Torio vs.

Fontanilla
G.R. No. L-29993; 85 SCRA 399
October 23, 1978

Facts:
On October 21,1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution
No. 159 to managed the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration. The 1959 Malasiqui Town
fiesta executive committee was created, which in turn organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage.
A 'zarzuela' troupe of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member , arrived for their performance on
January 22. During the 'zarzuela ' the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was pinned underneath.
He immediately hospitalized, but died the following day.
Fontanilla's heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its
Municipal Council and all the Council's individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of
its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any
of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipality's agents in carrying out the
municipal ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking
was not one for profit, furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing
the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismiss the complaint, concluding that the Executive Committee had
exercised due diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the construction of the stage,
and the collapse was due to process beyond the control of the committee. Consequently, the
defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla .Upon appeal, the court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of 12,000.00 by way of moral and
actual damages: 1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the cost.

Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.

Ruling:
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments
om conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be
sued, and contract and be contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character, public, governmental or political on the
one hand; and corporate, private or proprietary on the other. Government powers are those
exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal powers, on the
other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community. These include
those who which are ministerial, private and corporate.
This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality for the
acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty, no
recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statue on the matter, nor
from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they
did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is
that municipal corporation can be held liable to third person ex contract or ex delicto. They may
also be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.
 Angara v. Electoral Commission Case Digest

G.R. no. L-45081

Jose A. Angara, Petitioner

Vs.

The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo & Dionisio C. Mayor, Respondents

July 15, 1936

Facts:
 The petitioner. Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio
Mayor, were candidate voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas during September 17, 1935 elections. The provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed petitioner as member-elect the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his
oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of
Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among
other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
Petitioner Jose A. Angara, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss
the Protest”, a alleging:
a. That resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented;
b. That the aforesaid resolution has its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limit of
said period; and
c. That the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period.
Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that there is no
legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a
member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein
petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative.
2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner not
 withstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly.

RULING:
1. Yes, The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and
while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject
to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.
2. No, the issue hinges on the interpretation of Section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution
which provides:
“SEC.4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the three
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by
the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

Therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and
that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner
toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Belica v. Executive Secretary, G.r. No. 208566 (2013)
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe J

Facts

Greco Belgica and many others filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System, referring to both the Congressional and Presidential Pork
Barrel.

Additional information:

The Pork Barrel existed in 1922 as the source of discretionary funds among Congress members—and
later, to include certain funds of the President. The Congressional Pork Barrel comes under the General
Appropriation Appropriation Act (GAA), whereas the Presidential Pork Barrel comes under
Malampaya Fund and Presidential Social Fund.

Issue:

Whether or not the Congressional and Presidential Pork Barrel is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Partly granted.

The Congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional because it violates the principles of separation
of powers, non-delegability of the legislative power, check and balance, and local autonomy. But the
Presidential pork barrel system is valid—as the SC disagrees, as it ruled that PD 910, which created
Malampaya Fund and PD 1869, which amended PAGCOR’s Charter, provided for appropriation.
 CASE DIGEST

Bengzon, et al. vs Drilon

G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

Justice Hugo Gutierrez Jr.

FACTS:

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. Identical
retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under Republic
Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 and a Presidential Decree 578, signed by Pres.
Marcos which extended similar retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces. Eventually,
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 modifying the pensions to be fixed to the then prevailing
salary rates, instead of giving them automatic readjustment feature (i.e. pension to increase or decrease
as the salary at the time increases or decreases), like what they had previously in RA 1797. Significantly, Pres.
Marcos restored the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who have retired prior to
September 10, 1979 in Presidential Decree 1909.

Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved House Bill No. 16297(HB 16297) to restore the
automatic readjustment feature. However, President Aquino vetoed the bill for it would allegedly disrupt
the compensation standardization. It turned out however, that absent its publication, PD 644 has never
become a valid law, making HB 16297 superfluous for RA 1797 was still in effect. Additionally, the veto
on HB 16297 produced no effect. Pursuant to such, Congress included in the General Appropriations
Bill (GAB) for Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the
adjusted pension rates. Pres. Aquino vetoed all that referred to the payment of said pension for the
reason, among others, that it nullified her veto of HB 16297 in 1990 and resulted into the veto of portions
of two sections in the appropriations for the judiciary and of an entire section in the item on General
Fund Adjustments.

