Enad, Jayson Ace S.

BSCRIM-4C

CASE 1

G.R. No. L-20721             April 30, 1966

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARTIN ALAGAO, et al., defendants-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
R. Pronove, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.
De Santos and Delfino for defendants-appellees.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an appeal by the City Fiscal of Manila from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining
the motion to quash the information in its Criminal Case No. 66655.

On October 20, 1962 the City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees charging
them of having committed the complex crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest, as
follows:

That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then members of the Manila Police Department, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to
one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery through unlawful arrest, in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the aforesaid date, without reasonable ground therefor
and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the
said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was
supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place or
commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial Apolonio y Santos,
supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he (Marcial Apolonio y
Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear to have
agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his (Marcial
Apolonio y Santos') duties, which was to expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly
incriminating or imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime bribery.

On October 25, 1962 the defendants, through counsel, moved to quash the information against them on the
grounds that (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; and (2) the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Later on, the defendants filed a supplemental motion to
quash, alleging that the information charges more than one offense.

The contention of the defense in the motion to quash is that "... the information would seem to indicate that the
accused are charged with a complex crime, that is, the accused without reasonable ground arrested Marcial
Apolonio y Santos for the purpose of incriminating him by planting on his person a marked P1.00 bill. We
have searched the penal laws in vain for a crime such as set out in the information at bar." Then the motion to
quash further states: "... there would either be only the singular crimes of incriminatory machinations or
unlawful arrest, or perhaps two crimes, incriminatory machinations and unlawful arrest. If such would be the
case then this Honorable Court would not have any jurisdiction over any crime or crimes charged. For
certainly, incriminatory machinations and unlawful arrest would come within the jurisdiction of the inferior
court.

The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash, contending that "A perusal of the information will readily
conclude that it is a complex crime in the sense that unlawful arrest was used as a means for incriminatory
machination." The City Fiscal further contended that the motion to quash raises a question of fact which should
be raised during the trial and not during the stage of the proceedings when the allegations in the information
should be controlling. The City Fiscal also contended that the crime of unlawful arrest, being punishable
by arresto mayor and a fine of not exceeding P500.00, the same falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance.

On November 9, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order sustaining the motion to quash,
the pertinent portion of which order reads as follows:

A careful perusal of the information quoted above shows clearly that it is defective. Assuming the
truth of the allegations of the information, the Court is of the opinion that there is no complex crime
involved. The alleged unlawful arrest committed by the defendants cannot be said to have been used
as a necessary means to commit the crime of incriminatory machination. The latter crime could be
committed without the unlawful arrest. The acts constituting the two offenses — unlawful arrest and
incriminatory machination — are two separate and independent acts that preclude the concept of a
complex crime. The alleged planting of evidence took place while the victim was already under
investigation, long after the consummation of the alleged unlawful arrest.

It is true that under an information charging a complex crime the Court may convict the defendant of
two component crimes, if the evidence of record does not establish the complexity of the crime. This
cannot be done, however, in the case at bar for the simple reason that one of the component offenses
of the alleged complex crime, that is, — incriminatory machination, — does not fall within the
concurrent, much less original exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

Consequently, the motion to quash is granted and the case is hereby dismissed, without prejudice for
the prosecution to file the proper informations against the defendants in the proper court.;

The City Fiscal of Manila, on November 28, 1962, filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order,
but on December 19, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence
this appeal of the City Fiscal of Manila to this Court.

In the present appeal, the main question to be resolved is whether the information filed in the court below
alleges the complex crime of "incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest." It is the view of the
court a quo  that the information alleges the commission of two distinct crimes, one, for unlawful arrest, and,
the other, for incriminatory machinations. The lower court discarded the theory of the prosecution that the
offense of unlawful arrest was a necessary means to commit the crime of incriminatory machinations, because
of the allegation in the information that the accused had first unlawfully arrested the offended party Marcial
Apolonio y Santos and after the arrest he was investigated and it was during the investigation that the accused
had commingled the marked P1.00 bill among the paper bills that were taken from the possession of the said
offended party. The trial court is of the opinion that "the alleged planting of evidence took place while the
victim was already under investigation, long after the consummation of the alleged unlawful arrest."1
We cannot sustain the view of the trial court. It is the general rule that in resolving the motion to quash a
criminal complaint or information the facts alleged in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.
The exceptions to this general rule are those cases where the Rules of Court expressly permit the investigation
of facts alleged in the motion to quash.2 The grounds, or facts, relied upon in the motion, to quash in the
present case, are not included in the exceptions we have adverted to. We find that the information in the
present case specifically alleges that the accused did "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate and
impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery  through  unlawful
arrest ... ."3 The information further alleges that "... the said accused ... without reasonable ground therefor and
for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities did there and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly being
investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there placed or commingled a marked P1.00 bill
together with the money taken from the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos ...". It is very apparent that by the use
of the phrase "through unlawful arrest" in the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was
resorted to as a necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating
him. From a reading of the information we find a close connection between the act of the accused in first
unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and it was during that investigation that
they planted incriminatory evidence against him. We agree with the Solicitor General in his contention that the
accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken
from the offended party. We find merit in the following argument, as stated in the brief of the Solicitor
General:

Under the circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest Marcial because it was the only way
that they could with facility detain him and, more importantly, search his person or effects and, in the
process, commingle therewith the marked peso bill. It should be observed that without detaining,
investigating and searching Marcial it would have been impossible, if not difficult, for the accused to
plant the marked one peso bill, because then they could not have simply held Marcial and placed the
marked one peso bill in his pocket, without the latter vigoriously protesting the act. Besides, if the
accused simply held Marcial and planted in his pockets the marked one peso bill without arresting
him, they could not have possibly accomplished their purpose, because Marcial would have surely and
easily discovered what they were up to. Indeed, the accused had to arrest Marcial, even in the absence
of a valid reason, so that under the semblance of a police investigation, they could get whatever
money was inside his pockets and include in it the marked one peso bill. In short, the accused had to
arrest Marcial so that he could be detained and pretending to investigate him, search his person and
thereby have the opportunity of planting the marked one peso bill among his belongings. 1äwphï1.ñët

In declaring that the information did not allege a complex crime the trial court expressed the view that the
alleged planting of evidence took place while the victim was already under investigation, "long after the
consummation of the alleged unlawful arrest." This observation of the trial court does not find support in the
allegations contained in the information in question. The statement in the information that the offended party
was investigated "after" the unlawful arrest does not necessarily convey the idea that the investigation took
place "long after" the arrest had been effected. It should be a matter of evidence first, before any conclusion is
arrived at: that the investigation, during which the incriminating evidence was planted, had taken place
immediately after the arrest or long after the arrest. The allegation in the information that the accused
committed the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and also the allegation that
the act of planting the incriminatory evidence took place during the supposed investigation after the unlawful
arrest, are basis for the logical assumption, in the absence of evidence, that the two acts imputed to the accused
— that of unlawfully arresting and that of planting incriminatory evidence — had closely followed each other,
and that the former was a necessary means to commit the latter.

For a criminal complaint or information to charge the commission of a complex crime, the allegations
contained therein do not necessarily have to charge a complex crime as defined by law. It is sufficient that the
information contains allegations which show that one offense was a necessary means to commit the other. 4 On
this particular point this Court has ruled, as follows:

In order to determine whether two offenses constitute a complex crime, we should not find out
whether, in accordance with their definition by law, one of them is an essential element of the other,
such as physical injuries which cause the death of the victim, or stealing of personal property without
the consent of the owner through force or violence, for in such cases there would be only one single
offense of homicide in the first and robbery in the second case. But we should take into consideration
the facts alleged in a complaint or information and determine whether one of the two separate and
different offenses charged therein was committed as a necessary means to commit the other offense; if
it were, the two offenses constitute one complex crime; otherwise the complaint or information
charges two crimes or offenses independent from one another. (Parulan vs. Rodas and Reyes, 78 Phil.
855, 856)

We, therefore, held that the information in question in the present case contains allegations properly charging
the commission of the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and the court a
quo committed error when it ordered its dismissal.

We likewise hold that the court a quo  has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the
information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor  or imprisonment of from one
month and one day to six months, and a fine not exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory
machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six
months. 6 Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious
offense shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. And so, in the present case, in the
event of conviction, the penalty for the crime of unlawful arrest should be imposed in its maximum period. 7

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed and set aside, and this case is remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings. No costs. So ordered.

CASE 2

[ G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020 ]

PASCASIO DUROPAN AND RAYMOND NIXER COLOMA, PETITIONERS, V. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An in flagrante delicto arrest that does not comply with the overt act test is constitutionally infirm.1 Two
elements must concur, the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and that such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.2

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision4 and
Resolution.5 The Court of Appeals upheld the Regional Trial Court Decision,6 which affirmed the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Decision7 finding Pascasio Duropan (Duropan) and Raymond Nixer Coloma (Coloma)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Unlawful Arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code.
Duropan and Coloma were charged in an Information which read:

That on or about the evening of the 7th day of March 2009, in Barangay Lincod, Municipality of Maribojoc,
Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and not having authorized by law, arrest a certain WILLIAM PACIS without reasonable ground,
for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authority; to the damage and prejudice of the offended victim in
the amount to be proved during the trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code.8

On arraignment, Duropan and Coloma pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial then ensued. As the Rule
on Summary Procedure governed the case, witnesses' affidavits were presented in lieu of their direct
testimonies.9

According to the prosecution, Duropan and Coloma were Barangay Kagawad and Barangay Tanod,
respectively, of Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol.10

The Abatan Lincod Mangroves Nipa Growers Organization or simply, "ALIMANGO" is a cooperative duly
registered with the Cooperative Development Authority. Since 1998, it was authorized to develop, utilize, and
protect the Mangrove-Nipa Area in Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol. Its members cut, gather, and weave nipa
palms.11

On March 7, 2009 at 11:30 a.m., Duropan, Coloma, and another barangay official saw William Pacis (Pacis),
Lino Baldoza Jr., Jeremias Moquila, Melvin Magbanua, and Ronnel Zambra harvesting nipa palm in a
plantation.12 Coloma approached them and asked who gave them authority to harvest. Pacis replied that they
were ALIMANGO members.13

Doubting Pacis' claim, Duropan and Coloma pushed Pacis and his companions on board two (2) paddle boats.
Pacis then protested and inquired whether Duropan and Coloma can arrest them without a warrant. Despite
their objections, Pacis' group was brought to the Police Station of Maribojoc, Bohol.14

Upon investigation, Pacis and his companions were released. The Maribojoc Chief of Police determined that
the barangay officials had no legal basis to arrest Pacis.15

In their affidavits, Duropan and Coloma claimed that the arrest was pursuant to Barangay Resolution No. 2,
which was enacted the day prior to the incident. It ordered the barangay officials to conduct "surveillance on
the mangrove/nipa area due to several complaints of illegal cutting of mangroves and nipa leaves."16

They narrated that they were conducting a surveillance operation when they saw Pacis and his group cutting
nipa leaves. Duropan believed that Pacis was committing theft because he knew that the nipa plantation
belonged to Calvin Cabalit (Cabalit).17

Duropan and Coloma averred that Pacis' claim that he was a member of the "ALIMANGO Association" was
doubtful. According to them, ALIMANGO is an organization, not an association.18 While questioning the
group, Pacis allegedly lost his temper and punched Duropan's shoulder.19 In light of his violent outburst, they
brought him to the police station.20

In its Decision,21 the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cortes found Duropan and Coloma guilty of Unlawful
Arrest. It found that all the essential elements of the crime were present22 and noted that both accused
admitted to knowing Pacis prior to the arrest.23 It reasoned that instead of immediately arresting them,
Duropan and Coloma should have given them time to prove their claim. It noted that this is relevant since "the
accuseds [sic] themselves had no proof that a certain Calvin Cabalit owns the area where Pacis and his group
cut nipas."24 It dismissed the contention that Pacis assaulted Duropan.25 The dispositive portion of the
Decision read:

WHEREFORE, finding accuseds [sic] Pascasio Duroan and Raymond Nixer Coloma GUILTY beyond
reasonable ground of the crime of Unlawful Arrest, each of them is hereby sentenced to the penalty of
imprisonment of from [sic] TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto
mayor and a fine of P500.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.26

On May 17, 2013, the Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City rendered its Decision27 affirming Duropan and
Coloma's guilt. It found that Pacis and his companions did not manifest any suspicious behavior that justified
an in flagrante delicto arrest.28 It affirmed the Municipal Circuit Trial Court's conclusion that the warrantless
arrest was illegal.29

The Regional Trial Court modified the imposed penalty, thus:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION rendered by the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cortes-Antequera-
Maribojoc, Cortes, Bohol dated November 23, 2011 in Criminal Case No. M-1467 for Unlawful Arrest
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant PASCASIO DUROPAN and RAYMOND
NIXER COLOMA are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Unlawful Arrest penalized under
Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes a penalty of imprisonment of Two (2) months and
One (1) Day of arresto mayor medium and fine of P500.00 each plus costs.

SO ORDERED.30

Duropan and Coloma's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Thus, they filed a Petition for Review before
the Court of Appeals.31

In its October 23, 2015 Decision,32 the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court's
Decision:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the RTC, Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, Bohol,
in Criminal Case No. 15504 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that the payment of the fine shall earn
6% interest rate per annum commencing from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.33

The Court of Appeals held that there was no sufficient basis for Duropan and Coloma to effect a warrantless
arrest.34 There was no overt act which indicated that Pacis "had just committed, was committing, or was about
to commit a crime[.]"35

Duropan and Coloma moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the Court of Appeals
Resolution.36

Thus, on March 10, 2017, Duropan and Coloma filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.37

Petitioners posit that not all elements of the crime were present. They argue that complainant Pacis was not
arrested, but was merely invited to the police station.38 They contend that it was their duty to investigate
whether he was authorized to harvest the nipa leaves. They argue that they had reasons to doubt his claim,
considering that he referred to ALIMANGO Organization as "ALIMANGO Association." Moreover, they
believed in good faith that the land he was harvesting from belonged to Cabalit.39

Petitioners maintain that complainant attacked them, which is why he was invited to the police station.40 In the
alternative, they argue that if he was indeed arrested, there was a reasonable ground for it.41

In its June 28, 2017 Resolution,42 this Court required respondent to comment on the petition within 10 days
from notice. On August 23, 2017, respondent filed a Motion for Extension.43 Thereafter, on October 23, 2017,
it filed its Comment.44

Respondent counters that petitioners' guilt was sufficiently proved,45 as all the elements of the crime were
present.46 It reasons that despite reports of rampant illegal cutting of mangrove and nipa, petitioners ought to
be diligent in verifying reports rather than surreptitiously arresting a private person.47 Further, contrary to
petitioners' claim, they acted in bad faith in opting to arrest complainant despite no genuine inquiry into the
circumstances.48

In its January 10, 2018 Resolution,49 this Court granted the motion for extension, noted respondent's
Comment on the petition, and required petitioners to file a reply within 10 days from notice.

