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Ex. 25 Req. Stay Pending Appeal S. Brad Axel
Ex. 25 Req. Stay Pending Appeal S. Brad Axel
Vs.
Appellants
\,_;
"M~: Schnciider" or "Mrs. Schneider"), appearing prose, and pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.310,
move this Court for a stay pending appeal or review of the lower court's Order denying a stay
INTRODUCTION
1. Appellants filed the instant appeal based upon a Final Judgment of Foreclosure which the lower
2. On or about June 8, 2017, Mr. Schneider communicated with Appellee's Counsel's Henry Bolz
(hereinafter referred to as "Bolz"), and his associates, Sheyla Mesa, by electronic mail
regarding a deposition of Mr. Schneider and Mrs. Schneider, as well as a special set trial
Exhibit "25"
3. In said email, Mr. Schneider requested that Appellees' Motion for Specially Set Trial Date be
postponed to a mutually agreeable time, given Mr. Schneider's conflict of schedule, which
included a trip to Washington D.C. at the time ofthe hearing, at which judgment was entered.
4. Bolz was abundantly aware of this material fact, yet did not afford Appellants the opportunity
to even defend themselves at the Special Set Trial, resulting in judgment being entered against
5. The judgment was based upon a granting of summary judgment, despite the material fact that
Appellants were blindsided by the Special Set Trial which ultimately wound up with the
judgment of foreclosure.
6. Appellants allege that the Trial Court incorrectly granted Summary Judgment in favor of the
Appellee where genuine issues of material fact existed which were timely raised by the
Appellants.
7. Upon judgment being entered, Appellants timely filed a Motion for Rehearing on the matter,
and a Motion to Vacate the Judgment, which Motions were denied by the Court.
8. Appellants subsequently filed an Amended Motion for Rehearing, along with a Motion for
Reconsideration, which laid forth the grounds and evidence in support that the trial court
abused its discretion and noted in said Motions that Appellants would be bringing this instant
9. Appellants understand that this Court receives many appeals with accompanying requests for
a stay. Appellants respectfully submit that the unique facts at bar justify a stay pending appeal
for two main reasons. First, summary judgment of foreclosure was inappropriate here,
especially given the multitude of unresolved issues of material fact, and the trial court should
not have entered a dispositive order while several items were left hanging at the pleading stage
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of this matter. See e.g. Knight Energy Services, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 660 So.2d 786 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1995). Second, the loan history upon which the amounts awarded in the Final Judgment
by the trial court was predicated was unintelligible, padded with egregious fees and falsified
10. On the unique facts at bar, this Court should grant a stay pending appeal. See Fla. R. App. Pro.
9.310.
ANALYSIS
11. Appellants are confident that their appeal in this cause will be meritorious. That argument,
though, is for another day. For now, this Court should grant a stay pending appeal, ensuring
the foreclosure sale does not proceed on August 10, 2017, as presently scheduled.
12. The prejudice to Appellants if they are foreclosed and ultimately prevail on appeal is enormous.
13. The prejudice to innocent third parties is likewise significant. Candidly, it would be awful if
an innocent third party purchases this property at a foreclosure sale only to then be forced to
14. Conversely, the prejudice to Appellee if a stay is granted is negligible. Appellants are
maintaining the home and will continue to do so while an appeal is pending. In the event
Appellants do not prevail on the appeal, the property will still be there for Appellee to
foreclose.
15. The sale can simply be rescheduled and Appellee will have lost nothing. Appellants'
willingness to pay property taxes and property insurance while the appeal is pending - as a
condition of the stay - reflects their good faith and show that Appellee will suffer no harm by
a stay.
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THIS COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A STAY OF EXECUTION