ISSUES:

This action assails the constitutionality of President Aquino’s veto of specific provisions in GAB on the
ground that:

(1) the veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
(2) the subject veto is not an item veto;

(3) the veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed

(4) the veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them.

HELD:

Veto Power of the President

1. Though constitutionally vested, the act of Executive in vetoing is not absolute.

2. Generally, the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all.

3. In appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, the President may veto an item to avoid inexpedient riders being
attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.

4. Item veto power does not grant the authority to approve a part of such item and disapprove the
remainder.

5. Limitations of the veto power of the President:

(a) The President cannot veto the provisions of law that have been enacted long before his/her term of
office started;
Suit Against Government Agencies
Bermoy vs Phil Normal College Case Digest

Facts

21 employees of Philippines Normal College who were working in various capacities in its
dormitory filed an action in the Court of First Instance in Manila against the said school for
the recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The action is dismissed on the ground
that the defendants are not corporations or juridical entities without the capacity to be sued.

Issue

Whether the court was right to dismiss the action on the ground that the PNC has no capacity
to be sued.

Ruling

RA 416, which took effect in July 1949, converted the old Philippine Normal School into the
present Philippine Normal College.

One of the provisions of the charter that created Philippine Normal College state that the
PNC has the power to “Sue and be Sued” The state has already given the consent by
inventing the College with the express power to be sued in courts.

The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

 ATTY. JANRY FABIAn--CONSTTITUTIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON

G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012

Justice Lucas P. Bersamin

Facts: On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a
General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders),
represented by its President and General Manager Servillano dela Cruz, for the construction of
the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the
campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).3

In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress
billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The
third billing worth ₱ 273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on
Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting
Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid
billing and to recover various damages. The suit, entitled Stern Builders Corporation and
Servillano R. Dela Cruz v. University of the Philippines Systems, Jose V. Abueva, Raul P. de
Guzman, Ruben P. Aspiras, Emmanuel P. Bello, Wilfredo P. David, Casiano S. Abrigo, and
Josefina R. Licuanan, was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-14971 of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City (RTC).4
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then
on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion.
The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the
UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the
UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due
course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon
motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already
issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003
(although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently,
the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the
release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP escalated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Therefore,
(a) whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy
the judgment award;
(b) whether the UP’s prayer for the deletion of the awards of actual damages of ₱
5,716,729.00, moral damages of ₱ 10,000,000.00 and attorney’s fees of ₱ 150,000.00
plus ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance could be granted despite the finality of the judgment of
the RTC.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals under review; ANNULS the orders for the
garnishment of the funds of the University of the Philippines and for the release of the
garnished amount to Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz; and DELETES from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court dated November 28, 2001 for being void only the awards of
actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00, moral damages of ₱ 10,000,000.00, and attorney's fees of ₱
150,000.00, plus ₱ 1,500.00 per appearance, in favor of Stern Builders Corporation and
Servillano dela Cruz.

The Court ORDERS Stem Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz to redeposit the amount
of ₱ 16,370,191.74 within 10 days from receipt of this decision.

Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents.

 Angara v. Electoral Commission Case Digest

G.R. no. L-45081

Jose A. Angara, Petitioner

Vs.

The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo & Dionisio C. Mayor, Respondents

July 15, 1936

Facts:
 The petitioner. Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio
Mayor, were candidate voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas during September 17, 1935 elections. The provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed petitioner as member-elect the National Assembly for the said district,
for having received the most number of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his
oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of
Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among
other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
Petitioner Jose A. Angara, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss
the Protest”, a alleging:
a. That resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented;
b. That the aforesaid resolution has its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limit of
said period; and
c. That the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period.
Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that there is no
legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a
member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein
petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative.
2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner not
 withstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly.