On March 2, 2018, petitioners filed their Reply.50 This Court noted this in its June 6, 2018 Resolution.51

In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that not all elements of the crime of unlawful arrest were attendant in this
case,52 since complainant was neither arrested nor detained for the purpose of delivering him to the proper
authorities.53 Petitioners assert that holding them liable for the crime of unlawful arrest is tantamount to
requiring them "to be as sophisticated as the court [in] determining [with] absolute certainty beyond reasonable
doubt the ground for the arrest of persons[.]"54

The issues for resolution are:

First, whether or not petitioners Pascasio Duropan and Raymond Nixer Coloma arrested William Pacis.

Second, whether or not there was reasonable ground to arrest Pacis, which warrants petitioners' acquittal from
the charge of unlawful arrest.

This Court denies the Petition.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court charged and convicted petitioners with the crime of unlawful arrest
penalized under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

ARTICLE 269. Unlawful Arrest. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized by law, or without reasonable ground
therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.55

The crime of unlawful arrest punishes an offender's act of arresting or detaining another to deliver him or her
to the proper authorities, when the arrest or detention is not authorized, or that there is no reasonable ground to
arrest or detain the other.
As worded, any person may be indicted for the crime of unlawful arrest. This was affirmed in People v.
Malasugui,56 where this Court considered whether a public officer may be held liable under this crime.

Malasugui explained that a public officer may be exculpated from the crime of unlawful arrest under specific
circumstances:

[U]nder the law, members of the Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police and of
chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even of townships (secs. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383 of the
Revised Administrative Code) may make arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed
or about to be committed in their presence, but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to
suspect that one has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them. . . An arrest
made under said circumstances is not unlawful but perfectly justified[.]57

Malasugui inferred that a public officer who does not have the authority to arrest shall be criminally liable.
Even when a public officer is authorized to arrest, he or she must have a judicial warrant. However, when the
enumerated circumstances exist, the absence of a judicial warrant is justified and does not expose the public
officer to criminal liability.

I (A)

There are several crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code pertaining to the curtailment of a person's liberty.
The crimes against the fundamental laws of the state58 and the crimes against personal liberty59 are
differentiated, thus:

Failure to judicially charge within the prescribed period renders the public officer effecting the arrest liable for
the crime of delay in the delivery of detained persons under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Further, if
the warrantless arrest was without any legal ground, the arresting officers become liable for arbitrary detention
under Article 124. However, if the arresting officers are not among those whose official duty gives them the
authority to arrest, they become liable for illegal detention under Article 267 or 268. If the arrest is for the
purpose of delivering the person arrested to the proper authorities, but it is done without any reasonable ground
or any of the circumstances for a valid warrantless arrest, the arresting persons become liable for unlawful
arrest under Article 269.60 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

A public officer whose official duty does not involve the authority to arrest may be liable for illegal detention.
Illegal detention, defined under Articles 26761 and 26862 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes "any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him [or her] of his [or her]
liberty[.]"63

A public officer who has no duty to arrest or detain a person is deemed a private individual, in contemplation
of Articles 267 and 268 of the Revised Penal Code. Even when a public officer has the legal duty to arrest or
detain another, but he or she fails to show legal grounds for detention, "the public officer is deemed to have
acted in a private capacity and is considered a 'private individual."'64

In Osorio v. Navera,65 Staff Sergeant Osorio, a ranking officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, filed a
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. He argued that he may not be
charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
considering that the felony penalizes private individuals only. In rejecting this contention and affirming the
Court of Appeals' denial of his petition, this Court explained:

SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court, specifically by the
Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the crime of kidnapping. The processes which the trial court
issued, therefore, were valid.

Contrary to SSgt. Osorio's claim, the offense he committed was not service-connected. The case filed against
him is none of those enumerated under Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles
of War.

Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal duty to detain
a person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds for the detention. Without these
legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private capacity and is considered a "private
individual." The public officer becomes liable for kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable
by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary detention punished with significantly lower penalties.

The cases cited by respondents are on point. In People v. Santiano, members of the Philippine National Police
were convicted of kidnapping with murder. On appeal, they contended that they cannot be charged with
kidnapping considering that they were public officers. This Court rejected the argument and said that "in
abducting and taking away the victim, [the accused] did so neither in furtherance of official function nor in the
pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity,
that they [committed the crime]." This Court thus, affirmed the conviction of the accused in Santiano.

In People v. PO1 Trestiza, members of the Philippine National Police were initially charged with kidnapping
for ransom. The public prosecutor, however, filed a motion to withdraw information before the trial court and
filed a new one for robbery. According to the public prosecutor, the accused cannot be charged with
kidnapping because the crime may only be committed by private individuals. Moreover, the accused argued
that the detention was allegedly part of a "legitimate police operation."

The trial court denied the motion to withdraw. It examined the Pre Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by
the defense and found that it was neither authenticated nor its signatories presented in court. The defense failed
to show proof of a "legitimate police operation" and, based on Santiano, the accused were deemed to have
acted in a private capacity in detaining the victims. This Court affirmed the conviction of the police officers for
kidnapping.

It is not impossible for a public officer to be charged with and be convicted of kidnapping
as Santiano and Trestiza illustrated. SSgt. Osorio's claim that he was charged with an "inexistent crime"
because he is a public officer is, therefore, incorrect.66 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

Thus, public officers who have no duty to arrest or detain a person, or those who may have such authority but
fail to justify the arrest or detention, may be indicted for kidnapping or serious illegal detention or slight illegal
detention.

I (B)

Inquiry is incumbent on whether the person implementing the arrest has the official duty to arrest or detain,
and whether he or she had reasonable ground to effect the apprehension in that instance.

In the crime of unlawful arrest, the offender who arrested or detained another intended to deliver the
apprehended person to the proper authorities, considering he or she does not have the authority. This act of
conducting the apprehended persons to the proper authorities takes the offense out of the crime of illegal
detention.67
As early as 1908, in United States v. Fontanilla,68 this Court had differentiated unlawful arrest from illegal
detention. Santiago Fontanilla (Fontanilla) found Apolonio de Peralta (de Peralta), Emeterio Navalta (Navalta),
and several laborers tilling his land. De Peralta insisted that the land was his brother's. A fight ensued, which
ended when Fontanilla captured and tied de Peralta and Navalta with a rope. He then brought them to the
municipal jail.

The trial court ruled that Fontanilla was guilty of illegal detention under Article 481 of the old Penal
Code.69 This Court modified the ruling, and held that Fontanilla was not guilty of illegal detention, but of
unlawful detention under Article 483 of the Penal Code,70 the precursor to unlawful arrest under Article 269
of the Revised Penal Code:

It does not appear that the persons whom the accused arrested committed any crime which would justify their
arrest without warrant by a peace officer, and the evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that there was
no justification whatever for their arrest by a private person. The accused was not a peace officer, and was not
exercising any public function when he made the arrest, nor did he have any authority to seize trespassers upon
his land and commit them to the public jail, yet the fact remains that he did apprehend and detain these parties,
and turn them over to the authorities.

Article 483 of the Penal Code provides that any person who, cases permitted by law being excepted, shall
without sufficient reason, apprehend or detain another, in order to turn him over to the authorities, shall be
punished with the penalties of arresto menor and the fine of 325 to 3,250 pesetas, and the offense committed
by the accused clearly falls under the provisions of this article. The trial court was of opinion that the offense
committed is that prescribed by article 481, which provides that any private person who shall lock up or detain
another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor. We
think, however, that the fact that the accused, after he had apprehended the complaining witnesses,
immediately conducted them to the municipal jail, and thus turned them over to the authorities, takes the
offense out of that article and brings it within the purview of article 483.71 (Emphasis supplied.)

Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure72 permits warrantless arrests in certain
instances. A public officer who does not have the official duty to arrest or detain may lawfully do so, and
effect a citizen's arrest. Petitioners admittedly attempted this here.

Finally, courts convict or acquit based on what the information charges and the evidence presented during trial.
This is called prosecutorial discretion in charging the offense. It is the prosecutor who decides what felony or
offense to charge based on the evidence presented to its office.

Here, it was entirely left for prosecutorial discretion to charge either illegal detention or unlawful arrest. For
unlawful arrest, the added element to be proved is whether from the overt facts of the case, there was a clear
intent to submit the persons arrested or detained for the purpose of prosecution. The prosecutor could have also
charged illegal detention, which means that the intent to present for legal detention and prosecution need not
be proven. However, in this case, the prosecutors decided to charge unlawful arrest only, with a significantly
lower penalty.

Thus, to prosecute accused of the crime of unlawful arrest successfully, the following elements must be
proved:

(1) that the offender arrests or detains another person;

(2) that the arrest or detention is to deliver the person to the proper authorities; and

(3) that the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or that there is no reasonable ground to.
We affirm the findings of the three tribunals that all the elements constituting the crime of unlawful arrest are
present in this case. Hence, petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt is likewise affirmed.

II

Despite petitioners' challenge, the prosecution established that petitioners arrested Pacis to bring him to the
proper authorities.

On one hand, the petitioners' claim that they merely invited Pacis to the police station to investigate whether he
had the authority to harvest nipa. On the other, they contend that he got violent which led them to arrest him.

Whatever the reason for the apprehension, it is apparently conceded that Pacis was brought to the Maribojoc
police station, the proper authorities contemplated in Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, he
was arrested, within the meaning of the same article.

Arrest is defined in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as "the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."73 It is "an actual restraint of a person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest."74

However, jurisprudence instructs that there need not be an actual restraint for curtailment of liberty to be
characterized as an "arrest."

Babst v. National Intelligence Board75 involved the National Intelligence Board's invitations to and
subsequent interrogations of several journalists. There, this Court declared:

The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of
invitation and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and
academic as regards the aforesaid matters.

Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some
questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is
a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but
as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the
invitation carries the ominous warning that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this
Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and
chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.76

Similarly, in Sanchez v. Demetriou,77 among the issues discussed was whether then Mayor Antonio L.
Sanchez (Sanchez) was arrested. Commander Rex Piad of the Philippine National Police invited Sanchez to
appear at Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. This Court explained what may be deemed an arrest:

Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest
is not required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an
intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.78 (Citation omitted)
Although denominated as requests, invitations from high-ranking officials to a hearing in a military camp were
deemed arrests. This Court characterized them as authoritative commands which may not be reasonably
expected to be defied.

When the accused is in an environment made hostile by the presence and actuations of law enforcers where it
can be reasonably inferred that they had no choice except to willingly go with them, then there is an arrest. The
subjective view of the accused will be relevant—which includes among others—their station in life and degree
of education.

Intent to arrest by the arresting person or officer, whether through actual restraint or other means, must also be
clearly established.79

In People v. Milado,80 Rogelio P. Milado (Milado) was carrying bricks of marijuana in his backpack aboard a
jeepney, on the way to Bontoc, Mountain Province. Acting upon an information that there was a person
transporting marijuana in the jeepney, the police officers set up a checkpoint. In the checkpoint, the police
identified Milado and told him to stay inside the jeepney. They subsequently brought him to the police station,
where they ordered him to open his bag where the marijuana was kept. In order to determine whether or not
there was a lawful search incidental to an arrest, this Court first resolved whether there was an arrest, and
whether the arrest was lawfully made:

[I]t cannot be denied that when the policemen saw appellant, and that he matched the description given to them
by the asset, they were certain that he was the person they were looking for. It was based on this conclusion
that appellant was brought to the police station. Although no "formal arrest" had yet been made , it is clear that
appellant had already been deprived of his liberty and taken into custody after the policemen told him to stay
inside the jeepney and instructed the driver to drive them to the police station. The term "invited" may have
been used by the police, but it was obviously a command coming from three law enforcers who appellant could
hardly be expected to defy.

Thus, as a consequence of appellant's arrest, the policemen were authorized to look at the contents of the black
bag, on the ground that a contemporaneous search of a person arrested[.]81 (Emphasis supplied)

Homar v. People82 also involved the legality of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. Ongcoma Hadji Bomar
(Bomar) was jaywalking when the police accosted him and directed him where to properly cross the street.
However, they noticed that Bomar was uneasy, searched him, and found in his possession a sachet of shabu.
This Court ruled that there was no lawful arrest and reasoned as follows:

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

....

The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was
emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines. The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in
that case was inadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no
intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was
unlawful. This is notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto for violating an
ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers.83
Petitioners' defense fails as it merely argues on semantics. However they opt to call it, it was evident that Pacis
was taken into the barangay officials' custody based on their belief that he committed a crime, either because
he was allegedly committing theft, or because he became violent. Their intent to arrest Pacis was clearly
established.

In any case, these were undisputed and non-issues before the trial courts, as the Court of Appeals found:

First, the records would reveal that the petitioners arrested the private complainant as this fact was admitted by
both of them. Second, they arrested him for the purpose of bringing him to the proper authorities, in this case,
the police station in Maribojoc, Bohol.84 (Emphasis supplied)

II (A)

At this juncture, this Court is tasked to determine whether petitioners were authorized to arrest Pacis, and
whether there was a reasonable ground to do so.

