Hacking

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The prosecution has charged the accused persons under S.66 and 66C of the IT Act, 2000,

S.302, S.465 r/w S.34 and S.120B of the IPC. Furthermore, Rahul has been held liable under

S.107 of the IPC.

WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR HACKING ?

On the charges in the IT Act, it is contended that Rahul is liable for the offence of hacking by

the fact of the insertion of the key logger device to crack Karan’s online banking password

and the subsequent withdrawals made from the account and Manohar is liable for

unauthorised access in the folders of Karan’s laptop to find his online banking password and

for transferring Rs.25, 000 more than he was authorized to.

WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR MURDER ?

On the charge of murder under S.302, the prosecution has proved that Manohar caused a

bodily harm on Karan with the intent of doing so and with the knowledge of special

circumstances that made him believe that the injury so caused was likely to cause the death of

Karan.

WHETHER THE ACCUSES IS GUILTY OF FORGERY ?

On forgery, it is contended that Manohar dishonestly or fraudulently forged the prescription

in Dr. Chaudhary’s name with the intent of causing damage to the public or a particular

person and with the intent of committing fraud.

It is contended that the acts were done in furtherance of the common intention of both

Manohar and Rahul to commit the crimes so as to fulfil their final object of amassing Karan’s
wealth for themselves. Therefore, they are both to be held jointly and severally liable for all

these acts.

WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY ?

It is contended that the illegal acts of hacking, murder and forgery that were committed were

in reference to an agreement between Manohar and Rahul to do an illegal act or a legal act by

illegal means. They are therefore both to be held liable for all the crimes committed in

reference to such an agreement and the crime of criminal conspiracy also.

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF ABETMENT ?

Rahul had instigated and goaded Manohar into committing the murder of Karan by frequent

reminders of the riches that Manohar would see if his uncle would die one day. Furthermore,

Rahul helped Manohar out with the commission of the crimes through his participation in the

conspiracy to commit these crimes. Rahul is therefore liable for abetment by instigation as

well as abetment by conspiracy.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE.1. MANOHAR AND RAHUL ARE CULPABLE UNDER SECTION 66 AND

SECTION 66C OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.

It is submitted that Manohar and Rahul are liable under Section 66 and Section 66c of the

Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act). Here motive could be sufficiently established

which becomes extremely relevant in cases dealing with circumstantial evidence.1 The motive

of their act could easily be deduced from the fact circumstances. Manohar’s inherent need to

match up to his much more affluent friends forced him to borrow money from Rahul on

multiple occasions. To fulfil these monitory needs he had to resort to the aforementioned

criminal acts.

There are two acts which will be scrutinized to find out the culpability under the said sections

of the Information Technology Act. The first act would be the act of inserting a device called

key logger to track and extract password from Karan’s personal computer and then using the

password for transferring money into Manohar’s account on multiple occasions. The second

act would be the act of Manohar extracting the password of Karan’s bank account from his

Laptop and then using it to transferring the sum of 2.5 Lakhs into his account instead of the

authorised 2.25 Lakhs by Karan. The two acts will be referred to as Act 1 and Act 2 hereafter

for the matter of convenience.

Section 66 imposes criminal liability on a person who commits any crime under Section 43 of

the said Act, who fraudulently or dishonestly, without permission of the owner or anyone in

charge of a computer (a) accesses or secures access to such computer, computer system or

network, (b) extracts any data, (g) provides access to any person to facilitate access to a
1
Pauna v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 2011 SC 2545
computer, computer system or network in contravention to the provision of the Act. Whereas

section 66C imposes punishment for identity theft on any person who fraudulently and

dishonestly makes use of electric signature, password or any other unique identification

features of any other person.

1.1. THE ACTIONS OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL COULD BE DEEMED TO BE

CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER SECTION 66 OF THE INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.