RULING:
1. Yes, The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and
while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject
to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.
2. No, the issue hinges on the interpretation of Section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution
which provides:
“SEC.4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the three
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by
the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

Therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and
that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner
toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Case digest:
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner vs THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES EMTERPRISES, INC.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 101949
December 1, 1994

Facts:
The petition arose from the controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meter
located in the municipality of Paranaque. Said lot is contiguous with two other lots. The three
lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a
dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of
concern to Tropicana.
Issue

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a
lot to a private entity
Ruling
As expressed in Section in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such
principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a
condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if
petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the
said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that
the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in
nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property
and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.
Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to disposed of the same
because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of donation.
G.R. No. 103524

Bengzon vs, Drilon

FACTS:
Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in
the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of
seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The
retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving
at the time of his retirement or resignation.

Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 for automatic readjustment.

Constitutional Commissions members under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act
No. 3595, were given same retirement benefits.
President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar retirement benefits to
the members of the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic readjustment features of
Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A of
Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595, which authorized the adjustment of the pension
of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the
prevailing rates of salaries.
Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement pension of officers and
enlisted men was restored by President Marcos. A later decree Presidential Decree 1909 was
also issued providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed
Forces who have retired.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed
provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under the
impression that Presidential Decree 644 became law after it was published in the Official Gazette
on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the
legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said retirement
pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional Commissions.
The petitioners asked this far a readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with
Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that Presidential Decree 644 repealing Republic Act
No. 1797 did not become law as there was no valid publication. Presidential Decree 644
promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared for the first time only in the supplemental issue of the
Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but published only on September
5, 1983. Since Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force and effect of law, it therefore did not
repeal Republic Act No. 1797.
The petitioner’s requests granted. It is hereby authorized that their monthly pensions be adjusted
and paid on the basis of RA 1797 effective January 1, 1991 without prejudice to the payment on
their pension differentials corresponding to the previous years upon the availability of funds for
the purpose.

General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended
for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals.

President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special
Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts. Enacted effectively
nullified the veto of the President of House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the automatic
increase in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-enacting Republic Act No. 1797 and
Republic Act No. 3595.

Issue: WON President Aquino exceed her veto power and violated the Doctrine of Separation of
Power? YES.

Ruling:
The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. In 1953,
Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Thus, Congress included
in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings which may be used
to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. The veto power of the
President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency
legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power
is merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress and not to repeal laws that are already existed
nor set aside and overrule the decision of the supreme court.
 Casibang v. Aquino

G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979

MAKASIAR, J.:

Facts:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner,
who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation,
counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote
buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the
1971 Election Code.

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner,
who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation,
counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote
buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the
1971 Election Code.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his
evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu
contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been
superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further
submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are
only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under
Section 9 of Article XVII.

Issue:

Won the New Constitution placed the election review outside the ambit of judicial review?
Ruling/Held:

No. The case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been
interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department
to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The
term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

That “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the
benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new
Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who
at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest”
and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory
Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law
to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-
frame prescribed in the Election Code, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper
determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.”‘ We
rationalize that “the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to
shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private
respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question,
would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory
characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by
the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot.”

Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color.
That section merely allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code
and any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” It is apparent at once that such power
committed by the New Constitution to the National Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by
whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the electoral protest case. Whoever
will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever change
or modification the National Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local government code.
 Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

G.R. No. L-23825

December 24, 1965

FACTS:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to
act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive order Nos. 93 to
121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after
the date last mentioned, on or November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of
the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action for writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents
from passing in audit any expenditures of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/ or
any disbursement by said municipalities.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based,
provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub province, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other
political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into
one or more sub provinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may
be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may “not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed “except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board” upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected” and the
“recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.

RULING:

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a
valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
Jonn Gabriel Lamorin
JD-1

Concept of Political Question

Case Digest

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, et. al.

G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001
Puno, J.

Facts

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning
of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused
the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage.Calls for the resignation of the petitioner
filled the air. On October 11, However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused
to resign. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives to the Senate.

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable.At 3:00 p.m.,
Secretary of National Defence Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the
chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former
Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators,
General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members
of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government."
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., the petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace.