To recall, petitioner Duropan was a barangay kagawad, while petitioner Coloma was a barangay tanod of
Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol. A barangay kagawad is a member of the legislative council of the sangguniang
barangay, which enacts laws of local application. He or she is a person in authority, per Section 388 of the
Local Government Code. Meanwhile, a barangay tanod is deemed as an agent of persons in authority whose
duties are described in Section 388 of the Local Government Code:

SECTION 388. Persons in Authority. — For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall
be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may
be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of
life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority. (Emphasis supplied)

While deemed as persons in authority and agents of persons in authority, respectively, the barangay
kagawad and barangay tanod are not the public officers whose official duty is to arrest or detain persons
contemplated within the purview of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is undisputed that Pacis' apprehension was not pursuant to an arrest warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates instances when warrantless arrests are lawful:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Manibog v. People85 distinguished between the arresting officer's "probable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested committed an offense[,]" leading to a warrantless arrest, and a reasonable suspicion that entails a
"stop and frisk" search:

For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of
the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must have personally witnessed the
crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must have had probable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested committed an offense. Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest
generally precedes, or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search.

In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest, stop and frisk searches are conducted
to deter crime. People v. Cogaed underscored that they are necessary for law enforcement, though never at the
expense of violating a citizen's right to privacy:

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is,
law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in
a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

Posadas v. Court of Appeals saw this Court uphold the warrantless search and seizure done as a valid stop and
frisk search. There, the accused's suspicious actions, coupled with his attempt to flee when the police officers
introduced themselves to him, amounted to a reasonable suspicion that he was concealing something illegal in
his buri bag. However, Posadas failed to elaborate on or describe what the police officers observed as the
suspicious act that led them to search the accused's buri bag.

....

Manalili and Solayao upheld the warrantless searches conducted because "the police officers[,] using their
senses[,] observed facts that led to the suspicion." Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances in each case
provided sufficient and genuine reason for them to suspect that something illicit was afoot.

For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal knowledge of facts, which would
engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act. Cogaed emphasized that anything less than the
arresting officer's personal observation of a suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement
of the "basic right to security of one's person and effects."

Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere suspicion is not enough; there should be a
genuine reason, as determined by the police officer, to warrant a belief that the person searched was carrying a
weapon. In short, the totality of circumstances should result in a genuine reason to justify a stop and frisk
search.

In Esquillo v. People, the police officer approached and searched the accused after seeing her put a clear
plastic sachet in her cigarette case and try to flee from him. This Court upheld the validity of the stop and frisk
search conducted, since the police officer's experience led him to reasonably suspect that the plastic sachet
with white crystalline substance m the cigarette case was a dangerous drug.

In his dissent in Esquillo, however, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Lucas Bersamin (Chief Justice
Bersamin) pointed out how the police officer admitted that only his curiosity upon seeing the accused put a
plastic sachet in her cigarette case prompted him to approach her. This was despite not seeing what was in it,
as he was standing three (3) meters away from her at that time. The dissent read:

For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of reasonable suspicion that a
person is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a
reasonable, prudent police officer. Yet, the totality of the circumstances described by PO1 Cruzin did not
suffice to engender any reasonable suspicion in his mind. The petitioner's act, without more, was an innocuous
movement, absolutely not one to give rise in the mind of an experienced officer to any belief that she had any
weapon concealed about her, or that she was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer.
Neither should her act and the surrounding circumstances engender any reasonable suspicion on the part of the
officer that a criminal activity was afoot. We should bear in mind that the Court has frequently struck down the
arrest of individuals whose overt acts did not transgress the penal laws, or were wholly innocent. (Citation
omitted)

Chief Justice Bersamin cautioned against warrantless searches based on just one (1) suspicious circumstance.
There should have been "more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity" to uphold the validity of a stop and frisk search.

Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have personally
observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then create a reasonable
inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate further.86 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

Even granting that petitioners may have had the authority to inquire into the surrounding circumstances, and
that what transpired was a stop and frisk search, petitioners failed to cite any suspicious circumstance that
warranted Pacis' immediate arrest.

Petitioners argue that due to the numerous reports of stealing nipa leaves, it was reasonable for them to suspect
that Pacis violated the law. This argument falls short in light of three (3) things: (1) they were aware that
ALIMANGO existed, whose members were authorized to harvest nipa; (2) they personally knew Pacis; and (3)
they were uncertain that Cabalit owns the land where they found Pacis and his group. We elaborate.

Upon hearing a reasonable explanation as to why Pacis was harvesting the nipa leaves, petitioners had no
reason to suspect any wrongdoing. Petitioners knew Pacis and are familiar with ALIMANGO. Since it was
easy to verify if he was indeed a member of the group, prudence dictated that they first investigate. Had it
turned out that he was not a member and was indeed stealing from Cabalit, a warrant of arrest could have been
obtained as they witnessed the commission of the crime.

In addition, they were uncertain that Pacis and his companions were harvesting on Cabalit's land. Petitioners
admit that "there [were] no demarcation lines showing the exact boundaries"87 of the two (2) plantations.
Apart from Pacis mistakenly stating "association," instead of "organization," there was no apparent
irregularity. There was no reason to believe Pacis and his group were breaking the law.

Petitioners invoke paragraph (a) to justify their warrantless arrest.88 People v. Cogaed89 requires compliance
with the "overt act" test in in flagrante delicto arrests:
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.90 (Citations omitted)

"Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm."91 Both
elements that justify an in flagrante delicto arrest were absent in this case.

In arguing that they had reasonable ground to arrest Pacis, petitioners contend that they believed in good faith
that he was stealing nipa leaves from Cabalit's land. We are not convinced.

First, Pacis was merely cutting nipa leaves when petitioners came across him. This act by itself is not a crime.

Second, the group displayed no signs of suspicious behavior. The only overt act they saw Pacis and his
companions do was harvesting nipa leaves from a plantation in plain view and in broad daylight.

As the Court of Appeals explained:

Petitioners' defense will not hold water in light of the fact that the nipa palms cut by the private complainant
and his group belonged to an organization called [ALIMANGO], of which the private complainant and his
group are duly registered members. As aptly pointed out by the [Regional Trial Court], the prudent act that
should have been done by the petitioners, as barangay officials, was to conduct a thorough investigation on the
reports of illegal cutting of mangroves or nipa leaves in the area rather than resorting to the drastic move of
arresting the private complainant who had identified himself as a member of [ALlMANGO]. The decision of
the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court] also correctly pointed out that if petitioners were doubtful of the private
complainant's membership with [ALIMANGO], they should have required him to furnish the proper
documents to prove his membership. The acts of petitioners in maliciously ignoring the claim of membership
of the private complainant, arresting the latter without reasonable ground, and forcibly bringing the latter to the
police station in Maribojoc, Bohol, sufficiently constitutes bad faith. All these factual circumstances are
enough to rebut the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties in
petitioners' favor.92

There was no overt act within petitioners' plain view which hinted that Pacis was committing a crime. During
his apprehension, Pacis has not committed, was not committing, nor was he about to commit a crime. The
warrantless arrest in this case was unlawful.

III

As found by all three (3) tribunals, this Court affirms the ruling that petitioners are guilty of unlawful arrest
under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code.

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty for unlawful arrest should be taken from
the medium period of arresto mayor, which is two (2) months and (1) day to four (4) months. Contrary to the
penalty imposed by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in
this case. It does not apply to "those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year."93

Thus, the Regional Trial Court correctly modified the penalty of imprisonment to two (2) months and one (1)
day, which is within the range of the imposable penalty, and affirmed the tine of P500.00 each. The Court of
Appeals correctly modified it to state that the payment of the fine shall earn 6% interest rate per annum
commencing from the finality of the decision until fully paid.
We are not averse to the aggressive protection of our environment, especially of our diminishing mangroves.
The zeal displayed by the accused as barangay officials to comply with their duties is, to some degree,
commendable. However, there is a delicate line between zeal in enforcement and disregard for the fundamental
rights of our citizens. Unfortunately, the accused clearly and unequivocally crossed that line.

Harvesting nipa indeed may be a leading cause for the deterioration of our mangroves. Both the offended
parties and the accused however are fully aware that for many of our citizens in rural areas, the humble nipa is
still the affordable option to build their shelters that will protect many of those who still live in poverty against
the harsh realities of our steadily deteriorating climate conditions.

It is the poor who will harvest the nipa, not the rich.

Therefore, our laws and regulations are humane enough to grant licenses to some associations allowing them to
harvest sustainably and always mindful of the carrying capacity of our shared ecology.

The accused should have been mindful of this reality. After all, they are from the same locality. Their restraint
could have been an expressive gesture of social justice. As public officers, inquiry into their authority would
have been sufficient. Accosting the offended parties was uncalled for under the circumstances. Justice is better
served. often by tempering it with mercy and a humble dose of common sense.

We affirm their conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals October 23, 2015
Decision and February 1, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 02182 are AFFIRMED.

CASE 3

February 13, 2019

G.R. No. 210731

SIMEON LAPI y MAHIPUS, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused, assisted by counsel, fails to object
to its validity before arraignment.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision  and December 10, 2013
1 2

Resolution  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01564, which upheld the Regional Trial Court
3

September 15, 2010 Decision.  The trial court found Simeon M. Lapi (Lapi) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
4
having violated Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165  and sentenced him to six (6) months of
5

rehabilitation at a government-approved facility.

In an Information dated April 20, 2006, Lapi, Allen Sacare (Sacare), and Kenneth Lim (Lim) were charged
with violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. The Information read:

That on or about the 17th day of April, 2006, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the herein accused conspiring, confederating and acting in concert, not being authorized
by law to smoke, consume, administer to oneself, ingest or use a dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously engage in ingesting and introducing to their bodies a dangerous drug known as
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu and after confirmatory test on the qualitative examination of the
urine sample on the three accused, they were found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine, a dangerous
drug, per Chemistry Report Nos. DT- 042-2006, DT-043-2006 and DT-045-2006, respectively, in violation of
the aforementioned law.

Act contrary to law. 6

On arraignment, Lapi, Sacare, and Lim pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At pre-trial, Sacare and Lim
changed their pleas to guilty, and were sentenced to rehabilitation for six (6) months at a government-
recognized center. Only Lapi was subjected to trial on the merits. 7

According to the prosecution, at around 1:50 p.m. on April 17, 2006, operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-
Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2,
Bacolod City. During the operation, Police Officer 2 Ronald Villeran (P02 Villeran) heard noises from one (1)
of the houses. He "peeped through its window"  and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim "having a pot session."
8 9

P02 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, but the door was locked. He then tried to enter
through the kitchen door. Upon entry, he met someone trying to flee, but P02 Villeran restrained the person.  10

Then, P02 Villeran "peeked into the adjacent room"   and saw that the pot session was ongoing. He entered the
11

room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tried to escape, but were caught by P02
Villeran's team members, who were waiting by the main door.  12

Having been arrested and their paraphernalia seized, the men were then brought to the City Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Operation Task Group Office, where a police blotter was filed. They were later brought to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to undergo drug tests.  13

The initial laboratory report found that Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), while their companions, Noel Canlas and Carmelo Limbaco,   tested negative. Another
14

test conducted yielded the same results. 15

In his defense, Lapi alleged that on April 17, 2006, he was in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City to deliver
a mahjong set to a certain Antonio Kadunggo. On his way home, two (2) persons approached him and searched
his pocket. They took his money, handcuffed him, and boarded him on a tricycle with four (4) other persons
whom he did not know.  16

Lapi stated that upon reaching the Taculing Police Headquarters, he and the others were subjected to a drug
test. They were then escorted to their detention cell without being informed of the test results. Rolando
Cordova, a barbecue vendor in the area, corroborated Lapi's testimony.  17
In its September 15, 2010 Decision,  the Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless
18

arrest against him was legal since he was caught in flagrante del icto.  19

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision read:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Simeon Lapi y Mahipus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) as charged, judgment is hereby rendered
imposing upon him the penalty of a minimum of Six (6) Months rehabilitation in any government recognized
government center, this being apparently his first offense, to start within fifteen (15) here-from.

The doctor-in-charge of said rehabilitation facility is also required to render a written report of the progress of
the program and the termination of the rehabilitation of the accused.

SO ORDERED. 20

Lapi appealed to the Court of Appeals. 21

In its April 29, 2013 Decision,  the Court of Appeals denied the Appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court
22

Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that P02 Villeran, upon seeing the pot session, "had reasonable ground to believe
that [Lapi was] under the influence of dangerous drugs. Thus, he was justified and even obligated by law to
subject him to drug screening laboratory examination." 23

Lapi filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its December 10, 2013
24

Resolution. 25

Hence, Lapi filed this Petition.  26

Petitioner argues that while he raises factual questions, his case falls under the exceptions under the Rules of
Court. He claims that the Court of Appeals' factual findings "are totally bereft of support in the records and so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion." 27

Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity of his arrest before entering his plea, his
warrantless arrest was illegal from the start. Hence, any evidence obtained cannot be used against him. He
argues that P02 Villeran committed "a malevolent intrusion of privacy"  when he peeped through the window;
28

had he not done so, he would not see what the people in the house did.  He contends that this intrusion into his
29

privacy "cannot be equated in plain view[;] therefore[,] petitioner cannot be considered caught inflagrante
delicto."  He submits that to "rule otherwise would be like giving authority to every police officer to intrude
30

into the private homes of anyone in order to catch suspended drug offenders." 31

Respondent, on the other hand, counters that petitioner prays for a review of the facts and evidence, which is
beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari.  It asserts that the warrantless arrest was valid, as
32

"[t]he act of having a pot session is clearly the overt act required under the law, which indicates that petitioner
is actually committing an offense."  It argues that what prompted P02 Villeran to enter the house was not the
33

noise from one (1) of the houses, but what he saw petitioner a nd his companions were doing in the house
where they were apprehended.  34

Further, respondent claims that since petitioner was not the owner of that house, he had no "reasonable
expectation of privacy that must be upheld."  It submits that "[a] houseguest who was merely present in the
35
house with the consent of the householder cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in his host's
home." 36

This Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest against petitioner Simeon M.
Lapi was valid. However, this Court must first pass upon the procedural question of whether or not the Petition
should be denied for raising questions of fact.

This Court is not a trier of facts.   A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
37

must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law.  Parties may only raise issues that can be determined
38

without having to review or reevaluate the evidence on record.  This Court generally gives weight to the
39

factual findings of the lower courts "because of the opportunity enjoyed by the [lower courts] to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess their testimony." 40

In criminal cases, however, the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proven.  To prove guilt, courts must evaluate the evidence presented in relation to the elements of the crime
41

charged.  Thus, the finding of guilt is essentially a question of fact.   For this reason, the entire records of a
42 43

criminal case are thrown open for this Court's review. In Ferrer v. People: 44

It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and that it
becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether
they are assigned as errors or not.  45

This Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual findings of the lower courts, or even arriving at a
different conclusion, "if it is not convinced that [the findings] are conformable to the evidence of record and to
its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses."  The lower courts' factual findings will not bind this
46

Court if facts that could affect the result of the case "were overlooked and disregarded[.]" 47

An examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals shows no error that requires
this Court's review. On this ground, the Petition can be outright dismissed.