16. The judgment entered by the trial court included both injunctive relief and money damages.
17. Florida law is clear that when the same judgment includes both monetary and non-monetary
relief, the supersedeas bond requirements for automatically staying the execution of a purely
monetary judgment set forth in Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(l) do not apply. Florida Coast Bank
of Pompano Beach v. Mayes, 433 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
18. Rather, in such circumstances, such as this matter, stays of execution pending appeal are
governed solely by Fla. R. App. P. 9.31 0(a). Id. ("When monetary and other relief are granted
in the same judgment or order, then the Rule 9.310(b)(l) exception does not apply and the
parties must proceed in accord with the provisions of Rule 9.31 0( a)."); see also 2 Fla. Prac.,
Appellate Practice § 11:2 (2015 ed.) ("If the judgment grants any other form of relief in
addition to ordering the payment of money, the trial court may exercise its discretion [under
19. Rule 9.310(a) provides that "a party seeking to stay a final or non-final order pending review
shall file a motion in the lower tribunal, which shall have continuing jurisdiction, in its
20. "A stay pending review may be conditioned on the posting of a good and sufficient bond, other
conditions, or both." Rule 9.310(a). Thus, trial courts have "discretion under Rule 9.31 O(a) as
to the nature and extent of security to be posted for a stay." Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat,
PA., 622 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); see also Wilson v. Woodward, 602 So. 2d 545, 546
(Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ("When the court on remand exercised its discretion under subdivision (a)
of rule 9.310, it was not bound to apply the formula provided in subdivision (b) for the
automatic stay of money judgments."); Lopez-Cantera v. Lopez-Cantera, 578 So. 2d 726, 726
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(Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ("Upon motion for stay pending review pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.31 O(a), the trial court has discretion to grant, modify or deny such
relief.").
21. Notably, the Second District Court of Appeal has made clear that, even where a judgment is
only for money damages, trial courts also retain discretion to enter stays based upon conditions
other than a supersedeas bond in the amount required for an automatic stay.
22. In particular, the appeals court has interpreted Rule 9.31 O(b)( 1) to mean that a trial court may
stay execution without requiring a bond at all, or by setting that bond at an amount it deems
reasonable under the circumstances. See Plattv. Russek, 921 So. 2d 5, 7-8 (Fla. 2d DCA2004);
see also Waller v. DSA Grp., Inc., 606 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ("a trial court
has authority upon motion of a party to enter a stay order upon conditions other than a bond").
23. The Legislature has also now expressly granted trial courts the same discretion. See Fla. Stat.
§ 45.045(2) ("The court, in the interest of justice and for good cause shown, may reduce the
supersedeas bond or may set other conditions for the stay with or without a bond.").
24. In other words, when presented with a motion to stay execution of judgment under Rule
9.310(a), a trial court faces two questions: (1) should it enter a stay, and (2) under what
conditions?
25. In Appellants' Amended Motion for Rehearing and Motion to Vacate, Appellants laid out the
procedural issues which transpired before the trial court. Specifically, the Amended Motion to
Vacate laid out the multiple issues which ultimately resulted in the judgment being entered,
and the various and unscrupulous steps Appellee took to achieve that objective.
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26. A true and correct copy of the filed Amended Motion for Rehearing and Motion for
Reconsideration is attached hereto, and incorporated fully throughout this Motion as "Exhibit
A".
27. In the circumstances of this case, a stay is required because pursuant to both the federal and
Florida Constitutions, Appellants have a right to obtain appellate review of this judgment.
28. There are independent sources of that constitutional right: The federal Due Process Clause, and
two provisions of the Florida Constitution that guarantee access to appellate courts.
29. As multiple courts have recognized, that right would be infringed if the opposing party could
immediately render an appellant financially destitute by executing on the judgment during the
pendency of an appeal.
30. Indeed, even before the U.S. Supreme Court formally announced the rule requmng
independent appellate review, the Fifth Circuit had concluded that the First Amendment does
not tolerate that scenario. See Henry v. First Nat'/ Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.
1979) (affirming an injunction that barred plaintiffs from executing on a state court judgment
pending appeal).
31. Though the federal Constitution does not contain a generalized right to appeal, the U.S.
Supreme Court has concluded that, once a state affirmatively chooses to provide a right of
appeal, it is a violation of due process for a defendant not to have "a fair opportunity to obtain
an adjudication on the merits ofhis appeal." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985).