After the people’s clamour in EDSA for him to resign from his position, Petitioner Joseph
Estrada issued a statement that he will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a
peaceful transition of power and start the healing of the nation warped by confusion due to
his impeachment trial. Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House stating that he is temporarily unable to perform the duties of the office
of the President and let then Vice-President Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assume
the position of Acting President.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave or resign while respondent Arroyo is an
Acting President.
2. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act and incapable of exercising
as President.
3. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit, and if so, up to what extent.

Ruling:

Article VII of the Constitution Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve
the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation
of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that the petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001
after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned
has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001
or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.The court holds that the petitioner resigned as
President.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.

The court rejected his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must
first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to
the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him.
 JUAN BENGZON vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE INSULAR AUDITOR
G. R. No. L-42821 January 18, 1936
Malcolm, J.:

FACTS
Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace on March 7, 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon reaching 65
years of age on January 14, 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law. He later sought communications to
the Secretary of Justice, the Governor-General, and the Insular Auditor to claim gratuity pursuant to Act No. 4051 “An Act
to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the
service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must
relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other
purposes.” but all these officials advised him that he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act.

Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon but that provision has
been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond the power of the governor-general hence he filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the veto of the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051, the Retirement Gratuity law, is a
legislative act or not.

RULING / HELD
Yes. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this is also in compliance
with the Organic Act Section 19 of the former organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice
for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the governor-general. Specifically it provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of
Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislattive purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.
ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, GR No. 164785, 2009-04-29

FACTS:

In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano
seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterance he made in his television
show, Ang Dating Daan.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16,
2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in
accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in
relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD
1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also set the case
for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying
that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board
recuse themselves from hearing the case. Two days after, however, petitioner sought to
withdraw his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension
order thus issued.

ISSUES:

THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB]

DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x
IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding

It is petitioner's threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the
relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly
authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.

RULING:

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory,
regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the
Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain
powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority
given should be liberally construed.

A perusal of the MTRCB's basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency
of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this
authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of... regulation and
supervision.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB's authority
and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted
above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel,
permits... for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as
are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall
be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television."

Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television
programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials
and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither
amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the
assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive
suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat,... to the
MTRCB's duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of
whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of
the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

Even if we concede that petitioner's remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still
the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech.
Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the
young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which

absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner's flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter
profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does...
not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression
are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains speech should be greeted with
furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per
se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and
indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.
 LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ,
CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO
REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and
disbursing officer, respondents.

G.R. No. L-10520 | 103 Phil 1051 | February 28, 1957 | En Banc | Justice
Concepcion

Political and International Law | Constitutional Law | Separation of

Powers | Political Question

The term “political question” connotes xxx a question of policy. It refers to

those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the xxx branch of the government.

FACTS:

Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by
members of the Citizens Party (CP) who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP).
The Senate was at the time composed of 23 members of the NP and one of the CP —
petitioner Sen. Tañada. When the SET was being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of the CP,
nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of the NP, then nominated “not on
behalf of the [NP] but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate” Sens. Delgado and
respondent Cuenco “to complete the membership of the Tribunal”. This he claims is the
mandate of the Constitution which reads: “xxx Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court xxx and the remaining
six shall be Members of the [House] who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein. xxx.” Over the objection of Sen. Tañada, Sens.
Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen. Tañada now contests them in Court.
Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on the matter as the issue
is a political question and not judicial.

ISSUE:

Is the issue a political question beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry?

RULING:

No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is not clothed with “full
discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the SET.¹ The exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of
the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
We have not only jurisdiction, but also the duty to consider and determine the principal
issue² raised by the parties herein.