II

Even if this Court reviews the substantial merits of this case, the Petition is still denied. The Court of Appeals
did not err in affirming the trial court's finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

A citizen's right to be secure against any unreasonable searches and seizures is sacrosanct. No less than the
Constitution guarantees that the State cannot intrude into the citizen's persons, house, papers, and effects
without a warrant issued by a judge finding probable cause:

Article III

Bill of Rights

....

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.  48

The Constitution guarantees against "unreasonable" warrantless searches and seizures. This presupposes that
the State may do so as long as they are reasonable. People v. Aruta  outlines the situations where a warrantless
49

search and seizure may be declared valid:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.  50

For a warrantless arrest to be valid, the arrest must have been committed under the following circumstances:

RULE 113

ARREST

....

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112. 51

Here, petitioner was seen by police officers participating in a "pot session."  P02 Villeran, respondent's
52

primary witness, testified that on the day of the incident, he and other police operatives were conducting a
"stakeout operation" in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. He stated:

While I was passing on that house and upon hearing that there was a noise inside the house, I peeped on the
window and I was able to see three persons sitting with a small table on the middle of them, one of those
person (sic) was holding an alumin[u]m foil which was rolled and was used as a straw and placed on his mouth
while there was another foil with a lighted lighter in the bottom of that foil with the fume from that foil he was
sniffing through his mouth and after that he passed that aluminum foil from him to another.  53

Petitioner was arrested and subjected to drug testing. When he tested positive for shabu, he was subsequently
charged with having violated Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165,  which reads:
54

SECTION 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. -A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for
use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6)
months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of
this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall
not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall
apply.

Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since P02 Villeran had to peep through the window to
ascertain that something illegal was occurring. He posits that his case is similar to that of People v.
Balasa.   In Balasa, the police were tipped off by an informant that people were packing drugs in a certain
55

house. Upon reaching it, the police officers peeked into a window, where they saw a man and a woman
repacking marijuana. The officers entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested the
pair. This Court held that the arrests and the subsequent searches and seizures were invalid as the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that the people in the house were committing a crime.

Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment.   He
56

did not move to quash the Information against him before entering his plea.   He was assisted by counsel when
57

he entered his plea.   Likewise, he was able to present his evidence.   In People v. Alunday:
58 59 60

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing
the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not
a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
Herein, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he actively
participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this
Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by
not raising the objection before his arraignment.

It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed,
the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.

Accused-appellant was not even denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, because of his
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted
plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.  61

In Balasa, the accused were charged with possession of illegal drugs. This Court not only contended with the
validity of the warrantless arrest, but also examined the validity of the subsequent search of the accused and
the seizure of items in their possession. As with certain constitutional rights,  the right to question the validity
62

of a warrantless arrest can be waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest.  63

Petitioner does not deny that his drug test yielded positive for illegal drugs. What he questions is the alleged
illegality of his arrest.

Petitioner, however, has already waived the right to question the validity of his arrest. No items were seized
from him during his arrest as he was not charged with possession or sale of illegal drugs. Thus, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Article II,
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision and December 10, 2013 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CEB-CR No. 01564 are AFFIRMED.

CASE 4
G.R. No. 238453

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JAIME SISON, LEONARDO YANSON, AND ROSALIE BAUTISTA, Accused

LEONARDO YANSON, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To be valid, searches must proceed from a warrant issued by a judge.  While there are exceptions to this rule,
1

warrantless searches can only be carried out when founded on probable cause, or "a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."  There must be a confluence of
2
several suspicious circumstances. A solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause; items seized during
warrantless searches based on solitary tips are inadmissible as evidence.

In offenses involving illegal drugs, narcotics or related items establish the commission of the crime charged.
They are the corpus delicti of the offense. The inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence that forms
3

the corpus delicti dooms the prosecution's cause. Without proof of corpus delicti, no conviction can ensue, and
acquittal is inexorable.

This Court resolves an appeal from the assailed Decision  of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
4

Regional Trial Court's Joint Judgment  convicting accused-appellant Leonardo Yanson (Yanson) and his co
5

accused, Jaime Sison (Sison) and Rosalie Bautista (Bautista), for violation of Section 4  of Republic Act No.
6

6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

An Information was filed against Sison, Yanson, and Bautista before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Kabacan, Cotabato City, charging them with violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972:

That on May 31, 1996, in the Municipality of Mlang (sic), Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly, without any permit from the authorities, transport, shipped (sic) and carry along
with them, in a vehicle with trademark ISUZU, colored Silver gray, with Plate No. SDC 619, Six (6) kilos of
dried marijuana leaves/Indian Hemp, placed inside two (2) separate sacks, which is prohibited drugs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

On arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial then followed.  8

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses:  (1) Superintendent/Colonel Eriel Mallorca (Superintendent
9

Mallorca); (2) Senior Police Officer 4 Dionisio Arsenio (SPO4 Arsenio); (3) PO3 Rafael Biton; (4) SPO3 Isaac
Prado (SPO3 Prado); (5) SPO4 Vivencio Jaurigue; and (6) SPO4 Albert Claudio. The defense presented the
three (3) accused as its witnesses. 
10

According to the prosecution, at 8:30 a.m. on May 31, 1996, the Municipal Police Station of M’lang, North
Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate number 619  and carrying
11

three (3) people—that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police instructed the alert team to
set up a checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along the road from Matalam to M’lang.  12

At around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police officers
on standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an
officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine.  13

The vehicle, its driver, and its passengers were brought to the local police station.  The Chief of Police kept the
14

seized sacks. The following day, he and SPO4 Arsenio brought the seized items to the Davao City Crime
Laboratory for examination. The seized sacks were personally received by Superintendent Mallorca, who then
examined the items and later reported that their contents tested positive for marijuana, weighing a total of
5,637 grams.  15

The driver and the two (2) passengers were later identified as Sison, Bautista, and Yanson, respectively. 16

For the defense, Yanson testified that at around 5:30 a.m. on the day of the incident, Bautista and Sison fetched
him from his house in Poblacion, Surallah, South Cotabato. They all drove to Midsayap to get something from
the house of the Surallah Mayor, who was Sison's uncle. He claimed, however, that he did not know what that
something was.  While he stayed in the pickup, Sison and Bautista entered the Mayor's house, came out 30
17

minutes later, then returned to their vehicle. They drove off, but stopped in Kabacan, North Cotabato to eat at a
terminal before going home.  18

As they reached M’lang on their way home, they were stopped by police officers who inspected the vehicle
and told them that they were looking for something. After the inspection, they were brought to the police
station where they were detained and compelled to admit that marijuana was seized from them.  19

Sison testified on substantially the same sequence of events as Yanson, though he notably recalled that they
took the trip to Midsayap at 5:30 p.m. 20

Bautista testified that at around 5:30 to 6:00 a.m. on the day of their arrest, she was waiting by the roadside for
a ride to Marbel (also called Koronadal, South Cotabato) to purchase goods for resale in her ready-to wear or
"RTW" business. While she was waiting, Sison and Yanson, who were aboard a silver gray Isuzu pickup, saw
her and stopped. Yanson asked about her destination and offered her a ride, which she accepted. En route to
Cotabato City, they passed by Yanson's house where Yanson’s male friend joined them. After passing a long
steel bridge, Yanson told Sison to park Yanson and his friend alighted and, on foot, crossed the highway and
walked ahead together. 21

After 30 minutes, Yanson and his friend returned and told Bautista that they were all going to return to the
place they had just come from Bautista, however, stayed behind by the highway. After some 15 to 20 minutes,
Sison, Yanson, and his companion returned. When they were about to leave, Yanson's companion
disembarked, leaving her, Yanson, and Sison to take the return trip at around 9:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m. They
stopped to eat at a carinderia before resuming their trip.22

Bautista further alleged that when they reached M’lang, they were stopped by police officers who inspected
their vehicle. Sison alighted and opened the vehicle's hood, exposing the marijuana under it. Upon discovery,
they were taken to the police station along with their vehicle, and there they were detained. 23

In a Joint Judgment  promulgated on March 11, 2013, the Regional Trial Court convicted Yanson, Sison, and
24

Bautista of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the Joint Judgment read:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds all accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for VIOLATION OF
SECTION 4, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972D.]

This Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT. In addition, this Court imposes
upon each of them a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 20,000.00).

In the service of their sentences, let the period of their respective preventive detention be credited in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

The marijuana involved in this case is hereby confiscated in favor of the Government and shall be properly
disposed of in accordance with the law.

Considering that the use of the vehicle in the commission of the offense is not authorized by its owner, it is
hereby ordered that the said vehicle be returned to its owner.

The bail bond for accused-convict Rosalie Bautista is hereby cancelled. Pending the finality of this Judgment,
let convict Rosalie Bautista be committed for detention at the North Cotabato District Jail, BJMP, Amas,
Kidapawan City.
SO ORDERED. 25

The Regional Trial Court sustained the search conducted on the tipped vehicle as a valid warrantless search
because, according to it, the accused consented anyway. 26

Moreover, the trial court made much of apparent inconsistencies in the accused's testimonies. It noted that
Sison and Yanson testified that there were just three (3) of them in the trip, while Bautista recalled Yanson
having a male companion. It also noted that Yanson and Bautista recalled leaving for Surallah at around 5:30
in the morning, while Sison recalled leaving at 5:30 in the afternoon. Also noteworthy to the trial court,
Yanson and Sison claimed that they were heading to Midsayap while Bautista maintained that they were
headed to Cotabato City. 27

The trial court further concluded that all three (3) accused engaged in a conspiracy. It noted their acts of
leaving Surallah together on board the same vehicle and making their return trip together as indicative of their
joint purpose and design. 28

Only Yanson appealed before the Court of Appeals. 29

Yanson contended that the two (2) sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and Sison are
inadmissible evidence since the police officers did not have probable cause to conduct a search on their
vehicle.  He noted that the radio message supposedly received by the police officers was "[t]he sole basis for
30

their belief of the alleged transportation of marijuana[.]" 31

Citing People v. Vinecario,  Yanson asserted that searches at checkpoints, in the absence of probable cause,
32

should be limited only to a visual search. Thus, he maintained that the further instruction for Sison to open the
hood of their pickup amounted to an unreasonable intrusion and violation of privacy. Yanson added that Sison
could never have freely consented to an extensive search considering how, when they were flagged down and
asked about opening the hood, he was surrounded by police officers and could not feel secure in declining.  33

Yanson added that while the governing law at the time he allegedly committed the offense was Republic Act
No. 6425, he was entitled to benefit from the favorable amendatory provisions of Republic Act No. 9165. He
noted that Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires arresting officers to strictly comply with the chain of
custody requirements. 34

Yanson claimed that the police officers who arrested them failed to faithfully comply with Section 21,
particularly when they failed to mark and seal the two (2) sacks of marijuana allegedly found under the
pickup's hood. He also pointed out that the Chief of Police, Jose Calimutan, failed to testify on the steps he
took to maintain the integrity of the items allegedly seized. 35

Yanson faulted the Regional Trial Court for maintaining that he engaged in a conspiracy with his co-accused.
He asserted that he was simply a passenger who had no knowledge of whatever materials lay under the
pickup's hood.36

The Office of the Solicitor General countered that probable cause was properly established since there was
verified information that the pickup was being used to transport illegal drugs. It maintained that an extensive
search in checkpoints is allowed if the officers conducting the search have probable cause to believe, prior to
the search, "that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched." 37

The Office of the Solicitor General added that the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 could not
be applied as the crime was committed on May 31, 1996, long before Republic Act No. 9165 came into effect.
It added that, in any case, the police officers were shown to have adhered to the four (4) critical links
concerning chain of custody.  38

The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Yanson conspired with his co-accused to transport
marijuana. It contended "that conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to
commit long as the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common
design towards the accomplishment of [the] same unlawful purpose." 39

In its January 23, 2018 Decision,  the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Joint Judgment.
40

It ruled that there was probable cause to conduct an extensive search since the information received by the
police officers was sufficiently accurate, given how the pickup "was spotted in the place where it was said to
be coming from and was actually loaded with marijuana." 41

Moreover, the Court of Appeals found no reason to apply Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, considering
that Republic Act No. 9165 was not in effect when the crime was committed. 42

The Court of Appeals also maintained the finding of conspiracy in Yanson's act of travelling with Sison and
Bautista from Pikit to M’lang with the contraband. 43

The dispositive portion of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Judgment dated February 11, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 16, Kabacan, Cotabato in Criminal Case No. 96-121 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life
Imprisonment and payment of fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.  44

Yanson filed his Notice of Appeal,  which was given due course by the Court of Appeals in its March 7, 2018
45

Resolution. 46

Acting on the records transmitted by the Court of Appeals, this Court issued a June 4, 2018
Resolution  informing the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs. Through separate
47

manifestations, however, the parties opted to not file supplemental briefs and merely adopted the arguments
and issues they had raised before the Court of Appeals. 48

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not accused appellant Leonardo Yanson's guilt for illegally
transporting marijuana was established beyond reasonable doubt. Subsumed under this issue are the issues
previously raised before the Court of Appeals:

First, whether or not a valid search and seizure was conducted on the pickup boarded by accused-appellant and
his co-accused, Jaime Sison and Rosalie Bautista;

Second, whether or not Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 may retroactively apply; and

Finally, whether or not accused-appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused.

The Court grants the appeal. Accused-appellant and his co-accused are acquitted.