The requisite mens rea required here is specifically mentioned in the Section itself which

state that the act shall be done dishonestly or fraudulently, which means, with the intention to

deceive or cause injury and with the intention to cause wrongful gain to oneself or wrongful

loss to another.2 With respect to Crimes related to cyber trespass in US law too, persons

cannot be charged for such offences unless the accused is not sufficiently and adequately

‘warned’ or had ‘had the mens rea of committing a criminal act’. 3 In the present case, Rahul

and Manohar hacked into Karan’s banking account with the use of a device called key logger

and transferred sums of money into Manohar’s account clearly trying to defraud Karan and

cause him a wrongful loss meanwhile enriching themselves with Karan’s money and

therefore the requisite mental element is clearly established in the following case. The

wordings of Section 43 seem to clearly run parallel to the Sections of the computer misuse

statute in England. The word ‘permission’ could be read in reference to words such as

‘Access’ and ‘authorisation’ in the Computer misuse Act, 1990.

Section 17(2) and 17(5) of the computer misuse Act, 1990 sets out ways in which a person

secures access and define authorized access by reference to access “of the kind in question”.

The actus reus related to such acts to commit an offence is stated under s.1 (1) of the Act. In
2
Sections 24 and section 25 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
3
Intel Corps v. Hamidi, 7/P3d 296[Cal 2003]
the R. v. Bow Street Magistrate Court and Allison case4, it was held that it is not the access to

the computer that the person is working on which is contention but the fact that if that person

had the permission to access that very document on the computer. The Act does not sanction

those who access computers, its sanctions those who use computers to secure access to data

and programs.5 In the case at hand, assuming but not contending that Manohar did have

access to Manohar’s personal computer, he would still not have the authorization over the

documents that he allegedly retrieved through the act of hacking and therefore the access of

those documents could be found to be unauthorized and liable under Information Technology

act, 2000. Rahul and Manohar, getting the key logger and inserting it in Karan’s computer,

caused Karan wrongful loss and wrongful gain to themselves. With the intent that is clearly

deducible to commit a crime under Section 66 of the Act and gain wrongful access to Karan’s

computer. The intention becomes much clearer as an act under Section 66 was committed in

pursuance of committing a future crime of misappropriation and identity theft under section

66C of the Information Technology act. This invariably leads to the guilt of Manohar and

Karan sub clause (a), (b) and (g) of Section 66 of the act.

Rahul with his established knowledge relating to computer technology and Manohar’s access

to the computer lead us to the conclusion that this act could not have been committed with

just any of the two persons singularly. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Manohar and

Rahul were co-partners in the commission of the crime. 6 Furthermore, the presence of key

logger which was found plugged into Karan’s computer, them being seen by Raghav working

on the PC for hours and Rahul connecting his laptop to the PC further establish the claim. 7

4
R. v. Bow Street Magistrate Court and Allison, [2000] 2 AC 216
5
C. Gringas, ‘to be great is to be misunderstood: the Computer Misuse Act, 1990’ (1997) 3 Computer and

telecommunication law review 213.

6
Sarojini v. State of MP, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 632
7
George Kutly v. State of MP, 1992 Cr Lj 1663 (ker)
Regardless of the fact that whether a person knew the passwords, or made intelligent guesses,

or used some software to crack the passwords, it is clear that there is unauthorised access if

that authorisation did not exist at that very moment.8

1.2. MANOHAR WAS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 66 AND SECTION 66C OF THE

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.

It is hereby submitted that Manohar was allowed to withdraw money from Karan’s account

only under the condition that Karan be kept informed of withdrawals. Manohar’s fraudulent

and dishonest intent is clear in his withdrawal of more than the normal amount. Assuming but

not contending that Manohar had the permission in this case to withdraw the money, the fact

that Rs.25, 000 more was withdrawn is evidence of such a fraudulent intent on his behalf.

