Alabarces - de Los Tribalismos A La Política
Alabarces - de Los Tribalismos A La Política
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Pablo Alabarces
Universidad de Buenos Aires
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Pablo Alabarces
W
hile I was finishing my book, Fútbol y Patria1 — an analysis
of the relations between football and narratives of the
nation in Argentina during the twentieth century that was
eventually published in Buenos Aires in 2002 — the country was shak-
en by an unprecedented economic and political crisis, which led to mass
demonstrations and ended with the resignation of two presidents in a
fortnight. Those demonstrations showed, surprisingly, the everyday
pervasiveness of a football culture that seemed to become politicised
(in terms of songs, the shirts of both local and national teams, and con-
frontations with the police). A few months later, while the continuing
political and social instability illustrated the deep fragmentation of soci-
ety, the World Cup in Korea and Japan allowed the emergence of con-
tradictory discourses. Some believed that success in football would be
the route to escape the crisis and lead to an eventual reconstruction of
society, while many others believed that defeat for Argentina in the
World Cup would instigate a new social crisis. Both predictions failed
to materialise. This work aspires to read that process, through partici-
pant observation and the analysis of the media (printed, radio and tel-
evision), and to postulate some hypotheses for the interpretation of a
— perhaps new — role for football identities in Argentina.
companies (Cicalese et al. 2002, p. 7). At the same time, however, the
middle and upper classes — global travellers who had savings in dol-
lars — had been seduced by false richness. They had surrendered to
excessive consumerism and famous international labels thanks to the
over-valuation of the peso. Argentina was known by some as
Belinda: a third of its inhabitants lived as if they were in Belgium;
two thirds as if they were in India. Moreover, the events of
December 2001 had left 25 dead on the streets of Argentina.
My thesis was finished: I defended it in February 2002, and it was
published in July. After all that happened, and with the proximity of
the FIFA World Cup in Korea and Japan in 2002, I feared that I
would have to rewrite it completely.
aimed to produce consumers rather than citizens). The other actor was
civil society, profoundly weakened after the experience of the military
dictatorship of 1976–83 and the subsequent failure of the Radical
government of Raúl Alfonsín to bring those responsible for the dicta-
torship to justice during the subsequent democratic transition.8 This
weakness was further exacerbated by the deep ideological shift of
Peronism, the dominant political movement in Argentina, which trans-
formed its discourse and policies from progressive populism into a
conservative revolution with the election of Carlos Menem in 1989.
The military terror of 1976–83 and political betrayal of 1987–89
weakened society, with the exception of certain pressure groups con-
nected to the most privileged sectors of the middle classes, such as cer-
tain consumer or environmental protection groups. The other excep-
tion was the reaction to specific cases of state excesses, such as police
repression. The only organisations that survived this period with some
symbolic importance were the human rights groups born during the
dictatorship. These included the group known as the Mothers and
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, as well as the group of Children
of the Disappeared (HIJOS). However, these groups were not repre-
sentative of society as a whole, but limited to their specific demands.
In this context, football’s attempt to provide the discourse of a new
national story must necessarily fail, because it is a discourse based on
sporting heroes, and Diego Maradona’s retirement represented the end
of the last sporting hero in Argentina. In addition, the conditions
imposed by the media transformed this discourse into a commercial
concern, making it incapable of producing new political practices. The
current social, political and economic conditions of Argentine society
make it a country of football fans, united by the Argentine shirt, and
sharing an impossible dream of imaginary success — but one that is
sporting, not political or economic. National identity — a phenomenon
always imagined but never imaginary — must be based on specific ele-
ments that indicate belonging (Anderson 1991). If being Argentine
does not include the right to work, food, health care and education,
then it is not worth it. Identity must be inscribed in a physical, not an
imaginary, way (Jenkins 1996). The chauvinist tales of sports presenters
do not involve any physical inscription (Sarlo 2001, p. 18).