I
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires a warrant to be issued by a judge before a search can be
validly effected:

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

The issuance of a search warrant must be premised on a finding of probable cause; that is, the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."  49

The rule requiring warrants is, however, not absolute. Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when
warrantless searches and seizures are considered permissible:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest ...;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view,"...;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.  (Emphasis supplied)

50

A search of a moving vehicle is one (1) of the few permissible exceptions where warrantless searches can be
made. People v. Mariacos  explains:
51

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a
store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.   (Citation omitted)
52

However, for a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause remains imperative.  Law
53

enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct searches. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals: 54

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
55

In determining the existence of probable cause, bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not
demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction,  it requires the existence of "a reasonable
56
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." 57

II

People v. Cogaed,  citing Chief Justice Lucas Bersamin's dissent in Esquillo v. People,  emphasized that in
58 59

warrantless searches, law enforcers "must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance."  What is required is
60

the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity."61 Indeed, it is unlikely that a law enforcer's suspicion is reasonably roused at
the sight of a single activity, which may very well be innocent. It is far more likely that there first be several,
continuous, peculiar acts of a suspect before any law enforcer's suspicion is roused. At every peculiar act done,
a law enforcer's suspicion is successively confirmed and strengthened.

There have been a number of cases where this Court considered warrantless searches made in moving vehicles
to be valid. In these cases, probable cause was founded on more than just a solitary suspicious circumstance.

In People v. Malmstedt,  Narcotics Command officers set up a temporary checkpoint in response to "persistent
62

reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."   These
63

included information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. At the
checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected it, starting from the front, going towards the rear. The
bus turned out to be the vehicle boarded by the accused. Upon reaching the accused, an officer noticed a bulge
on his waist. This prompted the officer to ask for the accused's passport and identification papers, which the
accused failed to provide. The accused was then made to reveal what was bulging on his waist. It turned out to
be hashish, a derivative of marijuana. 64

In Malmstedt, this Court ruled that the warrantless search was valid because there was probable cause--
premised on circumstances other than the original tip concerning a Caucasian person for the arresting officers
to search the accused:

It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused
was trying to hide his identity. 
65

In People v. Que,  police officers went on patrol after receiving information that "a ten-wheeler truck bearing
66

plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte."  When they saw the
67

truck resembling this description pass by, the officers flagged it down.

Q: That information was relayed to you only by your Chief Calimutan, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And, because of that you went to the check point (sic) and put a barricade along the National Highway?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And then you searched every vehicle that passed on that check point (sic)?

A: No, because according to the information[,] it was a pick-up.

Q: So, you checked all pick-up that passed on your check point (sic) on that morning on May 31, 1996?
A: Not all, sir.

Q: Now, how many of you who (sic) conducted the check point (sic), Mr. Witness?

A: There were many of us but I can no longer remember how many.   (Emphasis supplied)
92

Sison's predicament calls to mind a similar situation that this Court passed upon in Aniag, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections.   There, this Court noted:
93

In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive
search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be
more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.   (Citation omitted)
94

Sison did not have much of a choice when he was asked to open the hood of the vehicle. He could not have
given his genuine, sincere consent.

Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution stipulates that illegal searches and seizures result in the
inadmissibility in evidence of whatever items were seized:

SECTION 3....

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

This exclusionary rule is a protection against erring officers who deliberately or negligently disregard the
proper procedure in effecting searches, and would so recklessly trample on one's right to privacy. By negating
the admissibility in evidence of items seized in illegal searches and seizures, the Constitution declines to
validate the law enforcers' illicit conduct. "Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree." 
95

Section 4  of Republic Act No. 6425  punished the sale, administration, delivery, distribution,
96 97

and transportation of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 9165,  which was enacted in lieu of Republic Act
98

No. 6425, punishes under its Section 5  the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution,
99

and transportation of dangerous drugs, and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes the same set of acts as Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, except that the
amending law extends to controlled precursors and essential chemicals.

Essential elements must be proven for a successful prosecution of violations of Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165 (or what used to be Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425). People v. Montevirgen  discussed the elements
100

for conviction for the illegal sale of illegal drugs, one (1) of the several acts penalized by Section 5:

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following
elements must be proved: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. ... What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the  corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence.  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
101
Corpus delicti, literally meaning the "body of the crime," pertains "to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime."  Jurisprudence explains that, to prove corpus delicti, "it is
102

sufficient for the prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven—say, a person has died or
a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act."
103

In cases involving drugs, the confiscated article constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime charged.  Under
104

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the essence of the crime is the sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs, and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals. The act of transporting the drugs, as in this case, must be duly proven by the prosecution, along
with how a particular person is the perpetrator of that act. The seized drug, then, becomes the corpus delicti of
the crime charged. The entire case of the prosecution revolves around that material.

In drugs cases where the allegedly confiscated drug is excluded from admissible evidence-as when it was
acquired through an invalid warrantless search-the prosecution is left without proof of corpus delicti. Any
discussion on whether a crime has been committed becomes an exercise in futility. Acquittal is then
inexorable.

Thus, here, the arresting officers' search and subsequent seizure are invalid. As such, the two (2) sacks of
marijuana supposedly being transported in the pickup cannot be admitted in evidence.

Even assuming that they were admissible, there remains no proof, whether direct or circumstantial, that the
accused actually knew that there were drugs under the hood of their vehicle. Ultimately, their actual authorship
of or conscious engagement in the illegal activity of transporting dangerous drugs could not be ascertained.

In any case, with evidence on corpus delicti being inadmissible and placed beyond the Regional Trial Court's
contemplation, the prosecution is left with a fatal handicap: it is insisting on the commission of the crime
charged, but is without evidence. Accused-appellant's acquittal must

ensue. 105

VI

His co-accused, Sison and Bautista, must also be acquitted.

Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concerns situations where there are
several accused but not all of them appeal their conviction:

SECTION 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar
as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

As a rule, the effects of an appeal can only bind the accused who appealed his or her conviction. However,
when an appellate court renders a

and the conduct of the parties' lawyers" to determine whether the delay is justifiable. When the case is simple
and the evidence is straightforward, it is possible that delay may occur even within the given
periods.  (Citations omitted)
116

This Court fails to see what extraordinary facts and circumstances or peculiar complexity warranted taking as
much as 17 years to rule on this case. The Regional Trial Court's delay is immensely distressing, even more so
now that each of the accused, as this Court has found, must be acquitted. This Court endeavored to do its best
to resolve this appeal with dispatch resolving it within more than just a year of the appeal having been brought
before it. But even its judgment of acquittal can only come after all of 22 years that it had taken the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to rule on this case.

In light of this occasion, this Court enjoins judges and justices at all levels to be more heedful not only of the
imperative to timely render judgment, but also of the need to always be conscientious in resolving cases. The
accused here could have benefitted from their acquittal much sooner had the Regional Trial Court judge or the
Court of Appeals justices been more scrupulous in discharging their functions and readily appreciated the fatal
flaws in the prosecution's case. This Court is constrained to grapple with the already immense delay that
confronted us at the filing of accused appellant's appeal. We can only hope that our judgment of acquittal—and
the lessons it can offer--can dispense a measure of recompense to the wrongfully accused.

WHEREFORE, the January 23, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01374-MIN
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Leonardo Yanson and his co-accused, Jaime Sison and
Rosalie Bautista, are ACQUITTED of transportation of prohibited drugs and are ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless they are being held for some other legal cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate
implementation.  The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this
1âшphi1

Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

For their information, copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine National Police
and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for
destruction in accordance with law.

CASE 5

G.R. No. L-35500             October 27, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE RUBIO, defendant-appellant.

Guillermo B. Guevara for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Moran presiding, denying
appellant's motion to declare null and void a search warrant issued on December 26, 1930, and to have
returned to him the books of account, invoices, and records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. The
case was originally assigned to a Division of Five and was there decided, but subsequently, on representations
being made that the interpretation of an Act of Congress was involved, the Division ordered its decision set
aside and the transfer of the case to the court in banc.

The Administrative Code, section 1434, grants police power to internal revenue agents. Acting pursuant to this
authority, the chief secret service agent and a supervising agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue gave
testimony under oath before Judge Revilla, in which they specified the premises situated at No. 129 Calle Juan
Luna, District of Binondo, City of Manila, occupied by Jose Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading
Corporation, which it was desired to search. The witnesses, among other things, stated:

It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered reliable that in said premises there are
fraudulent books, invoices and records.

I have watched personally the foregoing house for several times in company of the complainant and I
can assert positively and with a probable case that the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and
records, exist and being conducted in the said house, and the occupant of the same keeps in his
possession effects and devices to wit: Fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation & to
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation & New York Trading Corp.

Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search warrant was issued in the usual from, reading as follows:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,           plaintiff,           }

VERSUS

JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex Trading

          Corporation, Paramount Corporation and
          New York Trading Corporation,                           defendant.       }

The People of the Philippine Islands, to the Internal

Revenue Agents of the City of Manila.

GREETING:

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the complainant on oath of Juan
Evaristo and Augusto Piccio of the City of Manila, P. I., that the defendant Jose Rubio keeps
illegally and feloniously fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that he verily believes
upon probable cause that the said books, invoices and records, at No. 129, Calle Juan Luna in
the City of Manila, P. I., and the said (personal) property is now being used in the
commission of felony.

You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and proper assistance and to
enter, in the day time or in the night time, into the said dwelling house and there diligently
search for fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that you seize and bring them before
this court, to be disposed of according to law.
 Given under my hand this 26th day of December, 1930.

(Sgd.) E. P. REVILLA          
Judge, Court of First Instance          

On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place indicated in the warrant, searched the
premises, and took therefrom books, invoices, and documents belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation
of which Jose Rubio was the manager. Thereafter, as indicated, a motion was presented on behalf of Rubio to
secure a pronouncement of nullity of the search warrant, which motion, after receiving memoranda in support
and in opposition but without taking evidence, was denied.

The particular portions of the Act of Congress which are relied upon are found in the Philippine Bill of Rights,
being paragraphs 3 and 11 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly referred to as the
Philippine Autonomy Act. These portions of the Organic Act Provide: "That the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated" (sec. 3, par. 11); and "That no person shall . . . be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" (sec. 3, par. 3). The applicable statutory
provisions are sections 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reading as follows:

SEC. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him
to search for personal property and bring it before the court.

SEC. 96. It may be issued upon either of the following grounds:

1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.

2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of committing a felony.

SEC. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported
by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complaint and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing.

SEC. 99. If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the following form:

The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the order of the trial court, the statement of the case, and the
law as herein set forth, are the following:

1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant was illegal and void for failure to
observe the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its issue.

2. The lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant were illegal and void appellant's books and
papers might be retained because they were proper subjects for seizure under a search warrant.

3. The lower court erred in not holding that the seizure of appellant's books and papers was made
solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution and was,
therefore, unlawful.
The point made in the first error was not originally passed upon the trial court, and is plainly without merit.
The requirements of the law were substantially, and even literally, complied with in this case. Appellant's
contention that the search warrant was issued without the complainants or any witnesses having been
examined, is untenable. The depositions speak for themselves. It is also contended that the application and the
warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified statements of the two internal
revenue agents and the warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila all describe the property sought
to be seized as "fraudulent books, invoices and records". While it is true that the property to be seized under a
warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the
description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. It has been held
that, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required
that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant has not shown
that the internal revenue agents exceeded their powers under the warranty by seizing property other than that
described in the warrant question. The list of books, invoices, and records seized by said officers is the best
evidence to show that they strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing those things, and only
those described in the search warrant.

Under the second error, it is claimed that "the books, invoices, and records seized are property which one may
lawfully possess; they were searched and seized solely for the purpose of using them as evidence to prove an
offense supposed to have been committed by appellant against the internal revenue customs laws, which search
and seizure for the purpose intended is prohibited by law." Reliance is placed on the Philippine cases
of Regidor vs. Araullo ([1904], 5 Off. Gaz., 955); Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real ([1920], 42 Phil., 886); and
United States vs.  De los Reyes and Esguerra ([1911], 20 Phil., 467). An examination of the first two cited
cases reveals that the seizures made under the warrants issued therein were irregular and manifestly in
violation of law. In the first case, for instance, the court observed:

A causal examination of the property mentioned in the affidavit and the list of books, papers, and
documents actually seized by the said officers, as represented by their signed statement, above quoted,
will show that the officers, in executing the said search warrant, did not limit themselves, in seizing
property, to that which was described in the affidavit or search warrant. (Regidor vs. Araullo, supra.)

In the second case, the court said:

The important question that remains to be decided is whether, under a search warrant for opium, the
officers of the law were authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property having a remote
or no connection with opium. (Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, supra.)

Under these circumstances, it is evident that the seizures made were in excess of the authority given to the
seizing officers. In the case at bar, however, it has been shown that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed
the command of their warrant by seizing no other property than that described therein.

In the third case cited by the appellant, that of United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, supra, the holding
was that no public officer has the right to enter the premises of another for the purpose of search or seizure
against the will of the occupant and without the proper search warrant. This case is entirely foreign to the point
under discussion, inasmuch as in the instant case a search warrant was issued. From the above, it will be seen
that the three Philippine cases relied upon by the appellant rest upon different facts from those in the case at
bar.

After the decision in Division had been promulgated, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court of April
11, 1932, delivered in the case of United States of America vs. Daniel M. Lefkowitz and Pauline Paris was
received, and it is now urged that this opinion is controlling. Of course, if the opinion, on examination, be
found to support the views of the appellant, it would become our duty, even as against any pride which one
might have in maintaining a position previously taken, to change front to conform to the pronouncements of
the higher court. Turning to the opinion just mentioned, we find it said: "All the searches and seizures were
made without a search warrant" — in contrast, the searches and seizures in the case at bar were made with a
search warrant. Further, it was said: "The only question presented is whether the searchers of the desks, cabinet
and baskets and the seizures of the things taken from them were reasonable as an incident of the arrests" — an
entirely different state of facts from those before us. Again, it was said: "The Fourth Amendment forbids every
search that is unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy" — an admonition which
should be respected in this jurisdiction where constitutional rights are as sacred as in the United States proper.
Finally, a contrast was suggested between the search of one's house or place of business made
contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant of arrest and a search warrant, and it
was said:

Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of crime of which
respondents were accused or suspected. They could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under
a search warrant issued upon ample evidence and precisely describing such things and disclosing
exactly where they were. (Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 310.)

xxx     xxx     xxx

Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made solely to find evidence of respondents' guilt
of the alleged conspiracy or some other crime. Though intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor
in violation of the Act, the papers and other articles found and taken were in themselves unoffending.
The decisions of this court distinguish searchers of one's house, office, papers or effects merely to get
evidence to convict him of crime from searches as such as those made to find stolen goods for return
to the owner, to take property that has been forfeited to the Government, to discover property
concealed to avoid payment of the duties for which it is liable, and from searches such as those made
for the seizure of counterfeit coins, burglars' tools, gambling paraphernalia and illicit liquor in order to
prevent the commission of crime.

