Jones, Self-Aggrandizing Vehicle
Jones, Self-Aggrandizing Vehicle
C.V. Jones
1
I supply an asterisk wherever referring to terms such as *buddhadhātu and
*ātmadhātu, which are not attested in extant Sanskrit fragments of the tathāgatagarbha
sources under discussion. However the presence in surviving translations of terms which
in all probability reflect these, for example the Tibetan sangs rgyas kyi khams and bdag
kyi dbyings/khams, permit us to discuss with some certainty the use of these specific
expressions in underlying Indic texts. See further n. 27; also Radich 2015a: 23–32.
It is clear that some tathāgatagarbha authors used both the terms tathāgatagarbha and
*buddhadhātu – both seemingly tatpuruṣa compounds – to refer to a permanent element
(dhātu) that belongs to sentient beings, said to be somehow within their bodies: see e.g.
Habata 2014. Shimoda Masahiro’s model of the evolution of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-
mahāsūtra (MPNMS) prioritized *buddhadhātu as the older of these terms in the text’s
composition; the dhātu being the permanent, bodily element of a Buddha, akin to that which
would be preserved in a stūpa, concealed in the constitution of all beings. A likely under-
standing of the term tathāgatagarbha in the MPNMS is then that beings possess a cham-
ber (garbha) for a tathāgata, and so can be said to have a tathāgatagarbha in their bodies:
see Shimoda 1997: 283–292 (English portion 21–22); Radich 2015a: 159–168; also e.g.
MPNMSC1 12.885a5–6; MPNMST §391,14–16.
Buddhist literature in general holds instead that sentient beings are better
understood exhaustively in terms of the five skandhas, themselves char-
acterized by dependent arising and impermanence.2
It can be contended that tathāgatagarbha texts such as the Mahāpari
nirvāṇa-mahāsūtra, which held that it is indeed correct to speak of sen-
tient beings in terms of their having a permanent, unchanging self, are
guilty of some lapse into the kinds of ātman-oriented metaphysics other-
wise eschewed by Indian Buddhism. Non-Buddhist religious literature
typical of classical India – for example the Brāhminic Upaniṣads, the
bhakti-oriented Bhagavadgītā, and ‘nāstika’ Jain scriptures – frequently
conceived of a true self or other lasting, essential nature that transmi-
grates and can, in some or other fashion, experience liberation from
rebirth. The Buddhist tradition was meanwhile marked by a rejection of
thinking in such terms; developing a sophisticated, alternative discourse
which held such postulations to be erroneous and, ironically, the root
cause of our continued suffering.3 We might call this Buddhist discourse
2
This is not to understand anātman, at least in the pre-Mahāyāna Buddhist discourses
attributed to the Buddha, to constitute the negation of any notion of selfhood: a view that
this literature holds to be an erroneous, annihilationist position (ucchedavāda: see e.g. the
Yamakasutta, SN III 109–115). Rather, as articulated by Albahari (2002), the earlier dis-
courses attributed to the Buddha reject metaphysical positions regarding the ātman – its
existence or absence among the skandhas – in favour of anātman best understood as a
method for promoting detachment from any notion of a lasting, essential nature. A not
dissimilar reading is that of Wynne (2011), who charts the emergence of an interpretation
of anātman closer to a denial of the self in Abhidharmic sources: one which perhaps had
lost the nuance of earlier literature concerning this doctrine.
3
I will not consider here the exceptional and non-Mahāyānist pudgalavāda or ‘person-
alist’ position, which was held by schools including the Sāṃmitīyas and Vātsīputrīyas.
This doctrine – concerned with the status of the person (pudgala) existing neither within
nor apart from the skandhas – does not appear to have been an influence upon ātmavādin
tathāgatagarbha authors. While both traditions share a concern for preserving some notion
of personal continuity in a broader tradition concerned predominantly with impermanence,
the pudgalavāda affirms personhood strictly in terms of saṃsāric existence, i.e. referring
to a person dependent upon the skandhas, the ‘bearer’ of them as some ‘burden,’ and who
is the subject of transmigration. For texts such as the MPNMS the self is instead that which
is fully realized upon awakening: i.e. what is common between (1) a sattva, and subse-
quently (2) a Buddha. In other words, as far as pudgalavāda sources tell us their view was
that the attainment of nirvāṇa results in the end of anything that could have been deemed
a self, whereas for ātmavādin tathāgatagarbha authors the goal of awakening is the man-
ifestation of the true self, equated with Buddhahood. For a thorough account of pudgala-
vāda doctrine, see Priestley 1999.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 117
4
It is certainly the case that Abhidharmic and Mahāyānist articulations of anātman
doctrine are what we can call metaphysical, i.e. attempting to present accounts of what
properly exists: be these substantial dharmas or reality understood in terms of śūnyatā,
tathatā etc., though this may not have been what was intended by, or frequently understood
of, earlier discourses attributed to the Buddha. Either way, it is true to say that the domi-
nant discourse across Indian Buddhist literature articulated an account of beings without
recourse to the category of any permanent, unchanging self, regardless of how one branch
or another of Buddhist tradition approached this matter. It is this kind of discourse that I
am here calling anātmavāda.
5
I use ātmavāda to refer to any doctrine, Buddhist or otherwise, that has at its centre
the affirmation of some unchanging notion of selfhood considered to deserve the label
ātman. Hence while the authors of texts like the MPNMS distinguish their doctrine from
all erroneous forms of ātmavāda, their own positions (albeit couched throughout in terms
of tathāgatagarbha doctrine, and aimed at realizing specifically the qualities of a Buddha)
still deserve to be categorized as such.
6
For an overview of this doctrine, likely an innovation of the SPS itself, see Williams
2009: 152–155; also Kunst 1977; Hubbard 1995.
118 c.V. jones
extent of the Mahāyāna – directs all beings towards the realization of full
awakening; or, in the innovative language of these ātmavādin tathāgata-
garbha authors, liberation of their essential “Buddha-nature,” which can
be called also one’s true self.
The key texts in this discussion belong to what has been called the
Mahāparinirvāṇa-group of sūtras: a set of texts composed in India no
later than the early fifth century, and containing likely some of the earliest
expressions of tathāgatagarbha doctrine.7 Of particular significance
among these are the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra (MPNMS) itself and
the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra (AMS), which – along with the likely later
*Mahābherīsūtra (MBhS) – use the term ātman to designate the tathāga-
tagarbha; seemingly, and it seems by their authors’ own admission, gen-
erating confusion of their doctrine for that of non-Buddhist ātmavādin
traditions.8
In his recent work concerning the MPNMS, Michael Radich has
argued that this text presents likely the earliest form of tathāgatagarbha
doctrine that is available to us. In contradiction to the earlier, extensive
overview of the tathāgatagarbha literature produced by Takasaki Jikidō,
Radich holds that the MPNMS does not reflect some derivative or
(regarding its ātmavādin position) more ‘radical’ development of a sup-
posedly older form of tathāgatagarbha doctrine, represented by texts
such as the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS), Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra
(ŚDS) and Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa (AAN).9 These other works all
7
See e.g. Takasaki 1975: 127; Suzuki 2002: 22; Radich 2015a: 34–35, 97–99, also
appendix 3.
8
No complete Sanskrit versions of any of these texts remain, however it is clear that
in extant Chinese and Tibetan translations of them the term ātman (我 or bdag, respec-
tively) was understood to denote the tathāgatagarbha. The AMS is noteworthy for prefer-
ring the term *ātmadhātu (discussed later) over ātman, though it shall be seen that its
authors still understood the Buddha to have taught the existence of a self as part of his
explanation of the tathāgatagarbha. Regarding the relative dating of the AMS, especially
in regards to the *Mahābherīsūtra, see Suzuki 2000. For a recent overview of this litera-
ture, see Radich 2015b: 264–269.
9
See Radich 2015a: 23–34. Radich opposes the picture of the tathāgatagarbha liter-
ature presented by Takasaki (1975: 768–769), which posits the TGS, ŚDS and AAN,
together with the RGV(V), to constitute a ‘main current’ of tathāgatagarbha thought in
India, with the MPNMS-group of texts somewhat sidelined. In a future publication I will
explore how far we can discern a development of ideas concerning selfhood throughout
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 119
argue for the existence of some reality that is the permanently present,
essential nature of sentient beings, without ever deeming it to be a ‘self’:
a contrast to a central position of the MPNMS. However they do not
attempt to defend the tathāgatagarbha doctrine in general, nor confront
any objections that might have occurred to audiences: major concerns of
the MPNMS, AMS and MBhS. Moreover, it appears likely that the ŚDS
– which provides the doctrinal backbone for the one lasting Indian śāstric
authority on this doctrine, the Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra (RGV) and its
commentary (RGVV) – together with the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (LAS), may
well contain material responding to and opposing an older, ātmavādin
form of tathāgatagarbha doctrine represented by the MPNMS, AMS and
MBhS.10 We must then entertain the possibility that the earliest tathāgata-
garbha sources known to us presented their doctrine as one of a permanent,
the tathāgatagarbha literature as a whole. It is in the meantime clear that the relationship
of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine to the category ātman, as well as perceived confusion of
it for non-Buddhist traditions concerned with the self, is a recurring theme of the MPNMS-
group, ŚDS, LAS, and the RGV(V), along with other śāstric sources that refer to the
tathāgatagarbha. Regarding the TGS, see n. 26; concerning selfhood across these texts
more broadly, see Kanō 2016: 385-391.
10
It is not certain that authors of either the ŚDS or LAS, in denying the appropriateness
of the category of selfhood in regards to the tathāgatagarbha, had in mind the MPNMS,
though evidence suggests this to be likely. The LAS certainly knows of the MPNMS and
AMS, mentioning both as authorities in its promotion of vegetarianism (Nanjio 1923:
258,4), and its opposition to the tathāgatagarbha conceived in ātmavādin terms certainly
evokes the language of the MPNMS: see nn. 104 and 119.
The ŚDS employs an account of the (inverted) viparyāsas similar to that found in the
MPNMS, and affirms, with three other “perfections,” the ātmapāramitā or “perfection of
self” to characterize the dharmakāya (see ŚDS: T.353, 222a18–a26; comparing e.g.