32. As a result, multiple federal courts have concluded that bond requirements that are set so high
that they would effectively represent an "impermissible barrier to appeal" violate an appellant's
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due process rights, unless they are relaxed to avoid that result. See, e.g., Adsani v. Miller, 139
F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
33. Finally, this Court need not even reach any federal constitutional issue, because whatever due
process right the federal constitution guarantees in these circumstances, the Florida
Constitution provides broader rights. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 487 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1987)
(holding that a federal court should have abstained from enjoining Texas's bond requirement,
because the Texas Constitution's Open Courts provision may provide broader rights than the
federal due process clause); Henderson v. Crosby, 883 So. 2d 847, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
(holding that "article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution affords [the appellants] more
34. Unlike the federal Constitution, the Florida Constitution unambiguously grants all litigants a
right to appeal all final trial court orders, regardless of the circumstances. Amendments to the
Fla. R. App. P., 696 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 1996) ("we construe the language of article V,
section 4(b) as a constitutional protection of the right to appeal"); TA. Enters. v. Olarte, Inc.,
931 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("the Florida Constitution grants a constitutional
right to appeal 'as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts"') (citation
omitted); Bain v. State, 730 So. 2d 296, 298-99 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("there is a Florida
35. The right to appeal is guaranteed by both article V, section 4(b) and the open courts provision
of Article I, section 21 of the Declaration of Rights. Id. The "open courts" provision operates
as a "constitutional limitation on the legislature's power to limit the right to appeal." TA.
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36. Florida law therefore provides that "the legislature may implement this constitutional right and
place reasonable conditions upon it so long as they do not thwart the litigants' legitimate
appellate rights." Amendments to the Fla. R. App. P., 696 So. 2d at 1104-05 (emphasis added).
37. Indeed, just recently the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that "Appeals to ... the District
Courts of Appeal are constitutionally guaranteed rights in this State. This being true, it is
fundamental that statutes or rules regulating the exercise of such rights should be liberally
construed in favor ofthe appealing party and in the interest of manifest justice." McFadden v.
38. Therefore, "[a] statutory condition that thwarts the litigants' legitimate appellate rights under
Article V, section 4(b)(2) also violates the access-to-courts provision." TA. Enters., 931 So. 2d
at 1018 (citation omitted). "[T]o find a violation of the right of access, it is not necessary for
[a] statute to produce a procedural hurdle which is absolutely impossible to surmount, only one
39. Applying these principles, this Court must in turn apply Rule 9.310 in a manner that is
40. Moreover, long before it was clear that there was a state constitutional right to appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court held that a requirement to post a bond to take an appeal from a
municipal to a circuit court was constitutional, only because it did not "place an unreasonable
or prohibitive burden on one seeking review by the circuit court." Austin v. Town of Oviedo,
41. Here, setting too high a bond amount would place an unreasonable and prohibitive burden on
Appellants.
42. In short, it would violate the Florida Constitution to apply Rule 9.310 in any manner.
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43. Therefore, this Court should grant a stay of execution, or in the alternative require Appellants
44. To determine whether to issue a stay to maintain the status quo during an appellate proceeding
pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.310, Florida courts have traditionally considered: "[1] the moving
party's likelihood of success on the merits, and [2] the likelihood of harm should a stay not be
granted." Sepich v. Papadoulos, 145 So. 3d 156, 157 n.6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), citing State ex.
45. Both factors weigh heavily in favor of staying execution of judgment pending appeal in this
case, and cancelling or postponing the aforementioned foreclosure auction sale pending review.
46. The reasons why Appellants are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal have been
exhaustively addressed in their post-trial motions, and Exhibit A, and there is little to be served
by repeating those points here. Rather, what is particularly relevant here is that there can be no
47. While the parties and the court may disagree about whether the District Court of Appeal's
rulings at the temporary injunction phase of this case are dispositive, there can be no serious
question that important and potentially dispositive issues in this case have "already been
significantly tested in the appellate fire," and, as a result, it is clear that Appellants' position on
48. Moreover, the wholly unprecedented magnitude of the judgment here also strongly weighs in
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Appellants Will Unquestionably Be Harmed If a Stay Is Not Granted
49. The circumstances of this case also present certain- not merely likely- "harm should a stay
50. An important consideration in applying this factor is whether the harm is "irremediable."
51. Here, the failure to grant a stay would cause irreparable harm to Appellants, insomuch as they
52. As other courts have recognized, that would amount to irreparable injury. Miami Intern. Realty
53. Finally, staying execution of judgment pending appeal would also be in the public interest, as
the current posture of this case, like many other foreclosure proceedings where a judgment is
entered without consideration of all parties' positions, is rampant in the trial courts.
54. In light thereof, this Court should grant a stay pending appeal, allowing Appellants to pursue
Respectfully Submitted,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy hereof has been furnished to Henry H. Bolz III, 121 Majorca
Ave. #200. Coral Gables, FL 33134, by mail this 2nd day of August 2017.
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