Moreover, it could be proved beyond doubt that there was no permission of authorisation

given to Manohar to snoop through his Laptop and open any specific folder, which combined

with the requisite mental element mentioned in Section 66, is itself a criminal offence. The

onus is primarily on the person receiving the limited authorisation to act appropriately rather

than on the person granting it and therefore the person granting it need not set out the acts

which are permitted from the acts that are not. 9 A mere reading of the wording of Section

66C, would be enough to comprehend that the act of using Manohar’s email and password to

transfer money into his account to be an offence under the said section. Manohar, dishonestly

and fraudulently acquired Karan’s password without his authorisation and therefore

committing identity theft as mentioned in the section using Karan’s banking password

identification in cyber space. Further, Manohar took advantage of the sordid condition of his

uncle, seeing this as an opportunity to dishonestly defraud him. If the hypothesis suggested

by the accused is fanciful, far-fetched or improbable, the court may reach to the conclusion

8
Vinod Kaushik v. Madhvika Joshi, MANU/ CY/0001/2011
9
International Airport Centres v. Citrin, 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused,10 and therefore such arguments

should be dismissed at face value by the honourable court.

ISSUE.2. WHETHER MANOHAR IS GUILTY OF THE MURDER OF KARAN?

It is humbly submitted by the prosecution that Manohar is indeed guilty of the murder of

Karan under Cl. (2) of S.300 of the IPC. Cl. (2) does not as such require that the person

committing the crime have the intent to cause death of that person. All is required to prove

murder under Cl. (2) of S.300 is the intention of the offender to cause such bodily injury

coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of

the particular person concerned11. Therefore, if the accused has special knowledge of certain

ailments of the deceased (2.1), and causes such bodily injury with the intent (2.2) and

knowledge that due to that particular ailment, there is all likelihood to cause the death of that

individual through the infliction of this bodily harm (2.3), he shall be liable for murder under

this section12.

2.1. MANOHAR HAD KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN AILMENTS THAT KARAN

WAS SUFFERING FROM.

It is submitted by the prosecution that Manohar had knowledge of the specific ailments that

Karan was suffering from. It has been established that Manohar had been taking care of

Karan ever since Karan’s illness was detected. Furthermore, as a medical student, and a good

one more so, Karan would understand the doctor’s diagnosis of Karan. Therefore, it can be

sure that Manohar had indeed an idea of the ailments that Karan was suffering from.

10
Mohan Lal Pangasa AIR 1974 SC 1144; Govinda Reddy Krishna AIR 1960 SC 29
11
Mohanan Kani v. State of Kerala, (1993) Cur Cri R 702 (DB) (Ker); Rajurant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR

1966 SC 1874
12
Nga Maung v. Emperor, (1905) 6 Cri LJ 389
2.2. MANOHAR HAD THE INTENT OF CAUSING SUCH BODILY INJURY AS

LIKELY TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF KARAN.

It is known that Manohar, as a medical student, has learned of the effect of medicines.

Therefore, with such knowledge, the act of Karan of injecting a higher dosage of Angispan

than necessary is proof of the intent to commit the requisite bodily harm. Furthermore, from

the frequent discussions between Manohar and Rahul, and Manohar’s subsequent acting upon

such discussion by killing Karan, intent to commit the murder can be understood. Lastly, it is

contended by the prosecution that the act of murder was in furtherance of the common

intention of both Manohar and Rahul to fulfill their common object of amassing Karan’s

wealth for their benefit.

2.3. THERE WAS A LIKELIHOOD OF CAUSING THE DEATH OF KARAN FROM

THE INJURY INFLICTED UPON HIM.

It is submitted by the prosecution that there was likelihood to cause the death of Karan from

the injury inflicted on him by Manohar. From the list of the items taken as evidence from the

scene of the crime for the sake of the investigation, it can be seen that a total of four syringes

were used. Furthermore, in taking care of Karan, Manohar would have had an idea about the

medicines he took as well. Lastly, Manohar also had the knowledge that due to Karan’s liver

disease, his body would be able to metabolize medicines much faster. This knowledge can be

inferred from the fact that he was a third year medical student and would have as such

learned about the same. Also, from his internship, Manohar would have gained valuable

experience working with alcoholics. Therefore, the above facts fall under S.4 of the Evidence

Act as those facts that the Court shall presume.

Therefore, it is clear that Manohar had the knowledge of the effect of an overdose of

medicines, and that Manohar knew of Karan’s faster metabolizing rate. Hence, it can be
understood from the facts thus proved, that Manohar had the knowledge that the bodily injury

thus inflicted on Karan was likely to cause his death.