We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court
in Gouled vs. United States ([1920], 255 U. S., 298), and Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. United States ([1930], 282
U. S., 344). In the first case, it was said:

. . . search warrants . . . may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and
papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal
or penal proceeding, but . . . they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and
seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complaint may have in the property to be
seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken. (Boyd Case,
116, U. S., 623, 624, L. ed., 748; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 524.)

There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them
immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in
which other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and
warrant. . . . we cannot doubt that contracts may be so used as instruments or agencies for perpetrating
frauds upon the Government as to give the public an interest in them which would justify the search
for and seizure of them, under a properly issued search warrant, for the purpose of preventing further
frauds.

xxx     xxx     xxx

As to the contract with Steinthal, also a stranger to the indictment. It is not difficult, as we have said,
to imagine how an executed written contract might be an important agency or instrumentality in the
 bribing of a public servant and perpetrating frauds upon the Government so that it would have a
legitimate and important interest in seizing such a paper in order prevent further frauds, . . . .

As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a general exploratory search of premises, the seizure of
papers therefrom, and their retention for use as evidence in a criminal proceeding cannot be sustained where
made at a time when no crime was being committed and under a false claim of possession of a search warrant,
by one making of an arrest of persons on the premises under color of an invalid warrant, who required one of
them, by pretention of right and threat or force, to open a desk and safe. It was further ruled that, there is no
formula for the determination of the reasonableness of a search and seizure, but each case is to be decided on
its own facts and circumstances.

This brings us in logical order to the third error and the point often made that the seizure of appellant's books,
invoices, and records was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal
prosecution. The question, in its final analysis, is, were appellant's books, invoices, and records seized solely
for use as evidence of a crime of which the appellant was accused or suspected? — or were the books,
invoices, and records seized in order to prevent the further perpetration of fraud? In the first place, it is to be
observed that the public has an interest in the proper regulation of appellant's books. (Act No. 3292, section 4.)
In the second place, the books belonged to a corporation of which the appellant was simply the manager. And
in the third place, the search warrant only issued on a showing of probable cause — to adopt the language alike
of section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the search warrant — that "fraudulent books, invoices,
and records" were "now being used in the commission of a felony."

Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the books, invoices, and records were taken solely for the
purpose of being used as evidence against Rubio, we find no support for this contention in the record. In the
trial court, the assistant city fiscal said: "As we have stated above, the search and seizure in this case were
made under the provisions of the internal-revenue laws and the authority of a search warrant, and not for the
purpose of obtaining evidence, but with a view to seize the instruments used in the violation of said laws
committed by the defendant." On appeal, the prosecution persistently maintains its position that the seizure
was made with the object of preventing the use of the books of account, documents, and papers in the
commission of further offenses or fraud or against the Government. Not a scintilla of evidence is to be found in
the record to prove that the Government has used the books of account, documents, and papers as evidence
against the appellant, or that the Government ever had the intention of so doing. All we know is, that an
information was filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and that he
compromised another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of P100,000. On
this showing, we perforce cannot deduce that the books of account, documents, and papers were wanted solely
for use as evidence of a crime.

A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the arguments presented and the authorities cited, leads us
to the same conclusion as before, namely, that no constitutional right of the appellant was violated; that the
letter of the law was followed, and that the order of the trial judge was correct in all particulars. Wherefore, the
judgment will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

Convinced that the decision in this case sets at naught important constitutional principles, I dissent.

I am of the opinion that the warrant here in question is null and void, because it was issued not only without
authority of law but in contravention of express constitutional and statutory provisions. Section 3, paragraph 11
of the Organic Act, provides "That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated"; and section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in turn, provides that "A search warrant shall
not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to
be searched and the person or thing to be seized." These provisions of law are almost an exact reproduction of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and they were undoubtedly intended to afford the
same protection to the people of these Islands as the Fourth Amendment affords to the people of the United
States. We are thus fully justified in relying on American authorities and cases for the purpose of ascertaining
the real intent, object and scope of such provisions.

In the leading case of Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S., 616, 625; 29 L. ed., 746, 749), the Supreme Court of
the United States, through Justice Bradley, dwelt at length on the historical reasons for the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment and made, among others, the following pertinent observations: "In order to ascertain the
nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms
"unreasonable searches and seizures," it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of
the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England. The practice had obtained in the Colonies
of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected
places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book"; since they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." This was in February,
1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was perhaps the most prominent event which
inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country. "Then and there," said John
Adams, "then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born." And speaking of the importance and scope of the protection
intended to be given by Fourth Amendment, the same court, in Weeks vs. United States (232 U. S., 383, 329;
58 L. ed., 652, 655), said: "This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of
giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our federal system with the enforcement of
the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of
unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to
unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people
of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights."

The historical background of the provisions in our Organic Act which recognizes "the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures" clearly reveals that it was intended to protect the people against
abuses arising from the issuance of general warrants, thus reaffirming the principle "that a man's house was his
castle and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers." As stated by
Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, P. 611: "The maxim that "every man's house is his castle," is
made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has
always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen." To safeguard the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, we find not only in the Federal Constitution but in every State constitution a provision to the
effect that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause and upon application supported by oath
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. "The effect of the Fourth
Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure
the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law." (Weeks vs. United States, supra.) In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court vs. United
States (75 L. ed., [Adv. Ops.], 191), it was said: "The first clause of the Fourth Amendment declares: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated." It is general and forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all, those
suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent, and unquestionably extends to the premises where
the search was made and the papers taken. (Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 307; 65 L. ed., 647, 561;
41 S. Ct., 261.) The second clause declares, "and warrants shall issue, but upon probable case, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." This prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact. It emphasizes the
purpose to protect against all general searches. Since before the creation of our government, such searches
have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions or
statutes of every state in the Union. (Angello vs. United States, 269 U. S., 20, 33; 70 L. ed., 145, 149; 51 A. L.
R., 409; 46 S. Ct., 4.) The need of protection against them is attested alike by history and present conditions.
The amendment is to be liberally construed and all owe the duty of vigilance for its effective enforcement lest
there shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of which it was adopted. (Boyd vs. United States, 116
U. S., 616, 623; 29 L. ed., 746, 748; 6 S. Ct., 524; Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 389-392; 58 L. ed., 654,
655; L. R. A., 1915B, 834; 34 S. Ct., 341; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177, supra.)" 1awphil.net

Turning now to the case before us, in the search warrant sufficient to satisfy the law? It seems clear to me that
a perusal of the warrant itself, of the application upon which the same was issued and, of the sworn testimony
given in support of the application, requires a finding that the warrant failed to comply with the requirements
prescribed by law as to (1) the existence of probable cause, and (2) the description of the property or things to
be seized.

It is a well established doctrine that if a warrant is sought for the seizure or search of person or property, the
application must be based on a sworn statement of facts, not surmises or beliefs. "No search warrant shall be
issued unless the judge has first been furnished with facts under oath — not suspicions, beliefs, or surmises —
but facts which, when the law is properly applied to them, tend to establish the necessary legal conclusion, or
facts which, when the law is properly applied to them, tend to establish probable cause for believing that the
legal conclusion is right. The inviolability of the accused's home is to be determined by the facts, not by rumor,
suspicion, or guesswork. If the facts afford the legal basis for the search warrant, the accused must take the
consequences. But equally there must be consequences for the accuser to face. If the sworn accusation is based
on fiction, the accuser must take the chance of punishment for perjury. Hence the necessity of a sworn
statement of facts, because one cannot be convicted of perjury for having a belief, though the belief be utterly
unfounded in fact and law." (Veeder vs. United States, 252 Fed., 414, 418.)

In United States vs. Borkowski (268 Fed., 408), the court held that the finding of probable cause should be
based, not on the opinion or belief of a witness or witnesses, but on facts set forth in the affidavit from which
the existence of probable caused may be fairly inferred. Otherwise the conclusion would be that of the witness,
and not of the judicial officer in whom alone the Constitution has vested the extraordinary power to issue
search warrants, and who is thus legally charged with the duty of preventing unreasonable searches and
seizures.

The reason for the doctrine is tersely stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Go-Bart Importing
Co. vs. United States, supra, thus: "This prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of
fact. It emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general searches. Since before the creation of our
government, such searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are
denounced in the constitutions or statutes of every state in the Union."
Let us now see the sworn statements supporting the application for the search warrant in this case. Do they
state facts — rather than suspicions, beliefs, and surmises? In the first statement we find the following
questions and answers:

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Juan Evaristo, chief secret service agent.
Augusto Piccio, supervising agent, Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Q. Are you the applicant for this search warrant? — A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According to the best of
information the house is occupied by Mr. Jose Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation
and its subsidiary companies.

Q. What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has been reported to me by a
person whom I considered reliable that in said premises there are fraudulent books, invoices and
records.

In the second statement we also find the following questions and answers:

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio, internal
revenue officers, Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Q. Are you the witness for this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the house situated at No. 129, Calle Juan Luna, District of Binondo, City of Manila?
— A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know who occupies said house? — A. Yes. According to the best of my information the
house is occupied by Mr. Jose Rubio.

Q. What do you know about that house? — A. I have watched personally the foregoing house for
several times in company of the complainant and I can assert positively and with a probable cause that
the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being conducted in the said house, and
the occupant of the same keeps in his possession effects and devices to wit: fraudulent books of the
Simplex Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation and New
York Trading Corporation.

The same persons, Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio, signed both statements.

It will be observed, in the first place, that the witnesses could not even state positively who occupied the
premises or house to be searched. All that they affirmed was "According to the best of information the house is
occupied by Mr. Jose Rubio." In the second place, the only reasons given for the application for the search
warrant, are as follows: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered reliable that in said
premises there are fraudulent books, invoices and records" and "I have watched personally the foregoing house
for several times in company of the complainant and I can assert positively and with a probable cause that the
prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being conducted in the said house, and the
occupant of the same keeps in his possession effects and devices to wit: fraudulent books of the Simplex
Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation and New York Trading
Corporation."
As I shall try to explain more fully later, the alleged existence of "prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and
records" and the alleged possession by the appellant of "fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation
and subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation and New York Teding Corporation" furnished no
definite bases of which could justify the issue of a warrant upon probable cause; and, as declared by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the requirement as to the existence of probable cause for the issue of a
search warrant "prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact."

The other essential requisite for the issuance of a search warrant, which is also lacking in the present case, is
that relating to the description of the thing or things to be seized. The law provides in unmistakable language
that the application for a search warrant must particularly describe the thing to be seized. The reason for this
requirement is explained by Cooley in his work already cited as follows: "Search-warrants are always
obnoxious to very serious objections; and very great particularly is justly required in these cases before the
privacy of a man's premises is allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law. And therefore a designation of
goods to be searched for as "goods, wares, and merchandises," without more particular description, has been
regarded as insufficient, even in the case of goods supposed to be smuggled, where there is usually greater
difficulty in giving description, and where, consequently, more latitude should be permitted than in the case of
property stolen." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, pp. 621, 622.)

Neither the phrase "fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies Paramount
Trading Corporation and New York Trading Corporation", found in the sworn statement, nor the phrase
"fraudulent books, invoices and records", found in the search warrant, supplies the particularity of description
required by law. Such phrases do not even express a conclusion of fact by which a warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure, but they do express a conclusion of law as to the full import of which
even lawyers may differ. In the last analysis, therefore the warrant in this case authorized nothing less than a
general exploratory search, which is precisely what the law condemns as "obnoxious to fundamental principles
of liberty". In Marron vs. United States (275 U. S., 192, 196; 72 L. ed., 231, 237), the court said: "The
requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them
impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."

The constitutional rights of the appellant were also violated when the books and papers in his possession were
searched for and seized to be used as evidence against him. The record shows that the books and papers so
seized were made the basis for the institution of a criminal action against the appellant. This is expressly
admitted in the order appealed from. The order, in fact, says:

Aplicando los principios arriba mencionados al caso presente, resulta, segun el parrafo 7 de la mocion
del acusado, que los documentos y papeles secuestrados en poder de este fueron entregados por los
agentes de rentas internas al Fiscal de la Ciudad, por lo que este instituye la querella registrada como
causa criminal No. 41563. En esa querella se alega que el acusado Jose Rubio, valiendose de los
mencionados documentos y papeles, quiso defraudar al Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas. De suerte que
estos documentos y papeles fueron usados como instrumentos o agencias (instruments or agencies)
para la perpetracion de fraudes contra el Gobierno. En tal caso, el publico tiene en esos documentos y
papeles un interes que justifica el secuestro de los mismos, al objeto de evitar fraudes ulteriores.

Se dira que la querella fiscal no es prueba de que los documentos y papeles secuestrados en poder del
acusado se han usado realmente para los fines que en la querella se describen. Pero el Juzgado cree
que la querella constituye prueba de "causa probable" de que esos documentos y papeles se han usado
para tales fines.

Curiously enough, the order under review sought to justify the search and seizure by the very fact that the
books and papers seized, were used as evidence against the appellant. This clearly brings the case within the
principle laid down in Boyd vs. United States, supra, followed in a long line of cases, both State and Federal,
and recently reaffirmed in United States vs. Lefkowitz (76 L. Ed. [Adv. Ops.], 563). The principle adverted to
is that which declares as illegal searches and seizures whether made with or without a search warrant, when
the purpose of making search was solely to secure evidence to be used, in a criminal or penal proceeding,
against the person in whose house or office the articles searched for and seized were found. It is true that in the
Lefkowitz case the court found that "all the searches and seizures were made without a search warrant", but it
is also true that the court positively declared that even if they were made with a search warrant they would
have been equally held illegal. The searches and seizures were held illegal not because they were made without
a search warrant, but because of the purpose for which they were made. So the court said: "Respondents'
papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of crime of which respondents were accused or
suspected. They could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search warrant issued upon ample
evidence and precisely describing such things and disclosing exactly where they were. (Gouled vs. United
States, 255 U. S., 298, 310; 65 L. ed., 647, 653; 41 S. Ct., 261.)" The court further observed:

Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made solely to find evidence of respondents' guilt
of the alleged conspiracy or some other crime. Though intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor
in violation of the Act, the papers and other articles found and taken were in themselves unoffending.
The decisions of this court distinguish searches of one's house, office, papers or effects merely to get
evidence to convict him of crime from searches such as those made to find stolen goods for return to
the owner, to take property that has been forfeited to the Government, to discover property concealed
to avoid payment of duties for which it is liable, and from searches such as those made for the seizure
of counterfeit coins burglar's tools, gambling paraphernalia and illicit liquor in order to prevent the
commission of crime. (Boyd vs. United States, 116 U. S., 616, et seq.; 29 L. ed., 746; 6 S. Ct., 524;
Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383, 395; 58 L. ed., 652, 656; L. R. A., 1915B, 834; 34 S. Ct.,
341; Ann. Cas., 1915C, 1177; Gouled vs. United States, supra [255 U. S., 306; 65 L. ed., 651; 41 S.
Ct., 262]; Carrol vs. United States, 267 U. S., 132; 69 L. ed., 543; 39 A. L. R., 790; 45 S. Ct.
280, supra.)