100 FOOTBALL, IDENTITY AND CRISIS
Conclusion: The Nation, the Politics and the (Still) Tribal Fans
This analysis has contributed to an interpretation of the role of foot-
ball and Argentine identity. It seems that the crisis, people’s behav-
iour, print media and radio discourse during the 2002 World Cup and
Argentina’s elimination from the competition provided further evi-
dence to confirm all the hypotheses included in Fútbol y Patria.
Football was again only football, and politics only politics.
So what happened after the World Cup of 2002? In the political
sphere, the middle classes seem to have recovered from their original
indignation and from their street militancy, and brought a cautious
end to their public protests. Apart from providing extra work for
academic colleagues in social sciences who were frantically dedicated
to analysing the events, the crisis of December 2001 produced a
healthy repoliticisation of society and a growth in the discourse of
progressive politics. Today the population is much more optimistic.
And football is still only football. After politicisation peaked dur-
ing the crisis (the national team appeared with shirts defending the
old public airline, Aerolíneas Argentinas, and its workers, and also
supporting the teachers’ pay demands), the waters calmed. Tribalism
reappeared. Between World Cups, nobody cares about the national
side. At its extreme, local football plays the role of a non-govern-
mental organisation: it worked in collaboration with the organisa-
tion Missing Children, or with the Red Solidaria (Solidarity
Network) — in the latter case helping to collect funds and goods to
help those affected by floods in the city of Santa Fé in April 2003.
The biggest ‘contamination’ with macro-political intervention was
during the invasion of Iraq. Demands for peace were expressed in
some stadiums, and some flags were waved in support of Saddam
Hussein, as a means of complaining about the imperialist Anglo-
Saxon invasion. But these examples also highlight persistent tribal-
ism. When the war began, Colón fans, from the province of Santa
Fé, waved a banner that read: ‘Bush, in the stadium of Unión [from
the same city] there is oil’, with the (metaphorical) objective of hop-
ing their rivals would be bombed. But after the floods the stadium
of Colón was seriously affected, and the fans of Unión responded
with: ‘In Colon’s stadium there is … water.’ Even political issues,
such as the war, are reinterpreted as tribal banter.
FOOTBALL FANS AND THE ARGENTINE CRISIS 109
Acknowledgements
The research for this paper was financed by UBA, FONCYT and
CONICET (Argentina). It was made possible by many contributors:
first María Graciela Rodríguez, with whom I presented an ad hoc
seminar in the Department of Communication (FCS-UBA) and dis-
cussed several of my hypotheses: she generally disagreed with me, so
110 FOOTBALL, IDENTITY AND CRISIS
Notes
1 I have preferred to use the Latin term patria instead of ‘fatherland’,
because it represents more accurately the meanings of a legal and insti-
tutional community and its associated connotations. This is in line
with the usage of Smith (1991).
2 On the Argentine crisis, see also Carranza 2005 and Auyero 2006.
3 In order to defeat hyperinflation, the Peronist government of Carlos
Menem pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar in 1991. It became
increasingly impossible to sustain this exchange rate, and from the
middle of the decade a deepening economic crisis due to over-valua-
tion led to increasing unemployment. The crisis deepened after the
devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999, which made Argentina more
uncompetitive and diverted the attention of the international curren-
cy markets to its worsening economic problems. In December 2001,
the De la Rúa government imposed the so-called corralito, freezing
bank accounts in a final attempt to stave off the collapse of the cur-
rency and of the country’s domestic banking system.
4 In a demonstration formed largely by the Buenos Aires middle class-
es, an unsuspected solidarity was formed with the suburban popular
classes, the people against whom the state of siege was directed (since
the lootings had taken place primarily in the poor neighbourhoods of
the suburbs of Buenos Aires and in other provinces of Argentina).
Those same middle classes seemed largely to withdraw from the pub-
lic protest after De la Rúa’s resignation and the devaluation that
would happen a few days later.
5 The cacelorazo is not an Argentine invention. There have been many
antecedents, a famous one being the protests of Chilean (right-wing)
FOOTBALL FANS AND THE ARGENTINE CRISIS 111