MPNMSC1 862a5–14). It is significant that the ŚDS, unlike the MPNMS, does not attrib-
ute selfhood to the tathāgatagarbha itself, but only ātmapāramitā to the dharmakāya, and
is otherwise adamant that the terms ātman, sattva, jīva or pudgala are not appropriate
designators for the tathāgatagarbha (T.353, 222b19–b21). I find it likely that the ŚDS
reflects some desire to develop tathāgatagarbha doctrine away from any similarity to an
ātmavādin position, purposefully employing the positive expressions found in the MPNMS
to describe only the dharmakāya, which is the tathāgatagarbha subsequent to its having
been cleansed of adventitious afflictions (a formulation developed in greater sophistication
by the RGVV: see n. 31). For more on this likely debt of the ŚDS to the MPNMS, see
Shimoda 1991.
Finally, the Anūnatvāpūrnatvanirdeśa makes no reference to the tathāgatagarbha in
terms of selfhood, though I agree with Silk (2015: 11–13) that this text appears to owe a
debt of influence to the ŚDS, which would have clarified already how the tathāgatagarbha
is unbefitting of the term ātman.
120 c.V. jones
Throughout its account of this true self the MPNMS certainly shows an
awareness that its content crosses some kind of doctrinal Rubicon into
foreign, ātmavādin territory. Its account of the self, indeed of tathāgata-
garbha doctrine as a whole, is a defensive one, and elaborated at great
length through responses to the incredulity of the bodhisattva Kāśyapa,
the Buddha’s interlocutor in this part of the sūtra.13 The authors of the
For accounts of the relative dating of tathāgatagarbha sources see Takasaki 1975:
119–120, 167; also Radich 2015a: 92–96. For a recent discussion of issues in transmission
regarding relevant material of the RGVV, see Ruegg 2015: 317–320; for a recent treatment
of the development of this text, see Kanō 2014.
11
See also Hodge 2010/2012: 42–43; 53–54; 82–84. Hodge argues that the tathāgata
garbha-oriented material of the MPNMS was originally concerned with promoting a
doctrine of a self in sentient beings, the language of which was gradually redacted towards
the tathāgatagarbha/*buddhadhātu position represented in versions of the text available
to us today.
12
E.g. MPNMSC1 883b15–17: 佛告迦葉:眞實我者,是如來性。當知一切衆生悉
有,但彼衆生,無量煩惱覆蔽不現。Compare MPNMST §376,1–5; MPNMSC2 407b9–10.
13
The majority of material concerning the tathāgatagarbha as a kind of self appears
in a set of responses to questions voiced by the bodhisattva Kāśyapa. For more on the
arhat Kāśyapa’s role in Mahāyāna sūtras, particularly as representing the continuity of the
Buddha’s influence in the world after his apparent departure, see Silk 2003 and Tournier
2014.
The list of Kāśyapa’s misgivings with the teaching of a true self differs across our
extant versions of the MPNMS, though the shortest (perhaps earliest) such list occurs at
MPNMSC1 883c7–c18. Herein, Kāśyapa asks how a self could be posited in light of given
facts such as the increase in any person’s knowledge over time (a self being something
unchanging); the grim realities of birth and death; apparent differentiation between beings
(in terms of varṇas) determined by karma; the wickedness of beings who kill, steal etc.;
disability or deformity; and the requirement for the self to reside somewhere, in some
discernable fashion, in the body (which, on inspection, it does not). Compare MPNMSC2
407c20–c26; MPNMST §379. Complaints such as these not only strongly suggest real-
world objection to a Buddhist account of a self, but also confirm what our authors believed
their audience(s) to consider this term to denote: i.e. an unchanging kernel; immune to
death and subsequent rebirth; of virtuous and unblemished character; which should be
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 121
MPNMS were clearly aware that their ideas jarred with what had previ-
ously been received of the dharma – that the doctrine of a ‘Buddhist self’
profoundly contradicts what had otherwise been taught – and keenly
argue that theirs is not any self known through the language of extraneous
religious teachers, or so-called tīrthikas.14 This defensiveness is present
also in the AMS, which seems even more aware of non-Buddhist musings
on the nature of the self, many of which are reminiscent of the ātmavādin
perspectives of the Upaniṣads, and which is just as adamant as the
MPNMS that none of these properly describe the tathāgatagarbha that
is one’s true self.15
Adopting even a carefully qualified ātmavāda position seems to have
invited confusion and consternation among Buddhist audiences, along
with accusations of promoting a false representation of the Buddha’s
teaching.16 It is then clear, and perhaps not surprising, that authors of the
MPNMS and AMS faced opposition in advancing such a doctrine, and
noteworthy that what are likely later contributions to the evolution of
the tathāgatagarbha idea, such as those found in the ŚDS, explicitly
disassociated this teaching from the language of selfhood.17 The relative
shared by and undifferentiated across all sentient beings; and which is discernible by them
in their constitution.
14
See MPNMSC1 863a9–a16; MPNMSC2 378c28–c29; MPNMST §107, 13–27.
I choose to leave the term tīrthika untranslated, though take it to refer always to teachers
belonging to non-Buddhist religious traditions. In particular I reject the still common and
very problematic rendering of tīrthikas as “heretics:” such a translation is misleading, as
the term certainly refers to teachers or religious practitioners extraneous to the Buddhist
saṅgha; in the language of Western religious history “heretic” commonly denotes those
who hold unconventional views within the fold of a given tradition. An elegant neologism
worthy of further consideration is “allodoxes,” employed by Scherrer-Schaub 1991: xli,
n. 63, also 1999: 71, and more recently Eltschinger 2014a: 36, n. 3; 2014b: 194, n. 14. This
would reflect well the literal meaning of the common Chinese translation of tīrthika as
外道.
15
See AMSC 525b7–14; AMST D.213, 151b1–b4; Q.879, 158b3–b7. Herein we find
mention of misguided notions of the self as comparable to the size of a thumb or various
grains, featured also in the MPNMS (discussed later); also said to be of various colours,
or situated in various locations in the body. Regarding colours of the self in other Indian
traditions, see Balcerowicz 2016: 44-54. See also n. 44.
16
The MPNMS states that its doctrine will be slandered and considered a product of
Māra: see MPNMSC1 881a9–29; MPNMSC2 404a1–23; MPNMST §347–348; also Radich
2015a: 33–34.
17
See n. 10.
122 c.V. jones
dating of these texts aside, it remains of curiosity why and by what kind
of motivation authors of the MPNMS and associated works chose to
adopt the language of a self in advancing tathāgatagarbha doctrine;
inviting predictable opposition from Buddhist audiences who would
likely have heard time and again that the Buddha’s understanding of
personhood avoided recourse to any such category.
Evidence in both the MPNMS and the AMS (which seems in many
ways to be its doctrinal successor) suggests that the language of selfhood
not only described how their authors conceived of the tathāgatagarbha –
as a Buddha or awakened subject permanently resident in the constitution
of sentient beings – but also facilitated an explanation of the relationship
their doctrine had to other, non-Buddhist discourses concerning libera-
tion.18 It appears that both works supposed the scope of the Buddha’s
influence in saṃsāra to be greater and more diverse than was immedi-
ately apparent to their audiences: a feature of the ekayānist understanding
of the Mahāyāna under whose influence many tathāgatagarbha sources
seem to have been.
18
It is apparent that the ātmavādin tathāgatagarbha of sources like the MPNMS, affirm-
ing the existence of something like an awakened subject, can be contrasted to the tathāgata-
garbha doctrine of the ŚDS, AAN and LAS, perhaps a later development, in which this refers
to something more like an awakened substrate underpinning the existence and liberation of
sentient beings. For more on this cautious distinction, see Jones 2016, esp. pp. 113–115.
19
See DN II 72–168.
20
This dating of Dharmakṣema’s translation work rests on when he is understood to
have arrived at Guzang, somewhere between 412 and 421 CE. See Chen 2004 for further
discussion of this matter.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 123
21
Available also are 34 published Sanskrit fragments of the text from Central Asia, and
a single folio preserved at Kōyasan: see Habata 2007; 2009; Radich 2015a: 21. An impor-
tant quotation of the MPNMS is preserved also in the RGVV: see Johnston 1991 [1950]:
74,20–75,12.
In a later publication I shall provide full critical editions of the passages discussed
throughout this article. In the meantime, material consulted here is drawn from the Taishō
edition of the Chinese canon (T), along with the Derge (D) and Peking (Q) editions of the
Tibetan bka’ ’gyur. In the case of MPNMST, we are lucky to have the critical edition of
the text produced by Habata 2013, to which I refer throughout this article.
22
For more on this material of the MPNMS, see Fujii 1993. The discussion of the
ātmavādin tathāgatagarbha in Ruegg 1989: 19–26 is limited to consideration of passages
drawn from a Tibetan translation of MPNMSC2 (e.g. D.121; Q.789), and focuses on material
exclusive to Dharmakṣema’s version of the text. While valuable in regards to the evolution
and later reception of tathāgatagarbha doctrine this is of less help in consideration of an
earlier ‘core’ text of the MPNMS.
23
As Radich (2015a: 129–132) has demonstrated, the MPNMS contends that the cor-
rect understanding of the Buddha is as the dharmakāya, which is apart from any worldly
displays of the Buddha’s physical body: e.g. MPNMSC1 866a16–18: 善男子,如來身者,是
常住身,是不壞身,是金剛身,非穢食身。是則法身,當作是觀 – “Good son, the
body of the tathāgata is a permanently abiding body, an indestructible body, a vajra-body,
not a body [sustained by] unclean food; thus see it to be the dharmakāya.” Compare
MPNMSC2 382c27–29; MPNMST §144. See also Radich 2011 [2012].
124 c.V. jones
24
See Shimoda 1997: 163–171 (English portion 13); also Shimoda 2015. Radich
(2015a: 21–22; appendix 4) has proposed a simpler reworking of this stratification that
sees the earlier content of MPNMS (i.e. MPNMS-dhk) end more cleanly at MPNMSC1
868a17; MPNMSC2 385b5; MPNMST §168.
25
See MPNMSC1 885a5–8; MPNMSC2 410a6–a9; MPNMST § 391,14–16. See also
Shimoda 1997: 278–298 (English portion 22); Radich 2015a: 159–168.
26
This overturns the older position, advanced by Zimmermann (2002), that the Tathāga-
tagarbhasūtra (TGS) might constitute our earliest source for the tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
As Radich (2015a: 32–57) argues, the TGS does not attempt to explain or defend this
doctrine or any aspect of it, and instead likely introduced the expression tathāgatagarbha
from elsewhere after it had, perhaps, earned some acceptance in wider Buddhist circles.
Meanwhile it is clear that acceptance of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is a major concern
of the MPNMS-group: see also n. 13. Moreover, the term tathāgatagarbha appears only in
what Zimmermann (2002: 28–32) had identified as likely the latest material of the TGS,
and hence this text – though a rich source of imagery expounding a doctrine of the intrin-
sically awakened nature of sentient beings – may well not reflect the early development of
the tathāgatagarbha idea as closely as the MPNMS. All versions of the MPNMS mention
by name some Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, though Radich (2015a: 37–40; after Hodge 2010/2012:
36, n. 66) argues that this may be self-referential, i.e. in description of the MPNMS itself:
a feature discernable also in versions of the AMS, MBhS and ŚDS.
However, the suggestion that the MPNMS reflects the tathāgatagarbha in a stage of
development earlier than in any other known source does not rule out that this expression
may have developed outside of the MPNMS known to us today. See Habata 2014: 156,
suggesting that the tathāgatagarbha as it appears in the MPNMS presumes audiences to
have some familiarity with it.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 125
27
Extant translations of the MPNMS reflect preference for terms that seem to render
tathāgatagarbha (e.g. 如来蔵; de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po) over *buddhadhātu (e.g.
佛性; sangs rgyas kyi khams): see Radich 2015a: appendix 1. Lack of agreement between
versions of the MPNMS regarding which Indic term might have occurred where, as well
as the absence of the term *buddhadhātu in any extant Sanskrit fragment of the text,
should discourage over-thinking the apparent use of one term over the other, ostensibly
tathāgatagarbha and *buddha-/tathāgatadhātu, underlying any particular lines of our sur-
viving translations. As such, Radich (2015a: 24–32, also 159–168) criticizes the view that
the MPNMS advances a doctrine of the “*buddhadhātu” as distinct from, or worse still
derivative of, the tathāgatagarbha, even if the former term may have led to the adoption,
or possibly generation (Radich 2015a: 166–167), of the latter.
28
See n. 13.
126 c.V. jones
29
See n. 25.
30
E.g. in the Vipallāsasutta: see AN II 52.
31
See Johnston 1991 [1950]: 75,6–12; also Ruegg 1969: 364–370. This material in the
Sanskrit RGVV seems to accord closest with that found in MPNMSC1 (862b21), which
calls the correct position apart from the four distortions the “true dharma(s)” (眞實法):
best understood as the “true qualities” which characterize awakening. Inversion of the
viparyāsas to affirm positive attributes of awakening is found also in the Mahāmeghasūtra
(T.387, 1082a18–20), in a passage that Suzuki (2001) argues is evidence of exchange
between this text and the pre-tathāgatagarbha material of the MPNMS.
32
This portion of MPNMS-dhk equates the four positive attributes to four categories
of what is supermundane: ātman = Buddha; nitya = dharmakāya; sukha = nirvāṇa; śubha
= dharma: see MPNMSC1 862a13–14; MPNMSC2 377b21–22; MPNMST §101, 10–13.
Hodge (2012: 42) suggests that this is likely a later interpolation inserted into the main
text, meant to clarify what is certainly a challenging and unclear passage. But presumably
this does not extend to the rest of this portion of MPNMS-dhk, concerning as it does ātman
as befitting the supermundane, in contrast to its meaninglessness in regards to what is only
worldly: see MPNMSC1 862a5–14; MPNMSC2 377b7–c12; MPNMST §100–101.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 127
The authors of this material were clearly under no illusion that use of
the term ātman to refer to an aspect of liberated reality evoked comparison
with the ideas of tīrthikas. But importantly the introduction of the claim
that the Buddha might be described as ātman is here not apropos of sen-
tient beings at all; rather, a somewhat special usage of the term ātman to
refer to the Buddha is distinguished from anything resembling the ideas
of rival teachers. Later use of the term ātman, in MPNMS-tg, features a
second account of the viparyāsas clearly distinct from that found in
MPNMS-dhk; one in which ātman is taken now to refer specifically to
the tathāgatagarbha.33 Hence this material of MPNMS-dhk pre-dated, but
informed in a significant fashion, the ātmavādin form of tathāgatagarbha
doctrine that would later more properly contrast with anātmavādin dis-
course concerning how one should understand sentient beings.
The key passage of MPNMS-dhk defending the Buddha’s use of the
term ātman, as well as belittling the doctrines of tīrthikas, features in a
lengthy parable that compares the Buddha to a skilled physician, who is
said to replace in his duties another, ignorant doctor who is explained as
representing the tīrthikas. In this parable the skilled physician alone
knows when to prescribe to his patients a milk-based medicine, which
had previously been prescribed for any and all ailments (and with under-
standably mixed results) by his ignorant predecessor.34 In unpacking the
meaning of this story, the Buddha of the MPNMS employs another,
shorter comparison: between the aforementioned charlatan physician and
the activities of some kind of woodworm.
For example, a sheet of wood possesses a trail of marks, which resemble
the king’s name, that have been eaten out by an insect. Those who are not
skilled in writing consider these to be real letters; those who are skilled in
writing know that they are not real. The former [unskilled] doctor was like
this: even if [able to] concoct the milk-remedy, he did not discern the right
time [to prescribe it].35
33
This longer account of the viparyāsas in MPNMS-tg makes clear that the correct
understanding of ātman refers certainly to the tathāgatagarbha – i.e. some ‘self’ of sen-
tient beings – while anātman refers only to false notions of the self considered by worldly
persons: see MPNMSC1 883b3–5; MPNMSC2 407a20–26; MPNMST §373.
34
See MPNMSC1 862b24–863a3; MPNMSC2 378a17–c18; MPNMST §106.
35
MPNMSC1 862c15–c17: 譬如板木有虫食跡,似王a名字。不善書者,謂是眞
字;其善書者,乃知非眞b。先醫如是:雖合乳藥,不知分別時節所應。
128 c.V. jones
This is likely the earliest surviving literary defence of the term ātman as
a designator for the Buddha (though not, as it came to be in MPNMS-tg,
as a designator for the tathāgatagarbha), and reflects an important atti-
tude of our authors regarding the veracity and value of non-Buddhist
teachings. This passage of the MPNMS not only affirms a correct usage
of the notion of ātman – opaquely relating to some understanding of
Buddhahood – but in so doing implies that discourse on selfhood in
general (ātmavāda), though generally misguided, bears resemblance to
some truth about the status of a Buddha. In other words this passage of
MPNMS-dhk opens the door not just to further Buddhist consideration
of to what (if anything) the term ātman should refer, but moreover takes
an important step towards participating in a discourse concerning the
nature of sentient beings that had been eschewed by earlier, indeed likely
the earliest, Buddhist authors.
For the authors of MPNMS-dhk erroneous teachings concerning the
ātman can only prefigure the true teaching of the self, so far understood
to refer only to the figure of a Buddha. Beyond doubt is the primacy of
a
王=生<元><明>
b
書者乃知非眞=別者知非書字本<三><宮>, 別者乃知非書字本<聖>
Compare MPNMSC2 378b27–c2; MPNMST §106,69–74.
36
MPNMST §107,7–12: mu stegs pa rnams tshar gcad pa’i phyir bdag med do // sems
can med do // srog med do // gang zag med do zhes gsung ngo // mu stegs pa rnams kyis
bdag bstan pa ni srin bus brkos pa’i yi ge dang ’dra ste / de’i phyir nga sems can thams
cad la bdag med do zhes bstan pa ston par mdzad do // Compare MPNMSC1 863a7–9;
MPNMSC2 378c21–c23.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 129
37
This is in what MPNMSC1 calls the chapter “on the nature of the tathāgata” (883b13:
如來性). However these chapter divisions do not feature in either of our other versions of
the text, and may have been introduced (perhaps by the translators of MPNMSC1) to dis-
cern thematically discrete portions of the text. See Habata 2007: li–liv; Hodge 2010/2012:
34, n. 60.
38
This last portion of the tathāgatagarbha-oriented material in the MPNMS exhibits
a particularly close relationship to the doctrine of the AMS. It is preceded by an explana-
tion that the *buddhadhātu can be perceived, albeit indistinctly, by the tenth-stage
bodhisattva: a position not explored elsewhere in the MPNMS, but certainly held by the
authors of the AMS. See e.g. MPNMSC1 887a8–a16; MPNMSC2 412a1–4; MPNMST §406;
also e.g. AMSC 525b24–c2; AMST D.213, 152a1–152a4; Q.879, 159a4–a7.
130 c.V. jones
39
MPNMSC1 887b24–25: 世尊,世間衆生皆言有我,比義云何? Compare the quite
different MPNMST §416,1–3; and MPNMSC2 412b15–16: 非聖凡夫,有衆生性皆説有我 –
“ignoble common folk, having the sattva-dhātu, all state that there is a self.”
40
The form of this parable in MPNMSC1 does not describe a lost sword, but rather
a rhinoceros. This must reflect some confusion regarding something like, or derivative
of, the Sanskrit khaḍga. Curiously MPNMSC1 describes this rhinoceros as tame
(MPNMSC1 887b27: ), which if present in the corresponding Indian text underlying this
translation would constitute an entertaining Indian variant, rather than any error or inser-
tion during the act of translation. Due to the agreement of the other two versions of the
text, and the similarity of the parable’s explanation across all three (plus the likelihood
that the fictional prince would have more reasonably transported a sidearm than a large
pachyderm), I choose to follow the explanatory content of the parable found in MPNMSC1
but assume its content to have, in some previous incarnation, referred originally also to a
lost sword.
41
MPNMSC1 887b24–887c9; MPNMSC2 412b15–412c14; MPNMST §416.
42
MPNMSC2 412c14–15 seems also to concern the bodhisattva’s arrival into the world
(出現於世). From MPNMST §417,1–3 it is clear that the bodhisattva mahāsattva arises in the
world, teaches regarding the self, and subsequently dies (…’jig rten du ’byung ste / bdag gi
de kho na nyid bstan nas ’chi bar byed do), akin to the departure of the prince in our parable.
43
MPNMSC1 887c9–c12: 如是,菩薩摩訶薩,出於世時,爲衆生説眞實之我。其
無知者,聞一切衆生皆有佛性,不知其眞,便妄想説:我如寸燈,在於心中a,種種
衆生、我、人、壽命。
a
〔我如…中〕八字-<聖>
Compare MPNMSC2 412c14–c20; MPNMST §417,1–11.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 131
44
See e.g. notions of selfhood found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 4.12–13; 6.17 (Olivelle
1998: 394–395; 402–403); also Habata 1990.
45
Such lists are clearly well established in earlier Buddhist sources, for example in a
gloss upon the Mahāniddesa, on the subject of worldly notions of selfhood in the Aṭṭhaka-
vagga of the Suttanipāta (4.6.5), which presents us with a list of ten such ideas or expres-
sions: see La Vallée Poussin & Thomas 1916: 127; also examples in Skilling 1997: 300–301;
331.
46
See MPNMST §417,11: skyes bu mthe bo tsam zhes bya ba dang / ldum bu sha ma
ka’i ’bras bu tsam dang / ’bras kyi ’bru tsam zhig snying la gnas te ’bar ro shes log par
rtog par byed de. Compare also MPNMSC2 412c14–c20.
47
For more of such lists in these sources, see e.g. MPNMSC1 862a2–a5; MPNMSC2
377a25–b5; MPNMST §107,13–27; §98,1–§99,5; also AMSC 525a21; AMST D.213,
150b7–151a4, Q.879, 158a1–158a6.
132 c.V. jones
…just as that which was said [by the pauper] in his dream was passed on
from one person to another, they [,the ignorant persons,] develop distorted
views: imagining that there is a self and searching for the nature of the self
(*ātmadhātu);48 [then,] not finding the true self, [they] develop the idea that
there is no self, while worldly sentient beings constantly develop deluded
notions: imputing notions of an existent self and of non-self. Likewise, good
son, I say that the nature of the tathāgata (*tathāgatadhātu) is the supreme
truth.49
The equivalent passage in MPNMSC2 states more clearly that the doc-
trine of anātman is taught by the Buddha to eliminate wrong views
concerning the self.50 The sense in all versions however is that whatever
is erroneous about other conceptions of the self, they all have as their
origin the tathāgatagarbha: the true self that is beyond the faculties of
sentient beings.
48
Here 我性 – an expression found only twice in MPNMSC1 – corresponds in
MPNMST to the only occurrence of bdag gi khams (§417,4–8) in that version of the text,
and hence very likely reflects *ātmadhātu. This is an expression that dominates the
tathāgatagarbha doctrine of the AMS (to which we return below) and may even have roots
in this passage of the MPNMS. See also Habata 1990: 180.
49
MPNMSC1 887c12–c16: 如彼夢説,展轉相承,皆起邪見,計有吾我,求吾我
性。不得實我,作無我説,而諸世間一切衆生常作妄想,計有吾我及無我想。如
是,善男子,我説如來之性最爲眞實。Compare MPNMSC2 412c21–c26; MPNMST
§417,4–9.
50
See MPNMSC2 412c23–24: 爲斷如是諸邪見故,如來示現説於無我. It is worth
remembering that the authors of the MPNMS certainly accepted some interpretation of
anātman doctrine, denying that – just as various plants lack any substantial core to them –
there can be no substance underlying the worldly notions of ātman, jīva, pudgala etc.: see
MPNMSC1 862a2–5; MPNMSC2 377a25–b5; MPNMST §98. The authors clearly held that
denying the existence of these is not inconsistent with affirming the true self, the tathāga-
tagarbha, which they claim is not like any of these notions. See also n. 13.
It has been suggested that earlier Buddhist literature implicitly gestured towards some
self that is beyond the skandhas: see Pérez-Remón 1980, and the lengthy rebuttal of this
thesis by Steven Collins (1982). Another similar interpretation of early Buddhist sources
as espousing something like the upaniṣadic self (still unconvincing) was offered by
Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, recently made available in English: see Bhattacharya 2015:
1–120. Whether or not such readings are at all persuasive is of little consequence here;
it remains the case that however one reads what is implied by accounts of (non-)selfhood
in the works of pre-tathāgatagarbha authors – whether Śrāvakayānist or Mahāyānist in
disposition – their shared discourse avoided any explicit postulation (or negation) of a
permanent self, i.e. they espoused what I am here calling the anātmavāda: see n. 4.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 133
The explanation of this parable goes further still, and introduces some
ideas and expressions that we shall see developed further by the AMS.
In a tricky passage, the MPNMS suggests that correct discourse on the
self, even when apparently found outside of the Buddha’s teaching, is a
manifestation still of the Buddhist dharma. As our three versions of the
MPNMS here exhibit some pertinent differences, we shall consider the
same passage as it is presented by each translation.
MPNMSC1
If a worldly [person] expounds a self that is in accord with dharma, he
should be known to be beyond what is worldly; it should be known that he
is an emanation of a bodhisattva manifested in conformity to conventional
teachings.51
The Buddha again said to Kāśyapa: all speech, incantations, and treatises;
that which is taught by the Tathāgata is the root of all these.52
MPNMSC2
Good son, if there is some common person (*pṛthagjana) who is able to
explain [this] well, then this is in accord with the supreme dharma of the
Buddha. If there is someone able to discriminate and propagate this
[teaching] accordingly, you should know him to be an emanation of a
bodhisattva.53
51
See Habata 1990: 182–183. This is reminiscent of the activity of the bodhisattva –
“in accord with what is of the world” – epitomized by texts like the Lokānuvartanāsūtra
(e.g. T.807,751c3: 隨世間習俗而入,示現如是), which clearly share a kind of ‘docetic’
Buddhology akin to that found in the MPNMS: see Radich 2015a: 105–158; also Harrison
1982.
52
MPNMSC1 887c16-20: 若世間説我隨順法者,當知是則爲離世俗,當知皆是菩
薩變化,現同俗説。 佛復告迦葉:一切言説、呪術、記論,如來所説爲一切本。My
translation disregards a chapter division (after 現同俗説) present in MPNMSC1 and instead
follows the division of the text into meaningful sections, following its Tibetan form, in
accord with Habata (2013). The material which follows this passage concerns secret prop-
erties of akṣaras, expressing an interest in mantra which perhaps speaks further about the
interest authors of the MPNMS had with religious ideas and practices beyond commonly
held parameters of the Buddhist dharma: see Blum 2013: 357, n. 131. See also n. 37.
53
MPNMSC2 here reads 菩薩相貌, which Blum (2013: 254) translates as the “counte-
nance of a bodhisattva.” Here 相貌 likely reflects the Sanskrit *nimitta, very possibly reflect-
ing a misreading of nirmita; a development suggested by e.g. the likely misplaced occurrence
of 相貌 at T.227, 564b15, corresponding to a form of nirmita in the Sanskrit Aṣṭasāhasrikā
Prajñāpāramitā: see Vaidya 1960: 163,13; also Karashima 2011: 308, n. 54. A similar
134 c.V. jones
Good son, all various different discourses, incantations, speech and words,
all these are teachings of the Buddha, and not teachings of tīrthikas.54
MPNMST
What is well-spoken and in accord with correct dharma, even if of worldly
persons, should be known as supermundane.
If among the worldly there is that which is in all ways highest dharma, then
that should be known as an emanation of a bodhisattva.
All various treatises, spells and incantations should be known to be pro-
nouncements by the perfect Buddha.55
misreading may have affected the Chinese translation of this expression in MPNMSC2:
hence I amend my own translation to also be concerned with *nirmita of bodhisattvas.
54
MPNMSC2 412c25-413a1: 善男子, 若有凡夫能善説者,即是隨順無上佛法。若有
善能分別隨順宣説是者,當知即是菩薩相貌。善男子,所有種種異論、呪術、言
語、文字,皆是佛説,非外道説。
55
MPNMST §418,1–6: legs par smras pa chos dang ’tsham pa gang yin pa de ni ’jig
rten pa rnams kyi yin na yang ’jig rten las ’das pa yin par rig par bya’o // ’jig rten pa’i
nang na rnam pa thams cad du chos kyi mchog ni / byang chub sems dpas sprul pa yin
par rig par bya ste / bstan bcos sam / rig sngags sam / gsang sngags ci yang rung ba de
dag thams cad ni / rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa yin par shes par gyis shig /
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 135
56
See MPNMSC1 870c15–16; MPNMSC2 388b15–16; MPNMST §193. Regarding the
title Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra, see MPNMSC1 870c21: 種種現化,如首楞嚴三昧所説;
also MPNMSC2 388b20–b22; though MPNMST §194,3–4 calls these cho ’phrul, which
suggests the term *(ṛddhi)prātihārya over specifically *nirmita/nirmāṇa. The Śūraṅgama
samādhisūtra available to us today indeed mentions a range of magical displays (e.g.
T.642, 640a11–12 called herein 神通變化; *ṛddhiprātihārya), though not emanated forms
in the manner detailed by the MPNMS: see Lamotte 1965: 221, §120. Radich (2015a:
51–52; 53–54) presents good reason to conclude that the text referred to by the MPNMS
is quite different to any form of the Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra that survives today; see also
Kaneko 1990.
57
See Karashima 2007: 72–79 regarding the icchantikas as a category in the MPNMS.
These are seemingly, in their earliest mention in relation to tathāgatagarbha doctrine,
persons who make false claims to Arhatship, who moreover reject the ‘vaipulya sūtras’
and ideas such as the permanence of the Buddha.
136 c.V. jones
58
See MPNMSC1 871b15–c26; MPNMSC2 389a27–390a1; MPNMST §202–214. In this
portion of the text the tīrthika is not included in the otherwise diverse productions of the
Buddha, but perhaps it is pertinent that this passage has no interest in the tathāgatagarbha
doctrine, and may belong to a different period of the MPNMS’s no doubt complex com-
position.
59
Regarding other evidence for the tathāgatagarbha doctrine as an extension of
docetic Buddhism, see Radich 2015a: 105–157. See also n. 51.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 137
60
See Kanō 2000: 58. This article remains to date the most thorough treatment of the
AMS and its content; see also Suzuki 1999; 2000; 2014.
61
MN II 97–106.
62
See Kanō 2016: 4–5, n. 11. See e.g. AMSC 528b11–19; AMST D.213, 161a4–b7;
Q.879, 168b1–169a6.
63
We shall address later the one important reference to the Buddha teaching ātman in
the AMS outside of the form *ātmadhātu. The expression *ātmadhātu in the AMS is
certainly in want of further study, building upon Kanō 2000.
138 c.V. jones
64
See Kanō 2000: 69. Other readings of this compound are possible, but I base this
on a passage of AMST that seems to play with a distinction between the conventional self
that acts (bdag nyid) and an underlying “nature” of the self (bdag gyi khams) that is the
tathāgatagarbha. See AMST D.213, 192b3–192b6; Q.879, 200a2–200a6; comparing also
AMSC 539a23–a29.
65
For example in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Kimura 2007: 54,15-
17): tadyathā 'pi nāma Śāriputra ātmeti cocyate, na cātmā upalabhyate, na sattvo na jīvo
na poṣo na puruṣo na pudgalo na manujo 'py upalabhyate, anupalambha-śūnyatām
upādāya.
66
AMSC 525a29–b4: 諸佛如來所不得者,謂過去一切諸佛世尊,於一切衆生所極
方便求,無如來藏不可得。現在一切諸佛世尊,於一切衆生所極方便求,無我性不
可得。未來一切諸佛世尊,於一切衆生所極方便求,無自性不可得。Compare AMST:
D.213,151a6–151b1; Q.879,158a8–158b3. In this we find *sattvadhātu (sems can gyi
khams) substituted for *svadhātu. Regarding *svadhātu see Kanō 2000: 69; 80 n. 22; also
Radich 2015a: 29, suggesting *maddhātu for 自性 in the MPNMS.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 139
The portion of the AMS in question again concerns rival religious tradi-
tions; primarily, it first seems, the emergence in the world of various
non-Buddhist ascetical practices. These are said to arise as the dharma’s
influence in the world dwindles, as teachings of the Buddha are distorted
and, eventually, forgotten. The authors of this material present the Bud-
dhist dharma as the point of origin for all paths aiming at liberation,
rather than as only one (correct) body of teaching among competing tra-
ditions. The following synopsis reflects the shorter account of AMSC,
referring to expressions from AMST where it appears to reflect similar
underlying Indic terms.
This mythical account describes a previous kalpa, after the passing of
a Buddha named Kosantabhadra (AMSC: 拘孫陀跋陀羅; AMST: ko san
ta bzang po), and during the lifetime of the final remaining practitioner
67
It is also interesting that the AMS lists these notions of the self apart from a list of
designators for the agentive self (ātman, jīva, pudgala etc.), which it denies elsewhere and
seems to consider to have been rejected already by the Buddha’s earlier teachings associ-
ated with the Śrāvakayāna: see AMSC 525a20–a25; AMST: D.213, 150b7–151a4; Q.879,
158a1–158a6. In other words it is possible to read the AMS as having not considered
earlier expositions of the Buddha to be concerned with erroneous notions of any ‘subtle’
self hidden in the body in any manner reminiscent of the Upaniṣads. Such a distinction
between what we may loosely call notions of an ‘agentive’ and ‘subtle’ self, reflected by
some separation of two types of erroneous ātmavāda discourse in the structure of the
AMS, may suggest that the text considered forms of upaniṣadic selfhood to be of a differ-
ent category to those confronted by earlier pronouncements by the Buddha regarding the
ātman, jīva, pudgala etc. See also n. 45.
140 c.V. jones
68
It is possible that the AMS here refers to the origins of the Jain tradition, though
concerning the term nirgrantha more generally see n. 94.
69
AMSC: 541a27–c3. This last practice mentioned only in AMSC is among those men-
tioned in a list of ascetical practices found in the MPNMS, though there the context is the
Buddha’s clarification that such practices are not among those taught by him, and that
whoever claim otherwise are agents of Māra: see MPNMSC1 882b19–c4; MPNMSC2
406a16–b6; MPNMST §364–365.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 141
70
At the final stage of Buddhamati’s misadventures, AMST mentions also those who
“pursue suffering to a state called ‘unmoving’” (mi g.yo ba’i sar mya ngan du ’gro ba),
which still must have in mind a form of religious suicide . See AMST D.213, 198b2–199a5;
Q.879, 205b8–206b3.
71
Such blatant mockery challenges the possibility that the tathāgatagarbha authors
had as their aim appealing to extraneous ātmavādin teachers themselves. Though texts
within this literature are clearly concerned with the relationship between the ideas of non-
Buddhist teachers and their own – perhaps with the aim of appealing to audiences swayed
by ātmavādin traditions – this does not appear to be in order to convince or convert rival
teachers themselves (see however n. 104). Concerning the suggestion that the MPNMS
may have been aimed specifically at, or in part preserved by, householders, see Habata
2014: 162–163.
142 c.V. jones
dane, [they] also do not know the concealed teaching of the Tathāgata:
namely, saying that non-self is taught by the Buddha, they reason in accord
with [that] teaching, just like in the origination of tīrthikas [described
above].72 Those worldly beings are accordingly foolish; regarding the super-
mundane [they] moreover lose track of the knowledge that was taught
secretly [by the Buddha].
Therefore the Tathāgata taught the middle path of the ekayāna, which is
apart from the two extremes. He taught the self to be real, the Buddha to be
real, the dharma to be real, the saṅgha to be real; hence is taught the middle
way that is known as the Mahāyāna.73
72
AMST here elaborates that the error of holding the Buddha to have taught anātman
belongs specifically to the tīrthyas (mur ’dug): see D.213, 199b2; Q.879, 206b7.
73
AMSC 541c7–c17: 如是文殊師利,世間一切所作之上尸羅、威儀,種種所
作,一切悉是如來化現。法滅盡時,如是事生。若如是者, 正法則滅。如是文殊師
利,於眞實我,世間如是如是邪見諸異妄想:謂解脱如是, 謂我如是。出世間者,亦
不知如來隱覆之教:謂言無我是佛所説。彼隨説思量,如外道因起a。彼諸世間隨順
愚癡;出世間者,亦復迷失隱覆説 智。是故如來説一乘中道離於二邊:我眞實、佛
眞實、法眞實、僧眞實:是故説中道名摩訶衍。
a
〔起〕-<三>
Compare AMST D.214, 199a7–199b4; Q.879, 206b5–207a1, in which we find sangs
rgyas kyi sprul pa.
74
AMST D.214, 199b3; Q.879, 206b8–207a1: bdag tu gtogs pa’i chos kyi de kho na
nyid dang / de bzhin gshegs pa dang / dge ’dun gyi de bzhin nyid ni… // I am grateful for
the help of Kazuo Kanō in making sense of this passage.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 143
75
D.3852; Q.5252: Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba’i bshad sbyar.
76
D.3852 tsha 41a5–a7; Q.5252 tsha 47b1–b5: ’di ltar yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs
rgyas ko san ti’i dge slong buddha ma ti’i rjes su ’brangs nas / bskal pa dang po’i tshe ’dzam
bu’i gling lta ba’i lha rnams la brten te / skyes pa’i phyi rol pa’i lta ba ’di dag kyang khong
du chud par byas la de bzlog par bya’i rnam par sdang bar bya ba ni ma yin te / ’phags pa
sor mo’i phreng ba la phan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo las / ’jam dpal de ltar
’jig rten pa’i tshul khrims dang spyod pa dang bya ba’i cho ga thams cad kyang sangs rgyas
kyi sprul pa’o zhes gsungs pa’i phyir dang / de dag snying rje’i yul du gyur pa’i phyir te //
de phyir log par bstan pa yi // grub mthar (D mtha) ’chal ba’i blo can la // re lugs rjes ’jug
blo can rnams // snying rje nyid ni rab tu skye // zhes bshad pa’i phyir ro //
144 c.V. jones
Michael Zimmermann has identified strong ties between the SPS and the
Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, and furthermore with tathāgatagarbha thought in
general.78 The SPS is mentioned by name in the MPNMS, and, as seen
above, the AMS considers itself to teach according to the ekayāna.79
77
Here AMST instead calls this “the vehicle of the tathāgata” (de bzhin gshegs pa’i
theg pa): an expression otherwise absent from this text. However the expression ekayāna
(theg pa gcig) still occurs ten times throughout the rest of AMST: more frequently than in
nearly any other text preserved in the bka’ ’gyur. For more on the occurrence of the term
ekayāna throughout AMSC, see Nattier 2007: 184–185.
78
Zimmermann 1999; 2014: 519–520.
79
See MPNMSC1 893c6; MPNMSC2 420a23–a24; MPNMST §495,17; also the Sanskrit
fragment no. 21 which features saddharmapauṇḍar[ī]k(a)[m]: see Habata 2009: 580. This
mention is in connection with the well-known prediction of the SPS that all beings will
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 145
There are clear doctrinal similarities between the prediction in the SPS
that all beings will eventually attain awakening and the affirmed univer-
sality of the tathāgatagarbha in texts like the MPNMS and AMS, but for
our purposes the SPS echoes two other themes common to the passages
addressed above.80 The first is the ability and disposition of the Buddha
to emanate different phenomena for the benefit of different audiences, and
the second is the role of expedient soteriological paths as his foremost
creations: in the SPS the vehicles of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha,
which are taught in accord with the capabilities of those who are not yet
ready to embark upon the path of the bodhisattva.
The SPS, like many other Mahāyāna sūtras, describes Buddha Śāk-
yamuni employing his supernatural power to achieve some or other aim,
for the benefit always of some or other sentient beings. This includes
emanating different bodies to teach in different worlds, but more pivotally
the appearance and departure of other Buddhas in the world who are
associated with having taught the vehicle of the śrāvaka.
eventually attain full awakening, relating it to the existence of the tathāgatagarbha (e.g.
MPNMSC1 893c5–c4). For more evidence of the SPS having influenced the MPNMS-
group, including the prophecy complex which unites the MPNMS and other texts, see
Radich 2015a: 52; appendix 3; also Hodge 2006; 2012. MPNMSC2 features a single men-
tion of the ekayāna and denial of the triyāna doctrine (383a25), though this does not
feature in either other translation or any Sanskrit fragment. See also Shimoda 2002.