In Entick vs. Carrington (19 How. St Tr., 1029), Lord Gamden declared that one's papers are his
dearest property, showed that the law of England did not authorize a search of private papers to help
forward conviction even in cases of most atrocious crime and said (p. 1073): "Whether this proceedeth
from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be
more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very certain, that the law
obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search
for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with
the guilty."

The teachings of that great case were cherished by our statement when the Constitution was adopted.
In Boyd vs. United States, supra (116 U. S., 630; 29 L. ed., 751; 6 S. Ct., 524), this court said: "The
principles laid down in this opinion (Entick vs. Carrington) affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. . . . They apply to all invasions on the part of the Government and its employees
of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. . . . Any forcible and compulsory extortion of
a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other." And this court has always construed provisions of the
Constitution having regard to the principles upon which it was established. The direct operation or
literal meaning of the words used do not measure the purpose or scope of its provisions. (M'Culloch
vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 406, 407, 421; 4 L. ed., 579, 601, 602, 605; Boyd vs. United States, 116
U. S., 616; 29 L. ed., 746; 6 S. Ct., 524, supra; Byars vs. United States, 273 U. S., 28; 71 L. ed., 520;
47 S. Ct., 248, ubi supra.)
In Federal Trade Commission vs. American Tobacco Company (264 U. S., 298, 305, 306), the Supreme Court
of the United States through Justice Holmes, declared that the mere fact "of being organized as a corporation
do not make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad company now may be. (Smith vs. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 245 U. S., 33, 43.) anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment
would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our
traditions into the fire (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Brimson, 154 U. S., 447, 479), and to direct
fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime. We do not
discuss the question whether it could do so if it tried, as nothing short of the most explicit language would
induce us to attribute to Congress that intent. The interruption of business, the possible revelation of trade
secrets, and the expense that compliance with the Commission's wholesale demand would cause are the least
considerations. It is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search through all the respondents'
records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up. The unwillingness of this court to
sustain such a claim is shown in Harriman vs. Interstate Commerce Commission (211 U. S., 407), and as to
correspondence, even in the case of a common carrier, in United States vs. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.
(236 U. S., 318, 335). The question is a different one where the State granting the charter gives its Commission
power to inspect."

The internal revenue agents concerned in this case have shown commendable zeal in their efforts to protect the
revenues of the Government; but this same zeal, if allowed to override constitutional limitations, would
become obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty". And if we are to be saved from the sad experiences of
some countries which have constitutions only in name, we must insist that governmental authority be exercised
within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters is not so much what the people write in their
constitutions as the spirit in which they observe their provisions.

The order appealed from should be reversed, the search warrant issued in this case declared invalid, and the
books and papers seized thereunder ordered returned to the appellant.

Villa-Real, J., concurring:

I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Abad Santos.

CASE 6

[ G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020 ]

DELFIN R. PILAPIL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. LYDIA Y. CU, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. No. 228589]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LYDIA Y. CU, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, C.J.:

For decision are the petitions1 assailing the Decision2 dated June 10, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated
December 2, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 133253.
The facts are as follows:

Prelude

The Bicol Chromite and Manganese Corporation (BCMC) is the holder of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) No. 211-2005-V. The MPSA granted unto BCMC the right to mine a specific site located
in Barangay Himagtocon, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur.

In 2009, BCMC entered into an Operating Agreement4 with Prime Rock Philippines Company (Prime Rock)
allowing the latter to, among others, operate the aforesaid mining site.

However, on January 31, 2011, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau - Regional Office 5 (MGB RO5) issued a
Cease and Desist Order (CDO)5 against Prime Rock enjoining the latter from engaging in any mining
activities.

Inspection of the Mining Site

Around six (6) months after the issuance of the CDO, petitioner Delfin R. Pilapil, Jr. (Mayor Pilapil) - then
mayor of the municipality of Lagonoy received reports about the existence of an illegal mining operation in
Barangay Himagtocon.6 Mayor Pilapil supposedly also received reports that Prime Rock had filed an appeal
against the CDO.7 To verify these reports and to ensure that the CDO is not being violated, petitioner decided
to conduct an ocular inspection of the mining site operated by BCMC and Prime Rock.8

On August 24, 2011, petitioner, accompanied by a team of eight (8) policemen and two (2) barangay captains,
entered the mining site.9 While inspecting the site's premises, Barangay Captain (BC) Roger Pejedoro-one of
the companions of petitioner-happened upon an open stockroom that contained numerous bags of what
appeared to be explosives.10 BC Pejedoro reported his discovery to another member of the inspection team,
Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Rey H. Alis, who, in turn, informed Mayor Pilapil. Mayor Pilapil forthwith
ordered the seizure of the said bags.11

Inventory of the seized items yielded 41 sacks of explosives, with an aggregate weight of 1,061 kilos, and 4
1/2 rolls of safety fuses (subject explosives).12 The subject explosives were then kept at the Explosive
Magazine, Provincial Public Safety Management Company in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, for safekeeping.13

On August 26, 2011, the Camarines Sur Police Provincial Office of the Philippine National Police issued a
Certification stating that, as per the records in its office, no permit to transport or withdraw explosives had
been issued to Prime Rock.14

Proceedings in the RTC

On the basis of the foregoing events, an Information15 for illegal possession of explosives16 was lodged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Camarines Sur against certain officers and employees of BCMC and
Prime Rock. Among those accused in the said Information were respondent Lydia Cu, the president of
BCMC,17 and one Manuel Ley, the president of Prime Rock.18 The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:

That on or about the 24th day of August 2011 in Sitio Benguet, Barangay Himagtocon, Municipality of
Lagony (sic), Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, illegally and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control, forty one (41) sacks of
explosives and four (4) and half (1/2) rolls of safety fuse which is breakdown (sic):
 SACKS KILO
7 sacks 200
7 sacks 190
7 sacks 200
7 sacks 140
7 sacks 175
6 sacks 156
TOTAL 41 sacks 1,061 kilos

without any authority in law nor permit to carry and possess the same, to the prejudice of the Republic of the
Philippines.19

The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. T-3754 and was raffled to Branch 58 of the RTC of San
Jose, Camarines Sur. Ꮮαwρhi ৷

On September 28, 2012, the RTC issued warrants of arrest against Cu and Ley, and their other co-accused in
Criminal Case No. T-3754.20

Both Cu and Ley filed motions21 questioning, among others, the existence of probable cause to justify the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them. There, they raised qualm regarding the admissibility in evidence of
the subject explosives, arguing that the same had been seized by Mayor Pilapil in violation of the constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

On October 23, 2012, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the implementation of all warrants of arrest
in order to review the evidence on record and determine the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance
of such warrants.22

On November 27, 2012, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in Criminal Case No. T-3754.23

On January 4, 2013, the prosecution filed an omnibus motion assailing the November 27, 2012 order of the
RTC and seeking the implementation of the warrants of arrest.24

On October 22, 2013, the RTC issued an Order25 finding probable cause to hold Cu, Ley, Go, Loo and
Chuntong for trial, and reinstating the September 28, 2012 warrants of arrest against them.

Proceedings in the CA

Cu challenged the latest order of the RTC with the CA via a petition for certiorari.26 Cu impleaded the
presiding judge27 of the RTC and Mayor Pilapil as respondents in such petition.

On January 8, 2014, the CA required the inclusion of petitioner People of the Philippines (the People) as a
respondent in her certiorari petition.28

On March 4, 2014, Cu filed a supplement to her petition reiterating as an issue the supposed defect of the
subject explosives for having been procured through a warrantless, hence illegal, raid of the mining site
operated by BCMC and Prime Rock.29 She postulated that the seized explosives were "fruits of a poisonous
tree" that could not be the basis of a finding of probable cause against her.

On June 10, 2016, the CA rendered a Decision30 favoring the above postulation of Cu. The CA thus decreed
the setting aside of the October 22, 2013 Order of the RTC, the dismissal of the information in Criminal Case
No. T-3754, and the quashal of the warrant of arrest against Cu. The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated October 22, 2013 is here by SET ASIDE. The
Information charging [Cu] of violation of Section 3, Republic Act No. 9516, being based on a "fruit of a
poisonous tree" is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Warrant of Arrest against [Cu] is
ordered QUASHED.31 (Emphases in the original)

The People and Mayor Pilapil (collectively, petitioners) filed their respective motions of reconsideration, but
the CA remained steadfast.32 Hence, the present petitions.33

The petitioners claim that the CA erred in subscribing to Cu's position. They insist on the competence of the
subject explosives as evidence and claim that the same have been seized legally. They argue that while Mayor
Pilapil's ocular inspection of the mining site was conducted without a search warrant, the consequent taking of
the subject explosives may nonetheless be justified under the plain view doctrine.34

OUR RULING

Mayor Pilapil's seizure of the subject explosives is illegal and cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine.
The warrantless ocular inspection of the mining site operated by BCMC and Prime Rock that preceded such
seizure, and which allowed Mayor Pilapil and his team of police officers and barangay officials to catch a view
of the subject explosives, finds no authority under any provision of any law. In addition, established
circumstances suggest that the incriminating nature of the subject explosives could not have been immediately
apparent to Mayor Pilapil and his inspection team.

The subject explosives were thus seized in violation of the constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. As such, they were correctly regarded by the CA as "fruits of a poisonous tree" subject
to the exclusionary principle. Fittingly, they cannot be considered as valid bases of a finding of probable cause
to arrest and detain an accused for trial.

Hence, we deny the petitions.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution ordains the right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. The provision reads:

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Fortifying such right is the exclusionary principle adopted in Section 3(b), Article III of the Constitution. The
principle renders any evidence obtained through unreasonable search or seizure as inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, viz.:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.

What then are unreasonable searches and seizures as contemplated by the cited constitutional provisions?

The rule of thumb, as may be deduced from Section 2, Article III of the Constitution itself, is that searches and
seizures which are undertaken by the government outside the auspices of a valid search warrant are considered
unreasonable.35 To be regarded reasonable, government-led search and seizure must generally be sanctioned
by a judicial warrant issued in accordance with requirements prescribed in the aforementioned constitutional
provision.

The foregoing rule, however, is not without any exceptions. Indeed, jurisprudence has recognized several,
though very specific, instances where warrantless searches and seizures can be considered reasonable and,
hence, not subject to the exclusionary principle.36 Some of these instances, studded throughout our case law,
are:37

1. Consented searches;38

2. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest;39

3. Searches of a moving vehicle;40

4. Seizures of evidence in plain view;41

5. Searches incident of inspection, supervision and regulation sanctioned by the State in the exercise
of its police power;42

6. Customs searches;43

7. Stop and Frisk searches;44 and

8. Searches under exigent and emergency circumstances.45

The instance of particular significance to the case at bench is the so-called seizures pursuant to the plain view
doctrine.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling within the plain view of a law enforcement officer, who has a
right to be in a position to have that view, may be validly seized by such officer without a warrant and, thus,
may be introduced in evidence.46 An object is deemed in plain view when it is "open to eye and hand"47 or is
"plainly exposed to sight."48 In Miclat, Jr. v. People,49 we identified the three (3) requisites that must concur
in order to validly invoke the doctrine, to wit:

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Guided by the foregoing principles, we now address the issues at hand.

I
The established facts betray the claim of petitioners that the plain view doctrine justifies the warrantless
seizure of the subject explosives. The first and third requisites necessary to validly invoke the said doctrine are
not present in the instant case.

The first requisite of the plain view doctrine assumes that the law enforcement officer has "a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area[.]"50 This means that the officer
who made the warrantless seizure must have been in a lawful position when he discovered the target
contraband or evidence in plain view. Here, it was established that Mayor Pilapil and his team of police
officers and barangay officials were able to view the subject explosives during the course of their ocular
inspection on the mining site operated by BCMC and Prime Rock. Hence, in order to ascertain the existence of
the first requisite of the doctrine in the case at bench, an inquiry into the legality of such inspection is
necessary.

Mayor Pilapil And His Inspection Team Were Not In A Lawful Position When They Discovered The Subject
Explosives

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that Mayor Pilapil and his team entered and conducted an ocular
inspection on the mining site of BCMC and Prime Rock without any judicial warrant. As petitioners concede,
Mayor Pilapil was moved to carry out such entry and inspection solely by reports which suggest that Prime
Rock was engaging in mining activities, in violation of the CDO issued by the MGB RO5.51 Upon reaching
the mining site, however, Mayor Pilapil and his inspection team actually encountered no active mining
operations.52 What they were able to chance upon were the subject explosives which, at the time, were kept in
bags and stored inside a room, albeit one whose door was ajar.53

The foregoing facts clearly establish that Mayor Pilapil and his inspection team were not in a lawful position
when they discovered the subject explosives. The intrusion and inspection of the mining site of BCMC and
Prime Rock, which afforded Mayor Pilapil and his team the opportunity to view the subject explosives, were
illegal as they were not sanctioned by a warrant. Moreover, there is nothing in the facts which indicate that
such entry and inspection fall within any of the recognized instances of valid warrantless searches.