Therefore, with proof of Manohar’s actions against Karan, it is submitted that he be held

criminally liable for Karan’s murder and that Rahul be held liable for the same as the act was

done so in furtherance of the common intention of both the accused persons, making them

liable for the act under S.34 and S.120B of the IPC.

ISSUE.3. WHETHER MANOHAR IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY?

It is humbly contended that Manohar is guilty of forgery under section 463 of Indian Penal

Code, 1860. It is to be noted that essential elements to be satisfied to constitute the offense of

forgery are proof that the document or part of the document has been falsified (1.1)

dishonestly or fraudulently (1.2). Furthermore, an intent of the accused (a) to cause damage

or injury to i) public, or ii) any person; or (b) to cause any person to enter into express or

implied contract (c) to commit fraud or so that fraud may be committed(1.3) must be proved

beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution

3.1. A FALSE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN MADE.

To constitute the offence of forgery the simple making of a ‘false document’ is sufficient,

with the intention that it should injure other.13 It includes dishonestly or fraudulently making,

signing, sealing or executing a document, or a part of a document, with the intention of

causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed

or executed, by authority of a person by whom or by whose authority it was not made, signed,

or executed. In this case the use of prescription by Manohar for getting Angispan without any

authority given to him by Dr Choudhry amounts to making of false document.

13
Feda Hossein (1881) 10 CLR 184
Making of a document does not necessarily mean signing or otherwise executing it. It only

means creating or bringing into existence. 14 Making a false document does not consist in

writing without doing anything towards its execution. 15 In this case Manohar brought the

false document in existence and executed it by asking Raghav to use it to get the medicine.

3.2. THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN MADE DISHONESTLY OR FRAUDULENTLY.

To constitute the offence of forgery ‘false document’ should be made dishonestly or

fraudulently. The test as to the fraudulent character of a deception for criminal purpose as

explained by Stephen16 is whether an advantage that could have derived a benefit that could

not have been derived if the document were true. In this case the author derived advantage as

the prescription was made with expectation of advantage, as to get medicine, and to deceive

the shopkeeper so that he give the medicine by thinking that it is prescribed by doctor.

3.3. MANOHAR HAD THE INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME.

Intention is the necessary requirement for the offence of forgery. It is sufficient that there

should be the intention of causing it.17 According to Sind judicial commissioner’s court the

proper administration of justice is so vital to the ordered existence of a civilised community

that intent to defraud justice is something very closely affecting the public and hence can be

said to cause damage or injury to the public and to the party concerned in the particular

case.18 Where there is an intention to deceive and by means of the deceit to obtain an

advantage there is a fraud, and if a document is fabricated with such intent is a forgery. 19 A
14
Province of Bihar v Surendra Prasad Ojha AIR 1951 Pat 86

15
Lim Hoe (1894) 1 UBR (1892-1896) 279

16
History of Criminal Law, Vol II, P 121. This extract is quoted in several Indian cases.

17
Chunku AIR 1931 All 258

18
Emperor v. Ahmed Khan S/o Fateh Khan and Ors,AIR 1943 Sind 46 (49)

19
Per Bannerji, J, in Muhammad Saeed Khan (1898) 21 All 113, 115
general intention to defraud, without the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or

wrongful loss to another is not forgery.20

ISSUE.4. WHETHER MANOHAR AND RAHUL ARE GUILTY OF CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY?

S.120B provides for the punishment for the crime of criminal conspiracy. As per S.120A of

the IPC, two or more people are guilty of criminal conspiracy when they agree to do an

illegal act or a legal act by illegal means (4.1). Therefore, Rahul and Manohar are together

liable for criminal conspiracy as well as all criminal acts committed by either in reference of

such an agreement(4.2).