¹ The question is said to be political when it is a matter which is to be exercised by the

people in their primary political capacity. It is judicial when it is a matter that has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act. In short, the term “political question” connotes a question
of policy; that is, it refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or Executive branch of the Government.” It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
(Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051)

² On the issue on whether the election of Sens. Delgado and Cuenco is valid, the Court ruled
in the negative. It was held that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution in
prescribing the manner for organizing the Electoral Tribunals is to prevent the majority
party from ever controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof be
founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties with the
Justices of the SC to insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests.
Thus, the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more
than three members thereof to the SET, and the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three Senators. The Senate
may not elect, as members of the SET, those who have not been nominated by the political
parties specified in the Constitution; hence, the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no
standing to validly make such nomination. (Ibid.)
 Magallano vs Ermita
GR No. 187167
August 16, 2011

FACTS:

Republic Act No.3046 or An Act Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea in the Philippines
followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their “territorial
sea”, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under
scrutiny. This change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine Archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime islands” not only results in
the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To
buttress their arguments territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522for what it
excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of
UNCLOS III’s framework to regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RA 9522 is unconstitutional on the ground that it reduces Philippine Maritime
Territory.

RULING:

RA 9522 is constitutional. Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific base points along their coasts from which baselines are drawn,
either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition of
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones,
and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
Case on WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

Meritt vs Government of the Philippine Island

G.R No. L-11154
March 21, 1916

FACT:

E. Merritt while riding his motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles per hour was
bumped by General Hospital Ambulance at the southwestern intersection before Taft
Avenue.

As a result, E. Merritt was severely injured. With his weakening mental and physical
condition, he could not perform his job as a contractor the way he used to thereby
forcing himself to dissolve his partnership.

In order for the plaintiff to recover damages, he sought to sue the Government of the
Philippine Island which the latter authorized by virtue of Act 2457, an act Authorizing
E. Merritt to bring a suit against the Government of the Philippine Island and
authorizing the Attorney-General to appear in the said suit. A case was then filed
before the CFI of Manila, which fix the responsibility for the collision solely on negligent
on the ambulance chauffeur. After the trial, the lower court awarded E. Merritt P14,
741 as compensation for his permanent injuries and loss of wages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government is legally- liable for the damages as a result of the
negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.

RULING:

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject
to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue
of such provisions of law, is not responsible for damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions. It is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers, and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and
that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without
costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for
the number of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of
the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
18 SCRA 1120
December 17, 1966

FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil Philippines. The
Customs Arrastre later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered cases
plus other damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being a person under
the law (Rules of Court in Section 1 rule 3), defendants cannot be sued.

Rules of Court, in Section 1 Rule 3, provide:

Section 1. Who may be the parties. – Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action.

Which accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person (2) a juridical person
(3) an entity authorized by law to be sued.

After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither
the Customs Arrastre service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable.

The plaintiff appeals and contends that not all government entities are immune from suit that the
defendant is exercising proprietary functions (relating to ownership) and as such, can be sued by
private individuals for the reason that the nature of this function (arrastre service) is proprietary,
not governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre1 operation is concerned, appellant would put
defendants under the third category of “entities authorized by law” (Rules of Court Section 1 Rule
3) to be sued.

ISSUE:
Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs be sued?

HELD:

NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operations of arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and a necessary incident2
of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

1
A person/Entity who/which performs portside cargo handling operations.
2
Accompanying but not a major part of something.
The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of the government. Its primary
function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles
and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. To this function, arrastre
is a necessary incident. Although said arrastre function is deemed proprietary, it is necessarily an
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in
the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform
its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted
as to the end should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
 CASE DIGEST

Case Name: Pamatong vs. Comelec

Case No: G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Petitioner: Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong

Respondent: Commission on Elections

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated
his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional
and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he
has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to
be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative
in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing
to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is
onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine
the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 Province of North Cotabato v. GRPP on Ancestral Domain
G.R. No. 183591
October 14, 2008

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (MOA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This
public document would reach a consensus between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have
a Bangsamoro homeland. However, the Executive Department did not sign the document. Invoking the
right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and pray for the Court to
enjoin the Executive Department to enter into agreements similar to MOA in the future.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional insofar as provisions on Articles XII of the Constitution is
concerned.