Mayor Pilapil Has No Statutory Authority To Conduct A Warrantless Inspection Of The Mining Site Operated
By BCMC And Prime Rock

The petitioners would insist, however, that Mayor Pilapil was authorized to enter and undertake a warrantless
inspection of the mining site operated by BCMC and Prime Rock by virtue of the following provisions of the
law and executive regulations:54

1. Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC),55 which gives municipal mayors the power to issue business licenses and permits. Citing the
case of Hon. Lim v. Court of Appeals,56 the petitioners argue that such power effectively gives a
municipal mayor the power to conduct warrantless inspections and investigations of private
commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits;57

2. Section 8(e) of DENR58 Administrative Order No. 2010-21 or the Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations (RIRR) of RA No. 794259 which allows local government units to participate in the
monitoring of any mining activity as a member of the Multipartite Monitoring Team (MMT)
described under Section 185 of the RIRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Mining Act); and
 3. Sections 80, 87 and 94 of the RIRR of RA No. 7942 which grant unto the governor or mayor the
authority to inspect quarry, sand and gravel, guano, and gemstone gathering areas.

The scatter-shot citation of legal provisions does not impress. None of them justify Mayor Pilapil's warrantless
entry and inspection of the mining site of BCMC and Prime Rock.

To begin with, Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC does not-whether expressly or impliedly-authorize a
municipal mayor to conduct warrantless inspections of mining sites. The petitioners, in that sense,
misconstrued the case of Hon. Lim v. Court of Appeals.60 The power of a mayor "to inspect and investigate
private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their [business] licenses and
permits,"61 which was recognized in Lim, could not extend to searches of mining sites in view of the unique
inspection scheme over such sites established under RA No. 7942, or the Mining Act, and its RIRR.

Mining operations in the country are principally regulated by the Mining Act and its RIRR.62 As part and
parcel of their regulatory thrust, the said act and executive rule did allow the government-through particular
agencies or officials, for specific purposes and subject to definite limitations or conditions-to enter and conduct
inspections in mining sites and areas. These administrative inspections, duly authorized and reasonably limited
by statute and regulation, are examples of inspections sanctioned by the State in the exercise of its police
power that, as aforementioned, may be considered as among the instances of valid warrantless searches.63

As they now stand, however, the Mining Act and its RIRR do not confer any authority upon a municipal mayor
to conduct any kind of inspection on any mining area or site. A rundown of the administrative inspections
sanctioned by the said act and executive rule makes this clear:

1. Section 6664 of the Mining Act, in relation to Section 14565 of the RIRR, allows the conduct of
a safety inspection of all installations in a mining or quarrying site. Such inspection, which must be
carried out at reasonable hours of the day or night and in a manner that will not impede or obstruct the
work of the mining contractor or permittee, can only be conducted by a regional director of the MGB
or his duly authorized representative.

2. As part of the terms and conditions of an Exploration Permit, Section 22(d)66 of the RIRR
sanctions the semi-annual inspection of mining exploration sites in order to verify the exploration
work program report submitted by the permittee. This inspection can only be conducted by the MGB
or a regional office thereof.

3. As part of the terms and conditions of a Quarry Permit and of a Sand and Gravel Permit, Section
80(a)(5)67 of the RIRR allows the inspection and examination of the permit area by the regional
director of the MGB, or by the provincial governor or city mayor concerned.

4. As part of the terms and conditions of a Government Gratuitous Permit, Section 80(b)(6)68 of the
RIRR allows the inspection and examination of the permit area by the regional director of the MGB,
or by the provincial governor or city mayor concerned.

5. As part of the terms and conditions of a Guano Permit, Section 87(d)69 of the RIRR allows
the inspection and examination of the permit area by the regional director of the MGB, or by the
provincial governor or city mayor concerned.

6. As part of the terms and conditions of a Gemstone Gathering Permit, Section 94(g)70 of the RIRR
allows the inspection and examination of the permit area by the regional director of the MGB, or by
the provincial governor or city mayor concerned.
 7. As part of the terms and conditions of a Mineral Processing Permit, Section 113(c)71 of the RIRR
allows inspection of mineral processing sites in order to validate activity reports submitted by the
permittee. This inspection can only be conducted by the Director or a regional director of the MGB.

8. As part of the conditions of an Electrical or Mechanical Installation Permit, Section 152(a)72 of the
RIRR authorizes the inspection of a newly installed mechanical or electrical installation in any mining
or quarrying site. Such inspection, which must be done prior to regular operation, is conducted by a
regional director of the MGB or his duly authorized representative.

9. Section 15873 of the RIRR sanctions the field inspection of storage facilities for explosives of a
mining contractor or permittee. Such inspection, which must be done immediately after the mining
contractor or permittee files a purchaser's permit application, can only be conducted by a regional
director of the MGB.

10. Section 17474 of the RIRR subjects every mining operation to an environmental monitoring and
audit in order to determine a mining contractor's or permittee's compliance with the approved
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Program or the Annual Environmental Protection and
Enhancement Program required under Section 69 of the Mining Act, and Sections 169 and 171 of the
RIRR. Such monitoring and audit are conducted semi annually by the MMT, described under Section
185 of the RIRR.

The MMT is composed of the following: (a) a representative from the MGB regional office, (b) a
representative from the DENR regional office, (c) a representative from the Environmental
Management Bureau regional office, (d) a representative of the mining contractor or permittee, (e) a
representative from the affected community or communities, (f) a representative from the affected
indigenous cultural community or communities, if any, and (g) a representative from an environmental
non-government organization.75

11. As part of the terms and conditions of a Mineral Agreement or a Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA), Section 228(c)76 of the RIRR subjects the premises of mining contractors who
availed of the benefits under Sections 222 to 227 of the RIRR to the visitorial powers of the MGB.
The power allows duly authorized representatives of the MGB to conduct inspection and examination
of the books of accounts and other pertinent records and documents of such contractors in order to
ascertain a contractor's compliance with the Mining Act and its RIRR, as well as the terms and
conditions of the Mineral Agreement or FTAA.

12. As part of the terms and conditions of a Drilling Lease Agreement, Section 248(h)77 of the RIRR
allows the inspection of the drilling operations of the lessee. The said inspection, which may be done
at any time during the subsistence of the drilling lease agreement, can only be conducted by
the Director of the MGB or his duly authorized representative.

As can be observed, most of the administrative inspections sanctioned under the Mining Act and its RIRR fall
under the exclusive responsibility of the MGB-either through its Director, one of its regional directors or an
authorized representative of the said officials.78 There are only two outliers to this norm-the first is the
environmental monitoring and audit of mining sites under Section 174 of the RIRR, and the second is the
inspection of mining permit areas that are covered by a Quarry, Sand and Gravel, Government Gratuitous,
Guano, or Gemstone Gathering Permit pursuant to Sections 80(a)(5), 80(b)(6), 87(d) and 94(a) of the same
regulation. The first has to be carried out by an MMT as described under Section 185 of the RIRR. The second,
on the other hand, may be conducted by a provincial governor or city mayor, in addition to the regional
director of the MGB.
Verily, Mayor Pilapil's intrusion and warrantless inspection on the mining site operated by BCMC and Prime
Rock find absolutely no justification under the Mining Act and its RIRR. A municipal mayor-on his own and
acting by himself-has no authority to order and conduct any of the administrative inspections sanctioned under
the said act and executive rule. In this respect, we no longer perceive any need to dwell into petitioners'
invocation of Sections 8(e), 80, 87 and 94 of the RIRR as grounds for Mayor Pilapil's actions; the same simply
has no merit.

Mayor Pilapil's zeal to cur b illegal mining activities within his municipality is commendable. However, that
zeal can never justify taking a course of action that is not authorized under the law, much less be an excuse to
flout basic constitutional rights of the people. Upon receiving the reports that Prime Rock was allegedly
engaged in illegal mining, Mayor Pilapil could have simply applied for a judicial warrant to search the mining
site of BCMC and Prime Rock for the purpose of verifying such report. Yet, he did not. Instead, Mayor Pilapil,
on his own initiative, assembled a team of police officers and barangay officials, and led them in a raid that is
not sanctioned by any provision of law. Under such circumstances, we cannot but make the conclusion that the
warrantless ocular inspection conducted by Mayor Pilapil and his team on the mining site operated by BCMC
and Prime Rock was illegal.

The illegality of the aforesaid ocular inspection means that Mayor Pilapil and his team were not in a lawful
position when they were able to view the subject explosives. By this, the first requisite for a valid invocation of
the plain view doctrine cannot be considered satisfied. Accordingly, Mayor Pilapil and his team's subsequent
warrantless seizure of the subject explosives is not reasonable and runs against the constitutional proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Assuming for the sake of argument that Mayor Pilapil's prior intrusion and inspection of the mining site
operated by BCMC and Prime Rock had been lawful, the warrantless seizure of the subject explosives still
cannot be sustained. The third requisite of the plain view doctrine-that the incriminating character of the item
seized must have been immediately apparent to the officer who made the seizure-is just the same absent in the
case at bench.

Even in the midst of a valid intrusion by a law enforcement officer, the plain view doctrine cannot be used to
justify the indiscriminate seizure of any item that happens to fall within such officer's open view.79 A contrary
rule is nothing short of allowing government agents to conduct general exploratory searches of evidence - a
scenario precisely condemned by the Constitution.80 Thus, as conceived in jurisprudence, only items
whose incriminating character is immediately apparent to the law enforcement officer may be seized pursuant
to the plain view doctrine.81

In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,82 we laid down the test to determine when the "incriminating character" of
a seized item may be considered as "immediately apparent" for purposes of applying the plain view doctrine:

The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating
character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and
criminal activity.

Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a
person.

Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the
officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen
property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely
than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.
The evidence thus collected must be seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law
enforcement.83 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted).

Stated otherwise, in order to satisfy the third requisite of the plain view doctrine, it must be established that the
seized item-on the basis of the attending facts and surrounding circumstances-reasonably appeared, to the
officer who made the seizure, as a contraband or an evidence of a crime.

As said, this requisite was not met in this case.

Taking another look at the established facts, we are convinced that the incriminating character of the subject
explosives-if indeed they have one-was not immediately apparent to Mayor Pilapil and his inspection team.
The facts attending and surrounding the discovery and seizure of the subject explosives could not have
engendered a reasonable belief on the part of Mayor Pilapil and his team that the subject explosives were
contraband or evidence of a crime, viz.:

1. The presence of the explosives within a mining site is not unusual. Even the Mining Act recognizes
the necessity of explosives in certain mining operations and, by this reason, confers a conditional right
on the part of a mining contractor or permittee to possess and use explosives, provided they procure
the proper government licenses therefor.84 Hence, the mere possession of explosives, especially by a
mining contractor in a mining site, cannot be instantly characterized as illegal per se.

2. At the time they were first discovered by a member of Mayor Pilapil's inspection team, the subject
explosives were not being used or even being prepared to be used. They were kept in bags which, in
turn, were stored inside an open room.85 Thus, no inference that such explosives were evidence of
any alleged illegal mining can be drawn.

The foregoing circumstances clearly contradict any notion that there was any observable illegality in the
subject explosives. Mayor Pilapil and his inspection team seized the subject explosives without any probable
cause, nay without any reason, apart from the subject explosives being exposed to their sight. Such seizure,
therefore, is arbitrary and seems to have been made only in the hopes that the subject explosives would
subsequently prove to be a contraband or an evidence of a crime. The seizure, in other words, is nothing but a
veiled fishing expedition of evidence.

Their incriminating character not being immediately apparent, the subject explosives-even if discovered in
plain view-are not items that may be validly seized without a warrant pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, Mayor Pilapil and his team's warrantless seizure of the subject explosives is not reasonable and
runs against the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

II

Since the subject explosives have been unequivocally seized in violation of the constitutional proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures, they are properly regarded by the CA as "fruits of a poisonous
tree" subject to the exclusionary principle set forth in Section 3(b), Article III of the Constitution. The subject
explosives are inadmissible and may not be considered as evidence for any purpose in any proceeding86-
including as bases for a finding of probable cause to arrest and detain an accused for trial.

Without the subject explosives, the indictment for illegal possession of explosives and, ultimately, the warrant
of arrest against Cu will have no leg to stand on.

With that, we must deny the present petitions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated June 10,
2016 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133253
are AFFIRMED.

NEWS

 News
 World
 Business
 Entertainment
 Sports Desk
 Life
 Videos
 Transportation
 Special Projects

 
 FRONT PAGE

 NEWS

Two cops demoted for 2019

illegal arrest, search in Quezon
City

By CNN Philippines Staff

Published Dec 26, 2020 12:38:44 PM
 
  

Metro Manila (CNN Philippines, December 26) — Two policemen in Quezon City
have been found guilty of illegally arresting a woman in 2019 and searching her house
without a warrant, the local government announced.
In a statement on Friday, the city’s public information office disclosed that the People’s
Law Enforcement Board, a police disciplinary authority, slapped patrolmen Zaldy Mejos,
Jr. and Julie Boison with a one-rank demotion.

The administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by a certain Marissa Torres,
who said Mejos and Boison searched her home and arrested her without the proper
warrants on January 19, 2019.

The policemen said they were only acting on a report that Torres had a gun and that
they, invoking the "plain view doctrine", entered her house upon seeing the nozzle of a
suspected firearm in a black sling bag inside Torres’ sari-sari store.

The police said they found a gun and illegal drugs, but Torres said those were planted.

District 1 of the Quezon City PLEB sided with the complainant.

Torres was “illegally and unlawfully arrested and her residence searched without a
warrant,” the city government’s statement read, quoting the decision of the PLEB.

“[The] plain view doctrine applies when the discovery of evidence is inadvertent,” it
added, saying the policemen cannot use this to justify their warrantless search.

Quezon City Mayor Joy Belmonte called on her fellow local chief executives to make
sure their respective PLEBs are organized to punish erring policemen.

Meanwhile, Quezon City PLEB Executive Officer Rafael Calinisan said lawmakers
should work on amending Republic Act No. 9708 to prohibit the promotion of cops who
have pending administrative cases with the board.

Essay

As a future police officer, always keep on our mind that there is provision to
follow and respect for the dignity as a human/living person in this world. We
respect that provision as we respect as a human being living in world. As the police
officer we want to respect the citizen in the community as they gave respect to us.
We know some of our organization got wrong doing but we ensure to as a future
police officer it comes to respect above the all we respect the law that no one get
hurt or goes to being bad person and that is the respect we want to protect the
community relations.