4.1. THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE TO DO AN ILLEGAL ACT OR

A LEGAL ACT BY ILLEGAL MEANS

It is not necessary that there should be an express proof of the agreement for from the facts

and conduct of the parties, the agreement can be inferred 21. It is not even necessary to

establish by direct evidence that the accused person did enter into such an agreement 22. It is

generally a matter of inference deduced from certain special acts of the accused, done in

pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them 23. The evidence of

transition of thoughts and the sharing of the unlawful design need only be proved 24. In the

present case, numerous instance showing that Manohar was a highly ambitious person and his

talks with Raghav where he equated money with success which have been corroborated by

the statements of Raghav and Devika. Furthermore, the fact that Manohar was in debt to

20
Dhunum Kazee (1882) 9 Cal 53

21
Ibid

22
Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emporer, (1910) 11 Cri LJ 453

23
Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260

24
E. K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066
Rahul and the fact that Rahul was in need of the money, therefore demanding it to be returned

at the earliest is proof of the similar interest of Rahul in Karan’s money. Also, Rahul’s

frequent reminders to Manohar of the money that Manohar would inherit if Karan met an

early demise are evidence of each accused having the knowledge of the other’s intention.

Once, a reasonable grounds for conspiracy has been established, anything said, done or

written by one of the conspirators in reference to common intention, is relevant against the

other not only for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy, but also for proving

that the other person was party to it25. Therefore, the hacking of the deceased, Karan’s

password by both Manohar and Rahul is proof of their conspiracy to amass all of Karan’s

wealth. Lastly, an agreement to do an illegal act which amounts to a conspiracy will continue

as long as the members of the conspiracy remain in agreement and as long as they are acting

in accord and in furtherance of the object for which they entered into the agreement 26.

Therefore, due to their being no evidence that the conspiracy had indeed ended, or that their

object was indeed fulfilled, it is contended that the conspiracy continued to include the crimes

of murder and forgery conducted. Therefore, all the criminal acts conducted in this case, can

be looked at as one entire criminal conspiracy, punishable under S.120B of the IPC.

4.2. BOTH RAHUL AND MANU ARE LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

AND ALL THE ACTS COMMITTED IN REFERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE TWO

If pursuant to the criminal conspiracy, the conspirators commit several offenses, then all of

them will be liable for the offenses even if some of them had not actively participated in the

commission of the offense27. It is not necessary that all conspirators must know each and

25
Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682

26
Lennart Schussler v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 549

27
State of HP v. Krishnan Lal, AIR 1987 SC 773
every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-conspirators in the main objects of the

conspiracy28. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the

knowledge of others, it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated

with the object of the conspiracy29. In this case, Rahul’s persistent instigating of Manohar to

kill his uncle is evidence of his involvement and knowledge of Karan’s murder. However,

assuming but not contending that Rahul did not actually know that Karan would be murdered

by Manohar to further the ultimate objectives of the conspiracy, he would still be liable for

Karan’s murder under S. 120B of the IPC as this act was still committed in reference to the

common objectives of Manohar and Rahul, solidified by their agreement to enter into a

criminal conspiracy.

ISSUE.5. WHETHER THE ACTS OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL WERE IN

FURTHERANCE OF THEIR COMMON INTENTION DEFINED UNDER

S. 34 OF THE IPC

It is contended by the prosecution that both Manohar and Rahul had a common intention to

commit the crimes in order to attain their common final object of amassing Karan’s wealth.

S.34 has been applied to cases wherein the offense was committed by only one of two or

three persons, although all of them had the common intent to commit the same. In furtherance

of the common intention, several persons must have done several acts which together

constitute an offense. In such a situation S.34 provides for each to be liable for the entire act

as a whole30. The major elements that are required to be proved while proving an individual's

liability under S. 34 of the IPC include the commission of an illegal act by several persons

(5.1) and that such an act was done in the furtherance of the common intention (5.2).

28
RK Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821

29
Yash Pal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433

30
Dhansai v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 Ori 105
5.1. THERE WAS THE COMMISSION OF AN ILLEGAL ACT

It is not necessary to prove an overt act by a particular person in order to convict the person.

Criminal act done by all or one of them in furtherance of the common intention of all would

suffice to convict all the people 31. It is contended that each criminal act of hacking, murder

and forgery were all done by one of them in the furtherance of their common intention.

Lastly, culpability of a person under S. 34 cannot be excluded merely because he was not

present at the scene of the occurrence of the particular offense for which he has been

charged32.

5.2. THE CRIMINAL ACT WAS DONE IN FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMON

INTENTION OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL

Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act in point of time 33.

Therefore, there need be a prior plan to commit a crime. This pre-arranged plan however

need not be an elaborate one34. A mere existence of a pre-arranged plan that the offense be

conducted is enough to satisfy this element. In most circumstances, proof of common

intention has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the

case at hand35. In the case of hacking, the bringing of the key logger by Rahul to Manohar’s

house beforehand in order to insert in Manohar’s computer is proof of the existence of a

common intention between the two to commit the offense of hacking. Also, a single criminal

act may involve and give rise to several offenses. The common intention must be to commit

the particular crime, though the actual crime may be conducted by anyone sharing the
31
State of UP v. Iftikhar Khan, 1973 Cr LJ 636 (SC); Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 Cr LJ 1111 (SC);

State of Punjab v. Mann Singh, 1983 Cr LJ 229 (SC)

32
Tukaram Ganpet Pandave v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 514

33
Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188; Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555

34
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216; Bhopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 Raj 305

35
Maqsoodan v. State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 218 (SC)
common intention36. Therefore, it is contended by the prosecution that while the act of

murder was conducted in furtherance of the common intention between the two accused

which can be inferred from their frequent discussions on what it would mean if Karan were to

die one day, a common intention to commit the offense of forgery can be inferred as it is

merely an offense that was given rise to in the commission of the initial intended crime of

murder.

ISSUE.6. WHETHER RAHUL IS LIABLE FOR ABETMENT

It is humbly submitted that Rahul is liable for abetment by instigation under Section 107,

where one person is urged forward by a person who will not himself act, but who procures or

instigates another to put in execution his criminal intention. 37 Under the section, a person who

actively suggests another to do an act by any means or language, direct, or indirect, whether it

takes the form of express solicitation, or of hints, insinuation or encouragement is liable for

abetment by instigation (6.1).38

6.1. MANOHAR WAS INSTIGATED BY RAHUL TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE

The word ‘instigate’ means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage

doing an act.39 There has to be a reasonable certainty in regard to the meaning of the words

used by the ‘incitor’ in order to judge whether or not there was an incitement, but it is not

necessary in law to prove the actual words used for the incitement. 40The offence is complete

as soon as the abettor has incited another to commit a crime, whether the latter consents or

36
Hardev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 179; State of Maharashtra v. Kalu Shrinivasam, AIR 1980 SC

879
37
M & M 83

38
Amiruddin Salebhoy AIR 1923 Bom 44

39
Parimal Chatterji AIR 1932 Cal 760

40
Prem Narain AIR 1957 All 177
not, or whether, having consented he commits the crime or not. This form of abetment

depends upon the intention of the person who abets, and not upon the act, which is actually

done by the person whom he abets. 41 Abetment does not in itself involve the actual

commission of the crime abetted. It is a crime apart.42

The Supreme Court has laid down that a person who engages with another in a conspiracy for

the doing of an act which is an offence; he abets such an offence and would be guilty of

abetment under section 115 or section 116, even if the offence abetted is not committed in

consequence of the abetment. The offence of abetment is complete when the alleged abettor

has instigated another or engaged with another in a conspiracy to commit the offence. It is not

necessary for the offence of abetment that the act abetted must be committed. 43
For the

purpose of abetment by instigation it is immaterial whether the person instigated commits the

offence or not or the persons conspiring together actually carryout the object of the

conspiracy.44

41
La Aung (1906) 12 Burma LR 70

42
Barendra Kumar Ghose AIR 1925 PC 1

43
Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 209

44
Faguna Kanta Nath AIR 1959 SC 673
PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities

cited; this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

Find that

A. The deceased, Mr. Karan was murdered.

B. The accused Mr. Manohar Lal and Mr. Rahul Gulati have committed the offences

under the sections 302, 465 r/w 34, 120B and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 &

sections 66 & 66c of the Information Technology Act, 2000 ( as amended by the IT

Amendment Act, 2008).

And pass any other order that it may deem fit in the ends of justice, equity, and good

conscience. All of which is respectfully submitted.

Place: S/d_________________

Date: (Counsel on behalf of the Prosecution)