Further ties worthy of mention connect the SPS to another ātmavādin tathāgatagarbha
text in the MPNMS-group. The MBhS not only features versions of the parables of the
lost son and of the emanated city, better known through the SPS, but is explicit in con-
necting the tathāgatagarbha with the ekayāna and the denial of the triyāna paradigm:
若一切衆生有如來藏一性一乘者,如來何故説有三乘聲聞乘、縁覺乘、佛乘 ? (T.270,
297b20–22) – “If all sentient beings have the tathāgatagarbha, which is one [common]
nature, one [shared] vehicle; why then does the Tathāgata say that there are three vehicles:
śrāvakayāna; pratyekabuddhayāna and buddhayāna?” See Suzuki 2002; 2015 for further
evidence of a close relationship between the SPS and MBhS; also Jones 2016.
The ŚDS also advocates the ekayāna model of the Mahāyāna (T.353, 220c19–21), but
is particularly focused on belittling the value of other Buddhist vehicles as deficient for
the purposes of the bodhisattva. This may support my suspicion that the ŚDS reflects a
re-evaluation of categories drawn from the milieu of earlier tathāgatagarbha texts (namely
those of the MPNMS-group) and, broader, the ekayāna.
80
Regarding the SPS promising awakening for all beings (or – at very least – for all
who have accepted the dharma in one or other of its forms), see for example its Sadāpari
bhūtaparivarta: Kern & Nanjio 1970: 375–385; also Zimmermann 1999: 165–168; 2002:
77; Suzuki 2015.
146 c.V. jones
The SPS elsewhere compares the two inferior vehicles of the śrāvaka
and pratyekabuddha – in this text conceived as only stepping-stones
towards the vehicle of the bodhisattva – to magical emanations, through
the parable of the illusory city. A group of travelers bound for the loca-
tion of a far-off treasure are deterred due to the great distance between
them and their destination. This is until a skilled leader conjures another
city en route, comparable to the perceived goals of the arhat and pratye
kabuddha, which convinces the party to embark on their journey after
all.83
Regarding this [cultivation of beings], the Tathāgata, knowing sentient
beings to be of feeble aspiration, like the guide who produces the magically
made emanated city, so that those beings may have respite…[teaches two
provisional, inferior goals].84
81
Kern & Nanjio 1970: 242,11–12: tan mayāpi mahāpratibhāna bahavas tathāgata
vigrahā nirmitāḥ, ye daśasu dikṣv anyonyeṣu buddhakṣetreṣu lokadhātusahasreṣu sat-
tvānāṃ dharmaṃ deśayanti…
82
Kern & Nanjio 1970: 317,10–13: ye ca mayā kulaputrā atrāntarā tathāgatā arhantaḥ
samyaksaṃbuddhāḥ parikīrtitā dīpaṃkaratathāgataprabhṛtayaḥ, teṣāṃ ca tathāgatānām
arhatāṃ samyaksaṃbuddhānāṃ parinirvāṇāni, mayaiva tāni kulaputrā upāyakauśalya
dharmadeśanābhinirhāranirmitāni /
The MPNMS also states that the Buddha’s apparent departure from the world is an
example of his skill-in-means (MPNMSC1 方便; MPNMST thabs) or is merely displayed
(MPNMSC2 示同) for the sake of sentient beings: see MPNMSC1 860c14–15; MPNMSC2
375b4–5; MPNMST §79,2–3; also Radich 2011 [2012]: 245–283; 2015a: 105–115. The
MBhS – strongly indebted as it seems to be to both the SPS and MPNMS – takes this idea
further, holding that the death of the Buddha was shown only to teach beings about the
ubiquity of impermanence in saṃsāra (e.g. T.270, 296c12–16).
83
A version of this parable appears also in the MBhS: T.270, 296a7–b7.
84
Kern & Nanjio 1970: 189,2–4: tatra tathāgatah sattvān durbalāśayān viditvā yathā
sa deśikas tadṛddhimayaṃ nagaram abhinirmimīte teṣāṃ sattvānāṃ viśrāmaṇārtham (…).
Regarding abhinirmimīte, see Edgerton 1953: 52a.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 147
Hence use of the verb nir-√mā in the SPS can refer to the production of
past Buddhas themselves and, by implication, all that they were created
to teach, i.e. the inferior vehicles of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha.
The vehicles can themselves be compared to illusory creations, issued
– as with emanated Buddhas who taught them – for the purposes of
leading beings step by step to what is revealed finally in the SPS itself:
the ekayāna, into which all other Buddhist vehicles can be considered to
be subsumed.
We might compare this to use of the same verb in our tathāgatagarbha
sources (apparent, at very least, where we have encountered the verb
sprul in Tibetan translation). In both Chinese translations of the MPNMS
and its parable of the lost sword, *bodhisattva-nirmita most likely refers
to tīrthikas themselves, or certainly ostensibly ‘worldly’ teachers. This
same content in MPNMST, along with the *buddha-nirmita in the expla-
nation of the Buddhamati myth, in both the AMS and Bodhibhadra’s
quotation of it, may however be read to refer to the practices of tīrthikas
rather than any teachers themselves. Even if we permit that some of these
passages may concern the emanation of teachings and not persons, it is
likely that here the distinction between some doctrine and those who
voice it in the world is not a significant one.85 Hence we can certainly
read both of our ātmavādin tathāgatagarbha sources as holding that reli-
gious teachers apparently extraneous to the dharma are themselves, along
with their doctrines, emanated instruments of the Buddha; of no value
next to the Mahāyāna as expounded by these sūtras, apart from being
further evidence of the Buddha’s creative power and extensive activity
for the benefit of all sentient beings.
It is by no means clear that the MPNMS or AMS are developing an
account of the Buddha’s activities directly from a source such as the SPS.
But bearing in mind themes shared by these three texts – both (1) Śākya
muni Buddha’s permanence beyond any worldly displays, and (2) affir-
mation of the capacity for awakening in all sentient beings – as well as
85
This attitude towards tīrthikas and their doctrines evokes a statement about the Bud-
dha and his teaching found at the culmination of the Vakkalisutta (SN III 119–124): that
whosoever sees dhamma, sees the Buddha, and vice versa. The innovation of the texts
discussed here is that whoever sees any religious teacher sees, in some refracted form, the
Buddha and his dharma also.
148 c.V. jones
evidence that both of these tathāgatagarbha works knew the SPS and its
ekayāna position, it is significant that all of them present a similar picture
regarding how a transcendent Buddha exerts his influence upon saṃsāra.
This is through the production of emanations that are instrumental in the
development of sentient beings – and not only those consciously upon
the bodhisattva path – in the direction of full awakening. In the SPS these
emanations are associated with the provisional vehicles of the śrāvaka
and pratyekabuddha, but in the MPNMS and AMS the activities of Bud-
dhas and bodhisattvas are expanded to account for any form of ‘religious’
enterprise, including any discourse resembling the Buddha’s account of
what is essential to sentient beings, and what it means to attain liberation
from rebirth.
The suggestion that a bodhisattva might take the form of a tīrthika
specifically is an uncommon one in Indian Buddhist literature, but not
without some precedent. In no doubt a very different doctrinal context,
the Mahāvastu makes a single mention of the eighth-stage bodhisattva
becoming a tīrthika for the sake of teaching the “destruction of [re]birth”
(bhavasūdana), presumably – as this text by no means advances any
ātmavāda doctrine – to be succeeded by the Buddha’s own teaching of
anātman.86 So too the tīrthika as imagined by the MPNMS and AMS is
presumably the mouthpiece for earlier doctrines of the self, expediently
produced for the purpose of introducing the very idea of liberating one’s
‘true self’ from rebirth. A significant contrast however is that the tīrthika
of the Mahāvastu prefigures a turn to the doctrine of anātman revealed
by the appearance of the Buddha, and not the later revelation of the Bud-
dha’s own, definitive ātmavāda.87 The MPNMS and AMS both imply that
86
Edgerton 1953: 254b; Senart 1882: 106,8: …ataḥ prabhṛti tīrthikā vā bhavanti bha-
vasūdanāḥ. A similar account of the activities of the eighth-stage bodhisattva is found in
the Daśabhūmikasūtra (e.g. Kondō 1936: 140,10–141,7; T.287, 560c3–c18), though no
mention is made of the manifestation of any tīrthikas specifically.
The Mahāvastu and its account of the bodhisattva’s appearance in the world also exhibits
a form of lokānuvartanā thinking: holding that the Buddha/bodhisattva acts “in conform-
ity to the world” despite being beyond suffering any particular rebirth in saṃsāra. See
Radich 2015a: 109; 120–122; also n. 51 above. For more on the range of the bodhisattva’s
transformations, see Harrison 2003: 144–145.
87
It is certainly the case that the Mahāvastu would have the views of the (bodhisattva-)
tīrthika superseded by the Buddha teaching the doctrine of anātman, whereas the MPNMS
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 149
holds that the correct understanding of the dharma is an original and superior doctrine of
(Buddhist) selfhood.
It is because of such a distinction that I am unwilling to consider the innovation of a
Buddhist ātmavāda in the MPNMS an example of religious ‘inclusivism’ (one possible
interpretation of this Buddhist ātmavāda offered, tentatively, in Ruegg 1989: 50–52). An
instance of religious inclusivism, at least classically understood (see e.g. articles in Hacker
1995) would reduce the perspective of some other system(s) to a provisional or deficient
expression of one’s own. However, under this understanding of the term it would then be
something else again to promote above these, as the MPNMS does, a seemingly new
doctrine that is strikingly reminiscent to what is being called deficient or wrong-minded,
i.e. clearly resembling the ātman doctrines of other, inferior systems. Hence I contend that
the language of inclusion may put us on the wrong track. Pending further study, I find it
better to think of the authors of the MPNMS as having attempted to expand the boundaries
of the dharma into a religious discourse that had previously been the accepted domain of
rival traditions: the ātmavāda which was shared, in broad terms, by other Indian systems.
This shared religious discourse constituted a new frontier in which Buddhist innovators
and authors might have promoted their own (they would have hoped persuasive) account
of some essential nature proper to sentient beings.
88
The idea of the tathāgatagarbha as the secret import of the Buddha’s teaching,
conveyed via what may be called his sandhāvacana, is central to both MPNMS-tg and the
AMS: see e.g. Blum 2013: xxi; Radich 2015a: appendix 2. Suzuki (1999) has argued that
a key feature of the AMS is its reinterpretation of older Buddhist teachings in terms of the
tathāgatagarbha: the suggestion being that what was considered a secret newly revealed
by the MPNMS can, according to the AMS, be understood as the hidden import of specific,
older articulations of the dharma.
