Carman-Jardenico, Raissa Anjela

Salubo-Domugan, Sheena E.

CHOSEN TOPIC:

Annulment of marriage where consent is obtained by fraud.

Article 45 (3) of The Family Code of the Philippines states:

“(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such

party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely

cohabited with the other as husband and wife;”

Article 46 of the Family Code provides the kinds of fraud that constitute

the ground for annulment

The kinds of fraud that will give ground for annulment are as follows:

1. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party

of a crime involving moral turpitude;

2. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she

was pregnant by a man other than her husband;

3. Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature,

existing at the time of the marriage; or

4. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or

lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

 1960-1969

Palaroan vs. Anaya

G.R. No. L-19193. November 29, 19651

(Raissa Anjela C. Jardenico)

FACTS:

Appellant filed an action for the annulment of his marriage to appellee,

claiming that his consent thereto was obtained through force and intimidation

employed by said appellee, her two brothers and other relatives. The Juvenile

and Domestic Relations Court, after due trial, dismissed the complaint and

ordered appellant to pay support to appellee. No appeal having been taken

from said decision, appellee filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of

execution, which the lower court granted. Instead of appealing from the order

granting the motion for execution, appellant filed a complaint with the Court of

First.

ISSUE:

Whether Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court erred in dismissing the

complaint for the annulment of marriage?

RULING:

Appellant had no cause of action for the annulment of the aforesaid

decision. He could and should have appealed therefrom or from the order

granting the writ of execution and denying his motion for reconsideration.

1
Palaroan vs. Anaya, G.R. No. L-19193. November 29, 1965
Moreover, the fraud relied upon by appellant as ground for the annulment of

the decision is not the fraud — extrinsic — that would constitute a ground for

the annulment of the proceedings had before the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court, but the fraud that, if proven, would be a ground for the

annulment of the marriage contracted between him and appellee. If his

consent to the marriage contract was not given voluntarily, he should have

appealed from the decision dismissing his complaint.

Aquino vs. Delizo2, G.R. No. L-15853; July 27, 1960

(Raissa Anjela C. Jardenico)

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an annulment of marriage based on the ground of fraud,

it being alleged that at the date of their marriage, defendant Delizo concealed

from petitioner that fact that she was pregnant by another man. Defendant

claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and

the plaintiff. Noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the

child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and

holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not

constitute such fraud to annul a marriage. The complaint was dismissed. On

appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable

neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth. On the

theory, it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual

intercourse during their engagement so the child could be their own, and

2
Aquino vs. Delizo, G.R. No. L-15853; July 27, 1960
finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect that

defendant was pregnant when he married her. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the annulment of

marriage based on fraud?

RULING:

Yes. After going over the record of the case, the court find that the

dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained. Under the new Civil

Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she

was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is

ground for annulment of marriage. In the case at bar, the defendant wife was

alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage

to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was

readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged

by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of

pregnancy, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that

it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on

the lower part of the abdomen. If, defendant is "naturally plump", it would be

difficult to know by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of

their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true

state of affairs.

The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and

defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and

therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely

conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record.

 1970-1979

AURORA A. ANAYA vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN G.R. No. L-27930

November 26, 19703

(Sheena E. Salubo-Domugan)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December

1953. Defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7

January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and

intimidation. The judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959

dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage

and granting Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was

being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora

that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with

a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such

pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for

the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground and ask for

moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his

pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of

marriage.

3
Anaya vs. Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 197
HELD:

No. Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its

annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,

existing at the time of the marriage:

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party

afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely

cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be; This

fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or

species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:

ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to

in number 4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime

involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two

years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she

was pregnant by a man other than her husband.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity

shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of

marriage.

Romulo Tolentino vs. Helen Villanueva

GR No. L-23264, Mar 15, 19744

(Sheena E. Salubo-Domugan)

FACTS:

Petitioner Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to

Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because

immediately after the marriage, he discovered that private respondent was

pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the

marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as

immediately after the marriage celebration, Villanueva left his house and until

he discovered on January, 1962 that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu.

Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the

complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason

petitioner filed a motion to declare her in default. Respondent Judge declared

private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of the Civil Code

of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for

investigation. In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed

the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself

for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the New Civil

Code.

His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been

denied, petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of July 29, 1963

and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.

ISSUE:

4
Romulo Tolentino vs. Helen Villanueva, GR NO. L-23264, Mar 15, 1974
 Whether the annulment of marriage be pursued?

RULING:

No. Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly

prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal

separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and

direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the

prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties

exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to

prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. The prohibition expressed in

the aforecited laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of

marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern

of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital

interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions

against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated

evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the

stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the

defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract

between the parties and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear,

the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the

State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.

