RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (2 October 2007)

SECTION 1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3
hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil
actions as well as special proceedings.

Sec. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. – In all matters not specifically covered by this
Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply.

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
a. “Biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if
found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva
and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones;
b. “DNA” means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the chain of molecules found in every
nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individual’s DNA is unique for the individual,
except identical twins;
c. “DNA evidence” constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
d. “DNA profile” means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample
obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from
that person;
e. “DNA testing” means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction
of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the
information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more
distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the
biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and
f. “Probability of Parentage” means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of
a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated
individuals in a given population.

People v. Vallejo
431 Phil. 798 (2002)
The Supreme Court affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death
on the basis of DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim which matched the accused’s
DNA profile. The Court conceded that Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA
evidence.

It observed that, by 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as
evidence. Going deeper into the probative value of DNA analysis as evidence, the Supreme Court had
cautioned trial courts to be cautious in giving credence to such as evidence. This refutable presumption of
paternity should be subjected to the standards that, in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
courts should consider: — how the samples were collected, — how they were handled, — the possibility of
contamination of the samples, — the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

These standards would later be modified in accordance with acceptable standards in accordance with
advancements in technology and codified in the Supreme Court’s Rule on DNA Evidence.

Lastly, the Supreme Court ruled that obtaining samples from petitioner for DNA testing does not violate his
right against self-incrimination. Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It is well settled that the privilege is applicable only to
testimonial evidence. Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination
is limited to a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication or testimonial
evidence from a defendant and not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material.

FACTS:
On July 10, 1999 in Rosario, Cavite, at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s
house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped
Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child wasn’t home
yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s
whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a riverbank.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death. In the afternoon of July 11, the
police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the
victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the policethat Vallejo was acting
strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore
the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing. The
person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the
instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo and a
vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in
Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O.
Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile. Meanwhile,
Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo
insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA
samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy (including his clothing
– which in effect is an admission placing him in the crime scene – though not discussed in the
case) were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and
was sentenced to death by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated
that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused
considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay
case.The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and
for thefirst time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines

People vs. Yatar

FACTS:
On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s (Isabel Dawang’s) house, despite
her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the
morning. At10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house
where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn ’ s first cousin saw Yatar,
who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second floor
and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawang’s house, Judilyn didn’t find this
unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatarcalled upon Judilyn, telling
the latter that he would notbe getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time,Judilyn noticed
that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt(without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that thelatter ’
s eyes were “ reddish and sharp.” Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyn ’ s
husband, asthe former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatarimmediately left when Judilyn ’
s husband arrived. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she foundthe lights of her
house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked
Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to check whether the teenage
girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the doortherein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded
opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped inthe darkness of the second level of her
house, she feltKathylyn ’ s lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it.
Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found
Kathylyn ’ s clothes and undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt
splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabel ’ shouse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as
evidence for Yatar’s conviction?

RULING:
Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3) years before the Rules
on DNA evidence took effect. The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of
Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so long as the same is RELEVANT
and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST.

At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7of
the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect in 2007, provides for the factors to be considered
in assessing the probative weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from
DNA testing. Such factors, are,to wit:
 1. Chain of custody
2. Methodology
3. Accreditation of DNA lab
4. Reliability of the test result

Herrera vs Alba
G.R. No. 148220; June 15, 2005

FACTS:
Armi Alba, mother of 13-year-old Rosendo Alba, filed a petition for compulsory recognition,
support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner denied that he is the biological father
respondent. He also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother. Respondent filed a motion
to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support this motion,
respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Saturnina C. Halos, the head of the University of the
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute, a DNA analysis laboratory. In her testimony, Dr.
Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy
rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA testing

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA testing violates the right against self-incrimination

RULING:
By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.
The Court moved from the issue of according “official recognition” to DNA analysis as evidence
to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis. Section 17, Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution provides that “no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
This privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence.and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. He further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity
case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is “communicative” in essence taken
under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be
material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body;
the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof; an order by the judge
for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed; and the court can compel a woman
accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction
on “testimonial compulsion.”
 Agustin v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 162571; June 15, 2005

FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC. In
their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s
insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel
also denied having fathered the child. On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old
Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the
open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe
was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin
then sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause
of action. The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
thus this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of
unreasonable search

RULING:
No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In no uncertain terms,
we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his
right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

People v. Umanito
G.R. No. 172607, October 26, 2007
FACTS:
The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The alleged 1989 rape of the private
complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child hereinafter identified as
“BBB.” In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed
uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB. With the advance in genetics and the
availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
appellant is the father of AAA’s child. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to
the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the
DNA test results. The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles
and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve
the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence. The DNA
analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and
Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there
is a Complete Match in allof the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That
based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the
biological father of BBB. The defense admitted that if the value of the Probability of Paternity is
99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].