89
See sources cited in n. 6.
150 c.V. jones
90
See Jamspal 2010: xvi.
91
Jamspal 2010; Takasaki 1975: 254–275. Regarding this text as a Buddhist critique
of the arthaśāstra genre of literature, see Zimmermann 2000.
92
See BGVNSC 359a24–b3. This translation presents similes for the tathāgatagarbha sim-
ilar to those found across the MPNMS, MBhS and TGS. This passage is found in just one (and
the most expansive) of the three recensions of the BGVNS, however the inclusion of the
tathāgatagarbha doctrine in this version complements well its espousing not just an ekayāna
position, but also the ubiquity of the Buddha’s influence via his emanation of different
religious teachers. See Zimmermann 2000: 178–180; 194–198; also Takasaki 1975: 257–262.
93
See e.g. BGVNSC 326b8–b15.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 151
94
This Satyaka is presumably the same nirgrantha known from the sutta literature (e.g.
the Mahāsaccakasutta: MN I 237). The Jain representative of the six tīrthikas, in accounts
such as that found in the Sāmaññāphalasutta: DN I 47–86, is one “Nigaṇṭha” Nātaputta,
and the Jain tradition itself accepted this title as denoting one “without ties,” i.e. a member
of their own brand of śramana tradition. However Jamspal (2010: 143–147) demonstrates
how it is simplistic to translate Buddhist usage of the term nirgrantha always as referring
to the Jains; in the BGVNS the nirgrantha Satyaka is both clothed (so apparently not a
digambara Jain) and moreover appeals to the authority of the Vedas, i.e. cannot be any
kind of ‘heterodox,’ nāstika brand of śramana. The term certainly still denotes a kind of
renunciate religious practitioner or teacher not belonging to the saṅgha, much akin to how
one might understand referents of the term tīrthika.
95
See BGVNSC 361b10–c26. Compare BGVNST, D.146, 132b5–134a5; Q.813,
91b2–93a7: translated in Jamspal 2010: 108–109.
96
See AMSC 528b20–25; AMST D.213, 162a1–2; Q.879, 169a6–7.
97
Rather than any form of the verb nir-√mā, 住持力 here probably reflects some form
of the Sanskrit adhi-√ṣṭhā (reflected throughout BGVNST by byin gyi rlabs: see Jamspal
2010: 171): a feature of the Buddha’s activity in the world explored in Tournier 2014: 9–13.
152 c.V. jones
Why is this? Because in this place all of these [apparent] tīrthikas etc. are
founded upon the teaching of inconceivable liberation; all [possessing] great
cognition comprehend the teaching of the perfection of insight; all have
attained the power of great skill-in-means and vigorous sovereignty; all
attain non-abandonment of the recollection the Buddha, dharma and saṅgha;
all having reached the highest perfection use their supernatural power to
teach and develop sentient beings; all have attained empowerment by the
Tathāgata to teach and develop sentient beings.98
Hence tīrthikas and their teachings, though certainly inferior next to the
doctrine of the BGVNS, are revealed to exist not only as displays of
the extent of the Buddha’s power, but as instruments for the purposes
of teaching particular categories of sentient beings. Expansion of the
Buddha’s sphere of influence to account for extraneous religious tradi-
tions indeed seems a logical next step for the ekayāna paradigm of the
SPS, and moreover what Radich has deemed the development of
98
BGVNSC 326c23-327a2: 彼處不生諸外道等。何以故? 文殊師利,我佛國土,有
諸外道、尼乾子等,皆是如來住持力故,爲欲示現不可思議方便境界。何以故? 此處
a
一切諸外道等,皆是住於不可思議解脱門故;皆是大智、究竟般若波羅蜜門故;一
切皆得大方便力奮迅自在故;一切皆得不捨佛、法、僧等念故;一切皆到第一彼
岸,以大神力,教化衆生故;一切皆得如來加力,教化衆生故。Compare BGVNST
D.146, 97a3-6; Q.813, 53a4-7, translated in Jamspal 2010: 36; also T.271, 306a3-9.
a
I here amend the Taishō edition of BGVNSC in favour of the following: 諸=處
<三><宮>
99
BGVNSC 327a3–a5; also Jamspal 2010: 36–37.
100
BGVNSC 327c10–13: 外道大神通 皆自在菩薩 / 汝當知方便 示現如是相 /
一切諸菩薩 聞諸外道等 / 具足方便力 皆發歡喜心。Compare BGVNST D.146,
98b4–5; Q.813, 54b6–7, translated in Jampsal 2010: 39; also T.271, 306c5–6. Both of these
versions differ slightly from the verses of BGVNSC, and more clearly refer to the tīrthikas
as creations (e.g. BGVNST rnam par ’phrul pa; vikurvaṇa) by bodhisattvas.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 153
101
See n. 51. Radich (2015a: 110–112) notes that the view that the Buddha had already
attained awakening long before his worldly birth and apparent (though only displayed: see
n. 82) passing into nirvāṇa is foremost in the doctrine of both the SPS (Kern & Nanjio
1970: 318,13–319,5) and MPNMS (e.g. MPNMSC1 870c22–23; MPNMSC2 388b22–24;
MPNMST §194.7–10).
154 c.V. jones
102
A further curious suggestion of this expanded ekayāna paradigm is found in the
verses of the LAS, which teaches that the ekayāna doctrine (which the LAS considers a
provisional teaching) is used to explain the lack of any basis to a set of five vehicles:
adding to those of the tathāgata, śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha both the devayāna and
brahmayāna: see Nanjio 1923: 134–135; also Kunst 1977: 313–314. This reflects the LAS
carefully qualifying some form of ekayāna teaching in a manner quite different from that
found in the SPS, and it is curious that it sees the single vehicle as encompassing two more
paths associated with what may refer to non-Buddhist teachings or aspirations.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 155
103
Hubbard 1995: 131. Hubbard clarifies that the ekayāna of the SPS should not be
confused with an attempt to accommodate in any tolerant sense the so-called Hīnayāna
traditions, but rather states their irrelevance in light of what is revealed in the SPS. Such
an attitude seems to underpin also the passages of the MPNMS, AMS and BGVNS under
discussion here.
104
See also n. 71. Notably this is not the opinion of some later texts in the tathāgata-
garbha tradition: the LAS holds that the tathāgatagarbha is taught “for the purpose of
156 c.V. jones
attracting the tīrthakaras who are fixated on views of the self” (Nanjio 1923: 79,1–2:
ātmavādābhiniviṣṭānāṃ tīrthakarāṇām ākarṣaṇārthaṃ). It is safe to say however that the
LAS is critical of ekayāna doctrine (see n. 102), and is likely to not have represented
accurately the intentions of authors responsible for the MPNMS-group of sūtras. See also
n. 120.
105
Radich (2015a: 61–82: following Suzuki 1999; 2000 and Hodge 2006; 2012; plus
unpublished work), argues this from evidence drawn from a prophecy complex shared by
MPNMS-tg and other texts in the MPNMS-group: a detailed argument too long to repro-
duce here, but notably not central to Radich’s primary claim that the MPNMS is likely the
earliest tathāgatagarbha source available to us.
106
Williams 2009: 109 associates the tathāgatagarbha with the Gupta era (circa 320–
550 CE) – “the high period of vigorous classical Brāhmanic ‘Hindu’ culture” – following
Nakamura (1980: 212), who situates specifically the MPNMS in this era; see also Chappell
1980: 139–140. For a thorough account of India’s shift to Brāhminic hegemony under the
Guptas, see Verardi 2011: 128–196. Eltschinger 2014a: 73–92 discusses the development
of Buddhist prophesies of decline in late-Gupta period texts, likely reflecting concerns
Buddhists had regarding “a loss of political footing (if not political hostility) and the
enmity of non-Buddhist orthodox and sectarian milieux.” These problems can be consid-
ered major factors in the evolution of Buddhist apologetics in the sixth century, from
which point Buddhist philosophers seem to have shifted their attention to challenges from
non-Buddhist systems; problems that had perhaps troubled the certainly earlier authors of
the MPNMS and AMS also.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 157
regarding the absolute dating of the MPNMS and AMS, but demonstrates
that the authors of these texts were concerned with the ideas and practices
of other traditions, and moreover the appeal these had to some or other
audience.107 This expressed itself as the development of a Buddhist dis-
course on the true self of all sentient beings, certainly influenced by
doctrinal innovations of the SPS, and with it an elegant explanation for
any similarities this may have born to features of other religious systems,
in whose domain ātmavādin discourse would have been held to be.
It is also not the case that through surviving tathāgatagarbha sources
we can necessarily find, in some original form, the beginnings of the
adoption of an ātmavāda position by any Buddhist community; these
sūtra texts offer only a small window, and a murky one at that, into posi-
tions and opinions that their authors and their communities would have
held.108 But clearly the MPNMS and AMS wished to advance the idea
that ultimately sentient beings possess some permanent, unchanging
essence that befitted the label ātman, and that this properly understood is
the uniquely Mahāyānist category of the tathāgatagarbha. The disadvantage
107
The MPNMS and AMS are also key early sources for Buddhist vegetarianism:
something better associated with non-Buddhist Indian traditions. In the MPNMS there is
clear evidence that what is advocated is however not the ‘vegan’ attitude of those it iden-
tifies as nirgranthas – drawing a line at the refusal of gifts derived from animal life (but-
ter, silk, leather etc.): see MPNMSC1 869a8; MPNMSC2 386a28–29; MPNMST §175,1–4.
It further states that it is wrong to think of plants as hosting life-forces (jīvas), in a possi-
ble further distinction from Jain attitudes and practices: MPNMSC1 882b23–24; MPNMSC2
406a24; MPNMST §364.11–12.
Regarding vegetarianism in the AMS, see AMSC 540c26–c27; AMST D.213, 197a5–a6;
Q.879, 204b3–204b4. See also Ruegg 1980: 236–237; Schmithausen 2003.