RULING:
No. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional. The Executive branch would amend the Constitution to conform
to the MOA-AD as it violates (1) Section 2, Article XII on State ownership of all lands of the public domain
and of all natural resources in the Philippines. Under the MOA-AD, the ancestral domain does not form
part of the public domain. The ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to entire Mindanao, Sulu and
Palawan land which they or their ancestors continuously possessed since time immemorial. This negates
the Regalian doctrine of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, since Bangsamoro people include indigenous
minorities, MOA-AD would violate Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) which
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails,
among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise; (2) Section 9, Article XII under the Constitution which provides that the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) may head an independent economic and
planning agency for the country. Under the MOA-AD, however, the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) will
have its own economic planning agency; (3) Section 20, Article XII which establishes the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP) as an independent monetary authority. Under the MOA-AD, however, the BJE will
have its own financial and banking authority. In sum, if the Court did not stop the signing of the MOA-
AD, this country would have been dismembered because the Executive branch would have committed
to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD.
 Torio vs. Fontanilla
G.R. No. L-29993; 85 SCRA 399
October 23, 1978

Facts:
On October 21,1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution
No. 159 to managed the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration. The 1959 Malasiqui Town
fiesta executive committee was created, which in turn organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage.
A 'zarzuela' troupe of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member , arrived for their performance on
January 22. During the 'zarzuela ' the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was pinned underneath.
He immediately hospitalized, but died the following day.
Fontanilla's heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its
Municipal Council and all the Council's individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of
its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any
of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipality's agents in carrying out the
municipal ordinance and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking
was not one for profit, furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing
the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismiss the complaint, concluding that the Executive Committee had
exercised due diligence and care in selecting a competent man for the construction of the stage,
and the collapse was due to process beyond the control of the committee. Consequently, the
defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla .Upon appeal, the court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of 12,000.00 by way of moral and
actual damages: 1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the cost.

Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.

Ruling:
Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments
om conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be
sued, and contract and be contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character, public, governmental or political on the
one hand; and corporate, private or proprietary on the other. Government powers are those
exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal powers, on the
other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community. These include
those who which are ministerial, private and corporate.
This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality for the
acts of its agents which result in injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty, no
recovery can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statue on the matter, nor
from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they
did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is
that municipal corporation can be held liable to third person ex contract or ex delicto. They may
also be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.
 ATTY. JANRY FABIAn--CONSTTITUTIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON

G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012

Justice Lucas P. Bersamin

Facts: On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders), represented by
its President and General Manager Servillano dela Cruz, for the construction of the extension building
and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the University of the
Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).3
In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress billings
corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The third billing
worth ₱ 273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite
the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela Cruz
to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various
damages. The suit, entitled Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano R. Dela Cruz v. University of the
Philippines Systems, Jose V. Abueva, Raul P. de Guzman, Ruben P. Aspiras, Emmanuel P. Bello,
Wilfredo P. David, Casiano S. Abrigo, and Josefina R. Licuanan, was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-
14971 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC).4
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on
January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial
of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on
May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS in Diliman,
Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to
the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern
Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous
motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June
11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had
already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of
garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP escalated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:
Therefore,
(a) whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the
judgment award;
 (b) whether the UP’s prayer for the deletion of the awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00,
moral damages of ₱ 10,000,000.00 and attorney’s fees of ₱ 150,000.00 plus ₱ 1,500.00 per
appearance could be granted despite the finality of the judgment of the RTC.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals under review; ANNULS the orders for the garnishment of
the funds of the University of the Philippines and for the release of the garnished amount to Stern
Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz; and DELETES from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court dated November 28, 2001 for being void only the awards of actual damages of ₱ 5,716,729.00,
moral damages of ₱ 10,000,000.00, and attorney's fees of ₱ 150,000.00, plus ₱ 1,500.00 per
appearance, in favor of Stern Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz.

The Court ORDERS Stem Builders Corporation and Servillano dela Cruz to redeposit the amount of ₱
16,370,191.74 within 10 days from receipt of this decision.

PD No. 144 Section 84 to the effect that the revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury
or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority and
that the order of garnishment clashed with the ruling in the University of the Philippines Board of
Regents vs. Ligot-Telan to the effect that the funds belonging to UP were public funds.
Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents.