General v. Urro - 2011, Godoy, Eh 201

HON. LUIS MARIO M.
GENERAL, Commissioner, National

Police Commission, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO S.
URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee, et al. GR
191560, 29 March 2011, EN BANC
Digest by: Iris May G. Godoy, EH 201
Principle in sum:
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes

the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise
specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where
an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office
involved. The President's power to issue an acting appointment is
particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292).
FACTS:
1. 20 September 2004 - President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

(PGMA) appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting
Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian
sector.
2. 25 January 2006 - PGMA reappointed Roces as acting

NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
3. September 2007 - Roces died.
4. 21 July 2008 - PGMA appointed petitioner as acting

NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
5. 21 July 2008 - PGMA - appointed Eduardo U. Escueta

(Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and
designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
6. Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of

the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of Celia
Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM
Commissioners.
7. 5 March 2010- Urro’s appointment date; while the

appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both
dated March 8, 2010.
8. 19 March 2010 - DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-
Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate
congratulatory letters to the respondents.
9. 25 March 2010 and 27 April 2010 - respondents Urro and de

Guzman took their oath of office as NAPOLCOM
Commissioners before DILG Secretary Puno and
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez,
respectively.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro,

Constancia P. de Guzman and Eduardo U. Escueta
(collectively, the respondents) as Commissioners of
the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) is
constitutional.
SUPREME COURT’S RULING:
1. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents'

appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the
submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of
whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and
maintain this present petition — a quo warranto against
respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause
of action for quo warranto, a discussion of the
constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is
rendered completely unnecessary.
2. [In] constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to

refrain from resolving any constitutional issue "unless the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
3. Notably, the petitioner does not expressly claim that he was

issued a permanent appointment; rather, he claims that his
appointment is actually a regular appointment since R.A.
No. 6975 does not allegedly allow an appointment of a
NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an acting capacity.
4. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the

Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the
part of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
5. At the outset, the petitioner's use of terms needs some

clarification. Appointments may be classified into two: first,
as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is
made.
6. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no

confirmation from the Commission on Appointments cannot
be properly characterized as either a regular or an ad
interim appointment.
7. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioner's

acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the
functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the
NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.
8. The Rules of Court requires that an ordinary civil action

must be based on a cause of action, which is defined as an
act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of
the other which causes the latter injury.
9. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment

(and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause
of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an
acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent
revocability at any time by the appointing authority.
10. The petitioner's appointment paper is dated July 21, 2008.
From that time until he was apprised on March 22, 2010 of the
appointment of respondent Urro, the petitioner faithfully
discharged the functions of his office without expressing any
misgivings on the character of his appointment.
11. In the present case, the petitioner does not even allege that
his separation from the office amounted to an abuse of his
temporary appointment that would entitle him to the incidental
benefit of reinstatement. Under these facts, the additional
circumstance of estoppel clearly militates against the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
xxx

General v. Urro - 2011, Godoy, Eh 201

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HON. LUIS MARIO M.

GENERAL, Commissioner, National

Digest by: Iris May G. Godoy, EH 201

Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes

1. 20 September 2004 - President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

2. 25 January 2006 - PGMA reappointed Roces as acting

3. September 2007 - Roces died.

4. 21 July 2008 - PGMA appointed petitioner as acting

5. 21 July 2008 - PGMA - appointed Eduardo U. Escueta

6. Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of

7. 5 March 2010- Urro’s appointment date; while the

9. 25 March 2010 and 27 April 2010 - respondents Urro and de

1. Whether the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro,

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents'

2. [In] constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to

3. Notably, the petitioner does not expressly claim that he was

4. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the

5. At the outset, the petitioner's use of terms needs some

6. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no

7. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioner's

8. The Rules of Court requires that an ordinary civil action

9. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

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