108
It is difficult to account for the apparently earlier equation of the Buddha with the
self, found in MPNMS-dhk and underpinning the example of the woodworm discussed
earlier. This is significant, as presumably it is only (in Shimoda’s terms) the internalization
of the Buddha relic (dhātu), i.e. the existence of the tathāgatagarbha in sentient beings,
by later material of MPNMS-tg that would permit anything in the constitution of sentient
beings to warrant designation as ātman. Prior to any account of the nature of a Buddha
residing in sentient beings, it is perhaps the case that MPNMS-dhk considered the label
ātman fitting for a Buddha who is revealed to exist permanently and beyond suffering: the
major concern of this earlier material of the text. Evoking the four viparyāsas to explain
awakened reality (see nn. 10 and 31), the authors of MPNMS-dhk arrived at the provocative
position that the Buddha himself should be considered ātman: of unchanging character,
existing permanently and apart from the suffering which characterizes existence in
saṃsāra.
158 c.V. jones
109
Nattier 2003: 174–176.
110
See Zimmermann 2014: 515–516; 526–527.
111
Kern & Nanjio 1970: 442,5–445,10.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 159
112
Regarding the Kāraṇḍavyūhasūtra, Studhome (2002: 50–52) argues that this
text – likely also influenced strongly by the SPS – is also one concerned with at once
appropriating and undermining extraneous, primarily Śaiva, doctrinal motifs and practices.
See also Eltschinger 2014a: 82–85.
113
The Sanskrit of this passage is preserved in the 8th century Nāmamantrārthāvalokinī
of Vilāsavajra. A similar position is found in the Mañjuśriyamūlakalpa, attributing extra-
neous tantras to previous, provisional teachings of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. See Sander-
son 2009: 131–132, n. 309; Ruegg 2008: 35–36; also Hodge 2003: 52.
114
D.2663; Q.3490: rnam par snang mdzad mngon par byang chub pa’i rgyud chen
po’i ’grel bshad.
160 c.V. jones
The gods such as Īśvara, Brahmā and so on are however generally beings
of two kinds: (1) those arisen through karma and (2) “awareness beings”
(jñānasattva). Regarding those, such gods are also teachers of common
paths to nirvāṇa belonging to foolish, ordinary beings, who are lost [in
saṃsāra].
As the path which they have taught is a cause for attainment made known
by the Lord Vairocana, one should view the gods Īśvāra, Brahmā and so on
as awareness beings emanated from the body of the Lord Vairocana.115
115
D.2663 nyu 84a7–84b3; Q.3490 cu 26b1–4: …byis pa so so’i skye bo (D. so sor
’gro ba) rnams kyi bdag dang lha rnams la brten nas rang gi rnam (D. bdag cag gi rnam)
par grol ba ’tshol ba (D. btsal ba) ste / rnam par grol ba (D. grol ba’i) / ’tshol ba’i
(D. btsal ba’i) bde bde yang bcom ldan ’das rnam par snang mdzad kyi brgyud ba’i rgyur
blta’o // dbang phug chen po (D. dbang po chen po) dang tshangs pa la sogs pa’i lha de
rnams kyang spyir sems can rnam pa gnyis te las las (D. las la) skyes pa dang / ye shes
kyi sems can no // de la skabs ’dir ni (D. om. ni) lha de rnams kyang byis pa so so’i skye
po (D. so sor ’gro ba) ’khyams pa rnams la (D. om. la) / so so’i mya ngan las ’das pa’i
lam ston pa po (D. om. po) ste // lam (D. adds de) ston pa yang bcom ldan ’das rnam par
snang mdzad kyis mkhyen (D. mkhyen : shes) nas thob pa’i rgyur sbyor ba yin pas dbang
po dang brgya byin la sogs pa’i lha de rnams bcom ldan ’das rnam par snang mdzad kyi
sku las sprul pa’i ye shes kyi sems can du blta ’o //
116
See Sanderson 2009: 124–242 (especially 124–127) regarding possible early
motivating factors behind Buddhist adoption of tantric ritual structures and motifs.
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 161
Conclusions
118
Regarding confirmation that the MPNMS does indeed still accept an interpretation
of anātman, see n. 50. An interesting development occurs in the MBhS, which argues that
a doctrine of anātman had been taught simply to refute worldly notions of the self and,
moreover, to lead beings to the Buddha as a superior teacher (see T.270, 296b24–c2).
The MBhS, which also goes so far to state also that emptiness-oriented sūtras are only of
incomplete meaning (T.270, 296b8–10), arguably constitutes the apex of substantialist
descriptions of the tathāgatagarbha, and is certainly deserving of further scholarly atten-
tion. For more on this text, see Suzuki 1997; 2000; 2002; 2007; 2014; 2015; also Jones
2016.
119
The LAS, having rejected the view that tathāgatagarbha conceived as a kind of self
is anything but an expedient teaching for the benefit of ‘self-obsessed’ tīrthakaras (see
n. 104), states that the Buddha taught this doctrine for “the purpose of ridding fear regarding
lack of self among ignorant persons” (Nanjio 1923: 78,8–12: …bālānāṃ nairātmya
saṃtrāsapadavivarjanārthaṃ). A few lines later (Nanjio 1923: 79,9) we also find the curi-
ous expression tathāgatanairātmyagarbha-, which corresponds to a clearer equation of the
tathāgatagarbha with nairātmya in the Tibetan version of the LAS (D.108, 86b5; Q.775,
95a5–6: de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po bdag med pa): an interpretation very much contrary
to the ātmavādin tathāgatagarbha of the MPNMS-group. Evidence suggests that the LAS
held some tathāgatagarbha sources to have waded problematically into ātmavādin waters,
but also accepted this doctrine insofar as it was a provisional teaching: an understanding
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 163
by the MPNMS and AMS – specifically that which presents its perceived
opponents as emanations by the power of the Buddha and bodhisattvas – does
however throw into relief the closeness between early tathāgatagarbha
sources and other texts espousing the ekayāna form of Mahāyāna Bud-
dhism, concerned as this model of the Mahāyāna seems to have been with
affirming the Buddha’s expansive – or in some texts even exhaustive –
influence over the religious landscape of classical India.
Abbreviations
AAN Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa
AMS Aṅgulimālīyasūtra
AMSC Aṅgulimālīyasūtra: Chinese translation, 央掘魔羅經, T.120
(Vol. II).
AMST Aṅgulimālīyasūtra: Tibetan bka’ ’gyur translation – ’phags pa sor
mo’i phreng ba la phan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo,
e.g. D.213; Q.879.
AN Aṅguttaranikāya: Pāli Text Society edition.
BGVNS Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvāṇanirdeśasūtra
BGVNSC Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvāṇanirdeśasūtra: Chinese
translation of Bodhiruci, 大薩遮尼乾子所説經, T.272 (Vol. IX).
BGVNST Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvāṇanirdeśasūtra: Tibetan
bka’ ’gyur translation: ’phags pa byang chub sems dpa’i spyod
yul gyi thabs kyi yul la rnam par ’phrul ba bstan pa zhes bya ba
theg pa chen po’i mdo, e.g. D.146; Q.813.
D Derge edition of the Tibetan bka’ ’gyur/bstan ’gyur.
Bibliography
Albahari, Miri. 2002. “Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā.” Asian Philosophy
12(1): 5–20.
Balcerowicz, Piotr. 2016. Early Asceticism in India: Ājīvikism and Jainism.
Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar. 2015. The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism.
Cotopaxi, Colorado: Canon (translation of L’Ātman-Brahman dans le Boud-
dhisme ancien, Publications de l’École française d’Extrême-Orient, Vol. 90.
Paris, 1973).
a self-aggrandizing vehicle 165
Blum, Mark. 2013. The Nirvana Sutra. Vol.1. Berkeley: Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai
America.
Chappell, David Wellington. 1980. “Early Forebodings of the Death of Bud-
dhism.” Numen 21(1): 122–154.
Chen, Jinhua. 2004. “The Indian Buddhist Missionary Dharmakṣema, (385–433):
A New Dating of His Arrival in Guzang and of His Translations.” T’oung-
p’ao: Revue internationale de sinologie 90(4–5): 215–263.
Collins, Steven. 1982. Review of Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism by
J. Pérez Remón. Numen 29(2): 250–271.
Edgerton, Franklin. 1953. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary.
Vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Eltschinger, Vincent. 2014a. Buddhist Epistemology as Apologetics. Vienna: Ver-
lag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
—. 2014b. “The Yogācārabhūmi against Allodoxies (paravāda): 1. Introduction
and Doxography.” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 55: 191–234.
Fujii, Kyōko 1993. “On the Ātman Theory in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.” Pre-
mier colloque Étienne Lamotte (Bruxelles et Liège 24–27, Septembre 1989).
Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters: 27-31.
Habata Hiromi. 1990. “Daijō Nehankyō niokeru ātoman ron 大乗<涅槃経>にお
けるアートマン論.” Hokkaidō Indo Tetsugaku Bukkyō Gakkai 5: 173–190.
—. 2007. Die Zentralasiatischen Sanskrit-Fragmente des Mahāparinirvāṇa-
Mahāsūtra. Marburg: Indica et Tibetica Verlag.
—. 2009. “The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra Manuscripts in the Stein and
Hoerle Collections (1).” In Seishi Karashima and Klaus Wille, eds., Buddhist
Manuscripts from Central Asia: The British Library Sanskrit Fragments.
Vol. 2.1. Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology,
Soka University: 551-588.
—. 2013. A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Translation of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-
mahāsūtra. Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag.
—. 2014. “Busshō no sengen: Nehangyō 仏性の宣言—涅槃経.” In Shōryū
Katsura, Saitō Akira, Shimoda Masahiro, and Sueki Fumihiko, eds., Nyo-
raizō to busshō 如来蔵と仏性. Shirīzu daijō Bukkyō シリーズ大乗仏教,
Vol. 8. Tokyo: Shunjūsha: 141–166.
Hacker, Paul. 1995. Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional
and Modern Vedānta. Edited by Wilhelm Halbfass. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Harrison, Paul. 1982. “Sanskrit Fragments of a Lokottaravādin Tradition.” In
L.A. Hercus et al., eds., Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour
of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday. Delhi: Sri Satguru Pub-
lications: 211–234.
—. 2003. “Mediums and Messages: Reflections on the Production of Mahāyāna
Sūtras.” Eastern Buddhist 35(1): 115–151.
166 c.V. jones
Abstract