RULING:
Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA
Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified
to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after
the day she said she was raped by Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted andovercome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).
The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not
contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the
admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits “A” and “B” inclusive of sub-markings) nor
presented evidence to rebut the same. By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed
to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the crime
of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of
the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given that the results of the Court-ordered
DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented
for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny Umanitos
Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Ong v. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713; December 17, 2007

FACTS:
A complaint for recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodgin, represented by her mother and guardian Jinky Diaz against Rogelio Ong
before the RTC. As alleged by Jinky in her complaint, She and Rogelio met at Tarlac City
and their friendship developed into love. At this time however, Jinky was married to a
foreign national, Hasegawa Katsuo.

In 1994-1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together in Capitol Garden, Tarlac
City which produced Joanne Rodjin Diaz who was born on Feb 1998. Rogelio brought
Jinky to the hospital and also took the mother and child home after delivery. Rogelio paid
all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and finally provided for all the minor’s
needs- recognizing her as his. However, on September 1998, Rogelio abandoned the
mother and child, stopped supporting the minor and falsely alleged that he is not the father
of the child.

After summons were served against Rogelio, he failed to file any responsive pleadings
despit repeated motions for extensions prompting the court to declare him in default and
allowed Joanne to present evidence ex parte and granted the reliefs prayed for. Rogelio
then filed a motion to lift the order of default and was granted by the court. Rogelio then
filed a motion for new trial and was also granted. The RTC then ruled that Joanne was
the Illegitimate child of Rogelio in view of Joanne’s subsisting marriage with Hasegawa
Katsuo and ordered Rogelio to pay support in favor of Joanne.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case for DNA testing despite Rogelio’s
death.

RULING:
NO. Petition DENIED.

The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As defined above, the
term “biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s body,
even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above
as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown
the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the
conduct of DNA testing.
 Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710; June 6, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus
S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate
of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing
that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology;
(d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from
the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles
from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy. Jesus learned of this
and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse
filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient
in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him
as Jesse’s father. Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the
case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects
for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie
case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for
Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC
held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is
premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed
to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a
prima facie case.

ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.

RULING:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects
during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters
of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only
the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

People v. Corpuz
G.R. No. 208013; July 3, 2017

FACTS:
Allan was charged with four counts of rape in RTC, Pangasinan when accused, by means
of force, feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, 14 years old, with a mental age of
a 5 year old child, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
During trial, Dr. Araos-Liberato issued the Medico Legal Certificate, which stated that AAA
was 14 years old when she was examined. Her findings provided: Healed hymenal
lacerations at 11:00, 5:00 and 2:00 o'clock position; Hymenal orifice admits two fingertips;
Pregnancy test corresponds to 3 to 4 months age of gestation. Allan denied the
accusations and insisted that all the charges against him were merely fabricated by AAA's
father, FFF. He allegedly sacked FFF as a truck driver in his sand and gravel business
for allowing his son to drive the truck that led to an accident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of rape under Article 266-A 1(d), RPC.

RULING:
Yes, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA were clearly established by the
victim's testimony. To warrant a rape conviction under Article 266-A 1(d), it should be
shown that "a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted
another who is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. In this case, AAA was 14
years old when she had her neuropsychiatric examination with Tablizo. The examination
revealed that at the time of examination, AAA's Intelligence Quotient was 42 and her level
of intelligence was equal to Moderate Mental Retardation. Also, she had a mental age of
a five (5)-year-and-eight (8)-month-old child. Further, the defense did not even contest
her condition.
Ratio Decidendi: Sexual intercourse with an intellectually disabled person is rape since
proof of force or intimidation becomes needless as the victim is incapable of giving
consent to the act.
Gist: This Court resolves this appeal filed by Edgar Allan from the Decision of the Court
of Appeals. Which affirmed the RTC’s ruling that Allan was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of Simple Rape of AAA, a mental retardate.

Webb vs. NBI

FACTS:

People vs. XXX

FACTS:

Aquino vs. Aquino

FACTS:

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