"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the

prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties

exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the

State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated."
 1980-1989

Donato vs. Hon. Luna

G.R. No. 53642; April 15, 1988 5

(Raissa Anjela C. Jardenico)

FACTS:

Pertaining to the facts provided, the City Fiscal of Manila filed an

information for bigamy against petitioner Donato. In a civil case, private

respondent filed for annulment of marriage with petitioner. Private respondent

entered into marriage with petitioner Donato, without knowledge that petitioner

was already married to certain Rosalinda. Petitioner answered that his second

marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and

that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by

private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the

solemnization of the second marriage, the parties had lived together and

deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a

period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit, in which the

requisite of marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the

New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the case for

bigamy contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of his second

marriage raises a prejudicial question which must first be decided before the

criminal case can proceed. Hon. Luna denied the motion to suspend the

5
Donato vs. Hon. Luna, G.R. No. 53642; April 15, 1988
proceedings for bigamy as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the

present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First

Instance should be suspended in view of the pending civil case for annulment

of marriage on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?

RULING:

No. The requisites of a prejudicial question is not applicable in the case

at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not

determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.

Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the private respondent, who filed

the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her

consent was obtained through deceit. The doctrine in Landicho vs. Relova

states that: The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages

entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial

questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the

suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be

considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it

must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one

that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his

act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his

conviction for the crime of bigamy.

 In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his

consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats,

force and intimidation.

MOISES JOCSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA

JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents

GR No. 55322, Feb 16, 19896

(Sheena E. Salubo-Domugan)

FACTS:

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents

executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly

conveyed, by sale, to her daughter, Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what

apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3)

share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these

documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties

subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only

heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are

the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete

which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. It is the position of petitioner

that since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3

were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete,"

the certificate of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E", to "J", pp. 4-9,

Records) were enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were

6
Jocson vs. CA, GR No. 55322, Feb 16, 1989
acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article

160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.

The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner. On the

other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties are conjugal properties.

RULING:

No. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that: "All property of the

marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be

proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Article 160

he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during

the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,

however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the

properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra

Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses'

coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It

is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one

already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties

under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor

but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which

explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the

latter.

1990-1999
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO

C. HERNANDEZ

G.R. 126010, December 8, 19997

(Sheena E. Salubo-Domugan)

FACTS:

In 1992, Lucita sought for the annulment of her marriage to private

respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She

alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the

suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family

and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time

engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. That after they were married, he

cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while

having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity,

private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually

transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was

irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life.

In her prayer, she asked that respondent be ordered to give support to their

children, that she be awarded the custody, that she be adjudged as the sole

owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as

well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the

conjugal home. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for

annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. It said that the circumstances on

which petitioner anchors her petition were grounds for legal separation, and

7
Hernandez vs, CA, G.R. 126010, December 8, 1999
not for annulment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial

court. It ruled that “psychological incapacity”, as a ground for declaration of

nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Also, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited

drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled

on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. Psychological incapacity" should refer to a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital

covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties

to the marriage. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning

of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality,

disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give

meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must

exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The incapacity must be

psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms

may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or

one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the

obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid

assumption thereof. Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented

to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity

to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. Thus, any doubt

should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Hernandez vs. CA

G.R. No. 126010; December 8, 19998

(Raissa Anjela C. Jardenico)

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity. Private respondent could not find a stable job so it

was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses. However,

because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's

business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees

with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. Private respondent was able to

get a job and availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the

company but private respondent consumed the entire amount for himself

within four months of his retirement. Petitioner discovered that private

respondent had relationships with different women and had an illegitimate

child. When petitioner confronted private respondent about his extra marital

relationship, he beat her up, resulting on her confinement in the hospital.

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous

conduct which resulted in private respondent contracting gonorrhea and

infecting petitioner. Petitioner sent a hand written letter to private responden

but did not reply. Private respondent left for Middle East abandoning the

petitioner and their children. The trial court dismissed the petition for

annulment of marriage. The Court states that claim of "psychologically

8
Hernandez vs. CA, G.R. No. 126010; December 8, 1999#
incapacitated" are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for

the grant of legal separation and not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of

marriages. CA dismissed the appeal of petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled

on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we held: "Psychological incapacity" should

refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to

be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be

assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so

expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to

live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine

the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability

to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition

must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently

envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouses to have sexual

relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the

Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial

declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of

psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party

being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,

homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable

pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,

lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they

become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family

Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude

the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending

on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every

circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other

conditions of the incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and

evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily

decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and

persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even

desirable.

2000-2020

Almelor vs. Hon. Regional Trial Court

G.R. No. 179620. August 26, 2008 9

(Raissa Anjela C. Jardenico)

Facts:

Leonida filed a petition to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was

psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida

asserted his concealment to her of his homosexuality. It was confirmed when

she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. Manuel countered that the

9
Almelor vs. Hon. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 179620. August 26, 2008
true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. To

corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus

further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw

Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. The

RTC granted the petition for annulment. Manuel filed a notice of appeal which

was, however, denied due course. etitioner Manuel takes the present

recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the errors of CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in its decision declaring the marriage as null and void?

RULING:

Yes. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the

allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to

Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public

perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of

witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it

against his sexuality. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to

substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he

concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court

considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the

corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities

and interpreted it against his sexuality.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower

court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The
law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party

was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in

the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel

was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid

such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not

homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such

concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in

giving consent to the marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid

marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of

vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family

Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud.

Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.

Villanueva vs CA

Gr. No. 132955; October 27, 2006

(Sheena E. Salubo-Domugan)

Facts:

Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage with

Lilia alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying her

who was already pregnant. He cited several incidents that created on his

mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger

to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers

as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University

of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain
Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant

claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her

home province of Palawan to marry her. Orlando also alleged that he never

cohabited with Lilia after the marriage.

Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and

voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a

month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned

to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that

petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son

being born prematurely.

Issues:

May the subject marriage be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent?

RULING:

No. Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court is

not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so

overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of

marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed,

appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that

time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of

self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of

harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear

upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the

security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those
who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his

predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

FINDINGS:

Cases Supreme Court Rulings

Palaroan The fraud relied upon by appellant as ground for the annulment

vs. Anaya of the decision is not the fraud (extrinsic) that would constitute a

ground for the annulment of the proceedings had before the

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, but the fraud that, if

proven, would be a ground for the annulment of the marriage

contracted between him and appellee. If his consent to the

marriage contract was not given voluntarily, he should have

appealed from the decision dismissing his complaint.

Aquino vs. The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the

Delizo marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband

constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.

Tolentino The prohibition against annulling a marriage by non-appearance

vs. of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a

Villanueva mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when

the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct

the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to

preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.

Anaya vs. The concealment of his previous relationship does not constitute

Palaroan fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage

as it is not one of the enumerated circumstances of fraud under

Art 46 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Donato vs. The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case

Hon. Luna at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and

Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the

second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt

or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was

petitioner's second wife, private respondent, who filed the

complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground

that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Hernandez The Court stated that claim of "psychologically incapacitated"

vs. CA are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the

grant of legal separation and not as grounds for a declaration of

nullity of marriages. Furthermore, the Court did not grant relief in

favor of the petitioner under Article 46 (3) of the Family Code of

the Philippines which states that “concealment of a sexually

transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the

time of the marriage”, as there is no dispute that the "gonorrhea"

transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred five (5)

years after their marriage was celebrated. The provisions of

Article 46, (3) should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, (3)
 of the same code, and a careful reading of the two provisions

would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of

the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of

petitioner's marriage on this ground cannot be legally accepted

by the Court.

Almelor vs. No sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations

RTC that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to

Leonida at the time of their marriage. Even assuming that

Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as

a ground to annul the marriage. The law is clear, a marriage

may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained

by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. It was not

proved by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a

homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately

hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality,

and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the

innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and

intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the

marriage.

Villanueva Appellant invokes fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made

vs. CA to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child

when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not

have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an

 erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at

worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to

copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before

the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the

appelle. He also narrated that sometime in January 1988, he

and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was

consummated, with the defendant on top". Appellant failed to

provide proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife.

FURTHER EXPLANATION:

Are there changes in how the Supreme Court decided the cases?

Answer: No

If so, what are these changes?

Answer: None as per the case digests above.

If the Supreme Court was consistent in its decisions,

What are the reasons for this?

We believed that the Supreme Court was consistent in its decisions in

because they are very keen and capable to construe the laws provided in the

Family Code of the Philippines. The Supreme Court follows the strict

implementation of the laws provided. Article 45, paragraph (3) and Article 46

of The Family Code provides the causes and circumstances which shall

constitute fraud as a ground for the annulment of marriage. Both provisions

should be analyzed in conjunction, and the provision under Art. 45, paragraph

(3) of the Family Code clearly indicates the word “consent of either party”.

Such “consent” is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid,

consent must be freely given by both parties and an allegation of vitiated

consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. It would be noted that

marriage involving fraud, without which, the other party would not have

married the other is a clear indication of vitiated consent.

Having a case where the petitioner misinterpreted the law or used

inappropriate grounds of fraud that constitute the ground for annulment can

be the reason for the dismissal of the case. In Hernandez vs. CA, the Court

stated that claim of "psychologically incapacitated" are among the grounds

cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation and not as

grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages.

In addition to that, Supreme Court was consistent in its decisions

because of lack of evidence. The court dismisses any action when there is no

enough evidence to prove the claim of the petitioner. In Donato vs. Hon. Luna,

the Supreme Court dismissed the case since the petitioner has not even

sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained

by the use of threats, force, and intimidation.

In cases when the grounds used for the action are misinterpreted, it will

also result in the dismissal of the case. AURORA A. ANAYA vs. FERNANDO

O. PALAROAN, Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with

another woman does not constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further

excluded by the last paragraph of the article that "no other misrepresentation

or deceit as to … chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

Therefore, when the law is clear, it is applied strictly by the Supreme Court. In

other words, they are very vigilant and kin in interpreting and applying the law

to cases.

REFERENCES:

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1987/07/06/executive-order-no-209-s-1

987/

http://www.gtalawphil.com/Philippine%20Annulment%20101_1.htm

www.lawphil.com

www.cdasia.com